Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting)
Tuesday 17th June 2025
(1 day, 16 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesMental Health Bill [HL] 2024-26 View all Mental Health Bill [HL] 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 17 June 2025 - (17 Jun 2025)
The Chair
Please ensure that mobile phones are turned to silent mode. If hon. Members and officials wish to remove their jackets, they have leave to do so.
Clause 22
Consultation of the community clinician
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause 23 stand part.
New clause 4—General duty to secure sufficient resources for services in the community—
“(1) It is the general duty of integrated care boards to ensure, insofar as is reasonably practical, that services in the community responsible for delivering care, treatment, or detention provisions under the Mental Health Act 1983 and this Act have the necessary resources, including financial support, to meet service demands.
(2) Additional forms of resource may be determined by integrated care boards in consultation with relevant local authorities or health care service providers and may include—
(a) sufficient numbers of trained medical professionals;
(b) purpose-built facilities for patient care;
(c) community services responsible for out-patient care.
(3) Each Integrated Care Board must conduct an assessment of its resources every two years to evaluate its ability to deliver services in the community effectively.
(4) Each Integrated Care Board must publish a report outlining its findings upon completing the assessment in subsection (3). The first reports must be published within one year of the passage of this Act.”
This new clause places a general duty on integrated care boards to ensure that services in the community have the necessary level of resource to meet demand on services to ensure that the provisions of the Bill function as intended and to assess and report on this every 2 years.
The Minister for Care (Stephen Kinnock)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. I will discuss a number of issues concerning community treatment orders and ensuring sufficient resources for community-based care.
Clause 22 will add the community clinician as a third key decision maker for community treatment orders, alongside the responsible clinician and approved mental health professional, ensuring additional professional oversight. Involving the community clinician in the initial request for a community treatment order will improve the planning and implementation of community treatment orders by ensuring good communication between ward and community doctors, aiding continuity of care. It should also help to prevent the inappropriate use of community treatment orders, for instance to free up beds where there are pressures on acute wards.
Making sure that only those who need to be on a community treatment order will be put on one supports the principles behind the reform of the Mental Health Act 1983, including the principles of least restriction, of therapeutic benefit and of treating the person as an individual. It should also positively impact the racial disparities that have been seen in the use of community treatment orders. The community clinician’s opinion is important when a patient is under a CTO, because the clinician may have a better understanding of the patient’s progress, including how well the patient is engaging with their treatment while in the community. Their insights are valuable in deciding whether the patient should be discharged to a community treatment order or recalled to the hospital if their symptoms worsen. Those who are supporting the patient in the community should be a part of the decision of whether the restrictions of the CTO are still required.
I turn to clause 23. In addition to reducing the number of people placed on CTOs, as has been referred to in relation to clauses 6 and 22, we aim to provide greater protection to those subject to them. CTOs extend the coercive powers of the Mental Health Act into people’s lives beyond hospital. CTOs should be used only when necessary, with conditions tailored to the individual rather than applying blanket restrictions. Currently, some CTO conditions display an overreach of power, such as requiring abstinence from alcohol even if this is unrelated to the person’s mental health condition. The clause will remove the ability of the responsible clinician to apply conditions to a person’s community treatment order which are appropriate but not necessary, giving a higher threshold for conditions to be set.
The clause will allow the mental health tribunal to recommend that the responsible clinician reconsider the necessity of conditions specified in a CTO if the tribunal determines that the patient is not yet suitable for discharge. For example, while not set out in the Bill, the tribunal may use this power if it finds the conditions imposed in a CTO to be possibly disproportionate, overly restrictive, lacking clinical benefit or not treating the person as an individual.
New clause 4 would place a general duty on integrated care boards in England to ensure that community services have the necessary resources to meet demand, and to report on this every two years. This duty to commission local services based on local need is already placed upon integrated care boards by the National Health Service Act 2006, as amended by the Health and Care Act 2022. An integrated care board must arrange for the provision of services as it considers necessary to meet the reasonable requirements of the people for whom it is responsible. Integrated care boards and their mental health trusts are required to prepare a joint forward plan that describes how the ICB will arrange for NHS services to meet their population’s physical and mental health needs. For that reason, we do not think the new clause is necessary, and it could place a disproportionate burden on ICBs and mental health providers. I therefore hope that the hon. Member for Winchester will be satisfied not to press it. I commend clauses 22 and 23 to the Committee.
Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your leadership, Sir Desmond, especially on such a warm day. I hope that there is not too much hot air in the Committee to keep us even warmer.
Clause 22 will introduce a series of important amendments to the operation of community treatment orders under the Mental Health Act 1983. The clause has the stated aim of strengthening clinical safeguards and ensuring continuity of care between hospital and community settings. The Opposition support these goals in principle.
Let me set out the current legal position. At present, decisions to place a person on a CTO require two professional inputs: the patient’s responsible clinician and an approved mental health professional. The responsible clinician can vary, suspend, recall or revoke the order, often with no statutory obligation to consult the clinician who will be managing the patient’s care in the community.
Clause 22 will change that. It introduces the new role of the community clinician—defined as the approved clinician who will oversee the patient’s care in the community—and requires their involvement at key decision points in the life of a CTO. Specifically, it requires a written statement from the community clinician that the CTO criteria are met, where they are not the responsible clinician. It obliges the responsible clinician to consult the community clinician before varying conditions, recalling or revoking a CTO, unless such consultation would cause unreasonable delay. It also includes the community clinician in the process of renewing a CTO, again via a written statement.
These are not insignificant changes. They mark a shift towards multidisciplinary accountability and a greater emphasis on the continuity of care between in-patient and community settings. The Opposition strongly support both principles. However, there are several points that I would like to probe constructively, and I hope the Minister will respond in the spirit of improving what is clearly a well-intentioned clause.
First, the term “unreasonable delay” appears multiple times in the clause as an exception to the duty to consult the community clinician, but I cannot see it defined in the Bill or in the explanatory notes. Could the Minister clarify what constitutes “unreasonable delay” in practice? Will guidance be issued to ensure consistency across trusts and clinicians? We must ensure that this exception does not swallow the rule or become a loophole in time-sensitive situations.
Secondly, what happens when clinicians disagree? The clause requires the agreement of the community clinician in writing before a CTO can be made, but it is silent on what happens when there is disagreement between the responsible clinician and the community clinician. This is not a hypothetical concern; differing clinical views are common and can be a healthy part of multidisciplinary practice. Could the Minister confirm whether there is a proposed resolution mechanism where clinicians differ? Would the decision default to a tribunal or a second opinion, or is the CTO simply not made?
Thirdly, as the Minister has mentioned, on the operational readiness to implement this clause, the new duties on community clinicians are not trivial. They are being asked to produce written statements, engage in formal consultations and be available to advise on time-sensitive decisions such as recalls and condition changes. Can the Minister reassure the Committee that a workforce impact assessment has been or will be conducted? Will there be investment in community mental health staffing and digital infrastructure to ensure that this duty is workable?
Fourthly, I want to raise the issue of handover and role clarity. The clause will introduce a new statutory role—the community clinician—but patients often transition rapidly between settings. There may be uncertainty about who holds that responsibility at a given time. Will guidance ensure that community clinicians are formally designated and that responsibilities are clearly recorded at the point of discharge?
I want to end on a constructive note. Clause 22 is a step in the right direction. It reflects many of the recommendations of the independent review of the Mental Health Act, including the emphasis on least restriction and on therapeutic benefit. I encourage the Government to consider defining or clarifying unreasonable delay in regulations or guidance, introducing a clear process for resolving professional disagreement, and committing to publish a plan detailing workforce support, guidance and digital infrastructure to ensure that this takes place.
Clause 23, which is linked to clause 22, will introduce two important amendments to the operation of community treatment orders under the Mental Health Act 1983. As things stand, section 17B(2) allows a responsible clinician to attach conditions to a CTO if they are necessary or appropriate, to ensure the patient receives treatment, to prevent risk to health or safety or to ensure engagement with services. Such conditions can include where the person lives, their attendance at appointments and even lifestyle restrictions such as abstaining from alcohol or drugs. However, we know that these conditions can be seen as coercive. Patients often feel that breaching them means automatic recall to hospital. In practice, some CTO conditions may drift toward overreach rather than clinical necessity.
The clause responds to these concerns in two ways. Subsection (1) will remove the words “or appropriate” from section 17B(2), meaning that CTO conditions must now be strictly necessary, not just advisable or convenient. The Opposition support this narrowing of the threshold. It sends a clear message that CTO conditions must be clinically justified, proportionate and tailored to the individual’s needs. However, I ask the Minister how clinicians will be guided in applying the new “necessary” test. Will the code of practice be updated with examples and scenarios? Crucially, what measures will be taken to ensure that patients are clearly informed that a breach of a CTO condition, in itself, is not automatic grounds for recall?
Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. Taking a step back to my hon. Friend’s point about “necessary”, is he concerned, as I am, that it is not clear to those responsible what “necessary” means? We could open ourselves up to potential legal challenges and disputes, which would give lawyers lots of money but would have no benefit for the patients.
Dr Evans
My hon. Friend makes an incredibly important point. Some later clauses try to address a problem where a patient was consenting to a community order, but the restrictions were so tight that it worked out as deprivation of liberty. My hon. Friend is absolutely right that knowing what is necessary is important to provide a clearly defined structure for the patient. Patients worry that if they breach that protocol, they will be automatically recalled. That might prevent them from breaching the conditions in the first place, but on the other hand it is a sword of Damocles above them. In no way does that create a beneficial therapeutic environment for them.
The Chair
Order. I am afraid we have to suspend the sitting, as the sound is unworkable. I am assured that a sound engineer is on the way.
9.37 am
Sitting suspended.
Dr Evans
Brevity is an important skill that you have exemplified in this House for many years, Sir Desmond, so I will not subject the Committee again to matters that I have already covered.
I ask again the question that I posed just before the suspension: how will clinicians be guided in applying the new “necessary” test? Will the code of practice be updated with examples and scenarios? Crucially, what measures will be taken to ensure that patients are clearly informed that a breach of CTO conditions is not, in itself, an automatic ground for recall? That concern has come across in evidence and is a long-standing source of misunderstanding and mistrust, as has been highlighted in cases and in the Wessely report.
Clause 23(2) will insert new subsection (3B) into section 72 of the Mental Health Act, giving mental health tribunals the power to recommend that the responsible clinician reconsider whether a CTO condition is necessary, even when they do not discharge the patient. That is a welcome enhancement of patient rights. Currently, if a tribunal decides not to discharge a patient, it has no power to challenge potentially excessive conditions. The clause strikes a useful middle ground, offering oversight without overturning clinical decisions. Having said that, will there be any requirement for the responsible clinician to formally respond to the tribunal’s recommendations? Without such a duty, there is a risk that recommendations may be quietly disregarded and the benefit of the provision may be undermined.
Clause 23 is a positive and proportionate reform, but to strengthen its practical impact I suggest that the Government consider updating the code of practice to clarify what constitutes a “necessary” condition under section 17B of the Mental Health Act; introducing a duty to respond to tribunal recommendations under proposed new section 72(3B), with a short time limit and a written explanation if the recommendation is rejected; and providing clear information to patients.
New clause 4, tabled by the Liberal Democrats, seeks to place a general duty on ICBs to ensure that sufficient resources are available for community-based mental health services, particularly in the context of implementing provisions under the Mental Health Act. It speaks to a concern that many Committee members will have heard time and again from patients, practitioners and families alike: that the success of any reform to the Mental Health Act will ultimately rest on the capacity of community services to deliver. We know the reality: patients can be discharged to under-resourced settings or subject to CTOs that depend on clinicians who may be overstretched or unavailable. Clause 22 will rightly expand the role of community clinicians in CTO decisions, but that works only if they exist, are available and have the time and tools to engage meaningfully.
I acknowledge that new clause 4 identifies a genuine structural risk in the way in which we approach reform, and I commend colleagues for raising it, but should it sit in primary legislation? I am not so sure. I have some questions for the hon. Member for Winchester not about the intention of the new clause, but about the appropriateness and practicality of placing such a duty in primary legislation. Primary legislation is best used where duties are clear, enforceable and universal. The duty proposed in the new clause, although admirable, is qualified by the words
“insofar as is reasonably practical”,
which reflects the reality that integrated care boards do not control all the levers of workforce, capital investment or even, in many cases, service design.
With that in mind, I ask the hon. Member the following questions. What mechanism would be used to enforce the duty? If an ICB fails to meet the duty, what would the consequences be? Would the duty not create legal ambiguity or even the potential for judicial review where service users feel that resources are inadequate, or even where the ICB has acted reasonably in difficult circumstances? Furthermore, how would the duty interact with the existing statutory duties on ICBs under the Health and Care Act 2022, including the duties around health inequalities and integration?
A stronger element of the new clause, which merits closer consideration, is the assessment and publication of findings on local community mental health capacity. This kind of transparent, data-led accountability could be an effective tool not only for Parliament and regulators, but for local patients and advocacy groups. Perhaps that element could be taken forward in secondary legislation as part of the updated NHS England commissioning guidance. The Minister will forgive me, but I am not sure whether such a tool already exists, so perhaps he will address that point.
Does the Department plan to require ICBs to assess and report on community mental health capacity in the light of the new duties being created by the Bill? Could there be scope for a reporting duty to be included in regulations or guidance, even if a general resourcing duty is not placed in primary legislation? The Bill refers to commissioning, and under earlier clauses we have talked about dynamic registers. Will the Minister set out whether the issue is covered here or in another way?
We cannot ignore the resource dimension, so I am grateful to colleagues for pressing the Committee to address it. However, we must be careful about the tools we use, what we write into law, and what we deliver through planning, commissioning and political will. I look forward to hearing from the hon. Member for Winchester and the Minister in response to my questions.
Sojan Joseph (Ashford) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. I welcome the changes proposed in clauses 22 and 23. Clause 22 seeks to amend the Mental Health Act to require the community clinician responsible for overseeing the patient’s care as a community patient to be involved in decisions regarding the use and operation of community treatment orders.
While I was practising as a mental health professional, I was personally involved in many community treatment orders and in recalling patients to hospital. Although I acknowledge the concerns raised by various charities and members of the Committee about the overuse of community treatment orders and restrictions on patients, such orders have many benefits. As the Minister has highlighted, they help to release the pressure on in-patient settings. They also help patients to live in a home environment: without such provision, some patients would have to stay in hospitals for longer, which can be more restrictive than being in the community.
The Committee needs to understand the kinds of patient who are often considered for community treatment orders. These patients are already well known to mental health services. They may have a long-term serious mental illness and may have to take medication continuously. More often, they are on regular injections of what is called depot medication; mental health professionals administer such medication either once a month or once every three months. Community treatment orders enable clinicians to make sure that patients receive the medication they need, so that they do not relapse and so they can have a good quality of life.
By introducing an additional professional check on whether the patient really needs the support of a community treatment order, and by requiring more evidence that the patient needs the support of the community treatment order to get better, clause 22 will adopt two of the four principles of treatment proposed in Sir Simon Wessely’s independent review, namely the principle of least restriction and the principle of therapeutic benefit.
Dr Evans
The Committee is very lucky to have the experience and expertise of someone who has used community treatment orders in the field. Will the hon. Member address my point about clinical conflict? We are introducing two new people: a community clinician and a responsible clinician. Has he seen any difficulties in practice with a difference of opinion between clinicians? How were they resolved? Does he see any way in which the clause could create or resolve a problem? My worry is that there is no clear resolution that would deal with discrepancies. I would love to know what is happening at the moment, as the law stands, in the hon. Member’s clinical experience.
Sojan Joseph
I thank the hon. Member for that important intervention. Healthy conflicts between professionals can be useful and can be used as a reassurance to people who are concerned about the overuse of CTOs. However, capacity can sometimes be an issue, especially in community settings, an issue that new clause 4 addresses.
It is also important to understand that mental health services have changed over the years. The consultant who treats the patient in hospital may not know much about them or how they are in the community. In the past, all those patients were followed by a care co-ordinator—not necessarily a mental health psychiatrist, but a mental health nurse or social worker who followed the patient throughout their journey and kept an eye on them. We do not have enough capacity these days, so nobody is following the patient. A community treatment order helps them to have at least minimum contact when they have to go and see a patient to administer medication. I support that conflict—sometimes it can be very healthy—but I also acknowledge that we need more capacity in the community.
Clause 22 makes a new distinction between a patient’s responsible clinician with overall responsibility for them, including in hospital, and a community clinician with the responsibility for the patient in the community. It will impose specific duties on the community clinician where they are not the responsible clinician. For example, subsection (2) will amend section 17A(4) of the Mental Health Act to require that where the responsible clinician is not the clinician who will have care for the patient in the community after their discharge, that community clinician must also agree in writing that the community treatment order criteria are met. That will ensure continuity of care of the patient from the hospital into the community, and it will have the added benefit of additional professional oversight in respect of the need for a community treatment order. That is to be warmly welcomed.
I also highlight subsection (4), on the power to recall a community patient to hospital. That will mean that if the community clinician is not the responsible clinician, the community clinician will still need to be consulted before a patient can be recalled under the community treatment order, unless such a consultation would lead to an unreasonable delay. That seems an entirely welcome and sensible reform. In some cases, an unreasonable delay may not be helpful, because some patients need to have their medication at regular intervals. For example, a patient on clozapine who misses their medication for three or four days in a row may have to restart their whole treatment regime, which will mean an even longer in-patient admission process.
Subsection (6) will require a community clinician to make a statement in writing, if they are not the responsible clinician, in support of the renewal of a patient’s community treatment order, if that is the conclusion of the responsible clinician. Getting written confirmation from the community clinician who is intimately involved in the patient’s care that a renewal of the community treatment order is both necessary and appropriate and is the correct thing to do. Once again, it is about ensuring that a further professional opinion is considered; it is also about checking whether the patient still needs the support of a community treatment order.
Clause 23 will make changes in relation to the conditions that a person subject to a community treatment order may be required to follow. It will amend section 17B of the Mental Health Act so that conditions can be imposed only if they are “necessary”. This is a simple and welcome update from the current wording, “necessary or appropriate”.
Clause 23’s second modernisation is to give the tribunal a new power to
“recommend that the responsible clinician reconsider whether a condition…in the community treatment order is necessary”.
This would apply when the tribunal has decided not to discharge a patient completely from a community treatment order, but has come to the conclusion that not all its conditions are required. Once again, this is a welcome reform and is in line with the principle of therapeutic benefit. Some conditions put on patients can be seen as restrictive: for example, if a condition states that patient cannot use alcohol or illicit drugs, the clinicians will be looking at whether the patient’s use of alcohol or illicit drugs has an impact on their mental state or on their non-compliance with treatment. That is very important. I welcome the changes in clause 23.
Dr Danny Chambers (Winchester) (LD)
It is an honour to serve under your chairship, Sir Desmond. I thank the Minister and the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth for their comments on Liberal Democrat new clause 4.
This is another good example of how, although we are aware that it has laudable aims, the Bill will fail without the supporting infrastructure. As everyone will be aware, community mental health services are among the issues that generate the most emails and correspondence—certainly in Winchester, where young people especially are struggling to access mental health care. In that context, we are alarmed that mental health spending has fallen as a share of overall health spending in the last financial year. That has been coupled with the decision to drop a number of mental health targets, including targets for the number of people receiving mental health interventions such as talking therapy, and the target to ensure that 75% of people with a severe mental health illness receive an annual physical check. Priority has not been given to the services necessary to deliver better mental health care.
For the Bill to make a meaningful difference, the Government must ensure that community mental health care services receive the investment that they need to fulfil their obligations under the Bill—I know that that is a bit of a circular argument—and reduce the overwhelming pressure on in-patient services.
There is also the impact on schools, police services and families. When I went out with the police in Winchester not long ago, they told me that between 40% and 50% of their time is spent dealing with people who have a mental health issue in some capacity. The lack of community mental health care is not just a resource burden on the health service; a lot of our other services are also affected.
Dr Evans
The hon. Member rightly talks about resources and about the cuts as a proportion—although small, it is a cut in NHS spending. The last Conservative Government brought in the mental health investment standard to try to ensure parity between physical health and mental health in investment so that, regardless of how big the pot was, mental health was prioritised. Does the hon. Member agree that there is a concern that that could be slipping under this Government? Does he agree that that needs to be addressed in the context of the community provision that we are discussing?
Dr Chambers
I broadly agree. We were really heartened that in the King’s Speech, the Government said that mental health needs to be treated as seriously as physical health. There are many reasons to join a political party but, given my long history of working in mental health charities, one major reason for joining the Lib Dems was that they had been saying that for years. I was pleased to hear that in the King’s Speech too, but we have to ensure that the percentage of spend on mental health does not slip in proportion to other very important resources.
Anna Dixon (Shipley) (Lab)
I think we are all agreed that, in order to implement the changes to the Bill, we need investment in mental health services, particularly community mental health services, but does the hon. Gentleman recognise that the Labour Government have kept the mental health investment standard, ensuring that there is sufficient and increasing investment in mental health in this country?
Dr Chambers
I hope that that is the case. I know that is the aim, but I suppose we will see in four, five or six years’ time what the mental health resources are. No one aims to underfund these services, but the demand on them changes and they need to be resilient. Darzi said that in April 2024 there were 1 million people on mental health waiting lists, and we know that some children wait 15 months, so we must not just maintain the current investment standard, but try to catch up on the huge backlog, which will not change unless we reform the system or invest in more staff and resources.
David Burton-Sampson (Southend West and Leigh) (Lab)
The hon. Gentleman makes a good point—mental health services are in a very bad place—but does he agree that the Government have already announced investment in mental health specialists in all schools, and in mental health crisis centres? I have no doubt that once the 10-year plan for the NHS comes out, there will be an even clearer path for how we tackle mental health issues.
Dr Chambers
I am really looking forward to the 10-year plan and reading about how it will improve mental health. We shared Labour’s manifesto commitments to mental health practitioners in each school and mental health hubs, so we certainly support that.
The hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth made some very good points and said that this proposal should possibly not be in primary legislation. I accept that integrated care boards do not have control over how every part of the service is delivered, so I am happy not to press the new clause to a vote, but I think the second part, which says that integrated care boards should have a duty to assess and report on the resource needed to meet the demands on services every two years, is important.
Gregory Stafford
I rise to speak to clauses 22 and 23 and to Liberal Democrat new clause 4.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth said, the Opposition support clauses 22 and 23 generally. Clause 22 addresses the concern that community clinicians—essentially, those responsible for overseeing a patient’s care outside hospital—have historically had limited formal input into decisions about community treatment orders, even though they are central to the patient’s ongoing care. It ensures that community clinicians not only are consulted but, in some cases, must provide written agreement before key decisions are made. It aims to improve continuity of care, ensure decisions reflect the realities of community-based treatment, and reduce inappropriate and poorly co-ordinated use of CTOs.
The benefits of the clause are obvious, but they are worth restating. Clearly, it improves the continuity of care and ensures that clinicians with direct knowledge of the patient’s community care are involved in those key decisions. It enhances safeguards, adding an additional layer of professional oversight before coercive measures are imposed or suggested. It promotes collaboration by encouraging joint decision making between the hospital-based and community-based clinicians, and it reduces the risk of inappropriate CTOs by ensuring they are used only when genuinely appropriate and supported by those delivering care.
However, I ask the Minister to touch on three points. First, requiring a written agreement or consultation could delay urgent decisions if not managed efficiently, so will he explain how, under the clause, any potential delay—a disagreement or just administrative inertia—can be removed to ensure treatment is not delayed?
That moves me on to the administrative burden. Clearly, the clause adds a level of complexity and requires more documentation and co-ordination. Although I understand that that is a necessary outcome, I would again be grateful for the Minister’s thoughts on how to ensure effective and speedy implementation.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth said, the ambiguity in the roles of the two clinicians may create confusion or disputes over responsibilities if they are not clearly defined or agreed. My reading of the clause is that there is no such clear definition; will the Minister look to provide one through other agencies, or will he put something into the clause in Committee or later in the Bill’s proceedings?
Clause 23, on the conditions of community treatment orders, addresses the concerns that the threshold for imposing conditions on community treatment orders has been too low, allowing conditions that may be clinically unnecessary or overly restrictive. By removing the “appropriate” test, the clause will tighten the legal standard to ensure that only necessary conditions are imposed.
Additionally, the clause will empower tribunals to play a more active role in scrutinising CTO conditions by allowing them to recommend that clinicians review specific conditions, even if the patient is not discharged. This reflects the Bill’s broader aim of enhancing patient rights and removing unnecessary restrictions.
The clause is a welcome addition. It will ensure that CTO conditions are imposed only when strictly necessary, meaning that there are stronger safeguards, and it will enhance the role of tribunals in protecting patient rights without requiring full discharge. It will reduce clinical overreach by preventing the use of overly broad or vague conditions that may not be clinically justified.
However, as with the previous clause, I have some questions. First, the tribunal power is limited in that it can only recommend, not require, the reconsideration of conditions. Is that the intention, or will the Minister strengthen the clause at some point to ensure that the tribunal can require a reconsideration of conditions? If he will not, what issues does he see arising from there not being a reconsideration?
Secondly, as I mentioned in my intervention on my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, I have a concern about the potential ambiguity in the shift from “appropriate” to “necessary” leading to uncertainty or dispute over interpretation. As we touched on in relation to other clauses, clinicians will need additional guidance or training to apply the revised standard consistently. Where will that revised training and guidance be located, and what is the timeframe for its implementation? We need to ensure that all clinicians are fully trained and ready to use this new power.
I will briefly touch on new clause 4, tabled by the Liberal Democrats, because although I understand that the hon. Member for Winchester may not press it, somebody else might. It would place a general duty on integrated care boards to ensure that services in the community have the necessary level of resource to meet demand such that the provisions of the Bill function as intended, and to assess and report on this every two years. As my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth mentioned, the Opposition generally support the overall aims of the new clause, but as ever, there are some issues with the detail, so I have five questions for the hon. Member for Winchester if he responds, or for the Minister to answer in his summing up.
First, if we imposed a statutory duty on ICBs to ensure sufficient resources for the CTOs, what mechanisms would there be to monitor and enforce compliance? Secondly, what would be the consequences if an ICB failed to meet this duty? Would there be formal accountability or a sanction process? Thirdly, how would the duty interact with existing NHS budgetary constraints and competing priorities? Would it become a statutory obligation with no clear means of redress if unmet? Fourthly, could the duty set a precedent whereby Parliament mandates resource guarantees without providing additional central funding? Finally, what constitutes “sufficient” resources in the context of the CTOs? Who defines that standard, and it is defined locally or nationally?
Stephen Kinnock
The term “unreasonable delay” is subject to review by the courts, and further guidance will be given in the code of practice. On what happens if the responsible clinician and the community clinician disagree, the addition of a third decision maker is not about overruling the responsible clinician, who continues to have overall responsibility for the patient on the community treatment order. Including the community clinician at the point of putting someone on a community treatment order helps to ensure continuity of care for the patient. Involving the community clinician in other decisions around the community treatment order, particularly recall, revocation, renewal and discharge, means they can provide an additional insight into the patient’s status while in the community.
Dr Evans
I am grateful for the clarification. Does it mean that, in essence, there will be a hierarchy, so the responsible clinician is above the community clinician and trumps them? If a community treatment order cannot be signed off, it does not exist. I want to explore that angle; is that what the Minister is suggesting?
Stephen Kinnock
Yes, the responsible clinician has primacy.
On the workforce impact, our impact assessment, which was published alongside the Bill, sets out the additional hours of required clinician activity. We will invest in implementing these reforms.
On the meaning of the word “necessary”, we will provide further guidance in the code of practice to provide for a range of scenarios to help to clarify necessary conditions, as well as to clarify that failure to meet those conditions should not always result in recall to hospital.
On the requirement for a responsible clinician to respond to recommendations, we considered giving the tribunal the power to change or remove conditions on a person’s community treatment order. However, the outcome of our stakeholder engagement was that tribunal colleagues did not consider that it was appropriate for them to make clinical judgments, for example whether a condition is of clinical benefit. Providing the power to recommend that the responsible clinician reconsiders the conditions allows the tribunal to provide additional scrutiny but also allows for clinical discretion in decision making.
The hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon asked about training. The training plan will be in the first written ministerial statement.
On where the terms are defined, clause 10 defines responsible clinician and clause 22 defines community clinician. We will define the distinction between the roles in the code of practice.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 22 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 23 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 24
Nominated person
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 54 to schedule 2, page 77, line 21, at end insert—
“(3) Where the patient has not attained the age of 16 years, a nominated person must have parental responsibility for the patient.”
This amendment would stipulate that the nominated person for a patient under 16 must have parental responsibility for the patient.
Amendment 55 to schedule 2, page 80, line 13, after “2(2))” insert
“, has parental responsibility for the patient (see paragraph 2(3))”.
This amendment would stipulate that the nominated person for a patient under 16 must have parental responsibility for the patient.
Government amendments 40 and 41.
Schedule 2.
Clauses 25 to 28 stand part.
Stephen Kinnock
I will discuss a number of issues concerning the topic of the nominated person, one of the Bill’s key reforms. I will first address clause 24 and schedule 2, which seek to replace the current nearest relative provisions with the nominated person, chosen by the patient, who can protect their rights when they are detained. The independent review found the nearest relative provision to be outdated and inappropriate. It allocates someone based on a hierarchical list, which does not reflect modern families and could result in someone unfamiliar or potentially risky to the patient being given the role.
We have ensured that appropriate safeguards are in place to protect patients as well as to enable choice. A health or social care professional or an advocate must witness the nomination and confirm in writing that the nominee meets the criteria and that no undue pressure has been put on the patient. Children and young people with the relevant capacity or competence can choose their own nominated person. We expect this will be their parent or guardian, but sometimes a step-parent or other relative over 18, without parental responsibility, may be more suitable to protect a patient’s rights. Safeguards will be put in place to support children in making this choice.
If a patient of any age lacks capacity or competence to make a nomination, an approved mental health professional will appoint a nominated person on their behalf. For children under 16, this will be someone with parental responsibility, including the local authority if the child is subject to a care order. This appointment is temporary until the patient has capacity or competence to make their own appointment.
For all patients, the responsible clinician or approved mental health professional can temporarily overrule the use of a particular nominated person’s power, for example to discharge the patient, if the patient is likely to act in a manner that is dangerous to themselves or others. A nominated person can be removed by the county court if deemed unsuitable—for example, if they misuse their powers or neglect the patient’s welfare or the public interest. Anyone with an interest in the patient’s welfare, such as their parents, can apply to the court. The Bill extends the nominated person safeguard to some restricted part III patients, but their nominated person’s powers will be limited, as appropriate, in the interests of public safety and criminal justice.
Amendments 54 and 55 would require nominated persons for patients under 16 to have parental responsibility for the child, whether chosen by the child or appointed for them. The Bill currently requires this if the child lacks competence to appoint their own nominated person. However, where a child has competence to decide, we think it is right that they can choose the person to represent their interests. That view was supported by the majority of respondents to the White Paper consultation on reform of the Mental Health Act, and it is in keeping with the principles of choice, autonomy and treating the person as an individual.
Like the current “nearest relative” provision, which the nominated person will replace, the amendments do not take into account the greater diversity of modern family structures—for example, where a step-parent may play a vital role in a young person’s life but does not have formal parental responsibility. Our engagement with children and young people during the development of the Bill suggests that the vast majority will appoint a parent as their nominated person. However, we think having choice is important to prevent children from having to have a nominated person who may not engage with the role or act in accordance with their best interests, just because they have formal parental responsibility.
Where children have competence to choose their own nominated person, a health or social care professional, or advocate, will be required to witness the nomination and confirm in writing that the nominated person is over 18 and suitable to take up the position. Regardless of nominated person status, parents should be involved in a child’s care and treatment, and they will retain their legal rights under parental responsibility. Safeguards are in place to allow for the overruling and displacement of the nominated person if they are behaving in a way that is not in the child or young person’s best interests.
Government amendments 40 and 41 will remove paragraph 11(3) to 11(5) of schedule 2 from the Bill, as it is unnecessary to specify in legislation which person with parental responsibility the approved mental health professional must appoint as nominated person for an under 16-year-old. A prescriptive list of who an approved mental health professional must appoint for a child under 16 may prevent a more suitable adult from being chosen as the nominated person. The Bill states that for under-16-year-olds lacking competence, an approved mental health professional must appoint a parent, or whoever has parental responsibility, to be the child’s nominated person. This would include consideration of special guardians and child arrangement orders.
The Government do not agree that a person with residual parental responsibility should always be blocked from being a nominated person, as the child arrangement order or special guardianship may be in place for reasons other than the parent being a risk to the child. For example, the parent might struggle with their own health issues, but that does not necessarily mean that they would not be an effective nominated person. The situation is different in the case of a care order because the local authority is being given lead parental responsibility. We have engaged with the Children’s Commissioner on that point.
If there is no suitable person with parental responsibility willing to act, the approved mental health professional must take into account the patient’s past and present wishes and feelings, so far as reasonably ascertainable, when deciding who to appoint. We will establish an expert taskforce to support the development of the statutory code of practice to provide clear guidance for professionals involved in the nominated person appointment process for children and young people.
Clause 25 will require the approved mental health professional to consult the nominated person before they make an application for admission for treatment or guardianship. This is an existing right for the nearest relative. However, currently if the nearest relative exercises one of their powers, such as the ability to block admission, but the professional believes their objection is unreasonable, the only means of overruling them is to remove or displace them as the nearest relative. This can leave patients without someone to represent their interests during detention.
Clause 25 will allow the approved mental health professional to make use of the existing barring order to temporarily overrule the nominated person, if the patient would be likely to act in a manner dangerous to other persons or themselves if their admission was blocked. This is a well-established process. Although the nominated person can continue to represent the patient in other ways, they can still be displaced by the court from the role entirely if their actions indicate they are unsuitable for the role—for example, if they are repeatedly objecting to admission without considering the welfare of the patient or the interests of the public. Approved mental health professionals can continue to use that process.
Clause 26 will transfer the nearest relative provisions relating to the power to order discharge of a patient to the new nominated person role. The power can be temporarily overruled by a responsible clinician if they think that the patient’s discharge would result in danger to themselves or others. It is a well-established process that allows for clinical discretion, but means that the nominated person can continue to represent the patient’s rights in other ways. Clause 26 also reduces from six months to three months the time period during which the nominated person cannot make another order for discharge. That reflects the changes in detention periods under clause 29.
Clause 27 will give the nominated person a new power to object to the use of a community treatment order. We also recognise, however, the importance of protecting patients and the public, so if the responsible clinician is concerned that without a community treatment order, there would be a risk of danger to the patient or others, they can overrule the nominated person’s objection. Those changes will help both to reduce the number of inappropriate community treatment orders and to ensure that safeguards are in place for patient safety and public protection.
Finally, clause 28 provides that before deciding to transfer a patient, the person responsible for taking that decision must consult the patient’s nominated person, unless consultation is not reasonably practicable or would involve unreasonable delay. The nominated person will not be able to object to a transfer, because there may be good reasons for transferring a patient—for example, if a different trust can provide better care, such as a specialist eating disorder unit. Consulting the nominated person, however, means that they are aware of the reasons for transfer and how it will benefit the patient. That will help the nominated person to remain actively involved in protecting patients’ rights and kept informed about a patient’s care and treatment.
Dr Evans
I welcome the chance to contribute to the debate on clauses 24 to 28. I will then turn to Government amendments 40 and 41 and to amendments 54 and 55, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Dr Spencer).
Clauses 24 to 28 represent a significant reform to the Mental Health Act 1983. They seek a shift from the traditional concept of a nearest relative to giving patients more control by allowing them to nominate a person to act on their behalf. Clause 24 is the cornerstone of the reform, establishing the role of a nominated person as the patient’s chosen individual to take over certain rights and responsibilities previously held by the nearest relative. It represents a fundamental change from a fixed family-based system to one centred on patient choice and autonomy.
Currently, the nearest relative, often by blood relation, holds a range of statutory powers under the Mental Health Act, regardless of the quality of their relationship with the patient. The clause will enable patients, especially adults, to nominate a trusted person—a family member, friend or advocate—who can act in their best interests. That is a progressive and patient-focused change relating to modern social realities, where family ties are complex and a biological relative is not always the best supporter.
Empowering patients to select their nominated person can enhance trust, improve communication and ultimately lead to better care outcomes. It does, however, raise pressing questions. For children and young people, particularly those aged 16 and 17, who gain legal capacity to nominate, what safeguards ensure that parental concerns and children’s welfare remain adequately considered? How will disputes between nominated persons and relatives, or between the nominated person and clinicians, be resolved? Part of that might be addressed in Government amendments 40 and 41, but I am keen to understand a little more. What training and oversight will ensure that nominated persons understand their duties and, importantly, their boundaries? Finally, for a patient who does not or cannot nominate someone, will the nearest relative still have a role, and how will that be managed?
Clause 25, on applications for admission or guardianship, builds on clause 24. It will require the approved mental health professional to consult the nominated person before making applications for admission or guardianship, except where consultation is not reasonably practicable or would cause unreasonable delay. It will also allow the nominated person to object to such applications, requiring a barring report from the approved mental health professional if an objection is made.
The clause will formalise the nominated person’s involvement at a critically early stage of the intervention, ensuring that their voice can influence decisions that deeply affect the patient. The power to object introduces an important check, though it is balanced by the professional’s ability to override objections on the grounds of safety. The Opposition agree with that, but there are still some questions. How will professionals navigate conflicts between their clinical judgment and objections by the nominated person? Will there be clear guidance to avoid delays that could jeopardise patients or public safety?
Gregory Stafford
I thank my hon. Friend for his comprehensive analysis of the provisions under discussion. Does he understand amendments 54 and 55 to mean that, although there would be a narrowing of who can be chosen as the nominated person, there would still be some flexibility for the child to choose? Does he have any concerns about a situation in which a minor—someone under the age of 16—may, for whatever reason, choose somebody who the health professionals believe is not the most appropriate person, and does he have any sympathy with the idea that, given a parent has responsibility for the child in every other aspect of their life, the parent should have that same responsibility in this context?
Dr Evans
My hon. Friend has identified the nub of the issue, and his intervention leads me on to an example that demonstrates the problems that we are talking about. I have chosen to debate these provisions in the order shown on the selection list because I wish to understand whether the Minister believes that Government amendments 40 and 41 will deal some of the issues that I am about to raise. There clearly has to be flexibility in dealing with these situations, but it is worth exploring what could go wrong. The nub of the issue is that they may well go wrong. Let us take an example.
Say that A is 16, and she is struggling with anxiety and behavioural issues. She has had serious suicidal episodes and previous drug use. She lives at home with her loving, supportive parents, who have always acted in her best interests and want to engage constructively with her care, but A is under pressure from a 19-year-old boyfriend. He is controlling, and discourages her from speaking to her parents or professionals. When asked to nominate a trusted adult, A names him. Under the Bill as drafted, the nominated person could be accepted, provided A is deemed to be competent. That would give her boyfriend access to her care decisions and significant legal standing. Under amendments 54 and 55, that would not be possible because he does not have parental responsibility, and therefore could not be appointed.
That example illustrates why the amendments matter. Children, especially those in crisis, may be vulnerable to coercion, grooming, or misplaced trust. Loving parents, who have legal obligations to protect and care for their children in every other walk of life—as my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon pointed out—could find themselves legally sidelined.
Are there risks in amendments 54 and 55? We must consider the edge cases. Not all children under 16 live with those who are trusted and have parental responsibility. There are estranged families, kinship carers, informal fostering arrangements and situations of abuse. A strict parental responsibility requirement could exclude the very people relied on by a child. I ask the Minister whether there is flexibility in the amendments for exceptional cases in which someone without PR may be appropriate, with oversight. Do Government amendments 40 and 41 already address that point? Forgive me if I have misinterpreted, but they seem to be bridging amendments. Would guidance or a statutory code of practice provide a better mechanism to balance protection and flexibility? What assessment has been made of children in care or informal arrangements, where parental responsibility might technically lie with a local authority or estranged parent, especially under the changes proposed by Government amendments 40 and 41?
There are potential routes forward. One option might be to require PR by default but allow exceptions if the child expresses a clear competence preference, the AMHP agrees that a person is suitable and poses no safeguard risks, and a senior commissioner or legal oversight has sign-off. That is a possible way of keeping amendments 54 and 55 alive, and it would keep within the spirit of the amendments by protecting children from harmful influence without removing their voice in complex or marginal cases. We could also explore adding an explicit safeguard power to override a child’s nomination where there is concern of coercion or abuse, regardless of parental responsibility status. Again, I think that may be what Government amendments 40 and 41 are trying to do, but I would be grateful to see whether that is the case.
David Burton-Sampson
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Desmond. I rise to speak to clauses 24 to 28, and I will start by sharing the story of two of my constituents: Carol and her husband John.
John had been an active member of the local community before he was sadly diagnosed with dementia. As his dementia progressed, John was settled into a good care home and Carol was happy with the care that he was receiving. Due to a change in his medication, Carol was told that John had become more agitated and aggressive than usual. She was asked whether she would agree to John being assessed. Although she did not really understand what that meant, she did not see any reason to refuse.
From that point on, Carol says that she felt like she had lost control over her husband’s care. John was assessed by four strangers, and Carol was told that she could not be present. Following the assessment, Carol was told that John would need to be detained under the Mental Health Act within the next two weeks. Carol was very concerned to hear that John would be detained, but despite having power of attorney, she was not able to overrule that decision. She hoped that he would be able to get help with his medication and that he would be discharged.
In the end, Carol had only half an hour’s notice that John was going to be detained. She rushed to the care home to see her husband, who had been sat in the garden having a cup of tea with some friends, being abruptly put into a van by two men and taken away. She was not allowed to come with him, and for the first time in her life, Carol had a panic attack. She could not imagine how traumatic it was for John, who was disorientated and confused because of his dementia, to be taken by people he did not know to a strange place.
John was taken to a secure mental health ward that was very different from the familiar environment of his care home. Carol was told that she could not visit him, but she was insistent and turned up anyway. She was then allowed to meet his doctors on his first day and was reassured to hear that he would be detained for only two weeks while his medication was reviewed.
In the end, John was detained for eight months. Carol continued to visit every day, spending as much time as possible with him. She had specially adapted her home to accommodate John’s needs, but she was not able to have him discharged to either his home or a care home. Precious time was taken up with the endless fight to get John into a more appropriate environment. Sadly, John’s health significantly declined while he was detained. He lost the ability to walk and speak, and Carol felt that, in his declining state, he could not pose any danger to himself or anyone else. However, it was only after he was admitted to hospital for a catheter fitting that Carol was able to get him discharged, thanks to a doctor telling her that she could use her power of attorney to take him home—something she was told she was unable to do in the mental health facility.
She took him to a care home, where, sadly, he died two weeks later. John’s cause of death was listed as Parkinson’s, but Carol feels strongly that the anxiety and fear of his final months contributed to his death. Carol understood that her husband was dying; all she wanted was to be included in making decisions about his care. She knew very clearly what she wanted for him. She told me:
“I wanted him to die in a bed with clean sheets, with a window open and with me by his side.”
Those wishes were not taken into account.
As John’s wife and carer, Carol spent every day with him, yet she felt excluded from the decision-making process for his care. She should have been able to focus on what was important: spending time with him. The changes in clauses 24 to 28 would have helped Carol to feel more involved in representing John during his time in care. Clearly, there were failures to allow Carol, as John’s nearest relative, the rights that she was entitled to in order to support him.
With the move from “nearest relative” to “nominated person”, the new rights afforded by the Bill would have given Carol even greater engagement. Given that she had power of attorney, it is likely that she would have been appointed the nominated person by the AMHP. However, moving forward, it is important that those rights are properly afforded to the nominated person, so that we do not have another situation like John and Carol’s.
Although I welcome and fully support the changes in clauses 24 to 28, I seek an assurance from the Minister that all efforts will be made to ensure that the rights of nominated persons are fully recognised and assigned, and that nominated persons will be made fully aware of their responsibilities and powers, allowing advocacy for the patient under care.
I turn briefly to amendments 54 and 55 and Government amendments 40 and 41. I agree with the Government’s view that if a child has capacity, they should be able to have the choice to appoint their own nominated person. I appreciate the intent of the amendments from the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge, but I think that the Government’s approach is more appropriate.
Gregory Stafford
I appreciate that the hon. Gentleman sees the potential benefit in the amendments standing in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge. However, my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth gave an example, which I do not think is entirely distanced from reality or possibility, in which a person could well choose someone who is deeply inappropriate. In that situation, the person or people—that is, the parents—who had in every other part of life had responsibility for that child would now potentially not have responsibility for the child, in what is probably the most important part of that responsibility.
Does the hon. Member for Southend West and Leigh really not have any concerns about that? If he does, does he not support at least the intentions behind those two amendments, if not the exact wording or drafting? If he does accept those intentions, would he like to see the Government table similar amendments, drafted in a way that he would find more appropriate?
David Burton-Sampson
I appreciate the hon. Member’s intervention. He makes the point that there may be situations in which the young person’s request might be inappropriate. However, on the flip side, there may be a situation in which it might be inappropriate for the person with parental responsibility to be the nominated person. They could have been involved in the situation that has led to that young person entering a mental health spiral—an abuse situation, for example, which has not been discovered by the authorities. That person would still have parental responsibility at that time. I think it is important that the young person can choose the person to support them in their ongoing care. I will be supporting clauses 24 to 28 and Government amendments 40 and 41.
Dr Chambers
Amendment 49 extends the support offered by mental health advocates to cover social and financial stresses and to family carers and other members of the household when the patient is discharged.
Other hon. Members have today discussed how social and financial struggles can play a major role in someone’s mental ill health and in blocking their recovery, and how those are often the areas where someone can most benefit from advocacy and advice. As we are all aware, patients should not be viewed as a collection of symptoms, but within their whole context, including the situation they are living in. Addressing someone’s housing insecurity, debt or family breakdown should not be viewed as a separate consideration, but as a core part of supporting them to live happily, healthily and independently. Furthermore, family carers and the wider household are absolutely critical for people’s wellbeing and recovery, and should be properly equipped to prepare for their loved one returning from hospital. They, too, may need advocacy and may be missing out on support that they can and should receive.
A good example comes from Winchester, where Winchester Citizens Advice has a member of staff—a former mental health nurse—based at Melbury Lodge in-patient mental health unit. Often, someone may be admitted for two, three or four months, and when they are discharged, they go home to all their life admin—there will be final demands for credit cards or requirements to repay personal independence payments and that type of thing. It is very overwhelming, particularly for those who already have fragile mental health, to have to sort out a whole backload of administration—especially financial and complicated administration. For two days a week, that staff member supports in-patients in sorting out all their administration from anything that needs to be done.
What is interesting is that when these patients are discharged from Melbury Lodge in Winchester, if they have had that help, they end up being hospitalised and on medication for a shorter time. They are also more likely to engage with various support and community services once they have been discharged and are much less likely to be readmitted to hospital. For every £1 spent on that initiative, £14.08 is saved in cost avoidance. That initiative run by Melbury Lodge and Winchester Citizens Advice was up for an NHS award last year. It is a proven concept and something that should be done across the entire country. It has been running for two years and has proved how much money can be saved. Unfortunately, it was a pilot project and is struggling to secure money to continue indefinitely. I urge the Government to look at how that type of initiative could be rolled out around the whole country.
Sojan Joseph
The hon. Member is making a very valid point that all patients need help with their finance and accommodation to keep them in the community and make discharge more appropriate. However, those provisions are already in place as part of the patient’s care plan. Different hospitals have different settings, such as a discharge or enablement team, or even the nurses on the ward itself can help and look into those provisions. Does the hon. Member think that that is the role for independent mental health advocates, who prioritise detention and the Mental Health Act, rather than the finance and accommodation issues, which need to be resolved by a different team?
Dr Chambers
I accept that point. It is a very sensible point. There has been a huge amount of discussion about what is in scope. Given that this is focused primarily on both current in-patients and preventing readmittance to an in-patient unit, I think it is within scope. I am aware that a lot of staff support patients, but it is not a core part of their role. It is something they squeeze in among all their other duties. When we have the expertise of someone at citizens advice, who knows how to navigate the huge complexity of various organisations and businesses that have to be dealt with, it is a lot more efficient. The figures speak for themselves.
The Chair
Order. We have strayed on to amendment 49, which is a separate debate. Can we come back to the amendments before us?
Dr Chambers
My apologies, Sir Desmond. I thought amendment 49 was included in the debate on clause 24.
Rosie Wrighting (Kettering) (Lab)
I rise to speak to clauses 24 to 28 and the Government amendments to them. They cover an important and long overdue reform, which introduces a new statutory role: the nominated person, replacing the outdated concept of the nearest relative. I think, cross party, we all agree that this is about protecting some of the most vulnerable people in society and children.
The clauses and amendments make important changes to the current Act, which too often forces an individual to rely on someone they may not trust or even have contact with, just because of their family relationship. As the Minister said, the White Paper found that the vast majority would choose their parents, but we must have legislation that reflects the diversity of society and families. Growing up in a single parent family, it would have been inappropriate for my other parent—who is one of my nearest relatives, but who I did not live with, know or particularly trust—to be my representative or make decisions on my treatment and care. In my upbringing, the people who knew me best were not always my closest blood relatives.
The nominated person model gives individuals the right to decide who should speak for them when they are at their most vulnerable. That might seem like a small change, but it is a powerful one and aligns with the Bill’s overall goal of placing patient voices at the heart of mental healthcare. Having someone a person trusts—someone who knows them and can advocate for them—is vital. I was contacted by a constituent whose brother was sectioned and assessed at hospital as needing ongoing support in sheltered accommodation. His social worker challenged the decision and recommended private accommodation. That confusion, despite his sister continually challenging the recommendation, meant he was discharged, with nowhere to go, in the middle of the night.
It is crucial that safeguards will remain. Where an individual cannot nominate someone themselves, a person can still be appointed on their behalf, but with far clearer guidelines and recourse if concerns arise. It is not about removing protection; it is about modernising it to reflect the society we represent. Mental health legislation must reflect the value and diversity of the society it serves, and the clauses and amendments before us bring us a step closer to that.
Aphra Brandreth (Chester South and Eddisbury) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. I rise to support amendments 54 and 55, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge, but I will first briefly speak to clause 24, which is an important and long-overdue step towards modernising the Mental Health Act 1983, crucially strengthening the rights, dignity and autonomy of individuals subject to it.
The reform of the existing nearest relative provisions, replacing them with a new system that allows for the appointment of a nominated person, is an important part of ensuring that individuals get the right support, and modernises an outdated system. The current model is based on a rigid and outdated hierarchy in which the role of the “nearest relative” is determined by law, not by the wishes of the patient. This one-size-fits-all approach fails to account for the complexities and nuances of individual relationships. It can result in someone unsuitable, or even actively harmful, being placed in a central role in a person’s care and treatment journey. Indeed, the limitations of the system have been acknowledged by practitioners, patients and policymakers alike. It is too often disempowering, and the patient can lose agency at a time when they need to be empowered to feel in control of the situation as much as possible.
As the shadow Minister says, clause 24 is the cornerstone of the reforms. It is an important change to the current legislation to reaffirm the commitment to patient-centred care, to dignity and to the principle that those receiving treatment under the Mental Health Act should have a voice in decisions about their support network. The aim of the clause—to put the patient first—is important. It acknowledges that the person best placed to advocate for the patient may not be their closest relative. In some cases, family dynamics are fraught. In others, the designated relative may hold views about treatment that conflict with the patient’s wishes or medical advice. We have seen real-world examples in which the imposition of the “nearest relative” role has led to tension, distress and, ultimately, a breakdown in trust. That is not the kind of environment in which recovery is fostered.
Amendments 54 and 55 would address the specific issue of nominated persons and those with parental responsibility for children under the age of 16. It is important that we consider situations in which a young person may be in a vulnerable position and their decision on who their nominated person should be may not be in their best interests. We have a particular duty to ensure that children are safeguarded. Clause 24 as it stands will allow under-16s to choose someone who is not the parent to have significant power, including the ability to discharge the child from hospital.
We must listen to and actively try to support any young person who needs that kind of intervention—it is not that their views should not be considered. However, there is a very real risk that a vulnerable child or teenager might be coerced by or under the control of an older partner, for example, as my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth pointed out. Perhaps they might choose an older friend. We need to consider that a decision made by the nominated person, such as an older friend, may have implications for those with parental responsibility. For example, that older friend may decide to discharge a child from hospital and into the care of the parents, who would not provide advocacy or be part of that decision making.
The Minister said that safeguards will be put in place, but can he expand on that? There are some real concerns here. Let us consider a situation in which there has been a decision by a court to determine which parent has responsibility for the child. If complex family issues have already been considered by the family court, it is right that the decision be followed. I respectfully ask the Minister to reconsider this point. We must respect the fact that parents of those under 16 are best placed to advocate for, support and act for their children. This is about capacity, consent and, ultimately, safeguarding.
Gregory Stafford
My hon. Friend makes a powerful point. I remember the comments made by the hon. Member for Southend West and Leigh, who is chuntering from a sedentary position—I think he disagrees with my hon. Friend’s point. In his reply to my intervention, he made the point that there are situations in which things are the other way round, where those who have parental responsibility are not necessarily the appropriate persons.
Does my hon. Friend agree that, on first principles, the parent should have parental responsibility in all areas of life, including the ones that she is talking about, unless there are specific reasons, such as the court decision to which she referred, that suggest that the parent is not the correct person to have responsibility? Surely, in the balance of danger or risk, there is a far greater risk if the nominated person is not a parent than if the nominated person is a parent.
Aphra Brandreth
My hon. Friend makes an important point. If parents are not acting in the best interests of their children, there is a wider safeguarding issue that needs to be considered. One would question why such parents had been left in a situation in which they have responsibility for their children and are potentially harming them.
That leads me nicely to another point, which is that introducing the additional wording would bring mental health in line with physical health. For someone under the age of 16, it is their parents who have the responsibility to act in the best interests of their physical health; it seems to me that one would expect the same for mental health. I therefore urge the Committee to support amendments 54 and 55.
Let me return briefly to the overarching aims of clause 24. I underscore the point that the wider principle at stake—patient autonomy—is one that I support. The ability to make informed choices about one’s care should be a central component of our care system. In mental health, where individuals can feel particularly vulnerable, that becomes even more essential. Granting patients the power to nominate someone who will advocate for them, advise them and represent their wishes is a powerful act of empowerment. Moreover, this change enhances safeguards for patients. It ensures that the person acting on their behalf is someone they have chosen and trust. It reduces the potential for conflict and opens the door to a more collaborative and compassionate model of care.
If the Committee agrees to the amendments, which would provide the necessary safeguards for children, who I believe should be considered separately to adults, my overall view is that clause 24 represents a pragmatic, compassionate and patient-focused update to the Mental Health Act. It aligns with our modern understanding of mental healthcare and puts trust, respect and dignity at the heart of our legislative framework.
Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Desmond. I am grateful for the opportunity to speak to amendments 54 and 55, which propose that where a nominated person is appointed to represent the interests of a patient under the age of 16, that individual must hold parental responsibility. At face value, that is a concise and apparently straightforward proposal. However, as with much in the Bill and in our mental health legislation more broadly, what appears simple can raise intricate legal and ethical questions. I therefore wish to probe both the merits and the challenges of these amendments. I do so not to come down firmly on one side of the argument or the other, but in the hope of assisting the Committee to think through the implications of the amendments. I hope to prompt the Minister to provide further clarification as our consideration of the Bill proceeds.
I will start by setting out the case in favour of the amendments. There is an intuitive and, I would argue, legally grounded rationale behind amendment 54. It rests on the principle that serious decisions concerning a child’s mental health—decisions that might involve treatment without consent, or even deprivation of liberty—ought to be taken, or at least overseen, by somebody who already holds recognised legal responsibility for that child.
Parental responsibility is not merely administrative. It carries statutory and common-law duties to protect, support and advocate for a child’s welfare. By requiring the nominated person to have such responsibilities, the amendment seeks to ensure a level of legal legitimacy and continuity. It would strengthen the position of those with a formal bond to the child and might help to guard against the risk of unsuitable or ill-informed individuals stepping in to play such a critical role.
In that sense, amendment 54 reflects what many would see as good legal hygiene. It would bring new legislation into closer alignment with the Children Act 1989 and with broader child welfare practice. It would create a baseline expectation that only those with legal authority over a child should make, or help to make, decisions of such magnitude. It would also offer reassurances to families. For parents and guardians already concerned about the complex and sometimes opaque processes of mental health detention, the amendment offers a clear signal that their role cannot be set aside lightly. That reassurance may be particularly important when children are subject to long-term care or involuntary treatment. However, questions begin to surface at precisely that point, because although the principle appears sound, the practice is far from straightforward. It is therefore important that we probe both the advantages and disadvantages of the amendment.
Victims and Courts Bill (First sitting)
Tuesday 17th June 2025
(1 day, 16 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesVictims and Courts Bill 2024-26 View all Victims and Courts Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Amendments as at 17 June 2025 - (17 Jun 2025)
The Chair
Before we begin, I remind Members to switch electronic devices to silent. Tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings. Date Time Witness Tuesday 17 June Until no later than 9.45 am Crown Prosecution Service Tuesday 17 June Until no later than 10.25 am Domestic Abuse Commissioner for England and Wales; Victims’ Commissioner for England and Wales; Victim Support Tuesday 17 June Until no later than 10.55 am Resolve; ASB Help Tuesday 17 June Until no later than 11.25 am Association of Police and Crime Commissioners; National Police Chiefs’ Council Tuesday 17 June Until no later than 2.40 pm The Suzy Lamplugh Trust; End Violence Against Women Coalition; Women’s Aid Federation of England Tuesday 17 June Until no later than 3.00 pm Justice for Victims Tuesday 17 June Until no later than 3.20 pm ManKind Initiative Tuesday 17 June Until no later than 3.40 pm HM Prison and Probation Service Tuesday 17 June Until no later than 4.00 pm Ministry of Justice
Ordered,
That—
1. the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 9.25 am on Tuesday 17 June) meet—
(a) at 2.00 pm on Tuesday 17 June;
(b) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 19 June;
(c) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 24 June;
(d) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 26 June;
2. the Committee shall hear oral evidence in accordance with the following Table:
3. proceedings on consideration of the Bill in Committee shall be taken in the following order: Clauses 1 to 3; Schedule 1; Clauses 4 to 5; Schedule 2; Clauses 6 to 12; new Clauses; new Schedules; Clauses 13 to 16; remaining proceedings on the Bill;
4. the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 5.00 pm on Thursday 26 June.—(Alex Davies-Jones.)
Resolved,
That, subject to the discretion of the Chair, any written evidence received by the Committee shall be reported to the House for publication.—(Alex Davies-Jones.)
Resolved,
That, at this and any subsequent meeting at which oral evidence is to be heard, the Committee shall sit in private until the witnesses are admitted.—(Alex Davies-Jones.)
The Chair
Before we hear from the witness, do any Members wish to make a declaration of interest in connection with the Bill? If any interests are particularly relevant to a Member’s questioning or speech, they should declare them again at the appropriate time.
We will now hear oral evidence from the Crown Prosecution Service. We must stick to the timings in the programme motion to which the Committee has agreed. For this session, we have until 9.45 am. Could the witness please briefly introduce herself for the record?
Sarah Hammond: Good morning, everybody. My name is Sarah Hammond. I am the chief Crown prosecutor for the CPS in Mersey-Cheshire and the CPS national lead for victims and witnesses.
Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)
Q
Sarah Hammond: The CPS looks at every sentence that is imposed to see whether, in our view, it is potentially unduly lenient. If we identify that a case is potentially unduly lenient, we would ask for some advice from the prosecution counsel who appeared in the sentencing court. We would read that, and, if we still felt that the sentence was unduly lenient, we would put together a package of papers to send to the Attorney General’s office for consideration.
Dr Mullan
Q
Sarah Hammond: Currently the responsibility for informing victims of the sentencing outcome from the hearing lies with the police witness care unit officers. Having said that, if there are questions that the witness care unit officers cannot answer then under the victims code they can refer the matter back to the CPS. We would then happily speak to the victim, explain the unduly lenient sentence programme, and signpost them to where they can access that and the steps around it. We have a guide for victims once they come into the criminal justice system, to explain what happens when a case comes to the CPS, and there is a section within that about when they feel a sentence is too short. We also have a presence in court at the sentencing hearing so, where possible, either prosecution counsel or a member of the CPS can speak to the victim about the sentence and answer any questions they have about potential challenges.
Dr Mullan
Q
Sarah Hammond: I am aware that the Law Commission is looking more widely into potential reforms of the law and criminal appeals.
Dr Mullan
Just to make you aware, the Law Commission’s current consultation paper says that it does not recommend any change to that time period, so I am interested in your views on that question specifically.
Sarah Hammond: Okay. A timescale of 28 days is challenging, but at the moment we feel it works quite well. As professionals within that environment we are well used to obtaining the information we need with a sense of urgency. There are quite good mechanisms in place. That said, if there is evidence that extending the timescales would make the process smoother or more efficient and give people who, as you say, probably have other things on their minds than appealing sentence the ability to do so, then the CPS would support that.
Dr Mullan
Q
Sarah Hammond: I have not personally. I could make some inquiries into how often that happens and we could happily write to the Committee with some more detail around that.
Dr Mullan
Q
Sarah Hammond: I think we would have to look at what the extent of the legislation is, but we would be happy to work together with the Government in relation to that.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Davies-Jones)
Q
Sarah Hammond: We welcome the focus in the Bill on broadening the pool of professionals who are eligible to become crown prosecutors. Recruitment can be challenging. It is a competitive market out there, so I think measures that broaden the pool of people from which we can recruit will be really helpful. We have other measures in place that will assist with the recruitment of crown prosecutors. We have just launched a scheme called Go Prosecute for senior crown prosecutors, aimed at professionals who have perhaps stepped out of criminal law practice for a while for various reasons. We would offer them a 12-month contract, with a view to extension, to come back into the field of criminal law practice and would support them to do so.
Alex Davies-Jones
Q
Sarah Hammond: It will allow us to recruit. We were very pleased with the settlement that we received in the spending review, which gives us the capacity to take the legal workforce to the levels that we really need to be able to prosecute cases effectively. The measures in the Bill will also allow for a more diverse workforce. It will allow people who have perhaps had different experiences and backgrounds in the profession to become Crown prosecutors.
As a whole, I do not think it can solve all the problems with backlogs and delays, and there is a duty on everybody in the justice system to ensure that we are maximising productivity and efficiency as well within the systems. We have just started a programme of continuous improvement, and I know that it is a priority for the Director of Public Prosecutions personally. We are looking at all our systems and processes to make sure that we are stripping out any inefficiencies and waste.
Alex Davies-Jones
Q
Sarah Hammond: It is important to get a wide range of evidence. I have been working in the CPS for 27 years, so I have seen only one side of it, and there will obviously be lots of different aspects. As I said, if there is that wide body of evidence that suggests that people are being disadvantaged by that timescale, it is important to get all the information around that before any decisions are made.
Caroline Voaden (South Devon) (LD)
Q
Sarah Hammond: As always, there is a collective challenge when a Bill becomes law just to work out how things will work in practice and how implementation will work. Take the restriction on parental responsibility. It will be important for the CPS to work with the Government, police and local authorities to obtain the relevant information about evidence of parental responsibility and put that before a judge to make the decision without causing any further delays in the system. Once the Bill becomes law, it is a case of working through some of the processes to make sure that the implementation is smooth and we have those clear processes in place.
Caroline Voaden
Q
Sarah Hammond: It will enable us to recruit more. As I have said, it is quite a competitive market out there. There will be more people eligible to become Crown prosecutors. That will include people who are qualified under the provisions relating to the Chartered Institute of Legal Executives. We also have a number of associate prosecutors who have worked for the CPS for many years and have great experience. However, I do not think that is the complete solution to it. While we can possibly recruit more Crown prosecutors, a system-wide approach is needed to tackle those backlogs and delays and give justice for victims.
Caroline Voaden
Q
Sarah Hammond: There is a balance between ensuring that we widen the service and not letting professional standards drop. We have a very comprehensive induction and training programme for Crown prosecutors. They have a 12-week induction programme when they join us. For those who join us who perhaps do not have experience of criminal law or have stepped out of criminal law for a while, there is also a separate course that serves as a refresher into the basic principles of criminal law. I am happy that there are some safeguards and training in there to ensure that prosecutors are of the standard we require.
Tristan Osborne (Chatham and Aylesford) (Lab)
Q
Sarah Hammond: If I may, I will take the first question in two parts. I do not have that figure on the current recruitment rate with me today, but we can write in and let you have it. On minimum standards, we would have an interview process for people to become Crown prosecutors. There would be minimum standards for people to pass that interview stage, and we would not lower them just because we are broadening the pool of Crown prosecutors. It is important that professional standards do not slip.
I am not aware of any reason why private prosecutions would increase as a result of the particular recruitment issues, but if that is problem, obviously we will look into it, and work with our colleagues on that as well.
Jack Rankin (Windsor) (Con)
Q
Sarah Hammond: Ultimately, that is a matter for the Government. There is clearly an argument for victims to be able to see that justice has been done. It will also potentially help with appeals for unduly lenient sentences if victims are able to access the sentencing remarks, so they can see the basis upon which the sentence has been passed.
The Chair
If there are no further questions, I thank the witness for her evidence this morning.
Examination of Witnesses
Dame Nicole Jacobs, Baroness Newlove and Katie Kempen gave evidence.
The Chair
Q
Katie Kempen: Good morning. My name is Katie Kempen, and I am the chief executive of Victim Support, the leading victims’ charity for England and Wales.
Baroness Newlove: Good morning. I am Baroness Newlove, the Victims’ Commissioner for England and Wales.
Dame Nicole Jacobs: I am Nicole Jacobs, the Domestic Abuse Commissioner for England and Wales.
Dr Mullan
Q
Baroness Newlove: I welcome the fact that there is an extension as such, but the 28-day limit has not changed for the victim, and that is the worry. The extension is more in the backroom. I agree with it, because I do not want things to be rushed, but the limit has not changed for the victim, which worries me. Victims really do not know this information; it will be mentioned only if the prosecution lets them know about it. Once they leave the courtroom, it can take a long time, but the clock is ticking. Really, that is the crux of why we have mentioned this. Nobody understands undue leniency in the first place, and it is then for the victims to look into it.
Also, at the end of the 28-day process, I have had victims put a request in, but the box has shut at 5 pm, and that is it. I think that is quite cruel to a victim as well. I think the limit needs to be a lot longer to give them time to absorb the sentence and understand it. When I say longer, I am thinking six months, because we give plenty of time to an offender, who has a legal advocate all the way through. I speak personally on this issue. I can assure you that it needs to be looked at again.
Dame Nicole Jacobs: I would echo that. I am stating the obvious, but with victims—certainly through the lens of domestic abuse—you have to appreciate some of the dynamics of coercion and control, including isolation from family and friends. Often, a lot of information is unknown and comes to the attention of friends, family and victims in different ways. There is so much there that has to be unpicked and understood.
I know we will go on to talk about this, but certainly support for victims throughout the criminal justice system, really needs improvement. It comes down to the most basic understanding of who is who, and what your rights are. That was the whole point of the Victim and Prisoners Act 2024, and this Bill is about improving on that. It is really true how disorienting the system is, and we need to do so much more to put in place solid advice and support for victims. Those 28 days seem to fly in the face of that.
Katie Kempen: We would also support an extension. Our experience of working with victims who have gone through court is often that the process traumatises them and they need some time for decompression. They need time to speak to their advisers or advocates. We know that victim services are under pressure. Our advocates will be carrying other caseloads as well. From our perspective, to give the victims time to understand and process what has happened to them, and to be able to access the support and guidance that they need, 28 days is really difficult to work within, so we would support an extension. We have no issue with the extension that is within the Bill. We support that.
Dr Mullan
Q
Baroness Newlove: Again, from personal experience—after 17 years, and still going through the criminal justice system—I think that, once a person is convicted, you have to consider the whole environment of what the victims and families have sat in. I sat for 10 weeks in a courtroom, listening to everything, and I think we need to understand that the victim personal statement—I prefer “impact statement”, to be honest; it was changed under Gordon Brown—is their right to have their say. I do not think there is the right to keep redacting.
I am now a bit concerned because I am hearing that it is a piece of evidence, so they have got to be careful what they say. In all the years that I have been working in this area, I have never heard that before. For me, it is about having that voice—for example, hearing about somebody who has been brutally murdered. It is their opportunity. I am going to look further into this, as Victims’ Commissioner, but I think it is a right for the victims. It is in the victims code; it does not have any caveats.
I am very concerned to hear, when we meet victims, that something has been redacted three times, or taken out three times. There needs to be more evidence about this and how they are treated. These are the most appalling crimes, and I do not think it is acceptable. Otherwise, victims are just going to say, “Why bother?” The championing I have done over 13 years has been to ensure that the victim impact statement is the voice of the victim, which has been silenced all the way through.
Katie Kempen: The addition from our perspective is that the victims we support, by and large, find the whole process quite confusing, and they need support to get through it. We would welcome clear guidance, clear information and respect for the victim’s right to have their voice heard, in so far as is possible.
Dame Nicole Jacobs: I would agree. A lot of these answers are going to come back to the same principles: one of the things that we have not achieved is clear support for victims, end to end. There are contracts, or bits and pieces—I am sure Katie can speak to this—that are parts of the process. However, all those things feed in to one another. The victim impact statement is an example of where victims often do not understand what their rights are. They do not understand who to speak to if they are being told something they feel is unjust or they do not agree with. We could do so much more. One gap in the Bill that I wanted to mention concerns wider support for victims, in terms of building community-based support that could start at a much earlier point in the criminal justice process.
In the context of court delays, court backlogs and the sentencing changes afoot, this is a critical piece of legislation that could address some of those gaps. That would help victims very much, end to end. Some of the examples of injustice that we pick out would be much more comprehensively addressed. That is one of the things I would encourage you all to consider.
Dr Mullan
Q
Baroness Newlove: First and foremost, you need to consider what the victims and families have gone through—the whole context. This is just one part of it. I am nervous when you focus on one section and do not look at the environment. Victims and families are sat in the courtroom for many months. They have listened to everything. They may have given evidence via the defence. They have a prosecutor that is not for them, but for the state, and may have let them down. This needs to be viewed in its context. I have always said that I wish judges would own courts, because defendants run them ragged. I have been to many courts over the years, and when you get a good judge, you really get that.
We are also talking, however, about families who do not understand the judiciary or the language. There needs to be a part of the hearing, when the defendant has been convicted, to say, “We need to speak to the families.”—but do not just do it on the day of the sentencing; give them the opportunity to digest, as you would with the defence and legal arguments, when nobody is allowed in. That could be private, where nobody comes in. It is important to recognise the whole context.
If the defendant is not there, put TV screens in the prison cell. When I worked in the courts, I went to prison cells when defendants would not come down, and we have been up and done that. It is about controlling the environment but, more importantly, it is for the victim, because the defendant seems to control this, which is so wrong when they have been convicted. We need to train the judiciary how to do this, and it is not going to be favourable to one side. Victims only get this time after the whole process, and I am concerned that they will not have the opportunity to digest it. They are emotionally drained and I think it could be rushed too quickly.
Dame Nicole Jacobs: I agree with that.
Katie Kempen: Building on that, there is a need for a holistic exploration of what victims experience in the courtroom. Our report, “Suffering for justice”, referenced long waits for sentencing hearings and not being able to access special measures. The reality for victims in court is that they are standing outside court with the offender’s supporters and family, that they have to sit in the public gallery, and that they clearly feel they are being intimidated when the sentencing remarks come through. We welcome the sharing of the sentencing remarks with victims, ensuring that they understand the impact of them.
We agree that the victims’ voice needs to be at the centre of any sentencing hearing. Some victims may well want the offender to attend. In other cases I have attended, I have seen young people give their victim personal statements against people who have abused them, it was very difficult for them to be able to see the offender. I really feel that victims’ needs should be taken into consideration so that they feel they can have their say in that environment.
Baroness Newlove: May I just add something important? When offenders have been acquitted, as they were in my case—I say this because this is how it feels—the offender’s family may be in the public gallery. My family had to have police protection. It is about the environment in that sentencing court. It is not simplistic. I hope that the Government take on board the fact that there is all that going on: you having to digest a very important, very technical decision while you are being goaded and having to be protected.
Dr Mullan
Q
You will be aware that the Bill introduces a duty on the court to make an order to remove parental responsibility in respect of any children for whom an offender has parental responsibility, if they have been sentenced to four or more years. We have laid an amendment to suggest that provision should apply if an offender is convicted of an offence against any child, not just a child for whom they have parental responsibility, and to any offender who has a custodial sentence. Which do you think is the preferable approach, or, more generally, what are your views on removing parental responsibility for those convicted of child sex abuse?
Dame Nicole Jacobs: I am very aware of dysfunctions within how domestic abuse is understood in the family court. It is positive to clarify to the court that, with certain offences, allowing parental responsibility should be considered inappropriate. Even saying that, though, I am a bit cautious about a completely black-and-white approach. I agree with the provisions in the Bill, but you would have to think very carefully about the range of other offences—for equivalent convictions against other children, absolutely, but I do not know enough about what is being proposed in terms of the range of other offences.
While we are on the subject of family court, one of the long-standing clarifications needed from Government is about a presumption of parental involvement. The Government were looking into that literally years ago, when I was first appointed as a designate, and it has not been resolved. That should be either clarified through this legislation or just clarified full stop. In the family court, the welfare checklist in the Children Act 1989, which is adequate in considering the safety of a child, is often confused with a presumption of parental involvement. I believe that the safety of children, who are recognised as victims in their own right in the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, should be paramount.
Alex Davies-Jones
Q
Going back to non-attendance at sentencing hearings, what impact will compelling perpetrators to attend their sentencing hearings have on victims and their families, and will giving the judge—for the first time ever—the ability to issue sanctions on them once they are in prison make a difference in terms of helping victims and families feel that they getting justice?
Dame Nicole Jacobs: As Baroness Newlove said, it depends on the victim and the family, and the context of the situation. For many people, it would be heartening to feel that there is an ability to compel someone to come to court to hear their sentence and the consequences of their actions, which have devastated the lives of those people. But I could also imagine, especially in the context of domestic abuse, situations in which the victim, or their family if they have been murdered, would find some of that difficult. You would have to understand those dynamics.
In the context of domestic abuse, for example, there could be a very clear notion that that would be the just thing to do. There could be another example where, because of the nature of the family—keep in mind that for domestic abuse, I am looking through the lens of the fact that the victim and perpetrator are very well known to each other; that is not the case for all sorts of other crimes—there could be dynamics that are more complex. That is why what both Katie and Baroness Newlove have said, about understanding that the victim and families will feel confident and engaged and able to speak, is really important.
We must also keep in mind, especially with domestic abuse, that there could be family members and people involved as victims who have radically different views. Again, there is a complexity to this that does not necessarily always come through in a very black-and-white provision.
Baroness Newlove: Again, I want to support the family. The decisions we are making here are for the professionals to make the courtroom run seamlessly, but it could happen instantly—if the defendant just does not come down, how are we going to manage the emotions on the day, as well as the emotions they have gone through on the journey? I really want to make sure that they are supported.
I see that there is going to be a penal order in prison. I could go on a bit about that myself, but I will not—that is out of scope. I welcome that provision, but am also concerned about how it is managed. If the governor of the prison sees that that is going to be detrimental to their health and wellbeing, it might not happen, and so then where is the transparency about that being delivered for the victim? I think we need to do further work and look at that, because there is very little communication to victims. Nobody knows what they do in prison. Victims are told what they are doing, but they get very little information. For me this is a step forward, but what happens at the end of the day is far more important.
Alex Davies-Jones
Q
Dame Nicole Jacobs: I cannot underscore enough how important it is for this gap to be filled. It is exactly as you say; there are so many victims who, if they do not meet the criteria of the victim contact scheme, are literally not in the frame for any advice or support. Yet there are all these changes, whether that is an early release or just any information at all, such as the conditions of release. I get these calls at my office—I am sure we all do. They are very hard to problem-solve through; you have to find the right person within probation who may be able to tell you, and it is a huge gap.
I am really pleased about the provision adding offences to the full victim contact scheme, such as coercive and controlling behaviour, stalking and harassment. That is really welcome. More people will be eligible for the victim contact scheme. I remind you of what I am told by probation—that victims who are eligible for the scheme do not always have contact because some of the contact details are lost or the fact that they are eligible for that scheme is maybe not known to them. That brings us back to the same theme: where is the end-to-end support for victims?
I think a helpline will really fill a gap. My question about the helpline is whether the resource is adequate. That is a question that needs to be answered, or at least there needs to be an iterative process, where we can see that and build on it. My guess is that the helpline will start feeling very much like casework. It will not be as simple as victims calling and saying, “Can you tell me some information?” or an advocate calling on their behalf. They will want to then say, “I do not think these conditions are adequate”, and they will have a lot of questions. There is a lot of logistics behind the scenes that I worry about, and whether they will have the access to the information they need.
I am sure I should hand over to Katie and Baroness Newlove, who see a lot of this happening too. The answer is yes; it is great to have the helpline, but there is a question mark in my mind about the resourcing and whether we will quickly learn that there is much more need for a caseworking approach.
Certainly, the biggest gap remaining for me is victims whose offender is in prison for something that is not a domestic abuse-related crime. That is the biggest difficulty in all this. Very often—say if it is a drug-related crime—it has “nothing” to do with domestic abuse, but they are a known perpetrator, and those victims need to be able to access the line.
Alex Davies-Jones
Q
Dame Nicole Jacobs: I am very pleased about that. It is a big step forward.
Katie Kempen: I agree with Nicole. We support the extension of the victim contact scheme, and we think it is hugely valuable to have that access to information—victims tell us that all the time. As has been said, in the last year or so, it would have been an invaluable resource for victims to be able to access.
On Nicole’s concerns about resourcing, as an organisation that runs a helpline, I would say that up to £200,000 for the helpline feels quite optimistic. The operational challenges that we bump into include that people are often in mental health distress when they access these contact lines, so the calls take longer and you need your staff to be trained in safeguarding, data protection, referrals and so on, which all takes time and investment.
The other element from our perspective is the knock-on impact this will have on victim services. It is estimated that the phone call will last about 28 minutes, and we will then need to pick it up and explain to the victim what their rights are, where they can go from here and where they can get further information. Undoubtedly, we will need to give additional emotional support—the phone call is likely to be quite traumatic for them. We need to see additional investment in the victim services that will be picking up the additional demand that comes from the scheme, although I would say it is a hugely welcome step forward.
Alex Brewer (North East Hampshire) (LD)
Q
Katie Kempen: We think it is clear and makes it quite accessible. From our perspective, if possible, we would like to see the eligibility for the victim contact scheme to go to all victims of domestic abuse. As Nicole mentioned, a person might not be convicted of a DA-related offence, but there is none the less an impact on the victim. You have referred to flagging as part of the sentencing review, and we think that could help. Where possible, we would like to see it extended. However, it seems as though the reforms will make it easier and clearer for victims to access support information.
Baroness Newlove: I agree.
Dame Nicole Jacobs: I would just underscore for the Committee that the inclusion of children is very important. I recently published a report on children, “Victims in their own right?”—that question mark was on purpose. One aspect of the report was mapping 700 services for children in England and Wales, and the fact that one in five say that they do not have adequate funding, which had led to curtailment.
If I had to name one of the largest gaps we have in victim services—I would say there are gaps across the board—it is the huge gap in relation to children. That goes back to this continual theme. Under the Victims and Prisoners Act, we have the duty to collaborate. I was a huge champion for that, and I am now very involved in its enactment, but it does not create any new funds for services for victims; it says to local areas, “You have a duty to collaborate on the funding streams that currently exist”.
I would say that a huge gap in this Bill is a duty to fund community-based services. Without wishing to embarrass Katie by talking about the incredible work that is done by Victim Support, there is a range of services that are the foundation of support for victims. They do not sit in core budgets like other kinds of public services do. That is one thing we have to fundamentally address for victims to have that kind of end-to-end support. I will not labour it any more, but I have to point out the biggest gap. It is great to have children defined, but what does that mean?
Katie Kempen: The reality for us is that the budgets for commissioning services are being cut, so the services that we can provide are being cut. The increase in national insurance contributions has obviously hit the sector really hard as well. We support all this work to improve the victim experience, but it needs to go hand in hand with a well-resourced victim sector that can take victims from the point of the crime occurring—even pre-charge and pre-contacting the police—right to the end of the criminal justice process.
Baroness Newlove: Can I bring it back to the information for victims? The one thing I am really concerned about is the importance of what information is given to victims, because it is very patchy. They are being told, “We cannot tell you whether the offender has been released”, and they cannot be told where the offender lives or what the offender knows about their exclusion zones. I truly welcome the fact that we will hopefully turn it into a restriction zone, because I have mapped my life out, and I have three offenders who know exactly where I am.
More importantly, the information takes too long and is very clunky. The victim liaison officer tries to do as much as they can, but I think this is an ideal opportunity—I am looking at the Minister—to let the victim know that, if the offender has been released, he does not live in the area; he lives 300 miles away. That gives comfort. I have met a victim who is petrified that the offender lives near her, because nobody will tell her where the offender is. We are not saying police must pinpoint where he is, but, if that offender lives 300 miles away, she can at least go out the door and go to the shops without feeling that he will be around the corner. That is really important. Why are we nervous about sharing information about offenders when offenders can know a lot about victims?
Adam Thompson (Erewash) (Lab)
Q
Baroness Newlove: Antisocial behaviour is my drum. I absolutely welcome that the commissioner is now able to explore the treatment of victims of antisocial behaviour—I have been going on about that for many years—but there are still challenges that victims face.
I really like that it will allow an investigation of how the housing agencies and associations treat victims, because it is like ping pong with these housing associations—I welcome that. I challenged the Victims and Prisoners Act because victims should expect to be entitled to the right support under the victims code. Victims of persistent antisocial behaviour should fall under the victims code. Trying to get people to understand the impact of antisocial behaviour as a crime—and it is a crime—is all down to how much the victim reports. That is where we need better understanding.
I also want a statutory threshold for ASB case reviews, and I want an independent chair for ASB case reviews, because I am tired of agencies marking their own homework. More importantly, I want the victim to be able to go to this, because you are talking about them and the impact on them, yet they are not invited. For me, that is really important. I welcome anything for antisocial behaviour, and I would like the Government to look at the report’s recommendations and see what else we can add.
Bradley Thomas (Bromsgrove) (Con)
Q
Baroness Newlove: I certainly do. The media give out information, and I have learned more about my sentencing remarks because I never got them until very long afterwards. Every victim, not just those of sexual crimes, has a right to see those sentencing remarks, because it gives them time to digest. You leave the courtroom thinking that you know everything, but as your memory and emotions come, you start asking yourself questions.
Sentencing is very technical: you hear a sentence, then it is reduced if they have been on remand—there are boxed-off things. Also, as I found out, there are tariff reviews for juveniles, which even the probation service was not aware of because there are very few of them. If you look at the crime rate, you will see that we are getting younger offenders in prison. We have to prepare families for the tariff review, which means that offenders go to appeal to reduce their tariff, so you go through that.
It should not simply be a case of saying, “There are the sentencing remarks.” There are implications, and every victim has a right to see the sentencing remarks. It is about them, and it affects the decisions about what the offender will do, and it should be the victim’s right to have that information. They do not have any advocates to speak for them, and the prosecution pursue their own case. If the media can get things out there, why can we not give it to victims and families?
Katie Kempen: From our perspective, accessing sentencing remarks is an issue for victims. They would like to be able to access them. We welcomed the pilot and its continued roll-out.
I have a nuanced response because victims’ needs differ. If there is to be wider publication, we need to see whether any protection is needed for individual victims, rather than carte blanche, “Yes, publish them all.” A key issue is explaining the sentencing remarks to victims. Again, in our “Suffering for Justice” report, where victims did not have the sentencing remarks explained to them, it caused them real anguish and distress. They should be able to have the sentencing remarks explained to them, and where they do, it helps their recovery journey and brings closure. My answer is yes, with some nuance. We need the explanation, and we need to treat the victims like a human being who has gone through a traumatic experience.
Dame Nicole Jacobs: I agree.
Mr Jonathan Brash (Hartlepool) (Lab)
Q
Katie Kempen: Yes. Particularly when looking at antisocial behaviour, we absolutely welcome the additional powers for the Victims’ Commissioner. Brutally, the Victims’ Commissioner knew what the issues were surrounding antisocial behaviour—the last time she was in office, she wrote a fantastic report that has still not been fully implemented and enacted.
At Victim Support we would like to see an ASB charter so that victims of antisocial behaviour have clarity on their expectations and rights, and on the responsibilities of each organisation. Victims are far too often ping-ponged between different organisations. They do not hear their rights in terms of the reviews.
As Baroness Newlove has said, there is a cohort of victims who slip through the net in accessing victim support services. Their case may not reach the criminal threshold that gets them to victims code rights, but they are still finding that their lives are essentially ruined by antisocial behaviour. Those cases are complex, difficult to resolve and take significant advocacy. We need some clarity on rights and responsibilities in that arena.
Baroness Newlove: I add a request to get rid of the term “low level.” The police start by thinking that antisocial behaviour is low level, and if you train your police officers with that narrative, they will not give respect to victims. Antisocial behaviour is horrendously violent to the individual. For my last report I met victims whose houses were nearly burned down, but the local authorities never came. I have met a victim of arson against their car, which nearly murdered the family because she was sleeping on the sofa—the police never came out, but the fire officers sat there for two hours.
We have to get away from looking at antisocial behaviour as low level, because it is the route for violence upon violence. I do not want to talk just about me, but my husband was murdered. Before that, it would have been treated as antisocial behaviour. If he had lived, it would have just gone through the system. If you leave antisocial behaviour, it is like a cancer; it will spread and spread.
That is where it helps communities, if you really want to get to the nub of all this. As Victims’ Commissioner, I am delighted about being able to go to a housing provider, but you are quite right about the implementation and accountability. This is going to take many attempts, but it has to start with the police to stop the ping-ponging. There is a human there who is feeling suicidal. You will act if they take their life, like Fiona Pilkington or David Askew did, and that is too little too late.
Jack Rankin
Q
Baroness Newlove: I broadly welcome it, with a bit of a caveat, as I am the victims’ champion. Currently, I have to explain to every victim who writes in that I cannot get involved in individual cases under the statute. That is not to say that I do not pass on the information to Ministers and ask them to help and support. I am very concerned about how we may class victims under two tiers, and that is what we have to look at—it will not be me, but the future Victims’ Commissioner.
I receive hundreds of letters, even in the House of Lords, and I am trying to separate them using three criteria. First, does the correspondence highlight a gap in the policy? That is about a victim’s right to a review, and if it is not right, I raise it with the Minister or the Attorney General. Secondly, does the correspondence highlight a failure to deliver in line with policy? I see cases that seemingly meet the ASB case review threshold, but the local authority has added further obstacles, which does not help.
Thirdly, and finally, does the correspondence highlight policy that perverts outcomes for victims? By that, I mean that the court orders compensation, which is deducted from criminal injuries compensation—that is another debate that I will not go into. In some cases—or in the majority of cases, if we are perfectly honest—the victim waits years, because it is a drip feed. If we are looking at funding, there is over £1 billion outstanding in unpaid fines and compensation. I would like the courts to act and get the money off the offender so that it goes to victims, who have to wait too long.
Those are the criteria I am looking at. It will take a while, but it is paramount that the Victims’ Commissioner sets guidelines. I hear that line, “Does not look at individual cases”, but my correspondents think I can, and it really hurts me when I have to say that I cannot as Victims’ Commissioner—it is all the jargon and waffle that we do. I ensure that victims truly understand that I will signpost their correspondence to the people in charge. I will show them, and they will get transparency in that way.
Jack Rankin
I was just going to offer the panel the opportunity to say whether there is anything not in the Bill that they would like to see included.
The Chair
I think we will pass on that, if we may. I will go to our last question from Tristan Osborne, but we have to be quick.
Tristan Osborne
Q
Baroness Newlove: We are going to wait for Sir Brian Leveson’s report, because it does not matter what I say. It matters what Sir Brian comes up with. However, as my background is working with magistrates and Crown courts, I am looking at district judges, or DJs—who used to be called stipendiary magistrates. I want to see more of them, because I can assure you that if you have a stipendiary magistrate—and there are only two laypersons, by the way, and this is one—the professionals have to get their act together. It depends on what Sir Brian Leveson is looking at, and—
The Chair
Order. I am very sorry to interrupt, but we are at the end of the time allotted for the Committee to ask questions. On behalf of the Committee, I thank our witnesses for their evidence.
Examination of Witnesses
Rebecca Bryant and Charlotte Hamilton-Kay gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from Resolve and ASB Help. We have until 10.55 for this session. Will the witnesses please introduce themselves for the record?
Rebecca Bryant: Good morning. My name is Rebecca Bryant and I am the chief executive of Resolve.
Charlotte Hamilton-Kay: Good morning. I am Charlotte Hamilton-Kay and I am the deputy chief executive of ASB Help.
Dr Mullan
Q
The antisocial behaviour that your work focuses on is often resolved, at least initially, through non-custodial sentences, so the other measures available to the court are particularly important. I would like to ask you about court fines and compensation. I have spoken to victims who feel it is unfair that if someone is responsible for, let us say, the criminal damage of property, the victim will not necessarily be awarded compensation for the value of that property, as they would if they took someone to the small claims court. To reassure people in the community that the measures available are effective, would there be benefit in ensuring that when someone is responsible for property damage, the victim is awarded compensation that matches the value of the damaged property?
Rebecca Bryant: Compensation in relation to antisocial behaviour cases is currently quite vague. Often, if you are looking at cases that are resolved through an early intervention and prevention approach, you would be looking at more of a restorative justice element, and perhaps mediation, where there is no compensation and it is more about recognising the impact of the behaviour the person has perpetrated. Once you move into the legal action arena, we have to recognise that a lot of the people who are perpetrators of antisocial behaviour may not be in a position to pay any compensation—although I recognise that, from a victim’s perspective, some sort of restorative approach would be welcome.
Charlotte Hamilton-Kay: I agree with that. Part of the problem with antisocial behaviour is that when we record it, and when certain agencies take reports, there is a real grey area in how it is classified. We struggle with the classification of crime versus antisocial behaviour. It is often dismissed as a misdemeanour or, as Baroness Helen said, it is low level, so we are not necessarily going to reach the threshold at which we can look at compensation. That is impactive for victims of antisocial behaviour, because it immediately makes them feel that what they have experienced and suffered is not as important or serious as other cases that might meet the criteria. We would really need to look at that before we could go that way.
Additionally, victims of antisocial behaviour often do not report what they are experiencing because they feel they are not going to be listened to or taken seriously. Introducing a compensation element would just complicate that at this stage.
Dr Mullan
Q
Rebecca Bryant: That is not something that I have come across at all. Restorative justice and community remedy can be either between the two individuals or group of individuals who are involved in the antisocial behaviour—bringing them together and doing a piece of work to recognise the impact of that behaviour—or something in the community itself, perhaps with higher visibility. There was a pilot last year around immediate justice and the impact on the community of seeing the behaviour paid back, if you like.
Restorative justice is often only one of the tools that we use to respond to antisocial behaviour. When we are talking about early intervention and prevention, we also use mediation and warnings, highlighting to the individual perpetrator the impact that the behaviour is having on the victim and the community.
Dr Mullan
Q
Rebecca Bryant: Yes, I think I would, but how long is that time? I think a victim of antisocial behaviour, community safety issues or even crime wants to see some closure, move forward and move past the incident that has happened. Having something like that hanging over them for an indefinite amount of time might not enable them to have that closure.
Charlotte Hamilton-Kay: The bonus of fines or penalty notices for antisocial behaviour is that we hope they act as a deterrent. If they are not working as a deterrent, it does not matter what amount of time we put on them: they are not going to have the effect on the perpetrator of stopping the behaviour. Yes, there needs to be culpability —we should not just have a “get out of jail free” card if we can wait out the clock—but we need to be realistic about what they are going to achieve.
Dr Mullan
Q
Rebecca Bryant: Absolutely, yes, I do. What is taken into account around sentencing is often rather opaque, as is whether someone actually has to attend the sentencing. Victims need to be able to see justice done, because they have had a traumatic experience and have perhaps gone through the process of giving evidence live and having to face the person who has perpetrated the antisocial behaviour, crime or community safety issue. Having access to the sentencing report and the sentencing itself, and understanding that their victim impact statement is being read out and taken into account, would be significantly beneficial.
Charlotte Hamilton-Kay: I agree. We have to look at everything on a case-by-case basis, and in some situations it would not be appropriate—a victim would not feel comfortable with it. The problem with antisocial behaviour is, again, that grey area between ASB and crime. Impact is the biggest factor, and a victim needs to have that voice and explain how they have been impacted, but we certainly do not want the secondary traumatisation of coming face to face with someone who potentially does not acknowledge what they have done. You would have to look at the complexities of each case.
Alex Davies-Jones
Q
Charlotte Hamilton-Kay: It is a really great step. We need more accountability, and oversight of all agencies involved in managing antisocial behaviour, and the duty to co-operate with the Victims’ Commissioner, is a really great start to that. There is a huge postcode lottery and disparity across England and Wales in the way that victims of antisocial behaviour are supported, the way their cases are managed and what action is taken on different behaviours. Anything we can do to bring a nationalised approach would be really beneficial to victims.
Rebecca Bryant: I think there is a balance. We welcome the Victims’ Commissioner having the authority, and the co-operation element, but the arena of social housing, local authorities and antisocial behaviour is very crowded at the moment. You have the social housing regulator, which is currently looking at housing providers in relation to the consumer standard, which includes antisocial behaviour—their approach to it, the number of cases per 1,000 and the respondents’ satisfaction with how they respond to it. That is not just for housing providers; it includes local authorities with housing stock. That is one side.
You also have the local government ombudsman and the housing ombudsman, which both deal with individual people who are not satisfied with the response they have received from the agency we are talking about. We are very supportive of antisocial behaviour victims and approaches being at the forefront of the Victims’ Commissioner’s mind, and her or him being able to pull together responses, require people to respond and perhaps look at themes and areas where we can strengthen our support and guidance for agencies that work in this arena, but what will that actually look like? We are currently working on that with the current Victims’ Commissioner. At the moment it is quite vague. There would have to be a tightening up of what element she is going to look at, bearing in mind that the ASB case review, the housing ombudsman, the local authority ombudsman and the social housing regulator are all looking at the same thing.
Caroline Voaden
Q
Rebecca Bryant: Funded universal support for victims of antisocial behaviour. It has been made clear by not only us but the previous panel that antisocial behaviour is a very broad church and often includes criminal activity, but it is not recorded as a crime. We use antisocial behaviour legislation, as it is under the current regime and as it will be in future with the Crime and Policing Bill, as that stands, for the use or threat of violence, for example. We all know that using or threatening violence is a crime, yet we use antisocial behaviour legislation to respond to it. It can involve drug dealing, cuckooing properties, criminal damage—all those things are crimes.
If you are a victim of crime and you report it as a crime to the police, you will get an automatic offer of victim support. When you are dealing with an antisocial behaviour case, you might report it to the local authority or to a housing provider, and you do not get immediate access to victim support. We know from our own research and research from the Victims’ Commissioner, various different reports and colleagues like ASB Help that what supports a victim is having a named person who can support them through the process. That person can guide them through often very complex and difficult situations in relation to taking legal action, or if the perpetrator is vulnerable and has multiple issues around mental health, drugs and alcohol, and the significant delays in the civil justice system mean that the case may go on for a long time.
We need specialist victim support that is universal and independent. I should stress the independence because, often, when a complainant makes a complaint to a housing provider and a local authority, they will be part of a caseload of many. They will be given some support and guidance, and some people have specialist training to do that, but we would seriously support having an independent specialist to provide that kind of support—for example, Victim Support, which is commissioned and funded. It is very much a postcode lottery at the moment. There are some police and crime commissioners in the country who fund specialist ASB victim support, but they are few and far between. It really is a postcode lottery as to what you get where you live. That is what I think is missing.
Charlotte Hamilton-Kay: I absolutely agree with that. We can talk about victims of a single instance of minor crime, which I do not say easily; it is the criminal version of “low level”. If, for example, someone smashed your plant pots on your front doorstep, that is a crime and you are entitled to support for it. But if you have been suffering sleepless nights for 12 months because a neighbour has kept you awake constantly, you are losing your job because you are falling asleep at work, and you have experienced a constant campaign, there is no one there. If there was a statutory agency to provide support, that could be life-altering for some people. It is a very important thing that we continue to campaign for.
With the best will in the world, a lot of the measures are a great step forward for victims of antisocial behaviour, but if we do not allocate the resources and ensure that the training and experience is there for frontline practitioners, then we are only as good as our weakest link. We need to ensure that we support our frontline practitioners who work in the field of antisocial behaviour to get the job right. If they do not have the resources to do the job properly, they are not going to be able to. If they have not got the training and the knowledge to understand the vulnerabilities and the different caveats of antisocial behaviour, they are not going to be able to do the job properly. That is immediately where we fall down. Unfortunately, the buck will stop with them, so we are dutybound to make sure they have adequate support to do it right.
Caroline Voaden
Q
Rebecca Bryant: I would say that the vast majority of local authorities and housing providers up and down the country resource their response to antisocial behaviour, but there has been a significant impact on that since 2008, with austerity and the cuts that have happened across local authorities. I believe that the toolkit itself is strong. There is a mixture of early intervention and prevention, which we absolutely know work. Around 75% of complaints around antisocial behaviour are resolved first time. When we are talking about taking cases to court, we are only talking about a small minority of all the complaints.
There is something there about us understanding the real picture of antisocial behaviour in the country. A million incidents of antisocial behaviour were reported to the police last year, but our YouGov survey suggests that over 50% of people do not report antisocial behaviour, so imagine doubling that number to 2 million, and then adding on top the incidents recorded by housing providers and local authorities: we are probably looking at more like 4 million or 5 million incidents of antisocial behaviour. It is a really significant problem; it is pernicious and causes great damage to communities and individuals alike.
There are certain things that we strongly feel should happen. We did some work with the all-party parliamentary group a couple of years ago, looking into the complexity of antisocial behaviour. We made a recommendation that there should be a pilot for a specialist housing court that could look at the complexity around antisocial behaviour. You are asking an ASB officer to be an enforcement person, a mediator, a victim support person, a mental health expert and a social worker.
We recognise that people who perpetrate antisocial behaviour can often be victims themselves and have had traumatic experiences—adverse childhood experiences—in their lives, which might be the root cause of their antisocial behaviour. We need to have something like a specialist court, and we need the judiciary who look at antisocial behaviour to be trained to understand the complexity, because we often find that judges are not necessarily trained in antisocial behaviour when they look at complex cases.
The resources required are wide. It is about not just local authorities and housing providers but the community safety partnership, because we know that a partnership response is what resolves antisocial behaviour. It is not about one single agency, and it is certainly not just within the auspices of the police.
Mr Brash
Q
Rebecca Bryant: We have long called for a campaign on antisocial behaviour to explain rights. That is one of the reasons why we have Antisocial Behaviour Awareness Week, when we talk about how to report and what people should expect when they report antisocial behaviour. I liked the idea from Victim Support that perhaps we should have a charter that explains people’s rights: you can ask for an ASB case review, you can make a complaint to the ombudsman if you are dissatisfied, and you can—if this element of the Bill passes—make a complaint to or request support from the Victims’ Commissioner.
Equally, we must remember that this is about stopping antisocial behaviour. Often when members of the public report antisocial behaviour, they are looking for a specific outcome. That outcome might be to evict the person who is the perpetrator, when actually, that is not our role. Our role is to stop the antisocial behaviour from happening. So there is always something, on behalf of housing providers and local authorities, about managing the expectations of the individual who is making the complaint and being really clear on what antisocial behaviour is, what you can resolve as an individual, and what we can do to support you as an organisation. We need to be much clearer about what people can expect from us as the agencies and our response.
Charlotte Hamilton-Kay: Absolutely. I will make a couple of points. Rebecca has mentioned the ASB case review. The disparity in its administration across England and Wales is a real issue for victims. We released a report last year that showed there are some areas in England and Wales that, in four years, have still not held one ASB case review, and this legislation has been around for over 11 years. That is purely because victims are not aware of the case review’s existence. They are not able to make an application because it is not publicised. We have to ask why it is not publicised. Practitioners feel that it is a complaint process and will involve them being questioned on why they have made the decisions they have made in case management, and victims are really missing out on the opportunity to explain the impact of what they are experiencing.
As Baroness Newlove mentioned, we really need to standardise the threshold for an ASB case review application, so there are no additional caveats—it is three instances in six months and that is it. We also need to standardise how it is publicised and how victims are made aware of it, because a lot of people are still unaware. A report that you at Resolve issued in the last couple of years said that 87% of people were still unaware of this tool’s existence, so in 11 years we have not done a very good job of making people aware of it.
Finally, on the concept of a victim being able to express what they are experiencing, when we are talking about tenants, everybody experiences things differently. What might be really impactful to me could just go straight over your head. It is all about your personal circumstances and what your experience is, what your triggers are and what you happen to have been experiencing that day. We need to be very clear about what is antisocial behaviour, what is unreasonable behaviour and what is inconsiderate behaviour, and manage the expectations of what people can and cannot demand change to. Managing the expectations of victims is part of the support network. When they know what to expect and what can and cannot happen, and when they are not dealing with that unknown, it makes it a lot easier for them to cope.
Adam Thompson
Q
Rebecca Bryant: It is very difficult to see this Bill in isolation, considering we have the Crime and Policing Bill going through Parliament at the same time. We want to be in lockstep and to recognise that we need not only to support victims and communities, but to consider the drivers for antisocial behaviour—where it is happening and how we can better respond, whether that is through a legal toolkit or by putting checks and balances in place. For example, I gave evidence to the Joint Committee on Human Rights last week around checks and balances on ensuring that we recognise the human rights of individuals versus the community, and how we do that.
Having a spotlight on antisocial behaviour can only be a good thing if it is what the majority of people in the country say is a high priority. Having spoken to lots of Ministers, Governments and civil servants over the last 25 years that I have been working on antisocial behaviour, that priority has not gone away. When you look at our survey results on the impact of antisocial behaviour, one in seven people say that their mental health is impacted, and one in 10 actually move home because they are a victim of antisocial behaviour. Over 50% of people do not report it to us. Why not? Is it because they do not trust us to respond? Is it because we do not advertise how to report it to us? There is something there that we need to be think about, and we need to do more research into that.
With the Crime and Policing Bill, there will be mandating of data collection. For the first time since the crime and policing Act that is there at the moment, we will be gathering information on use of early intervention and prevention tools, and we will be able to evaluate what works, what we want to invest in and how we train our staff. We will look at legal action and whether the new respect order—as it will be once it has been piloted—works. What is the impact of positive requirements and what is the impact of sentencing? What is the impact of increasing fines as a deterrent?
At the centre of that, we will have the Victims’ Commissioner, advocating for individual victims of antisocial behaviour—in a different way, perhaps, from the way the ombudsman will be looking at complaints, the ASB case review looks at a response or the social housing regulator looks at things. The Victims’ Commissioner is actually advocating for the individual victim or the communities that are being impacted, and that can only be a good thing.
The Chair
I thank colleagues for the timeliness and focused nature of their questions. I thank the witnesses for sparing their valuable time this morning to come and give evidence to us.
Examination of Witnesses
Clare Moody and Assistant Chief Constable Genna Telfer gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners and the National Police Chiefs’ Council. We have until 11.25 am for this session. Will the witnesses please introduce themselves for the record?
Clare Moody: Good morning. I am Clare Moody, representing the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners.
Genna Telfer: Good morning. I am Genna Telfer, representing the NPCC.
Dr Mullan
Q
Genna Telfer: That is a difficult question to start with. It is a tricky one. This would probably be better done through a victim survey of individuals who have been through the process. Although we would want to give people additional time to truly consider it, what might take someone two weeks to think about might take someone else 12 months, so what is the right timeline to put on it? I am not sure I can answer that from a policing perspective.
Obviously, our witness care teams keep victims informed and talk to them. That is absolutely something we would do. We inform them about the scheme, but we do not tell them whether they are eligible for it or not, because we think that would be better done by the CPS, which has a better understanding of how it all works. But in terms of the timeline, that is a difficult one to answer, because how long is a piece of string?
Clare Moody: I agree with Genna. I do not feel that I am qualified to say right now that if you extended this to three months or to two months—
Dr Mullan
Q
Clare Moody: I absolutely can see the benefit in that. When you are in the moment, with so many emotions, and are in a high state of emotional experience, we do not retain information—none of us does. So we are talking about being able to refer back to that. I am not clear, to be honest, on the reasons why the remarks are not already published, so I cannot argue to the specific points about why this does not exist right now. But my instinctive response, if that is fair, is that, yes, it would seem sensible to publish those remarks.
Genna Telfer: I think this came up recently. I am not sure whether it came out from one of the surveys, but there was a question about victims being present at sentencing, and I know that some work was going on about that with the CPS as well. So if they want to be in the room, rather than just reading the remarks, obviously, that might be beneficial to some victims.
Dr Mullan
Q
Genna Telfer: Absolutely. That was one of the points that we were going to raise today. I think victims should be considered and consulted as part of that process. Having read about the way that this is going to work—the different options such as potentially adding time to the sentence, or physically removing a suspect into court— the second option is “reasonable force” and I can imagine there are lots of issues with that, in terms of practicality. If someone really does not want to be in court, it will be difficult to achieve that. There is then the potential disruption that could be faced, such as delays for the victim because the trial takes longer to go ahead as a result of that issue. So I think some victims will absolutely want that, but others would probably prefer not to have it.
Dr Mullan
Do you want to add anything, Clare?
Clare Moody: In terms of the involvement of the victim in that decision making, as Genna said, there are complications around getting the perpetrator into the courtroom, but who would not want them to see the justice that is being meted out and for the victims to have that opportunity? But yes, the consultation would make sense.
Alex Davies-Jones
Q
Genna Telfer: As I said, moving anyone who does not want to be moved is very difficult. We do it all the time in policing; we have to move people when they do not want to. It is difficult, it takes a lot of people and it takes a lot of resource. There is a risk of injury to the prison staff who are moving them. What we are trying to achieve, versus the impact of trying to do that, might be the balance that is needed. I think that while it is good to have it in there, prison entitlements and the potential extension of the sentence are probably more the tools to do this than the actual physical restraint of people.
Clare Moody: I would say exactly that. An accidental outcome of this should not be the greater traumatisation of victims. The process might wind up with some kind of scene that involves centring the perpetrator, rather than what the victims have been through. I think there needs to be care around that in ensuring that victims are still at the heart of the process.
Alex Davies-Jones
Q
Genna Telfer: I think it will simplify it. At the moment we have two schemes—the contact scheme and the notification scheme—with different eligibility, so it will make it slightly easier. The helpline is a great idea, but it needs to be resourced properly, as with anything. If it is not, then we are setting an expectation for victims that might not be met, which might frustrate them further. A concern for us in policing is whether, if it is not resourced properly within probation, it falls back to policing to address, when we might not have the information or resource to do it. But in principle, absolutely, I think it is a great idea.
Clare Moody: Again, I agree with that. It is about simplification, clarity, support for victims, and the value that that adds. Of course, there will not be straightforward calls. Victims will be calling in and asking, “But what about this?” or “Can you tell me this?” to get more information. There will be complexity in the calls that come in and the response to them. There needs to be resourcing for that, and there may be a knock-on to wider victim services, because there will be questions that fall out of that and through to the victim services support sector.
Alex Davies-Jones
Q
Clare Moody: Those powers are welcome. One of the points about the new powers is the reporting. It is about aligning what is going on with those powers. Where police and crime commissioners have a responsibility for antisocial behaviour reviews, how does that align with the work of the Victims’ Commissioner? With all of this, it is about making sure that there is simplicity in the system for victims and that there is not duplication, and aligning things. For example, as police and crime commissioners, we do local reporting through the local criminal justice boards, and we report into the Ministry of Justice through that. How does that sit alongside the work of the Victims’ Commissioner, so that there is not a multiplicity of reports and we are pointing in the same direction of benefits and changes that we need to see for victims?
Genna Telfer: Yes, it has to complement what PCCs are doing through the local criminal justice boards. Any additional support we can get to work with partners is welcome. As was described earlier, ASB is definitely not just an enforcement issue; it is the whole partnership piece. We welcome the additional powers around housing. As Clare said, it has to complement what is going on locally.
Caroline Voaden
Q
Clare Moody: I cannot comment on future spending and where that will go. We would share the view that resourcing matters for the helpline. The nature of services is that they generate demand. It is not just about services for the helpline; it is about wider victim services support. That is for funding decisions that are beyond my remit.
Caroline Voaden
Q
Clare Moody: As a police and crime commissioner, I am always going to ask for increased funding.
Caroline Voaden
Q
Genna Telfer: That is always a challenge. It is a challenge that we are trying to work through at the moment in terms of code compliance and how we share information through different agencies. There is a piece of work going on between policing, the MOJ and the CPS to try to work out how we align all our data—how we have the right people giving the right information at the right time, but also access to that data.
The first thing is whether the data is right. There is a whole piece of work going on in the MOJ at the moment around data auditing and checking. The second thing is how the communication is happening. We have just launched a joint communications framework between policing and the CPS, which gives our witness care units practical examples of what they communicate and when. In future, we would like, potentially, to look beyond that to go into probation and expand it further. There is another piece of work ongoing around technology and how that could assist us to do some of this. That is subject to funding, because none of that comes cheap, but absolutely, the intention is to try to align that as much as possible. There will probably always be some gaps when you are transferring from one agency to another, but as much as we can, we are trying to join it up, so that the victim gets the right information, ideally from the right place.
Caroline Voaden
Q
Genna Telfer: Yes, absolutely.
Sally Jameson (Doncaster Central) (Lab/Co-op)
Q
I want to ask a specific question on the Opposition amendment on restraint and gagging in court. I understand the Government’s position, allowing reasonable force at the judge’s discretion. As you will know from policing history, the use of force is on a spectrum from minimal right up to the top end. I have never heard of being able to gag. It is certainly not a technique that is used in the Prison Service; it is not in the “Use of force” manual and it is not part of the training. Were the Opposition amendment to be made, how would you suggest that it be done? What do you think the impact on the courtroom more widely would be if we were to take forward gagging? Do you believe it is even legal under current rules?
Genna Telfer: Obviously it is not something we are trained in, or something we do, so there would be a whole training implication. We do use spit hoods—that is probably as close to that that we get, in terms of putting something over someone’s head, but that does not affect sound and even those are quite controversial, so they are used quite sparingly. It is difficult, because if we did not do that, we are back to the disruption point and potentially removing people straightaway for contempt of court.
On the legality, I do not know—it is something that we would have to have a look into. If it were agreed, it would need to be checked whether it was legal, and then there would be a whole range of training. But that is not something policing would do; it would be the Prison Service involved in that, rather than us.
I can talk about my own experience. I was an officer safety trainer, so I have quite a lot of knowledge and, again, that would be really difficult to do. We use leg restraints, handcuffs and things, but to restrain someone effectively and to gag them to move them into a courtroom, I think would be really challenging.
Clare Moody: I go back to the point that I was making earlier about not making this a theatre show. I think that would somehow make it a spectacle, and it puts the perpetrator at the centre of all the attention. As I said earlier, this is about justice for the victims, and I think that there would be real problems with that. Adding to the points that Genna made about the practicalities of it, making a show of it, or making theatre in the courtroom, I do not think is the appropriate thing to do.
Jack Rankin
Q
Genna Telfer: Yes.
Jack Rankin
Q
Genna Telfer: It is not; it is exactly the same, but we do not move them easily. If someone does not want to be moved, there is a risk to the people moving them, as well as a risk to the individual. Obviously, we train and we do a lot of work to make sure that that injury is limited, but people do get injured when we try to move someone forcefully, on both sides.
Jack Rankin
Q
Clare Moody: I did not, no. I talked about making a spectacle of it.
Jack Rankin
Yes—sorry. That is why in the amendment we have suggested that victims need to be consulted about what would happen. Obviously that would be a risk, but that should be the victim’s choice. That should not be for the establishment—the criminal justice system or politicians. We should actively say, “This is the potential risk of this. Do you want that to happen?” They should be the people at the heart of our conversation, should they not?
Genna Telfer: I think they should be at the heart of the conversation, but I do not think they should be the decision maker. If you have someone who is so violent that it presents a risk, effectively making other people victims—prison officers or whoever—there should be a decision either by the Prison Service or by the judge that, “This is too risky to do, and it is going to cause more problems than it is going to solve.” I accept that we would want to consult the victim and put them at the heart of it, but I do not think they should be the decision maker in that case.
Clare Moody: I absolutely echo the point that Genna has made. It is one thing saying that this might be the outcome, and that it depends how the outcome is displayed in terms of what that could look like in a courtroom, but there could be the danger of retraumatising victims if this becomes all about the disruption in the courtroom at the point of sentencing. I think there are real problems with that.
Genna Telfer: I do not disagree with the principle of it. I just think it would be very difficult to do.
Mrs Elsie Blundell (Heywood and Middleton North) (Lab)
Q
Genna Telfer: We obviously have really close working relationships with our partners. There should always be a number of people around the table trying to work out the best option to deal with these cases—from a problem-solving point of view, not just in the short term. Rather than just solving the immediate problem by, for example, moving people from one address to another, they might ask, “How do we manage this for the future?”
In my experience, I do not think there is an unwillingness from housing associations and local authorities to get involved. I think sometimes there are just challenges with being able to resolve some of the issues. The new power for the Victims’ Commissioner on the requirement to give a reasonable response as to why something has or has not been done will be really helpful, because it will provide more transparency and scrutiny of the problems we are trying to resolve. I do not think there is an unwillingness; I just think there are some challenges in the system that make it difficult.
Mrs Blundell
Q
Clare Moody: Not specifically on the legislation piece. I think it is about the agencies working together. We have an example in Avon and Somerset where there are police officers who co-locate with the housing association —they have a desk space in the housing association—and that close working has resulted in closer co-operation on how to manage difficult situations with tenants. There are practical ways you can do things that do not necessarily require the legislation to change, because they are already in place.
Bradley Thomas
Q
Genna Telfer: I am not sure I can add any more to what I have already said. I have said that if the victim wants the offender in court, I agree with the principle of it. In terms of gagging people and dragging them into court, which is effectively what we are talking about, it just becomes really challenging. I am not saying that you would not necessarily do it; I just think there is a whole load of stuff that needs to be worked through to consider it.
The Chair
If there are no further questions, I thank the witnesses for their evidence this morning.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Samantha Dixon.)
Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Ninth sitting)
Tuesday 17th June 2025
(1 day, 16 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesFootball Governance Bill [HL] 2024-26 View all Football Governance Bill [HL] 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 17 June 2025 - (17 Jun 2025)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
For the avoidance of doubt, I should explain that I am not Esther McVey. For that, I apologise. None the less, we are now sitting in public and the proceedings are being broadcast. I remind all Members please to switch electronic devices to silent. We will now continue our line-by-line consideration of the Bill.
Clause 57
Applications for resolution process to be triggered
Amendment made: 29, in clause 57, page 47, line 12, leave out “the application relates” and insert—
“the question or questions for resolution mentioned in subsection (1) relate”.—(Stephanie Peacock.)
This amendment provides that a specified competition organiser may only apply under clause 57 if the conditions in clause 57 are met in relation to the qualifying football season or seasons to which the question or questions mentioned in subsection (1) of clause 57 relate.
Mr Louie French (Old Bexley and Sidcup) (Con)
I beg to move amendment 130, in clause 57, page 47, line 35, leave out subsection (6) and insert—
“(6) Condition 4 is met in relation to a qualifying football season if—
(a) a distribution agreement is in force between the two specified competition organisers in relation to the season,
(b) the distribution agreement has been in force for at least the applicable period (see subsections (7) and (8)), and
(c) no distribution order has effect in respect of the specified competition organisers in relation to the season.
(7) Where—
(a) the specified competition organisers have agreed (whether in the distribution agreement or otherwise) a period for the purposes of condition 4, and
(b) both of the organisers have notified the IFR of the period so agreed,
the applicable period is that period.
(8) In any other case, the applicable period is 5 years.”
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 128, in clause 57, page 47, line 38, leave out “five years” and insert—
“the applicable period (see subsections (7) and (8))”.
Amendment 129, in clause 57, page 47, line 41, at end insert—
“(7) Where—
(a) the specified competition organisers have agreed (whether in the distribution agreement or otherwise) a period for the purposes of condition 4, and
(b) both of the organisers have notified the IFR of the period so agreed,
the applicable period is that period.
(8) In any other case, the applicable period is five years.”
Mr French
It is a pleasure to serve under you again, Sir Jeremy, and I welcome back everyone else in Committee.
The clause sets out further details on the circumstances in which the specified competition organisers can apply to trigger the resolution process. The Government have moved on the mechanism within the backstop, which is welcomed by the leagues, but the amendments tabled in my name seek to correct some gaps in the clause. Amendment 130 would allow the relevant leagues to set a different period other than five years for the resolution process to be triggered. Amendments 128 and 129 would also allow the relevant parties to set the appropriate period for triggering the backstop.
The clause matters, not just because of what it allows, but because of what it delays. In particular, it creates a cooling-off period, a requirement that certain preconditions be met before the regulator can become involved in live disputes between football’s governing bodies and competitions. Of the conditions listed in the clause, condition 4 is especially significant. As the Bill stands, condition 4 is met only if the relevant distribution agreement between competitions—for example, between the Premier League and the English Football League—has been in force for at least five years.
We understand why the five-year test was included: the intention is to prevent the Government’s regulator from being dragged into every routine renegotiation, and to ensure that the resolution process is only triggered in relation to long-standing agreements that may have become outdated or contentious. Five years, however, is a long time in football. Broadcasting cycles, financial realities and competitive conditions can change quickly.
In that time, for example, a team such as Luton Town went from playing in League Two in the 2017-18 season, to competing in the Premier League in the 2022-23 season. Granted, the team have now fallen down the pyramid to League One again, but that helps prove that, even with parachute payments being handed out from the Premier League and potentially now being included in the resolution process, that does not stop a club from failing on the pitch or in the boardroom.
I therefore tabled amendments 128 to 130, which would allow the “applicable period” under condition 4 to be shorter than five years when two conditions are met: first, when the specified competition organisers have agreed a different period, either in the distribution agreement itself or separately; and, secondly, when both organisers have notified the regulator of that agreed period. In that case, the “applicable period” for the purpose of condition 4 becomes whatever period the organisers have agreed—rather than being fixed at five years by statute.
These are flexibility amendments, which an industry with businesses will benefit from, rather than having the inflexibility of fixing a date in statute. The Government argued that our earlier amendment to cap the pay of their new regulator was inflexible and too firmly rooted in the present day, so it would be unfortunate if the Minister were to oppose the amendment for exactly the opposite reasons. None of us would want that.
The amendment allows football’s governing bodies—the Premier League, the EFL, and others—to determine their own timelines for when they believe the regulator should be able to step in, if negotiations breakdown. It does not force earlier intervention; it simply allows the option where both parties agree. That is a consensual, common-sense reform that respects the autonomy of football’s existing institutions, while giving them the tools to resolve disputes more efficiently when necessary. It makes the clause more responsive, less rigid and more capable of reflecting the fast-moving dynamics of football finance and league relationships.
Will the Minister confirm why the Government chose to fix the five-year period in primary legislation, rather than allowing the competitions to define the appropriate timeline for regulatory intervention themselves? Does she agree that, if both parties are asking for an earlier resolution window, it is counterproductive for the legislation to prevent it? It would cause delays to the redistribution of money from one specified competition to another, which would entirely undermine the point of the regulator. If we do not pass the amendment, we risk locking football into a situation where, no matter how bad a deal becomes or how outdated a distribution agreement appears, the regulator’s hands are tied for another half a decade. They say that a week is a long time in politics, and the same is true for football. In half a decade’s time there could be—and I hope there is—a new Government, and Charlton could have returned to the Premier League and may even be in the Champion’s League final—I will try to keep it realistic; the sun must be getting to me.
As drafted, the Bill allows prolonged stalemates, growing financial resentment between divisions, and a continued lack of reform, even when both sides might privately want the regulator’s help to resolve matters. That is especially important given the recurring tensions between the certain specified competition organisers on financial redistribution, among other things. If both sides were willing to allow the Government’s regulator to assist earlier, we should facilitate that, not block it.
Regulation, especially in this context, should be a last resort, and football must be given the space to sort out its own affairs where possible. The amendment reflects that principle. It does not force the regulator into a situation early; it simply allows football competitions to agree that if things go wrong, the regulator can be invited in sooner rather than later. That is not interference but empowered self-governance, which is what we should be striving for when—as the fan-led review ultimately sought to do—we return the governance of English football back to the FA. The amendment gives clubs and competition organisers more ownership of the process, not less.
Does the Minister recognise that the amendment would incentivise early engagement and constructive negotiation, rather than prolonging the stalemates that have now become common place? Clause 57 is an important procedural gateway, but the current wording of condition 4 imposes a rigid five-year rule that may prevent the regulator from acting, even in cases where both sides want its help. The amendment would introduce flexibility and consent into the process. It ensures that the trigger point for resolution reflects the needs of the game, not an arbitrary statutory timescale set many seasons before it may actually be needed.
The amendment is limited, reasonable, and entirely in keeping with the Government’s desire for a targeted, proportionate, and respectful form of regulation. I hope that the Minister will accept the amendment based on the position she has taken on earlier amendments to the Bill.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stephanie Peacock)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Jeremy. I will use the opportunity presented by amendment 130 to talk to another of this Government’s changes to strengthen the Bill. The Opposition amendments would amend clause 57, which sets out how and under what conditions a league can apply to the regulator to trigger the backstop.
We will discuss clause 57 in more detail in the next group, but in brief, one of the conditions for triggering the backstop is that there has been no new distributions agreement between the leagues for at least five years. The amendments seek to reintroduce drafting from the previous version of the Bill that allowed leagues to reach an agreement to extend that five-year period. The Government removed that drafting when we introduced the Bill, because in our judgment five years is an appropriate period.
Our strong preference, of course, is for football to reach an agreement without any regulatory involvement. We have done everything in our power to push for an agreement and continue to urge everyone to find a solution that works for all of football. The five-year period in the Bill has been chosen to ensure the regulator can only intervene in cases where a sufficient agreement has not been reached for a significant period of time. We believe that this is the correct amount of time.
That is not to say, however, that the backstop will be triggered every five years. This is not the only threshold that has to be met to trigger the process. It is a two-stage test. The regulator must also see a tangible risk to its ability to deliver its objectives before the process can be triggered. If the leagues agreed a good deal for a period longer than five years, while a league could still apply to trigger the backstop, the threshold of jeopardising the regulator’s objectives would not be met and the backstop would not be triggered.
There is an inherent imbalance of negotiating power between the distributing leagues and the recipient league. Allowing industry to contract out of the backstop completely could inhibit agreements that appropriately finance the football pyramid while preventing involvement from the regulator. That would badly damage the regulator’s ability to protect and promote the sustainability of English football and leave it unable to address what is currently a clear issue in the industry. For the reasons I have set out, I hope the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup will withdraw the amendment.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Stephanie Peacock
Clause 57 sets out a basic set of conditions that must be met for a league to be allowed to apply to the regulator and request that the backstop be triggered. The regulator cannot unilaterally trigger the backstop process; it must receive an application from one of the leagues under clause 57. This clause sets out that a regulated league can apply to trigger the process if there are unresolved issues between it and another league in relation to the distribution of relevant revenue. We discussed the definition of relevant revenue when we debated clause 56.
For a league to apply to trigger the backstop, at least one of the four conditions outlined in clause 57 must be met. Those four conditions are as follows: no distribution agreement is in place between the relevant leagues; there has been a material reduction in the amount of relevant revenue received by a relevant league since the last distribution agreement was reached; there has been a material change in circumstances in relation to the relevant revenue received by one or both relevant leagues since the last distribution agreement was reached; and at least five years have passed since the last distribution agreement between the relevant leagues came into force.
Each of the conditions is designed to mitigate a specific risk to the sustainability of the pyramid. Those are a complete absence of any distribution deal; a reduction in distributed revenue; a significant change in the circumstances surrounding distributions; and an old deal no longer fit for purpose but unable to be refreshed because the industry cannot agree. The conditions set an appropriate framework for when a league can apply to trigger the process. They help to avoid vexatious applications or fishing expeditions when a perfectly good, up-to-date industry deal is already in place. That is why clause 57 should stand part of the Bill.
Clause 58 specifies procedural steps and requirements. The applicant league has to comply with those for its application to trigger the backstop to be valid. Before making an application, the league must first notify the other relevant league and the regulator of its intention. That prevents either league from being blindsided by the process being triggered. The notice must list the issues in dispute, explain why one of the relevant conditions in clause 57 is met, and invite representations from the other specified competition organiser. That act, in and of itself, may help to trigger useful discussion between the leagues, as clearly outlining the issues preventing an agreement from moving forward will bring the leagues closer to compromise. After the other relevant league has had a chance to make any representations, the applicant league may apply to the regulator to trigger the process. It must include the other league’s representations with its application. That ensures that the regulator has the information that it needs from both leagues, so that it can make a considered decision on whether to trigger the backstop. The exchange of representations is also an early opportunity for the leagues to come to an agreement themselves, before the process is triggered. Ultimately, this clause is about creating transparency and promoting dialogue, which sets the tone for the rest of the backstop process.
Clauses 57 and 58 together outline the requirements that must be met for a league to apply to trigger the backstop process. The requirements in clauses 57 and 58 are just the first hurdle that a league has to clear in order for the regulator to consider its application. In order to actually trigger the backstop the regulator then has to assess whether the application meets certain legal tests set out in clause 59, which we will discuss further in a later group. I beg to move that clauses 57 and 58 stand part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 57, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 58
Applications under section 57: procedural and other requirements
Amendments made: 30, in clause 58, page 48, line 7, at end insert—
“(za) set out details of the question or questions for resolution mentioned in section 57(1) to which it is intended the application will relate,”
This amendment provides that a notification under clause 59(1)(a) must set out details of the question or questions for resolution to which it is intended the application will relate.
Amendment 31, in clause 58, page 48, line 8, leave out “the application relates” and insert “that question relates or those questions relate”.
This amendment provides that a notification under clause 59(1)(a) must specify the qualifying football season or season to which the question or questions for resolution relate.
Amendment 32, in clause 58, page 48, line 12, leave out paragraph (c)
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 30.
Amendment 33, in clause 58, page 48, line 22, at end insert—
“(za) set out details of the question or questions for resolution mentioned in section 57(1) to which the application relates,”
This amendment provides that an application under clause 57 must set out details of the question or questions for resolution to which the application relates.
Amendment 34, in clause 58, page 48, line 23, leave out “the application relates” and insert “that question relates or those questions relate”.
This amendment provides that the application under clause 57 must specify the qualifying football season or season to which the question or questions for resolution relate.
Amendment 35, in clause 58, page 48, line 27, leave out paragraph (c)—(Stephanie Peacock.)
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 33.
Clause 58, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 59
Decisions by the IFR on applications under section 57
Amendments made: 36, in clause 59, page 48, line 33, leave out “the qualifying football season or seasons” and insert “one or more of the questions for resolution”.
This amendment provides that the IFR must decide whether the resolution process should be triggered in relation to one or more of the questions for resolution to which the application under clause 57 relates.
Amendment 37, in clause 59, page 48, line 33, after “relates” insert “(or a modified version of one or more of those questions)”.
This amendment provides that the IFR may decide that the resolution process should be triggered in relation to a modified version of one or more of the questions for resolution set out in the application under clause 57.
Amendment 38, in clause 59, page 48, line 36, leave out “qualifying football season” and insert “question or questions for resolution”.
This amendment provides that the IFR must be satisfied that the conditions in clause 59(2) are met before deciding to trigger the process in relation to a question or questions for resolution.
Amendment 39, in clause 59, page 48, line 38, leave out “that season” and insert “each season to which the question relates or the questions relate”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 38.
Amendment 40, in clause 59, page 48, line 41, after “triggered” insert “in relation to the question or questions for resolution”. —(Stephanie Peacock.)
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 38.
Mr Clive Betts (Sheffield South East) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 93, in clause 59, page 49, line 1, after “(c)” insert
“has exercised any of the IFR’s other functions under this Act in order to resolve the question or questions for resolution and such question or questions remain unresolved, or”.
It is a pleasure to be here with you in the Chair, Sir Jeremy. I will pass this over to the Minister. This is just an attempt to slightly clarify and strengthen the role of the regulator and the point of intervention. It would be helpful to see how this fits in with the way that the Minister has reconfigured the clause with her amendments.
Stephanie Peacock
I thank my hon. Friend for his amendment. We will discuss clause 59 in more detail in the next group. It sets out the tests that must be met for the regulator to justify accepting a league application so that it can then trigger the backstop. The amendment adds to clause 59 to give the regulator an additional basis on which to justify triggering. It could accept an application to trigger the backstop if it has tried and failed to resolve the disputed distribution issues using its other regulatory functions. I want to reassure my hon. Friend that the amendment is not necessary. Clause 59 already allows the regulator to accept an application to trigger if it considers that its other functions would not be able to resolve the disputed issues in a reasonable timeframe. That appropriately covers the scenario set out in my hon. Friend’s amendment.
If the regulator has already tried and failed to resolve a distribution issue using its other functions, that would be a reasonable basis for it to conclude that its other functions were not up to task. The existing test in clause 59 could then be met and an application trigger at the backstop could be accepted. It is important to clarify once again that the regulator would not be triggering the process itself. This is simply a clarification regarding a situation in which an application was submitted and the regulator had tried and failed to resolve the issue outlined previously using its other powers. In this situation the regulator would still have the discretion as to whether or not it triggered the process based on whether the application met the other high threshold. I hope this provides some reassurance. We will discuss this a little further in the next group.
Mr Betts
We are off to a good start this morning. I am 100% convinced that the Bill already does what I was seeking it to do. I hope we are 100% convinced on the other issues that we debate later on. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendments made: 41, in clause 59, page 49, line 4, after “triggered” insert “in relation to one or more of the questions for resolution”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 38.
Amendment 42, in clause 59, page 49, line 10, at end insert—
“(4A) Where the IFR is minded that the resolution process should be triggered, the IFR must consult the Football Association on the question or questions for resolution in relation to which it is minded to trigger the process.”
This amendment requires the IFR to consult the Football Association on the question or questions for resolution in relation to which it is minded to trigger the process.
Amendment 43, in clause 59, page 49, line 15, at end insert—
“(zi) the question or questions for resolution in relation to which the IFR is triggering the resolution process,”
This amendment provides that the notice under clause 59(5) must set out the question or questions for resolution in relation to which the IFR is triggering the resolution process.
Amendment 44, in clause 59, page 49, line 16, leave out “the resolution process relates” and insert “that question relates or those questions relate”.
This amendment provides that the notice under clause 59(5) must set out the qualifying football season or seasons to which the question or questions for resolution relate.
Amendment 45, in clause 59, page 49, line 18, leave out sub-paragraph (ii)
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 43.
Amendment 46, in clause 59, page 49, line 18, at end insert—
“(iia) how the IFR has taken account of any representations, copies of which accompanied the application under section 57 by virtue of section 58(5)(d), in setting out that question or those questions, and”
This amendment requires the IFR to set out in a notice under clause 59(5)(b) how it has taken account of any representations when setting out the question or questions in relation to which it is triggering the resolution process.
Amendment 47, in clause 59, page 49, line 20, leave out “the question or questions for resolution” and insert “that question or those questions”
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 43.
Amendment 48, in clause 59, page 49, line 21, at end insert—
“(5A) Where any of the questions for resolution set out in the notice differ from those to which the application made under section 57 relates, the notice must set out the extent of, and reasons for, those differences.”—(Stephanie Peacock.)
This amendment requires the IFR to set out the extent of, and reasons for, any differences between the question or questions for resolution set out in a notice under clause 59(5)(b)(ii) and the question or questions for resolution set out in an application under clause 57.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
As we discussed on clauses 57 and 58, the backstop can be triggered only in response to an application by a league. Clause 59 sets out how the regulator will assess an application to trigger, how it will decide whether to trigger at all and how it will determine exactly which issues need to be resolved under the backstop. The backstop has been carefully designed to deliver the right outcomes with minimal regulatory involvement. As part of this, it has been designed to be used as a last resort. That is why this clause introduces high statutory thresholds that must be met in order for the backstop to be triggered.
In particular, the clause sets out that the regulator must have reasonable grounds to suspect that its ability to advance at least one of its objectives would be jeopardised if the backstop were not triggered. The regulator must also consider whether other regulatory tools could be utilised to resolve the issues instead. The regulator must be satisfied that at least one of the conditions in clause 57—which we have already discussed —is met.
Mr French
I will be brief. I echo some of the Minister’s comments. His Majesty’s official Opposition welcome any efforts to ensure that the backstop process is triggered only as a last resort and we will carefully monitor how that works in future.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 59, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 60
The mediation stage
Amendments made: 49, in clause 60, page 50, line 4, after “resolution” insert
“set out in a notice under section 59(5)(b)(zi)”.
This amendment clarifies that the question or questions for resolution subject to the mediation process are those set out in a notice under clause 59(5)(b)(zi).
Amendment 50, in clause 60, page 50, line 6, leave out
“the question or questions for resolution”
and insert
“that question or those questions”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 49.
Amendment 51, in clause 60, page 50, line 15, after “resolution” insert
“set out in a notice under section 59(5)(b)(zi)”.—(Stephanie Peacock.)
This amendment clarifies that the question or questions for resolution subject to the mediation process are those set out in a notice under clause 59(5)(b)(zi).
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
Once the backstop is triggered, clause 60 requires the leagues to enter mandatory mediation as a first stage. As we have made clear, the Government’s strong preference is for a football-led solution to the financial distribution issues. I welcome the shadow Minister’s comments along those lines.
A mediation stage gives the relevant leagues an opportunity to reach an agreement with minimal intervention from the regulator. The stage is designed to facilitate meaningful negotiation and compromise between the parties. To this end, it encourages the leagues to appoint a mutually agreed mediator, but if they cannot, it ensures the regulator will appoint someone with the appropriate skills and experience.
The leagues can end the mediation process for multiple reasons. Most notably, the mediation—and the process as a whole—will end if an agreement is reached. However, the mediator can also end the process if it is not producing meaningful, good faith negotiations. The process can also end if it reaches the 28-day deadline. If the leagues are engaging in meaningful discussion but the deadline is reached, the mediator can extend the process by up to another 28 days.
We believe that process is flexible enough to encourage negotiation but concrete enough to ensure the backstop remains an effective regulatory intervention. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 60, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 61
Final proposal stage
Mr Betts
I beg to move amendment 3, in clause 61, page 50, line 40, leave out
“require any final proposal to be accompanied by supporting evidence”
and insert
“require any final proposal to—
(i) be accompanied by supporting evidence;
(ii) be consistent with the resolution of any relevant issues identified in the Regulator's most recently published State of the Game report;
(iii) give effect to the views of any relevant specified competition organiser which has not been invited pursuant to clause 61(4)(c) to submit to the committee a final proposal; and
(iv) advance the Regulator's objectives in section 6, consistent with its general duties and Regulatory principles in sections 7 and 8.”
This amendment would set additional requirements to accompany any final proposal for the resolution process.
This is quite an important issue, because it concerns the principle and basis on which the regulator comes to a decision. My amendment simply sets out certain things that the regulator must have regard to and take into account when making that decision.
First, there should be supporting evidence—that seems straightforward. Secondly, and importantly, we ought to keep anchoring what the regulator does back to the essence of this proposed legislation and the regulator’s purpose. Clause 6 very clearly sets out the regulator’s objectives of promoting the financial soundness of regulated clubs and the financial resilience of English football, and I think we can all agree that that is what the regulator should be doing and seeking to achieve.
Surely, therefore, when we are talking about the detail of how the regulator reaches a final decision on the backstop, we ought to be absolutely clear that it must have foremost in its mind those initial objectives. Otherwise, what is the point of the regulator and its objectives? Why are we in this Committee if not to address the financial soundness of clubs and English football as a whole?
My amendment mentions considering the views of others who may not be formal parts of the backstop mediation process. It provides that the regulator would not have to listen to them, but could
“give effect to the views”
of the Football Supporters’ Association, the Professional Footballers’ Association or others who may have views. Those groups would not determine what the regulator decides to do, but surely the regulator has to take account of their views.
I hope that the Minister gives serious consideration to at least making sure that, when reaching that final and absolutely crucial decision on financial distribution, the regulator’s aim should be to deal with the problems of the financial soundness of clubs and the overall financial soundness and wellbeing of English football.
Stephanie Peacock
I thank my hon. Friend for his amendment. Although we are still keen for an industry deal on distributions, part of getting it right is ensuring that the regulator is best placed to act if needed. As the Government amendments that we are due to debate in the next two groups show, we have reflected on many of the same points. We think it is right that any distribution order shows how it aligns with the findings of the state of the game report and with the regulator’s objectives and duties, including the duty to have regard to its regulatory principles.
That is why Government new clauses 3 and 4, which amend the final stages of the backstop, already address these issues. We will discuss the new clauses in more detail shortly, but they clearly require that the regulator sets out any relevant findings from the state of the game report and that any league proposals include evidence about how they address those findings. They will also require that any order the regulator makes addresses the state of the game findings, and they highlight the importance of the regulator’s objectives and its general duties, including the regulatory principles.
I also make clear again that, after we set out the competitions in scope of the regime, the regulator’s objectives, namely to protect and promote the heritage and financial resilience and soundness of English football, will apply to the top five divisions of English men’s football. When creating a distributions order between any two leagues, the regulator must have due regard for the wider impact the order may have on all the clubs and leagues it regulates. The regulator must make an evidence-based decision that takes into account all relevant considerations, and its final decision must advance its objectives.
It is also important to clarify that, while the order will be limited in scope to the questions set out when the process is triggered, it will not be without context. Given the important role a satisfactory distributions order will play in the future of the entire sport, the regulator will need to come to a solution that works for all of football.
For those reasons, I cannot accept my hon. Friend’s amendment, but I hope that his concerns will be appropriately addressed by the Government amendments that we will debate shortly.
Mr Betts
I am pleased to see that the Minister actually read my amendment and formulated her new clauses accordingly. What she says is reassuring. As she just said, there is no point in the regulator doing a state of the game report unless it has regard to it when coming to a view about financial distribution. That is absolutely clear from what the Minister has said, and that is what the regulator must do. On the basis of those assurances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
Over the course of engagement on the Bill, specifically in the other place, we have heard concerns about the risk posed by the binary choice distribution mechanism outlined in the Bill. While I have always acknowledged the merits of the previous binary mechanism in the Bill, specifically the powerful incentive it created for the leagues to come to an industry-led solution, we want to provide the industry and its investors with the certainty they need. Although the previous model had significant strengths, the uncertainty it introduced into the process made it higher risk than other options.
We want to get this policy right and we will always be open to sensible, well-made points on the design of the regime. I thank Lords Birt, Pannick, Thomas and Burns for their thoughtful scrutiny of this part of the Bill in the other place and for their comprehensive suggestions. Their engagement has been invaluable in the continued development of this policy.
In the light of that work, we are making targeted changes to the backstop mechanism, primarily through the replacement of clauses 61 and 62 with Government new clauses 3 and 4. The new clauses will move the mechanism from a binary choice mechanism to a staged regulator determination. In our new model, the regulator can impose its own solution, drawing on the leagues’ proposals, the state of the game report and other evidence in order to best deliver the regulator’s objectives. This ensures a more collaborative, data-driven solution.
New clause 3 sets out what happens if there are still unresolved questions between the leagues when mediation ends. It requires the regulator to invite proposals from the leagues and sets a framework and timeframes for the regulator and leagues to collaborate towards a solution. The Government’s strong preference is for the industry to come to an independent solution, so the proposal stage is designed to incentivise that. The regulator will have to outline clearly the expected scope of the proposals, set by the questions for resolution that we have discussed previously. It must also set out any relevant findings from the state of the game report. That will ensure that proposals remain focused on addressing the most pressing issues facing the game.
League proposals must be shared both with the regulator and between the disputing leagues themselves. That will allow for a more fruitful negotiation, as the leagues will be more informed about each other’s position on core issues. Leagues will also be able to submit revised proposals, ensuring both sides have the best chance possible to outline their position to the regulator, and allowing the regulator the opportunity to request additional relevant information.
That structure will ensure the regulator is in the position to make the best and most evidence-based decision possible while driving the leagues closer together, encouraging them to come to their own agreement. For those reasons, I hope hon. Members will support the new clause.
Mr French
I will not repeat the comments the Minister has made, but we also believe that this new mechanism is an improvement on the previous one, in line with feedback from the other place and from the leagues. The new clause would allow modified proposals to be submitted to the football regulator and for more of a negotiated settlement rather than a binary one. The only question we have at this stage, because we will have to see how this works in practice, is about the criteria the regulator would be looking to apply when selecting one party’s proposals over another. What does the Minister envisage that will look like?
Stephanie Peacock
I am grateful to the shadow Minister for his general support for this change. He is absolutely right to acknowledge that it comes from the other place, but also from working with various stakeholders, in particular the leagues, which have welcomed it.
The regulator must follow its objectives and duties at all times and criteria that simply restate those obligations are unnecessary. We did consider more specific criteria but did not want to be overly prescriptive, so I draw the attention of hon. Members back to the regulatory principles in the Bill and the state of the game report.
Question put and negatived.
Clause 61 accordingly disagreed to.
Clause 62
Distribution orders
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 4, in clause 62, page 52, line 5, at end insert—
“(d) must address to the satisfaction of the Regulator any issues identified by the Regulator’s most recently published State of the Game report.”.
This amendment would add the principle that the final proposal in the resolution process should address any issues identified by the Regulator’s most recently published State of the Game report.
Amendment 126, in clause 62, page 52, line 6, leave out subsection (3).
Amendment 141, in clause 62, page 52, line 11, leave out from “means” to “in” in line 13 and insert
“the first full football season in respect of which relegation revenue would be applicable”.
Amendment 5, in clause 62,, page 52, line 43, at end insert—
“(8A) Where subsection (1)(c), (4)(b), or (5) applies, the committee must make an order requiring the relevant revenue to be distributed in accordance with a proposal of its own that is consistent with the principles in subsection (2) on or before the last day of the period of 28 days beginning with the final proposal deadline.”.
This amendment would require the IFR, under the circumstances specified in the amendment, to make an order requiring the relevant revenue to be distributed in accordance with its own proposal.
Clause stand part.
Government amendments 54, 70 and 73.
Government new clause 4—Distribution orders.
Mr French
Clause 62 is, in many ways, the most far-reaching and contentious provision in the Bill. It establishes the legal framework by which the Government’s regulator, having assessed final proposals under the new resolution process we have already discussed, may issue a legally binding “distribution order”, thereby compelling parties to adopt a financial redistribution model imposed by the regulator. This is not a minor regulatory power. It is a direct intervention into the financial core of English football. While the desire to resolve long-standing disputes, particularly between the Premier League and the EFL, is understandable, the clause as drafted gives rise to very real risks of overreach, unintended consequences and potential conflict with international football rules.
Let me start with subsection (1 )(c). In the current drafting, if the expert panel finds that neither of the final proposals submitted by the parties is consistent with the statutory principles, it is required to terminate the process and notify the parties that it has done so. That is not an option; it is a legal requirement. We must ask what kind of resolution process it is, if both sides present imperfect proposals and the committee’s only course of action is to walk away. That is not resolution; that is resignation.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
The shadow Minister is speaking very clearly, and I agree with him on the potential for political interference. Does he also see within the clause any scope for market distortion because of the powers that the regulator has?
Mr French
I understand my hon. Friend’s concerns, and I note that the Football Association sent a letter to Bill Committee members over the weekend, highlighting its concern about scope creep and how that may also interfere with what the regulator is meant to be tightly governed to do.
I would like to think that we would rather solutions were made within football. It is important that backstop powers are a clearly defined last resort and that the process encourages the principle of bodies working together to find a joint solution. Let me be very clear: by defining “relegation revenue” in statute and bringing parachute payments into scope, the Government risk triggering exactly the kind of interference that UEFA explicitly prevents in its statutes. Amendment 126 would remove subsection (3) in full. That would not abolish the regulator’s ability to consider fair distribution; it would simply make clear that internally agreed mechanisms, such as parachute payments, fall outside the regulator’s remit.
James Naish (Rushcliffe) (Lab)
On parachute payments, what is the shadow Minister’s view on the balance between sustainability and giving clubs a competitive advantage? Does he not think that the regulator could have a role to play in determining the extent to which parachute payments, which have grown considerably, are getting to the point at which their size distorts their purpose?
The Chair
Before the shadow Minister responds, I remind the hon. Member for Rushcliffe that the dress code requirements for Committee are the same as for the Chamber, which means a tie must be worn. I cannot see the hon. Gentleman wearing one. If he would like to put one on before he next seeks to intervene, that might make things easier.
Mr French
I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point; I will move on slightly while he seeks his tie and then come back to his question.
We believe that such mechanisms should fall outside the regulator’s remit unless or until the parties themselves choose to make it part of a proposed solution. We believe that is a reasonable balance: it respects the autonomy of leagues, avoids placing English football at odds with UEFA compliance and helps ensure that the regulator remains focused on its core mission of financial sustainability and integrity, not financial redistribution imposed by decree.
Mr Betts
On the issue of parachute payments, as the Minister will recall we had this debate in the equivalent Committee in the last Parliament. It is absolutely fundamental. Let us go back to the objectives of the regulator, which include:
“to protect and promote the financial soundness of regulated clubs…and…of English football.”
How can it be sound that over 90% of the funds in English football go to the top 25 clubs, and that, of the money that the Premier League gives out, 80% goes to those clubs on parachute payments? There is a problem, is there not?
Mr French
As I was explaining, our preference would be for the leagues to use their autonomy to reach a conclusion. I understand the hon. Gentleman’s frustration, but I will move on.
Building on this, there remains a broader point that we have sought to create through a number of amendments to the Bill, and one that we fear the Government consistently leave the door open to—the likely empire-building of the Government’s regulator. We know that UEFA is concerned about the potential for scope creep, as is the FA in the letter referenced earlier. If this Government’s regulator expands into broader aspects of football governance, it could undermine established structures and processes of the sport. The inclusion of parachute payments in this clause, and the inflexible process in subsection (1)(c), are classic examples of the very scope creep that other regulators fear.
The clause, as it stands, is not just a domestic issue; it is a risk to England’s standing within European football, as we have said before. The Government must remember what the Bill is supposed to do. It is about ensuring that clubs are run sustainably, that fans are respected and that football’s heritage is protected. It is not about the Government’s imposing financial structures or about overriding the autonomy of leagues. It is certainly not about placing us on a collision course with UEFA and FIFA.
UEFA has made clear the potential compliance risks from the Bill, and it has warned of the ultimate sanction: exclusion from UEFA competition. Are this Government and this Minister truly prepared to jeopardise English clubs’ participation in Europe? Is the Minister so confident in her regulatory model that she is prepared to put English football on a different legal footing from that of every other UEFA member, and have English football cast out from international football? I hope not—the clubs will also hope not and the fans will not forgive it, if that were to happen.
Clause 62 is the most interventionist part of the Bill. If we are to retain it, we must amend it by removing subsection (1)(c) to allow the expert panel to act with realism and discretion. We must remove subsection (3) to ensure that parachute payments and, by extension, football’s autonomy remain protected. These are not wrecking amendments but safeguards. They ensure that the Bill delivers what it promises: a sustainable and respected football regulator without overreach, scope creep or crossing the line into political interference. We believe that the Government must take the warnings seriously about the impact on international competition. As a Committee, let us ensure that this Government’s regulator supports the game, rather than risks its place on the international stage.
Mr Betts
I want to speak to amendment 141, which has been tabled in my name. To some extent, amendments 4 and 5 have been superseded, and I accept what the Minister said earlier about the arrangements in Government new clause 4 being a significant improvement on where we were before with the pendulum arrangements in the backstop. Also, they are a distinct improvement on where the last Government were, because they allow the regulator to look at parachute payments in a particular way. That is really helpful, because we cannot address the massive disparity of funding within football, and the cliff edge that exists between the Premier League and the Championship, without addressing the issue of parachute payments.
I want specifically to look at amendment 141, because it is about timing. I want to go through what I think is the time period that we will now move towards. If the Minister thinks that I am wrong, it would be helpful if she would explain that to me. Hopefully, if we get the Bill through before the parliamentary recess, and it comes into effect fairly quickly, the regulator can begin work next season. I hope that is the intention. In the first season, 2026-27, it is probable that the regulator will be bedding in—having discussions, getting arrangements with clubs, and trying to work towards the beginnings of the licensing system. I am speculating because we do not absolutely know, but it seems to me that is the sort of way we will go.
The regulator will also be starting to work on the state of the game report; hopefully, therefore, the regulator might have it by the end of 2026. Perhaps we could do it a bit quicker—we have encouraged the Minister to make it 12 months rather than 18. But assuming that the report takes 18 months, it will appear towards the end of 2026. When is the regulator likely to be in a position to implement a backstop, if that is deemed necessary? The regulator will be having discussions in the meantime, hopefully trying to encourage the leagues to reach an agreement. Best of luck with that! If the regulator does that in a year when previously it has failed over many years, it will have done a fantastic job and I am sure we will congratulate it. But if there is not an agreement, we will get to the backstop probably at the beginning of the 2027 season at the earliest.
The problem is that because of how “relevant period” is described in new clause 49, there will then be basically two years before the backstop kicks in. On that basis, this Parliament will not see any significant distribution of funding in English football. That will not come in until the 2029-30 season, after the end of this Parliament, because of the two-year gap between the regulator reaching a decision and then the backstop being implemented. Why, if we have gone all through this process?
We know what the problems are in the English football game. We know about the massive disparities of income and about the concentration of money not merely in the Premier League but in the parachuted clubs as well. The regulator has a responsibility to address the soundness and stability of English football and of clubs within English football. We know that the Championship clubs are massively overburdened with debt, as they all try desperately to compete to get into the Premier League. If all that is the problem, and the regulator is bound to address it, does address it, and decides the leagues have not resolved it so comes to implement a backstop, why then do we sit back and wait for two years for the backstop to be implemented? That is the issue. Having failed to stop the regulator and the inclusion of backstops within their remit, it almost seems as if the Premier League has decided, “Well, at least we can stop any of this happening in this Parliament in the hope that after the election another Government will come in and save us.” It is almost as though that is what it is trying to do.
I say to the Minister, kindly and carefully: have a think about this. There is an awful lot of concern—not just in the English Football League, but among colleagues. Clubs throughout the EFL have been speaking to their local MPs and saying, “We know what the problems are. We are electing you to Parliament to resolve those problems, and you committed to do that in your manifesto. Yet with this timescale, the likelihood is that by the time you get to the end of this Parliament you won’t have solved the problem. You won’t even have put anything in place to do so.”
At the end of this Parliament, I would like the Minister to be saying, “I am the Sports Minister who has substantially helped resolve the appalling distribution of finances in English football, which cripples our game and means that clubs are exposed to enormous cliff edges that put them unnecessarily into debt, and which leads to bad practice among owners.” There are many things to stop bad practice, but we could help by resolving the issue now and agreeing on something: not how the regulator should do its job, but that once the regulator has done the job it is at least allowed to implement within a timely period.
I hope the Minister will seriously consider amendment 141 and listen to other colleagues who may want to discuss these issues as well.
Max Wilkinson (Cheltenham) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Jeremy. I rise to speak in support of amendment 141. The hon. Member for Sheffield South East has made a compelling case for its necessity. The Bill has a clear purpose, and we believe it broadly does the job. That is why we support it. Changing the previous version to include the parachute payments within scope is the right thing to do for redistribution of funds from those who can afford it, down to the smaller and lower league clubs that really need the help. Those are the people the hon. Member for Sheffield South East referred to. Those of us who represent football league clubs are being asked to do the right thing—to back the regulator to ensure that there is financial sustainability in the lower divisions.
Jon Pearce (High Peak) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Jeremy. I make my usual declaration of interest, which is that I am a member and former chair of the RamsTrust. I rise to speak in support of amendment 141, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East.
The purpose of the Bill is to protect and promote the sustainability of English football. Parachute payments are arguably the greatest source of systemic unsustainability within the game at the moment, and must therefore be addressed as urgently as possible. I have made this point on a number of occasions, because it is incredibly personal to me and other Derby County fans: parachute payments nearly cost Derby its football club. We came within hours of disappearing completely, because we had an owner trying to compete with clubs that had parachute payments, and that became entirely unsustainable.
Championship clubs are currently relying on owners, on average, for about £16 million a year. That means that the Championship is unsustainable, because it is trying to compete with the Premier League and parachute payments. We either accept that the game is for the whole country, all 92 league clubs and all the non-league clubs, or we think it should be run in the interests of the Premier League. I fundamentally think that our game is a national game and is far too important for us to sit back and allow a small number of elite clubs to decide its future.
My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East made a really strong case for his amendment. The timescales will mean that we could well be looking at the next Parliament. This is the Premier League trying to kick the can down the road in the hope that they never have to comply with it. I fear the unsustainability of the game will mean that in that period, we could lose other clubs. I therefore support my hon. Friend’s amendment.
Amanda Martin (Portsmouth North) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Jeremy. I draw attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests, be that as a season ticket holder at Portsmouth football club or, as of this morning, a newly re-elected member of the Pompey Supporters Trust board.
In the Bill under the previous Government, as we have heard, parachute payments were ruled out. I welcome, along with many fans, the change brought by the Minister to allow the regulator to look at those payments. Because of that, I know that Labour has strengthened the backstop, and, importantly, now puts it within the scope of the Bill. The change comes in part 6, where the critical issue of financial distribution is discussed. That is a key element of the Bill for my football club, Portsmouth, and other English Football League clubs, as it is impossible for club sustainability to be achieved unless there is a change to how money is distributed across the game.
However, like other Committee members, I have one area of concern that I would like to seek clarification on, and it is linked to my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East’s amendment 141. The Bill proposes a two-year period during which parachute payments cannot be reduced at all following a distribution order taking effect. Clubs such as Portsmouth believe that that should be halved to 12 months; a two-year window, as we have already heard, could result in the issue of parachute payments not even being addressed during this term of Parliament.
Can my hon. Friend the Minister give details of this timeframe, and of the possibility of the IFR having the ability to determine for itself the right approach to payments to regulated clubs, rather than having a set timeframe? Could she also comment on the role that reports such as the state of the game report may play in financial regulation?
Melanie Onn (Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Jeremy. I wanted to take this opportunity to support my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East’s amendment 141. It speaks directly to the principle at the heart of this Bill: ensuring a sustainable and fair future for football clubs throughout the pyramid, including those at the very heart of our communities.
The current structure of parachute payments, where clubs relegated from the Premier League receive tens of millions more than their counterparts, is a major contributor to systemic unsustainability. Those payments—£48.9 million in year one and £40.1 million in year two—create a gulf that clubs in the Championship must try to bridge, not with balanced support but with risky financial manoeuvres. The result is dependency on volatile owner funding, something that we have seen tragically unravel at clubs such as Bury, Wigan, and, of course, Derby County.
The backstop mechanism that the Government are introducing in the Bill is absolutely the right approach, providing a necessary and independent means for resolving disputes in financial distribution. But the two-year protected period on parachute payments really does risk hampering the ability of the new independent football regulator to respond with the urgency that is often required.
When the Bill was first published back in October, the understanding among many clubs, including my own local club of Grimsby Town—I declare no official interests, although it is important to our local community and is one of the teams in the lower leagues that really feels the financial strain from unfair distribution—was that the protected period would be set at 12 months rather than two years. Amendment 141, as I read it, simply seeks to reflect that original expectation.
Allowing for a one-season window still gives the regulator the discretion to proceed carefully, while also preserving the flexibility to act more swiftly should the need arise. This is about fairness, and also about credibility, because, if we are to empower the regulator, we should not be artificially constraining it before it begins its work.
I am grateful for the Minister’s attention to detail and her response to my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East’s contributions so far. I really think that the spirit of amendment 141 aligns with all our shared ambitions to build a financially sustainable game. It is a constructive proposal, and I hope that the Minister gives it serious consideration.
Lincoln Jopp (Spelthorne) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship Sir Jeremy. I remind the Committee of my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. Unlike the hon. Member for Rushcliffe, I chose my tie with purpose this morning, to celebrate both the fact that this might be the last day of the Bill Committee and also events in Atlanta last night.
What we have seen is the thin end of the wedge. I am alive to the arguments about the disparity that parachute payments create in the overall economy of football. However, this Bill is undoubtedly the thin end of the wedge. It will come as no surprise to Members that I am a Conservative, and therefore I think the best form of regulator is competition. We all just ought to watch, because if the regulator has parachute payments within its purview, what is next? It will be agents’ fees, TV rights carve-ups, finishing position bonuses and cut prize money. Seeking to run football as some sort of socialist command economy will come unstuck. I put on record my concern that that is exactly what the Bill seeks to do.
Stephanie Peacock
The amendments deal with the final stage of the backstop mechanism. I will respond to the shadow Minister, and then I will respond to the wider debate, including to my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East.
The final stage of the backstop mechanism is when, if the leagues have not been able to agree a complete deal themselves, the regulator will make an order to resolve whatever issues remain. That stage is set out in clause 62, and Members have tabled amendments relating to their concerns about the existing clause 62. The Government have tabled new clause 4, which would entirely replace clause 62, so the shadow Minister need no longer be troubled by many of the concerns he has set out. He was particularly bothered by clause 62(1)(c), but that will be taken out in its entirety. Our new clause 4 addresses many of the concerns reflected in hon. Members’ amendments, and I hope I can satisfy the Committee that new clause 4 is a positive change to the final stage of the backstop.
We should remember that by this stage of the backstop process the regulator will have assessed an application and representations from the leagues, set out the scope of the backstop by defining the questions of resolution, and highlighted the relevant findings in the state of the game report. The leagues will have been through mediation to resolve those questions. They will have been asked to exchange proposals to solve any questions outstanding after mediation, giving them another opportunity for compromise and negotiation.
New clause 4 sets out how the regulator will create a distribution order as a last resort if, after all those stages, the leagues cannot strike a deal. The regulator will first have 60 days to create a provisional order. We expect that during that period it will engage with the leagues as necessary to keep the process as collaborative as possible. Even at that stage, the regulator can continue to encourage an industry deal. Unlike the binary “winner takes all” model in clause 62, new clause 4 allows the regulator to design its order based on the evidence and drawing on any league proposals submitted.
The order the regulator designs must adhere to clear principles: it must not place an undue burden on league commercial interests; it must observe a delay before any reduction in parachute payments—I will address that in a moment; it must have regard to any duly submitted league proposals; and it must explain how it addresses relevant state of the game findings. The regulator’s objectives and general duties are paramount.
The leagues will then be able to submit representations on the provisional order. That feedback will help the regulator to shape an order that works for industry. The regulator will consider the representations and finalise all that into a full distributions order. That order will take into account any relevant issues raised by the state of the game report, the evidence that the regulator has gathered throughout the process, the engagement it has had with the leagues and any proposals they have submitted. The regulator will be best placed to design a solution that addresses the problems it identifies and delivers on its objectives.
If the backstop reaches that point, it is because the industry has failed to strike a deal, but we still want the solution to be as industry-led as possible. The regulator will be required to have due regard to the league proposals submitted. It can choose to directly lift aspects of the proposals into its order, but it is not required to adopt a league proposal wholesale. That is a slightly more flexible system that moves away from the inherent risk of a “winner takes all” model, and allows the regulator to carefully design a solution.
The model also allows for more evidence-based and data-driven decisions. It gives the regulator enough discretion to ensure that any order is as effective as possible in addressing the core financial issues facing the game. We are confident that the regulator, keeping in mind its objectives to promote sustainability and its duties to avoid adverse effects on growth and sporting competitiveness, can come to a balanced solution.
I thank everyone who has engaged meaningfully with this part of the Bill throughout its passage to help us to reach this version of the model. I am confident that the new approach is the right one. In light of that, I hope that Members will support the addition of new clause 4 and the consequential Government amendments in this group.
On the non-Government amendments, I will first address those tabled by the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup, and then those tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East. Opposition amendment 125 addresses the regulator’s ability to terminate the distribution process if it does not receive a viable proposal from either league, but Government new clause 4 already gives the regulator discretion to deal with that scenario. As I have said, under new clause 4, the regulator need not accept either league’s proposal wholesale. It can design its own solution, drawing on the league proposals as appropriate. We think that greatly increases the chances that the process will reach a satisfactory conclusion, and ensures that football will not go without a distribution deal. On that basis, I ask for the amendment to be withdrawn.
Lincoln Jopp
The Minister said that just because the Bill enables the regulator to consider parachute payments, that does not mean that it will. The Minister is in the unique position of being the person who is going to appoint the football regulator, because the Secretary of State has stood down from that decision. Will the Minister ask the person selected to be the regulator whether they would like to exercise the power—whether “can” will mean “will”?
Stephanie Peacock
I will discuss that in more detail in a moment, but I gently say to the hon. Member that it will not be a personal decision by the regulator; as we have discussed, the regulator will make a decision based on the findings of the state of the game report and will be guided by the regulatory principles. I do not want to get drawn into speculating whether they will or will not do that. We need the state of the game report to be done quickly, so that if the backstop is triggered, the regulator can consider the findings in the whole and make an informed decision.
On amendment 4, as the Government amendments show, the regulator will issue a notice that sets out the relevant findings of the state of the game report, which will need to be addressed by a distribution order, and the order must explain how it addresses those findings. We are absolutely aligned on the intention behind amendment 5. This exact change—to ensure that the regulator need not adopt league proposals wholesale but can instead design its own solution—is core to new clause 4.
Amendment 141, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East, seeks to shorten the transition period for parachute payments. While a timely distribution order is a priority, we must ensure that there are adequate protections for relegated clubs, to prevent a cliff edge. That is why the Bill guarantees that there can be no reduction at all in parachute payments, for an absolute minimum of one year from the end of the first season to which a distribution order applies. Shortening that period would give relegated clubs less time to plan financially, putting them at greater risk of financial trouble. That is, after all, the issue we are seeking to address through the legislation. I know that may not be the answer that my hon. Friend wants, but for those reasons I hope he will withdraw his amendments.
Mr Betts
I am still not quite sure how—given that all clubs now know that a regulator will be appointed, that the leagues and clubs know that financial distribution is at the heart of the Bill, and that a club can be promoted during the two-year period—any club can start preparing for that situation. At the beginning of that period, the club would not know whether it was going to get parachute payments, because it could be promoted and relegated in that period. I do not think the idea holds that two years gives certainty to clubs.
I am really worried about the idea of signalling, at this stage, that there will potentially be no change in financial distribution until the end of this Parliament. I do not know how far the Minister has thought that through, but if we want to encourage the Premier League and the EFL to sit down and reach an agreement—if that is the preferred way forward, and I think it is—surely the idea that the process can be extended by not reaching an agreement until beyond the next election is an incentive for the Premier League to do nothing. It is waiting for the pressure to come off, and the way to relieve it is simply to do nothing and hope that it goes away after the election.
Clearly, that pressure will go away if the Conservative party wins the election and implement a Bill with parachute payments not included in the regulator’s remit. That is what will happen. We were all elected to achieve change, and the change that most fans want to see is the addressing of the fundamental disparity within the English game that produces a cliff edge and all the problems in the Championship. We know how those problems need to be addressed: with the regulator’s powers in this excellent Bill. Why sit for two years after the regulator makes a decision and do nothing, when to give a year is fine?
The Minister has heard comments and concerns from hon. Friends today—Committee members who obviously have a great deal of interest in football in general and in their clubs in particular. Will she agree, as the hon. Member for Cheltenham asked, to take the matter away and give it further consideration? I do not want to push the Minister here and now on the words in my amendment, but I do want her to give an understanding that she recognises that there is a problem that needs to be addressed to satisfy her colleagues.
Stephanie Peacock
I assure my hon. Friend that I have thought about it carefully—that was a fair challenge. Indeed, when in opposition, I tabled an amendment to the previous Government’s Bill. I think we have very much strengthened the legislation by ensuring that parachute payments are in scope. We thought it odd to have a Bill on the financial sustainability of football without including them. That is why this Government have strengthened the Bill.
I completely acknowledge the strength of feeling on the matter. I say again that the regulator can consider it, but that does not necessarily mean that it will. It will need the evidence in the state of the game report. I appreciate and completely understand why hon. Members have shared examples from their own clubs, and are speculating on the impact of parachute payments, but that is not my role today. It is up to the state of the game report and the independent regulator to come to that decision, if the backstop is triggered.
Mr Betts
Would the Minister not therefore give the regulator a discretionary power to decide when it should be implemented, after either one year or two years? We will have a regulator who will be on top of the job and will have seen all the issues and evidence, in detail that we cannot see in Committee. Will the Minister consider giving flexibility and discretionary powers to the regulator?
Stephanie Peacock
No, I am afraid I am not in a position to do that. It is a one-year period from the end of the first season to where the order applies. We think that is a balance. It is obviously a challenging issue, with strong feelings, but formulating this part of the Bill is about striking a balance. We believe we have the right one, but I acknowledge my hon. Friend’s concerns.
Mr French
Given the previous debate, the Minister will be pleased that I am willing to withdraw amendment 125, so she gets a win out of that one. I listened carefully to her comments on removing that subsection (1)(c), and, in the light of that and in a spirit of goodwill, I will withdraw the amendment.
It would be helpful if the Minister would explain what checks and balances there will be surrounding the football regulator’s final determination. The legislation will leave it entirely up to the football regulator how best to determine the questions of resolution, with the only guardrail seemingly being that the distribution order should not place an undue burden on the commercial interests of any specified competition organiser, and the distribution order should not result in a lower amount of relegation revenue being distributed to a club during the relevant period than would have been distributed to the club during that period had the order not been made. It would also be helpful if the Minister could outline whether either of the parties would be offered the right of appeal, following a distribution order from the regulator.
Stephanie Peacock
We will come to about appeals and challenges shortly, so we might be able to explore that in further detail. I have a detailed breakdown of the process; in the interests of time, I will not read it out, but I will send a copy to the hon. Gentleman, because I think it will answer his question.
The Chair
We now come to the decisions on amendments 141 and 5. Does the hon. Member for Sheffield South East wish to pursue either of them?
Mr Betts
I am disappointed by the Minister’s response. She has generally been very helpful in trying to acknowledge concerns when they have been raised, and in agreeing to have a look at them. I will not press my amendments to a vote at this stage, but I will bring them back on Report.
The Minister is entirely reasonable and open-minded on these matters, and has engaged in discussion on all sorts of things, but I worry that a handful of clubs in the Premier League are determining what happens with distribution orders, which is disappointing. I will return to this issue in due course, because I do not think the Minister’s approach on this clause has been how she has approached the rest of the Bill. I am disappointed, but I will not press my amendments to a vote.
Clause 62 disagreed to.
Clause 63
Duration and revocation of distribution orders
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
It is important to build safeguards into the backstop process, and clause 63 outlines what happens if circumstances arise in which a distribution order made under clause 62 is no longer viable or necessary. To provide clarity to the leagues, any distribution order will need to specify when it comes into force and how long it is in force. In ordinary circumstances, an order will remain in force until the specified period ends, but clause 63 allows the regulator to revoke an order in exceptional circumstances. The regulator might choose to do that if there was an unexpected change to the broadcast market that meant an order was no longer fit for purpose. It is important that the Bill provides that flexibility to prevent a scenario in which an unsuitable arrangement is left to stand.
Similarly, the clause ensures that the regulator will revoke an order if a league subsequently strikes a distribution deal covering the same seasons as the order. That again demonstrates the Government’s commitment to prioritising and encouraging industry-led agreements wherever possible. Whenever the regulator revokes an order, it will need to notify the parties and set out the reasons for its decision, continuing the underlying commitment to transparency at every stage of the process. I urge that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr French
I have only a brief question for the Minister in the light of her comments: how frequently does she envisage distribution orders being reviewed by the regulator, and is there a risk that clubs or competitions may face financial instability due to short-term changes to distribution orders?
Stephanie Peacock
Not very often, is the short answer to the hon. Gentleman’s question, and it might be helpful if I give a brief example. If there was a very significant reduction in broadcast revenues, complying with an order might actually threaten the sustainability of clubs in the distributing league. It is not a measure we expect to be used frequently.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 63 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 64
Review of distribution orders, payment of costs, etc
Amendment made: 54, in clause 64, page 54, line 18, leave out “62(8)(b)” and insert “(Distribution orders)(10)(b)”. —(Stephanie Peacock.)
This amendment is consequential on the insertion of NC4.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
For the backstop process to be viable as a regulatory solution, it needs to be legally enforceable. The clause sets out that, once the regulator has made a distribution order, it must keep the relevant leagues’ compliance with the order under review and monitor whether there is any need to take enforcement against the relevant leagues if they do not comply. Without this power, the sustainability issues that the backstop seeks to address will remain present.
Although constructive engagement with clubs will be the regulator’s default first step, the clause references its ability to take enforcement action, as outlined in part 8 of the Bill, to ensure that a distribution order is upheld. Furthermore, the clause allows the regulator to make rules on how costs associated with the backstop are to be paid. That could, for example, allow it to pass on the cost of mediation to the leagues. Finally, the clause also explicitly highlights the ability, at any stage, for the leagues to come to an alternative agreement.
It is important to reiterate that the distribution order is a last resort power, only to be used in cases where football cannot come to an agreement itself. If the leagues reach an agreement to resolve the issues in dispute before the backstop process concludes, the regulator will not impose an order. If they reach an agreement after the backstop has run its course, the regulator must revoke its order. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Mr French
The clause requires the regulator to periodically review distribution orders and monitor compliance. It also gives the regulator power to determine who should bear the costs of the resolution process, including mediation and the final proposal stages.
I have the following questions for the Minister. First, who is liable for the cost of reviews, and is there a cap on the expenses that can be passed on to clubs? Secondly, what criteria will determine how costs are apportioned between parties? Lastly, will the regulator be independently audited on its cost management in conducting such reviews to minimise the costs for clubs?
Stephanie Peacock
I am grateful for those questions. As I said, the clause sets out the rules for how costs associated with the backstop are paid. It could, although it does not have to, allow for the costs of mediation to be passed on to the leagues. If it is helpful, I am happy to write to the hon. Gentleman with more detail. The clause sets out the regulator’s ability to pass the cost on to the leagues if it feels it is appropriate, but I reiterate the regulatory principle of proportionality.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 64, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 65
Power to require information
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
Clause 65 is the first clause in part 7 of the Bill, which covers the regulator’s investigatory powers, and relates to information gathering. It gives the regulator a power to require specified information and sets out the associated procedures for obtaining the information.
Accurate, reliable and timely information will be central to the regulator’s regime. Without a full and up-to-date picture of clubs and the market, it would not be able to regulate effectively. It would be reliant on voluntary disclosures or publicly available information, which could be incomplete, outdated or selectively presented. That is why the power in the clause is important to the regulator’s regime. The clause gives the regulator the power to issue an information notice to a person, requiring the person to give the regulator specified information that it considers necessary in exercising its functions. For example, the regulator may require information in order to monitor clubs and investigate possible non-compliance with the regulatory regime.
The ability to request information is not a unique or controversial power for a regulatory body. It is common practice among regulators to seek information from the regulated industry and from those subject to investigation. For example, the Competition and Markets Authority, the Financial Conduct Authority, Ofcom and many more all have information gathering and investigatory powers, which they use regularly. Such powers are regulators’ bread and butter, without which they would be unable to effectively regulate. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Mr French
Clause 65 allows the regulator to require persons, including clubs and their officers, to provide information that may be needed for the exercise of the regulator’s functions.
I have the following questions for the Minister. First, what are the limits on the volume or sensitivity of information that the regulator can demand from clubs? Secondly, could the clause lead to regulatory overreach if requests are too frequent or expansive? Lastly, how will the cost of compliance be managed, especially for smaller clubs?
Stephanie Peacock
We acknowledge that this is a new regime for football clubs to be operating under. They already submit information to the football authorities, and we expect that submitting information to the regulator should not be any different.
As with anything it does, the regulator should act proportionately. In this context, that means that it will consider the burden that an information request might place on a club. For example, the burden might be higher for a smaller club, so the regulator might also consider the nature of the information request. For example, the volume and nature of the information required might differ depending on the circumstances of the club.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 65 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 66
Reports on clubs by expert reporters
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
The clause gives the regulator the power to appoint a person to prepare a report on a regulated club. The person is referred to as an expert reporter, and they must have the necessary skills and expertise to prepare the report. The regulator will have expert staff and the ability to request the information it needs, but this power will allow it to draw on specialist third-party expertise and resources. For example, the expert reporter might be a firm with audit experience, where the regulator thinks that it would benefit from the firm’s ability to synthesise and analyse information gathered from the club at first hand. That could enable the regulator to exercise its functions more effectively.
The report can be on any matter that the regulator considers appropriate in order to carry out its functions. For example, the report might deal with a specific issue or with the club’s circumstances and operations more generally. The expert reporter will have the ability to require information from as many persons as necessary for the purpose of preparing the report.
The clause also covers other procedural matters relating to the appointment of the expert reporter, including rules on expenses incurred in the appointment of the reporter and requirements to co-operate with and assist a skilled person once appointed. There is precedent for such a power: the Financial Conduct Authority, for example, has the power to appoint a skilled person to a firm.
We expect that the regulator will find the power useful when it would benefit from the expert reporter’s skills to combine and interpret information gathered at first hand or on a more continuous basis over a period of time. Based on a report, the regulator may be better informed to determine whether it needs to take action on a club, or which action to take—for example, whether to impose a discretionary licence condition or to take enforcement action. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Mr French
As the Minister outlined, the clause gives the regulator the power to appoint an expert to prepare a report on a club. I have three questions for her. First, who will select the expert reporters and how with their independence be assured? Secondly, will there be cost limits or reimbursement rules in place to prevent financial strain on clubs that are required to co-operate? For example, without naming any individual companies, over the years we have seen many examples of excessive costs being applied by certain accountancy firms for such reviews. I am sure that we would not want those overburdening small clubs. Lastly, will clubs have a right to comment on or challenge a draft of the report that the expert provides before action is taken?
Stephanie Peacock
The regulator will be able, if it is thought appropriate, to provide for the club concerned to cover the costs associated with the expert reporter. That is because it will not be a commonly used tool and the cost will be specific to a single club, so, rather than all clubs picking up the cost through the levy, where possible, the regulator can ensure that the regulated party pays. However, the regulator will have discretion, and it might be the case that the club’s financial means are low and the regulator does not think it appropriate to impose additional costs on it.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 66 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 67
Meaning of “relevant infringement”
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to consider the following:
Schedule 7.
Clause 68 stand part.
Government amendment 65.
Schedule 8.
Clauses 69 to 74 stand part.
Stephanie Peacock
This group of clauses and schedules covers the meaning of “relevant infringement”, investigations into any relevant infringements, and the regulator’s investigatory powers.
Clause 67 explains the meaning of “relevant infringement” for the purposes of the Bill by reference to schedule 7. Relevant infringements are breaches of the requirements set out in the Bill and can be investigated and enforced by the regulator. Schedule 7 sets out the cases in which a relevant infringement is committed and the persons who can commit such an infringement, which could be a club or competition organiser, but also senior individuals at a club.
The fan-led review made it clear that it was vital that those in senior positions at clubs—those who make the damaging decisions that hurt clubs—were made subject to sanctions by the regulator. That is why we have ensured that the regulator may investigate and enforce on not only clubs and owners of clubs that may commit a relevant infringement, but officers and senior managers of the club.
In addition to the information offences, which we will debate in due course, the infringements in schedule 7 are a comprehensive and complete list of the possible non-compliance that might occur in relation to the Bill and the regulator’s regime. They include failure by a club to comply with a licence condition; failure by an owner to comply with a direction to cease to be an owner; and failure by competition organisers to comply with a distribution order.
The regulator may apply sanctions in response to a relevant infringement being committed, in accordance with the enforcement provisions in the Bill, but any conduct that is not listed in schedule 7 as a relevant infringement will not warrant enforcement action by the regulator. A closed list of possible relevant infringements on the face of legislation provides up-front clarity to the regulated industry and other persons as to what conduct is not permitted. It also clarifies the limits of the regulator’s enforcement regime.
Clause 68 gives the regulator the power to undertake an investigation if it has reasonable grounds to suspect that a relevant infringement has been committed. Powers of investigation are necessary to facilitate effective evidence-based enforcement. Such powers are commonly exercised by regulatory bodies across a wide range of industries. Any enforcement action the regulator takes must be based on sound evidence. The regulator does not need to carry out an investigation before taking enforcement action if it has sufficient evidence through other means. However, the regulator will need to be able to exercise investigatory powers in cases where it does not yet have sufficient evidence to decide whether to take action.
The specific investigatory powers of the regulator are set out in schedule 8. Like the general information-gathering powers in earlier clauses, the powers are exercisable only when the regulator opens an investigation into whether a person has committed a relevant infringement. The powers will enable the regulator to obtain the relevant information that it needs to look into suspected non-compliance with its regime. It has two investigatory powers: the power to ask questions of or interview any individual, and the power to enter business premises under a warrant issued by the courts or the Competition Appeal Tribunal. Those are proportionate powers that are common across other statutory regulators; for example, the Financial Conduct Authority, Ofcom and the Competition and Markets Authority all have similar investigatory powers.
Clause 68 also sets out important procedural requirements in respect of an investigation. Specifically, the regulator is required to give notice to a person under investigation explaining the matter being investigated.
Clause 69 sets out the potential outcomes of an investigation by the regulator. When investigating, the regulator must determine whether a relevant infringement has been committed and whether there is a reasonable excuse for doing so. The regulator can close an investigation by issuing a closure notice if no infringement is found to have taken place. The notice must clearly set out the regulator’s decision and the reasoning behind it. If the regulator decides that a relevant infringement has been committed, it can take enforcement action, which we will discuss in the next group.
Clause 70 enables the regulator to accept a commitment from a person under investigation in relation to their behaviour in certain circumstances. That means that, instead of carrying on with the investigation and potential enforcement action, the regulator is able to accept a binding commitment in lieu of the investigation. For example, a club could come forward during an investigation and offer to take certain action itself to rectify a possible infringement. The clause is intended to help facilitate a participative approach in place of formal investigation and enforcement. I want to reassure the Committee that a commitment is not a way that clubs can dodge scrutiny from the regulator, or reach settlements behind closed doors in order to avoid sanctions. The regulator is not obliged to accept a commitment and is still free to investigate different behaviour, even if a commitment is accepted.
Clause 71 is supplementary to clause 70 and sets out further detailed procedures for accepting, reviewing, varying and releasing a person from a commitment. It sets out safeguards, including to keep commitments under review to ensure that they remain effective, necessary and appropriate, as well as to issue notices when taking action on commitments, which may be published in the interest of transparency.
Clause 72 imposes a duty on persons to preserve information that may be relevant to an investigation. That means that a person who knows or suspects that an investigation is being conducted or is likely to be conducted must not destroy, dispose of, falsify or conceal relevant information. As set out in schedule 9, which we will come to in the next group, failure to comply with the duty could be met by civil or criminal sanctions.
On clause 73, information is crucial to the work of the regulator. I have discussed the powers the regulator will have to obtain the information it needs. However, those powers will not cut across legal professional privilege. The confidentiality between professional legal advisers and their clients is an important protection and it would not be appropriate for the regulator to interfere with that. That is why the clause clearly sets out that the regulator cannot require any person to produce, generate or provide it with any privileged communications.
Transparency has always been a key principle when designing the regulatory regime. Clause 74 requires the regulator to publish certain notices related to investigations. The specific requirements in the clause build on the general regulatory principle of transparency in clause 8. Requiring notices to be published will enable transparency and clarity in respect of the regulator’s investigations.
Government amendment 65 to schedule 8 will ensure that the regulator can conduct investigations thoroughly and without imposing unnecessary burdens. At present, if the regulator obtains information when entering business premises under a warrant as part of an investigation, it can only keep that information for three months. On reflection, we think that is an unnecessary and arbitrary restriction. While the regulator must strive to carry out investigations promptly, we do not want the process to be curtailed artificially and risk affecting the quality or thoroughness of the investigation, nor do we want the regulator to be forced to burden clubs with repeat requests for the same information simply because the three-month deadline has passed. It is in the interests of all parties that the regulator follows best practice on the retention of information taken under warrant, including the Home Office powers of entry code of practice. This is why we tabled the amendment to remove the three-month timeframe. I urge the Committee to accept it.
Mr French
The provisions in this group all relate to infringement and the enforcement of infringements. Schedule 7 sets out the detailed definition of what constitutes a relevant infringement for the purposes of parts 7 and 8 of the Bill. It provides clarity on the types of conduct that may lead to investigation and enforcement action by the football regulator, including failure to comply with a duty under the Bill, a condition of a licence or a direction issued by the regulator. The schedule also enables further types of infringement to be specified through regulations. The intention is to provide a clear and comprehensive basis for the regulator’s investigatory and sanctioning powers.
Does the Minister think there are sufficient limits in schedule 7 to prevent the scope of relevant infringement from expanding over time without parliamentary scrutiny? Could broad definitions allow the regulator to pursue cases not originally envisaged by Parliament? How will consistency in interpretation be maintained across different clubs and cases?
Clause 68 allows the regulator to investigate whether a relevant infringement has occurred. It sets out the procedure to be followed and the types of action the regulator may take during an investigation, including seeking information and issuing notices. The clause forms part of the regulatory enforcement framework. What procedures are in place to prevent investigations from becoming unnecessarily protracted or burdensome? Could smaller clubs face disproportionate challenges in dealing with investigations due to limited resources?
Schedule 8 outlines the investigatory powers available to the football regulator in relation to relevant infringements. It includes the power to ask questions, require documents or information, and apply for a warrant to enter premises where necessary. The schedule also sets out the circumstances in which those powers may be used and the procedural safeguards that apply. The powers are designed to assist the regulator in establishing the facts of a case and determining whether enforcement action is appropriate. The provisions reflect standard regulatory practice and are intended to ensure that investigations are conducted in a proportionate and lawful manner. Does the Minister believe that there are sufficient safeguards to ensure that investigatory powers are not used disproportionately? Could the powers result in unnecessary costs or disruption to the day-to-day operations of clubs?
Clause 69 covers the outcomes of investigations. The clause sets out that the football regulator may find that there has been no infringement or, if it finds that there has been an infringement, that it may decide to take no action —possibly because the person had a reasonable excuse for committing the infringement. In what circumstances does the Minister envisage there to be a reasonable excuse, and does she worry that this risks setting a dangerous precedent? If an individual is found to have had a reasonable excuse, will that encourage others in the leagues to consider using that excuse if they are investigated? How will the outcome of an investigation be communicated to the relevant club or individual? Will the outcomes of investigations be publicly available? Once again, clause 69 raises important questions about consistency. If closure notices or outcomes are not published, what mechanism will there be for ensuring that investigations by the regulator are consistently applied?
Clause 70 sets out that the football regulator may accept an appropriate commitment from a person during the course of an investigation into certain relevant infringements. Does the Minister anticipate that that will be a regular feature? If so, what effect will that have on the football regulator’s ability to conduct an investigation? The clause clarifies that accepting a commitment does not prevent the regulator from continuing an investigation into different behaviour in relation to the same or a different relevant infringement, or starting a new investigation in relation to the same behaviour to which the commitment relates. It is therefore for the regulator to determine whether to continue the investigation. What criteria will be used to determine whether a commitment should defer or withhold investigation? Does this leave scope for inconsistencies in the approach of the regulator? If a commitment does not prevent the regulator from starting a new investigation into the same behaviour, it raises the question: why add another layer of bureaucracy when the ultimate result may be the continuation of said investigation?
Clause 71 adds provisions to clause 70. For example, it sets out that the football regulator must give the person a notice as soon as reasonably possible after it decides to accept, or not to accept, a commitment in lieu of investigation, and sets out what the notice should state. Can the Minister clarify how this notice will be given to individuals at a club? It also clarifies that the football regulator may accept a variation to a commitment, provided the varied commitment would still be appropriate. What is the process an individual would need to go through to amend or vary a commitment? Furthermore, it sets out that the football regulator may release a person from a commitment and must give the person a notice as soon as possible after deciding to do so. Many of the factors that the football regulator must consider are at its discretion, such as reviewing the appropriateness of a commitment. That raises further questions about consistency and the importance of making unbiased decisions.
Clause 72 places a duty on individuals under investigation to preserve information. The clause is key, but how will a person suspect they are subject to an investigation? Furthermore, the clause does not provide a date range up to and from when an individual must preserve relevant information. Will the football regulator adjudicate on whether information has been disposed of on purpose or accidentally? Likewise, will the regulator determine whether a document is falsified or authentic? The phrase “relevant” is broad, and it is open to interpretation by the regulator.
Clause 73 ensures that privileged communications are to be protected from the football regulator’s requirements. That is extremely important, as it covers communication between a professional legal adviser and their client to do with legal proceedings. However, will the football regulator have any powers to challenge claims that a communication is privileged? I would appreciate if the Minister could clarify whether that is a possibility. Furthermore, who will verify that a communication is privileged? Could the football regulator seek voluntary waivers of privilege in exceptional circumstances? What assessment has been made of the potential of the clause to inadvertently delay or obstruct investigation?
Clause 74—you will be pleased to know that this is my last point, Sir Jeremy—requires the football regulator to publish a notice where it has given a person an investigation notice under clause 68 or a closure notice under clause 69. Is there a timescale for such publication? How will the notice be communicated or published? Will it be publicly available? If so, will full details of the investigation be published, or will some material be redacted or withheld? Will there be an opportunity to appeal before publication to avoid reputational damage? Will clubs or individuals have the right to respond with advance warning prior to publication, if that is the case?
Stephanie Peacock
I am grateful to the shadow Minister for his questions. I noted as many down as I could, but I will endeavour to check Hansard if I do not cover all of them. First, he spoke about scope creep. I draw his attention to my comments earlier about how any conduct that is not listed in schedule 7 as a relevant infringement will not warrant enforcement action, and how we believe a closed list of possible relevant infringements in legislation provides clarity to the regulated industry and other persons as to what conduct is not permitted. The scope therefore cannot expand. I absolutely agree that things should be done in a timely fashion. In debates on the Bill, we have talked continually about proportionality, and we would expect cost and disruption to be kept to a minimum.
On the shadow Minister’s point about reasonable excuse, I draw his attention to my previous comments that it is not about sidestepping responsibility, but about being collaborative throughout. We expect the regulator will publish some information about investigations that it undertakes. It is required to publish an investigation notice issued to a person under clause 68, as well as an investigation closure notice under clause 69. However, the Bill allows for certain information to be withheld from publication if the regulator believes the disclosure or publication would significantly harm a person’s personal or business interests. The regulator is not required to publish revenue and customs information or information that might contravene data protection legislation or prejudice the prevention of crime.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 67 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 7 agreed to.
Clause 68 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 8
Investigatory powers
Amendment made: 65, in schedule 8, page 109, line 14, leave out “a period of three months” and insert “so long as is necessary in all the circumstances”.—(Stephanie Peacock.)
This amendment provides that information obtained by the IFR under a warrant may be retained for so long as is necessary in all the circumstances.
Schedule 8, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 69 to 74 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 75
Sanctions
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Schedule 9.
Clauses 76 and 77 stand part.
Stephanie Peacock
Together, the clauses and schedule in this group cover the sanctions available to the regulator for a variety of infringements, and the procedure for taking enforcement action. Clause 75 sets out the enforcement actions that the regulator may take and the sanctions that it may impose, by reference to schedule 9. We expect that the regulator will seek to pre-empt and address instances of non-compliance through constructive engagement where possible, but that will not always be appropriate. That is why this clause empowers the regulator to reach for stronger and more direct tools, and gives it the mandate to use them boldly when necessary.
The range of sanctions set out in schedule 9—sanctions of varying type and severity—will help the regulator to deter any non-compliance with its requirements. In particular, they include “name and shame” censure statements, and financial penalties. Where relevant, these sanctions can be applied to individuals making the decisions at clubs, as well as or instead of the clubs themselves. This can act as a better deterrent and avoid indirectly hurting fans. The regulator will also have the ability to appoint a skilled person to a club where relevant, to help the club to return to compliance. This presents a less punitive and more assistive enforcement tool for certain circumstances that call for it.
Schedule 9 also provides for the ultimate sanction—suspension or revocation of an operating licence. That can apply to either a provisional or a full licence, but it has a very high threshold for use, in that one or more of the “aggravating conditions” specified in the schedule must be met. We do not expect the regulator to need to reach for this sanction, particularly given that it can target owners and officers at clubs first. However, it is a necessary part of a licensing system, and a deterrent for the most egregious behaviour—for example, the threat of clubs joining a prohibited breakaway competition.
Clause 76 requires the regulator to give a warning notice before it takes any enforcement action. This is common practice and ensures a transparent and fair process by providing early warning and an opportunity for the target to make representations. Clause 77 requires the regulator to issue a decision notice once it has considered any representations received on the warning notice. The decision notice will set out whether the regulator has decided to take enforcement action and, if so, what that action is. As set out in clause 80, which we will debate in the coming groups, the regulator is obliged to publish warning and decision notices, to ensure complete transparency.
Mr French
Sir Jeremy, you and the Committee will be pleased to know that I will not seek to repeat word for word everything that the Minister has said on each of the clauses, but I will pose a number of questions to her on each of them.
As we have heard, clause 75 gives the football regulator the power to impose sanctions in response to relevant infringements. How is proportionality assessed when deciding between different types of sanction? What is the estimated administrative cost of monitoring, imposing and reviewing sanctions? What legal protections are in place to prevent sanctions from being used punitively?
Clause 76 requires the regulator to issue a warning notice before imposing a sanction. The notice must set out the proposed action and give the person an opportunity to make representations, which is welcome, but is there an independent review mechanism if a club believes that a warning notice is unjustified?
Clause 77 requires the regulator to issue a decision notice, following a warning notice, if it decides to proceed with a sanction. The decision notice must explain the reasons for the decision and the right of appeal. Is there a process to allow clubs to challenge decision notices before they are published? What legal advice and support will be available to smaller clubs facing regulatory action?
I will move on to schedule 9, regarding sanctions overall. This schedule sets out further details on the sanctions available to the football regulator. Part 1 deals with sanctions related to information failures, including financial penalties and censure statements. Part 2 concerns infringements of substantive duties and conditions and includes suspension or revocation of licences and the appointment of a skilled person. Part 3 contains further provisions regarding financial penalties, including about daily rate calculations and enforcement of penalties as civil debts.
The schedule supports the enforcement powers in clauses 75 to 78 and provides the operational framework for sanctions. How are the levels of financial penalties determined in order to ensure fairness across clubs of different financial sizes? What checks exist to prevent excessive reliance on fines as a primary enforcement tool? Could any of the sanctions—for example, licence suspension—create unintended consequences for fans and local communities?
The Minister will be aware that I have pointed out in previous sittings the sporting competition impacts of any removal of a licence and how that may or may not affect relegation. We are interested in the Minister’s comments on how licence conditions would work when sanctions are applied.
Stephanie Peacock
The minimum period for representations on a warning notice is 14 days. A warning notice is an important procedural safeguard on the regulator’s enforcement process that ensures that the person in question can make their case. For example, that might be to explain that there was a reasonable excuse for non-compliance. We will talk about appeals in a moment. We have said throughout Committee and other proceedings on the Bill that appeals can be made.
On the hon. Gentleman’s point on cost, as well as the ability to impose significant financial penalties, including fixed penalties of up to 10% of a club’s revenue, the regulator will be able to hold a club’s senior management accountable for the club’s compliance where relevant. That means that, where appropriate, the regulator can take enforcement action against individuals as well as, or instead of, clubs. Targeted enforcement of that kind will be effective in changing behaviour, deterring non-compliance and aligning the incentives of those calling the shots with the club itself. It will also mean that sanctions do not need to unduly punish a club, and so indirectly hurt its fans, when not appropriate.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 75 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 9 agreed to.
Clauses 76 and 77 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 78
Offences
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
Clause 78 backs up the regulator’s information-gathering powers by creating information offences, including offences relating to the destruction or concealment of information and the provision of false or misleading information. The possible penalties for a person guilty of those offences include a fine or even imprisonment. The ability for the regulator to impose strong sanctions for what are clear offences should deter any person from information-related misconduct that would hamper the regulator. Information offences and sanctions are well precedented among other regulators, and their existence acts as a powerful and necessary deterrent. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Mr French
Again, I will not seek to repeat the Minister’s words. Clause 78 creates specific offences for destroying and falsifying information, providing false or misleading information, and obstruction. On summary conviction, a person who is guilty is liable for imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates court, for a fine, or both. On conviction or indictment, a person who is guilty is liable for imprisonment not exceeding two years, for a fine, or both. In relation to those offences, what evidentiary threshold must be met before a criminal offence would be pursued? Could the clause deter voluntary disclosure for fear of criminal liability? What is the projected cost to the public purse of enforcing those offences through the criminal justice system?
Stephanie Peacock
The effect of the clause is that it is a criminal offence to destroy, dispose of, falsify or conceal relevant information; to permit the destruction, disposal, falsification or concealment of relevant information; to provide false or misleading information to the regulator or an expert reporter; to give to another person information that is false or misleading, knowing that the information will be given to the regulator; and to obstruct an officer of the regulator exercising a warrant.
We are talking only about information-related offences, so it is fairly unobjectionable that persons should not be able to conceal or destroy information that the regulator asks for. The potential for criminal sanctions is normal for offences of that kind at other regulators. Those regulators tend not to have to ever use criminal sanctions, but having them available sends a clear and strong message that misconduct related to information will not be tolerated.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 78 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 79
Urgent directions
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
Clause 79 will enable the regulator to give urgent directions to respond quickly to a risk of serious harm. These are directions to a person, such as a club, to take or to cease a certain action within a specified timeframe to bring an infringement to an end. Urgent directions will give the regulator a strong tool to intervene quickly where serious, ongoing non-compliance jeopardises the regulator’s objectives.
We expect compliance to be the norm and that, if necessary, most cases of non-compliance can be addressed using the sanctions set out in schedule 9. However, urgent directions will provide a more direct enforcement option to bring the most serious and potentially harmful issues to an end swiftly. Given the urgency, the regulator will not be required to give the person an opportunity to make representations. There is precedent for that among other regulators. The Financial Conduct Authority has similar “voluntary requirement” and “own-initiative requirement” powers. If a person fails to comply with an urgent direction, the regulator can apply to the courts for an injunction.
Clause 80 will require the regulator to publish certain notices and directions related to enforcement. This will ensure complete transparency around enforcement proceedings for fans, the industry and the wider public—something that has been lacking in the industry to date. I commend the clauses to the Committee.
Mr French
I have some brief questions for the Minister. On clause 79, what criteria will the regulator use to justify issuing an urgent direction? Is there a risk of overreach if urgent powers are exercised without immediate oversight? Will clubs have a right to appeal or review such directions after the fact?
We believe that clause 80 mirrors clause 74 in providing a general duty for the regulator to publish various notices and statements issued under the Bill. Are there exceptions where publication could be delayed to prevent market disruption or reputational harm?
Stephanie Peacock
An urgent direction will be used only in response to non-compliance that is ongoing and of sufficient seriousness. That is reflected in the statutory threshold for the use of an urgent direction. The threshold—that the infringement must jeopardise or risk jeopardising the regulator’s objectives—is used in multiple places in the Bill as a high bar for more severe actions, for example revoking an operating licence.
A person can appeal against an urgent direction, although, as per the appeals provisions in the Bill, the urgent direction would be binding while the outcome of the appeal was being decided.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 79 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 80 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Vicky Foxcroft.)
Victims and Courts Bill (Second sitting)
Tuesday 17th June 2025
(1 day, 16 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesVictims and Courts Bill 2024-26 View all Victims and Courts Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Amendments as at 17 June 2025 - (17 Jun 2025)
The Chair
Good afternoon. The air conditioning is doing its usual thing, so if anybody feels the need to strip off, please do so within reason. We are now sitting in public and the proceedings are being broadcast. Before we start hearing from witnesses, do any Members wish to make any declarations of interest in connection with the Bill? Looking around the table, I see that they do not.
Examination of Witnesses
Suky Bhaker, Andrea Simon and Farah Nazeer gave evidence.
The Chair
Q
Farah Nazeer: Good afternoon. My name is Farah Nazeer, the chief executive officer of Women’s Aid.
Suky Bhaker: Hi, I am Suky Bhaker, the chief executive of the Suzy Lamplugh Trust.
Andrea Simon: I am Andrea Simon, the director of the End Violence Against Women Coalition.
Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)
Q
We have tabled amendments to suggest that victims and their families should have more time to consider an application to the scheme. Given your experience of working with women affected by violence, controlling behaviour and the other complex things that go on, do you think that 28 days after a sentence has passed is a sufficient amount of time to allow people who might in future wish to make such an appeal to make that decision?
Suky Bhaker: Fundamentally, the challenge with the unduly lenient sentence scheme is that victims are not aware of it. Although increasing the timeframe would be beneficial, and increasing the timeframe for Attorneys General when it comes to reviewing the applications certainly would be, we need to address the underlying issues.
We need to get this on a par with offenders’ rights. Offenders are made aware of their right to appeal by counsel immediately, and it is often the witness care unit that informs victims. However, a lot of victims do not fall under that scheme, so would never know that they were eligible. That is what leads them to apply quite late. There are also exceptional circumstances where offenders are able to apply outside of the 28 days. That needs to apply for victims as well, so that there is parity for victims and offenders.
Andrea Simon: Although we are pleased to see that there are provisions around extending the unduly lenient sentence scheme time limit to 28 days in the Bill, we still think it is too short. Our members advocate that it should be extended further to six weeks for the Attorney General, and the 14 days to apply to the Court of Appeal should be extended as well. There definitely needs to be more time.
Getting advice from a criminal barrister is also quite important in these cases. Anecdotally, we have heard from member organisations that there is not enough time for a barrister to look over sentencing reasons. This can sometimes result in judges failing to apply, for example, the dangerous criteria to a sentence, so we think it would make a significant difference if that time was extended.
Farah Nazeer: I do not have a significant amount to add. Suffice it to say that victims—particularly of the abuses we are talking about, including sexual and domestic abuse—are deeply traumatised when they come out of that process, and need sufficient time to make a decision. They also need the right kinds of advice, and to know where to go for that advice. The pathways are often completely unclear and often victims are battling many other factors—ill health, trauma, managing children and all sorts of things. As colleagues have said, absolutely yes, but how about that wraparound support to enable victims to do that in the first place? Doing it is just not possible, even if the provision is there, if you do not have the support to do it.
We have often sought to support victims to apply, and they are just not ready at all in that first month. It is too traumatic—everything is just a fog, a haze. It takes time for that haze and that fog to clear, for your mind to be able to still and for you to think, “Actually, I’m willing to go round this a second time.”
Then the right support has to come into place—not just the legal support, but the emotional and trauma support, knowing that there is somewhere to place your children and knowing that the children will have support through the process. All that is equally important if a victim is to be able to claim justice.
Dr Mullan
Q
First, have you ever heard of—or do you have experience of—people being told to alter or adjust their statements? Even if you have not, if that were the case, do you agree that we should do whatever we can to allow victims to say what they would like to say at sentencing hearings, outside of things that they legally cannot say?
Suky Bhaker: For victims of stalking, the crime is very much a crime of impact. At Suzy Lamplugh Trust, we predominantly work with victims of stalking and harassment and, as I say, it is a crime of impact, so the victim personal statement is paramount in terms of explaining the effects of the crime, particularly because a lot of them are psychological effects; it is not physical behaviours that we are seeing. We would argue that it is absolutely paramount that victims should be able to take that opportunity and to have the power to voice exactly what that experience has been for them. They are often left powerless within a system, and this is their one opportunity to be able to convey the impact.
Having said that, a lot of victims of stalking choose not to make such a statement because they choose for that information not to be shared with the perpetrator; often, perpetrators receive a sense of gratification in court on hearing about the impact. For us, there has to be a balance—perhaps in allowing victims to produce a statement but it not being available to perpetrators.
Farah Nazeer: I guess that something underlying this is that barristers or solicitors will often advise people to remove things irrespective, because of the way the courts will respond to it. That speaks to a wider and more problematic culture within the court system. I do not think that you can really look at one without looking at the other.
Dr Mullan
Q
Suky Bhaker: You need to take into account the risks for the victims. Some victims would very much like and want the opportunity for the offender to be there, but for other victims of stalking that occasion is an opportunity for the offender to have contact again with them. I guess that there would be concerns from victim survivors about the potential behaviours, or how that perpetrator might play out in a court setting.
Stalking is very much about communication, so putting the victim and the offender in the same room actually fulfils the gratification of the offender on some occasions. However, we absolutely recognise that there is a sense of justice for other victims and that they very much want that offender to be there. You need to take the victim’s view into account.
Farah Nazeer: I have nothing more to add to that; it is the same across all the crimes that we work with.
Dr Mullan
Q
There have been concerns that the measure should apply to any children so that you lose parental responsibility if you have been convicted of an offence against someone who was not one of your children. Do you have a preference for one of the two approaches? I do not know whether I have explained them clearly enough; please let me know if I have not.
Suky Bhaker: We believe it should be extended to any child. Someone who presents a risk to their own children certainly presents a risk to other children. In fact, we would go further and say that it should be extended to include other forms of violence against women and girls as well as offences such as attempted murder.
Andrea Simon: I echo that. We definitely agree in principle with the aims to limit the parental responsibility of men convicted of a child sexual offence. That restriction should certainly be expanded to include serious sexual offending against any child and should not be limited to the individual’s own child. There is a lack of clarity in the proposals about what would happen if a stepchild was abused, for example, so we want to see those loopholes and inconsistencies closed.
Farah Nazeer: I agree. I would add that we think it should be extended further, given how long these things can take for those going through trial, those on bail, those awaiting trial or those being investigated—that is the reality of the vast majority of certainly domestic abuse cases. The consequences of ignoring that are dire. We have a report coming out next week that illustrates the impact on children in terms of harm and death when it comes to making these quite frankly unsafe contact arrangements.
Dr Mullan
Q
Suky Bhaker: It is paramount that victims themselves should not feel that they are the ones being restricted by restraining orders. Often our service users tell us that exactly that happens and that the exclusion zones are not broad enough. Without knowing where the perpetrator is or making the zones wide enough, the victims themselves end up being the ones who feel imprisoned and restricted: they do not know where it is safe to go, because they do not know where the offender will be. Those exclusion zones definitely need to be made wider.
Andrea Simon: We also need to think about the practicalities and who will actually ensure that the exclusion zones are adhered to and monitored, and that actions are taken if there are breaches. That is in the broader scope of how we resource probation and policing to make sure that victims can feel reassured that these measures will result in their safety. That is absolutely vital.
Farah Nazeer: We often see orders that just do not make any sense—for example, where a perpetrator and a victim work in quite close proximity and that has not been taken into account, and where children go to school and so on. There needs to be a victim-centred approach when it comes to thinking about the exclusions and where a perpetrator can be. It is a really important principle and a good principle to have, but what we need is the training, the thought and the care that sits behind that, and also the enforcement.
Even the orders issued currently are broken on a regular basis and there are not the resources to address that. It is one thing to set this in motion and put it in place, but how it works on the ground is something that the Committee should really consider when it comes to statutory services’ ability to deliver to the aspirations and ambitions of the Bill, and equally the ability of services on the ground to support victims through varying processes.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Davies-Jones)
Q
You said that you welcome the provision and that you want it to be extended further. Can you talk about how the family courts are used in this way at the moment? Obviously, perpetrators and offenders will be able to appeal from the criminal court to the family court. What impact will it have if large swathes of them choose to appeal? That is why we have chosen to keep it quite tight.
Farah Nazeer: From our perspective, the victims we work with—women going through the family courts—see the family courts as a place of further perpetration and trauma, and an instrument of post-separation abuse. They are cross-examined, not believed and made to justify every single aspect of their lives. Although children should be recognised as victims of domestic abuse in their own right, they are often not, and the perpetrator’s rights are put above those of the children, which leads to dire consequences.
It is an astonishing omission that this Bill does not consider the family courts, because they need to be absolutely central. We feel that the Bill currently prioritises justice through a societal lens, but not healing and moving on for the actual victims through the family court, which is the court that the vast majority of victims engage with and causes them the most harm.
It is incredibly important that the Committee considers the implications in the context of the family court setting. No policy area that Women’s Aid works on is a picnic, but this is the worst of all policy areas because we see the instruments of justice being weaponised to harm survivors. We see children harmed all the time, and dying as a result of unsafe contact. If anybody who has been involved in the process were to read the transcript, they would think, “Why on earth would this happen? Why on earth would anyone do this?” It is absolutely astonishing, but it happens day in, day out. This would be a completely lost opportunity if this issue were not considered really carefully as part of this Bill.
Alex Davies-Jones
Q
I want to take you on to the victim helpline and the victim contact scheme. Suky, the Bill will for the first time ever bring victims of stalking and harassment into the victim contact scheme, regardless of sentence. What difference will that make to victims and survivors? Could you outline the importance to victims of being able to access timely communication?
Suky Bhaker: For victims of stalking, the crime is about fixation and obsession, so we are often looking at repeat offences and breaches. Receiving timely information about what is happening to the offender through the helpline and the victim contact scheme is essential, because it is a safety mechanism—it is a risk-assessing tool that lets the victim know how they can keep themselves safe—so it is really pivotal that the scope is increased.
Perpetrators of stalking get sentences of about 14 months on average, and many fall under one year, so it is really important that the scheme covers them. Of course, that does not address the systemic issue of whether that is the right sentencing, but it is at least a mechanism whereby victims can receive that information so that they can carry out safety planning and risk management.
Alex Davies-Jones
Q
Andrea Simon: Although we think it is a step in the right direction—we recognise that the Government have good intentions to extend the victim contact scheme—we think, on the eligibility and scope, that not all victims and survivors of violence against women and girls will be covered. We are not entirely reassured by how viable the helpline will be for many victims. With the helpline, in particular, the onus is on the victim to get in touch and make contact. The responsibility is not on, say, the probation system to inform victims of what is happening. We believe the correct reading of article 56b of the Istanbul convention, which talks about measures of protection, is that the state should actively inform victims when a perpetrator is to be released. People should not have to proactively reach out in order to get that information through a helpline, which we know will be utilised by some, but not in every case.
We also have concerns when it comes to survivor participation and licence conditions for perpetrators, because some survivors only have access to the helpline and potentially do not have the same level of entitlement as those under the victim contact scheme. We would like some clarity about how, when incorrect information is held or there are changes in circumstances, victim-survivors will be able to provide that information and how it can be fed through into the management of perpetrators. There is a slight lack of clarity about who will be informed and where that information will go, and I just think we have to be really clear in the public communications about the helpline, and about the victim contact scheme in general, to make sure that the public understand it, are aware of it and know how to take it up.
We are also keen to see these measures interact with the sentencing review recommendations and what is forthcoming. Of course, one review recommendation that the Government have taken up is to have the domestic abuse flag as an identifier, which is very welcome, but we would like to see the victim contact scheme essentially extended to everybody, because we know that domestic abuse offences are quite often not flagged up. The flag will help in the future, but not every index offence involves coercive control—for example, it might be criminal damage or some other kind of assault. We are worried about people who will not be able to access the information or access the scheme, so we think it should be extended more widely so that there are not gaps that people can fall through.
Farah Nazeer: I agree with what my colleagues have said. However, I think the helpline is a really strong idea. It is a move in the right direction, but nobody is supported by a helpline when their perpetrator is coming out, so you are having that conversation with the helpline and assuming that the helpline will meet the needs of the expanded victim cohort. Then a victim needs to go to a service. They need regular, routine casework support to support them through the trauma of having somebody come out or maybe come out earlier than expected—all kinds of things. Without the services to support the intentions of the helpline, we will not see that ambition of true victim support realised, so those two things have to work in tandem.
Andrea Simon: We would also recommend that advocates have access to the helpline as well. It is very important that, particularly for those supporting some of the most marginalised survivors, they can access information via the helpline. We would like clarity about their inclusion in the scheme.
Alex Brewer (North East Hampshire) (LD)
Q
Farah Nazeer: Yes, absolutely. I think part of the challenge is the enduring pro-contact culture within the court setting. While that might have started as a good aspiration, in the context of domestic abuse cases— 60% of family cases are domestic abuse cases—you have a very dangerous equation there, given that the dominant culture is very pro-contact. It is also a system that permeates across the rest of the services that are there to support children. Even when supervised arrangements are put in place, there is not the infrastructure, the monitoring or the accountability framework to ensure that that actually does happen, so the amount of unsafe contact that happens—in spite of unsafe court orders—when it comes to parent contact is significantly larger than the evidence would suggest.
Andrea Simon: I would add that, when we think about the systemic barriers to child sexual abuse convictions, we know that one of those is the enhanced issues around shame, grooming and fear that young children have. The family court itself has got a poor record on this—it often finds children to be poor historians of the abuse. The points that Farah is making about how we look at the family court and the fact that it is not part of the remit of the Bill are important. It is urgent that we review the response to child sexual abuse in the family courts, following the IISCA review and the National Child Safeguarding Practice review. We are disappointed that we are not going to have an opportunity to look further at that within the scope of the Bill.
Alex Brewer
Q
Suky Bhaker: In terms of the ambitions of the Government to get victims the justice that they deserve, things like greater accessibility and information sharing are all really important. The challenges that we see in our service are the systemic failures through the criminal justice system and victims experiences as a whole. While there are some welcome steps in the right direction in terms of adding to those protections, we need to look at how we have got to the place we have got to in terms of an outcome.
Victims have often reported being really dissatisfied with the police response, from reporting through to the court process and on to conviction. In fact, when it comes to stalking cases, only 1.8% will ever reach a conviction. We are talking about really small numbers. We have to look holistically at the police response, at understanding VAWG crimes, and at investigation risk assessment safety planning, as well as at interpreting the legislation correctly and the use of protective orders. We need to put that protection around the victim and look at systemic change. Rather than information giving, which I think colleagues have spoken to, there needs to be a whole-system approach around the victim.
Farah Nazeer: I think the ambitions are absolutely going in the right direction. The intent is really clear. In terms of the gaps and where the ambitions might not serve victims, there is the omission of the family courts, as I have said already, and the pro-parental contact culture. We need to begin to quite bravely address that, because that is where a huge amount of harm happens. Not including, as is currently the case in the Bill, a statutory duty to fund community-based services is a gap.
I know nobody particularly wants to talk about funding right now, but in terms of ensuring that the ambitions set nationally are actually delivered locally, you need those services in place to support victims, otherwise it will not happen. We can see that from the solid intentions in the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, which included a statutory duty to fund safe accommodation. That was a statutory duty not just to do it but to fund it. But even then, unless things are defined—unless they are really precise—you can end up with a lack of services in spite of that duty. Something without any form of provision whatsoever will not deliver the outcomes that you are seeking to achieve.
Andrea Simon: Overall, there are important provisions—none more so than the ones that campaigners, themselves having experienced abuse, wanted to see in the Bill. But we feel that the Bill itself is relatively narrow in scope, and could be more ambitious, particularly given the backdrop of persistently high rates of violence against women and girls and a chronically underfunded support sector for survivors.
The extent of the challenges as they exist in the criminal justice system for victims and survivors of VAWG are huge, and not everything will be in scope, but there are some important provisions that we feel the Bill could include that would make a difference, particularly to rape victims. These include the poor practice that we are aware of happening in the courtroom around bad character evidence for rape survivors. Some of you may be familiar with what happens when rape survivors are cross-examined and the defence brings up previous disclosures of abuse, and uses that to make out that the survivor is being untruthful, undermining their credibility and character. We understand that is happening because judges are incorrectly allowing a line of questioning.
There is a lack of clarity in the law that could be amended in the Bill. We know that the Bill has a purpose to look at provisions for victims and procedures connected specifically to the administration of justice in prosecutorial terms and functions. We are very clear that there is a worrying trickle-down effect about what is happening at trial and in the courtroom, and what is being used by police and the Crown Prosecution Service as a reason not to prosecute a rape case. We think that is in anticipation of a defence barrister using previous allegations in court against the victim to undermine them.
We already know that that feedback loop exists. We have seen it previously, when prosecutors and investigators were routinely requesting information about victims’ medical and counselling records, and things like that. When they go down that route of trying to bring in evidence that is unrelated to the case—when there is no evidence that they are not real allegations of abuse, but that the case has been dropped or they withdrew from the process—it is disadvantaging victims’ access to justice.
The Bill could deal with that opportunity to increase justice for rape victims if it clarified section 100 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. An amendment to the Bill would be able to deal with what is seen as admissible as evidence in court; if there is clear and reliable evidence to suggest that the previous disclosure was false, not simply that a disclosure of rape had happened. We think that including that would be a major step forward for rape victims.
Tristan Osborne (Chatham and Aylesford) (Lab)
Q
The second question is about the Victims’ Commissioner. That is obviously a welcome step. Is there any other element where you think the Victims’ Commissioner should get more responsibilities? They have to report annually and will have to take into account. Should they have broader powers, maybe to look at family courts and give a viewpoint? You mentioned that earlier. Do you think the Bill goes far enough?
My third question is about sentencing hearings. There are obviously going to be differences between where someone who is sentenced for affray or a violent offence and where it is a sexual offence. Are there nuances with the victims? Do some victims not want to see the offender in the courtroom? Should that be a mitigating circumstance in all cases for them not to appear? For instance, you mentioned a case example of harassment. In that case, should we give more focus to the courts to say, “You should not actually be attending this court hearing”? That would be almost a reversal of this policy, so that we are putting the victim before the requirement, if that makes sense.
Andrea Simon: With the unduly lenient sentencing scheme, it is both things. It is certainly a communications issue. We do know of victims and survivors who realise only at the last minute that they are eligible, so they have run out of time, and it has been a desperate dash to get an application in. We should end that because it is not serving anybody. There is the point about extending it, but it is not an either/or; it is also about the communications, the length of time, and letting people know that this exists.
I was part of a sentencing review panel, and a lot of evidence came through about the complete confusion that victims find themselves in when it comes to trying to get information. There is not one source; there are many different places where information can be fed through. You are often trying to fight to find somebody who will be able to help you. It is very inconsistent and patchy currently. There is a lot of strength to the sentencing review’s call to review all the communication channels and look at how we can best streamline them and how they are most effective for victims and survivors.
There is also a wider public education piece about what is going on with sentencing. I would not say that most members of the public are that well informed, because where would they get that information? It is only once you are in the system that you start to realise how complicated it can be to get the information that you need. We have to marry that with being able to tailor the needs of individual victims. There is no homogeneous victim group. Different victims will want to know information, but the offer should be there, and we should empower victims as much as we possibly can within the process.
Very quickly, I definitely support the extension and expansion of Victims’ Commissioner’s powers. I would potentially question how the Victims’ Commissioner will be able to work on systemic issues with the current level of resourcing that is committed. There is not necessarily a proportionate increase in the resourcing for the commissioner to be able to take on individual cases and look at systemic issues as well. We need to be clear about managing expectations, and potentially about what the expansion of the Victims’ Commissioner’s role can deliver.
Suky Bhaker: I very much agree with Andrea on the sentencing. As mentioned, there is an education piece there. Victims are not aware, or are made aware far too late in comparison with offenders’ rights. There is merit to increasing the timeframe as well.
We welcome the expansion of the Victims’ Commissioner’s powers, particularly in relation to the victims code. Less than a third of victims are aware of their rights under the victims code. That is corroborated by service users at the Suzy Lamplugh Trust. It is pivotal for that information —that education piece—to be there and for it to be monitored for greater accountability and transparency.
I think the provisions can go further. We have spoken a lot about family courts, which is absolutely right. We need to consider that part of the Bill, and, I would argue, civil courts. We see stalkers using civil courts as a legitimate means to continue stalking their victims through vexatious claims. Often, they have no recourse to justice when a criminal investigation is ongoing at the same time. We think that needs to be better explored in the Bill.
Farah Nazeer: On lenient sentencing, there is no silver bullet. It is probably threefold. First, it is awareness and education, as you rightly say. Secondly, it is time. Thirdly, it is support: support to understand what the process looks like, to go through it and to hold your nerve. It is all that emotional support that sits around it. There is a threefold set of interventions that needs to happen.
I would absolutely welcome the expansion of the Victims’ Commissioner’s role to look at family courts and what happens within that setting, but that will be possible only if the office is resourced to meet the requirements and the ambitions set out in the Bill. That comes back to the resourcing question.
On perpetrators being in court for sentencing, if you start off with a victim-centred approach, that is a good way to be led—what does the victim feel? There will invariably be crime types, such as the crime types that we work with involving women who have experienced male violence of some description—VAWG—where there should be some form of directive that alerts courts to the fact that they really do need to check in. They need to ask the questions. We know that, even where there is guidance, practice directions and training, it does not always manifest in the everyday practice of courts. I think a really important part is thinking about what monitoring there might be, as well as the robust mechanisms that you might be able to put in place to ensure that this actually happens and meets the ambitions, so that there is ultimately some form of accountability framework.
Jack Rankin (Windsor) (Con)
Q
The Chair
Very briefly, if you would, as we are running out of time.
Farah Nazeer: I think it will help. We work with loads of women who are in that setting, and when you are in that setting, you need more than one way to contact someone. It could be an email, a phone call or straight afterwards—there are lots of interventions. Again, these kinds of issues do not afford themselves a silver bullet, so having multiple interventions to ensure that the survivor knows is really important.
The Chair
Thank you very much to the witnesses for your time this afternoon; we are most grateful.
Examination of Witnesses
Glenn Youens and Paula Hudgell gave evidence.
The Chair
We are now going to hear oral evidence from Justice for Victims, and we have until 3 pm for this panel. We have Mr Glenn Youens online—can you hear us, Glenn? Would you like to start by introducing yourself?
Glenn Youens: My name is Glenn Youens. I am one of the members of Justice for Victims. My four-year-old daughter, Violet-Grace, was killed in a hit-and-run in 2017 by Aidan McAteer in a stolen car. Along with Paula and a few other people, we have set up this group to hopefully give a voice to victims and involve them in this kind of thing. We want to give an actual voice to victims to say how we feel that we have been treated by the justice system.
The Chair
Thank you very much indeed. Paula?
Paula Hudgell: I am Paula Hudgell, and I am part of the group as well. I am the adoptive mother of Tony Hudgell, who I am sure a few of you know. He was abused by his birth parents at 41 days old, and he was at death’s door. As a result of his absolutely horrific abuse he lost both his legs, along with other injuries.
Dr Mullan
Q
Glenn Youens: We were led to believe that our victim impact statement was a way of saying how the crime and what had happened had impacted our family. We had to write it two or three times before we even went to court, to make sure that it was right and put in the right process. When we got to court, we were told that we had to edit it as there were certain things in it that we were not allowed to say. For instance, my wife Becky called Aidan McAteer a “child killer”, and we were told that we couldn’t say that because he had not been convicted of it. Even though he had pleaded guilty to it, we were not allowed to call him that.
There were quite a few things that Becky wanted to be quite graphic about. She wanted to talk about all Violet’s injuries, exactly what had happened to her and how she had died of brainstem death. We were told that we could not do that because it would not be fair on him. From our point of view, if this is supposed to be a victim impact statement, we are supposed to be telling the judge, the court and—in our case—the perpetrators exactly how what they had done has impacted our family. To then be told, “You can’t say that, you can’t say this”, does not feel like a true representation of the impact on our family. For us, it was quite a negative experience.
Also, on the day, Becky’s mother, my mother-in-law, was also hit. She was crossing the road with Violet, and she never got the chance even to put across an impact statement, because she was in hospital fighting for her life. We tried to put those things in there, but we were told that we were not allowed to, because it would not be fair on him. For us, we feel that it should have been a chance for us to say to him how he had affected our family, but it was not done that way, so for us and a few other families we have spoken to, it was not as we feel it should have been. It was not a true impact statement.
Paula Hudgell: Most of the people I have spoken to have had an experience like Glenn’s, but it just shows that there is a way of having a positive victim impact statement. We were very lucky that the barrister on our case was very experienced. She read out the impact statement in such a way that it captured everything. She got across everything that needed to be said, but in those two weeks of the trial, the jury had aged about 20 years. It had been very difficult, and they still did not know whether Tony was alive or dead. In that, she put a photo of Tony under the Christmas tree with my other children, which the whole courtroom just applauded, because they realised that he was alive and living as good a life as he possibly could.
That impact was, we felt, absolutely right. It was right for the situation and for us. Everything had got through. The perpetrators were there, and for us, it was seeing their faces of sheer shock—they did not know he had had his legs amputated by that time, but we felt it was a very positive experience. It just shows that it can be done that way, but I know of so many people who had their victim impact statements changed. It was the same for the Everards; they were told to delete part of theirs. It is not everywhere that people have that experience to be able to do it properly.
Glenn Youens: Having spoken with Paula last night and had a conversation about this, hearing how impactive and how positive it was for Paula—if that is the right word in the situation—really highlighted for us the inconsistencies in the information that people are given and the way things can be done. I am grateful that Paula got that, but for us it was completely the opposite. It just shows, even within our small group, how inconsistent that is from one court to another court. That is what we need to look at.
Dr Mullan
Q
Paula Hudgell: Yes, we absolutely agree. We feel that the victims should be asked about the sentencing hearings, but we also appreciate that in some cases—although you want to see the perpetrators and you want to be there to see them sentenced—some of the perpetrators really do not behave, and they can actually cause more harm to the victims and their families by being there. I know it says it is down to the judges, but the victims and their families really should be consulted on how they want to proceed.
Glenn Youens: I would say the same as Paula: it really should be down to the families. For judges, it is another case, another part of their job, but the families are the ones living that reality. If they want to see the perpetrators in court, they should be able to; if they do not want to, they should be able to put that forward. I do not think that anyone can make that decision apart from families. It is important that they are given the option. It should not just be what the judge thinks; there needs to be a conversation with them, letting them put their point across properly. Some people might want to see them; some people might not. It is really important that the families, the victims, are considered properly, and that it is not just, “This is what the judge thinks.” It needs to be a conversation with the victims.
Dr Mullan
Q
Paula Hudgell: Yes. As long as it is what the victims themselves or their families actually want, then yes, I think they should be compelled to be there. Obviously, it is slightly different, but with our VPS in a parole hearing they refused to listen to it. I do not agree with that, because you cannot see how that person reacts. It should not be down to their rights; it should be down to a discussion with victims as to whether they want it. Yes, I agree with forcing people.
Glenn Youens: I think it is down to the families. In our case, Aidan McAteer and Dean Brennan asked if they could not come to court; they wanted to do it by video link. And the judge said, “No, you have to be there. You have to attend.” For us, that was what we wanted. At the end of the day, these criminals chose to do what they did; they chose to be there. Among the victims, nobody chose to be there. The victims should be looked after and made to feel that if that is what they want, then that is what we will do, because they are the ones who have been pushed into this.
A lot of people do not have experience in court and do not have experience of the criminal side of stuff; they have been dragged into it. The least the courts can do is to make them feel as comfortable as possible. If that means the criminal being there and acting up, shouting up, doing what they want—if they still want to see the criminal’s face when they receive proper justice, the criminal should be made to attend. Whether that they should be restrained or had time added on to their sentence, they should be made to do it. What the victims’ families feel should be done for them.
Dr Mullan
Q
Paula Hudgell: It is very difficult when you have been through a trial or a sentencing. Your emotions are everywhere. It is so draining—it just takes over your whole life.
A lot of the time, the information is not given that you can actually appeal a sentence. Twenty-eight days is not long enough. People are going through a bereavement. As one of our group pointed out, “You have 28 days to take a T-shirt back to the shop—28 days to make a decision over that!” You may not find out until the last minute. It is very, very difficult.
Also, a lot of the time you do not know the process, unless you are from a legal background. Sometimes you are not told and that information does not filter through. Yes, it should be a lot longer, because your emotions are all over the place when you are in that situation.
Glenn Youens: As Paula said, and as Katie said in our group—“Twenty-eight days? You get longer to decide if you like an item of clothing or not.” Becky asked the CPS about how we appealed the sentence, and we were actually advised on the day not to appeal it, because it was felt that if we did appeal it, the criminal could get less time in prison. That was our first experience with it.
After that, we were planning Violet’s funeral; we had to go from there and plan our daughter’s funeral, and then we had 28 days to try and appeal the sentence. Your head was not in the right place. We did not open post for about four or five months after that. We did not answer the phone to people, because we were trying to put our life back together. But then to realise that, as you say, you have 28 days to appeal it—it is not enough time for people like us and other victims. Their first thing is trying to put their lives back together again. Then, when you are strong enough to realise, “I can go through this court case—I can go through this again,” to be told, “It’s too late now.”—I just do not think that is acceptable for families.
Unless you have been in a situation where you have had to go to the sentencing of somebody who has killed your loved one, it is really hard to express how you feel in the next few days, weeks or months. I was off work for seven months before I returned to work—it was seven months before I felt like I could go back to any kind of normality. Yet you are only given 28 days to decide whether you want to go through that court case again, and also to decide whether that is worth doing when there is a chance that he might get a lesser sentence than the already insulting sentence he has been given.
That needs looking at. It needs to be done properly, and the families need to be consulted, because I am pretty confident that most families you will speak to will agree that 28 days is not long enough to do anything in that situation.
Alex Davies-Jones
Q
Alex Brewer
Q
Paula Hudgell: That is a difficult one, because I do not really know about it—sorry.
Glenn Youens: I do not think that we know enough about that side of it, but I think anybody who has been affected by a crime is a victim.
The Chair
That was nice, short and pithy, if I may say so; I wish some of my colleagues were as succinct. There are no further questions, so thank you both very much indeed, Glenn and Paula. I know how difficult this must be for you, and I very much appreciate your giving your time today. What you have said will be very important in the Committee’s deliberations.
Examination of Witness
Mark Brooks gave evidence.
The Chair
We will now hear oral evidence from ManKind Initiative. We have until 3.20 pm for this panel. Will the witness please introduce himself for the record?
Mark Brooks: My name is Mark Brooks. I am chair of the trustees of the ManKind Initiative charity. We are a specialist by-and-for service for male victims of domestic abuse, and we work with colleagues across the sexual violence sector and related sectors.
Dr Mullan
Q
I want to ask about exclusion zones. At the minute, a perpetrator will be told that there are certain places that they cannot go, but they can go everywhere else. We have heard evidence that this means that victims of domestic abuse or other offences are constantly unsure about where they might run into the offender. The Government propose changing that around, so that there will be certain places that the perpetrator can go, and then the victim can be confident that, by not going to those places, they will not run into them. Do you have any views on that approach?
Mark Brooks: We support that approach, because it puts the victim first and the rights of the perpetrator second. The ex-partners of some of the men we have spoken to have gone to prison and, after coming out, have caused a huge number of problems for them in the wider community. Those men and their children—daughters and sons—have had to move, and they are continually fearful of coming into contact. We would be in favour of that approach. It is the right way round.
Dr Mullan
Q
Mark Brooks: For it to act as a deterrent, we think it should apply in all cases. We want far-reaching consequences for anyone who commits those crimes, so we think it should be extended.
Dr Mullan
Q
Mark Brooks: I absolutely do. The key thing is to make sure that all victims are aware of it. We should make sure that domestic abuse victims, female or male, are far more aware of it, especially where the criminal sanctions have not been large. As you heard from the Suzy Lamplugh Trust, the impact of abuse post-separation or post-sentence—when the criminal sanctions have ended—can often be as traumatic as the crime itself, because it potentially leaves the victim on eggshells for the rest of their life. If they have access to the helpline and know what is happening with the person who committed the crime against them, they can better manage that. As previous witnesses have said, we obviously need more funding for people to go to local support services when their offender is released from prison.
Alex Davies-Jones
Q
In these evidence sessions, we have heard a lot about the importance of communicating with victims, not just to give them information relating to their perpetrator but to help them understand their rights. Can you tell us about your interaction with the victims code? How will the measures in the Bill relating to compliance, the scrutiny of agencies and the Victims’ Commissioner’s powers help with that?
Mark Brooks: We are continually promoting the victims code, not only through our helpline and our website but through our interaction with practitioners across the domestic abuse sector. The victims code is really important, and it has helped a number of men who have gone through that.
Part of the problem is that male victims, in particular, are often not in the system in the first place, so they do not come forward to the police and to community-based services. Only one in 20 clients of community-based domestic abuse services or independent domestic violence advisers is male. The victims code is really important in supporting men when they are in the system, but the challenge on communication is getting them into the system in the first place.
Anything that better promotes the victims code—I really welcome the new powers for the Victims’ Commissioner to audit the code—is really important. From my wider business experience, I know that if you do not measure it, it does not get done. That is a really important new power for the Victims’ Commissioner.
Alex Brewer
Q
Mark Brooks: I think the two measures that have been put forward to recognise children as victims of domestic abuse are really important. The previous witnesses talked about the family courts, which are as vexatious a place for men, male victims and dads as they are for mothers. It is really important, when we talk about the family courts and the impact on parents and children, that we have a balanced and nuanced debate, especially because we constantly have men calling us who have had problems with the family courts relating to allegations, as well as protecting their own children.
On the Bill’s measures to protect children in relation to the family courts, some organisations have asked the Government to think about shared parenting or the presumption of contact issue. We think that must remain, primarily because if you start unravelling that, you start unravelling the family unit as the core basis of what is good for children. There need to be more safeguards around protecting children, especially in the family courts, but the presumption of contact, as set out in the Children Act 1989, should remain.
Alex Brewer
Q
Mark Brooks: It is not so much in the Bill, and the Minister knows our position on this, but there continues to be an issue with how male victims of domestic abuse, sexual abuse, stalking and other crimes are seen by society and, importantly, within the justice system. We know that the present and the previous Victims’ Commissioners support the position that male victims of domestic abuse should not be classed as victims of violence against a woman or a girl. A son, as covered by the Victims and Courts Bill, has been characterised, classed and defined by successive Governments as a victim of violence against a girl, even though he is obviously a boy.
The same issue applies to male victims of domestic abuse. Successive Governments have officially classed them as being victims of violence against a woman. We are asking that “violence against women and girls” be changed to include male victims. When the Bill is enacted, any male victim covered by it should no longer be classed as a victim of violence against a woman or a girl. That has to change; it is quite Orwellian, aside from anything else, as it is clearly incorrect.
We therefore need to get more male victims recognised in their own right. They would then have more access, more understanding and better support to be able to come forward and benefit from the measures in the Bill. This is a wider political issue. Just to reiterate, we want to keep the violence against women and girls strategy and definition, but we want a parallel view for male victims.
Mr Jonathan Brash (Hartlepool) (Lab)
Q
Mark Brooks: We believe it is right that a perpetrator, or somebody who has been sentenced, should be forced to be present at court, including at sentencing. It is important that victims not only see that justice is being done in terms of sentencing and the court experience, but feel that it is being done. Seeing the person being convicted in front of them, with their family and the wider community, is absolutely essential, so we support the measures on that in the Bill.
In terms of it being a spectacle, the bottom line is that we must act in the interest of the victim, the person who has had the crime committed against them. They must be the priority, so we are in favour of the measures put forward by the Government.
Mrs Elsie Blundell (Heywood and Middleton North) (Lab)
Q
Mark Brooks: I work in wider policy around men’s health and I have been helping the Government on the men’s health strategy call for evidence, which is out now. In terms of language, I often see literature in which men are not visually present, so it is important that men in all their shapes, sizes and guises are visible. Also, there needs to be more outreach, often targeting where men go, not where you think they should go. Leaving things in libraries and GP surgeries, for example, will not reach men. We need far better promotion online and through community groups, barbers and sports clubs—Facebook is also really important for men—basically reaching out to where men go.
There is a huge growth in community-based support charities for men, which have grown exponentially in the last five years—things like Men’s Sheds, Andy’s Man Club, Talk Club and so forth. Some of them are in the room next door, giving a presentation about the men’s health strategy, so use those. The justice system and the people within it can be smarter in reaching out to non-statutory organisations.
Jack Rankin
Q
Mark Brooks: Yes, in principle. I come back to my point about the importance of making sure victims feel that justice is being done, as well as seeing it being done.
Bradley Thomas (Bromsgrove) (Con)
Q
Mark Brooks: The issue is where you would draw the line. It depends on the violent offences, and against whom they are committed. I mentioned the wider work I have been doing on men’s health and the criminal justice system. You do not want a situation where men who have gone to prison and are going through a rehabilitation process for violent crimes, but not against their children, are not able to rebuild their relationship with their children. We have found that a lot of men in prison want to be present dads, even when they are in prison, which means they want to re-engage with their children when they come out of prison.
Bradley Thomas
Q
Mark Brooks: I think that should be considered if it is against their partner and they share a child. Certainly that should be up for consideration, but no wider than that. Again, we have to make sure that men or women coming out of prison, who have been convicted of these offences, have the opportunity to be rehabilitated. One of the big concerns is that people go into prison for crimes such as domestic abuse and do not receive the support they should so that they can have a safe relationship with others when they come out, if that can happen. We need more work on perpetrators, and that is certainly a point worth considering.
The Chair
Mr Brooks, thank you very much indeed for taking the time to be with us this afternoon.
We are coming to the penultimate panel, and it is quite likely that the final panel will be punctuated. If so, since the Minister will be on the Front Bench for the business to come in the Chamber, I do not propose to call her back—I hope that is satisfactory. Hopefully we will get everybody in and the two remaining panels will not be interrupted, but I am expecting a vote shortly before the hour, so it is quite possible that they will be.
Examination of Witnesses
Kim Thornden-Edwards and Chris Jennings gave evidence.
The Chair
Q
Kim Thornden-Edwards: My name is Kim Thornden-Edwards, and I am the chief probation officer in His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service.
Chris Jennings: My name is Chris Jennings. I am an area executive director in HMPPS, with operational responsibility for prisons and probation in the south-west and what we call south-central. I also have a national victims policy team sitting under my command—that is really why I am here today, rather than the first part of my job.
Dr Mullan
Q
Chris Jennings: That sounds well described from our perspective. It is obviously for Ministers to set policy, rather than us.
Dr Mullan
Q
Chris Jennings: I have operational responsibility for 15 prisons, so I have some expertise, but I have never been a prison officer and do not have personal experience in that way.
Dr Mullan
Q
Chris Jennings: Yes, I would say we are skilled in that.
Dr Mullan
Q
Chris Jennings: With the appropriate training and resources, I guess it would be possible.
Dr Mullan
Q
Chris Jennings: There are some resource implications, but not massive ones that are causing us particular concern at this stage. A lot of the legislation is about bringing work that we already do on to a statutory footing, so we are not adding a huge amount of new work into the system, albeit the helpline is an expanded service that will be new. However, for the victim contact scheme, there is nothing massive, and we have published an impact assessment that sets out our views on that, and the numbers of new staff and resources are not massive.
Kim Thornden-Edwards: We already operate with a helpline that addresses some aspects of this. We would be looking to build on and expand the resources into that helpline. We already have resources in place, so it will just be about building out from that. As Chris says, our impact assessment so far does not indicate that a significant uplift in resources will be required, but we will keep that under review.
Caroline Voaden (South Devon) (LD)
Q
Chris Jennings: We have staffing challenges in different ways in the Probation Service. Victim liaison officers are a particular group of staff that we recruit through a particular route. It is not the same route that we recruit probation officers through, and that is not the same route that we recruit unpaid work supervisors through. There are different role types within the service, and some of them are under more pressure than others. VLOs are not one of the areas where we are under most pressure, despite your description being absolutely true for some of the other areas.
There is also a geographic spread of where we are under pressure operationally; it is not the same everywhere. Some places are very well resourced and some are less well resourced. Those combinations lead us to a place where we do not think that resourcing should be the thing that holds us back from making a success of this. Of course, we have to pay close attention to it, because if the numbers go up more than we anticipate, we will need to make sure that we resource that adequately, but we are not hugely worried about it at the moment.
Kim Thornden-Edwards: The victim contact scheme is a discrete service, so we do not transfer staff across or expect people to do a multiple brief on it. It is a discrete service that we recruit to separately. Our recruitment of victim liaison officers has been on an upward trajectory over the last 10 months. The banding and grading, and therefore the salary, of victim contact officers also increased last year, so we anticipate that there will be further uptake in terms of recruitment. Across the Probation Service, most grades saw an increase over the last year, so we are generally on an upward trajectory for staffing. You may be familiar with the Lord Chancellor’s announcement that we will look to recruit a further 1,300 probation officer staff during this financial year. We anticipate continued significant growth of probation areas over the period of the spending review.
Caroline Voaden
Q
Chris Jennings: Yes. We are very used to dealing with the impacts of all those sorts of crimes in our world. It is the bread and butter of what we do. We will need to make sure that we give people the appropriate skills and training and do not throw them in at the deep end, but we are well used to doing that and we have the skills to do it. I have no reason not to be confident that we can make that work.
Kim Thornden-Edwards: We are also building on a service that is delivering good outcomes currently. In 2024, so very recently, His Majesty’s inspectorate of probation, which provides our external scrutiny, found our statutory victim work to be outstanding for three of our regional inspections. We also had an inspection in 2023 of general victim services that found the services to be good. We are building on a good level of service delivery currently and victim liaison officers who are doing a good job. We are very concerned to ensure that their training remains relevant and pertinent to the specific issues that the victims who use our service are often involved in. There is dedicated training for domestic abuse.
We are also concerned, as the service, and particularly the helpline, expands and extends, to ensure that those who deliver the helpline will be involved in the most appropriate training, including domestic abuse and a trauma-informed approach. We will build in those training requirements at every juncture and for every member of staff involved in the scheme.
Tristan Osborne
Q
My second question is about restriction zones. We are pivoting away from exclusion zones to restriction zones, which is giving more focus to victims. Do you think the monitoring is in place for the Probation Service to be able to manage that change of approach, to ensure that there is a pivot away from the rights of the perpetrator to the rights of the victim?
Chris Jennings: Maybe I should pick up the first question. Depending on how a perpetrator appears before the court—whether they are beaming in from prison via video link or attending in person at court—there are different responsibilities in terms of who undertakes the potential restraint of the prisoner. If we deliver somebody to court, court officers take custody of that person and look after them in the dock. I am less able to speak about the skills of the court staff, because it was many years ago that I worked in the court service and I do not feel up to date.
If you are in prison and beaming in via video link, I guess—to an earlier question—it would be possible to train prison officers who are already skilled in some forms of control and restraint in a different way. My instinct would be, although I am not perfectly qualified, that for court staff that would be quite a leap.
Kim Thornden-Edwards: On your second question about a switch from exclusion zones to restriction zones, we are currently working through the finer detail of that policy change and its impact and implications. We will take stock and determine what policy change is required to enable staff to make the change, what practice and operational guidance and instructions will be required, and what training element will be required, should that be necessary. We will be working through all those potential implications to this change. Our staff are very well versed in exclusion zones and understanding those. I am confident that they will be able to understand the change in emphasis and what some of the implications are, and will be able to bring the necessary degree of professionalism, integrity and foresight to those arrangements.
Chris Jennings: Our relationship with the police will be key, too. We work closely in partnership with them on these sorts of things. That will be required during this change, too, to maintain those close operational relationships on the frontline.
Sally Jameson (Doncaster Central) (Lab/Co-op)
Q
I want to come back to the point about compelling attendance at sentencing hearings. The Government’s Bill states that a relevant officer may,
“for the purpose of delivering the offender to the courtroom, use reasonable force, if necessary and proportionate.”
That is in relation to the existing use of force policy framework and the relevant Prison Service orders that apply to it. Do you agree that, when you look at the use of force framework, the words “necessary”, “proportionate” and “reasonable” relate to the whole spectrum of use of force, from the very lowest level, such as a guiding hold, right to the top level, and therefore the word “restraint” in the amendment tabled by the official Opposition does not detail what existing restraint would be used that is not already covered in the current policy framework?
My second question is this. I have never heard or seen gagging in any Prison Service policy, so from your operational experience, what implement would you suggest would be used for gagging and how would it be applied?
Chris Jennings: In reverse order, that is well beyond my area of expertise, because, as you rightly identify, that is not something that is in use in the service at the moment. Perhaps, in some unfortunate hostage situations, other prisoners may deploy such techniques, but not our staff, so I am not qualified to offer a perspective on what sort of equipment may or may not be appropriate.
On your first question, again, I am not an expert on use of force—I have not done the jobs you have done to get to the role I am in now—but I think that the description you gave of the policy is accurate. That way that you described it is what it means at every level; that would be my interpretation.
Ruth Jones (Newport West and Islwyn) (Lab)
Q
Chris Jennings: I was the director in Wales for four and a half years, until 18 months ago, so I know working in Wales quite well. It is one of the better staffed areas, despite colleagues’ perspectives to you being right; there will be some carrying heavy workloads, I am sure. The distinction is between the probation officer caseload and what we ask VLOs to do. They are not the same thing. As Kim described, they are ringfenced activities. There is obviously communication between the two sets of staff, but they are not the same thing.
The overall probation caseload in some areas is definitely something that we are more worried about, but not as it pertains particularly to the VLOs. That is why we are perhaps reasonably upbeat about it. It is not one of the areas that we are under most pressure on, so I think we will be able to absorb it. There will be some national things, such as the helpline and ensuring that we resource that on a national basis. My national team have a key role to play in providing the training, support and guidance to VLOs out there.
Switching my hat back to my other day job, operationally, between me and my regional probation directors, we will have to ensure that we are paying full attention to implementing the Bill well, given how crucial it is to confidence in the justice system and making sure that we are providing the support that victims deserve. I do feel confident about our ability to do that.
Kim Thornden-Edwards: I certainly endorse that. Again, it is about the discrete element of the victim liaison officers. In terms of general staffing, I absolutely acknowledge what you are saying. The Lord Chancellor has acknowledged that there are capacity issues in the Probation Service, and workloads are currently too high. We have a comprehensive plan to mitigate that. Part of that is around growth. The Lord Chancellor announced £700 million of additional funds for probation by the end of the spending review period, so we will be able to look at growth with that funding.
We are also looking at ways to improve our processes and use of technology. Those are things that our probation staff on the frontline are saying to us are real hindrances to their ability to do the best job every day, which they absolutely want to do. They are time hoovers, too. The time that staff want to spend with people on probation and on licence, to protect the public and effect the changes that we need to see in their behaviour, is being eaten up by bad tech and poor processes. Alongside growth, there is absolutely a commitment to make those changes as we go forward.
The Chair
Thank you very much indeed. What you have said will be very useful in the Committee’s deliberations.
Examination of Witness
Alex Davies-Jones gave evidence.
The Chair
Good afternoon, Minister. For the record, could you introduce yourself?
Alex Davies-Jones: I am Alex Davies-Jones, the MP for Pontypridd and the Minister with responsibility for victims and tackling violence against women and girls in the Ministry of Justice.
Dr Mullan
Q
Alex Davies-Jones: Yes, indeed, and we look at other international examples. Of course, we look for best practice.
Dr Mullan
Q
Alex Davies-Jones: It is very important to note that the judicial system in the USA is very different from that in England and Wales. It is not easy to operate a distinct comparison. In the US, as far as I am aware, they are able to use extensive force to compel perpetrators to attend hearings, court and so on, but I am not immediately familiar with all the intricacies of it.
Dr Mullan
Q
Alex Davies-Jones: In principle, along with extensive training and resource, I believe is what they said.
Dr Mullan
Q
Alex Davies-Jones: I would have to consult with other stakeholders, such as the Prison Officers’ Association, other potential legislation, and so on. It is not as black and white as that.
Dr Mullan
Q
Moving on to the ULS scheme, you have mentioned, both in the Chamber and in your questions today, that the Law Commission is considering issues such as criminal appeals. What is your understanding of its consultation proposal of changes to the ULS scheme in relation to victims and others making use of it?
Alex Davies-Jones: I am very pleased that the Law Commission has extended its time limit for the consultation in order to take into consideration the views and feedback of victims. The consultation has been extended until the end of June. It is really important that a range of views is taken into consideration. We have heard a range of views in the evidence today about how the ULS works and people’s different experiences with it. It is very important that the Law Commission takes that into consideration. I would like to put it on the record that I have met the Law Commission to discuss this and other parts of the work that the commission is looking at as part of the Ministry of Justice. The feedback has been taken on board that victims’ views should be considered.
Dr Mullan
Q
Alex Davies-Jones: I am happy to answer that question. To reiterate what we have heard throughout the evidence sessions today, there is a wide range of views, particularly on whether and how we could make an amendment to allow victims to appeal. It is important that that wide range of views is taken into consideration.
With respect, we only have one Attorney General; therefore, there are not many people for us to consult with. The request has come directly from the Attorney General’s Office to allow it more time to review cases from this side of things. This is a measure that was in the previous Government’s Criminal Justice Bill, which fell before the general election. There were no other measures in that Bill to change the unduly lenient sentence scheme. This Government have chosen to take that measure and put it in this Bill, while being aware that there is a range of views that need to be considered on the unduly lenient sentence scheme as a whole for victims.
Dr Mullan
Q
Alex Davies-Jones: I agree that the vast majority of witnesses we heard from think that the scheme needs to be amended. There was a huge discrepancy in how they thought that should take place and what the time length should be. There were also a lot of views on the communication around the ULS and other victims’ rights, which need to be considered. That is why I think it should be carefully considered by an independent body such as the Law Commission rather than hastily changed in this Bill. It should all be considered as a whole.
Dr Mullan
Q
Alex Davies-Jones: I am committed to ensuring that victims’ voices and views are heard and represented throughout the justice process. That is why we have introduced the Bill, and why we are committed to putting victims back at the heart of our criminal justice system. I think it is important for the Committee to know that, at present, a victim impact statement is considered a vital piece of evidence in a judicial proceeding or court of law, which is why it has to be quite tight in its formation. As we have heard today, that is why it is important to increase victims’ awareness of what they can put in the statement.
I am always open to hearing how we can best convey the views and feelings of victims, and I have tasked my officials with looking at whether there is another way that we can make that possible. We are currently looking at that, but we must be aware of the parameters of a specific victim impact statement and the weight it is given by a judge and potentially a jury, which is why it needs to be quite specific and why we have heard that victims have been told or asked to change it.
Dr Mullan
Q
Alex Davies-Jones: I think it is important to note that it is considered by a judge or jury in sentencing, and it is still classed as evidence. It needs to be factual and there are also restrictions placed on what victims can say about a perpetrator. For example, they are unable to threaten a perpetrator in the victim impact statement. I agree that victims need more education and support in understanding what they can say, but I do not want to be in any position where I am restricting a victim in how they can put forward the impact that a crime has had on them. Therefore, I am actively looking at what mechanism is best to do that.
Dr Mullan
Finally, I just point out again that our amendment addresses the issue of making threats, for example. Those are things that you cannot do anyway, in terms of free speech, so our amendment covers that issue also. I encourage the Minister to look at our amendment again more closely, to see whether she can support it.
Caroline Voaden
Q
Alex Davies-Jones: I am happy to clarify the Government’s thinking behind why we have kept this measure quite tight. It is important to say at the outset that there are other mechanisms to remove parental responsibility from offenders and perpetrators, and those mechanisms will still remain, such as the family court process.
What this measure does is quite novel: it removes parental responsibility at the point of conviction in the criminal courts, and it is an untested measure in doing so. It is important that we can see the impact this will have on victims, survivors and, first and foremost, children. It is important to stress that perpetrators will be able to appeal this through the family courts, and they will be able to apply for legal aid through the system as a result of this.
Therefore we feel that, at this point in time, it is important to keep such a novel approach quite tight. That is why we have chosen to restrict it to offenders who have been committed of any sexual offence against their own children and been sentenced to four years or more. We are not saying that we would not be open to expanding it in the future, but, as I think we heard quite clearly throughout the evidence sessions today, we must consider the impact this could have on the family court system as it currently stands.
The family court is under immense pressure. Sadly, another element of the criminal justice system that we inherited from the previous Government is the immense pressure from the backlog. You also heard about the issues that currently stand within the family court, and how many victims and survivors, particularly victims of domestic abuse, feel that it retraumatises them. I would not want to put any other victims through that process, and that is why the Government have chosen to target this measure, as a starting point, at that specific cohort. We feel it is a novel approach; it has never been done this way, and so we have chosen to be quite specific with it.
Caroline Voaden
Q
Alex Davies-Jones: There is a mechanism available to remove parental responsibility via that route, currently through the family courts. I am aware that that would require the other parent to take the perpetrating parent to the family court, and I have been made aware that it is not easy to do that, but that route is available. That is why we have chosen to keep this measure quite tight at present.
Caroline Voaden
Q
Alex Davies-Jones: Because there are sadly quite a lot of sex offenders in this country, so extending the measure to any sex offender could bring waves of people into scope. We are not saying that that is not appropriate, but this is a novel approach and those perpetrators can have parental responsibility stripped through other means. I am very cautious about putting extra strain on the family courts, given the issues that they face. At present, we want to keep it to any sexual offence where the perpetrator gets four years or more in prison and it is against their own child, in order to keep that child safe from the perpetrator.
Caroline Voaden
Q
Alex Davies-Jones: I would have to come back to you to clarify that point, but I am happy to do so.
Anneliese Midgley (Knowsley) (Lab)
Q
Alex Davies-Jones: Thank you for that question. We have built on the previous Government’s measure to compel perpetrators to attend their sentencing hearings. The previous measure was merely an extra two years on their prison sentence. As you have stated, and as victims have told us, for someone serving a whole-life order or life imprisonment, an extra two years on their sentence is not really an incentive to come to court.
We listened to the Pratt-Korbels and other families who have been through this horrific situation, and have done something quite novel. For the first time ever in this Bill, judges will be given powers to issue sanctions on perpetrators once they are in prison. We have not listed those sanctions on the face of the Bill because we do not want to be prescriptive. A whole range of measures is available, and we feel that listing them in the Bill would be too restrictive. By not doing so, we enable judges to use every tool at their disposal to issue sanctions in prison. They include, for example, limitations on access to a gym, to work programmes or to television. We are looking at visit restrictions, and salaries can be taken away if the offender is in a work programme. All that can be looked at in the round; those are all available to a judge as part of a sanctions programme.
We want perpetrators to attend their sentencing hearings in person. You heard how important it is to victims and survivors to have them there in person to hear justice being done. We have looked at all the practical ways in which that can be done. We have worked with stakeholders, including the judiciary and prison governors, and we felt that this is the best course of action.
Bradley Thomas
Q
Alex Davies-Jones: Yes.
Bradley Thomas
Q
Alex Davies-Jones: You have outlined some of the issues that we have come up against in trying to make this measure workable, and that is why we have chosen to keep it quite specific in the Bill. I am not aware of the details of your constituent’s case, which sounds horrific; my thoughts are with her and the family. From what you have outlined, although the perpetrator has committed a heinous act against the mother, we are unaware of any acts committed against the children. It is about where you draw the line. How many perpetrators do you bring in scope of the measure? The route is available to your constituent to remove parental responsibility via the family courts. That route is available to her now, and I would always suggest that someone takes that route if they feel that it is the most appropriate course of action.
In the Bill, we are talking about parental responsibility being removed on a criminal conviction in court for an offence against the child, to keep the children safe. How broad do we make this measure, especially when it is untested and novel? We need to keep it quite specific, because we do not know what impact it will have on the family court system, how many perpetrators will appeal or the impact that that will have. The measure is therefore quite specific, and we feel that that is the appropriate course of action for now.
Alex McIntyre (Gloucester) (Lab)
Q
Alex Davies-Jones: To repeat my answer to Anneliese, the measures in the previous Government’s Bill, which fell before the general election, would have only added an extra two years on to the sentence of a perpetrator who failed to attend their sentencing hearing. The measure in this Bill goes significantly further. For the first time ever, judges will have the ability to sanction perpetrators in prison who fail to attend their sentencing hearing or are disruptive while in the courtroom. If the perpetrator does attend the sentencing hearing, but proceeds to disrupt it, the judge will be able to apply the sanctions. That is a measure in the Bill.
We are also providing prison officers with the ability to conduct reasonable force to get the perpetrator to attend the sentencing hearing. That is a measure in the Bill. Our Bill is markedly different, and that is because we have listened to victims and survivors about what they wanted and felt was appropriate to ensure that there was culpability and accountability.
Adam Thompson (Erewash) (Lab)
Q
Alex Davies-Jones: I am grateful for that question. It is important to note that the criminal justice system is a system: it only works with every element of it slotting together. Therefore, the Bill does work in tandem with the Crime and Policing Bill, which is currently before the House. There are a number of measures in that Bill around respect orders, giving police the power to seize off-road bikes without a warrant, and new powers in this Bill, working in conjunction with the Victims’ Commissioner, on a duty to collaborate involving different agencies, for example. All these fit together, and it is important that we look at this holistically.
There were a number of measures that were raised today, and a number of witnesses raised measures that are not in this Bill. I stress to Committee members that a lot of work is happening behind the scenes. I am happy to discuss the work that is being done on measures raised as not necessarily being in this Bill, because we have got a number of reviews taking place in the MOJ at the moment. You will all be aware of the recently published sentencing review, and there is a courts review being conducted by Sir Brian Leveson. All this needs to fit together holistically; it cannot be done in isolation. There will future legislation coming forward as well, so it is important not to pin everything down in every Bill just because we have the opportunity to do so. It needs to fit and be rightly considered and reviewed before we do so.
Alex Brewer
Q
Alex Davies-Jones: I suppose that could be considered, but the family court is currently the route that is available to someone to appeal. By preventing an appeal, you would get into a whole swathe of issues, and you could be in a very difficult situation if there was no route to appeal. We are aware of the issues in the family court and, as I have just said, it is important to not take this Bill in isolation. A lot of work is being done in the Ministry of Justice to look at how we improve the family court, not least through the work we are doing on pathfinder courts and ensuring that the voice of the child is centred in proceedings considering children. It is very difficult, but I do not envisage any mechanism where you could introduce a measure such as this and not have the right to appeal. Given that the family court is the most appropriate route for that, and where they hear those proceedings, it would not be practical to create a different mechanism. I do not see it fitting and being realistic in any other way.
The Chair
Thank you very much, Minister; brilliantly timed. That brings us to the end of today’s session with seconds to spare, I think.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Samantha Dixon.)
Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Tenth sitting)
(1 day, 16 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 2 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 2 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
Before we commence proceedings, I mention that I am content for colleagues—Members and officials —to remove their jackets if they so wish. I am conscious that it is very warm. [Interruption.] I am thankful that Mr Betts is pleased about that.
Clause 81
Reviewable decisions etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 66, 67, 68, 71, 69 and 72.
Schedule 10.
Clauses 82 and 83 stand part.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stephanie Peacock)
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair once again, Mr Turner. Broadly, this group deals with the first three clauses of part 9, on reviews and appeals. A key safeguard on any regulatory regime is the opportunity to challenge the regulator’s decisions. As we will discuss in subsequent groups, decisions can be appealed to the specialist Competition Appeal Tribunal, but, as a preliminary step, clauses 81 to 83 create a statutory right for anyone “directly affected” by many of the regulator’s decisions to request that the regulator conduct an internal review.
Internal reviews will involve fresh decision makers reviewing a decision. They will provide a quicker and lower-cost option than immediately pursuing litigation. That should also streamline the overall appeals process, help ensure that litigation is a remedy of last resort, and hopefully minimise burdens on all parties and on the legal system.
Schedule 10 is a list covering the majority of significant regulatory decisions the regulator will make that directly affected persons are likely to appeal. These are the decisions that can be subject to internal review and appeal to the Competition Appeal Tribunal. More operational decisions have not been captured in the list of reviewable decisions, nor have “positive” decisions, where the likelihood of appeal is negligible, such as the decision to grant a club a licence. The right to apply for judicial review still applies in the usual way to decisions not captured in schedule 10.
Clause 82 sets out that, after the regulator makes a reviewable decision, a directly affected person can request that the regulator conduct an internal review. The clause outlines the procedure for internal reviews and empowers the regulator to refuse a review request in certain circumstances, including if the regulator considers that the request is vexatious. This should ensure that internal reviews are not used as a mechanism for clubs to frustrate and slow down the regulatory process. The clause guarantees that any individual who was involved in making the original decision will not be involved in conducting the internal review. That will ensure a fair review by fresh decision makers.
Lastly, clause 83 outlines further procedure around internal reviews. The outcome of an internal review can be to uphold, vary or entirely cancel the original decision. This means that the applicable reviewer can correct a flawed or unfair decision. The regulator will have a statutory deadline of 14 days to conduct the internal review, with a maximum possible extension of a further 14 days in special cases. This should strike the fine balance between delivering a streamlined process and giving the regulator sufficient time to conduct a proper re-evaluation of the evidence. In the interests of an open and transparent appeals process, the regulator will be required to publish the outcome of any internal review.
I turn to a series of Government amendments related to appeals. Government amendment 66 will add the regulator’s decision to trigger the backstop process to the Bill’s list of reviewable decisions. This will add a statutory route of appeal for the decision. Currently, the Bill makes only a decision not to trigger the backstop a reviewable decision. Making either decision at this vital stage reviewable will strengthen the regulator’s accountability by providing competition organisers with statutory avenues to appeal.
Government amendments 67, 68 and 71 will make the board, not the expert panel, the applicable reviewer of the three distribution decisions: to trigger the backstop, to make a distribution order and to revoke a distribution order. The regulator’s board will be the regulator’s most senior decision makers and so will be best placed to make and review these momentous decisions.
Government amendments 69 and 72 will remove the statutory route of appeal for three minor procedural decisions—the decisions to conduct an investigation under clause 68, to ask questions as part of an investigation, and to not accept a commitment in lieu of an investigation. This will reduce unnecessary opportunities to hamper the regulator by appealing interim procedural steps of an investigation. It would be inappropriate to allow a club to appeal the rejection of a commitment in lieu of an investigation, as this should be entirely at the regulator’s discretion as the investigating authority.
I reassure the Committee that these changes will not limit access to justice. Affected parties will still be able to appeal the final decision—that is, the outcome of any investigation—to the Competition Appeal Tribunal. The amendments simply remove the ability to challenge and frustrate the regulator at every step of an investigation. I commend the clauses, schedule and Government amendments to the Committee.
Mr Louie French (Old Bexley and Sidcup) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Turner. I will keep my comments brief, which the Committee and you will probably be pleased to hear. I have listened carefully to what the Minister outlined, and the natural questions that arose about the amendments and clauses relate to how she imagines perceived biases will be avoided from boards and the panels, given that the expertise required to review such decisions will most certainly mean that most people involved in the process will be from the football industry.
How will the regulator seek to avoid any perception of biases, so we can ensure that what looks like a stage 1 complaints process—it is easiest to compare this with a council—has the relevant transparency and process involved to avoid going to stage 2, which would be the Competition Appeal Tribunal? Secondly, can the Minister explain why Government amendment 72 removes the decision to exercise the power to ask questions in an interview from the list of reviewable decisions? Why have the Government made that decision?
Stephanie Peacock
I direct the hon. Gentleman to the regulatory principles, in terms of the individuals involved—whether that is the board or the expert panel—and schedule 10, which lists the major significant regulatory decisions. If we look again at the regulatory principles, we see that there is a requirement to be proportionate and to act in a fair way. I will write to him about his second question, on amendment 72, but I think that this refers to the three minor amendments we are making so that the system cannot be frustrated at each step of the way. But I will clarify that and write to him, in the interests of accuracy.
Mr French
I am happy to receive a response in writing.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 81 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 10
Reviews
Amendments made: 66, in schedule 10, page 120, line 17, column 1, leave out “not to trigger” and insert
“to trigger, or not to trigger,”.
This amendment includes a decision to trigger the resolution process in the list of reviewable decisions set out in Schedule 10.
Amendment 67, in schedule 10, page 120, line 17, column 2, leave out
“a committee of the Expert Panel”
and insert “the Board”.
This amendment provides that the applicable reviewer for a decision to trigger the resolution process is the Board rather than a committee of the Expert Panel.
Amendment 68, in schedule 10, page 120, line 19, column 2, leave out
“a committee of the Expert Panel”
and insert “the Board”.
This amendment provides that the applicable reviewer for a decision to make a distribution order under NC4 is the Board rather than a committee of the Expert Panel.
Amendment 70, in schedule 10, page 120, leave out lines 21 and 22.
This amendment is consequential on the insertion of NC4.
Amendment 71, in schedule 10, page 120, line 23, column 2, leave out
“a committee of the Expert Panel”
and insert “the Board”.
This amendment provides that the applicable reviewer for a decision to revoke a distribution order under clause 63 is the Board rather than a committee of the Expert Panel.
Amendment 69, in schedule 10, page 120, leave out lines 27 to 30.
This amendment removes a decision to conduct an investigation under clause 68 and not to accept a commitment in lieu under clause 70 from the list of reviewable decisions in Schedule 10.
Amendment 72, in schedule 10, page 120, leave out lines 35 and 36.—(Stephanie Peacock.)
This amendment removes a decision to exercise the power to ask questions under paragraph 2 of Schedule 8 from the list of reviewable decisions in Schedule 10.
Schedule 10, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 82 and 83 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 84
Appeals to the Competition Appeal Tribunal
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
The clauses relate to the appeals of the regulator’s decisions to the Competition Appeal Tribunal. An appeals process should provide the appropriate opportunity to challenge that a regulator is acting fairly and within its statutory remit. It should also be a focused and efficient process that does not excessively delay the final resolution of decisions or hinder the regulator in achieving its objectives. Finally, while providing effective assurance of the regulator’s decision-making process and judgment, the appeals system should not unduly undermine the expert independent regulator. We believe that the appeals process, and the standard of appeals set out in the clauses, effectively balance those different considerations.
Clause 84 sets out when appeals can be made, who can bring an appeal and how they are sequenced with internal reviews. Clause 85 sets out the standard of appeal that is to be applied by the Competition Appeal Tribunal on appeal of different types of decision. The majority of decisions will be appealable on judicial review grounds, having been first internally reviewed. That will provide a streamlined process for the majority of appeals.
The regulator reviews internally to ensure that its decision is robust, and the reviewed decision can then be scrutinised by the Competition Appeal Tribunal. In judicial review appeals, the Competition Appeal Tribunal will also be able to quash flawed decisions, but not substitute the regulator’s decision for its own. That will ensure appropriate deference is given to the regulator as the expert body that is best placed to make decisions of technical judgment in the football market.
However, there are some particularly significant enforcement decisions that the regulator can take under the Bill. We expect these actions to be rare, as they are for extreme and serious circumstances only. But, if taken by the regulator, these punitive actions could have a significant impact on a person’s rights. That is why, for the six decisions, we believe that a merits appeal is more appropriate, which means that the Competition Appeal Tribunal can substitute its decisions over the regulator’s. Finally, as is standard, clause 84 also establishes an onward route of appeal of the Competition Appeal Tribunal’s decisions to the Court of Appeal.
In summary, we think that the standard of appeal, and the wider appeals process set out in the Bill, strikes the correct balance between offering appropriate scrutiny of regulatory decisions and not allowing those decisions to be constantly challenged and undermined. I therefore commend the clauses to the Committee.
Mr French
This part of the Bill is important. We have argued consistently throughout this Committee that we believe that the right of appeal will be fundamental to the clubs in the context of this Bill. But we do have concerns, as the official Opposition, that football clubs will increasingly see themselves in legal disputes rather than focusing on matters on and off the pitch.
The natural question regarding this process is really about how the Minister will help to ensure that there is a fair playing field in terms of the financial costs of going to an appeal. How will those smaller clubs have the same rights and access to such appeals when they clearly will not have the same financial means as some of the Premier League clubs?
Stephanie Peacock
My officials engaged with legal experts and senior members of tribunals while developing the Bill. That is why we have set out the Competition Appeal Tribunal process, and why we believe that it will be proportionate and appropriate for all levels of the pyramid.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 84 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 85 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 86
Disclosure of information by the IFR
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
This group of clauses relates to the disclosure of information both to and from the regulator. Clause 86 will enable the regulator to share relevant information with bodies within the industry and regulators that are dealing with similar and relevant issues. As well as allowing those bodies to benefit from the regulator’s knowledge and information, that should encourage those bodies to reciprocate by sharing relevant information they hold with the regulator. These two-way sharing relationships should help to establish an effective network of communication that strengthens the efficiency of regulation in the industry and across the economy.
Clause 87 concerns the disclosure of information to the regulator, for example by His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. It also gives the Secretary of State the power to make regulations to enable other public authorities to share information with the regulator, if they do not already have the ability to do so. That will help to future-proof the regulator’s regime and ensure that it can obtain information from all the relevant bodies so that it can effectively deliver its functions.
Clause 88 sets out some restrictions and protections on the processing and disclosure of information by and to the regulator. That includes ensuring that a disclosure is in line with data protection legislation and does not prejudice the prevention, investigation or prosecution of a crime. It also prevents the disclosure of certain information, received from the National Crime Agency or HMRC, without their consent. This is to give those bodies confidence that sensitive information can be shared safely. The clause also permits the regulator to exclude information from disclosure that might significantly harm the legitimate personal or business interests of the person to whom the information relates. These are all important safeguards around the treatment of potentially sensitive information.
Finally, clause 89 creates criminal offences and penalties related to the safeguards for HMRC information set out in the previous clause. The penalties for these offences are commensurate with other regulatory regimes and are a proportionate but robust deterrent against the unlawful disclosure of information. I commend the clauses to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 86 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 87 to 89 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 90
Rules
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
The Bill provides a clear framework of powers and duties for the regulator to follow. In places, that is a detailed and prescriptive framework to direct and constrain the regulator’s regime more closely, but in other places there is greater room for the regulator to exercise discretion. That approach reflects regulatory best practice, which is to give the expert, independent and better informed regulator the flexibility to adapt regulations to the circumstances of different persons and to changing circumstances over time. Such flexibility will allow the regulator to be light touch where possible but intervene more strongly where necessary.
The ability for the regulator to make rules facilitates that approach. Rules will allow the regulator to fill in the technical and operational details of its regime within the framework afforded to it by this Bill. It could amend, replace or revoke those rules in future to adapt to developments in the market. The clause sets out some procedural safeguards around the making of rules and what these rules may do, including that the regulator must consult specified competition organisers and anyone else it considers appropriate before making, amending or replacing any rules. As outlined previously, this consultation is an important part of the participative approach that the regulator should take to make sure its regime works for the industry.
Mr French
Without wishing to sound like a broken record, the Opposition have raised concerns about scope creep for the regulator down the line, and how that may lead to unintended consequences. The obvious question to the Minister is: what consultation will take place with Members of this House so that we can scrutinise any rule changes and be confident that the regulator has not gone beyond the scope of the powers that we deem necessary at this point?
Stephanie Peacock
I make two points in response to that. Of course, there is the provision in the Bill—I believe we will come on to this, but we may have already covered it—for a five-year review. On this clause, the regulator must consult specified competition organisers and anyone else it considers appropriate before making, amending or replacing any rules. This is about future-proofing, and certainly not about scope creep.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 90 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 91
Regulations
Mr French
Clause 91 provides the procedural backbone to the regulatory powers contained in the Bill. It sets out how the Secretary of State—whoever that may be, should this Bill become law—may make regulations under this legislation, including who may exercise discretion under them, and the form of parliamentary oversight that will apply. In short, this clause tells us how much power the Executive has in implementing the detail of the Bill, and how much say Parliament retains once the Bill becomes law.
The clause may be tucked away in the final third of the Bill, but its importance should not be understated. It governs not only the process of regulation, but the boundaries of ministerial authority. In some areas, we believe those boundaries are drawn too widely. That is why I have tabled amendment 127, which would remove the Secretary of State’s power under clause 56(2)(b) to specify, by regulation, other sources of relevant revenue that could be brought into scope of the resolution process.
Let me start by talking about clause 91. Subsection (1) allows regulations to confer discretion on a person and to vary by purpose, or to make incidental and consequential provisions. That is common enough in legislation, but it is worth nothing that that includes financial discretion, which has material implications for how the football regulator functions.
Subsection (2) confirms that all regulations must be made by statutory instrument. Again, that is standard practice. Subsection (3) provides a list of which regulations must be made under the affirmative procedure, and subsection (4) confirms that all other regulations fall under the negative procedure.
Subsection (5) removes the hybrid procedure, even if a regulation might otherwise qualify as hybrid, effectively limiting Parliament’s ability to challenge or delay regulations in which private or commercial interests are disproportionately affected. That all gives the Secretary of State wide scope to make rules that affect both her own regulator and the football industry, with only partial scrutiny by Parliament.
Clause 56 is where this becomes far more than procedural. Under clause 56(2)(b), the Secretary of State is empowered to expand, by regulation, what qualifies as relevant revenue for the purpose of regulatory intervention. Put plainly, this is a power to change what money is up for grabs.
That is a significant power. It means that the Secretary of State can decide what kinds of revenue are subject to redistribution disputes between leagues and competitions. Today, that might mean central broadcasting income, but tomorrow it could include gate receipts, sponsorship revenue, commercial arrangements specific to certain clubs or competitions, or even transfer proceeds or merchandising royalties. In theory, it could give a future Secretary of State the ability to bring any revenue stream into scope, and thereby invite the regulator to oversee, or even compel, its redistribution. This is a constitutional concern, not just a technical one. Will the Minister please confirm whether there are any limits—statutory or political—on what the Secretary of State could define as a source of “relevant revenue” under clause 56(2)(b)? If not, does she accept that that gives the Government open-ended authority to intervene in private commercial arrangements within football?
My amendment would remove this regulation-making power from the Bill. It would ensure that the scope of financial disputes eligible for regulatory resolution is fixed in primary legislation, not adjustable by ministerial diktat. We believe that is the right balance; it allows Parliament to define the guardrails and prevents future mission creep, whereby politically contentious revenue streams are dragged into disputes between the Premier League and the EFL, or any other competitions.
This is not just about the risk of interference; it is about certainty, predictability and trust in the regulatory model. We have already made clear our concerns about how English football will run into issues with UEFA and FIFA regarding their statutes. I will not repeat that again now, but we believe that, by granting the Secretary of State the power to redefine revenue categories by regulation—outside of parliamentary debate—clause 56(2)(b), as enabled by clause 91, risks violating those principles.
Such interference has one clear sanction:
“the ultimate sanction…would be excluding the federation from Uefa and teams from competition.”
As we have already discussed, that is not a risk that should be taken lightly. If football governance is to remain independent, and if the regulator is to operate with a clear mandate, the definition of revenue categories must not be subject to political discretion; it must be set by Parliament in primary legislation, not by the stroke of a ministerial pen. That is especially true when the very mechanism in question, the resolution process, is designed to resolve disputes about money. What qualifies as “relevant revenue” goes to the heart of the matter. It is not ancillary; it is foundational.
Clause 91 may appear to be about procedures, but it is in fact about power. It determines how broad the reach of the Secretary of State will be in defining, influencing and intervening in the financial affairs of English football. In particular, through the mechanism created by clause 56(2)(b), it allows new revenue streams to be brought into the scope of the Government-backed intervention without proper parliamentary scrutiny. That is not what was promised when this Bill was introduced. We were told by the Government and this Minister that their regulator would be a light-touch and targeted regulator—one designed to uphold financial sustainability and protect supporters, not one that could be weaponised by future Ministers to remake the game’s financial settlement from above.
By tabling amendment 127, we are saying that revenue boundaries must be set in statute, not in statutory instruments, that Parliament, not the Secretary of State, should decide where the line is drawn, and that the regulator should focus on its core remit and not be dragged into every financial dispute, with a “revenue” label slapped on by regulation.
Stephanie Peacock
I believe that amendment 127 is consequential on the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup’s amendment 124 regarding our changes to the Bill to include parachute payments, which we debated last week—although I think he gave a slightly more wide-ranging speech just now. Amendment 124 would have prevented parachute payments from being considered under the backstop, and it would have prevented the Secretary of State from amending the revenue in scope of the backstop in future. I will state here what I stated last week, and what has been my consistent position, even in opposition: for the regulator to make an informed decision regarding the financial state of football, it must consider all relevant factors, and that includes parachute payments.
As drafted, the “relevant revenue” in scope of the backstop expressly includes broadcast revenue, because that is the predominant source of revenue and distributions for the relevant leagues. However, there is no guarantee that that will always remain the case. As I covered in last week’s debate, the financial landscape of football is ever-changing. No one could have predicted 30 years ago just how much television broadcasting of English football would grow, and who can predict where technology may take us in another 30 years? That is why clause 56 allows the Secretary of State to specify other kinds of revenue to be included as “relevant revenue”. This will simply future-proof the backstop mechanism.
However, as I outlined in the previous debate, there are still clear constraints and safeguards regarding this power. The Secretary State must consult with the regulator, the FA and the relevant leagues before using the power, and can use the power only when there has been
“a material change of circumstances”.
Any use of the power will be scrutinised by Parliament under the affirmative procedure.
Mr Clive Betts (Sheffield South East) (Lab)
We cannot set something in stone and say, “That’s how it’s going to be forever.” Giving that bit of flexibility is right. I was talking to my friend Richard Caborn, who was a previous sports Minister, and he said to me that, when discussions first began about revenue within football, they were concentrated on the television rights to UK matches in the United Kingdom. It has since become apparent, of course, that it is the international rights that are the real driver of resources. That was not thought about when the first distribution was done.
Stephanie Peacock
I appreciate my hon. Friend’s intervention; he has put an important point on the record, and it is always nice to be able to pay tribute to Richard Caborn, the former sports Minister and my former south Yorkshire colleague. He has done a lot of work in this area; indeed, I know that he has worked very closely with my hon. Friend.
This process is simply about future-proofing. Given that this Committee has already agreed to clause 56 and disagreed to the shadow Minister’s amendment 124, all that this amendment would achieve is to remove one of the safeguards, making regulations to update the definition of “relevant revenue” negative rather than affirmative. For those reasons, I hope that the shadow Minister will withdraw his amendment.
Stephanie Peacock
Clause 91 sets out the parameters and procedure around the powers of the Secretary of State to make regulations under the various provisions of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 91 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 92
Minor definitions etc
Mr Betts
I beg to move amendment 11, in clause 92, page 75, line 17, after “functions” insert
“or give rise to the perception that said person’s functions have been prejudicially affected, including (but not limited to) a situation in which a person is—
(a) employed by or engaged as a consultant by any specified competition organiser or any group undertaking of a specified competition organiser;
(b) connected in any capacity with an organisation which has, in the last year, received at least half of its income from a specified competition organiser;
(c) connected with a group undertaking of an organisation within the scope of part (ii);
(d) connected in any capacity with an organisation which has, in the last year, received at least half of its income from any of the organisations listed in parts (ii) or (iii); or
(e) connected (as defined in section 252 of the Companies Act 2006) with an individual within the scope of parts (i), (ii), (iii) or (iv) of section 92(1).”
The amendment gives further detail to the definition of “conflict of interest” within this Bill.
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Mr Turner, hopefully for the last time—in this Committee, I mean. The amendment is simply trying to make the Bill a bit more specific about what “conflict of interest” might mean. I am sure that the Minister will tell me that the amendment is not quite right in its drafting and wording. Nevertheless, it is at least worth putting on the record that this is an important issue. Maybe we can obtain some clarification about what “conflict of interest” means in practice.
Stephanie Peacock
I thank my hon. Friend for tabling this amendment. I acknowledge its intent to fortify the provisions in the Bill for dealing with conflicts of interest. We will cover “Minor Definitions” in detail when we discuss the next group of clauses, which includes clause 92 stand part. However, I will touch on “Minor Definitions” briefly when responding to this amendment.
As we discussed at length on day one of this Committee, when we debated conflicts of interest, it is essential that the regulator can deliver its regime free from undue influence and vested interests. The Bill already makes it clear that the regulator will be free from conflicts of interest and the Government amendments made in the other place strengthen those protections even further—indeed, beyond any doubt.
We believe that the existing definition of a conflict of interest is appropriate and will capture the correct issues. That definition is any interest that
“is likely to affect prejudicially that person’s discharge of functions”.
I reassure my hon. Friend that our definition is well precedented; for example, it can be found in the Pensions Act 2008 and the Financial Guidance and Claims Act 2018.
Stephanie Peacock
The shadow Minister is making a well-rehearsed argument. As we have discussed previously, the newly appointed chair of the regulator has been fully endorsed by a cross-party Select Committee.
Returning to the amendment, we are confident that this definition and the conflict of interest protections in the Bill, supplemented by public law principles and non-legislative measures that are already in place, provide comprehensive safeguards to identify and manage conflicts of interest appropriately. For those reasons, I hope that my hon. Friend will withdraw his amendment.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause 93 stand part.
Schedule 11.
Stephanie Peacock
Clauses 92 and 93 and schedule 11 relate to definitions. Clause 92 defines various terms used throughout the Bill that are not already defined elsewhere. Clause 93 refers to schedule 11, which lists where in the Bill to find definitions or explanations of terms that apply to multiple provisions—for example, “competition organiser,” “football season” and “regulated club.”
Clause 92 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 93 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 11
Index of defined terms
Amendment made: 73, in schedule 11, page 123, line 4, column 2, leave out “62(3)” and insert “(Distribution orders)(9)”.—(Stephanie Peacock.)
This amendment is consequential on the insertion of NC4.
Schedule 11, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 94
Pre-commencement consultation
Stephanie Peacock
I beg to move amendment 55, in clause 94, page 76, line 14, leave out from “to” to end of line 15 and insert
“—
(a) a provision of this Act which requires the IFR to consult another person;
(b) the provision made by section 10(5)(a) and (b).”
This amendment includes the provision made by clause 10(5)(a) and (b) in clause 94.
Stephanie Peacock
These amendments relate to a simple administrative change to clause 94, the pre-commencement clause. Clause 94 will allow the shadow regulator to conduct consultation with relevant stakeholders ahead of Royal Assent. That clause was added to ensure that the shadow regulator would be able to begin consultation on its functions, and that, if deemed appropriate by the regulator post Royal Assent, that consultation could be relied on, ensuring no unnecessary delays to the set-up and commencement of the regulator.
The change simply ensures that the clause captures the slightly different wording in the state of the game clause about the regulator inviting suggestions on the report. By making this change, we reduce the operational risk of the regulator not reporting its state of the game report as quickly as possible post Royal Assent, and therefore being up and running as soon as necessary.
Amendment 55 agreed to.
Amendments made: 56, in clause 94, page 76, line 18, leave out “carried out consultation” and insert “did anything”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 55.
Amendment 57, in clause 94, page 76, line 20, leave out “consultation carried out” and insert “anything done”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 55.
Amendment 58, in clause 94, page 76, line 21, leave out
“consultation had been carried out”
and insert “thing had been done”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 55.
Amendment 59, in clause 94, page 76, line 23, leave out “consultation carried out” and insert “anything done”.—(Stephanie Peacock.)
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 55.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
Clause 94 will allow the shadow regulator to conduct consultation with relevant stakeholders ahead of Royal Assent, and for that consultation to satisfy the requirements placed on the regulator in legislation post Royal Assent.
Clause 94, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 95
Offences by officers of clubs and bodies corporate
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
Clause 95 makes sure that if a club is found to have committed certain offences under the Bill, such as falsifying or destroying information, the individuals responsible can be held criminally liable.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 95 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 96
Review of Act
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
During Committee in the other place, Peers raised the importance of evaluating the impact, intended outcomes and success of the regulator. The Government absolutely agree that it is good practice for the impacts of regulation to be monitored and evaluated post-implementation. That is why we have added this clause, which will require the Secretary of State to carry out a review of the operation of the Act and its impact on industry. That review must be completed no later than five years after the full commencement of the licensing regime.
Mr French
Given the concerns that His Majesty’s Official Opposition have raised throughout the passage of the Bill in this place and in the other House, we welcome the inclusion of the review of the Act. However, the clause mentions laying a copy of the report before Parliament. How does the Minister envisage Parliament being able to have its say on the benefits or non-benefits of the regulator at that point?
Stephanie Peacock
I think we discussed this earlier. It is up to individual Select Committees whether they wish to call the independent regulator before them. I will write to the hon. Gentleman on the practicalities of laying the report.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 96 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 97
Payments into the Consolidated Fund
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
Clause 97 covers situations in which the regulator must return money to the Exchequer and requires the regulator to pay into the consolidated fund amounts received through the levy to recoup its set-up costs.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 97 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 98
Minor and consequential amendments
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
Clause 98 relates to minor and consequential amendments to other primary legislation. Those amendments are to existing Acts and are necessary for the Bill to function as intended. For example, they add the regulator to the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and enable the competition appeal tribunal to hear appeals of the regulator.
Stephanie Peacock
I believe so, but in the interest of accuracy I will double check and write to the hon. Gentleman.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 98 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 12 agreed to.
Clause 99
Extent
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
Clause 99 sets out the territorial extent and application of the Bill. The regulator’s scope is intended to be limited to the top five tiers of English men’s football. That is where the fan-led review identified significant harms and structural challenges that the market had failed to resolve. Five Welsh clubs compete in the English football pyramid, four of which—Cardiff City, Newport County, Swansea City and Wrexham—would be captured in the scope of the regulator. One more, Merthyr Town, which was recently promoted to the sixth tier, could be in scope in the future. To ensure that all clubs within the English football pyramid are captured and protected equally under the same regulatory regime, the legislation must extend to both England and Wales.
Mr French
I will not seek to rehash an earlier debate on the multi-club issue that the Opposition raised. However, I urge the Minister again to look closely at how that may work in the future. I fully appreciate her point about the Welsh clubs that compete in the English structure, but, as we highlighted in previous debates, a number of Scottish clubs now have multi-club ownership with English clubs and will be affected by this legislation directly or indirectly. If the Minister gave further thought to that and let me know, it would be appreciated.
Stephanie Peacock
I will make that commitment.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 99 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 100
Commencement
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
The Bill provides for the majority of provisions to be brought into force by commencement regulations. Different provisions may be brought into force on different days, enabling the new regime to be brought into force in a structured and considered manner. The main exceptions to that are the provisions that establish the regulator and its governance structure. In addition, there are some basic initial functions that the regulator needs to stand up the regime, such as putting rules in place and preparing a state of the game report. These provisions will be brought into force on Royal Assent to enable the regulator to get on with the task of standing up the new regime without unnecessary delay.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 100 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 101
Short title
Stephanie Peacock
I beg to move amendment 60, in clause 101, page 80, line 11, leave out subsection (2).
This amendment would remove the privilege amendment inserted by the Lords.
Stephanie Peacock
Clause 101 concerns the short title of the Bill. It makes certain that, once it has passed through Parliament, the Football Governance Bill will be cited as the Football Governance Act 2025. Finally, Government amendment 60 is technical and procedural; it removes the privilege amendment inserted on Third Reading in the Lords to clause 101. This was added in the other place to make it clear that they have not infringed on the financial privileges of this House.
Amendment 60 agreed to.
Clause 101, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
New Clause 3
Proposal stage
“(1) This section applies where mediation under section 60 comes to an end by virtue of the occurrence of an event within section 60(6)(b), (c) or (d).
(2) As soon as reasonably practicable after the occurrence of the event, the IFR must give notice to the two specified competition organisers.
(3) A notice under subsection (2) must—
(a) set out the question or questions for resolution,
(b) specify the qualifying football season or seasons to which that question relates or those questions relate,
(c) set out any findings in the IFR’s most recent state of the game report that the IFR considers relevant to that question or those questions,
(d) invite each of the two specified competition organisers to submit to the IFR and to each other a proposal as to how that question or those questions should be resolved,
(e) require any proposal to be accompanied by supporting evidence (including evidence as to how the proposal addresses the findings set out under paragraph (c)),
(f) specify the day on or before which proposals are to be submitted.
(4) A question for resolution may be set out in a notice under subsection (2) only if it is the question, or one of the questions, for resolution remaining unresolved when the mediation mentioned in subsection (1) came to an end.
(5) Where a notice under subsection (2) sets out a question for resolution that relates to relegation revenue (within the meaning given by section (Distribution orders)(9)), the notice must require the specified competition organisers to explain in a proposal how the proposal will promote the financial sustainability of clubs which operate teams relegated from a competition organised by the specified competition organiser distributing the relegation revenue.
(6) Subsection (7) applies if, on or before the day specified by virtue of subsection (3)(f), a specified competition organiser submits to the IFR a proposal which the IFR considers is not a qualifying proposal.
(7) The IFR may give both specified competition organisers a notice specifying a later day (falling not more than seven days after the end of the day specified by virtue of subsection (3)(f)) on or before which proposals are to be submitted.
(8) As soon as reasonably practicable after—
(a) the initial proposal deadline, or
(b) (if earlier) the day on which the IFR considers that both specified competition organisers have submitted qualifying proposals,
the IFR must give a notice under subsection (9) to the two specified competition organisers.
(9) A notice under this subsection must—
(a) state which of the two specified competition organisers (if any) has submitted a qualifying proposal before the initial proposal deadline,
(b) invite each such specified competition organiser to—
(i) confirm their proposal, or
(ii) make any permitted modifications to their proposal,
and submit the confirmed or modified proposal to the IFR and the other specified competition organiser, and
(c) specify the day on or before which the confirmed or modified proposal is to be submitted.
(10) The IFR may specify in a notice under subsection (2) or (9) the form and manner in which proposals and supporting evidence must be submitted.
(11) In this section—
(a) ‘the initial proposal deadline’ means—
(i) the day referred to in subsection (3)(f), or
(ii) where the IFR gives a notice under subsection (7), the day specified in the notice;
(b) a ‘qualifying proposal’ means a proposal which—
(i) explains how the question or questions for resolution should be resolved, and
(ii) complies with the requirements imposed by virtue of subsection (3)(e) and (5) (if applicable);
(c) a modification to a proposal is ‘permitted’ unless it results in the proposal no longer being a qualifying proposal.”—(Stephanie Peacock.)
This new clause substitutes clause 61 with a new clause providing for a revised procedure for the proposal stage of the resolution process.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 4
Distribution orders
“(1) This section applies where the IFR has given a notice under section (Proposal stage)(9).
(2) Before the end of the period of 60 days beginning with the day on which the notice under section (Proposal stage)(9) was given, the IFR must give the two specified competition organisers a notice of the distribution order it proposes to make.
(3) The IFR may extend the period in subsection (2) by up to a further 14 days if it considers it appropriate to do so.
(4) A notice under subsection (2) must—
(a) give reasons for the proposed distribution order,
(b) explain how the proposed order applies the principles mentioned in subsection (8),
(c) explain how the proposed order addresses the findings set out under section (Proposal stage)(3)(c),
(d) invite each of the two specified competition organisers to make representations about the proposed distribution order,
(e) specify the period within which such representations may be made, and
(f) specify the means by which they may be made,
and the IFR must have regard to any representations which are duly made.
(5) The period specified under subsection (4)(d) must be a period of not less than 14 days beginning with the day on which the notice is given.
(6) As soon as reasonably practicable after the end of the period specified under subsection (4)(d), the IFR must make an order requiring relevant revenue to be distributed in a way that the IFR considers appropriate for the purpose of resolving the question or questions for resolution set out under section (Proposal stage)(3)(a) (a ‘distribution order’).
(7) In making a distribution order the IFR must—
(a) apply the principles mentioned in subsection (8), and
(b) have regard to any proposal submitted under section (Proposal stage)(9)(b).
See also section 7 (in particular the IFR’s general duty to exercise its functions in a way that advances one or more of its objectives and to have regard to various matters).
(8) The principles referred to in subsection (7)(a) are that—
(a) the distribution order should not place an undue burden on the commercial interests of either specified competition organiser, and
(b) the distribution order should not result in a lower amount of relegation revenue being distributed to a club during the relevant period than would have been distributed to the club during that period had the order not been made.
(9) For the purposes of subsection (8)—
‘relegation revenue’ means revenue distributed by a specified competition organiser to a club in consequence of a team operated by the club being relegated from a specified competition organised by the specified competition organiser;
‘relevant period’, in relation to a distribution order, means the period of one year beginning with the final day of the first football season in respect of which relegation revenue would be distributed in pursuance of the order.
(10) A distribution order—
(a) must impose on the specified competition organisers such obligations as the IFR considers appropriate for the purpose of securing compliance with the requirements set out in the order, and
(b) may, where a distribution agreement is in force between the specified competition organisers in relation to the same qualifying football season or seasons to which the order relates, provide for that agreement to have effect subject to provision contained in the order.
(11) At the same time as making a distribution order, the IFR must give the two specified competition organisers a notice—
(a) including a copy of the order,
(b) giving reasons for the order,
(c) explaining how the order applies the principles mentioned in subsection (8),
(d) explaining how the order addresses the findings set out under section (Proposal stage)(3)(c), and
(e) including information about the possible consequences under Part 8 of not complying with the order.
(12) The IFR must, as soon as reasonably practicable after making a distribution order, publish the order or a summary of the order.”—(Stephanie Peacock.)
This new clause substitutes clause 62 with a new clause providing that the IFR may make a distribution order that distributes relevant revenue in the way that the IFR considers most appropriate for the purpose of resolving the question or questions for resolution.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 7
Duty not to promote or engage in advertising and sponsorship related to gambling
“A regulated club or English football competition must not promote or engage in advertising or sponsorship related to gambling.”—(Max Wilkinson.)
This new clause prevents regulated clubs and competitions from promoting or engaging in gambling advertising or sponsorship.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Max Wilkinson (Cheltenham) (LD)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Turner. We are not calling for a ban on gambling with the new clause, but we are calling for a ban on advertising it through one of our most culturally powerful platforms. The new clause is a proportionate, evidence-led measure to break the link between football and gambling harm. When we consider that 70% of young people are aware of being exposed to gambling advertisements, is it any wonder, when these adverts are emblazoned on football team shirts and plastered on the side of every pitch for everyone to see?
Gambling firms spend a huge amount of money every year on advertising. They do not lack influence or reach. Gambling has much wider impacts than simply in the football stadium. Since 2011, gambling losses in the UK have risen by 80%, and new data from the Gambling Commission indicates that up to 2.5% of adults in Great Britain may be suffering from gambling harms. Football is unique in its reach and influence. Unlike alcohol and tobacco, gambling is still embedded in the game. Club sponsorships, half-time adverts and pundit discussions all feature it. If we do not act here, we send a message that profits matter more than people’s wellbeing. We understand that the Government think this is outside the scope of the Bill, but it is an important discussion for us to have in the context of anything to do with football.
Lincoln Jopp (Spelthorne) (Con)
Could the hon. Gentleman give us some sense of his assessment of how much money the new clause would take out of football?
Max Wilkinson
It is not about the money that this would take out of football, but the money that is taken out of the pockets of many football fans who are being exploited by predatory gambling companies every day.
Stephanie Peacock
I thank the hon. Member for tabling the new clause. The Government are clear that, wherever gambling advertising and sponsorship appears, it must be socially responsible. The Government do not believe that the regulator should have a role in commercial matters such as sponsorship, which are rightly decisions for clubs and competition organisers. We must be wary of scope creep that sees the regulator straying into matters that should be reserved for the industry, and stepping on the toes of industry authorities such as the FA. What constitutes the promotion of gambling could be interpreted extremely broadly, with significant consequences for clubs, and sport more widely.
For instance, the new clause could be interpreted as meaning that players could not take part in competitions that had gambling sponsors. Clearly, that would have significant unintended consequences for clubs and the sport more widely. All major football bodies have published their joint gambling sponsorship code of conduct, which sets minimum standards for socially responsible gambling sponsorship within football. We are working closely with sporting bodies to review the implementation and impact of the codes of conduct to ensure that they have a meaningful impact. This review will provide key evidence to inform the most appropriate next steps for gambling sponsorship. The Premier League has already made the decision to ban front-of-shirt sponsorship by gambling firms by the end of next season.
For the reasons I have set out, I am unable to accept the new clause, and I hope the hon. Gentleman will withdraw it.
Max Wilkinson
I am pleased that this is on the Minister’s mind, and that the Government seem to understand the problem. I think we would all accept that there is a bigger problem with gambling adverts in football which needs to be solved. Whenever we turn on Sky on a Sunday afternoon, it is obvious to all what is going on, as the adverts are often completely unrepresentative of the reality of football gambling.
I have a particular concern about those who are engaged in punditry while encouraging us in half-time adverts to spend our money. That is a clear conflict of interest that needs to be resolved at some point. I accept that at this stage, the Government are not going to take it on. We will not press the new clause to a vote today, as we recognise the numbers in the room, but it is an important discussion that all parliamentarians need to be involved in. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 9
Free to air coverage
“(1) The Independent Football Regulator must require that every season—
(a) at least ten Premier League football matches,
(b) the League Cup Final, and
(c) the Championship, League One and League Two playoff finals,
are made available for live broadcast on free-to-air television channels in the United Kingdom.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(a) the matches must include a representative selection across different clubs and times in the season, subject to reasonable considerations of scheduling and broadcasting logistics.
(3) In this section “free-to-air television” means a service that satisfies the qualifying conditions of such a service defined by Section 2 of the 1996 Communications Act.”—(Max Wilkinson.)
This new clause would mandate a minimum of ten Premier League matches, the League Cup Final and the Championship, League One and League Two playoff finals on free-to-air television channels.
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 13—Televising of football matches of national interest—
“(1) The Communications Act 2003 is amended as follows.
(2) After Section 299 (categorisation of listed events) (2)(d) insert—
“(e) the Independent Football Regulator, established by the Football Governance Act 2024, in relation to televising of football matches between licensed football clubs.””
This new clause adds the IFR as a statutory consultee on the listing of sporting events for free-to-air coverage.
Max Wilkinson
With new clauses 9 and 13, we are calling for an expansion of the crown jewels of sports broadcasting to ensure that key fixtures from the domestic football calendar are made available on free-to-air television. Members will have recently seen some of the coverage about dwindling viewership figures for this year on TNT and Sky. That should give us all cause for concern, particularly those who are involved in the finances of football. Specifically, we are calling for the free-to-air package to include 10 Premier League games a season, the League cup final, and the play-offs for the Championship, League One and League Two, in addition to those already free to air, such as the FA cup, World cup and the Euros.
This is not about undermining private broadcasters, but viewing figures are on the wane. We had a 17% drop in audience numbers last season. At the same time, there are signs that the value of Premier League broadcast rights has plateaued as more live games have been added to recent packages. This is an opportunity for broadcasters and leagues alike to innovate their offering. Our proposals could open the door to new forms of commercial engagement, such as sponsorship tied to mass viewership, broader brand exposure and appointment-to-view opportunities that bring in new audiences. That approach has worked elsewhere across Europe, most notably in La Liga, where one game a week is free to air, keeping the league accessible to all fans, regardless of their ability to pay.
Recent research shows that in general Premier League fans are more likely to come from lower-income backgrounds than those who regularly attend matches. The hon. Member for Spelthorne has referenced the eye-watering cost of his season ticket on a number of occasions in this Committee. For many supporters, attending games is unaffordable, and with the rising cost of living, stacking multiple sports subscriptions is out of reach for too many households. Increasing free-to-air coverage would not just make games more accessible; it would reignite national moments of the kind we see during the World cup or the Euros. Those moments build unity, inspire young people and renew grassroots interest in the game.
Stephanie Peacock
I thank the hon. Member for Cheltenham for tabling new clauses 9 and 13, which concern the televising of football matches as listed events and free to air. First, I want to be clear that it is not an issue for the Bill or the regulator, but I would like to use this opportunity to set out the Government’s position on the issue.
The Government are keen to ensure that sporting events of national interest are made available to the public as widely as possible. In domestic football, the present arrangements under the listed events regime have protected key moments such as the FA cup final, while ensuring that the Premier League, EFL and FA are able to raise billions of pounds annually, which is invested back into the pyramid. We all want to see more matches being televised free to air, but that must be balanced against that investment, and not risk it.
As for the Bill, there have been strong voices from all sides that the regulator must have a tightly defined remit, and must not intervene in areas where it is more appropriate for football authorities or others to lead. We agree with that, and I am sure the hon. Member will agree that the bar for statutory, regulatory intervention in any market should be very high. It would not be appropriate for the regulator to intervene in commercial decisions between the relevant broadcasters and rights holders. Decisions relating to the number of matches of specific competitions that are broadcast are determined through commercial negotiation and are subject to factors such as rights costs and scheduling considerations. Additionally, we do not feel it is right to expand the regulator’s remit by including it as a body that must be consulted on listed events.
Decisions relating to the coverage of certain sporting and other events of national interest are, again, a matter for the relevant broadcasters and rights holders. A widened regulatory remit considering broadcasting and commercial decisions would distract from the key responsibility of the regulator and widen the scope of the Bill. The regulator will ensure that there are financially viable clubs for fans to watch, both at their grounds and on television. For those reasons, I am unable to support the hon. Member’s new clause.
Max Wilkinson
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 10
Fan representation: mandatory golden share
“(1) A licensed club must, as a condition of holding a licence under section 15, issue a non-transferable golden share to a recognised Supporters’ Trust or equivalent democratic fan organisation.
(2) The golden share must confer on its holder the right to veto any proposal by the club to—
(a) relocate the club’s home ground outside its current local authority area,
(b) change the club’s name,
(c) materially alter the club’s primary colours or badge, or
(d) enter into or withdraw from any competition not sanctioned by The Football Association, the Premier League, or the English Football League.
(3) A licensed club must—
(a) consult the holder of the golden share on any material changes to the club’s ownership, governance, or strategic direction,
(b) provide the holder with access to relevant financial and governance information reasonably required to fulfil its function, and
(c) facilitate structured and regular engagement between the club and the holder of the golden share.
(4) The Regulator must monitor compliance with this section and may—
(a) issue guidance to clubs and Supporters’ Trusts on the operation of the golden share,
(b) impose licence conditions or financial penalties for non-compliance, and
(c) take enforcement action where a club fails to uphold the rights associated with the golden share.
(5) In this section—
‘Supporters’ Trust’ means a formally constituted, democratic, not-for-profit organisation that is recognised by the Regulator as representing the interests of a club’s supporters;
‘golden share’ means a special share or equivalent legal instrument issued to a Supporters’ Trust, entitling its holder to the rights and protections described in this section.”—(Max Wilkinson.)
This new clause would give fans a veto on club proposals, exercised through a recognised Supporters’ Trust or equivalent democratic fan body.
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 21—IFR duty to provide information and support on golden shares—
“(1) Within 6 months of the passing of this Act the IFR must publish guidance for recognised Supporters’ Trusts or equivalent democratic fan organisations holding a golden share as specified in section [Fan representation: mandatory golden share].
(2) The guidance published under subsection (1) must explain the purpose of a golden share and advise on how holders of a golden share can engage with their regulated club when utilising the rights bestowed by the golden share.
(3) The IFR must also provide an information support service for holders of a golden share to contact for advice on utilising their golden share.”
This new clause adds a duty for the IFR to support fan organisations in the use of their golden share through advice services and guidance.
Max Wilkinson
The spirit of the Bill is rightly focused on ensuring the financial sustainability of the game and, crucially, protecting the heritage of clubs by giving fans a greater voice. As I have said, we support the Bill. In the spirit of the noble aims of the Bill, we have tabled new clause 10, which proposes a simple but powerful safeguard: a mandatory “golden share” for fans. It would require all licensed clubs to
“issue a non-transferable golden share to a recognised Supporters’ Trust”
or equivalent democratic fan body. The share would grant fans a veto over fundamental decisions affecting the club’s identity and future, including relocation of its home ground, changing its name, altering its primary colours or badge, and entering or withdrawing it from competitions not sanctioned by the FA, Premier League or EFL.
The golden share was an idea included in Dame Tracey Crouch’s fan-led review, but it seems to have been forgotten. We are simply bringing fans’ voices back to the table. The Committee will, of course, be able to think of many instances where such a veto would have helped. I will raise three examples: the attempt by Assem Allam, the owner of Hull City, to rebrand the club as “Hull Tigers”; the relocation of Wimbledon to Milton Keynes; and the time that Cardiff changed their shirts to red. The new clause aims to prevent such incidents from happening in the future. It would be a positive step; we urge the Government to accept it.
Stephanie Peacock
I will respond to new clauses 10 and 21 together because they both relate to a “golden share”. The regulator will operate an advocacy-first approach, and the regulatory principles in clause 8 set out a collaborative approach, including with fans. Although we expect that the regulator will welcome any club that feels a golden share is the best approach for it, such an arrangement would require a significant restructure at the majority of clubs. The new clause would place a burden on clubs to make considerable changes, such as establishing a community benefit society if one does not already exist, and amending fundamental legal documents.
Instead, the regulator will give strong, irreversible legal protections to prevent damage to the most important aspects of the club. That will include regulatory protection for club heritage and stadium changes, as well as ensuring fan engagement. As we have discussed, clubs will be required to consult fans on key issues that are important to them. The Bill mandates fan consultation on a club’s strategic direction and business priorities, and on operational and match day issues, which specifically include ticket pricing and matters related to the club’s heritage. Such consultation, along with the protections on stadiums and key points of club heritage such as colours, emblem and name, ensure that fans are put at the heart of their clubs without the burdens that could, as I have just discussed, be associated with a golden share.
For those reasons, I am unable to support the new clause.
The Chair
I am afraid I reneged on my duty to call Mr Naish. I think I was too interested in the point about Hull City.
James Naish
It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Turner. I want to place it on the record that the Notts County supporters’ trust got in touch with me over the weekend, and it is very much sympathetic to new clause 10. The trust was set up in 2003 to save the club when it was in administration, and it has played an important role in saving the club from being wound up. It fully supports any improvements in supporter representation, and its representatives specifically noted that they would like to see at least one independent supporter director on the board of all professional clubs, which measure would push in the same type of direction as the new clause. I recognise what the Minister has just said, but I thank the supporters’ trust for getting in touch. I also recognise that, where trusts are in existence, they are doing excellent things for their clubs.
Stephanie Peacock
My hon. Friend is a strong advocate for his constituency, and I am pleased that he has been able to represent his local fan trust. The Bill will require fan engagement at all clubs with the adequate and effective means in place to deliver the licensing requirement. The regime does allow for a bespoke approach to be taken at each club, based on what is best in each club’s specific circumstances. A supporter director was considered by the fan-led review and support for the concept was mixed. The review concluded that
“a fan director rarely delivers on fan expectations.”
Clubs are welcome to introduce any additional engagement strategy that they think will be of benefit to them and their fanbases. Many clubs have already responded to the fan-led review, made decisions to push themselves beyond the recommendations, and implemented fan engagement strategies that they think will work best for their club. I am grateful to my hon. Friend for making that case.
Max Wilkinson
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 11
Protection of assets of regulated clubs
“(1) Where any of the following assets belong to a regulated club, the asset must not be removed from the club’s ownership or used as collateral for a secured loan—
(a) any stadium,
(b) any training facility,
(c) any trophies,
(d) any car park,
(e) any hotel.
(2) But subsection 1 does not apply to a car park or a hotel where—
(a) the regulated club can demonstrate to the IFR’s satisfaction that the asset is causing financial loss or poses a material risk to the club’s financial sustainability, and
(b) the IFR has provided prior written approval for the disposal of the asset or the use of the asset as collateral.
(3) Where the current owner of a regulated club owns any asset listed in subsection (1)(a) to (c), the owner may not sell the club unless the owner has inserted the asset into the club’s ownership structure.”—(Max Wilkinson.)
This new clause would ensure that the club assets listed above are recognised as the inalienable property of the club rather than the club’s owners.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Max Wilkinson
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
We cannot claim to be reforming football unless we tackle one of its most dangerous long-term trends—the creeping financialisation and asset-stripping of clubs. The hon. Member for High Peak has mentioned this on a number of occasions; he has experienced it in his former role as chair of the RamsTrust. New clause 11 would introduce protections to ensure that core assets such as stadiums, training grounds, trophies and, in some cases, commercial properties like car parks and hotels, remain in the club’s ownership, where they belong. Specifically, the new clause would ensure that assets cannot be sold off or used as security for loans without the prior written approval of the regulator; that the regulator may give its approval only if the asset is demonstrably causing financial loss or poses a material risk to the club’s financial health; and, critically, that if any of the assets are owned by another organisation rather than the club itself, they must be transferred back into the club’s ownership before any sale of the club can proceed.
The current system allows owners to move critical assets out of a club’s hands with little or no transparency. Once that happens, the club often faces high rent obligations to use its own stadium and training facilities, has weakened negotiating power in takeovers and insolvency, and potentially experiences a complete disconnection from its historical home. Derby County are not the only example of where that has happened. We think this concept is worth taking forward, and we hope the Government are listening.
Stephanie Peacock
I thank the hon. Member for his amendment. He and I have a shared aim to ensure that there are sufficient protections for home grounds and other assets. We have already discussed the issue of protections for home grounds, so I understand the intention behind the amendment. However, the Government do not believe that it is a proportionate measure. The amendment would place significant blocks on any action to alter the financial arrangements of a long list of assets, and would substantially interfere with the property rights of clubs.
Clubs should be able to exercise commercial discretion over the use of wider club-owned assets. For example, the sale or refinancing of assets can sometimes be an acceptable and prudent way of improving a club’s liquidity, if necessary, but the amendment would remove that ability. There are other measures in the legislation to protect against the mismanagement of club assets, including the financial regulation provisions, regulatory oversight of financial plans, and an enhanced owners and directors test to ensure that owners are best placed to be the custodians of a club.
Last Thursday, I set out my understanding that the regulator could prevent the sale of training grounds through the use of discretionary licence conditions. I want to clarify that the regulator cannot directly block the sale of a training ground through licence conditions, but, where appropriate, it can act to discourage a sale and to mitigate any harmful financial impacts of a sale. The regulator can only set discretionary licence conditions in a limited number of areas. As per clause 22, which we have debated already, the regulator can only impose financial discretionary licence conditions that relate to liquidity requirements, debt management and overall cost reductions.
However, the regulator does have the levers to take action to protect a club’s financial sustainability if there ever arises a scenario in which the club intends to sell its training ground. By selling a valuable asset, a club may weaken its balance sheet and increase its financial risk. If there was a problem, the regulator could require the club to take mitigating action. For example, it could place a liquidity requirement on the club. The regulator could also use its powers to discourage the club from selling its training ground in the first place—for example, by indicating that if the club were to sell its training ground, the regulator would have no choice but to impose more significant financial restrictions on the club through discretionary conditions, thereby strongly steering the club away from that course of action. If that scenario were to arise because a bad actor sought to asset-strip the club, the regulator’s owners and directors test would kick in to remove that unsuitable custodian. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Cheltenham to withdraw the motion.
Max Wilkinson
I have heard what the Minister said. She seems to be implying that this issue can be dealt with by the Bill, and that the regulator will have an eye on these sorts of things. I am somewhat reassured, but I hope that when the regulator is introduced—and we hope it is introduced—it will be given a strong steer that it ought to make sure that the owners of clubs are not stripping assets. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 12
Duty not to stage home matches outside United Kingdom without approval
“(1) A regulated club must not stage any home fixture in a competitive match at a venue outside the United Kingdom without the approval of the IFR.
(2) The IFR may only grant approval under subsection (1) if the fixture is not part of a specified competition.
(3) For the purposes of this section, a ‘home fixture’ means any fixture where the club is designated as the home team by the rules of the relevant competition.”—(Max Wilkinson.)
This new clause would prevent a regulated club from staging a competitive home fixture outside of the United Kingdom. It will allow regulated clubs to stage non-competitive fixtures outside of the United Kingdom.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Max Wilkinson
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
When we discussed this issue on Second Reading, I said that the prospect of Arsenal playing Manchester City in Dubai should have all football fans reaching for the sick bucket—I assume most Man City and Arsenal fans would agree with that. I remain of that view. The new clause would prevent a regulated club from staging a competitive home fixture outside the UK. It would allow a regulated club to stage non-competitive fixtures outside the UK.
Football is our national sport but too many fans are already priced out of attending matches. Clubs with large overseas fan bases clearly have a profit motive to schedule games outside the UK. The new clause would erect further barriers to stop that happening. We do not want barriers to local fans, who have supported their clubs through thick and thin, getting to the game.
Jim Dickson (Dartford) (Lab)
The hon. Member is pointing to a real fear for fans, particularly Premier League fans. In Europe, Serie A has said it will be playing competitive matches in the United States within two years. The Spanish super cup, its equivalent of the Community Shield, is already played in Saudi Arabia. It is important that we collectively as a Bill Committee keep an eye on this matter, so that the regulator uses its power to prevent that happening. Nothing would bespeak a bigger betrayal of fans than competitive matches played overseas that they could not get to.
Max Wilkinson
I strongly agree. This is a real risk that we cannot look past. With the increasing foreign ownership of clubs, many people would clearly look to buy a football club and market it around the world by taking it on tour. We should not put up with that in this country; this is our national game and it should be protected as such. Staging competitive UK fixtures outside the UK must not be allowed. It would dilute football’s links to the communities that it needs to continue to survive. It would act only in the interests of club owners who might not always have the interests of fans at heart.
Lincoln Jopp
I am listening with interest to the hon. Member’s comments, but does he think that link to home is diluted for American football or baseball when those leagues play a match in London?
Max Wilkinson
The hon. Member makes an interesting point. The US has a franchise system, so every club can be moved wherever it wants. Someone who is an Oakland Raiders fan would probably also have been an LA Raiders fan. Where else did the Raiders play? There was definitely a third place, at least, in my lifetime, because clubs regularly move around the nation. When there is that franchise problem in America, hardcore elements of a National Football League club campaign against their club moving, and then campaign for it to move back to that city. The LA Raiders are a case in point.
That link between clubs and communities has already been severed in America, so it is less of a concern that the Jacksonville Jaguars are effectively now London’s team. London has taken that club to its heart, just as people across the UK have taken many other NFL and American sports teams to their heart. The hon. Member raises an interesting point, but I am not sure there is a direct comparison.
We risk getting to that point where some English and Welsh football teams go abroad—although Merthyr Tydfil might like the idea of going on tour, if they get up to the level of league where they are regulated. We need to ensure that we do not get into the position where our teams go on tour around the world to play competitive Premier League games. That would clearly be a gross betrayal of what we hold dear as football fans.
Stephanie Peacock
I thank the hon. Member for tabling this new clause. I know this is an incredibly important issue for many fans, and I am grateful to be able to address it today, after a number of Members made contributions. FIFA is currently reviewing its position on overseas league matches. It has committed to looking at how that may impact supporters as well as players, along with a number of other valuable considerations.
We appreciate this is an extremely important issue for fans and we do not want to see any developments that undermine the heritage or integrity of the game. It is crucial that fans are consulted and that their view is taken into account on any proposals that would take matches away from the local community in which they usually play.
The Government have spoken about this issue to the FA, which has a right to veto any such future proposals. It has assured us that it agrees that fans’ views must be taken into account when considering this important issue. To be clear, the Bill already ensures that by giving the regulator the power to ensure that clubs consult with their fans on operational and match day issues. We have not tried to list everything that might be considered a match day issue in the Bill, but let me be clear that moving matches abroad would be an operational and match day issue. Fully licensed clubs must have mechanisms in place to adequately and effectively consult their fans about this issue and they must take fans’ views into account when making decisions about it.
Given the importance of this developing issue, the Government will remain in conversation with the relevant governing bodies to ensure that fans’ voices continue to be heard. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member to withdraw his new clause.
Max Wilkinson
Hon. Members are all waiting for it—this was going to be the moment that we were going to force a vote, but given that the Minister has put on record the fact that this will be considered an operational and match day issue for the regulator, so fans must be consulted on it and would probably have a veto, we are content that we do not need to press the new clause to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 17
Impact on regulator of changes in Government administration
“If the Department for Culture Media and Sport is abolished, or its functions in relation to football substantially relocated, the Government must automatically review the suitability of the continuation of the IFR and the impact that the abolition or relocation will have on the IFR.”—(Mr French.)
This new clause would require the Government to review the IFR in the instance that the Department for Culture, Media and Sport were abolished, or its functions substantially altered.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Mr French
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
We believe that new clause 17 is important, given the speculation that the Minister might soon be going somewhere else on a free transfer. On a more serious note, this is a sensible provision, given the legal requirements on the Secretary of State in the Bill. For example, there has been much speculation that if the Department for Culture, Media and Sport were disbanded, sport, for example, would end up in the Department of Health and Social Care or the Department for Education, which would mean a different relationship with the football regulator going forward. Therefore, it is important to include a review mechanism in the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
The hon. Gentleman’s new clause suggests that if DCMS were to be abolished, or if football were to be moved out of the Department’s portfolio, that should trigger a review of the regulator. A machinery of government change should have no bearing on whether there is continued need for an independent regulator established by Parliament. Just because circumstances in the sponsoring Department change, that does not mean that the regulator should be subject to a review. Machinery of government changes are common; we saw several of them under the previous Government. We do, however, believe that the regulator should be assessed and reviewed at the right time, as part of important monitoring and evaluation of the regulation.
Max Wilkinson
Were DCMS to be abolished, which Department does she think the regulator would end up reporting into?
Stephanie Peacock
I could not possibly speculate on such a hypothetical question.
I will say that clause 96, which we have already debated, mandates a review of the Act within five years of the licensing regime being fully commenced. Among other things, the review will look into whether the regulator has been effectively achieving its objectives, or whether those objectives might be better achieved in a different way. There are also other ways in which the regulator can be scrutinised and held to account by Parliament, such as through Select Committee hearings. I therefore hope that the hon. Member will withdraw his new clause.
Mr French
I have listened very carefully to the Minister’s response and to the intervention from the hon. Member for Cheltenham. Given the point that we are making about the role of the Secretary of State in relation to some of the regulator’s powers, we think that that hypothetical question is key. I gave examples of Departments that sport or football could move to, such as the Department of Health and Social Care or the Department for Education, which we think would significantly change the perspective on the business side of football. We will therefore press the new clause to a vote.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Mr French
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
This new clause is designed to improve the transparency of the regulator, ensuring that the public, football and Parliament are aware of the risks that we have discussed at length—in particular, any issues arising from international regulators such as UEFA or FIFA. We believe it is important to have transparency, and to ensure that Members understand the risk, as can football clubs. The Opposition will look to press the new clause to a Division, subject to the Minister’s comments.
Stephanie Peacock
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his new clause. There has been a lot of debate in the House, including in Committee and in the other place, about letters received from UEFA. There have been particular concerns that the Bill and the regulator should not breach UEFA or FIFA statutes, and there is a strong feeling that we must not risk English clubs or national teams being banned from international competitions through this legislation.
Let me be clear again that the regulator will be operationally independent of the Government and will not exert an undue influence on the FA’s ability to govern the game. The extent of its statutory powers and duties will simply not allow it to do so. That is why both UEFA and the FA have confirmed that the Bill as drafted does not breach UEFA statutes. Indeed, the FA is on the record as supporting the regulator’s introduction.
The new clause would require the publication of all future UEFA and FIFA correspondence received by the regulator or the Government, or correspondence relating to the regulator. Requiring private communications to be made public would serve only to discourage honest and frank conversations with key stakeholders, and would thus stand in the way of constructive relationships with UEFA and FIFA. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the new clause.
Mr French
I have listened carefully to the Minister’s comments. The Committee should also be aware that the FA has warned specifically about scope creep, which is something that the Opposition have also been very concerned about. We therefore think it is prudent to ensure that there is transparency and awareness of risk going forward. If there were to be significant warnings from UEFA or FIFA about scope creep, the new clause is an important mechanism for us to understand that as parliamentarians, clubs and fans of football. We will press the new clause to a Division.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Mr French
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
It has been 40 years since alcohol was first banned in view of the pitch. Given the support that lifting the measure has among a number of clubs, the Football Supporters’ Association, and even some Labour MPs, we urge the Government to consider the new clause.
Jon Pearce (High Peak) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Turner. Does the shadow Minister consider the new clause to be scope creep?
Mr French
I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point—I was probably due one of those after five days in Committee—but if we are talking about the interests of fans, we believe that this measure should be considered. Some clubs might want the option; some might want it only in certain areas—for example, excluding family areas of stadiums. We believe that fans, especially those who act responsibly, should be treated as adults. A bit more common sense around how the ban works in the modern age might stop some of the binge drinking that happens before games because fans cannot drink in the stands.
We urge the Government to give careful consideration to this option to consult. We are not instructing them to take a definite position, but just to consult.
Max Wilkinson
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Turner, and to be in raucous agreement with the shadow Minister.
Max Wilkinson
The hon. Member suggests that we have not sided in any Divisions with the official Opposition; the record will show that we have.
Max Wilkinson
No, several.
I have been to many football matches at more than 50 Football League grounds, and every time I have attended with groups of people who have been in the pub until the last possible moment, forcing down an extra pint—or an extra lucky gin and orange, which was a tradition that a group of my friends used to have—before a game. They did that because they knew that once they got into the ground, they were subject to ridiculous rules that meant they were not treated as adults. These people were very much adults. They were drinking real ale and talking about cricket, sport and things they had done at work that week. They were not football hooligans. We know that the majority of people who watch football matches are not football hooligans.
These rules date from a bygone era when people were concerned that everyone who went to the football was a hooligan. The atmosphere in grounds these days is entirely different from what it was back in the 1980s and 1990s, when things happened that nobody would want to see now. We are drifting in the right direction, back towards standing in stadiums—that is positive—and we need to start drifting back towards a situation in which we treat football fans as adults and recognise that the current ridiculous ban means that people are more likely to be more drunk at football.
Mr Lee Dillon (Newbury) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Turner. People can sit on the terraces at Twickenham and watch rugby union while having a pint of Guinness. Does my hon. Friend agree that that causes no concern around behaviour, and could easily be transferred to the football stadium?
Max Wilkinson
I agree. The assumption that football fans are hooligans is clearly not borne out by the statistics any more. We need to take a real-life, real-world view of what happens as a result of these rules.
As the shadow Minister said, the new clause does not say that everyone must drink at football grounds or that the ban must be overturned. It puts the issue in the context of a review, after which clubs might be able to reintroduce alcohol in stadiums. That is important. I believe that the hon. Member for York Outer (Mr Charters) recently suggested such a measure, so there is clearly cross-party support.
Lincoln Jopp
I welcome the hon. Member’s support for the new clause. Does he agree that things have significantly changed since the 1970s? The majority of fan trouble is now fuelled by cocaine, not alcohol. We should reclaim a pie and pint at half-time for good, honest fans.
Max Wilkinson
I think that we should reclaim a pie and pint at half-time, during the first half and during the second half. I have attended a football match and seen cocaine somewhat brazenly being taken in the loos at half-time. Those of us who attend football regularly will see that, and it is very concerning—more concerning, I would suggest, than people drinking beer during while watching football. I draw my remarks to a close, other than to say that this is a long-overdue debate.
Jim Dickson
I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way and hope he forgives me for not being a supporter of a club at which gin is the normally consumed pre-match beverage.
I have a lot of sympathy with what the hon. Gentleman is saying. I regularly attend home matches for Dartford football club, where people can drink in view of the pitch and there is no trouble—it is a great, family atmosphere. However, just to be real here, I have also seen situations where alcohol is clearly fuelling aggression, violence and bad behaviour for some of the reasons that have been pointed out. I am a little fearful of very significant consumption in view of the pitch; we still need to be careful of that. Were we to allow limited opportunities to consume alcohol in view of the pitch, in certain parts of the grounds, in the leagues where it is currently not permitted, we would need careful controls to prevent the problems that have been identified.
Max Wilkinson
To clarify the point about the lucky gin and orange, I believe that my friends chose that as a pre-match drink because they had already had five pints of real ale and were no longer able to fit in that quantity. Having gin on top of five pints of real ale is clearly not a good idea. There are other opportunities for people to have all kinds of drinks before football. The point is that people force down drinks in pubs because they know that they cannot drink during the game, and that means that they are more likely to be drunk in the football ground. We support the new clause.
Mr Betts
This is a difficult issue. None of us wants fan behaviour to get worse, given that it has largely stabilised at most grounds. Such behaviour happens not just before the game but at half-time: fans rush down and get at least two or three pints in during the quarter-of-an-hour break.
I ask the Minister reflect on this proposal; I am not asking her to agree with it. She might talk to colleagues in Europe through UEFA. I have been to a Bundesliga game in Berlin. They serve beer there—in quite large quantities—but it is 2%, so it is weaker. That is one way to do it. It seems to be a regulation, and it seems to work.
Amanda Martin (Portsmouth North) (Lab)
I agree with my hon. Friend that we should explore what is happening in Europe. Alcohol is sold in lower rates, and only in certain areas of the stadium and only at certain games. I, for one, would be willing to welcome alcohol, but there would have to be a really good review, involving the police, that looks at what is done elsewhere. As a Portsmouth fan, let me say that there is absolutely no way that it should be served at a Portsmouth versus Southampton game.
Mr Betts
I would have thought that if my hon. Friend was going to watch Portsmouth play Southampton, she would want to be well inebriated before she had to watch Southampton win—[Interruption.] I am sorry to upset her.
I say to the Minister that we do not have to make the decision now—this is not the Bill to do it—but we should at least reflect on it with the FSA.
Lincoln Jopp
I draw the hon. Gentleman’s attention to the fact that the new clause is not asking for the ban to be lifted. It is very much in the spirit of what he is saying. It says that there should be a requirement to consult, which seems to be the process that he is advocating, so I do not think it would be out of place in the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
I thank the shadow Minister for tabling this new clause and all hon. Members for their thoughtful contributions. I gently say to him that I think that his claims to end binge drinking would probably be scope creep.
This is a very serious issue. As the shadow Minister may be aware, the legislation in question is owned by the Home Office. My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East is right that this is a challenging issue, but I recognise that it is important and I will therefore raise it with my ministerial counterparts in the Home Office.
I hope the shadow Minister will appreciate that, as we have made clear throughout the Committee, the Bill seeks to ensure that football clubs are sustainable. It would not be appropriate for the Government to agree to review legislation about alcohol at football matches in the context of this Bill, given the significant public order implications, but I will reflect the comments from across the Committee to my counterparts in the Home Office. On that basis, I hope he will withdraw the new clause.
Mr French
I thank all colleagues for their contributions to this important debate on an issue that has real impacts on fans and stadiums around the country, as we have heard already. I have also seen some of the behaviours that have been referred to, such as people rushing to drink before kick-off or rushing at half-time to make sure that they can get a drink in. I have also travelled around Europe watching football. I am a big lover of sport, so I do travel and watch games when I go abroad. I have never come across many issues when I have been abroad, where the rules are different.
The Minister’s comments were interesting. I could make the usual joke about how for people to watch a team in red, they need a lot of drink—especially at the moment, given current form. However, the expressions of Committee members assure me that this is a live issue that they have concerns about. I think we should test the opinion of the Committee with a vote.
Mr French
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
We believe that the provisions of new clause 20 are missing from the Bill as drafted. We have debated issues involving clubs, fans and leagues, but there has been little on player welfare. In different debates, we have discussed scheduling and the impact on player welfare of the excessive number of games in different competitions. The perfect example is the club world cup taking place in America. There are also other competing demands on player welfare and the welfare of retired players, as we have discussed.
This new clause on player welfare would, within one year of the passing of this Bill, require the Secretary of State to review how to improve the welfare of football players, considering neurodegenerative diseases incurred by heading footballs, the number of games footballers have to play each season—in line with my earlier comments—and the impact on current and former professional footballers’ welfare. It is a straightforward amendment, very much in the spirit of the new duties being asked of the regulator and the leagues going forward. We would therefore be interested in the Minister’s response.
Mr Betts
Briefly, will the Minister look at something else directly related to the new clause, which is the safety of the grounds that players play at? Three years ago, the PFA approached me about a horrible incident at Bath City, where a young player went headlong into a concrete wall and suffered severe brain damage. I was surprised to find that the Safety of Sports Grounds Act 1975 does not cover players, but only spectators. That is a shocking omission, although we can probably understand how it got there.
At the time, I went to see the then Sports Minister with the PFA. He was supportive, and he agreed that he would write, with the PFA and others, to get the leagues and the other football authorities to look seriously at this issue. I think that guidance was given about how they should approach ground safety for players and the dangers they could face, such as running headlong into a concrete wall with no protection between the wall and the pitch.
The Minister probably will not be able to answer me now, but will she investigate how far that guidance changed behaviour and whether it had any impact on making grounds safer for players? It is an issue. One incident caused severe damage to the wellbeing of one young player. It could happen anywhere. That was at Bath City, which is not a regulated club. It is an issue not just of regulation but of player safety, and we ought to be concerned about that.
Stephanie Peacock
I thank the hon. Member for his new clause. Player welfare is an incredibly important issue, and as we have discussed previously in this Committee, I agree that the welfare of footballers should be safeguarded. But the regulator will have a precise focus on financial regulation, corporate governance, fan engagement and heritage. It will be focused only on the market failures that the industry cannot itself address. The regulator has not been designed to address sporting issues such as player welfare or equipped with the relevant powers and duties. The safety, wellbeing and welfare of everyone taking part in sport is absolutely paramount, and that is why we have committed to looking further at those issues. While it is not appropriate for this Bill, I am fully aware of the importance of prioritising player welfare and ensuring that former players and their families have the support they need.
National governing bodies are responsible for the regulation of their sports, and for ensuring that appropriate measures are in place to protect participants from harm, including head injuries. They are, of course, independent of Government, but the Government expect national governing bodies to make the health and safety of players their top priority. The Secretary of State and I recently met with a small group of affected family members and ex-footballers, including individuals associated with Football Families for Justice, to discuss player safety and welfare for those suffering from dementia. We heard at first hand players’ experiences and the views of groups on how safety and welfare at all levels of the sport could be improved.
On neurodegenerative diseases, we are considering what is required, including how to support football to come together and address the problems raised. We are committed to supporting the families and the football authorities to come together to address the issues raised, and our officials are in the process of arranging meetings to explore that further.
The number of games that footballers play each season is a matter for competition organisers and the Professional Footballers’ Association. It would not be right for the regulator to become involved in those matters, which are not ultimately about the sustainability of clubs.
Before I finish, I commit to writing to my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East on ground safety, and to taking that issue away to investigate, as he asks.
Lincoln Jopp
The Minister said that the regulator’s purview is the financial sustainability of clubs, but that that was not in any way related to the number of games that teams play in a single season. Surely they are directly related, because clubs will be tempted to thrash their players in order to generate revenues from television and gate receipts?
Stephanie Peacock
I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s point, but that is a match day issue. I direct the hon. Gentleman and the rest of the Committee to the regulatory principles, which we changed under this Government to explicitly reference players. We think that that is an important change. I am afraid I cannot support the new clause.
Mr French
I have listened carefully to the Minister’s answers in response to this new clause. I fully understand the point that she is making about it being up to the sport to better govern the welfare of players, and I have great sympathy with her on that. Ultimately, however, this Bill has been brought forward because the Government believe that football has not been good at regulating itself, and so we are debating that in Committee. Given the widespread concerns around player welfare, it seems to me that on sustainability—we had a long debate about that on the first day of the Committee—and where it sits, my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne hit the nail on the head by saying that the sustainability of clubs depends very much on the sustainability of players.
While I am not going to get a violin out for Premier League stars who may be on £400,000 or £500,000 a week, there is a broader point here about how far that can be pushed and what happens to players’ health—particularly, as we have heard from families, when they reach retirement. As the Minister has mentioned, there are a number of problems. We would like to give some serious consideration to where this needs to sit, because there does appear to be an issue here. As such, I will not seek leave to withdraw the new clause, and I hope that we can return to the matter at a later stage as well.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Mr Dillon
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 22 relates to a consultation on changes to kick-off times. For football fans across the country, last-minute changes to suit TV schedules have a direct impact on their plans for that sporting event, whether having to procure a hotel because they cannot get home from the game as public transport is not running, or having to change their whole plan and maybe resell their ticket. The 2025 FA cup final had a kick-off time of 4.30 pm, and in the year Wigan beat Man City it was a 5 pm kick-off time. The last train to leave for Manchester from London is at 9.01 pm. So if the FA cup final this year had gone to extra time and penalties, fans would not have been able to make that last train back home to Manchester. As a Manchester United fan, I am not one for protecting City fans, but it just seems ludicrous that for the 2025 FA cup final, the BBC wanted to keep the kick-off at 3 pm because it had Eurovision later that night to schedule and ITV wanted a 5.30 pm kick-off because it knew that would increase its revenue. Both clubs were consulted, the broadcasters were consulted, but the fans were not. This clause seeks for the regulator to have a role in adjudicating on kick-off times.
Listening to the Minister in response to other amendments, I was concerned she may consider ruling out this clause out because it affects commercial activity and broadcasters. I am now hoping it falls under the purview of operational and match day issues, and the regulator will have power to intervene.
Stephanie Peacock
The Government do not believe that it is appropriate for the regulator to intervene in the sporting calendar, including interfering with match day timings. This clause would widen the scope to cover on-pitch decisions, which is something we wish to avoid. However, I am aware of the issues that the hon. Gentleman has raised regarding the impact timings can have on fans. There may be consequential issues such as match day travel and club communication with fans that would be captured by “operational and match day issues” as one of the relevant matters for fan consultation discussed in our debate on part 5. In most cases, however, the kick-off time itself is not always an issue that club have enough control on to adequately consult fans and respond to opinion. To mandate them to do so could therefore be problematic. It is well within the gift of the leagues and the governing bodies to address concerns surrounding kick-off times, and the Government remain in conversation with stakeholders to ensure that fans are engaged properly by those bodies on this issue. For these reasons, I cannot accept the new clause.
Mr Dillon
I am disappointed in the Minister’s response. I think it is a crucial aspect. However, noting the numbers in the room, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 23
Duty to create emergency fund
(1) As a condition of purchase of a regulated club the new owner may, if required by the IFR, pay an amount equal to the club's quarterly forecast expenditure into an emergency fund (referred to in this section as “the fund”).
(2) Withdrawals cannot be made from the fund while the person who deposited the fund is the owner of the club.
(3) When a club’s quarterly forecast expenditure increases the owner must increase their deposit into the fund to match the increased forecast.
(4) If an owner does not update the fund to match an increase in the club’s quarterly forecast expenditure the IFR may suspend the regulated club’s operating licence until such time as the required deposit into the fund has been made.
(5) When a club files for insolvency the owner abrogates all claim to the fund and the fund may be accessed to pay club salaries and day to day running costs.
(6) When the owner who deposited the fund sells the club they may withdraw the fund but the fund must first be used to repay any debts accrued during the time period they were the owner.”—(Mr Dillon.)
This new clause gives the IFR an option to require new club owners to establish an emergency fund to provide for club operational costs such as player and staff wages in an emergency scenario.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Mr Dillon
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
This new clause introduces a duty to create an emergency fund if the regulator has concerns over the financial resources of a particular owner. If a player is not paid for two consecutive months, then under FIFA regulations they have the ability to terminate their contract with 14 days’ notice. However, that still means they are out of pocket. We know that there are real consequences from players not being paid, such as the contract termination that they may go through, the player and the fans having a loss of confidence in that club, and of course financial distress to individuals not paid. Clubs can have point deductions if they do not play players on time and registration embargoes as well. However, that still does not address the issue of the player and staff not being paid. As recently as March this year, the team of the hon. Member for Sheffield South East, Sheffield Wednesday, did not pay its players on time. This is a live issue that we see season in, season out. An emergency fund would mean that players could have recourse to be paid on time.
Stephanie Peacock
I thank the hon. Member for the new clause. While I understand the intent of adding this provision and creating an emergency fund, we have been clear that this is not a zero-failure system. Clubs can and do go into administration for many reasons, sometimes beyond their control. This regime tries to minimise the likelihood of that happening and gives them the best chance of being a going concern football club. This means that there is an assumption that a club will continue operating and meet its obligations for the foreseeable future
However, I reassure the hon. Member that the Bill’s strengthened statutory tests on the new prospective owners, as we discussed in the debate on part of 4 of the Bill, will work to deliver the intent behind the new clause. At the point of entry, prospective owners will be required to pass the financial plans and resources test. This will demonstrate that they have sufficient financial resources to run the club and have considered things such as the estimated running cost. This will help mitigate against any future need for an emergency fund.
On an ongoing basis, if a club is exhibiting an unsustainable level of risk, the financial regulation regime allows for specific discretionary licence conditions, which we discussed when debating part 3 of the Bill, to be put on clubs. Those conditions can relate to debt management, liquidity requirements and restricting the club’s overall expenditure. This is a far more proportionate approach to managing the risk of insolvency, rather than requiring owners to hold money that could be invested into the club to be used by default. This is likely to impact on levels of investment in the game. For those reasons, I urge the hon. Member to withdraw the new clause.
Mr Dillon
I thank the Minister for her response, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 25
Youth and community projects: duty on the IFR
“(1) The IFR must take steps to encourage regulated clubs to invest in youth and community projects.
(2) The IFR must, in pursuance of the duty in subsection (1), at least once a year report on the extent to which each regulated club has invested in youth and community projects.”—(Mr Dillon.)
This new clause requires the Independent Football Regulator to take steps to encourage clubs to invest in youth and community projects, including through annual publication of a progress report.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Mr Dillon
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Many clubs already have excellent community outreach programmes and foundations with which they support their local communities. This is a simple new clause that just seeks the regulator’s ability to report on those involvements. I suspect that it would not push any existing club into having to engage, because I believe that they already engage with their communities. It is more about capturing that and selling to the wider public the benefits from the investment that football clubs make in their communities.
Stephanie Peacock
I thank the hon. Member for the new clause. Football clubs are instrumental in fostering more active and resilient communities. By harnessing the power of sport, this community outreach work promotes social cohesion, improves public health and makes a positive impact on people’s lives. The Government recognise and support the contributions of many clubs in helping to strengthen communities and get more people active, in line with the Government’s own priorities.
That is why we made an amendment to corporate governance provisions in the other place. This addition was explicitly to include a club’s contribution to the economic and social wellbeing of the local community within the definition of corporate governance in the Bill, and so require clubs to report on these contributions as part of the corporate governance statement. This reflects that football clubs are more important to their communities than a typical local business. This reporting could include, for example, whether a club has invested in youth and community projects, and we would expect any club that does so to report on it as part of its corporate governance statement.
I am afraid that I disagree the regulator should be required to encourage a specific type of community investment. As we discussed when debating schedule 5, the Bill is deliberately not prescriptive when it comes to corporate governance. That gives the regulator flexibility to write its code in consultation with the industry, and it gives clubs flexibility to explain how they are applying that code. This is about encouraging best practice and greater transparency around the operations and activities of the club. This should steer all clubs toward better governance, without micro-managing how they are operated.
As we have been clear, the regulator cannot start mandating specific changes to a club’s corporate governance, such as quotas for board members. The same applies to community outreach. Of course, we recognise that it is important and should be encouraged, but we do not believe that it is appropriate to encourage a specific, prescriptive type of community action that all clubs should undertake. That is not in line with the approach that the Bill takes to corporate governance, and would not be in line with the light-touch approach to regulation that we all want to see. That is not to take away from the huge contribution that clubs make, and I take this as an opportunity once again to pay tribute to the Barnsley FC Community Trust.
Mr Dillon
I thank the Minister for her response, and welcome the recognition of clubs’ community work in the governance statements. The new clause would add a requirement around youth because, whether on literacy or childhood obesity, football clubs have a unique power to engage young people through their very presence as a shining example to look up to. However, I accept the Minister’s remarks, and beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the Chair do report the Bill, as amended, to the House.
Stephanie Peacock
On a point of order, Mr Turner. I thank all the Chairs who have presided over this Committee; as always, I am thankful for your guidance and support throughout the sittings. I thank all those who have contributed their views on the Bill, both in this iteration and the version that the previous Government introduced. A number of important stakeholders—players, clubs and many more—have shared their views and enabled us to bring forward the Bill that we see today. In particular, I thank the Premier League, the EFL, the National League, football clubs across the country and the Football Supporters’ Association. Their engagement has been vital, and I am grateful to them for working productively to ensure that the Bill takes steps towards a future where football can be enjoyed for generations to come.
I pay tribute to Dame Tracey Crouch, whose brilliant work on the fan-led review of football led to the introduction of the Bill. Her work and expertise have been invaluable, and I thank her for her dedication to making the game fairer. I also pay tribute to the officials in the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, who have been working often very long hours on the preparations for Committee stage; I am grateful for all their help. I pay particular tribute to Adam, Ellen, Charlotte, Kaz, Lucy, Robbie, Conor, Matt, Beth, Leah, Kyle, Lewis, Comfort and Callum for their hard work on the Bill. I also thank those in my private office in the Department for their work to support me in taking the Bill through Committee as the Minister. My particular thanks go to Chris McAlister for all his work on this; the head of my office, Matthew Phillips; and of course Helen Elston. I also thank my parliamentary office, Millie, Karen and Anna, who supported me in opposition, when I was in the shadow Minister’s place.
I thank all members of the Committee for their contributions. It has been excellent to see such strong feeling in the debate. I know that Members have aimed to represent fans and their constituencies in the best possible way. I thank the Committee for such a lively and thoughtful debate throughout the sittings. I particularly thank my hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham North for keeping us all in check and on time; my opposite number, the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup; and the hon. Member for Cheltenham. I also pay tribute to House officials, and thank them for their work to support us as elected representatives. The work that they do in this place is invaluable and I, like I am sure many other hon. Members, are incredibly grateful.
It has been an excellent debate, and I am proud that the Government have delivered on our manifesto commitment by finally bringing in the Bill. I conclude by quoting Dame Tracey Crouch’s last contribution in Committee. She spoke of
“the people who just go and watch the game because they love it and it is important to them deep inside their soul.”––[Official Report, Football Governance Public Bill Committee, 23 May 2024; c. 246.]
It is for those people who love the game that we have proposed these measures. I believe that the Bill introduces much-needed changes that will protect football so that they can continue to enjoy it for generations to come. That is what we have delivered today.
The Chair
I, too, thank Dame Tracey Crouch for the work that she did in this House. I also thank His Majesty’s loyal Opposition and the Lib Dems for the constructive way in which this issue has been debated. I thank the learned Clerks for the help that they have given me, and all officials, including our wonderful Doorkeeper.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill, as amended, accordingly to be reported.
Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting)
Tuesday 17th June 2025
(1 day, 16 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesMental Health Bill [HL] 2024-26 View all Mental Health Bill [HL] 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 17 June 2025 - (17 Jun 2025)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
As it is quite warm, any hon. Member who wishes to remove their jacket may do so.
Clause 24
Nominated person
Question (this day) again proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
Amendment 54, in schedule 2, page 77, line 21, at end insert—
“(3) Where the patient has not attained the age of 16 years, a nominated person must have parental responsibility for the patient.”
This amendment would stipulate that the nominated person for a patient under 16 must have parental responsibility for the patient.
Amendment 55, in schedule 2, page 80, line 13, after “2(2))” insert
“, has parental responsibility for the patient (see paragraph 2(3))”.
This amendment would stipulate that the nominated person for a patient under 16 must have parental responsibility for the patient.
Government amendments 40 and 41.
Schedule 2 stand part.
Clauses 25 to 28 stand part.
Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Harris. I rise to speak in support of clauses 24 to 28, schedule 2, and the vital amendments 54 and 55 in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Dr Spencer). Together, those provisions form a crucial pillar of the Bill, which must modernise our framework for the 21st century while not forgetting one of the oldest truths in our social contract: that parents, not the state, bear the first and deepest duty to protect their children.
The Bill will reform an Act that has stood in various forms since 1983, and which was itself built on a much older legacy of how this country balances individual liberty with the need, in rare cases, to deprive someone of that liberty for the sake of that person’s safety, or the safety of others. For decades, that balancing act has been shaped by the so-called “nearest relative” rule. However well intentioned that rule was, it has often failed to serve the people it is meant to protect. Patients have found themselves legally represented by estranged parents, distant cousins or an ex-spouse with whom they have had no contact for years. In the worst cases, that has compounded trauma and undermined recovery. Clause 24 will address that problem by giving patients the power to appoint a “nominated person” of their choosing: someone whom they trust, who understands their needs, and who can speak up when they themselves cannot. That is, quite simply, the right approach for modern mental health care. It is grounded in autonomy, and respect for the individual’s right to shape their own care and safeguard their own dignity.
Good principles must be matched by good machinery. That is why schedule 2 is not a mere administrative detail, but the backbone of this reform. It sets out, step by step, how a nomination is made, who may be nominated, how conflicts are avoided, and how mistakes are corrected. Under part 1 of schedule 2, a patient must make the appointment in writing. It must be signed and witnessed by
“a health or care professional or independent mental health advocate”.
That is a safeguard against casual or coerced choices. The nominated person must themselves consent: they are not a passive bystander but an active participant. If the relationship breaks down, the patient may revoke the nomination, or the nominated person may resign. Crucially, the county court may step in to remove or bar a nominated person if that person acts unreasonably, abuses their power, or is clearly unsuitable.
Part 2 of proposed new schedule A1 to the Mental Health Act 1983, inserted by schedule 2 to the Bill, addresses an issue that we must take seriously: capacity. Not every patient will have the capacity to make the appointment at the moment it matters most. The proposed new schedule therefore provides a fall-back system. A court may appoint a nominated person on the patient’s behalf, or a default can be determined under criteria set by regulation. The court again retains ultimate oversight to resolve disputes or replace a default, if the circumstances require it. It is thoughtful, practical and rights-based lawmaking, and I commend the drafters for getting the balance broadly right.
Clauses 25 to 28 will give the nominated person real power. They are not a figurehead. Clause 25 demands that professionals consult the nominated person before applying for detention or guardianship. If the nominated person objects, the professional must provide a report showing why detention is none the less necessary, with a clear risk-based justification. The nominated person can then challenge that decision. Clause 26 shortens the duration of the bar on discharge requests from six months to three. If a nominated person believes that the person no longer needs to be detained, they can press for release sooner and more effectively than before.
Jen Craft (Thurrock) (Lab)
Without wanting to sound abrupt, we all have the explanatory notes and are reading them, so in the interests of brevity might the hon. Member consider getting to the point about what he would add to or take away from the Bill? We all know what the clauses aim to do; the Minister has already set that out.
Gregory Stafford
I thank the hon. Lady for her point, but I shall continue in the same vein unless I am told to do otherwise.
Clause 27 will ensure that when community treatment orders are considered, with all the restrictions they bring, the nominated person’s voice must be heard and an objection must be properly countered with evidence. Clause 28 addresses hospital transfers, recognising that being moved to another hospital can uproot fragile support networks and compound distress. By embedding a consultation duty here, too, the Bill will make it harder for patients to be moved arbitrarily or without explanation.
In summary, the clauses and the schedule empower patients, embed transparency and build trust, but they do so through a lens rightly focused on adults—capable, consenting adults who make choices freely. That brings me to my fundamental point: we must be absolutely certain that this approach will not inadvertently erode a bedrock of child protection: that a parent is the default legal protector for their child. For an adult, autonomy means freedom of choice, but for a child, especially one under 16, autonomy must never mean being left alone to navigate a labyrinth of legal forms and healthcare powers without the protection of a parent. That is why I strongly support amendments 54 and 55, which would ensure that for under-16s, parents remain the lawful decision makers and the first safeguard for their child’s welfare.
Let us imagine for a moment a vulnerable 14-year-old who, in the confusion and fear of a psychiatric admission, is persuaded by a well-meaning adult—or, worse, someone with a hidden agenda—to appoint them as the nominated person. That child may be separated from their parents—the very people who know the child best and have a legal duty to care for them—while an outsider gains rights to object to treatment or discharge decisions. Once that nomination is made and witnessed, it carries weight in law and could marginalise the very people who brought that child into the world and have a moral and legal duty to protect them.
This is not just theoretical. We know from real cases in family courts that unscrupulous individuals can exploit vulnerable young people. The risk that the new system could unintentionally open the door to manipulation must be taken seriously. Let us not be naive about how exploitation works: groomers, traffickers and abusers thrive in grey areas of the law; they will find loopholes and drive a coach and horses through them. If we do not make it crystal clear that no child under 16 can override parental responsibility without a court’s explicit order, we risk creating an invitation for abuse.
Can the Minister assure the Committee that no child under 16 will be permitted to override parental responsibility simply by nominating someone else without a full and proper process? Schedule 2 does include fall-back arrangements and eligibility checks, and those are welcome, but unless the law is explicit that only a court can displace a parent’s right to act for their child, those safeguards are not watertight.
Amendment 54 addresses a related area, the notification of incidents. It would require the Secretary of State to review whether the law should be strengthened so that all admissions of children and young people for mental health treatment trigger mandatory incident reporting, and whether the timeframes for that reporting are still appropriate. It would require the Secretary of State to review whether incident reporting requirements are robust enough for all under-18s in mental health settings. Are all incidents of restraint, seclusion, injury or absconding being reported promptly and comprehensively? If not, what must change?
We have seen far too many tragic cases in which harm or abuse in children’s mental health units came to light only after a scandal broke, because the system did not catch it in time. Proper oversight is not an optional extra; it is essential for the trust of families. In my view, a review alone is not enough, so I urge to the Minister to confirm that, if the review finds gaps, the Government will legislate swiftly to close them. In the meantime, what interim steps will be taken to ensure that no child is left unprotected?
Amendment 55 is the final safeguard in this suite of amendments. It would allow the Secretary of State to make consequential amendments to other laws to implement the Bill cleanly. That is good housekeeping, but it must not become a blank cheque. When it comes to parental rights or child safeguarding, no technical tweak should be done behind closed doors by negative procedure; Parliament must approve it in full daylight, on the record. Will the Minister confirm without ambiguity that any consequential amendment that touches on parental powers or child protections will come before both Houses under the affirmative procedure?
To illustrate things in the starkest terms, let me paint one more scenario for this Committee. A 15-year-old girl, already vulnerable, is detained following a self-harm incident. Her parents, distressed but committed, wish to be involved in her care plan and discharge, but in her fragile mental state the child is persuaded by an older friend—perhaps well-meaning, perhaps not—to nominate them instead. That friend, now a legally recognised nominated person, blocks discharge, disagrees with treatment and excludes the parents from updates. The clinicians are caught in a legal tangle. The child is caught in the middle, and the parents must fight in court to reclaim their rightful role. As I said before, that is not a theory; it is the sort of real-life pitfall that sloppy drafting can enable. If we see it coming and fail to stop it, we will have failed as legislators.
I wish to be clear that I support clauses 24 to 28 and schedule 2 because they modernise mental health law for adults in a way that is respectful and empowering. I support amendment 54, because it would strengthen transparency and accountability where children’s lives and safety are at stake. I support amendment 55, because it would keep our statute book coherent, but it must never be misused to erode rights by stealth. Above all, I support the amendments because they ensure that the new nominated person system does not inadvertently weaken the oldest and strongest protection we have, which is the legal responsibility of parents to care for their own child.
I urge this Committee to adopt the clauses, the schedule and amendments 54 and 55 as essential guardrails to ensure that what we pass here is not just legally sound, but morally right. Let us modernise this law and strengthen patient voice, but let us never allow a child to lose their parents’ protection by accident or bureaucratic slip. Let us be in no doubt: when the state removes or limits parental rights, it must do so under the strictest scrutiny of a court of law, with evidence tested and the child’s welfare paramount. A signed piece of paper at a bedside should never be enough. That is the dividing line between a humane, modern health system and one that risks creating new injustices in the name of progress.
I ask the Minister again: will the Government enshrine in this Bill or elsewhere that parents are the legal representatives for under-16s unless a court directs otherwise? Will he guarantee rigorous checks to prevent the manipulation of young minds at their most vulnerable? Will he commit that any necessary changes found by the incident review under amendment 54 would be acted on without delay? I commend this package of reforms to the Committee, and I trust that the Government will listen carefully to these warnings and act to make the legislation watertight.
The Minister for Care (Stephen Kinnock)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Harris, not least because I understand you have just returned from New Zealand, where you had duties as the Government’s trade envoy. I thought perhaps we should do a haka in your honour to mark it, but you might rule against that.
Stephen Kinnock
I have no comment on that, and we are not going to divide on it either.
Let me address the questions raised in this morning’s debate. First, I was asked how disputes will be resolved when the nominated person and clinicians disagree. Where a specific nominated person, power or right is being used, the nominated person’s decision applies, because these are statutory powers and rights under the Mental Health Act. However, clinicians will have discretion and can overrule a nominated person’s decision, if there is a danger to the patient or others. That will be clarified in the code.
Secondly, I was asked how we will ensure that nominated persons are aware of their powers. In addition to the broader training and familiarisation required alongside the reforms for clinicians, the statutory forms used to appoint a nominated person will set out that the witness should explain the role of the nominated person and make sure that the nominated person and patient understand the powers and requirements of the role. I think my hon. Friend the Member for Southend West and Leigh raised that point, too.
Thirdly, I was asked whether there is a mechanism to appoint an interim nominated person, and yes, there is. The interim nominated person is the nominated person appointed by an approved mental health professional when a person lacks the competence or capacity to appoint their own nominated person. While the legislation does not refer to the term “interim nominated person”, that in practice is what they are.
A lot of the discussion today has focused on how the provision will apply to children and young people. I understand the concerns raised and the importance of getting this right. In summary, we object to amendments 54 and 55, which would require nominated persons for patients under 16 to have parental responsibility for the child, whether chosen by the child or appointed for them, on the basis that children with the relevant competence should have the ability to choose their own nominated person. That is in line with the recommendations of the independent review, and in keeping with the principles of choice and autonomy and treating the person as an individual. We have put safeguards in place to ensure that their selection is appropriate and to remove anyone who does not exercise those powers in the best interests of the child.
Anna Dixon (Shipley) (Lab)
Can the Minister assure us that there are powers in schedule 2 for the removal of a nominated person? One of the grounds is that any person engaged in caring for the patient or interested in the patient’s welfare may raise concerns—for example, a parent or other unpaid carer who has information that the nominated person is not acting in the best interests of the patient.
Stephen Kinnock
I can assure my hon. Friend on that. We have safeguards in place both to ensure that the selection is appropriate in the first place and that, if there are behaviours that indicate that the person is not right for the task, they will be removed and their powers taken away.
Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)
Can the Minister clarify where these powers are and what they look like? For example, if a 15-year-old decides to appoint someone who is 23—maybe a boyfriend, maybe not—the problem is that once they make that nomination, we are waiting for something to happen. The idea behind the clauses we have been debating, and the use of exceptional circumstances to try to solve this problem, is to ensure that we prevent any problem from happening in the first place. That is the bit I am not clear on. I thought that Government amendments 40 and 41 were possibly intended to address that point, but my worry is that once the person is chosen, we do not know how they will behave. The whole idea is to give parental responsibility first. Could the Minister address where this is in the Bill, or what it looks like in the code? This is the critical bit to get right for children.
Stephen Kinnock
With all due respect to the hon. Gentleman, I am not going to spend time shuffling my papers around. If he cares to look at schedule 2, I think he will find it there.
Government amendments 40 and 41 have been tabled because we believe that it is not necessary to specify in legislation which person the parental responsibility the approved mental health professional must appoint as nominated person for an under-16-year-old. We have committed to clarify this in the code of practice. We have committed to establishing an expert taskforce to support the development of a statutory code of practice to provide clear guidance for professionals involved in the nominated person appointment process.
The fourth question was whether we need parental responsibility by default. The current nearest relative provision assigns an automatic relative according to a hierarchical list, which does not reflect modern family structures. For instance, step-parents and parents who live abroad are not included. That can mean that children and young people may have a nearest relative who can make decisions about their care but who may not know the child well or engage with the role, or who could even be a risk to them. Without formal care proceedings, the child would be left to be represented by a relative who will not act in their best interests.
Fifthly, questions were raised about how to ensure that young patients are not isolated from family support if needed. Engagement with children and young people suggests that they are most likely to appoint their parent as a nominated person. If they appoint someone who is not their parent, then parents could still be involved in their care and treatment where appropriate. Safeguards are in place to allow for the overruling and displacement of the nominated person if they are behaving in a way that is not in the child or young person’s best interests.
Similarly, where a child is under a care order and parental responsibility sits primarily with the local authority, the local authority will retain its parental responsibility for the child even if the child chooses a nominated person who is not the local authority. The code of practice will provide guidance on how practitioners should include those with parental responsibility and care in key processes and decisions.
Sixthly, in cases where there are safeguarding concerns, what safeguards exist to ensure that the nominated person acts in the best interests of the child? The witness will determine whether the child’s nomination is suitable. Clinicians will also have the power to overrule decisions made by a nominated person if they think there is a danger to the patient or to others. The patient, an approved mental health professional, parents and anyone with an interest in the child’s welfare can apply to the court to displace the nominated person if they think they are behaving in a way that is not in the child’s best interests.
Finally, there was a question about how we will ensure that there is no coercion, including in the example involving an older partner. We will provide guidance to the witness on how to check that no coercion has taken place, as well as wider suitability criteria. A nominated person cannot be appointed if coercion or undue pressure has taken place. We intend to state in the code, subject to consultation, that an advocate should be involved early on to provide support to the child or young person throughout the nomination process. Advocates could work with witnesses to ensure that they have the relevant information about the child to make an informed appointment.
I hope that hon. Members are satisfied with those answers and will not press their amendments. I commend Government amendments 40 and 41, clauses 24 to 28 and schedule 2 to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 24 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 2
Nominated persons
Amendment proposed: 54, in schedule 2, page 77, line 21, at end insert—
“(3) Where the patient has not attained the age of 16 years, a nominated person must have parental responsibility for the patient.”—(Dr Evans.)
This amendment would stipulate that the nominated person for a patient under 16 must have parental responsibility for the patient.
Dr Danny Chambers (Winchester) (LD)
I beg to move amendment 49, in schedule 2, page 87, line 13, at end insert—
“(18A) In section 130B (arrangements in relation to independent mental advocates: England), after subsection (3)(d), insert—
‘(e) support the patient’s carer and family members to prepare for the patient’s discharge from hospital treatment, and
(f) support the patient to access help with social and financial stressors that might otherwise increase their likelihood of future detention.’”
This amendment extends the support offered by Mental Health advocates to cover social and financial stressors and support for family carers and other members of the household when the patient is discharged.
It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Harris. I jumped the gun this morning, so I have already spoken in detail about the amazing initiative at Melbury Lodge with Winchester Citizens Advice. I will not bore the Committee with the details again, except to say that it is a brilliant example not only of delivering really good care for patients, but of a really good cost-effective intervention for the taxpayer. If it is not appropriate for it to be set out in secondary or primary legislation, will the Minister consider a meeting with me, Melbury Lodge and Winchester Citizens Advice to discuss how this type of initiative could be rolled out across the country?
Aphra Brandreth (Chester South and Eddisbury) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Harris. I rise to make some brief comments on amendment 49.
I am sympathetic to aims of the hon. Member for Winchester in tabling the amendment. A patient who is being discharged from hospital may indeed require specific, targeted support. The overall success of their treatment and continued recovery can be greatly enhanced where the right structures are in place to support them in the community. The amendment rightly draws attention to social and financial stressors that may affect an individual at the point of discharge and in the weeks and months that follow. We all recognise that there is a pressing need for a more joined-up approach between in-patient services and community provision. Without that, we risk patients falling through the cracks and suffering unnecessary and distressing re-admissions. Better discharge planning must be at the heart of our efforts.
I have some concerns, however. Although I acknowledge the good intentions behind the amendment, it risks expanding the remit of independent mental health advocates beyond what might be appropriate. There is a delicate balance, but an important distinction, between advocacy and care co-ordination. Independent mental health advocates play a vital role, and it is essential that their independence and clarity of purpose be preserved. If we are not careful, we risk blurring that boundary. In doing so, we may undermine the very effectiveness of the independent mental health advocate in fulfilling their primary function.
The role of an IMHA is to support patients in understanding and exercising their rights under the Mental Health Act. They may already be involved in supporting an individual to prepare for discharge, including by contributing to plans for ongoing care and support. The amendment would significantly increase the breadth of that role and might shift the focus away from the core purpose of advocacy.
Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)
My hon. Friend makes a pressing point. Does she agree that if the amendment is accepted, there will be a requirement for additional training to deal with financial and social support, which goes outside the current scope of these important advocates?
Aphra Brandreth
My hon. Friend makes an important point. This is not a simple or straightforward addition; it would require potentially substantial training. We would not want somebody in a role that they were not adequately prepared for. With any amendment, we would need to ensure that training, and the time and expense of it, had been factored in.
Even with the best intentions, the success of any extended support role, such as that envisaged in the amendment, will ultimately rely on the availability and integration of local services. Where appropriate services are in place and are working well together, advocates can play a valuable role in signposting and supporting access. Rather than placing additional responsibilities on the IMHA, our focus should be on working with community providers to ensure that the necessary support, particularly for social and financial needs, is consistently available and is effectively joined up across the system.
Having said that, I recognise and welcome the emphasis placed by the hon. Member for Winchester on the role of carers and family members. Too often, they are overlooked in discharge planning, yet their involvement can make a critical difference to a patient’s successful transition from hospital to home. When carers feel informed, supported and prepared, it gives patients the reassurance and stability that they need to continue their recovery with confidence. The primary responsibility of the independent mental health advocate, however, must remain their responsibility to the patient. I am concerned that the drafting of the amendment could create ambiguity about who the IMHA is principally there to support.
Financial stress is undoubtedly a real and urgent concern. Mental ill health can severely affect an individual’s capacity to work, to manage their finances or even to engage with systems of support. Equally, financial instability can exacerbate mental health difficulties. Those are serious challenges that must be addressed, but I would question whether the IMHA is the right professional to take on that role directly. Instead, we should ensure that they are well placed to refer individuals to appropriate services without assuming responsibility for co-ordinating that support themselves.
Gregory Stafford
I do not know whether the hon. Member for Winchester will press his amendment to a vote, but if he does, would my hon. Friend support the idea of having a pilot roll-out of the system before we go the whole hog, because of all the potential problems that she has highlighted?
Aphra Brandreth
That is an important point. These are quite substantial changes, and we do not know the full impact that they would have on the system. We have talked about issues such as whether there is sufficient training for advocates and a joined-up approach with what is happening in the community. A pilot would provide the opportunity to see where it is working and where there might be things that need to be changed or considered. It would certainly be a sensible approach. We all want to ensure that we are supporting individuals to be discharged in a safe way that minimises the likelihood of their being readmitted, but we need to do so without overcomplicating the roles and the system that are currently in place.
I commend the hon. Member for Winchester for bringing these important issues to the attention of the Committee. His amendment raises legitimate and timely concerns around the support offered to individuals leaving hospital, as well as the wider context in which recovery takes place. I hope that I have been able to offer some reflections that will assist hon. Members in considering the matter further.
Dr Evans
This morning, we touched on amendment 49, so I will not repeat my remarks. I will simply ask a pithy question of the hon. Member for Winchester. He rightly talked about the incredible work that his local citizens advice bureau carries out. How will the amendment blur the lines between social workers, caseworkers and the independent advocates who are already doing this work? How does he perceive that working? I worry about the complexity that it would create. I would be grateful if the hon. Member addressed that point.
Stephen Kinnock
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Winchester for bringing this issue before the Committee. The intention of his amendment is to extend the support offered by independent mental health advocates
“to cover social and financial stressors and support for family carers and other members of the household when the patient is discharged.”
It would amend paragraph 18 of schedule 2, which deals with amendments relating to nominated persons. It should more properly be inserted into schedule 3, which deals with independent mental health advocates.
The Bill will already extend the support that advocates can provide to help patients to be involved in decisions about their care and treatment, to be able to make a complaint and to be provided with information about other available services. Those other services could include support following discharge from statutory or voluntary organisations, which may cover social and financial issues, and help to support carers. Those organisations would be better placed to support patients with these specific needs, rather than independent mental health advocates, whose skillset is specific to supporting patients to understand their rights under the Mental Health Act and participate in decisions about their care and treatment. We will consult on guidance in the code of practice to help independent mental health advocates to understand their extended role.
In addition to policy regarding independent mental health advocacy, advance choice documents give individuals the chance to give instructions about practical aspects of their life. Examples of such aspects include domestic, financial or caring responsibilities, such as children or pets. This provision allows the individual to be looked after when unwell and aims to ease additional anxieties. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Winchester to withdraw his amendment.
Dr Chambers
I appreciate the valid points that hon. Members have made. The point about running a pilot was a sensible suggestion. We have had something that could be viewed as a pilot in Winchester for two years. We know that it works well, and every £1 spent on it saves £14.08. If I have suggested this amendment in the wrong part of the Bill through my naivety and inexperience, or if mental health advocates are not the right people to deliver a solution that we know works, may I ask the Minister whether there is a more appropriate part of the Bill in which to include it or another way to implement this proven system, such as by amending a different Bill, before I decide whether to press the amendment to a vote?
Stephen Kinnock
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that question. Fundamentally, our view is that the role that he is proposing is not the right one for an independent mental health advocate. The role of an independent mental health advocate is to work with the patient around their legal rights, rather than to deal with some of the more practical issues that he is talking about here. Our sense is that there are both statutory and voluntary organisations who are better placed to carry out that work. I do not think that a pilot would work with IMHAs, because by definition that is not the right role for IMHAs.
Dr Chambers
In that case, can we have a discussion outside the Committee about how to do this?
Dr Chambers
indicated assent.
Amendment 49 negatived.
Schedule 2, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 25 to 28 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 29
Detention periods
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephen Kinnock
Currently, under the Mental Health Act, a person detained for treatment can be kept in hospital initially for six months before the responsible clinician must make an assessment to decide whether to continue their detention or to discharge them. The independent review raised concerns that six months is too long. It heard evidence that patients were sometimes detained longer than necessary and were only considered for discharge when a tribunal hearing was due. It found that in up to 17% of cases referred to the mental health tribunal, discharge happened in the 48 hours before the hearing. That suggests that some patients are being detained longer than is necessary.
The review recommended reducing from six months to three months the initial detention period for people admitted for treatment, so that a patient’s detention is reviewed sooner to ensure that patients are not detained when they are no longer benefiting from treatment and can be safely discharged.
Clause 29 will mean that patients detained for treatment have their detention reviewed three times—up from twice—in the first year: at three, six and twelve months from the date of detention. The new renewal periods will not apply to part III patients, except in very specific circumstances when an unrestricted patient changes status. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Gregory Stafford
I have some brief questions for the Minister about this important clause, which has serious implications for patient liberty and for public protection. We must ensure that decisions are clinically and legally sound. First, how will the proposed changes to initial and renewal detention periods help conditions and services and manage public risk more effectively, particularly in forensic or high-risk cases? Secondly, do longer detention periods after revocation of a community treatment order reflect a higher perceived risk, and if so, is there clear clinical evidence supporting that extension to six months? Thirdly, are we confident that the new timelines strike the right balance between protecting the public and ensuring patients are not detained longer than necessary? Finally, and as an adjunct to that, what other considerations are there in the clause or the Bill to keep the public safe and to make sure that decisions are correct in the context of clause 29?
Dr Evans
Clause 29 addresses the length and renewal of detention periods under the Mental Health Act. I begin by acknowledging the important step that this clause represents in shifting towards a more rights-based, patient-centred model, as enshrined in the Bill.
Clause 29 would shorten the initial period of detention for treatment under section 3 of the Mental Health Act from six months to three months. Subsequent renewal periods are, likewise, reduced from six months to three months and then from one year to six months. This is clearly informed by the principle of least restriction, as is rightly highlighted in the explanatory notes in paragraph 212.
On that basis, we welcome the direction of travel, but, while we agree with the principle of moving towards shorter, more proportionate detention periods, we have questions and concerns about implementation, consistency and safeguards, which I hope the Minister will address.
First, will shorter periods lead to better outcomes, or just more paperwork? The goal here is to ensure that detention is not allowed to drift and that patients are not held in hospital for longer than is necessary without rigorous justification. However, the clause still allows for indefinite renewal in increments, once those shorter initial periods expire. Can the Minister assure us that these changes will result in more meaningful reviews and not just more frequent rubber-stamping of detention? It would be helpful to understand whether the Government have assessed the clinical capacity, particularly among responsible clinicians and approved mental health professionals, to conduct these reviews with real rigour. If not resourced properly, we risk replacing one form of inertia with another.
Secondly, what safeguards exist against the resetting of detention periods on transfer? I am by no means a legal expert, so forgive me if I have completely misinterpreted this, and I bow to the legal expertise of the Minister, the Government and, most importantly, to able staff in the Box. However, clause 29(2) introduces into section 19 of the Mental Health Act new subsection (2A), which provides that if a guardianship patient is transferred to hospital, they will be treated as if they had been admitted on the day of transfer. In practical terms, does that not reset the detention clock?
To my eyes, this concept of resetting the detention clock appears most clearly in subsections (2) and 29(5)(d) of clause 29, where a patient who is transferred from guardianship to hospital, or who has their community treatment order revoked, is treated as if they had been newly admitted to hospital on that day. This effectively resets the start date of the detention period. Clause 29(2), which will insert proposed new section 19(2A) into the Mental Health Act, states:
“But, in the case of a patient falling within subsection (2)(d), section 20 has effect as if the patient has been admitted to hospital in pursuance of an application for admission for treatment on the day on which the patient is transferred.”
New paragraph 5B of schedule 1 to the Mental Health Act states that the modifications
“apply in relation to a patient transferred from guardianship to a hospital in pursuance of regulations made under section 19…In section 20(1)(a)…for “admitted”…there is to be substituted “transferred”.
In new paragraphs 5C and 5D of that schedule, the same resetting principle applies to patients whose CTOs are revoked, with renewal detention starting from the date of revocation, not from their original hospital admission or order.
In practice, this could mean that if a patient is placed under guardianship on 1 January and transferred to hospital on 1 April under section 19(2)(d) of the Mental Health Act, then under proposed new section 19(2A), they would be treated as if they had been newly admitted on 1 April. Therefore, even though they have been under compulsion since 1 January, the new three-month detention clock begins on 1 April. Likewise, a patient under a community treatment order that was issued on 1 February and revoked on 1 August will, under paragraph 5D, start a new in-patient detention period on 1 August, not 1 February.
On one hand, that makes sense. We do not want people whose state is fluctuating to be released, or simply to time out. On the other hand, if we are looking purely from the patient’s perspective, as the legislation asks us to do, with regard to the principles in clause 1, that could be a problem. Will the Minister clarify how many times such a reset could occur for a single individual? Is there any form of oversight, review or reporting requirement where this happens? That mechanism might be necessary in some clinical contexts, but without safeguards it could become a back door to prolonging detention, which is something that the clause seeks to reduce. Is there some kind of register or mandatory recording of these incidents to spot repeat patterns?
Thirdly, another issue that needs addressing is the creation of possible complexity. Paragraphs 218 and 219 of the explanatory notes set out a separate but equally important issue. Clause 29’s welcome shortening of detention periods—from three months to start with, then three months, then six months, then annual reviews—is not applied evenly to patient groups. Who gets the shorter periods? Most civil patients detained under part II and some patients on revoked community treatment orders. Who does not get them? Patients detained by a hospital order from a court, if their CTO is revoked within six months of the order, as in paragraph 218. And, of course, restricted patients—typically those involved in more serious offences.
Stephen Kinnock
The aim of the clause is to ensure that a patient’s detention is reviewed sooner. The planned reforms will not change the fundamental power and purpose of the Act, which is to detain and treat people when they are so unwell that they become a risk to themselves or others. Where a patient continues to meet the criteria, their detention will be renewed.
Opposition Members have asked about extra paperwork and workload in general for both clinicians and tribunals. In the impact assessment that we published alongside the Bill, we set out the estimated costs and benefits of the reforms and the expected workforce requirements that are critical to our implementation planning. That includes consideration of the impact on clinicians of additional detention reviews, which we have calculated is estimated to be around four hours of additional workload by the clinician for each patient who is detained beyond three months.
On the clinical evidence for shortening the detention period, in the independent review we found that in 17% of cases referred to the mental health tribunal, discharge happened in the 48 hours before the hearing, which strongly suggests that some patients are being detained for longer than is necessary.
Stephen Kinnock
I did not catch the question to which the hon. Gentleman is referring. Could he repeat it, please?
Dr Evans
The issue is about resetting. As the legislation is written, it would suggest that because people are moving from one place to another, the clock resets. Clinically, that could make sense, but part of the problem is that every time the clock resets, so does the person’s detention. That is a key part. Fundamentally, in this clause we are trying to stop people being detained when they do not need to be. In fact, the Minister has just said that 17% of people were discharged before the tribunal could happen. The question is around specifying, when it comes to admission and transfer, that the clock resets. What safeguards do we have to make sure that we are counting the number of times it is reset, that it is clinically appropriate and, most importantly, that we are not substituting one way of dealing with this with a back-door way of creating a reset motion?
Stephen Kinnock
I am struggling a little to understand what the hon. Gentleman is driving at. I pointed out in my opening remarks that the review clearly recommended reducing the initial detention period for people admitted for treatment from six months to three months, so that a patient’s detention is reviewed sooner to ensure patients are not detained when they are no longer benefiting from treatment and can be safely discharged. The clause means that patients detained for treatment will have their detention reviewed three times in the first year: at three, six and 12 months from the date of detention—up from two, as it was previously. I do not think that there is any implication that it is resetting the detention; it is just a rolling set of reviews.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 29 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
I will not tolerate any further speaking outside the structure. It is the second time that it has happened this afternoon, and I will not tolerate it any further.
Clause 30
Periods for tribunal applications
Stephen Kinnock
Clause 30 will introduce important reforms to the tribunal process by adjusting the timeframes for when patients can apply to the tribunal regarding their detention. Section 2 patients will now have 21 days rather than the current 14 to apply. This reform addresses concerns that patients in crisis often need more time to fully understand their rights, access legal advice and make an application.
For section 3 patients and transferred guardianship patients, clause 30 will reduce the initial application period from six months to three months. This aligns the application period with the new, shorter initial detention period of three months, reduced from six months, for these patients. This change maintains the current rights for these patients to make an application once during each successive period of detention.
For conditionally discharged restricted patients, clause 30 provides different application periods. These vary depending on whether the patient has been conditionally discharged with or without conditions that amount to a deprivation of liberty. Conditionally discharged restricted patients who are subject to deprivation of liberty conditions—also known as patients on a supervised discharge—can make an application to the tribunal sooner, between six months and 12 months from the date that they become subject to said conditions, and thereafter every two years. In contrast, conditionally discharged restricted patients who are not subject to deprivation of liberty conditions will have application periods between 12 months and two years, and thereafter every two years.
The different application periods reflect the need to consider a patient’s detention more frequently and earlier where more restrictive deprivation of liberty conditions are present. These changes improve access to the tribunal, ensuring greater protection for some of society’s most vulnerable individuals.
Clause 31 will strengthen the system of automatic referrals to the tribunal for patients detained under the Mental Health Act. It ensures that patients who may not be able to make an application to the tribunal themselves are still afforded regular judicial oversight. For patients detained under section 2, this clause reduces the automatic referral period from six months to three months. This improves the current safeguard by bringing the trigger for the automatic referral sooner. This will apply when a section 2 patient’s detention has been extended beyond 28 days and no application or referral has been made to the tribunal for review of the patient’s detention.
The clause will also improve the automatic referrals for patients detained under section 3. It does this by triggering referrals on the expiry of three months and 12 months and annually thereafter, where the tribunal has not considered the patient’s case. Additionally, this clause removes the automatic referral trigger on revocation of a community treatment order. It was found in practice that the automatic referral was an ineffective safeguard, as often the patient either was back in the community and subject to a new CTO or had reverted to being a section 3 patient before the tribunal reviewed their case. Now, where a patient’s CTO is revoked, they will be automatically referred at three months and 12 months after revocation, and then every subsequent 12 months. This allows the automatic referral periods to apply afresh from the date on which the CTO is revoked.
The clause will ensure that patients detained under the Mental Health Act are subject to regular and timely tribunal reviews, particularly when they are unable to advocate for themselves.
Clause 32 will deliver important tribunal oversight for the small cohort of restricted patients discharged into the community under conditions that amount to a deprivation of liberty, who are also known as supervised discharge patients. The clause will require patients subject to supervised discharge to be referred initially at 12 months after deprivation of liberty conditions are imposed, followed by a further referral every two years, where the patient’s case has not been heard by the tribunal in this period. The clause will also provide a safeguard for patients who may fluctuate between conditional and supervised discharge, to ensure that no supervised discharge patient will go more than four years without their case being considered by the tribunal. Automatic referrals to the tribunal ensure that patients under some of the most restrictive conditions have routine oversight of their detention where independent review would otherwise be absent.
The clause will also clarify the powers of the tribunal when considering the application or reference of a conditionally discharged patient, which include the power for the tribunal to impose conditions amounting to a deprivation of liberty. Deprivation of liberty conditions may be imposed or retained only where the tribunal is satisfied that they are necessary to protect another person from serious harm and are no less beneficial to the patient than a recall to hospital. This test preserves public protection, while enhancing the safeguards in place for conditionally discharged patients, ensuring that their care and liberty are subject to regular independent scrutiny.
Together, these changes will promote a more robust system of oversight for patients subject to long-term detention and restrictive conditions, ensuring that their rights are respected and their detention is regularly reviewed.
Clause 33 will extend the same principles of regular, proportionate scrutiny to restricted patients who are not conditionally discharged subject to deprivation of liberty conditions. For restricted patients detained in hospital, section 71 will be amended to reduce the automatic referral period from three years to one year. That amendment aligns with the amendments to increase the frequency of automatic referrals introduced in the Bill for part II patients. Through annual tribunal reviews, it is intended that those individuals are safeguarded against inappropriate detention. That aligns with the broader principles of fairness and accountability, ensuring that individuals in long-term detention are subject to appropriate judicial oversight.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this afternoon, Mrs Harris. I rise to speak on clauses 30 to 33, which go to the core of the rights architecture that surrounds mental health law in this country—namely, the oversight and challenge mechanisms available to individuals subject to detention, supervision or conditional discharge. I think we are all aware that the 1983 Act, although fit for its time, has failed to keep pace with the evolving understanding of mental health illness and modern expectations of legal accountability or procedural fairness. The clauses, although technical in nature, seek to rectify a number of the long-standing shortcomings in the operation of the mental health tribunal system.
Clause 30 will extend and clarify the time period within which patients may apply to tribunals. Essentially, it will do two things. First, it will extend the application window for section 2 patients—those detained for assessment—from 14 to 21 days. Secondly, it will reduce the initial waiting period for section 3 patients and those under guardianship from six months to three months. Those are sensible and overdue changes, because 14 days is a narrow window for any legal action, let alone one initiated by an individual who may be experiencing acute psychological distress.
Extending the application window to 21 days provides a fairer opportunity to seek representation and prepare a meaningful application. Equally, the reduction of the initial period for section 3 and guardianship patients to three months offers an important safeguard against prolonged detention without scrutiny. It restores a measure of clarity between the gravity of the detention order and the speed with which it may be challenged.
The clause will also clarify the rights of conditionally discharged restricted patients who are subject to deprivation of liberty conditions—that is, those who are discharged from hospital but required to comply with supervisional residence requirements that are so restrictive that they cross the legal threshold for a deprivation of liberty. At present, those individuals occupy a legal grey zone: they are not formally detained, yet the liberty they enjoy is so curtailed that it raises significant questions as to their article 5 rights. Clause 30 will properly address that anomaly by creating a defined, regular route of appeal, initially between six and 12 months from the imposition of the deprivation of liberty conditions, and biannually thereafter. Those are measured and proportionate changes that enhance access to justice, improve compliance with human rights obligations and restore clarity to a field that has suffered, at times, from legal opacity.
The reforms are not without consequences. A wider cohort of eligible applicants and more frequent review periods will inevitably increase the burden on the tribunal service, on legal aid provision and on clinical teams who must prepare documents and attend hearings. That challenge is not to be dismissed lightly.
Gregory Stafford
Does my gallant and learned hon. Friend have any information on the current waiting times for tribunals? What does he expect the effect of the changes proposed in these clauses to be on waiting times?
Dr Shastri-Hurst
My hon. Friend makes a pertinent point. We all know, from our casework or personal experiences outside of this place, about the pressures on the Courts and Tribunals Service. Mental health tribunals are not exempt from that pressure. Changing the timeframe on which tribunals operate, and the frequency with which reviews take place, will inevitably increase the burden on the service. Therefore, although these changes are broadly welcome, it is important that we are cognisant of their impact on the resources that will be required, the number of judges and wing members that will be needed, and of course the hard standing of the court and tribunal infrastructure that will need to be made available. Other issues, such as those around the digitalisation of the service, will also need to be addressed.
Clause 31 will recast the regime for automatic tribunal referrals, replacing the prior six-month structure with the concept of “a relevant period”. For detained patients, referrals will now occur at three months, then 12 months, and annually thereafter. For community patients, they will occur at six months, then 12 months, then annually. Most significantly, hospital managers will be under a new duty to refer a case when no review has occurred in 12 months, regardless of whether an application has been made. That is a sound reform.
The clause will introduce coherence to a previously fragmented system, and establishes a minimum standard of legal oversight. The inclusion of a backstop provision—that no individual should go more than 12 months without review—is essential. In a system in which patients may not always have the means or capacity to apply for a review themselves, it offers a critical safety net. Clause 31 will also repeal section 68A of the 1983 Act, which has become unwieldy and duplicative. By streamlining the referral process, the Bill enhances legal clarity and administrative efficiency, but I would caution that the increased complexity of the new timeframes may require significant training of those responsible for their implementation.
Clause 32 will provide for restricted patients who are subject to deprivation of liberty conditions. It goes further than clause 30 by imposing mandatory referral duties on the Secretary of State. Under the clause, a tribunal must be convened after 12 months, every two years thereafter, and at four years if no review has occurred. Crucially, the clause also codifies the tribunal’s powers. It may now vary or impose conditions, including those that constitute a deprivation of liberty, provided that they are necessary to protect the public from serious harm and are no more restrictive than hospital detention. That clause introduces a principled, proportionate framework for balancing public protection with patient liberty, and avoids vague or discretionary use of such powers.
Finally, clause 33 will apply the same principles to restricted patients not subject to deprivation of liberty orders. Such individuals, although under fewer constraints, are none the less subject to significant legal orders. The new requirement for a tribunal review at two years, and every four years thereafter, ensures that oversight is regular and non-discriminatory.
All four clauses are united by a clear objective to rationalise tribunal access, enhance procedural safeguards and bring the Mental Health Act into alignment with modern standards of fairness and proportionality. However, I will close with a caveat: rights without resourcing are hollow. If we are to place greater demand on the tribunals service, and to rely on it as the guardian of liberty for thousands of individuals, it must be adequately funded, staffed and supported. Legal representation must be accessible. Tribunal members must be properly trained. Hospital managers must be equipped to meet their new responsibilities.
With those reservations, I broadly welcome clauses 30 to 33 as a necessary recalibration of our mental health law. They reflect the dignity of the individual, the demands of public safety, and the enduring principle that no one should be deprived of liberty without fair or timely review.
Natasha Irons (Croydon East) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Harris. I rise to speak in support of clauses 30 to 33. I echo many of the remarks of the gallant and learned hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley, but I will try not to go over too much of the same ground.
These clauses seek to provide clarity and improvement in access to the tribunal process, both for patients detained under the Mental Health Act and for those on conditional discharge, and seek to implement key recommendations from the independent review. Section 66 of the Act is amended to extend the period in which a patient detained under section 2 can apply to the tribunal from 14 days to 21 days. Clause 30 also allows for auto-enrolment in a hearing, reducing that time from six months to three months. It clarifies that conditional discharge patients are included in this package, so they also have the right to have their treatment reviewed at a tribunal. Providing for auto-enrolment simplifies the system for people who, as the hon. Member mentioned, are perhaps not in the best position to make administrative decisions and fill in the paperwork to apply to a tribunal.
Although this framework and these changes are necessary to bring clarity and autonomy back into people’s healthcare, it would be good to hear from the Minister about how we will support patients throughout these processes as we learn about the different timelines. How will we ensure people can access this change in the system and understand what they are entitled to under this new provision?
Dr Evans
Clauses 30 to 33 deal with the tribunal access and automatic referrals of patients detained or conditionally discharged under the Mental Health Act. Let me begin, again, by welcoming these provisions, which seek to improve safeguards, ensure timely oversight, and extend the rights of individuals, particularly those under deprivation of liberty conditions in the community. These are serious matters of liberty and I acknowledge the Government’s intention to modernise and strengthen protection. Nevertheless, it is important that we look carefully at how the clauses operate in practice. I will take each in turn.
Clause 30, on tribunal application periods, will make important changes to when patients can apply for the tribunal. First, it will extend the time that patients detained under section 2 of the Act have to apply from 14 to 21 days. This is a welcome change. We know that the first few days in hospital are incredibly disorientating, so allowing patients a bit more time to seek legal advice is entirely sensible.
Secondly, the clause will reduce the period for patients detained under section 3 to apply from six months to three. I can understand the logic of that, given that clause 29 also shortens the initial detention period, but is there any reason for choosing that mark? Is there any evidence that the three-month window will still allow patients to have sufficient time and support to exercise their rights?
Thirdly, the clause will introduce new provisions for conditionally discharged restricted patients, setting out different application timeframes depending on whether the patient is subject to conditions amounting to deprivation of liberty. Those under the deprivation of liberty safeguards will be able to apply between six and 12 months after discharge and then every two years. For those not under such conditions, the window begins at 12 months. That reflects the impact of conditions on a person’s liberty, and I recognise that distinction, but can the Minister clarify how patients will be informed about which track they are on? That will be fundamental to exerting their rights. Will any guidance be issued to ensure consistency? Will patients have access to advocacy or legal advice at this point?
On clause 31, automatic tribunal referrals are a crucial safety net for those who for whatever reason do not exercise their right to apply. The clause introduces a new framework of relevant periods after which the hospital managers must refer, as we have heard. For section 2 patients, it will be three months. For section 3 and CTO patients it will be three months, then 12 months and every year thereafter. Significantly, the current three-year review period for many detained patients is reduced to one year.
The clause marks a substantial increase in oversight, which I support, but it also raises practical questions. Given that we have put these backstops in place, have the Government made any estimate of how many extra tribunals will be needed and how much extra work they will generate? The Minister was kind enough to say that there were four hours of clinical work involved in doing the plans, but I do not think we have yet heard how much work the Government estimate that the tribunals will take.
More importantly, what support is being provided to ensure that the tribunal system can meet that increased demand? I am particularly concerned that the benefits of these reforms may not be felt if backlogs or delays undermine the safeguards they are intended to deliver.
Gregory Stafford
Does my hon. Friend think that if there is a backlog, that could undermine patient rights or clinical progress in some way? How will the tribunal system be able to cope with that increased workload and meet its legal obligations to provide timely tribunals so that patients get the best care?
Dr Evans
That is a difficult balance to get right. I appreciate that the Government have said that the Bill will take 10 years to implement, but if these measures come into force from day one, we will start to see automatic referrals come through. There will be a lag as the transition happens, but my hon. Friend is absolutely right: we can foresee scenarios where patients who want to be referred into the tribunal are waiting in inappropriate care places, which may be to the detriment of their personal care and may actually make their recovery worse. He is right to highlight that question, which is why having a broad understanding of how many extra referrals are coming would be useful.
Clause 32 focuses on conditionally discharged restricted patients who are subject to deprivation of liberty conditions. It rightly ensures that those patients are brought within scope of automatic referral, first after 12 months and then every two years. Again, that is a positive step, ensuring that even those not detained in hospital will still have access to a review of their conditions. Crucially, the clause also gives the tribunals the power to vary or remove those DoL conditions.
Can the Minister say more about how that important power will be used? What criteria will the tribunals apply to assess whether a condition is genuinely necessary and proportionate? Will patients be legally represented in those hearings by default? Will another advocate be there, or will it be someone else in their place? Here, too, I would welcome some clarification from the Minister. I hope he will forgive my legal naivety, but my mother always said, “It’s better to ask a dumb question than stay dumb forever.”
The explanatory notes talk about DoL conditions. The current legal framework for authorising the deprivation of liberty for individuals who lack capacity is complex and in transition. Under the Mental Capacity Act 2005, deprivation of liberty safeguards have been the established mechanism since 2009 to ensure lawful deprivation of liberty in care settings. However, the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Act 2019 introduced liberty protection safeguards as modernising replacements, designed to simplify and broaden protections.
LPS are widely seen as an improvement to DoLS, because they extend safeguards to a wider range of settings, including hospitals and people’s own homes where deprivation of liberty might occur. They also streamline the assessment process, reducing bureaucratic delays and better reflecting person-centred decision making. The Law Commission and various stakeholder groups have supported LPS as a way to address the significant practical and legal challenges posed by DoLS, including the so-called DoLS backlog, where assessments have been delayed for many vulnerable individuals.
Despite that, I do not believe that LPS have yet been implemented, leaving DoLS still in force. I wonder if we are therefore creating ambiguity as we update the Mental Health Act through the Bill’s clauses, such as those addressing conditional discharge and deprivation of liberty, without clarity on how those will intersect with the forthcoming LPS framework that will be introduced under separate legislation. That raises important questions about the sequencing and co-ordination of legislation reform. How will the Government ensure coherence and avoid conflicting provisions when different statutes address overlapping issues at different times?
Given that context, have the Government abandoned the planned implementation of LPS, or do they remain committed to bringing them into force? If the implementation is still planned, will the Government provide a clear timeline for when LPS will replace DoLS? How do the Government intend to ensure that the provisions we are debating will align with or adapt to the introduction of LPS? What steps are being taken to ensure that vulnerable individuals and professionals who navigate this complex legal landscape will have clear, consistent safeguards and guidance through the transition? Clarification on those points is essential to avoid legal uncertainty and to ensure that the reforms provide coherent protection for those deprived of their liberties.
Clause 33 deals with patients who are not under DoLS conditions. It will ensure that even those who are under DoLS conditions, such as detained restricted patients or conditionally discharged patients with lesser restrictions, receive automatic tribunals. It will reduce the current three-year referral intervention for detained restricted patients to 12 months and introduce automatic referrals for non-DoL conditionality discharge patients after two years and then every four years. Again, that is a step forward, but four years feels like a long gap between reviews for those discharged with conditions that still significantly affect their daily lives. Will the Minister explain the thought behind the chosen timeframe? If a person’s condition changes, is there a mechanism to trigger an early referral outside the normal cycle?
The clauses show progress. They reflect a clear intention to strengthen patients’ rights, increase oversight and address historical injustices, particularly for those living under deprivation of liberty conditions in the community. But with complexity comes risk, and we need to ensure that patients understand their rights and the legal support available. The tribunal system must be properly resourced to uphold the safeguards that we place in the legislation.
Stephen Kinnock
I will try to answer some of the questions. On tribunal capacity, people who are conditionally discharged and those with restrictions that amount to a deprivation of liberty represent only a small fraction of tribunal business—well under 1% of all mental health tribunal cases. The modest increase in hearings is therefore expected to be absorbed within existing capacity, while delivering significant rights benefits to the individuals concerned. It is worth noting, too, that the mental health tribunal continues to perform strongly. Amazingly, it is one of the very few areas of our public services not to be left with a massive backlog by the previous Government. The open caseload has remained stable at approximately 3,700 cases for a decade, despite 31,226 appeals in 2024-25.
I was asked about LPS and replacing DoLS. The previous Government paused the implementation of the liberty protection safeguards; they decided to focus on other priorities. In the absence of LPS, the deprivation of liberty safeguards system will continue to apply. The Department has made it clear that all bodies with legal duties under the DoLS must continue to operate these important safeguards to ensure that the rights of people without the relevant mental capacity are protected.
Stephen Kinnock
We have made it clear that we are going to continue with DoLS. Basically, we have to look at whether replacing them with LPS will achieve the stated objectives of the exercise, and I am not entirely convinced about that. It is under review.
On supporting patients, the independent mental health advocate will ensure that patients are aware of their rights. Throughout the Bill we are ensuring that patients have support by moving to an opt-out model. Additionally, if a patient does not bring a case, they will be referred automatically to the tribunal if a specified period has passed. Patients will be supported in getting tribunal oversight, as the referrals are made by a hospital manager.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 30 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 31 to 33 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 34
Discharge: process
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephen Kinnock
The clause seeks to strengthen the protocol on discharging individuals under the Act by introducing a statutory requirement on the person who makes the discharge decision to consult with another. Currently, a patient’s responsible clinician can, in law, unilaterally decide to discharge a hospital in-patient from certain powers of the Act. Under our amendments, they will be required to consult someone else who is professionally concerned with the patient’s treatment, whether that be in the hospital or in the community. Where the responsible clinician is a consultant psychiatrist, the consultee may be a nurse, psychologist or occupational therapist. That is to ensure a more rounded perspective on the patient’s readiness for discharge from the Act.
The clause will introduce a similar protocol for the discharge of people under guardianship, guardianship orders and community treatment orders. For guardianship and guardianship orders, the person who makes the decision to discharge from the powers under the Act may need to consult either the responsible local social services authority or a person’s designated social worker. For patients under a community treatment order, the responsible clinician is required to consult the community clinician, in recognition of the fact that they will likely have a much clearer understanding of the patient’s progress in the community and whether they are ready for discharge under the Act.
Although multidisciplinary-based decisions represent best practice, we know that they are not always taken. The clause seeks to change that by helping to make sure that the decision to discharge is carefully considered and receives greater professional oversight.
Aphra Brandreth
I rise to speak to the implications of clause 34 for clinical decision making, patient safety and the operation of the Mental Health Act more broadly. The clause introduces a new requirement for the responsible clinician to consult another professional, from a different professional discipline, who is involved in the patient’s care before they make a decision to discharge a patient from detention or from a community treatment order under section 23 of the Mental Health Act 1983. If the patient is on a community treatment order, the clinician must consult the relevant community clinician.
At its heart, the clause seeks to ensure that decisions about discharge are not taken in isolation. It reflects a wider shift in mental health care towards collaborative, multidisciplinary approaches. We should welcome that in principle. These are often complex decisions that involve vulnerable individuals, and a single viewpoint may not always capture the full clinical picture. By requiring consultation with someone from another discipline, be that a nurse, an occupational therapist or a psychologist, we can help to ensure that decisions are more thoroughly considered and less likely to overlook risks.
The clause provides an important safeguard against premature or inappropriate discharge, particularly in cases where a patient may continue to pose a risk to themselves or others. It builds in a degree of professional scrutiny that supports safer and more consistent practice and, in doing so, should improve confidence among patients, families and practitioners.
I would be grateful if the Minister provided further clarity on a few practical points about how the clause will operate. First, it requires consultation but does not appear to specify whether the consulted clinician must agree with the responsible clinician’s decision in order for discharge to proceed. In cases where there is disagreement between clinicians of different professional backgrounds, what is the expected course of action? Is the responsible clinician ultimately free to proceed, or will there be an escalation mechanism? It would be helpful to understand how differing professional opinions are to be balanced and how potential deadlock is to be managed.
Secondly, although I welcome the intention to improve the rigour of decision making, will the Minister reassure the Committee that the additional consultation requirement will not introduce unnecessary delays into the discharge process? It is, of course, essential to get these decisions right, but it is also important that we do not create new barriers to discharge when a patient is clinically ready to move on. Delays in discharge can have a negative impact on patient outcomes, as well as increasing pressure on services. Although the consultation must be meaningful, it should also be proportionate, timely and clearly understood by all involved.
Will the Minister comment on how the requirement will be implemented in practice? For example, will guidance be issued to support clinicians in understanding their duties under the clause and to ensure consistency across services?
Overall, the clause represents a thoughtful and measured reform. It strengthens patient safety, promotes professional collaboration and introduces a safeguard that is both reasonable and necessary. Notwithstanding the clarifications I have raised, I hope that it will help to ensure that discharge decisions are made with greater confidence and care without becoming unduly bureaucratic.
Dr Evans
I rise to speak to clause 34, which inserts new consultation requirements into section 23 of the Mental Health Act 1983. The requirements relate to the discharge of individuals detained under parts II and III of the Act, as well as those subject to community treatment orders or guardianship.
Currently, under the Act, the responsible clinician has the power to discharge patients detained under sections 2 and 3, as well as unrestricted patients subject to a hospital order under part III, without any formal requirement to consult other professionals. This is already considered outdated practice in most clinical settings, where decisions are typically made within the multi-disciplinary team. However, that is not required by law. By contrast, discharge decisions for restricted patients remain with the Secretary of State for Justice or the mental health tribunal and are not affected by the clause.
Clause 34 seeks to change the current situation. It will insert proposed new subsections (2A) to (2C) into section 23 of the 1983 Act, placing a statutory consultation duty on responsible clinicians, local authorities and, in some cases, the patient’s nominated person. The aim, as outlined in the Government’s explanatory notes and by the Minister, is to formalise best practice and ensure that no discharge decision is made unilaterally without appropriate professional oversight. The Opposition welcome the intention behind the clause—strengthening safeguards, encouraging multidisciplinary collaboration and protecting patients from unsafe or premature discharges are all necessary and overdue steps—but we have a few questions about it that I hope the Minister will address.
First, proposed new subsection (2A) requires the responsible clinician to
“consult a person—
(i) who has been professionally concerned with the patient’s care or treatment, and
(ii) who belongs to a profession other than that to which the responsible clinician belongs”.
That is a sound principle, but there is an ambiguity in the phrase “has been professionally concerned”. Who do the Government have in mind? The Minister set out that it could be a nurse or a counsellor, but would it stretch as far as a GP or a practice nurse? Will there be a codifying list, either in statute or in the code of practice, so that we know who is expected to speak to that person? Does it require current involvement in the patient’s care? For example, could a professional who saw the patient only briefly many months ago qualify? If so, is that adequate to meet the clause’s intention? We would welcome clarification from the Minister on whether a definition of who and what an appropriate consultee looks like will be covered in guidance or regulations.
Secondly, I fully understand the good intent behind proposed new subsection (2B)(c), but as a good Opposition we should point out a possible unforeseen problem. It states that when the nominated person—that is, the person chosen by the patient to act in their interests—is making a discharge decision under guardianship, they
“must consult the responsible local social services authority.”
That raises both legal and practical questions. Is it appropriate to place a statutory duty on a layperson, who may be a relative, a friend or a carer with no formal training or professional support? What is the consequence if they fail to consult? Would their decision be invalid, or could it be legally challenged?
I know that the Government are trying to ensure that relatives and advocates are consulted, which is commendable. I am sure there will be no issue in the vast majority of cases, but there is a risk that the duty may unintentionally create legal uncertainty and administrative burdens for families. Has the Minister thought about whether it might be better framed as a duty on the local authority to advise or support the nominated person, rather than vice versa? I am sure we both agree on the motive and principle of shared decision making; it is simply a question of where to place the burden.
Thirdly, under proposed new subsection (2C), if someone is on a community treatment order, the responsible clinician and hospital managers must consult the community clinician before they discharge the person from that order. Again, that seems sensible, but what happens if there is no identified or available community clinician? As we have discussed, they are legally named, so could that requirement create a bottleneck to discharge? Will there be provision for proceeding with discharge if consultation is not practicable within a reasonable time? Without such a safeguard, there is a risk that patients remain subject to detention, such as conditions under a CTO, even when all parties agree that discharge is clinically appropriate.
Furthermore, the clause does not appear to require the consultation outcome to be documented, nor any disagreement to be recorded. If the responsible clinician consults someone and then disregards their view—as we heard earlier, according to the Minister they have precedence—that may be entirely justified, but surely transparency demands the recording of the reasons. Will the Government consider adding a requirement to document consultation, perhaps in the code of practice, to ensure that reasons are given when discharge proceedings are taken against clinical advice?
The clause represents an important step towards improving safety, accountability and multidisciplinary care in discharge planning, but the Opposition believe that to realise its full potential and avoid creating uncertainty or delay, the Government should look again at the clarity of key terms, such as “professionally concerned”; the appropriateness of placing duties on laypeople, such as the nominated person; the practical challenges around consultations when key professionals are not available; and the need for clear documentation requirements to uphold transparency and safeguarding in decision making. I look forward to hearing the Minister address those points.
Stephen Kinnock
The hon. Member for Chester South and Eddisbury asked about differences of opinion. The second professional does not have to agree. The ultimate decision in such cases sits with the responsible clinician, to ensure the clear accountability of decision making.
The hon. Lady also asked about delays. We see consultation with another professional as important to making a more informed decision on whether the patient is ready for discharge under the Act. It is especially important that the second professional involved in discharge decisions is from a discipline different from that of the responsible clinician. That will ensure a broader perspective, particularly when the second professional, such as a nurse, may have had more frequent contact with the patient.
Aphra Brandreth
On the discipline of the second clinician consulted, is there any guidance as to who might be appropriate? I mean not just the list of potential professions but whether there is guidance on who would be appropriate in different situations. We welcome the multidisciplinary approach, but I would like some clarification. Given your earlier response, saying that they need to agree, it is not really clear how this would add to the process. It would help if there were clarity on the professions.
Stephen Kinnock
We will absolutely provide guidance on that in the code, but the consultee in the case of a detained person is someone who is professionally concerned with the patient’s treatment, whether that be in the hospital or in the community, and who is from a discipline different from that of the responsible clinician. Those criteria will be applied throughout the process.
Finally, on the question from the Opposition spokesman, the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, yes, reasons will have to be given whenever there is a difference of opinion. All the relevant documentation and how that should work will be set out in the code of practice.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 34 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 35
Ascertaining and learning from patients’ experiences of hospital treatment
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephen Kinnock
This amendment seeks to overturn the previous amendment tabled—sorry, I should have said “the clause”. The clause seeks to overturn the previous amendment, tabled by Earl Howe and Lord Kamall. Although we support the intention of the amendment, our view continues to be that it would be duplicative.
There are already many ways in which service user feedback is used to inform policy and practice. For instance, every year the Care Quality Commission conducts thousands of interviews and visits with people detained under the Mental Health Act 1983. That may result in the CQC investigating a complaint or requiring an action statement from providers about service improvements. Although there may be room to enhance existing feedback mechanisms, we would prefer to improve what we have rather than create something new that would risk confusion.
If the objective is to provide time and space for the person to reflect on their past experiences post-discharge, I reassure the Committee that that should already form a part of co-producing a person’s care in the community plan. We also intend to create space for individuals to reflect on past experiences when making their advance choice document, with facilitation from a suitably qualified person.
Josh Dean (Hertford and Stortford) (Lab)
Young people who have been through detention often report challenging circumstances following that detention. Rather than supporting them, that sometimes increases their trauma. Can the Minister assure me that, as part of the changes he just set out, we will still ensure that young people have the opportunity to feed their experiences back? What specific work will the Government undertake to gather those views from young people?
Stephen Kinnock
My hon. Friend makes an important point. We are absolutely committed to ensuring that we create a space for young people to provide feedback. Some of that will be around past experiences when making their advance choice documents, but much broader opportunities for feedback will absolutely be built into the system. We want this to be a learning process. It is important that the code of practice is not just a document that sits on the shelf gathering dust; it should be a live document. That is why the feedback is so important.
It should be noted that although reflecting on past experiences may be therapeutic for some individuals, for others it can be traumatic, so the measure should be entirely service-user led. We also continue to be concerned about the burden that the amendment would place on independent mental health advocacy services, which are already under strain.
Gregory Stafford
I apologise—this may be due to the terminology of “amendment” versus “clause”—but is the Minister saying that the Government are likely to vote against clause 35 as it currently stands? He is talking about amendments and clauses, and that is slightly confusing me. [Interruption.] His officials are nodding.
Stephen Kinnock
Yes, but the issue may have a bearing on a potential Division. The challenge that I am facing is that my notes said,
“This amendment seeks to overturn”,
but we are talking about a clause that is seeking to overturn a previous amendment. Are we speaking in favour of a clause that will overturn an amendment? [Interruption.] Confusion reigns.
The Chair
Clause 35 was added by a Lords amendment; maybe that is where the confusion has come from. The Government tabled an amendment to leave out clause 35.
Stephen Kinnock
We will figure it out as we go along. I have now lost my place. [Interruption.] My answer to the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon is that the Government are voting against clause 35 stand part.
Stephen Kinnock
Right. Advocates have told us that implementing what is set out in the clause would raise logistical and resourcing problems, as it would require a significant shift from their current role. They have also raised concerns that if they acted in effect on behalf of the hospital to collect feedback, their independence and impartiality in the eyes of the patient might be undermined. We would prefer to direct resources to increasing access to advocacy services among in-patients, as proposed by the Bill. Advocates play a crucial role in promoting and protecting the rights of patients. We do not wish to detract from that or to dilute their role. I do not commend the clause to the Committee.
Jen Craft
Like many Committee members, I was deeply confused about how we were proceeding.
On the face of it, the clause broadly seems as if it should be part of any Act about mental health care, including post discharge. I have spoken about my own experience of interacting with the Mental Health Act as it stands. I might have found the clause fairly helpful post discharge and others might have found it useful as well. However, I have just heard the Minister’s description of the limitations of the clause, and the speech that I was about to make has been thrown into complete disarray by the confusion just now. But I implore the Minister to consider the fact that, when it comes to encouraging participation, understanding, and co-designing and co-producing services, capturing the experience of those recently detained under the Mental Health Act can be extraordinarily useful. Clause 35, which was added by an amendment from the Lords, seems a fairly useful way to do that.
Gregory Stafford
Like the hon. Lady, I see many benefits from the clause. Like many Committee members, I am surprised that the Government intend to vote against it.
As has been mentioned, the clause was inserted in the House of Lords by my noble Friends Earl Howe and Lord Kamall. I think it introduces a very valuable and forward-looking provision—namely, a mandatory debrief session within 30 days of discharge. It introduces a formal mechanism for learning from patient experiences following detention under the Mental Health Act. Although patient feedback mechanisms exist in some services, they are not consistently applied or mandated. The clause ensures that every detained patient has the opportunity to reflect on their care with an independent advocate, and that their feedback contributes to service improvement. It reflects a broader shift in mental health law towards transparency, accountability and the patient voice, and aligns with the recommendations from the 2018 independent review of the Mental Health Act, which the Government have used as an argument in favour of many of the other clauses.
Clause 35 is more than just a procedural addition. It represents a shift in culture towards embedding the patient voice and accountability in the mental health care system. It recognises the importance of empowering individuals after detention, supporting their recovery, and learning from their lived experience to improve future services. Mental health charities and third sector organisations have strongly endorsed the clause, seeing it as a meaningful step towards a more rights-based, transparent approach to care.
Clearly, the clause empowers patients, because it gives them a structured opportunity to share their experiences and influence service provision. It promotes transparency by requiring hospitals to report publicly on what they have learned and how they have responded. It supports quality improvement by encouraging services to reflect on and address systemic issues in the delivery of care. Furthermore, it has independent oversight through the involvement of IMHAs, which helps to ensure that feedback is gathered impartially and respectfully.
The reforms prioritise professional clinical opinion, safeguard children from inappropriate influence during periods of acute vulnerability, and elevate the patient voice in the post-care process. In doing so, they align the Mental Health Act much more closely to modern standards of care, international best practice and evolving public expectations. I believe that the clause is essential to strengthening the Bill and ensuring that our mental health system becomes not only more effective but more compassionate, responsive and just.
Dr Evans
I rise to speak to clause 35, which would insert new section 23A into the Mental Health Act 1983. It was introduced and passed in the Lords, and rightly so. As the hon. Member for Thurrock said, it seems surprising that anyone might want to take it out.
The clause was introduced as a new duty to offer all patients detained under the Act a consultation with an IMHA within 30 days of discharge. The purpose is to review their experience of hospital and learn from that experience through a report shared with hospital managers. Currently, the Mental Health Act makes provisions for access to IMHAs primarily during detention, particularly around decisions concerning treatment and care planning. However, once a patient is discharged, formal advocacy tends to fall away, unless pursued through broader NHS complaints mechanisms. There is no statutory duty to engage with patients post discharge, to understand how they have experienced their care or to systematically learn from those experiences.
In that context, the clause represents a welcome and important step forward. We know from successive reviews from the Care Quality Commission, NHS England and, of course, the independent review of the Mental Health Act, led by Sir Simon Wessely, that patients often feel disempowered during their detention. Many describe experiences of coercion, poor communication or even trauma. Yet those experiences frequently go unheard: lost in the silence that can follow discharge. Clause 35 seeks to change that, creating a pathway for those voices to be heard, and, more importantly, for services to learn from them. I strongly support that principle.
We need to clarify one thing first: the clause says a patient must “be offered” a consultation within 30 days —it is no more formalised than that. It is not a statutory requirement to take part, but purely to offer. That is important when it comes to making sure that reports are made in partnership with the patient. That is positive language, which would help to support the decision making and feedback loop.
In their rebuttals, I appreciate that the Government may ask whether the clause would mean hospital managers marking their own feedback. They might also ask how we would deal with CQC capacity. Those are reasonable questions, but at the heart of the clause, as agreed by the Lords, is the fact that all too often patients’ thoughts after discharge are not fully taken into account.
Gregory Stafford
Surely the fundamental part of the Bill is self-assessment and self-reflection. That does happen in some cases, and certainly in other parts of the healthcare system, but in this area generally does not; when it does happen, it is done in an inconsistent manner. The clause seeks to formalise things and to ensure that there is a benchmark by which service users and patients can feed back to the service they have just come from, to improve services. Does my hon. Friend share my confusion about why the Government would want to take that out?
Dr Evans
My hon. Friend makes a strong point. In clinical practice, we know that reflective learning is important, but that is not mandated. As we have seen from the reports, part of the reason why we do not see improvements is that we do not know about them. The clause gives patients the chance to empower themselves in a statutory, regulated way, which then allows us further transparency on how those issues arise.
Let us not forget that patients with good experiences would also have the chance to feed those back, further helping to support the services and hopefully leading to beacons of best practice up and down the nation so that we could then learn from those. That is the idea behind the clause: making sure that the likes of the regulator would be able to share lessons about not only those who have struggled but those who have done well. Clause 35 really offers a rare opportunity to hardwire the patient voice into the feedback loop of mental health services. That is a principle that I and my Opposition colleagues strongly support.
Stephen Kinnock
Fundamentally, we do not support the clause because it is overkill. It simply puts too much burden on to a system that is already carrying out the tasks that the clause seeks to impose on the system, particularly through the CQC. Given that advocates currently have no role in relation to discharged patients, it is clear that the clause would present a new burden; that has been confirmed through my officials’ engagement with advocates and other stakeholders. One hospital manager said that within their small trust alone, the clause would result in contacting and interviewing more than 1,000 individuals discharged from the Act each year.
Dr Evans
The Minister says that advocates had no role in discharge, but they do when advising patients about their rights—that is fundamentally what they do. At the point of discharge, they enable patients to know what their rights are. I take his point about capacity issues. If the Government want to take the clause away, how will they hardwire patients’ feedback into the heart of the Bill?
Stephen Kinnock
The CQC visits and interviews thousands of detained patients each year under its statutory duty to monitor the use of the Mental Health Act. Those visits can lead to the CQC requesting improvements from service providers. The CQC publishes annual reports highlighting key findings and themes from those visits.
Trust boards are responsible for collecting and acting on service user feedback to improve services. Under the NHS contract, the patient and carer race equality framework requires trusts to have clear and visible systems in place for gathering and responding to feedback from patients and carers. What is more, Healthwatch England and its local branches also play a key role in representing the views of health and social care users. I do not really know what more the system could do. The clause simply over-embroiders and over-complicates; when that happens, we usually end up with vast numbers of unintended consequences.
We appreciate that concerns have been raised around the CQC’s role in collecting in-patients’ views. As I said, we would prefer to work with stakeholders to understand those concerns and improve the feedback mechanisms that we have, rather than reinvent the wheel and create something new. We recognise that, although there are multiple aims to the clause, the primary one is to provide a space for people to heal from their experiences of being detained. We are strongly of the view that inviting the individual to share their experiences as part of their advance choice document or care plan—
Jen Craft
I am glad that the Minister is explaining how capturing feedback and experience is being allowed for in other parts of the Bill. To clarify, in my own head I feel that the clause aims to capture the experience immediately after it has happened, just as hospitals offer women who have just given birth the opportunity to talk through their experience. It is healing for the patient to understand what happened to them, and it provides immediate feedback to the hospital. Is that kind of level captured in other parts of the Bill?
Stephen Kinnock
I understand and recognise my hon. Friend’s concerns, but we can rattle through all the different forums where feedback can be captured: the CQC, the trust boards, the patient and carer race equality framework, Healthwatch England and all the other informal channels in the mental health ecosystem. Our view is that adding another layer into all that would in the end be counterproductive. That is the Government’s position.
Natasha Irons
The Minister mentioned the complex network of ways in which patients can give their feedback; perhaps the aim of the clause is to try to simplify that and, as my hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock mentioned, make it a bit more direct and immediate after treatment. Are there any plans to simplify the process in another way? The complex cobweb that the Minister described is perhaps the reason why the patient voice is not always captured and utilised in a way that we would want if the services that people rely on are to be improved.
Stephen Kinnock
My hon. Friend raises an important point. I do worry about the list of different organisations and agencies throughout the system, and not just in mental health—so many parts of the system have had layer upon layer of bureaucracy added in. That is one of the reasons why we are abolishing NHS England: we want to try to find greater simplicity and clearer channels of communication.
Through the development of the code of practice and the consultation process, simplifying and clarifying the system will be a key objective. Adding another layer would have the opposite effect. But my hon. Friend makes an important point, which will definitely be a part of the process of consultation and development of the guidelines and code of practice. On the basis of those answers, I recommend that we do not adopt the clause.
The Chair
Order. I am expecting four Divisions imminently, so I will suspend the Committee.
Stephen Kinnock
Clause 36 will introduce a subset of the current conditional discharge power where deprivation of liberty conditions are expressly allowed, otherwise known as supervised discharge. The aim of the clause is to prevent a small group of criminal justice patients with specialised support needs from remaining in hospital unnecessarily, while ensuring the risk they pose in the community is robustly managed. The reform responds to a Supreme Court decision, which found that there was no power under the current Act to impose discharge conditions that amount to a deprivation of liberty. Prior to the judgment, such conditions were used in a small number of cases in which patients with specialist needs required stringent arrangements to protect themselves and the public from harm.
Careful consideration has been given to the ethical and legal balance of the arrangements. We are clear that the threshold for use of the power is very high, and it will be accompanied by appropriate safeguards. A stringent test will be applied. The conditions will only be applied if the tribunal or Justice Secretary views the conditions as necessary to protect others from serious harm and, for the tribunal, if it considers the conditions would be no less beneficial than if the patient remained in hospital. We are also introducing additional safeguards, which ensure that supervised discharge patients are automatically referred to the tribunal after 12 months and every two years thereafter. That is more frequent than patients subject to conditional discharge, given the restrictive nature of the conditions being placed upon them.
I turn to clause 37. Prisoners and other detainees who become acutely mentally unwell in prison or another place of detention, such as an immigration removal centre or youth detention accommodation, can be transferred to hospital for treatment under sections 47 and 48 of the Act. Clause 37 will make two minor changes to those provisions.
Currently, the criteria for detention under the Act provides that appropriate treatment must be “available” for the patient or other detainee. The Court of Appeal, however, ruled that due to the specialised provision and security requirements relating to this cohort of patients, treatment must be available in practice for the detention criteria to be met, meaning that a hospital place must be identified. That diverges from how “available” treatment is interpreted across the rest of the Act, and it risks creating an additional barrier for this cohort of patients in accessing the care they need.
We are therefore clarifying the detention criteria to ensure that they can still be met, based on the patient’s clinical need, even when no hospital place has yet been identified. The change is also necessary for the effective implementation of the statutory time limit in clause 38, so that the Secretary of State is not delayed in issuing a transfer warrant when a specific bed space has not yet been identified. Clause 37 will also update the list of immigration legislation provided in section 48 to expand the scope of immigration detainees who can be transferred under that section.
The Chair
I remind Members that if they want to take their jackets off, they may. It is very warm.
Gregory Stafford
I rise to support clauses 36 to 40. Clause 36 addresses a legal gap identified in case law, which held that the Mental Health Act 1983 did not permit the imposition of conditions amounting to a deprivation of liberty for conditionally discharged patients. The clause provides a clear statutory basis for such conditions, but only under strict safeguards. It aims to balance public protection with patient rights, ensuring that DoL conditions are used only when absolutely necessary and proportionate. This is a positive step, because it clarifies the legal authority, resolving any uncertainty, following court rulings, about the legality of DoL conditions in conditional discharges. It protects public safety by ensuring that high-risk patients can be managed safely in the community, under appropriate restrictions. It includes safeguards that require DoL conditions to be justified and proportionate, with a focus on patient welfare, and it aligns with notable human rights law, especially the definitions and principles from the Mental Capacity Act and the relevant case law.
However, I have a couple of questions for the Minister. My view is that there is potential for overuse. Without robust oversight, there is a risk that DoL conditions could be used too readily. What safeguards is the Minister putting in place to ensure that that does not happen? There is clearly an impact on patient liberty, and we need to get the balance right. Even with the safeguards, these conditions significantly restrict individual freedom and therefore must be carefully monitored. How is the Minister ensuring that that will happen? In relation to the legal thresholds, determining whether conditions meet the legal test may require detailed clinical and legal assessment. We have talked about the practical implications of this Act on numerous occasions. I again ask the Minister whether he is certain that we have the relevant clinical and legal assessors out there to ensure that we can push that forward.
Clause 37, entitled “Transfers of prisoners and others to hospital: conditions”, will update the legal framework for transferring individuals from prison or immigration detention to hospital under the Mental Health Act. The previous wording of the Act required that treatment be “available”, but did not specify that it must be appropriate for the individual’s condition. This clause will align the criteria with more modern clinical standards and broader reforms in the Bill, which emphasise person-centred care and treatment suitability. It will also ensure that immigration detainees are clearly included in the scope of these provisions. Again, it is positive, because it updates and consolidates the list of immigration-related detention powers covered by the Act. It supports human rights compliance, because it aligns with principles of lawful and proportionate deprivation of liberty under article 5 of the European convention on human rights; it brings the Act in line with the current clinical and legal terminology; and, most importantly, it ensures that transfers are made only when appropriate treatment—not just any treatment—is available.
I have just a couple of questions for the Minister on this clause. I see potential for disputes. Determining what constitutes appropriate treatment may lead to disagreements between clinicians and authorities. What are the Minister’s thoughts on those potential disagreements? There are also some resource implications. It may increase demand for secure hospital beds if more transfers are approved under the revised criteria. I would welcome any thoughts from the Minister on how to ensure that we have the right number of secure hospital beds, not just as a totality, but in the specific regions and areas where people may be being detained.
Clause 38 is also about the transfer of prisoners and others to hospital, but specifically about time limits. It responds to a long-standing concern about delays in transferring prisoners and immigration detainees to hospital for mental health treatment. Under the current system, there is no statutory time limit, and individuals can wait weeks or months in prison, despite being assessed as needing urgent psychiatric care. That has been criticised by mental health professionals, legal advocates and human rights bodies. The clause will introduce a legal framework for setting and enforcing time limits, aligning with the Bill’s broader goals, which I think we all agree with, of improving patient rights and dignity and timely access to care. Again, I support the clause, because it will reduce delays. It will help to ensure that mentally unwell detainees are transferred to appropriate care settings without unnecessary delay, and will introduce clear expectations and accountability for decision making. It enables some flexibility, I think, because it allows for tailored regulations, to accommodate different case types and operational realities.
Again, however, I have some questions. I think there will be some implementation challenges. Services may struggle to meet the deadlines without sufficient resources —an issue that I mentioned in relation to the previous clause. Also, time limits may be difficult to apply in complex or borderline cases without clear guidance. Does the Minister see a need for explicit guidance in the code of conduct, or in some other form, to ensure that the risk of a rigid application does not make things more complicated or, more especially, mean that a potential patient is sent to the wrong care simply because we are focusing on the time rather than the appropriateness of the care? Of course, I would welcome his thoughts on how any new tracking systems and co-ordination between prisons, hospitals and the Ministry of Justice might work in this case.
Finally, I will briefly touch on clause 39. This is a technical update regarding the term “remand centre”, because that is no longer used in law or in practice; instead, young people are remanded to youth detention accommodation. Given that the clause is purely technical, I support it.
Anna Dixon
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Harris. I will briefly speak in support of clauses 36 to 40. These clauses reflect the principle of least restriction, albeit for people who are subject to part III, and who are therefore subject to the deprivation of liberty conditions. It is really important that there are frameworks around conditional discharge, and these clauses will do a lot to bring it in line with best practice, and to put the limit set out in the best practice guidelines on a statutory footing to ensure that there is a 28-day transfer. To be successful, that will require multidisciplinary working between the health and justice systems. With that in mind, will the Minister give an assurance that he is confident that the 28-day limit can be met? If there is already data on how many transfers are made within that time limit, in line with best practice guidelines, that would give some assurance that the new statutory time limit is likely to be met.
I am pleased to see that the time limit should be breached only in exceptional circumstances, and that the Bill specifies that a shortage of hospital beds or staff does not constitute exceptional circumstances. It is really important that that is not used as a reason not to transfer or discharge people later than the 28-day limit. Some of the discharge test rests not only on whether there is a risk of harm to another person, but on a public test. Can the Minister clarify how those two tests will work in tandem? Is that already being done in practice?
Finally, I note that the evidence that we have received from the Care Quality Commission says that it welcomes closing the legal gap following the High Court ruling, as set out in the explanatory notes. However, the CQC believes that supervised discharge should be used only “when strictly necessary”, and I know that there are ongoing discussions between the Department’s officials and the Care Quality Commission. Can the Minister give an update on those discussions and clarify what role, if any, the CQC will play in the oversight of these measures?
As the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon said, clauses 67 to 70 bring the Bill in line with youth justice practices and terminology, and with immigration policy. It is important that we take the opportunity to make sure that the Bill is fully up to date and in line with other pieces of legislation, so I support the clauses.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
I rise to speak in support of clauses 36 to 40, which provide critical legal clarification and technical refinements to the 1993 Act. While differing in scope and impact, each of these provisions is underpinned by a clear shared commitment to enhance public protection, uphold patient rights, and ensure that the legal framework reflects both current clinical practice and developments in case law.
Let me begin with clause 36, which addresses a long-standing lacuna in the legislative architecture governing conditionally discharged restricted patients. It follows the 2018 Supreme Court ruling in the case of Secretary of State of Justice v. MM, where it became clear that the existing Mental Health Act did not permit the imposition of conditions amounting to a deprivation of liberty as part of conditional discharge. The decision created uncertainty for clinicians, tribunals and, most crucially, risk-managed patients living in the community. It is therefore pleasing to see that clause 36 seeks to address that gap. The clause introduces new statutory powers for both the Secretary of State and the first-tier tribunal, in respect of imposing deprivation of liberty conditions in the community. It does so with some stringent safeguards.
Dr Evans
I rise to address clauses 36 to 40, which focus on patients involved in criminal proceedings or serving custodial sentences, and how we better align their care and liberty and the protection of the public. These clauses engage serious and sensitive issues—individual liberty, the management of risk and the functioning of the justice and health systems in tandem.
I turn first to clause 36. Under the current Mental Health Act, a restricted patient—typically someone who has been detained under a hospital order with restrictions due to the risk they pose—can conditionally be discharged under section 42 by the Secretary of State for Justice or under section 73 by the tribunal. Conditions can be placed on their discharge, but they cannot amount to deprivation of liberty. This is key. If conditions require constant supervision or control, such as being escorted at all times, then the patient cannot be discharged at all, even if they no longer need in-patient treatment. This was confirmed in the Supreme Court case, MM v. Secretary of State for Justice, in 2018.
Essentially, at the heart of the clause is a group of individuals who have been detained in a hospital under a restricted hospital order. In other words, they are people who have committed serious offences but were found to be suffering from mental disorders at the time. These individuals are not sent to prison; instead, they are detained in secure hospitals under the Mental Health Act. In some cases, clinicians and tribunals decide that someone can be discharged from hospital, but only if they comply with very strict conditions. These can include requirements such as living in a particular place with 24-hour supervision, not leaving without permission, being monitored at all times and other limits that can seriously restrict their liberty.
The issue arose in the case MM v. WL, in which a patient with capacity had consented to highly restrictive discharge conditions involving 24-hour supervision. The court found that the discharge under such conditions could not lawfully take place under the Mental Health Act, even with the patient’s consent, because it amounted to deprivation of liberty, and it was not lawful to call it a “conditional discharge”.
The law as it stands does not provide for that, which is where this clause comes in. Clause 36 seeks to address the impasse by amending sections 42 and 73 of the Act. It allows both the Secretary of State and the tribunal to impose deprivation of liberty conditions upon discharge only where they are necessary to protect others from serious harm, and where conditional discharge is no less beneficial to the patient than continued hospital detention.
I also welcome the intent of the clause: to introduce the principle of least restriction, ensuring that patients are not kept in hospital simply because the law offers no safe option. Paragraph 281 of the explanatory notes states:
“This power supports the principle of least restriction by allowing patients to be discharged from hospital and treated in the community, where otherwise this might have been prevented.”
However, I would like to raise several probing questions for the Minister. Do we know how many patients are currently affected by the MM judgment and held in hospital longer than clinically necessary? How will patients be supported to challenge these conditions, particularly if they have capacity and disagree with the restrictions? Equally, if we flip it and argue for more restrictions, what if there are concerns or disagreements from the services, clinicians or families? How will they be able to challenge the decision in reverse?
I am pleased that my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley is here, as I am not legal expert, but when I was prepping for this, I also noted the retrospective effect of clause 36(5), which allows certain conditions to be applied to those already detained or conditionally discharged when the clause comes into force. The retrospective effect of clause 36 is noted specifically in subsection (5) and reinforced in the explanatory notes. Subsection (5) states:
“The amendments made by this section apply in relation to any person who is a restricted patient within the meaning given by subsection (1) of section 79 of the Mental Health Act 1983, or is treated as a restricted patient as a result of that subsection, whether the person became such a patient (or treated as such a patient) before or after the coming into force of this section.”
This is a clear signal of retrospective application. I believe, in legal terms, this has the effect of changing legislation to make a provision apply as if it has always been in law in the past, not just from the date of commencement. What does this mean? This clause effectively retroactively legalises conditional discharges that include deprivation of liberty before the Bill becomes law, even though under current law, following the MM judgment, that was not permissible.
The explanatory notes to the Bill make this point more directly. For example, paragraph 284 on page 53 states:
“Clause 36 subsection (5) allows the new measures to operate retrospectively by providing that deprivation of liberty conditions can be imposed on restricted patients who are already detained, or who are conditionally discharged, at the time the provisions come into force.”
Again, I am no lawyer, but this makes it clear that the Government are intent on validating past decisions, particularly those made before that are contrary to the MM judgment, which held that the Mental Health Act did not permit deprivation of liberty as part of the conditional discharge. Can the Minister confirm that article 5 of the ECHR safeguards has been fully considered in that respect? On page 72 of the explanatory notes, paragraph 394 says that the right hon. Member for Ilford North (Wes Streeting) believes that the Bill is compatible with the ECHR. To my surprise, when I was working on this at the weekend, I noticed that it says, “in her view”—a small drafting error that highlights my hours and hours of prep for this.
On a serious note, the real-world effect of clause 36(5) is to retroactively legalise the use of conditional discharges that involve deprivation of liberty even though, under current law as interpreted by the courts, such decisions were unlawful at the time that they were made. Why does that matter? The retrospective provision protects public authorities, particularly the Secretary of State for Justice, and mental health professionals from legal liability for decisions made before, or in disregard of, the MM judgment. It shields decisions that may have breached a patient’s rights, particularly their right to liberty under article 5 of the ECHR, by making those actions lawful after the fact.
Anna Dixon
Does the hon. Gentleman agree that one of the challenges of that court ruling, which will stand unless the Bill amends the law, is that there will be people detained for longer than is appropriate because a conditional discharge is not possible under the law as it is currently interpreted? The whole Bill is about the principle of least restriction. Does he not agree that we need to make this change to fit with that principle?
Dr Evans
I agree on that, and we will support the clause. But, as the hon. Member rightly pointed out earlier, we need interoperability between the moving parts to make sure that they all align with the provision in the clause. She is absolutely right: this measure is in the Bill because the patient in the MM case had capacity and had agreed to being discharged with deprivation of liberty impositions, and that was found to be unlawful because of a parallel Act. What I am worried about, and the point that I am trying to make, is that there are so many moving parts in these Acts that we could be in danger of complicating the situation further.
Clause 36 seeks to address the uncertainty by legislating for a new power to impose deprivation conditions as part of a conditional discharge, as the hon. Member rightly pointed out. However, in doing so, the clause effectively runs parallel to, and perhaps even conflicts with, the as yet un-implemented LPS framework. The Government introduced the LPS framework through the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Act 2019. It was intended to be more flexible and responsive than DoLS. But given that the LPS framework has not been commenced, and that there is no clear timetable for implementation—the Minister seemed to suggest that he was unsure whether he will implement them, even though the 2019 Act was passed by Parliament—are we legislating for an entirely separate deprivation of liberty route under the Mental Health Act, and potentially bypassing or duplicating existing safeguards under the Mental Capacity Act?
It all comes back to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley about good record keeping and legislative housekeeping. I ask the Minister how the new conditional discharge power will interact with either the DoLS or the liberty protection safeguards—if they are eventually implemented. Are they simply a subsection of the deprivation of liberty conditions, and therefore would not matter? Can the Minister foresee a time where a patient could be subject to both the new powers and the LPS, and if so, who is the decision maker and where do the appeals rightly lie? Should we not wait for the full implementation of the LPS before layering further deprivations in place? That is an open and rhetorical question, but one that vexes me when we are discussing this Bill in detail. There is a real risk here of fragmenting the legal landscape, leading to confusion for clinicians, patients and carers.
Clause 37, which is about conditions relating to the transfers of prisoners and others to hospital, addresses a barrier to timely transfers from prison to hospital. At present, under the case R (ASK) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department of 2019, a transfer from prison under section 47 or 48 of the Mental Health Act cannot be authorised unless a specific hospital bed has already been identified. While well intentioned, that threshold has arguably had a negative effect in deterring referrals and delaying access to treatment.
Clause 37 rightly lowers that threshold. It amends section 47 and 48 of the Act so that a hospital place need not be available at the point of referral. Instead, the clinical decision about suitability for hospital can proceed earlier, allowing for better planning and quicker transfers. That seems a pragmatic response to a bureaucratic bottleneck, but how will this amendment be implemented in practice to ensure that it does not create the false expectation of imminent transfer? Will there be national guidance issued for uniform application of that new test across the entire prison estate?
Clause 38 deals with transfers from prisons to hospitals, and their timeline. It introduces a new statutory duty for transfers from prison or detention to hospital to be completed within 28 days of initial review for assessment via proposed new sections 47A and 48A. As we have heard, that reflects good existing practice. The NHS England guidance already recommends that transfers should be completed within 28 days. However, clause 38 now gives that statutory force subject to exceptional circumstances, which the Bill carefully defines. For instance, as we have heard, shortages of staff and hospital beds do not qualify unless they are caused by exceptional events such as fires or flooding.
This clause is welcomed as an important safeguard for therapeutic benefit, because delays in transfer can cause serious deterioration. It must, however, be supported by sufficient resources and capacity, on which I have a few questions. What assessment has been made of compliance with the 28 day target, and what proportion of cases currently fall outside of it? Will investment be made to ensure bed availability and staffing so that those statutory duties may be fulfilled? When this was debated in the other place, the Justice Minister said:
“I am pleased to share that this Government have recently established a health and justice strategic advisory group, which will bring together key partners with responsibility for the various parts of the transfer process. This group will be chaired by a national clinical director, who will report regularly to Ministers and be responsible for agreeing a joint work plan to support implementation of the statutory time limit, identifying solutions to common barriers to timely transfers and holding partners to account.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 31 March 2025; Vol. 845, c. 102.]
That is laudable, so I tabled a written question to find out about the group that Lord Timpson talked about. Fortunately, the answer to my written question came back today. The group have not met and are not meeting until 1 July, so I ask for some clarification around that committee. It seems welcome, and this is a complex area. Given that the Justice Minister raised that issue, who will the group report to—the Ministry of Justice or the Department of Health?
Later in his remarks, Lord Timpson talks about the written ministerial statement coming to Parliament. We have heard the Government say that a couple of times about reporting timescales, but in his speech Lord Timpson talked about reporting to Ministers. What kind of time- scales and frequency can we expect if the group has not even met yet? What reporting will there be to Ministers, either in the Ministry of Justice or the Department of Health, to address some of the issues that we are debating today?
Clause 39 deals with transfer directions for persons detained in youth detention accommodation. It is rightly pointed out that this is a gap in the law. There is no power under section 48 to transfer to hospital a child who has been remanded to a youth detention accommodation by the Crown court, even if they urgently need in-patient care for mental disorders. That really does seem to be an anomaly. Such power exists for magistrates court remands, so clause 39 rightly corrects this, and I support it. Do we know how many children have been affected by that gap since 2012? I ask because if this is to come into law with immediate effect, it will have an immediate resource effect. We of course want to make sure that everyone—particularly young people—is in the right place. The fact that some of them legally are not may well cause another problem for us all.
Finally, I turn to clause 40, which appears to be a technical clarification of schedule 1 of the 1983 Act, confirming that the whole of section 66(2)(d) is disapplied for unrestricted part III patients. It clarifies the right of application to the tribunal, and to me it seems uncontroversial and helpful.
I acknowledge the thoughtful work being proposed in these clauses, and I understand what they are trying to do. They represent a clear attempt to modernise and humanise the way the Mental Health Act applies to some of the most vulnerable and high risk patients in our system, but we must ensure that any new powers, particularly those involving deprivation of liberty and retrospective legislation, are subject to clear safeguards, scrutiny and proper resourcing. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to my questions.
Stephen Kinnock
On safeguards, supervised discharge will only be used when necessary, given its restrictive nature and significant resource demands. A stringent test will apply. It must be deemed necessary by the tribunal or Justice Secretary to protect others from serious harm, and the tribunal must deem it to be no less beneficial than hospital care. Additional safeguards include automatic tribunal referrals after 12 months and every two years thereafter, if not previously reviewed.
On capacity, our expectation is that this will not have a significant impact on other restricted patients. The small cohort who are likely to be subject to supervised discharge will free beds, and that could positively impact any patient who needs a bed, but the numbers remain small and are unlikely to lead to widespread bed availability.
On demand for secure beds, clause 37 will correct a discrepancy in detention criteria caused by a Court of Appeal decision. Rather than creating further disparity, it aligns the criteria for sections 47 and 48 of the Mental Health Act with the consistent interpretation of available treatment used throughout the rest of the Act. Clause 37 does not alter the approach to clinical prioritisation of in-patient care, or the fact that a person will only be transferred once an appropriate bed has been found, in terms of both therapeutic care and level of security. That also addresses the question on implementation from the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon.
I turn to the questions asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley. She asked about the 28-day limit. Any change to the time limit would require an enhanced level of parliamentary scrutiny. Therefore, the power shall be subject to the draft affirmative procedure to ensure that both Houses are given the opportunity to debate any decision.
On dual tests, the Secretary of State for Justice applies a slightly different test from that of the tribunal in order to preserve their discretion in the interests of public protection, but conditions for patients must still be appropriate and proportionate. We will publish operational guidance to make it clear that the Secretary of State for Justice should have regard to the principle of therapeutic benefit and only use this type of discharge when the evidence indicates that it is in the best interests of the patient.
Under section 120 of the Mental Health Act, the Care Quality Commission and Health Inspectorate Wales have a duty to monitor the use of the Act. Patients subject to supervised discharge will be captured by section 120 for the purpose of regulatory oversight as a subset of conditionally discharged patients who are liable to be detained under the Mental Health Act.
I turn to the questions asked by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth. The Ministry of Justice considers that these measures are compatible with article 5 of the European convention on human rights. In 2018, the Supreme Court case of Secretary of State for Justice v. MM established that there was no lawful basis under the Act to impose conditions that amounted to a deprivation of liberty. The new provisions will provide a statutory basis for the Justice Secretary and the tribunal to impose such conditions.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 19, in schedule 3, page 91, line 13, after “patient” insert
“or English qualifying informal patient under 18”.
This amendment extends the provision of opt-out advocacy services in England to informal inpatients under 18.
Government amendments 42 and 43.
Schedule 3.
Stephen Kinnock
I will first discuss clause 41 and schedule 3. Independent mental health advocates are specially trained advocates who can support patients detained under the Mental Health Act to understand their rights and participate in decisions about their care and treatment, but not everyone who would benefit from an independent mental health advocate currently has access to one. In view of the benefits that advocacy can bring, we are expanding the right to an independent mental health advocate to all mental health patients, including informal or voluntary patients who are not detained under the Act.
We know that some informal patients are not told about their rights and legal status. Informal patients in Wales already have the protection, and we want to extend it to patients in England. It will help ensure that the voices of individuals are heard and their rights respected, and that potentially vulnerable groups, including children and young people, do not go without important advocacy protections.
Moreover, the Bill provides an additional enhanced mechanism for ensuring that the most vulnerable mental health patients, those compulsorily detained under the Mental Health Act, are able to benefit from advocacy. We are introducing an opt-out system for that particular cohort, to put the onus on hospital managers rather than patients themselves to request independent mental health advocacy services. Hospital managers must notify providers of advocacy services about the patients who are eligible for IMH advocacy. Advocacy providers must then arrange for independent mental health advocates to interview those patients to find out whether they want to use their services.
The right to an independent mental health advocate will also be expanded to include part III patients who are subject to the new supervised discharge, which allows for part III patients to be conditionally discharged into the community and still deprived of their liberty. The Bill also enables independent mental health advocates to provide extra help to patients to have a greater say in their treatment or to make a complaint. Together, these changes increase the access that patients have to advocacy, which contributes to improved patient rights.
I will next address amendment 19. We appreciate that people under 18 are a vulnerable group who would benefit from advocacy representation. For this reason, the Bill extends the right to an independent mental health advocate to informal patients, including under-18s, who are often admitted on a voluntary basis. We are introducing a duty on hospital managers to inform them of this right. That means that hospital managers will be expected to proactively approach all children and young people, and others, such as their parents or carers, to make sure they know that they are entitled to an advocate and help them to appoint one.
We will make it clear in the code of practice how independent mental health advocates should support children and young people with their particular needs. However, we think it is right that detained patients, including under-18s—rather than informal patients—receive advocacy on an opt-out basis. This is because they are subject to greater restrictions, meaning that it is even more important that they are supported to exercise their rights.
Finally, I will address Government amendments 42 and 43. Schedule 3 introduces the concept of “English qualifying informal patients”, who, for the first time in England, will be eligible for independent mental health advocacy services. We are amending this measure to change the definition of both English and Welsh qualifying informal patients. Amendments 42 and 43 are minor amendments to address a technical issue with the legislation. There is case law saying that the term “informal patient” would cover anyone there on a voluntary basis and not subject to any compulsory legislative framework. However, as currently drafted, the Bill’s definition is wider, defining an informal patient in England or Wales as an in-patient in hospital who is receiving assessment or treatment for a mental disorder at the hospital but not subject to the Mental Health Act. A person deprived of their liberty under any other legislation such as the Mental Capacity Act 2005 or under a court order would therefore be classed as an “informal patient”, which would be incorrect, as people who are detained cannot, under case law, be informal patients.
That would lead to complications in practice. A patient subject to the deprivation of liberty safeguards would be eligible for independent mental health advocacy as well as independent mental capacity advocacy. However, an independent mental health advocate cannot provide any help or support in relation to the Mental Capacity Act. The amendments address that issue by changing the definitions of “English qualifying informal patient” and “Welsh qualifying informal patient”, to be an in-patient receiving assessment or treatment for a mental disorder who is not detained under any other legislation or court order.
For those reasons, I hope that the hon. Member for Winchester is satisfied not to press his amendment, and I commend Government amendments 42 and 43, clause 41 and schedule 3 to the Committee.
Aphra Brandreth
I rise to speak to clause 41, which brings into sharper focus two pillars of a fair and rights-based mental health system: the provision of clear information to patients and the strengthening of independent mental health advocacy. It rightly recognises that, when a person is detained under the Mental Health Act 1983, often during a period of acute crisis and difficulty in their life, they need to feel that their clinical needs are being met, but in a way that respects them as individuals, with the same entitlements to dignity and agency as any other member of our society.
The clause provides for informal patients to be eligible for an independent mental health advocate. I welcome the extension to enable more individuals to access this vital advocacy. It empowers patients to know that independent advocacy is available, but we must ensure that there are sufficient resources so that those who choose this help are given sufficient support when they are in a potentially vulnerable position. As someone representing a constituency that is in England but borders Wales, I also welcome that these changes bring care into line so that advocacy help is offered to informal patients, regardless of which side of the border they are accessing treatment.
The clause places a renewed duty on services to ensure that information is given to patients clearly, promptly and in a form that they can understand. It introduces an obligation for advocacy providers to determine, through an interview, whether a qualifying patient wishes to use the service. This support is important; no person should be expected to navigate the complexities of mental health legislation, or their rights under it, without proper guidance. However, where there is a duty
“on hospital managers and others to notify providers of advocacy services about qualifying patients”,
can the Minister clarify who is meant by “others”? Will there be a list of people and roles who are given this responsibility?
The role of an independent mental health advocate is vital. These individuals can be a lifeline. They can help people to understand their rights and any medical treatment, and crucially, can support an individual to have their say about any treatment. Clause 41 rightly reinforces the importance of independent mental health advocates, and it is important that we match that ambition with the legal and practical steps to support them.
It is entirely right that we welcome the recognition of the role of independent mental health advocates, who serve a vital function in ensuring that patients’ voices are heard and their views represented, especially when navigating what can be an incredibly complex legal and clinical environment. Their independence is fundamental to not only their effectiveness but the confidence that patients and families can place in the system, which brings me back to my point. It is therefore important that we support independent mental health advocates with the resources that they need to do their job effectively.
If we are to rely further on advocates, we need to ensure that they are in a position to deal with that, so that we do not create statutory entitlements that are difficult to act upon. Actions, as well as words, are needed. At present, many areas already struggle with advocacy coverage. If we now place additional expectations on the service, and I believe that we will through this provision, we must ensure that there are sufficient numbers of trained, experienced independent mental health advocates across the country to meet rising demand. Can the Minister reassure the Committee that the necessary people with the skills and training are available to fulfil this expanded role?
We must also consider the patients’ experience, as has been the focus of so many of the remarks made in the Committee today. Again, I emphasise the vulnerability of patients at times of crisis. If we are to tell patients that support in the form of an advocate is there for them, we need to ensure that it is accessible and easy to reach and understand. Clause 41 moves us in the right direction, but implementation is everything. It must be backed by local accountability, adequate funding and clear operational guidance. This includes ensuring that all patients, regardless of background, language or capacity, are given support that is appropriate and effective.
It is vital to consider the wider implications of this clause. The reinforcement of the independent mental health advocate’s involvement should be mirrored by greater investment in advocacy services, stronger integration with care planning and more regular engagement with patients themselves on how these services work in practice. In our earlier discussions, my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon suggested that we use trials, which could also be considered here to ensure that, as changes are brought in, they are matched by appropriate service levels.
I am largely supportive of clause 41, which I think moves us in the right direction towards a transparent mental health system that is there for patients, ensuring that they have a voice and are not an afterthought. As long as it is deliverable in practice, and does not give false hope to patients, the clause strengthens the Bill.
Josh Dean
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Mrs Harris—when I wrote my speech, it said “this afternoon”, but it now says “this evening”. I rise to speak to clause 41 and schedule 3. I welcome the role that they will play in extending the right to access the services of an independent mental health advocate to voluntary patients in England not detained under the Mental Health Act, and ensuring that all detained patients are offered these services through an automatic referral, creating an opt-out system.
Independent mental health advocates play an important role in supporting patients detained under the Act to understand their rights and participate in decisions around their care and treatment. Clause 41 and schedule 3 seek to ensure that the individual needs of each patient are taken into account, even where they may not be able to engage in decision making about themselves. In doing so, they recognise the patient as an individual. This provides for important safeguards for patients and reinforces the Bill’s principles of autonomy and least restriction, which is a crucial part of bringing mental health legislation into the 21st century. I similarly welcome Government amendments 42 and 43, which seek to further strengthen the important safeguards in the Bill.
I hear the points that the Minister has made on children and young people admitted informally, but I would be grateful if he could address the matter further. As we know, informal patients are those who consent to an admission to a mental health hospital or whose parents consent to an admission on their behalf. Often, they are treated under the same or similar conditions as those detained under the Act. While detained patients will receive an automatic referral to advocacy services under the new opt-out scheme, my understanding is that that will not be the case for those admitted informally, meaning that informal patients would still be required to ask for the support of an independent mental health advocate.
Children admitted informally are likely to experience the same conditions as another child detained under the Act, but without the parity of access to advocacy services through the opt-out system. Because a parent is able to consent to informal treatment on their child’s behalf, they are one of few groups, if not the only one, able to be admitted informally without their own consent. Therefore, there is a concern that children and young people admitted informally may continue to experience problems accessing the support of an advocate. I seek the Minister’s assurance that the Government have considered fully the provision of advocacy services for informally admitted children and young people, and how this gap might be addressed.
I welcome how these parts of the Bill will embed those important principles of individuality, autonomy and least restriction, expanding the important safeguards offered by independent mental health advocates. I would be grateful if the Minister could touch on those points about children and young people in his response.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
I will speak briefly on schedule 3, which makes a number of important amendments to the 1983 Act concerning the role of independent mental health advocates. The schedule implements several practical reforms to provide consistent and accessible advocacy and support for individuals receiving mental health care. It builds upon existing statutory provisions by extending the right to advocacy beyond detained patients and setting out clearer expectations of how and when advocacy services should be made available.
One of the most notable changes is the extension of IMHA eligibility to include informal patients—individuals receiving voluntary treatment rather than under compulsion. This responds directly to the recommendations made in both the independent review and the 2021 White Paper, which identified disparities in support available to different patient groups. Under these reforms, access to advocacy is no longer limited to those detained under the Act. Instead, all qualifying patients, including informal ones, will be eligible for IMHA support where appropriate. This change reflects the recognition that voluntary status does not necessarily equate to full understanding or confidence in navigating care decisions.
To ensure that eligible individuals are aware of and able to use this support, hospital managers will now be required to notify advocacy services when a patient becomes eligible. This automatic referral mechanism removes the onus from patients themselves to initiate contact, many of whom may not be aware of their rights or may face barriers to asserting them. In turn, advocacy providers will have a duty to arrange an interview with each referred patient to establish whether they wish to use the service. This helps to close the loop between eligibility and engagement, and ensures that advocacy is offered in a timely and structured manner.
Schedule 3 also sets out clearer responsibilities on both hospital managers and advocacy providers. Clearly, that will improve co-ordination and ensure the consistent application of the policy across different care settings and regions. In practice, it should help to reduce gaps where eligible patients might otherwise miss out on support due to ambiguity around who holds the responsibility for initiating contact. It is worth noting that these reforms complement the broader set of changes proposed in clauses 41 to 44, which collectively aim to strengthen patient rights, increase transparency in decision making and improve the overall quality of patient experience in mental health services.
This approach has a number of potential benefits. First, it is likely to improve access to advocacy for groups who have historically been underserved. These include informal patients, individuals with communication difficulties and those less familiar with the mental health system. Secondly, it enhances procedural fairness by ensuring that patients are supported in understanding their options, raising their concerns, or appealing decisions where necessary. Thirdly, it brings the statutory framework into closer alignment with human rights principles and best practice standards, particularly in terms of informed participation and supported decision making.
There are, however, three specific practical challenges that I wish the Minister to acknowledge. First, these reforms will require sufficient resources for advocacy services, particularly as demand is likely to increase once eligibility is broadened. Secondly, effective implementation will depend upon robust co-ordination between hospital managers and external advocacy providers, which may vary in capacity and capability across regions. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s approach to ameliorating that. Thirdly, there is a risk of inconsistency in delivery without clear national guidance and adequate oversight mechanisms, so I would be grateful if the Minister could address the mechanisms that are intended to be put in place.
These are not insurmountable issues, but they highlight the importance of a carefully planned implementation strategy, supported by training, monitoring and adequate funding. Schedule 3 represents a targeted and proportionate set of amendments that support the underlying aims of the Bill to ensure that all individuals receiving mental health care, whether formally detained or not, are able to access independent support, understand their rights and participate more fully in decisions about their treatment. [Interruption.]
The Chair
My apologies for the noise in the corridor; there was meant to be a yoga event in here at 6 o’clock. I thank the Doorkeeper for trying very hard to keep everything under control.
Dr Chambers
I do not know whether we could combine yoga with our proceedings, Mrs Harris.
The hon. Member for Hertford and Stortford spoke really well in a similar vein to what I am about to say. Our amendment 19 to clause 41 would extend the provision of opt-out advocacy services in England to informal patients under 18 years old. Young people and their families and carers often face a nightmare navigating the mental health system. We find this on every level. A psychiatrist who came into my office in Winchester said that he and his wife, who is also a medical professional, were struggling to navigate the system to get care for their own child. His words were quite profound: “If we can’t navigate the system, what hope has anyone else got?”
Even when young people have secured desperately needed in-patient care, often after many months of delay, they can face real challenges in understanding the care being implemented and its impact. Often, such young people are cared for far from home. Enabling them to benefit from mental health advocacy that ensures the pressures on the system do not lead to unfair or damaging decisions for mentally ill young people is crucial. It can help to ensure that the patient’s whole situation and entire history is always taken into account, and that treatment is always appropriate, rather than symptoms just being addressed in isolation. We should be looking to empower patients and their families and carers across the whole system, not just in relation to those who are sectioned.
Gregory Stafford
You will be delighted to know that there will be no yoga from me, Mrs Harris.
I rise to support clause 41 and schedule 3, which will expand access to independent mental health advocates to not only those detained under the Mental Health Act but informal voluntary patients. Like many Committee members, I am sure, a number of IMHAs in my constituency have approached me about this, and they welcome the expansion. I pay tribute to the amazing work that they do across Farnham, Bordon, Haslemere, Liphook and the surrounding villages. Previously, only patients detained under specific sections of the Mental Health Act or subject to certain treatments were entitled to IMHA support.
The clause reflects the recommendations of the 2018 independent review of the Mental Health Act and the 2021 White Paper, and aims to enhance patient rights and reduce disparities in access to advocacy. That clearly empowers more patients by giving informal patients access to advocacy support. It improves transparency and accountability in mental health care settings. It ensures proactive outreach so that patients are not left unaware of their rights or support options, and supports informed decision making and potentially reduces coercive practices.
Clearly, there may be some resource implications for advocacy services, which the Minister may wish to touch on. Likewise, there may be some implementation challenges, which other hon. Members have raised, especially around ensuring timely and consistent notification and engagement. There could be potential delays in care co-ordination if advocacy processes are not well integrated. I would welcome the Minister’s thoughts on that.
This shift is long overdue. Too many vulnerable people, admitted voluntarily but feeling powerless, have lacked a clear, independent voice. The clause corrects that injustice by embedding advocacy deeper into the system, moving from passive availability to proactive engagement.
Schedule 3 underpins clause 41 by putting clear duties on hospital managers and advocacy providers alike to ensure that patients are automatically offered support. It is opt out, not opt in. That clarity of responsibility will reduce coercion, increase transparency and ultimately lead to fairer treatment decisions.
Schedule 3 operationalises the principles set out in clause 41 by embedding them in the structure of the Mental Health Act 1983. Like clause 41, it reflects recommendations from the 2018 independent review and the 2021 White Paper, aiming to reduce disparities in access to advocacy and ensure that all patients, regardless of detention status, are supported in understanding and exercising their rights. Like clause 41, it strengthens patient voice, reduces inequalities, improves compliance and encourages the early intervention and resolution of concerns.
Let me turn to Liberal Democrat amendment 19, which was tabled in the name of the hon. Member for Winchester. Clearly, its purpose is to extend the opt-out advocacy services in England to include informal patients under the age of 18. This ensures that children and young people who are not formally detained under the Mental Health Act, but who are receiving in-patient care, still have automatic access to an IMHA.
Currently, opt-out advocacy provisions primarily apply to patients who are formally detained. However, informal patients aged under 18, who may be in hospital with parental consent, can still experience significant restrictions and may not fully understand or exercise their rights. This amendment seeks to close the gap by ensuring that young informal patients are automatically offered advocacy support, recognising their vulnerability and limited legal autonomy.
My view is that this does strengthen patient rights. It safeguards vulnerable patients and promotes equality by aligning the rights of informal patients aged under 18 with those of detained patients. It supports informed decision making and helps young people to understand their rights and treatment options. If the hon. Member is minded to press the amendment, I hope that the Government will at least give it tacit support, even if they do not vote for it. That being said, I would welcome the Minister’s comments on why he does not feel that the amendment, or an alternative draft of the wording, if he does not like the specifics of it, should be included in the Bill. I do believe that this is important.
Government amendments 42 and 43 to schedule 3 are relatively technical but important elements of the Bill that align provision in England and Wales. I have just a few questions for the Minister. Robust rights must come with realistic resources. How will the Government ensure that advocacy services are funded and resourced properly to meet the new wider demand? Although they are technical, the Government amendments will still have an impact. What steps will be taken to monitor consistency so that a patient in Farnham, Bordon, Haslemere, Liphook or one of the villages surrounding my constituency has the same access to an advocate as a patient in Coventry, Aberafan or Swansea. We want to make sure that there is consistency.
Finally, will there be clear standards for timely engagement, especially given the risk of treatment delays if advocacy is not well integrated? If the Minister can answer those questions, I think that this will be a good step forward for patient voice and fairness in mental health, and I would support the clause and schedule 3.
Dr Evans
I rise to speak to clause 41 and schedule 3, which introduce the independent mental health advocate system under the Mental Health Act 1983. I recognise the positive intentions behind the reforms. The proposals respond to long-standing concerns about access to advocacy for people receiving mental health treatment, especially for those who are not detained, but are nevertheless vulnerable, and may struggle to understand the challenges within their care.
Currently, IMHA services are guaranteed only to a relatively narrow group—namely, patients detained under the Act, those under community treatment orders or guardianship, and certain patients undergoing serious medical treatments under sections 57 or 58A. As the explanatory notes make clear in paragraph 313, that excludes a substantial number of informal or voluntary patients, many of whom may be experiencing significant distress or coercion, even if they are technically not detained.
The clause expands eligibility to a new category of English qualifying informal patients, bringing England more in line with a system already used in places such as Wales. This welcome and overdue development reflects the principle that the right to advocacy should be grounded not in a legal status alone, but in need and vulnerability. The introduction of the opt-out referral system for detained patients is also a step forward. Concerns have been raised that eligible patients never access IMHA, often because they are unaware, overwhelmed or too unwell for self-referral. Making the referral automatic is likely to increase the uptake and strengthen patient voices in critical decisions about care, treatment and discharge.
Although the direction of travel is right, I want to raise several probing questions in areas of concern, particularly relating to implementation, scope and safe- guarding. On resource and workforce readiness, the Government are significantly expanding both the pool of eligible patients and the responsibility of advocacy providers. That is welcome, but it inevitably raises the question of capacity. Can the Minister confirm whether additional funding will be made available to local authorities, or is it up to the NHS and IMHA providers to ensure the expansion is deliverable? Are the new roles of the IMHAs explicitly addressed in the new workforce plan that he is introducing? What assessment has been done of the number of new IMHAs that will be required to meet the duties, particularly now we are using an opt-out model? Without the workforce and training in place, there is a risk that the rights introduced in the legislation will not be fully realised in practice.
My second point is about capacity, consent and best-interest decisions. I would like to clarify a couple of points on schedule 3. It would appear, as drafted, that IMHA providers will be required to assess whether a patient has the capacity to decide whether to receive advocacy, and if not, whether it is in their best interests to do so. That gives providers a significant and quasi-clinical responsibility.
Proposed new section 130B(2C) states:
“Arrangements under section 130A must require a provider of advocacy services, on becoming aware of an English qualifying compulsory patient for whom they are responsible, to arrange for an independent mental health advocate to visit and interview the patient (if possible) with a view to determining”,
first,
“whether the patient has the capacity or is competent to take a decision about whether to receive help from an independent mental health advocate”;
secondly,
“if the patient does have that capacity or competence, whether the patient wishes to receive such help”;
and thirdly,
“if the patient does not have that capacity or competence, whether it is nonetheless in the patient’s best interests to receive such help (which, if so, is to be provided under the arrangements).”
On the first point about whether the patient has the capacity or is competent to take a decision about receiving help from an IMHA, my understanding is as follows. The role of independent mental health advocates is to support people detained under the Mental Health Act, to understand their rights and to be involved in decisions about their care and treatment. IMHAs do not, I believe, have the legal authority to assess mental capacity. The assessment of mental capacity is typically carried out by a qualified healthcare professional such as a doctor, psychiatrist or specially trained nurse, following guidance under the Mental Capacity Act 2005. IMHAs are there to help patients understand the information about their treatment and their rights, and can support them in expressing their views, but they do not perform capacity assessments. So is this a change in professional scope? Is it an oversight? Is it an update? Or is it simply what is happening in practice, which now has legal backing?
Chris Bloore (Redditch) (Lab)
The hon. Gentleman makes an interesting point, but is not the point of an IMHA to ensure that the patient understands their rights under the previous Act and the Bill? That is how they participate in taking decisions about what is available to the patient. Although they might not be clinically trained, they know the legislation inside out, and that gives power and advocacy to the patient.
Dr Evans
The hon. Gentleman identifies exactly what the point of an IMHA is. The way the Bill is written, the IMHA determines whether a patient has capacity or competence to make a decision. That determining means that they are making the choice, which is quasi-clinical. According to the definition that the hon. Gentleman has just given, that would fall out of the IMHA’s scope, because that would involve the ability to make decisions about capacity.
My concern is whether we have scope creep here. If so, we should be explicit about it—perhaps it is something we want to consider—but the way it is written, IMHAs will make capacity-based decisions about whether a person has the capacity to decide whether they need help. I would argue that that should be done by someone who is qualified as a doctor, a psychiatrist or community psychiatric nurse, as currently happens. That is the clarification that I am looking for from the Government. If I have the wrong end of the stick, I will happily back down, but this area of the Bill needs clarifying.
To that end, and if the Bill is written as I fear, I would welcome it if the Minister can tell us how IMHA providers will be supported to make best interest decisions appropriately, especially in cases involving fluctuating capacity or complex presentations. Will there be clinical oversight or statutory guidance to avoid inconsistency or overreach in these assessments? Although I support the principle of proactively offering advocacy, we must ensure that the decisions made on a person’s behalf are done with the appropriate checks and accountability, and by the right people.
My third point is about the exclusion of emergency section patients. The welcome change in the clause and the schedule expands the pool of support, but we should also pay attention to those who are, by definition, excluded. Paragraph 317 of the explanatory notes make it clear that individuals detained under sections 4, 5, 135 and 136 will not benefit from IMHA support. Those are often people detained in crisis situations, sometimes in police custody, or brought in under emergency powers.
For completeness, will the Minister clarify why that group is being left out, given their heightened vulnerability and the likelihood of distress or disorientation? Are the Government satisfied that patients under these emergency powers are receiving adequate information and support at the most critical moments of intervention? Is there a mechanism to support the nominated person if the patient does not have capacity, so that the nominated person receives the information they need to make a fully informed decision? If the answer is that the duration of detention is too short to justify IMHA involvement, I ask the Minister: how short is too short when a person’s liberty and medical autonomy are in question?
It may be that Government amendments 42 and 43 address some of those points, so I will return to this in a second before moving on to my fourth point. In terms of information sharing and patient autonomy, I welcome the retention of the duty to inform patients, especially informal patients, of their right to advocacy, and for that provision to be given both orally and in writing. However, I note that the responsible person must also—except where the patient requests otherwise—be provided with written information to the nominated person. What safeguards are in place to ensure that that does not inadvertently breach the patient’s privacy, such as in situations involving estranged family members, controlling relationships or very personal health issues, which could be disclosed but are not relevant to mental health? It is essential that the nominated person framework enhances advocacy and support and does not undermine the person’s right to control who knows about their care.
Finally, I would welcome clarity from the Minister about how the uptake and impact of expanding the IMHA system will be monitored. Will there be reporting requirements on providers? If so, will that be through the integrated care boards, or is that part of the CQC? Will patients have the opportunity to feed back on the effectiveness of the support they receive?
Before I turn to the amendments, I reiterate that the Opposition support the principle of strengthening advocacy in mental health services. Clause 41 is an important step towards a more rights-based and person-centred system, but the detail of the implementation is key.
I note that proposed Government amendments 42 and 43 to schedule 3 specifically change the definition of “English qualifying informal patient” and “Welsh qualifying informal patient” to exclude patients detained under any
“legislation or by virtue of a court order”,
rather than limiting exclusion to those detained solely under the Mental Health Act. That important clarification partly improves on one of the problems I mentioned when discussing clause 41.
In simple terms, those amendments try to address the issue of clarity and coverage for patients detained under other laws, and I believe that this is how they do that. Originally, the Bill excluded only patients detained under the Mental Health Act from being classified as informal patients eligible for IMHA services, but some patients might be detained under other laws or court orders, such as criminal justice laws, which the original wording did not cover. The amendments change the definition to exclude anyone detained under any legislation or by a court, not just the Mental Health Act. In practice, this means that patients detained under other laws will not mistakenly be considered informal patients eligible for IMHA services under this part of the Bill.
The proposals close a gap so that the right groups get advocacy services, and there is less confusion for hospitals and advocates about who qualifies. In essence, by broadening and bettering the definition and defining the exclusion, this will ensure that patients detained under other legislation, such as the Criminal Justice Act, or other court-mandated detention powers, are not mistakenly classified as informal patients eligible for IMHA services under those provisions. That reflects a more comprehensive and legally coherent approach to defining eligibility.
This clarity is welcome, as it reduces potential ambiguity in respect of providers. That said, will the Minister comment further on how these changes will interact with existing IMHA provisions or advocacy entitlements for those detained under other legislation? Are there parallel safeguards or advocacy rights for those groups? What guidance will be provided to practitioners and IMHA providers to navigate the complexities of overlapping detention regimes, especially when a patient’s status might shift rapidly between voluntary Mental Health Act detention and court orders? Will this amendment necessitate any further changes in regulations or operational policies to ensure smooth implementation and clarity for patients, families and service providers? Ensuring that no patient falls through the cracks due to definitional nuances is crucial for integrity in our mental health advocacy services.
Finally, Lib Dem amendment 19 would insert after “patient”, in schedule 3, page 91, line 13,
“or English qualifying informal patient under 18”.
As the hon. Member for Hertford and Stortford and Opposition Members rightly pointed out, it is quite hard to see why the Government would not want to put that in place. The explanatory statement says that it aims to extend
“the provision of opt-out advocacy services in England to informal inpatients under 18.”
It seems clear in what it does and is a well-defined amendment to that end. I am keen to understand why the Government do not want to support it. Do they believe that this is currently balanced elsewhere in the system? Are there already provisions elsewhere? If not, why—if it is good for adults and we are strengthening their opportunities—should it not be the same for our children?
I will finish on that point. I would be grateful for answers on the clause, the schedule, the Government amendments and the Lib Dem amendment.
Stephen Kinnock
The hon. Member for Chester South and Eddisbury asked who can make referrals in addition to hospital managers. The list of responsible persons is in proposed new section 130CC, in paragraph 6 of schedule 3. In addition to hospital managers, the responsible local social services authority is also required to notify providers of advocacy services about qualifying patients; whether it is a matter for the hospital or the local authority depends on the patient.
I was asked whether there are enough people to fulfil the tasks of the IMHA. The impact assessment gives our current best estimate of likely workforce and funding requirements and sets out the expected expansion required for each workforce group. We will recruit approximately 330 additional IMHAs.
Aphra Brandreth
Does the Minister have any more detail on that? Is there a timeframe for recruiting these advocates and putting the training in place? That would help reassure the Committee that there is provision to ensure that the timing will fit with the introduction of the changes in the Bill.
Stephen Kinnock
As has been discussed, as soon as the Bill gets Royal Assent we will launch an extensive consultation around the code of practice. The code of practice will cover everything from training to recruitment to capacity building, and the plan will be set out in the first annual written ministerial statement, which will take place one year after the Bill receives Royal Assent.
My hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford asked about children admitted informally. We are introducing a duty on hospital managers to inform informal patients of their right to a mental health advocate. We will set out the importance of independent mental health advocate representation for children and young people in the code of practice. That could include the importance of a proactive approach for hospital managers.
We will also describe in the code the new role for independent mental health advocates in relation to informal patients, including vulnerable in-patient groups, such as children and young people, people from ethnic minority backgrounds and people with a learning disability or autism.
The hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon asked whether we have the money for it. The funding requirements will, I think, be related to our best estimate of likely workforce and funding requirements. If we are going for 330 additional IMHAs, the funding requirements will be defined by that number.
The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, asked whether it will be local authority funding. We are obliged to fund new burdens on local authorities to resource this expansion of the independent mental health advocates. He then asked a blizzard of additional questions; I got lost in the thread of them all. We will go through Hansard and write to him.
Stephen Kinnock
No, I have finished.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 41 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 3
Independent mental health advocates
Dr Chambers
I think the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon has spent more time discussing our amendments than I have, so I would like to give him the opportunity to vote in favour of one of them.
Amendment proposed: 19, in schedule 3, page 91, line 13, after “patient” insert—
“or English qualifying informal patient under 18”— (Dr Chambers.)
This amendment extends the provision of opt-out advocacy services in England to informal inpatients under 18.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Stephen Kinnock
The clauses will amend section 132 of the Mental Health Act in relation to detained patients, and section 132A in relation to community patients, and insert a new provision in relation to conditionally discharged patients. They place a statutory duty on hospital managers to supply complaints information to detained patients, community patients and conditionally discharged respectively, as well as to their nominated person.
Patients, their family and carers have a right to complain about the treatment they receive, including care and treatment under the Mental Health Act. The patient’s rights to complain are enshrined in the NHS constitution. Although the code of practice currently sets out that information about complaints should be provided to patients when they are detained, there is no statutory duty to do so. Under the clauses, hospital managers will be required to provide information on how to make a complaint about: first, functions under the Bill; secondly, any medical treatment for mental disorder received during their detention; and thirdly, the outcome of any complaint about medical treatment. That includes providing information about how to make a complaint to the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman about the mismanagement of complaints about medical treatment, where the person believes their complaint to another body—for instance the hospital or CQC—was not appropriately investigated.
Hospital managers must take practicable steps to ensure that patients have understood complaints procedures, and information about complaints must be provided both verbally and in writing. The duty requires that information must be provided as soon as practicable after the patient is first detained, when the section that they are detained under changes, when the detention is renewed, or every 12 months for restricted patients under part III of the 1983 Act. For community patients, a duty is triggered as soon as it is practical after being placed on a community treatment order and as soon as practical each time the community treatment order is renewed. For conditionally discharged patients, it is triggered as soon as practicable after being conditionally discharged. I commend clauses 42 to 44 to the Committee.
Gregory Stafford
I rise to speak in favour of clauses 42, 43 and 44, which together strengthen the duty to inform patients—whether detained in the community or conditionally discharged—about how to make a complaint about their treatment and the outcome of that complaint. The Mental Health Act has long included duties to tell patients their rights, but too often that information has been patchy, hard to understand or buried in paperwork. The clauses tackle that by requiring clear, repeated information about not just detention, but treatment and the complaints process.
Clause 42 relates to information about complaints for detained patients. Section 132 of the Mental Health Act 1983 originally required hospitals to inform detained patients of their rights, but that was often inconsistently applied. This clause responds to long-standing concerns about transparency and patient empowerment, aligning with the broader goals of the Bill to enhance autonomy and dignity in mental health care. Specifically, there is an expanded duty of information. Hospital managers must now ensure that detained patients understand how to make complaints, not only about their detention, but about their treatment, along with the outcomes of any complaints.
There are some timing requirements, i.e. that the information must be provided as soon as practicable after detention begins and be repeated annually for restricted patients, or after each section 20 report for others. That will improve patient’s awareness of their rights and how to seek redress. It will promote accountability and mental health services by encouraging feedback and complaints, and support better outcomes by addressing grievances early and constructively.
Sojan Joseph (Ashford) (Lab)
I welcome the strengthening of section 132 of the Mental Health Act in respect of information about complaints, as proposed in clauses 42 to 44.
Clause 42 deals with information about complaints for detained patients. Currently, through the code of practice, there is a requirement that hospital managers will pass on that information. They should do so both orally and in writing, ensuring that the information is accessible, including in easy-read format for people with learning disabilities. Hospital managers should also ensure that the information has been understood. The clause would amend section 132 of the Act by placing that statutory duty on hospital managers, supplying detained patients and the nominated person with the necessary information about complaints, and taking practicable steps to ensure that the information has been understood.
Proposed new subsection (2A) deals with the types of complaints covered by that duty. They include complaints about carrying out of functions under the Act and about medical treatment. Proposed new subsection (2A)(c) ensures that the statutory duty covers information about the patient’s right to complain to the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman about the maladministration of such complaints. Proposed new subsection (2B) sets out that the duty is triggered
“as soon as practicable after the commencement of the patient’s detention”.
That means that the duty will be triggered each time the section under which the patient is detained changes, and when the authority to detain under that section is renewed.
In respect of part III of the 1983 Act, which concerns restricted patients to whom automatic renewals do not apply, the duty will be triggered every 12 months from the start date of detention. As I mentioned earlier, much of that process is already expected to take place, but ensuring it takes place in future by making it a statutory duty is a sensible and welcome strengthening of that safeguard.
That is also the case for clause 43, which relates to information about complaints for community patients and seeks to amend section 132A of the 1983 Act. As a result of the clause’s changes, there will be a statutory duty on hospital managers to supply information about the complaints procedure, as set out in clause 42, to community patients and the nominated person. That will mean that the patient must be provided with complaints information as soon as practicable after they are placed under a community treatment order, and each time that community treatment order is renewed.
Clause 44 deals with information about complaints for conditionally discharged patients and inserts proposed new section 132B, which requires hospital managers to give complaints information to conditionally discharged restricted patients. The proposed new section states that such information must be provided before the patient leaves hospital, or as soon as possible when the patient is conditionally discharged. Patients must receive the information when they are first detained in the hospital, and again whenever they are conditionally discharged. As with clause 42, the hospital manager must ensure that the patient has received such information both orally and in writing, and that practical steps have been taken to ensure that the patient understands the information. A copy of the information must also be given to the nominated person within a reasonable timeframe, unless the patient has requested otherwise. I support the clauses, as the changes made by it will strengthen the Act.
Aphra Brandreth
I rise to make a few brief remarks about clauses 42 to 44, which would amend the 1983 Act to place statutory duties on hospital managers to supply complaints information to both the patient and the nominated person in respect of detailed patients, patients subject to a CTO and conditionally discharged patients.
These are important clauses. The people concerned are potentially vulnerable individuals. They need to know that they have a voice in this process and feel empowered to speak out and complain, should they wish. There is a duty on hospital managers to ensure that detained patients understand how to make complaints. However, I ask the Minister how that duty will be checked and evaluated. We all agree that the ability to speak out to make a complaint is important, but we need to ensure that proper safeguards and parameters are in place on how that will happen.
I also welcome the provision requiring that the information must be provided as soon as is practicable. That is important to give patients confidence. The timing requirements will potentially make a huge difference. The journey of a patient may change rapidly over the course of their treatment, so not leaving it too long will potentially make a substantial difference to their ability to recover swiftly, and ensure that they have been able to speak out if they are concerned not just about their detainment but about the way that their treatment is being carried out, and the potential implications of that.
Like many of the measures that we have discussed, these clauses might have administrative implications. We need to ensure that we have fully considered and are able to put in place the necessary support for hospital managers to deal with complaints appropriately. It is important that if someone comes forward with a complaint, it can be dealt with swiftly.
As mentioned on some other matters, we need to ensure consistency for patients, so that they understand the information that they are being provided and that, whatever region they might live in or hospital they might be at, consistent information is provided. I would like the Minister’s reassurance on that point.
Overall, however, the clause improves patients’ awareness of their rights and how they can seek redress. I think we all agree that that is extremely important. It will promote accountability in mental health services by encouraging feedback and complaints. I would like reassurance of some oversight to ensure feedback on any complaints that come forward so that we identify where consistent issues come up, to provide better services not just to the individual but to future individuals. Overall, the clauses support better outcomes by addressing potential grievances and ensuring that they are addressed early and constructively, so I am supportive of them.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
You will be delighted to know that I will be mercifully brief, Mrs Harris, because I am broadly supportive of all three clauses. Having worked as a doctor in clinical practice, and as a barrister, I am cognisant of the importance of transparency, patient autonomy and procedural fairness, in particular with vulnerable patients who are often seen in a mental health care setting.
I welcome this trio of clauses, but I have some gentle challenges to put to the Minister for when he gets to his feet. First, how will data be captured on the information that is to be provided to patients and their families? What feedback mechanisms will be in place, not just for patients but for those who support them—their carers and families—and for clinicians, on the practicalities of how the system is working?
Sojan Joseph
I was a clinician and I practised on wards; patient records are electronic for staff. When staff complete the explanation of section 132 rights, they record that on the electronic patient records. Does the hon. Member agree that that would be a good place to get the data?
Dr Shastri-Hurst
The hon. Member makes a very valid point. There is that mechanism, but this is also about ensuring that the quality of the information that has been imparted—not just the process of it being done—is recorded. An audit process must ensure that the important conversations and information are imparted in a way that the patient and their family understand, in sufficient detail and as part of a process whereby, if there are concerns or doubts, they can be addressed in a ready manner. I take his point that there are metrics by which to measure things, but it is not just about capturing data; it is about capturing quality data in order to ensure that that is being fulfilled.
To pick up on the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Chester South and Eddisbury about regional variability, consistency across the board is important not only in the regions, but in the delivery methods and capacity that underpin this crucial service.
Finally, on potential confusion and legal information being communicated in inaccessible ways, it is important that legalese does not get in the way of clarity for individuals who will have to navigate the information. I am interested to hear the Minister’s views on how we can ensure that the information is imparted in an accessible way for all those concerned—importantly, not just for patients and their families, but for clinicians who have to impart the information. They need to feel comfortable navigating their way around what can often be a complex set of regulations and legislation.
Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Taiwo Owatemi.)