Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting)
(1 day, 10 hours ago)
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The Chair
We are now sitting in public and the proceedings are being broadcast. Before we continue line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill, I have a few reminders for Committee members. Please switch off or silence electronic devices. No food or drink, other than that provided, is permitted during our sittings. Hansard would be grateful if Members could email their speaking notes or hand them to the Hansard colleague in the room.
I remind Members to bob to catch my eye if they wish to speak in any debate. The selection list for today’s sitting, which is available in the room and on Parliament’s website, shows how the clauses, schedules and selected amendments have been grouped for debate.
Clause 4
Interference with uncrewed devices
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Minister for the Armed Forces (Al Carns)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Mr Efford. Defence needs to protect itself from crime with security measures that will deter, detect and defeat criminal activities, including those directed by hostile states, that threaten its critical sites or operations. Currently, the only authorisation process that enables interference with drones that might be used to commit crimes that threaten defence operations and assets is in part III of the Police Act 1997. Only the civilian police can obtain such an authorisation to deal with these threats.
The increase in drone activity around defence sites means that defence cannot rely on local police forces for its security requirements. The emergence, in Ukraine and elsewhere, of drones as a new frontier of warfare has brought into sharp focus the urgent need for defence to meet this rapidly developing threat, not only in operational theatres but here in the UK, to protect defence operations and bases. We must have ways to protect ourselves from the threats posed by drones, be they in the air, on land or on or under water.
Clause 4 will create a regime whereby defence personnel can obtain authorisation to use approved equipment to prevent drones from being used to commit criminal offences in relation to defence sites and property in the UK. The regime will consist of a two-stage approval process.
The first stage will consist of a senior person in defence—a two-star military officer or civil service equivalent—giving authorisation for the use of approved equipment to detect and prevent relevant offences. Applications for authorisations can be made only by defence personnel; before giving an authorisation, they will need to be satisfied that it is appropriate, in the interests of national security, that it be given. An authorisation can cover one or more defence areas, particular defence property or a description of property. This stage will ensure that appropriate areas and property can be protected using the appropriate equipment. Defence areas include sites in the UK used for the purpose of defence, as well as sites used by visiting forces. Defence property includes vehicles and vessels in the UK. It will be possible for an authorisation to cover a description of such property—royal naval vessels, for example—so that it is not necessary for each one to be individually identified.
To ensure that the new regime is agile, we have not specified the type of equipment that can be used under an authorisation, or taken a power to prescribe this in regulations. Instead, the Secretary of State will need to approve equipment before it can be used. This will allow new equipment to be used as swiftly as possible to protect defence interests. The approval process will be governed by defence policy, which will ensure that equipment is safe to use or test in the UK. An authorisation can last for up to 12 months and may be renewed; it can also be varied or revoked.
The second stage in the authorisation process involves a responsible person. Before approved equipment can be used, the responsible person must be satisfied that it will be used only in accordance with the authorisation that covers the area or property to which it relates. Furthermore, before equipment can be used to detect and defeat a drone, the responsible person must be satisfied that it is both reasonable and proportionate to do so. I commend the clause to the Committee.
David Reed (Exmouth and Exeter East) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Efford. As we all know, drones and other uncrewed systems are rapidly reshaping modern defence and are already central to surveillance, logistics and frontline operations. Their importance will only grow in the years ahead. For our armed forces, they offer speed, precision and flexibility; for our adversaries, they present new and evolving threats that we must be ready to counter. That is why the clause matters.
My own limited experience was back in the early 2010s, when I saw drones brought into military service in our operations in Afghanistan. Those pieces of kit were really expensive and large, but we could see how they were reshaping the modern battlefield. Looking at how the technology has evolved over the years, the first signs that I saw were in how prisoners were working with criminal networks on the outside to deliver drugs and other contraband into prisons. They were using cheap, commercial, off-the-shelf drones to carry out those illegal acts. The barrier to entry for such products has fallen significantly. Our military now has to contend with protecting military sites, bases and other critical assets from people who can buy cheap drones that have a big operational effect, so new powers need to be given to our armed forces people.
We will have more opportunities to strengthen these powers. We support what the Minister proposes, but we will discuss new clauses at a later sitting. The success of clause 4 will depend on whether the wider system supports it. We have heard repeatedly from colleagues across the House about regulation issues with testing autonomous systems in UK airspace or waters. Multi-departmental efforts will be required to take away some of the regulation, so that we can give defence manufacturing and our armed forces the ability to test the new technologies and implement them in their operational output.
Our armed forces must be equipped with not just the tools, but the doctrine and training to use them effectively. We have a clear opportunity for change. The United Kingdom has the expertise and the industrial base to lead in uncrewed systems, which is good for the export market. Clause 4 provides part of the foundation, but it must be matched by practical action to ensure that the capabilities can be delivered at scale. If we get it right, we will strengthen our national security, our defence industry and our critical national infrastructure; if we fall behind, others will set the pace. The choice is ours.
Sarah Bool (South Northamptonshire) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Mr Efford, after the Easter recess. I believe that the Minister clarified this point, but I ask for confirmation: will the extension of anti-drone permissions extend to US bases such as RAF Croughton in my constituency?
Al Carns
The clause is exactly what we need. The explosion in drone systems across the world requires the proper legislation, and the clause will fit that purpose.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 4 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 5
Sexual harm prevention orders and sexual risk orders
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Schedule 2.
Clause 6 stand part.
Schedule 3.
Clauses 7 to 9 stand part.
New clause 12—Protective Orders: Persons No Longer Subject to Service Law—
“(1) This section applies where a person—
(a) is charged with, or has been convicted of, an offence within the service justice system, and
(b) was subject to service law either at the time of the alleged conduct or at the time of the charging decision, whether or not they remain subject to service law at the time of trial or sentencing.
(2) A service court may make any of the following orders in respect of a person as if they were still subject to service law—
(a) a sexual harm prevention order or interim sexual harm prevention order (see sections 103A to 103K of the Sexual Offences Act 2003);
(b) a sexual risk order or interim sexual risk order (see sections 122A to 122K of that Act);
(c) a service domestic abuse protection order;
(d) a service stalking protection order;
(e) a service restraining order (see section 229 of the Armed Forces Act 2006).
(3) An order made under subsection (2)—
(a) has effect as if made by a civilian court of equivalent jurisdiction, and
(b) is enforceable accordingly.
(4) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for the recognition, enforcement and variation of orders made under this section, including provision about which court has jurisdiction to vary or discharge such an order after it is made.”
This new clause ensures service courts can impose protective orders on individuals who leave service before trial, preventing avoidance of such orders simply by leaving service.
Al Carns
Clauses 5 to 7 and schedules 2 and 3 relate to protection orders. The Government are committed to providing safety, justice and real support for all in the defence community, both now and in future, which is why a particular focus of the Bill is on protecting victims of serious sexual and violent crimes.
Currently, the service justice system cannot impose the full suite of protection orders that are available in the civilian criminal justice system. That can create inconsistencies and critical gaps in victim safeguarding, particularly where cases are based overseas and are therefore under the jurisdiction of the service justice system. It means that there are key vulnerabilities, insufficient protection powers in the SJS in comparison with the civilian system and, as existing orders do not convert into civilian equivalents, gaps in protection when a subject leaves service. Those gaps place victims, both in defence and in the wider public, at risk of continued harm. They mean that victims in the service justice system do not always receive the level of protection to which they would be entitled in the criminal justice system.
Clauses 5 to 7 will address those inconsistencies and will be central to providing enduring protection for victims by enabling service courts to make interim and full protection orders and notices that are enforceable even after someone leaves the service. Those service orders include sexual harm prevention orders, sexual risk orders, domestic abuse protection notices and orders, stalking protection orders and restraining orders. The clauses will align the justice systems to ensure that no member of the defence community is left with lesser protections than their civilian counterparts. They will empower the service police to apply for interim and full orders and will empower the service courts to impose them, ensuring that victims receive enduring protection from further harm. The powers apply to service personnel and civilians subject to service law both in the UK and overseas, ensuring their worldwide application.
The service police are members of the armed forces who perform broadly the same role for the armed forces, wherever they are in the world, that their civilian counterparts perform in police forces across the UK. Although the service police currently operate in line with the principles of the guidance issued by the Home Office on disclosure of police information, the fact that they have no statutory duty to do so is a disparity with the civilian system. Clause 8 will therefore impose a requirement on the service police to have regard to existing statutory guidance about the disclosure of police information for the purposes of preventing domestic abuse, sexual offending and stalking. It will also amend section 77 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 to include the Ministry of Defence police in the list of police forces that need to have regard to the domestic violence disclosure system. This will better protect potential victims from the risks associated with domestic violence, sexual offending and stalking.
Clause 9 will ensure that offenders who have, for example, been sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment by a court martial for controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship are automatically supervised under multi-agency public protection agreements. Once those offenders are released from prison, they will be managed in the community in the same way as if they had been sentenced by the Crown court. If offenders under the scope of clause 9 are not managed under MAPPA when released on licence into the community, it may be harder for police, prisons and probation services to work together to protect the public and manage the risk that the offenders pose.
I will speak to new clause 12 in my closing remarks.
Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Efford. I am grateful for the opportunity to speak in support of new clause 12 and offer broader support for clauses 5 to 9, which represent a significant strengthening of the protective framework in the service justice system.
It is worth setting out the basic principle that the armed forces justice system must be capable not only of dealing fairly and effectively with wrongdoing, but of ensuring that the protection of victims and management of risk do not fall between institutional cracks. The credibility of the service justice system depends on continuity, coherence and, above all, confidence that protective measures will not be undermined by procedural happenstance.
Clauses 5 to 9 make important and welcome progress. They will extend the availability and operation of sexual harm prevention orders, sexual risk orders, domestic abuse protection orders, stalking protection orders and restraining orders in the service justice system. They make provision for enforcement, variation and guidance structures, including in respect of the important role of provost marshals and service police in the exercise of those functions. The clauses will modernise the service justice landscape in a way that recognises the reality of contemporary risk management. They will ensure that service personnel and civilians subject to service discipline are not operating in a parallel system that is less capable of protecting victims or managing dangerous individuals. In particular, the extension to the service courts of protections against domestic abuse and stalking is a welcome alignment with civilian criminal justice standards, ensuring consistency of safeguarding irrespective of jurisdiction.
However, as is often the case in the refinement of complex statutory schemes, there remains a narrow but important residual gap, which is precisely what new clause 12 seeks to address. The core issue is one of jurisdictional continuity. At present, protective orders in the service justice system are clearly available while an individual is subject to service law. Clauses 5 to 9 also go further by making provision for enforcement in certain circumstances in which the individual ceases to be subject to service discipline after an order has been made. A difficulty arises, however, in the transitional space where an individual is charged or even convicted while subject to service law, but ceases to be subject to service law before the protective order is imposed or finalised. Without express provision, there is a risk that such an individual, by virtue of leaving service, will fall outside the effective reach of the service court’s protective jurisdiction at precisely the point at which such orders are most necessary.
New clause 12 performs a simple but important function. It would provide that where a person is charged with or convicted of an offence in the service justice system and was subject to service law at the relevant time, the service court may impose specified protective orders as if the person remained subject to service law. It is, in effect, a statutory deeming provision, preserving jurisdiction for protective purposes notwithstanding the cessation of service status.
The legal merits of that approach are clear. First, it prevents what might properly be described as jurisdictional arbitrage. Without such a provision, there is a theoretical, though in practice very real, risk that individuals could seek to avoid the imposition of protective orders by leaving service prior to trial or sentencing. Even if such behaviour is not deliberately engineered, the mere existence of a gap creates inconsistency and undermines confidence in the system. The protective reach of the service justice system should not be rendered contingent on administrative status at a particular moment in time.
Secondly, the new clause reflects a well-established principle in criminal justice, which is that protective orders are ancillary to the underlying offence and risk posed by the offender, not merely to their procedural status. The civilian courts retain wide powers to impose protective orders at sentencing precisely because the assessment of risk is rooted in conduct, not institutional affiliation. New clause 12 would ensure that the service courts are placed in an equivalent position, recognising that the underlying risk does not evaporate simply because service status changes.
Thirdly, the new clause would promote legal certainty and coherence. Through clauses 5 to 9, the existing framework already recognises that certain orders may continue to have effect or be enforced after a person leaves service. However, enforcement is not the same as imposition. It is logically and legally cleaner to ensure that the court retains the power to make the order at the point of disposal, rather than relying on subsequent conversion or deeming mechanisms. The new clause therefore fills a structural gap and ensures that the life cycle of protective orders is not disrupted by jurisdictional transition.
Fourthly, the new clause is carefully drafted in respect of its propriety. It would not create an unfettered or novel category of punitive power. Rather, it would explicitly confine the service court’s ability to make orders to those that it would have been able to make had the individual remained subject to service law. It is, in essence, a continuity provision, not an expansion of jurisdiction.
Importantly, subsection (3) of the new clause would provide that such orders are to have effect
“as if made by a civilian court of equivalent jurisdiction”
and are “enforceable accordingly.” That is a critical safeguard. It would ensure interoperability between the service justice system and the civilian criminal justice system, avoiding the creation of parallel regimes that might otherwise give rise to confusion about enforcement authority.
Subsection (4) of the new clause, enabling the Secretary of State to make regulations regarding recognition, enforcement and variation, is also welcome. It would provide necessary flexibility in an area where procedural interfaces between service and civilian jurisdictions must be capable of adjustment over time. In particular, it would allow for clarity as to which court is best placed to vary or discharge orders once a person has fully transitioned out of service life. That is a sensible delegation of secondary rule-making power, consistent with the established constitutional practice in this field.
David Reed
It is difficult to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley—he is a former Army officer, a doctor and a barrister—but I will attempt to add to the debate.
This issue is clear: under the present framework, a service court can only impose protective orders—such as a sexual harm prevention order, a stalking protection order, a domestic abuse protection order or a restraining order—if the individual remains subject to service law at the point of trial or sentence. Where an individual has left the forces before that stage, the court’s ability to impose those protections falls away, even where the alleged conduct took place during service and proceedings were properly brought on that basis. That creates an obvious and avoidable gap—my hon. Friend laid out the argument on this expertly. It presents a route that any competent legal adviser could identify.
Where proceedings are pending or a conviction is likely, there is a clear incentive to leave service before the point at which an order could be imposed. The individual who may present the greatest risk to a victim, who knows their workplace, shares the same base or moves within the same social network, can remove themselves from the reach of a protective order simply by leaving. That is not a remote possibility; it is a foreseeable consequence of the current structure, and it should be addressed.
New clause 12 addresses this consequence in a proportionate and coherent way. It provides that, where an individual was subject to service law at the time of the alleged conduct or at the point of charging decision, the service court retains the power to impose protective orders as though the individual remained subject to service law. It does not expand service jurisdiction into new territory, and it does not create new offences. It simply preserves an existing power at the point where it is most needed: at conviction or sentence.
New clause 12 also ensures that such orders have full effect. An order made in those circumstances is to be treated as though it was made by a civilian court of equivalent standing, which would provide clarity on enforcement, avoid any uncertainty between service and civilian systems, and allow a proper provision through the regulations for recognition, enforcement and variation. In practical terms, it gives the courts a power that is both meaningful and workable.
The Bill makes a serious effort to strengthen the experience of victims within the service justice system. We heard from many experts during the evidence sessions, and that really brought it home for many of us on the Committee. Measures such as protective orders, enhanced powers for service police and independent legal advocacy represent real progress. However, it is important that those provisions operate together effectively. At present, there is a clear weakness. Where leaving service provides a means of avoiding a protective order, that weakness will be exploited. The purpose of new clause 12 is to ensure that it cannot be.
Those most likely to benefit from this change are often the most vulnerable. Individuals affected by serious sexual offences, domestic abuse or stalking within close professional communities face particular risks, especially where working and social environments are closely intertwined. For them, a protective order is not a technical matter, but fundamental to their sense of safety and ability to continue in their role. Access to that protection should not depend on whether an individual leaves service at a particular moment.
Rachel Taylor (North Warwickshire and Bedworth) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Efford. I welcome the clauses we are considering. This Government were elected to renew the nation’s contract with those who serve, and this Bill promises to do that. We cannot do it without ensuring that armed forces personnel are protected from sexual and violent behaviour, domestic abuse, stalking and harassment. We must ensure that, if such incidents do happen, justice is swift and victims are supported.
As far as possible, the service justice system reflects the provisions of the civilian justice system, and the Bill is modernising and improving victim support. It was extremely helpful to speak to those involved in the service justice process, and I thank the Chair for organising those visits, which helped to inform us all.
Among the key measures being introduced are the sexual harm prevention orders and the sexual risk orders, which can be issued in the service court in response to provost marshal. The Bill also allows for service domestic abuse protection notices to be issued by the service police, and for service domestic abuse protection orders and service stalking protection orders to be issued by the service courts. This will ensure better protection for personnel and civilians.
The Bill also solves the discrepancy that exists between service courts and civilian courts if an offender is sentenced by the service court when they have committed a serious offence. Currently, the transfer from the service courts to the civilian justice system is undertaken on a discretionary basis. The Bill will modernise that system, and bring offenders sentenced by the service courts into line with the civilian justice system. The Bill will better support victims of a service offence by streamlining the complaints procedure.
I have some sympathy with the arguments behind new clause 12 and a great deal of respect for the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford. However, in practice, individuals cannot simply leave the armed forces to avoid proceedings. A serviceperson will not be discharged or given a final leaving date until disciplinary or criminal proceedings have been properly concluded. Even after an individual has already left service, sections 57, 58 and 61 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 allow them to be charged with an offence committed while they were subject to service law. My argument in respect of new clause 12 is that it is simply not necessary. However, I think dialogue between the Minister and the right hon. Member would be welcome.
Al Carns
I thank the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford for tabling new clause 12, which seeks to ensure that service courts can impose protective orders on individuals who leave service before trial and preventing the avoidance of such orders simply by leaving the service. I recognise the good will and the sentiment behind new clause 12. However, it is not needed.
I want to be clear that individuals should not be able to evade accountability for their conduct and that safeguarding measures must not fall away simply by reason of service or leaving the armed forces. Protecting victims of domestic abuse, stalking and sexual harm is a clear priority of this Government. The reality is that individuals cannot simply leave the armed forces to avoid proceedings—they just cannot. It is actually relatively complicated to leave the armed forces. A serviceperson will not be discharged or given a final leaving date until disciplinary or criminal proceedings have been properly concluded.
Importantly, if for some reason an individual were to slip through the net and leave the service, sections 57, 58 and 61(2) of the Armed Forces Act 2006 allow them to be charged with an offence committed while they were subject to service law. Such a charge may be brought within six months of their leaving service, or after six months with the consent of the Attorney General, ensuring that service courts can still exercise that jurisdiction when necessary.
The Government have engaged with experts, including the Home Office, the Defence Serious Crime Command and safeguarding teams in the design and creation of service protection orders to ensure that they are robust and effective. That includes ensuring that service protection orders will be recognised and enforceable within civilian courts. That means that where a protection order is made, the Bill provides for those orders to transition to the civilian justice system once an individual leaves service and provides enduring protection for victim-survivors. The reality is that people cannot just leave the military, especially if they are under investigation. Secondly, if they do, they are still subject and can be pulled back for a minimum of six months. Taken together, that approach provides continuity, confidence and protection beyond service.
David Reed
The Minister is laying out a very well-structured argument, and I see many of the points, but I wonder about certain circumstances. For instance, if a serviceperson took drugs and was kicked out—they have to abide by those rules, which we all know about in the armed forces—what would then happen?
Al Carns
If there were criminal proceedings, he would be held to account in the service justice system for up to six months after the case. It is relatively simple. As we know, it is quite hard to leave the military, and when someone does, they are still subject to service law for six months after they have left.
The Government do not believe that new clause 12 is necessary and I therefore invite the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford not to press it. I also commend clauses 5 to 9 and schedules 2 and 3 to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 6 to 9 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 10
Victims of service offences
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Al Carns
Clause 10 places a duty on the Secretary of State for Defence to issue an updated code for victims in the service justice system. The existing armed forces code of practice, which identifies the services and support to be provided to victims in the service justice system itself, is set out in regulation and has not been substantively modified since it was introduced in 2015. Clause 10 revokes the 2015 regulations. Since 2015, we have continued to make improvements to the service justice system to provide a better service to victims and witnesses, such as with the creation of the Victim Witness Care Unit, which I think the Committee saw when they went down to Portsmouth.
This clause will introduce important legislative changes to the service justice system that were made to the civilian criminal justice system through the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024. The legislation will require those responsible for providing a service to victims of service offences in accordance with the code to do so unless there are good reasons not to; and the flexibility afforded by guidance will allow future modifications and improvements to the service justice system to be easily reflected in the contents of the new code. Clause 10 also places a duty on the Secretary of State to issue guidance about victim support roles, improving clarity and encouraging greater consistency, so that service providers will be held to similar standards as their equivalents in the civilian criminal justice system.
David Reed
Clause 10 is a necessary and proportionate step to ensure that victims of service offences are properly recognised and supported within the military justice system. Those affected by such offences often face distinct pressures linked to service life, including close living and working environments and concerns about reporting within the chain of command. Strengthening protections and support mechanisms helps to build confidence in the system, encourages reporting and reinforces the principle that service personnel are entitled to the same standards of justice and care as any civilian. This is an important measure in upholding both discipline and fairness across the armed forces.
Clause 11 strengthens the role of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration in a practical and necessary way. By allowing victims to bring complaints directly to the commissioner, it removes unnecessary barriers and ensures that their voices are heard more clearly and promptly. This change reflects a sensible and compassionate approach, particularly in cases involving service offences, where the experiences of victims must be treated with seriousness and respect. It reinforces accountability while improving access to justice.
Al Carns
Clauses 10 and 11, in reality, thicken out the service justice system and align it with the civilian justice system, providing greater freedoms and protections for anybody who is a victim within this system. I commend them to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 10 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 11 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 12
Service policing protocol
Ian Roome (North Devon) (LD)
I beg to move amendment 6, in clause 12, page 29, line 6, at end insert—
“115C Duty to refer sexual offences and domestic abuse to civilian police
(1) This section applies where a service police force or the tri-service serious crime unit is made aware of an allegation that a person subject to service law, or a civilian subject to service discipline, has committed a relevant offence in the United Kingdom.
(2) The Provost Marshal of the relevant service police force, or the Provost Marshal for serious crime, must immediately refer the allegation and transfer the investigation to the relevant civilian police force.
(3) In this section—
“relevant civilian police force” means the civilian police force for the area in which the alleged offence took place;
“relevant offence” means—
(a) any offence under the Sexual Offences Act 2003,
(b) an offence involving domestic abuse within the meaning of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, or
(c) an offence of attempting or conspiring to commit an offence within sub-paragraph (a) or (b).
(4) The Secretary of State may by regulations specify further offences which are to be treated as a relevant offence for the purposes of this section.”
This amendment requires the Service Police and the Defence Serious Crime Command to refer all allegations of sexual offences and domestic violence to the civilian police forces for investigation and subsequent trial in the civilian justice system.
Ian Roome
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Efford. Amendment 6 would introduce a requirement for the service police and the Defence Serious Crime Command to refer all allegations of sexual offences and domestic violence to the civilian police forces for investigation and subsequent trial in the civilian justice system.
Clause 12 currently inserts into the Armed Forces Act 2006 a new section requiring the Secretary of State to issue a “service policing protocol” to co-ordinate the work of the Defence Council, each service police force and the tri-service serious crime unit. That provision aims to better co-ordinate those organisations’ vital work and to protect against improper interference in their criminal investigations.
This amendment would insert an additional section requiring the provost marshal to refer all allegations of sexual offences and domestic violence to the relevant civilian police force. That is important because, although cases involving this kind of accusation may be heard faster under military investigation, many fear that these cases continue to be adversely influenced by the close-knit community within the armed forces and by the military chain of command. It was a recommendation of the 2021 Atherton report, in which more than 2,000 female service personnel and veterans said that they had been victims of bullying, discrimination, harassment or sexual assault during their service in our armed forces. Some reported a culture where cases are minimised, evidence is lost and perpetrators are protected. Transferring that role to independent civilian police would remove the risk of a conflict of interest that can happen when the military investigates itself.
In the shocking case of Royal Artillery Gunner Jaysley Beck, who tragically took her own life in 2021, the coroner ruled that the sexual harassment she had suffered should have been referred to the police. The Ministry of Defence aims to see the percentage of women in our armed forces increase from 12% to 30% by 2030, and independent police investigation of sexual crimes would help to rebuild trust and accountability. Under subsection (3), a “relevant offence” would be committing, attempting or conspiring to commit an offence under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 or an offence involving domestic abuse as defined by the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. The Secretary of State would also have the power to add additional offences should it be deemed necessary.
Rachel Taylor
I thank the hon. Member for North Devon for tabling the amendment, and I have just a few things to say. Its impact would be to remove the voice of the victim from the process in deciding the jurisdiction of sexual offences and domestic abuse cases. If a victim does not want their case dealt with in the criminal justice system, it is possible, as is the case with many situations where we see violence against women, that they will withdraw from the process. We have seen lengthy delays in the civilian justice system for dealing with rape and serious sexual offence cases. We have seen many instances of victims removing themselves from the process. The amendment would have the impact of removing the victim’s choice for the matter to be dealt with in the service system, possibly leading to a case where no prosecution was ever pursued. That cannot be right and therefore I cannot support it.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
I will confine my remarks to amendment 6, tabled by the hon. Members for North Devon and for Tunbridge Wells. Although I have real sympathy with its purpose, I am hesitant about its drafting, and recognise that, in this place, we sometimes develop what could be described as an unhealthy instinct to overcomplicate what, at its heart, is a very simple objective—that serious allegations are handled properly, consistently and in a way that commands the public’s confidence.
I will start with where I hope and think we all agree: that allegations of sexual offences and domestic abuse are among the most serious that any justice system will have to confront. They demand to be treated with urgency, professionalism and, above all, trust. I do not think it is controversial to say that victims, whether serving in uniform or not, should not feel that the system is treating them differently depending on administrative geography or institutional habit. That is the spirit in which I understand that the amendment seeks to ensure that such cases are not left solely within the service channels, but are referred immediately to civilian police forces, with the implication that civilian investigation would become the default route.
I understand why Members are attracted to that clarity. There is a certain political comfort in having bright lines. I must confess that I have often found myself drawn to them, but that is usually just before discovering why lawyers or police officers prefer slightly more shaded ones. I support the principle underlying the amendment, but I have reservations about the way in which it seeks to achieve it.
My first concern is practical. The amendment requires that where service personnel, or the tri-service serious crime unit, are made aware of an allegation, they must immediately refer it and transfer the investigation to civilian police. “Immediately” is one of those words that looks quite reassuring in legislation but behaves rather less co-operatively in real life. In practice, the first hours of an investigation are often the most sensitive. Evidence is fragile, scenes need securing and victims may need safeguarding. Crucially, the question of who is best placed to take operational control may depend on facts that are not yet fully known. There will be cases where civilian forces are clearly the best placed from the outset—I suspect that they may be the majority—but there will also be cases where service police are already on the ground, embedded in the environment and uniquely placed to stabilise the situation before any handover, if necessary, can sensibly take place. What worries me slightly is that we risk turning a sensible presumption of civilian involvement into a rigid statutory trigger that may inadvertently disrupt good policing practice at exactly the wrong moment.
The second concern is more about coherence than timing. The amendment fixes jurisdiction by reference to the area where the offence took place. Again, that will work perfectly well in many cases, but the armed forces are not always known for their geographical neatness. People move, units deploy and conduct straddles locations. Investigations often involve a mixture of service personnel and civilians across different parts of the country. My concern is not that the principle is wrong but that a rigid allocation rule may create friction between agencies at precisely the moment when co-ordination matters the most.
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, I have concerns about the role of service policing itself. The service police and the Defence Serious Crime Command are not an inferior version of civilian policing. They are specialised and professional, and they often operate in environments that civilian forces are simply not structured to manage at first contact. If we were starting from scratch, we would not design two parallel systems and hope they never meet; we would design integrated systems with clear rules on information sharing, handover and joint working. That is where the real answer to this question lies. What I do not want us to do—however well intentioned the amendment is—is accidentally create a system where the service police are required to stand down too early or where information is transferred without the structured co-ordination that makes investigations effective. That is a defence not of silos, but of joined-up working between different agencies.
This is where I come to what I think would improve the Bill more than the amendment. What we really need is not just a duty to refer but a clear statutory expectation of mandatory information sharing and structured joint working between service police and civilian forces when dealing with sexual offences and domestic abuse. That would achieve the spirit of the amendment, and I think it would do so more reliably, without removing operational discretion at the earliest and most sensitive stage of any investigation. With that in mind, I gently press the Minister on this point. I do so in the spirit of someone who, prior to coming to Parliament, has sat through enough briefings to know that when everybody says, “Of course, we already share information effectively,” the definition of “effectively” remains quite different in different organisations.
Will the Minister give a clear commitment that the Government will ensure mandatory enforceable information sharing arrangements between the service police and civilian police forces in all cases involving sexual offences and domestic abuse? If that commitment is forthcoming, a great deal of the concern behind the amendment would arguably fall away. It would ensure that civilian forces are engaged early, that victims do not fall between systems, and that service police are not left operating in isolation or ambiguity. Although I support the broad intent of amendment 6 and its aims of ensuring serious allegations are handled properly and consistently, I am afraid that I am not persuaded that the current drafting is the best way to achieve that aim. I worry that it may constrain operational judgment in ways that are not fully intended.
I am, however, keen that we do not lose sight of the objective. I would strongly welcome the opportunity to work with colleagues across the House to refine this approach, potentially on Report, in a way that better balances mandatory co-operation with operational flexibility. If we get that right, we will do two important things at once: we will strengthen confidence in the handling of the most serious allegations, and we will ensure that those responsible for investigating them are not inadvertently placed in a straitjacket that makes their job harder rather than easier. On that basis, I hope the Government will engage constructively and I look forward to continuing this conversation.
David Reed
I acknowledge the intention behind amendment 6, and I thank the hon. Member for North Devon for tabling it. It is designed to ensure that serious offences, including sexual violence and domestic abuse, are investigated by civilian police with the specialist expertise and resources that those cases demand. That is an objective that both sides of the Committee can support, but as my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley has laid out, some of the wording and the blanket approaches that have been drawn into clause 12 need to be hammered out.
Public confidence in the handling of such grave matters is essential, particularly when they involve members of the armed forces. That said, it is important to examine whether the approach set out in the amendment is the most effective way to achieve that aim. There are practical considerations around how referrals would operate, how responsibilities would be divided and how we would ensure that victims experience a clear and consistent process from start to finish.
Mr Paul Foster (South Ribble) (Lab)
I find this a fascinating debate because we can all see the meaning of the amendment, but the hon. Gentleman mentioned victims. If he recalls, we all visited the Defence Serious Crime Command and the victim support unit, and it was made clear that the victim support service has made some real improvements over the past few years. In any crime investigation that is transferred from the service justice system to the criminal justice system, the victim support unit cannot support the victim. That is a concern to me, and it was raised with us. Does the hon. Member agree that is a considerable concern that we should look at?
David Reed
Yes, I completely agree. If a crime has happened and the victim engages with a support unit, having to move between civilian and military judicial systems, and switch between people that they have had trusted conversations with, is—if I were to put myself in their shoes—probably not what they want to do if they have been exposed to sexual violence or other violence. I completely understand the approach that the hon. Gentleman puts forward.
I am keen to continue constructive discussions with colleagues across the Committee, as well as with the Ministry of Defence, to ensure that our system for investigating and prosecuting offences continues to improve. I look forward to working with the Minister on those proposals.
Al Carns
I thank the hon. Member for North Devon for his views on the Bill, but before providing comment on amendment 6, I will first speak to clause 12.
Currently, under section 115 of the Armed Forces Act 2006, there is a duty on individual provost marshals to seek to ensure that all investigations carried out by the service police are free from improper interference. Clause 12 provides a power to create a protocol that will support the provost marshal in complying with that duty, but it also goes further than that. It will set out how all members of defence can support such investigations and improve the working relationship between key stakeholders in support of service policing. That power is loosely based on the equivalent power under which the civilian Policing Protocol Order 2023 was created in the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011. The civilian protocol sets out the operational independence and governance structure in civilian policing in England and Wales. There is currently no equivalent to that in defence and no clear articulation of investigative independence for service police to enable personnel in defence to ensure the support of investigations.
The effect of clause 12 is that, through the protocol that it provides for, it will be formally articulated to the whole of defence how people in defence should exercise, or refrain from exercising, functions in order to improve working relationships and ensure that investigations carried out by the service police are absolutely free from improper interference.
Amendment 6 seeks to amend clause 12 to override the victim’s preference. That is the key issue: to override the victim’s preference by making sure that all investigations and prosecutions take place in a relevant criminal justice system of the UK. That cannot be the right way forward. By overriding the victim’s preference, the amendment risks increasing the victim withdrawal rate. Noting the procedural differences between the two systems, 2024 administrative data on adult rape-flagged cases shows that the withdrawal rate from civilian police investigations is 59% compared with 24% from the Defence Serious Crime Command. We heard that from various witnesses in evidence sessions. The amendment potentially risks making the victim withdrawal rate even higher in the civilian criminal justice system.
David Reed
We have talked a lot about the UK, but can the Minister give some clarity on when those offences happen abroad? Say, for instance, someone was on an overseas base in Cyprus, and the Cypriot police were to be involved. What would happen at that point and how would that affect the equation?
Al Carns
The hon. Member raises a very important point. I will have to come back to him with specific details and statistics on that, and I will write to the Committee.
As mentioned before, the amendment potentially risks making the victim withdrawal rate even higher than in the criminal justice system. It also risks the loss or erosion of “golden hour” evidence and the safeguarding of victims in cases of sexual offending or domestic abuse. That is because the amendment does not place a duty on civilian police forces to accept the case. That could make delays in the civilian criminal justice system worse. In 2024, investigations of adult rape-flagged cases in the criminal justice system in England and Wales took 338 days. That is higher than the 148 days seen in the service justice system, even when taking into account the further 72 days until charge is directed.
To reassure the Committee, the Government are committed to making sure that each case, in particular those involving sexual offences or domestic abuse, is dealt with in the right jurisdiction. The prosecutors’ protocols therefore provide for decisions on jurisdiction to be made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the views of the victim. That is one of the most important points—the views of the victim and their preference. In the event that agreement cannot be reached in England and Wales, for example, the ultimate decision on jurisdiction lies with the Director of Public Prosecutions in the civilian system, so there is a fall-back mechanism. It is a priority for us that decisions on jurisdiction are made in a timely way and take into account the victim’s preference. That is why clause 25 strengthens the provision of information and support to victims when they are asked their preference on jurisdiction.
There are two points I would like to come to. The first is the horrendous case of Gunner Jaysley Beck and what has been done since that incident, but also the Sarah Atherton review that took place in 2021. Since then, there has been a huge amount of work—under both the previous Government and this Government—to ensure that the service justice system, and indeed military culture, is transforming in the right direction. I will be really clear: when I joined, in 1999, LGBT individuals were still not allowed in the military. The culture has moved. It moved slowly, but it is moving faster, I think, in the last five years and in the last two years than I have seen it move in a long time.
There have been a couple of key milestones in that movement. The first one is zero tolerance to unacceptable sexual behaviour. That zero tolerance has trickled down to every rank in the military. I remember implementing that direction for my staff when I was the chief of staff for the UK carrier strike force. That took place across the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. The Raising our Standards programme is a commitment to tackle unacceptable behaviours and to drive lasting cultural change—again, to try and move in the right direction. Importantly, the violence against women and girls taskforce change programme is now running in Catterick and Plymouth, something I launched when I was the Veterans and People Minister. There is also the tri-service complaint system.
All of those programmes are moving in the right direction to ensure that if anyone is a victim of sexual violence or harassment, they have a place to go to express their concerns. It also ensures that it is dealt with independent of the chain of command and allows the victim to raise issues and get them dealt with in the most effective and appropriate manner.
We are currently working on a formal information sharing agreement. Currently, information is shared with civilian police forces through local engagement during investigations. I am happy to continue dialogue and take that forward to make sure that that is more solidified, clear and standardised across various civilian police and military police elements.
The reality is that clause 25 strengthens the provision of information and support to victims when they are asked for their preferred jurisdiction. Therefore, this Government maintain that case-by-case decisions taking into account the view of the victim—and that is critical, the view of the victim—is the best way forward. I hope that provides necessary reassurance to the hon. Member for North Devon, and on those grounds I ask him to withdraw the amendment. I commend clause 12 to the Committee.
Ian Roome
I will withdraw the amendment, but I ask that the Minister takes on board the comments made by the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley in his powerful speech, so that this can come out on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 12 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 13
Entry for purposes of obtaining evidence etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Al Carns
The purpose of clause 13 is to extend the powers of judge advocates to enable them to issue search warrants, which can include other premises that are occupied or controlled by a person subject to service law, or a civilian subject to service discipline, but are not necessarily occupied as a residence. Examples include vehicles, boats or storage containers. Clause 13 also aligns the definition of premises in the Armed Forces Act 2006 with that in section 23 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984—also known as PACE.
Turning to clause 14, under existing powers in section 314 of the 2006 Act, the UK civilian police can arrest a serviceperson reasonably suspected of committing the offences of desertion or absence without leave, commonly known as AWOL. Clause 14 extends those powers to include servicepersons reasonably suspected of committing the service offence, under section 12 of the 2006 Act, of disobedience to lawful commands.
A lawful command may be given by a commanding officer or the service police to protect victims from further harm, or indeed to prevent the risk of further offending by the suspect. Those may include restrictions on places that the suspect can visit, such as specific buildings or addresses, or people with whom they can have contact. By enabling the civilian police to arrest someone suspected of breaching such orders, their enforceability will be enhanced.
Turning to clause 15, the 2006 Act allows only the commanding officer of a suspect to authorise their pre-charge custody after arrest. This can sometimes create delays in the investigation process or risk further harm to victims or witnesses. Since the establishment of the Defence Serious Crime Command, the increased volume and complexity of its caseload have rendered the issue progressively more challenging.
Clause 15 creates a power for all the provost marshals to authorise pre-charge custody for service offences. This will apply to arrests for schedule 2 offences and offences that would attract a sentence of over two years’ imprisonment in the civilian criminal justice system. It will also apply to schedule 1, part 2 offences where permission has been refused for a commanding officer to deal with the matter summarily, and to attempted versions of the offences. Clause 15 will also apply where prescribed circumstances exist, such as repeated assaults on two or more occasions, or where a senior rank has inflicted serious injury on a service person.
Clause 15 also extends the existing powers for commanding officers, and the associated safeguards, to the four provost marshals. These safeguards include the 12-hour review period and the 48-hour time limit beyond which an extension must be approved by a judge advocate. Commanding officers must still be notified if a suspect is taken into custody, and that must take place within six hours of the arrest. In exceptional cases, commanding officers have the power to authorise custody, but they must notify the provost marshal for serious crime and the provost marshal of the service police force for the service of which the suspect is a member.
Clause 16 inserts new section 58A into the 2006 Act, imposing a time limit for charging summary offences under section 42. This clause reflects recommendation 35 of Sir Richard Henriques’s 2021 review: that the service justice system should follow the principle of the civilian justice system that minor matters, triable only in a magistrates court, have a six-month time limit imposed on them from the date the offence was committed. The clause therefore imposes a six-month time limit on summary-only offences in the service justice system. However, the clause will enable the Director of Service Prosecutions to determine whether such matters may be heard outside the six-month time limit. Such a pragmatic approach reflects the realities of service life, operational demands and the nature of deployments and operations, which may make a hard six-month time limit unworkable. I commend clauses 13 to 16 to the Committee.
David Reed
These clauses deal with entry for purposes of obtaining evidence, arrest and detention by civil authorities, pre-charge custody, and time limits for charging certain offences. It is right that service police are given clear and effective powers to obtain evidence, as the Minister has laid out clearly, and that such powers are subject to proper judicial oversight. The provision to allow a judge advocate to authorise entry and search of relevant premises seems sensible to modernise the system and to help investigations proceed efficiently and lawfully. I also welcome the clarification around arrest and detention by civil authorities, and the extension of pre-charge custody arrangements in serious cases. The changes should help to ensure that serious allegations are dealt with more consistently and with the necessary urgency.
Al Carns
The clauses will enhance the ability of our military police forces and our provost marshals to enact service justice. These measures will make the forces safer, enable them to look after the victims, and support their freedom to operate within the military system.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 14 to 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 17
Duty of commanding officers to report serious offences
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Al Carns
Clause 17 will strengthen the duty of commanding officers to report allegations of serious offences to the service police. It removes an existing limitation where a commanding officer is obliged to report only a suspected schedule 2 offence committed by someone under their command. Under clause 17, where a commanding officer becomes aware that a serious offence may have been committed by any
“person subject to service law”
they must promptly refer the matter to the service police. However, the duty does not apply if the commanding officer reasonably believes that the service police or Defence Serious Crime Unit is aware of the matter. This is not a new process but an improvement to the existing duty, which will ensure that all serious allegations, including of sexual offences, are reported to the service police as promptly as possible. I commend clause 17 to the Committee.
David Reed
I welcome the clause, which seems a sensible and practical strengthening of the duty of commanding officers to report serious offences. The Minister, as a former commanding officer, will have experienced this duty at first hand, so I respect his judgment and expertise on the matter.
It is right that responsibility should apply wherever a commanding officer becomes aware of allegations concerning any person subject to service law, not only those within the officer’s direct chain of command. A broader duty will help to ensure that serious matters are not missed simply because of the structure of a unit or the form of command. At the same time, the safeguards in subsection (4), which mean that no further report is needed where the service police or tri-service serious crime unit is already aware, is a sensible way to avoid duplication and unnecessary bureaucracy. Taken together, the clause is a balanced reform that strengthens accountability, improves consistency and supports the proper investigation of serious offences across the services.
Al Carns
Commanding officers should always report an issue if they see one. With this change, they will have to and will be held to account.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 17 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 18
Summary hearings: punishments available to commanding officers
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Al Carns
Clause 18 gives a commanding officer the power to award a punishment of service detention to a
“corporal, bombardier, lance sergeant or lance corporal of Horse in any of His Majesty’s military forces”.
Those are OR-4 ranks, according to the NATO military rank codes. The power may be used only by commanding officers with extended powers at summary hearing. Currently, commanding officers in the Army and the Royal Air Force Regiment cannot impose service detention on an OR-4 rank, whereas those in the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force can. This variation in powers risks delay and unnecessary cost to the service justice system through trials potentially being heard at the court martial rather than being retained for summary hearing.
Allowing service detention to be imposed at summary hearing on corporals in the Army and the Royal Air Force Regiment is also in line with the operational reality that our military capabilities are becoming more integrated and joint. It is therefore increasingly likely that OR-4s from across the armed forces will be jointly deployed or even in joint units. As a result, it is more likely that commanding officers may face situations in which OR-4s from different services are defendants at summary hearing in a single case or in linked cases.
Clause 19 will give a commanding officer the power to impose a deprivation order in combination with a punishment of service detention, forfeiture of seniority or reduction in rank or disrating. Such punishments are used in more serious cases seen at summary hearings. At present, a commanding officer can impose a deprivation order only alongside a fine or “minor punishment” such as an admonition. Where a charge has been proven at summary hearing or a conviction obtained in a service court, they can be used to deprive the offender of any rights to certain property—this is property that has been lawfully seized from an offender or was in the offender’s possession or control when apprehended or charged with an offence. That might be, for example, tools used to commit the offence, offensive weapons or controlled drugs. In the more serious cases that might be dealt with at summary hearing, clause 19 will enable commanding officers to impose punishments that are just and proportionate and that protect the public and other service persons—for example, so that the property cannot be used again to commit the same or similar offences.
David Reed
We welcome clauses 18 and 19 on summary hearings and deprivation orders with the punishments available to commanding officers. They represent a serious aim and a proportionate update to the summary hearing powers available to commanding officers. Clause 18 would promote greater consistency across the services, by enabling service detention to be imposed on corporals, as the Minister said, and equivalent ranks, bringing the Army and the Royal Air Force Regiment into closer alignment with arrangements already in place elsewhere.
Clause 19 is likewise a practical step forward, as we heard in some of the evidence sessions. Permitting a deprivation order to be imposed alongside more serious summary punishments would give commanding officers a broader and more flexible set of options, while keeping matters within the summary system. That should help to ensure that sanctions are better tailored to the offence and the circumstances of the individual case. Taken together, the provisions enhance fairness, consistency and operational effectiveness, and we are pleased to support them.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
I welcome the clause. Will the Minister set out how there will be consistency in the use of these powers by commanding officers, to ensure that there is equality of justice across the board?
Al Carns
As someone goes across the single services and joint staff colleges, there will be different sections where they are trained on administering justice and the rights of a commanding officer. Importantly, there will be joint standing procedures produced around the clause, which everyone who becomes a commanding officer will have to read and ensure that they adhere to.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 18 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 19 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 20
Qualification for membership of the Court Martial
Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)
I beg to move amendment 9, in clause 20, page 34, line 27, at end insert “or
(iii) a retired holder of such a rank.”
This amendment would add retired officers to those qualified for membership of the Court Martial.
Mr Francois
I again place on record our thanks to you, Mr Efford, and to our excellent Clerks and the team who organised a very good visit down to Portsmouth, where I think we learned a lot about the operation of the service courts in practice—I certainly did. A number of issues were raised in that discussion, not least about the operation of juries in courts martial, and who serves on those jury panels, how they are selected and why. I will give two or three examples of the issues that came from that and then talk to the amendment.
The current practice, when an officer is being tried for an offence, is that only officers may serve on a jury panel in a court martial. Some people raised questions with the briefers that day about why that should be, and it is an interesting issue. The book answer from the Department was that officers should be tried by a jury of their peers, and therefore it should be other officers who serve on that panel. There is an issue that follows from that about the rank of the officer being tried and the rank of the officers that then serve on the panel. We learned about a practical constraint, which is that if a relatively senior officer is being tried, let us say a colonel or above—to take an Army example—there is only a relatively small pool of people who could be trawled to sit on that panel to pass judgment on that officer.
In the civilian world, we would not have a system where, if a professor were being tried, only graduates could sit on the panel. The civilian system is that people are chosen entirely at random from the electoral roll and are asked to do jury service, which they are mandated to do, with certain exceptions set out in statute. In the civilian world, people are not tried by people of—how can I put it?—an equivalent educational or social status. As the saying used to be, it is a jury of 12 good men and true; now it is, rightly, a jury of good men and women and true who assess someone’s guilt or innocence. In the military, we still carry out the process in this ranked, structured way.
Let us say that we had a lance corporal who was being tried for being drunk and disorderly—perhaps he had got into a bar brawl after the end of an exercise; he had gone out at the weekend, had let off a bit of steam and this had led to him allegedly committing an offence. At present, as I understand it, only senior non-commissioned officers of the rank of the equivalent of colour sergeant or above could pass judgment on that lance corporal. That raises an interesting question: why should another corporal or lance corporal, who likes a night out on a Friday as well, not be allowed to serve on that panel? Why does it have to be a colour sergeant or equivalent?
Forgive me, Mr Efford, I am using Army ranks because that is what I am most familiar with from my service, but the point holds good across all the services. Why should only a colour sergeant or above be allowed to pass verdict on a lance corporal or even a private soldier? A number of such issues cropped up from our visit. Also, as in the old saying that the Minister reminded me of, time spent in reconnaissance is seldom wasted. This was a good example of that practice.
The amendment was drafted specifically to address one of those issues—the potential shortage of officers to serve on court martial panels, especially if a relatively senior officer is being tried, when by definition the pool of available serving officers to serve on a panel is limited. We have tried to come up with a practical suggestion, which is to use retired officers of equivalent rank. I am also interested to hear what other members of the Committee think of the wider issue, which is, does this have to be as hide-bound by rank as it is at the moment? I am interested in the Minister’s view as well, not least because he has been a commanding officer.
If we are to keep the system in essence as we have it at the moment, however, would it not make sense to be able to draw on a pool of retired officers of the required rank, who might have a little more time on their hands? We would not be taking anyone away from ongoing operations, and we could take time from their lives in order for them to continue to serve in a military context in the important task of administering service justice. That, in essence, is the intention of the amendment, but we also tabled it to provoke, I hope, a wider debate—I am looking at one or two Labour Back Benchers in particular, because they were vocal about this when we were in Portsmouth, so now is their chance—about why we do things in the way that we do them, and whether there is some potential for change, but if not, why not?
I hope that I have laid out the issue fairly clearly for the Committee.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
I am grateful for the opportunity to speak in support of the amendment, which was tabled in the name of His Majesty’s loyal Opposition, and to set out my broader support for clause 20. I will begin with the clause itself, because it addresses the composition of the court martial. In such circumstances, it is right that we support the very sensible change that the clause sets out, with its underlying intent to ensure that the court martial is properly constituted and capable of commanding confidence across the armed forces and the wider public. Enlarging the pool of those who can sit on it is a welcome amendment.
Precisely because we support that principle, however, we also need to examine whether the system is fully equipped for the realities it faces. In that context, the amendment becomes not only relevant, but in my view increasingly necessary. The amendment proposes a simple change, as set out by my right hon. Friend, to include retired holders of the relevant rank among those qualified for membership of the court martial.
At first glance the amendment may appear relatively modest, but I suggest that, like many apparently modest changes in defence legislation, it subtly reflects something much more significant. It reflects a recognition of the demands placed on our armed forces justice system and how those are changing over time, and changing rapidly. We are operating in an era of increasing operational tempo—a phrase that is often used in defence debates, sometimes frequently.
Luke Akehurst (North Durham) (Lab)
Has the hon. Gentleman made any assessment of whether the capacity savings from serving officers not having to serve on the court—because under the amendment they would be replaced by retired officers—are perhaps exceeded by the burden on the service justice system of having to track and maintain some kind of database of the retired officers that it would call on to serve?
Dr Shastri-Hurst
The hon. Gentleman makes a helpful challenge. Clearly, there is no impact assessment with the amendment. However, there is a joint service publication, the RARO—regular army reserve of officers—list, and there are those letters I receive annually asking me to update my address and contact details. There are already mechanisms by which individuals can be identified and recalled for this service. Given the operational tempo that I have described, it makes sense that we ameliorate the pressure on those who are currently in active service while not impacting the flow of justice through the service justice system.
Mr Francois
In my experience, retired officers, particularly retired senior officers, are keenly aware of their pension entitlements. If we are paying them a pension through the armed forces pension scheme, we presumably know who they are and where they live. Via that database, it would not be particularly onerous to come up with a list of retired senior officers who could at least be invited. We are not suggesting that this should be mandatory, but we are suggesting that they may want the opportunity to serve. Via their pensions, we know where they are.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend, who from his time as a Defence Minister knows well how to keep tabs on those who have served our country but are now retired. The pension scheme is an obvious way to do so. In addition, he makes an important point about the willingness of individuals to engage in the process. These are people who have given enormous service to their country, and often wish to continue giving service long into their years of retirement from active service.
Our armed forces are more stretched and more globally engaged than before, and they are more frequently deployed than at almost any point in recent decades. The spectrum of threats facing our country is widening, from state-based adversaries to hybrid war, cyber-operations and persistent instability in regions where British forces are called to act with precision and professionalism. As I have set out, when operational tempo increases every part of the system is affected. It is not just about equipment, logistics or personnel numbers, but about the justice system that underpins discipline, accountability and command authority.
The question, therefore, is a relatively simple one: does our current system of service justice have the flexibility, depth and resilience required to meet that demand? Amendment 9 is one attempt to ensure that it does. It recognises that we are asking a great deal of a relatively small pool of serving officers. We are asking them not only to command forces in complex environments but, where necessary, to sit in judgment in court martial proceedings, including in cases involving senior rank, complex evidence, and often significant reputational consequence for all involved. That is not to say that these individuals are incapable of doing those tasks, but that is a heavy burden on any system. It becomes more difficult still when we consider the practical realities of availability.
Senior serving officers are, by definition, in high demand. They are deployed, rotated, assigned to strategic planning roles or engaged in operational command responsibilities that cannot simply be paused or rescheduled. At the same time, the court martial system requires a bench that is credible, experienced and capable of understanding the realities of service life. It is not enough that those sitting in judgment are legally competent to interpret the evidence; they must also understand the context in which decisions are made, the pressures under which orders are given and the operational environments in which conduct is assessed.
That combination of legal competence and operational understanding is not easily found, and it is here that amendment 9 can make a tangible contribution. By extending eligibility to retired officers of appropriate rank, we end up expanding the pool of individuals who can bring that essential combination of experience and judgment to the court martial system.
I want to be clear about what the amendment seeks to do and what it does not seek to do. It is not an attempt to dilute standards. On the contrary, it is an attempt to strengthen them by widening the field of those who meet them. It is not an attempt to undermine the authority of serving officers; it is an attempt to relieve them of some of the competing pressures that now fall on them in an increasingly demanding environment. It is not an attempt to create a separate or parallel justice system where some are tried by those who are still in active service and some are held in judgment by those who have retired. It is merely an attempt to ensure that the existing system has the necessary capacity to function effectively.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
I welcome the hon. Member’s intervention. If he is suggesting that we should look at going wider than the confines of this specific amendment, I would welcome that conversation. It is about increasing the flexibility and agility of the court martial system so that it reflects the challenges for those who currently serve in uniform.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
The Minister is right to challenge me on the case that I am making. It is about competing challenges facing those in senior rank in the armed forces. My right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford gave the example of colonels or above. We have heard of very senior officers being brought before a court martial in cases that may involve, for instance, continuity of education allowance. These are senior individuals who then take out other senior individuals. They are often in a fairly small pool and have perhaps worked closely with one another during their service, but they also have increasing demands, given the global instability that we are currently facing.
It therefore makes logical sense to widen that pool and take the pressure off the shoulders of those who have operational responsibilities by allowing those who have served in the past, and hold those ranks by virtue of their service, to sit within the court martial system and increase capacity. I am not suggesting that there is an inefficiency in the service—everybody involved is doing the best job they can. It is about flexing resources so that they are used most appropriately to deliver the outcomes that we need not only from a national security and defence perspective, but to maintain the integrity and speed with which service justice is administered.
There is also a broader strategic point that we must not overlook, and it touches on the Minister’s point. We often speak about the importance of a whole-force concept and the idea that national defence is about not simply those currently in uniform but a wider ecosystem of reserve capability, which we will come on to later. It is also about veterans, institutional memory and those who can bring expertise from their time in service. We are, quite rightly, investing in the reserve forces. We are also increasingly recognising the value of civilian expertise in a variety of fields, such as cyber-intelligence or technology. In many respects, we are trying to build a much more flexible and adaptive defence structure, and yet, when it comes to the service justice system, we have not always applied the same logic with equal measure or consistency. We have in effect treated participation as something that must be narrowly confined to serving personnel, even when highly experienced retired officers could make a valuable contribution.
Luke Akehurst
I feel that the hon. Member is perhaps trying to fix something that is not broken. In the evidence we heard about the service justice system, was there anything that implied that there was a large-scale problem with delays and scheduling? I ask because I thought I was hearing about a system that was relatively efficient and speedy compared with the delays that we all know are afflicting the civilian justice system. There was just one instance—I think it was of a general who had done something inappropriate regarding funding for school fees. It was almost a sui generis incident where it had been difficult to put together a board. Will the hon. Gentleman accept that there is some danger that the amendment is attempting to fix something that is not broken in a system that is actually working rather well?
The Chair
Order. I gently remind hon. Members that interventions should be slightly shorter than that.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
I fear that recollections may differ. My interpretation of the evidence that we heard is not that this is a failing system—far from it. I gently suggest to the hon. Member that the civilian Crown courts and magistrates courts may not be the best benchmark against which to compare its performance.
There is a wider issue, which the hon. Gentleman has touched on: this should not be merely about fixing a problem that exists now. There should be some horizon-scanning for the emerging challenges for the armed forces, not only in the present day but in the years ahead, and safety-proofing of the system against those challenges. That is the specific intent behind the amendment.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford and I have spent time making the argument about the more senior pool of officers. That is a fair position to take, because they will be under much greater demands, with extensive challenges. Given the threat levels we face—there was a statement in the main Chamber yesterday about events in the middle east—we are living in a much more unstable world, with much greater demands on our armed forces. One can foresee increasing difficulty in constituting panels for cases, particularly those involving senior officers. It would be a dereliction of duty if, instead of planning for those threats and the challenges that they might pose to our armed forces, the Committee and the House more widely sought only to react to them in future. It is always better to do things proactively in a calm manner and think about the implications, rather than doing things retrospectively and hurriedly because an issue has arisen.
I will dwell a little more on cases involving the higher ranks. When they do arise, it is often necessary for the panel to include officers of either equivalent or higher rank, but the pool of serving officers is by definition limited. As I hope I have described, that can create genuine operational and logistical difficulties in assembling boards that are both appropriately constituted, given the demands on their make-up, and able to proceed without undue delay. Retired officers of the relevant rank represent an obvious and sensible extension of the pool that would help us to proof the system. They would bring not only rank equivalence, but often a broader perspective. Having stepped back from the pressures of immediate command, they might bring a degree of reflective judgment that is particularly valuable in the complex and sensitive cases that invariably involve more senior officers, by virtue of the nature of the offences of which they are accused.
I speak as someone who has developed a healthy respect over the years for the ability of retired officers to express opinions with a greater level of clarity than they may have done in post. That brings a refreshing breadth to the system. There is something about leaving service—I certainly found this myself—that appears to improve one’s ability to identify precisely what everyone else should have done differently. Stepping away from the pressures and challenges of day-to-day service life enables individuals to take a wider and more holistic approach.
I am mindful of the fact that I am probably trying your patience, Mr Efford, so I will wind up shortly. I do not pretend that amendment 9 is perfect in every detail. The hon. Member for South Ribble provided a helpful challenge in relation to whether its scope should be wider. There are certainly questions about eligibility criteria and the mechanism for appointment, although I think that there is an obvious mechanism for identifying potential appointees. Those questions will need careful consideration, but that is not a particularly unusual position to be in at this stage of the legislative process. The purpose of Committee is not necessarily to produce final answers, but to test the direction of travel. I think the direction of travel is sound when it comes to ensuring that the system is foolproof.
This is about the resilience of our justice system and about making better use of experience that already exists in our wider armed forces community. It is about ensuring that the demands of the increasing operational tempo are not inadvertently creating bottlenecks in the very system designed to uphold discipline and fairness. Ultimately, that is the balance that we are trying to strike: on the one hand we want armed forces that are operationally effective, globally deployable and able to meet the demands of a more dangerous and uncertain world, but on the other hand we want a service justice system that is robust, timely and capable of functioning without becoming a constraint on our operational effectiveness. Those two objectives should not be in tension. We need to think carefully about how we design institutions that can support them both.
Clause 20 is an important part of that architecture: it will ensure that the court martial remains properly constituted and legally sound. Amendment 9 would strengthen that approach by ensuring that it remains practically workable under conditions of increasing demand. I urge the Government to accept the amendment, because I suspect that as operational pressures continue to rise and as we ask more of our armed forces across multiple domains, the need for flexibility in our service justice system will only become more rather than less pressing. If we get it right now, we will not only improve efficiency and effectiveness, but strengthen confidence in the system. That is ultimately what we should be trying to achieve in the Bill.
Ian Roome
It is important that we take on board the evidence from our visits. Otherwise, what is the point of going on them? That point was brought up when we debated a previous amendment, with reference to the use of the civilian or military justice system.
The hon. and gallant Member for Solihull West and Shirley made an excellent speech about using retired officers. We heard from those who are recruiting that there are delays. We heard during a visit that a senior officer had struggled to find a panel, and the process had been delayed because permission from the then Secretary of State was needed to use an officer of a lower rank. We also heard that it would be much easier to find officers. It is difficult to find officers of an equivalent rank, particularly among the higher ranks, who have not served or trained together or do not know each other, and to be sure that they do not have any relevant interest in protecting someone or perverting the course of justice. The right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford also made a good point about who constitutes the panel. I support amendment 9, because what is the point of our going on visits if we do not act on what we have been told is an issue?
We also heard a point that has not been mentioned today, which is that those in the non-commissioned ranks, such as warrant officers who have 25 or 30 years’ experience in the job, could also sit on the panels. It is not addressed in the amendment, but we heard evidence that those with years of military service and a lot of experience could be used on the panels too.
David Reed
I will add to the arguments of my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley, my right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford and the hon. Member for North Devon.
The Opposition’s recollections align very closely with those of our Liberal Democrat colleague. Although we did not hear about a system that is breaking, we definitely heard about a system that is under strain. If memory serves—please correct me if I am wrong—we were shown a really good presentation by the people we visited in Portsmouth that demonstrated how the service courts have expanded. We had just a few men before; more rules and regulations have now been introduced, and thankfully women are being included, but extra bureaucracy has been added to the system. As the hon. Member for North Devon articulated, being more senior and not knowing people you have served with from other units is for the birds. We are going to end up with bottlenecks.
Sarah Bool
If there is one phrase my father always says to me, it is “Sarah, you can’t teach experience.” We have talked about bringing retired officers back into the justice system; this is a very good example of what we can do to call on their experience. With jury service and jury trials, we try to get a range of experience from all types of peers. I know that there is an argument to say, “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it,” but we want to streamline and enhance our justice system to make it as effective as possible. I support amendment 9.
Al Carns
I thank the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford for tabling amendment 9, which seeks to add retired officers to those who are qualified for court martial membership. However, I believe that the amendment is unnecessary and most likely counterproductive.
The first argument made was about capacity and the lack of senior officers to sit on courts martial and hold people to account. As the Committee knows, we keep those things under constant review. The right hon. Member mentioned a case from several years ago that highlighted a lack of capacity to charge senior members. We pushed through secondary legislation in 2024 to amend two of the armed forces court martial rules so that if a defendant was at one star or above, the president of the board would be at one-star level; they did not need to be of higher rank. That was a significant change.
As for lack of capacity, I will throw out a question to the Committee: how many one-stars do we have in the military? We actually have 200 one-stars—let that sink in—and that does not include the reserves. There is no capacity issue here.
Secondly, the amendment could be counterproductive, because it is vital that the board members have up-to-date knowledge and real-time experience of the latest single-service policies. I say that from experience, because sentencing at court martial fulfils a number of purposes, including punishment, maintenance, discipline and deterrence.
Al Carns
As the hon. Member will know, trying to speak to people about whether they know other people is exceptionally difficult. Trying to capture that in a data record would be even more difficult. The 200 officers in service at the moment do not include the reservist pool, which is quite large—and that is just one-stars, not two-stars, three-stars or four-stars, so the pool is actually far larger.
I will go back to the purpose of sentencing at court martial, because it is an important point. As I say, it includes punishment, maintenance, discipline and deterrence. It must also take into account the best interests of the service and the maintenance of operational effectiveness. I completely agree that experience cannot be taught, but sometimes experience can wane over time. An appreciation of the relevant factors comes with experience, but also with the responsibilities of rank, as the veterans community will understand, and with the exercise of leadership and command over others. In some cases, that will not come with the most up-to-date operational context, which could cause an issue on the court martial board.
David Reed
We want to strengthen the Bill by working with the Government and taking a collaborative approach. Having a shared reality, in any aspect of life, is massively important. Among Opposition Members, there is alignment on the shared reality that we heard about, when we went down to Portsmouth, from the people we empower to run the service justice system. Does the Minister know of any of the cracks or weaknesses, as we heard about on our visit? Does he acknowledge that there may be issues to address?
Al Carns
Listening to evidence and acting on it is critical. Understanding the context in which it sits is equally important. Did that individual know that there are 200 one-stars within defence? Did they have the authority and responsibility to allocate individuals in a short, timely and effective manner to a court martial board? Probably not. The problem is not capacity. It is perhaps that the Defence Serious Crime Command needs greater authorities and programming to pool individuals in a timely and effective manner to sit on a court martial board and deliver justice.
Mr Francois
This is not a criticism of the Minister, because no doubt he had other important things to do, but he was not on that visit, as I recall. As Her late Majesty once said, recollections may vary, but this was a point raised with us by the people presenting to us on the operation of the system. We did not invent it. They made the point quite strongly that, for instance, if people had been on staff courses together—let us say that they had done the Royal College of Defence Studies course for a year together—that would sometimes rule them out. I must make the point to the Minister that we have not fabricated this; it is a problem that was raised with us by the experts who actually deal with the process day to day.
Al Carns
In no way, shape or form am I suggesting that this was fabricated, made up or a lie. What I am trying to say is that context is important. The statistics show that there are 200 one-stars in regular service, not including the reserve. That is a large pool of individuals, which reduces the right hon. Member’s argument about capacity. He talked about people knowing each other, but there are clear protocols in place to ensure that when the board is pulled together, the range of individuals on it is as broad as it is wide, and that there is at least one woman and one man on it. I think that that is adequate. The 2024 secondary legislation that amended the rules was brought in specifically in response to the case that was mentioned during the Committee’s visit—