Courts and Tribunals Bill (Third sitting)
(1 day, 11 hours ago)
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The Chair
We are now sitting in public and the proceedings are being broadcast. Before we begin, I remind Members to switch electronic devices to silent, and that tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings.
We now begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room and on the parliamentary website. It shows how the clauses, schedules and selected amendments have been grouped together for debate. A Member who has put their name to the lead amendment in a group is called to speak first. For debates on clause stand part, the Minister will be called first. Other Members are then free to indicate that they wish to speak in the debate by bobbing. Please bob on each occasion on which you wish to speak during proceedings.
At the end of a debate on a group of amendments and new clauses, I shall call the Member who moved the lead amendment or new clause again. Before they sit down, they will need to indicate whether they wish to withdraw the amendment or new clause, or to seek a decision. If any Member wishes to press to a vote any other amendment in the group, including grouped new clauses, that is at the Chair’s discretion. My fellow Chairs and I shall use our discretion to decide whether to allow a separate stand part debate on individual clauses following the debates on relevant amendments.
I remind Members that decisions take place in the order the provisions appear in the Bill. This means that some amendments may be divided on considerably later than the point at which they are debated. I hope that explanation is helpful.
Clause 1
Removal of right to elect trial on indictment
Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)
I beg to move amendment 38, in clause 1, page 3, lines 20, at end insert—
“, but see subsection (10).
(10) Notwithstanding the preceding subsections, the accused may elect to be tried on indictment if he demonstrates to the court that the circumstances of his case are such that to be tried on summary would amount to a breach of the principles of natural justice.”
Dr Mullan
It is a pleasure to have you with us, Ms Jardine, and I look forward to this first of many Committee sittings. I am pleased to begin line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill, beginning with clause 1 and the Opposition amendment tabled in my name.
The clause is a helpful place to start our considerations because it cuts straight to the core of our concerns and criticisms, many of which are similar and run through our opposition to many of the other clauses. The clause will amend subsections (2) and (9) of section 20 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 to remove the requirement for the defendant to consent to their case remaining in the magistrates court for summary trial. In effect, that will remove the ability of a defendant charged with an either-way offence to elect trial by jury in the Crown court.
This is one of the key changes that add up to reforms that represent an unprecedented erosion of our right to trial by jury, which is, without doubt, one of our oldest and most important traditions. It has been with us for hundreds and hundreds of years, bordering on the amount of time one might typically consider to make it an ancient right, as some people refer to it.
No wonder that right has become so valuable when we compare it to what went before. For about 500 years before the beginnings of what became the jury trial system, we had trial by ordeal. Guilt was determined by God through his unseen hand in the outcome of events, unrelated to considering in any way what happened or what we might consider evidence. The two main forms this took were trial by fire and trial by water. For trial by fire, the accused had to carry a red-hot iron bar and walk 9 feet. If the wound healed within three days, they were innocent, but if it festered, they were guilty.
For trial by water, the accused was plunged into a pool of water on a rope with a knot tied in it a long hair’s length away from the defendant. If they sank to the depth of that knot, the water was deemed to have been accepting of them and their innocence, but if they floated, the water was rejecting them, rendering them guilty. There was of course also trial by combat, or wager of battle, a fight between the accused and the accuser, which was introduced by the Normans in 1066.
Although they were invested in the wisdom of God and the Church, it was actually the gradual withdrawal and ultimate banning of the participation of the Church that brought an end to such practices. But that is not to say that even within those practices there was not some sense of allowing the views of others to play a role. Dr Will Eves, a research fellow at the University of St Andrews’ school of history, said that the key to the ordeal was the interpretation of the result. The community would probably have had some idea whether someone had actually committed the crime and would interpret accordingly. He said:
“In trial by hot iron, the issue wasn’t if the iron had caused a wound but rather how it had healed. So that’s a much more nuanced issue, much more open to interpretation. Whether the wound was festering was a judgment which could be influenced by the community’s knowledge of the individual involved and their awareness of the broader circumstances of the case.”
The wider involvement of the community then took the form of testaments to character, rather than a careful examination of the facts, as a basis for determining guilt.
On 26 January 1219, King Henry III issued an edict, and trial by petty jury was born in England, but it was its precursor that introduced the idea of 12 individuals that is still with us today. In 997, King Æthelred issued the Wantage code, which determined that 12 noblemen—of course, it was just men—be tasked with the investigation of a crime. It is an extraordinary testament to the legacy and enduring nature of such proposals that a core element of that kernel of an idea, with 12 individuals at the heart of the system, remains more than 1,000 years later.
Prior to the petty jury reforms, there were other forms of jury—for example, to investigate land disputes—but guilt was still determined by trial by ordeal. The reforms made by King Henry III are rightly considered one of our most important cultural, and we might even say civilisational, inheritances. The concept and approach has, in some form, been spread around the world to more than 50 countries. In 1956, the legal philosopher Patrick Devlin said:
“For of all the institutions that have been created by English law, there is none other that has a better claim to be called…the privilege of the Common People of the United Kingdom”.
Committee members may have noted that the 1219 edict came after the often quoted Magna Carta declaration of 1215. That declaration was a precursor to the fundamental idea behind what became jury trials and the 1219 edict: the idea that the judgment of an individual should be made by their peers. The barons had in mind the importance of protecting people from the heavy hand of the King, but their instincts are reflected neatly in all those who now have concerns about the power of the state in all its forms, including the judicial system that collectively holds the power that then sat with the King. The Bill asks us to consider reforms to ideals and protections hard fought and won for us, for very good reason, many hundreds of years ago. That fact alone should give us reason to tread carefully.
Of course, as we have heard in earlier debates and the Committee’s evidence sessions, the use of jury trials is not absolute. The form a jury trial takes varies across the countries that adopted it, and our system has undergone reform. It is fair to say that the debate is not absolute or black and white. The majority of criminal cases in this country are decided by magistrates, whose role and importance were solidified in the modern era by the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1952 and the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980. Although the Government and their supporters might say it, we are not arguing that we should turn back the clock, or that all those currently seen by magistrates should be seen by jury trials instead, but let us consider the nature and manner of the reforms made in the modern era that remain in place today.
Changes were made during world war two. At a time when our nation faced one of its greatest threats, when our continued existence as a free state was uncertain and when every effort was turned toward winning the war, what did we do? Did we radically cut down on jury trials? No. The number of jury trials and what cases would or would not be considered by them remained completely unchanged. The change was made to the number of jurors, which was reduced from 12 to seven. What did the Government of the day do as soon as the Nazi threat was defeated? They put it back up to 12.
In more recent memory we had the covid pandemic, a challenge sometimes equated in seriousness to world war two. When every aspect of our society, public life and freedoms were massively curtailed in a way that was completely unprecedented, did we permanently get rid of jury trials? No. There was cross-party consensus that we should do everything we could to maintain jury trials. We invested millions of pounds in Nightingale courts, alongside other measures, to allow jury trials to continue as soon as they could, without making any permanent change to the law and individuals’ right to access jury trials.
Labour Members will no doubt point to the changes on triable either-way offences, similar to the proposals in clause 1, that were made in the 1980s, but done differently, via offence reclassification. The changes covered common assault where no one was injured, joyriding and lower-level criminal damage, and research shows that they led to a 5% drop in the number of cases that headed to the Crown court. These are questions of gradation, and the reforms in the Bill are unprecedented in their impact and completely incomparable with those changes. The Government’s own analysis says that they will result in a halving of the number of jury trials.
Who else might we turn to in support of our view that labelling the erosion of a right as a reform and realigning the dial further and further away from where we are now cannot be seen as a minor act? We can turn to many members of the Government, and the Prime Minister himself, to support our view. On limiting jury trials, the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. Member for Rother Valley (Jake Richards) said:
“Instead of weakening a key constitutional right, the government should do the hard work.”
The Justice Secretary said:
“The right of an individual to be punished only as a result of the “lawful judgement of his equals” was enshrined in Magna Carta of 1215. Yes, this right only extended to a certain group of men, but it laid the foundation of a principle which is now fundamental to the justice system of England and Wales.”
He also said:
“Jury trials are fundamental to our democracy. We must protect them.”
Finally, he said:
“Jury trials are a fundamental part of our democratic settlement. Criminal trials without juries are a bad idea.”
That is what the Deputy Prime Minister, Justice Secretary and lead proponent of the reforms has said.
Finally the Prime Minister has said that the
“general and overriding presumption should be jury trial, with very, very limited exceptions”,
and that
“The right to trial by jury is an important factor in the delicate balance between the power of the state and the freedom of the individual. The further it is restricted, the greater the imbalance.”
There we have it. They all understood that these are questions of balance. The Government are simply on the wrong side of that balance with the reforms in the Bill, including clause 1. That is not just because of the scale and gravity of the changes, but because of the other ways forward and other approaches, as yet untested but available to them.
The Opposition’s approach in Committee, on this clause and others, is therefore straightforward. We will test whether the Government have correctly diagnosed the problem, whether the evidence supports the proposed solution, whether the safeguards being removed are proportionate to the gains claimed, and whether other options are available. Those are the fundamental questions. Of course, we will not forget that, despite everything else Government Members said previously, the reforms were born of necessity and that the Minister believes they are positive improvements to our justice system regardless.
The Government have estimated that clause 1 and other clauses will reduce Crown court sitting days by 27,000 a year while increasing magistrates court sitting days by 8,500. They think the provisions will reduce the open Crown court caseload by around 14,000 cases, and cost £338 million between 2024-25 and 2034-35. However, several stakeholders have criticised the assumptions and models that the Government used to produce the estimates, particularly in respect of how much time jury-only trials would save.
Cassia Rowland of the Institute for Government has said that the total impact of the Government’s proposals on court demand is
“likely to be around a 7-10% reduction in total time taken in the courtroom”.
She therefore considered that improving court efficiency,
“an alternative which enjoys broad support across the sector and which could begin much faster”,
provided “opportunities for meaningful improvements”. She said that implementing such efficiencies
“alongside more moderate proposals to handle some more cases in magistrates’ courts…would be less likely to provoke backlash.”
I could not agree with her more.
The Criminal Bar Association has criticised the “over-optimism” of the impact assessment, describing the Government statement that the Bill would only increase magistrates court demand by 8,500 days as “astonishing”. It says:
“The assumptions are that magistrates will complete each of these trials within four hours and guilty pleas/sentences within 30 minutes. Is there is an expectation that magistrates will be dispensing rough justice when they have these more complex, more serious cases allocated to them? Or are the assumptions in the Impact Assessment simply wrong?”
I think they are. Let us be clear: the Government would have us believe that 27,000 crown court sitting days can simply be converted into just 8,500 magistrates sitting days.
Clause 1 represents a fundamental shift in the balance between the citizen and the state. At present, a defendant in an either-way case has the right to elect trial by jury. The clause removes that right entirely, with the decision resting solely with the magistrates court, depending on likely sentence length. We object to the clause in its entirety, but we have also sought to put forward meaningful changes through amendment 38, which would simply allow the defendant to demonstrate that, in the particular circumstances of their case, trial without a jury would breach the principles of natural justice.
What current examples of violations of natural justice do we envision and hope this safeguard can protect against? Let us consider two theoretical cases of offenders, both facing trial for theft. This may be an opportune moment to point out that some of the examples used by Government Members to demonstrate the irrationality of Crown court time being frequently taken up by theft offences betray a lack of understanding of what happens in terms of the likely disposals in such cases. Nevertheless, as it seems such a popular example, I am happy to use it.
In the first example, we have an accused who has never been in trouble with the law before. He or she has a clean record and the offence was not aggravated in any way. In fact, he or she gives an account of a misunderstanding. No harm came to the victim, and the value of the goods they are said to have stolen was considered to be medium—between £500 and £10,000. But the impact of a guilty finding on his or her life would be enormous, because the accused is a practising solicitor. It would almost certainly lead to the loss of their employment and significant damage to their reputation.
The sentencing guidelines suggest that if the accused is found guilty, they might expect just over a year in prison. They are determined to have their case heard by a jury, because they believe their account of events would be believed by a jury, but under clause 1 as it stands, that would be denied them. Because they are clear of their innocence, they will not take a police caution, an out of court disposal, or make an early guilty plea.
Let us consider another accused. They are very far from being a person with a clean record. They have been convicted of multiple offences of theft, and other offences alongside those in the past—for example, criminal damage and common assault. They have been convicted of theft more than a dozen times. Those of us who have had an interest in criminal justice for some time will know that those sorts of offenders regularly appear before the courts.
The accusation the second person faces is of another order of seriousness. They are accused of having stolen a piece of jewellery worth more than £100,000. In fact, the loss of that item led to the collapse of a small business, as the owner was an elderly lone female, who is now living in constant fear and simply cannot face customers again. She trusted the accused on their visit to the business, and does not feel that she can trust anyone else. The accused faces up to six years in custody, so they will retain their right to a jury trial. They have no reputation to lose as a serial and convicted offender, and no employment to lose either.
Alex McIntyre (Gloucester) (Lab)
The shadow Minister is making an articulate argument about how the criminal justice system might deal differently with different types of offenders, but would he not agree that someone’s background should not determine their guilt? They have either done it or they have not. Actually, someone’s good character and previous clean record is taken into account at sentencing. Will the shadow Minister remind the Committee how sentencing is dealt with in the Crown court—is it by jury or by a judge sitting alone?
Dr Mullan
The hon. Gentleman’s question articulates the gap between what the Opposition and the Government think about these issues. Actually, for a case like the first example, the sentence passed will be almost irrelevant to the person. If they are found guilty and convicted of an offence, they will suffer all the consequences that I have talked about whatever sentence they are given. Such consequences do not exist for the individual in the second example; they do not have employment or a reputation to lose.
The Government also often portray the assumption that people are guilty—if they are accused, they are guilty. The whole point of the jury trial system is to allow what we have all agreed, at some point and in some ways, is the fairest and most balanced way to determine guilt. The Justice Secretary himself has talked in detail about how it is the fairest way to determine guilt. When someone’s decision is going to have huge consequences for the accused’s life, it is perfectly reasonable for people to want the fairest mode of determining that guilt.
Linsey Farnsworth (Amber Valley) (Lab)
Is the hon. Gentleman saying two different things? At the start, I heard him say that we have fairness across the whole criminal justice system, but he seems now to be suggesting that magistrates court trials are inferior and less fair. Is that the position of the Opposition?
Dr Mullan
As I said, it is actually the position of the Justice Secretary, in his own report, where he said that the fairest and most balanced element of the justice system is jury trials. If the hon. Member thinks it is odd for me to hold that view, perhaps she should have a conversation with the Justice Secretary.
Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)
Does my hon. Friend agree that the question the hon. Member for Gloucester asked shows the crux of one of the issues? He used the term “offender” to describe someone where a verdict has not yet been reached, but they are the defendant. Is the assumption of innocence before guilt is proven not a key principle we should be fighting for?
Dr Mullan
Absolutely. I have been very careful in writing my speech to not say that and to be clear about that. Again, when we have had debates about people causing the backlog and holding up justice for other victims, there is an inherent assumption that everybody who has been accused is guilty. Of course, we know that is not the case.
As I said, Members should think about the two cases I cited and decide whether it would be fair and just for the individual who has so much more to lose to lose their ability to seek the mode of trial that we have articulated—the mode that Members of the Government are articulating is the fairest way of deciding things—when the person with the repeat record, who does not have a reputation or job to lose, gets to continue doing all the things that the Government have said are wrong, such as holding up trials in other, more serious cases.
Members who have read ahead may think that there is some overlap between our amendment and the way in which I have articulated it and amendment 24, tabled in the name of the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden, and they would be right. Our thinking is the same. Our intention and the issues we are trying to elucidate are the same. Of course, we know that we are joined politically in our views on this issue, not by the Ministers in their former articulation of what is important to them, but by 37 Labour MPs who signed a letter in opposition to the erosion of our jury trial rights by clause 1 and other similar clauses. I will name just a few of them: the Mother of the House and the hon. Members for Leeds East (Richard Burgon), for Walthamstow (Ms Creasy), for Liverpool Riverside (Kim Johnson), for Salford (Rebecca Long Bailey), for Liverpool Wavertree (Paula Barker) and for Norwich North (Alice Macdonald). They are very far away from me on the political spectrum—some of them could not be further away—but, along with their other colleagues, they are clear that the proposals are wrong, and I wholeheartedly agree with them on that.
Those Members—Labour Members—rightly say that these proposals are “madness” and will cause more problems than they solve and that the public will not stand for this erosion of a fundamental right, particularly given that there are numerous other things that the Government can do more effectively to reduce the backlog. I guess that where there are 37 Labour MPs willing to put their name to a letter, there are many more concerned in private, and I am sure that various Members were allowed to be absent from the estate for some of our earlier votes.
I ask Government Members to think about their colleagues and the difficult position that they will put them in if clause 1 and associated clauses are passed. The Government have quite simply failed to articulate why these proposals are the only way forward. The Government might have received a more sympathetic reception had they truly exhausted all the other options—if they had stretched every sinew since their election to tackle this issue.
Rebecca Paul
The removal of the cap on sitting days appears to be bringing the backlog down, which I think everyone in the Chamber can agree is a good thing. Why are the Government not looking at that, projecting it forward and taking that into account before making radical changes that remove rights of citizens?
Dr Mullan
It seems that my hon. Friend has been reading the same reports from the Criminal Bar Association as I have. They were reported in the press last weekend or the weekend before, I think, and identified a number of regions, according to their analysis, where the backlogs were coming down as a result of the changes that were already being made.
Let us be clear, we are sympathetic to every single victim who is waiting longer than they should for a jury trial. As the Minister kindly accepted in the evidence sessions, it would be totally wrong to say that those of us across all the elements of the political spectrum who oppose the changes do so with any kind of disregard or lack of sympathy or care for victims and what they are going through. Some of the ways in which those long waits have been articulated and framed as caused by jury trials is not helpful, because less than 10% of drop-outs occur post charge. That figure is coming down this year, so the number of people who are dropping out post charge is reducing.
Rebecca Paul
Would the shadow Minister also be interested to understand the impact of the three-year suspension on sentences that went live just a few weeks ago on the projections going forward and on the impact on the Crown court backlog?
Dr Mullan
Indeed. I hope that the Minister can start to address the figures from the Criminal Bar Association, in particular, and to articulate whether she agrees or disagrees with them. If she disagrees, why? As the Criminal Bar Association makes clear, if the Government had sight of that data—they would have known ahead of the Committee’s evidence sessions, and potentially some of the earlier stages of the Bill, that those figures were coming down—why did they choose not to make such potentially important information available to those of us considering the Bill? It is not helpful for Members to quote waits of four or five years for people to get to trial when, in fact, those figures can relate to the delay between the alleged offence and sentencing. Yes, waits for trial from the point of charge are too long, but that is just part of the picture.
Of course, the obvious weakness in the Government’s arguments that this is a measure to tackle what we should all consider to be a temporary problem—getting back to our historical court waiting times—is that these measures are permanent, without any plan to reverse them when the backlog is down to pre-pandemic levels. As I have said, we have precedent for that. During world war two, when we made changes to the number of people sitting on juries, we reversed those changes when the crisis was resolved.
The Government have announced an intention to recruit and train a further 2,000 magistrates in the next financial year. That is welcome, but recruiting and training magistrates takes time, and, in fact, the delays in the magistrates courts themselves loom over us. On the other hand, the Bar Council rightly points out how many barristers have left the profession. Those are trained, ready-to-go professionals, choosing not to practise criminal law, who could quite easily return to criminal practice, compared with having to train a magistrate from scratch.
What is missing from the Government’s approach is any serious attempt to make the most of the capacity that we already have. Court sitting days are still being wasted. Yesterday alone, 58 out of 515 Crown courtrooms sat empty—that is 11%. I am sure that, as we go through the day and proceedings move forward, we will get the figures for today. I imagine that those will be in line with every other day that the Idle Courts X account, which I think those of us following this debate have become great admirers of, shows day in, day out: Crown courtrooms sitting empty.
Trials also still collapse due to basic administrative failures. None of the problems are solved by curtailing the right to elect. As I have said, only a few years ago the Justice Secretary described jury trials as fundamental to our democracy—a sentiment that every Member of this House must share—yet now, in office, he appears willing to curtail them in the name of expediency.
This proposal also was not in the Labour manifesto at the election. A change of this nature—an unprecedented erosion of a fundamental right that we have all enjoyed for hundreds and hundreds of years—was not in that manifesto. I think that makes it extremely difficult for the Government to insist, particularly in the Lords, where I am sure very many Members will have serious concerns, that they have any kind of democratic mandate to push through these reforms.
Of course, we have been here before. In what will come as little surprise to many Members, just as with Labour’s current proposals to fatally weaken the punitive elements of our justice system by letting serious violent and sexual offenders out of prison earlier, Jack Straw, the then Justice Secretary, also proposed removing the right to a jury trial in either-way offences when Labour was last in office. As is the case today, Members across the House and stakeholders fought against, and successfully defeated, those proposals.
We can therefore do away with the pretence that this is entirely the workings of an independent figure in Sir Brian Leveson. Although I have no doubt that he came to his conclusions independently, I imagine that those old proposals had been sat in the Ministry of Justice, waiting for the right Minister for civil servants to press this idea on, and they found that in our Justice Secretary and our Prime Minister.
We would be right to fear that it is the thin end of the wedge. Often such arguments are hypothetical: we say, “Well, we think this is the thin end of the wedge; some future Government or future Minister will want to go further.” Thanks to the plans being leaked, we know what the current Justice Secretary wanted to do. He wanted to go much further than even the proposals we see before us by removing jury trials for offences carrying sentences of up to five years—five years! Where will the Government go next if they succeed with these proposals?
Sir Brian Leveson’s review made clear that the estimate of a 20% reduction in trial times is subject to what he described as “very high levels of uncertainty”. That uncertainty reads across to the other measures, including clause 1, which we are considering today. He said that it was very important that the Government undertook further detailed analysis before moving ahead with those proposals. When I put that to him during evidence, he simply said—I am paraphrasing but I think it is a fair and accurate description—that that is now a matter for the Government, and he was not willing to be drawn on whether they had actually done that further detailed analysis.
I brought up the main additional piece of analysis that the Ministry undertook, which was a stakeholder engagement exercise—not a typical one that seeks to measure and come up with firm outcomes. It found that the time saving was between 10% and 30%, so there is a huge variation in what the Government may or may not achieve, and, fundamentally, it is potentially very different from what even Sir Brian recommended.
Jury trials are not an obstacle to justice; they are a safeguard against its abuse. They ensure that the most serious power that the state holds—the power to convict and imprison—is exercised, where possible, with the consent and involvement of the public. If we allow that safeguard to be weakened, we should not be surprised when public trust in the justice system continues to erode. The answer to a justice system in crisis is not to strip away centuries-old protections; it is to make the system work as it should. That is why the proposals are wrong and should be opposed.
If the Government are serious about reducing backlogs, there are obvious steps they could take that do not involve weakening constitutional safeguards. I will come back to those at further stages, but I draw Members’ attention to the evidence given by the operations director in His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service—the civil servant in charge of making our courts run more smoothly, efficiently and productively. I asked him what he thought were the priorities for bringing down the Crown court backlog. He mentioned lifting the cap on sitting days. He welcomed that and said it made a big difference. The other examples he gave were improvements to prison transport and to listing. None of those priorities had anything to do with jury trials. The man charged with making our system run more efficiently, when asked to list his key priorities, did not say anything to do with jury trials in his first four points. As I have said, a second report from Sir Brian goes through a whole range of measures that will improve the efficiency and productivity of our courts. We have some further amendments for later stages to tease out some of those, and I look forward to considering them.
Let us be clear. The burden on this Government is extremely high, as it should be, to make the case for unprecedented changes to halve the number of individuals able to have a jury trial. The Government could have spent time—two or three years—hammering the uncontroversial things that have political consensus and are able to make a difference. They could have looked at Liverpool Crown court, which does not have a historical backlog. As Sir Brian said in his evidence, to some extent, every court has a backlog of cases waiting to be heard, which is helpful for managing those cases, but there are normal levels of waiting time that are accepted without people having to go back to the judge and ask for more time.
As I understand it, the Minister has not visited Liverpool Crown court in the last 12 to 18 months. She can correct me if I am wrong. I do not think the Deputy Prime Minister has visited Liverpool Crown court either.
The Minister for Courts and Legal Services (Sarah Sackman)
I have visited lots and lots of courts.
Dr Mullan
Indeed, but, as I said, I do not think the Minister has actually visited the court that is most successfully managing and dealing with these issues, which is somewhat odd. I would have been visiting that court and trying to understand and replicate, in detail, every single thing that it does. If, in the end, the Government had found something that made the difference we all want, there could have been a different conversation, but they chose not to do that.
As I put to the Minister during our evidence sessions, politicians and Departments have only so much capacity and political attention, and only so much they can do with their time. Instead of investing that time, energy and attention into the detailed work of doing things better and improving the system, the Government are embarking on a reform programme that I suspect will end up overwhelming the Minister’s time. It will be a huge distraction from the very hard and detailed work that she needs to lead. I accept that she will try her absolute best to continue to deliver across the spectrum, but the political reality will be very different.
We oppose clause 1. We tabled an amendment that would, to some extent, limit the damage that it does, but we are clear that it should not proceed at all. The Government have completely failed to articulate robustly, and with clear, reliable data, the impact that it will have. They have not answered the very many criticisms put forward by those practising in the system every day about what will have an impact, and they have not secured the Opposition’s support for the curtailment and erosion of a fundamental right that has been with us for hundreds of years.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
It is great to see you in the Chair today, Ms Jardine. I oppose clause 1 and its many implications for justice. It takes away the defendant’s right to elect a trial by jury for all either-way offences, which, according to the Bill’s impact assessment, will reduce jury trials by half. That is no minor thing, and I agree with the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle that clause 1 must be removed from the Bill, as well as clauses 2 to 7, which we will debate later.
Compared with the removal of half of jury trials, there would be a highly contested and—in the Government’s own estimates—much smaller impact on efficiency in the courts. There is also the potential for the workload in the magistrates court and the Crown court to increase beyond what is estimated. As Emma Torr from APPEAL highlighted during our oral evidence session, this will include new allocation processes and new multi-step processes for considering appeals, and the need for judges to spend time outlining reasons for their decisions, which juries do not have to do. The chair of the Bar Council of England and Wales also told us about the impact on confidence in the system, stating:
“Overall, the jury system is seen as the only part that still works, so why are we focusing on that? We want to focus on all those aspects that will reduce delays now, rather than hacking at a constitutional cornerstone, which also reflects community participation.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 40, Q72.]
This cutback in jury trials is not the measure promised to victims of sexual and domestic violence in the Labour manifesto, and later we will consider amendments that would what was promised. This cut is not a measure that will, under the current system, help victims through more compassionate and better trained court processes, or by improving outdated buildings where they currently risk contact with their abusers. The lack of legal support for magistrates court processes could, as we heard from the head of JUSTICE, lead to more victims being cross-examined by their own abusers.
We heard clearly from the leaders of the circuits that those working in criminal justice day in, day out have not yet been able to employ the real efficiencies that could come with more investment and innovation, and that would bring down the backlog without the measures in the clause. Those include the better user of technology, more sitting days, blitz courts and improvements at the investigation stage. I believe that we must act on the backlog, but that must start with those measures and the increased investment that is needed to correct what the chair of the Bar Council told us about investment under successive Governments. She said:
“We saw a rapid cutting of MOJ funding between 2009-10 and 2022-23: it declined by 22.4%. We are about 30% below where we should be.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 41, Q75.]
The main point I want to express today is my concern about the motivation behind the choices that the Government have made in these proposals by taking up, and deviating from, the recommendations of the independent review of the criminal courts in a particular way, and about how the severe erosion of the principle of jury equity can apply to certain types of defendants and certain offences in a way that I suspect this clause is aimed at. That really eats away at a constitutional cornerstone in a truly historic way. It eats away at the principle of jury equity.
We know that jury trials are more often chosen by black and other minority defendants, and that public confidence in a jury of their peers to see through institutional biases is real. We know that defendants whose crimes have been protests, motivated by the public interest and committed to expose or impede powerful corporate or corrupt organisations and practices, also feel this way.
Tim Crosland’s oral evidence on behalf the campaign group Defend Our Juries, which was set up before this Bill was proposed in anticipation of an attack on jury trials, told us about key recent protest cases where juries have chosen acquittal and applied the principle of jury equity in practice. Those included:
“In April 2021, the Shell six, who had spray painted “Shell Lies” on Shell headquarters, were acquitted by a jury. In January 2022, the Colston four, who toppled the statue of the slave trader Edward Colston into Bristol harbour, were acquitted by a jury. In November 2022, members of Palestine Action, who had defaced Elbit Systems—suppliers of drones to the Israel Defence Forces—were acquitted by a jury. In January 2023, members of Insulate Britain were acquitted by a jury for blocking roads.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 89, Q192.]
Tim Crosland told us how the principle of jury equity is there to apply to cases of conscience in which people’s actions were motivated by the public interest. He told us about the High Court’s 2024 judgment in the case of 69-year-old retired social worker Trudi Warner, who had displayed information about the principle outside a court hearing a protest case. It is worth our listening to more details of what was said in that judgment. Paragraph 16 discusses how the principle of jury equity is well established in our common law and recognised across the common law world. The judge gives several examples from Canada, New Zealand and the United States of the principle being applied. The judgment also talks about how its origins lie in Bushel’s case, from 1670, which
“arose out of the prosecution of two Quaker preachers for holding an unlawful assembly. The Recorder of London, presiding at the trial, directed the jury to convict. The jury refused. They were fined and imprisoned until payment. It was this imprisonment that the jurors successfully challenged by habeas corpus, on the basis that juries have a right to find facts and apply the law to those facts according to conscience and without reprisal.”
The judgment also quotes Lord Bingham, in another landmark judgment, on the principle’s history. He states that
“the acquittals of such high-profile defendants as Ponting, Randle and Pottle have been quite as much welcomed as resented by the public, which over many centuries has adhered tenaciously to its historic choice that decisions on the guilt of defendants charged with serious crime should rest with a jury of lay people, randomly selected, and not with professional judges.”
He added:
“I know of no other real checks that exist today upon the power of the executive.”
In my speech on Second Reading, I pointed out that a number of offences created recently to react to successful direct action protests now sit in the triable either-way category. They include, in the Public Order Act 2023, new offences about interference with key national infrastructure, including blocking roads, and specific offences about causing serious disruption by tunnelling; and, in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, the offence of causing public nuisance, which replaced a common law offence and applies a higher penalty for acts that create serious annoyance or inconvenience, such as noisy protests.
Importantly, Tim Crosland pointed out to us in his oral evidence that the choices the Government have made in how to implement this measure will serve to virtually eliminate jury equity in practice. He told us that, of the more than 200 people jailed in the past few years for peaceful protest, only one has been jailed for more than three years. In that light, it is suspicious that the Government have chosen three years as the threshold in the Bill, despite the Leveson report’s recommendation of two years. Sir Brian also recommended raising the financial threshold below which criminal damage—often how direct action protests are charged—is charged as a summary offence and kept in the magistrates court, where sentences are limited, but the Government are not raising that threshold. Sir Brian also said that restricting the right to elect for jury trial was
“contingent upon magistrates’ sentencing powers remaining at the current…12 months”,
but the Government propose powers to increase them instead. He also recommended that the new bench division should sit with a judge and two magistrates, to maintain a lay element in these Crown court cases, but the Government have chosen to ignore that, too.
As far as the recent examples of cases in which jury equity has been applied are concerned, all those deviations from the recommendations point in the same way. In the light of evidence that other measures would be more effective at backlog reduction, it therefore seems to me that at least one motivation for adopting this measure is to stop the embarrassment of jury equity. I did not get the chance to ask the Minister about this during the oral evidence, but has she discussed with colleagues, companies or other interests targeted by protesters the implications and impact of the Bill and this clause, in deviating from the Leveson recommendations in the way that it does, on the important principle of jury equity?
Finally, on Second Reading, I raised the question of whether these measures are yet another part of a package of the Government’s wider attacks on civil liberties. I have described this package as a “toolkit for tyrants” that includes
“digital ID, facial recognition surveillance on our streets and the erosion of fundamental asylum rights—all things contrary to our British values and which should not be packaged up for this or any future Government to use against minorities…and dissidents.”—[Official Report, 10 March 2026; Vol. 782, c. 249-250.]
I would like the Minister to reflect on the potential future impact of this attack on jury equity under a much worse Government.
Alex McIntyre
While we are on the subject of British values, is the Green party in Westminster’s position that criminals should go to jail? A Green party candidate in Scotland has said that they should close all the prisons in Scotland. Can she clarify the Green party’s position on that for the Committee?
Siân Berry
The Scottish Green party is a separate party from the Green party of England and Wales, so I cannot vouch for its policies. However, the Green party’s justice policies look in the round at what is effective in reducing crime, rehabilitating offenders and improving society, based on evidence. I am sure that the Scottish Green party have those principles in mind with any policy it puts forward.
That is the end of what I was planning to say, and I hope we will hear more from the Minister about the erosion of jury equity and what Tim Crosland, in relation to the Bill, called its complete elimination. This will be an important effect of what is being proposed, and it has not had enough debate as yet.
Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South and Walkden) (Lab)
Before I turn to the substance of this clause, I want to begin by setting out the perspective from which I speak. Before entering Parliament, I worked as a prosecutor for more than 14 years. During that time, I dealt with a wide range of serious cases, including sexual abuse, rape, domestic violence, historical child abuse and cases involving families and vulnerable victims.
On a daily basis, I saw at first hand the impact of the criminal justice system on victims, witnesses and their families, as well as their emotions, their concerns and the importance of ensuring that justice is done fairly and transparently. Although I have not practised in recent years, my understanding of the system remains current. I remain in regular contact with practitioners, including solicitors, barristers, members of the judiciary and colleagues in the CPS, and I continue to follow closely what is happening in both the magistrates court and the Crown court.
In addition, during my time as a shadow Justice Minister, I worked on issues relating to prisons, probation and the courts, and I have seen how changes in the system, including the increased use of technology, remote hearings and the handling of evidence, have affected the way that justice is delivered. So I speak on this Bill from a position of experience and of ongoing engagement with the criminal justice system. Colleagues will be relieved to know that I will not be repeating this preamble in any future contributions.
Let me begin by addressing what lies at the heart of this Bill: the restriction of jury trials. Trial by jury is not a procedural detail; it is one of the most fundamental safeguards in our justice system. It reflects the simple but powerful principle that when the state seeks to take away a person’s liberty, that decision should not rest with the state alone, but with ordinary citizens—a jury of their peers.
That principle has a deep constitutional root—from Bushel’s case in 1670, which established the independence of juries, to its role across the common law world, trial by jury has long stood as a protection against arbitrary power. That is not just a feature of our legal system, but a principle reflected across the common law jurisdiction and a recognition that justice must be seen to be done and must not rely solely on the state. It is also one of the reasons that the public has confidence in our system.
The proposal in clause 1 to remove the right to elect a jury trial is not a trivial matter. It covers offences such as theft, fraud and stalking that carry real-life consequences, including custodial sentences, reputational harm and long-term impacts on people’s lives. The Government argue that the measure is necessary to deal with the delay in the system. I have great sympathy with the Government about the massive delay in the court system but, respectfully, jury trials are not causing that delay.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
If the situation the courts find themselves in is so obviously caused by the previous Government, why on earth is the hon. Member’s Government scrapping jury trials as a response?
Yasmin Qureshi
The restriction on some cases not being tried in jury trials is because the Government feel that that will help to bring down the delay in court listing. I say to the Government that the problem is not the jury system, but the fact that other provisions need to be made sufficient. I am afraid that the problem was 14 years of Conservative cuts—I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman was a Member then. The Conservative Government did not take the Ministry of Justice seriously. There was a Lord Chancellor virtually every year—in 14 years, I think we had 10 Lord Chancellors, which tells us how important the criminal justice system was to the now Opposition.
To go back to my point about clause 1, and all the other clauses that follow, I urge my colleagues and the Minister to please rethink this whole thing. Juries are not the cause of the delay in our system.
Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)
I will speak about the Liberal Democrats’ opposition to clause 1. The main reason why clause 1 should not be included in the Bill is that it fundamentally transforms the relationships that defendants have with the justice system. It is really important to make it clear that we are talking about defendants who have entered a not guilty plea, rather than the language that has been used this morning.
In particular, clause 1 removes the defendant’s ability to object to summary trial in the magistrates court—a process that is streamlined for swift justice and should be reserved for less serious cases. In his independent review of the criminal courts, Sir Brian Leveson recommended removing the right to elect a Crown court trial for certain low-level either-way offences that carry a maximum sentence length of two years or less. The Bill would remove the right to elect Crown court trial for all either-way offences. Concerns have been raised publicly about that, including the quality of justice, the capacity of the magistrates court and the fairness of applying this retrospectively.
Magistrates courts also face an increasing backlog, which is currently at 379,000 cases. That is a 17% increase on the previous year, alongside a huge drop in the number of magistrates over the past 20 years—from 28,300 to now 14,600. I am very aware that the Government are embarking on a journey to try to bring more magistrates into the system, but as they increase the number of magistrates, there are also magistrates leaving the system, so it is a real struggle to increase the number.
Removing the power of defendants to elect will increase the workload of the magistrates court, and the system will struggle to absorb that. Many in the legal profession have made that point. It would also be unfair to apply this change retrospectively. Consent is the appropriate basis for the most serious cases to be tried within a summary process. Changing the provision for more serious offences—to be clear, we are talking about things like possession with intent to supply, unlawful wounding and sexual assault—risks miscarriages of justice, as more serious cases would face summary trials in higher volumes, with reduced rights of appeal.
Rebecca Paul
It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Jardine. It is a pleasure once again to be locked up in a Bill Committee with the Minister. It has been a while, and I am feeling nostalgic; it is wonderful to be here with her again. Maybe one day we will be on the same side—that would be nice, wouldn’t it?
I will speak against the clause in its entirety and in support of the amendment. I start by thanking the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden for her powerful contribution. What she is doing is incredibly brave. It is not an easy thing to be sat on the Government Benches with a different view. I really hope that everyone will listen to what she had to say, because I think she was balanced in her approach: she was critical of the previous Government, and did not pull her punches on where she thinks the issues arose, but she suggested some good measures and made good points that we could adopt to address the backlog. That is the one thing that we all agree on in this room: we all want to address the backlog. We can rake over the past all we like, or we can look forward and do the right thing for the British people.
Clause 1 is an egregious clause that seeks to remove one of our fundamental rights. It seeks to remove the right of an adult defendant charged with a triable either-way offence to elect for Crown court trial instead. Instead, the mode of trial will be determined solely by the magistrates courts. In practice, that means that defendants who currently have a right to trial by jury—the right to be judged by their peers—will no longer have it.
The Government have suggested that this unprecedented change to our justice system will impact only those accused of shoplifting and other petty crimes, but that is not the case. It impacts those accused of an either-way offence where the sentence would be for up to three years in prison—three years. It will impact people charged with causing death by careless driving, committing fraud, sexual assault or actual bodily harm, and many other serious offences. Those are not minor or petty by any stretch and can be life changing for everyone involved. Removing the right to jury trial for such crimes is not a minor tweak to our justice system; it takes a sledgehammer to it.
Trial by jury is an English institution, which has served for centuries to ensure that justice is done. No justice system works if it is not accepted and respected by its people. It is vital that we remember that before making changes. Throwing the baby out with the bathwater on an ideological whim is an irresponsible act. Dispensing justice is not just another process with checkboxes; it impacts people’s lives irrevocably. Decisions about how our system operates should be taken carefully and responsibly in recognition of that, and should allow an element of flexibility in the approach to get the right outcomes. That is what the amendment seeks to add.
I urge the Government to tread carefully before throwing away something that has worked for hundreds of years, and that the British people value and respect. The common-sense determination of 12 citizens is often exactly what is needed to ensure fair justice. They are not jaded or desensitised to crime, because they have not had to sit through it day in, day out for years on end. They have not seen over their whole career the worst of humanity. They are from all walks of life, bringing diversity, and often compassion and understanding to the process. The Government can of course force the change through with the numbers they have, if they so wish, but I urge them to reflect on whether that is truly the legacy that they want.
The planned limitation of the right to trial in the clause is justified by the Government as a necessary measure to get the Crown court backlog down. They defend this extraordinary restriction of our rights by arguing that the changes put victims first and at the heart of the justice system, but I remind the Government that before any verdict, there are no victims and offenders, only defendants and complainants. In this country, we are innocent until proven guilty. Justice is not just about victims; it is also about fairness for the accused, too.
Matt Bishop (Forest of Dean) (Lab)
The hon. Member is presenting her case, her argument, very well and eloquently. To pick up on one point, she said that there were no victims before the verdict, but I would argue that there is always a victim when a case is in court. There is a victim—just because no one has been convicted, the victim is still a victim of a crime. Does she not agree?
Rebecca Paul
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that point, but I do not agree, because sometimes a crime has not been committed. It is important that we use the right terms. The Government have a tendency to talk a lot about victims; they have effectively pitted victims against anyone who happens to stand up and say, “Actually, maybe we shouldn’t get rid of our right to a jury trial.” That is the wrong approach to take. It is important that we use the right terminology, and that we do not shame people into silence for daring to suggest that the removal of jury trials may be an issue in some cases. The language that we use is really important.
Linsey Farnsworth
It is right that we should talk about language. I refer the hon. Member to guidance on the CPS website in relation to the use of the term “victim”. In its guidance, the CPS says that it often uses the word “victim” when talking about general crime. When someone is making a speech in Parliament to say that there are victims waiting for justice, it is perfectly right and proper to do so, because they are not talking about an individual case. That is set out in the CPS guidance.
Rebecca Paul
The hon. Lady makes an interesting point, but we need to always be aware of the technical definition of the words that we are using. When the Government talk constantly about victims needing justice, and it all being about victims, I am not sure it is in the right spirit.
What all of us in this Committee Room agree on, however, is that the Crown court backlog is a critical problem that needs to be addressed. But limiting trial by jury is not the way to do it. We have heard that repeatedly from knowledgeable and experienced people working in the justice system—we have even heard it from one of the Government’s own Members, the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden. The Bar Council does not support it, the Criminal Bar Association is opposed, and the Law Society says the Government’s proposals go too far.
Linsey Farnsworth
We have heard a lot about the Bar Council and the Law Society. What we have not heard a lot about is the position of the Crown Prosecution Service on this point. If the Crown Prosecution Service was a legal firm, it would be the biggest in the country. It has thousands of lawyers working for it. Tom Guest, a member of the policy team at the Crown Prosecution Service gave evidence to the Justice Committee, in which he set out that the CPS is supportive of this legislation to look at structural reform. He said that it is not the only answer, but that it is necessary. The CPS considers us to be at a critical juncture, and that the backlog needs dealing with. Does the hon. Member agree that it is not universally the case that people working within the criminal justice system are against the legislation? Actually, the biggest law firm in the country is in favour of these structural reforms.
Rebecca Paul
I thank the hon. Lady for making that point, and I of course agree. Clearly, there is not a consensus, which is why we are here today, but we can categorically state that most knowledgeable and experienced people working in the justice system are against what this Labour Government are trying to do.
Dr Mullan
The policy adviser of the CPS does not represent the individual views of all the different people who work for the CPS. The suggestion that, because the policy lead or the senior management team have a view, everyone who works for the CPS thinks that this is the right thing is obviously complete nonsense.
Rebecca Paul
I completely agree with my hon. Friend. If I recall correctly, the hon. Member for Amber Valley has previously worked in the CPS—she might want to disclose her interest.
Linsey Farnsworth
Yes, that is correct; I was a Crown prosecutor for 21 years, and I worked all the way through the terrible, terrible years when the Conservative Government were absolutely ripping apart our criminal justice system, so I speak with experience on this matter. I speak with a lot of former colleagues who still work on the frontline, and every single one of them supports this proposal. The difficulty is that, as civil servants, they cannot speak out. That is why we do not hear from them as much as we do from barristers. I worked at the CPS until just before the general election, so my experience is very recent.
Rebecca Paul
I thank the hon. Lady for making that point, and I hope that she is comfortable having put that on the record. It is good to hear her view.
Dr Mullan
People who work for the CPS have privately expressed to me that they are against these proposals but, as I have said, the idea that a chat with a few former colleagues is representative of the views of the thousands of people involved in different ways with what the CPS does is completely unsustainable.
Rebecca Paul
My hon. Friend makes a very good point. I completely agree with him, and I remind the Committee that most people in this country are against these changes. Most people who know about the justice system are against the changes—[Interruption.] I know it is really hard for Labour Members to hear that they are not on the side of the people on this one. How has it all gone wrong? They have forgotten who they are and who they represent. It is a sad day.
Joe Robertson
This is an extraordinary exchange. I accept that the hon. Member for Amber Valley is not the official voice of the CPS or of the Labour Government, but her sense of “officialdom knows best” will give ordinary men and women in this country great concerns about these changes. Of course, there are some cases in which there is no victim. There are some cases in which the victim is a person who has been falsely accused. That is why we have a legal system in which the ordinary men and women of this country are judged by their peers. That is the principle that is up for debate here—not some wider official view from a prosecuting organisation, rather than the courts.
Rebecca Paul
I thank my hon. Friend for that point; he makes it eloquently, as always.
I really enjoyed going through the groups that do not support these proposals. Obviously, the Government like to rely heavily on Sir Brian Leveson’s findings and recommendations, but when my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East questioned him in the oral evidence session, he did not blame jury trials.
Fundamentally, jury trials are not the problem. They are not creating the delays, so limiting them will not address the backlog. In fact, their curtailment will likely bring a whole host of other issues to the table that were not there before. The Bar Council believes that the changes
“will produce serious adverse consequences that have not properly been considered by the Government.”
In the light of such uncertain outcomes, I find it difficult to understand why the Government will not perform a pilot first to test the proposal or put in place a time limitation more generally. To plough ahead in this way, with no way back in the event of failure, is reckless by any measure. A more cautious approach might have been more positively received.
As we heard from Kirsty Brimelow KC, the chair of the Bar Council, it is vital that we approach the backlog problem logically, look at where the delays are occurring and target them. For rape cases, the majority of the delay is actually at the investigation and charge point, which takes an average of two years. Although the one-year delay at court stage is too long, the lion’s share of the problem is pre-court—perhaps the CPS can help with that one—so let us deal with that.
The Government should open all the courts so that they can hear cases every day. Yesterday, 11% of Crown courts were not sitting, and I am sure we will find out later what the percentage is today. Revising the contract with Prisoner Escort and Custody Services to ensure that defendants are delivered to the dock on time would also help. Giving proper consideration to specialist rape and serious sexual offences courts to deal with sexual offence cases and addressing the many inefficiencies and delays in the system through a better use of technology would no doubt greatly reduce the backlog.
It is also important that we give the steps that the Government have already taken to address the backlog an adequate chance to filter through. One example is increased sitting days: in February 2026, the Justice Secretary announced that there would be no cap on sitting days for ’26-27, which will undoubtedly help.
In addition, last month, powers were granted to suspend custodial sentences of up to three years, a change from the previous two years. Putting aside whether that is a sensible measure, it will undoubtedly increase the number of guilty pleas. That means fewer trials and a decrease in the backlog. The Government should properly model the impact of those significant changes on the backlog before imposing such a draconian limitation on jury trials. I would be grateful if the Minister could share any projections of the impact of those two changes on the backlog and clarify whether they have been factored into the “do nothing” option of the impact assessment. It looks as though they might not have been included, because they are not referenced.
If clause 1 is accepted, there are several types of serious cases where the defendant might now lose their right to elect for trial by jury. It has been suggested by the Justice Secretary that only cases involving minor offences, such as stealing a bottle of whisky, will be impacted, but that is not the case. Let us start with causing death by careless driving. That is a serious offence—rightly so, given that a life has been lost—and it carries a maximum five-year sentence and driving disqualification. Currently, the defendant has the right to elect for trial by jury. That is especially important in such cases, where the difference between careless and unfortunate is not entirely clear.
It is exactly that type of case where we see the benefit of 12 individuals, all with different experiences, using their judgment to decide whether the defendant crossed the line into “careless”. Under clause 1, that right is no longer available; the judge will decide on their own. Imagine a defendant who is innocent. Their whole life, and that of their family, is to be decided by one person—their bad day can destroy the defendant’s entire life. Their case might not even make it to a judge; it could remain in the magistrates court. Surely the intention was never for our magistrates courts to hear cases involving the loss of a life.
Sexual assault is another serious offence. It carries a maximum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment and inclusion on the sex offenders register. It is also completely life-changing for everyone involved. Under clause 1, the defendant’s right to choose a jury trial will be removed. Many of those cases could end up in the magistrates courts, but they are nothing like the normal cases seen in magistrates courts day to day: they are highly sensitive and complex, involving third-party disclosure, and video recorded and forensic evidence. They are not simple add-ons to what those courts already do. With the best will in the world, they do not currently have the capability or skillset to handle such specialist cases involving traumatised victims.
Linsey Farnsworth
May I refer the hon. Member to the fact that the youth courts often deal with cases of this nature? They have sentencing powers of up to two years. Would the hon. Member suggest that youths are not getting a fair trial in those circumstances?
Rebecca Paul
I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention, but I will not comment on that specifically. I am talking about the magistrates courts, which generally deal with low-level motoring offences.
Rebecca Paul
I will look into the hon. Lady’s point, and I have no doubt that we will talk about that later on.
Can a Government who pride themselves on putting victims first truly be comfortable with what I have just laid out? Those are just two examples, but we see the same pattern for numerous other serious offences such as actual bodily harm, fraud and affray. In what world can those offences ever be considered minor enough to qualify only for summary justice? I do not believe that this is what victims want, either. For justice to be done, they need to have complete confidence that people will respect and accept the verdict given. That is a key part of the justice process.
Limiting jury trials for some of the most serious offences will mean that a verdict, whether innocent or guilty, will lose its current gospel status in the eyes of the populus. Clause 1 sows doubt into our justice system, and that doubt will eat away at it. At the opposite end of the spectrum less serious offences are impacted, but that will still have huge ramifications for the individual in the dock. We must always remember the human being at the centre of this. The offence with which someone is charged may be minor, but that does not stop it being the worst thing that has ever happened to them.
Dr Mullan
The point I made in my remarks was that I imagine that is a very conservative estimate of the number of additional days. We know that, by definition, we are sending more complex and serious cases than have been traditionally and historically heard in magistrates courts.
Rebecca Paul
I thank the shadow Minister for that point; I share his concerns. There is also a question regarding whether unpaid volunteers will even want to take on such a serious role that involves handing out two-year sentences—that is quite a responsibility.
The outstanding caseload in magistrates courts has been increasing in recent years. In September 2025, the outstanding caseload was around 373,000, which was a 74% increase compared with pre-pandemic levels in September 2019. The shift of cases from the Crown court back into the magistrates court is simply moving the issue to a less suitable court to deal with it. It is simply moving the problem around, rather than actually addressing it.
Summary trial through the magistrates court was always designed for the purpose of swift justice in low-level cases. By removing the right to elect for a jury trial, in combination with increasing magistrates’ sentencing powers to two years’ imprisonment and removing the automatic appeal against conviction, important protections are being removed, and the groups that will be impacted most detrimentally are ethnic minorities.
Magistrates are unpaid members of their local community who volunteer to act as magistrates. There is no requirement for them to be legally qualified. That may well be fine for summary-only offences, such as low-level motoring offences and minor criminal damage, but it is not appropriate for more serious offences. Many magistrates do an excellent job and give up their time selflessly for the benefit of their community. In spite of that, I do not believe that they should have the power to send someone to prison for two years. Let us all remember that magistrates can be as young as 18.
In closing, I want to make one last point. This change was not in the Labour manifesto; indeed, there is no mention of any changes to trial by jury at all. Only one such commitment was made, which Government Members appear to have forgotten. To quote from the Labour manifesto:
“Labour will fast-track rape cases, with specialist courts at every Crown Court location in England and Wales.”
That is on page 67, if anyone needs to refresh their memory. That is what the British people voted for. The Bill could have been so different if clause 1 had started with that, instead of jeopardising fair justice for many defendants. It is such a shame that a Government with such a historic majority have so quickly forgotten the change they promised, and whom they fight for and represent.
Sarah Sackman
Let me begin by saying that the Bill has been prepared with precisely the people and communities who elected us and gave us our mandate in mind. The Labour party manifesto contained one word on the front cover: “Change”. It was not an acceptance of the status quo—a brittle criminal justice system with record and rising backlogs, which we inherited from the previous Government.
Rather than sit idly by, we are a Government who govern by choosing, and the choice we make is that, when we see a problem, we set about fixing it. We do so in a way that is informed by our values of equality, fairness and social justice. We also do so in an evidence-based way, which is why we commissioned an independent review of the criminal courts, led by Sir Brian Leveson and ably supported by Professor David Ormerod and others. They produced a detailed and comprehensive analysis that spoke to the depth of the crisis in our criminal justice system and the impact that the delays are having across the piece, not just on those impacted by crime but on those defendants on remand languishing in jail, whose lives have been put on hold, perhaps for crimes they did not commit. They spoke to the long-term challenges in our criminal justice system and the changing nature of evidence in our system, involving more digital and forensic evidence, all contributing to a picture in which trials are now more complex and take twice as long as they did in 2000.
In that time, there has been no reform of our criminal justice system; instead, as we have heard from a number of Members today, there has been a chipping away of the Department’s budget, underinvestment, the stripping back of not just legal aid but sitting days, the closure of more than 40% of our courts and people leaving the Bar in droves, all of which have driven the backlogs—and there is consensus that we need to do something about them.
I was interested in the remarks made by the hon. Members for Chichester, for Brighton Pavilion, for Bexhill and Battle and for Reigate, and my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South and Walkden, all of whom called on this Government to pull every lever at our disposal. Here is the thing: I agree. We should be doing all those things, and indeed we are. We are not waiting to begin on the efficiency drive so desperately needed and called for by Sir Brian’s report and by those across the criminal justice system.
Sarah Sackman
The hon. Member started with a long digression into trial by ordeal. I hope this Committee will not become a trial by ordeal, but I find the brass neck approach to this from the Opposition surprising, given that they cut the Department’s budget in real terms, while we have invested in record levels of sitting days and have, I am proud to say, announced that we are lifting the cap on sitting days next year. I intend to get back to my point, but, interestingly, we are beginning to see the progress that our measures have made. Last quarter’s figures show that the backlog continues to rise—it is a snapshot—but we are starting to see the impact of the investment in a record number of sitting days and the lifting of the cap, which we know will be beneficial.
We have been clear from the start, following the expert recommendations of the independent review of the criminal courts, that three things will be needed: major investment in sitting days, the £92 million in criminal legal aid for solicitors that we invested in the early days of this Government and the committed uplift of £34 million to advocates fees, and a record settlement for the CPS.
Sarah Sackman
I will not take any more interventions; I want to make progress. The point is that we are already beginning to see the investment aspect of this.
The second pillar of how we address the backlog, which many have commented on, is efficiencies, and we have part 2 of Sir Brian’s report. In his speech on his vision for the justice system, the Deputy Prime Minister committed to a number of measures that are already under way. We will get blitz courts in London and the south-east under way this month, aggressively listing cases to get through them more efficiently. A pilot for AI-driven listing, working with the judiciary towards a national listing framework so that we end the postcode lottery on listing and list more efficiently, investment committed to case co-ordinators and driving case progression so that we are using the limited resources at our disposal most efficiently are all examples of taking forward greater efficiencies, which are desperately needed.
Sarah Sackman
I will just conclude this point. The central insight of the independent review of the criminal courts, in direct answer to the hon. Member for Reigate, borne out by the modelling, which has been externally verified and which we presented in the impact assessment, is that efficiency—however optimistic we are about it—and investment alone will not turn the tide on the rising backlog. That is because of the inheritance from the previous Government, coupled with the long-term challenges and changes in our justice system that the IRCC outlined. That is why we need all three things: efficiency, investment and reform.
Rebecca Paul
In my speech, I asked a specific question about the impact assessment. One of the options was to do nothing, and it would be helpful if the Minister could clearly articulate what was included in that option. Did it include the impact of uncapped sitting days, or of the three-year custodial sentence? Did it include all the other things that she was talking about, and that are being done anyway, or was the option literally to do nothing? If it was to do nothing, that is not a fair comparison.
Sarah Sackman
The hon. Lady will have seen that with the presentation of the Bill, as is right and appropriate, a suite of documents and material was made available to Members of this House and the wider public. The factsheet that accompanies the Bill includes a series of scenarios, one of which is literally to do nothing, and looks at the forecast of the projected caseload coming into the Crown court. There is another scenario, which asks what maximum investment would do to bring down the backlog—maximum investment being maximum, uncapped sitting days. The factsheet shows that that would mitigate the growth, but would not begin to bring down the backlog. We then project what maximum investment coupled with efficiencies would do. That would have a further dampening effect, but again, it would not even begin to get into the backlog, such is its scale—standing at 80,000 today. The factsheet supports the central insight of the IRCC: that it is only by pulling all three levers—investment, efficiencies and reform—that we begin to get down the backlog in this Parliament.
I have been pushed in the Chamber, by the Justice Committee and in the media by people saying, “Minister, you are saying that the backlog is only going to start to come down by the end of this Parliament,” as if to say, “Can’t you do more?” We are pulling every single lever even to get that effect, such is the growth of the backlog, which is due to the factors I have outlined.
Matt Bishop
I am proud to stand with the Minister and the Government on the Bill. Members on the Committee and in the Chamber have often used the terminology of “abolishing” jury trials. The definition of “abolishing” is formally ending, cancelling or getting rid of something completely, usually by law or official decision. Will the Minister clarify that none of the three points she has made is about abolishing jury trials?
Sarah Sackman
Of course that is right. No one is talking about the abolition of jury trials. We have said, and I will say repeatedly, that juries are a cornerstone of the British legal system and of our legal culture. We are preserving jury trials for the most serious cases. By seeking to tackle the shameful delays in our criminal justice system, we are seeking to ensure that, where jury trials are appropriate and very much necessary, they happen in a timely fashion. There is no point in having a jury trial if it comes one, two or three years after the fact, when witnesses are pulling out, the quality of evidence has worsened, people’s memories fade, and quality justice is simply not delivered. The state’s fundamental obligation is to deliver a fair trial.
Under our existing system, as a society we have already made a threshold choice about who accesses a jury trial and who does not. Currently, 90% of cases in this country are tried—fairly, robustly, rigorously and independently—without a jury. This debate is about where that threshold should be, not about a complete abolition of jury trials. It is about a pragmatic and proportionate threshold change to respond to the issue of timeliness, which is currently detrimental to the state’s delivery of a fair trial to all.
Sarah Sackman
I am not sure who to give way to, but I will give way first to the hon. Lady—I will try to be as fair as I can.
Siân Berry
We are debating clause 1, which as I understand it will completely remove defendants’ right to elect; the rest of the Bill puts in place procedures whereby other people—judges—will decide whether a jury trial is held. The right to elect a jury trial is being completely abolished. Is that not correct?
Sarah Sackman
The hon. Member is right. Where currently a defendant charged with a triable either-way offence has the ability to choose trial by jury in the Crown court, even in a scenario in which a magistrates court has accepted jurisdiction over their case, that ability to choose is removed by clause 1. Currently, defendants do not need to justify that choice; presumably they choose it because they consider that they will derive some advantage from it. The reform that we are making is to remove that ability to choose and, rather, to place the responsibility with the court to allocate the mode of trial according to the seriousness of the offence.
There was much discussion raised by the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle, and I believe one or two others, about the approach, and whether we should have an approach driven by the characteristics of a particular defendant—whether they are of good character, whether they have previous convictions—but that is not the approach we have chosen to take. The approach we have chosen to take is one in which it is the expert court, independently, that is triaging the case and allocating mode of trial based on the seriousness of the case. The best and most objective proxy for that is the likely sentence and the allocation guidelines, much in the same way as magistrates currently allocate trials in their mode of trial hearings.
Dr Mullan
The Minister is an extremely articulate individual. Will she just confirm that she agrees that, as the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion pointed out, the Government are abolishing the right to elect, so it is perfectly reasonable for individuals to use the term “abolish” in relation to some of these reforms—because they are abolishing the right to elect?
Sarah Sackman
For those watching on TV—which is probably my mum—I will be absolutely clear: the Government are not abolishing jury trials. The Government are preserving jury trials for the most serious cases, and we are working in this way to ensure that those trials are fair and timely.
Sarah Sackman
What clause 1 does is remove the ability of a defendant to choose where they are tried, which, at the moment, they have a right to insist on. So we have—
Sarah Sackman
Let me finish my sentence; you asked me the question. We are removing the right to elect, and removing it completely. The right to elect means, notwithstanding the fact that under our current system—by the way, the right to elect does not exist in Scotland. I do not think any of us here would suggest for one minute that Scotland does not have a fair and independent justice system. It operates in a different way. The right to elect does not exist in a whole host of jurisdictions that have far lesser uses of jury trials than ours. What we are removing is the ability of the defendant to insist on their choice of trial, notwithstanding the seriousness of the case.
The CPS data shows that last year, under the current system, that happened in some 4,000 cases where the magistrates courts had accepted jurisdiction. In other words, under the magistrates courts’ existing sentencing powers, which currently stand at 12 months, they could hear that case and hear it fairly. They could also hear it more promptly because, as we know, the backlog is less in the magistrates court, and when the same trial that could be heard in the magistrates court is heard in the Crown court it takes four times as long, so there is swifter justice in that sense. Under the right to elect, the defendants in those 4,000 cases said, “I want a jury trial.” Under the current legislation, they can insist on that choice.
Some Members may say, “Actually, we think that is really important,” and I understand that that is the position of the Green party and the Opposition. We say something different for two reasons—one pragmatic, one principled. The pragmatic point is that, under the status quo—which we all agree is failing everybody, and we are implored to do something about the backlog—it is pragmatic and proportionate that cases that can be heard more swiftly and more proportionately, and be retained in the magistrates court, should be. It should be the court that triages that, in the same way as—to use the health analogy—if I went to A&E on a Saturday night with my child, and my child had a graze that could be dealt with by a nurse, if I insisted that it had to be seen by a specialist consultant, the answer would be, “Well, no; the person who needs to be seen by a specialist consultant is the person who has a specialist condition.” The triaging is done by the experts.
Paulette Hamilton (Birmingham Erdington) (Lab)
The Minister is making some important points, but I must bring her back to what she said about the fairness of jury trials, and about people feeling that they are fair. At the moment, many minority groups and working people of a lower socioeconomic level feel that if a trial is moved to be heard by just a judge and magistrates, it will not be fair. The Minister needs to clarify that. I absolutely agree with what she says about the need for change, but we must bring the public along with us. If the judge is a white middle-class man, the magistrates are white middle-class men and we cannot get variety, how will we get fairness? Remember, your mum is watching.
Sarah Sackman
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. We often use the old adage about justice needing not just to be done, but to be seen to be done. That is vital, and again comes back to the language that people use about our courts. The suggestion that a person gets a rougher justice in the magistrates court is inaccurate, and we have to ensure that there is confidence in every tier of our justice system, including in our judges.
My hon. Friend is also right, not only about the perceptions of, but the real-world impact on minority communities and those who have historically had negative experiences with criminal justice. We know that disproportionality exists, whether in charging practices, sentencing outcomes or the amount of black and minority ethnic men on remand. Black and minority ethnic communities are disproportionately the victims of crime, and a person who is black is four times more likely to be a victim of homicide than a person who is white, which is a grave injustice.
That is why it is so important that the Deputy Prime Minister has committed that the Government will, in due course, introduce an amendment to the Bill to provide for a review to properly monitor the impacts of the reforms, and of wider justice measures, on precisely the communities and individuals that my hon. Friend spoke about. We have to enrich our understanding of the issue and ensure that the reforms command the confidence of all the communities that we represent.
Sarah Sackman
I will make a little progress. As I have said, where a magistrates court has determined that an offence is suitable for summary trial there, clause 1 removes the ability of a defendant to insist on their choice of venue. The decisions about venue and mode of trial will rest with the court. That allocations process ensures that decisions about jurisdiction are made solely by the courts, so that cases are heard in the most appropriate venue according to their severity and complexity. There are thousands of cases in the Crown court caseload where the magistrates court has indicated that it has sufficient sentencing powers to hear the case, but a defendant has elected for jury trial.
Dr Mullan
I wish to pick up on a point the Minister made earlier, as interventions from other Members hampered me from doing so at the time. She hinted in her earlier remarks that although the total backlog is rising, there have been some improvements. I wonder whether she was attempting to address my questions around the Criminal Bar Association saying that the backlogs are falling in a number of areas. Could the Minister clarify whether the MOJ accepts that the backlogs are already falling in a number of courts? If it does not, what is the gap between what the CBA says and the Government’s position?
Sarah Sackman
I was coming to that point, but as the hon. Member has raised it, I will address it now. First, I put it on record that any suggestion that the Ministry of Justice or I have sought to bury good news is totally false. I would be the first person to be screaming it from the rooftops if our measures and our investment, which we made in contrast to the previous Government, were actually working. The fact is that at the last projected figures, in December, the backlog still stood at over 80,000 and it continues to remain high—slightly up from the previous quarter.
Rebecca Paul
I thank the Minister for that point. This goes back and links to the question I raised on the impact assessment. It is really important that we get clarity from the Minister on the impact assessment. The interpretation I am taking from her answer to me on whether existing measures like the suspension of three-year sentences and the uncapped sitting days were taken into account, is that, no, those are not in the “do nothing” scenario. I am struggling with why that would be. Surely, in the impact assessment you need to be showing the reality in order to do a fair comparison? It is reassuring to hear her say that she has looked at these numbers, but why are they not included in the impact assessment so that we can all clearly see them and see why she is taking the decision she is around limiting jury trials?
Sarah Sackman
I refer the hon. Member to the summary factsheet that was produced, which shows all of what I have described very clearly. I will ensure that every Committee member has a link. There was also a helpfully produced website by the MOJ, which synthesises all of these facts, all of the modelling, which demonstrates all of these things. I understand that she is looking at the formal impact assessment, but if you go on the website and look at the factsheet—all of which has been shared with stakeholders and the media, and I will ensure that she has the model she seeks—I can assure her that on the MOJ’s forecast of the growth in the backlog, even with maximum investment and ambitious efficiency we do not begin to reduce the backlog. That is our analysis, and it is what supported the IRCC’s analysis. It is only when you do all three things—investment, efficiency and structural reform—that you bring down the backlog.
Dr Mullan
I think even though the Minister did not directly and clearly say it, there was an acceptance there that the backlog is falling in a number of areas. A question that flows from that: what analysis has been done on why? I imagine this is something that the Ministry of Justice is all over like a rash. It is having to do something that is opposed by many people. Even if the Minister thinks it is the right thing to do, the Minister will accept it is a reduction in the rights of citizens, even if she thinks it is justifiable. If the Government’s main argument—that this will not work without removing jury trials—is not being demonstrated in a number of Crown courts, why is that? What has the Minister done rapidly to understand why they are coming down and what is transferable, right now, to the other courts?
Sarah Sackman
Just to be absolutely clear, I have not accepted the CBA figures. What I have told you, and everyone here, is that on the last published figures, the backlog continued to rise between September 2025 and December 2025. I accepted that it may be that in some courts there are signs of improvement—
Sarah Sackman
Let me just finish the point on clause 1, if I may. As I was saying in answer to a colleague’s question, the approach here on clause 1 and the approach to these structural reforms is pragmatic, driven by the necessity to bring down these backlogs, following the central insight of the IRCC; but the approach in clause 1 to remove the ability of the defendant to insist on their choice is also a principled one. We heard in Committee from crime victims—I think I am using that word appropriately in that context—that the ability of the defendant to insist on their mode of trial, notwithstanding the seriousness of the offence, in their view tilted the balance excessively towards defendants’ rights to drive the criminal justice process. In a criminal court, the Crown is on one side, represented by the prosecution, and the defendant is on the other. The complainant, who may turn out to be a victim of crime, is not represented. In this scenario—in keeping with other jurisdictions such as Scotland—it seems that the right to have the defendant drive the process, irrespective of the proportionality or the suitability of that mode of trial, is in principle an odd design choice.
Joe Robertson
It seems that the Minister has perhaps momentarily forgotten that the entire legal system in this country is tilted in favour of the defendant. The defendant is innocent until the prosecution makes its case, and it cannot just make a good case, because the case has to be beyond reasonable doubt. The whole system is tilted in favour of the defendant, and rightly so. It is slightly strange to hear her use the argument that the defendant should not have freedom and liberty to elect when they are innocent people until convicted—and many of them are never convicted.
Sarah Sackman
I am well versed in how our legal system works. I am well versed in the principle of the idea of innocent until proven guilty, and the criminal standard of proof. That is all important, as are the other safeguards that this reform system would retain. However, I make no apologies for the approach that we take in reforming this system, which, as I have said, is not just driven by necessity and pragmatism but by principle, and for the case repeated by myself and the Deputy Prime Minister—that we are a Government who will centre victims of crime. I also make no apologies for the investment we make in victim support services, or for the recalibration we are making in terms of how mode of trial is determined. Determining mode of trial is driven not just by the severity of cases, by creating an objective test to be applied by the courts, but the pursuit of timeliness. Timeliness, by the way, helps not only complainants and victims of crime but those accused of crime. If I were accused of a crime, I would want to clear my name as quickly as possible, so timeliness helps everybody across the criminal justice system.
Yasmin Qureshi
I understand the point that the Minister is making about victims and I am obviously concerned for them, but we are also talking about defendants’ rights. She will be aware that 900 postmasters and postmistresses from the Horizon scandal have all said, “Please do not abolish jury trial,” and the reason is that when they were being charged with those offences, many of them were told to plead guilty by lawyers who thought that a public jury would find it difficult to believe that a Government organisation had made a mistake. However, some of them did elect Crown court trials and were acquitted. That is 900 potential defendant/victims. Lord Hain and my hon. Friend the Member for Poplar and Limehouse (Apsana Begum) mention the importance of the jury trial. I do think that the victim and defendants have a right to elect, and I think that we should abandon restricting the jury trials.
Sarah Sackman
Of course, the Post Office Horizon scandal was one of the great miscarriages of justice of recent times. However, it is important to remember that we are discussing the whole system and that, of course, for the most serious crimes under a reformed system, we would be retaining jury trial. It is also important to remember, as I think even those representatives from the criminal Bar accepted, that there is no constitutional, absolute right to a jury trial. If that were so, the 90% of people whose cases are dealt with in the magistrates court would have a right to insist on a jury trial. This whole debate is centred around the appropriate way to treat that cohort of cases in the middle—between summary-only, which stay the same, retained by the magistrates, and all the indictable-only cases, or indeed anything likely to receive a sentence of over three years, which retain a jury trial.
Sarah Sackman
Let me just finish my sentence. This whole debate is located around a relatively narrow group—although we are still talking about thousands of cases—of triable either-way cases and those likely to receive a sentence of three years or more. It is why the question about jury equity, posed by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, interestingly relates somewhat to—
Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting)
(1 day, 11 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Chair
We are now sitting in public and the proceedings are being broadcast. Before we continue line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill, I have a few reminders for Committee members. Please switch off or silence electronic devices. No food or drink, other than that provided, is permitted during our sittings. Hansard would be grateful if Members could email their speaking notes or hand them to the Hansard colleague in the room.
I remind Members to bob to catch my eye if they wish to speak in any debate. The selection list for today’s sitting, which is available in the room and on Parliament’s website, shows how the clauses, schedules and selected amendments have been grouped for debate.
Clause 4
Interference with uncrewed devices
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Minister for the Armed Forces (Al Carns)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Mr Efford. Defence needs to protect itself from crime with security measures that will deter, detect and defeat criminal activities, including those directed by hostile states, that threaten its critical sites or operations. Currently, the only authorisation process that enables interference with drones that might be used to commit crimes that threaten defence operations and assets is in part III of the Police Act 1997. Only the civilian police can obtain such an authorisation to deal with these threats.
The increase in drone activity around defence sites means that defence cannot rely on local police forces for its security requirements. The emergence, in Ukraine and elsewhere, of drones as a new frontier of warfare has brought into sharp focus the urgent need for defence to meet this rapidly developing threat, not only in operational theatres but here in the UK, to protect defence operations and bases. We must have ways to protect ourselves from the threats posed by drones, be they in the air, on land or on or under water.
Clause 4 will create a regime whereby defence personnel can obtain authorisation to use approved equipment to prevent drones from being used to commit criminal offences in relation to defence sites and property in the UK. The regime will consist of a two-stage approval process.
The first stage will consist of a senior person in defence—a two-star military officer or civil service equivalent—giving authorisation for the use of approved equipment to detect and prevent relevant offences. Applications for authorisations can be made only by defence personnel; before giving an authorisation, they will need to be satisfied that it is appropriate, in the interests of national security, that it be given. An authorisation can cover one or more defence areas, particular defence property or a description of property. This stage will ensure that appropriate areas and property can be protected using the appropriate equipment. Defence areas include sites in the UK used for the purpose of defence, as well as sites used by visiting forces. Defence property includes vehicles and vessels in the UK. It will be possible for an authorisation to cover a description of such property—royal naval vessels, for example—so that it is not necessary for each one to be individually identified.
To ensure that the new regime is agile, we have not specified the type of equipment that can be used under an authorisation, or taken a power to prescribe this in regulations. Instead, the Secretary of State will need to approve equipment before it can be used. This will allow new equipment to be used as swiftly as possible to protect defence interests. The approval process will be governed by defence policy, which will ensure that equipment is safe to use or test in the UK. An authorisation can last for up to 12 months and may be renewed; it can also be varied or revoked.
The second stage in the authorisation process involves a responsible person. Before approved equipment can be used, the responsible person must be satisfied that it will be used only in accordance with the authorisation that covers the area or property to which it relates. Furthermore, before equipment can be used to detect and defeat a drone, the responsible person must be satisfied that it is both reasonable and proportionate to do so. I commend the clause to the Committee.
David Reed (Exmouth and Exeter East) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Efford. As we all know, drones and other uncrewed systems are rapidly reshaping modern defence and are already central to surveillance, logistics and frontline operations. Their importance will only grow in the years ahead. For our armed forces, they offer speed, precision and flexibility; for our adversaries, they present new and evolving threats that we must be ready to counter. That is why the clause matters.
My own limited experience was back in the early 2010s, when I saw drones brought into military service in our operations in Afghanistan. Those pieces of kit were really expensive and large, but we could see how they were reshaping the modern battlefield. Looking at how the technology has evolved over the years, the first signs that I saw were in how prisoners were working with criminal networks on the outside to deliver drugs and other contraband into prisons. They were using cheap, commercial, off-the-shelf drones to carry out those illegal acts. The barrier to entry for such products has fallen significantly. Our military now has to contend with protecting military sites, bases and other critical assets from people who can buy cheap drones that have a big operational effect, so new powers need to be given to our armed forces people.
We will have more opportunities to strengthen these powers. We support what the Minister proposes, but we will discuss new clauses at a later sitting. The success of clause 4 will depend on whether the wider system supports it. We have heard repeatedly from colleagues across the House about regulation issues with testing autonomous systems in UK airspace or waters. Multi-departmental efforts will be required to take away some of the regulation, so that we can give defence manufacturing and our armed forces the ability to test the new technologies and implement them in their operational output.
Our armed forces must be equipped with not just the tools, but the doctrine and training to use them effectively. We have a clear opportunity for change. The United Kingdom has the expertise and the industrial base to lead in uncrewed systems, which is good for the export market. Clause 4 provides part of the foundation, but it must be matched by practical action to ensure that the capabilities can be delivered at scale. If we get it right, we will strengthen our national security, our defence industry and our critical national infrastructure; if we fall behind, others will set the pace. The choice is ours.
Sarah Bool (South Northamptonshire) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Mr Efford, after the Easter recess. I believe that the Minister clarified this point, but I ask for confirmation: will the extension of anti-drone permissions extend to US bases such as RAF Croughton in my constituency?
Al Carns
The clause is exactly what we need. The explosion in drone systems across the world requires the proper legislation, and the clause will fit that purpose.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 4 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 5
Sexual harm prevention orders and sexual risk orders
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Schedule 2.
Clause 6 stand part.
Schedule 3.
Clauses 7 to 9 stand part.
New clause 12—Protective Orders: Persons No Longer Subject to Service Law—
“(1) This section applies where a person—
(a) is charged with, or has been convicted of, an offence within the service justice system, and
(b) was subject to service law either at the time of the alleged conduct or at the time of the charging decision, whether or not they remain subject to service law at the time of trial or sentencing.
(2) A service court may make any of the following orders in respect of a person as if they were still subject to service law—
(a) a sexual harm prevention order or interim sexual harm prevention order (see sections 103A to 103K of the Sexual Offences Act 2003);
(b) a sexual risk order or interim sexual risk order (see sections 122A to 122K of that Act);
(c) a service domestic abuse protection order;
(d) a service stalking protection order;
(e) a service restraining order (see section 229 of the Armed Forces Act 2006).
(3) An order made under subsection (2)—
(a) has effect as if made by a civilian court of equivalent jurisdiction, and
(b) is enforceable accordingly.
(4) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for the recognition, enforcement and variation of orders made under this section, including provision about which court has jurisdiction to vary or discharge such an order after it is made.”
This new clause ensures service courts can impose protective orders on individuals who leave service before trial, preventing avoidance of such orders simply by leaving service.
Al Carns
Clauses 5 to 7 and schedules 2 and 3 relate to protection orders. The Government are committed to providing safety, justice and real support for all in the defence community, both now and in future, which is why a particular focus of the Bill is on protecting victims of serious sexual and violent crimes.
Currently, the service justice system cannot impose the full suite of protection orders that are available in the civilian criminal justice system. That can create inconsistencies and critical gaps in victim safeguarding, particularly where cases are based overseas and are therefore under the jurisdiction of the service justice system. It means that there are key vulnerabilities, insufficient protection powers in the SJS in comparison with the civilian system and, as existing orders do not convert into civilian equivalents, gaps in protection when a subject leaves service. Those gaps place victims, both in defence and in the wider public, at risk of continued harm. They mean that victims in the service justice system do not always receive the level of protection to which they would be entitled in the criminal justice system.
Clauses 5 to 7 will address those inconsistencies and will be central to providing enduring protection for victims by enabling service courts to make interim and full protection orders and notices that are enforceable even after someone leaves the service. Those service orders include sexual harm prevention orders, sexual risk orders, domestic abuse protection notices and orders, stalking protection orders and restraining orders. The clauses will align the justice systems to ensure that no member of the defence community is left with lesser protections than their civilian counterparts. They will empower the service police to apply for interim and full orders and will empower the service courts to impose them, ensuring that victims receive enduring protection from further harm. The powers apply to service personnel and civilians subject to service law both in the UK and overseas, ensuring their worldwide application.
The service police are members of the armed forces who perform broadly the same role for the armed forces, wherever they are in the world, that their civilian counterparts perform in police forces across the UK. Although the service police currently operate in line with the principles of the guidance issued by the Home Office on disclosure of police information, the fact that they have no statutory duty to do so is a disparity with the civilian system. Clause 8 will therefore impose a requirement on the service police to have regard to existing statutory guidance about the disclosure of police information for the purposes of preventing domestic abuse, sexual offending and stalking. It will also amend section 77 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 to include the Ministry of Defence police in the list of police forces that need to have regard to the domestic violence disclosure system. This will better protect potential victims from the risks associated with domestic violence, sexual offending and stalking.
Clause 9 will ensure that offenders who have, for example, been sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment by a court martial for controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship are automatically supervised under multi-agency public protection agreements. Once those offenders are released from prison, they will be managed in the community in the same way as if they had been sentenced by the Crown court. If offenders under the scope of clause 9 are not managed under MAPPA when released on licence into the community, it may be harder for police, prisons and probation services to work together to protect the public and manage the risk that the offenders pose.
I will speak to new clause 12 in my closing remarks.
Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Efford. I am grateful for the opportunity to speak in support of new clause 12 and offer broader support for clauses 5 to 9, which represent a significant strengthening of the protective framework in the service justice system.
It is worth setting out the basic principle that the armed forces justice system must be capable not only of dealing fairly and effectively with wrongdoing, but of ensuring that the protection of victims and management of risk do not fall between institutional cracks. The credibility of the service justice system depends on continuity, coherence and, above all, confidence that protective measures will not be undermined by procedural happenstance.
Clauses 5 to 9 make important and welcome progress. They will extend the availability and operation of sexual harm prevention orders, sexual risk orders, domestic abuse protection orders, stalking protection orders and restraining orders in the service justice system. They make provision for enforcement, variation and guidance structures, including in respect of the important role of provost marshals and service police in the exercise of those functions. The clauses will modernise the service justice landscape in a way that recognises the reality of contemporary risk management. They will ensure that service personnel and civilians subject to service discipline are not operating in a parallel system that is less capable of protecting victims or managing dangerous individuals. In particular, the extension to the service courts of protections against domestic abuse and stalking is a welcome alignment with civilian criminal justice standards, ensuring consistency of safeguarding irrespective of jurisdiction.
However, as is often the case in the refinement of complex statutory schemes, there remains a narrow but important residual gap, which is precisely what new clause 12 seeks to address. The core issue is one of jurisdictional continuity. At present, protective orders in the service justice system are clearly available while an individual is subject to service law. Clauses 5 to 9 also go further by making provision for enforcement in certain circumstances in which the individual ceases to be subject to service discipline after an order has been made. A difficulty arises, however, in the transitional space where an individual is charged or even convicted while subject to service law, but ceases to be subject to service law before the protective order is imposed or finalised. Without express provision, there is a risk that such an individual, by virtue of leaving service, will fall outside the effective reach of the service court’s protective jurisdiction at precisely the point at which such orders are most necessary.
New clause 12 performs a simple but important function. It would provide that where a person is charged with or convicted of an offence in the service justice system and was subject to service law at the relevant time, the service court may impose specified protective orders as if the person remained subject to service law. It is, in effect, a statutory deeming provision, preserving jurisdiction for protective purposes notwithstanding the cessation of service status.
The legal merits of that approach are clear. First, it prevents what might properly be described as jurisdictional arbitrage. Without such a provision, there is a theoretical, though in practice very real, risk that individuals could seek to avoid the imposition of protective orders by leaving service prior to trial or sentencing. Even if such behaviour is not deliberately engineered, the mere existence of a gap creates inconsistency and undermines confidence in the system. The protective reach of the service justice system should not be rendered contingent on administrative status at a particular moment in time.
Secondly, the new clause reflects a well-established principle in criminal justice, which is that protective orders are ancillary to the underlying offence and risk posed by the offender, not merely to their procedural status. The civilian courts retain wide powers to impose protective orders at sentencing precisely because the assessment of risk is rooted in conduct, not institutional affiliation. New clause 12 would ensure that the service courts are placed in an equivalent position, recognising that the underlying risk does not evaporate simply because service status changes.
Thirdly, the new clause would promote legal certainty and coherence. Through clauses 5 to 9, the existing framework already recognises that certain orders may continue to have effect or be enforced after a person leaves service. However, enforcement is not the same as imposition. It is logically and legally cleaner to ensure that the court retains the power to make the order at the point of disposal, rather than relying on subsequent conversion or deeming mechanisms. The new clause therefore fills a structural gap and ensures that the life cycle of protective orders is not disrupted by jurisdictional transition.
Fourthly, the new clause is carefully drafted in respect of its propriety. It would not create an unfettered or novel category of punitive power. Rather, it would explicitly confine the service court’s ability to make orders to those that it would have been able to make had the individual remained subject to service law. It is, in essence, a continuity provision, not an expansion of jurisdiction.
Importantly, subsection (3) of the new clause would provide that such orders are to have effect
“as if made by a civilian court of equivalent jurisdiction”
and are “enforceable accordingly.” That is a critical safeguard. It would ensure interoperability between the service justice system and the civilian criminal justice system, avoiding the creation of parallel regimes that might otherwise give rise to confusion about enforcement authority.
Subsection (4) of the new clause, enabling the Secretary of State to make regulations regarding recognition, enforcement and variation, is also welcome. It would provide necessary flexibility in an area where procedural interfaces between service and civilian jurisdictions must be capable of adjustment over time. In particular, it would allow for clarity as to which court is best placed to vary or discharge orders once a person has fully transitioned out of service life. That is a sensible delegation of secondary rule-making power, consistent with the established constitutional practice in this field.
David Reed
It is difficult to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley—he is a former Army officer, a doctor and a barrister—but I will attempt to add to the debate.
This issue is clear: under the present framework, a service court can only impose protective orders—such as a sexual harm prevention order, a stalking protection order, a domestic abuse protection order or a restraining order—if the individual remains subject to service law at the point of trial or sentence. Where an individual has left the forces before that stage, the court’s ability to impose those protections falls away, even where the alleged conduct took place during service and proceedings were properly brought on that basis. That creates an obvious and avoidable gap—my hon. Friend laid out the argument on this expertly. It presents a route that any competent legal adviser could identify.
Where proceedings are pending or a conviction is likely, there is a clear incentive to leave service before the point at which an order could be imposed. The individual who may present the greatest risk to a victim, who knows their workplace, shares the same base or moves within the same social network, can remove themselves from the reach of a protective order simply by leaving. That is not a remote possibility; it is a foreseeable consequence of the current structure, and it should be addressed.
New clause 12 addresses this consequence in a proportionate and coherent way. It provides that, where an individual was subject to service law at the time of the alleged conduct or at the point of charging decision, the service court retains the power to impose protective orders as though the individual remained subject to service law. It does not expand service jurisdiction into new territory, and it does not create new offences. It simply preserves an existing power at the point where it is most needed: at conviction or sentence.
New clause 12 also ensures that such orders have full effect. An order made in those circumstances is to be treated as though it was made by a civilian court of equivalent standing, which would provide clarity on enforcement, avoid any uncertainty between service and civilian systems, and allow a proper provision through the regulations for recognition, enforcement and variation. In practical terms, it gives the courts a power that is both meaningful and workable.
The Bill makes a serious effort to strengthen the experience of victims within the service justice system. We heard from many experts during the evidence sessions, and that really brought it home for many of us on the Committee. Measures such as protective orders, enhanced powers for service police and independent legal advocacy represent real progress. However, it is important that those provisions operate together effectively. At present, there is a clear weakness. Where leaving service provides a means of avoiding a protective order, that weakness will be exploited. The purpose of new clause 12 is to ensure that it cannot be.
Those most likely to benefit from this change are often the most vulnerable. Individuals affected by serious sexual offences, domestic abuse or stalking within close professional communities face particular risks, especially where working and social environments are closely intertwined. For them, a protective order is not a technical matter, but fundamental to their sense of safety and ability to continue in their role. Access to that protection should not depend on whether an individual leaves service at a particular moment.
Rachel Taylor (North Warwickshire and Bedworth) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Efford. I welcome the clauses we are considering. This Government were elected to renew the nation’s contract with those who serve, and this Bill promises to do that. We cannot do it without ensuring that armed forces personnel are protected from sexual and violent behaviour, domestic abuse, stalking and harassment. We must ensure that, if such incidents do happen, justice is swift and victims are supported.
As far as possible, the service justice system reflects the provisions of the civilian justice system, and the Bill is modernising and improving victim support. It was extremely helpful to speak to those involved in the service justice process, and I thank the Chair for organising those visits, which helped to inform us all.
Among the key measures being introduced are the sexual harm prevention orders and the sexual risk orders, which can be issued in the service court in response to provost marshal. The Bill also allows for service domestic abuse protection notices to be issued by the service police, and for service domestic abuse protection orders and service stalking protection orders to be issued by the service courts. This will ensure better protection for personnel and civilians.
The Bill also solves the discrepancy that exists between service courts and civilian courts if an offender is sentenced by the service court when they have committed a serious offence. Currently, the transfer from the service courts to the civilian justice system is undertaken on a discretionary basis. The Bill will modernise that system, and bring offenders sentenced by the service courts into line with the civilian justice system. The Bill will better support victims of a service offence by streamlining the complaints procedure.
I have some sympathy with the arguments behind new clause 12 and a great deal of respect for the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford. However, in practice, individuals cannot simply leave the armed forces to avoid proceedings. A serviceperson will not be discharged or given a final leaving date until disciplinary or criminal proceedings have been properly concluded. Even after an individual has already left service, sections 57, 58 and 61 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 allow them to be charged with an offence committed while they were subject to service law. My argument in respect of new clause 12 is that it is simply not necessary. However, I think dialogue between the Minister and the right hon. Member would be welcome.
Al Carns
I thank the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford for tabling new clause 12, which seeks to ensure that service courts can impose protective orders on individuals who leave service before trial and preventing the avoidance of such orders simply by leaving the service. I recognise the good will and the sentiment behind new clause 12. However, it is not needed.
I want to be clear that individuals should not be able to evade accountability for their conduct and that safeguarding measures must not fall away simply by reason of service or leaving the armed forces. Protecting victims of domestic abuse, stalking and sexual harm is a clear priority of this Government. The reality is that individuals cannot simply leave the armed forces to avoid proceedings—they just cannot. It is actually relatively complicated to leave the armed forces. A serviceperson will not be discharged or given a final leaving date until disciplinary or criminal proceedings have been properly concluded.
Importantly, if for some reason an individual were to slip through the net and leave the service, sections 57, 58 and 61(2) of the Armed Forces Act 2006 allow them to be charged with an offence committed while they were subject to service law. Such a charge may be brought within six months of their leaving service, or after six months with the consent of the Attorney General, ensuring that service courts can still exercise that jurisdiction when necessary.
The Government have engaged with experts, including the Home Office, the Defence Serious Crime Command and safeguarding teams in the design and creation of service protection orders to ensure that they are robust and effective. That includes ensuring that service protection orders will be recognised and enforceable within civilian courts. That means that where a protection order is made, the Bill provides for those orders to transition to the civilian justice system once an individual leaves service and provides enduring protection for victim-survivors. The reality is that people cannot just leave the military, especially if they are under investigation. Secondly, if they do, they are still subject and can be pulled back for a minimum of six months. Taken together, that approach provides continuity, confidence and protection beyond service.
David Reed
The Minister is laying out a very well-structured argument, and I see many of the points, but I wonder about certain circumstances. For instance, if a serviceperson took drugs and was kicked out—they have to abide by those rules, which we all know about in the armed forces—what would then happen?
Al Carns
If there were criminal proceedings, he would be held to account in the service justice system for up to six months after the case. It is relatively simple. As we know, it is quite hard to leave the military, and when someone does, they are still subject to service law for six months after they have left.
The Government do not believe that new clause 12 is necessary and I therefore invite the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford not to press it. I also commend clauses 5 to 9 and schedules 2 and 3 to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 6 to 9 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 10
Victims of service offences
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Al Carns
Clause 10 places a duty on the Secretary of State for Defence to issue an updated code for victims in the service justice system. The existing armed forces code of practice, which identifies the services and support to be provided to victims in the service justice system itself, is set out in regulation and has not been substantively modified since it was introduced in 2015. Clause 10 revokes the 2015 regulations. Since 2015, we have continued to make improvements to the service justice system to provide a better service to victims and witnesses, such as with the creation of the Victim Witness Care Unit, which I think the Committee saw when they went down to Portsmouth.
This clause will introduce important legislative changes to the service justice system that were made to the civilian criminal justice system through the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024. The legislation will require those responsible for providing a service to victims of service offences in accordance with the code to do so unless there are good reasons not to; and the flexibility afforded by guidance will allow future modifications and improvements to the service justice system to be easily reflected in the contents of the new code. Clause 10 also places a duty on the Secretary of State to issue guidance about victim support roles, improving clarity and encouraging greater consistency, so that service providers will be held to similar standards as their equivalents in the civilian criminal justice system.
David Reed
Clause 10 is a necessary and proportionate step to ensure that victims of service offences are properly recognised and supported within the military justice system. Those affected by such offences often face distinct pressures linked to service life, including close living and working environments and concerns about reporting within the chain of command. Strengthening protections and support mechanisms helps to build confidence in the system, encourages reporting and reinforces the principle that service personnel are entitled to the same standards of justice and care as any civilian. This is an important measure in upholding both discipline and fairness across the armed forces.
Clause 11 strengthens the role of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration in a practical and necessary way. By allowing victims to bring complaints directly to the commissioner, it removes unnecessary barriers and ensures that their voices are heard more clearly and promptly. This change reflects a sensible and compassionate approach, particularly in cases involving service offences, where the experiences of victims must be treated with seriousness and respect. It reinforces accountability while improving access to justice.
Al Carns
Clauses 10 and 11, in reality, thicken out the service justice system and align it with the civilian justice system, providing greater freedoms and protections for anybody who is a victim within this system. I commend them to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 10 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 11 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 12
Service policing protocol
Ian Roome (North Devon) (LD)
I beg to move amendment 6, in clause 12, page 29, line 6, at end insert—
“115C Duty to refer sexual offences and domestic abuse to civilian police
(1) This section applies where a service police force or the tri-service serious crime unit is made aware of an allegation that a person subject to service law, or a civilian subject to service discipline, has committed a relevant offence in the United Kingdom.
(2) The Provost Marshal of the relevant service police force, or the Provost Marshal for serious crime, must immediately refer the allegation and transfer the investigation to the relevant civilian police force.
(3) In this section—
“relevant civilian police force” means the civilian police force for the area in which the alleged offence took place;
“relevant offence” means—
(a) any offence under the Sexual Offences Act 2003,
(b) an offence involving domestic abuse within the meaning of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, or
(c) an offence of attempting or conspiring to commit an offence within sub-paragraph (a) or (b).
(4) The Secretary of State may by regulations specify further offences which are to be treated as a relevant offence for the purposes of this section.”
This amendment requires the Service Police and the Defence Serious Crime Command to refer all allegations of sexual offences and domestic violence to the civilian police forces for investigation and subsequent trial in the civilian justice system.
Ian Roome
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Efford. Amendment 6 would introduce a requirement for the service police and the Defence Serious Crime Command to refer all allegations of sexual offences and domestic violence to the civilian police forces for investigation and subsequent trial in the civilian justice system.
Clause 12 currently inserts into the Armed Forces Act 2006 a new section requiring the Secretary of State to issue a “service policing protocol” to co-ordinate the work of the Defence Council, each service police force and the tri-service serious crime unit. That provision aims to better co-ordinate those organisations’ vital work and to protect against improper interference in their criminal investigations.
This amendment would insert an additional section requiring the provost marshal to refer all allegations of sexual offences and domestic violence to the relevant civilian police force. That is important because, although cases involving this kind of accusation may be heard faster under military investigation, many fear that these cases continue to be adversely influenced by the close-knit community within the armed forces and by the military chain of command. It was a recommendation of the 2021 Atherton report, in which more than 2,000 female service personnel and veterans said that they had been victims of bullying, discrimination, harassment or sexual assault during their service in our armed forces. Some reported a culture where cases are minimised, evidence is lost and perpetrators are protected. Transferring that role to independent civilian police would remove the risk of a conflict of interest that can happen when the military investigates itself.
In the shocking case of Royal Artillery Gunner Jaysley Beck, who tragically took her own life in 2021, the coroner ruled that the sexual harassment she had suffered should have been referred to the police. The Ministry of Defence aims to see the percentage of women in our armed forces increase from 12% to 30% by 2030, and independent police investigation of sexual crimes would help to rebuild trust and accountability. Under subsection (3), a “relevant offence” would be committing, attempting or conspiring to commit an offence under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 or an offence involving domestic abuse as defined by the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. The Secretary of State would also have the power to add additional offences should it be deemed necessary.
Rachel Taylor
I thank the hon. Member for North Devon for tabling the amendment, and I have just a few things to say. Its impact would be to remove the voice of the victim from the process in deciding the jurisdiction of sexual offences and domestic abuse cases. If a victim does not want their case dealt with in the criminal justice system, it is possible, as is the case with many situations where we see violence against women, that they will withdraw from the process. We have seen lengthy delays in the civilian justice system for dealing with rape and serious sexual offence cases. We have seen many instances of victims removing themselves from the process. The amendment would have the impact of removing the victim’s choice for the matter to be dealt with in the service system, possibly leading to a case where no prosecution was ever pursued. That cannot be right and therefore I cannot support it.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
I will confine my remarks to amendment 6, tabled by the hon. Members for North Devon and for Tunbridge Wells. Although I have real sympathy with its purpose, I am hesitant about its drafting, and recognise that, in this place, we sometimes develop what could be described as an unhealthy instinct to overcomplicate what, at its heart, is a very simple objective—that serious allegations are handled properly, consistently and in a way that commands the public’s confidence.
I will start with where I hope and think we all agree: that allegations of sexual offences and domestic abuse are among the most serious that any justice system will have to confront. They demand to be treated with urgency, professionalism and, above all, trust. I do not think it is controversial to say that victims, whether serving in uniform or not, should not feel that the system is treating them differently depending on administrative geography or institutional habit. That is the spirit in which I understand that the amendment seeks to ensure that such cases are not left solely within the service channels, but are referred immediately to civilian police forces, with the implication that civilian investigation would become the default route.
I understand why Members are attracted to that clarity. There is a certain political comfort in having bright lines. I must confess that I have often found myself drawn to them, but that is usually just before discovering why lawyers or police officers prefer slightly more shaded ones. I support the principle underlying the amendment, but I have reservations about the way in which it seeks to achieve it.
My first concern is practical. The amendment requires that where service personnel, or the tri-service serious crime unit, are made aware of an allegation, they must immediately refer it and transfer the investigation to civilian police. “Immediately” is one of those words that looks quite reassuring in legislation but behaves rather less co-operatively in real life. In practice, the first hours of an investigation are often the most sensitive. Evidence is fragile, scenes need securing and victims may need safeguarding. Crucially, the question of who is best placed to take operational control may depend on facts that are not yet fully known. There will be cases where civilian forces are clearly the best placed from the outset—I suspect that they may be the majority—but there will also be cases where service police are already on the ground, embedded in the environment and uniquely placed to stabilise the situation before any handover, if necessary, can sensibly take place. What worries me slightly is that we risk turning a sensible presumption of civilian involvement into a rigid statutory trigger that may inadvertently disrupt good policing practice at exactly the wrong moment.
The second concern is more about coherence than timing. The amendment fixes jurisdiction by reference to the area where the offence took place. Again, that will work perfectly well in many cases, but the armed forces are not always known for their geographical neatness. People move, units deploy and conduct straddles locations. Investigations often involve a mixture of service personnel and civilians across different parts of the country. My concern is not that the principle is wrong but that a rigid allocation rule may create friction between agencies at precisely the moment when co-ordination matters the most.
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, I have concerns about the role of service policing itself. The service police and the Defence Serious Crime Command are not an inferior version of civilian policing. They are specialised and professional, and they often operate in environments that civilian forces are simply not structured to manage at first contact. If we were starting from scratch, we would not design two parallel systems and hope they never meet; we would design integrated systems with clear rules on information sharing, handover and joint working. That is where the real answer to this question lies. What I do not want us to do—however well intentioned the amendment is—is accidentally create a system where the service police are required to stand down too early or where information is transferred without the structured co-ordination that makes investigations effective. That is a defence not of silos, but of joined-up working between different agencies.
This is where I come to what I think would improve the Bill more than the amendment. What we really need is not just a duty to refer but a clear statutory expectation of mandatory information sharing and structured joint working between service police and civilian forces when dealing with sexual offences and domestic abuse. That would achieve the spirit of the amendment, and I think it would do so more reliably, without removing operational discretion at the earliest and most sensitive stage of any investigation. With that in mind, I gently press the Minister on this point. I do so in the spirit of someone who, prior to coming to Parliament, has sat through enough briefings to know that when everybody says, “Of course, we already share information effectively,” the definition of “effectively” remains quite different in different organisations.
Will the Minister give a clear commitment that the Government will ensure mandatory enforceable information sharing arrangements between the service police and civilian police forces in all cases involving sexual offences and domestic abuse? If that commitment is forthcoming, a great deal of the concern behind the amendment would arguably fall away. It would ensure that civilian forces are engaged early, that victims do not fall between systems, and that service police are not left operating in isolation or ambiguity. Although I support the broad intent of amendment 6 and its aims of ensuring serious allegations are handled properly and consistently, I am afraid that I am not persuaded that the current drafting is the best way to achieve that aim. I worry that it may constrain operational judgment in ways that are not fully intended.
I am, however, keen that we do not lose sight of the objective. I would strongly welcome the opportunity to work with colleagues across the House to refine this approach, potentially on Report, in a way that better balances mandatory co-operation with operational flexibility. If we get that right, we will do two important things at once: we will strengthen confidence in the handling of the most serious allegations, and we will ensure that those responsible for investigating them are not inadvertently placed in a straitjacket that makes their job harder rather than easier. On that basis, I hope the Government will engage constructively and I look forward to continuing this conversation.
David Reed
I acknowledge the intention behind amendment 6, and I thank the hon. Member for North Devon for tabling it. It is designed to ensure that serious offences, including sexual violence and domestic abuse, are investigated by civilian police with the specialist expertise and resources that those cases demand. That is an objective that both sides of the Committee can support, but as my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley has laid out, some of the wording and the blanket approaches that have been drawn into clause 12 need to be hammered out.
Public confidence in the handling of such grave matters is essential, particularly when they involve members of the armed forces. That said, it is important to examine whether the approach set out in the amendment is the most effective way to achieve that aim. There are practical considerations around how referrals would operate, how responsibilities would be divided and how we would ensure that victims experience a clear and consistent process from start to finish.
Mr Paul Foster (South Ribble) (Lab)
I find this a fascinating debate because we can all see the meaning of the amendment, but the hon. Gentleman mentioned victims. If he recalls, we all visited the Defence Serious Crime Command and the victim support unit, and it was made clear that the victim support service has made some real improvements over the past few years. In any crime investigation that is transferred from the service justice system to the criminal justice system, the victim support unit cannot support the victim. That is a concern to me, and it was raised with us. Does the hon. Member agree that is a considerable concern that we should look at?
David Reed
Yes, I completely agree. If a crime has happened and the victim engages with a support unit, having to move between civilian and military judicial systems, and switch between people that they have had trusted conversations with, is—if I were to put myself in their shoes—probably not what they want to do if they have been exposed to sexual violence or other violence. I completely understand the approach that the hon. Gentleman puts forward.
I am keen to continue constructive discussions with colleagues across the Committee, as well as with the Ministry of Defence, to ensure that our system for investigating and prosecuting offences continues to improve. I look forward to working with the Minister on those proposals.
Al Carns
I thank the hon. Member for North Devon for his views on the Bill, but before providing comment on amendment 6, I will first speak to clause 12.
Currently, under section 115 of the Armed Forces Act 2006, there is a duty on individual provost marshals to seek to ensure that all investigations carried out by the service police are free from improper interference. Clause 12 provides a power to create a protocol that will support the provost marshal in complying with that duty, but it also goes further than that. It will set out how all members of defence can support such investigations and improve the working relationship between key stakeholders in support of service policing. That power is loosely based on the equivalent power under which the civilian Policing Protocol Order 2023 was created in the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011. The civilian protocol sets out the operational independence and governance structure in civilian policing in England and Wales. There is currently no equivalent to that in defence and no clear articulation of investigative independence for service police to enable personnel in defence to ensure the support of investigations.
The effect of clause 12 is that, through the protocol that it provides for, it will be formally articulated to the whole of defence how people in defence should exercise, or refrain from exercising, functions in order to improve working relationships and ensure that investigations carried out by the service police are absolutely free from improper interference.
Amendment 6 seeks to amend clause 12 to override the victim’s preference. That is the key issue: to override the victim’s preference by making sure that all investigations and prosecutions take place in a relevant criminal justice system of the UK. That cannot be the right way forward. By overriding the victim’s preference, the amendment risks increasing the victim withdrawal rate. Noting the procedural differences between the two systems, 2024 administrative data on adult rape-flagged cases shows that the withdrawal rate from civilian police investigations is 59% compared with 24% from the Defence Serious Crime Command. We heard that from various witnesses in evidence sessions. The amendment potentially risks making the victim withdrawal rate even higher in the civilian criminal justice system.
David Reed
We have talked a lot about the UK, but can the Minister give some clarity on when those offences happen abroad? Say, for instance, someone was on an overseas base in Cyprus, and the Cypriot police were to be involved. What would happen at that point and how would that affect the equation?
Al Carns
The hon. Member raises a very important point. I will have to come back to him with specific details and statistics on that, and I will write to the Committee.
As mentioned before, the amendment potentially risks making the victim withdrawal rate even higher than in the criminal justice system. It also risks the loss or erosion of “golden hour” evidence and the safeguarding of victims in cases of sexual offending or domestic abuse. That is because the amendment does not place a duty on civilian police forces to accept the case. That could make delays in the civilian criminal justice system worse. In 2024, investigations of adult rape-flagged cases in the criminal justice system in England and Wales took 338 days. That is higher than the 148 days seen in the service justice system, even when taking into account the further 72 days until charge is directed.
To reassure the Committee, the Government are committed to making sure that each case, in particular those involving sexual offences or domestic abuse, is dealt with in the right jurisdiction. The prosecutors’ protocols therefore provide for decisions on jurisdiction to be made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the views of the victim. That is one of the most important points—the views of the victim and their preference. In the event that agreement cannot be reached in England and Wales, for example, the ultimate decision on jurisdiction lies with the Director of Public Prosecutions in the civilian system, so there is a fall-back mechanism. It is a priority for us that decisions on jurisdiction are made in a timely way and take into account the victim’s preference. That is why clause 25 strengthens the provision of information and support to victims when they are asked their preference on jurisdiction.
There are two points I would like to come to. The first is the horrendous case of Gunner Jaysley Beck and what has been done since that incident, but also the Sarah Atherton review that took place in 2021. Since then, there has been a huge amount of work—under both the previous Government and this Government—to ensure that the service justice system, and indeed military culture, is transforming in the right direction. I will be really clear: when I joined, in 1999, LGBT individuals were still not allowed in the military. The culture has moved. It moved slowly, but it is moving faster, I think, in the last five years and in the last two years than I have seen it move in a long time.
There have been a couple of key milestones in that movement. The first one is zero tolerance to unacceptable sexual behaviour. That zero tolerance has trickled down to every rank in the military. I remember implementing that direction for my staff when I was the chief of staff for the UK carrier strike force. That took place across the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. The Raising our Standards programme is a commitment to tackle unacceptable behaviours and to drive lasting cultural change—again, to try and move in the right direction. Importantly, the violence against women and girls taskforce change programme is now running in Catterick and Plymouth, something I launched when I was the Veterans and People Minister. There is also the tri-service complaint system.
All of those programmes are moving in the right direction to ensure that if anyone is a victim of sexual violence or harassment, they have a place to go to express their concerns. It also ensures that it is dealt with independent of the chain of command and allows the victim to raise issues and get them dealt with in the most effective and appropriate manner.
We are currently working on a formal information sharing agreement. Currently, information is shared with civilian police forces through local engagement during investigations. I am happy to continue dialogue and take that forward to make sure that that is more solidified, clear and standardised across various civilian police and military police elements.
The reality is that clause 25 strengthens the provision of information and support to victims when they are asked for their preferred jurisdiction. Therefore, this Government maintain that case-by-case decisions taking into account the view of the victim—and that is critical, the view of the victim—is the best way forward. I hope that provides necessary reassurance to the hon. Member for North Devon, and on those grounds I ask him to withdraw the amendment. I commend clause 12 to the Committee.
Ian Roome
I will withdraw the amendment, but I ask that the Minister takes on board the comments made by the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley in his powerful speech, so that this can come out on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 12 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 13
Entry for purposes of obtaining evidence etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Al Carns
The purpose of clause 13 is to extend the powers of judge advocates to enable them to issue search warrants, which can include other premises that are occupied or controlled by a person subject to service law, or a civilian subject to service discipline, but are not necessarily occupied as a residence. Examples include vehicles, boats or storage containers. Clause 13 also aligns the definition of premises in the Armed Forces Act 2006 with that in section 23 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984—also known as PACE.
Turning to clause 14, under existing powers in section 314 of the 2006 Act, the UK civilian police can arrest a serviceperson reasonably suspected of committing the offences of desertion or absence without leave, commonly known as AWOL. Clause 14 extends those powers to include servicepersons reasonably suspected of committing the service offence, under section 12 of the 2006 Act, of disobedience to lawful commands.
A lawful command may be given by a commanding officer or the service police to protect victims from further harm, or indeed to prevent the risk of further offending by the suspect. Those may include restrictions on places that the suspect can visit, such as specific buildings or addresses, or people with whom they can have contact. By enabling the civilian police to arrest someone suspected of breaching such orders, their enforceability will be enhanced.
Turning to clause 15, the 2006 Act allows only the commanding officer of a suspect to authorise their pre-charge custody after arrest. This can sometimes create delays in the investigation process or risk further harm to victims or witnesses. Since the establishment of the Defence Serious Crime Command, the increased volume and complexity of its caseload have rendered the issue progressively more challenging.
Clause 15 creates a power for all the provost marshals to authorise pre-charge custody for service offences. This will apply to arrests for schedule 2 offences and offences that would attract a sentence of over two years’ imprisonment in the civilian criminal justice system. It will also apply to schedule 1, part 2 offences where permission has been refused for a commanding officer to deal with the matter summarily, and to attempted versions of the offences. Clause 15 will also apply where prescribed circumstances exist, such as repeated assaults on two or more occasions, or where a senior rank has inflicted serious injury on a service person.
Clause 15 also extends the existing powers for commanding officers, and the associated safeguards, to the four provost marshals. These safeguards include the 12-hour review period and the 48-hour time limit beyond which an extension must be approved by a judge advocate. Commanding officers must still be notified if a suspect is taken into custody, and that must take place within six hours of the arrest. In exceptional cases, commanding officers have the power to authorise custody, but they must notify the provost marshal for serious crime and the provost marshal of the service police force for the service of which the suspect is a member.
Clause 16 inserts new section 58A into the 2006 Act, imposing a time limit for charging summary offences under section 42. This clause reflects recommendation 35 of Sir Richard Henriques’s 2021 review: that the service justice system should follow the principle of the civilian justice system that minor matters, triable only in a magistrates court, have a six-month time limit imposed on them from the date the offence was committed. The clause therefore imposes a six-month time limit on summary-only offences in the service justice system. However, the clause will enable the Director of Service Prosecutions to determine whether such matters may be heard outside the six-month time limit. Such a pragmatic approach reflects the realities of service life, operational demands and the nature of deployments and operations, which may make a hard six-month time limit unworkable. I commend clauses 13 to 16 to the Committee.
David Reed
These clauses deal with entry for purposes of obtaining evidence, arrest and detention by civil authorities, pre-charge custody, and time limits for charging certain offences. It is right that service police are given clear and effective powers to obtain evidence, as the Minister has laid out clearly, and that such powers are subject to proper judicial oversight. The provision to allow a judge advocate to authorise entry and search of relevant premises seems sensible to modernise the system and to help investigations proceed efficiently and lawfully. I also welcome the clarification around arrest and detention by civil authorities, and the extension of pre-charge custody arrangements in serious cases. The changes should help to ensure that serious allegations are dealt with more consistently and with the necessary urgency.
Al Carns
The clauses will enhance the ability of our military police forces and our provost marshals to enact service justice. These measures will make the forces safer, enable them to look after the victims, and support their freedom to operate within the military system.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 14 to 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 17
Duty of commanding officers to report serious offences
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Al Carns
Clause 17 will strengthen the duty of commanding officers to report allegations of serious offences to the service police. It removes an existing limitation where a commanding officer is obliged to report only a suspected schedule 2 offence committed by someone under their command. Under clause 17, where a commanding officer becomes aware that a serious offence may have been committed by any
“person subject to service law”
they must promptly refer the matter to the service police. However, the duty does not apply if the commanding officer reasonably believes that the service police or Defence Serious Crime Unit is aware of the matter. This is not a new process but an improvement to the existing duty, which will ensure that all serious allegations, including of sexual offences, are reported to the service police as promptly as possible. I commend clause 17 to the Committee.
David Reed
I welcome the clause, which seems a sensible and practical strengthening of the duty of commanding officers to report serious offences. The Minister, as a former commanding officer, will have experienced this duty at first hand, so I respect his judgment and expertise on the matter.
It is right that responsibility should apply wherever a commanding officer becomes aware of allegations concerning any person subject to service law, not only those within the officer’s direct chain of command. A broader duty will help to ensure that serious matters are not missed simply because of the structure of a unit or the form of command. At the same time, the safeguards in subsection (4), which mean that no further report is needed where the service police or tri-service serious crime unit is already aware, is a sensible way to avoid duplication and unnecessary bureaucracy. Taken together, the clause is a balanced reform that strengthens accountability, improves consistency and supports the proper investigation of serious offences across the services.
Al Carns
Commanding officers should always report an issue if they see one. With this change, they will have to and will be held to account.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 17 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 18
Summary hearings: punishments available to commanding officers
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Al Carns
Clause 18 gives a commanding officer the power to award a punishment of service detention to a
“corporal, bombardier, lance sergeant or lance corporal of Horse in any of His Majesty’s military forces”.
Those are OR-4 ranks, according to the NATO military rank codes. The power may be used only by commanding officers with extended powers at summary hearing. Currently, commanding officers in the Army and the Royal Air Force Regiment cannot impose service detention on an OR-4 rank, whereas those in the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force can. This variation in powers risks delay and unnecessary cost to the service justice system through trials potentially being heard at the court martial rather than being retained for summary hearing.
Allowing service detention to be imposed at summary hearing on corporals in the Army and the Royal Air Force Regiment is also in line with the operational reality that our military capabilities are becoming more integrated and joint. It is therefore increasingly likely that OR-4s from across the armed forces will be jointly deployed or even in joint units. As a result, it is more likely that commanding officers may face situations in which OR-4s from different services are defendants at summary hearing in a single case or in linked cases.
Clause 19 will give a commanding officer the power to impose a deprivation order in combination with a punishment of service detention, forfeiture of seniority or reduction in rank or disrating. Such punishments are used in more serious cases seen at summary hearings. At present, a commanding officer can impose a deprivation order only alongside a fine or “minor punishment” such as an admonition. Where a charge has been proven at summary hearing or a conviction obtained in a service court, they can be used to deprive the offender of any rights to certain property—this is property that has been lawfully seized from an offender or was in the offender’s possession or control when apprehended or charged with an offence. That might be, for example, tools used to commit the offence, offensive weapons or controlled drugs. In the more serious cases that might be dealt with at summary hearing, clause 19 will enable commanding officers to impose punishments that are just and proportionate and that protect the public and other service persons—for example, so that the property cannot be used again to commit the same or similar offences.
David Reed
We welcome clauses 18 and 19 on summary hearings and deprivation orders with the punishments available to commanding officers. They represent a serious aim and a proportionate update to the summary hearing powers available to commanding officers. Clause 18 would promote greater consistency across the services, by enabling service detention to be imposed on corporals, as the Minister said, and equivalent ranks, bringing the Army and the Royal Air Force Regiment into closer alignment with arrangements already in place elsewhere.
Clause 19 is likewise a practical step forward, as we heard in some of the evidence sessions. Permitting a deprivation order to be imposed alongside more serious summary punishments would give commanding officers a broader and more flexible set of options, while keeping matters within the summary system. That should help to ensure that sanctions are better tailored to the offence and the circumstances of the individual case. Taken together, the provisions enhance fairness, consistency and operational effectiveness, and we are pleased to support them.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
I welcome the clause. Will the Minister set out how there will be consistency in the use of these powers by commanding officers, to ensure that there is equality of justice across the board?
Al Carns
As someone goes across the single services and joint staff colleges, there will be different sections where they are trained on administering justice and the rights of a commanding officer. Importantly, there will be joint standing procedures produced around the clause, which everyone who becomes a commanding officer will have to read and ensure that they adhere to.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 18 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 19 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 20
Qualification for membership of the Court Martial
Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)
I beg to move amendment 9, in clause 20, page 34, line 27, at end insert “or
(iii) a retired holder of such a rank.”
This amendment would add retired officers to those qualified for membership of the Court Martial.
Mr Francois
I again place on record our thanks to you, Mr Efford, and to our excellent Clerks and the team who organised a very good visit down to Portsmouth, where I think we learned a lot about the operation of the service courts in practice—I certainly did. A number of issues were raised in that discussion, not least about the operation of juries in courts martial, and who serves on those jury panels, how they are selected and why. I will give two or three examples of the issues that came from that and then talk to the amendment.
The current practice, when an officer is being tried for an offence, is that only officers may serve on a jury panel in a court martial. Some people raised questions with the briefers that day about why that should be, and it is an interesting issue. The book answer from the Department was that officers should be tried by a jury of their peers, and therefore it should be other officers who serve on that panel. There is an issue that follows from that about the rank of the officer being tried and the rank of the officers that then serve on the panel. We learned about a practical constraint, which is that if a relatively senior officer is being tried, let us say a colonel or above—to take an Army example—there is only a relatively small pool of people who could be trawled to sit on that panel to pass judgment on that officer.
In the civilian world, we would not have a system where, if a professor were being tried, only graduates could sit on the panel. The civilian system is that people are chosen entirely at random from the electoral roll and are asked to do jury service, which they are mandated to do, with certain exceptions set out in statute. In the civilian world, people are not tried by people of—how can I put it?—an equivalent educational or social status. As the saying used to be, it is a jury of 12 good men and true; now it is, rightly, a jury of good men and women and true who assess someone’s guilt or innocence. In the military, we still carry out the process in this ranked, structured way.
Let us say that we had a lance corporal who was being tried for being drunk and disorderly—perhaps he had got into a bar brawl after the end of an exercise; he had gone out at the weekend, had let off a bit of steam and this had led to him allegedly committing an offence. At present, as I understand it, only senior non-commissioned officers of the rank of the equivalent of colour sergeant or above could pass judgment on that lance corporal. That raises an interesting question: why should another corporal or lance corporal, who likes a night out on a Friday as well, not be allowed to serve on that panel? Why does it have to be a colour sergeant or equivalent?
Forgive me, Mr Efford, I am using Army ranks because that is what I am most familiar with from my service, but the point holds good across all the services. Why should only a colour sergeant or above be allowed to pass verdict on a lance corporal or even a private soldier? A number of such issues cropped up from our visit. Also, as in the old saying that the Minister reminded me of, time spent in reconnaissance is seldom wasted. This was a good example of that practice.
The amendment was drafted specifically to address one of those issues—the potential shortage of officers to serve on court martial panels, especially if a relatively senior officer is being tried, when by definition the pool of available serving officers to serve on a panel is limited. We have tried to come up with a practical suggestion, which is to use retired officers of equivalent rank. I am also interested to hear what other members of the Committee think of the wider issue, which is, does this have to be as hide-bound by rank as it is at the moment? I am interested in the Minister’s view as well, not least because he has been a commanding officer.
If we are to keep the system in essence as we have it at the moment, however, would it not make sense to be able to draw on a pool of retired officers of the required rank, who might have a little more time on their hands? We would not be taking anyone away from ongoing operations, and we could take time from their lives in order for them to continue to serve in a military context in the important task of administering service justice. That, in essence, is the intention of the amendment, but we also tabled it to provoke, I hope, a wider debate—I am looking at one or two Labour Back Benchers in particular, because they were vocal about this when we were in Portsmouth, so now is their chance—about why we do things in the way that we do them, and whether there is some potential for change, but if not, why not?
I hope that I have laid out the issue fairly clearly for the Committee.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
I am grateful for the opportunity to speak in support of the amendment, which was tabled in the name of His Majesty’s loyal Opposition, and to set out my broader support for clause 20. I will begin with the clause itself, because it addresses the composition of the court martial. In such circumstances, it is right that we support the very sensible change that the clause sets out, with its underlying intent to ensure that the court martial is properly constituted and capable of commanding confidence across the armed forces and the wider public. Enlarging the pool of those who can sit on it is a welcome amendment.
Precisely because we support that principle, however, we also need to examine whether the system is fully equipped for the realities it faces. In that context, the amendment becomes not only relevant, but in my view increasingly necessary. The amendment proposes a simple change, as set out by my right hon. Friend, to include retired holders of the relevant rank among those qualified for membership of the court martial.
At first glance the amendment may appear relatively modest, but I suggest that, like many apparently modest changes in defence legislation, it subtly reflects something much more significant. It reflects a recognition of the demands placed on our armed forces justice system and how those are changing over time, and changing rapidly. We are operating in an era of increasing operational tempo—a phrase that is often used in defence debates, sometimes frequently.
Luke Akehurst (North Durham) (Lab)
Has the hon. Gentleman made any assessment of whether the capacity savings from serving officers not having to serve on the court—because under the amendment they would be replaced by retired officers—are perhaps exceeded by the burden on the service justice system of having to track and maintain some kind of database of the retired officers that it would call on to serve?
Dr Shastri-Hurst
The hon. Gentleman makes a helpful challenge. Clearly, there is no impact assessment with the amendment. However, there is a joint service publication, the RARO—regular army reserve of officers—list, and there are those letters I receive annually asking me to update my address and contact details. There are already mechanisms by which individuals can be identified and recalled for this service. Given the operational tempo that I have described, it makes sense that we ameliorate the pressure on those who are currently in active service while not impacting the flow of justice through the service justice system.
Mr Francois
In my experience, retired officers, particularly retired senior officers, are keenly aware of their pension entitlements. If we are paying them a pension through the armed forces pension scheme, we presumably know who they are and where they live. Via that database, it would not be particularly onerous to come up with a list of retired senior officers who could at least be invited. We are not suggesting that this should be mandatory, but we are suggesting that they may want the opportunity to serve. Via their pensions, we know where they are.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend, who from his time as a Defence Minister knows well how to keep tabs on those who have served our country but are now retired. The pension scheme is an obvious way to do so. In addition, he makes an important point about the willingness of individuals to engage in the process. These are people who have given enormous service to their country, and often wish to continue giving service long into their years of retirement from active service.
Our armed forces are more stretched and more globally engaged than before, and they are more frequently deployed than at almost any point in recent decades. The spectrum of threats facing our country is widening, from state-based adversaries to hybrid war, cyber-operations and persistent instability in regions where British forces are called to act with precision and professionalism. As I have set out, when operational tempo increases every part of the system is affected. It is not just about equipment, logistics or personnel numbers, but about the justice system that underpins discipline, accountability and command authority.
The question, therefore, is a relatively simple one: does our current system of service justice have the flexibility, depth and resilience required to meet that demand? Amendment 9 is one attempt to ensure that it does. It recognises that we are asking a great deal of a relatively small pool of serving officers. We are asking them not only to command forces in complex environments but, where necessary, to sit in judgment in court martial proceedings, including in cases involving senior rank, complex evidence, and often significant reputational consequence for all involved. That is not to say that these individuals are incapable of doing those tasks, but that is a heavy burden on any system. It becomes more difficult still when we consider the practical realities of availability.
Senior serving officers are, by definition, in high demand. They are deployed, rotated, assigned to strategic planning roles or engaged in operational command responsibilities that cannot simply be paused or rescheduled. At the same time, the court martial system requires a bench that is credible, experienced and capable of understanding the realities of service life. It is not enough that those sitting in judgment are legally competent to interpret the evidence; they must also understand the context in which decisions are made, the pressures under which orders are given and the operational environments in which conduct is assessed.
That combination of legal competence and operational understanding is not easily found, and it is here that amendment 9 can make a tangible contribution. By extending eligibility to retired officers of appropriate rank, we end up expanding the pool of individuals who can bring that essential combination of experience and judgment to the court martial system.
I want to be clear about what the amendment seeks to do and what it does not seek to do. It is not an attempt to dilute standards. On the contrary, it is an attempt to strengthen them by widening the field of those who meet them. It is not an attempt to undermine the authority of serving officers; it is an attempt to relieve them of some of the competing pressures that now fall on them in an increasingly demanding environment. It is not an attempt to create a separate or parallel justice system where some are tried by those who are still in active service and some are held in judgment by those who have retired. It is merely an attempt to ensure that the existing system has the necessary capacity to function effectively.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
I welcome the hon. Member’s intervention. If he is suggesting that we should look at going wider than the confines of this specific amendment, I would welcome that conversation. It is about increasing the flexibility and agility of the court martial system so that it reflects the challenges for those who currently serve in uniform.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
The Minister is right to challenge me on the case that I am making. It is about competing challenges facing those in senior rank in the armed forces. My right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford gave the example of colonels or above. We have heard of very senior officers being brought before a court martial in cases that may involve, for instance, continuity of education allowance. These are senior individuals who then take out other senior individuals. They are often in a fairly small pool and have perhaps worked closely with one another during their service, but they also have increasing demands, given the global instability that we are currently facing.
It therefore makes logical sense to widen that pool and take the pressure off the shoulders of those who have operational responsibilities by allowing those who have served in the past, and hold those ranks by virtue of their service, to sit within the court martial system and increase capacity. I am not suggesting that there is an inefficiency in the service—everybody involved is doing the best job they can. It is about flexing resources so that they are used most appropriately to deliver the outcomes that we need not only from a national security and defence perspective, but to maintain the integrity and speed with which service justice is administered.
There is also a broader strategic point that we must not overlook, and it touches on the Minister’s point. We often speak about the importance of a whole-force concept and the idea that national defence is about not simply those currently in uniform but a wider ecosystem of reserve capability, which we will come on to later. It is also about veterans, institutional memory and those who can bring expertise from their time in service. We are, quite rightly, investing in the reserve forces. We are also increasingly recognising the value of civilian expertise in a variety of fields, such as cyber-intelligence or technology. In many respects, we are trying to build a much more flexible and adaptive defence structure, and yet, when it comes to the service justice system, we have not always applied the same logic with equal measure or consistency. We have in effect treated participation as something that must be narrowly confined to serving personnel, even when highly experienced retired officers could make a valuable contribution.
Luke Akehurst
I feel that the hon. Member is perhaps trying to fix something that is not broken. In the evidence we heard about the service justice system, was there anything that implied that there was a large-scale problem with delays and scheduling? I ask because I thought I was hearing about a system that was relatively efficient and speedy compared with the delays that we all know are afflicting the civilian justice system. There was just one instance—I think it was of a general who had done something inappropriate regarding funding for school fees. It was almost a sui generis incident where it had been difficult to put together a board. Will the hon. Gentleman accept that there is some danger that the amendment is attempting to fix something that is not broken in a system that is actually working rather well?
The Chair
Order. I gently remind hon. Members that interventions should be slightly shorter than that.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
I fear that recollections may differ. My interpretation of the evidence that we heard is not that this is a failing system—far from it. I gently suggest to the hon. Member that the civilian Crown courts and magistrates courts may not be the best benchmark against which to compare its performance.
There is a wider issue, which the hon. Gentleman has touched on: this should not be merely about fixing a problem that exists now. There should be some horizon-scanning for the emerging challenges for the armed forces, not only in the present day but in the years ahead, and safety-proofing of the system against those challenges. That is the specific intent behind the amendment.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford and I have spent time making the argument about the more senior pool of officers. That is a fair position to take, because they will be under much greater demands, with extensive challenges. Given the threat levels we face—there was a statement in the main Chamber yesterday about events in the middle east—we are living in a much more unstable world, with much greater demands on our armed forces. One can foresee increasing difficulty in constituting panels for cases, particularly those involving senior officers. It would be a dereliction of duty if, instead of planning for those threats and the challenges that they might pose to our armed forces, the Committee and the House more widely sought only to react to them in future. It is always better to do things proactively in a calm manner and think about the implications, rather than doing things retrospectively and hurriedly because an issue has arisen.
I will dwell a little more on cases involving the higher ranks. When they do arise, it is often necessary for the panel to include officers of either equivalent or higher rank, but the pool of serving officers is by definition limited. As I hope I have described, that can create genuine operational and logistical difficulties in assembling boards that are both appropriately constituted, given the demands on their make-up, and able to proceed without undue delay. Retired officers of the relevant rank represent an obvious and sensible extension of the pool that would help us to proof the system. They would bring not only rank equivalence, but often a broader perspective. Having stepped back from the pressures of immediate command, they might bring a degree of reflective judgment that is particularly valuable in the complex and sensitive cases that invariably involve more senior officers, by virtue of the nature of the offences of which they are accused.
I speak as someone who has developed a healthy respect over the years for the ability of retired officers to express opinions with a greater level of clarity than they may have done in post. That brings a refreshing breadth to the system. There is something about leaving service—I certainly found this myself—that appears to improve one’s ability to identify precisely what everyone else should have done differently. Stepping away from the pressures and challenges of day-to-day service life enables individuals to take a wider and more holistic approach.
I am mindful of the fact that I am probably trying your patience, Mr Efford, so I will wind up shortly. I do not pretend that amendment 9 is perfect in every detail. The hon. Member for South Ribble provided a helpful challenge in relation to whether its scope should be wider. There are certainly questions about eligibility criteria and the mechanism for appointment, although I think that there is an obvious mechanism for identifying potential appointees. Those questions will need careful consideration, but that is not a particularly unusual position to be in at this stage of the legislative process. The purpose of Committee is not necessarily to produce final answers, but to test the direction of travel. I think the direction of travel is sound when it comes to ensuring that the system is foolproof.
This is about the resilience of our justice system and about making better use of experience that already exists in our wider armed forces community. It is about ensuring that the demands of the increasing operational tempo are not inadvertently creating bottlenecks in the very system designed to uphold discipline and fairness. Ultimately, that is the balance that we are trying to strike: on the one hand we want armed forces that are operationally effective, globally deployable and able to meet the demands of a more dangerous and uncertain world, but on the other hand we want a service justice system that is robust, timely and capable of functioning without becoming a constraint on our operational effectiveness. Those two objectives should not be in tension. We need to think carefully about how we design institutions that can support them both.
Clause 20 is an important part of that architecture: it will ensure that the court martial remains properly constituted and legally sound. Amendment 9 would strengthen that approach by ensuring that it remains practically workable under conditions of increasing demand. I urge the Government to accept the amendment, because I suspect that as operational pressures continue to rise and as we ask more of our armed forces across multiple domains, the need for flexibility in our service justice system will only become more rather than less pressing. If we get it right now, we will not only improve efficiency and effectiveness, but strengthen confidence in the system. That is ultimately what we should be trying to achieve in the Bill.
Ian Roome
It is important that we take on board the evidence from our visits. Otherwise, what is the point of going on them? That point was brought up when we debated a previous amendment, with reference to the use of the civilian or military justice system.
The hon. and gallant Member for Solihull West and Shirley made an excellent speech about using retired officers. We heard from those who are recruiting that there are delays. We heard during a visit that a senior officer had struggled to find a panel, and the process had been delayed because permission from the then Secretary of State was needed to use an officer of a lower rank. We also heard that it would be much easier to find officers. It is difficult to find officers of an equivalent rank, particularly among the higher ranks, who have not served or trained together or do not know each other, and to be sure that they do not have any relevant interest in protecting someone or perverting the course of justice. The right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford also made a good point about who constitutes the panel. I support amendment 9, because what is the point of our going on visits if we do not act on what we have been told is an issue?
We also heard a point that has not been mentioned today, which is that those in the non-commissioned ranks, such as warrant officers who have 25 or 30 years’ experience in the job, could also sit on the panels. It is not addressed in the amendment, but we heard evidence that those with years of military service and a lot of experience could be used on the panels too.
David Reed
I will add to the arguments of my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley, my right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford and the hon. Member for North Devon.
The Opposition’s recollections align very closely with those of our Liberal Democrat colleague. Although we did not hear about a system that is breaking, we definitely heard about a system that is under strain. If memory serves—please correct me if I am wrong—we were shown a really good presentation by the people we visited in Portsmouth that demonstrated how the service courts have expanded. We had just a few men before; more rules and regulations have now been introduced, and thankfully women are being included, but extra bureaucracy has been added to the system. As the hon. Member for North Devon articulated, being more senior and not knowing people you have served with from other units is for the birds. We are going to end up with bottlenecks.
Sarah Bool
If there is one phrase my father always says to me, it is “Sarah, you can’t teach experience.” We have talked about bringing retired officers back into the justice system; this is a very good example of what we can do to call on their experience. With jury service and jury trials, we try to get a range of experience from all types of peers. I know that there is an argument to say, “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it,” but we want to streamline and enhance our justice system to make it as effective as possible. I support amendment 9.
Al Carns
I thank the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford for tabling amendment 9, which seeks to add retired officers to those who are qualified for court martial membership. However, I believe that the amendment is unnecessary and most likely counterproductive.
The first argument made was about capacity and the lack of senior officers to sit on courts martial and hold people to account. As the Committee knows, we keep those things under constant review. The right hon. Member mentioned a case from several years ago that highlighted a lack of capacity to charge senior members. We pushed through secondary legislation in 2024 to amend two of the armed forces court martial rules so that if a defendant was at one star or above, the president of the board would be at one-star level; they did not need to be of higher rank. That was a significant change.
As for lack of capacity, I will throw out a question to the Committee: how many one-stars do we have in the military? We actually have 200 one-stars—let that sink in—and that does not include the reserves. There is no capacity issue here.
Secondly, the amendment could be counterproductive, because it is vital that the board members have up-to-date knowledge and real-time experience of the latest single-service policies. I say that from experience, because sentencing at court martial fulfils a number of purposes, including punishment, maintenance, discipline and deterrence.
Al Carns
As the hon. Member will know, trying to speak to people about whether they know other people is exceptionally difficult. Trying to capture that in a data record would be even more difficult. The 200 officers in service at the moment do not include the reservist pool, which is quite large—and that is just one-stars, not two-stars, three-stars or four-stars, so the pool is actually far larger.
I will go back to the purpose of sentencing at court martial, because it is an important point. As I say, it includes punishment, maintenance, discipline and deterrence. It must also take into account the best interests of the service and the maintenance of operational effectiveness. I completely agree that experience cannot be taught, but sometimes experience can wane over time. An appreciation of the relevant factors comes with experience, but also with the responsibilities of rank, as the veterans community will understand, and with the exercise of leadership and command over others. In some cases, that will not come with the most up-to-date operational context, which could cause an issue on the court martial board.
David Reed
We want to strengthen the Bill by working with the Government and taking a collaborative approach. Having a shared reality, in any aspect of life, is massively important. Among Opposition Members, there is alignment on the shared reality that we heard about, when we went down to Portsmouth, from the people we empower to run the service justice system. Does the Minister know of any of the cracks or weaknesses, as we heard about on our visit? Does he acknowledge that there may be issues to address?
Al Carns
Listening to evidence and acting on it is critical. Understanding the context in which it sits is equally important. Did that individual know that there are 200 one-stars within defence? Did they have the authority and responsibility to allocate individuals in a short, timely and effective manner to a court martial board? Probably not. The problem is not capacity. It is perhaps that the Defence Serious Crime Command needs greater authorities and programming to pool individuals in a timely and effective manner to sit on a court martial board and deliver justice.
Mr Francois
This is not a criticism of the Minister, because no doubt he had other important things to do, but he was not on that visit, as I recall. As Her late Majesty once said, recollections may vary, but this was a point raised with us by the people presenting to us on the operation of the system. We did not invent it. They made the point quite strongly that, for instance, if people had been on staff courses together—let us say that they had done the Royal College of Defence Studies course for a year together—that would sometimes rule them out. I must make the point to the Minister that we have not fabricated this; it is a problem that was raised with us by the experts who actually deal with the process day to day.
Al Carns
In no way, shape or form am I suggesting that this was fabricated, made up or a lie. What I am trying to say is that context is important. The statistics show that there are 200 one-stars in regular service, not including the reserve. That is a large pool of individuals, which reduces the right hon. Member’s argument about capacity. He talked about people knowing each other, but there are clear protocols in place to ensure that when the board is pulled together, the range of individuals on it is as broad as it is wide, and that there is at least one woman and one man on it. I think that that is adequate. The 2024 secondary legislation that amended the rules was brought in specifically in response to the case that was mentioned during the Committee’s visit—
Armed Forces Bill (Fifth sitting)
(1 day, 11 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Minister for the Armed Forces (Al Carns)
I would like to make a correction to an earlier statement about new clause 12, before I continue to address amendment 9. I would like to clarify a point that arose in the debate on new clause 12 in relation to service protection orders. The powers in the Armed Forces Act 2006 create a time limit for charging former members and ex-regular reservists with a service offence committed while subject to service law of six months from the date they ceased to be subject to service law.
After a period of six months from the date on which they ceased to be subject to service law, a person may be charged with a service offence, committed while subject to service law, with the consent of the Attorney General. They do not remain subject to service law once they have left the armed forces, and the same time period also applies to civilians subject to service discipline. If there are any questions about the detail of that, I am happy to write to the Committee on anything specific that is required.
David Reed (Exmouth and Exeter East) (Con)
I will just pick up on a point I raised this morning, which I discussed with an hon. Friend who has experience in this space. Take, for example, a crime that is committed while a person is serving that is not serious enough to warrant their being remanded into custody—it goes over the six months because it is a knotty case. Because there is zero tolerance on drugs, someone might say, “Right, this is a knotty case. I am going to get into trouble for it, and I am going to get kicked out regardless, so I will just take some drugs. I will be kicked out within a very short space of time”. If they then let those six months elapse, what is the process for that?
Al Carns
I am always very reticent to get into the detail and legalities of the exacts, given there are multiple variables that we are discussing, whether it be drugs or whether it be a criminal offence. If a person is serving and a crime is committed, they will not be allowed to leave until the process for dealing with the justice of that case is well thought through, whether that be within the military system or transferred into the civilian justice system, because they cannot just leave the military while there is a case ongoing. However, if the hon. Member has a specific concern about a specific case with correct parameters, we will ensure we write to him on it and all of its different variables. It is quite difficult to provide the specifics on that now.
David Reed
I will make that intervention now, and then we can carry on that conversation. If there is zero tolerance of drugs, and if the person who has committed a crime knows they will be kicked out—as they should be—it would be good to hear from the Ministry of Defence if there is a loophole in which someone could say, “I will do this act knowing full well that I will be kicked out very quickly”. It would be good to understand what the process is. Does that person continue to be housed by the armed forces? Where do they stay? Are they still part of their unit? What happens to them?
Al Carns
The broader welfare of individuals who are dismissed for misuse of drugs is a separate issue to the original offence and the judicial system, which will be followed through whether they are serving or whether they have left or been removed from the armed forces. What I am specifically saying is that they can still be charged six months after. The Bill will ensure that any of those processes that are put in place for them while in the military can seamlessly transfer to the civilian justice system, so that justice can be carried through. However, if there is a specific issue, bracket it in parameters, give it to us and we will make sure that we respond.
Al Carns
Coming back to amendment 9, I agree that pulling together a court martial board to deal with senior officers poses more challenges than it does for junior personnel. Such cases are rare, and changes were made quite recently to address the issue. Changes were made in secondary legislation in 2024 to provide more flexibility in the formation of court martial boards for trials where the defendant is a senior officer, to address any potential difficulties in finding sufficiently senior personnel who do not know the defendant to sit on the board. Having boards that are tri-service has also helped assist with that. The changes ensure that the president of the board—the most senior person on the board—will be at least a one-star when the defendant is a one-star or above, and that practical attempts are always made to try to find a suitable two-star. When a two-star cannot be found, a one-star works. For defendants below one-star, the president of the board is always one rank higher.
We talked about capacity and the availability of ranks, and we will look into the detail of how we ensure that the Defence Serious Crime Command has the authority to leverage people to deliver the right consistency on boards. In terms of capacity in dealing with senior officer trials, there are around 200 one-stars in the armed forces and around 470 personnel at one star or above. There are sufficient personnel to meet the few occasions when senior personnel are tried. We keep those matters under review through the governance board of the service justice system, the service justice board and the service justice executive group, in which all key stakeholders are represented.
Clause 20 amends section 156 of the Armed Forces Act 2006, to correct an anomaly relating to those who are eligible to sit on a court martial board. The Armed Forces Act 2021 reduced qualification for those non-commissioned officers who were entitled to sit on a court martial board from a warrant officer to those of substantive OR-7 rank, for example a colour sergeant. However, a technical oversight meant that other subsections of section 156 were not also amended to reflect those changes. Consequently, only warrant officers and equivalent who became commissioned officers automatically qualified to sit on a court martial board, while OR-7s still had to undergo a three-year qualification period. Clause 20 simply enables those who receive their commission and were of former substantive OR-7 rank to automatically qualify to sit on the court martial board. I hope that provides the necessary reassurance to the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford on those grounds, and I ask him to withdraw his amendment.
Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)
I do not think we need to have a debate on clause 20 stand part because we had a pretty thorough debate on the amendment, which covered most of the issues. I will seek the leave of the Committee to withdraw the amendment, but I would like to put down the marker that we have had an interesting debate and we might wish to return to this subject on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 20 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 21
Power to impose post-charge conditions on persons not in service detention
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Al Carns
Clause 21 provides judge advocates with the power to impose post-charge conditions on adult defendants in the court martial or service civilian court, where the defendant is not held in service custody.
Currently, judge advocates can only set post-charge conditions on a defendant’s behaviour or movements if the defendant appears before them in service custody. If a defendant appears before them who is not in service custody, they are unable to set any conditions. That causes problems when risks occur, such as absconding, reoffending, or interfering with witnesses. The clause provides that the defendant must be informed in writing of the grounds for the application and be given notice of the hearing. The defendant will be able to attend the hearing, be legally represented and make representations to the judge advocate. Defendants will also have the right to apply for a variation or discharge of any conditions set.
Clause 21 provides commanding officers and the service police with arrest powers for breach of a condition. It also establishes a service offence of failing to attend a hearing concerning a judge advocate-imposed condition, without reasonable excuse, carrying a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment.
Finally, clause 21 provides a judge advocate with the ability to impose urgent conditions where they consider it necessary, without the need for the defendant to have notice of the hearing or to be present. In that situation, the judge advocate must arrange for a hearing with the defendant present to take place as soon as practicable and the conditions will stop having an effect at the end of that hearing. By creating a new pathway for judicially imposed obligations with specific enforcement, the measure will contribute to ensuring attendance, preventing reoffending, protecting witnesses, and safeguarding defendants.
Clause 22 will enable a new procedure to be introduced into the court martial rules, allowing for the dismissal of a charge as well as a mechanism to enable a previously dismissed charge to be brought again under certain conditions. The clause simply enables court martial rules to replicate a procedure that currently exists in the criminal justice system, known as the voluntary bill procedure. Once updated, the court martial rules will allow the Director of Service Prosecutions, in exceptional circumstances, to seek the High Court’s consent to reinstate a charge previously dismissed where it is in the interests of justice to do so. While there is no exhaustive list of the circumstances in which the High Court can grant consent, case law provides some guidance. Cases where the voluntary procedure has been used are where there has been a substantive error of law that is clear or obvious; where new evidence has become available; or where there was a serious procedural irregularity.
Clause 23 will enable the courts martial to use mental health-related powers, equivalent to those already in the civilian system under the Mental Health Act 1983, which include the ability to make a hospital order on conviction as part of sentencing. Currently, in cases where the accused has been found not guilty by virtue of insanity or where the accused has been found unfit to stand trial and there is a finding that they did the act charged against them by the service court, a judge advocate is able to make a hospital order under the Mental Health Act 1983. A hospital order provides initial hospital treatment instead of imprisonment for a criminal offence.
However, there is no provision for cases where the accused is diagnosed as requiring mental health care while awaiting trial; before a finding of fitness to stand trial has been made; or the accused has been convicted of an offence and not yet sentenced. While the service justice system has very few cases where such a provision may be required, a recent case highlighted that these powers may be required when the accused is dealt with before a fitness to plead and/or a defence of insanity has not succeeded and the accused is found guilty.
The clause ensures that service personnel and civilians subject to service discipline receive safe, lawful and appropriate care, and that defence meets its legal and moral obligations to protect those experiencing serious mental health difficulties while in service.
I move on to clause 24. The Armed Forces Act 2021 introduced powers, known as slip rules, for commanding officers in summary hearings, the summary appeal court and the service civilian court, equivalent to the powers that already exist in the court martial. Slip rule powers simply enable punishments or activation orders made in error to be varied or rescinded quickly without the matter having to be referred to an appeal. Clause 24 addresses the error so that secondary legislation can implement the activation orders power for the service civilian court as originally intended.
David Reed (Exmouth and Exeter East) (Con)
It continues to be a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Efford. Clauses 21 to 24 cover powers to impose post-charge conditions on persons not in service detention.
We welcome these clauses as sensible, technical enforcement improvements to the service justice system. They address a number of anomalies and gaps, and will help to ensure greater consistency, clarity and fairness in how the system operates. Taken together, the measures strengthen the ability of the service justice system to deal with cases effectively, while maintaining appropriate safeguards for those involved. They also bring aspects of the system more closely into line with civilian practices where that is appropriate. Overall, these are practical reforms that improve the functioning of the system and we are happy and content to support them.
Al Carns
These are technical changes to enhance the service justice system that deal with some of those knotty issues such as mental health. I recommend that the Committee fully support them.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 22 to 24 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 25
Guidance on exercise of criminal jurisdiction
Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)
I beg to move amendment 18, in clause 25, page 43, line 23, leave out paragraph (a) and insert—
“(a) must require that, before a victim is asked to express a preference regarding jurisdiction—
(i) the victim is provided with a standardised explanation of the service justice system and the civilian justice system,
(ii) such information is presented in a clear, accessible and neutral manner,
(iii) the information includes an explanation of the key features, processes, available support and potential outcomes of each system, sufficient to enable the victim to make an informed decision, and
(iv) the victim is informed of the availability of any independent legal advice or advocacy and how it may be accessed,
(b) must require that—
(i) a written record is made of the information provided to the victim, and
(ii) where a victim expresses a preference, a record is made of the reasons for that preference, so far as provided by the victim,
(c) must not present information in a way that is misleading or lacking appropriate context.”.
This amendment creates requirements for the information victims receive regarding both justice systems.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 19, in clause 25, page 44, line 33, at end insert—
““independent” means independent of—
(a) the chain of command, and
(b) any body responsible for the investigation or prosecution of the offence.”
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 18 and defines independence for the purposes of that amendment.
Clause stand part.
Clause 26 stand part.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this afternoon, Mr Efford. I will speak in support of amendments 18 and 19 and, in doing so, will address clause 25 more broadly.
At its heart, clause 25 concerns one of the most sensitive and important decisions in the entire service justice framework—the point at which a victim is asked to express a preference as to whether an allegation should proceed in the service justice system or the civilian justice system. For many victims, this is the first moment at which they are invited into a process that will shape not only the course of an investigation, but their experiences of justice itself. That is precisely why it is incumbent on us to get it right.
I think all of us would accept that asking a victim to make a jurisdictional choice without proper, balanced and comprehensible information risks placing an unfair burden upon them at a moment of deep vulnerability. It risks substituting clarity for confusion, and it risks turning what should be an informed decision into, in effect, an uninformed guess between systems they may not fully understand.
Amendment 18 seeks to address that concern directly, and it does so by placing clear statutory requirements on the nature, quality and neutrality of the information that must be provided before any preference is expressed. That principle is incredibly important because, if we are asking victims to make decisions that can affect the trajectory of an investigation, we have a duty—indeed, a moral obligation—to ensure that those decisions are properly informed.
David Reed
My hon. Friend has again laid out the argument in an extremely comprehensive way, and it will be difficult to add anything new to the argument that he has put forward, but I will give it a go.
Ensuring that a victim is properly informed before being asked to state a preference on whether their case is heard in the service justice system or the civilian courts is essential, and I think we can all agree on that. The principle of concurrent jurisdiction allowing a victim to have a voice is a positive one.
However, a preference given without adequate understanding is not a meaningful choice; it becomes a procedural step rather than a genuine expression of agency. It is important to recognise that. The two systems differ in significant ways, and we have heard that in a lot of the evidence sessions and during our Committee trip down to Portsmouth.
These systems operate under distinct procedures, timelines and support arrangements and can lead to different outcomes. Many victims will have no prior experience of either system, and some may be asked to make this decision while in considerable distress. Without a clear, neutral explanation of what each system entails, the process does not empower victims but risks forcing them to make an uninformed decision or leaving them susceptible to undue influence. To reinforce that point, although it may be easy to make the decision when you have a clear head, if you have been the victim of a crime and your head is all over the place, having to make an informed decision when the information on the two systems is not clear and you have not encountered either system before makes the situation even more troubling.
The amendment would establish a basic standard to require that victims are given a clear, accessible and impartial explanation of both systems before any preference is sought. That explanation would cover how each process works, what support is available and the potential outcomes, and inform victims of the availability of independent legal advice or advocacy and how to access it. Crucially, it would introduce a requirement for a written record detailing the information provided and, where preference is expressed, the reasons given.
Al Carns
I thank the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley for speaking to amendments 18 and 19. I acknowledge their sentiment, which is to ensure that the information provided to victims is appropriate and timely. The Government’s intention is to ensure that when a victim of an offence committed in the UK by a serviceperson is asked to indicate a preference on jurisdiction, they can do so in an informed way. The information provided must be accurate, helpful and, of course, objective, so I share the hon. Member’s objectives.
The Government have already begun work with the statutory consultees set out in clause 25 to understand what information should be provided to the victim, how and when it should be provided, and who should provide it. That complex, detailed work involves stakeholders from across the criminal justice systems of England, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland, including the Victims’ Commissioners, and has so far highlighted the importance of seeking an informed view from the victim and that that information should be provided in a factual and impartial way. It has also highlighted that where a victim indicates a preference as to whom they wish to discuss jurisdiction with, it should be acted on, and that a record of the discussion of the victim’s preferred jurisdiction, and the reason given for it, must be kept.
Our work with stakeholders has also highlighted the importance of taking into account the needs and circumstances of the victim, and the circumstances of the offence, so the guidance must allow for a flexible, case-by-case approach. In some cases—as offences take place in different times and contexts—it may not be appropriate to confront a victim who only shortly before experienced a rape offence with many pages of written information to digest. In those cases, a more trauma-informed, verbal approach, under the statutory guidance and supported by a shorter leaflet or booklet, may work better.
In other cases, a victim may have a strong view from the outset that their case should be dealt with in the civilian criminal justice system. Asking that victim to go back through lots of information about the service justice system when it is already known that they have a strongly held preference would be unwelcome, and may prove counterproductive, as the civilian police investigator risks coming across as questioning or disbelieving the victim’s preference, undermining future co-operation with the victim and, ultimately, the successful investigation of the case. I absolutely understand the hon. Member’s intent, and I hope that I have provided some reassurance that guidance will facilitate access to support that is independent of the chain of command, policing and prosecutors.
Amendment 19 is, in some ways, linked to amendment 18, and seeks to ensure that victims have access to independent support before indicating a preference on jurisdiction. We have already begun work with the statutory consultees set out in clause 25 to understand who can support victims to reach a preference on jurisdiction, which will vary across the UK and across the service justice system. Where the victim indicates a preference on whom they wish to discuss jurisdiction with, it should be acted on. For example, when initial contact is made with service police, victims of serious sexual offences may choose to seek support from the Victim Witness Care Unit, which is independent of the chain of command and of service policing. Alternatively, they might wish to discuss the matter with the lead service police investigator. Crucially, the guidance will facilitate access to alternative support in response to the wishes of the victim.
In February 2026, the Government announced that we would launch the independent legal advocacy support programme pilot, which will provide impartial legal support to anyone aged 18 or over, irrespective of whether they are a serviceperson or a civilian. Anyone who reports a sexual offence that has been committed by a serviceperson subject to service law, or a civilian subject to service discipline, when that is being investigated by the service justice system, will qualify for support under the scheme.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
On the basis of the Minister’s clarification and reassurances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clauses 25 and 26 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 27
Driving disqualification orders: reduced disqualification period
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Al Carns
At present, service courts are empowered to make a driving disqualification order against an offender in proceedings for a service offence. However, there is no legal mechanism for service courts to reduce that period of disqualification from driving where the offender undertakes an approved course, unlike the civilian justice system. Clause 27 will enable the service courts—the court martial and the service civilian court—to make an order to reduce a period of disqualification from driving where the offender satisfactorily completes an approved course. This new power will be available to a service court where it convicts an offender of a certain road traffic offence, such as drink-driving, and imposes a driving prohibition of 12 months or more. These provisions address a gap in the existing legislation that has meant that the powers of service courts in relation to driving prohibitions are more limited than those of their civilian counterparts. It will ensure that the service courts have the same tools available to them as the civilian courts when dealing with these sorts of cases.
David Reed
Clause 27 aligns the service justice system with the civilian courts and introduces a constructive way for offenders to reduce their disqualification period through completion of an approved course. On our side of the Committee we see that as a practical and proportionate reform that supports rehabilitation, encourages personal responsibility and delivers greater consistency across both systems, and we are happy to support it.
Al Carns
I will begin with clause 28. The minor service sentences of reduction in rank or disrating, of forfeiture of a specified term of seniority or all seniority, and of service supervision and punishment orders all serve a useful purpose in punishing service personnel. However, these sentences are effectively made redundant by having no rehabilitation period. That undermines the purpose of the punishment, which by its nature is designed to have an impact on an individual’s career. The single services have no opportunity to consider whether administrative action should be taken against a serviceperson because the convictions are considered immediately spent. Administrative action has a range of options and may include assessing whether the nature of the conviction means that the individual is unsuitable for life in the service, or whether they are suitable for promotion during the period of rehabilitation. Considering these options following a conviction is vital to maintain operational effectiveness and the welfare and safety of others in the armed forces.
Clause 28 will establish rehabilitation periods of 12 months for these sentences. As a result, the rehabilitation periods will be harmonised with those for other minor service sentences: custody for one year or less, removal from His Majesty’s service, service detention, reprimand and severe reprimand and a fine. The clause also aligns the rehabilitation periods in Scotland with those in England and Wales. The required amendments relate to differences in terminology. Clause 28 will preserve the intended disciplinary effect within military administrative processes and maintain operational effectiveness and the welfare and safety of others in the armed forces.
I turn to clause 29. The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 prevents the single services from taking administrative action when a conviction becomes immediately spent. Increasingly, the civilian police in England and Wales issue simple cautions for a wide range of offences, and those cautions are treated as spent right away. As a result, the services are unable to take administrative action in response to conduct that may still be relevant to a role in the armed forces. A single lapse in conduct, however minor it may appear in civilian terms, can have serious consequences in a military environment, where values, standards and cohesion are not optional but fundamental to keeping our people and our nation safe. As we continue to professionalise the armed forces and rebalance the demographic representation, the current approach is increasingly inappropriate, especially where the conduct resulting in a caution is incompatible with the high values and standards expected of our armed forces.
Clause 29 will create an exemption from the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act that enables the single services to place a disclosure obligation on serving members of the armed forces to report spent cautions. Once it is disclosed, the single services will be able to consider the caution and, if necessary, take an appropriate approach to conduct associated with it.
Clause 29 will enable the armed forces to maintain the highest standards, ensuring that every incident is addressed appropriately, that victims are supported, and that we can better retain and recruit our personnel. At a time when we are committed to halving violence against women and girls and to driving up the integrity and professionalisation of our armed forces, this change is not only timely but essential.
David Reed
Clauses 28 and 29 are practical and proportionate reforms. Clause 28 defines rehabilitation periods for certain service punishments under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974. Sanctions such as reduction in rank, forfeiture of seniority and service supervision and punishment orders will no longer be treated as spent. Again, that is a good approach.
Clause 29 will enable the armed forces to require the disclosure of spent cautions issued to service personnel during their service period. I note the points that the Minister raised about the information that may be used by superior officers for administrative rather than disciplinary purposes or to support the maintenance of discipline, operational effectiveness and rehabilitation within the forces. The clause also provides clear definitions of “superior officer” and “administrative action” to ensure consistency in how the relevant provisions are applied. The Opposition support the clauses.
Al Carns
This is about improving our service justice system and, of course, the ability of our command chain to enact the highest standards. I commend clauses 28 and 29 to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 28 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 29 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 30
Commissioner’s functions in relation to Royal Fleet Auxiliary
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Al Carns
Clause 30, which introduces schedule 4, provides the statutory basis for extending the remit of the Armed Forces Commissioner to the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Truro and Falmouth for raising the issue in a ten-minute rule Bill and getting it the attention that it deserves.
Although the RFA is a civilian organisation, its personnel routinely operate alongside the Royal Navy. Indeed, they are essential to the Royal Navy. They face similar risks, pressures and, in many cases, operational demands. RFA personnel have distinct welfare needs shaped by long deployments, a demanding operational tempo and the challenges of supporting military operations. Bringing the RFA within the remit of the Armed Forces Commissioner will ensure that those issues are visible at the highest levels of defence oversight.
Clause 30 and schedule 4 will not alter the employment status of RFA personnel. They will remain civilian employees with full employment rights, including trade union representation. The extension to the Armed Forces Commissioner’s remit is designed to avoid interfering with existing statutory protections or established industrial relations frameworks and union representation.
Clause 30 will insert into the Armed Forces Act 2006 a new subsection that introduces schedule 14ZB to enable the commissioner to conduct thematic investigations into systemic RFA welfare concerns, such as those relating to accommodation, on-board facilities, training, welfare support, access to welfare services or the effects of extended time at sea, enabling wider patterns and areas requiring improvement to be identified. It will also strengthen accountability by giving the commissioner a clear mechanism to raise concerns directly with the Secretary of State. This will ensure that identified welfare themes, whether they are linked to operations, to support arrangements or to wider Ministry of Defence responsibilities, are formally captured and considered. While clause 30 and schedule 4 expand the commissioner’s remit, they also set clear boundaries. Individual employment disputes, civil proceedings, matters covered by collective agreements or complaints brought by unions will remain outside the scope, preserving clarity and the integrity of the existing processes.
Having served in the military for 24 years, I spent several months, if not years, on Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships, or working with it, and I hold it in the highest regard. The RFA underpins the Royal Navy’s deployable standards and capabilities. I think this is a fantastic move to ensure that it gets the representation it deserves. In practical terms, clause 30 and schedule 4 will provide an independent avenue through which RFA personnel can escalate systemic welfare issues. Over time, that will strengthen support to the RFA and ensure that its personnel’s welfare is considered alongside that of service personnel, while respecting their distinct civilian status. I commend clause 30 and schedule 4 to the Committee.
David Reed
I will expand on clause 30. I pay tribute to my near-ish neighbour in Cornwall, the hon. Member for Truro and Falmouth, for her work on the issue and how she has progressed it in the House of Commons. I think that clause 30, which will extend the remit of the Armed Forces Commissioner to include the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, reflects a clearer understanding of the role of RFA personnel and the part they play in our national security. It will ensure that those who serve in this unique capacity are afforded a basic safeguard: an independent route through which serious welfare concerns can be raised and addressed.
The Royal Fleet Auxiliary occupies a distinctive and often misunderstood position within His Majesty’s naval service. Its personnel are civilian mariners who operate alongside the Royal Navy in demanding environments. They are not members of the armed forces in a strict legal sense, yet they deploy globally, support military operations and spend long periods at sea under conditions that closely mirror those faced by uniformed personnel.
I have spent nowhere near as much time in the military as the Minister, but I have spent a small amount of time on RFAs. It is difficult to distinguish between members of the RFA and those of the Royal Navy, and the professional standard across both organisations is definitely felt. That reality matters, because the pressures arising from such service are significant: long deployments, separation from family, fatigue and the strain of high-tempo operations can all take their toll. In a period of international conflict, with the multitude of issues coming down the track, I can see those ships and their crews being used even more. Getting this right in the Bill now is massively important.
There can also be issues relating to bullying, harassment and misconduct. Those are real concerns that affect morale and wellbeing. For too long, RFA personnel have lacked a clearly defined, independent mechanism for raising serious welfare concerns beyond existing civil service or employment processes. Clause 30 will address that gap in a proportionate way by providing a credible avenue for concerns to be examined where other routes may be insufficient.
Schedule 4 is key to making this reform workable. It sets out how the commissioner’s functions will apply in practice, including a duty to promote the welfare of RFA personnel and improve public understanding of the issues that they face. Greater visibility will strengthen accountability and support better outcomes. The schedule will also enable the commissioner to investigate general welfare matters affecting the RFA. That will ensure that their role is not limited to individual complaints and that they can identify wider patterns and systemic issues where they arise. That is how effective oversight should operate, and it is what we should expect of people who work with our military in such a close way.
The extension of powers has been designed with care. The RFA is a civilian-manned service, and the safeguards reflect that. The provisions on powers of entry are also essential. The commissioner must be able to visit vessels and premises, examine documents and speak to personnel. Without that, oversight would lack substance. Those powers are rightly subject to safeguards, including restrictions on grounds of national security or safety, and the protection of legal privilege.
I also welcome the amendments relating to reporting and governance. Including RFA functions in the annual reports will strengthen transparency and parliamentary scrutiny. Preventing RFA members from serving as deputy commissioners will help to preserve the independence of the office.
Taken together, these provisions form a coherent and practical framework. They extend meaningful protections to RFA personnel while respecting their unique status. Ultimately, the clause is about fairness and recognition, which is something I think we all agree on. It acknowledges the vital contribution of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary and will ensure that those who serve have confidence that their welfare matters and their concerns will be properly heard.
Jayne Kirkham (Truro and Falmouth) (Lab/Co-op)
I feel I should say something about this, as I started it. I did so because I consider Falmouth to be the home of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary’s Bay class ships, as it is where they are maintained and repaired, so the RFA personnel are in great part my constituents.
RFA personnel are fundamental to the Navy and to the military. In many cases, as has been pointed out, they allow them to do their job. Recently, they worked on operations relating to the shadow fleet and protecting cables. One of the Bay class ships became a hospital ship off the west coast of Africa during Ebola. The RFA has played multiple roles, often as the forgotten service; it slips between the civil service and the military. Many in the RFA feel that their work has not been appreciated, so I am pleased that the Government have picked up on that and put this clause in the Armed Forces Bill—it is much appreciated. It is the start of work on building recognition of the RFA and on retention and recruitment within the service, which has struggled of late. I appreciate this measure and am very pleased that it has been included.
Mr Francois
As the title of clause 30 is “Commissioner’s functions in relation to Royal Fleet Auxiliary”, I will ask the Minister something about the commissioner and then something about the Royal Fleet Auxiliary.
It would appear that, after some time, the Government have now announced someone to fill the position of commissioner. I wonder whether the Minister can confirm that. There are reports in the media that the appointment has been made, but I hope the Minister will put that firmly on the record and say a bit about the individual and how they came to be selected. What was the process by which they got that important job? Has the Defence Committee been involved in the appointment in any way?
Mike Martin (Tunbridge Wells) (LD)
I can help out a little with the right hon. Gentleman’s question. The post was not filled. The Government were having some difficulty in filling the post, and—
The Chair
Order. We are going down a rabbit hole. The Committee is not here to debate who will fill the commissioner’s role; we are here to debate the clause. Can we get back on subject, please?
Mr Francois
Thank you, Mr Efford. I just wanted to know who got the job.
Turning to the RFA, I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Truro and Falmouth for what she has done to raise the profile of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. The issue is clearly extremely close to her heart. I believe that she was trying to advance a private Member’s Bill, having done well in the ballot, but there has been a slight problem with that, because—almost exceptionally, other than during covid—the Government’s business managers have hardly provided any time at all in this Session for private Members’ Bills. All those Members who had Bills that were important to them never really got a chance to make their case, so it is good that she has had the opportunity to put something on the record today.
The commissioner has important powers, as my hon. Friend the Member for Exmouth and Exeter East said, and the Royal Fleet Auxiliary has a very important role. From memory, it was created in 1905. The Minister, from his time as the chief of staff of the carrier group, knows how important it is. Technically, its personnel are not members of the armed forces, but members of the merchant navy. However, it is fair to say that the Royal Navy could not operate without them, as was well said by the hon. Member for Truro and Falmouth, who understands these matters.
The RFA has a slightly unusual constitutional position, but is a vital part of Britain’s defence none the less. Indeed, a few days ago, a number of Russian shadow fleet tankers were shadowed through the English channel by the RFA Tidespring, because no escort was operationally available. That is pretty embarrassing for the Government, when the Prime Minister has talked so tough about boarding shadow fleet tankers but has boarded precisely none of them. We touched on that point in the Chamber yesterday. Perhaps the Minister can update us. Why we did not have a warship available to undertake the task, when the Russians had a warship to escort their own shadow fleet? The middle of the channel is international waters. Where are we on all this?
The Chair
Order. Can we get back to the Bill? The right hon. Member is asking a lot of questions that I am sure are very interesting, but they are not germane to the Bill. Can we get back to the subject that we are debating?
Mr Francois
Yes, Mr Efford. I will conclude there. I just wanted to know why the RFA is doing a job that the Royal Navy is supposed to do. After our debate yesterday, perhaps the Minister will enlighten the Committee.
Al Carns
First, I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Truro and Falmouth. She generated this, and now it has come to fruition, so well done. The reality is that there is no Royal Navy without the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. The RFA does an exceptional job across everything from high-end technical to refuelling and enabling our carrier strike group.
When we talk about embarrassment and availability of capability, the unfortunate reality is that we have the cards that we have been dealt, after successive Governments under-invested in the significant hard capability that we require to deter hostile states. As a Minister in the previous Government, the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford owns an element of responsibility for that.
Mr Francois
For the record, whatever we did or did not do in Government, we did not bring in the £2.6 billion of operational spending cuts in the financial year just gone. That is why our availability is so poor, and that was a purely Labour decision, was it not?
The Chair
Order. We are getting off the subject again. Can we come back to the clause, please?
Al Carns
There is no Royal Navy without the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. Its personnel are the best of us. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 30 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Christian Wakeford.)
Representation of the People Bill (Sixth sitting)
(1 day, 11 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 12 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
Good morning. Please ensure that all electronic devices are turned off or switched to silent mode. We now continue line-by-line scrutiny of the Representation of the People Bill. The selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room and on the parliamentary website. That shows how the clauses, schedules and selected amendments have been grouped together for debate.
I remind the Committee that a Member who has put their name to the lead amendment in a group is called to speak first; in the case of a stand part debate, the Minister will be called first. Other Members are then free to indicate by bobbing that they wish to speak in the current debate. At the end of a debate on a group of amendments, new clauses and schedules, I shall call the Member who moved the lead amendment or new clause again. Before they sit down, they will need to indicate that they wish to withdraw the amendment for the new clause or seek a decision.
If any Member wishes to press any other amendment to a vote, including grouped new clauses and schedules, they need to let me know. The order of decisions follows the order in which amendments appear in the amendment paper. I hope that explanation is helpful.
Clause 48
Absent voting
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss:
Government amendments 14 to 17.
Schedule 3.
New Clause 40—Expired postal votes—
“(1) The Representation of the People Act 2000 is amended as follows.
(2) In Schedule 4, paragraph 3 (Absent vote at elections for a period) after sub-paragraph (5) insert—
‘(5A) In the case of a person whose entitlement to vote by post at elections of the kind in question has expired, the registration officer shall make available, upon request from a registered political party, that person’s details as supplied to the registration officer in his application to vote by proxy at parliamentary elections.’”
This new clause would give registered political parties access to data on expired postal votes.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government (Samantha Dixon)
I will speak first to clause 48 and associated schedule 3, before addressing Government amendments 14 to 17 and new clause 40, tabled by the Opposition.
The current legislative framework for absent voting was designed for a very different electoral landscape. Today, far more people vote by post; supply chains and administrator resources are under greater pressure; and expectations around reliability and timely delivery have changed. Developed in consultation with the electoral sector, clause 48 modernises and strengthens the absent voting system to reflect those realities. It streamlines administration, gives electors greater flexibility and ensures that safeguards around the integrity of absent vote applications remain robust.
These measures will enable postal voters to take part in elections with confidence, by helping to ensure their ballot is issued and delivered in good time, while allowing a switch to voting in person or by emergency proxy if their ballot is delayed. They will not apply to Northern Ireland because of the different absent voting regime there and the stricter security requirements around absent voting, which are a result of the history of electoral fraud in Northern Ireland.
Setting clearer rules and deadlines will give electoral administrators the confidence and certainty needed to manage their workload effectively and keep the absent voting system running smoothly at the most demanding points in the electoral timetable. The integrity of our elections is of paramount importance. The clause also strengthens safeguards in the absent voting system by clarifying identity verification requirements, and introduces a clear statutory determination deadline for identity verification. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Government amendments 14, 15 and 16 remove a regulation-making power that the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel has advised is unnecessary. The Bill already provides that a proxy with a long-term proxy postal voting arrangement can make temporary arrangements for a particular poll without affecting that long-term arrangement. Where a proxy instead applies for a proxy postal voting arrangement for a particular election, the correct outcome is that the long-term arrangement is cancelled. That is the policy intention, and the Bill already delivers that without the need for regulation-making powers. The amendments therefore simplify the legislation, remove redundant provisions and ensure the law operates clearly and consistently for electoral administrators.
Government amendment 17 ensures consistency between the absent voting regime and the proxy voting offences in section 61(1A) of the Representation of the People Act 1983. The Bill already allows someone who has applied to be registered, and is only awaiting the end of the objections period, to be treated as a person who “will be registered” for absent voting purposes. Without the amendment, that same person could be granted a proxy vote but might not be legally capable of committing the offence of acting as a proxy for too many electors if they knowingly breached the proxy limits. The amendment closes that gap, reflects the advice of the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel and ensures that the law operates clearly, consistently and as intended. I commend the amendments to the Committee.
New clause 40 seeks to require electoral registration officers to share information with political parties about electors whose postal voting arrangements have expired. While supporting voter participation is important, the Government do not consider the new clause to be workable, proportionate or necessary. As drafted, it does not provide access to postal vote expiry data itself; instead, it links disclosure to details supplied in proxy vote applications for parliamentary elections, which is not how postal voting arrangements are recorded or renewed in practice.
Most postal voters will never have applied for a proxy vote. As a result, for many electors whose postal vote has expired, there would simply be no proxy application data to disclose, meaning that the new clause would not achieve its apparent policy aim. There is also a clear mismatch in scope. The new clause refers to postal vote expiry for
“elections of the kind in question”
but limits disclosure to proxy applications made for parliamentary elections, significantly narrowing and distorting the dataset that would be available.
A question of principle is also at stake. Electoral registration officers already have a legal duty to notify electors directly about when their postal voting arrangements are due to expire and to provide them with information about how to make a fresh application to vote by post. That ensures that voters are informed at the right time without reliance on third parties.
Lewis Cocking (Broxbourne) (Con)
When postal voters are notified by their local authority that they are about to drop off the roll, does the Minister agree that they should not always be encouraged to do that online? Some people who have postal votes do not want to make online applications. Does she also agree that they should be sent a fresh application from the council, with a freepost envelope for its return, so that they can keep their postal votes?
Samantha Dixon
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his question. It is appropriate for electoral registration officers to use their discretion in the circumstances that he describes. They can do that already, and should continue to do so, rather than the Government prescribing the route that they should follow.
Finally, requiring electoral registration officers to respond to ad hoc requests from political parties, alongside their existing statutory write-out duties, would impose a substantial and unnecessary administrative burden. For those reasons, the Government cannot support new clause 40.
Paul Holmes (Hamble Valley) (Con)
Good morning, Dr Allin-Khan, and good morning to members of the Committee. I suspect that by the end of today I am going to have a super tan, given that sun coming through the window. Thank you to Joe for sorting out the blinds.
I rise to speak to new clause 40 in my name and to talk briefly to clause 48. As the Minister has outlined, the new clause would give registered political parties access to data on expired postal votes. As the Minister said, clause 48 would give effect to schedule 3, which makes various changes to absent voter arrangements. If a voter cannot get to the polling station on the day of the election, they can apply for an absent vote. The Minister has outlined in comprehensive detail the minor amendments to the clause that she has brought to the Committee, and we have no problem with those.
The Electoral Commission’s report, however, on the 2024 general election recommended that postal voting
“should be reformed to improve the service for voters and strengthen resilience”
within the system. The Association of Electoral Administrators has called for a longer electoral timetable, including for UK Parliament elections, and for earlier absent voting deadlines, set at 16 working days before polling day. The explanatory notes to the Bill note the intention to move the postal vote application deadline in Great Britain to three days earlier in the electoral timetable, which will be from 11 to 14 working days before the poll. The Elections Act 2022 introduced a series of measures to tighten the security around postal voting, which included providing that postal vote applications expire after three years. That was to stop the scope for postal vote fraud and error.
However, one of the unintended consequences of that change, which we now recognise with concern, is that the Government have not provided for political parties and elected representatives to have access to postal vote expiry data. Political parties already have access to lists of postal voters, and as the 2022 Act provisions start to bite we are seeing a large drop-off in the number of registered postal voters. It is our belief that all parties should be able to recruit postal voters because of that huge drop-off.
I was talking to my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne earlier about how, in some areas of my constituency, postal vote drop-off levels are sitting at around 35%. We think that the Government should allow political parties to have access to data in order to play their part in postal vote recruitment if someone has dropped off. The Government have refused to amend the law to allow that, and Labour Ministers have admitted that the Government do not track the number of postal vote renewals or expiries. Amending the law in this way would be a simple step to support democratic engagement and turnout, and provide a level playing field for all parties. There would be no detriment to data protection rights, given that political parties already have access to who has a postal vote.
It is not for me to argue with parliamentary counsel—I would never do so—so I take the steer of officials at the Minister’s Department about the scope of the clause. However, I look for reassurance that the Minister will come back to the Committee about the general principle of allowing political parties access to the drop-off data; we may return to this issue at later stages. All parties, regardless of their infrastructure and machinery across the country, should be able to help the Government by playing their part in increasing the uptake of postal votes if those often vulnerable and elderly people have dropped off.
I have come back to Parliament for a rest after campaigning in the local elections for two weeks, as I suspect most Committee members have. I met many people who did not know that they had dropped off, which is unfortunately an unintended consequence of the legislation that the last Government passed. If the Minister can give a commitment to write to me about how we can amend the Bill to allow parties access, I will be content not to press new clause 40 to a Division. I would like to hear what the Minister has to say.
Samantha Dixon
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his comments; I understand the points he makes. There is a statutory duty for EROs to notify postal voters that their postal vote is due to expire at the end of January that year, and they will be contacting them. The Government’s view is that there needs to be a proportionate approach that does not add a burden in what is already a busy time for EROs. But I will write to the hon. Gentleman to set out current Government thinking in light of his remarks.
Paul Holmes
I thank the Minister for that reassurance and I look forward to her letter. The Opposition still think that political parties have a role. Because many elected representatives have access to the electoral roll, we get monthly updates; I know that that is different from what happens in an election period, and I understand that the Minister is concerned about proportionality and the burden placed on election officials. However, we believe that political parties have a role and a right to be able to see the drop-off data. However, for the smooth running of the Committee and to make progress, I will not press new clause 40 to a Division.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 48 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 3
Absent Voting
Amendments made: 14, in schedule 3, page 118, leave out lines 19 to 23.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 15.
Amendment 15, in schedule 3, page 119, line 7, leave out from “election” to end of line 8.
This amendment and Amendments 14 and 16 remove a redundant regulation-making power and associated provision. The power would have allowed for provision to be made about circumstances in which a proxy’s long-term postal voting arrangement must be preserved when the proxy is granted a postal voting arrangement for a particular poll.
Amendment 16, in schedule 3, page 119, leave out lines 11 to 13.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 15.
Amendment 17, in schedule 3, page 123, line 37, at end insert—
“20A In section 61 (voting offences other than personation), after subsection (1A) insert—
‘(1B) In subsection (1A), a reference to P being a person who will be registered includes P being a person who has applied to be registered where there is no reason not to register P other than the fact that the objections period has not ended.
(1C) In subsection (1B) “the objections period”, in relation to an application for registration, means the period prescribed under section 10ZC(2) (in relation to Great Britain) or 10A(3) (in relation to Northern Ireland) for making objections to the application before it is determined.’”—(Samantha Dixon.)
This amendment ensures that certain offences in section 61(1A) of the Representation of the People Act 1983 relating to the appointment of proxies apply to the expanded category of people who “will be registered” for the purposes of the absent voting rules.
Schedule 3, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 49
Power to obtain election-related information etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Samantha Dixon
As set out in our manifesto, the Government are committed to encouraging participation in our democracy. To achieve that, it is essential that electors are kept well informed about elections and referenda in their local area and about other pertinent information, such as the candidates running and the locations of polling stations. The clauses will enable us, in conjunction with the Electoral Commission, to improve online information services to provide that information to the public. Although the information is already available to electors, that service will help ensure that electors have access to consistent and complete information via a central service. The information that election officers may be required to provide will be limited to factual information about the poll and will not include details on the policies of candidates or political parties.
Clause 49 will create a new power for the Secretary of State to require returning officers, counting officers, petition officers and electoral registration officers to share specified information relating to elections and referenda. The Secretary of State can require the information to be shared with the Department, the Electoral Commission or both.
Clauses 50 and 51 specify which officers can be required to provide information, and for which types of elections and referenda. That power will be exercised via secondary legislation, so the exact details of the information required and processes for sharing it will be confirmed in due course. At this stage, our ambition is that the information will be collated by the Electoral Commission and shared with the public via its website. Electoral administrators will be supported to provide the required information and for electors to provide their location to quickly find the most relevant information. This is a straightforward and proportionate measure that we believe will greatly improve the electorate’s access to information and support increased engagement.
Paul Holmes
I thank the Minister for that explanation. Around the country, many enthusiasts for democracy, such as myself, will be shaking with excitement about being able to find all the information in one place. Frankly, I cannot understand why we have not moved to such a system before, and I am happy to credit the Minister for her foresight in bringing forward such a forward-thinking proposal.
Even in the last week, candidates were desperately trying to find out who had been nominated in their counties or boroughs at various stages. The information was supposed to be published at 4 o’clock on the Thursday or Friday, but Hampshire county council had not published the information in time. Such things are important for people participating.
What is particularly welcome in these clauses is the fact that people who have various disabilities will be able to access the support available. Many constituents knocking on doors in the last few weeks have raised questions about the support that they might want. Having a single place where somebody can just stick in their postcode, or where they live, and have access to information about the local or national election that they are entitled to participate in is a very good thing. We will not contest the clauses. We think they are a very good move for elections.
Samantha Dixon
I agree; we should remove all barriers to electors participating in elections. I thank the shadow Minister for describing how those barriers are in effect.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 49 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 50 and 51 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 52
Effect of the death of the Sovereign on certain elections and referendums
Samantha Dixon
The clause and schedule 4 ensure that in the event of the demise of the Crown, effective and consistent processes are in place for scheduled local elections and other polls, including mayoral elections, local referendums and Northern Ireland Assembly elections, as is already the case for a parliamentary general election. In the event of the demise of the Crown, if a UK parliamentary general election is taking place, legislation provides for a 14-day pause in the timetable for the general election to allow time for public mourning and the funeral arrangements, and the date of the poll is moved to after the date of the funeral. Different provisions are in place for other types of polls.
We believe that the 14-day pause in proceedings used for UK parliamentary general elections is the most appropriate arrangement, so the clause extends those provisions to a number of other types of election and referendum, including parliamentary by-elections, scheduled local elections, London Assembly elections, mayoral elections, local referendums and Northern Ireland Assembly elections. The measures also apply to certain Welsh elections in specific circumstances, when they are combined with UK parliamentary or police and crime commissioner elections.
A royal proclamation may already adjust the date of a postponed poll for a UK parliamentary general election by up to seven days. Under the Bill, when such a proclamation is made, any other polls combined with the general election will also move so that they remain combined. The Bill also creates an equivalent ministerial power to adjust postponed polls that are not UK parliamentary general elections by up to seven days. The provisions will ensure that consistent and appropriate provisions are in place for polls being held in such circumstances. I hope that Members will support the measure.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 52 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 4 agreed to.
Clause 53
Form of documents for elections and referendums
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendment 18.
Schedule 5.
Samantha Dixon
The clause, schedule 5 and Government amendment 18 deal with parliamentary processes used to update various forms. A range of prescribed electoral forms are set out in legislation, including poll cards, nomination forms and ballot papers. The rules for each type of poll, be it UK parliamentary, mayoral or local government, are set out in separate pieces of legislation. Each set of rules includes a full set of forms, despite the content of each prescribed form being almost entirely the same from one type of election or referendum to the next, so even a minor amendment to a form results in significant duplication across legislation, which is hugely inefficient.
That process is made even more difficult by different parliamentary procedures being required to update the forms in the different pieces of legislation. A good example of that is the recent legislation to add a veteran card to the list of accepted voter ID. That simple addition required an a affirmative instrument to be debated in both Houses to make the change for UK parliamentary elections, a negative instrument replicating the changes for local elections, and a third no-procedure statutory instrument making the same changes to Welsh language forms. That one small change therefore resulted in three instruments and more than 171 pages of legislation.
To reduce the unnecessary burden on parliamentary time, the clause makes a number of streamlining changes and amends the powers in the Representation of the People Act 1983 to allow the forms to be updated far more efficiently. The sector and stakeholders have been asking for this change, which will allow a relatively small but none the less important consolidation of electoral law.
Government amendment 18 is a purely technical change designed to ensure that the Bill operates as intended. It corrects a minor drafting error relating to the proposed changes to improve how electoral forms are updated. It is a routine correction identified during the drafting process and does not affect the Bill in substance. I commend the amendment, clause 53 and schedule 5 to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 53 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 5
Form of documents for elections and referendums
Amendment made: 18, in schedule 5, page 135, line 5, leave out “and (2)”.—(Samantha Dixon.)
This amendment corrects an error by removing a reference to regulations made under rule 8(2) of Schedule 1 to the Representation of the People Act 1983 from provision about the parliamentary procedure applying to certain regulation-making powers under that Act. Rule 8(2) does not confer power to make regulations.
Schedule 5, as amended, accordingly agreed to.
Clause 54
Removal of requirement to publish election agents’ addresses
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Samantha Dixon
Harassment and intimidation of voters, electoral staff and campaigners, both online and in person, is totally unacceptable and has a profoundly detrimental impact on our democratic process. We want as many people as possible to engage in our democracy, but sadly there are some who seek to deter involvement through abuse and intimidation.
Candidates already have the option to keep their home address from being published on the statement of persons nominated and on ballot papers, but a requirement remains for candidates who act as their own election agent to have their home address published on the notice of election agents. We are removing this requirement, enabling candidates in this position to provide a correspondence address to be published instead of their home address. We are also extending that option to all election agents. These changes will ensure that those who take part in our democracy can feel safe and secure in their home. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Paul Holmes
We welcome clause 54, which, as the Minister outlined, will allow candidates acting as their own agent to remove their home address from publication requirements. I reiterate what the Minister said: intimidation and harassment during any kind of political campaign is unacceptable. We had a very good cross-party debate on harassment in the last sitting of the Committee.
These measures seem very sensible, but I would like the Minister to address something that has just come to me, so is almost guaranteed to be nonsense. When a correspondence address has been given, if impropriety has been found to have occurred in the return of election expenses by either an agent or a candidate, might there be unintended consequences in terms of the paper trail and how that person can be found? For example—the Minister will be aware that this is slightly out there—if a dummy corporation sets up a correspondence address through a PO box, how can we ensure that the agent is held to account through an investigation? The Minister can write to me on that. It just came to me, so I am not expecting an answer now. Other than that, I think the clause is perfectly sensible, and we will not contest it.
Samantha Dixon
The hon. Gentleman makes an important point. Election agents could use a PO box as a correspondence address, but not as their office address. I hope that gives him the reassurance that any agent behaving inappropriately would be findable.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 54 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 55
Leave to pay late and disputed expenses claims
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Samantha Dixon
To prevent attempts to circumvent spending limits, current rules require campaigners to seek permission from the courts before they are able to pay invoices late. In practice, most late or disputed claims are delayed due to routine administrative issues. The Electoral Commission has said that the court-based process for leave to pay applications is inefficient and costly, delaying prompt payments and placing unnecessary burdens on campaigners, the courts and suppliers, especially small businesses.
Clause 55 addresses those inefficiencies by transferring responsibility for granting leave from the courts to the Electoral Commission. The commission will be able to give permission to campaigners to pay late or disputed claims. It is right that such decisions are made by the specialist regulator of political finance. By transferring that function to the commission, the clause will reduce unnecessary bureaucracy, support both suppliers and campaigners, and maintain the integrity and transparency of the broader campaign finance framework.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 55 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 6 agreed to.
Clause 56
Delivery and inspection of returns and declarations
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Schedule 7.
Clause 57 stand part.
New clause 47—Commencement of section 9(2) of the Political Parties and Elections Act 2009—
“(1) Within three months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must exercise the power in section 43(1) of the Political Parties and Elections Act 2009 to bring into force section 9(2) of that Act (declaration as to source of donation).
(2) This section comes into force on the day on which this Act is passed (and section 80 is to be construed accordingly).”
This new clause requires the Secretary of State to exercise the power to commence section 9(2) of the Political Parties and Elections Act 2009 which inserts section 54A into the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, which requires declarations to be provided as to the source of donations.
New clause 48—Offences relating to election expense returns: reduction in threshold—
“(1) The Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 83 (declaration by treasurer as to return relating to campaign expenditure), in subsection (3)(a), for ‘knowingly or recklessly makes’ substitute ‘knows or suspects, or has reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting, that he is making’.
(3) In section 123 (declaration of responsible person as to return relating to referendum expenditure), in subsection (4)(a), for ‘knowingly or recklessly makes’ substitute ‘knows or suspects, or has reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting, that he is making’.”
This new clause reduces the threshold for two offences in the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 so that where false declarations are provided in relation to election expenses an offence is committed if they have reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting that they are making a false declaration.
New clause 49—Declaration as to source of donation: reduction in amount—
“In section 54A of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (declaration as to source of donation)—
(a) in subsection (1), for ‘£7,500’ substitute ‘£500’;
(b) in subsection (2)(B), for ‘£7,500’ substitute ‘£500’.”
This new clause would require any donation above £500 to be accompanied by a declaration as to its source (rather than the current minimum of £7,500).
New clause 50—Penalties for false declarations—
“(1) Schedule 20 to the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (penalties) is amended as follows.
(2) In the entry for section 54A(5) (making a false declaration as to source of donation), in the second column, for ‘1 year’ substitute ‘3 years’.
(3) In the entry for section 83(3)(a) (making a false declaration to Commission when delivering return), in the second column, for ‘1 year’ substitute ‘3 years’.
(4) In the entry for section 123(4)(a) (making a false declaration to Commission when delivering return), in the second column, for ‘1 year’ substitute ‘3 years’.”
This new clause raises the maximum penalties for submitting false declarations from 1 year’s imprisonment upon conviction on indictment to 3 years’ imprisonment upon conviction on indictment.
Samantha Dixon
Under current rules, candidates or their election agents must deliver a return and declaration and any accompanying documents relating to their election expenses to the returning officer. To supplement the extension of the Electoral Commission’s enforcement role, clause 56 will require candidates or their election agents also to deliver a copy of the return and declaration and accompanying documents to the Electoral Commission. Those incurring expenditure in relation to candidates and recall petition campaigners will likewise be required to deliver copies of relevant returns and declarations to the commission.
That will ensure timely receipt of returns and declarations by the Electoral Commission, which is essential to its ability to perform its new regulatory functions quickly, scrutinise returns and deal with those not complying with the rules. The Electoral Commission will also have new responsibilities for making candidate returns and declarations available for public inspection, promoting transparency by facilitating the collection and publication of data on candidate finance in a single source. Allowing the Electoral Commission to prescribe a form of return that campaigners must use will also help campaigners comply with reporting requirements and facilitate scrutiny of returns.
Turning to clause 57, the Electoral Commission has existing duties to monitor and secure compliance with the expenditure and donations rules set out in PPERA, as well as other enactments promulgating rules concerning candidates or their election agents. To enable it to perform those duties effectively, it also has powers to make regulations relating to information that must be included in donations reports that are required under these pieces of legislation.
Paul Holmes
We think these clauses are sensible, but I have a number of questions for the Minister on their implementation. First, has she had any feedback from the Electoral Commission regarding these added responsibilities? Does she think they are within its current operational capacity? Has the commission given her Department any feedback on whether it is happy to undertake the new requirements that the Government are placing on it, and that it is resourced properly to implement and enforce them, particularly those in clause 56?
Clause 56 places a duty on candidates to send a copy of their returns to the Electoral Commission as well as the local returning officer. I am sure the Minister is aware that there are political parties and independent candidates of all shapes, sizes, abilities and internal machinery. There are associations of all political parties across the country that are run by a couple—at best—of well-intentioned volunteers, who might not necessarily be at the forefront of new electoral law changes. Has the Minister taken that into account? How will she communicate these regulations effectively so that we do not have the unintended consequence of some well-intentioned candidates and agents falling foul of them, just because of the postcode they seek to represent?
The Opposition have a wider concern about changes like this one, especially in the light of the answer given to a written question put by my hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner. The Government have proceeded with these legislative changes without consulting the Parliamentary Parties Panel. Given that clauses like this one will have a direct influence on and consequences for political parties of all shapes and sizes, it is regrettable that the panel has not been consulted at all on the Bill whatsoever.
I urge the Minister and the Government to take a step back in progress with the Bill’s passage and reset their view on consulting the Parliamentary Parties Panel when they are seeking to make changes of this nature. In that way, political parties represented on the Committee can actually be consulted and give the Government their views. It is regrettable that they have not done so. The Minister has rightly brought the clause forward, but she has absolutely no information about the views on these changes of parties—not just the Conservative party but smaller parties and independent candidates—
I hope the Minister takes that as a genuine nudge. It is a complaint from the official Opposition that these changes, and the Bill in general, have changed precedent. When the last Government introduced the Bill that became Elections Act 2022, the panel was consulted because that legislation affected all political parties on an equal basis. This Government have chosen not to do that. That is regrettable. I look to the Minister to change the course of this Government when it comes to future changes to electoral legislation.
Lisa Smart (Hazel Grove) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Dr Allin-Khan. This discussion about part 4 feels slightly odd because we are having part of the conversation but will have a further conversation on Report, for all the good and understandable reasons that we have talked about, after the publication of the review by Sir Philip Rycroft. Many people truly welcome Sir Philip’s work and some of us were fortunate enough to take part in it, but we are discussing the measures under consideration while fully aware that we expect further movement from the Government.
I will speak to the new clauses tabled in the name of the Chair of the Joint Committee on National Security Strategy, the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western). We Liberal Democrats welcome clauses 56 and 57, but the JCNSS did a huge amount of work looking at money and interference in our politics, and it has made some recommendations, which are manifested in the new clauses. The JCNSS welcomed the Government’s commitment to commence section 54A of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000. That section was inserted in 2009 but never commenced. It covers requirements for donors to make a declaration about their donation, but the Committee found that the provisions need more work to adequately address concerns about donors acting as conduits for foreign money. New clause 47 would require the Government to commence section 54A of the 2000 Act within three months of the Bill being passed. The subsequent linked new clauses change the provisions of section 54A to address its shortcomings.
Regarding new clause 48, the JCNSS heard evidence that law enforcement often faces prohibitively high thresholds for taking action on suspicions of wrongdoing, and that part of the problem is linked to the wording of the legislation, which requires law enforcement to prove that actors “knowingly” broke the rules. New clause 48 would lower the threshold and use wording in line with that of anti-money laundering regulations, whereby persons are liable if they have reasonable grounds to suspect that they are facilitating impermissible donations.
Regarding new clause 49, the JCNSS questioned why it would be appropriate to have such a high threshold—£11,180—for making a declaration. It perceived a gap that could be exploited. For example, a UK donor might receive £11,179 from a Russian source in connection with a planned donation but would, apparently, not need to declare that when making a £11,179 donation. The JCNSS noted the general principle that donations below £500 are largely outside the reporting scope of PPERA and would not need to be reported or recorded. A £500 threshold might therefore prove a more robust basis to guide the level at which money received in connection with a donation needs to be declared. The new clause would require any donation above £500 to be accompanied by a declaration on its source, and whether related gifts have been received. Transparency and consistency are both good things, of which there should be more.
Paul Holmes
I wonder if I could urge the hon. Member to change her view. Does she not think that the £500 threshold is very low, if we consider the fast period when a candidate may be fundraising, during the longer term of an election period? Many of our constituents will give money during that period. At £500, the burden placed on candidates and on the person giving the money would be probably too harsh. The threshold needs to be lifted to something more realistic.
Lisa Smart
I welcome the shadow Minister’s intervention, and I think that we should talk far more than we do about domestic money in politics, as well as foreign money in politics. Power is concentrated in far too few hands. The price of elections is going up and up, and that is not good for democracy. I would welcome that discussion.
New clause 49 is in the name of the Chair of the JCNSS, so I am speaking to it on his behalf. We are talking about £500 during the course of a calendar year, so £50 a month breaches the threshold. I think there is a conversation to be had. As I say, this new clause is not in my name.
On new clause 50, the Committee heard evidence that the current 12-month prison sentence was not an adequate deterrent. Also, the low sentences reportedly limit the type of investigatory tools that law enforcement may use in an investigation. I am content to speak to the new clauses on behalf of the Member who tabled them, the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington.
Dr Ellie Chowns (North Herefordshire) (Green)
I rise to speak to both the clauses and the new clauses tabled by the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington, which the hon. Member for Hazel Grove spoke to.
Briefly, commencing section 9 to PPERA, as proposed by new clause 47, is something that was put into legislation 17 years ago, so it feels really quite overdue. Regarding the points that were just discussed around new clause 49, which proposes the reduction to £500 of the threshold for declaring the source of a donation, making such a declaration is not necessarily a hugely onerous process. I imagine that when someone makes a donation and fills in a form, they just put, “Source: my salary”. This is not necessarily a hugely problematic part of the process of creating more transparency. We surely all agree that more transparency is needed in our political financing system, to protect from the corrosive effect of foreign donations, and of huge inequalities and the lack of transparency over domestic donations. I strongly support all the new clauses.
I will raise a couple of additional points, which I would like the Minister to respond to. First of all, regarding the provision in clause 56 and schedule 7 to submit two returns now—to both the local returning officer and the Electoral Commission—I note that the Electoral Commission, in its briefing to the Committee, argued that this provision clearly makes things more complex and problematic, and it argued that the primary responsibility for submission should be to the Electoral Commission. Does that not make more sense? Given that the Bill is introducing a requirement to submit to the Electoral Commission, why do not we just say, “Submit the return to the Electoral Commission”? Then the Electoral Commission can correspond with the returning officer if it wants to. But let us just have one submission and make the process as simple as possible for candidates and parties. Could the Minister respond on that point from the Electoral Commission about the requirement to submit two returns?
Secondly, a point raised by Philip Rycroft in his extremely useful report, under recommendation number 7, is that
“The Electoral Commission should mandate political parties to submit their annual reports and accounts and campaign spending returns in a standardised format.”
Could the Minister comment on whether she proposes to take that recommendation forward? It would be very helpful in improving transparency and clarity in the system.
Lloyd Hatton (South Dorset) (Lab)
I will just make some very brief remarks on the record.
I welcome this landmark Bill, which does a great deal to bring our democratic landscape into the 21st century, but I will briefly put on the record some thoughts about new clause 47.
As we digest the Rycroft review, I think that the new clause is worth further consideration, particularly about how we can have meaningful deterrence for the most egregious flouting of political finance rules. If we want to be able to deal with that issue, we also need to have effective prosecutions for serious breaches. My concern at the moment is that there is something of an enforcement gap, and I know that that is a description that the Electoral Commission has outlined as well. I remain concerned that when it comes to the real risks posed by foreign interference, we are leaving that gap open, which would run contrary to the rightful and important aims of this Bill.
The director general of the National Crime Agency highlighted here in Parliament in February that there is a “gap in law” and that
“a foreign state or foreign individual—someone who is impermissible—can transfer money to someone who is in the UK, who is permissible, and that person can give money to a political party or a politician, and there is nothing to stop that. That is perfectly lawful.”
There is an enforcement gap there that I know that the Minister, along with other Ministers and officials, will want to address. It is worth reflecting further on the aims of new clause 47 and how it tries to strengthen this Bill further beyond the work that it already does. As we look to digest the Rycroft review, and the Bill proceeds to further stages, it is important that we give the aims in the new clause rightful consideration, and think about some of those issues around the gap in enforcement when it comes to the most egregious breaches of political finance rules.
Samantha Dixon
A number of points have been made, which I thank hon. Members for. I can reassure the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Hamble Valley, that we have worked closely with the Electoral Commission on these proposals. All my officials talk to the Electoral Commission constantly, so its capacity to take this on board is understood.
In terms of consultation, we always work with the parliamentary parties panel. However, as I was coming into this position, I reached out to all the leaders of the opposition parties and invited them to come to talk to me about the Bill prior to its Second Reading. Not all took up the offer; however, I was pleased to meet those who did.
Turning to the point about the two sets of returns, it is still important to address the point raised by the shadow Minister and the hon. Member for North Herefordshire. It is important for returning officers to receive returns and declarations, because having those available for inspection at the local level remains an important part of our democracy. I would not want to see that taken away. That is why we are proposing both the EC and returning officers receive them.
On new clause 47, the Government fully recognise the importance of greater transparency over the source of political donations, and we are already taking that forward. Work to activate donor source declarations is underway as part of our wider political finance reforms, and the Government have been clear that those measures will be delivered in this Parliament. The new clause would not change our direction or add new policy substance. I understand that the hon. Member for Hazel Grove is eager to see this implemented quickly, and I want to reassure the Committee that this is a Government priority. However, imposing a fixed deadline risks cutting across the careful sequencing needed to implement reforms coherently.
We need to align commencement with the broader package, ensuring that guidance and systems are ready, and give campaigners proportionate lead-in time. That speaks to the point made by the shadow Minister that this is about not just the established parties but smaller parties as well. A rigid statutory date risks poorer implementation without adding any new substance to what the Government are already delivering. Our approach is to activate donor source declarations in step with the wider package in the Bill, so that parties can have clear and workable rules and the Electoral Commission is operationally prepared. On that basis, I hope the hon. Member will feel able not to push the new clause to a vote.
New clause 48 seeks to lower the criminal threshold for two political finance offences so that a party treasurer or a responsible person would commit an offence when it could be proven that they had
“reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting”
that a declaration accompanying a campaign or referendum expenditure return was false. Currently, prosecutions for such offences are possible only when it can be proven that the offender “knowingly or recklessly” makes a false declaration. That threshold was designed to reflect the seriousness of criminal liability and ensure that sanctions target deliberate and clearly irresponsible wrongdoing.
The Government welcome Philip Rycroft’s comprehensive and well-reasoned report on foreign financial interference in our democracy, which includes relevant recommendations in this space. Any proposal to amend the knowledge test for relevant offences will need to be considered with great care to ensure that party treasurers and responsible persons are not unduly exposed to potential criminal sanctions for administrative errors or inadvertent admissions. It is also important to consider the political finance regime in the round to avoid amendments creating inconsistencies between parts of the statutory framework.
The Rycroft review provides a valuable basis for broader consideration and the Government are actively working through its recommendations to ensure that political finance rules and their enforcement remain proportionate, coherent and fit for purpose. For those reasons, although we do not support new clause 48, we will continue to assess the review’s findings carefully and will set out a full Government response, including whether making further amendments to the Bill would be appropriate. Given that reassurance, I hope the new clause will not be pressed.
The integrity of political finance depends on measures that are both effective and proportionate. That is why the Bill introduces stronger due diligence expectations and tougher rules for institutional donors. Our general approach has been to address weaker points of the framework where there is greater risk. While the intention behind the new clause is acknowledged, reducing the declaration threshold to £500 does not follow that risk-based approach and could end up weakening the system.
In that respect, I share the views of the shadow Minister because I believe the new clause would create a large volume of low-value declarations and, in doing so, divert the time and energy of donors, recipients and the regulator on to lower-risk activity. We want resources to be focused on higher-risk activity, such as the enhanced due diligence that we want donors to undertake when they receive larger donations. The Government believe that the risk-based approach that we are taking in the Bill is the right one. It ensures that further scrutiny will be applied where it matters most.
New clause 50 seeks to increase the maximum criminal penalties that can be imposed for various false declaration offences under the political finance framework. In the Bill, the Government are acting on long-standing recommendations to strengthen the Electoral Commission’s power and extend its remit to ensure that enforcement provides a clear deterrent against breaking the law, while remaining proportionate. However, we recognise that we cannot be complacent, so we welcome the Joint Committee on National Security Strategy’s recent report and Philip Rycroft’s independent review on foreign financial interference in our democracy. They both include relevant recommendations regarding the enforcement of political finance offences.
Any proposal to increase sentencing for such offences will need to be considered carefully to ensure that criminal penalties remain proportionate. It will also be important to consider the political finance regime and its enforcement in the round to prevent amendments from creating inconsistencies between parts of the statutory framework. The Rycroft review provides a valuable basis for that broader consideration and the Government are actively working through its recommendations to ensure that political finance rules and their enforcement remain proportionate, coherent and fit for purpose.
Noting that new clause 50 covers ground similar to one of Mr Rycroft’s recommendations, we will assess the review’s findings carefully and set out a full Government response, including whether to make further amendments to the Bill in the light of that work.
Paul Holmes
Does the Minister see the absurdity of the Government’s strategy in this area of policy? The Government commissioned a huge review—a good review—by Philip Rycroft that they need to examine and consider properly. But we are discussing a section of the Bill where although a direct influence on future legislation is outlined by Philip Rycroft, the Minister is resisting amendments from other political parties, saying she will bring in amendments later because the Government have not considered Rycroft’s review properly. She is not going to accept this, but does she not see that the way the Bill is working is absurd? We are going to have retrospective amendments when it comes to the review, but the Minister will only accept amendments from her own side and not from other political parties.
Samantha Dixon
The shadow Minister is, of course, fully entitled to his views. However, the new clauses relate to a very narrow framework in the Bill. The Government are considering the review and its recommendations from a much broader, cross-Government perspective. That requires much broader work. We will bring our response to the review to Parliament in time for proper scrutiny.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 56 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 7 agreed to.
Clause 57 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 58
Risk assessments for donations to registered parties etc
Samantha Dixon
I beg to move amendment 39, in clause 58, page 67, line 38, leave out “, when it” and insert “—
(a) the party has not previously undertaken a risk assessment in relation to a relevant benefit accruing to the party in the same calendar year, and
(b) when the value of the donation”.
This amendment would mean that a risk assessment is required for donations when the £11,180 threshold (for donations or regulated transactions) is breached the first time in a calendar year. (See also amendment 40, which requires a risk assessment the second or subsequent time the threshold is breached.)
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 40 and 41.
Amendment 32, in clause 58, page 68, leave out from beginning of line 15 to end of line 21 and insert—
“(2) In carrying out a risk assessment, the party must prioritise taking into account whether the person from whom the donation is received is a foreign citizen and likely to have foreign influence links.
(2A) In carrying out a risk assessment, the party must treat donations from UK citizens, who reside in the UK, as a low risk.
(2B) In carrying out a risk assessment, the party must also take account of the following risks—
(a) the type of person from whom the donation is received,
(b) that person’s previous donation history,
(c) the type of donation,
(d) the amount of the donation, and
any other risk factors the party considers to be relevant.”
Amendment 31, in clause 58, page 68, line 20, at end insert—
“(da) whether the person from whom the donation is received is required to register under the Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme established by the National Security Act 2023.”
This amendment would require the risk assessment to take into account whether a donor is required to register under the Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme.
Government amendments 42 and 43.
Clause stand part.
Government amendments 44 to 78.
Schedule 8.
Government new clause 60—Power of Scottish Ministers to vary sums in Schedule 7 to PPERA 2000—
“In section 155 of PPERA 2000 (power to vary specified sums or percentages), in subsection (1A)—
(a) after ‘vary’ insert ‘—
(a) ’;
(b) at the end insert
‘, or
(b) any sum for the time being specified in Schedule 7 so far as that sum applies in relation to a donation to a member of a local authority in Scotland who is not also a member of a registered party.’”
This new clause, which would be inserted after clause 62, amends section 155(1A) of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 to provide a power for the Scottish Ministers to vary the sums in Schedule 7 (control of donations to individuals and member associations), so far as they relate to areas of devolved competence.
Samantha Dixon
I will first speak to clause 58, schedule 8, Government new clause 60, and Government amendments 39 to 41 and 44 to 78, before turning to the amendments tabled by the Opposition.
In line with recommendations from the Electoral Commission, the National Crime Agency and the Committee on Standards in Public Life—now known as the Ethics and Integrity Commission—clause 58 addresses a long-standing gap in electoral law. Current rules require recipients of donations to verify the permissibility of the donor but do not require them to assess whether a donor may be facilitating a donation from an impermissible source. Existing permissibility checks remain important, but they do not always provide sufficient assurance where donations are routed through third parties or where risk indicators are present.
The clause introduces a clear, proportionate due diligence duty on campaigners to look beyond current permissibility checks and determine whether there is a material risk that a political contribution originates from an impermissible source. The new framework strengthens the ability of campaigners to assure themselves that donations come from permissible sources. Its purpose is not to impose unnecessary burdens, but to ensure that campaigners take reasonable, proportionate steps to understand who is behind a donation. By embedding a culture of risk-based due diligence, the clause helps to guard against foreign interference, increases confidence in the integrity of donations, and aligns political finance rules with best practice in other sectors.
Government amendment 39 to 41 and 44 to 78 seek to clarify the point at which a political donation exceeds the £11,180 thresholds and requires a risk assessment under the new “know your donor” rules. Currently, the Bill requires a risk assessment once a recipient receives cumulative contributions from the same donor surpassing £11,180 in a calendar year. However, after that point is reached, every further donation received from the same donor in the same calendar year, regardless of value, would require another risk assessment. That was not our policy intention.
Under the updated approach, a risk assessment will be required each time a donor gives £11,180 cumulatively or as an individual donation, after which the running total in effect will reset to zero. That replaces the previous rolling aggregation threshold, removing unnecessary repetition and ensuring that parties complete a risk assessment only when receiving a further significant donation from the same donor. Risk assessments could be carried out on every donation if a campaigner feels the need to do so.
Paul Holmes
I rise to speak to clause 58 and to Opposition amendments 32 and 31, which would require the risk assessment to take into account whether a donor is required to register under the foreign activities and foreign influence registration scheme.
As the Minister outlined, clause 58 would make changes to PPERA to require registered political parties to undertake risk assessments on reportable donations—those more than £11,180. Multiple donations from the same donor within a calendar year would be aggregated for the purposes of the threshold. Similarly, schedule 8 would require third-party campaigners and others already regulated under PPERA to undertake “know your donor” risk assessments. We welcome the Minister’s approach to tightening the regulations around political donations. As the hon. Member for Hazel Grove said, we need to talk much more about this issue, including domestic donations. We think that the clause has some really strong attributes to increase transparency and equalise the donation procedure.
I take issue with the Minister’s interpretation of the consequences of amendments 31 and 32, although she recognised that they are well intentioned. I fail to see how they narrow the scope of the risk assessment, when they would actually broaden it. It seems alien that the Government are not willing to broaden the scope of those risk assessments with a system that has been in place since 1 July 2025. If we reject these two amendments, do we not risk creating two frameworks? We would be wilfully leaving out an existing framework when trying to do risk assessments. It would strengthen the risk assessment if we brought into play an existing framework that already undertakes regulation.
Our amendments would broaden the scope of the risk assessment rather than narrow it. When somebody is making a donation to influence the role of Members of Parliament, and they are voluntarily registering themselves under the foreign influence scheme, it is important that that is included in our donations regime. It does not stop the well-intentioned aims of the clause from operating, because this already exists. I fail to understand the Minister’s resistance to the two amendments.
We are discussing very important attributes of the Bill and very important subject matters: donations to political parties. We have all had our bad ones. We have all had our good ones, which enable democracy to take place. We have had a comprehensive and welcome review from Philip Rycroft. The Minister has outlined that the Government will undertake a solid consultation response to that review, but we are pushing ahead with clauses that will, let us face it, be passed in this Committee and then in the House at later stages of the Bill. The Minister will bring forward amendments that will be debated, but there has not been a consultation.
We have always contested that the measures in the Bill could be paused until there is a proper cross-party review of the Rycroft review. If we could come to some agreement on a cross-party basis, the later passages of the legislation could be fast-tracked. It is regrettable that the Minister and the Government—although I do not blame the Minister personally—are coming to this House with important and forward-looking legislation without taking into account a proper review to directly influence the proposals they have introduced. I do not think a general election is imminent—unless the Minister suddenly gives us cause for concern—so a pause would not be detrimental to the passage of the Bill. It could give scope for cross-party agreement on the proposed reforms and speed up the passage of the Bill.
The Bill is a significant piece of legislation, but it has been introduced only at the tail end of the parliamentary Session. I am aware that there is a carry-over motion, and the Conservatives fully support that through the usual channels, so why rush the clauses when we have not had the proper implementation and review of the Rycroft review? It would make far more sense to introduce a consolidated Bill in the next Session after cross-party consultation so that we can have a proper discussion, rather than fast-tracking the Government’s tabled amendments.
I am sure that the Minister will respond to that in her usual courteous way, but I would be grateful if she could outline why she seems to think that amendments 31 and 32 would somehow hinder the operational regulatory implementation of her proposals. They would actually broaden the scope, and, we would argue, back up its implementation through already existing legislation. We regret the attitude that the Government have taken to the importance of the Rycroft review and the consultations with all political parties through the Parliamentary Parties Panel. I remind her that a written question has outlined that there was no consultation on a cross-party basis before the Bill was introduced to the House. We will be push amendments 31 and 32 to a vote.
Lisa Smart
We Liberal Democrats support greater scrutiny of the sources of political money. We will not oppose any of these amendments, whether from the Government or His Majesty’s Opposition, but we want to raise some issues because we believe that they could have gone further.
The amendments were tabled, as has been mentioned, following the publication of the Rycroft review, but revisions around cryptocurrency donations are not included in them. In a welcome statement to the House, the Secretary of State talked specifically about banning crypto donations, but there is no mention of that in the Bill. The Government accepted Sir Philip’s recommendation on the day that it was published, so why is there nothing about that in this group of amendments? The Government have a ready vehicle for it in front of them, so the Committee would welcome an explanation of why that is. Can the Minister set out a planned timetable of future actions, including a firm commitment on when a cryptocurrency amendment will appear?
The shadow Minister talked fairly about how this process is running in parallel, making it quite difficult to understand what is ahead of us. The Government are working on a response to the Rycroft review in full, and there are measures in the Bill that they will be keen to ensure are implemented in time for the next general election, including votes at 16 and automatic voter registration. Those will take time to implement, so I understand that the Minister is playing a reasonably sticky wicket, trying to go at pace but in a thorough and considered manner. She has not been dealt an easy hand, but I would appreciate hearing about her planned timetable for issuing further amendments.
I am sure that the Minister agrees about the scale and immediacy of the threat that some of the amendments seek to address, including foreign interference in our elections and democracy. Urgency on those actions is needed. It is important to get these measures in place as soon as possible, but they really should be the right measures. I would welcome hearing from the Minister about when she plans to bring forward further information, and I am sure that we all look forward to scrutinising that in due course.
Dr Chowns
Broadly, I hugely welcome all measures to improve the risk assessment of donations, which is critical, so I am glad to see those here. I agree that much more needs to be done than is currently in the Bill, as outlined by Philip Rycroft, among others, so I welcome the Government’s commitment to do that. I share the frustration expressed about the fact that we have two processes going on in parallel and so, from my perspective, we will not have sufficient opportunity adequately to scrutinise the proposals that the Government are promising to bring forward in relation to Rycroft. However, I absolutely feel their urgency and look forward to whatever opportunity we do have to scrutinise them.
I agree with the hon. Member for Hazel Grove that there are critical missing elements that we could and should be addressing in this part of the Bill: crypto donations, in particular, but also the desperate need for an overall cap on political donations. We will be able to discuss those issues later, when we come to the new clauses, but it seems rather odd that the Government have put nothing in this part of the Bill in relation to those critical elements.
I want to raise two specific issues in relation to this group of amendments. First, the Electoral Commission has made two points about the articulation of risk factors. It would like the list of risk factors to include any other risk factors that a reasonable party would consider relevant, rather than any other risk factors that a political party itself considers relevant, because that would constitute marking its own homework. It seems to me that that small tweak to language would clarify the risk factors. The Electoral Commission also recommends the inclusion of a risk factor relating to a person’s connections to other countries and jurisdictions. That might be a more inclusive way of addressing some of the points about a foreign influence registration scheme. I would welcome the Minister’s comments on those two recommendations—requests, essentially—from the Electoral Commission.
Secondly, in a report produced last month, CenTax—a joint initiative of the London School of Economics and the University of Warwick—pointed out that it would be potentially much more sensible to establish a donor registration system operated by the Electoral Commission itself. That would mean transferring responsibility for the risk assessment for “know your donor” checks to the Electoral Commission rather than to political parties, which, depending on their size and longevity and so forth, might have varying capacities to do that. When a donor wished to make a donation to a party above a certain minimal threshold, they would apply to the Electoral Commission for a donor registration number and then use that when making the donation. That would make it much easier to keep track of multiple donations by a given donor, either to a single party over a period of time or to multiple parties.
That seems to me a sensible and workable proposal for improving transparency and clarity in the system, recognising and addressing the burden of compliance requirements that will be placed on parties—including local parties, which, as has been mentioned, are very much reliant on volunteers—and ensuring a consistent approach to donor risk assessment and monitoring. I would welcome the Minister’s response to that recommendation from CenTax that a donor registration system should be established.
Lloyd Hatton
Before I speak to clause 58, let me say in response to the hon. Members for Hamble Valley and for Hazel Grove that this game-changing legislation and the Rycroft review have both come in the first Session of a new Government. There is a clear understanding—the Minister has made it known here and in the Chamber—that the threats that we face, whether through foreign interference or foreign money trying to influence our democratic process, are severe, and we have made a robust response to them, through this legislation and by commissioning the Rycroft review last year.
I want to make two points on clause 58. First, a key part of the changes introduced by the Bill is the “know your donor” principle, which will require political parties to take more responsibility for exactly who is funding them. Existing rules do not specifically require recipients to consider the risk that a donor is potentially facilitating an illegal donation. I welcome the fact that that will change as a result of this clause, which will bring about a complete overhaul of the system and I believe will improve the integrity of our democracy, help strengthen national security and help restore trust in political parties across the country.
Paul Holmes
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right that the clause is important. We do need to have a greater say. He says he supports the clause, and I agree with him, because he is very sensible. But given some of the headlines we have had across the House in recent weeks about the origins of donations and the facilitation of bad donations, why does he not agree with us that foreign influence registration should be part of the risk assessment? Does he share my concern that the Government have rejected that?
Lloyd Hatton
I do not believe that the Government are rejecting that carte blanche. As I was about to say—it is almost as if the hon. Gentleman has my notes before him—the Rycroft review commissioned by this Government notes that the “know your donor” provisions are similar to the anti-money laundering checks that are required by thousands of organisations, large and small, in the private sector, the third sector and elsewhere. Those are about ensuring that financial transactions, such as a donation, are indeed legitimate. As we digest the Rycroft review, I hope and expect that the Minister will give careful consideration to what it sets out and look at the idea that “know your donor” checks should more closely mirror the due diligence checks we see elsewhere, particularly in relation to anti-money laundering regulations.
In making my second point, which I think is worthy of further consideration, I think it will be helpful to provide a case study. As Members on both sides of the Committee will recall, earlier this year the hon. Member for Great Yarmouth (Rupert Lowe), a former Reform UK MP—I notified him that I would be mentioning him—launched a new political party, Restore Britain. Before that, however, he set up a “political movement”, and he may or may not—we do not know—have received substantial contributions from impermissible sources before Restore Britain was registered officially as a political party. The fact is that we simply do not have a clear understanding, and the current legal landscape means that there are no checks on the funds that a party may hold prior to formal registration.
I should make it very clear that the Bill goes far in strengthening controls on the sources of donations to political parties, and goes a great way to shoring up our democracy against foreign interference. However, I would really welcome the Minister’s thoughts and ideas on how we can ensure that a political party does not seek to sidestep controls on donations and loans by accepting substantial contributions from a potentially impermissible source simply because it has not yet set itself up officially as a political party.
I know that this is something that Rycroft seeks to understand at a top level in his review, so I do not expect it to be dealt with in Committee—I think that would be wrong, because we had the review only just before the Easter recess—but I would welcome the Minister’s thoughts, as the Bill proceeds, on how we close down the potential problem whereby political movements, political projects or whatever we want to call them seek to gain donations outside the controls and checks that would apply if they were a registered political party.
The Chair
Order. Before I call the Minister, I remind hon. Members that it is not necessarily befitting of the House to make comment on whether other hon. Members may or may not have conducted matters in a dishonourable fashion.
Samantha Dixon
I thank Members for the wide-ranging and constructive points that they have made. The Government accept the thrust of the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Hamble Valley; however, we believe the existing clauses already allow for foreign links, the status of the foreign influence registration scheme and other relevant indicators to be considered.
It is important for us all to consider—this speaks to a point that the hon. Member for North Herefordshire made—that, as drafted, the list of statutory risk factors is capable of amendment by secondary legislation, so that the framework can remain up to date. As new risks emerge, they can be addressed through secondary legislation. The hon. Member for Hazel Grove made the point that this is a very fast-moving landscape. When the Government introduced the strategy last July, it was prior to the conviction of Nathan Gill. New risks have emerged in considerable number in the past year, and my hon. Friend the Member for South Dorset described how new parties are emerging. It is important that legislation is not prescriptive in a way that hampers consideration of risks as they emerge.
I appreciate the sensitivity that the hon. Member for Hazel Grove expressed—I think the hon. Member for Hamble Valley understands this too—to the challenge of legislating in a fast-moving landscape. The Government are responding as promptly as we can. On the timetable, Parliament will be prorogued soon—I do not know when; my hon. Friend the Government Whip may have more intelligence on that—but this is a carry-over Bill, and that is important given the consideration and consultation that needs to happen as we respond to the Rycroft review.
David Simmonds (Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner) (Con)
I want to pick up on the implications of the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Hamble Valley and the hon. Member for South Dorset. We are all aware that Reform was the first political organisation to come into being as a private company. It operates outside the framework of a traditional political party, and that carries with it some risks.
As the Minister has outlined, the intention is that the framework identifying those risks can be regularly updated. However, that organisation has been in existence for some six years, so this is not something that has suddenly materialised. The point that my hon. Friend outlined in his contribution, and in the amendments covering things such as FIRS, is that that these are emerging risks that we have all been aware of for some time.
I appreciate the Minister’s point about the timetable and where we are in this Session, but it would be helpful to understand from her how soon those long-standing risks that we have been aware of for some time will find their way into secondary legislation and therefore the framework, or where they might feature in amendments on Report so that they can be properly taken into account.
Samantha Dixon
The hon. Member will appreciate that implementation of the Bill will require substantial secondary legislation. As tempting as it is to set out a timetable, we have to focus on getting the primary legislation through first. There is the tension, which the hon. Member for Hazel Grove described, between going at pace to implement measures such as votes at 16 and considering as comprehensively as possible the matters that arise from the Rycroft review. It is a challenge, albeit not an insurmountable one, for the Government to do both.
Considerable parliamentary time will be devoted to the secondary legislation; that will become clearer as time progresses. We need to move forward as swiftly as we can. We will introduce the amendment regarding crypto when parliamentary time allows, and we will ensure that it has parliamentary scrutiny. I have noted the comments by the hon. Member for North Herefordshire about a donor registration scheme. None the less, it is beholden on political parties, candidates and campaigners to take seriously the risks from donors. It will be their responsibility, under this legislation, to assess those risks, and if they are found to wilfully, recklessly or knowingly circumvent them, they will be subject to prosecution.
We need to move forward with this legislation as much as we can. I sense the frustration from Members across the Committee about the time that will be required to do this, but we need to do it thoughtfully, carefully, and at pace but not too fast. I jest, but we will do it as soon as we possibly can in a way that does not jeopardise scrutiny.
Amendment 39 agreed to.
Amendment proposed: 32, in clause 58, page 68, leave out from beginning of line 15 to end of line 21 and insert—
“(2) In carrying out a risk assessment, the party must prioritise taking into account whether the person from whom the donation is received is a foreign citizen and likely to have foreign influence links.
(2A) In carrying out a risk assessment, the party must treat donations from UK citizens, who reside in the UK, as a low risk.
(2B) In carrying out a risk assessment, the party must also take account of the following risks—
(a) the type of person from whom the donation is received,
(b) that person’s previous donation history,
(c) the type of donation,
(d) the amount of the donation, and
any other risk factors the party considers to be relevant.”—(Paul Holmes.)
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Samantha Dixon
With the introduction of votes at 16, 14 and 15-year-olds will be able to pre-register as attainers for up to two years before they reach voting age. To safeguard the data of young people, their electoral register data will be subject to enhanced protections. These enhanced safeguards will restrict access to under-16s’ electoral registration data, meaning that political parties and other recipients of political donations will not be able to independently verify whether a 14 or 15-year-old is on the register.
Clause 59 closes a potential loophole by prohibiting donations from under-16 attainers, ensuring that the electoral regime remains secure, while still allowing 16 and 17-year-olds, whose details can be verified, to donate like all other voters. The clause reduces the risk of impermissible or potentially foreign-linked donations entering the electoral system via routes that are unverifiable. Given the wider context of foreign interference concerns, we believe it is right to take this preventive step. Sixteen and 17-year-olds will still be able to donate like any other eligible voter, enabling early registration while ensuring that the political finance system is safeguarded from impermissible donations as younger voters become active participants in our democracy. I commend clause 59 to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 59 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 60
Donations by companies and LLPs etc
Lisa Smart
I beg to move amendment 34, in clause 60, page 72, line 36, at end insert—
“(c) the person has nominated a director or partner who is to be personally responsible for ensuring the donation is made in accordance with the requirements of this Part.”
This amendment provides that for donors from corporate bodies to be permissible they must nominate a director or partner who is responsible for compliance with the legal requirements relating to donations.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 35, in clause 60, page 73, line 8, at end insert—
“( ) After section 54D (inserted by section 58 of this Act) insert—
‘54ZE Criminal liability of nominated director or partner to follow requirements
(1) A director or partner nominated by virtue of section 54(3ZA)(c) commits an offence if without reasonable excuse they cause or permit a breach of any requirement imposed under this Part.
(2) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—
(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years or to a fine, or to both;
(b) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years or to a fine not exceeding £500,000, or to both.’”
This amendment provides that the director or partner who has been nominated to be responsible for ensuring compliance with the legal requirements relating to donations commits an offence if they cause or permit a breach of those requirements without reasonable excuse.
Amendment 36, in clause 60, page 77, line 14, after “party” insert
“, any other party, regulated donee (within the meaning of Schedule 7) or candidate (see Schedule 2A to the Representation of the People Act 1983)”.
This amendment would ensure that the amount a company or limited liability partnership can donate to a party must take into account any donations it has already made to other parties, regulated donees (which includes members of parties, members associations and holders of elective offices) or electoral candidates.
Amendment 37, in clause 60, page 77, line 28, after “party” insert
“, any other party, regulated donee (within the meaning of Schedule 7) or candidate (see Schedule 2A to the Representation of the People Act 1983)”.
This amendment would ensure that the amount a company or limited liability partnership can donate to a party must take into account any donations it has already made to other parties, regulated donees (which includes members of parties, members associations and holders of elective offices) or electoral candidates.
Clause stand part.
New clause 13—Permissible donors not to include property development and construction undertakings—
“(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of PPERA 2000 and any other enactment, a person is not a permissible donor to a registered party, recognised third party, regulated donee or permitted participant if they meet the conditions in subsections (2).
(2) The conditions in this subsection are that the person is a property development or construction undertaking as defined under subsections (3) and (4).
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), a person is a ‘property development or construction undertaking’ if they are a body corporate, partnership, limited liability partnership, or unincorporated association, of such an undertaking which carries out, whether wholly or substantially, activities consisting of—
(a) the acquisition, disposal, or development of land for commercial or residential purposes,
(b) property speculation,
(c) the construction, renovation, or substantial alteration of buildings or infrastructure, or
(d) the provision of construction services as a principal contractor,
and whose principal business activities fall within such Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes as may be prescribed by regulations made by the Secretary of State.
(4) Further to subsection (3), a ‘property development or construction undertaking’ includes—
(a) any person who is acting on behalf of a property development or construction undertaking,
(b) any person who is funded either directly or indirectly by a property development or construction undertaking, and
(c) any subsidiaries or holding companies of a property development or construction undertaking.
(5) The Electoral Commission may issue guidance for the purposes of determining whether an undertaking is a property development or construction undertaking.”
This new clause would mean that a property developer or construction undertaking would not be a permissible donor to a registered party, recognised third party, regulated donee or permitted participant.
New clause 32—Restrictions on permitted donors: public contracts—
“(1) Section 54 of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (permissible donors) is amended as follows.
(2) After subsection (2) insert—
‘(2A) An individual who would otherwise fall within subsection (2)(a) is not a permissible donor if that individual—
(a) has significant control of a company which has been awarded a public contract within the previous ten years, or
(b) has significant control of a company which is a parent undertaking or subsidiary undertaking of a company falling within paragraph (a).
(2B) A company which would otherwise fall within subsection (2)(b) is not a permissible donor if that company—
(a) has been awarded a public contract within the previous ten years, or
(b) is a parent undertaking or subsidiary undertaking of a company falling within paragraph (a).’
(3) After subsection (8) insert—
‘(9) In this section—
“public contract” has the meaning given by section 3 (public contracts) of the Procurement Act 2023;
“significant control” has the meaning given by section 790C (key terms) of the Companies Act 2006;
“parent undertaking” and “subsidiary undertaking” have the meanings given by section 1162 (parent and subsidiary undertakings) of the Companies Act 2006.’”
New clause 52—Permissible donors not to include oil and gas companies—
“(1) Section 54 of PPERA 2000 (permissible donors) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (2)(b) after ‘Kingdom’ insert ‘, subject to the exemption in subsection (2A).’
(3) After subsection (2) insert—
‘(2A) A company is not a permissible donor if it is an oil and gas company.’
(4) After subsection (8) insert—
‘(9) For the purposes of this section, “an oil and gas company” means any company which derives over 50% of its annual revenue from the extraction, acquisition, transportation, processing, supply or disposal of petroleum or natural gas, or a combination of the two.’”
This new clause provides that an oil and gas company would not be a permissible donor for the purposes of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000.
Lisa Smart
Before I speak to the amendments, I should say that I welcome clause 60, but I do not support new clauses 13, 32 or 52. The overall thrust of these provisions is that the UK is one of the only countries that still allows donations by companies, and I would be interested to hear from the Minister whether she and her colleagues gave any consideration to putting a stop to that altogether.
Amendments 34 to 37 are, again, in the name of the Chair of the JCNSS, the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington. The Committee’s report identified a need for tighter rules on corporate donations. That includes ensuring that proportionate civil and criminal sanctions can be targeted at those who deliberately engage in wrongdoing.
Amendment 34 would ensure that corporate donors must nominate a director or partner who would be responsible for complying with the legal requirements. Otherwise, the JCNSS fears that there is a risk of inadequate deterrence if accountability can be attributed to a complex corporate structure. The amendment would help to enable the Electoral Commission and law enforcement to hold specific individuals to account for wrongdoing.
Amendment 35 is a linked amendment, and specifies that the responsible director or partner would be criminally liable for breaching political finance rules. To ensure appropriate deterrence, it would raise the penalties from 12 months to three years in prison. Those higher sentences would also enable law enforcement to make use of more extensive investigatory powers when examining potential wrongdoing. The National Crime Agency said that the use of many investigatory tools is curtailed by the fact that sentences are only 12 months.
On amendments 36 and 37, the JCNSS report highlighted a potential Bill loophole relating to corporate donation limits. The Committee supported the Government’s proposal of limiting donations in line with the amount of revenue generated in the UK, but the report highlighted assessments from the Electoral Commission that the upper limit appears to apply to the individual recipients of donations, rather than to the individual company. That suggests that a company could donate its upper limit to a political party and then donate the upper limit hundreds of times over to individual MPs and regulated entities—for example, candidates. The Committee concluded that this unlimited limit is the wrong policy choice and a major issue with the Bill’s drafting. It seeks to fix that loophole with the amendments.
Samantha Dixon
I will speak first to clause 60, before addressing the amendments tabled by hon. Members.
Clause 60 directly responds to long-standing concerns about vulnerabilities in the current political finance system and about the risk of illicit foreign money influencing UK democracy. Under the current framework, it is possible for shell companies or companies with weak UK connections to be used to channel money into our political system. The Electoral Commission and many other stakeholders have consistently called for stronger safeguards to ensure that only legitimate entities can donate.
The new tests will require companies and limited liability partnerships wishing to donate to registered political parties to meet stricter criteria to show a genuine UK connection. The company must have generated enough income in the previous three calendar years to justify its donation. That will help to prevent shell companies from being used as fronts for foreign money. Additionally, companies must meet strict criteria related to control. They will need to be headquartered in the UK, and the majority of persons with significant control must be UK electors or UK citizens. That will ensure UK electoral control and prevent foreign influence. To prevent companies from being set up solely to make political donations, donors must have at least one up-to-date set of accounts filed with Companies House.
Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fourth sitting)
(1 day, 11 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 9 / Noes: 6 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 9 / Noes: 6 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Minister for Courts and Legal Services (Sarah Sackman)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Butler. As I was saying earlier, when I was cut off mid-flow, clause 1 supports a more efficient use of court resources by preventing cases of lower-level seriousness from escalating unnecessarily to the Crown court. I was responding to the point made by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion about jury equity. Her comments and those of others, most notably the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle, concerned the question of whether one should look at the characteristics of the defendant when allocating the mode of trial, rather than the seriousness of the crime, which is the objective test we have included in clause 1.
In essence, the approach taken is an objective one, and it adheres to the principle of equality of treatment when it comes to the mode of trial, because it is driven by the seriousness of the crime. The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion made a point about freedom of expression and the right to protest, and they of course make up a cornerstone of our democracy, but some public order offences, depending on their seriousness, are currently heard in the magistrates court and some will be heard with a jury trial. That will remain the case, although of course some, depending on their seriousness and the likely sentence, might be heard by the Crown court bench division.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
Tim Crosland’s point was that the Government are, in effect, abolishing the principle of jury equity. Can the Minister tell us that we cannot ever expect a judge to triage a case based on the fact that the true interests of justice might lie with a defendant relying on the principle of jury equity? Will she admit that the principle of jury equity is being abolished by the clause?
Sarah Sackman
I heard the evidence from Tim Crosland. I put to him that some of the cases he mentioned, including the Elbit Systems trial, which the hon. Lady mentioned, contained an indictable-only charge, meaning that the case would receive a jury trial, as that one did in fact. Some cases will go to the Crown court bench division and will therefore be heard in front of a judge.
The point is that the seriousness of the offence and the likely sentence make up the applicable test under the Bill, rather than who the defendant happens to be, their past history or the particular type of offence. The objective test is the same, regardless of whether the defendant is a young person from a working-class background, a young person of colour from a particular marginalised community, a practising solicitor or an environmental campaigner. Under the processes, they will all be treated equally. We are not creating carve-outs for particular types of offences or particular kinds of defendants; the seriousness of the case is determined by the court through the application of the test, and that is what determines the mode of trial.
Alex McIntyre (Gloucester) (Lab)
This morning, we heard a passionate and important contribution from my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington about monitoring the proposals’ impact on minority communities. She has tabled an amendment so that we can discuss that question, and I look forward to debating it. Although I understand what the Minister is saying about jury equity, can she assure the Committee that the Government are committed to reviewing it in the light of my hon. Friend’s argument?
Sarah Sackman
Absolutely; the comment from my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington was really important. In fairness, the hon. Member for Reigate also made the point about the equality impacts. The way that the measures in the Bill, and indeed our current justice system, impact on different communities in differential ways rightly concerns the Government. It is precisely why we committed to an independent statutory review, and it is why too I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington for tabling her amendment, so that the Committee will have an opportunity to discuss those important issues on a cross-party basis.
We need to ensure not only that we have the right safeguards, monitoring and data collection, but that the reforms in the Bill do not entrench a status quo that has sometimes fallen short of our collective aspirations for justice and equality, so that they can command the confidence of all communities as we implement, monitor and refine them in future, if needed.
Jess Brown-Fuller (Chichester) (LD)
The Minister is making an impassioned plea for trying to equalise the system. Does she not share my concern about the Government’s proposals? Person A could be accused of sexual assault on the tube, and have never been in any criminal justice situation, while person B could have had a string of offences that they have been charged with and ended up serving prison time for. They would get a jury trial because of their past offences, but somebody of previous good character would not, under the Minister’s proposals.
Sarah Sackman
It would depend on the facts of the case. First, I do not entirely understand the rancour behind the examples. If someone has committed a serious crime that could attract a six, seven or eight-year sentence, those are indictable-only offences. I think we all agree that we would want them to have a jury trial, which they would under the proposals in the Bill, because anything likely to get a sentence of three years or more will receive a jury trial.
In the scenario the hon. Lady described in respect of the person of good character, it is right that at the plea and trial preparation hearing—the mode of trial allocation phase—the likely sentence depending on the seriousness will be looked at. In that process, the likely sentence would no doubt take into account—albeit it is a high-level assessment, in line with the sort of assessment that magistrates courts make every day—the mitigating factors, which might include the person’s good character. In bringing forward the reforms, I believe that that person will get a fair trial wherever they get it: in a magistrates court, in the Crown court bench division or, indeed, at a full jury trial if the crime is likely to get a sentence of three years or more. It is not about the person who has done the more serious crime enjoying greater rights. It is because it is a more serious crime that it gets a jury trial. That is a proportionate use of the resources in our system.
Jess Brown-Fuller
The Minister may have misunderstood my point. If person A and person B have committed the exact same offence—they might have done it a day apart, in the same place, in the same circumstances—but person B has previous record, they are more likely to be heard in front of a jury trial. With person A, who is of good character, the offence remains the same, but the fact that person B has had previous offences means they are charged with a higher offence. The case and the evidence might be exactly the same, but they would end up with a different type of trial. Does the Minister think that is fair?
Sarah Sackman
We have an obligation to guarantee a fair trial. I believe that wherever cases are heard in this system, they will be heard fairly. It will be a different mode of trial, but it will be heard fairly. Ultimately, it comes back to a fundamental difference between us. The view has been taken by those on the Opposition Benches that, somehow, what one gets in a magistrates court—where 90% of our trials are heard—is less fair. That is in front of not just lay magistrates but district judges hearing cases. Some of the most serious civil matters such as the decisions around care proceedings—to remove children from their parents’ care—are determined by single judges. I believe that a single judge can determine cases fairly and impartially. That is the system that exists in different jurisdictions, including our own, and it works well and fairly. It is not unfair for somebody to be allocated a trial type based on the seriousness of the offence they are alleged to have committed.
Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)
The Minister is to some extent varying her argument. Earlier in the debate, she accepted that these things are a matter of gravity and of weighing up, and inherent in saying that is that the Minister must accept that there are less and more fair ways of doing things. The point the Minister is now making is that it is an equally fair system. If the Crown court backlogs are the absolute priority, why not therefore make all trials magistrates trials? If there is no difference between the two, and the Minister cannot accept the point, made by the Opposition and other Members, that there is a difference in their value, why not extend the magistrates’ sentencing powers and let everything be done by magistrates?
Sarah Sackman
We do think that jury trials are a cornerstone of British justice. It is not inconsistent to say that the most serious cases—all cases in which the likely sentence is above three years—should be heard at a jury trial. If we turn the hon. Gentleman’s argument on its head, everybody should get a jury trial, because otherwise they are not getting a fair trial. We do not think that.
As a society, we have for centuries made a threshold choice about who can access a jury trial. We are having a debate now about where that threshold should be drawn. Our proposals strike the right balance between the rights of the different participants in the system. We think they secure fairness because of the other safeguards in the system—the giving of reasons by a judge in the Crown court bench division and the transparency measures we are bringing in—but we also think they are proportionate use of court resources. The hon. Members for Reigate and for Bexhill and Battle both made the point that somebody getting a criminal conviction in the magistrates court, which may attract a six-month custodial sentence or less, is a pretty serious thing in itself. For some people, that may mean, reputationally, that they can no longer pursue their career. These things are serious.
I do not think any of us is saying that the status quo, whereby magistrates and district judges hear those cases, is not inherently fair. It is fair. What is not fair is the status quo whereby the scale of the delays is detrimental to the quality of justice we are able to provide to the public, whether in jury trials, judge-only trials or magistrates trials. The delays are such that they are undermining law enforcement, the quality and recency of the evidence, and people’s memories. It is undermining the calibre of the justice that the system is able to mete out. Dealing with the delays is not just an efficiency question; it is inherent to the question of fairness itself.
We keep repeating the old adage that justice delayed is justice denied. It is a powerful one because there is truth in it: the older the vintage of the cases, the less fair they become. That is not fair on anybody. It is not fair on the defendant on remand or fair on the complainant. It is not fair on the witness, who may have just had the misfortune of passing by a criminal incident, and is being asked to recall what happened a year or two years ago, when they would like to move on with their lives. When it comes to fairness, timeliness is critical.
Sarah Sackman
I have to make a little progress.
Let me turn to the detail of clause 1. Part of its function is to ensure consistency across the statute book. To ensure consistency in that way, the clause makes a series of consequential amendments to remove references to a defendant electing for a Crown court trial. That includes amendments to the uncommenced written plea and allocations provision inserted by the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022. Those uncommenced written procedures would allow defendants to indicate a plea without attending court. Their inclusion does not signify that the Government are intending to commence them. The clause ensures that if those provisions were brought into force in future, they would operate consistently with the removal of the defendant’s ability to choose the mode of trial. Defendants will still be able to indicate a plea in writing, and both parties may still make representations on venue. That decision on mode of trial would rest with the court.
The clause also updates the remittal power in section 46ZA of the Senior Courts Act 1981. Currently, where a case is already in the court, a judge may remit to the magistrates court only with a defendant’s consent. Clause 1 removes the requirement to obtain that consent, ensuring that remittal decisions, like allocation decisions, are made on the basis of the court’s assessment of suitability.
Dr Mullan
The Minister is somewhat chopping and changing her arguments. I can stand up and say that if budgets and resources were no issue, I would prefer every case to go to a jury trial. I can say that; I can be consistent that that is my preference, because I think they are, in some respects, a superior form of justice to magistrates courts. That is not to say that magistrates courts are totally inadequate or unable to do the job, but they are less preferable than a jury trial, and we have covered many of the reasons why.
On the one hand, the Minister says that she agrees with that to some extent, that these are weighing exercises and that there is a preference. But when she is pointed to a specific element of unfairness that that creates, she reverts to saying, “Well, all these things are equal and there is no difference between the two.” That is an inconsistency in her position that we do not have on the Opposition Benches. We are very clear: our preference would be for the superior jury trial in every circumstance, but we accept that that is not always practical; we are fighting the curtailment of that and the further shifting of the dial in the other direction.
What is the Minister’s view? Are these things absolutely equal? Is a magistrates trial just the same as a jury trial? Does she have no issues with that? If so, why not go further, as the Secretary of State wanted to, in respect of five years, for example? Or does the Minister accept that a magistrates court is, in some respects, inferior and less fair, and that there is therefore a rational argument for people to say that they would rather be in the Crown court?
Sarah Sackman
We know that people would rather be in the Crown court because, when they have a right to elect, some opt for that. I have acknowledged that fact, but this is not a debating contest. There is an air of unreality about the way the hon. Member put his arguments. He says that if he could choose, everyone would get a jury trial. I do not know of any jurisdiction in the world that has that. We know what the Conservative party would have done. It had the chance, over 14 years, to run the justice system, and we are now living with the consequences: prisons running hot, courts with record backlogs, legal aid gutted and 40% of our magistrates courts closed.
Since the Crown court was created in 1971, there has been no substantial criminal justice reform, despite broad societal changes, technological changes and the fact that, as the independent review of the criminal courts pointed out, the profile of crime and criminal evidence in this country has changed, which means that Crown court trials now take twice as long as they did in 2000, just because forensic and CCTV evidence makes them more complex. We would expect a public service to evolve with that societal change. We have always made that threshold decision; it is a decision that is taken in other common-law jurisdictions as well. The idea that we will talk in hypotheticals about being absolutist, and about having all jury trials or not—
Sarah Sackman
No, it has a total air of unreality. If we look at the current system, I think we all agree that it is not working for any participant in the system. It cannot be when there is a backlog of 80,000 and above and we hear the stories we are all familiar with, which hon. Members have put to me, whether they are supportive or not, about the delays in the system, the creaking courts and the more than 1,000 trials that did not go ahead on the scheduled day because of an absence of either a prosecuting or a defence barrister. We are trying to rectify that with our investment in the workforce.
We have to make decisions about the system as we find it, not as we might dream it to be in some academic seminar. The fact is that we have all made a choice, because 90% of trials in this country are already undertaken by magistrates. As I said, I do not think anyone is seriously suggesting that those are not fair. The state’s obligation is to guarantee a fair trial. Whether those trials are heard by lay magistrates or by a district judge, they uphold principles of natural justice. I do not understand why anyone would say that the trials that take place day in, day out in our magistrates courts do not uphold principles of natural justice and article 6 of the European convention on human rights—which, by the way, includes the obligation to conduct criminal trials within a reasonable time. The importance of timeliness, and the inherent importance of timeliness to a fair hearing, is enshrined explicitly in article 6.
The state’s obligation is to ensure that fair trial—it is not a jury trial in every case—and we have always made that threshold decision. The removal of a defendant’s ability to insist on their choice of trial venue does not change that. The right to elect does not exist under the Scottish legal system, for example, and no one would seriously suggest that the Scottish legal system offends the principles of natural justice. Our justice system is rightly respected around the world, irrespective of where a case is heard.
Siân Berry
The Minister has made many points about magistrates court hearings being as fair, but she seems to have forgotten the amount of evidence we heard during the oral evidence sessions. Witnesses acknowledged that magistrate court hearings were “rough and ready” and “rough around the edges”, that mistakes may be made, and that the Bill later removes the automatic right to appeal, which is an important safeguard against what she must admit is the slightly inferior justice that can be found in the magistrates courts. Will she not admit that and talk more about the appeals situation?
Sarah Sackman
No, I will not accept that it is inferior. I maintain the position that it is proportionate to the severity of the cases currently dealt with in the magistrates court. When asked why they want to retain jury trials, and timely jury trials for the most serious crimes, the Opposition seem to be arguing that one of the virtues of the jury system is citizen participation. But our lay magistrates are also citizens. An amendment that we will come to later argues that magistrates should be in the Crown court bench division. The rationale that lay participation would be better lies behind that, but—
Several hon. Members rose—
Sarah Sackman
Let me finish my point. I find it incongruous and arguably inconsistent when I hear Members say that the ideal form of the system is citizen participation in the form of a jury, only to then, all of a sudden, describe lay magistrates hearing summary-only trials—which they do fairly, day in, day out—as somehow inferior, because that is also citizen participation. [Interruption.] I do not know if the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion is asking me to give way again, but I shall do so.
Siân Berry
Apologies to the Minister for heckling. The point about the right of appeal is absolutely key. If mistakes are made in the magistrates court, it is currently the case that they are corrected at quite a rate. We heard evidence on that. Those two things give Opposition Members genuine and legitimate cause for concern.
Sarah Sackman
On that specific point about appeals, a tiny fraction of cases—I do not have the figure in front of me, but I am happy to share it later—are appeals to the Crown court. The hon. Lady is right that we heard evidence that a significant proportion of those— I think it is around 40%—are successful. I expect them to continue to be successful under the reformed system, which introduces a permission filter. All the permission filter does is root out unarguable cases in a way that is consistent with the appeals process in the Crown court and in civil jurisdiction.
Sarah Sackman
I am going to make a little progress.
The point is that our magistrates court, trials before district judges and the Crown court bench division will continue to uphold those principles of natural justice. Both the prosecution and defence will continue to be able to make representations on whether a case should be heard in the Crown court, and the court must take into account those representations in reaching its decision. As with all cases heard in the magistrates court, defendants retain the right of appeal to the High Court and the Crown court against conviction or sentence. Even with a permission stage for certain appeals, those safeguards remain in place.
On amendment 38, tabled by the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle, principles of natural justice are preserved in our reforms. We heard evidence from victims of crime and former judges alike about the detrimental effect that delays are having not just on people’s lives but on the quality of justice that can be administered. It is difficult to argue that the current system is consistently meeting our obligation to ensure a fair trial where, as I have said, justice delayed is justice denied. That reflects a structural failing and one that points to a system in urgent need of investment and modernisation. That is why clause 1 as drafted is focused on delivering swifter justice for all participants in the system.
The right to a fair trial is, as I have said, protected under article 6 of the European convention on human rights and reflected in long established common-law principles. Removing the defendant’s choice of venue does not change the procedural fairness of proceedings, nor the defendant’s ability to participate effectively in their case. Defendants will continue to receive fair and impartial justice, regardless of where their case is heard.
Rebecca Paul
I thank the Minister for her generosity in taking interventions. I think it may well be a timely point at which to deal with a quick question I raised earlier, about legal aid. Clearly, a defendant is potentially less likely to secure legal aid in the magistrates court than they are in the Crown court. I am sure the Minister will not be comfortable with that situation, so will she be looking to address that inequality that comes from the changes?
Sarah Sackman
I am glad to hear the Conservatives’ concern about legal aid and, yes, of course I am, as the Minister responsible for legal aid. We do under the current regime have a means test for criminal legal aid. The vast majority of those who apply for legal aid in the criminal context can access it. One of the things we want to do as a Government is wait to see precisely what forms the eventual product here take before analysing how we ensure that legal aid provision is as broad as it needs to be. Access to justice is fundamental not just to the individual concerned but to the efficient administration of justice; that is so important. We know from the civil jurisdiction, where so much legal aid was stripped out, that civil or criminal courts being confronted with vast numbers of litigants in person who are struggling to navigate the system is not just a detriment to them, but to the whole administration of justice. So of course we are looking at that, but it is important to make sure that the plans match precisely what form the Bill takes when it has come through Parliament.
As I said, decisions on mode of trial will be taken by judges and magistrates, who are independent office holders who take a formal judicial oath to act impartially and fairly. That oath is binding and accords with natural justice. Mode of trial decisions continue to be guided by the independent Sentencing Council’s allocation guidelines, which provide a clear and structured framework for allocation decisions. Further to that, magistrates courts are already required to give brief reasons for their allocation decisions, reflecting a long established common-law duty. That requirement will extend to the Crown court in relation to the mode of trial allocation decisions, so someone will know why they were allocated to a venue. That understanding is important for litigants and the transparency they require.
Amendment 38 does not add further protections beyond the safeguards that already exist. A defendant’s trial in the magistrates court does not breach those principles of natural justice and the existing legal protections already ensure procedural fairness in summary proceedings. The Committee will remember well the powerful testaments we heard from many, but in particular the victims who gave their evidence at a public session and their view that the system is weighted heavily towards the defendant. Not only do our reforms restore some of that balance, placing decisions over allocations in the hands of the court rather than those of defendants, but they make a material difference in addressing the backlogs. I am afraid that amendment 38, by contrast, is a defence of a failing status quo. For these reasons, I urge the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle to withdraw the amendment.
Dr Mullan
I will take this opportunity to address some of the points raised in this morning’s debate, and to expand on areas that were points of contention. There was healthy debate about the record of the issues that were inherited by this Government. One reason why this Government have got so quickly into so much difficulty is the way they seek to frame the challenges they inherited, and how the Labour party framed those challenges during the election. That applies across several issues, including inflation and global economic shocks. [Interruption.] This is relevant because the Bill is part of a consistent practice and approach—to reassure hon. Members, I will not spend long on this point. In opposition, the Labour party clearly sought to blame the Conservative Government entirely for those issues, but now that the same issues are affecting the Labour Government, they do not get credibility in saying the issues are broader and outside their control. Labour said the doctors’ strikes were entirely our fault—
The Chair
Order. I remind the Opposition spokesperson that his comments must be relevant to the amendment under consideration.
Dr Mullan
I will move on to a more directly relevant point.
When we talk about the challenges in the courts and what was inherited, the Government would do themselves a much greater service and reflect accurately the debate and the challenges if they more regularly sought to speak fairly and freely about what actually happened in relation to Crown court backlogs, and the reason why the amendment was tabled. Prior to the pandemic, Crown court backlogs were lower under the Conservative Government than they were under the previous Labour Government.
Every time the Government highlight the real challenges with the Crown court backlogs and omit to recognise that the historically unprecedented level of the backlogs was almost entirely driven by the covid pandemic, they do a disservice to the complexity and reality of what went on in our court service. Every time they talk in isolation about a lack of investment in the period of 14 years, they fail to understand that Members on Labour’s side, who have been highly critical of the Conservative party, actually recognise that over many decades, prior to the Conservative Government, as other Labour Members said on Second Reading, there has been a lack of investment—an investment lower than I would want—in our court service.
I have been clear since taking up the position of shadow Justice Minister that I would have wanted a higher degree of protection for the justice system than that in the decisions taken at the time. The Opposition have not been afraid to say that or to own the responsibility for it, as we have in a number of other areas where we wish things had been done differently. I have explained that, for me, courts and the criminal justice system is one of the reasons—if not the main reason—why I sought election to Parliament, so I am always going to say that we should invest more strongly in the justice system.
Just last week, I did an interview on Times Radio about our work on whole-life orders, after I successfully appealed a case in which someone had not got a whole-life order; the Court of Appeal gave them a whole-life order. The presenter asked me why we do not have more whole-life orders, and why more is not done about it. I explained that, in reality, as a politician I might have my priorities, and other individual MPs might have their own priorities, but inevitably the decisions of the Treasury, what goes into the manifesto and what the Government commit to are a matter of the public’s priorities. As someone who campaigns strongly on behalf of victims of crime, I understand the enormous impact that crime has. I also must accept that most people, most of the time, are not victims of any crime, let alone serious crimes, so convincing the public at large to vote for parties that will invest seriously in and improve our criminal justice system is difficult. In polling, the criminal justice system is not at the top of the list of the public’s priorities, as much as I might wish it were.
The Government and Labour Members would do better to more accurately reflect the history of what has happened in the criminal justice system, and particularly in relation to Crown court backlogs. I do not recall that when Labour were last in government—I have looked through Hansard for this—Labour MPs got up and complained about Crown court backlogs that were higher than those we delivered in Government, prior to the pandemic. That is the reality of what happened: the pandemic had an unprecedented impact on our criminal justice system. The vast majority of the historically unprecedented situation that we are dealing with is directly related to the pandemic. If, every time they talked about this, hon. Members made that point, the Opposition would be able to take their criticisms of our record more seriously.
To pick up on some remarks, I welcome those of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, who drew attention to the issue that we considered in the evidence hearings about the not guilty pleas that some of us are uncomfortable with. As I said, I strongly objected to some of those. On the Colston statue, behind the scenes I was one of the MPs lobbying for the Attorney General to do as she did—to seek clarification from the Court of Appeal to stop that from happening again.
I very much resent some of those things—but is that not the point? We have a system that allows for that, that allows for MPs to have a view, to be unhappy or to criticise something that a judge sitting on their own would say, “Look, this is obvious. This is absolutely a guilty—no question”, but a jury might find a different outcome for reasons of their own. I have to admit that, before this debate and the Bill coming before the House, I had only ever viewed this issue through the prism of frustration, wanting to understand how it works and how we might even curtail this, supporting the Court of Appeal declaratory ruling on that judgment. This whole process, however, has made me reflect on the broader role of juries in civil liberties and in curtailing the power of the state.
Even if Parliament wants something done in a particular way, a jury of ordinary people retains the right—as frustrating as that might be, but it has been clarified repeatedly in case law—to say, “Look, we understand all the facts, and we might even agree privately that the law has been broken, but for this reason or that we are going to offer that as not guilty.” Our system has been asked explicitly whether that is something that should happen, and we have been told explicitly that that is something that our system deliberately holds on to. On the balancing, every time we shift more cases into the magistrates court, again we are minimising that, reducing it as an important part of what we might call an informal constitutional settlement.
I welcome the remarks by the Lib Dem spokesperson, the hon. Member for Chichester, who helpfully drew our attention to the gaps between what Sir Brian recommended and what the Government are doing. That is another major hole in the Government’s argument. The example that the hon. Member articulated was about his suggestion of two years going back to magistrates ending up as the Government’s three years. We will also discuss the issue of a Crown court bench without any magistrates, so in two major ways, the Government are not doing what Sir Brian recommended.
In evidence, the Minister even put to some of the witnesses from the Bar Council:
“What do you know that Sir Brian…does not?”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 43, Q81.]
That question, I am afraid, can be turned right back around to the Minister, who is also not doing what Sir Brian recommended. What does she know that Sir Brian does not? If it is so important that we listen carefully to Sir Brian, because he has done such an exhaustive piece of work and put so much time into developing detailed, specific and concrete proposals, why are the Government happy just to disregard the elements of that that they do not agree with?
We cannot do the same. We cannot say, “Actually, we don’t think the evidence is there. We don’t think the case has been made”, but the Government can. They want to say that about a fundamental element—this is not a minor element—which is whether a judge sits on their own or with two magistrates. That is a major difference. In fact, the most radical element of the proposals is the judge sitting on their own in those types of cases, but the Government do not agree with what Sir Brian said about it.
Sarah Sackman
Does the hon. Gentleman recognise that Sir Brian, in his report, gave scope for the Government to go further than his recommendation, should we need to? Can he comment on why no Conservative MP went to Sir Brian when he offered to engage with them today?
Dr Mullan
The Minister is factually incorrect. The engagement session was not today, but yesterday. I met Sir Brian, my hon. Friend the Member for West Suffolk (Nick Timothy) met Sir Brian, and Conservative shadow Ministers met Sir Brian during his review. It is completely incorrect for the Minister to suggest that we did not engage with him. We were happy to agree, as he was, that we would continue talking to him, so I am afraid that the Minister has failed slightly with her intervention. She might want to send a note to ask whoever gave her that information to try harder next time.
Sarah Sackman
What about what Sir Brian said in his report? Is it not right that the report specifically gives the Government scope to go further than his recommendations?
Dr Mullan
It absolutely does—but the Minister is not doing what Sir Brian recommended. She is rejecting his approach, but when we want to reject his approach, she asks how we can possibly question what Sir Brian has to say on such matters. That is the reality of what is happening. It is a consistent flaw that the Government cannot undo.
My hon. Friend the Member for Reigate did a good job of illustrating the nature and seriousness of so many of the offences we are considering. She also sought a firm answer on, for example, the modelling of the increases in guilty pleas that we might expect owing to the increase in the length of suspended sentences.
We had a debate about, “Well, it’s in the explanatory notes, not in the impact assessment,” as if that was just immaterial. The Minister and her officials will know very well that there is a big difference between what goes into an impact assessment, given the statutory nature of that document and everything that the Government have to do before they put things into it, and what a Government can put out in what is effectively a non-statutory document. They could really put anything in there that they wanted to.
Of course we would expect the Government to be fair, frank and honest, but the reason why we have impact assessments—and the reason why, when Labour Members were in opposition, they hammered the Conservatives repeatedly about what did or did not go into an impact assessment in particular, as opposed to broader documents—is that it has a statutory footing and is important in its own way. I think my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate did a good job of illustrating what was absent from that impact assessment.
We talked about the Crown Prosecution Service, and there was an attempt to say that what a senior member of the management said, one would assume—
Linsey Farnsworth (Amber Valley) (Lab)
On that point, will the hon. Member give way?
Dr Mullan
I will finish the sentence, and then I will.
Of course, we would assume that they had done that in consultation with other leadership figures, so we might reasonably say that they speak on behalf of the senior leadership team of the CPS, but there was an attempt to say that their views can somehow be taken to represent the views of the many people who work across the CPS—
Linsey Farnsworth
Mr Guest was giving evidence to the Justice Committee in his capacity on behalf of the CPS. He was talking with authority from the CPS, on the organisation’s behalf, on its official policy position. It is fair to say that the CPS, as Tom Guest said, is in favour of the structural reform we are making, is it not?
Dr Mullan
Nothing that I have said is in disagreement with that. The point we are making is about whether that reflects the wider, individual views of all the people who work for the CPS. I am not aware that the CPS, for example, undertook an internal staff survey. Does the hon. Lady want to intervene and tell me whether the CPS asked people about that? I am not aware that the CPS undertook an internal consultation exercise. Did the CPS consult all the many people who work for it and say, “This is our position. This is what we think”? How did it come to its view about these decisions?
The hon. Lady is very welcome to intervene and talk about how the CPS formulated its position in the way that she sought to talk about it, covering all the different people who work for the CPS. As I explained to her, I know there are people who work for the CPS who do not agree. She may well know people who do agree, but some do not agree. I took the liberty of re-contacting one of the people who works for the CPS over the Committee’s lunch break. Their—quite rightly—anonymous and private view, which they are entitled to hold and express to me is that, as a prosecutor, we should all be very worried when a state prosecutor wants to do something that further curtails the rights of defendants. I might not express it in those terms, but that is how someone from the CPS expressed it.
The hon. Lady is absolutely right to say that the formal policy position of the organisation of the CPS is as she described, but she was not right to refer to it as being meaningful because it covers lots and lots of people who have had no formal engagement whatsoever in helping the CPS to come to that conclusion. It is a bit like the Minister getting up and saying, “The Ministry of Justice is a big organisation and we all think this is what should happen.” The Minister knows that her civil servants are asked to produce policy; what they actually think about it and whether they agree with it is totally irrelevant, and she would never use the size of the organisation to add weight to the strength of her argument, because it is nonsense. As I pointed out when His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service gave evidence, people are not allowed to give their individual views; it is a policy position that the organisation has to hold.
Tristan Osborne (Chatham and Aylesford) (Lab)
One could make that point about any organisation, including those that support the hon. Member’s argument: they are, broadly speaking, representative bodies and they cannot speak for everyone within the organisation. In that case, do we accept any representation from anyone, on the basis that one person in any organisation might not agree with their management team? We have to have a basis of evidence and an organisational view that comes through that organisation is its relevant viewpoint. Would he agree with that?
Dr Mullan
There is a fundamental difference between the CPS and, for example, the Criminal Bar Association, which is a representative organisation—its job is to represent its members. The CPS is not a representative organisation of its employees. The hon. Gentleman is comparing totally different things. I will absolutely listen to organisations whose job it is to advocate for the people they are representing. That is not the job of the CPS. The job of the CPS is to prosecute. The CPS has a view and a policy position that does not represent its staff.
Jess Brown-Fuller
Does the shadow Minister agree that to try to compare the CPS with, for example, the Criminal Bar Association is nonsense because the CPS is a non-ministerial Department? As the hon. Member has pointed out, the policy position is to agree with structural reform because they know that the system is broken. None of us is disagreeing with that today or disagreeing that there is a problem in the system that needs fixing. Of course, the CPS would say that we absolutely need to do something. However, it is not its role as a non-ministerial Department to say that it thinks that the Minister has got it wrong. What it is saying in broadbrush terms is that it agrees that something needs to be done. In contrast, the Criminal Bar Association actually surveyed all its members, because it is an independent organisation, and 88% of them came back and said that they were opposed to the reforms. They are two totally different things.
Dr Mullan
I did raise an eyebrow at the level of evidence that the individual from the CPS chose to give in relation to commenting on Government policy in that way. I have spoken to previous Justice Ministers, and that was unprecedented. Again, if we want to give validity to its views, can Government Members point to a single time that the CPS has got up and directly opposed the policy of the Government of the day? It does not do that. It is all very well and good to champion it when it agrees with this particular point, but it is nonsense if it has never disagreed with Government policy because it is a non-departmental Government body. Again, the hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford is perfectly entitled to raise it, but to try to give it the weight and character of the other organisations that are lobbying, campaigning and representing does not hold up to much scrutiny—as we have seen.
Rebecca Paul
To build on the excellent points made by my hon. Friend and the hon. Member for Chichester, does this not fundamentally come down to the fact that the CPS is made up of civil servants? They are not meant to tell the Minister that they are wrong or right. That is not their job. I feel those on the Government Benches are misunderstanding the role of civil servants.
Dr Mullan
Yes, and I will be writing to the CPS about that, because commenting in the way that it has was extremely unusual. I would hope that it has a very clear explanation as to how it has been able to formulate that position, because, of course, the CPS is just articulating a particular viewpoint. As has happened, when a Government-funded agency does that, it gives it a certain weight that is not necessarily appropriate. That is why ordinarily non-departmental Government bodies are not expected to do that sort of thing. It is something we should think about more carefully.
We also talked this morning about public confidence among members of minority communities, as was raised by the hon. Member for Birmingham Erdington. The group JUSTICE has put forward its views and concerns about this. It notes that the equality statement for the Bill also notes that black, older and female defendants historically elect for a Crown court trial at higher rates. In 2022, 26% of black defendants elected for a Crown court trial, compared with 15% of white defendants—a very significant gap. In 2017, the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy) also concluded that many individuals from ethnic minorities opted for trial in the Crown court whenever possible, as they had more confidence in the fairness of jury trials compared with magistrates.
As the Bill is written by the person advocating for those changes, we should consider what the right hon. Member said very carefully. He said:
“Juries are a success story of our justice system. Rigorous analysis shows that, on average, juries— including all white juries—do not deliver different results for BAME and White defendants. The lesson is that juries are representative of local populations—and must deliberate as a group, leaving no hiding place for bias or discrimination.”
Would Government Members put it to the right hon. Member for Tottenham that he was in any way denigrating magistrates in making that point, or that he was saying magistrate trials were not fair? I do not recall any Labour MP making that point at the time that his report was published. The review found that BAME defendants often had lower confidence in the fairness of magistrates courts and, as I have said, therefore opted for a trial in the Crown courts. Because of that lack of trust, BAME defendants were also thought to be more likely to plead not guilty in magistrates court and push for a Crown court trial, which resulted in them missing out on the one-third sentencing reduction offered by early guilty pleas. These things have real-world consequences for the individuals concerned.
While the report found that BAME defendants were not disadvantaged compared with white counterparts at the jury trial stage, they faced harsher outcomes elsewhere in the system. I want to quote again from the Lammy review:
“The way that juries make decisions is key to this. Juries comprise 12 people, representative of the local population. When a jury retires to make a decision, its members must consider the evidence, discuss the case and seek to persuade one another if necessary. This debate and deliberation acts as a filter for prejudice—to persuade other jurors, people must justify their position. In the final decision, power is also never concentrated in the hands of one individual.”
What did the right hon. Member have to say about magistrates courts? He said:
“This positive story about the jury system is not matched by such a clear-cut story for magistrates’ verdicts. The relative rate analysis…commissioned for this review found that decisions were broadly proportionate for BAME boys and girls. However, there were some disparities for adult verdicts that require further analysis and investigation. In particular, there were some worrying disparities for BAME women.”
As a table in the report showed,
“of those women tried at Magistrates’ Court, Black women, Asian women, Mixed ethnic women and Chinese/Other women were all more likely to be convicted than White women.”
Again, would Government Members say that the right hon. Member was therefore advocating for the abolition of magistrates hearings? Of course not, and neither are we. We are simply making clear the trade-offs for such an unprecedented shift in their use—for such a significant curtailment of the use of the system of juries that is so well regarded and trusted by our constituents—and are arguing that the case has not been made.
JUSTICE also raised concerns about unrepresented defendants. My hon. Friend the Member for Reigate made that point in relation to legal aid. The equality statement for the Bill acknowledges that if more cases are dealt with in the magistrates court, a greater proportion of defendants may be ineligible for legal aid compared than if their case were heard in the Crown court. That is because the income eligibility threshold in the magistrates court of £22,325 is significantly lower than that in the Crown court, where it is £37,500.
An increase in unrepresented defendants risks undermining fairness. For example, defendants may receive harsher sentences if they do not know how to effectively offer mitigation. This is especially concerning where expanded magistrates’ sentencing powers will leave defendants facing trials for offences carrying a sentence of up to two years unrepresented.
Additionally, the Institute for Government has highlighted that unrepresented defendants in magistrates courts are also likely to prolong hearings and therefore erode any of the anticipated efficiency gains. It estimates that, for every additional hour in the average length of a trial, estimated savings will fall by more than one percentage point.
I also want to address the issue of youth courts, which was debated this morning. Government Members posited the fact that these courts hear more serious cases such as rape as some form of proof that curtailing jury trials in a similar adult case could be acceptable. That ignores the fact that each court and each setting has its own balances and goals and its own weighing exercise, with different considerations, where different conclusions will be reached.
Youth court trials generally do not have a jury because they are designed to be less formal and more focused on rehabilitation than punishment, with cases heard by specially trained youth magistrates rather than ordinary magistrates alongside district judges. These courts prioritise specialist knowledge and child-friendly proceedings over public proceedings, and aim to ensure that a child understands what is happening, with less intimidating atmospheres than adult Crown courts. Youth courts are closed to the public, which is not possible with a jury trial.
This is the trade-off we make, but these are trade-offs that, for decades and decades, we have not considered suitable in adult courts. We have considered the extra, additional vulnerabilities and the need to focus on rehabilitation in youth courts, so we carry out a different balancing exercise and make a different trade-off. That does not mean that we can read that across to an adult court without considering the benefits, the conclusions and the additional factors that we seek to mitigate—that we can just say, “Well you can just do the same for adults as you do in a youth court.” Different scenarios have different tests.
We also know that the choice of trial by jury is not the only reason some defendants elect for trial by jury. In fact, there are important procedural differences in the two courts. An application to dismiss is a legal request made by the defence to have some or all of the charges thrown out before the trial begins. This application is available only in Crown court cases and applies to indictable offences or cases that have been sent from the magistrates court to the Crown court.
An application to dismiss in the Crown court is a pre-trial request to throw out charges, according to rule 3.2 of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2025, and earlier versions. It must be made in writing after the prosecution serves evidence but before arraignment, arguing that a reasonable jury could not convict.
It is true that formal applications to dismiss are relatively rare compared with other ways in which a case might end, mainly because the legal bar for success is very high. While specific numbers for rule 3.2 applications are not always separated in basic reports, wider court data gives a clear picture of how often cases are dropped or stopped before a full trial. In recent quarters, up to late 2025, the figures available to me show that approximately 17% to 18% of defendants in for-trial cases had their cases dropped by the prosecution or stopped by the court before a verdict.
Why are formal dismissals that are available in the Crown court less common? The Crown Prosecution Service knows it is legally required to keep cases under constant review. If the evidence is truly weak enough to be dismissed by a judge, the CPS will usually discontinue the case or offer no evidence to avoid a wasted hearing. We know that is a very common occurrence. Are we confident that we know how much of that happens because of the availability of that legal test? The CPS knows that if it does not do that and if it does proceed in an inappropriate manner, it will face the legal test that it does not face in the magistrates court. If the Government have access to evidence that can reassure us, they should present it, but I could not find anything that leads me to be confident that cases dropped in the Crown court might proceed in the magistrates court, and perhaps they should not.
The provision of disclosure in the Crown court is much more robust. We have all seen cases where trials collapse because of exchanges related to disclosure. Crown court disclosure is strictly governed by the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, which requires formal staged disclosure. In magistrates courts, disclosure is often more streamlined, focusing on the initial details of the prosecution case. In the Crown court, a defence statement is mandatory. In the magistrates court, a defence statement is generally voluntary, although recommended. Once the prosecution discloses unused material, the defence has 28 days in the Crown court to serve a defence statement. In the magistrates court, the time limit is 14 days.
Crown court prosecutors must provide schedules of all unused material. Magistrates courts typically use, as I have said, streamlined disclosure certificates, which are not as extensive. We know there are problems with disclosure at times. The independent review of disclosure and fraud offences was officially announced by the UK Government on 23 October. Led by Jonathan Fisher KC, the review was commissioned as part of the fraud strategy launched in May 2023 to address the digital age challenges in criminal cases. It is the first of its kind since the 1986 Roskill report. Jonathan is a leading King’s counsel in financial crime, proceeds of crime, fraud and tax cases. He has been a visiting professor in practice at the London School of Economics and he holds a PhD, which was awarded by the LSE following his research into money laundering cases and the relationship between the obligation to report suspicious activity and corporate rights. Clearly, this is someone who speaks with a great deal of authority and experience in relation to the operation of criminal law.
Part one of the review, on disclosure, was published on 21 March 2025. It is helpful for us to reflect on it, given some of the exchanges we have had during debates. As I have said, Government Members sought to dismiss any suggestion that the magistrates courts were less fair or a less appropriate place to hold a hearing and suggested that everything is rosy in the magistrates court, so there is no possible reason why someone might not want to go to a magistrates court. They wanted to frame this as a purely binary choice between fair and unfair.
As I pointed out to the Minister, every time we point out some of the unfairnesses, the Minister says that everything is fair and it is all fine. But then when we ask the Minister to articulate why, if everything in the magistrates courts is just fine and dandy, we therefore keep jury trials for more serious cases, there is literally no rational or logical conclusion. The Minister says this is not a debating chamber, but the Minister is presenting a Bill with underlying political and legal principles, and if she cannot come up with a consistent set of those principles as a basis on which to articulate the arguments she is making, that is not a great advert for the Bill.
I can happily say that I think Scotland’s legal system is less fair, and I think the magistrates courts are less fair. I am perfectly happy to say that, but that does not mean that I want to get rid of them or curtail them. It is just part of the reality, and I am consistent in that regard. So let us talk about what Jonathan Fisher can do to assist us.
Sarah Sackman
I have never sought to sugar-coat the situation in our courts. Does the hon. Member think that one of the reasons why magistrates courts are struggling in parts of the country is because the number of magistrates halved under the last Government?
Dr Mullan
Yes, absolutely, which is why I said earlier that I regret some of the changes undertaken while we were in government. I have made it very clear that justice and all the issues we are debating are a real political priority for me. That is why, in large part, I wanted to become an MP. Members will rarely hear me disagreeing with arguments that need to be made in government about which Department gets priority. I absolutely welcome the success that the Minister and her colleagues have had in making arguments for resources.
But again, that is no answer to the public about what the Government are doing now. They are in charge. There is a constant harking back to decisions we took, but the Government have to stand on their own merits. The point we have made again and again is not that we should not do something. It is not that there is not a problem. Our argument is purely that we do not think this is the way to do it, and we do not think the trade-offs that the Government are setting out and what they are asking us to lose will translate into those benefits.
Matt Bishop (Forest of Dean) (Lab)
I am listening intently to what the hon. Gentleman is saying. How do the disclosure aspects he is talking about link to the amendment we are discussing?
Dr Mullan
Those aspects link directly, because I am discussing particular disclosure issues occurring in the magistrates court. As I will go on to explain, these are specific problems that Jonathan Fisher has identified as being a particular problem in the magistrates court rather than the Crown court—yet we are going to send more cases to the magistrates court.
We have to be clear eyed about exactly what we are doing. The issue is relevant because every time Opposition Members say, “Things are not the same in the magistrates court. You do not get quite as fair a trial; it is not comparable to a jury trial”, Government Members say, “That’s nonsense—they are all the same. If you believe that, get rid of magistrates courts.” It is important to understand this clear example of where the magistrates courts are delivering a less fair service than the Crown courts. I will carry on.
HMCTS data suggests that in 2023, a total of 311 magistrates court cases were ineffective because the prosecution explicitly failed to disclose unused material. In the same year, 746 magistrates court cases were deemed ineffective due to defence disclosure problems. Between October 2014 and September 2023, disclosure accounted for almost 7% of all ineffective trials in magistrates courts.
The issue is also extremely important from a victims’ perspective. The debate today has been about the defendants, but if we take the argument that in some of these cases the defendant would have been found guilty, who loses out the most if we send a case to the magistrates court and it collapses because of particular challenges with disclosure? The victim loses out, because it is over and done with and they do not have the opportunity to recorrect.
Alex McIntyre
I want to correct the record. This morning, I understood the Conservative party position to be that we are not allowed to call them victims at that point.
Dr Mullan
Sometimes I wish that Government Members would pay more attention to what is being said. I mentioned “some” cases and “some” of these people. That is the difference in how we tackle these issues. We do not get up and talk about “every victim” and I specifically did not say that. I went out of my way to say that among hundreds and hundreds of accusations, some people would inevitably be guilty. That is completely different from what, some of the time, some Government Members have been doing: assuming that everyone who claims to be a victim is one. That is very particularly what I did not do.
I finish this particular point with something else Jonathan Fisher said:
“Notwithstanding the vital need for further quantitative analysis, I am not convinced that, regarding the Crown’s duties, the disclosure regime is working as intended in the magistrates’ courts.”
That is an extremely serious consideration. He is not convinced that the disclosure regime is working as intended in the magistrates courts; he did not make that point about the Crown courts. I ask Government Members to reflect on that and then say there is no rational reason why some people might be concerned about more cases—and more complex, serious cases—being heard in the magistrates court. What that report alone says about our magistrates courts gives plenty of people a rational and reasonable basis to say that what happens in magistrates courts is less fair and potentially less effective than what happens in the Crown court. Government Members would do well to concede that important point.
I finish with a pretty extraordinary exchange with the Minister about the figures on the backlogs themselves. Let us remind ourselves of the central premise and argument: we all agree that the backlogs are too high. The Government say that they cannot be brought down to historic levels without the erosion of our jury trial rights. Opponents of the Bill are varied in their views, but perhaps most common is the view that other things can, and should, be done instead. What is happening right now with the backlogs is extremely important to this debate. If the backlogs are coming down in some places without these changes being introduced, it is vital to know and understand that.
Sarah Sackman
I checked this during the adjournment of the sitting: the CBA’s point relates to new receipts in certain courts, rather than the state of the backlogs, which, as I said, continue to rise. I absolutely welcome the progress in some parts of the country in lowering receipts, which is obviously good news for the courts, but that does not yet reflect any lowering of the backlogs. As we would expect, the investment will take time to kick in.
Dr Mullan
Clearly, if new receipts into the Crown court are coming down, we will not immediately see a reduction in the backlogs—we need time for the trials to come down. I am glad that the Minister has admitted that new receipts are coming down, because that is an extremely important insight into whether the backlogs themselves may then come down at a later stage. We also have to note that this potential improvement in the backlogs is happening without the introduction of changes to jury trials.
Sarah Sackman
Does the hon. Gentleman recognise that the central insight of the independent review—independent of Government—was that, absent reform, these backlogs will not come down? To confirm the point, the so-called do-nothing option includes the maximum investment of uncapped sitting days, so it already reflects the impact we can have on the backlogs with maximum investment. If that is the case, does he accept that nothing short of reform, efficiency and investment will bring the backlogs down?
Dr Mullan
As we heard from the Criminal Bar Association and others during the evidence sessions, we do not accept that the Government have sufficiently justified that modelling. Modelling is not perfect, and the IFG could not be clearer that the modelling used to justify the Government’s case, as the Minister has just done, is based on highly uncertain assumptions. If the Minister could actually produce some rock-solid modelling, so there was absolutely no way to dispute it, we would be in a different place. However, the Minister cannot produce modelling that even the IFG does not think is full of uncertainties.
Sarah Sackman
Does the hon. Gentleman accept that the very same sentence that he is quoting, which admits the fact that there is a degree of uncertainty—we are, of course, looking at a forecast—also accepts that our modelling assumptions, which the IFG itself pursued, are sound? In the same sentence, it recognises that the approach we have taken is sound, and as sound as it can be. What is not sound is doing nothing.
Dr Mullan
Let me think of a directly relevant example that shows just how important and meaningful that distinction is, in a way that the Minister is seeking to blur. We all follow political polls that are based on models. Those models are probably all sound, but they are all different and produce completely different results based on the assumptions—on voter turnout, for example.
I might speak to some Government Members and say, “Look, we have this poll that shows you’re going to smash it at the next election. You’re under no threat from Reform or the Lib Dems.” However, I might also say, “As part of that poll, we have assumed that 99.9% of the people who intend to vote Labour are going to come out and vote Labour.” Would Government Members then say, “Oh, great news! Absolutely, I’m going to smash the next election.” No. They would say, “Well, that assumption is fundamentally flawed.” The model may be correct, including the factors being considered, but inserting the assumptions into a model is what actually counts. That is what actually determines the outcomes, and the IFG is very clear about that.
Again, the Government are asking us to erode the important right to a jury trial, based on assumptions that the IFG says are highly uncertain. The Opposition’s position is quite clear. What is not uncertain is the fact that improving prisoner transport will help deliver improvements; that improving case management will deliver outcomes, which nobody disputes; or that improving access to early legal advice by reforming legal aid will help reduce the backlogs.
There is a whole slew of things that are not uncertain. Surely, the sensible and balanced thing to do is to get those things done first. Then, if the Government show that they really have done everything they possibly can, there could be a different discussion with MPs and the public about why they had chosen to erode and curtail an historic right that we have had for hundreds of years.
The reason why the data from the CBA is so important—the Minister accepts this—is that it is showing an improvement into the input. If the input is improving, then in theory the output will improve; I have not heard the Minister say that we will not get an improvement in the outlook at some point. If fewer cases are coming in, then surely there will be less of a backlog down the line. That is happening already—prior to the changes on jury trials and, more importantly, prior to all the other things having embedded in, as the Minister has herself admitted.
We have not even touched prison transport and we are getting an improvement; we have not even touched legal aid and we are getting an improvement—I could go on and on. The point was powerfully illustrated, in terms of priorities, by the representative from the HMCTS. I asked him about his priorities for reducing the backlogs and improving the situation. Jury trials did not even come close to the list of things that he thought were important. Surely we need to deliver on those elements successfully and consistently, but we all know that that is going to be extremely hard work.
I made the point to the Minister this morning. I do not doubt her sincerity on this, but being a Minister is about driving through major reform and change while having to manage day-to-day improvement in the system. She might think this an unfair comment, but I asked her this morning about what was happening with the inputs into the Crown courts. She is the Minister in charge of our backlogs, but when I asked for a clear answer about some of the statistics in regional variation, the Minister did not have them, did not know or was not able to answer. She had to go away at lunch time to answer a question about those key statistics. That is a bit like me asking the Health Secretary what is happening with regional variation in waiting times and the Health Secretary saying, “Well, I know overall waiting times are going down, but I don’t know the answer to that. I will have to go away and look and see what is happening in different parts of the country.” It is a giveaway.
Sarah Sackman
Given that the hon. Gentleman is besmirching my reputation, I should say that the equivalent is saying, “Health Secretary, what are the waiting list times in the UK—and what is the snapshot in Romford infirmary right now? I won’t afford you the opportunity to go away and get that figure over the break.” I think the hon. Gentleman is being a little unfair.
Dr Mullan
I do not think I am being the least bit unfair. I did not even ask the Minister to give a list or specifics; I just asked whether the statistics were going down in some parts of the country. That is a very broad and open question. I am flabbergasted that the Minister did not know whether things were improving, given that the main priority of the Bill is to get Crown court backlogs down. The Minister did not even know a topline figure.
One of the thrusts of the argument of the very many people who oppose the Bill is that if the good things happening in some areas were replicated everywhere, we would not have this issue. At the heart of some of the criticisms of the Government’s approach is the idea that we must understand that some places are getting this right. For the Minister not to know whether things are already getting better reflects poorly on the credibility of the case that this is the only way to do things. If it were me, I would want to know on a daily basis whether we were delivering this downward trend in some places. I would want to visit every single one of those places and drive forward that change.
The modelling is also important. The Government will already have modelled the period that we are in right now. I have to assume that the Government modelling gave some view as to whether there would be ups and downs in particular places. If we now know there are downward trends in particular places and the Government modelling did not account for that, that adds further reinforcement to the idea that we cannot rely on the Government modelling to make these decisions. It may well have got wrong the period that we are in right now, which makes things very uncertain when we want to look further in the future.
We are going to revisit these issues. As I said this morning, it is extremely important for the Government to be absolutely transparent at later stages about what is going on in the places getting lower receipts, as the Minister now accepts is happening. Why is that happening only in some places? What can be done to make sure it happens in other places? What does the Government expect would happen to the backlog if that was replicated across the country? As I have said, and as I will keep repeating, we are clear that the status quo is absolutely unacceptable for victims. We are clear about the role we played in that, and some Labour Members in the wider debate have accepted the role that Labour Governments, over the decades, have played in getting us to this place.
We want something to be done about the situation, but we also care about jury trial rights. I remind Government Members that there are victims’ representative groups that also do not want jury trial rights to be eroded. The idea that the issue is all about victims on the one side and opponents on the other is completely untrue—a point that the Minister accepted. To go down this particular road and erode our jury trial rights, the Government need a watertight case for why it is absolutely necessary, but they have completely failed to articulate, in any credible way, why this is the only thing they could possibly do and that there is nothing else they could do.
Sarah Sackman
The clause sits alongside clause 1 and ensures that the new allocation framework will operate coherently following the removal of the right to elect. It deals specifically with the written guilty plea route, which has not yet been commenced, created by the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022. Clause 1 removes a defendant’s choice to select the mode of trial in the Crown court in either-way offences. Once that choice is removed, it is necessary to make consequential amendments to the written allocation procedure so that it does not preserve a right that no longer exists in open court.
Clause 2 amends section 17ZB of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, which governs the procedure following a written indication of a guilty plea. Although those provisions have not been commenced, it is important that they are amended now, so that when they are brought into force, they operate consistently with the new allocation framework. Section 17ZB allows the defendant or the prosecution to object to the case being sent to the Crown court for conviction and sentencing where the magistrates court considers that its sentencing powers would be insufficient. Such an objection would prevent the court from sending the case unless the objection is withdrawn or a guilty plea is entered at an in-person hearing in the usual way.
Clause 2 will remove that ability to object. Instead, the magistrates court will have to invite written representations from both parties on whether its sentencing powers would be adequate and, having considered those representations, decide whether to send the case to the Crown court under section 51 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. That means that when a defendant engages with allocation in writing, the magistrates court will determine venue in the same way as it would at an in-person hearing.
As with clause 1, clause 2 does not remove existing safeguards. Both the prosecution and the defence will continue to be able to make representations, ensuring that the court has all the relevant information before making its decision. That will preserve fairness and ensure that all relevant factors, including seriousness, complexity and sentencing powers, are properly considered by the court before determining venue.
Taken together, clauses 1 and 2 will ensure that cases that are suitable for summary trial or sentence can be retained in the magistrates court, while cases that require Crown court sentencing are sent there efficiently, without unnecessary hearings. I commend clause 2 to the Committee.
Dr Mullan
I thank the Minister for explaining the measures as she understands them. I do not mind admitting that some of the explanations in the explanatory notes and the information from the Library have left us with questions about how the measure will operate. The clause refers to written indication of guilty plea, and the explanatory notes refer to this as being available to those who are pleading guilty. I do not mind admitting that the Minister is much more directly experienced with the legal system than I am, as are other members of the Committee, but I do not quite understand the idea of someone choosing the mode of trial after they have pleaded guilty. If they have indicated at the outset that they are going to plead guilty, will the hearing not be about sentencing, rather than trial? My remarks will be focused on that.
The obvious thing to ask is this. If this measure is purely about sentencing, why would anyone who has pleaded guilty ever elect to have a sentencing hearing in the Crown court, where they know there could be a higher sentence, rather than in the magistrates court, where they know there will be a cap on what sentence can be passed? Our arguments have been about the process of the trial itself, and I have touched on some of the elements other than sentencing. That is not to say that there may not be perfectly reasonable grounds for someone to object if they think the decision made was wrong. Again, these are people who have admitted guilt, so we can clearly say they are criminals. Some of them may have spurious reasons for wanting to approach the system in that way, by seeking not to go to the Crown court, but they may also legitimately think that the decision was wrong or not fair. They may well have legal advice that the decision was not consistent with the sentencing guidelines, and that they would have been expected to have stayed in the magistrates court. As we discussed this morning, a significant number of the appeals in the magistrates court are successful, although I accept that those who seek an appeal are in the minority. We all accept that the magistrates courts make mistakes.
It is important that we understand how this measure will work in practice. Can the Minister tell us how many people are objecting and using the mechanism at the moment? That is also confusing, because the explanatory note says that these provisions are not yet in place, but what is her projection of the difference this will make? What will be its material impact? The provisions have not been commenced, but the Government and civil servants must have a view about how objections would have operated and what they would have achieved, versus the right to make representations. What is the difference between those two mechanisms? A guilty person cannot insist on being sentenced in a magistrates court. If the magistrates think that someone is going to hit a higher tariff and should go to Crown court, the person can, in theory, object, as I understand it, but they cannot stop it. Before we vote on the clause, I want the Minister to explain in detail exactly how this will be different from what the Government envisioned was going to happen.
Is there a risk in theory that more things will go to the Crown court? If the Government are saying, “You can’t object,” they must think that at the minute, in theory—if the provisions were to be commenced—some people would be kept in the magistrates court inappropriately. The Government must want more of those people to go the Crown court. If they thought everyone was just going to stick in the magistrates court anyway, why would they be doing it?
Jess Brown-Fuller
The shadow Minister is clearly articulating his confusion, which I share. I believe that clause 2 is at odds with the rest of clauses 1 to 8, because it does the opposite of what those other clauses are trying to achieve. Let us say that, on the advice of legal counsel, Person A has been told that, if they plead guilty, they will most likely receive a suspended sentence. They are keen to move on with their life and therefore they are willing to enter a guilty plea, but they are then told by the magistrates that they would like their case to be heard in the Crown court, which could carry a higher tariff. At the moment, they have the right to object to their case being taken over to the Crown court, because the conditions in which they pleaded guilty have changed. By removing that right, we are making sure that people do not get to say whether they want their case heard in the Crown court, which could push more cases into the Crown court. That makes clause 2 feel at odds with the rest of the clauses, which are trying to remove things from the Crown court. Does the shadow Minister agree?
Dr Mullan
I do. In the other direction, the Institute for Government highlights that
“only around 30% of sentences of 6-12 months were handed out by magistrates”
since their sentencing powers increased from six months to 12 months. That indicates a hesitation in the magistrates courts to award higher sentences. If the Government have the objective of sending these cases to the Crown court, but there is evidence to suggest that magistrates hesitate when it comes to higher sentences, ultimately this measure will not change that.
I want to be clear, because I think that there is some confusion about what is written in the Bill and the explanatory notes. The explanatory notes say:
“The amendments remove the ability of the defendant or the prosecutor to object to the case being sent to the Crown Court for sentence”.
We are talking about sentencing, but that is not exactly what the Minister said or what the Bill seems to say. Before we are asked to vote in support of the clause, the Government need to clear this up, so that we can all understand what exactly this change will achieve that is different in theory from what was going to happen.
I appreciate that this is challenging because we are discussing changes that have never been put into operation, but that is not really an excuse. The Government should have a view of how things were going to operate, and therefore must have formed a view about how they want them to operate differently as a result of this change.
Sarah Sackman
I appreciate the complexity. We are slightly in the realm of the hypothetical. To be absolutely clear, the purpose of clause 2 is to align the uncommenced written plea and allocation provisions with the wider reforms in clause 1, which removes the right to elect. There is no intention at the current time to revisit the online plea and allocation system, so these written procedures have not been commenced, and they are not going to be commenced. The envisaged impact of those measures, which were part of the previous Government’s Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022, albeit that they have not been commenced, will have been assessed at that time. We have no intention to commence them.
Rebecca Paul
I thank the Minister for that explanation. I hope she will bear with me as I try to take it on board.
Clauses 1 and 2 amend the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 so that a defendant charged with an either-way offence is no longer able to elect trial by jury. As was clearly established earlier today, that right to elect is entirely abolished by clause 1. Instead, it will be for the magistrates court alone to decide where the case should be tried; it can either remain in the magistrates court or go up to the Crown court. Clause 2 deals specifically with situations where there is a written indication of a guilty plea.
Section 17ZB of the Magistrates’ Courts Act, as inserted by section 6 of the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022, sets out that the court can, on the material before it, without any hearing or representations, be satisfied that it is highly likely that, were the accused to plead guilty at summary trial of the offence in question and be convicted, the court would commit the accused to the Crown court for sentencing. Section 17ZB(5) then provides the accused with the opportunity to object to being sent to the Crown court for trial for the offence. Clause 2 amends that so that the accused and the prosecutor do not have the option to object and can instead only make representations as to whether the sentencing powers of the court would be adequate.
I note that “Crown Court” in the original section 17ZB is replaced with “court”. I assume that that refers to either the magistrates court or the Crown court, but I would be grateful for the Minister’s confirmation and explanation of that quite technical point, and of how it works with the Crown court bench division in the mix. The Bill’s explanatory notes suggest that it just means the magistrates court, but I went through the law— I should say that I am not a lawyer, but I dug it all out and read it—and, like a lot of Committee members, I am thoroughly confused. Normally, if something is logical and makes sense, I can follow it, so I am worried that it does not quite tie together. I am worried, even though I cannot quite articulate why, that the fact that the section will now just say “court” introduces some ambiguity. How is that defined? Quite often, these little bits of detail can be the speck of sand in the eye that can cause more problems than we realise.
This is a very technical issue, and I appreciate that it is difficult to go into it here and that the Minister is very good on the technical side of things—we have worked together on other things with very technical points, so I know that she is very thorough—but I think it is worth going through it again and making sure that the whole thing hangs together, so that we do not end up in a situation where the wrong place is doing sentencing or the wrong estimate of a sentence is made, and there is no way to unwind it. I am just a bit worried that there is potential for some problems to come out of this.
I appreciate the Minister’s helpful clarification that section 17ZB has not yet been commenced. However, if it had been, or if it were to be in future, it would, in a similar way to clause 1, remove powers and rights from defendants and give them less choice in how justice is dispensed in their case—essentially, a roll-back of rights. As I mentioned, I think we need to look at what will happen if the sentence estimate is wrong and how that will work its way through.
I thank the Minister for explaining that the provision is procedural, but it still strips people of the right to object and replaces it with the much weaker right merely to make representations. The explanatory notes are really clear on that point, even if they are not clear on a lot of others. They say that the changes made in clause 2
“remove the ability of the defendant or the prosecutor to object to the case being sent to the Crown Court for sentence”,
and instead create
“a process for each to make representations about whether the magistrates’ court’s sentencing powers would be adequate.”
That might have no impact if the section is never commenced, but if it ever is commenced, and we do not make sure that we have got clause 2 right, it may cause a problem and prioritise convenience over procedural protection.
When someone’s liberty, livelihood and reputation are at stake, it is a serious thing indeed to say that they may no longer object and may only make representations. Once again, the defendant is being moved further from the centre of the process, and the state closer to it. That is not right. Earlier in today’s proceedings, the Minister was reminded from the Opposition Benches that the legal system is balanced in favour of the defendant. That is not the spirit in which this change is being made. Indeed, that is the common thread running through clauses 1 and 2: at every stage, the defendant’s agency is reduced and the system’s convenience is elevated. The Government call that reform and improvement, but it is not; it is a distortion of our centuries-old legal protections.
There is a broader point here about confidence in the justice system. If the Government’s answer, again and again, is that defendants should simply trust the state’s estimate of seriousness, trust the allocation decision, trust the sentencing forum and trust that everything will work out in the end, that is not a strengthening of justice. It is a narrowing of the safeguards that make justice legitimate in the first place and will do nothing to address the backlog, which I recall was supposed to be the rationale for making these changes in the first place. Clauses 1 and 2 in combination are not what is required to address the Crown court backlog.
It appears that the backlog may be starting to come down already, as a consequence of uncapped sitting days and other changes that have been implemented, so why are the Government not taking a more cautious approach and exhausting all the good ideas that we have heard from expert witnesses before taking a sledgehammer to jury trials? Obviously, the first problem to address is the fact that up to 24% of Crown courts are not sitting on any given day, and getting the many defendants who arrive late to court there on time would be transformational. Why are we not solving those much more straightforward issues before pressing ahead with exceptional structural reform? We need to get the basics right, address inefficiencies and, most importantly, listen to those who know how to do it, such as the Bar Council and circuit leaders, and learn from the courts that are already making progress, such as Liverpool.
The Government are absolutely right to take the backlog issue seriously, but it is wrong to think that limiting jury trials will improve the situation. It could make the whole situation worse by creating years of transition and uncertainty and by moving one backlog from the Crown courts over to the magistrates. Furthermore, the cases moving over will be more complex, more technical and more sensitive. The Government are about to create a massive backlog in the magistrates court, which will then start to impact on low-level cases such as speeding offences.
I say that the Government should be more cautious because they have already accepted that there are other levers available. Ministers have announced that there will be no cap on Crown court sitting days next year, and that both the Crown court and magistrates courts will be funded at their highest ever operational level. That is much welcomed, but if the Government say that investment and capacity matter, why on earth would they not wait to see the full effect of those changes before pushing ahead with exceptional constitutional reform?
The Opposition position on that has been perfectly clear. On Second Reading, the Opposition’s reasoned amendment did not deny that the backlog is serious, but argued that the right answer is to improve case management, encourage earlier pleas, increase sitting days, increase the hours per day that courts are able to sit through better use of technology and improve the efficiency of prisoner transport. Those are practical, common-sense reforms; they go with the grain of the system, rather than taking a sledgehammer to jury trials and then hoping for the best.
The Government’s own impact assessment rather proves the point that this issue is as much about shifting pressure as solving it. It estimates that removing the defendant’s right to elect for jury trial would reduce crown Court demand by around 16,000 sitting days, but at the same time increase magistrates court demand by around 8,500 sitting days. The same document expressly recognises that reallocating cases to the magistrates courts is expected to increase the open caseload there and is likely to extend waiting times for hearing and sentencing in that jurisdiction. Even on the Government’s own figures, it is not some clean efficiency saving. It is a transfer of burden into a part of the system that is already under strain.
That is why clause 2 is more important than it first appears. Clause 1 removes the right to elect. Clause 2 then narrows the ability to resist where a written guilty plea is involved. Piece by piece, the Bill is building a system in which more serious, either-way cases are kept down, defendants have less say and the magistrates courts are expected to absorb ever more complexity. Ministers may present each provision as a small adjustment in isolation, but taken together, they amount to a very significant constitutional and practical change.
That change also carries transition risk. The Government are assuming that work currently taking place in the Crown court can be absorbed more quickly elsewhere. I know I am not telling the Minister anything that she does not already know, but the magistrates courts are not just a spare room in the system waiting to be filled. They will have to take more serious, more technical and more sensitive cases while continuing to deal with the huge volume of everyday criminal business that only they can process.
If the Government get this wrong, they will not have solved the backlog. They will simply have displaced it and degraded the quality of justice in the process. My plea is a simple one: “Proceed with caution. Let the effect of unlimited sitting days bed in. Fix the operational failings that everybody in the system can already see. Get defendants to court on time. Keep courtrooms sitting. Use technology better. Learn from the parts of the estate that are already improving, but do not dress up the removal of long-standing protections as if it were the only grown-up response to backlog. It is not. It is simply the most drastic one.”
That is why I cannot support clause 2. On its own, it may look technical, but in context it is part of a broader attempt to reduce rights, safeguards and the defendant’s role in how justice is administered. That is the wrong direction of travel.
Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South and Walkden) (Lab)
I rise to ask about two things. First, for clarification on what clause 2 is actually trying to do, because, like the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle, and like the hon. Member for Reigate, I was very confused by it. I read it many times and read the explanatory note as well. In desperation, I even went on to ChatGPT to see whether it could explain to me what clause 2 is trying to do.
I hope the Minister will bear with me: as I understand it, the procedures in the magistrates court are as follows: If it is a summary case, then the case stays in the magistrates court—the sentencing, trials and so on—and nobody has any right to go anywhere else. If it is an indictable offence, it has to be heard in the Crown court. There is no discretion and it is nothing to do with the magistrates court. If a defendant is charged with an either-way offence—this is the whole point of a jury trial—it has always been the case that he or she can turn up in court and say, “I plead guilty.”
Joe Robertson
I am not sure to what extent it is relevant, but I should probably declare that I used to be a practising solicitor, regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority and registered with the Law Society.
The Committee dealt with similar issues on the implications for the right of election at some length during the debate on clause 1. Of course, proper time should be devoted to relevant issues in clause 2, but there is a significant overlap. If clause 1 is the constitutional sword that strikes down the right to choose a jury, clause 2 is the mechanism, or at least part of the mechanism, that replaces it. It is the mechanism, its operation in practice and its real-world consequences that I want to examine in some detail.
Clause 2 establishes an allocation framework where there is a written indication of a guilty plea. Under it, courts—acting alone and without the defendant’s consent—decide on a venue. That is made obvious by the substitution of wording, with “objecting” replaced by “make representations”. I have some distinct arguments against clause 2. I will take them in order, and I make no apology for the time that may require. The Committee is being asked to make a decision of constitutional significance without, I will argue, adequate evidence, safeguards, honesty or straightforwardness about its consequences and the extent to which it has been properly examined. That deserves serious scrutiny.
The gateway itself is poorly designed. Let me begin with the mechanism itself; before one can assess the consequences, it is necessary to understand the structure. Under the current law, albeit not yet implemented, the allocation works in two stages: there is a role for the court, a role for the prosecution and a role for the defendants. However, under clause 2, the role for defendants disappears, or perhaps it is more properly described as being watered down until it is no longer a right. The magistrate or the court decide, and that decision is final.
The criteria applied may, and will, take into consideration any representations made by the defendant, but that is not the same as the defendant’s being able to object. The assessment is made on the papers available at the outset; while it is probably not fair to call it an educated guess about how a case will unfold or, in the case of clause 2, how a guilty plea may be pleaded, every experienced practitioner knows that the true seriousness of a case or sentencing becomes apparent as it develops. How a matter looks on the papers can become very different when oral representations are made.
Indeed, the Criminal Bar Association has noted—particularly in reference to clause 1, but it applies to the combined effect of clauses 1 and 2—that the Government’s own impact assessment assumes that cases heard in the magistrates courts under extended sentencing powers will average just four hours, for cases where the likely sentences are approaching 18 months. That is not a serious assumption. Critically, there is also no right of appeal against the allocation decision. Of course, the Government have chosen not to provide one—unfairly, but in my view understandably—because an appeal route would undermine what they are trying to achieve.
We are treating a symptom as though it were the disease itself. Before I turn to the specific failings of the approach in clause 2, I want to spend a moment on context. I think the Government have framed this debate—maybe not deliberately—in a way that obscures the actual problem. The Lord Chancellor has repeatedly said that the Crown court is in a state of emergency, and he is certainly right that it is under very significant pressure; the backlog stood at just under 80,000 cases at the end of September 2025. He has also repeatedly said that a jury trial is a major driver of that emergency. However, at the same time, he has said that, if the backlog is brought under control and reduced, he will not restore the right to elect a jury trial that is being abolished, and the same goes for the complementary provisions in clause 2. Plainly, whether he is right or wrong, he is inconsistent, and it makes no sense.
Alex McIntyre
As a former solicitor, I appreciate the hon. Member’s commitment to being paid at an hourly rate, given the speed of his contribution his afternoon.
One of the points the Secretary of State made in support of this measure at the Dispatch Box was that the changing nature of our criminal justice system and the added demand that will flow through the system in the future, added to the increasing complexity of cases, mean that jury trials are taking longer through the very nature of the additional evidence that is being gathered. That means that even if the immediate backlog is brought under control, there will still be a need for system reform in the long term, because otherwise we will not be able to keep it under control in perpetuity. Why does the hon. Member disagree with that?
Joe Robertson
I should clarify that I no longer get paid on an hourly rate—I am paid by the taxpayer, as the hon. Gentleman is, on the same terms.
I do not reject the argument about reform. I accept that. Sir Brian Leveson was very clear that the complexity of cases, including cases heard in the Crown court by a jury, has increased over the years, but he also said that he does not blame jury trials for the backlog. That is the difference between us. I do not see that the only option available to the Government is to end the election opportunity or the powers and rights of a defendant to select trial by jury or by magistrate.
Dr Mullan
The point was made very powerfully in the evidence sessions that we have this idea that we have to take a lot of time to explain all this complex stuff to a jury, and that we can just skip through it in a rapid way with a judge.
I visited courts and spoke to judges when I was on the Justice Committee. They themselves admit that they are not exactly whizz-kids when it comes to things like artificial intelligence or IT and the sort of things that might be over-complicating cases now. They are not going to be able to just whizz through stuff. They are going to need the same level of detail, explanation and time that a jury would need. Do we think defendants will be satisfied with a prosecution case that does not go through the same level of detail with a judge that it would have to go through with a jury?
We will end up with a whole new world of criminal appeals based on the idea that the judge did not adequately hear the evidence and that his summing up did not adequately address the reasons for his decisions. That could end up taking more time for judges. I am open to the idea that, potentially, we may possibly get some savings, but the case is so flimsy and weak that we cannot be expected to move forward on that basis when there are other things we could do.
Joe Robertson
I agree with my hon. Friend. There is a slightly strange implication that while jury trials have become more complex over time, due to technology and techniques for examining evidence—obviously a good thing—that somehow does not apply if the trial is in the magistrates court. That is the alarm bell, is it not? Magistrates courts are more capable of dealing with things in summary and they will not examine a case in as much detail and may miss things. That is not a criticism of magistrates and of the magistrates court—that is the system we have designed. When the consequences are less serious and the crime is less serious, the examination and process may be naturally less thorough.
That is not a reason to bring cases that today would be heard in the Crown court into the magistrates court without the defendant’s having the right to choose. My hon. Friend articulates that point exactly and represents the concerns that most people have.
In the evidence session, we heard that the current court backlog is the result of many things, including lack of investment—the Minister talked today about the lack of investment, and the issues with recruitment and retention, and criticised the previous Government for caps on sitting days—and the effect of the covid pandemic. The Minister and I might disagree on the extent to which that is true, but none of those things should be cured by abolishing jury trials.
Sarah Sackman
Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the 1% to 2% refers to the time savings achieved by the Crown court bench division? The IFG recognised that the totality of the package achieved a 10% saving. The Ministry of Justice’s modelling—externally verified—shows a 20% saving, which is highly material.
Joe Robertson
I accept the Minister’s statement to the extent that it is a statement of fact of people’s evidence. To address the issue of taking cases out of one court to give to another, however: that is a small minority of cases. Indeed, that is the argument that the Government make, certainly to their own Back Benchers when they are worried about the Back-Bench view of their proposals: “Don’t worry. Most cases are heard in the magistrates court anyway, and only a tiny percentage are being taken out of the Crown court.” The Government cannot have the argument both ways: when speaking to their own Back Benchers, “Don’t worry, this is not going to be meaningful,” and when speaking to the rest of the world about tackling backlogs, saying that that in itself is a meaningful change.
Dr Mullan
What does not bear up to much scrutiny is for the Minister to say, “Actually, the package as a whole will deliver these major reforms,” because we do not object to the whole package. We can say, “Go ahead and do the things that we do not object to, and we will have violent agreement at later stages in the Bill.” The Government cannot hold over us the fact that we agree with some of the package, because that is not a reason for us to go along with the things that we do not like. That is part of the whole process of parliamentary scrutiny of a Bill—the bits that we do or do not like. We are not removed from commenting positively about the good stuff because we disagree with other things.
Joe Robertson
Once again, I agree with the shadow Minister. If the Government genuinely want to address the backlog, the answer lies in the other 179 recommendations that Sir Brian Leveson made: increasing sitting days, which the Government have now done in a modest way; improving case management; removing unnecessary adjournments; rebuilding or restructuring the legal profession; sustainable legal aid; and a whole list of recommendations. None of that requires the—in my view—brutal axe taken against the right of election to jury trial. In fact, it is more than a brutal axe; jury trial is just being denied for an either-way offence That is being restricted to the magistrates court.
I now turn to what I consider the most serious argument against the clause, which is an uncomfortable one. It has been referred to already in debate on clause 1, but it is relevant to clause 2 as well. The venue to which all relevant cases we are discussing will be diverted is the magistrates court, which produces—measurably, consistently and substantially—worse outcomes for defendants from ethnic minority backgrounds than the Crown court does. That is not a theoretical proposition or a position of advocacy; it is the statistical evidence and the documented finding of researchers, legal practitioners and analysis drawing on Government data. Magistrates courts convict people from ethnic minority backgrounds at rates up to 40% higher than non-ethnic minority defendants. That is not a small or debatable margin; it is a significant consideration.
Albeit to make a slightly different point, the hon. Member for Chichester mentioned that if someone has a clean record they would be tried in the magistrates court, but if they had a list of previous offences they may be tried on the same facts in the Crown court, where conviction rates are lower. Having previous convictions therefore puts someone into a venue with lower conviction rates. I am not suggesting that the Government have designed the measure in that way, but it is plainly nonsense and unacceptable for that to come about. The Government need to look at that and amend it.
Charities have responded to Sir Brian’s proposals and have provided further granular data. In Crown court jury trials, people of colour are convicted at broadly similar rates to their white counterparts. It is not hard to see why: the principle—the whole idea—behind a decision being made by someone’s peers is that juries reflect the country in which we live. Magistrates and professional judges are predominantly whiter, more educated and more male than the population at large. It is interesting to note, but is not a criticism, that this Committee itself is evidently less diverse not only than juries, but than the population at large. A defendant from an ethnic minority background charged with an either-way offence this week has a right to elect. They can look at the data—thank goodness we have that data—take advice from their legal representatives and make a considered choice about the venue in which they believe they are most likely to receive fair treatment. I would suggest, without quoting evidence, that a number of them elect the Crown court because they believe they will get a fairer trial—because they are more likely to have their fate at least partly decided by someone who shares something of their own background and lived experience.
Let me address the Government’s response to this evidence, which has been inadequate. The Lord Chancellor—who, as he has reminded this House, knows the experience of racial disparity personally and profoundly, and has long spoken about it throughout and before his time in this place—has argued that progress is being made. He has cited the figure that 21% of judges now come from an ethnic minority background. I welcome the progress that has been made, particularly in the judicial system, but that still does not compare to the fairness and legal principle of trial by jury.
I want to put the constitutional point more plainly. Parliament is being asked to pass a provision that it knows, on the basis of evidence submitted to its own Committee, will produce racially differentiated outcomes. The Government have seen that evidence. Ministers have been questioned on it at length, and the Bill has not been amended to address it, but it must be. If a different Government Department proposed a policy that its own evidence showed would increase adverse outcomes for ethnic minority applicants by, in this case, up to 40%, what would we say? We would say it is discriminatory and grossly unacceptable. We would demand it be withdrawn pending a full equality impact assessment. We would not pass it on a Government Whip. This is the standard I invite the Committee to apply here. The fact that the discrimination operates through an allocation mechanism in the criminal courts, or in some cases through an administrative form, does not change its nature or its effect. The test is the outcome, not the intention. No one is suggesting the Government intend this, but it is the outcome and the outcome is documented.
The racial disparity in outcomes does not exist in a vacuum. It is connected causally, not merely coincidentally, to a documented and persistent deficit in judicial diversity. In 2019, 12% of magistrates were from a BME background, which compares to an 18% share of the general population. The magistrates do not reflect the country that they are being asked to judge in the same way as a jury do.
I turn to the argument that the legal aid threshold will leave defendants unrepresented when making their plea in sentencing. That is a further systemic consequence of clause 2. The means test for legal aid differs, of course, between the two tiers of court, as we have heard. In the Crown court the threshold is more generous. Defendants in a wider income range qualify for representation at public expense. In the magistrates court the threshold is lower and less generous. Many defendants who would qualify for legal aid in the Crown court may not qualify for it in the magistrates court. Under clause 2, a significant cohort of defendants who previously had a right to elect, and with it the more generous legal aid provision, will find themselves in the magistrates court facing charges and sentencing that could result in a sentence of 18 months, or ultimately 24 months, without adequate legal representation. The Institute for Government has flagged this explicitly. Because of the low-income threshold to qualify for legal aid in the magistrates court, many more defendants are likely to go unrepresented or under-represented, and an unrepresented defendant in serious criminal proceedings is not a defendant receiving fair justice.
There is a cruel irony in the Government’s framing of the issue. Ministers argue that one problem with the current system is that defendants elect a Crown court to delay proceedings and therefore game the system. But why would a defendant in a serious case choose the Crown court? Often precisely because they know that in the Crown court they are more likely to have or to be able to afford a lawyer, and in the magistrates court they may not. The election is not a game. It is part of a system that has stood for a very long time. It is a rational response, in this case, to a legal aid system that is itself under severe pressure.
Alex McIntyre
The hon. Member is giving a rather elongated speech this afternoon, which we are all enjoying. On the subject of the Criminal Bar Association, I seem to recall it rallying against the removal of the ancient right of double jeopardy, which it said would deny people a fair trial and ruin our criminal justice system. I am pretty sure his party was in favour of that removal back in the noughties. Those predictions have not transpired; it actually led to justice, for example, for Stephen Lawrence. Does he agree that the CBA may be wrong in some of its views?
Joe Robertson
I thank the hon. Member for paying attention to my speech and staying with me on this. Fairly obviously, I do not think that the Criminal Bar Association is always right, but I do in this case.
The Institute for Government published “Beyond reasonable doubt?” on the day of Second Reading. Its conclusions were stark: the reforms risk prioritising speed over fair justice; the projected savings remain highly uncertain; a 10% to 15% increase in demand on the magistrates court will be difficult to manage in practice; and the structural reforms are likely to impede attempts to improve productivity and could make the situation worse in the short to medium term. That is not the view of lawyers protecting their professional interests; it is the view of independent public governance researchers.
The Law Society has raised concerns about the retrospective application of the provisions, the fundamental unfairness of removing trial rights from defendants who have already elected under existing rules, and the prospects for those with cases already listed. It has also raised concerns about the legal aid means test misalignment, proportionality and cases involving children, as well as the potential unworkability of fraud provisions.
I submit that the burden of proof in this debate does not lie with those opposing the Bill, when the entire criminal law profession, leading independent think-tanks, retired judges and KCs have come out so united in their strength of opposition. Indeed, when the Government are looking to tear up centuries-old principles, whether in whole or in part—depending on how we analyse the crimes that will no longer be allowed to proceed to the Crown court—the burden of proof must surely be on the Government to explain why they are all wrong. That explanation, in my view, has not been provided.
John Slinger (Rugby) (Lab)
Does the hon. Gentleman acknowledge that previous Governments of all political colours have changed the threshold for jury trials, including those of Jim Callaghan and Margaret Thatcher? It is not entirely accurate to say, in the way that he did, that it is the tearing up of centuries-old rights; Governments periodically look at the threshold for access to jury trial.
Joe Robertson
Of course, the Minister made that point—in her view, this is about thresholds. Whether we want to call it an argument about thresholds, and whichever part of history we want to look at, the Opposition’s fundamental point remains. There is a distinct lack of evidence for this Government’s plans today, set against the range of other provisions that could be, and in some cases have been, introduced. In our view, they have not been given the time to bed in and potentially deliver the savings that the Government want. I accept the hon. Member for Rugby does not accept that, but I think that is the point of contention here.
Dr Mullan
I covered all the statistics on the reforms that the hon. Member for Rugby mentioned this morning. The scale of these changes, compared with the scale of those changes, is absolutely unprecedented. There has never been a reduction in jury trials of the scale before us today. In support of the point being made by my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East, the burden of proof must become higher and higher as the change being made gets bigger and bigger. This change is unprecedented, so let us have an unprecedented level of evidence to support it before asking us to consider it.
Joe Robertson
I agree with the shadow Minister, and I really have nothing to add—his words stand for themselves.
John Slinger
The shadow Minister states that the reforms proposed by this Government are unprecedented. Actually, the reforms of the Callaghan Government removed jury trials for theft, burglary, actual bodily harm and certain drug offences in 1977, and the Thatcher Government did the same in 1988 for criminal damage. Those are quite substantial changes, so I object to what I believe is hyperbolic language that some Opposition Members have used not only in Committee today but more widely. It undermines public confidence in the judicial system.
Joe Robertson
In an attempt to resolve a debate that is not immediately mine, I will give way to the shadow Minister.
Dr Mullan
It would assist the Committee to know why we are making these comparisons. I have figures on the effect of the reclassification of criminal offences in the Criminal Justice Act 1988, which is one of the examples that the hon. Member for Rugby used in order to say that we are unfairly comparing the categorisations.
Let us bear in mind that the changes before us today will result in a 50% reduction in jury trials. According to the Home Office statistics bulletin, which provides a summary of the effect of those changes for comparison, that legislation resulted in a 5% decline. The Government are asking us to support something that will lead to a 50% decline, yet the hon. Gentleman says that we are being hyperbolic in comparing the two and saying that one is insignificant and the other is significant. I think the difference between 5% and 50% is pretty significant.
Joe Robertson
I thank the shadow Minister. I am probably not in a position to arbitrate between the two arguments; the hon. Member for Rugby will have to forgive me, as I come from the starting position that I back the shadow Minister, not least because he was wielding a particularly substantial file when he just spoke.
I want to address a provision that is not the immediate subject of this grouping, but which fundamentally determines the significance of clause 2—the reform of appeal rights from the magistrates court contained in clause 7. Currently, a defendant convicted in the magistrates court has an automatic right of appeal to the Crown court. That right is exercised in approximately—
Linsey Farnsworth
On a point of order, Ms Butler. I seek guidance on how we get back to clause 2, because we have veered off significantly from it. Clause 2 relates to provisions that have not yet come into force but could well come into force in the future, specifically in relation to how cases could proceed from the magistrates court to the Crown court by way of written submissions. The idea behind that provision was to avoid the need for a court hearing if everybody agreed. How can we get back on to clause 2, because I fear we are veering significantly away from what it is trying to do?
The Chair
I will give a little leeway, but I ask the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East to please go back to clause 2.
Dr Mullan
On a point of order, Ms Butler. This speaks to the heart of the confusion at the start of the debate. On the one hand, the Minister wants to say that it is arbitrary and inconsequential, but the explanatory notes say that this is fundamental to enacting clause 1. That is what the Minister said—that these two things sit together, so everything that clause 1 is doing is surely in scope if the Minister’s argument is that clause 2 is needed to fully enact clause 1.
Joe Robertson
Thank you, Ms Butler, and I will of course stick to clause 2. I welcome any challenge that a specific point that I have made does not relate to clause 2. There is possibly a slight lack of clarity across the whole Committee, and I do not profess to be the only expert in the room; indeed, I am not an expert. However, I echo the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate that there seems to be a distinct lack of clarity about what clause 2 does. I am not suggesting that the Minister does not know, and I welcome an intervention if she feels that I need to be brought back into scope in this part of the debate.
Clause 2 specifically replaces automatic rights with a permission stage. When clauses 2 and 7 are combined, a defendant who believes they have been wrongly convicted must first persuade a Crown court judge that their appeal has sufficient merit before it is even heard. The Government argue that the 41% success rate shows that meritorious appeals will get through, but in my view, that misses the point.
The Law Society has identified precisely why the current simple route matters. A significant proportion of defendants in the magistrates court do not have a lawyer. As I have argued, under clause 2 more of them are likely to be unrepresented. Owing to the misalignment of legal aid means testing, an unrepresented defendant who has been wrongly convicted will surely be less likely to know how to draft grounds of appeal. They will not be able to identify legal errors that may appear in magistrates’ reasoning or decisions in the same way. As I understand it, they will also not be able to commission a transcript of proceedings in the same way and construct a submission that meets the permissions test. The permission stage is, in practice, a barrier that falls disproportionately on those least equipped to overcome it.
The opposition to the clause is broad and has not been answered. In some cases, the opposition is expert; in others, it comes through lived experience. I will briefly look at the range and weight of expert opposition to the provisions, some of which I have referred to already, because the Committee should understand— I am sure it does—what it is seeking to perhaps have regard to but set aside if it passes clause 2.
As we have heard, the Criminal Bar Association represents more than 4,000 practising criminal barristers. In answer to an earlier intervention, I do not say that the Criminal Bar Association’s word must be final, but it is clearly heavily persuasive, especially on this issue, which has already faced much scrutiny and disagreement from people with particular expertise in the field of criminal justice. As we have heard, its snap survey—so that is individual members, rather than the association—found that around 90% of members are against the proposals.
Sarah Sackman
I do not want to interrupt the hon. Gentleman because he is making important points, but the point was well made a moment ago that in line-by-line scrutiny the intent is to go line by line. Clause 2 deals with making what were uncommenced online procedures consistent with the changes made in clause 1 to the current ability of a defendant to choose venue. The hon. Gentleman is making a wide-ranging speech on whether one can appeal the mode of trial decision, and the permission to appeal. That will come later when we get to clause 7. I venture that these are all valid points that we will want to debate, but that might be the appropriate place to discuss those matters, because right now we are looking at clause 2. I am happy to reclarify the points I made in relation to clause 2, but if we range on to clause 7 in the scope of clause 2, we are not going to get the line-by-line scrutiny that we all want to achieve.
Joe Robertson
I thank the Minister for rather politely encouraging me to come towards the end of my speech. I will finish by addressing the idea that somehow, because something does not happen in Scotland, it must be okay not to happen in England. That plainly has nothing to do with politics or even football—not that I am suggesting the Minister thought it did. I am happy to say, as a proud citizen of the United Kingdom, that I think the English and Welsh legal system is the best in the world. The common-law system is the foundation, it has been adopted all around the world, and is by far the most widely-used legal system. It is possibly our greatest export, along with the English language.
Sarah Sackman
While I am very proud of our legal system, I do not necessarily take the view that ours is best and we cannot learn from other systems. Indeed, some of the places that we have exported to, such as Canada, are the places that we are looking to learn from when seeking to ameliorate our own system. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that, with its strong foundations, one of the strengths of our system is our fiercely independent judiciary? Much has been said about the judiciary, but does he agree that it is a fundamental pillar of our outstanding legal system and we should seek to defend it—and when judges are called enemies of the people, we should call it out?
Joe Robertson
I am very happy to say that I agree with all the things the Minister said. I also agree with learning from other systems. Plainly, the English legal system, like the English language, has been successful in its ability to adapt and evolve. Without going back to the beginning of my speech, started just a few minutes ago, for the reasons I have set out, I believe that this is an evolution—or arguably a revolution. [Interruption.] Was that another intervention? I think these measures are a stage too far.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I would like to briefly refer the Committee to some remarks that Sir Brian Leveson made during the evidence session we had before the recess. He said:
“We need people to confront what they have done. I do not want anybody to plead guilty who is not guilty and has seen the evidence. I am not asking to change the guilty plea rate, but in the early days, you pleaded guilty on the first or the second occasion you appeared at the Crown court—now there are many examples of that happening on the fifth or the sixth occasion you are in the Crown court. Each one of those takes a considerable amount of time. That is what is sucking up part of the time.”––[Official Report, Courts and Tribunals Public Bill Committee, 25 March 2026; c. 8, Q9.]
Sir Brian tried to explain that a lot of people look at the evidence and say, “Yes, I will plead guilty, but I will do so after Christmas”—that was his example. He said that now, because of the Crown court backlogs, people know that their case will not be heard until 2028.
The point that Sir Brian was trying to make is that we need to incentivise those who look at the evidence of their case, and recognise that a guilty verdict is probably going to be arrived at, to put in a guilty plea. Does clause 2 not risk having the reverse effect? People will see that if they put in a guilty plea, the one opportunity they have to argue whether the case should be heard in a magistrates court or a Crown court—although I imagine the majority of them would argue that it should be heard in the magistrates court in this specific example—is taken away from them. Are we not then disincentivising people to put in a guilty plea at an early stage, when we want to see the Crown court backlog come down?
Dr Mullan
Reflecting on what has been said, I think that confusion remains. I welcome the further remarks from the Minister, but I am still not clear on whether there will be any impact in the real world for people as a result of the change. Earlier, I read out a sentence from the explanatory notes that talks about how the clause relates to sentencing, but the sentence before that says it relates to a
“written indication of a guilty plea”.
The legislation says that a written plea is not actually a guilty plea, so there could still be a trial—someone might change their mind. The difference that the legislation talks about is that if someone gives an in-person plea, that is their plea. This reform introduces the idea of a written plea, and, probably quite sensibly, it was decided that that should not be seen as the final example. Decisions are being made at that point, but then the plea could be changed and there could be a trial. It could have a real-world impact; it is not a technical change.
If the Government are clear that they are not enacting this measure, why not? There must have been a reason why they thought that written guilty pleas were of use. I suspect it probably was an efficiency measure at the time and they thought, “If we allow people to more easily give an early indication, that might encourage them to do so, and we can get all the benefits that flow from that.” If the Government are on an efficiency drive, why are they not enacting the measure? I would have asked the same of my Government if they had the ability to enact it. I do not know what the timeline was—was there a natural lag or a deliberate decision not to enact it?
We need it laid out in black and white: will this change have any real-world impact—yes or no? What exactly will that impact be? Because of the quite open possibility that it will have a real-world impact in terms of reducing someone’s ability to go to the Crown court—that is what we are talking about—all the concerns that Members have about clause 1 apply to clause 2.
I want to pick up on some of the changes. The Minister mentioned how we have listened to Canada. The point I made quite clearly in our evidence session with the Attorney General of Ontario was that they brought their backlog down without making any changes to jury trials whatsoever, so I am not sure how helpful that is as an example of why we need to change the system.
Members mentioned a sunset clause. If the Bill were just about bringing the backlog down, there would be a sunset clause in it. That again demonstrates that the Government actually think this is a better way of doing things. If that is the case, they should make that argument. They should just say, “We are making these reforms because they are the better way to do things. There will be an additional benefit in terms of bringing down the backlog,” but they have not said that.
I certainly would not use the language that the Minister used, but I am absolutely clear that we need to improve judicial accountability. We had a whole panel in the evidence sessions in relation to the family courts, for example, and whether they are making the right sorts of judgments about the interests of the child. We heard quite clearly that judges should not place too much weight on the idea that there is a good relationship with both parents when making decisions. The reason the Government are proposing changes on this issue is that they clearly do not think that judicial decisions are consistently doing the right thing.
My first encounter with this lack of accountability in judicial decision making—this is very important if people will be subject to individual judicial decisions—was the case of a constituent who had fostered a young girl in difficult circumstances. The young girl was physically fit and healthy, but struggling. The family—the original parents—had applied to get custody back. The foster mother did not want the girl to go back to the family, and nor did the local authority or the wider family, but the judge decided—again, we are giving more power to judges by removing the power to elect—that the girl should go back.
That girl is now in an almost vegetative state—it is not quite like that, but she is extremely disabled. The wonderful lady who fostered that young girl, even though the girl was then in a very difficult physical state and was going to be extremely dependent for the rest of her life, adopted her, which was an extraordinary thing to do. She approached me to say, “Social services have to account for what has happened. The police, if they had been involved, would have had to account for what happened. Can you tell me what happens to the judge who made that decision, which led to these consequences?” I wrote the Lady Chief Justice asking whether she could explain to my constituent what the consequences were. If there is a legal matter, it goes to the Court of Appeal; other than that, there is no issue for the judge. That has really driven my view about a need for more judicial accountability. I recognise the Minister’s right to say that we have to be careful about the language we use when talking about these things, but there is nothing wrong with saying that we need a more accountable judiciary.
On the need to increase sitting days, the Government like to claim that there are record levels of sitting days. I do not know whether the Minister knows that that is not a fair reflection of what is going on, but we changed the way in which we measure sitting days. There used to be two separate counts of sitting days—trial days and judge days—and we then combined them. If we look at the figures fairly, the counts are at some points pretty similar, if not higher previously. The figure is higher now because there is just one figure. I am not seeking to take away from the Government’s efforts in that regard, but we should be fair and accurate in how we describe the historical record.
We discussed whether it was fair to use the term “abolition”, which has come up repeatedly. I am very careful about the language I use, and I do not say that, but I will not take any lectures on the issue from a party that, when my right hon. Friend the Member for Richmond and Northallerton (Rishi Sunak) was Prime Minister, put out a Facebook campaign saying that he did not think that paedophiles should go to prison—a disgusting misrepresentation of the reality. The Labour party was happy to do that, so I will not take any lectures from Labour Members.
The Chair
Order. I allowed the hon. Member to rise to make a quick contribution on clause 2. Would he sum up?
Dr Mullan
My final point in opposition to clauses 1 and 2 is that the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East (Karl Turner), who is not here today, would have had a lot to say during our proceedings. He is a Labour MP who has quite literally never rebelled against the Labour Whip. Ms Butler, you have probably been here longer than all the rest of us, so you know that in our parties we have the usual suspects, who rebel when they get the opportunity and take any chance to disagree with the governing party—we all have a sense of what that means. The hon. Gentleman is not one of the usual suspects. He is a passionate practitioner. He will have dealt with clause 2 cases. He will have sat in court and dealt with the sorts of things that clause 2 covers.
Linsey Farnsworth
Clause 2 relates to measures that have not come into force yet, so my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull East cannot possibly have any experience of that.
Dr Mullan
Sorry—I am not clear that there will not be real-world consequences in the kind of ways that the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East will understand. The Minister nodded her head when I suggested that fewer people will get a Crown court trial as a result of clause 2. The Minister indicated from a sedentary position that it is correct to say that fewer people will get a Crown court hearing specifically as a result of clause 2. If the Minister can clarify that, I am very open to hearing her. I ask Labour Members to think very carefully about the fact that one of their own, who is not one of the usual suspects, is so vehemently opposed to the change.
Sarah Sackman
I will address clause 2 and respond to some of the remarks the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East made about the equalities impact, as well as the point about efficiencies and the time scale over which they can be realised to address the problem that we all say that we want to address: the backlogs.
Clause 2 changes uncommenced provisions in section 17ZB of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 so that appropriate guilty pleas are sent to the Crown court for sentencing. To answer the question that the hon. Member for Reigate asked about the meaning of the word “court”, in this context, it refers to the magistrates court, which is where the first hearing takes place. I hope I have clarified that. It was before my time but, as I understand it, the measures aimed to provide the defendant with the chance to indicate a plea at the earliest possible opportunity and to enable allocation decisions to be made without the need for an initial in-person hearing. They will not change anything around the allocations procedures moving forward.
On the shadow Minister’s question about why we do not just do that, it is not a priority for the now, as we have a lot of other priorities. System readiness is essential for the commencement of an online plea and allocation procedure and we do not have a date for that commencement, so there is an air of the hypothetical here. However, clause 2 aligns with what we spoke about in the debate on clause 1 so that, should this or a future Parliament choose to implement the online plea and allocation procedures, the measure is clear.
To answer the question asked by the hon. Member for Chichester, no, the Government do not think that the measure would alter behaviour around early guilty pleas, although she is absolutely right that one thing we are striving to do—through not just these legislative reforms, but our approach to the reform of legal aid fees—is to change behaviour in the criminal justice system to achieve the early guilty plea rates that we saw before the backlog raced out of control, at the very least. The sooner we get those early guilty pleas, the more efficient the process is, for the system and for people’s ability to move on.
Currently, when a defendant has indicated a guilty plea and the magistrates court considers its sentencing powers to be inadequate, the court cannot commit the case to the Crown court for sentencing without the consent of both the defence and prosecution. Clause 2 removes both parties’ ability to object. Instead, the magistrates court must invite written representations from both parties on whether its sentencing powers would be adequate, and then, having considered those representations, decide whether to send the case to the Crown court under section 51 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.
Under the process as amended by the clause, should the provisions be commenced, defendants would continue to indicate their plea in writing, but decisions about the appropriate venue for trial would, as a consequence of the changes under clause 1, be made by the court alone. The Committee debated the merits of those changes in our significant and lengthy discussion on clause 1, but the policy decision in the clause is that the court rather than the defendant should make the decision on the venue of trial.
The hon. Member for Isle of Wight East commented on the impact of the current system, and of any reformed system, on minorities, which, as I indicated earlier, is really important. That topic is an important aspect of the Committee’s work and, as we reflected on earlier, it will be an important part of our future discussions. I genuinely look forward to the debate we will have on the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington, which will no doubt lead to important discussions across both sides.
I want to pick up on a figure that the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East cited. I heard him say—I wrote it down—that someone is 40% more likely to be convicted if they are an ethnic minority defendant in the magistrates court than in the Crown court. That is not a figure that I recognise and it is not one reflected in the equality impact assessment that accompanies the Bill, which cites the Ministry of Justice’s data. What our data shows is that someone is not more likely to be convicted if they are an ethnic minority defendant in the magistrates court. In general, conviction rates are 15% higher in the magistrates court compared with the Crown court for triable either-way offences or equivalent offences, but that is consistent across ethnicities.
I do not take issue with the hon. Member’s point that many who currently elect for a jury trial, including those from black and minority ethnic backgrounds, may well do so because they think they will get a fairer hearing or some other advantage by going before a jury. There is also no doubt that juries command a higher degree of confidence in those communities. I am sure that that will be teased out in the debate that we will have, but it is important that we are as careful as we can be. I am not suggesting that he was not being careful, but I do not recognise that 40% figure.
A statutory review mechanism for the ongoing monitoring of and response to racial disparities, whether in relation to sentencing outcomes, conviction rates or disproportionality in the CPS, is important. It is also important that where we see improvement and get things right, we talk about that, too. How will we command the confidence of our diverse communities unless we also talk about the improvements that are being made? I think sunlight is the best disinfectant. We need to be candid about the issues that exist in our current system and the status quo, and how that in many regards fails some of our communities. But if we seek to improve it, we have to be really clear on the data. I just wanted to clarify the statistic on conviction rates, which, as I said, is higher across all ethnicities, but of course that will include black, minority ethnic and mixed race defendants as well.
I want to say something about the efficiencies. Everyone agrees, not least as the backlogs have raced out of control, that the system has become more and more inefficient. It becomes a vicious cycle. Common themes have been raised and I agree that there are areas that need focus, such as prisoner transfers. Members will have heard about initiatives that the Government have already set in train in terms of opening up bus lanes. The Prisons Minister in the other place and I have established a prisoner escort and custody services prisoner transfer oversight board. I was at Wandsworth prison the other day. I got in a Serco van and talked to some of the prison officers and Serco people about how it operates and where there is grit, as it were, in the system. We are looking at it from end to end, as we must, including by engaging—this might come as a surprise—with the likes of the Bar Council. I have regular constructive engagement with it because it has lots of first-hand evidence of prisoners failing to turn up on time in court, sometimes because they have not left the prison and sometimes because they are in the cells in the court and there is no one available to bring them up. Getting to grips with those problems is really important.
I must bring Members back to the very clear evidence of Sir Brian Leveson’s review team. Although we must deal with the recommendations—indeed, we are doing so in real time, even before this Bill makes it on to the statute book—they will not be sufficient to reduce the backlog. One of the challenges consistently put to me stings pretty hard: “Even with everything you’re doing, Minister—even with the 20% savings that you say this will realise, even with the efficiency drive, and even with uncapping sitting days—you only begin to get the backlog down at the end of this Parliament. In the meantime, all the defendants on remand, all those complainants and all those actual victims of crime have their lives on hold. It is not happening nearly fast enough.” That is why we are choosing to pull every lever, including the levers in this Bill, which, by the way, includes clause 2. I commend clause 2 to the Committee.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Yasmin Qureshi
I beg to move amendment 23, in clause 3, page 5, line 25, leave out “the condition” and insert
“one or more of the conditions”.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 39, in clause 3, page 5, line 26, at end insert—
“or,
(c) the defendant demonstrates to the court that the circumstances of his case are such that to be tried without a jury would amount to a breach of the principles of natural justice.”
This amendment would ensure that trials by jury continue for indictable offences carrying a sentence of less than three years in prison if the defendant can demonstrate that it would be in the interests of natural justice.
Amendment 24, in clause 3, page 5, line 28, leave out subsection (5) and insert—
“(5) The conditions in this subsection are met in relation to a defendant if—
(a) the defendant, if convicted of the offence or offences for which the defendant is to be tried, would be likely to receive a sentence of imprisonment or detention of more than three years for the offence or offences (taken together);
(b) the defendant is of good character;
(c) the defendant has not previously been convicted of an imprisonable offence;
(d) the defendant would be treated as a rehabilitated person under section 1 of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974;
(e) if convicted of the offence or offences for which the defendant is to be tried, would likely suffer significant reputational damage or have their employment or professional qualifications adversely affected;
(f) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the gravity or complexity of the case may increase; or
(g) other exceptional circumstances pertain to the case.”
Yasmin Qureshi
I will not press these amendments to a vote, but I want them to be debated; they are probing amendments. Amendment 23 was tabled by me and my right hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell). At the moment, the proposed legislation only has one condition; I would like to put in more than one condition to be met when the courts are considering whether a case should go to the Crown court.
Amendment 24 sets out the conditions that I wish the Committee and the Minister to consider: when there is discussion or consideration about whether a case should be sent to the Crown court, they should look at whether
“the defendant, if convicted of the offence…for which the defendant is to be tried, would be likely to receive a sentence of imprisonment…of more than three years”,
which is what the Government have initially proposed. I also say that whether the defendant is of good character is a completely relevant consideration, along with the considerations in paragraphs (a) to (g) of the amendment.
I will explain the rationale behind that proposal. We have spoken about the fact that there are people of previous good character, who may be in a different position from people who have convictions, who could go to the Crown court. That is one good argument to make but, for me, when we are trying to restrict an either-way right of trial, the fact that someone is of good character is a relevant consideration. All the conditions I have set out should also be included in the Bill so that they are considered by the court when determining where the case should be heard.
Dr Mullan
I rise to speak in support of amendment 39 tabled in my name. As I touched on earlier this morning, along with amendments 23 and 24—which are driving at the same point, but in slightly different ways—we are revisiting the discussion that we in the Opposition framed as a broad categorisation of principles of natural justice. We do so with the hope that it allows flexibility and expandability for the courts to interpret and give weight to that clause in a common-law system. However, it is also perfectly legitimate to approach the issue in a more defined way, as amendments 23 and 24 do. Every one of those examples is something we would agree with.
Amendment 24 states that the relevant conditions would be met in relation to a defendant if:
“the defendant, if convicted of the offence or offences for which the defendant is to be tried, would be likely to receive a sentence of imprisonment or detention of more than three years”
or if
“the defendant is of good character”.
It was helpful for the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden to use her expertise to explain that that is not just an idea of someone’s character; good character has a very specific meaning in law and exists for a reason. It exists because the judicial system, in various ways, thinks that that is important and it has a material impact on how someone should be treated within the legal system. Amendment 24 also specifies that the conditions would be met if
“the defendant has not previously been convicted of an imprisonable offence”,
or if
“the defendant would be treated as a rehabilitated person under section 1 of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974”.
Again, we go out of our way to put those provisions in place to say that rehabilitated offenders, as defined by the 1974 Act, should be treated differently from other types of offenders. We are building on the already established idea that we do not all experience the judicial system in the same way in relation to our previous convictions and offences—in both directions, because if someone has convictions, but they have moved past those convictions, we would seek to treat them differently again.
Amendment 24 would also apply to a defendant who,
“if convicted of the offence or offences for which the defendant is to be tried, would likely suffer significant reputational damage or have their employment or professional qualifications adversely affected”.
I talked about that issue this morning, and I welcome the hon. Lady’s references to Members of Parliament. Surely we can relate to that in a very profound way when we face a conviction. MPs are one such example, but there are many others. I gave the example of a solicitor this morning, and there are also doctors—my professional background—and police officers; there are a whole range of people who would suffer a very particular and specific set of consequences because of their job.
That would perhaps not be universal, and we would have to tease out whether someone might want the magistrates’ sentencing restrictions or the Crown court’s route to guilty—we will probably have to separate those two things. Some people might prefer a magistrates court, not because of the plea but, as they are likely to be found guilty, because of the sentencing restrictions. However, I agree with the hon. Lady that—if not universally, certainly overwhelmingly—people would want their guilt to be determined by a jury, even if they might prefer a magistrate’s restricted sentencing powers.
Finally, amendment 24 would apply to defendants where
“there are reasonable grounds to believe that the gravity or complexity of the case may increase; or…other exceptional circumstances pertain to the case.”
Those examples fit neatly with the aims of Opposition amendment 39.
As I said earlier, of all the provisions in the Bill, clause 3, which these amendments would alter, probably represents the profoundest and most unprecedented change to our legal system. We had a debate this morning about other changes that have been made, such as changes to which offences are summary, triable either way or indictable. Although it is true to say that there have been variations, and there has been that narrowing, I was very clear that the scale and unprecedented nature of these changes stand apart.
What we are talking about here is a completely different approach to determining guilt for adults in criminal cases, entirely removing the lay element. Again, we debated this morning about the fact that we cannot fairly describe magistrates as being entirely distinct from the local population; we very clearly heard all the reasons why they are not the same as having 12 ordinary members of the public on a jury, but they are not professionals. What we are talking about here, with the introduction of this new bench division, is removing every possible element of lay involvement.
On Second Reading, when we had a broader debate about the Bill, Government Members criticised the fact that the debate was dominated by white, older male barristers—maybe they did not say older, but certainly white and male. The criticism was, “This debate is being dominated by white, male barristers. This isn’t fair. This isn’t reflective of all the voices and different views we need to hear.”
But what will these changes do? They will give more power and influence to people who are white and male and who, historically, have almost certainly been barristers. We are doing the exact opposite of addressing those Government Members’ concerns, including their concerns about who has a say in all these issues compared with ordinary members of the public. Clause 3 removes those ordinary members of the public.
Under proposed new section 74A to the Senior Courts Act 1981, any case sent to the Crown court must be tried without a jury unless one of two things applies: either an indictable-only offence is involved, or the court considers that, if convicted, the defendant would be likely to receive a sentence of more than three years’ imprisonment or detention. In all other cases, the default becomes a judge-alone trial.
We are introducing a whole new idea that an individual person—a magistrate, not a jury—can sentence someone to six to 12 months. We are introducing the idea that a single person, on their own, can sentence someone to three years’ imprisonment, without any involvement of the wider public. The question for the Committee is not whether the jury trial remains available in some cases, as we have discussed—we absolutely accept that it should. Instead, the question is whether Parliament is content to create a new statutory presumption that, for a wide range of classes of Crown court cases, the citizen will no longer be tried by a jury of their peers, but by a judge sitting on their own.
Again, as we talked about this morning, this is not what Sir Brian recommended—he was specific in his recommendation. This morning, the Minister talked about going further, which I would interpret as referring to what offences and timelines are used. I am not sure that we can extend that suggestion of going further to creating an entirely new set-up that Sir Brian did not recommend. He did not recommend that a judge sit on their own and sentence someone to up to three years in prison.
Sarah Sackman
Of course, judges sitting alone do sentence. I understand the point the hon. Member is making in relation to the Crown court bench division, but it is important that my mum, watching at home, understands that judges hand down sentences.
Dr Mullan
I thank the Minister for picking me up on that; I meant that they are determining the guilt of individuals who can then face up to three years in prison. It undermines the veracity and importance of Sir Brian’s recommendations that the Government do not have the support of his report on this, the profoundest and most unprecedented change that they are making. That cannot be understated.
The Bill makes clear that in all cases falling below the threshold sentence of more than three years, a trial must take place without a jury. That is not at individual discretion, but a hard and fast rule. The Committee should note that the threshold is assessed prospectively, on a likely sentence basis. That means that at an early stage, the court is being asked to make an evaluative judgment about the likely sentence before a trial, and to use that judgment to determine whether the oldest safeguards in our system are available at all.
The Minister may, quite rightly, say that making estimates or anticipating likely sentencing outcomes is part of our system—but never in this way, and never with the consequences that will flow in terms of who determines an individual’s guilt as a result of that estimation. The consequences are profound.
Yet for all the Government’s reliance on the three-year threshold, proposed new section 74D makes clear that a judge sitting alone retains the full sentencing powers of the Crown court and may impose a sentence of more than three years where appropriate. That will allow a judge to determine guilt on their own, and potentially to sentence someone for many years—more than three—for an offence. Those two issues interact. The Minister was right to call me out for blending the two measures, but they are linked in the real world, and they certainly will be linked in the minds of defendants and the wider public. That relates back to the confidence issue. If a defendant sees that the person whom they think was inappropriately asked to determine their guilt is also then allowed to give them a sentence beyond what they were expecting to get, and beyond the thresholds that were designed for the imposition of a sentence, that creates real challenges for public confidence.
There is a tension in the Government’s remarks around this issue, because they have emphasised throughout that all these reforms will not be used for the most serious cases. That is how they have described it. That is largely determined by taking into account the sentencing length that is available—it is not a direct read-across, but more serious offences inevitably have longer sentence lengths, so someone will potentially be directly affected by these reforms around the same sentence lengths that the Government say are not appropriate for different types of offences. The Government might say that they are not choosing certain types of offences with very long sentences, but someone could end up with exactly the sort of sentence that someone else might receive for something like a rape offence. The Government think that that is acceptable but, again, it is inherently contradictory.
The Committee should also be concerned by the structure of the reallocation under proposed new section 74B. Cases can move from jury to judge alone and then from judge alone to jury following changes of circumstance or the emergence of new evidence. Such decisions may profoundly affect how justice is perceived, yet the Bill provides no right of appeal against them. What the Government are doing here is not simply adjusting or tinkering; they are creating a new mode of criminal trial in the Crown court by allowing a single judge to determine guilt in a substantial class of cases, allowing that decision to be revisited during proceedings, permitting it in some circumstances without a hearing and then insulating those decisions from appeal.
The Government’s case for doing all that relies heavily on efficiency, but this is precisely where the clause remains weak. The wider criticism of the Bill has always been that the backlog is being treated as if it were caused by jury trials rather than case management failures, workforce pressures, poor productivity and court capacity. We talked a lot about the IFG’s criticisms of the modelling and the data that the Government put forward to justify their clauses, but the IFG is not alone in thinking that the Government’s claims around the benefits are unsubstantiated. The London School of Economics submitted in written evidence what it thought about the Government’s approach to modelling. It said:
“Sir Brian Leveson stated that the modelling on which his recommendations were based is ‘uncertain and should be viewed as indicative’ and that the MoJ should ‘carry out more detailed modelling on the operational and financial impact of the recommendations’.”
I brought that up in the evidence session with Sir Brian and put it to him that he had said that further work should be done; he did not feel that it was for him to comment any further than that. The LSE says:
“Given the range of reforms suggested by the Independent Review of the Criminal Courts, their complex interrelation, and the lack of rigorous modelling by independent research groups, we are not confident that the evidential basis for curtailing jury trial has been established.”
Both the IFG and the LSE think that the modelling case has not been successfully made, so there are a number of different questions on that. This is important because Parliament is being asked to accept the removal of a fundamental safeguard, not because the Government have shown that jury trials are causing the delay, but because it has chosen to pursue structural reform before exhausting operational solutions.
The real constitutional innovation here is not only that some cases may be tried without a jury, but that Parliament is being asked to enact a statutory presumption in favour of a judge-only trial for a broad range of Crown court cases, with very limited, if any, safeguards once that allocation has been made.
The Committee should also consider the wider context in which these proposals are brought forward. Sir Brian Leveson’s review did not present the removal of jury trials as a stand-alone solution; it sets out a broader programme of reforms aimed at improving efficiency, capacity and case management across the system, and yet the Government have chosen to bring forward the most constitutionally significant elements of that review, those that limit access to jury trials, while leaving much of the operational reform agenda unimplemented.
We have visited this point a number of times today: the Government have not done the things they say they will do that will make a difference. They cannot realistically claim that those things will not have the necessary impact if they have not tried to implement them.
Sarah Sackman
Does the shadow Minister recognise that, in the IFG’s report, one of the central insights was that the key drag on court productivity was workforce shortages? We are making that investment, but does he accept that it will take years to build back the criminal Bar, the number of prosecutors and people practising criminal legal aid to the level we would need to deal with these cases?
Dr Mullan
The Minister put that question very succinctly, in exactly the same way, to members of the criminal Bar, who know much more about this than me; they were very clear that they did not accept her point. She is contrasting a magistrate or a police officer, who must be trained from scratch, to barristers, who practise in all different parts of the law, and they have clearly pointed out that the welcome changes that the Government have made around sitting days are seeing people coming back. They have not stopped being barristers because they have not practised over the last few years; they are practising other types of law.
I was on the Justice Committee in the previous Parliament, and we discussed in detail the challenges around the criminal Bar strike action and so on, and they were very clear that these people had not gone anywhere—they were the same people, but they were choosing not to practise criminal law. I would lean heavily on their view that these people want to come back.
If the Government want to put forward an analysis and tell us the figures for all the people who are out there who could be practising criminal law and are choosing not to, and if they produced a gap analysis showing how many they think they need on top of that, then we would have a different discussion. However, I do not know that the Government have produced any analysis or figures for how many practitioners are due to come back, or likely to come back, or what we need to get them to come back and so on. The Minister may well be right to just say, “They’re not there, we can’t do it,” but we keep coming back to the same point: where is the basis for making such strong decisions?
Sarah Sackman
But does the shadow Minister accept that these things take time? His party is a great believer in the force of the market, and the market here has decided that it wants to go and work in other markets. The point is that, on whatever the analysis, these things take time. That is why the Government have not just put forward major investment in terms of legal aid fees but matched funding for pupillages to create the pipeline. But the training of criminal barristers capable of taking on these trials will take years, and all the while the projections show the backlog rising. Does the shadow Minister accept that any realistic view or analysis shows that it will take years to build back the Bar to what it needs to be, both from the bottom up and at the higher levels that those criminal barristers were talking about?
Dr Mullan
The point I am making is that we actually do not know that, because we do not know how many people used to practise who could now practise again. I absolutely agree with the Minister that there might need to be a further wave of people that will potentially exhaust the people who could be succinctly brought back into practice, but we have time in that regard. We might find that we bring sufficient professionals back into the profession for the next few years, at the same time as the Minister is investing in the future.
Again, I would welcome the Government publishing an analysis seeking to interrogate in detail how many people are out there who could and would come back, and what it would take. The Minister could then get up and say confidently, “We have looked at this and we know that there are this many people who previously practised criminal law, or could come back to criminal law, and this is what we expect them to do over the next few years. We think we need this many people. We think we will train x number, and that still leaves us with a gap.”
As with so many of these issues, the Minster has a case with her argument and interpretation of things, but if we are going to do something as profound as introducing a whole new way of determining guilt by way of a single judge on their own—something that has never been done in this country—then the evidence threshold on which the Government need to deliver their arguments is so much higher than what we are getting. That is the case on this and so many other issues.
Alex McIntyre
I have some experience in this, having changed my practice when I was a solicitor from being a banking lawyer to being an employment lawyer. It takes time to build up a level of expertise, and if I were to return from this place to being a solicitor, it would take me some time to re-educate myself and get up to speed with developments in the law to be able to practise again. I accept the shadow Minister’s point that there are some barristers who change their specialty as often as MPs change their parliamentary constituencies—
Alex McIntyre
And parties, which seems to be happening at an increasing rate on the Opposition Benches. Does the shadow Minister not agree that, at the very least, it will take time for those barristers to reskill, retrain and update their knowledge to be able to take on those cases, and that therefore the premise that the Minister is putting forward is the right one?
Dr Mullan
I am afraid that we are again at violent agreement and disagreement at the same time. The principle that hon. Member is talking about is absolutely fair. There will be a period of time in which we have to retrain people; but as I said, the Committee has had barristers before it who were very clear that they thought there would not be insurmountable obstacles. The hon. Member may question their credibility on that front, but it is perfectly legitimate for them to say that they question the Government’s credibility and the arguments they are making.
The hon. Member for Gloucester, the Minister and I are all missing a proper attempt to study, define and measure these things. Without that, the Government cannot expect us to move forward with a massive erosion of jury trial rights, in a way that has never been done before. We are not talking about triable either-way offences going from magistrates to Crown, which has been done, but not on this scale; rather, we are introducing a whole new way of determining guilt in this country, which will have profound implications, and we are supposed to decide it on the basis that the hon. Member and the Minister think it will take too long to do otherwise—nor, conversely, should we just take the barristers’ word for it. What we really need is a proper, exhaustive study of the issue, as we do with many other issues that we will come to where the same things apply.
The hon. Member for Gloucester did a good job—from his perspective—of pointing out that the Criminal Bar Association of course has its own interests and angle. As my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East pointed out, the Opposition are not saying that the Criminal Bar Association is sacrosanct and cannot be questioned or grilled. However, it is also in the camp of those who want to see more information and more details. When the Minister put it to the Criminal Bar Association in Committee that it had not put forward its modelling or proposals, it was made very clear that it had sought the same data and analyses that would allow it to demonstrate these things, and the Government had not allowed it to do so. We cannot on the one hand say that it is a loaded jury, in the American sense, and we cannot take its word for it, but at the same time criticise it for not having alternative opinions, when we will not help it to further elucidate those measures that might make a difference.
Sarah Sackman
We do not necessarily accept that that is why. There may be all sorts of reasons, which need to be unpacked, and that is the kind of thing I hope will be enriched by a statutory review. There may be all sorts of reasons why conviction rates for all ethnicities are higher in the magistrates court, not least because people may want to enter a guilty plea in a jurisdiction where the sentencing powers are lower. That may be a perfectly rational reason why there are higher conviction rates in the magistrates court across the board. We accept that premise, although I also accept that BAME defendants and communities have less confidence in the magistrates than in the jury system.
Dr Mullan
Yes, and I have made that point in other debates on this issue: we cannot say that with absolute certainly. The Deputy Prime Minister is clear—I think his phrase was that we have to explain why these things exist. The point is that we certainly cannot rule out that explanation, and it is certainly not an unreasonable conclusion to draw, which is why so many campaign groups that represent BME defendants are clear about why they think the disparity exists. The Minister is right that it is not proved definitely; the issue is that we have not done the work that the Deputy Prime Minister asked us to do in bottoming that out. We still cannot confidently say, and the Minister cannot say, that that disparity does not exist because of prejudice. It may well exist because of prejudice. We are not in a position to say that that is not the case, yet if that is the cause, we are heading in a direction that might encourage and make the disparities even more frequent.
In relation to sentencing in the youth estate, where we have over-representation of BME individuals, I have made the point that we have to look at offending patterns and so on, which vary among different ethnic minority groups, but we cannot rule the explanation out. However, having failed to rule it out, as the Deputy Prime Minister said we should, he is going to shift more of the weight towards those risks. Again, if we accept as a possibility the premise that this is about a narrowing of individuals’ backgrounds and life experiences versus the experiences of those they are judging, then that becomes a very reasonable hypothesis for what is happening.
If that is a reasonable hypothesis and we have not been able to exclude it, and if it is then correct, then we are doing something that supercharges that effect. If that hypothesis is correct, and this is to do with background and diversity of opinion, then we are narrowing that down even further, to the view of one individual—to the life history and life experience of just one person. What the Government are proposing could not be further from what the jury trial system delivers, and this at a point when we cannot say with confidence that it will not have an adverse impact on BAME individuals.
Sarah Sackman
Does the shadow Minister accept, though, that the legislation as drafted contains a number of guardrails? They include the provision of reasons that will need to be given by a judge, the fact that judges will have gone through judicial training and also the equal treatment handbook. Obviously, juries do not go through such training. Indeed, the statutory review that is being proposed is another guardrail. Does he accept that those are all safeguards with merit and that, as I said earlier, sunshine is the best disinfectant?
Dr Mullan
Yes, I accept that, to a degree, the Government have attempted to put in place safeguards. The question is: what weight can be given to those safeguards? We had a discussion earlier today about judicial accountability and whether we think the decisions made are good decisions. Family courts are a helpful comparator because they make decisions on their own, in an area that they should be expert and practised in. They do that all the time, yet the Government are choosing to legislate to restrict—or to modify—the way in which judges are asked to make decisions. That is despite the Government’s own impact assessment saying that it really should not make much of a difference and despite the fact that, in the other direction, the campaign groups do not agree with them.
The Government accept that individual judges sitting in a particular way do not always make the right decisions for the welfare of a child. Those judges are trained and have all the things that the Minister mentioned, but that does not mean that the Government do not think that they sometimes make the wrong decisions. Those safeguards will be helpful and will hopefully hedge things back in the other direction if this is related to prejudice; the point we keep making is that we do not think that the proposition that the Government are putting forward is sufficiently weighted to get the outcome they want.
Dr Mullan
I will just finish my point.
If we were confident that this would deliver the outcome that the Government claim it will, then things would be different, but we question whether it will achieve the result they want, whether the safeguards are in place and whether the alternative options have been sufficiently secured. We are also highlighting the gravity of the consequences for individuals and the gravity of the change to our judicial system. Again, we need a little more than just, “We’re going to try these safeguards,” when we cannot be confident that they will guard against this issue, especially when we know—if it is prejudice—how difficult and recalcitrant it has been.
This is not a new discussion or a new debate. The Minister will probably want to make the criticism that it was not sorted during our period in office, but equally I would not expect her get up and say that she is confident that she will get to the bottom of it in the next few years, sort it all out, and make sure there is no prejudice in our judicial system, in the magistrates court or among the judges who she is asking to sit and determine these cases on their own. I am pretty confident that the Government will not give us that guarantee, so again, the thresholds for these decisions are not being met.
Did the Minister want to intervene? I do not know if the moment has passed.
Dr Mullan
We have talked about the issue of safeguards against prejudice, and it is not a view just shared by people such as the Secretary of State for Justice. The CBA commissioned an independent survey of criminal barristers. Of the 2,029 respondents, 94% raised concerns about the lack of diversity in the proposed criminal courts bench division and 88.5% were against the introduction of the criminal court bench division. We know that the public have great confidence in the verdicts of juries. The British public have been surveyed about that, and a YouGov poll following the Government’s announcement in December 2025 found positive support for trial by jury, especially among those who had served on juries.
I do not know whether this is something that I have to declare as an interest, but I have served on a jury. Serving on a jury gives those who do it an amazing insight, which those who have not done it might not have, and helps them to understand the importance of the discussion, deliberation and exchange of views that simply cannot happen with an individual judge sitting on their own.
Sarah Sackman
I accept that it cannot happen, but equally we do not know what happens in jury deliberation rooms. We do not know how the jury arrived at a verdict. All that a defendant ever finds out is whether they have been acquitted or convicted. One advantage of the Crown court bench division is that the defendant will have the judge’s reasoning and an explanation of what findings of fact have been made and on what basis a decision has been reached. Can the hon. Gentleman not see some benefit in that?
Dr Mullan
That potential benefit has to be weighed against what we discussed earlier. For a very good reason, our system explicitly prevents the jury’s inner working from being subject to scrutiny. The system was deliberately designed in that way, and we will be taking that away in some cases. Of course, at a cursory glance, we would probably all welcome being able to better understand why decisions are being taken, but if we start doing that, we would lose the ability for the jury to decide something that we are not comfortable with, and which a prosecution barrister might have a field day with.
As I said, I get frustrated with those sorts of decisions. I was very frustrated when a jury did not convict the Colston four. I did not get to know why they did not do that, but the system is deliberately designed that way. The Minister has to accept that. That is almost proving the point that others have made—in particular, the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East has said this both publicly and privately. Judges are forced to be much more constricted in their decision making. If the facts are a, b and c, they just have to go along with those facts.
Sarah Sackman
Is the shadow Minister seriously saying that the giving of reasons, constrained by the legal tests that judges have to apply—meeting the criminal standard of proof and applying a logical route to verdict, free from bias and procedural unfairness—is not desirable? I find that an extraordinary proposition.
Dr Mullan
As I said, it is about weighing the benefits that the Minister has rightly articulated against the loss of the benefit of safeguarding individual people who are perhaps erring from a strict interpretation of the law. Again, this is not happenstance. The idea that a jury might do that has been tested repeatedly in appeals and judgments. It has been repeatedly affirmed that it is for a jury to go away and make up their own minds, having heard all the evidence.
Sarah Sackman
I think the shadow Minister misunderstands me. I am not critiquing our jury trials which, as I have said, are a cornerstone of British justice. I am trying to understand why he has so little faith in the judges of this country.
Dr Mullan
I have explained why I have concerns about whether the judiciary is sufficiently accountable for the decisions and positions that it takes under the current system. I am not shying away from that. The reality is that I do not think it is sufficiently accountable. I think judges sometimes make poor decisions; we have to get away from the idea that politicians cannot say that.
The Justice Committee visited the Supreme Court and got to sit with Supreme Court judges. The portrayal is sometimes that they would be absolutely appalled by MPs criticising their judgments and not thinking they had made the right decision, but they were perfectly relaxed about that. They said it is absolutely the role of politicians and MPs to have criticisms and be concerned about the decisions that they make.
Sarah Sackman
I do not think we are disagreeing about the importance of judicial accountability or the need for a more diverse judiciary. The Deputy Prime Minister is making huge progress on that and has been a real proponent of that, both when he was in opposition and now in government. What I am talking about is the process for which these structural reforms provide, whereby a judge will give a reasoned judgment for their verdict. If that verdict proves to be unsound, arbitrary, unfair or biased in some way, the person knows what the reasons are and can appeal it. Is there not merit in that process?
Dr Mullan
We have to run with the idea that some judges might have some prejudices. We do not know for sure that they do, but there is certainly every reason to believe that might be an issue, particularly when we look at the disparity in their backgrounds and so on. The Minister is asking us to consider that when a judge has a prejudice, particularly unconscious bias, he is going to sit down and write in his reasons: “I thought this person was more likely to be guilty.”
Dr Mullan
They are working very hard, as the Minister says, but the work is not complete. We have not done what the Under-Secretary of State for Justice said we should, which is do the stretching and have it all dealt with before we consider curtailing jury rights. We are proceeding when that has not happened, and the Deputy Prime Minister made similar remarks.
There are other individuals to whom one might think the Prime Minister gives a lot of credibility and weight. Geoffrey Robertson, the founder of the Prime Minister’s barristers’ chambers, condemned the plans to restrict jury trials in England and Wales as
“a betrayal of the values for which Labour purports to stand.”
It was not just the Prime Minister who practised with that individual. Maybe they were working with him under the cosh or they had the view that the chambers they chose to work in were founded by someone they did not give weight and credibility to.
The Deputy Prime Minister also worked in the chambers of this individual. Who else, Ms Butler? Richard Hermer, the current Attorney General, also practised in the chambers founded by this individual, who said that
“attacking juries must be regarded as a betrayal of the values for which Labour purports to stand…How have they come to betray a principle that has been so important over the centuries for those who have dissented or stood for progress?”
He adds that, given the Labour party’s
“record of support for progressive causes, for free speech and peaceful political protests, the Bill does seem a betrayal of Labour traditions…MPs who vote in favour will be on the wrong side of their party’s own history.”
That is from the person with whom the Prime Minister, the Attorney General and the Deputy Prime Minister all enjoyed practising the law for many years in the chambers on which they sought to rely.
This morning we covered the right to appeal. As we discussed, the rate of successful appeal in the magistrates court is higher than might be expected. We do not know how that figure and the difference in respect of jury trials will translate if cases are taken down to a single judge. The Minister stated that reasonings will be laid out and that that will make the system more transparent; of course it will to some degree, but the drawbacks do not make that trade-off worth while.
We are also going to see, with the new Crown court bench division, a whole new series of ways in which defendants seek to appeal sentences. The Minister talked about the fact that there are not enough barristers; how do we know that some of those trials and appeals are not going to draw from barristers’ time? We do not.
I return to the central argument about the value and weight of jury trials in the public perception. The issue is not just about how the public perceive jury trials. Jury trials are the most important way in which the public are part of our judicial system: the public are part of the process; it is not a process separate from us. We have talked about magistrates as a halfway house for representation and diversity of opinion, but the same arguments apply in relation to the participation of the citizenry from their point of view. That is not the point of view of the defendant and the decisions that they might take, but that of the individual citizen participating in the judiciary, versus that of the magistrates.
All the same arguments that I made in relation to the perception of potential prejudices apply to the question of introducing the new division, which will even more greatly extract the citizen from our judicial system. That extraction is important because it goes back to the original question of whether we feel that the judicial system is ours and we have a role to play in it, or that it is what would have been, in the old days, the King’s judicial system. It was the King’s system: justice was in his name, for him, or—as I talked about this morning—in God’s name, for God, with individual citizens excluded from the process.
Although the Opposition oppose clause 3, our amendment 39 at least attempts to curtail some of the issues with it. I note that when we discussed it this morning, the Minister would not engage on the direct, specific question of whether, looking at the examples in isolation, she thinks it is fair that somebody of good character who stands to lose an enormous amount—their job and their reputation—is going to lose access to a jury trial whereas a repeat, recalcitrant, more serious offender will not. We are clear that that is not fair, so we have attempted, with a similar aim but in a manner different from the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden, to introduce some safeguards, but we are opposed to the proposal in clause 3 in its entirety.
The Chair
Given that Dr Mullan has spoken about clause 3 more generally in this debate, I have two options as Chair. Would the Committee like to talk about clause 3 more generally with this group of amendments? The Committee will also have an opportunity to debate clause 3 on Thursday, when the Minister could respond more fully. That is a matter for the Committee to decide.
Sarah Sackman
As I think I am hearing from the Opposition, given that clause 3 is really meaty and has lots of aspects and that, I suspect, all hon. Members, including myself, have prepared on the basis of the groupings in the selection list, a lot of the detailed points on which hon. Members want answers may get lost if we try to debate them all in one go. If we keep to the groupings, that might be efficient.
Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Stephen Morgan.)