Armed Forces Bill (Fourth sitting)

David Reed Excerpts

Tuesday 14th April 2026 Public Bill Committees

[The Minister for the Armed Forces (Al Carns)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Mr Efford. Defence needs to protect itself from crime with security measures that will deter, detect and defeat criminal activities, including those directed by hostile states, that threaten its critical sites or operations. Currently, the only authorisation process that enables interference with drones that might be used to commit crimes that threaten defence operations and assets is in part III of the Police Act 1997. Only the civilian police can obtain such an authorisation to deal with these threats.

The increase in drone activity around defence sites means that defence cannot rely on local police forces for its security requirements. The emergence, in Ukraine and elsewhere, of drones as a new frontier of warfare has brought into sharp focus the urgent need for defence to meet this rapidly developing threat, not only in operational theatres but here in the UK, to protect defence operations and bases. We must have ways to protect ourselves from the threats posed by drones, be they in the air, on land or on or under water.

Clause 4 will create a regime whereby defence personnel can obtain authorisation to use approved equipment to prevent drones from being used to commit criminal offences in relation to defence sites and property in the UK. The regime will consist of a two-stage approval process.

The first stage will consist of a senior person in defence—a two-star military officer or civil service equivalent—giving authorisation for the use of approved equipment to detect and prevent relevant offences. Applications for authorisations can be made only by defence personnel; before giving an authorisation, they will need to be satisfied that it is appropriate, in the interests of national security, that it be given. An authorisation can cover one or more defence areas, particular defence property or a description of property. This stage will ensure that appropriate areas and property can be protected using the appropriate equipment. Defence areas include sites in the UK used for the purpose of defence, as well as sites used by visiting forces. Defence property includes vehicles and vessels in the UK. It will be possible for an authorisation to cover a description of such property—royal naval vessels, for example—so that it is not necessary for each one to be individually identified.

To ensure that the new regime is agile, we have not specified the type of equipment that can be used under an authorisation, or taken a power to prescribe this in regulations. Instead, the Secretary of State will need to approve equipment before it can be used. This will allow new equipment to be used as swiftly as possible to protect defence interests. The approval process will be governed by defence policy, which will ensure that equipment is safe to use or test in the UK. An authorisation can last for up to 12 months and may be renewed; it can also be varied or revoked.

The second stage in the authorisation process involves a responsible person. Before approved equipment can be used, the responsible person must be satisfied that it will be used only in accordance with the authorisation that covers the area or property to which it relates. Furthermore, before equipment can be used to detect and defeat a drone, the responsible person must be satisfied that it is both reasonable and proportionate to do so. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[David Reed (Exmouth and Exeter East) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Efford. As we all know, drones and other uncrewed systems are rapidly reshaping modern defence and are already central to surveillance, logistics and frontline operations. Their importance will only grow in the years ahead. For our armed forces, they offer speed, precision and flexibility; for our adversaries, they present new and evolving threats that we must be ready to counter. That is why the clause matters.

My own limited experience was back in the early 2010s, when I saw drones brought into military service in our operations in Afghanistan. Those pieces of kit were really expensive and large, but we could see how they were reshaping the modern battlefield. Looking at how the technology has evolved over the years, the first signs that I saw were in how prisoners were working with criminal networks on the outside to deliver drugs and other contraband into prisons. They were using cheap, commercial, off-the-shelf drones to carry out those illegal acts. The barrier to entry for such products has fallen significantly. Our military now has to contend with protecting military sites, bases and other critical assets from people who can buy cheap drones that have a big operational effect, so new powers need to be given to our armed forces people.

We will have more opportunities to strengthen these powers. We support what the Minister proposes, but we will discuss new clauses at a later sitting. The success of clause 4 will depend on whether the wider system supports it. We have heard repeatedly from colleagues across the House about regulation issues with testing autonomous systems in UK airspace or waters. Multi-departmental efforts will be required to take away some of the regulation, so that we can give defence manufacturing and our armed forces the ability to test the new technologies and implement them in their operational output.

Our armed forces must be equipped with not just the tools, but the doctrine and training to use them effectively. We have a clear opportunity for change. The United Kingdom has the expertise and the industrial base to lead in uncrewed systems, which is good for the export market. Clause 4 provides part of the foundation, but it must be matched by practical action to ensure that the capabilities can be delivered at scale. If we get it right, we will strengthen our national security, our defence industry and our critical national infrastructure; if we fall behind, others will set the pace. The choice is ours.

[Sarah Bool (South Northamptonshire) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Mr Efford, after the Easter recess. I believe that the Minister clarified this point, but I ask for confirmation: will the extension of anti-drone permissions extend to US bases such as RAF Croughton in my constituency?

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New clause 12 is therefore not a departure from the Bill’s architecture; it would be a necessary reinforcement of it. It would ensure that the protective intent underpinning clauses 5 to 9 is not inadvertently weakened by narrow jurisdictional discontinuity. It would close a loophole that may be technical in appearance but potentially significant in consequence. Of course, legislation of this nature rarely turns on grand philosophical divergences in this House. More often, it turns on whether the statutory scheme works in practice as well as it does in principle. The question is not whether protective orders are desirable—they clearly are—but whether the system for imposing them is watertight. New clause 12 would ensure that it is. For that reason, and in the spirit of strengthening the Bill, I hope that it has widespread support.

[David Reed]

It is difficult to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley—he is a former Army officer, a doctor and a barrister—but I will attempt to add to the debate.

This issue is clear: under the present framework, a service court can only impose protective orders—such as a sexual harm prevention order, a stalking protection order, a domestic abuse protection order or a restraining order—if the individual remains subject to service law at the point of trial or sentence. Where an individual has left the forces before that stage, the court’s ability to impose those protections falls away, even where the alleged conduct took place during service and proceedings were properly brought on that basis. That creates an obvious and avoidable gap—my hon. Friend laid out the argument on this expertly. It presents a route that any competent legal adviser could identify.

Where proceedings are pending or a conviction is likely, there is a clear incentive to leave service before the point at which an order could be imposed. The individual who may present the greatest risk to a victim, who knows their workplace, shares the same base or moves within the same social network, can remove themselves from the reach of a protective order simply by leaving. That is not a remote possibility; it is a foreseeable consequence of the current structure, and it should be addressed.

New clause 12 addresses this consequence in a proportionate and coherent way. It provides that, where an individual was subject to service law at the time of the alleged conduct or at the point of charging decision, the service court retains the power to impose protective orders as though the individual remained subject to service law. It does not expand service jurisdiction into new territory, and it does not create new offences. It simply preserves an existing power at the point where it is most needed: at conviction or sentence.

New clause 12 also ensures that such orders have full effect. An order made in those circumstances is to be treated as though it was made by a civilian court of equivalent standing, which would provide clarity on enforcement, avoid any uncertainty between service and civilian systems, and allow a proper provision through the regulations for recognition, enforcement and variation. In practical terms, it gives the courts a power that is both meaningful and workable.

The Bill makes a serious effort to strengthen the experience of victims within the service justice system. We heard from many experts during the evidence sessions, and that really brought it home for many of us on the Committee. Measures such as protective orders, enhanced powers for service police and independent legal advocacy represent real progress. However, it is important that those provisions operate together effectively. At present, there is a clear weakness. Where leaving service provides a means of avoiding a protective order, that weakness will be exploited. The purpose of new clause 12 is to ensure that it cannot be.

Those most likely to benefit from this change are often the most vulnerable. Individuals affected by serious sexual offences, domestic abuse or stalking within close professional communities face particular risks, especially where working and social environments are closely intertwined. For them, a protective order is not a technical matter, but fundamental to their sense of safety and ability to continue in their role. Access to that protection should not depend on whether an individual leaves service at a particular moment.

[Rachel Taylor (North Warwickshire and Bedworth) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Efford. I welcome the clauses we are considering. This Government were elected to renew the nation’s contract with those who serve, and this Bill promises to do that. We cannot do it without ensuring that armed forces personnel are protected from sexual and violent behaviour, domestic abuse, stalking and harassment. We must ensure that, if such incidents do happen, justice is swift and victims are supported.

As far as possible, the service justice system reflects the provisions of the civilian justice system, and the Bill is modernising and improving victim support. It was extremely helpful to speak to those involved in the service justice process, and I thank the Chair for organising those visits, which helped to inform us all.

Among the key measures being introduced are the sexual harm prevention orders and the sexual risk orders, which can be issued in the service court in response to provost marshal. The Bill also allows for service domestic abuse protection notices to be issued by the service police, and for service domestic abuse protection orders and service stalking protection orders to be issued by the service courts. This will ensure better protection for personnel and civilians.

The Bill also solves the discrepancy that exists between service courts and civilian courts if an offender is sentenced by the service court when they have committed a serious offence. Currently, the transfer from the service courts to the civilian justice system is undertaken on a discretionary basis. The Bill will modernise that system, and bring offenders sentenced by the service courts into line with the civilian justice system. The Bill will better support victims of a service offence by streamlining the complaints procedure.

I have some sympathy with the arguments behind new clause 12 and a great deal of respect for the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford. However, in practice, individuals cannot simply leave the armed forces to avoid proceedings. A serviceperson will not be discharged or given a final leaving date until disciplinary or criminal proceedings have been properly concluded. Even after an individual has already left service, sections 57, 58 and 61 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 allow them to be charged with an offence committed while they were subject to service law. My argument in respect of new clause 12 is that it is simply not necessary. However, I think dialogue between the Minister and the right hon. Member would be welcome.

[Al Carns]

I thank the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford for tabling new clause 12, which seeks to ensure that service courts can impose protective orders on individuals who leave service before trial and preventing the avoidance of such orders simply by leaving the service. I recognise the good will and the sentiment behind new clause 12. However, it is not needed.

I want to be clear that individuals should not be able to evade accountability for their conduct and that safeguarding measures must not fall away simply by reason of service or leaving the armed forces. Protecting victims of domestic abuse, stalking and sexual harm is a clear priority of this Government. The reality is that individuals cannot simply leave the armed forces to avoid proceedings—they just cannot. It is actually relatively complicated to leave the armed forces. A serviceperson will not be discharged or given a final leaving date until disciplinary or criminal proceedings have been properly concluded.

Importantly, if for some reason an individual were to slip through the net and leave the service, sections 57, 58 and 61(2) of the Armed Forces Act 2006 allow them to be charged with an offence committed while they were subject to service law. Such a charge may be brought within six months of their leaving service, or after six months with the consent of the Attorney General, ensuring that service courts can still exercise that jurisdiction when necessary.

The Government have engaged with experts, including the Home Office, the Defence Serious Crime Command and safeguarding teams in the design and creation of service protection orders to ensure that they are robust and effective. That includes ensuring that service protection orders will be recognised and enforceable within civilian courts. That means that where a protection order is made, the Bill provides for those orders to transition to the civilian justice system once an individual leaves service and provides enduring protection for victim-survivors. The reality is that people cannot just leave the military, especially if they are under investigation. Secondly, if they do, they are still subject and can be pulled back for a minimum of six months. Taken together, that approach provides continuity, confidence and protection beyond service.

[David Reed]

The Minister is laying out a very well-structured argument, and I see many of the points, but I wonder about certain circumstances. For instance, if a serviceperson took drugs and was kicked out—they have to abide by those rules, which we all know about in the armed forces—what would then happen?

[Al Carns]

If there were criminal proceedings, he would be held to account in the service justice system for up to six months after the case. It is relatively simple. As we know, it is quite hard to leave the military, and when someone does, they are still subject to service law for six months after they have left.

The Government do not believe that new clause 12 is necessary and I therefore invite the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford not to press it. I also commend clauses 5 to 9 and schedules 2 and 3 to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 6 to 9 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 10

Victims of service offences

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

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This important change will align the rights of victims in the service justice system with the rights already guaranteed to victims in the civilian criminal justice system in England and Wales.

[David Reed]

Clause 10 is a necessary and proportionate step to ensure that victims of service offences are properly recognised and supported within the military justice system. Those affected by such offences often face distinct pressures linked to service life, including close living and working environments and concerns about reporting within the chain of command. Strengthening protections and support mechanisms helps to build confidence in the system, encourages reporting and reinforces the principle that service personnel are entitled to the same standards of justice and care as any civilian. This is an important measure in upholding both discipline and fairness across the armed forces.

Clause 11 strengthens the role of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration in a practical and necessary way. By allowing victims to bring complaints directly to the commissioner, it removes unnecessary barriers and ensures that their voices are heard more clearly and promptly. This change reflects a sensible and compassionate approach, particularly in cases involving service offences, where the experiences of victims must be treated with seriousness and respect. It reinforces accountability while improving access to justice.

[Al Carns]

Clauses 10 and 11, in reality, thicken out the service justice system and align it with the civilian justice system, providing greater freedoms and protections for anybody who is a victim within this system. I commend them to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 10 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 11 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 12

Service policing protocol

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[David Reed]

I acknowledge the intention behind amendment 6, and I thank the hon. Member for North Devon for tabling it. It is designed to ensure that serious offences, including sexual violence and domestic abuse, are investigated by civilian police with the specialist expertise and resources that those cases demand. That is an objective that both sides of the Committee can support, but as my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley has laid out, some of the wording and the blanket approaches that have been drawn into clause 12 need to be hammered out.

Public confidence in the handling of such grave matters is essential, particularly when they involve members of the armed forces. That said, it is important to examine whether the approach set out in the amendment is the most effective way to achieve that aim. There are practical considerations around how referrals would operate, how responsibilities would be divided and how we would ensure that victims experience a clear and consistent process from start to finish.

[Mr Paul Foster (South Ribble) (Lab)]

I find this a fascinating debate because we can all see the meaning of the amendment, but the hon. Gentleman mentioned victims. If he recalls, we all visited the Defence Serious Crime Command and the victim support unit, and it was made clear that the victim support service has made some real improvements over the past few years. In any crime investigation that is transferred from the service justice system to the criminal justice system, the victim support unit cannot support the victim. That is a concern to me, and it was raised with us. Does the hon. Member agree that is a considerable concern that we should look at?

[David Reed]

Yes, I completely agree. If a crime has happened and the victim engages with a support unit, having to move between civilian and military judicial systems, and switch between people that they have had trusted conversations with, is—if I were to put myself in their shoes—probably not what they want to do if they have been exposed to sexual violence or other violence. I completely understand the approach that the hon. Gentleman puts forward.

I am keen to continue constructive discussions with colleagues across the Committee, as well as with the Ministry of Defence, to ensure that our system for investigating and prosecuting offences continues to improve. I look forward to working with the Minister on those proposals.

[Al Carns]

I thank the hon. Member for North Devon for his views on the Bill, but before providing comment on amendment 6, I will first speak to clause 12.

Currently, under section 115 of the Armed Forces Act 2006, there is a duty on individual provost marshals to seek to ensure that all investigations carried out by the service police are free from improper interference. Clause 12 provides a power to create a protocol that will support the provost marshal in complying with that duty, but it also goes further than that. It will set out how all members of defence can support such investigations and improve the working relationship between key stakeholders in support of service policing. That power is loosely based on the equivalent power under which the civilian Policing Protocol Order 2023 was created in the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011. The civilian protocol sets out the operational independence and governance structure in civilian policing in England and Wales. There is currently no equivalent to that in defence and no clear articulation of investigative independence for service police to enable personnel in defence to ensure the support of investigations.

The effect of clause 12 is that, through the protocol that it provides for, it will be formally articulated to the whole of defence how people in defence should exercise, or refrain from exercising, functions in order to improve working relationships and ensure that investigations carried out by the service police are absolutely free from improper interference.

Amendment 6 seeks to amend clause 12 to override the victim’s preference. That is the key issue: to override the victim’s preference by making sure that all investigations and prosecutions take place in a relevant criminal justice system of the UK. That cannot be the right way forward. By overriding the victim’s preference, the amendment risks increasing the victim withdrawal rate. Noting the procedural differences between the two systems, 2024 administrative data on adult rape-flagged cases shows that the withdrawal rate from civilian police investigations is 59% compared with 24% from the Defence Serious Crime Command. We heard that from various witnesses in evidence sessions. The amendment potentially risks making the victim withdrawal rate even higher in the civilian criminal justice system.

[David Reed]

We have talked a lot about the UK, but can the Minister give some clarity on when those offences happen abroad? Say, for instance, someone was on an overseas base in Cyprus, and the Cypriot police were to be involved. What would happen at that point and how would that affect the equation?

[Al Carns]

The hon. Member raises a very important point. I will have to come back to him with specific details and statistics on that, and I will write to the Committee.

As mentioned before, the amendment potentially risks making the victim withdrawal rate even higher than in the criminal justice system. It also risks the loss or erosion of “golden hour” evidence and the safeguarding of victims in cases of sexual offending or domestic abuse. That is because the amendment does not place a duty on civilian police forces to accept the case. That could make delays in the civilian criminal justice system worse. In 2024, investigations of adult rape-flagged cases in the criminal justice system in England and Wales took 338 days. That is higher than the 148 days seen in the service justice system, even when taking into account the further 72 days until charge is directed.

To reassure the Committee, the Government are committed to making sure that each case, in particular those involving sexual offences or domestic abuse, is dealt with in the right jurisdiction. The prosecutors’ protocols therefore provide for decisions on jurisdiction to be made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the views of the victim. That is one of the most important points—the views of the victim and their preference. In the event that agreement cannot be reached in England and Wales, for example, the ultimate decision on jurisdiction lies with the Director of Public Prosecutions in the civilian system, so there is a fall-back mechanism. It is a priority for us that decisions on jurisdiction are made in a timely way and take into account the victim’s preference. That is why clause 25 strengthens the provision of information and support to victims when they are asked their preference on jurisdiction.

There are two points I would like to come to. The first is the horrendous case of Gunner Jaysley Beck and what has been done since that incident, but also the Sarah Atherton review that took place in 2021. Since then, there has been a huge amount of work—under both the previous Government and this Government—to ensure that the service justice system, and indeed military culture, is transforming in the right direction. I will be really clear: when I joined, in 1999, LGBT individuals were still not allowed in the military. The culture has moved. It moved slowly, but it is moving faster, I think, in the last five years and in the last two years than I have seen it move in a long time.

There have been a couple of key milestones in that movement. The first one is zero tolerance to unacceptable sexual behaviour. That zero tolerance has trickled down to every rank in the military. I remember implementing that direction for my staff when I was the chief of staff for the UK carrier strike force. That took place across the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. The Raising our Standards programme is a commitment to tackle unacceptable behaviours and to drive lasting cultural change—again, to try and move in the right direction. Importantly, the violence against women and girls taskforce change programme is now running in Catterick and Plymouth, something I launched when I was the Veterans and People Minister. There is also the tri-service complaint system.

All of those programmes are moving in the right direction to ensure that if anyone is a victim of sexual violence or harassment, they have a place to go to express their concerns. It also ensures that it is dealt with independent of the chain of command and allows the victim to raise issues and get them dealt with in the most effective and appropriate manner.

We are currently working on a formal information sharing agreement. Currently, information is shared with civilian police forces through local engagement during investigations. I am happy to continue dialogue and take that forward to make sure that that is more solidified, clear and standardised across various civilian police and military police elements.

The reality is that clause 25 strengthens the provision of information and support to victims when they are asked for their preferred jurisdiction. Therefore, this Government maintain that case-by-case decisions taking into account the view of the victim—and that is critical, the view of the victim—is the best way forward. I hope that provides necessary reassurance to the hon. Member for North Devon, and on those grounds I ask him to withdraw the amendment. I commend clause 12 to the Committee.

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[David Reed]

These clauses deal with entry for purposes of obtaining evidence, arrest and detention by civil authorities, pre-charge custody, and time limits for charging certain offences. It is right that service police are given clear and effective powers to obtain evidence, as the Minister has laid out clearly, and that such powers are subject to proper judicial oversight. The provision to allow a judge advocate to authorise entry and search of relevant premises seems sensible to modernise the system and to help investigations proceed efficiently and lawfully. I also welcome the clarification around arrest and detention by civil authorities, and the extension of pre-charge custody arrangements in serious cases. The changes should help to ensure that serious allegations are dealt with more consistently and with the necessary urgency.

[Al Carns]

The clauses will enhance the ability of our military police forces and our provost marshals to enact service justice. These measures will make the forces safer, enable them to look after the victims, and support their freedom to operate within the military system.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 14 to 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 17

Duty of commanding officers to report serious offences

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Al Carns]

Clause 17 will strengthen the duty of commanding officers to report allegations of serious offences to the service police. It removes an existing limitation where a commanding officer is obliged to report only a suspected schedule 2 offence committed by someone under their command. Under clause 17, where a commanding officer becomes aware that a serious offence may have been committed by any

“person subject to service law”

they must promptly refer the matter to the service police. However, the duty does not apply if the commanding officer reasonably believes that the service police or Defence Serious Crime Unit is aware of the matter. This is not a new process but an improvement to the existing duty, which will ensure that all serious allegations, including of sexual offences, are reported to the service police as promptly as possible. I commend clause 17 to the Committee.

[David Reed]

I welcome the clause, which seems a sensible and practical strengthening of the duty of commanding officers to report serious offences. The Minister, as a former commanding officer, will have experienced this duty at first hand, so I respect his judgment and expertise on the matter.

It is right that responsibility should apply wherever a commanding officer becomes aware of allegations concerning any person subject to service law, not only those within the officer’s direct chain of command. A broader duty will help to ensure that serious matters are not missed simply because of the structure of a unit or the form of command. At the same time, the safeguards in subsection (4), which mean that no further report is needed where the service police or tri-service serious crime unit is already aware, is a sensible way to avoid duplication and unnecessary bureaucracy. Taken together, the clause is a balanced reform that strengthens accountability, improves consistency and supports the proper investigation of serious offences across the services.

[Al Carns]

Commanding officers should always report an issue if they see one. With this change, they will have to and will be held to account.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 17 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 18

Summary hearings: punishments available to commanding officers

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Al Carns]

Clause 18 gives a commanding officer the power to award a punishment of service detention to a

“corporal, bombardier, lance sergeant or lance corporal of Horse in any of His Majesty’s military forces”.

Those are OR-4 ranks, according to the NATO military rank codes. The power may be used only by commanding officers with extended powers at summary hearing. Currently, commanding officers in the Army and the Royal Air Force Regiment cannot impose service detention on an OR-4 rank, whereas those in the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force can. This variation in powers risks delay and unnecessary cost to the service justice system through trials potentially being heard at the court martial rather than being retained for summary hearing.

Allowing service detention to be imposed at summary hearing on corporals in the Army and the Royal Air Force Regiment is also in line with the operational reality that our military capabilities are becoming more integrated and joint. It is therefore increasingly likely that OR-4s from across the armed forces will be jointly deployed or even in joint units. As a result, it is more likely that commanding officers may face situations in which OR-4s from different services are defendants at summary hearing in a single case or in linked cases.

Clause 19 will give a commanding officer the power to impose a deprivation order in combination with a punishment of service detention, forfeiture of seniority or reduction in rank or disrating. Such punishments are used in more serious cases seen at summary hearings. At present, a commanding officer can impose a deprivation order only alongside a fine or “minor punishment” such as an admonition. Where a charge has been proven at summary hearing or a conviction obtained in a service court, they can be used to deprive the offender of any rights to certain property—this is property that has been lawfully seized from an offender or was in the offender’s possession or control when apprehended or charged with an offence. That might be, for example, tools used to commit the offence, offensive weapons or controlled drugs. In the more serious cases that might be dealt with at summary hearing, clause 19 will enable commanding officers to impose punishments that are just and proportionate and that protect the public and other service persons—for example, so that the property cannot be used again to commit the same or similar offences.

[David Reed]

We welcome clauses 18 and 19 on summary hearings and deprivation orders with the punishments available to commanding officers. They represent a serious aim and a proportionate update to the summary hearing powers available to commanding officers. Clause 18 would promote greater consistency across the services, by enabling service detention to be imposed on corporals, as the Minister said, and equivalent ranks, bringing the Army and the Royal Air Force Regiment into closer alignment with arrangements already in place elsewhere.

Clause 19 is likewise a practical step forward, as we heard in some of the evidence sessions. Permitting a deprivation order to be imposed alongside more serious summary punishments would give commanding officers a broader and more flexible set of options, while keeping matters within the summary system. That should help to ensure that sanctions are better tailored to the offence and the circumstances of the individual case. Taken together, the provisions enhance fairness, consistency and operational effectiveness, and we are pleased to support them.

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[Ian Roome]

It is important that we take on board the evidence from our visits. Otherwise, what is the point of going on them? That point was brought up when we debated a previous amendment, with reference to the use of the civilian or military justice system.

The hon. and gallant Member for Solihull West and Shirley made an excellent speech about using retired officers. We heard from those who are recruiting that there are delays. We heard during a visit that a senior officer had struggled to find a panel, and the process had been delayed because permission from the then Secretary of State was needed to use an officer of a lower rank. We also heard that it would be much easier to find officers. It is difficult to find officers of an equivalent rank, particularly among the higher ranks, who have not served or trained together or do not know each other, and to be sure that they do not have any relevant interest in protecting someone or perverting the course of justice. The right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford also made a good point about who constitutes the panel. I support amendment 9, because what is the point of our going on visits if we do not act on what we have been told is an issue?

We also heard a point that has not been mentioned today, which is that those in the non-commissioned ranks, such as warrant officers who have 25 or 30 years’ experience in the job, could also sit on the panels. It is not addressed in the amendment, but we heard evidence that those with years of military service and a lot of experience could be used on the panels too.

[David Reed]

I will add to the arguments of my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley, my right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford and the hon. Member for North Devon.

The Opposition’s recollections align very closely with those of our Liberal Democrat colleague. Although we did not hear about a system that is breaking, we definitely heard about a system that is under strain. If memory serves—please correct me if I am wrong—we were shown a really good presentation by the people we visited in Portsmouth that demonstrated how the service courts have expanded. We had just a few men before; more rules and regulations have now been introduced, and thankfully women are being included, but extra bureaucracy has been added to the system. As the hon. Member for North Devon articulated, being more senior and not knowing people you have served with from other units is for the birds. We are going to end up with bottlenecks.

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[Al Carns]

As the hon. Member will know, trying to speak to people about whether they know other people is exceptionally difficult. Trying to capture that in a data record would be even more difficult. The 200 officers in service at the moment do not include the reservist pool, which is quite large—and that is just one-stars, not two-stars, three-stars or four-stars, so the pool is actually far larger.

I will go back to the purpose of sentencing at court martial, because it is an important point. As I say, it includes punishment, maintenance, discipline and deterrence. It must also take into account the best interests of the service and the maintenance of operational effectiveness. I completely agree that experience cannot be taught, but sometimes experience can wane over time. An appreciation of the relevant factors comes with experience, but also with the responsibilities of rank, as the veterans community will understand, and with the exercise of leadership and command over others. In some cases, that will not come with the most up-to-date operational context, which could cause an issue on the court martial board.

[David Reed]

We want to strengthen the Bill by working with the Government and taking a collaborative approach. Having a shared reality, in any aspect of life, is massively important. Among Opposition Members, there is alignment on the shared reality that we heard about, when we went down to Portsmouth, from the people we empower to run the service justice system. Does the Minister know of any of the cracks or weaknesses, as we heard about on our visit? Does he acknowledge that there may be issues to address?

[Al Carns]

Listening to evidence and acting on it is critical. Understanding the context in which it sits is equally important. Did that individual know that there are 200 one-stars within defence? Did they have the authority and responsibility to allocate individuals in a short, timely and effective manner to a court martial board? Probably not. The problem is not capacity. It is perhaps that the Defence Serious Crime Command needs greater authorities and programming to pool individuals in a timely and effective manner to sit on a court martial board and deliver justice.