Employment Rights Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

2nd reading
Thursday 27th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I join in thanking the Minister for her introduction, and, of course, in praising and commending the speeches of the four maiden speakers today: the noble Baronesses, Lady Berger and Lady Gray of Tottenham, and my noble friends Lady Cash and Lord Young of Acton. This has been a very interesting debate. Before I start, I should declare my interest as a minority shareholder in two businesses that employ people. It is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Fox. I found myself nodding in agreement with much of what he said, and I will do my best not to repeat all of it.

Others have commented on the fact that this, overall, is a troubling Bill, and for numerous reasons—not least, as my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral articulated so expertly, its excessive reliance on secondary powers. I will not expand on that now, as the case has been made—and, indeed, reinforced just now by the noble Lord, Lord Fox—but I will focus my remarks on two areas where, to use a phrase coined by my noble friend Lady Penn, the balance is seriously wrong. They are the inevitable and disproportionate impact on SMEs, acknowledged in the Government’s own impact assessment, and the day-one rights and their inevitable impact on hiring.

I begin by turning to the bigger picture and quoting from the Government’s own impact assessment. It states:

“Many of the policies within the Bill could help support the Government’s Growth Mission … we conclude the direct impact on growth could be positive, but small”.


The word “could” appears 132 times in the assessment. That is the language not of confidence but of uncertainty and hesitation, and it shows a fundamental lack of conviction in the very legislation before us.

While the Government dither, businesses are suffering. Indeed, as we saw only yesterday, the OBR downgraded growth forecasts from 2% to 1%. A particularly telling phrase in the explanatory note—as already referenced by my noble friend Lord Moynihan—said

“we have not incorporated any impact of the Government’s Plan to Make Work Pay as there is not yet sufficient detail or clarity about the final policy parameters.”

It goes on to say:

“Employment regulation policies that affect the flexibility of businesses and labour markets or the quantity and quality of work will likely have material, and probably net negative, economic impacts on employment, prices, and productivity”.


That is an explicit acknowledgement of the uncertainty generated by this Bill, and an admission that implies that more downgrades are to come. Let us look at the facts. The business confidence index for the United Kingdom stood at 97.4 in December 2024, a sharp decline from the previous month and the lowest reading since July 2020. That, of course, was a time of extraordinary crisis, global shutdowns and economic freefall. Yet today, with no pandemic to blame, we find ourselves again teetering on the brink.

The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales’s Business Confidence Monitor, which is the most comprehensive measure of sentiment in our business community, plummeted from 14.4 to a mere 0.2 in Q4 2024. The Institute of Directors confirms this: its Economic Confidence Index dropped to minus 64 in February, close to the lows reached during Covid. Regarding this Bill specifically, the Institute of Directors’ survey suggests that 57% of business leaders will be less likely to hire.

ICAEW members across the UK have raised concerns about the Bill’s impact on costs, labour flexibility and business dynamism. According to a poll of its members, 73% expect the Bill to increase employment costs for new and existing employees. One said, “It is like rushing down a hill towards a lake and pressing the accelerator.” The OBR has told us how this ends: in unemployment, and it will be unemployment of the Government’s own making. On that subject, that is one statistic that noble Lords opposite failed to cite when making their international comparisons. For the record, it is currently 7.3% in France, 6.2% in Germany and only 4.4% here.

What is driving this collapse in confidence? It is the suffocating weight of excessive taxation and crippling uncertainty about the future, as many others have noted. Small and medium-sized enterprises, which concern those of us on these Benches considerably, are rightly hailed as the backbone of the British economy, and for very good reason. SMEs account for 60% of UK employment and 48% of business turnover. Their confidence has turned negative for the first time since Q4 2022, falling from 12.8 to minus 4.7. That figure is not just a dry statistic. It represents thousands of business owners lying awake at night, wondering whether they can afford to keep the lights on, let alone hire new staff or invest in their future.

We should be under no illusion: the cost of this uncertainty is devastating. The Federation of Small Businesses reported that a staggering 33% of small employers now expect to reduce staff. That number has doubled in just one quarter. Meanwhile, only 10% of small firms plan to take on new employees. The result will be a shrinking economy, a contracting workforce, reduced opportunities for young people and those seeking to move from welfare to employment, increased costs and bureaucracy, and a country that is clearly retreating from ambition rather than embracing it.

If more confirmation is needed of this picture, the Government’s own impact assessment for the recent SI, the National Minimum Wage (Amendment) Regulations 2025, confirms the difficulties facing small business. It states that

“there is some evidence of challenging business conditions for SMEs specifically. Around 42.7% and 36.8% of micro and small businesses, respectively reported having less than three months of cash reserves in September 2024 (compared to 19.2% for large businesses). Around 15.6% and 33.9% of micro and small businesses, respectively, reported the cost of labour as a challenge to business turnover in November 2024.”

It is not clear whether, by the “cost of labour”, it was talking about the workforce or the party opposite. SMEs will need many exemptions from the provisions of the Bill. Yet the picture I have just painted is about to be made worse, as the Bill chooses to add yet another burden: disastrous day one rights for unfair dismissals and statutory sick pay.

So I ask a simple question: who truly understands what a business needs to thrive and survive? Is it the entrepreneur who has built something from nothing, the employer who fights every day to keep their company afloat, or an employment tribunal that is removed from the realities of running a business yet is now empowered to make decisions that could determine its fate? As the data reported last year by His Majesty’s Courts & Tribunals Service makes clear, employment tribunals are currently not able to make any speedy judgments. The Law Society described the backlog as “spiralling” and a very well-known legal firm described the tribunals to us as

“a bit of a laughing stock”,

“creaking” and “hugely unreliable”. That firm might be expected to support the Bill out of self-interest, but it does not.

The Bill makes it harder for businesses to prove that redundancies are genuine. It creates a scenario where every decision could be second-guessed by tribunals that the legal profession thinks are a bit of a laughing stock. Every restructuring might have to be questioned and every difficult choice turned into an expensive legal battle. Why would a business fire for no reason? Businesses need motivated, skilled employees, and they need time to assess the likelihood of an employee acquiring those skills and demonstrating that motivation. The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, put this very well and comprehensively explained it. However, to quote one of his Cross-Bench colleagues—the noble Lord, Lord Moore of Etchingham—in a newspaper column the other day, this clause is,

“as if children, once admitted to a school, were immediately deemed to have passed all the ensuing exams”.

As my noble friend Lady Cash noted, this is not an us-and-them perspective. Even if there were no other reason, retention is cheaper than firing and rehiring. Yet the Bill assumes, without evidence, that businesses are acting in bad faith, that they need tribunals to intervene and that they do not already have a strong incentive to retain talent.

The cost of all this will be staggering. The impact assessment suggests £5 billion, which will inevitably prove to be optimistic and which will inevitably fall disproportionately, as the Government admit, on the very SMEs we need to power growth—SMEs that the facts say are already struggling as a result of this Government’s other misguided policies. Instead of managing their businesses and seeking new markets and customers, they will be bogged down in human resources. If they get it wrong, they will be bogged down in litigation, endless documentation and the endless hiring of legal experts to justify every strategic decision. This is not just bureaucratic overreach but an outright violation of business autonomy.

A business should be able to shape its own workforce in response to market demands, competition and innovation, yet under the Bill it seems that businesses can only make such decisions when faced with an existential crisis. What recourse would a company struggling with stagnation and trying to bring in fresh talent and stay ahead in a fiercely competitive world have? We must ask ourselves: do we want a thriving economy and businesses that grow, invest and create jobs, or do we want a system that strangles them in red tape, drags them into courtrooms and forces them into stagnation? The Bill, as it stands, will not boost our declining growth, restore business confidence or create jobs. Instead, it will leave many businesses trapped: unable to adapt, unable to compete and, ultimately, unable to survive.

So I ask the Minister: have the Government considered the likely impact of the measures in the Bill on their recently stated aim to move people off long-term welfare? Can they speculate as to the likely effect of day 1 unfair dismissal rights and statutory sick pay rights on that ambition? Can they answer why a prospective employer might take a risk on a potential employee who is recovering from a long-term medical condition? The obvious net effect of these measures will be to encourage employers to do more due diligence, be more risk averse and rely more on references and less on intuition. That will have a very damaging impact on social mobility and workforce diversity. How do society or the individuals and businesses affected benefit from that? How is that—to use the words of the noble Lord, Lord Livermore—either compassionate or fair?

Beyond the immediate damage to business confidence, we must consider the broader implications for the UK’s attractiveness as a destination for investment. Capital flow is where it is welcomed. Investment thrives where there is stability, flexibility and a regulatory framework that encourages and does not obstruct growth. The Bill sends precisely the wrong message to investors. It signals that the UK is becoming a more complex, risk-laden and bureaucratic place to do business. Why would international companies choose Britain when they can invest in economies with more business-friendly policies?

Ministers claim that employment protections will create a fairer economy, but they fail to acknowledge the reality: an economy that cannot attract investment is an economy that cannot create jobs at all, and surely that is the ultimate unfairness. Or, to put it another way, and to use the words of the noble Lord, Lord Watson, surely the greatest dignity of all is to have a job.

As we have heard, there is plenty more in the Bill that we will be addressing in Committee. My noble friend Lord Young of Acton made a brilliant maiden speech, drawing heavily on his experience with the Free Speech Union and talking to the invidious Clause 20. We will support him. As a reminder, my noble friend pointed out that employers are already liable for the sexual harassment of third parties under the worker protection Act. On flexible working, we struggle to understand the problem this is trying to fix. As my noble friend Lord Hunt said earlier, a majority of workers on these contracts seem to like them. The Recruitment and Employment Confederation states that 79% of respondents to their recent survey like flexible working because of the flexibility. The Chancellor says she wants to tear down regulation to boost growth, but this Bill introduces a new quango with perhaps alarming, to use the word of the noble Lord, Lord Fox, or even Kafkaesque powers.

We have spoken to all the major business organisations and many employers with real-world experience, and we can find none that supports the Bill. We found unanimity that it will cause considerable damage. Can the Minister give any examples, apart from those four that she has already mentioned and which have been trotted out fairly frequently over the past few months, of actual, real employers that support all the Bill? Please name just one, as we would love to talk to them to see what we have missed. We will of course also be turning to the subject of trades unions, to which a number of noble Lords have spoken. In particular, I commend the contributions of the noble Lord, Lord Burns, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and indeed the noble Lord, Lord Fox, from the Liberal Democrat Benches, for their thoughtful interventions on this.

We believe that the UK stands at a crossroads. We understand the intent behind the Bill, and of course there are some things in it that we can support. But we can either embrace policies that made us a global leader in investment and innovation, or we can burden ourselves and businesses with regulations that drive them elsewhere. I believe that the Government are serious about growth, but I have no choice but to conclude that the choice here is straightforward: they can have this Bill or they can have growth, but they cannot have both.

Employment Rights Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 29th April 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 283 and 327 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Fox. I note that my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral has dealt with the purpose clause in Amendment 1 very comprehensively, so I will say no more on that. I remind the Government Front Bench that it was the noble Lord, Lord Monks, who opened the attacks on Margaret Thatcher. My noble friend is perfectly within her rights to defend the great lady’s record.

There is a growing troubling feeling in many of the businesses that we have spoken to, across sectors, regions and sizes, that the Government see them not as partners in growth or employers to be supported but, as my noble friend Lord Evans of Rainow, noted, as bad actors to be restrained. The sense is that the Government have concluded that virtually all businesses cannot be trusted to do the right thing, and so they are pressing ahead with a centrally planned, top-down approach to employment reform. It is an approach that prioritises control over co-operation, uniformity over flexibility and ideology over evidence. This approach does not benefit businesses: it burdens them with cost and complexity; it strips away the flexibility on which many sectors rely, especially those with seasonal, part-time or rapidly evolving workforces; and it will impede their functionality.

The noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady, said that this Bill is popular, but it is not popular with the Federation of Small Businesses, the British Chambers of Commerce, the CBI, the Institute of Directors, Make UK, nor the Recruitment and Employment Confederation—and, as we have learned from my noble friend Lady Stowell, it is not popular with techUK. They have all raised serious concerns and called for urgent changes.

If there is a groundswell of support out there, it is an incredibly well-kept secret. If there is a group of employers which believe that these changes will make them more confident to hire, invest and grow, we have yet to meet them. Judging by the open letters, briefings and consultations that have been submitted to Parliament, neither have the Ministers opposite. Let us not pretend that this Bill is being driven by the demands of business, because it is not.

I move on to the amendments. The Government claim that this Bill is about protecting workers, but it is time that we recognised that protection cannot come at the cost of opportunity. For many workers, the most important protection is the ability to get a foot on the ladder, gain experience, build skills and find stable, long-term employment.

In that regard, I commend the noble Lord, Lord Fox, on his Amendment 283. I agree with my noble friend Lady Noakes that, in some ways, it risks creating a monster, but I think that, in this case, and because of the nature of this Bill, it will be a friendly monster, because it will at least provide some certainty. As we know, and as anyone who has had a conversation with businesses will tell you, businesses crave certainty more than anything else. The fact that the code of practice is written as it is reflects the complexities in the Bill, the vast array of delegated powers that the Government are about to award themselves and, of course, the lack of certainty.

The noble Lord is entirely right to focus his attention on SMEs. It is worth reminding the Committee that 48% of business turnover and 60% of employment is accounted for by SMEs. In many cases, they will be the businesses without extensive HR departments to help them interpret the facts in this Bill. Therefore, the Government will have to do it for them. This is not perfect, but it deals with the main issues. We would prefer to see no need for this amendment, but, because of the other factors that I have mentioned—the delegated powers and so on—we have no choice.

We need a framework that recognises the diversity of business models, the pressures that employers face and the legitimate role that they play in building opportunity. This is not an employers versus workers situation. We are all committed to improving workers’ rights but we must do so in a way that is realistic, pragmatic and supportive of the broader economy. Without that, we risk achieving the opposite of what we intend: fewer jobs, more uncertainty, greater barriers for the people we are trying to help and, frankly, less equality.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 8. I commend my noble friend Lord Wolfson on his excellent speech, bringing the reality of employing so many people into the heart of this debate, along with the constraints and the concerns being raised, while still recognising that I understand why so many people consider casual work and zero-hour contracts to be particularly poor when people are trying to have certainty of employment over some time. I also support Amendments 7, 12 and 13—in essence, any amendment that refers to specifying the reference period in the Bill.

I say that because, when thinking of 26 weeks, I think in particular of the hospitality industry in coastal areas. There are a number of employers around the country who literally shut down their businesses, or move to a much lower level of needing people, at certain times of the year, and then, in the summer, are desperately trying to find people. We need to give flexibility. The 12 weeks simply does not recognise that, as has been referred to. It is perfectly usual for people to work at different points throughout the year, potentially in on annualised-hours contract, but varying the number of hours expected to match the demand of customers requiring a particular service. I fear that the 12 weeks does not address that sort of business.

Across the country, 2 million people work in the hospitality industry. It is one of our biggest industries, and for many families it is key to how they support their household income. For the flexibility that employers want, and—thinking of how many people lose their childcare at certain times of the year—for employees to have flexibility around their hours worked, bringing in casual staff is a key element in how employers keep those businesses going.

There is another element that needs thinking through. While I appreciate that the Government seek to reduce the number of agency and bank workers in the NHS, let us not get away from the fact that, unfortunately, many NHS trusts are actually terrible employers. A lot of people leave or reduce their permanent contracts because they simply cannot get the flexibility that they need working in the NHS. That could be for caring reasons, for all sorts of people—it does not matter whether it is men or women; people provide care to their families and to their friends. I am concerned, and I intend to discuss further with NHS Professionals how this will impact on the NHS fulfilling its expectations for people right across the country. I appreciate that it is not simply NHS Professionals; many individual trusts have their own bank. That is intended to provide flexibility based on need, and recognises that simply not everybody can work the NHS shifts expected.

Thinking of the 26 weeks or the 12 weeks, I am also concerned that, at the other end of the Corridor, 650 Members of Parliament are all individual employers. They have to sign contracts, which are provided, but when people are ill or go on maternity leave, MPs can and do take people on through certain term contracts. I am concerned that there will be unintended consequences for the provision of services. As a real example, if you had to guarantee hours beyond when the employee came back, you could end up in a situation that you simply could not manage.

It is for those reasons that we need to think very carefully about the reference period when we are considering the different employment situations that small employers find themselves in, as well as the large sectors, such as hospitality and retail, which have already been discussed.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, Amendments 3, 6 and 17 stand in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Hunt. Before turning to the detail, I would like to frame the debate in its proper context.

At the heart of this issue lies the question of incentives. Much of the discussion around zero-hours contracts rightly concerns the security and well-being of workers. We must not lose sight of the fact that only a relatively small proportion of the workforce is employed on such contracts, or in other forms of temporary work. Many of these individuals are young people—as my noble friend Lady Lawlor illustrated in her very detailed speech—who are starting out in their careers. Others are disabled people, who may be able to work only a limited number of hours due to their personal circumstances. If we make the regulatory environment too rigid, we inadvertently create a disincentive to hire precisely these groups. We reduce the number of vacancies, reduce opportunities and end up harming those we most wish to support. Good intentions do not alone lead to good results. It is the incentives that lead to results.

I thank my noble friend Lord Moynihan and the noble Lords, Lord Fox and Lord Goddard, for their contributions in this group, and I will come on to others. My noble friend Lord Moynihan made a compelling argument to leave out this part of the clause altogether, because it is simply unworkable in its current form. I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say in response.

I turn to the specifics of my amendments. Job security is vital, and there can be no disagreement on that point, but we have to recognise that guaranteed-hours contracts are not always practical or appropriate across all sectors of the economy. The principle that we wish to uphold is simple: autonomy. Workers themselves are best placed to judge their own circumstances and to decide whether a guaranteed-hours contract would suit their needs.

Research from the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development, published in its report on zero-hours contracts, found that workers on such contracts often report a better work-life balance and higher well-being compared with other workers. This is an important reminder that flexibility, when genuinely chosen, can be empowering rather than exploitative.

Not every worker wants a rigid schedule. Young people, parents with caring responsibilities and disabled people may actively prefer the flexibility that variable hours allow. A one-size-fits-all approach simply does not reflect the realities of the modern labour market. Sectors such as retail, hospitality and tourism, and other seasonal industries, are heavily dependent on flexible staffing to meet seasonal demand. It is these very sectors that offer the vital entry-level opportunities to workers who might otherwise struggle to find employment.

Despite the Government’s understandable ambition to improve labour market fairness, the Bill as currently drafted risks reducing that flexibility rather than enhancing it. The automatic obligation placed upon businesses to offer guaranteed-hours contracts once certain thresholds are met would impose significant and disproportionate administrative burdens, even when the worker involved may have no desire to change their current arrangements.

The problem is particularly acute for larger employers, such as national retailers, as we have heard from my noble friend Lord Wolfson, who delivered an expert speech. They would be forced into a continual cycle of recalculations and offers, simply because an employee’s working patterns have shifted slightly. As my noble friend Lady Verma explained, that affects small businesses as well. In practice, firms would face a daily or weekly obligation to offer a new contract based on changing patterns, resulting in huge and unnecessary administrative costs. This would not only create inefficiency but would discourage businesses offering overtime and additional work voluntarily, thereby reducing opportunities for those who value flexibility.

The amendments I propose take a different approach. Instead of an automatic right to be offered a guaranteed-hours contracts, we propose a right to request a guaranteed-hours contract. It entirely respects the spirit of the Government’s intentions. As the noble Lord, Lord Fox, has already explained, it would impose the same the obligations on employers as the Government’s Bill. This would preserve the choice for workers, empowering them to seek greater stability when they wish, but it would avoid imposing blanket obligations on employers that may lead to perverse outcomes. The Government’s current drafting, with an automatic right to guaranteed hours, risks creating a bureaucracy that neither workers nor businesses have asked for.

On the subject of businesses, it is worth referring to the letter received from five employers’ organisations. For reference, those are Make UK, the CBI, the IoD, the Federation of Small Business and the British Chambers of Commerce. They say in that letter:

“Not every job can be made compatible with every possible need. This reform means businesses incur admin costs whenever an employee works variable hours. The result is that firms are discouraged from offering variable hours even when the flexibility is requested by workers, including voluntary overtime. The cost associated with administering and calculating contract offers on a rolling basis whenever staff work additional hours is also disproportionate and provides no clear benefit to workers”.


I could not have put it better myself.

There has been some reference on the other side, by the noble Baroness, Lady Carberry, to the Low Pay Commission, which met seven years ago. That ignores the fact that, over the last seven years, working practices more generally through the economy—whether on flexible-hours contracts or not—have changed very dramatically, partly as a consequence of the pandemic. I note that the FSB has now signed the letter which includes the quote I have just delivered, so it has clearly changed its mind.

I recognise that there may be an even simpler and more effective alternative to the right to request, which would be an automatic offer of a guaranteed-hours contract combined with the right for the worker to opt out if they so wish, so Amendment 17 introduces a worker opt-out mechanism. A qualifying worker may opt out of receiving a guaranteed-hours contract provided that the employer has provided clear written information about the guaranteed-hours system, the worker has given written notice in a prescribed form, and the employer reminds the worker at regular intervals, at least every six months, that they can opt back in at any time. Under that model, every eligible worker would be enrolled on to a guaranteed-hours contract after the reference period by default.

However, those workers who genuinely value the flexibility of their zero-hours arrangement—and there are many, particularly, as we have already discussed, young people, carers and so on—would have the right to decline the offer by providing written notice. This approach would strike a better balance, because it would ensure that guaranteed hours are the norm unless the worker themselves chooses otherwise, thereby protecting workers who might otherwise feel pressured not to request more security. Equally, it would avoid the unnecessary administrative burden on employers of offering contracts that in many cases would be rejected. We would be sparing businesses the cost and disruption of a process that delivers little practical benefit where flexibility is mutually valued by both employer and employee. It would ensure that the choice remains a real and continuing one, recognising that workers’ needs and circumstances evolve.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

I take that point. I was attempting to explain in my description, which I obviously need to develop a little bit more, that we understood some of those issues and are trying to find a way through it.

Amendments 3, 4 and 6 seek to change the model for the right to guaranteed hours from a right to be offered to a right to request. We have debated this at some length. These amendments would mean that a qualifying worker experiencing one-sided flexibility would need to make a request to their employer to access their right to guaranteed hours. Noble Lords underestimate the imbalance of powers that employees in this circumstance face. The noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, mentioned young people, which is the group that is likely to be the most intimidated by having to request guaranteed hours. Therefore, we are attempting to make sure that these rights are balanced in a proper and more effective way.

I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Carberry for reminding us that the Low Pay Commission also looked at a right to request and, understandably, rejected it for exactly that reason. It understood that the people in those circumstances had the least power in the labour market and would therefore, quite rightly, feel intimidated about coming forward. She also raised the issue of what happens if the request is denied. I know the noble Lord, Lord Fox, attempted to address that, but I do not know that the amendments necessarily do so. The noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, says that employment has changed since those days. I would say that employment has become even more unpredictable and unreliable. Nothing that the Low Pay Commission said—or indeed that I said—addresses the potential exploitation which the commission identified. There is an imbalance, and it is very difficult for people to come forward and make that request; that is why we are insistent that it is done in the way that we have suggested.

After receiving an offer, the workers would then be able decide whether to accept it, based on its specific terms. That would empower the worker to decide for themselves, having seen the offer on the table. This addresses the point that some people do want to work flexible hours, and we understand that.

Amendment 15 would allow workers on limited-term contracts of four months or less to voluntarily waive their right to guaranteed hours. We believe that workers should be able to retain the flexibility of a zero-hours contract or arrangement if they wish, which is why those who are offered guaranteed hours will be able to turn them down and remain on their current contract or arrangement if they wish. This amendment would add an additional opt-out mechanism for workers that could create needless confusion for both employers and workers.

Amendment 17 would provide workers with the ability to opt out of receiving guaranteed-hours offers. We understand the importance of workers being able to retain the flexibility of zero-hours contracts or arrangements if they wish, which is why those receiving a guaranteed-hours offer will be able to turn it down. However, to ensure that all qualifying workers will benefit from the legislation, all workers should be able to receive a guaranteed-hours offer. We want to ensure that employers and workers are starting from a position of equal bargaining power. Therefore, through the Bill we have allowed for employers and unions to collectively agree to opt out of the zero-hours contract measure, if they agree. Unions can make these deals based on their knowledge of the industry and a holistic view of what is best for the workers. We feel it is more appropriate than individual workers opting out of receiving offers. After receiving an offer, qualifying workers would then be able to decide whether to accept, based on their individual circumstances.

Finally, Amendment 2 would remove from the Bill the right for qualifying workers to be offered guaranteed hours. We think that all employers should be required to offer their qualifying workers guaranteed hours, as this is the best way of addressing one-sided flexibility in the workplace and ensuring that jobs provide a baseline of security and predictability.

Without guaranteed hours, workers do not have any form of certainty as to their earnings, making it difficult to apply for credit or a mortgage, to rent a flat, to plan for major events, or even to manage their day-to-day life expenses. As I have previously iterated, those who are offered guaranteed hours will be able to turn them down and remain on a current contract or arrangement if they wish. We believe that this is the right balance. I therefore hope that I have persuaded noble Lords not to press their amendments.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The Minister is relying a great deal on the fabled consultation that we are going to have. Can we have some idea of when that consultation is likely to take place? Can I suggest that it perhaps takes place before we get to Report, because it will iron out a great many of these arguments? The Minister asserted that some businesses have supported the 12-week reference period. Can she say which ones?

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

The Bill sets out, in a number of ways, that there will be regulations that will be consulted upon. This goes back to the issue of when that consultation will take place, but there is a framework for that set out in the Bill which should cover that point.

Employment Rights Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 29th April 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and my noble friend Lady Coffey. It is frankly not acceptable for the Government at this stage in a Bill to lay this many amendments of this magnitude to the policy in the phase of the Bill as it is travelling through the upper House. These measures will receive no scrutiny from the elected House. It is frankly not constitutionally proper to use this method. It should be used for only minor and technical amendments, and by no measure can these proposals be put into that category. The Government should be very ashamed about this. Frankly, the correct way of proceeding would be to withdraw the Bill and start again, and to lay this entire Bill back before the Commons so that it can be properly scrutinised in accordance with our conventional norms.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his detailed introduction to the amendments in this group. As he was speaking, I thought that he had inadvertently highlighted the mind-boggling complexity of what employers are up against when dealing with this Bill. I did hear all the words but, to paraphrase a famous comedian, I was not entirely sure that they were necessarily in the right order.

As my noble friends Lady Coffey and Lord Murray, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, have pointed out, the Government tabled these 27 amendments only a few days ago. Perhaps they are simply technical amendments, but I am afraid I am inclined to agree with the other speakers that they do not appear to be so. I will just pick a few items at random from the Minister’s speech. If amendments involve national security, insolvency and the death of a claimant at an employment tribunal, these are matters of substance; they are not technical at all.

This is not the way to do business in this House. The last-minute approach is symptomatic of a much deeper issue, which is the lack of care and due diligence when it comes to this Bill. It is rushed, it is poorly thought-through, it has been inadequately consulted on, and it is one that these Benches will scrutinise to the fullest possible extent.

We have to ask why the Government have still not tabled any amendments to address the concerns of businesses regarding the changes to zero-hours contracts in this Bill. These are not niche or minor concerns; they go to the heart of how businesses—especially, as we have been discussing all evening, small and seasonal employers—operate.

We have heard already some of the germs of the future scrutiny that these amendments can expect to receive in depth. We will not oppose them today, but we of course reserve the right to revisit them at a later stage, when we have had time to digest them and read the Minister’s comments in much more detail.

On a personal note, I read Amendment 14 with mounting horror. It induced a minor heart flutter because it reawakened memories of a particularly unsuccessful algebra exam I took when I was about 16. I would be very grateful if we could have a minor health warning on any future amendments of that type.

[Lord Leong (Lab)]

I thank all the noble Lords for their contributions. Some noble Lords raised concerns about the number of amendments tabled by the Government, and I would like to reassure the Committee that these really are technical amendments, brought about as a result of welcome scrutiny of the Bill. They are entirely appropriate and an ordinary part of making good legislation. I remind noble Lords that we had tons of government amendments when we debated the Procurement Bill recently, so this is not unusual.

I will answer some specific points raised by noble Lords. The noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, asked about Amendment 53. This is one of a number of technical amendments designed to ensure that the Bill operates as it was intended to operate. As an example of how technical they are, Amendment 53 seeks to amend new Section 104BA because we realised that it was not clear that Section 104 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 already ensured that dismissal in such cases was automatically unfair.

The noble Lord, Lord Murray, mentioned scrutiny. There will be technical regulations tabled at a later stage, or during the course of this legislation, and the House will have every opportunity to scrutinise these through the affirmative procedure. There will be time for noble Lords to scrutinise delegated powers and this Bill.

Employment Rights Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 8th May 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

18: Clause 1, page 8, leave out lines 41 to 44
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment removes the Secretary of State’s power to make regulations specifying additional circumstances in which the duty to offer a guaranteed hours contract does not apply, or an offer may be treated as withdrawn.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I begin by thanking the noble Lord, Lord Leong, for his letter explaining certain matters that were left over from the last day of Committee. The fact that the algebraic question required a three-page, detailed answer for one worked-up example rather illustrates our point that this adds a huge and possibly unnecessary level of complexity for small businesses in particular. But I will let that lie for now.

Amendments 18 and 19 standing in my name would remove the broad delegated power in new Section 27BD. This Bill continues the concerning trend of the steady transfer of legislative authority from Parliament to Ministers. As I noted at Second Reading, it contains no fewer than 173 delegated powers. The Government may, and probably will, argue that this is justified by ongoing consultation, but that is in effect an admission that this Bill is not yet complete or ready for full and proper scrutiny by this House.

Time and again, we have seen ill-defined powers handed to the Executive allowing for significant policy changes to be made by regulation without meaningful parliamentary oversight. Clause 1 exemplifies this problem. It inserts new sections into the Employment Rights Act 1996, establishing a framework for a new statutory right relating to guaranteed hours. However, through new Section 27BD(6), it grants the Secretary of State a remarkably wide power to make regulations specifying circumstances in which the duty to offer guaranteed hours does not apply or where an offer may be treated as withdrawn. There are no limitations, no criteria and no guiding principles. There is no requirement for a consultation or justification. In effect, the Secretary of State is given a blank cheque.

The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has been very clear that the power is “inappropriately broad” and should be

“restated with a greater degree of precision”.

While the Government’s memorandum refers to

“maintaining the original policy intent while allowing reasonable exemptions”,

the committee rightly points out that nothing in the Bill legally constrains the Secretary of State’s discretion in that regard. Moreover, as we raised on the first day of Committee, businesses need clarity on the operation of guaranteed hours. If there are to be sector-specific exemptions—and there may very well be a case for them—they should appear in the Bill, not be left to future ministerial discretion. Uncertainty benefits no one—not workers, not employers and not enforcement bodies. Allowing such fundamental aspects of the regime to be decided later by regulation undermines the transparency and stability of the framework that the Government are seeking to establish.

I remind the Minister that, during the passage of the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill, she rightly accepted similar concerns and tabled amendments which directly reflected the recommendations of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. At the time, she said:

“I hope the Minister is able to commit to taking on board the recommendations of the Delegated Powers Committee in this respect”.—[Official Report, 27/3/24; col. GC 198.]


Why should that principle not apply here? If it is truly the Government’s intention that this power will be used only in limited and specific cases, then the legislation should make that clear. As it stands, any future Secretary of State could by regulation significantly weaken or disapply this statutory regime without the involvement of Parliament.

Regardless of one’s views on the underlying policy, that is not an acceptable way to legislate. When Parliament creates new rights in statute, they should not be left vulnerable to being hollowed out at the stroke of a ministerial pen. This amendment removes that overly broad delegated power and ensures that any substantive changes to the scope of the duty must be brought back to Parliament through primary legislation. Will the Minister now commit, as she has done before, to taking seriously the recommendations of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and amending the Bill accordingly?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business and Trade and Department for Science, Information and Technology (Baroness Jones of Whitchurch) (Lab)]

My Lords, it is very good to return to the subject of zero-hours contracts as we start day 2 of Committee. As we debated last week, the Government are committed to ending one-sided flexibility and exploitative zero-hours contracts, ensuring that all jobs provide a baseline of security and predictability so that workers can better plan their lives and their finances.

Employers who already provide this security and predictability for their workers will benefit from a level playing field, but these measures will help drive up standards and eliminate undercutting across the board. Meanwhile, employees who enjoy the flexibility of their current zero-hours arrangements will not be pressurised into accepting a guaranteed-hour contract.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, for tabling Amendments 18 and 19, which would remove the power to make regulations specifying circumstances in which the duty to offer guaranteed hours does not apply, or an offer may be treated as withdrawn. This power would allow the Secretary of State to react dynamically to changing employment practices that may arise, allowing for updates to maintain the original policy intent of providing a baseline of security and predictability so workers can better plan their lives. It could provide the required economic flexibility that businesses have been asking for, to ensure that the policy is working as intended while adapting to changing circumstances.

This power is separate to the power in the Bill to exclude categories of workers. Regulations made under the excluded workers power would allow specified workers to be taken out of scope of the right to guaranteed hours. Since the right to guaranteed hours is a new, novel right, it could be necessary to exclude certain workers in order to respond to the changing employment environment.

The power at issue here relates to specified circumstances where the right to guaranteed hours would otherwise apply but limited and specified circumstances justified an exception to the duty to make a guaranteed-hour offer. We envisage that any exceptions to the duty to offer guaranteed hours will be narrow and be applied in specified circumstances; for instance, where the measures would otherwise have significant adverse impacts, even when the employers and the workers act with good intentions and there is no other accepted way to mitigate the risk. Examples could include unforeseen circumstances such as a pandemic or a state of emergency.

Consultation is required to further determine which specific circumstances may justify a potential exemption. I assure the Committee that we will give full consideration to any representations made in this House and by respondents to that consultation. Gathering the views from those who will be impacted by the policy via consultation remains of the utmost importance to this Government. By removing the power, we would become unable to make such exceptions and to provide flexibility in those specific circumstances. The power will also be subject to the affirmative procedure, meaning that both Houses will have the opportunity to debate this matter.

Like the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, I am, as ever, grateful to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee for its careful consideration of the Bill, including in relation to the power with which we are here concerned. The committee continues to serve your Lordships’ House well by providing a thoughtful analysis of the Government’s legislative programme, and I thank it for that.

As acknowledged by that committee, the need to respond to changing circumstances is an appropriate basis for such a power, but in the committee’s view, that power should be narrowed—whereas the amendment goes much further than what has been proposed by it. On that basis, I hope I have been able to set out more information on how the Government intend to use this power, and I of course look forward to responding more fully to the Delegated Powers Committee report in due course. I hope that reassures the noble Lord so that he feels able not to press his Amendments 18 and 19.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her response to these amendments, but I have to confess that I am disappointed, not simply that the amendment is being rejected but that the Minister has chosen not to uphold the principle of parliamentary scrutiny which she championed herself only last year. At that time, she said

“the limits on effective scrutiny of secondary legislation are manifest”.—[Official Report, 27/3/24; col. GC 197.]


That is spot on; I could not agree more, so I have to ask: does the Minister still stand by those words, or does she now disagree with her own assessment—and indeed that of the Attorney-General? I will refrain from quoting again from the Bingham lecture that he gave last November, but we may have to return to that in due course.

Today, the Government are defending a delegated power that is not just broad but boundless. It is a power that allows a future Secretary of State to undo or dilute a statutory right without reference to Parliament and without any of the safeguards the Minister has previously endorsed. I am disappointed, and I regret that the Minister has chosen not to accept these amendments or to listen to the Committee, but it seems that she does not listen even to her own warnings. For now, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 18 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

In the end, this is a further case of prematurely tabling the Bill. We do not have a sense of what the Government mean by this—so it is important for the Minister to set out how we will find out. If this is still in the process of consultation, we are back at exactly the same point that we were in previous groups. In general, we have passed the point of trying to demonstrate that work is lumpy, because the Minister has agreed that work is lumpy; this is about how that lumpiness is accommodated, as the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, set out. What is reasonable for employers to do, what is reasonable for employees to accept, and what is the Government’s view on that? That is what we need to know before we get to Report so that we can take this forward.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend Lord Lucas for introducing this group with his Amendment 21A. I could not agree with him more that flexibility is a key part of an efficient economy. That deserves to be written in stone. I am also grateful to my noble friends Lady Lawlor and Lady Noakes for their support for various amendments in this group and to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for his positive comments.

I shall speak to Amendments 22, 24 and 28 in my name. There are many circumstances in which an employer has no choice but to make a request or cancel a shift on short notice—my noble friend Lady Lawlor gave us some very useful examples of that. But to go on a bit, for example, if a colleague calls in sick, which is something that is likely to increase in frequency with changes to statutory sick pay governed in other areas of this Bill, or if events beyond the employer’s control intervene, such as local flooding or public disturbances, payment for unworked cancelled shifts becomes an additional financial burden at precisely the time when a business is already experiencing a downturn. It is not simply about inconvenience; it is actually about viability.

To give another particular example, we have heard from the hospitality industry that the proposed rights around notice and cancellation of shifts could severely undermine existing staffing practices. For instance, in the case of pubs, which as we know are under pressure anyway, those with outdoor garden spaces in particular operate in a highly unpredictable environment. One representative of the sector made it very clear to us when he said:

“The new right to notice of shift allocation and cancellation could undermine a pub’s ability to offer voluntary overtime”.


During the course of the discussion, the examples were magnified to some extent—and to some extent the example that I am about to give is the flipside of the one that my noble friend Lady Coffey highlighted with regard to restaurants in a previous group, and the fact that they are pre-charging for tables. The representative of the industry pointed out to us that in many cases, for example, offering food in a pub Monday to Wednesday is a highly marginal business, and they often let their staff go early, and so on. He is of the opinion that, as a result of the Bill, much of that work will simply disappear; they will not bother to open, because it will be too complicated to administer. Not the least of it is that it is not just the administration but the costs of offering the compensation that is governed by this clause. That would obviously not be very good for consumer choice, plus of course there are implications for tax receipts and a whole host of other areas as well.

In practice, these businesses rely heavily on flexibility, which includes voluntary shift swaps and short-notice availability. As we have discussed on numerous occasions, if the weather turns—and in Britain, let us be honest, that is not a small variable—a pub expecting a busy day may suddenly find itself very overstaffed. Under the Bill, cancelling those shifts could result in mandatory compensation.

I turn to Amendment 24. Another flaw identified in the Bill is that it presumes that, in every instance, a cancelled, moved or curtailed shift entitles the employee to compensation. This rigidity, however, does not account for the unforeseen events which, as noble Lords across the House will know, are a common occurrence throughout the working world. We have heard many examples of those. The assumption that the employer is always somehow at fault does not reflect the realities of working life. Our amendment therefore seeks to clarify and incorporate a degree of flexibility into the Bill. As the noble Lord, Lord Fox, pointed out, we are proposing that the conditions that govern this entitlement to compensation should be subject to regulation in this case. There is a strong case to be made for this exception to our general principled dislike of the amount of regulation on which the Bill relies. As defined by the Secretary of State, this could be nuanced to ensure greater parity in the employer/employee relationship.

It is vital that we remember throughout these debates that we are discussing a piece of legislation that will profoundly affect workers and employers across the country. I am concerned that, in certain elements of this Bill, an ideological assumption is made about the relationship between the worker and the employer, which leads to absolute positions—another point that the noble Lord, Lord Fox, raised in a previous group. We all have a duty to ensure that the Bill meets the practical demands of the real workplace and does not just speak to such assumptions. This amendment would balance the relationship between the employer and the employee and would make sure that those who provide the work are protected, alongside those who undertake it. There is an essential symbiosis that needs to be maintained in order for us to have a thriving economy, with good jobs available for workers. We cannot fall prey to inflexible, absolute stances that upset this relationship. Our amendment seeks to correct this mistake in the text of the Bill.

I am very grateful to my noble friend Lady Noakes in particular for her support for Amendment 28, because she raised unarguable points. The reasonable belief test outlined in the Bill raises several concerns. One of the most substantial is that the term “reasonable” is incredibly broad and creates a great deal of uncertainty for both workers and employers. As noble Lords across the House will know, this part of the Bill is designed to make working entitlements clearer and provide greater clarity and certainty to workers about the shifts they are working and the sort of income they can therefore expect to receive. However, the text in its current form is wide open to a massive range of interpretations and fails to provide clarity or protection for either workers or employers. How is either party to know what constitutes a reasonable expectation? Redefining this element of the Bill so that a formal confirmation of a shift is required for entitlement to compensation will provide clarity for both parties and will create a mutual responsibility between the worker and the employer to make expectations and duties clear.

It is my understanding that the Government intend this section of the Bill to place an obligation on the employer to clearly communicate shift assignments to workers in order to avoid misunderstanding. We agree that this should be the case, although the current text of the Bill uses language that is far too vague. If the Government want to promote the clear communication of shift assignments, surely providing for a formal commitment of work, rather than the belief of being needed, is the way to make sure that that obligation is met. Our proposal of a formal confirmation requirement would mean that both employer and employee know where they stand and what is expected of them and would address the shortcoming in the text as it stands.

I will say just a few brief words on Amendment 27, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Fox. Forty-eight hours seems to us a perfectly reasonable notice period regarding the time before a shift is due to start. A survey from the Association of Convenience Stores found that 90% of colleagues in the convenience sector report that they have never had a shift cancelled with less than 48 hours’ notice. Unless a reasonable notice period is reflected in the new requirements, it is likely to lead to a cautious approach to staffing by many hospitality and retail businesses. This would mean restricting operating hours and/or staff numbers during periods of uncertain footfall, rather than offering shifts that may ultimately be surplus to operational needs on the day, thus incurring compensation costs for late cancellations.

Moreover, there is a notable asymmetry in the Bill as drafted, because there are no reciprocal requirements for employees to provide notice when they are unable to work at a scheduled shift. That gap will have significant implications. One of the biggest challenges for employers, particularly in retail, is managing last-minute cancellations by employees due to illness, childcare needs or other issues. When employers must find cover at short notice, how are they to meet the same reasonable notice requirements that they themselves are held to?

We need common sense in this legislation, so I urge the Government to accept my and other amendments, or to be honest about why they will not.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Leong) (Lab)]

My Lords, before I address the amendments in this group, I take this opportunity to refer to the letter I wrote regarding the algebraic formula. There are existing formulae in employment rights legislation—for instance, in relation to the calculation of the amount payable to an agency worker as calculated in Section 57ZH of the Employment Rights Act 1996, so this is not something new. We will, however, publish full and comprehensive guidance in due course, which I am sure many noble Lords will find fascinating.

This has been a very useful debate, and I am very grateful for the contributions of all noble Lords. We have covered several areas in this debate related to the amendments tabled. The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, in his Amendment 21A, is seeking to make changes to the period of notice deemed reasonable for cancellation of or change to a shift for agency workers. The noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, in Amendment 22, is seeking to make changes to the right to reasonable notice of shifts for directly engaged workers. The noble Lords, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, Lord Fox and Lord Goddard of Stockport, are seeking to make changes to the right to payment for short-notice shift cancellations, movements and curtailments in Amendments 24, 27, 28 and 29.

Before I address each of these amendments in turn, let me share some analysis that the Living Wage Foundation did in 2023. It suggested that 59% of workers whose hours vary from week to week, which includes zero-hours and low-hour workers, receive less than a week’s notice of shifts, with 13% receiving less than 24 hours’ notice. The vast majority of respondents—90%—stated that they do not receive full payment when their shifts are cancelled unexpectedly, 74% receive less than half, 51% receive less than a quarter and 26% receive no payment. Further analysis, from the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development, suggests that approximately 33% of UK employers who use zero-hour contracts compensate workers for shifts that are cancelled with less than 24 hours’ notice, with 48% of employers responding that they do not.

I turn first to Amendment 21A. The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, says in his explanatory statement that this amendment

“seeks to define a reasonable maximum period of temporary work for agency workers in primary legislation”,

which

“will help remove any uncertainty for businesses worried about genuine temp work being caught in the new zero-hours regulations”.

The noble Lord seeks to achieve this by providing that the period of what is presumed to be reasonable notice for agency workers must be no greater than 24 hours. This would mean that it would be presumed reasonable if an agency worker receives 24 hours’ notice, but unreasonable if they receive less, so only in those latter situations would the agency or hirer have to prove that the period of notice was still reasonable in the circumstances.

I am not clear how this amendment would achieve this. The amendment would be made to Clause 2, concerning rights to reasonable notice for directly engaged workers, and appears to prevent workers being given more than 24 hours’ notice of cancellation or change to a shift. I reassure the noble Lord that the Bill provides for periods of notice “presumed reasonable” to be set in regulations for directly engaged workers and agency workers, as well as the factors that should be taken into consideration in individual cases.

Following consultation, it may be that the “presumed reasonable” periods of notice and the factors that should be taken into consideration will be different for agency workers and directly engaged workers. We intend to consult on what period is presumed reasonable, because it varies from case to case. Setting a period of reasonable notice in primary legislation would thus pre-empt consultation and not allow us to take into account stakeholders’ views.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Leong (Lab)]

I am not sure about that. Basically, we do not want to be too prescriptive and define what reasonableness is, because it varies from case to case and company to company. There needs to be that flexibility there.

Amendment 29 is a probing amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Goddard of Stockport, which seeks to add a power into the Bill to make regulations setting out factors that determine whether a worker reasonably believed they would be needed to work the shift. The Government tabled an amendment during Commons Report stage to ensure that a worker will not be entitled to a payment for a short-notice cancellation, movement or curtailment of a shift unless at some point prior to that they reasonably believed they would be needed to work the shift. This is considered appropriate because it is only where a person reasonably believes that they will work a shift that it is reasonable for them to prepare to work and incur costs as a result.

This amendment was necessary to eliminate the risk of workers taking cases to tribunals and making claims for shifts they did not reasonably believe they needed to work. This is particularly important in situations where an employer offers a shift out to multiple people, for example if they organise shifts through a large WhatsApp group. In cases like this, we want to be clear that people should receive cancellation payments when they are told they are not needed at short notice only if they reasonably believed they would work the shift in the first place.

For example, as set out in the Explanatory Notes, if there is an established practice of “first come, first served”, and an individual says they will work a shift after they have seen that another individual has already done so, they should probably not expect to work that shift. Even where a shift is offered only to one worker, they should still reasonably believe they will work it in order to be eligible for a short-notice payment. For example, if an employer offered a shift four weeks in advance, and the worker accepted the shift only two hours before the shift, it seems less likely they should expect actually to work that shift.

These are the kind of scenarios the Government considered when making the amendment; however, there are other scenarios where issues about this may arise. The Government wish to avoid being overly prescriptive by setting out factors in regulations, given the range of scenarios where this may be relevant. Instead, the Government consider it more appropriate to leave it to tribunals to determine on a case-by-case basis and we want to ensure that tribunals maintain flexibility to do so as they consider appropriate.

Before I conclude, I will answer the questions from the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, and the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, about reasons outside of employers’ control. With better planning, employers need not cancel as many shifts, but it is not right that, when there is uncertainty, the entire financial risk rests with the workers. We really need to have a fair balance, and the Bill offers exemptions as a possibility for that. We will consult on that; however, any exemptions are likely to be narrow, as we do not believe that workers should take the whole financial hit.

I hope that I have been able to persuade all noble Lords and provide assurances on the Government’s wider commitment to consult with stakeholders and businesses. I therefore respectfully ask noble Lords not to press their amendments.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Is the Minister really saying that the points that we were making are related only to employers’ bad planning? How on earth are they supposed to plan for natural disasters, floods and so on? Secondly, I apologise for using the wrong reference to the Bill, as the Minister helpfully pointed out. He also helpfully pointed out that much of the Bill is being written on the hoof, so I would be very grateful if he would commit to stop producing new iterations of the Bill, which are ever expanding.

[Lord Leong (Lab)]

I am sure that the noble Lord will be happy to hear that I will consult with everybody as widely as possible, including him. We can have further conversations to explain the purpose of the Bill and why we are doing it. We are not doing this in isolation. I believe that the Bill is pro-business and pro-worker, and we need to get that message across to him and other noble Lords.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

42: Clause 5, page 30, line 35, leave out from “independence,” to end of line 36 and insert “or
(ii) an employee representative body or staff association that—(A) has been formally established for the purpose of consultation or negotiation with the employer,(B) represents a defined group of the employer’s workers or the workforce generally, and(C) operates independently of the employer in its decision-making, andthe worker’s employer.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment expands the definition of an appropriate representative to include employee representative bodies or staff associations that are formally established, represent the workforce or defined groups of workers, and operate independently in decision-making. It ensures that workers can be represented by legitimate and independent collective structures beyond traditional trade unions.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendments 42, 43 and 44, which address a crucial gap in the Employment Rights Bill as currently drafted. The Bill, in its present form, assumes that collective agreements and the important rights that attach to them can be made only through trade unions. The assumption is problematic, as it fails to reflect the diverse and evolving landscape of employee representation in the United Kingdom.

Across a wide range of sectors, there are effective forms of employee representation that operate independently of trade unions. For example, many large employers across the UK have implemented formal employee forums, staff councils and other representative bodies that play a critical role in negotiating terms, improving working conditions and ensuring that workers have a voice. These bodies operate with transparency and independence; they often work closely with management but are not subject to the control of the employer. In sectors such as retail, hospitality and technology, companies have established these independent bodies to provide workers with a platform to express concerns, suggest improvements and engage with senior leadership on workplace issues. These bodies, although not unions, are trusted and valued by workers as genuine vehicles for consultation and negotiation.

Likewise, in industries such as financial services, employee representation often takes place through staff associations and other internal bodies that focus on consultation, transparency and communication between employers and employees. These bodies are instrumental in maintaining a constructive dialogue between workers and management, and they often handle issues such as pay, conditions and workplace policies without the need for union recognition.

The current draft of the Bill fails to accommodate these vital forms of representation. It risks excluding workers who are represented by such independent bodies from accessing the protections associated with collective agreements, including important provisions on guaranteed hours. This approach undermines existing employee engagement practices that have proven to be effective in fostering good relations between workers and employers. The Government have spoken repeatedly about the need to modernise our economy and bring employment rights into the 21st century. A key part of that modernisation must be acknowledging that trade unions are not the only legitimate means through which workers can be represented. Properly constituted employee forums and staff bodies can and do play a vital role in today’s diverse and evolving workplaces. By recognising this, the Government have an opportunity to align this legislation with the modern realities of work and deliver on their commitment to updating our employment framework.

Moreover, the Bill raises serious concerns about freedom of association. The principle of freedom of association is about not just the right to join a union but the right not to be compelled into union membership as a condition for accessing fair treatment at work.

If we want to strengthen the relationship between employers and employees, we must ensure that the Bill is inclusive of all legitimate and independent forms of worker representation. These amendments are designed to achieve that. They would extend the recognition of collective agreements to properly constituted employee representative bodies, such as staff forums or associations that operate independently from the employer in their decision-making. They would ensure that these bodies meet clear governance standards, including transparency, accountability and independence.

The Government’s aim is to promote better workplace relations, and these amendments support that aim. They would recognise the wide range of ways in which workers and employers engage with each other constructively. By recognising diverse forms of representation, we can build trust, enhance co-operation and create workplaces where both workers and employers can thrive. I urge the Government to support these amendments, which would reflect the realities of modern employee representation and strengthen the protections available to all workers, regardless of whether they belong to a traditional trade union. I beg to move.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

I totally oppose these amendments. This is the first time I have spoken in the progress of this Bill. I have amendments coming up later. I think the noble Lord’s amendments illustrate the complete difference in mental framework between those who support and work with the trade union movement and those who do not. I should be clear that, although I do not have any formal interest to declare, I have spent most of my working life working in or for the trade union movement. The trade union movement and what it has achieved is based on 150 years of struggle.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

Phew—I do not know whether I want to join in this philosophical debate because, clearly, we have heard strong views on both sides, and they have strayed way beyond the amendments we are trying to moderate today. But I would say that the Bill overall seeks to find the right balance between workers, unions and businesses, recognising that each has an important role to play. Our aim in the Bill is to modernise those arrangements for the 21st century so that we are not playing “Yah-boo, you did that back in 1953” but are actually looking to the future. We hope that is what the Bill will deliver.

These amendments aim to broaden the provisions in the Bill to allow employee representative bodies or staff associations to collectively agree to modify or opt out of the zero-hours measures. The Bill already allows these collective agreements to be made, but only by trade unions. As we are allowing for modification of statutory employment rights, it is vital that the appropriate safeguards are in place. This includes that only trade unions that have a certificate of independence, and are therefore free from employer control, can agree with employers to modify or opt out of rights, and that rights are guaranteed in exchange and incorporated into a worker’s contract.

I make it clear that staff associations and employee representative bodies, some of which we have heard described this afternoon, can do really good work, and we welcome engagement between employers and workers in all forms. However, we do not think it is appropriate for these associations and bodies to be able to modify statutory employment rights. This is not least because they may not have sufficient independence from the employers—a point well made by my noble friend Lady O’Grady—unlike independent trade unions, which do have that independence and which offer high levels of protection to workers. Furthermore, there is a well-established framework for trade unions, including recognition, independence and incorporation of terms, and the provisions build off these provisions.

I can see that the noble Lord’s amendments suggest a framework of requirements that staff associations and employee representative bodies would need to meet in order to modify or exclude zero-hours rights. These include requirements around independence, recognition, elections and record-keeping.

However, as my noble friends Lord Hendy and Lord Davies have said, the more you incorporate those requirements, the more you add to a staff association or employee representative body, the more similar it appears to be to an independent trade union. Given that the trade union framework is well established, historically and legally, it is not clear to me that it makes sense to establish a similar but different structure just for the purposes of the zero-hours measures. I am grateful to my noble friends Lord Davies, Lady O’Grady and others for reminding us of the hard-won rights that we have achieved through organisations within the trade union movement. Trade unions already serve to protect and advance the interests of workers.

I felt that the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, presented a caricature of the unions. For every criticism he has, we could come back with all the advantages that trade unions have delivered for working people over the years in pay and conditions and in some of the fantastic campaigns—for example, around the environment, women’s rights, and so on. They have already contributed enormously to modernising workplace rights, so I do not feel that it would be appropriate or proportionate to try to recreate them. The trade unions already provide the constructive dialogue with employers to which the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, refers, and membership of trade unions remains voluntary for employees.

I say, too, to the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, that there is a technical issue around all this. If his amendment was accepted as drafted, it would not achieve the aims that he intends. Collective agreements have a specific definition in the Employment Rights Act 1996, which the zero-hours provisions are being inserted into. The definition, referring to the definition in the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, provides that collective agreements are ones between independent and certified trade unions and employers’ or employees’ associations, so there would not be scope in the way that the noble Lord has worded his amendment for a wider definition of employee representatives.

We have had a debate which I have a feeling we are going to return to on some of the other trade union issues, but, for the time being, with this set of amendments in mind, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, will consider withdrawing his amendment.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

That was a short but most interesting debate, and I am grateful to all noble Lords who participated. I am particularly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, and the noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady, for their comments. No one on this side is denying that trade unions often have a proud history. As my noble friend Lord Deben pointed out, they have a very strong history in securing workers’ rights which has been constructive for our country over many years—no one is denying that. However, as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, pointed out, not all modern trade unions support that history. I am sure that noble Lords would accept that.

The fact is that the world has evolved, and these amendments simply respect that evolution. My noble friend Lord Moynihan points out that only 22% of workers are currently unionised. The latest figure that I can find for the private sector is 12.3%. The other 88% have not been prevented from joining a trade union; they have exercised a choice not to, a democratic choice, so trying to argue that this proposal is somehow undemocratic makes no sense in the context of the rest of the Bill. Why, for example, does the Bill later on scrap the 40% turnout requirement for statutory recognition? That seems profoundly undemocratic.

Having said all that, I am obviously very grateful to the Minister for her response, and I accept that there are probably technical issues with my amendment. With that helpful hint, I shall improve them for the next time that we debate these measures. However, on the first day in Committee, we heard the Government argue that, in relation to guaranteed hours:

“Unions can make these deals based on their knowledge of the industry and with a holistic view on what is best for their workers”.—[Official Report, 29/4/25; col. 1203.]


If the Government are willing to accept that logic for trade unions, surely the same reasoning must be extended to independent staff bodies and employment forums, many of which are embedded deeply within the day-to-day life of a company and have even greater practical knowledge of their specific industries and workplaces. In some cases, those bodies are closer to the operational realities of individual businesses than remote union structures, and they are more trusted by the employees themselves.

The debate should ultimately be about respecting individual workers and their choices. The Government’s stance suggests a lack of trust in individual workers and the belief that, unless a worker is represented through a traditional trade union, their voice is somehow less valid or less informed. Fundamentally, it appears that the Government do not believe in the individual and do not trust workers to know what works best in their own context; instead, they insist on a one-size-fits-all approach, even when that model may be entirely foreign to a smaller business or industries where union involvement has never been the norm.

What about the many employees who are content with their current representation? Will they now be told that their structures are not good enough and that they have to change, bring in new frameworks, hire experts and prepare for union-led negotiations, whether they want them or not? Will industries that have long enjoyed stable relations be pushed into more adversarial models, creating the very tensions that this Bill should be seeking to avoid? Can the Minister perhaps enlighten us as to how smaller businesses and those that have never operated within a unionised environment will adapt to rigid models such as this, which assume that union involvement is the only valid route to collective agreement?

These amendments do not challenge the value of trade unions—very far from it. They simply recognise that unions are not the only route to fair and effective representation. If the Government are truly serious about modernising employment rights, we must begin by acknowledging the diversity of how workers organise today. For now, I am of course content to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 42 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I join the general praise and congratulations for my noble friend Lady Penn for her Amendment 64. There is not much more for me to say, other than that I echo the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Fox. I hope the Government are listening and will address the issue raised by my noble friend as we get to the next stage. If they do not, I would be more than happy to support my noble friend in her future endeavours.

Amendment 66 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Watson, was expertly spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady. I was going to echo very much the same points about the employment tribunals. An awful lot will be expected of them but, as we know, the simple fact is that the backlog is increasing, there is a shortage of funds and the waiting times are increasing—they are up to two years. It does not seem very plausible to expect that employment tribunals will be able to cope with the amount of work that is coming their way—I am afraid that will probably include work with regard to that amendment. I look forward to hearing the noble Baroness’s comments.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I am afraid the noble Lord will not; he will hear from me. I thank my noble friend Lord Watson of Invergowrie in absentia for tabling Amendment 66 and my noble friend Lady O’Grady of Upper Holloway for so ably speaking to it. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, for tabling Amendment 64. This has been a broadly helpful debate, if somewhat spicier than expected, on flexible working.

This group and the next deal with flexible working. I agree with many of the comments that noble Lords across the Committee made in highlighting how important flexible working is in helping people to balance work with responsibilities in their personal lives, particularly caring responsibilities. As the noble Lord, Lord Ashcombe, pointed out, flexibility can lead to happier, healthier and more productive employees. He is absolutely right on this point. It is good for employees, good for businesses and, in turn, good for the economy.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, outlined in some detail, along with the noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady, a primary benefit of flexible working for families is that being able to work part-time, or having flexible start and finish times, can make it easier for parents to balance work and childcare needs. Similarly, for those caring for a vulnerable adult or a child with a disability, flexible working can help people to manage their caring responsibilities while remaining in work.

I echo some of the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Fox, about how we regard flexible working. To be clear, flexible working is not solely about working from home—something on which, post pandemic, we have become somewhat focused. Indeed, the ACAS guidance sets out eight examples of flexible working, and working from home is only one of those eight. It talks about compressed hours, staggered hours, remote working, job sharing and part-time hours as well as working from home.

According to the 2023 flexible jobs index, although nine in 10 want to work flexibly, only six in 10 employees are currently working flexibly and only three in 10 jobs are advertised with flexible working. Equally, the Government recognise that business needs vary and that not all flexible working arrangements are possible in all circumstances. That is why the Government are increasing access to flexible working by making it the default, except where not reasonably feasible. I concur with the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Fox: this is not a soft policy but an important economic and human management tool, and we should regard it as such.

Amendment 66 in the name of my noble friend Lord Watson would require the Secretary of State to review and publish a statement on the adequacy of the maximum compensation that an employment tribunal may award to an employee with a successful claim related to flexible working. The maximum compensation award is currently set at eight weeks’ pay for an employee bringing a claim to a tribunal.

Section 80I of the Employment Rights Act 1996 already means that the Government may review the maximum number of weeks’ pay that can be awarded to an employee. If they consider it appropriate to do so, they can then use this power to change the specified number of weeks’ pay by which the maximum amount of an award of compensation is set. It is therefore not necessary to include anything further in the Bill. It is worth pointing out to noble Lords that the maximum has risen every year since its introduction, from £250 in 2002 to £719 now—so this is not something that is caught in aspic. Therefore, we would argue that a statutory review on the maximum compensation award within six months of Royal Assent could create uncertainty across the board and detract from some of the other important reforms that employees, employers, trade unions and the wider economic and business community will need to prepare for.

Before leaving this, it might be helpful to speak to the wider points from the noble Lord, Lord Fox, on tribunals. I cannot speak in any great detail on this issue, but I understand that the Ministry of Justice is undertaking a review of the employment tribunal system. I would hazard that it has not been sufficiently invested in in recent years, and the slowness of that system is certainly something that we should seek to address.

Before leaving Amendment 66, it is worth pointing out that there is a risk in creating uncertainty for both businesses and workers alike by creating the possibility of differing awards for different types of claims. As things stand, a number of types of claims—for example, relating to redundancy and unfair dismissal—face the same maximum award as those relating to flexible working. It might be undesirable to create confusion and undue complexity through in effect having a two-tier system.

I turn to the amendment proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, Amendment 64, which would extend the right to request flexible working to candidates with a job offer. In practice, the Government believe that this is already the case. The right to request flexible working, which is being strengthened in this Bill, is already a day one right. This means that employees can request flexible working from their first day in a role. We know that, in practice, many employers and employees will begin discussions about working arrangements before the candidate starts work.

As the noble Baroness said, before joining an organisation, informal and constructive discussions can offer a more effective way in which to identify working arrangements that work for employees and employers than a one-off formalised request and response might otherwise achieve. Mandating through legislation a right to request flexible working prior to appointment would not account for the fact that not all job offers come to fruition, for a number of reasons. However, candidates with a job offer have some limited rights. Discrimination and contractual rights are among those. The hypothetical example that the noble Baroness cited in her contribution would indeed be taken care of; discrimination based on protected characteristics is currently outlawed during the recruitment process. However, we would contend that it is not a status that we would want to overformalise at this point.

Additionally, under this proposal, employers would still have up to two months to consider and respond to a request. If the intention of this amendment is to significantly bring forward in time people’s ability to have a flexible working request accepted, it would not succeed in this respect. While the Government encourage employers to start conversations about flexible working with new starters at an early stage, it would not be appropriate to extend the legal framework for flexible working to all candidates under offer.

Lastly, to respond to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, on sex discrimination, I contend that this form of discrimination would actually carry a higher risk of penalty and payout than unreasonable refusal of flexible working, so it is probably a little out of place in the debate on this amendment.

To close, I therefore seek that noble Lords do not press their amendments in this group.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

65: Clause 9, page 36, line 9, at end insert—
“(1AZA) But where the employer is— (a) the Security Service,(b) the Secret Intelligence Service, or(c) the Government Communication Headquarters,subsection (2)(b) does not apply, and the notification under subsection (1)(aa) need not explain why the employer considers that it is reasonable to refuse the application on the ground or those grounds.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would exclude the security services from the Bill’s provisions on flexible working.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 65 I shall speak also to Amendments 65A and 67. Amendment 65 is necessary because it lies at the very heart of the nature of the work that is performed by these agencies. The Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service and the Government Communications Headquarters, collectively known as the intelligence agencies, are at the heart of the United Kingdom’s national security apparatus. Their roles involve highly sensitive operations, often conducted in real time and under exceptionally stringent conditions. They work to protect the nation from terrorism, espionage and cyberattacks, among other threats. The national security landscape is dynamic and fast-moving, and it requires the utmost flexibility, discretion and responsiveness from their employees.

In this context, the introduction of provisions for flexible working could unintentionally create significant risks to national security. The need for immediate action, tight schedules and often secretive operations simply cannot be fully compatible with the predictability that flexible working arrangements might demand. We think it is essential that we avoid the unintended consequences of applying the Bill’s flexible working provisions to the intelligence services. Arguably, this list of services could be expanded, of course, to other operations that have implications for national security. As I said, these services operate in highly confidential environments and their work often involves time-sensitive operations that demand secrecy and agility.

This is obviously a probing amendment: I want to ask the Minister what conversations the Government have had with the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service and the Government Communications Headquarters regarding the potential impact of the flexible working provisions on their operations.

On Amendment 67, again I join in the broad support for flexible working that we have just heard in the last group, but this amendment presents an important opportunity to better understand the implications of introducing such a right. We think we ought to approach it with a slightly critical eye: specifically, we need to consider the Regulatory Policy Committee’s feedback on the clause, which has raised several concerns that cannot be overlooked. The RPC rating for this clause was red across all three core areas of rationale for intervention, identification of options, and justification of preferred way forward.

The RPC has stated that there is a lack of sufficient evidence presented to justify the need for this intervention. In particular, it highlighted that there is little evidence to suggest that employers are rejecting flexible working requests unreasonably. This is a key point that must be addressed. The committee’s wider concerns suggest that, without strong evidence of a widespread issue with employers rejecting requests, the Government are introducing a policy that is based on assumptions rather than concrete data. What problem are the Government trying to solve by introducing the right to request flexible working if the case is as the committee has described? Do they in effect believe that the RPC’s assessment is incorrect? What data or evidence do they have to demonstrate that employers are systematically denying such requests in a way that harms workers?

One of the most important questions that this clause raises is whether the intervention is justified. The RPC has pointed out that the rationale for introducing the right to request flexible working has not been sufficiently established, so the purpose of tabling this amendment is to find out what the Government have done in this area and to suggest that the overall environment around this debate would be enhanced by a broader understanding of the situation under consideration.

Amendment 65A seeks to provide clarity and fairness regarding the refusal of flexible working applications in roles where such flexibility would fundamentally alter the nature of the job or undermine critical operational needs. Clause 9, as drafted, is obviously well intentioned but is ultimately a blunt instrument. New subsection (1ZA) sets out a list of what are deemed reasonable grounds to refuse a flexible working request, but they are largely subjective and difficult to quantify in practice. For example, how can an editor reasonably be expected to prove that a journalist’s writing has deteriorated because they are working from home? How does one assess the decline in creative spontaneity that often arises when collaboration in the newsroom is replaced by isolated remote working? This ambiguity could create a climate of uncertainty for employers. Rather than making legally risky judgments, many may simply acquiesce to requests even where remote work may compromise essential aspects of the role. I go back to the example of journalism: this could disrupt the delicate balance of the newsroom and undermine quality, editorial cohesion and the development of junior reporters through in-person mentoring, and so on.

This is precisely why we think that sector-specific exemptions are needed. A one-size-fits-all approach, as is implied in the current drafting, is simply not adequate. This amendment provides a clearer and more realistic framework, recognising that in certain sectors and occupations physical presence is not optional but essential. To expect employers in some of these sectors to navigate the current subjective standards is both unfair and, we think, unworkable. This amendment seeks to offer a constructive alternative by allowing a reasonable refusal where the core nature of the role would be compromised, and by specifying sectors where that risk is most acute.

As I have said, we support flexible working in principle, but flexibility must be implemented with common sense and a clear-eyed understanding of operational realities. We do not believe that the current drafting provides that assurance. We urge the Government to take serious note of these amendments, because we may have to return to them on Report. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, is reassured and feels able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank all noble Lords who participated in this very interesting debate and I thank the Minister for his detailed answer. I accept and am somewhat reassured by his answer on Amendment 65; it is good to know that the security services employers have been properly consulted and are content with this legislation. That is to be welcomed, and I thank the noble Lord for it.

I was most interested in the comments from the noble Baroness, Lady Bousted. I believe she said—I apologise if I am misquoting—that employers have a poor understanding of what flexible working involves in education. I am sure they do, and that a lot of parents and people who are involved in education do. It rather makes the case for why Amendment 67 is necessary. The RPC’s opinion may not have related to the policy, but it still remains red: the fact is that the impact assessment was not good enough.

My noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe raised a very good point about what flexible working is. We agree that flexibility is to be encouraged, but I noticed that the noble Lord has now relied twice on the eight types of flexible working identified by ACAS. I suspect that that is not widely understood in the public domain. The proposed impact assessment would go a long way to make it much clearer what people could and should be asking for, what employers should be thinking about, the likely economic impacts and the more societal impacts from the right to request flexible working.

This would help the noble Baroness, Lady Bousted, as well, because people would have a much broader understanding of what it means in teaching. Obviously, 100% of teachers cannot work from home—that goes without saying—so what does this actually mean in practice? I do not think that anybody has much clarity about that, including, by the sounds of it, employees and many teachers themselves.

[Baroness Bousted (Lab)]

I am chairing a commission that will be very clear about what it means and how it can be employed in schools. I hope that will enlighten lots of people.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I look forward to being enlightened.

The noble Lord, Lord Fox, again made some very good points about the need to describe the job; I accept that that was an imperfect way of tabling that amendment. However, I leap into the defence of my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth from his attacks by the Fox. As I heard it, my noble friend was not saying that employment tribunals are no good; he was saying that there is a backlog, that they are probably underresourced and underfunded and that, because of their structural nature, they do not necessarily resolve things. An increasing reliance on them to resolve things will not necessarily have the desired effect. That is an incredibly important point that we should return to in the discussion that the Minister offered the Committee because, as I said in my last summary, we are placing an increasing reliance on employment tribunals to resolve an awful lot of the unanswered questions that are being discussed as a result of the Bill. For things not to be resolved even after they have got to an employment tribunal, after a long delay, seems a little short-sighted.

For now, as I say, I am somewhat reassured on Amendment 65, and I am grateful to the Minister for his answers. We should return to the idea of Amendment 67 and a much broader impact assessment, but for now I am content to withdraw Amendment 65.

Amendment 65 withdrawn.

Employment Rights Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th May 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

71A: Clause 11, page 37, leave out lines 21 to 24 and insert—
“(1) Statutory sick pay is payable by an employer to an employee—(a) at a rate of 60% of the employee’s normal weekly earnings for the first three qualifying days of any period of incapacity for work,(b) at a rate of 80% of the employee’s normal weekly earnings for subsequent qualifying days,subject to a maximum of £116.75 per week.(2) Subsection (1) applies regardless of whether the employee earns above or below any lower earnings limits that were previously set.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment adjusts the rates of Statutory Sick Pay (SSP), providing 60% of normal weekly earnings for the first three qualifying days and 80% for subsequent qualifying days.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 71B and 75 standing in my name.

According to the latest figures from the Office for National Statistics this morning, the number of payrolled employees fell by 33,000 in April, or 106,000 on the year, and the number of job vacancies also fell. Wage growth has slowed. This evidence suggests that the OBR was right and the provisions in the Bill are already creating a net negative impact. The Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development’s latest survey was widely cited at the weekend. It confirms that employers’ confidence is at the lowest level since the pandemic and that a quarter of employers are planning to make redundancies in the next quarter. The CIPD’s economist, Mr James Cockett, was quoted as saying:

“The Employment Rights Bill is landing in a fundamentally different landscape to the one expected when it formed part of the Labour manifesto in summer of last year”.


This picture was confirmed in KPMG’s and the Recruitment and Employment Confederation’s reports. Recruitment activity across the UK continued to weaken at the start of the second quarter. The chief executive of the REC, Neil Carberry, has said that

“it is time for real changes to address employers’ fears and boost hiring. A sensible timetable and practical changes that reduce the red tape for firms in complying with the Bill will go a long way to calming nerves about taking a chance on someone”.

Last week the noble Lord, Lord Fox, called for the Bill to go on vacation because we need to get it right. This raft of new statistics proves his prescience, and perhaps the vacation ought to be permanent. Instead, we are now being asked to consider further obligations on employers through changes to statutory sick pay. A number of businesses across sectors have made it very clear that, while they support the principle of statutory sick pay, they are concerned about the rate and structure being proposed. Many have called for the rate of statutory sick pay to be set at 60% rather than 80%, as a more sustainable and proportional figure. The Government claim to have consulted widely with businesses, trade unions and various stakeholder groups to try to strike a fair balance, but, based on the data and the concerns raised, we believe that the right answer, particularly for the initial days of absence, is 60%.

Let us look at some of the other evidence. In the British Chambers of Commerce 2024 workforce survey, a full 50% of respondents stated that they would be negatively impacted by the proposal for statutory sick pay entitlement from day one. That is a clear warning sign that the proposed structure may have unintended consequences. Further, in a survey by the London Chamber of Commerce, 38% of firms predicted that they would need to freeze hiring as a direct result of the statutory sick pay changes; 30% expected a reduction in profits; and 33% anticipated lower wage increases for their existing staff.

--- Later in debate ---

I assure my noble friend that of course the Government remain committed to monitoring the impact of the changes we are making to strengthen statutory sick pay, how the SSP is used by employers and how it supports employees, including lower-paid employees. This issue will be kept under review, and in the meantime I hope the amendment can be withdrawn.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister very much indeed for her response, and, indeed, all noble Lords for their contributions to what has been a thoughtful and valuable debate. My particular thanks go to my noble friends Lady Noakes, Lady Coffey and Lady Lawlor, as well as to my noble friend Lady Cash, for bringing to the debate her unique expertise in the area of behavioural science.

It is it is crucial that the Government fully recognise that many provisions in this Bill are interlinked, as we have heard from all sides of the Committee. Changes in one area can have unintended ripple effects in others. As I have said, we support statutory sick pay, but we must also acknowledge that these proposed changes will result in higher costs for employers. My amendments were an attempt—in the words of the noble Lord, Lord Fox—to ameliorate some of those costs and find some sensible compromises. I am disappointed that the Government have chosen to reject them. Without clarity, businesses cannot plan, cannot invest and cannot hire with confidence. As I pointed out in my opening remarks, the facts are plain: jobs are being lost now.

Regarding an SME rebate scheme—as highlighted by my noble friend Lady Coffey in her Amendment 73 and spoken to by my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lady Lawlor, as well as by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, in his Amendment 74—the Government have stated that final decisions will follow consultation with business through secondary legislation. The impact assessment notes plans for “extensive engagement” with small and medium-sized businesses to

“test where mitigations can be made”.

However, SMEs have spoken: they have asked for a rebate scheme as used during the pandemic. It is therefore disappointing the Government have not accepted the amendments to provide that support.

I would suggest that the Minister takes up the offer of the noble Lord, Lord Fox, to talk more on this subject —a conversation that we would like to be party to. I am pretty sure that we will be returning to it on Report. If I may paraphrase the noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady, it should not be beyond the wit of man to design a simple scheme that works. For now, however, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 71A withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, if I felt we were able to finish the group in the next five minutes, that would be fine. We have had a good debate, but this is an important topic, and it is important that the Committee is able to finish the group by hearing from any other Back-Benchers who might wish to contribute, as well as from the Front-Benchers and the Minister. All of the Committee might not be aware of it, but we have agreed through the usual channels that we will have the dinner break early to accommodate the repeat of the Statement. We are ultimately in the whole Committee’s hands. That is why we are breaking now. I know it is not usual to break midway through a group, but, as I say, it has been agreed through the usual channels that a dinner break at 6.30 pm would take priority. Perhaps we can resolve this.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I have had confirmation from my side that the usual channels have agreed.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Katz, for his explanation.

Employment Rights Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness O'Grady of Upper Holloway (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak very, very briefly. It is heartening to hear support for the amendments in this group right across the House. I will speak in particular to those from the noble Baronesses, Lady Lister and Lady Penn. I have already shared with the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, that, when I was at the TUC, I very, very vividly remember having conversations with young men who were working as riders and delivery drivers, and they really, really wanted to be good dads. They had young babies and children, and what was most important to them—and I hope others will reflect this in paying attention to how we make working families’ lives better—was predictability of shifts and guaranteed hours, so they would know how much money they could earn, but they also wanted paid paternity leave.

To keep this really, really brief, I have a couple of questions for my noble friend the Minister before she responds. First, can we accept that the starting point for a review would be to recognise that, compared with other countries, the UK is so ungenerous in its paid paternity leave? We do not need a huge review to know that; it is our starting point. If we are to move into the 21st century, we also need to recognise that new dads from all sorts of backgrounds want time to bond with their babies and be involved more equally in their care. Secondly, will this review focus specifically on paid paternity leave, working from the simple premise that, unless it is paid, there are whole swathes of new dads who simply cannot afford to take it?

I have been encouraged by the discussion around the House. I think there is a cross-party consensus that we all want to see new dads having that opportunity. We all know it will bring benefits for women—including closing the gender pay gap—and opportunities for children to have a better life, too.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Penn for her very thoughtful amendments in this group. I acknowledge the valuable contributions from all noble Lords, in particular the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, for introducing her amendments, and the noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, for introducing his amendments and, perhaps more importantly, reminding the House of the Conservative-led coalition Government’s work in this area—although I note that he did not heap praise on the then Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, my right honourable friend Iain Duncan Smith.

We fully recognise and support the intention behind these proposals, which is to strengthen support for families and in particular to enhance the role of paternity leave in allowing fathers to spend essential early time with their children. This is a laudable aim that clearly finds broad sympathy across the House.

However, while the objective is clear and commendable, we must also consider the practical implications of how such policies are implemented, particularly in relation to the impact on businesses. Many employers, large and small, continue to face significant challenges in the current economic climate, as we have discussed at length this evening. The introduction of new requirements, even when limited to large employers, must be approached with caution and care, and I acknowledge that my noble friend Lady Penn addressed many of those concerns directly in her speech.

As for the reporting obligations set out in Amendment 128, tabled by my noble friend, these would apply to businesses with 250 employees or more. While this threshold helps to focus the requirement on larger organisations, we should still be mindful of the potential administrative and financial burdens such reporting could entail. Even within that category, resources vary significantly, and not all may be equally equipped to take on new reporting functions—a point that was addressed by my noble friends Lord Bailey and Lord Ashcombe. That said, transparency and data collection can play a valuable role in shaping effective policy. If it can be clearly demonstrated that these measures would bring mutual benefits, improving employee well-being and retention, for example, without imposing disproportionate costs or complexity on employers, it is certainly something that we should be prepared to consider further.

Ultimately, we have to strike the right balance, ensuring meaningful support for families while safeguarding the viability and flexibility of the businesses that employ them. That is the lens through which we should view not just this amendment but the broader provisions of the Bill.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Leong) (Lab)]

My Lords, this has been a wide-ranging, informative and very exciting debate. I thank all noble Lords who have contributed. I take this opportunity to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, on his four month-old son. I begin by recognising the key role that parental leave plays in supporting families—I wish it had been available when I became a father, at a much older age, some 18 years ago. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Gascoigne, for sharing his story about the difficult time he had during the birth of his children.

This Government understand that the arrival of a child, whether through birth or adoption, is the most transformative time in a family’s life. We understand that the current parental leave system needs changing so that it better supports working families. We have committed to do this and we are taking action in a number of different ways. Through this Bill, the Government are making paternity leave and parental leave day-one rights, meaning that employees will be eligible to give notice of the intent to take leave from the first day of employment. I hope that many noble Lords will welcome this position. This brings such leave in line with maternity and adoption leave, so simplifying the system.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, we could hardly have expected two more expert speakers to propose this amendment. This is another case where society is getting something on the cheap and, even though it is a different argument from the one about unpaid carers, it is another way where, in fact, we are not recognising the value that society is getting from these people who work as special police officers.

I really want to hear what the Government say on this and I hope it is not the sort of answer that my friend, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, suggested it might be but is something rather more constructive that can come forward the next time this Bill comes up.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I would very much like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for his important amendment in this group and for the valuable context he gave in his opening remarks, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for speaking so eloquently to it as well.

They are both right. Special constables play a vital role in our communities and, as they pointed out, they serve alongside other police officers, offering their time and their skills to protect the public and contribute to the safety and well-being of society at large. As the noble Lord, Lord Fox, has just pointed out, society benefits from their work.

It is often overlooked, though. For many, being a special constable is something they do alongside other regular employment. These individuals are already balancing their professional lives with the demands of policing and, as has been pointed out, that can be both challenging and rewarding.

I could bore on for hours about how valuable special constables were when I was policing in Hong Kong—but I will not. I welcome this amendment and believe it represents a small but significant way to better support those who give their time to serve our communities by ensuring that special constables can fulfil their duties without facing conflicts with their employment obligations. We would be sending a strong message of support for public service generally, as well, of course, as for special constables. So we are very minded to support this amendment.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, this has been an interesting debate—some might say “esoteric”, but not me— and indeed, thankfully, a slightly shorter one. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for tabling Amendment 82, co-signed by the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Evans of Rainow. I am also grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Paddick, for meeting me, the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Leong, earlier today to discuss this amendment. It was really helpful to have the opportunity to, as we heard from both noble Lords this evening, hear the background context to the work of special constables, how they are regarded within the force and how they are integrated within the forces in which they serve.

Amendment 82 would give employees who are special constables a statutory right to time off from work to carry out their voluntary police duties. This Government recognise, as I think we all do across the House, and really value the important role that special constables play in our communities, and we are committed to ensuring that they are supported to navigate those responsibilities that they carry out as special constables alongside their working life.

Special constables, along with the full range of police volunteers, bring valuable and diverse skills, which complement the roles that full-time officers and staff play in delivering the best possible service to the public in protecting our streets and making sure that our communities are safe.

Employment Rights Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 19th May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I was—I was sitting over there. I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for speaking after him. I am sure he is welcome to speak after me if he disagrees with anything I have to say.

Obviously, I am a barrister, as are many of the contributors this evening. I practised in the employment tribunal and in human rights, and I am a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. The Joint Committee wrote to the Government in respect of the Bill, expressing concerns that were reflected by the Equality and Human Rights Commission: in particular, the potential for a conflict between the right to freedom of expression, guaranteed by Article 10—as we have heard from various noble Lords—and the Article 8 right to a private and family life. That balancing exercise would be difficult for many employers to carry out.

The previous iterations of measures of this type included safeguards which have been omitted from the Bill, as the noble Lord, Lord Young, pointed out. In the Worker Protection (Amendment of Equality Act 2010) Act 2023 there was a measure that sought to place a duty on employers to take reasonable steps to prevent sexual harassment of their employees, and which is now Section 40A of the Equality Act. During its passage through Parliament, that Bill included provisions which sought to introduce a duty on employers to prevent non-sexual harassment of their employees by third parties. That was Clause 1 of that Bill, as brought from the House of Commons. That provision failed. It would have required all reasonable steps to have been taken to prevent harassment of the employee, solely because they did not seek to prevent the expression of an opinion in circumstances where the conduct constituting harassment involved a conversation in which an employee was not a participant.

In short, the Government have so far failed to answer the question from the Joint Committee about their reasoning for not including a similar carve-out for overheard opinions in the new duty in Clause 20. That was echoed in the original iteration of the Equality Act 2010, passed by the previous Labour Government, under Section 40(2) to (4). That would have required an employer to be liable for third-party harassment where they had failed to take such steps as would have been reasonably practicable to prevent the harassment. However, to be liable, the employer would have had to have known that the employee had been harassed by a third party on at least two other occasions.

The Government have decided not to adopt the same three-strike policy taken in the equivalent provisions or in the earlier potential measure proposed in the 2023 Act. Instead, we have a rule-making power that is said to provide what steps are to be regarded as reasonable. To my mind, that sits uneasily with the mandatory terms set out in new subsection (1A). For those reasons, it should not be part of this legislation.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friends Lord Young of Acton and Lady Noakes very much for their expert, valuable and important introductions to and insights into this group. I also thank my noble friends Lady Meyer, Lady Lawlor, Lady Cash, Lord Strathcarron, Lord Ashcombe and Lord Murray for their practical, legal and philosophical objections to Clause 20, which, as noble Lords will perhaps not be surprised to know, I do not regard as straw-man arguments. It was also wise of my noble friends to note that these amendments have the support of UKHospitality. They also have the support of the British Beer and Pub Association.

These amendments are vital in ensuring that we do not inadvertently restrict fundamental rights of free expression in the workplace and beyond. We all recognise the importance of protecting employees from harassment. It is not about not caring about their plight, as the noble Lord, Lord Fox, implied; it is about also ensuring that we are not creating a framework that stifles open and honest conversation. That is especially true in matters of political, moral, religious or social debate.

Clause 20 as it stands is, as my noble friend Lady Cash pointed out, poorly drafted and therefore risks leading to unintended consequences. In fact, I agree with the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, about the speech from the noble Baroness, Lady Carberry, who made a very persuasive case that Clause 20 is superfluous in its current form.

The inclusion of speech or conversation that simply expresses an opinion on a political, moral, religious or social issue would lead to significant restrictions on individuals’ freedom to speak openly. This could lead to employees feeling that they cannot express their thoughts and ideas or, perhaps worse, would be penalised for expressing an opinion that someone else may find uncomfortable or offensive. As my noble friend pointed out, we must be mindful of the unintended consequences that could arise from an overbroad definition of harassment. Both he and the noble Lord, Lord Londesborough, gave strong examples from the footballing world. If I may speak as a fellow West Ham United fan, I am very aware that being a supporter of that august club can be a very testing experience that can drive one to the occasional profanity.

It is not just in sports that these concerns arise. Think about public spaces such as pubs, about which we have been hearing. If an individual overhears a conversation that they find offensive or upsetting, where does the line lie? What happens if somebody misunderstands something that is said and it is taken to an employment tribunal as a case of harassment? In such situations, the burden placed on employers would become unreasonable. Would they be required to intervene every time someone overhears an opinion that they find discomforting or just dislike?

If I may ask a genuine question, how are people supposed to judge, to quote the noble Baroness, Lady Carberry, whether a conversation is obviously fake or not? As my noble friend Lord Young and the noble Lord, Lord Londesborough, argued, are we expecting publicans to make finely calibrated judgments on ECHR Article 10 in particular? We should remember that even senior police officers, who are trained in these matters, often struggle to make such judgments. Employers will inevitably err on the side of caution and that is chilling.

I believe that we must ensure that harassment in this context remains focused on behaviours that are truly indecent or grossly offensive, not on speech that is merely uncomfortable or challenging. People must have the right to engage in conversations, to express differing opinions and to debate issues of public importance without the fear of being accused of harassment. To allow an employer to be forced or encouraged into silencing this kind of expression would be a serious violation of freedom of speech, which is a cornerstone of our democracy and society.

The amendments before us offer balance. They ensure that employers are not required to protect their employees from hearing or overhearing expressions of opinion, provided that those opinions are not indecent or grossly offensive. This is a reasonable and sensible approach. It respects individuals’ rights to express their views without creating an environment where every opinion has the potential to be deemed harassment.

Moreover, these amendments recognise the specific context in which such protections should apply. By excluding certain sectors, such as the hospitality industry, sports venues and higher education, we acknowledge the diverse nature of these environments where debate, disagreement and the expression of differing opinions are often the fabric of daily life. To apply the same strict rules in these settings as we would in an office environment or a more controlled space would be misguided. The noble Lord, Lord Fox, may well say that this is not the purpose of Clause 20. However, as my noble friends Lady Cash and Lord Murray pointed out, the drafting means that that is unlikely to be the effect.

The requirement for repeated instances of harassment before an employer must take action, as outlined in Amendment 86, aligns with the principle of proportionality. We should not expect employers to become the arbiters of every comment or opinion expressed, especially when such comments are made in good faith. The amendment rightly recognises that harassment should be defined as something that occurs repeatedly, not something that might result from a single isolated incident of disagreement or discomfort. I agree with my noble friend Lord Young of Acton that this is a solution in search of a problem or, based on his statistics, a sledgehammer in search of a nut.

When the Minister responds, can she please answer my noble friend Lady Noakes’s point on territorial extent? These issues are clearly not going away, so I urge the Government to take them very seriously. As it stands, Clause 20 is garbled and needs rewriting.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

I thank all noble Lords who have spoken. I hope I can reassure the Committee of the Government’s approach, as well as set straight some considerable misunderstandings on how the provisions will operate. I stress at the outset that the provisions in the Bill will protect employees while preserving existing human rights, such as freedom of speech, which I hope we can all agree are core British values. Also core to our identity is the belief that with rights come responsibilities.

I will first address the noble Lords, Lord Young of Acton and Lord Strathcarron, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, who oppose Clause 20. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, for meeting me to share his views. When we met, he pushed his position that our proposals are anti-banter, and he has reiterated that today. I make it clear that we are anti-harassment, not anti-banter, and this is what Clause 20 delivers.

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Fox, that I feel that we have been subjected to a wave of synthetic rage by many on the other Benches this evening, who have given examples that simply would not be covered by the harassment provisions in Clause 20. Removing Clause 20 would not only go against the manifesto on which this Government were elected but deprive employees of protection from all types of harassment by third parties under the Equality Act 2010. This Government are committed to tackling all forms of harassment in the workplace. In order to make workplaces safe, we must require employers to create and maintain workplaces and working conditions free from harassment, including by third parties.

For example, if a woman is sexually harassed by a customer at work today, she has very few effective options by which to seek legal redress, even if her employer has made no effort whatever to address the issue. The only possible employment law action in this scenario at present is for the Equality and Human Rights Commission to exercise its unique enforcement powers against the employer. However, such powers can be used only very selectively and strategically by the commission, and would be unlikely to be used in anything other than an exceptional case.

Sexual harassment is, sadly, not the only type of harassment that is experienced in the workplace. Employees can experience racial harassment or harassment related to their disability or other protected characteristics. In the case of non-sexual harassment, not even the possibility of enforcement exists at present. As such, Clause 20 is required for employees to be able to seek legal redress where they have experienced third-party harassment, and to ensure that employers are clear about their responsibilities.

Employment Rights Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 19th May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, this has been an important debate. As the noble Baroness, Lady Goudie, said—I apologise if I have mispronounced her name—most if not all speakers have worked on these two important and connected issues for years. That has been reflected in the quality of the speeches we have heard. It also reflects the fact that progress has not been made. We need to make progress here.

The traditional approach from Ministers in situations such as this is to say, “These are important issues and we agree something needs to be done”, and then either “We need more consultation”, as my noble friend pointed out, or “This is not the right vehicle for these issues”. Those are the two excuses that will be given. The point on consultation has been well made by my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell. As for whether this is an appropriate vehicle, just look at this Bill. It is well over 300 pages and covers almost every aspect of employment. To say there is no room in this Bill—I am pre-empting what may or may not be said—would be wrong. There is more than enough space in this Bill to cover these issues.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Morrissey, said, this was debated in the Commons and my honourable friend Layla Moran also had an amendment on this issue, but the Bill came here without it. The safe way of making sure that this can survive contact with a very large majority at the other end is for the Minister to take this on and put it in the Bill on the Government’s behalf. We have heard a lot of excellent speeches from the Minister’s own Benches, as well as across the Floor. Clearly, we can all agree on both these issues. The Minister should stand up and say “We will take this on, work with all interested parties and produce two amendments for both of these issues” to address what has clearly been going on for too long without being resolved in legislation.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I agree that this has been an extremely interesting debate. I thank all noble Baronesses—they are mostly Baronesses, with some noble Lords—for their contributions. In particular, the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, deserves singling out for her very thought-provoking introduction to this group.

As my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral pointed out in the previous group, every individual should feel safe and supported in their working environment. We recognise that NDAs have deviated from their original purpose, which was to protect trade secrets and intellectual property, as the noble Baronesses, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws and Lady Goudie, pointed out. They have been abused in some circumstances, particularly where they are used to silence the victims of misconduct, which includes sexual harassment.

However, we must also acknowledge there are some cases where NDAs may serve a legitimate purpose. Some individuals may wish to resolve disputes privately, without the need for public disclosure. It is important, therefore, that we do not take a blanket approach but instead consider the context in which NDAs are being used. Many of the amendments acknowledge those simple facts. Having said that, we also need to consider the wider impact that NDAs might have—for example, in cases of medical malpractice. How can society and the medical profession learn from mistakes that are not made public?

It is clear that further scrutiny of NDAs is essential. The potential for abuse cannot be ignored, and we must ensure that any agreement entered into is fully informed and entirely voluntary. I will briefly speak as a non-lawyer, because I was particularly taken by Amendment 281, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. Like the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, I was rather shocked that such an NDA might exist even under the current regime. How can one sign a legally binding document that prevents the disclosure of a breach of the law? With apologies to my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral, I say that only the legal profession could manage the perverse logic to invent such a thing.

As we have seen, particularly in the NHS, whistle-blowers are often the individuals who bravely speak out against wrongdoing, misconduct or unethical practices that might otherwise go unnoticed. Their courage in raising concerns is critical to maintaining trust and ensuring that the organisation remains committed to the highest ethical standards.

Both noble Baronesses, Lady Kramer and Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb, referred to the NHS. I looked into this earlier, and in one high-profile case, the NHS spent over £4 million on legal action against a single whistleblower, including a £3.2 million compensation settlement. This sparked criticism from Professor Phil Banfield, the chairman of the British Medical Association, who argued that whistleblowing is often not welcomed by NHS management. He emphasised that NHS trusts and senior managers are more focused on protecting their reputations than addressing the concerns of whistleblowers or prioritising patient safety. That is clearly a very unacceptable state of affairs, and that example alone suggests that the Government should take these amendments extremely seriously.

I am sure that the Minister is about to stand up and offer to have further discussions on this subject. We will pre-empt her and volunteer to take part in those discussions. There is clearly much more work to be done in this area. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s remarks.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business and Trade and Department for Science, Information and Technology (Baroness Jones of Whitchurch) (Lab)]

My Lords, I genuinely thank all noble Lords—they have mainly been noble Baronesses—who have taken part in this excellent debate, in which we have addressed some important, salient and highly concerning issues about the misuse of non-disclosure agreements. We have heard some very moving and completely unacceptable examples that have no place in the modern workplace.

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and my noble friends Lady Kennedy of The Shaws and Lady Goudie, for their Amendments 98, 101 and 101C, which seek to restrict the use of non-disclosure agreements that prevent workers disclosing certain misconduct. My noble friend Lady Kennedy’s amendment looks to apply this to a broader category of misconduct, including harassment, retaliation and discrimination. I also acknowledge that the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and my noble friend Lady Kennedy make it clear that workers should still be able to request confidentiality protections in agreements between a worker and employer, if they so choose. A number of noble Lords have reiterated that that is an important principle.

I also thank my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti for her Amendment 281, which makes express provision for a court to void an NDA in the public interest if it seeks to prevent the disclosure of illegal conduct by the employer. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, that my noble friend made a very compelling case on that issue.

I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Morrissey, for Amendment 101A and her contribution today. Her amendment would void any provision in an NDA that prevents a worker making a disclosure about sexual harassment. However, it would allow NDAs in settlement agreements to stand where the victim of sexual harassment requests them and where they have received independent legal advice. I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, for his comments in support of that amendment.

Today’s debate on NDAs demonstrates the best elements of your Lordships’ House. Points have been well made by all noble Lords, and we have listened carefully to their arguments. I was grateful to have the opportunity to meet with a number of noble Lords in recent weeks to reaffirm the Government’s position on the misuse of NDAs and to understand the intention behind these amendments. Let me be clear: NDAs should never be used to silence victims of sexual harassment and other forms of misconduct in the workplace.

My noble friend Lady O’Grady asked whether the proposals extend beyond sexual harassment. The whistleblowing measures in the Bill cover only sexual harassment. However, the whistleblowing framework already covers disclosures about criminal offences, breaches of legal obligations and endangerment of health and safety. In many cases, harassment and discrimination in the workplace will fall within those categories.

While the Government agree that NDAs should not be misused by employers to conceal misconduct in the workplace, any restrictions on their use must be carefully considered to avoid unintended consequences. For example, confidentiality can allow employers and workers to resolve a dispute and move on without publicity and expensive legal proceedings. It is vital that we take the time to consider any impacts on a worker’s ability to choose the right outcome for themselves, including the option of an NDA.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, the answer to both noble Lords—and I think I said this during my response—is that the amendments are all raising really important issues. There is an issue about the breadth of the issues and the extent to which we need to legislate or perhaps amplify things that are already the law but are not understood to be the law. We have more work to do on this, but we are working at pace on it. We still have time before the Bill passes through your Lordship’s House, so I hope we can make some progress during that time.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am sorry to intervene on the noble Baroness once more. Does that mean she intends to talk to interested Peers before Report?

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

I have already had one meeting and, as noble Lords will know, I seem to be in perpetual meeting mode. I certainly am very happy to carry on having those discussions.

Employment Rights Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 21st May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I will just say to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that the greatest danger we have is that the Bill passes and yet we have groups of people in the workplace who are not in any way protected, or not sufficiently protected, either from violence or from harassment. I thought the case was brilliantly made by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Llanfaes, backed up by the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb.

I say to the Minister: carpe diem. Here is an opportunity to make sure that there is not a gaping omission in the work that the whole Bill is attempting to do to provide proper protection in the workplace. I find it quite ingenious that the approach here is to try to use the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act. If the Minister has a better way of doing it, I am sure that everyone will be very eager and willing to listen. It contains within it the capacity for both investigation and enforcement. When we talked in previous groups, it was very evident that investigation and enforcement are very often the vital missing elements in the arrangements that we have set in place today. This seems to me to have been a very sensible approach to try to find an organisation that is appropriate and has the relevant kind of teeth.

I will not attempt to expand on the case as it has been made so eloquently. I am sort of filling in on this Bill when others have been called away—in this particular case to a NATO meeting. But I would have been very pleased to add my name to these amendments.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I join the general congratulations offered to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Llanfaes, on her very comprehensive introduction of these amendments; she deployed some incredibly powerful examples.

We are all in agreement that violence and harassment, particularly sexual harassment and gender-based abuse, have absolutely no place in any workplace. Every worker, whether in an office, on a site or working remotely, deserves to feel safe, respected and protected. Tackling those issues must remain a top priority.

The amendment before us seeks to introduce stronger duties on employers to prevent and respond to these harms. Measures such as risk assessments, training and clear reporting systems can be important in building a workplace culture where abuse is not tolerated and victims are supported, so we absolutely understand the intention behind the amendment.

Although we agree that there is a need for action, we do not believe that the Health and Safety Executive is the right body to enforce these new responsibilities. That is not meant as a criticism of the Health and Safety Executive; it is simply a recognition that there are fundamentally different areas of concern that we think require a different kind of regulatory response. That is not the same as saying that we do not support the intentions of the amendment.

We do not support Amendment 100. We need solutions that deliver real protections to address sexual harassment. Finally, I have to say, from a very personal point of view, that I completely agree with my friend, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and her reservations about proposed new subsection (3B).

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Leong) (Lab)]

My Lords, first, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Llanfaes, for her patience and apologise to her that it has taken until our fifth day in Committee for her to introduce her amendments. I thank her again for Amendments 99 and 100.

I assure the noble Baroness and all noble Lords that the Government are fully committed to protecting workers from workplace violence and harassment. This is a top priority for this Government, with our manifesto commitment, as mentioned earlier by the noble Baroness, to halve violence against women and girls in a decade. In response, I am happy to say that we already have a strong and, in the Government’s view, appropriate regulatory framework in place that ensures that workers are protected from such risks.

I refer to the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act. Under the statutory provisions made under the existing Act, employers have a very clear duty to protect their workers from health and safety risks, including workplace violence. Employers are required to assess and take appropriate steps to eliminate or reduce this risk. The Health and Safety at Work etc. Act, along with other related legislation, also mandates employers to take measures to reduce the risk of workplace violence.

As part of this, the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 require employers to assess risks in the workplace, including the potential for violence, and to take suitable action to reduce or eliminate this risk. The Health and Safety Executive—HSE—and local authorities are responsible for enforcing the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act and carry out both proactive and reactive measures to ensure that employers are complying with their duties. This includes ensuring that employers assess risks and implement appropriate measures to protect their workers and anyone else affected by their work from workplace violence. The HSE has also published accessible guidance on its website to help employers comply with their legal obligations. It also works very closely with other regulators to promote co-operation, share intelligence and, where appropriate, co-ordinate joint activities.

In the noble Baroness’s proposed amendments, there is a request for HSE to publish a health and safety framework specifically focused on violence and harassment in the workplace. Employers already have duties under the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations to ensure they have sufficient arrangements in place to manage health and safety risks in the workplace, including violence and aggression. Although workplace harassment could be addressed under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act, the HSE does not intervene where there is a more appropriate regulator or where more directly applicable legislation exists.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Verma (Con)]

My Lords, I did not want to intervene on this group, but, listening to the noble Lord, I became slightly worried that we are getting into censorship. This country is a proud country because of its ability to speak out and speak up. I would be incredibly nervous if we felt that we could not demonstrate our political views openly without being penalised for it. The unions do their own work, but it is incredibly important that people are able to demonstrate a political affiliation or a particular viewpoint without having to feel that they are going to be censored. That would really worry people like me, who often are the recipient of things that we do not like to hear, but we tolerate it because we think the country enables us to have the debate.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Young of Acton for his expert introduction to the amendments in this group. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Monks, about common sense, but I fear that went out of the window of an employment tribunal some years ago. As my noble friend Lord Young laid out in an earlier group, this Bill threatens to restrict free expression in some cases with its provisions. It is for this reason that I support the amendments, which seek to safeguard political opinion and affiliation within our employment laws.

At the heart of any thriving democracy lies the freedom to hold and express political beliefs without fear of retribution. In a democratic society, freedom of speech and freedom of belief are not luxuries; they are fundamental rights that underpin our entire system of governance and civil life. The workplace, where so many of us spend a significant portion of our lives, must be a space where individuals can hold and express their political views without fear of unfair treatment or dismissal. As it stands, our existing laws provide only patchy protections for political beliefs, and they leave many workers vulnerable. My noble friend Lord Young’s examples are truly shocking, and I would like to take this opportunity to wish, in particular, Mr Poursaeedi well in his ongoing battles.

We should draw upon the timeless wisdom of John Stuart Mill, who was one of the great architects of liberalism. He argued in his seminal work On Liberty that the truth emerges only through free and open debate, and he warned against the suppression of any opinion, because no one person or group holds a monopoly on truth. Even opinions that we may find mistaken—perhaps such as democratic socialism—or indeed offensive, must be heard and challenged openly, for only through such dialogue can society discern truth from error. Voltaire was right on this. I must admit I find it a bit disappointing that the Liberal Democrat Benches are not more enthusiastic about these amendments.

By protecting employees from dismissal or discrimination based on their political opinions or affiliations, these amendments would ensure that the workplace remains a forum where diverse ideas can be expressed, scrutinised and debated. Suppressing political expression risks silencing valuable perspectives and preventing the emergence of truth through robust discussion.

We in this House pride ourselves on opening our minds to a broad range of political views. Obviously, that involves robust engagement, challenging each other and refining our positions through vigorous debate. If such diversity of opinion is essential to the functioning of this Chamber, why would it not apply beyond these walls, and particularly in other workplaces? Workers, like us, should be free to express their political beliefs without fear of losing their jobs or being discriminated against.

In conclusion, I urge the Government to accept my noble friend’s amendments. To go back to the great liberal John Stuart Mill, he also said:

“A person may cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and in either case he is justly accountable to them for the injury”.


This is not the time for inaction. These amendments not only would protect workers from unfair dismissal and discrimination but would uphold our fundamental democratic values. By embedding these protections into our laws, we would reaffirm our commitment to free expression. I am afraid saying just that they are not necessary is not good enough. They clearly are necessary, as we heard in the examples from my noble friend.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business and Trade and Department for Science, Information and Technology (Baroness Jones of Whitchurch) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken. I think it would be helpful if I first clarify where the law stands on this.

On Amendment 101B, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, let me make it clear that religious and philosophical beliefs are already protected by the Equality Act 2010, including in the workplace. However, political belief—in the sense of a party-political affiliation or opinion—was not included as a protected characteristic in the Equality Act 2010. The noble Lord referred to the Grainger case. That case and the definition that the noble Lord read out referred to the issue of philosophical belief, which is already protected by the Act.

In 2015-16, the Equality and Human Rights Commission reviewed whether Great Britain’s equality and human rights legal framework sufficiently protects individuals with a religion or belief and the distinction of a religion or belief organisation while balancing the rights of others protected under the Equality Act 2010. The review found that the definition of religion or belief in the Equality Act is sufficiently broad to ensure wide protection for many religions or beliefs. It recommended no change to the definition of religion or belief or to the approach that the court should take in deciding whether any particular belief is protected under the Act.

We are not convinced that a political opinion or affiliation should be specifically protected by amendment to the Equality Act 2010 in contrast to other religions or beliefs. The extent of protected beliefs has been developed in case law, and we have not been presented with strong evidence that any legislative amendment is necessary. The amendment the noble Lord is proposing would potentially cause legal uncertainty over its relationship to the protected characteristic of religion or belief in Section 10 of the Equality Act, which has a much wider application than just the workplace.

The Government frequently receive calls for new protected characteristics—there have been over 21 suggested to date. While some of these carry merit, it simply would not be practical to include these all in the legislation, which would quickly become unmanageable for employers and service providers to follow, and for courts and tribunals to process and judge.

The noble Lord referred to the European Convention on Human Rights. The courts and tribunals will always be required to balance competing rights on the facts of a particular case, including the rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and freedom of expression under Articles 9 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as academic freedom.

Noble Lords have referred to a number of individual cases. They will appreciate that I cannot comment on individual cases. However, I can assure them that free speech is a cornerstone of British values. We are firmly committed to upholding the right of freedom of expression, which is protected by Article 10. I also absolutely agree with my noble friend Lord Monks that, in many cases—and preferably in all cases—it is ideal for these issues to be resolved by common sense at the workplace.

Turning to Amendment 141A, I seek to reassure the noble Lord that further legislative provision on this matter is not needed. Through the Bill, the Government are creating a day one right against unfair dismissal. As the noble Lord, Lord Young, acknowledged in his explanatory statement, additional protections for employees already exist under Section 108(4) of the Employment Rights Act 1996, which currently ensures that claims for unfair dismissal on the grounds of political opinion or affiliation are not subject to any qualification period. I can reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, that, while dismissal on the grounds of political beliefs and affiliations is not automatically unfair, if brought to a tribunal, the tribunal could find that it was unfair based on the circumstances at hand.

As we have said, these issues will very often have to be decided by a tribunal, based on the facts of the case. This will obviously also have to apply to the noble Lord’s amendment as well. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, that the delays in employment tribunals are a very real challenge that we are very conscious of, and we have already reported elsewhere in other debates on the Bill that we are taking steps to address this.

Relevant case law sets out the circumstances where political beliefs may constitute a philosophical belief for the purpose of the Equality Act 2010. In these cases, discrimination provisions could apply. Following a judgment from the European Court of Human Rights, the qualifying period for bringing a claim of unfair dismissal relating to political opinions or affiliation was removed, further strengthening employees’ access to justice in instances of unfair dismissal based on political views. The Bill ensures that claims for dismissal on this basis continue to be treated in the same way as claims for automatic unfair dismissal by carving them out in a new Section 108A from the requirement that any employee must have started work before a claim can be brought.

We regard this as the right approach. Making dismissal for political opinions automatically unfair, as this amendment seeks to do, would fundamentally change the way that free speech is considered in relation to dismissal for the holding of views or the expression of views that the employer regards as unacceptable. It could sweep up such a wide range of views as to be unworkable. As sufficient protection against dismissal for political beliefs already exists, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw Amendment 101B.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Goddard of Stockport (LD)]

I will reply to that. Yes, it is a technical question, and perhaps that wording sits there, but any person with an ounce of common sense who sees the Bill can see what the Government are trying to do. I do not think that the Bill, with over 300 amendments to it, is geared to do what the noble Baroness is intimating. That is cheap political point-scoring, and I think it is beneath her.

I have carefully considered the amendments put forward by noble Lords in this group, particularly those seeking to remove Clause 23 and Schedule 3, including Amendments 23 and 334 from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, the series of amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and others relating to probationary periods, including Amendments 105 to 112. While I am not persuaded by those amendments or the case for removing the provisions or fundamentally changing the Bill, I recognise the need for greater clarity on probationary periods. Given the Bill’s current drafting, which relies heavily on future regulation, it is essential that the Government provide clear and firm guidance on how the provisions will operate in practice, especially for small businesses, which will find ambiguity challenging in difficult times.

Amendment 107A from the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, which proposes a default initial employment period but would allow the Secretary of State flexibility to amend that through regulation, offers a balanced concept that could be helpful in providing certainty while retaining adaptability. Likewise, Amendment 334 from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, which calls for a retention of the current qualifying period until suitable regulations are in place, reflects concerns about the smooth transition, and that deserves attention. However, I am less convinced by the calls for further impact assessments or reviews of the proposals in Amendments 103 and 123, which I believe risk delaying the necessary reforms without providing clarity.

In light of those amendments, I urge the Government to seize this opportunity to give definition and definite practical guidance on the provisions that the Bill will implement. It would be better if the Minister could say in absolute terms the length of time for which probationary periods will be set in future regulation after the passage of the Bill. That would be particularly important for smaller employers that need certainty to comply. Providing that clarity would help to ensure that the reform worked as intended, and it would help to strike the right balance between protecting employees’ rights and allowing employers the flexibility to manage probationary employments effectively. On that basis, I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, and my noble friends Lady Neville-Rolfe and Lord Lucas for their amendments and their thoughtful contributions in this group. It has been a most interesting debate. I will speak to my Amendments 103, 113 and 123.

I completely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, that it would be much better to get this right now rather than pursuing Amendment 103 in particular, which returns to the Government’s insufficient impact assessment. The assessment that has been produced states that this provision will have one of the highest impacts, yet, as we have mentioned before, the Regulatory Policy Committee has given the Government’s analysis in this section a red rating. The RPC’s critique is not a matter of minor technicalities because it identifies serious deficiencies in the Government’s case for intervention in the options that they have considered and in the justification for the policy that they propose. The Government’s impact assessment admits that it lacks robust data on dismissal rates for employees with under two years’ service. To answer the question from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, there is no evidence for that. It proceeds regardless, however, with only superficial reference to “asymmetric information” and without any substantive analysis of any market failure.

The RPC highlights the impact assessment’s failure to consider how long-serving employees might view the equalisation of rights for new joiners—an issue of fairness and workplace cohesion that the Government have ignored. The impact assessment itself mentions that options such as reducing the qualifying period to 18 months or one year were considered and rejected without detailed assessment. No real exploration of probation periods was provided. That is not a balanced appraisal of possible alternatives; it is a justification for a predetermined decision.

On the justification of the preferred option, the impact assessment is again found lacking. The RPC calls for clarity on the costs to businesses—the costs of managing performance, handling disputes and the increased settlements to avoid tribunal risks. It also questions whether the Government have considered evidence from existing unfair dismissal claims and how risks might vary across sectors or job types, particularly in roles where reputational damage from a claim might deter employers from hiring at all.

More significantly, the Government have not addressed indirect and dynamic labour impacts, such as whether day-one rights might lead to more cautious hiring, greater use of temporary contracts or weaker overall job security. These are not abstract concerns as they go to the heart of how this policy might reshape employment relationships across the country. Noble Lords might be interested in a real example. I was talking this morning to a senior executive at a FTSE 100 company. It is an exemplary employer in every way; for example, offering many day-one rights. But this year—partly as a result of the jobs tax but also in anticipation of the Bill—it has reduced its hiring by 84%. I repeat that for the record: 84%. This is not abstract or theoretical. This is real, this is now.

It is important to note that these likely labour market impacts are not accounted for in the £5 billion cost to businesses, so the real cost is likely to be significantly higher. The result is a policy with high ambition but little practical clarity, as the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, has just noted. How will unfair dismissal rights interact with a statutory probationary period? Will employers still have access to the same set of fair reasons for dismissal? Will there be a different threshold for acting reasonably during probation? Can probation be extended if needed? None of those questions has been clearly answered.

The noble Lord, Lord Leong, reminded us of the light-touch, nine-month proposal, but what does that mean in practice? My noble friend Lady Meyer asked that. At the same time, the Government’s own analysis predicts that granting day-one rights for unfair dismissal alone will result in a 15% increase in employment tribunal claims. Using the statistics given by the noble Lord, Lord Barber, that is an additional 750 claims per year, on top of the 50,000 backlog already waiting 18 months to two years. The noble Lord argued that this is, in effect, a statistical irrelevance, but it is not to the 750 business owners who are being dragged through courts. That is a substantial impact. It represents direct costs to businesses in terms of time, legal risk and, of course, the chilling effect on recruitment.

The tribunal system itself needs to be looked at. Without significant new investment it is hard to see how the system will cope with this 15% increase. The result could be longer delays, greater costs and justice deferred for all parties. In an earlier group we heard about a case that is going to take more than two years to come before a tribunal. Yet the Government intend to bring these changes into force in 2026. On what basis? There is nothing in the impact assessment that explains why 2026 has been chosen or how the system will be ready by then. Businesses will need time to revise contracts, restructure probation processes and train managers on the new rules. What assessment has been made of whether 2026 is realistic, with all those things in mind? What engagement has been carried out with employers, particularly SMEs, about what implementation will require?

It is not unreasonable to ask the Government to explain how the timeline was determined and whether it is genuinely achievable, given the lack of clarity in both the policy detail and the supporting evidence. We all agree that employees deserve fair treatment, particularly in the vulnerable early stages of employment, but employers must also have a reasonable opportunity to assess performance, capability and suitability without the immediate threat of litigation.

We have established that there is no evidence for any of this clause. In fact, when the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, was arguing his point, he said that it is very difficult anyway for employees to take a case to an employment tribunal. The noble Lord, Lord Barber, as I just mentioned, said it is, in effect, a statistical irrelevance. If there is no evidence, it is too difficult and it is a statistical irrelevance, why are we bothering at all?

I want to raise a final point that others, particularly my noble friends Lady Neville-Rolfe and Lady Noakes, have referred to. It is not just about the policy itself; it is a more troubling concern. The policy will create unintended incentives, but for whom? It is not just about employers scaling back hiring overall but about who they stop hiring. If we remove the qualifying period for unfair dismissal and provide no workable probationary mechanism, we tilt the hiring incentives away from risk-taking, as we have heard. It will, in effect, stop employers taking a punt.

Right now, a small business owner might be willing to take that chance on someone with no formal qualifications, or from a non-traditional background, or re-entering the workforce after a time away. That chance exists because the employer has a short window to assess their suitability—and vice versa, of course—before facing the full weight of employment litigation risk. If that safety net is removed and exposure begins from day one and the probationary period lacks clarity or legal protection, that same employer will think twice. They will play it safe.

Noble Lords opposite should pay attention to those of us who have employed people. It is a simple fact. Who is going to suffer? It is not the already advantaged candidate with a polished CV. It is the young person with gaps in education, the career switcher with no references, the working parent returning after years out of the labour market, or the person coming back to work after a long period of illness. Noble Lords opposite should reread the speech given by my noble friend Lord Elliott, with his experience of the Jobs Foundation. He explained this much more eloquently than I just have. Those are the people who benefit from flexibility and second chances and who may now find those doors quietly closed.

This goes to the heart of social mobility and genuine workplace diversity. I would like to ask the Government a rhetorical question: have they considered the incentives this policy creates? If they have not—both common-sense experience of real working life in the private sector and, indeed, the RPC suggest that they have not—we risk designing a policy that sounds progressive but, in practice, reduces opportunity for the very groups that we should be helping the most. We need a decent impact assessment, and my amendment would allow for it.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. As there have been a number of questions about our intentions with these clauses, I think it would be helpful to clarify them and put them on the record.

Clause 23 introduces Schedule 3 and repeals Section 108 of the Employment Rights Act 1996, thereby removing the two-year qualifying period for protection against unfair dismissal. Schedule 3 further amends the 1996 Act, including the introduction of a statutory probationary period in legislation. Schedule 3 also removes the two-year qualifying period for the right to request written reasons for dismissal. Any employee who has been dismissed after the statutory probationary period will have the right to written reasons for dismissal within 14 days upon request.

The legislation will introduce a statutory probationary period that will maintain an employer’s ability to assess any new hires. Schedule 3 allows the duration of a statutory probationary period to be set in regulations by the Secretary of State following consultation. The Government’s preference, as we know, is for this probationary period to be nine months in length. Schedule 3 also creates the power to modify the test for whether dismissal during the probationary period is fair for reasons of performance or suitability for the role.

The Government’s intention is to use this power to set light-touch standards for fair dismissal during probation. The power will be limited to the following reasons for dismissal, which, under Section 98 of the Employment Rights Act 1996, qualify as potentially fair reasons: capability, conduct, illegality or some other substantial reason relating to the employee. The Government will consult on the light-touch standards and proceed to set out in regulations what specific reasons relate to the employee and when.

Schedule 3 amends the delegated power to set the maximum compensatory award for unfair dismissal so that a different maximum can be set for dismissals during the probationary period and when the light-touch standards apply. It is our intention to consult before the introduction of any new cap on awards.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Again, we are being promised a blizzard of consultations, but can the Minister give me any idea when those consultations will take place? Can we also have some assurance that all the employer organisations will be consulted on this occasion? From our conversations with many of them, they do not feel particularly consulted up to now.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

First, on the issue of consultation, I assure the noble Lord that there have been a considerable number of consultations, not only with the main employer organisations but in terms of working parties working on particular aspects of the Bill, and those will continue. That consultation will continue—and I have now forgotten his other question.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Will the Government consult with employer organisations?

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

Yes, I can confirm that that is the case.

Employment Rights Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 3rd June 2025 Lords Chamber

This amendment seeks to close the loophole that allows some employers to exploit unpaid workers as a means of avoiding their responsibilities under the National Minimum Wage Regulations. The challenge is to weed out the unscrupulous employer who misleads young people to extract free work with no real interest in employing them afterwards. This not only exploits individuals but highlights the need for clear safeguards to prevent bad employers abusing the system under the guise of offering experience. That said, we must be careful not to discourage genuine, well-structured opportunities for young people at the beginning of their careers, where learning, mentoring and future progress are real and meaningful. The goal here should be not to eliminate work experience but to ensure that, when it takes place, it does so on fair terms. I hope the Minister will reflect on this amendment and consider how best to balance access and protection with the views of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, and the noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Holmes for tabling this amendment and the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, with his perspective from the creative industries, for introducing it so well.

This amendment highlights an important issue: ensuring that work experience opportunities do not become a means to circumvent minimum wage regulations, thereby protecting young people and others seeking to gain valuable experience in the labour market. At the same time, as the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, noted, it is important to recognise that many charities, non-profit organisations and others rely to some extent on unpaid work experience placements, partly to deliver their valuable services but also to provide opportunities for individuals who might otherwise struggle to enter the workforce. We must acknowledge that many young people who leave education not knowing what they want to do, as the noble Viscount noted, find them a useful way of testing various sectors. The practical impact of this amendment on such organisations merits careful consideration to ensure that their ability to provide meaningful work experience is not unduly restricted, while maintaining fair treatment for those undertaking such experience.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who contributed to this short but focused and interesting debate. I too regret that the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, was unable to attend; with my Whip’s hat on, I note that perhaps if we had made better progress on earlier days of Committee then we would have heard from him directly. I pay tribute to him for tabling Amendment 129, which seeks to prohibit unpaid work experience for a period exceeding four weeks. I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, for stepping into the breach and making a more than worthy understudy in moving the amendment. I thank my noble friend Lady O’Grady of Upper Holloway and the noble Lords, Lord Goddard and Lord Sharpe of Epsom, for contributing to this debate. This is an important issue, and the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, and others are right to raise it. I pay tribute on the record to his previous work campaigning on this issue, not least through his Private Member’s Bill in the 2017-19 Session.

This Government made a commitment to deliver the biggest upgrade to workers’ rights in a generation. This includes tackling unfair working practices. As we heard from the noble Viscount, there are examples not simply in the creative sector—although that area of our economy is rife with them—but beyond it. This Government absolutely stand by the national minimum wage, and on 1 April delivered an increase of 16.3% to the 18 to 20 national minimum wage rate to make it £10 an hour—a record amount in both cash and percentage terms, making progress on closing the gap with the national living wage. This is an increase of £2,500 to the gross annual earnings of a full-time worker on the NMW. It was the first step in the Government’s plans to remove the discriminatory age bands and ensure that all adults benefit from a genuine living wage, making a real difference to young people.

I think it is worth saying in passing that we welcome, on this side of the House at least, the Conservative Party’s conversion in recent years to supporting the national minimum wage. However, as a member of the party that introduced it in the first place, in the teeth of some quite vehement opposition at the time, I assure noble Lords that this Labour Government are absolutely committed to supporting it and making sure that it applies in all cases where it should.

Work experience or internships can offer individuals, especially younger people, invaluable opportunities and experience. We do not want to close the door on these opportunities, but we do want to ensure that they are open and fair. Most importantly, where workers are due payment, they should be paid the wages they are entitled to, and I have to say that the current legislation already protects them.

As my noble friend Lady O’Grady of Upper Holloway—to whose years of campaigning in this area, through the TUC, I pay tribute—said, there is an aspect of this amendment, very well-intentioned though it is, that would create unintended consequences and raises the spectre of, as she put it, rolling internships of four weeks, on and on.

As we know, according to the Department for Education’s 2022 employer skills survey, around 5% of employers had offered internships, either paid or unpaid, in the preceding 12 months, and there were around 200,000 people on internships. The vast majority of these—88%—were of two weeks or more in duration, and nearly 30% were over six months. It is only right that these people should be paid the national minimum to which they are entitled.

As we have heard, the national minimum wage legislation provides for a number of exemptions to recognise the importance of gaining work experience. It is important to recognise that these examples have a strong and firm place in the economy, including students on placements for up to one year, as required as part of a UK course of either further or higher education, pupils below the compulsory school age, participants in certain government programmes to provide training, work experience or temporary work, and—the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, made this point—voluntary workers employed by a charity or voluntary organisation, providing they receive no monetary payments, except for expenses.

The Government are committed to banning unpaid internships, unless they are part of an educational or training course. Because of the way legislation is drafted, they are already largely banned. For national minimum wage purposes, the crucial fact is whether someone is considered a worker due to the nature of the work they do. Employers cannot simply call someone an intern or say they are doing work experience and not pay them. What matters is whether the arrangement they have makes them a worker for minimum wage purposes. However, one valid exception is work shadowing, which is where individuals are observing others perform tasks and are not performing any work themselves.

There is a risk that the broad-brush nature of this amendment could create loopholes, leaving interns or individuals on work experience open to abuse. Where an intern is carrying out tasks, they are a worker and therefore entitled to the national minimum wage. Accepting the amendment could mean that these individuals could be recruited for short-term roles and lose their entitlement to the minimum wage, even if they are performing work. The Government will be consulting on this issue soon. We want to engage with businesses and individuals who carry out internships or work experience. This is how we introduce change to ensure that individuals are protected and treated fairly.

We have heard from both the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, and my noble friend Lady O’Grady that enforcement is the issue here. The noble Viscount, Lord Colville, asked about the number of prosecutions. I am afraid I do not have that number to hand, but I will certainly undertake to write to the noble Viscount. Enforcement of any law is important, and I am sure that part of the consultation will cover issues of enforcement. Creating more laws but not solving the problem of enforcement would not actually get to the heart of the issue, which is making sure that, when people work, they are paid the national minimum to which they are entitled.

In that vein, I hope that we can deal with the issues the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, wishes to address most effectively outside the Bill. I therefore ask the noble Viscount, on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, to withdraw Amendment 129.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 131, 297 and 314 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, so movingly introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt.

Each of these amendments seeks to address long-standing inequalities that disabled people continue to face, particularly in the context of work and access to goods and services. Amendment 131 raises the important principle that workers should not be compelled to contribute to the development or sale of products that are knowingly inaccessible—which the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, raised. I hope that the Government, through the Department for Business and Trade, will publish clear guidance on what constitutes inaccessible products and services. Such guidance is needed. It would be invaluable in informing decision-making for businesses and helping workers recognise when they may be asked to contribute to the creation or sale of goods that fail to meet accessibility standards.

Amendment 297, meanwhile, calls for a royal commission. Despite what the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, said, I veer towards saying that we do need something formal such as a royal commission to investigate the persistently low employment levels among blind and sight-impaired people, a disparity that deserves serious attention. The questions that these amendments raise are valid and warrant a considered response from the Government.

I am also interested in the reasoning behind Amendment 314, which calls for a programme and timeline to develop an action plan aimed at closing the disability gap. Recent research from the TUC revealed that the disability gap stood at a staggering 17.2% in 2024, which was an increase on the figures quoted by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, from 2023. The same figures do not reoccur every year—they are going up—and these figures show that. The amendment represents a measured and practical approach, reflecting a growing consensus on the need for greater transparency and accountability in tackling workplace inequality.

Even if the Government are, unsurprisingly, not minded to accept the amendments in their current form, I hope that Ministers will consider how their intent may be taken forward through alternative means—and there can be alternative means. These are not radical demands but thoughtful suggestions for achieving progress in areas where it is long overdue. I hope that the Government’s heart will be in favour of the reasoning behind these amendments, and that we can all work together towards bringing the legislation into line with what our conscience is saying.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond for his amendments in this group, and my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral for introducing them on his behalf. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, for his contribution.

There is no doubt that those with disabilities, including blind and partially sighted people, face different challenges in the workplace, and the more we can do to increase awareness and representation in the workplace for these people and these groups, the better. We must also recognise that for many disabled people, the challenges begin long before a job interview. Structural barriers, from education and training to transport and technology, can compound over time and create a labour market that is harder to enter and harder to stay in. If legislation can help remove those barriers and create conditions for more equitable access to work, it is our responsibility to act.

It is also important that employers are supported and not penalised, so legislation should provide clarity and encourage inclusive practices. It should offer the right incentives and should not raise the cost or the perceived risk of hiring somebody who may already face disadvantage. Unfortunately, some elements of current legislation do just that.

I hope that the Government and the Minister listened to the concerns that were so well articulated by my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Palmer. These are not radical demands, as the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, pointed out, and I hope the Government will address them.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Collins of Highbury) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Wirral, for moving Amendment 131 and speaking to Amendments 297 and 314, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond. Of course, the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and I go back a long, long way. When I was in the T&G, he was frequently instructed by my union to defend workers, so I appreciate that he is absolutely on the right side of this agenda.

Of course, this is an issue that we have been debating for a very long time. I particularly pay tribute to the late Alf Morris, Lord Morris, who absolutely focused on this agenda and was responsible for the Disability Discrimination Act, which has been the foundation of all the other changes since then.

On Amendment 131, it is important to be clear that the Equality Act 2010 already places a duty on providers of goods, services and facilities, and persons exercising public functions, to make reasonable adjustments for disabled service users. The Equality and Human Rights Commission, as Great Britain’s national equality and human rights body, safeguards and enforces the laws that protect people’s rights to fairness, dignity and respect. In the context of this debate, it monitors and has powers to enforce the Equality Act, which prohibits discrimination, harassment and victimisation in a variety of settings, including work. The commission has been active in monitoring disability equality, including as part of its regular comprehensive reviews of how Britain is performing on equality and human rights, as well as its work in monitoring compliance with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The commission’s powers do not extend to monitoring the accessibility of manufactured goods or the development of services and, as such, it would not be able to respond to reporting of the kind suggested in the new clause. Therefore, the Government are unable to support the amendment.

Turning to Amendment 297, again I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, for speaking to this amendment and drawing attention to this important issue, and of course I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, who has been a strong voice on this and recognise his contribution in championing the rights of blind and sight-impaired people. Again, the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, can go back to the days when my union heavily supported the National League of the Blind and Disabled—a union that had been representing blind and disabled workers for nearly 100 years, certainly when we were engaged with it.

I agree that addressing the level of employment for blind and sight-impaired people is still an important issue, which is why we have a range of existing specialist initiatives in place to support individuals, including those who are blind and sight-impaired, to stay in work or get back to work. Our existing measures provide tailored support to disabled people more broadly and are designed to be flexible to meet the range of needs, including the needs of those who are blind and sight impaired. I repeat the point that the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, made: existing measures include work coaches and disability employment advisers in jobcentres —working with employers, absolutely right—and access to work grants, again to facilitate and support employers in doing this, as well as joining up health and employment support around individuals through employment advisers in NHS, talking therapies, individual placement and support in primary care, as well as WorkWell.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ashcombe (Con)]

My Lords, it seems that, yet again, the noble Lord, Lord Barber, and I are not going to quite agree. I support both these amendments, particularly the one in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Palmer.

I would like to look at the amendments from the point of view of the employee. When an employee finds themselves in a disciplinary or grievance hearing—we heard from my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough earlier—it signifies a profound breakdown in their relationship with their employer. It is a moment fraught with stress, uncertainty and fear; one where an individual may feel their professional life is unravelling before them. They may question how they will continue to support their family, whether they can afford to remain in their home, and what their future may hold.

Large corporations, such as the one I work for, have the benefit of HR departments to guide them through such proceedings, ensuring that their position is well-organised and profoundly represented. I have had the dubious pleasure of having to make people redundant; it is not fun, even with HR beside you, but they had nobody. In smaller companies, personal relationships between employer and employee can add an additional layer of complexity to the situation. In either case, the individual facing the hearing is often isolated, and struggling to recollect past events and present their case clearly.

These amendments, particularly Amendment 137, propose a fair and practical position: the right to have the assistance of a certified individual—someone equipped to review the facts dispassionately, organise events in logical sequence and provide the employee with a much-needed sense of reassurance. As we have heard, the trade unions already fulfil this role, particularly in large companies. However, many employees, myself included, choose not to join a union for a variety of personal reasons. The absence of union membership should not mean a lack of support in such critical moments. This amendment would ensure that every employee, regardless of union affiliation, has access to a certified individual who may provide guidance when facing disciplinary proceedings, fostering a fairer and more balanced process. For this reason, I support these amendments to uphold the right of fairness in our workplaces.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate, and in particular the noble Lords, Lord Pitkeathley of Camden Town and Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, for introducing their Amendments 132 and 137.

As has been said, not all workers have or want access to a union representative. In fact, the latest statistics that I have from the Department for Business and Trade suggest that only 22% of all employees are unionised. Not all workers have access to or can afford legal advice, particularly, as the noble Lord, Lord Pitkeathley, pointed out, those in smaller workplaces or those performing more precarious roles. Allowing trained, certified HR professionals to provide advice could help ensure that more employees are supported when making important decisions about their rights.

It is important to recognise the valuable support already available through organisations such as ACAS—mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Barber—citizens advice bureaux and others, which provide free and impartial advice. This amendment complements those services by seeking to expand the range of qualified advisers accessible to workers. The principle of widening access to competent support is a reasonable one, especially where safeguards are in place through certification by recognised professional bodies. As my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough pointed out, if nothing else, that ought to serve to ease pressure on employment rights tribunals, which, as we have discussed many times over the course of this Committee, are stretched to breaking point.

I have to say to the noble Lord, Lord Barber of Ainsdale, that that was a classic case of the TUC advocating for a closed shop, and I applaud him for that. However, not so many employees are now members of trade unions, as I have pointed out, and the majority of trade union members are in the public sector.

The question of genuine independence will be critical, and I would be interested to hear the Minister’s response on that. I would also say, perhaps to the noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, that, without wishing to quibble too much with his amendment, I think that as currently written it gives the Secretary of State rather too much discretion in determining what is a professional body. If he wants to have a think about that, I am available for a chat.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

133: After Clause 26, insert the following new Clause—
“Impact on farm businessesWithin 12 months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must publish an assessment of the impact of the provisions of Part 1 of this Act on farm businesses in the United Kingdom.”

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 133 in my name.

I have to start by saying that the family farm tax introduced by this Government is a disastrous policy. According to the NFU, it has put 200,000 jobs at risk—a staggering number that should have stopped Ministers in their tracks. I am disappointed to see noble Lords opposite are laughing at that number. A recent economic report on the combined effect of these measures lays the facts bare. It estimates the direct cost to the Treasury at £1.9 billion by 2030, stemming from lost tax revenues and increased benefit claims due to job losses and reduced productivity. More than 60% of farmers are expected to cut investment by over 20%, choking off future growth and innovation. The cost to the wider economy will be staggering—a staggering £14.8 billion blow to gross value added, all for the sake of political posturing masquerading as employment reform. The effect on food security alone could be catastrophic.

I must also highlight a concern that has been brought to light by recent tragic events and official responses, and that is the case of a farmer who took his own life just before the Government’s Budget, which is a heartbreaking example of the immense pressures our rural communities face. These pressures are exacerbated by the looming inheritance tax changes that threaten the very future of family farms.

Despite the seriousness of this issue, the official statistics on farmer, landowner and family business owner suicides are woefully inadequate. There is a significant delay, often of years, before accurate data is published. This delay means we will not see reliable figures for suicides in 2026 until 2028 or later, and that is simply unacceptable. Without timely, detailed data, broken down by occupation, policymakers cannot fully understand the human cost of these policies. Would the Minister acknowledge the urgent need for this and commit to working with the Office for National Statistics and other relevant bodies to improve the frequency and detail of suicide data by occupation, particularly for farmers and rural workers, so that we can properly address and understand this crisis without delay?

Turning to this legislation, it represents a further devastating blow to British agriculture. This Bill introduces unfair dismissal rights from day one of employment without a shred of evidence that it is workable in sectors such as farming. The extension of unfair dismissal protections from two years to day one of employment is being pushed forward with no clear guidance, no transitional arrangements and no defined probationary period. There is only speculation, and speculation is not a legal framework.

The Minister will say that this is currently being consulted on, but in the meantime farms are exposed. Every hiring decision becomes a legal and financial gamble. If a worker turns out to be unsuitable, which can happen quickly in physically demanding and safety-critical environments, the employer may be already too late to act without risking litigation. In farming, where work is seasonal, strenuous and sometimes requires immediate action, farms cannot afford to spend months navigating HR processes. They cannot afford legal exposure every time a hire does not work out, and that is exactly what Bill sets out.

Then there is the matter of zero-hours contracts. This Government, in their detachment from rural life, believe that these contracts are exploitative, but on farms they are essential. Harvests do not run on clocks, and weather does not obey timetables. Labour demand swings sharply: one week it is quiet, and the next week it is all hands on deck. Therefore, flexibility is all. Without zero-hours contracts, many farms simply cannot function, so replacing them with rigid guaranteed-hours contracts is not just unrealistic but destructive. The Bill would force the farmers to guess months in advance how many workers they will need—or pay the price when nature does not co-operate.

Rural employers, particularly farms and estates, rely heavily on seasonal and zero-hour staff to meet unpredictable and time-sensitive labour demands. That is not a loophole but a necessity born of reality. But the Bill introduces a new legal obligation that completely fails to take account of how agriculture works. Under the proposals in Part 1, if a casual worker ends up working a regular pattern—say, 20 hours a week over a few months—the employer will be legally required to offer a guaranteed-hours contract reflecting that pattern. That will fundamentally alter the nature of seasonal hiring.

Instead of flexibility, farmers will be locked into fixed commitments, which mean guaranteed pay even if the work disappears. In farming, it often does: crops cannot be harvested in a thunderstorm, livestock routines change, and machinery breaks down. Labour needs fluctuate by the day and employers have to adapt. The Bill removes that option, forcing them to guarantee wages based on past patterns and not future needs, and the result of that inevitably will be higher staffing costs, less flexibility and more legal risk. Farmers will no longer be able to adjust hours week to week based on workload and may instead reduce hours across the board, or simply hire fewer workers to avoid triggering these new obligations. That is not security for workers; that is lost opportunity.

Then we come to flexible working—another ideological insertion into a sector where it simply cannot apply. The Bill increases the burden on employers to justify denying flexible working requests. But who in this Committee honestly believes that lambing can be done from home or that dairy herds can be milked on a four-day week? Farming needs people physically present on time and able to adapt to sudden changes. This measure will destroy farms and open the floodgates to legal claims, rather than improve their working conditions.

I turn to another deeply flawed proposal in the Bill: the changes to statutory sick pay, which will hit farm businesses with immediate and unsustainable costs. Under the current system, employees are entitled to SSP only after three consecutive days of sickness absence. That allows employers, especially small family farms, to absorb short-term minor absences without being penalised for every cold, sprain or missed morning. The Bill proposes to remove that protection entirely, and statutory sick pay will become payable from day one of absence. For most farms, this is not just a technical change but a fundamental shift in financial exposure.

Agricultural work is physically demanding, often outdoors and highly seasonal. Casual absences are common and often unavoidable. But, under the Bill, every single one of those absences now comes with an automatic cost from the very first missed shift. Under the current rules, if a farmhand calls in sick on Monday and is back by Wednesday, the farmer pays nothing. Under the Bill, the employer must pay statutory sick pay from day one. Multiply that by three or four casual workers, each with intermittent absences through lambing or harvest, and you have a significant unpredictable cost burden for a farm with already razor-thin margins.

It does not stop there: the Bill also proposes to reduce the lower earnings limit—currently £123 per week—meaning that even fewer workers on minimal-hours or short-term seasonal contracts will now be eligible for sick pay. These are precisely the workers whom farms hire during calving, lambing, crop picking and harvest, often working flexibly as needed. Under this system, a farm might be required to pay sick leave to a casual labourer who worked only a handful of hours the week before and might not be scheduled for any in the week ahead—that is not financial protection.

Farmers are also now expected to put in place formal absence tracking and management systems. That means logging each instance of sickness, reviewing attendance histories, holding review meetings, drafting improvement plans and, if things do not improve, potentially going through a formal dismissal process. If that were not enough, we now face the proposed cancellation payments. Farms will be penalised for calling off shifts at short notice, even when the reason is pouring rain or a late-season frost. These changes will force employers to choose between operating at a loss and paying people not to work, and in what rational universe is that considered progress?

The Bill, particularly Part 1, is not reform but sabotage. Amendment 133 is therefore essential. It does not block the Bill or repeal any of its measures; it simply demands what the Government have utterly failed to do, which is to deliver a detailed impact assessment of how these reckless changes would affect UK farm businesses. If the Bill proceeds unexamined, the consequences will not be theoretical: more farms will close, more jobs will disappear, and rural economies will contract. The very people this Government claim to support—working families, small businesses and so on—will be left to pick up the pieces. I reiterate my point about the necessity of food security in troubled times.

If the Government have nothing to hide, they should have no objection to analysing the impacts of this legislation on farm businesses, and they should accept Amendment 133. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Leong (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken. I have listened to every noble Lord’s concerns. To be fair to the Secretary of State for Defra and my fellow ministerial colleagues at Defra, I should say that they are in regular contact with the farming community and farmers. The Secretary of State has recently spoken at the National Farmers’ Union conference. My noble friend Lady Hayman comes from a farming community and understands the problems that noble Lords have raised.

I turn to Amendment 133, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom. As I have repeated multiple times throughout the debate in this place, we have already published a comprehensive set of impact assessments, based on the best available evidence, on the workers likely to be affected by these measures. This includes an assessment of the economic impacts of the Bill, including impacts on workers, businesses, sectors and regions. We intend to publish further analysis in the form of an enactment impact assessment when the Bill secures Royal Assent and, as I have said previously, further assessments when we consult on proposed regulations to meet Better Regulation requirements. The 23 amendments on impact assessments tabled by the Opposition would pre-empt work that the Government are already planning to undertake.

It should also be mentioned that this Government are steadfast in our commitment to Britain’s farming industry. It is why we will invest £5 billion into farming over the next two years, the largest amount ever directed to sustainable food production in our country.

It is with immense sadness that we hear about suicides in the farming community, and I agree with noble Lords that we need to have accurate and timely data. I promise noble Lords that I will speak to my ministerial colleagues at Defra and the ONS as far as their request is concerned.

It will be no surprise to the noble Lord that we oppose Amendment 133 and ask him to withdraw it.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank the Minister for his response and all noble Lords for their contributions to this important debate. I particularly thank my noble friends Lord Deben and Lord Roborough for their expertise, which I think noble Lords around the Committee will agree shed great light on this tricky subject. I also greatly appreciate the support of the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, for what is a very modest amendment, and I am therefore disappointed with the Minister’s response, although pleased that he will consult Defra further.

On the subject of inheritance tax, the noble Lord asserted that Defra has been steadfast in its support for the farming community, but it is not clear that the farming community has recognised that steadfastness, because over a dozen leading farming organisations, including the National Farmers’ Union and the Country Land and Business Association, have condemned the Government for a lack of transparency. Those groups have written directly to the Treasury demanding the release of modelling and evidence behind the policy.

When pressed to explain why they rejected the fairer clawback option for inheritance tax reforms, Treasury Ministers offered nothing more than vague assertions—no consultation, no published impact assessment—and when challenged under freedom of information laws, the Treasury responded by saying that it was

“not in the public interest”

to disclose this analysis. How can the Government possibly claim this is not in the public interest? Are they really arguing that the means of food production and all that pertains to it are not in the public interest? We are talking about reforms that could rip through the foundations of multigenerational farms, force land sales and strip the viability from small rural businesses.

If this Government’s approach so far was not reckless enough, a fresh report from the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee has added yet more weight to the call for caution and transparency. The cross-party group of MPs has urged the Government to delay its proposed reforms to agricultural property relief and business property relief for two years, pushing back the implementation date from April 2026 to April 2027, with any final decisions postponed until October 2026. That is because the reforms are intended to tighten inheritance tax reliefs on farms and agricultural businesses and were introduced without adequate consultation or any formal impact assessment. The committee highlighted that rushing ahead without proper analysis risks serious consequences, including impacts on land values, tenant farmers, family farms and food production, and it warned that this could disrupt the food supply chain, potentially driving up supermarket prices and hitting consumers across the UK. Noble Lords should take seriously my noble friend Lord Deben’s warning about food shortages and what it does to government popularity.

What is particularly striking is the committee’s citation of a March 2025 survey which found that 70% of farmers were optimistic about their rural businesses before the Autumn Budget, but that figure plummeted to just 12% afterwards. That collapse in confidence speaks volumes about the uncertainty and fear that these policies have created within rural communities, and the same attitude is now evident in this Employment Rights Bill. Once again, we are seeing major legislative changes with profound economic impacts pushed through without proper consultation, without proper published impact assessments and without any serious recognition of the realities facing British farmers, and that is precisely why this modest amendment is so important.

At the bare minimum, before further damage is done, we should demand an independent, published assessment of how these employment law changes will affect UK farm businesses—not months after the fact and not hidden behind opaque Treasury memos. It is in the public interest, so it should be within 12 months of this Act passing. That is a modest, proportionate and entirely reasonable request. I will withdraw the amendment on this occasion but reserve the right to return to it. Again, I refer to my noble friend Lord Deben’s suggestion, or perhaps warning: 9 million people are watching.

Amendment 133 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Goddard of Stockport (LD)]

I will speak briefly to this amendment, which proposes to prohibit unpaid trial shifts by ensuring that those who undertake such shifts are paid at least the national minimum wage. This issue echoes concerns raised in earlier debates on unpaid work experience.

The amendment seeks to clarify that shift trials, defined as work undertaken in the hope of securing a temporary or permanent position, should be fairly compensated. This would address that potential gap in existing legislation and offer clearer protection for workers, ensuring that their time and labour are respect and valued. Such clarity is important for both workers seeking fair treatment and employers, and in maintaining transparent and ethical recruitment practices.

At the same time, it is important to consider the practical implications for employers who may rely on trial shifts as part of their recruitment process. I therefore invite the Minister to consider carefully whether this amendment strikes the right balance between protecting workers’ rights from exploitation and allowing employers reasonable flexibility in assessing candidates.

I look forward to the Government’s view on the best way to achieve a proportionate and effective approach that serves the interests of all parties involved.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this relatively brief group. I agree with my noble friend Lady Coffey. At first glance, the idea of banning unpaid trials seems fair, because no one wants to see people, especially young people, exploited under the guise of a try-out, as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, pointed out when she was introducing the amendment.

However, we also need to be honest about the likely effect of the change, particularly for those very people it is trying to protect. In many sectors—in particular hospitality, retail and care—trial shifts are often the only realistic way for somebody without a formal CV to show that they can do the job. Trial shifts can therefore open doors for young people, school leavers and those coming back into work.

If we start requiring every short work trial to be paid at minimum wage then the reality is that many of them simply will not happen at all. Employers, especially small ones, may decide that they are just too risky or costly. The obvious result will be fewer opportunities and fewer chances for somebody to get in front of an employer to show what they can do. I worry that this amendment, although well intentioned, could have the opposite effect: closing off relatively informal routes into work for those who need them most. The measures in the Bill already create the wrong incentives, and we do not need any more of them.

Employment Rights Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 3rd June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

I thank my noble friend for his powerful and clear speech; he has said it all. I just want to add that this issue has arisen from the P&O scandal that took place three years ago. The maritime unions are particularly concerned about this, and I hope that my noble friend the Minister will be able to provide some comfort for the arguments that have been presented. The issue of pre-emptive injunctive relief for seafarers and other workers is a crucial issue and it is possible that we will need to return to it on Report.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I appreciate the intent behind Amendment 143. After all, we are all familiar with the high-profile cases, such as P&O Ferries, to which the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, referred in his introduction.

I cannot pretend that I was au fait with the case details that the noble Lord explained, but we have some concerns about the practical and legal consequences of what is being proposed here. It seems to us that the amendment would allow employment tribunals to declare dismissals void and as having no effect; therefore, in effect, reinstating employees regardless of circumstances.

That is a major departure from the current legal framework, where the remedy for a breach is compensation, not nullification. That obviously raises serious questions. What happens if a dismissal is declared void months later? Is the employee reinstated, and are they entitled to back pay? What if the role no longer exists or has been filled? For many businesses and many workers, that would create uncertainty and not protection.

There is also the issue of enforcement. Giving tribunal decisions the force of the High Court, and allowing contempt proceedings for breach, risks confusing two fundamentally different judicial systems. Tribunals are meant to be accessible and the High Court is not.

I also question whether this change would meaningfully deter bad-faith employers. Those who already factor in the cost of breaking the law may simply budget for this risk too. Meanwhile, small and medium-sized employers acting in good faith could face disproportionate legal exposure for administrative or technical errors. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Watson of Invergowrie (Lab)]

My Lords, I am pleased to speak in support of my noble friend Lady Warwick on an issue that, as far as I am aware, has not appeared anywhere else but is of some importance. There is growing unease in the higher education sector about the potential implications of Clause 30. Universities UK has said it is frustrated that its letters to both officials and Ministers—they would be the same thing, I imagine—remain unanswered. UUK is probably being a bit polite in saying that it is frustrated; I suggest that it is unacceptable for a letter from any UK-wide organisation not to receive a response. If nothing else, I hope my noble friend will be able to give an assurance in her reply that she will ensure that Universities UK receives a considered response to its very legitimate concerns.

As my noble friend said, the higher education sector is concerned at the potential impact of measures proposed in Clause 30, which relate to outsourcing, on current arrangements within the sector and on the viability of steps that universities have taken or are planning to take in order to stabilise their financial position. Many universities consider themselves as falling within the definition of contracting authorities and may therefore be inadvertently caught in this clause of the legislation.

As originally introduced, the public sector outsourcing provisions applied to contracting authorities in England only. However, Ministers introduced an amendment in Committee in another place, and provisions now apply to contracting authorities in England, Scotland and Wales. Again as my noble friend said, the major point on which clarification is essential is whether and in what circumstances universities will be considered to be contracting authorities for the purposes of this legislation.

There is also the question of whether the planned separate outsourcing rules for different UK nations will or even might create complex and prohibitive arrangements for universities. As an example, if an institution is working across the UK nations—a good example would be the Open University—that could mean it is subject to two or more sets of outsourcing rules, potentially providing a conflicting legislative framework for its operational practice. I hope my noble friend will be able to clarify how the Government envisage such separate outsourcing rules will operate, and that in doing so she will provide reassurance to many in the higher education sector who, as my noble friend Lady Warwick said, are very supportive of the Bill in general but fear that universities could become victims of unintended consequences.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank both noble Lords for their contributions, and I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Warwick of Undercliffe, for her introduction to her Amendment 143B. We think it is important to recognise the unique position of higher education providers when considering worker protection in public sector outsourcing. Because universities and similar institutions operate outside the traditional public sector framework, they possess a level of autonomy that sets them apart from government bodies, so applying the same regulatory requirements to these institutions clearly risks imposing unnecessary burdens that could affect their ability to focus on their core missions of education and research.

The amendment seems to us to thoughtfully acknowledge that difference by excluding higher education providers from the scope of these specific worker protection provisions. Such an approach would allow the focus of these protections to remain on core public sector organisations, where procurement processes are more standardised and closely tied to government accountability. At the same time, it would respect the operational independence of universities.

The fair treatment of workers remains an essential principle across all sectors, including higher education. Encouraging good employment practices within universities should continue through other means, but the amendment recognises the practical realities faced by these institutions. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s answer.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

145: After Clause 32, insert the following new Clause—
“Use of positive action in the workplace(1) In this section—(a) “P” is a public sector worker who reasonably thinks that the application by P’s employer, in relation to P’s employment or a working practice, of sections 158 and 159 of the Equality Act 2010 has caused or risks causing detriment to P,(b) “R” is P’s public sector employee, and(c) P reasonably thinks that R is responsible for the detriment in subsection (1)(a).(2) A Minister of the Crown must by regulations make provision for—(a) forms through which P may anonymously question R on any matter relevant to subsection (1),(b) forms through which R may answer questions by P, and(c) such forms to be made publicly available.(3) Within six months of the passing of this Act and every three months thereafter, R must publish a report setting out―(a) the number of forms received under subsection (2), and(b) a summary of the nature of the complaints to which they relate.(4) A Minister of the Crown may by regulations require R to report on the use of sections 158 and 159 of the Equality Act 2010.(5) This section does not apply to activities undertaken by R under paragraph 1 of Schedule 9 of the Equality Act 2010.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment introduces a mechanism for public sector employees who believe they have been disadvantaged by their employer’s use of positive action under sections 158 and 159 of the Equality Act 2010. It would require the Government to create a process allowing such employees to anonymously question their employer and requiring employers to respond.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 145 standing in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral. This amendment introduces a mechanism for public sector workers who reasonably believe that they have been subjected to detriment as a result of their employers’ use of positive action under Sections 158 and 159 of the Equality Act 2010. It does not seek to outlaw such action, nor does it obstruct efforts to promote fairness. Rather, it seeks to ensure that fairness extends to all employees, not only those whom the state or the employer happen to deem underrepresented.

We must confront the uncomfortable truth that some public bodies have begun to apply positive action in ways that no longer reflect the careful balance envisaged by Parliament when the Equality Act was passed. We have now entered territory where lawful positive action shades into unlawful positive discrimination —where the scales of justice have been not merely tipped but turned. For example, let us consider West Yorkshire Police, a force whose conduct in this area raises urgent and serious concerns. It has come to light through both media investigation and internal whistleblowers that recruitment processes have been operated in a manner which in practice delays, restricts or even excludes applications from white British candidates. Candidates from certain ethnic minority backgrounds were allowed to apply early and, in some cases, were mentored through the process by dedicated positive action teams. Meanwhile, white British applicants were told to wait until a general window opened, often for as little as 48 hours. This, we are assured, is not discrimination but rather the fair operation of the law. I do not agree. This is not the spirit nor, arguably, even the letter of the Equality Act. It is a distortion of the law, and it demands redress.

What makes this all the more troubling is that these actions are being taken not by private corporations but by the state, or at least by institutions that act in the name of the state and are funded by the public purse. The taxpayer in this case is being forced to subsidise policies that they might find discriminatory and from which they may be excluded. There seems to be something especially perverse, indeed, almost Orwellian, about that.

This is not merely an abstract concern. West Yorkshire Police, for example, reportedly spent over £1.4 million in recent years on equality, diversity and inclusion staff—more than any other force in the country. That is public money. It is money earned by ordinary citizens, some of whom now find themselves effectively barred from entry into public service not because they lack ability but because their ethnic background does not satisfy an internal diversity target. When questions are raised, when whistleblowers from within these forces speak up, what happens? We hear of them being silenced, reprimanded or warned not to interfere. We hear of secret job listings marked “hidden” in the system, visible only to certain candidates. We hear of candidates greeted with hugs and reassurances that their interviews are merely a formality. That is not recruitment, and it is not equality. It is institutional manipulation.

The amendment before your Lordships seeks to restore a measure of transparency and accountability. It proposes a system by which a public sector worker who reasonably believes that they have been harmed by the operation of positive action can submit a formal question anonymously to their employer. The employer, in turn, must respond. Moreover, employers will be required to publish data on such queries, allowing Parliament and the public to monitor the use and potential abuse of these provisions. This is not a punitive or burdensome requirement; it is the most basic form of procedural fairness.

Let us be clear. This amendment does not challenge the principle of inclusion; it does not deny that discrimination has existed; but it says unequivocally that the answer to past unfairness is not the imposition of new unfairness, that the pursuit of diversity must not come at the expense of justice, and that inclusion must include everybody. Equality before the law is not a suggestion or a secondary consideration to be weighed against modern ideological preferences. It is a constitutional principle that underpins this very Chamber. When we allow it to be weakened quietly and gradually by well-meaning policies that turn into arbitrary practices, we invite division, resentment and, ultimately, more injustice.

The Minister may say that everything that I have described—the delays, the exclusion of white British applicants, the unequal mentoring and the hidden vacancies—is perfectly lawful under existing legislation. He may say that this is precisely how the Government intend for positive action to operate in the public sector. However, I sincerely hope that is not the argument that is to be advanced. Alternatively, the Minister may offer reassurance to the Committee and to the public that existing law already contains sufficient safeguards, and that what we have heard from West Yorkshire Police, Thames Valley Police and others would not and should not be permitted under any reasonable interpretation of the Equality Act. If that is the case, I would welcome that clarification. I would also welcome assurance that there is already a functioning system of redress for individuals who believe that they have been mistreated on the basis of how positive action has been applied.

If the Minister agrees with the points that I have made—that West Yorkshire Police should not have discriminated against white applicants and that there is no mechanism to stop this—then I very much look forward to the Government accepting this amendment. I beg to move.

[Lord Liddle (Lab)]

I came into this debate by chance, but it seems to me that this is part of a very undesirable development: an attack on the principle of equality, diversity and inclusion policies. These principles are at the heart of my politics. I have fought for racial equality ever since I was a student, when I went on marches against Enoch Powell and what he stood for. I thought that the response of the Labour Government in the 1960s—to make racial discrimination illegal—was very important. In more modern times, when I was chair of Lancaster University and looking at the question of student admissions, I always thought that we should make allowance for the fact that some working-class people had not had the best chance in life and take this into account in admissions procedures Therefore, I rather regret what the Opposition Front Bench is trying to do, which is to undermine the political acceptability of these policies.

There is a danger here. I have seen it from some people in my own party who say that, in response to the alleged great Reform upsurge, we should start abandoning EDI. That would be catastrophic for a social democrat like me, who has always believed in these things. I hope that the Members opposite will withdraw their amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank the Minister for that comprehensive answer, and I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this quite lively debate. I have to say I was disappointed that the greatest lady of them all who did not need a helping hand did not get a mention, so I will mention her: Margaret Thatcher.

I say to the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, that we are not seeking to undermine anything in this; I was very clear about that. I want to make it clear that, as I said in my opening remarks, this amendment does not seek to outlaw such action, nor does it obstruct efforts to promote fairness. It just seeks to ensure that fairness extends to all employees, not only to those whom the state or the employer happens to deem underrepresented.

I am grateful to the Minister for his extended quote from the Yorkshire case, but I also mentioned the case in Thames Valley. A tribunal there ruled that the three white police officers who won a claim after they were passed over for promotion were overlooked by Thames Valley Police because of their race and an ethnic-minority sergeant was promoted—this is the killer line—

“without any competitive assessment process taking place”,

which is precisely not the spirit of the laws that we have just been discussing.

[Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)]

And that is illegal.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

That is why we were asking these questions and laying this amendment. It is good to have it out in the open. The amendment sought not litigation but clarity. It sought not courtroom battles but a simple mechanism for transparency and accountability. It would have been a route for asking questions and a structure for reporting. It would be a reminder that positive action must remain within the bounds of the law and fairness, and not become a euphemism for sanctioned discrimination. However, I have heard the arguments from the Minister and, not least because of the lateness of the hour, I am content to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 145 withdrawn.

Employment Rights Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 5th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness O'Grady of Upper Holloway (Lab)]

My Lords, following the invitation from the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, I do feel obliged to say some very brief words on this group of amendments. I was at the helm of the TUC when we produced an AI manifesto for workers and that manifesto was AI-positive and optimistic about the potential for AI to help us create more satisfying work for workers and also boost productivity if we share those gains fairly. But it was also realistic, because the real experience of workers at the sharp end in terms of technology more generally is that it has often been used to drive, for example, the gig economy that this Bill proudly is looking to tackle in terms of insecurity and low pay.

Workers also experience oppressive surveillance, with Amazon being right at the top of the rogues’ gallery in that respect. And, of course, technologies such as facial recognition have been developed that bake in race discrimination. So, of course workers are right to be wary and concerned. That is why one of the key demands in that AI manifesto was, as the noble Lord has talked about before, the right to a human review when it comes to decisions about hire and fire. The right to a human review is a fundamental human right. Critically, the manifesto called for a voice for workers in agreeing new technology, including AI agreements, so that workers’ concerns are addressed directly and agreements are made with employers about how AI is introduced and used.

Given that, in a very welcome sense, there has been such broad interest and concern expressed in this short debate, can the Minister reassure us that we will be addressing not just problems such as the gig economy that we saw growing in the 20th century but the new challenges of the 21st century, where workers urgently need protection?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, for their amendments in this group and for their thoughtful introductions and contributions to what is clearly a vital and timely discussion around the future of artificial intelligence in the workplace.

Amendments 148, 149 and 150, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, seek to define AI systems in statute, mandate a workplace AI risk and impact assessment, known as a WAIRIA—I was not sure how to say it—and impose statutory consultation duties on employers prior to the deployment of such systems. In my respectful opinion, these measures go a bit too far at this stage.

To begin with the proposed definition of an AI system, I fully accept the need for clarity in legislation, but the definition offered here is overly expansive and risks capturing a vast range of tools, from predictive text and email sorting to payroll systems and basic data analytics. Technology evolves rapidly, and we think that any attempt to lock such a broad and fluid concept into rigid statutory language at this point risks hindering innovation and forcing employers into compliance regimes for systems that may pose no meaningful risk at all.

On the proposal for workplace AI risk and impact assessments, the intentions behind this are understandable. However, the execution here reads a little more like a blueprint for a full-scale regulatory regime rather than a light-touch safeguard. Employers would be expected to carry out detailed documentation, consult staff, assess and monitor impacts on mental health, contractual terms, pay and more, and then repeat that process at least annually or upon any system change—and that is no small task. For large employers it might be possible, but for SMEs it would surely be burdensome and, in many cases, entirely unworkable. Our concern is not with the principle of transparency or fairness but with the disproportionate bureaucratic weight that these provisions would place on businesses, particularly those outside the technology sector, which simply may not have the capacity or technical knowledge to meet such a standard.

The third proposal, which is a statutory duty to consult employees or trade unions at least one month before deploying AI systems, again assumes a degree of foresight and technical certainty that may not always exist in practice. The development and use of AI systems is often iterative, and definitions, use cases and impacts evolve over time. Requiring formal consultation at every turn risks paralysing technological progress and may well deter even the cautious adoption of beneficial systems.

I recognise that the amendments are rooted in a desire to protect workers and uphold ethical standards, but we have to resist the temptation to reach immediately for sweeping, front-loaded legislation in a domain that is still very much in its infancy. Regulation in this space, as I am sure all noble Lords would agree, must be agile, proportionate and grounded in practical reality.

We are entering a new phase where AI is no longer confined to research labs or boardrooms. It is appearing across ordinary workplaces, public and private alike. There are tremendous opportunities to improve productivity, streamline operations and foster collaboration between human workers and AI tools, yet we think many of the proposals in this group—including those seen elsewhere, such as the mandatory appointment of AI officers, rights to personalised algorithmic explanations, opt-in clauses, and statutory principles of fairness and explainability—share a common shortcoming, which is that they attempt to legislate about highly technical and fast-evolving systems with a degree of rigidity that may prove counterproductive.

We on these Benches share the Government’s ambitions to become a world leader in this space, and therefore we must remain mindful of all those factors, as well as of existing protections. Several of these proposals risk duplicating duties already present under UK GDPR, data protection law and various existing employment safeguards. The creation of overlapping, inconsistent or duplicative regimes could confuse employers and regulators alike, all while doing little to prevent truly harmful practices.

While we acknowledge all the opportunities that are potentially offered by AI, we must remain vigilant to the risks that it poses, including algorithmic bias, opacity and decision-making—which we have heard a lot about—and the misuse of personal data. But that vigilance must be coupled with regulatory restraint. We ought to be cautious to not impose premature, overly burdensome rules that stifle innovation and overwhelm well-intentioned employers, particularly in low-risk use cases, such as rota planning, document handling or payroll automation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Barran (Con)]

My Lords, it will amaze the Committee to know that I do not support the amendments in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. This could be a golden moment—I do not want to spoil it before it happens—where the Minister and I are on the same page. We will hold our collective breath.

I will make a few points. It was helpful and genuinely interesting to hear the history, context and examples that the noble Lord gave in relation to collective bargaining, but the fundamental concern that we have is that we find it hard to see how many of those—he talked about zero-hour contracts, for example—really apply to public sector employees across our schools and academies.

Our sense is that, in a world in which the Secretary of State receives advice from the negotiating body—the SSSNB, although I noticed that in my amendment on the Marshalled List I cunningly dropped one of the S’s, which makes it easier to say—the principle that the Secretary of State retains discretion is a good principle to stick to. I think the noble Lord explained that there could be ways in which the Secretary of State could overrule, but I feel that that makes it unnecessarily complicated. Perhaps more importantly, it fundamentally changes the relationship between unions and employers, and risks—perhaps more than risks—creating a much more oppositional relationship, where trade unions on one side and local authorities and trusts on the other are directly opposing one another in these negotiations. I also question whether it is practical, given the nature of our schools landscape.

Can the Minister clarify a couple of points? Amendments 153, 159, 160, 162, 167 and 170—the amendments that would leave out “employment”—would make the clause broader, to cover staff who are under contract rather than under contract of employment. Our concern is that that could cover people such as casual exam invigilators, peripatetic music teachers or staff who are under contract to look after the grounds. I would be grateful if she could confirm that the remit of the Bill refers to “terms of employment” as we understand it to mean.

Amendments 155 to 158 say to leave out “or is not”. This relates to the Secretary of State’s ability to prescribe the SSSNB remit through regulations. As the Bill is currently drafted, the Secretary of State can say that something is or is not to be treated as remuneration or a term of employment. For example, at present it could be said by the Secretary of State that an honorarium payment is not to be treated as being within the SSSNB’s remit. Removing “or is not” would mean the Secretary of State would have to be very specific indeed about what is to be considered remuneration. The current wording allows enough specificity about what is—and, importantly, what is not—within the remit of the SSSNB. We would argue that it is very important that that wording remains as is to avoid unnecessary confusion, tension or debate on its scope.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and my noble friend Lady Barran for their contributions to this debate. I commend the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, for getting rich people and yachts into a debate on the School Support Staff Negotiating Body. That is no mean achievement and she deserves our congratulations. I very much enjoyed the history lesson from the noble Lord, Lord Hendy. I learned a lot and I am very grateful, but I am afraid I have not necessarily arrived at the same conclusions or been swayed by his arguments.

I turn to the amendments. Amendment 153 seeks to confine the School Support Staff Negotiating Body’s remit solely to matters defined under Section 178(2) of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, effectively transforming the body from a consultative forum into a collective bargaining entity. It seems to us that this is a dangerous and fundamental shift. The negotiating body was designed to provide flexible, pragmatic consultation tailored to the diverse and complex nature of school support staff roles across a variety of settings. As we have heard, these range from small rural primaries to large multi-academy trusts. To impose the rigid and often adversarial legal framework of collective bargaining, as defined by industrial law, is to ignore the realities and needs of schools and academies. It risks bogging down negotiations in legal disputes and inflexible procedures that seem wholly unsuited to education.

Secondly, it dangerously extends the remit to include those working under contracts other than contracts of employment. That would create a vague and problematic category that threatens to blur employment relationships, dilute employer responsibility and foster legal uncertainty. Introducing such ambiguity would lead to confusion, disputes and potential litigation, detracting from the core mission of supporting school staff effectively.

Thirdly, Amendment 154, signed also by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, demands a formal dispute resolution process involving conciliation by ACAS and binding arbitration by the Central Arbitration Committee. While dispute resolution is important, mandating binding arbitration at multiple levels removes essential local discretion and flexibility. Schools and trusts require the ability to resolve issues quickly and pragmatically without resorting to protracted and costly arbitration. This amendment risks entrenching lengthy legal processes that are incompatible with the fast-moving and diverse educational establishment and environment.

Additionally, expanding the negotiating body’s remit to include discipline, grievance procedures and any “other matter” agreed by the parties is dangerously vague. It threatens to overload the body with operational matters that should be handled locally by employers, who understand their context best. It risks creating bottlenecks in decision-making, delaying essential actions and ultimately frustrating both staff and management. In essence, these amendments push for a highly legalistic industrial relations model that is inappropriate for school support staff and the complex, varied environments in which they work. It will increase bureaucracy, create inflexibility and heighten the risk of industrial conflict rather than fostering practical co-operation.

Building on these concerns, I will emphasise the significant risk of unmanageable negotiations that other amendments in this group introduce. If the negotiating parties are free to consider any payment, entitlement or matter without clear limits, the scope of discussions could become unwieldy and unfocused. Instead of concentrating on core issues, such as fair remuneration, reasonable terms and meaningful career development, negotiations would risk becoming mired in peripheral or impractical demands. This would risk slowing down the entire process, making it less efficient and ultimately less effective in delivering tangible benefits for school support staff.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Can I seek a point of clarification on the noble Lord’s clarification, which I am very grateful for? Was his argument that extending and future-proofing—I think those were his words—this for the self-employed is because he feels that there will be more self-employed people as a consequence of this Bill?

[Lord Hendy (Lab)]

No, not at all. Growing self-employment has been a trend for the last 20 years, which has perhaps accelerated a bit in the last 10 years. The worry is that school employers may adopt the device of allocating work to the self-employed, rather than to employed persons. If that is the case, there ought to be room for the negotiating body to deal with that issue and the consequences of it. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Baroness Coffey for her amendment and for her thorough and comprehensive introduction to it. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, for her perspective and experience, which are very valuable contributions to this debate.

This is a measured and constructive idea. As we have heard, the social care workforce is highly mobile, and too often valuable training is overlooked or repeated when someone moves to a new role. A centralised system that records training could easily help ensure that skills are recognised across the sector, improve efficiency and reduce unnecessary duplication. As the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, pointed out, in many cases a unique expertise would be brought that deserves to be recognised. It would also show respect for the professional development of care workers. It would signal that their time, effort and learning are worth tracking and carrying forward and are not lost at the point when they change jobs.

I of course acknowledge that the practical arrangements for such a scheme would need careful planning, but the principle is sound. Enabling continuity in workforce development would support retention, raise standards and bring consistency to a fragmented sector. I seriously hope that the Minister is listening.

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to the debate on Amendment 200A. I certainly can assure the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, that I am listening very closely. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, for tabling this amendment, which would require social care providers to ensure that their employees have access to any scheme logging training achievements that Social Work England may establish. Let me say at the outset that I understand the intent of the amendment, which is to give care workers development and extend their skills. As the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe and Lord Palmer, said, this would contribute to what this Bill seeks to do, which is to improve retention, the quality of work and the regard for care workers, and encourage recruitment, among many other very positive outcomes. However, unfortunately, the amendment does not do the job that I know is intended, because Social Work England does not regulate the work of social care workers, but only that of social workers. The amendment as drafted gives us difficulty, but I do completely understand what it tries to do.

Let me respond to a number of the points that were made. There are currently no plans to add to the existing regulation of care workers in the sector undertaken by CQC, but let me refer to the care workforce pathway, which may be of interest and assistance to a number of the noble Lords who contributed. The care workforce pathway is the first universal career structure for the adult social care workforce. On 9 April this year—not so long ago—my department published the expansion and revision of the care workforce pathway, which includes the crucial role categories for registered and deputy managers and personal assistants, as well as the new enhanced care worker role. That speaks to some of the issues the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, raised about the social care workforce. When we talk about the social care workforce, this is a wide group; it is a team of people, and they are all working to support whoever is in receipt of their care.

On the issues raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, and the noble Lord, Lord Palmer—in particular, how we recognise experience and training—I completely take the point. I can give the assurance that the department is already undertaking work on skills and learning and developing a digital skills record, which will provide a permanent and verifiable record of skills and achievements for members of the adult social care workforce. Most importantly, to the point raised by the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, it can be shared with new or potential employers, which can help to reduce unnecessary duplication of training and make taking on new recruits faster, which is key. So, we are all in extreme agreement about the importance of training for the social care workforce, if not about the actual letter of the amendment.

On regulations being able to provide for other matters relating to employment, as we discussed in the previous group in respect of Amendment 185, the Bill already sets out that regulations will be subject to the affirmative procedure in respect of matters that will be included in the negotiating bodies’ remits, which can of course include training and other matters. As a gentle bit of clarification for the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, I was making clear in the previous group that any regulations in this regard are subject to the affirmative procedure. I was not being as specific as I know she hoped I would be, but it is important to make that position a bit clearer. So, on any matter within its remit, the negotiating body could determine employee entitlements, which could be incorporated into relevant workers’ contracts.

The noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, asked about apprenticeships. Just last week, the Department for Education announced the launch of a health and social care foundation apprenticeship, set to begin from August 2025, which I am sure we will all welcome. This will offer young people a paid route into the health and adult social care sectors; I will not be alone in very much welcoming that.

The noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, talked about professional development and transferring across jobs. That principle is certainly being included in our health and social care sector, in respect of the digital skills record. As the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, said, this is a teamwork approach based around whoever needs the care. It requires different skills, which can be transferrable across different jobs, so the noble Lord makes a fair point.

With that, I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, will agree to withdraw Amendment 200A.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Meacher (CB)]

My Lords, I support the noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady. I am not a trade unionist, but I am very aware that there are sectors of the economy that are not unionised. Can the Minister inform the House whether there are sectors that are disadvantaged in terms of wage levels, and whether there are plans to unionise them?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate, which has been very interesting. The noble Lord, Lord Hendy, talked at some length about delivering a new deal for working people. He ranged fairly freely, so I might, too.

Did noble Lords opposite notice that a report published yesterday showed that there are now 150,000 fewer jobs since the Government took power? It is all very well delivering a new deal for working people, but there will be fewer of them, and this Bill will contribute to that. Noble Lords may not have seen it because it has only just come out, but a British Retail Consortium survey has just been published which shows—I am sure we will return to this theme next week—that half of retail directors now think they will reduce hiring, and 70% say the ERB will have a negative impact on their business.

Frankly, I am slightly staggered at the noble Lord’s Amendment 260, which seeks to return us to various EU standards, given that EU unemployment is, of course, generally significantly higher than it is in this country. Is that what the noble Lord aspires to? I am sure he does not, but that is how it looks.

The proposal to create statutory joint industrial councils raises significant concerns, not least the proliferation of new public bodies at a time when government and regulators are already stretched. Each of these councils would require administrative infrastructure, governance mechanisms, sector-specific expertise and ongoing support from both ACAS and the Secretary of State. This approach risks duplicating existing frameworks. We already have voluntary collective bargaining structures, recognised trade unions and sectoral engagement mechanisms in many industries. Superimposing a statutory model could complicate rather than enhance industrial relations, particularly in sectors where informal or local agreements are working effectively.

There is also the issue of flexibility. The statutory model risks creating rigid sectoral definitions that may not reflect the realities of modern hybrid or cross-sector employment. The labour market today does not always fit neatly into traditional categories, and it is unclear how the Secretary of State, even with ACAS guidance, would determine sectors without inadvertently excluding or misclassifying employers and workers. We must not overlook the potential for conflict or delay. Setting up these councils, negotiating procedures and achieving consensus across large and diverse sectors could slow down progress on pay and conditions, rather than speeding it up.

That is not an argument against collective bargaining. It is an argument for targeted, effective solutions that reflect the complexity of today’s economy, not a revival of structures drawn from legislation that is nearly half a century old. The world has changed. Where stronger bargaining is needed, let us work through existing mechanisms and invest in enforcement, rather than defaulting to the creation of statutory councils that may struggle to function as intended. I look forward to hearing from the Minister.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

I thank my noble friends Lord Hendy and Lord Barber of Ainsdale for Amendments 203, 257, 260 and 322. I hope, despite my noble friend Lord Hendy’s concerns, that he recognises that this Bill is a major step forward in delivering a new deal for working people, exactly in the way our manifesto and the King’s Speech set out. I would also say that this is only the first step in our proposals, as we have made clear all along that the “make work pay” programme will, over time, roll out to a whole set of other issues we have flagged up as we have gone through this debate.

Turning to Amendment 203 in the name of my noble friend Lord Hendy, I am pleased to be having the debate on sectoral collective bargaining and to set out the Government’s commitment to supporting it through the introduction of fair pay agreements in social care and the school support staff negotiating body, which we have just debated in detail. We want to ensure that the labour market works for everyone. A key aspect of this is allowing workers to participate in collective bargaining to improve pay and conditions. However, where labour markets are operating effectively or where existing collective agreements are working well, the Government recognise that sectoral collective bargaining may not be the best solution—I think this was the point the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, was making.

The amendment would enable the Secretary of State to establish statutory joint industrial councils in unspecified areas without parliamentary scrutiny or appropriate safeguards. We are committed to starting with fair pay agreements in the social care sector to address the stark and specific issues in the vital sector, which we have already debated. As part of our ongoing policy work, we are exploring how future sectors could benefit from sectoral collective bargaining. However, we first want to learn from this process to improve our policy approach and ensure that future sectoral collective bargaining arrangements most effectively respond to the complexities of the modern workforce. In the meantime, I assure my noble friend that we are committed to supporting sectoral collective bargaining and recognise the positive contribution it can make to the British economy.

Amendment 257 in the name of my noble friend Lord Hendy would add duties of promoting collective bargaining to ACAS’s remit. An existing ACAS code of practice provides guidance on the disclosure of information to trade unions for collective bargaining purposes. I have listened carefully to what my noble friend said, and I am afraid we will have to disagree on this. We do not support the amendment; we think it is important that ACAS maintains its independence and impartiality between employers and unions. We are concerned that the current status could be compromised by this amendment.

On Amendment 260 in the name of my noble friend Lord Hendy, we have debated the school support staff negotiating body and the social care negotiating bodies. A benefit of these sectoral bodies will be broad sectoral agreements. We expect that many workers in these sectors will be able to benefit from collective agreements for the first time. We intend to learn from the first fair pay agreement process in social care and the SSSNB, before considering rolling out agreements in other areas, as I have said.

Additionally, this amendment requires the Secretary of State to consult on and bring forward this action plan within six months. It is important that such policy matters have enough time for consideration, and we are keen that employer organisations and trade unions prioritise the consultations committed to in Make Work Pay, which will follow Royal Assent to the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, this has been a most interesting debate. It is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, even if he does not agree with my amendment in this group. Not that my noble friend Lady Coffey needs any defending, but I think she developed her theme admirably, which is surely the point of our being here. I thank my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough for introducing our noble friend Lady Noakes’s amendments, and for his excellent historical perspective. I thank my noble friends—perhaps I should call them my noble comrades —Lord Leigh, Lady Lawlor, Lord Moynihan and Lady Coffey for their contributions.

This clause may seem straightforward, and even beneficial at first glance, but its practical and legal implications reveal it to be unnecessary, burdensome, ideologically charged and fraught with uncertainty. For these reasons, it should be removed from the Bill. First, it is important—others have made this point—to acknowledge that workers’ rights to join trade unions are already comprehensively protected by our existing legal framework. These protections are well established in legislation such as the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, referred to by my noble friend Lady Lawlor, and the Employment Rights Act 1996.

These rights are well understood by workers, employers and unions alike, and information on these rights is widely available through multiple channels, including unions themselves, ACAS and legal advisers. Mandating a new written statement does not create or clarify any new rights; it simply duplicates what is already clear, adding unnecessary complexity without addressing any real problem.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

We can have a long discussion about that, but if we are talking about mandates, it may well be argued that probably Baroness Thatcher did not have that kind of mandate either. The fact is that we won that election with a huge majority, and I am very sorry that the party opposite lost so badly. They might want to reflect a little bit more on why that was, because some of the issues that noble Lords have been talking about in relation to the state of our economy are exactly what we inherited from the previous Government. Those issues are absolutely the result of that Government’s economic policies and not ours. We have been taking great steps to improve the situation. While I am on that issue, I should say that, as a result of this Government’s actions, we had the fastest-growing economy in the G7 at the start of this year; we have done three trade deals in three weeks, with India, the US and the EU; interest rates have been cut four times—

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The Minister is aware, of course, that interest rates are independently managed by the Bank of England.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

I make my case. The only reason those interest rates were cut was that our economy has been improving. Some £63 billion of private investment was announced at the investment summit last year. Introducing this Bill within 100 days will boost protections and quality of work for the lowest-paid, raising living standards across the country and creating opportunities for all.

I turn to the actual amendments. Amendments 205 and 207, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, would introduce exemptions to this measure based on the size of the business. The new duty on employers to inform all employees of the right to join a union is a key part of the Government’s wider commitment to strengthen workers’ voices in the workplace, enhancing their representation and ultimately improving working conditions through increased trade union membership and participation. Making exemptions of this kind risks creating a two-tier system in which some workers benefit from this important information while others do not, based purely on the size of their employer. We are committed to striking a fair and proportionate balance, ensuring that workers are aware of their rights without placing undue burdens on employers.

The statement will be provided at the start of employment, alongside the written statement of particulars, which employers are already required to give under Section 1 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 and on a prescribed basis. Therefore, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, that we do not believe that this is a particularly significant extra burden to justify exempting certain employers because of their size, because they already have to give that information anyway.

The noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, and others asked about the frequency. We will consult on the specific details, such as the frequency, manner, form and content of the statement before it is outlined in secondary legislation, and I can let noble Lords know that that will be via the negative procedure. We will particularly encourage input from both businesses and unions of all sizes to share their views.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My answer was specifically about Clause 55.

Amendment 206, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, would remove the compulsory element of the proposals, making it optional for employers to inform workers of their rights to join a union. To be clear, this is not about necessitating union membership but about ensuring that workers are aware of their rights and can make an informed decision about whether to engage. We want to empower workers to take a more active role in protecting their rights, and, where they choose, to participate in collective bargaining to improve their working conditions. Access to clear and accurate information is fundamental to that. This amendment would seriously weaken this measure by allowing employers to simply ignore the duty, defeating its policy intent entirely. It is vital that the right to union membership is made accessible to all workers as intended, that it is communicated regularly, and that employers are under a firm obligation to do so.

Amendment 208, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, would remove the requirement for employers to issue a statement of trade union rights on a prescribed basis. We are legislating for ongoing reminders of the right to join a trade union to reflect the reality of the workplace. New employers may miss information at the start of employment or change roles over time within the same organisation. Limiting the duty to the start of employment would also exclude existing staff, who equally deserve access to that information.

This statement of the right to trade union membership is important in fostering worker engagement and meaningful dialogue between unions and employers. Ongoing reminders are a key part of this measure. The Secretary of State will be able to set the frequency of this notification. This will be, as I have said, outlined in secondary legislation, subject to public consultation, and we invite interested parties to provide us with their views on this matter when we launch the consultation.

On the wider issue, the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, urged us to consult more. I can assure him that these proposals have been subject to extensive consultation, and we are continuing to consult on them. I can also tell the noble Lord that we had a very constructive meeting with the Federation of Small Businesses.

Finally, I turn to the clause itself. Clause 55 introduces a new legal duty on employers to inform workers of their right to join a union. Employers will be required to issue this statement at the start of employment, alongside the written statement of particulars, which I commented on earlier. There is currently no requirement in law for employers to notify their workers of the right to trade union membership. This lack of awareness may be contributing to the falling union membership and reduced worker participation in collective bargaining that we have been discussing. This duty intends to address this gap, ensuring that workers are better informed of this right and helping to strengthen the collective voice in the workplace and enhance their representation. This delivers on the Government’s commitment to improve working conditions through increased trade union membership and participation. Specific details of this measure, including the frequency, form, content and manner of the notification, will be set out in secondary legislation, as I have said. Therefore, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment and I urge that Clause 55 stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Just to press the point on the implementation plan, I am sure the Minister saw yesterday that the OECD downgraded growth forecasts for this country. Obviously, it blamed the global trade picture for a lot of that downgrade, but it also talked about business certainty in this country—or the lack of it. She herself has just acknowledged that businesses need certainty. The OECD is saying this, this is not just us alleging it. Will she please commit to picking up the pace when it comes to delivering this implementation plan and delivering it as soon as possible?

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, I am fully aware that it would help to see the implementation plan and, as I said, we are working at pace to get it to your Lordships as soon as we can.

--- Later in debate ---

We also, I hope, agree that first and foremost the best remedy would be to ensure that reasonable access actually happens, rather than just introducing financial penalties. I am very conscious that Ministers have been extremely generous with their time. I wonder whether, in this territory, there could be an agreement to have a meeting with unions and other stakeholders so that that confidence can be built.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Before the noble Baroness sits down, she has had a go at Amazon twice tonight. I wonder whether it might be of interest to her to know that it employs 75,000 people in the UK. No one who works there is on a zero-hours contract. The minimum annual starting salary is between £28,000 and £30,000. It provides flexible working opportunities from day one, including term-time contracts, which it is currently advertising on the radio. That, obviously, allows parents, grandparents and carers guaranteed leave during school holidays. Since 2010, Amazon has invested more than £64 billion in this country and £12 billion in the last 12 months. It also supports a network of about 100,000 UK-based small and medium-sized businesses. It may not be perfect on unions in the noble Baroness’s terms, but it deserves a bit more respect.

[Baroness O'Grady of Upper Holloway (Lab)]

I am sure the noble Lord opposite would agree that those workers who joined a union and wanted to have a union voice at work to improve their pay and conditions deserve respect, too, and that union-busting techniques and approaches to avoid even meeting unions to come to an agreement is, frankly, unacceptable in a modern, civilised society.

Employment Rights Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 10th June 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

213AA: Clause 56, page 78, line 15 at end insert—
“(2A) Where an access agreement relates to a hospital (within the meaning of section 275 of the National Health Service Act 2006), physical entry may be refused where—(a) patient safety, infection control, or clinical operations would be adversely affected,(b) the access purpose can reasonably be achieved by alternative means of communication, or(c) access would unreasonably disrupt urgent or time- sensitive medical activity.(2B) In determining whether access is reasonable in the context of a hospital, the Central Arbitration Committee must give significant weight to the factors set out in subsection (2A).”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment makes special provision for hospital workplaces, allowing physical access to be refused where it would impact patient safety, infection control, or clinical operations, or where access purposes can be met by alternative means. It requires the Central Arbitration Committee to give significant weight to these factors when considering access in hospital settings.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, this amendment would introduce necessary and proportionate safeguards to ensure that patient safety, clinical operations and infection control were not compromised by well-intentioned but potentially disruptive physical access to hospital environments by trade union representatives. Hospitals are not ordinary workplaces. They are places where critical decisions are made every minute, where vulnerable patients receive life-saving care and where medical professionals must operate in conditions that are tightly controlled in terms of both hygiene and procedure. Permitting physical access to union representatives who are not part of the clinical team and not governed by the same professional or ethical codes introduces risks that simply cannot be ignored.

These are not theoretical concerns. Infection control protocols exist precisely because hospitals deal daily with immunocompromised patients, open surgical wounds and the spread of dangerous pathogens. Entry by any individual not trained in and accountable to those protocols could result in the transmission of infections, the contamination of sterile areas or the unintended exposure of patients to harm. Moreover, hospital environments are highly sensitive to disruption. In intensive care units, emergency departments, operating theatres and maternity wards, even small delays or distractions can have life-or-death consequences. The presence of non-essential personnel in those spaces risks delaying clinical teams, congesting movement corridors, or interfering with time-critical procedures.

Physical access is not just a logistical matter; it can be a direct threat to a hospital’s ability to function safely and effectively. The amendment does not seek to deny trade unions the ability to communicate with members or fulfil their lawful functions. On the contrary, it would explicitly allow access to be withheld only where the access purpose could reasonably be achieved by alternative means; and in the 21st century, such alternatives, as we heard last week, are abundant. Virtual meetings, secure digital communications, designated liaison officers or scheduled engagement in non-clinical areas would all be viable channels for meaningful trade union engagement.

Hospitals are already under enormous pressure, so it is neither safe nor fair to expect them to open their most sensitive environments when those same objectives can be achieved by safer, more appropriate methods. Hospitals also bear legal and regulatory duties that cannot be suspended. Clinical professionals are legally obliged to safeguard patients and maintain secure environments. To require hospitals to grant physical access to non-clinical actors where such access could conflict with those duties would place hospital management in a difficult, nay impossible, position, risking litigation, regulatory sanction and, above all, the trust of the public.

The amendment further recognises the importance of proportionality. It does not seek to impose an outright prohibition; it would simply require the Central Arbitration Committee, when deciding on access disputes, to give significant weight to those clinical and operational factors. That is the right balance, respecting the legitimate role of trade unions while upholding the sanctity of hospital care. To oppose this amendment would be to ignore the distinct and high-stakes nature of hospital environments. No one disputes the value of union representation, but the right to organise must never override the duty to protect.

Hospitals are not platforms for industrial theatre; they are sanctuaries of healing staffed by professionals who need order, safety and focus to save lives. We have a duty to shield them from any policy that risks disrupting that mission. I urge the Committee to support the amendment and uphold the principle that access, however important, must never come at the expense of patient welfare. I beg to move.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, for his amendment and I hope, perhaps, that the lack of contributions means that we will make some good progress in Committee today.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

We have been making progress.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

On the noise from a sedentary position, I mean in numerical terms, if not in substantive debate.

As the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, just outlined, Amendment 213AA seeks to makes specific provisions for access into hospital workplaces by specifying circumstances in which access may be reasonably refused. It also requires the CAC to consider and give more weight to these factors when deciding on access.

As we discussed last week, the Secretary of State will be able, through regulations, to set the circumstances that the CAC must take into account when making decisions on access, including potentially complex access arrangements in workplaces such as hospitals and other healthcare settings. These areas of detail will be subject to public consultation before the regulations are made and we will invite all interested parties to provide their views on these matters when we launch our consultation.

It is a complex policy area that will involve detailed practical considerations. It is not as though, at the moment, we do not have strong and healthy engagement with a number of different trade unions in all manner of healthcare settings, including hospitals. We have trade union access, involvement and activity in complex workplaces, including hospitals. Special consideration is given to the importance of keeping them sterile and safe, particularly for those who have immunocompromised conditions and, indeed, anybody who is a patient in that setting. This can and has been achieved, and it is perfectly reasonable for the CAC, following consultation, to make regulations that set this. As I said, this is not a policy area that is not already well rehearsed and understood.

The noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, is right that hospitals are particularly special settings but they are also workplaces. The NHS employs large numbers of people and has a very mature industrial relations framework within it. It is certainly not implausible that, in consultation with all interested parties, the CAC could come to a perfectly reasonable compromise on access.

The Government also feel that it is not appropriate to make specific provisions for just this one kind of workplace—hospitals—prior to consultation. We are talking about hospital workplaces as opposed to, say, general practitioner or dental surgeries or other areas where you have regard to clinical safety and the sorts of considerations that the noble Lord talked about. Given that, I ask him to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for his answer, but a little disappointed. His words largely give away why the Government should accept this amendment. I believe he just used the phrase “reasonable compromise” with regard to the Central Arbitration Committee, whereas the amendment just says

“must give significant weight to the factors set out in subsection (2A)”.

The practical impact of both those phrases is much the same.

So I am disappointed that the Government have chosen to reject this amendment, which is modest, carefully constructed and aimed at protecting one of our most vital public services. We were not asking for a sweeping exclusion, nor undermining the rights of trade unions or seeking—to use the noble Lord’s phraseology—to restrict involvement. We proposed a targeted safeguard that simply recognises the unique, high-risk nature of hospital environments. I will not press the point now, but we reserve the right to return to this in due course. For now, I beg leave to withdraw.

Amendment 213AA withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

215ZA: After Clause 56, insert the following new Clause—
“Section 56: consultation requirement(1) Before section 56 comes into force, the Secretary of State must consult such persons as they consider appropriate, including—(a) representatives of trade unions, and(b) representatives of employers,on the use of digital communication methods as part of access agreements under section 56.(2) The Secretary of State must publish the outcome of that consultation.(3) Section 56 may not come into force until the outcome of the consultation under subsection (2) has been published.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Secretary of State to consult on the role of digital communication in trade union access agreements and to publish the outcome before the relevant provisions come into force.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 215ZA is in my name and seeks to insert a new clause following Clause 56. This amendment would require the Secretary of State to consult relevant stakeholders, including representatives of both employers and trade unions, on the use of digital communication methods as part of trade union access agreements under Clause 56. Furthermore, it would require that the outcome of that consultation be published and that the provisions of Clause 56 may not come into force until that has happened.

Let me say at the outset that this is a moderate, practical and entirely necessary amendment. It does not challenge the principle of union access. It does not frustrate the core intent of the legislation. What it does is inject a degree of transparency, rigour and, crucially, consent into a provision that, as it stands, risks doing significant unintended harm to employers and employees alike.

I refer to the remarks made last week by the noble Lord, Lord Katz, during Committee. I thought they were illuminating and, frankly, somewhat concerning. The noble Lord assured us that the Government intend to consult further on the digital provisions. But here is the critical point: the legislation as currently drafted allows Clause 56 to come into force before that consultation has occurred and before any regulations are laid. In effect, this Committee is being asked to pass a framework of legal obligations that have real-word consequences for access to workplaces and digital systems without knowing the rules that will underpin them. This is legislation in reverse, because it enables powers first and critical definitions and safeguards later.

Let us take the words of the noble Lord, Lord Katz, directly. He said that

“the precise details of how this will work in practice will be set out in secondary legislation following further consultation”.

But secondary legislation, as we have discussed many times over the course of this Bill and others that this Government are putting through, is not subject to the same scrutiny as primary legislation. It is not amendable. It can be laid quietly and approved via negative procedures. That is why we must build the consultation obligation directly into the primary legislation. Without it, we risk leaving employers, particularly small and medium-sized employers, exposed to obligations they neither understand nor have had the opportunity to influence.

The noble Lord acknowledged that digital access was not included in the original drafting of the Bill and so was not debated during the Commons Committee stage. It was inserted at a late stage in the legislative process. When pressed on this by my noble friend Lady Coffey last week, the noble Lord could offer no justification for the timing or the rationale behind that late change. Instead, we were told that

“in 2025, the idea that access to a workforce would not include digital channels is, frankly, fanciful”.—[Official Report, 5/6/25; cols. 984 and 985.]

Again, those were the noble Lord’s words.

That may well be the case, but policy made on assumptions and generalities is not good policy. What exactly will “digital access” mean in practice? Will unions be allowed to email employees directly? Will they be granted access to internal mailing lists? What about secure internal platforms or workplace intranets? Will employers be compelled to share employee contact details or act as intermediaries in the distribution of union materials? What safeguards will exist to protect commercially sensitive information, particularly in small firms that operate on a single device or a shared system?

My noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley also raised a very pertinent point last week. He said:

“The Government are asking the House of Lords tonight to pass legislation that will allow a third person the right to access an employee’s computer … without any controls, references or parameters”.—[Official Report, 5/6/25; cols. 984-85.]


That is not mere rhetoric but a credible reading of the Bill in its current form. If that is not the Government’s intent, we need clarity in law, not just reassurance from the Dispatch Box.

The noble Lord, Lord Katz, tried to deflect concerns by pointing to data protection legislation, but as many in this Committee know only too well, data protection laws regulate the use of personal data; they do not in themselves govern the parameters of access rights under trade union law. Nor do they address the central concern here: that employees and unions need agreed, defined rules of engagement for digital contact in the context of access rights. Indeed, the Government’s apparent position is that all this can be worked out later. That is simply not acceptable. When legislation interferes with the operation of businesses, the integrity of secure systems and the balance of power between employers and unions, it is not enough to say, “Trust us to sort it out in regulations”.

Let me also address the claim that consultation will happen eventually. Of course we welcome that promise, but good process means consulting before rules take effect, not after. It means asking those affected what is reasonable before forcing them to comply, and that is all this amendment does. It would require the Secretary of State to consult relevant stakeholders, including trade unions and employers; that the outcome of that consultation be published in the interests of transparency and trust; and that the relevant part of the legislation, Clause 56, cannot come into force until that is done. That would give everyone fair notice. It would ensure meaningful engagement and prevent the scenario we are currently hurtling towards: a system through which access rights could be imposed by the Central Arbitration Committee, including digital access, without any shared understanding of what that entails.

Access must be delivered in a way that is workable, proportionate and appropriate in each workplace context. In many modern workplaces, digital contact is indeed the most effective route, but in some environments, especially among some SMEs, it also represents a point of vulnerability both for the operations and for data security. I beg to move.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business and Trade and Department for Science, Information and Technology (Baroness Jones of Whitchurch) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, for Amendment 215ZA, which seeks to commit the Government to consult with trade unions and representatives of employers on the detail of Clause 56, which covers trade union right of access. In particular, it would require the Government to consult on the use of digital communication as part of access agreements.

I can confirm that the Government have already committed to consulting with both trade unions and employers’ representatives on the framework and conditions of access, including on the details of that digital access. I can confirm that we will not bring forward secondary legislation on this before we have consulted. While I am grateful to the noble Lord for tabling this amendment, and I look forward to the upcoming debates on Schedule 6 and Clause 57, I must ask him to withdraw his amendment.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

I can assure the noble Baroness that all the main business organisations are consulted as a matter of course, and many of our consultations are available more widely. I take on board her question about the black community and I will ensure that, where it has representative organisations, they are included.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for her answer. Just to be clear, as I understand it, that means that this aspect of the Bill will not be commenced until consultation has taken place. As my noble friend has just suggested, this begs the question of exactly who will be consulted and how. I look forward to hearing more from the Minister on that. I do not expect her to be able to answer that now, but it would be very welcome if she could outline the details of this consultation in a letter in due course. However, I am grateful that she has committed to having the consultation before the commencement of this provision. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 215ZA withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

215AZZA: After inserted paragraph 13A(5), insert—
“(5A) Where the CAC is satisfied that changes to the workforce materially affect the composition of the bargaining unit, it may direct the employer to provide updated specified information before the close of any ballot.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment enables the CAC to request updated workforce information from the employer where there have been material changes, ensuring that the ballot reflects the current composition of the bargaining unit.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for her explanation of the amendments, particularly the government amendments. However, she argued that this should have been something of the nature of a general debate. The reason why the amendments were degrouped in the other cases is because they all relate to the government amendments, which the Government are trying to pass off as technical when they are anything but. This deserved a discrete debate and that is what it is going to get. I will have to speak at some length, because there is a great deal to cover, for which I apologise in advance.

I will start with Amendment 215AZZA, which is essential to ensure that the union recognition ballot remains fair and truly representative of the bargaining unit at the time of the ballot. The Government’s current position, which locks in workforce data as of the application date and refuses to permit updates, rests on a false premise, and that is that the workplace is static and unchanging; this is simply not the case.

Many industries, from hospitality and retail to logistics and manufacturing, experience significant changes in their workplace composition over time. Employees leave, new workers are hired and entire teams can be restructured in response to market demand or seasonal shifts. By refusing to allow the CAC to request updated workforce information, the Government’s approach risks ballots that are fundamentally out of date—an electoral exercise held not on the actual workforce but on a ghost workforce that no longer exists.

Our amendment would give the CAC the power to direct employers to provide updated workforce information where material changes occur, allowing the ballot to reflect the current reality. This is not a matter of administrative tidiness. It protects workers from having union recognition based on outdated data imposed on them or from being excluded from the democratic process entirely because they joined the company after the arbitrary cut-off.

Furthermore, the CAC has a proven track record of acting promptly and impartially to ensure that ballots are fair and accurate, so the amendment would strengthen rather than weaken its role in protecting workers’ democratic rights. Without this power, the Government’s framework risks disfranchising many workers and undermining the confidence in the entire union recognition process. I have to say that noble Lords opposite frequently cite democratic concerns about current employment law, and if they are serious and not just paying mere lip service to that notion, they should back the amendment and the others to which I am speaking.

Amendment 215AZZB seeks to correct a fundamental injustice that is embedded in the Government’s Amendment 215A. The Government are excluding any worker who joins the bargaining unit after the application day from participating in the recognition ballot. This exclusion is indefensible. It denies newly hired employees any say in a process that will directly impact their working conditions, their representation and potentially their relationship with their employer. The principle at stake is simple: democratic fairness requires that those affected by a decision have the opportunity to participate in making that decision. To exclude workers based solely on an arbitrary application date denies them this right. It is not, as the Minister asserted just now, fair; it risks imposing union recognition —or, conversely, denying it—on employees who are not allowed to express their views.

In sectors where employee turnover is high or where the workforce expands rapidly due to seasonal demand, the Government’s approach risks disfranchising a significant portion of the workforce. These workers are often the most vulnerable and most in need of representation. Our amendment would ensure that all workers employed within the bargaining unit up to the close of the ballot would be eligible to vote. This aligns with the recognition process, with democratic principles and with the reality of modern employment patterns. To deny these workers a voice is to undermine the legitimacy of the entire process.

Amendment 215AZZC seeks to reinforce the need for fairness by ensuring that newly hired workers are not automatically excluded from the recognition ballot, provided they are employed before the ballot concludes. Again, we believe it is untenable for the Government to argue that workers hired after the application date should have no say in a process that determines their representative status and the terms and conditions that govern their work. In industries that are characterised by rapid hiring, seasonal peaks or unpredictable labour needs, the workforce on the application date may bear little resemblance to the workforce at the time of the ballot. By allowing all workers employed up to the ballot’s close to vote, we uphold principles of inclusivity and fairness, ensuring that this ballot truly reflects the views of those it affects.

Amendment 215AZZCA recognises the realities of sectors characterised by high seasonal or cyclical employment volatility, such as retail, hospitality and logistics. These industries often see dramatic fluctuations in employee numbers, with staff numbers sometimes doubling or halving within a matter of weeks or months. The Government’s proposals fail to take this volatility into account. They impose rigid cut-offs that disfranchise workers who join after the application day, even when their numbers materially affect the bargaining unit’s composition. This is not a marginal issue. In such sectors, the workforce on the application day may represent only a fraction of the employees who will work there over the coming months.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Lucas (Con)]

I understand that, but it still requires something in the Bill to allow a minimum number. We can return to that matter on Report.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 215AZZA (to Amendment 215A) withdrawn.

Employment Rights Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 10th June 2025 Lords Chamber

Debate on whether Clause 60 should stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to express my deep concern about the inclusion of the clause repealing Section 116B of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, and to urge that it be removed in its entirety from the Bill. The clause does not merely tidy up legislation or modernise outdated provisions, it seeks to dismantle a vital safeguard that upholds the principle that taxpayer funds should not be used to subsidise the activities of private organisations, no matter how long-standing or worthy those organisations may be.

Section 116B was introduced to ensure that where public sector employers agree to deduct trade union subscriptions directly from employees’ pay, a service commonly known as check-off, the administrative cost of doing so is reimbursed by the union. This is a reasonable and proportionate expectation. After all, unions are private membership organisations. It is not the role of the taxpayer to underwrite the cost of maintaining their finances, especially when alternative methods of payment, such as direct debit, are readily available and commonly used by the unions themselves. Repealing this provision would, in effect, shift the cost burden for this private financial arrangement on to public sector employers and, by extension, the taxpayer. These are costs that would be no longer recoverable, whether they involve payroll staff time, IT systems or administrative oversight.

Although each individual deduction might seem minor, across large public bodies—for example, the NHS, schools, local authorities or Whitehall departments —these costs accumulate. The public purse, as noble Lords opposite do not need reminding, is already under immense pressure and it should not be expected to shoulder this additional financial responsibility. There is a very real risk that this repeal, however well-intentioned, would result in taxpayers unknowingly subsidising trade union operations.

Moreover, Section 116B introduced a measure of transparency and accountability into the system. It ensured that unions have to make active choices about how they collect their subscriptions and whether to invest in alternative systems, such as direct debit. It also gave employees greater awareness of and control over how they supported union activity. Removing this provision without putting any comparable mechanisms in place risks eroding that transparency. It suggests a return to a one-size-fits-all approach in which the employer bears the cost and the worker has little visibility over the arrangements.

There is also the issue of equity. Public sector employers are distinct in that they are funded by the state and their accountability is to the taxpayer. In the private sector where check-off arrangements still exist, employers and unions are free to negotiate the terms of such systems, including where the cost should be reimbursed. Why should public employers uniquely be placed in a position where they must provide these services at their own expense without any form of compensation? It is a contradiction that undermines the rationale for removing Section 116B.

The proposed repeal would also remove the flexibility that currently exists in the system. Under Section 116B, the Secretary of State has the power to make regulations specifying exceptions, such as for devolved Administrations or specific categories of public bodies. That allows the provision to be adapted in a way that respects local autonomy; for example, in Wales, where different arrangements have been supported by the devolved Government. By removing the entire provision, this clause strips away that flexibility and imposes a blunt uniformity that does not reflect the complexities of public sector governance across the United Kingdom.

Finally, we must consider the broader message that this repeal sends. It risks creating the impression, fair or not, that trade unions are being afforded preferential treatment and being allowed to impose their operating costs on to the taxpayer without scrutiny. At a time when public trust in institutions is fragile and when every pound of public spending is rightly under the microscope, this is a deeply unhelpful signal to send.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business and Trade and Department for Science, Information and Technology (Baroness Jones of Whitchurch) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, for posing arguments against Clause 60 standing part of the Bill.

This clause seeks to repeal Section 15 of the Trade Union Act 2016 by amending the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 to remove Section 116B. Section 15 required trade unions to pay public sector employers where they administer payroll deductions for trade union subscriptions, known as check-off. It further required that this service be made available only where workers have the option to pay their union subscriptions by other means.

The Trade Union (Deduction of Union Subscriptions from Wages in the Public Sector) Regulations 2024 were introduced as a cost-saving measure, with estimated annual savings of £1.6 million, totalling £12 million over the following 10 years. However, as the impact assessment acknowledged, the regulations would bring a cumulative cost of £17 million to public sector employers and trade unions over that period. This is far higher than the estimated cost savings.

The current system places bureaucratic processes on both trade unions and public sector employers that can be clearly simplified to support productive trade union relations. There should be no costs to employers associated with withdrawing the check-off regulations. Employers will have the choice to continue with or amend any agreed arrangements regarding the deduction of union subscriptions from their employees’ wages, in discussion with their recognised trade unions.

We feel that there is a need to simplify this process, which is what our proposals intend to do. While I thank the noble Lord for this very short debate, I urge him to support this clause, for the reasons I have set out.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank the Minister for her explanation, although I am not particularly persuaded.

Clause 60 agreed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Goddard of Stockport (LD)]

My Lords, these amendments, proposed by the noble Lords, Lord Hendy and Lord Woodley, are I think as people have outlined. I have been on the wrong end of that legislation on a number of events—official strikes, unofficial strikes and secondary picketing. As a shop steward you are responsible for taking those actions for a company; there are consequences and I have suffered consequences from that.

It is not that I agree with the rights being taken away, but I think times have changed and unions have moved on now. The right of anybody to remove their labour, if they are pushed to it, should be a universal right, but it should be used very sparingly and in very special circumstances. It is all very well rushing to legislation and quoting the European Court, but we live in the real world and when things happen to people at work and people are treated badly, sometimes we have not got time to go and contact the KC and get case law. We just do the things that we used to do and take that action straight away. Sometimes that resolves the matter fairly quickly, because a reasonable employer will see the action you have taken as a direct result of another manager doing something that was not in agreement. So I get the thrust of this.

I have had notes typed and I have been writing my own notes, but I think the top and bottom for me is the amendment is seeking to restore a trade union’s flexibility in choosing which members to ballot and removing some procedural requirements and obligations to notify employees in advance of ballots. I think that time has gone as well.

Reinstating rights for prison officers, the group currently subject to significant legal limitations, is one I would like to slightly explore. The intent behind these amendments is to strengthen trade union rights and promote collective bargaining. The concern is potentially around impact, industrial relations and public safety, especially with the actions of prison officers. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, and to the Government that the way to protect prison officers is not to enshrine the right to strike but to remove the reasons why they would want to strike. That really is about improving the Victorian conditions that we have in 2025 prison systems, where people go into prison and come out worse criminals or nine out of 10 as drug addicts or whatever.

Governments, instead of trying to give extra law for prison officers, should be looking at the root cause. I know there is a prison plan being built and we are trying to get more education into prisons—if you want to speak to the noble Lord, Lord Timpson, he can give you chapter and verse on that, as I have listened to him doing. I hear why it is being done, I understand why it is being done and I know that it is not got a hope in somewhere else of getting through. But I thank the noble Lord for bringing it forward, because sometimes it is good to realise that things that we used to do are perhaps today not even politically correct to do. Human rights and the rights of people who go every day to work, to earn a living and support their family, need airing and need protecting. I know this is a probing amendment, but I thank the noble Lord for bringing it because it is interesting. Now and again it is good to be reminded of how it used to be and how it can be now.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I join the general thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Hendy. I thought it was a most interesting introduction and I learned a great deal. I particularly liked the phrase “constitutional benediction”, which I am planning to nick—although not in this context, because I rise to join the Minister and express my clear and firm opposition to the proposed new clause after Clause 64. It seeks to enshrine in statute a so-called positive right to strike even in breach of contract, as opposed—if I follow the noble Lord’s arguments correctly—to the freedom to strike. It strikes me as somewhat semantic in terms of the practical outcome, which I suspect is an argument we will hear again.

Let us be absolutely frank about what the amendment would entail. It would insert into the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 a wholly unprecedented and therefore dangerously broad provision that every worker shall have the right to take industrial action, whether or not it is in breach of any contract. It would not be subject to employer agreement or tethered to lawful procedures but would be an absolute statutory right to break contract terms and withdraw labour.

Industrial action, particularly strike action, is obviously a serious matter, and I think everybody would agree on that. It affects not only the employer but the public, the economy and, critically, the most vulnerable in society, who rely on public services. That is why we believe our existing legal framework strikes a careful balance. It protects the right to strike but does so within clear procedures and obligations: balloting requirements, notice periods and protections against unlawful disruption. This amendment would ride roughshod over all that.

What does it mean to have a right to breach your contract, regardless of process or proportionality? Surely, that is not a right; that is just carte blanche. This provision would displace the carefully constructed framework that governs how industrial action can be taken lawfully and responsibly. It would empower disruption without accountability. The purpose of employment law is not to tilt the playing field in one direction or another but to ensure that fairness, order and mutual obligations between employers and workers are respected. The right to withdraw labour must remain conditional on lawful procedures and not granted in the abstract, regardless of impact or legality.

Moreover, the proposed amendment would likely bring the UK into direct conflict with established contract law and create endless legal uncertainty. If workers are told that they have a statutory right to strike, even in breach of a contract, what does that mean for essential services, public safety, or the ability of schools, hospitals and transport systems to function with any consistency?

I do not think we should be mistaken. This amendment is not some minor clarification; it is a fundamental rewrite of the basis of workplace relations. It would undermine the principle that contracts entered into freely carry obligations and it would sweep away the balance between rights and responsibilities. I also have to ask: once a principle of contract breaking is established, how long before that is used as precedent in other contractual disputes?

Nobody denies that workers must be able to organise, speak up, bargain collectively and act where necessary. That is already protected in the legal framework. This amendment would take a sledgehammer to that balance. It would replace legal clarity, we believe, with legal radicalism, and accountability with absolutism. For those reasons, I urge the Government to reject the amendment.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Hendy for tabling Amendment 238, which would establish a broad statutory right to strike. I thank him also for our constructive and amicable meeting a few days ago and for his impressive tour of international conventions this evening. I have to say to him that anything I subsequently say does not mean that I do not take our international obligations seriously. In fact, in this increasingly uncertain world, we have more of an obligation to work collaboratively across countries. I think there is a lot to be gained from countries if we do that, not only on these sorts of issues but obviously on other issues of social justice as well.

I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox and Lady Jones, for adding to this short debate and the noble Lord, Lord Goddard. He raised some of the issues around prisons. I will be addressing those in the next group of amendments, but the point is well made that we certainly have to look after and defend our prison officers and recognise the service that they do for us.

The Government recognise the intention to reinforce protections for industrial action but it is important to emphasise that the right to strike is already protected under UK law, as set out in Sections 219 and 244 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, provided clear conditions are met. Introducing a specific codified right to strike would cut across the uncodified nature of the UK constitution and lead to a far-reaching and undefined statutory right that risks legal uncertainty and conflict with long-established frameworks that carefully balance the rights of unions and employers.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow my noble friends Lady Coffey and Lord Moynihan, and the noble Lords, Lord Goddard and Lord Hutton. I will come back to their amendments shortly.

I will speak to Amendments 245, 251B and the question of whether Clause 68 should stand part, which is tabled in my name. On the clause stand part, this clause represents a dangerous step backwards. The noble Lord, Lord Goddard, objected to it in the sense that he thought it might introduce a lack of clarity. But the fact is that the clause itself is a step backwards in transparency and democratic accountability that this Committee must not allow to pass unchallenged.

The provisions that Clause 68 seeks to remove, notably subsections (2B) to (2D) of Section 229, are not bureaucratic obstacles but fundamental pillars of informed democratic participation. They require that voting papers should include a summary of the dispute, specify the types of industrial action proposed and indicate when such action is expected to take place. These are not unreasonable burdens. They are the basic information any voter needs to make an informed decision.

Democracy thrives on transparency, not opacity. When we ask working people to vote on whether to take industrial action—a decision that may affect their employment, their families’ livelihoods and their future prospects—surely they are owed the courtesy of clear, comprehensive information about what they might be voting for.

Consider the absurdity of what this clause actually proposes. It is a ballot paper that asks, “Are you prepared to take part in industrial action short of a strike?” without specifying whether this means a work-to-rule, an overtime ban, a refusal to cover additional duties or any combination of actions. How can any reasonable person make an informed choice without knowing what they are agreeing to participate in?

The Government may well argue that these requirements impose administrative burdens on the trade unions, which is an argument we have heard on a couple of groups tonight. But since when did we consider informing voters to be an administrative burden rather than a democratic duty? We would not accept a general election ballot that failed to specify what office candidates were seeking or what their party stood for, so why should we accept industrial action ballots with less information?

Furthermore, these information requirements serve to protect union members themselves. Clear information helps ensure that workers understand not just what they are voting for but the potential consequences of their actions. This protects both their interests and those of their unions by reducing the likelihood of disputes over the course, scope or nature of mandated action.

Turning to Amendment 245, I agree with the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, and the noble Lord, Lord Goddard. I will speak to this amendment, although I must emphasise that my primary concern is not with the amendment itself but the Government’s fundamentally flawed approach to this critical issue. To be absolutely clear, the 50% turnout threshold for industrial action ballots should be maintained. This threshold exists for the very good reason that it ensures that strikes and other industrial actions have genuine democratic legitimacy, as the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, pointed out, and that they represent the will of a substantial portion of union membership and not merely an activist minority.

If the Government are determined to weaken these democratic protections, and regrettably it appears that they are, they must not compound this error by hiding behind secondary legislation. Businesses across this nation deserve better. They need to know the regulatory framework within which they will operate—a theme to which we have returned a number of times through the Bill. They cannot plan for investment, assess risk or make employment decisions when fundamental aspects of industrial relations law are left hanging in regulatory limbo. The Government’s approach creates precisely the uncertainty that undermines economic confidence and job creation.

I urge the Government to reconsider entirely and maintain the 50% threshold to provide the certainty that businesses need and the democratic legitimacy that industrial action requires. If the Government insist that they are going to lower the threshold, which we think will be disastrous, it should be in the Bill, so that we can scrutinise it fully, which is what my amendment would ensure. As my noble friend Lord Moynihan pointed out, a 20% threshold could lead to only 10% of a workforce supporting strike action. The House deserves the opportunity to examine and debate such fundamental changes properly and not have them smuggled through in statutory instruments with minimal parliamentary oversight.

I will speak very briefly to Amendment 251A, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hutton. I could not agree with him more. It would be a very regrettable error if the Bill were to inadvertently introduce an unintended consequence of potentially swingeing fines for airlines, for reasons that are not really any fault of their own. It is to be supported, and I hope he will return to the theme.

My Amendment 251B proposes a modest but vital extension, from 10 to 14 days, of the notice period required before industrial action can commence in the railway sector, for slightly different reasons. This is not an attempt to restrict workers’ rights but rather a recognition of the unique role that our railway system plays in the economic and social fabric of the nation. The railway network is not just another industry. As my noble friend Lady Coffey pointed out, it is the circulatory system of the economy and it moves millions of passengers and vast quantities of freight every single day. When railway services are disrupted, the effects cascade through every sector of society, from healthcare workers unable to reach hospitals to students missing examinations and businesses losing millions in productivity. The current 10-day notice period that is proposed is simply insufficient for the complexity of railway operations. I could go on, but I think I have said enough on the subject.

Four additional days may seem modest, but, in the context of the operations of the railway and airlines, it represents the difference between chaos and managed disruption. It allows time for proper contingency planning, for negotiations to continue and for the travelling public to make alternative arrangements. With that, I shall wind up, but I hope the Government are paying attention and will at least listen to these carefully considered amendments.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Goddard of Stockport, and my noble friends Lord Hutton of Furness and Lord Hendy for tabling amendments on the subject of industrial action ballot mandates, thresholds and notice. Despite the late hour, I recognise that there is significant interest here. I will try to do justice to all those amendments and to the opposition to certain clauses standing part of the Bill.

Before I go into the detail, I want to make it clear that a lot of what we are discussing relates to the repeal of the great majority of the Trade Union Act 2016, which was a clear manifesto commitment for this Government. I think it is worth framing why that is the context. This does, in a way, speak to a lot of what the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, mentioned. Far from supporting the economy, the strike legislation in the 2016 Act that we inherited from the then Opposition did not actually prevent strikes. In 2022, we lost more days to strikes than France. In 2023 and 2024, NHS strikes alone cost the taxpayer £1.7 billion.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

With respect, there are definitely elements in the group of amendments we are talking about that relate to the 2016 Act. I was simply setting out the context for my remarks. Perhaps the noble Lord will let me make some progress, and, if he is still not satisfied towards the end of the speech, we can spend a bit more time on this.

As I was saying, 2.7 million working days were lost to strike action in 2023, up from 2.5 million in 2022, and these were the highest annual number of working days lost to strikes since 1989. Put frankly, the 2016 Act did not achieve its objective of reducing strikes—in fact, it made things worse.

Amendment 244, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, and Amendment 245, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, both seek, in different ways, to remove the repeal of the 50% industrial action ballot turnout threshold. The Bill as drafted repeals this threshold in its entirety, returning us to the situation pre 2016, where only a simple majority of members voting in favour of strike action was required for industrial action to be deemed lawful.

We want to create a positive and modern framework for trade union legislation that delivers productive, constructive engagement, respects the democratic mandate of unions and reduces bureaucratic hurdles. The date for repeal of the 50% threshold will be set out in regulations at a future date, with the intention that it is aligned with the establishment of e-balloting as an option for trade unions. In combination with the delivery of modern, secure workplace balloting, we hope that this will ensure that industrial action mandates will have demonstrably broad support.

I turn to the opposition to Clause 66 standing part. In answer to the concerns expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, this clause does indeed seek to amend Section 226 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act to reverse the change made by Section 3 of the Trade Union Act 2016. Section 226 is amended to omit subsections (2A) to (2F), thereby removing the requirement for industrial action ballots in six defined public services—health; fire services; education for those aged under 17; transport; decommissioning of nuclear installations, management of radioactive waste and spent fuel; and border security—to have the support of at least 40% of those entitled to vote for the industrial action in order to be valid.

Alongside Clause 65, which removes the turnout threshold, a trade union will need only a simple majority of those voting in the ballot to vote in favour of industrial action for the industrial action to be deemed lawful. This was the case prior to the Trade Union Act 2016. This clause is a key part of the Government’s agenda. Again, I want to be clear that this is part of our commitment to repeal the Trade Union Act 2016.

I turn to Amendment 246, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Goddard of Stockport, and will speak to the opposition to Clause 69 standing part of the Bill. The noble Lord’s amendment seeks to retain the current six-month mandate period for industrial action following a successful ballot. The Government want to strike the right balance between ensuring that industrial action is based on a recent vote and reducing the need for re-ballots. Strike action is always a last resort; it is costly to workers as well as employers. For this reason, we consulted on the appropriate length of time before a trade union should re-ballot its members.

In that consultation, trade unions were very keen to have no need to re-ballot for a mandate at all. However, following the consultation, the Government have set the mandate period at 12 months, because the majority of industrial action concludes within that time. This will ensure the appropriate balance between reducing the costs of re-balloting and allowing mandates to continue for longer where they are likely to have continued members’ support, without prolonging disputes or permitting action to be called based on a more than year-old mandate. Retaining the six-month mandate period would prevent the Government delivering on their commitment substantively to repeal the Trade Union Act 2016.

I turn to the opposition to Clause 68 standing part from the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom. The purpose of this clause is to reduce the information that unions are required to include on a voting paper for industrial action, through repealing Section 5 of the Trade Union Act 2016, which introduced additional requirements into Section 229 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992. Section 5 of the 2016 Act required trade unions to include on the ballot paper a summary of the issues that are in dispute between the employer and the trade union; the type of industrial action that amounts to action short of a strike; and an indication of the time period during which it is expected that those specific types of action are to take place.

Repealing Section 5 will not remove all the information requirements. Under Section 229, the ballot paper will still require unions to ask their members on the ballot paper whether they support industrial action and which type of action they want to take part in, expressed in terms of whether it is strike action or action short of a strike. The noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, made an analogy with ballot papers not containing details such as the names of candidates or the nature of the election. I respectfully point out that there is a danger in that analogy; I do not think it is fair. After all, noble Lords opposite would not expect democratic elections for elected office to carry the kind of mandate threshold that they are insisting trade union ballots should have. Whether they want to make the analogy that democratic elections are like union ballots or not, there is a bit of a pick and mix going on—

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

That is fair enough; I accept the noble Lord’s point when it comes to general elections but, in effect, this is a referendum, which is usually much more clear-cut.

Employment Rights Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 16th June 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

251C: Clause 73, page 98, line 13, at end insert—
“(2A) Subsection (1) only applies where the protected industrial action is the result of a properly conducted ballot in accordance with sections 226 to 232.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that subsection (1) only applies where protected industrial action follows a properly conducted ballot under sections 226–232.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group seek to address gaps in our current legislation by establishing clear exemptions from detriment protections when workers engage in unacceptable conduct during industrial disputes, while creating a comprehensive framework that restores balance to industrial relations.

I am willing to be corrected, but we do not believe that these specific protections against certain leverage activities currently exist in legislation, which is precisely why Amendment 252 is necessary. However, this forms part of a broader package addressing systemic failures in our industrial relations framework. In our assessment, leverage may manifest in various forms, but at its core lies a deliberate strategy to publicly intimidate and humiliate employers, compelling them to make concessions in industrial disputes that they would not otherwise consider. We fundamentally reject this approach as unacceptable in civilised industrial relations.

When describing leverage in the context of the Grangemouth dispute, Unite the Union explicitly stated:

“Leverage targets all areas of weakness of an employer … Leverage is the translation of an organising mind-set into the planning and implementation of a campaign strategy, underpinned by the escalation of pressure to create uncertainty”.


Even more concerning, Unite the Union expressed the view that in a leverage campaign

“the employer is routinely treated as a target to be defeated not a friend to be convinced”.

This adversarial approach treats employers as enemies to be vanquished, rather than as partners in resolving legitimate grievances.

Amendment 252 specifically identifies actions that constitute leverage: intimidation at picket lines; protests at company premises or the private homes of senior managers; the harassment of non-striking workers; and deliberate actions designed to undermine business continuity planning. Workers who engage in these intimidatory tactics should face the prospect of dismissal without recourse to employment protection.

However, the problems extend beyond leverage tactics. Amendment 251C responds to the troubling rise of wildcat strikes and unofficial action lacking democratic mandates. The Grangemouth dispute exemplifies this. Leverage tactics were employed in pursuit of objectives that may not have commanded genuine workplace support. If workers are to enjoy enhanced protections, those protections should be reserved for action properly sanctioned through domestic process under Sections 226 to 232 of current legislation.

Amendment 251G seeks to address the growing problem of co-ordinated action by workers outside of established collective bargaining frameworks. We have seen increasing instances of social media-organised workplace action that deliberately circumvents union structures and creates chaos for employers facing industrial action without recognised representatives to negotiate with.

Amendment 251D seeks to address the very real risk that, without proper definition, every minor management decision during a dispute could become grounds for a detriment claim. We have seen in other jurisdictions how broad definitions create litigation cultures, where employers face constant threat of claims for routine operational decisions. This amendment would prevent the trivialisation of genuine grievances while protecting employers from vexatious claims.

Our compensation framework amendments respond to documented failures. Amendment 251K would establish three bands of detriment severity—minor, serious and extreme—addressing the current lack of guidance that leads to wildly inconsistent awards. Amendment 251L would require proof of “actual financial loss”, preventing the speculative claims that proliferate without such requirements. Amendment 251N would restrict compensation to economic losses, preventing the concerning trend towards “injury to feelings” awards that represent a fundamental category error in industrial relations contexts.

Amendments 251E and 251F seek to address the stark reality that industrial action has already compromised public safety. During recent NHS strikes, emergency cover was inadequate, putting patients at risk. The 2019 London Underground strikes left commuters stranded, creating security vulnerabilities. Amendment 251E would provide essential legal clarity for employers who must prioritise continuity of critical operations. Without this protection, fear of litigation prevents necessary operational decisions. Amendment 251F recognises that some industrial action poses direct threats to public health and safety. Such considerations must take precedent over detriment protections.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Leong) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for her contribution, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, for tabling these amendments. I ask noble Lords to bear with me as I respond to each of them.

I want to be clear about why this clause is required. Clause 73 inserts new Sections 236A to 236D into the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992. New Section 236A is required because the Supreme Court ruled in April 2024 that Section 146 of the 1992 Act is incompatible with Article 11 of the European Convention of Human Rights.

Amendments 251C, 251F, 251H and 251J are unnecessary as their purpose is already covered in existing legislation. In the case of Amendment 251C, Clause 73 already requires a ballot compliant with Section 226, as specified in Section 219(4) of the 1992 Act, and makes it clear that protection is limited to cases where the action is compliant. Furthermore, in the case of Amendment 251J, secondary action is already prohibited under Section 224 of the 1992 Act, and the new protection of Section 236A will not apply where the industrial action was unlawful secondary action.

With regard to Amendments 251F and 251H, Section 240 of the 1992 Act allows for criminal prosecution of those who intentionally and maliciously endanger life or cause serious injury to a person by going on strike. Furthermore, if an act of an employer is motivated primarily by health and safety concerns, not for the sole or main purpose of preventing or deterring the employee from taking protected industrial action or penalising them, they have a defence from detriment claims, and the tribunals will consider whether the employer’s act or failure to act constitutes detriment.

Amendments 251D and 252 seek to prejudge a full and open consultation on this issue by setting out circumstances in which the detriment protection will not apply. We will prescribe detriments in secondary legislation only once we have conducted a comprehensive consultation seeking views across the public, including those of workers, employers, trade unions and all other stakeholders.

With reference to Amendment 252, that protection from prescribed detriment applies only where the sole or main purpose of subjecting the worker to detriment is to prevent, deter or penalise the worker from taking protected industrial action; for example, if a worker is subjected to detriment solely or mainly because they have harassed or bullied non-striking workers, the protection will not apply. I can be clear that criminal law will continue to apply to pickets.

Amendment 251E would be an unnecessary limitation on the protections from detriment. The prohibitions that new Section 236A places on an employer are clear: the sole or main purpose of the action must be to deter or penalise industrial action, which would not apply in the case of genuine maintenance of critical operations. Amendment 251G would be an unreasonable restriction to apply to detriment protections. Non-union members have the right to participate in official protected industrial action and, where that is the case, must be afforded the same protections from detriment as union members.

Amendments 251L and 251N would place a burden on individuals to prove that they had suffered financial or economic loss as a result of detriment, and would limit the circumstances where they were eligible for compensation. These hurdles and limits would potentially deter them from engaging in industrial action, limiting compliance with the Supreme Court ruling and Article 11.

Amendments 251M and 251P seek to restrict compensation with regard to business deeds. I want to be clear that an employer’s action or failure to act in relation to prescribed detriments will be a legal obligation that cannot be breached proportionately, and there is no legitimate business interest defence for seeking to deter or penalise an employee for taking protected industrial action.

Amendment 251K seeks to establish bands of detriment severity of “minor”, “serious” and “extreme”, and would require the Secretary of State to specify maximum compensation limits for each, which tribunals would have to comply with. New Section 236D is already clear that employment tribunals must have regard to any loss sustained by a claimant that is attributable to the actions of, or failures to take action by, an employer. Therefore, tribunals will award compensation based on what the tribunal considers to be just and equitable and will be able to proportionately determine the amount of compensation, taking into account all the relevant circumstances. I hope I have reassured the noble Lord. I therefore ask him to withdraw Amendment 251C.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am very grateful to the Minister for his very comprehensive answer, and also to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, for her comments. I will have to read Hansard very carefully, because there is quite a lot of detail in the Minister’s answer, but I will say that for months we have listened to Ministers speak at considerable length about the urgent need to address bad actors in our workplaces. On a number of occasions, they have painted fairly vivid pictures of unscrupulous employers who exploit workers, flout employment law and engage in practices that undermine good industrial relations. However, having been presented with clear evidence of equally concerning bad actors within the trade union movement, the Government’s response has been, in effect, to stay silent. I repeated those Unite comments, and I will repeat them again here, that

“the employer is routinely treated as a target to be defeated not a friend to be convinced”.

To use a word that came up in the last group, that is not “constructive” or collaborative; that is very hostile in intent.

Without going into enormous detail, Amendment 251L, for example, would require proof of actual financial loss, which is a basic principle that would prevent speculative claims. I do not see how that would deter anyone with a legitimate claim from engaging in industrial relations, so how would their Article 11 rights be infringed, as I believe the Minister outlined?

We will have to come back to these amendments because, as I say, there was a good deal of detail in there. Once again, the Minister is relying on the mythical consultation; I would like to know when that consultation on these aspects of these amendments will take place. Of course, that also calls into question when he expects all this to be implemented—a subject to which I am quite sure we will return on a number of occasions this evening. But for now, I beg leave to withdraw.

Amendment 251C withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

254: Clause 75, page 101, line 41, at end insert—
“(4) The Secretary of State must conduct a review to assess the impact on emergency services arising from the repeal of the Strikes (Minimum Service Levels) Act 2023.”

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I support the amendments tabled after Clause 75, which would require the Secretary of State to assess the impact of repealing the Strikes (Minimum Service Levels) Act 2023 in terms of emergency service provision and the broader resilience of our public infrastructure during industrial action. These are pragmatic and proportionate amendments, and I regret that they are even necessary, but the manner in which Clause 75 proposes to repeal this legislation—abruptly and with no review, consultation or supporting evidence—leaves us no choice.

The 2023 Act was narrowly drawn. It applied only to a tightly defined set of sectors—ambulance services, fire and rescue, health, transport, nuclear decommissioning and border security—in which a complete withdrawal of labour poses serious and obvious risks to life, safety, national security or national functioning. It did not ban strikes or criminalise union membership. It allowed a minimum service level to be set, by regulation, after consultation with affected sectors. In other words, it was a public protection measure, a mechanism of last resort, and it mirrored provisions already in countries across Europe and beyond.

The Government now seek to repeal the law, seemingly on the basis that it achieved nothing. They will no doubt point to the fact that industrial action has continued since the Act came into force. Indeed, we know from statistics that 160,000 working days were lost to strike action in the first quarter of 2025 alone. However, that statistic proves nothing about the value, or otherwise, of the Act. It proves only that the right to strike continues to be exercised, as it should be.

The Strikes (Minimum Service Levels) Act was never intended to eliminate strike action, and its success should not be judged by whether workers stopped striking. It should be judged by whether the public was kept safe when strikes did happen, whether ambulances still reached heart attack victims, basic fire cover was maintained and border infrastructure functioned at a minimum level.

That is a relevant test, and the Government have produced no evidence to show that those minimum protections were either unnecessary or ineffective. In fact, if the Act truly achieved nothing, why the rush to repeal it? Governments do not normally spend valuable legislative time repealing laws that they believe have no impact. The truth is that this law has teeth: it provides leverage, and it establishes a legal baseline. The Government want to remove it not because it is useless but because it places limits on how far certain interests can allow disruption to stretch.

Even if one believes the Act was flawed, the responsible course would be to review its effects before repealing it, particularly when the law was so recent and implementation across sectors was still under way. Consultations on minimum staffing levels had not been concluded in all sectors, practical guidelines had only begun to take shape and the real-world application of the law was still emerging, so to repeal it now is to abandon public protection in the name of political symbolism, to uproot a tree before it even had time to settle and declare it a failure for not bearing fruit.

What is most striking, however, is that the Government have provided no evidence that repealing the Act will lead to improved industrial relations, despite making that very claim in the impact assessment for this Bill. It is asserted almost in passing that the removal of the Act will restore trust or reduce tensions in negotiations, but where is the proof of that? Where is the analysis? Where is the independent data or stakeholder feedback to support that optimism?

We are told to take it on faith that repealing a legal framework designed to protect the public will somehow produce a more harmonious climate between unions and employers. But we are not here to govern by faith—we are here to scrutinise and to ask hard questions, and to legislate with due diligence. I put this to the Minister directly: can the Government point to any serious evidence, whether from unions, employers, emergency service leadership or international examples, that repealing this Act will improve negotiation outcomes, reduce disruption or lead to faster resolution of disputes? If not, why are we legislating in the dark?

What is the Government’s alternative? If we strip away the only existing mechanism for maintaining safe service levels during strikes, what replaces it? Nothing in the Bill offers an equivalent safeguard. There is no provision for voluntary cover agreements, no incentives for minimum staffing, no rapid arbitration scheme and no contingency powers for life and limb services. We must assume that the Government are content to simply let key public services fall to zero capacity during industrial disputes. There will be no legal recourse, no duty to plan and no obligation to protect the public. That is not reform.

Meanwhile, the public, who continue to support the right to strike in principle, also expect a functioning state. They expect to be able to call an ambulance and get one; they expect transport to limp along during industrial disputes, not collapse entirely; and they expect public safety to be preserved. The amendments before us are not extreme; they merely require a clear-sighted review of the implications of this repeal, something that any responsible Government would do as a matter of course.

I urge noble Lords to support these amendments. If the Government are confident that repealing the Act would strengthen industrial relations and carry no risk to public welfare, they should have no objection to reviewing that impact and reporting to Parliament. If they are not confident, I submit that the repeal should not proceed at all.

In short, the issue here is not ideology; it is competence. We are about to discard the only statutory mechanism for ensuring minimum service level provision during strikes—a model recognised across Europe and endorsed by ILO principles—without evidence, without a plan and without a single word of accountability to Parliament. As I said earlier, that is not governance; it is recklessness. I beg to move.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to each of the three amendments in this group, starting with Amendment 254. A significant part of the reason for the minimum services, as my noble friend has just laid out, was to recognise that certain issues were affecting daily life.

It is worth while considering the timing of aspects of this, not long after the end of the Covid lockdowns, and recognising the economic challenges that our country faced. In combination with people’s need to access urgent medical support, bearing in mind that a number of activities had been cancelled many times already, the impact of seeing further strikes—cancelling a basic level of operation for patients—was starting to become potentially very difficult for the country to manage and for patients in getting better.

Other sectors were also discussed, and transport is a good example. I expect that none of the train operating companies used this, partly because many of them found different ways to keep trains running on a basic level—good examples of that would be Greater Anglia or South Western Railway. Greater Anglia will soon become a nationalised rail operator, so I would be very interested to know—I appreciate that the Minister may not have an answer today—what the practice will be in the future as a consequence of this. At the time, the operating company Abellio was able potentially to have gone to this piece of legislation to keep trains running, although it did not have to. Will nationalised rail companies be allowed to continue to keep services running so that users can get to work, or wherever they need to go, even though there are other people on strike? My expectation, candidly, is that no nationalised company will in any way go against any trade union strike. I cannot see a Labour Government Minister using that, so by repealing this legislation the Government will have lost a lever on behalf of many of the users of public services, or services put forward for public use, across the country.

At one point there was a discussion about schools. A similar issue had arisen with children during Covid, through no fault of their own and no fault of the teachers. Schools were kept open, by and large, physically for certain workers but also online. Undoubtedly, there was a challenge for education but also, frankly, the inconvenience to working parents when schools go on strike is particularly harmful and is disruptive to those families and the wider economy. But it was decided not to do that. We reverted back to making sure, in the spirit of the Act’s intentions, that we would keep it to what were deemed to be absolutely key public services. Otherwise, there would have been significant detriment to the wider public.

Amendment 258, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, on a review into the impact on small businesses, would be very helpful. Huge changes are being put in place after nine years of a piece of legislation that from the economy’s perspective has worked reasonably well. I appreciate that the trade unions may not have liked it—and I recall it being voted against, back when this was being debated in the House a decade ago—but it is vital to the wider economy that we get our companies growing.

It seems to change every time, but I think that overall the number one mission of this Government is growth and the economy. Yet they are starting to do things, through this Bill and other situations, that seem to be driven by ideology rather than pragmatism and practicality. As a consequence, the basics and the consequences of some of this legislation, or the repealing of existing legislation, need to be considered in proper economic depth. I would love this to have happened with an updated impact assessment for us to consider before we conclude the Bill. By the way, I am grateful to the Minister for making sure that the letter the Secretary of State sent me has been placed in the Library so that every Peer can see it, but it worries me that that issue will not be considered further.

Amendment 256 links with the idea of a certification officer. I will come to series of amendments on that soon, so I am not sure how much of a certification officer role will be left. When it applies its thoughts on how it goes about the enforcement of the laws to which it is subject—and which it is also doing on behalf of trade union members—it should consider our role in the world and, in particular, how that contributes to make sure that we have a growing economy. I am sure all Members of your Lordships’ House would agree that we need it to grow.

--- Later in debate ---

If I have not responded to the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, I will write to her and place a copy of the letter in the Library. I ask the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, to withdraw Amendment 254.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for his response, and to my noble friends Lady Coffey, Lady Noakes and Lady Lawlor for their comments. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, for introducing the important amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, which I neglected to speak to but will do in a second, for which I apologise. Regarding the Minister’s assertion that the unions do not cause chaos, perhaps somebody should alert the RMT to that. By its own estimation, it cost the economy £5 billion in 2023. I would call that fairly chaotic.

As we conclude this debate, I express some disappointment at the Government’s response to the modest and reasonable amendments that we have tabled. We have simply asked for evidence. A number of the assertions that the Minister made are based on none whatever. We have asked for an impact assessment—we repeatedly ask for impact assessments on all manner of aspects of this Bill. I will take him up on his offer of that meeting. However, to come back to the implementation plan, it would be a much better-informed meeting if we had an implementation plan and a timeline. We will not drop this until the Minister can provide one. I am sure he will be working “at pace”, in his noble friend’s phraseology.

All we have done is ask for the Government to pause and consider the real-world consequences of repealing a law that was designed to protect public safety during times of industrial action. The Government claim, with some optimism, that removing the Strikes (Minimum Service Levels) Act 2023 will somehow improve industrial relations. However, when they were asked to produce any evidence from employers, unions, the public or independent experts, none was forthcoming. There is no analysis of outcomes, no tracking of safety impacts, no consultation findings and no plan for what replaces the protections that they are so eager to tear down. In short, there is no case, just conviction without content.

We could go on and talk about how this is not theoretical, and I would again point noble Lords to look at Birmingham. If the Government truly believe that the 2023 Act was flawed, they should prove the case with data, with stakeholder consultation and with a sober assessment of what ought to follow in its place, and not simply repeal it blindly, prematurely and with no credible alternative offered. We are not asking for the impossible. Our amendments ask for a review, a report and a basic assessment of impact. They are measured, responsible and in keeping with the House’s role in ensuring good governance.

I have two more points. I should have acknowledged and expressed very strong support for Amendment 258 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Fox. That rightly seeks a review into the impact of Part 4 of the Bill on small and medium-sized enterprises, and I look forward to picking that subject up with him again when he is back.

I note that my noble friend Lady Coffey asked a very specific question about the nationalised rail industry. I am sure we would all like an answer, so perhaps the noble Lord will write with the Government’s intentions when it comes to governing that particular sector. For now, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 254 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

256: After Clause 83, insert the following new Clause—
“Certification Officer: growth dutyWhen discharging its general functions, the Certification Officer must, so far as reasonably possible, act in such a way as to advance the following objectives—(a) the international competitiveness of the economy of the United Kingdom, and(b) its growth in the medium to long term.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause would require the Certification Officer to advance the objectives of the international competitiveness of the economy and its growth in the medium to long term.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, as my noble friend Lady Coffey mentioned a short while ago, we have been told by this Government on numerous occasions that growth is their number one priority. Growth, growth and more growth has become something of a mantra for Ministers, but the harsh reality is that their actions are consistently undermining this stated objective, and their latest economic performance demonstrates the urgent need for the amendment before us today.

The UK economy shrank more than expected in April. The standard measure of economic output, GDP, contracted a sharp 0.3% according to data from the Office for National Statistics. Additional costs on businesses were also levied during that month as employer national insurance contributions took effect, which businesses told the ONS played a part in their performance. The biggest part of the economy, the services sector, contracted by 0.4% and manufacturing dropped by 0.9%. The Government are manifestly failing to reach their stated growth target.

It is not enough for the Government to tell workers, businesses and the British public what they want to hear about growth while simultaneously implementing policies that actively undermine economic competitiveness. The trade union provisions in the Bill represent a perfect example of this contradiction: they expand the protections and rights that will inevitably increase costs, reduce flexibility and diminish our international competitiveness, all while the Government claim to be prioritising growth.

My amendment would require the Certification Officer, when discharging functions under the Bill’s expanded trade union framework, to advance the objectives of international competitiveness and medium to long-term economic growth. It represents a vital safeguard against the economic damage that unconstrained implementation of these provisions could inflict. The Certification Officer oversees trade union administration from registration to financial transparency to complaint procedures. Under the Bill, these functions will expand significantly as new rights and protections are introduced. Without a growth duty, there is no mechanism to ensure that the Certification Officer considers the broader economic implications of how these expanded powers are exercised.

We operate in an intensely competitive global economy. Our European neighbours and international competitors are not standing still while we load additional costs and restrictions on to British businesses. When the Certification Officer makes decisions about trade union regulation, registration and oversight, those decisions must be made with full awareness of their impact on our ability to compete internationally. Countries such as Germany, despite having strong trade union traditions, maintain regulatory frameworks that prioritise economic competitiveness. Singapore, Ireland and other successful economies have demonstrated that worker protection and economic growth are not mutually exclusive, except when regulators are required to balance these objectives explicitly.

This amendment ensures that as we expand trade union rights and protections, we do so in in a way that enhances rather than undermines our economic position. It requires the Certification Officer to ask not just whether a decision serves trade union interests but whether it serves the broader national interest in maintaining a competitive and growing economy.

The concept of growth duties is well established across government precisely because regulators have learned that narrow focus on single objectives can create unintended economic consequences. Financial regulators have competitiveness objectives because financial regulation that ignores competitiveness can drive business overseas. Planning authorities must consider economic impact because planning decisions that ignore economic consequences can destroy local economies. Environmental regulators operate within frameworks that balance protection with economic considerations because environmental regulation that ignores economic reality becomes counterproductive.

The offshore employment trend demonstrates exactly why such balanced approaches are essential. When regulators focus solely on enhancing protections without considering economic consequences, they risk creating conditions where the protections become meaningless because the activity they are meant to regulate simply moves beyond their jurisdiction. It would be extraordinary if trade union regulation, which directly affects workplace costs, flexibility and productivity, were exempt from such considerations. This amendment brings the Certification Officer into line with best practice across government by requiring explicit consideration of economic impact.

The Government may argue that trade union regulation should focus solely on worker protection without economic considerations, but this position is fundamentally flawed for a number of reasons, and recent evidence makes it increasingly untenable. For example, it would create an artificial separation between industrial relations and economic policy that exists nowhere else in government and has proven counterproductive in practice. Every other area of regulation requires consideration of economic impact precisely because regulators have learned that ignoring economic consequences undermines policy objectives. It would also contradict the Government’s stated priority of growth while simultaneously demonstrating the practical impossibility of separating worker protection from economic performance.

When companies such as The Legends Agency can build multi-million-pound businesses by helping UK employers avoid UK employment law, the Government’s approach has clearly failed on its own terms. I beg to move.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I am a great fan of international competitiveness and growth objectives for regulators. When the first one was introduced for financial services regulators in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023, I thought it was an incredibly important addition to the way regulation of financial services is undertaken. Just last week, your Lordships’ Financial Services Regulation Committee issued its report on how that international competitiveness and growth objective is working, and I commend it to noble Lords.

I support what my noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom has said about applying the duty to the Certification Officer, but I invite him to consider whether there is a much more important area where such a duty should be applied in this Bill, which is to when the Secretary of State makes decisions about, for example, the enforcement provisions or making the various regulations that we know are necessary to make Part 1, and indeed other parts of the Bill, operate effectively.

The most important aspect of the Bill is going to be driven by what the Secretary of State does once it is enacted, but there is not an equivalent requirement on the Secretary of State to take into account the needs of international competitiveness and growth. It is essential for the Secretary of State to have that at the front of his mind when making regulations that will have such a big impact on the way that businesses operate in this country. I therefore commend my noble friend’s amendment, but if he is considering bringing something back on Report, he might consider something a little broader.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, for tabling Amendment 256. We fully recognise the importance of supporting growth and international competitiveness across our economy, and we will of course continue to pursue policies that will deliver on our economic ambition. However, we do not consider this duty to be appropriate for the certification officer.

The certification officer is not a traditional regulator; they are an independent quasi-judicial officeholder. Their core functions are to oversee regulatory compliance fairly and impartially and to ensure trade unions and employers’ associations adhere to statutory requirements in relation to their finances and governance. This includes investigating complaints, maintaining accurate registers and ensuring that democratic processes are upheld. Imposing a duty to promote growth and competitiveness would cut across this role. It risks introducing competing priorities, blurring legal clarity and ultimately undermining confidence in the CO’s neutrality. We cannot require the certification officer both to conduct their judicial and regulatory functions and to deliver economic outcomes. The certification officer has no role in relation to the international competitiveness of the United Kingdom economy or its growth in the medium to long term.

As noble Lords will know, this Government have been active in requiring a number of regulators to apply a growth duty. Those bodies to which the growth duty currently applies are purely regulators—regulators that set strategies and make decisions that significantly affect the type, scale and location of economic activity in important sectors. The decisions regulators take can set the parameters for economic activity across the economy, and, of course, we recognise that; but the certification officer does not have this responsibility or power. We share the noble Lord’s commitment to economic growth, but it must be pursued in the right way. Furthermore, requiring the certification officer to follow a growth duty would not be practicable, and there is no evidence that imposing such a duty would have any meaningful impact on the UK’s growth or international competitiveness. It would be like asking a court to consider cases based on their impact on economic growth rather than on the evidence of the case.

For those reasons, I must ask the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, to withdraw Amendment 256.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her answer, but I have to say that I am unpersuaded. The gist of it was that the certification officer does not have either the responsibility or the power, but by definition this amendment would deliver both those things. I completely agree with my noble friend Lady Noakes, and I shall take her suggestions on board and have a careful look at this. I do not believe that this amendment and the suggestions she made are mutually exclusive; in fact, if anything, they are very complementary. I thank my noble friend Lord Fuller for his comments, which, frankly, were just an expression of complete common sense.

I express my disappointment at the Government’s rejecting this amendment. I think it reveals more about the Government’s true priorities, frankly, than all the rhetoric about growth that we have heard. The Government are absolutely right to identify growth as a priority, but they will not find it in this Bill. In fact, there is nothing in the Bill that will bring any growth. I challenge the Minister to identify a single provision in these hundreds of pages that will increase productivity, enhance competitiveness or create jobs. The Government’s own impact assessment suggests the same: it is a document notably silent on growth benefits, while cataloguing increasing costs and regulatory burdens.

If the Minister is genuinely confident that the Bill will support growth, and if she truly believes that the expanded trade union protections and enhanced worker rights will somehow boost economic performance, I am surprised and somewhat mystified that she will not accept this amendment. The argument was that the certification officer is not a traditional regulator, but they still have a regulatory function, so I do not really see what difference that makes, frankly. What could be the objection to requiring the certification officer to consider growth when discharging functions under a Bill the Government claim supports growth? If these provisions truly advance economic competitiveness, a growth duty should be welcomed as a validation of the Government’s approach.

I could go on, but I do not see the point. The Government have rejected a genuine opportunity to demonstrate that their growth rhetoric has substance. The amendment would have required no fundamental changes to their approach, simply consideration of the economic impact when implementing trade union provisions. It would have aligned trade union regulation with best practice across government, while preserving all the work protections the Government claim to champion. The fact that they cannot even accept a modest requirement demonstrates that the commitment to growth is hollow rhetoric. It is designed to disguise an agenda focused more on trade union empowerment, regardless of economic consequences. How very disappointing for our great nation. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 256 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, I have tabled Amendment 257B simply because I did not see the answer in the Explanatory Notes to the Bill. This is quite a straightforward one for the Minister.

In Section 293 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, the regulations are normally done by negative resolution—or the annulment, as set out in new subsection (6). However, I want to understand why the Government felt that these particular regulations needed to be done through the affirmative procedure. They are not the only changes—that I am aware of—in the Bill to that section, or others, of the Act. Can the Minister explain why they have been singled out? Given the trend of your Lordships’ House over many years, why do we not move to having affirmative resolutions instead of annulments for these ones in the future? I beg to move.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Coffey for her amendments; they are measured, necessary and principled amendments to Clause 85, which rightly restore a degree of parliamentary scrutiny that had been quietly eroded in the original draft of the Bill. As we stated at Second Reading, there are 173 delegated powers in the Bill, which is unacceptable—not just to those the legislation will impact, but to the House.

In the Minister’s contributions on similar legislation in the past, she expressed her strong reservations about the use of delegated powers. I recall well her interventions, which were made with clarity and conviction, as she tabled amendments recommended by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. But we now find ourselves considering a clause that does precisely what she once warned against because it carves out certain sensitive and constitutionally significant areas and exposes them only to selective scrutiny.

The original version of Clause 85 created a two-tier system. Some regulations would require affirmative approval from this House, while others—no less consequential—would not. This piecemeal approach to oversight is not only undesirable but unnecessary. Regulations made under Section 293 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act are not merely technical: they pertain to fundamental matters, such as the rights of trade unions, the balance of power between employers and employees, and the protections afforded to those who take lawful industrial action. It is therefore only right and proper that all regulations made under this section should be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure: they should be laid before and approved by both Houses of Parliament.

My noble friend’s amendment achieves this. It does so with economy of language, but with significant constitutional consequence. It removes the artificial distinction introduced by subsection (5), and instead applies a uniform standard of scrutiny to the entirety of Section 293.

Since the Government took office, many of us across these Benches have expressed concern about the growing use of skeleton Bills, Henry VIII clauses and broad enabling powers that allow Ministers to legislate without adequate consultation or scrutiny. This amendment is a quiet but firm step in the other direction back towards balance, principle and the proper functioning of Parliament.

Again, I thank my noble friend for tabling her amendment, and I hope the Government will not merely accept it but embrace it to show their commitment to transparency and to the constitutional propriety of this House.

[Lord Leong (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, for his contribution. I remember standing before him during the PRaM Bill and we discussed this very matter. Some of this negative resolution is required because not only does it save parliamentary time but it is technical. Anyway, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, for tabling Amendments 257B and 257C, which would make all the powers under Clause 56 subject to the affirmative procedure, as well as existing regulation-making powers that are currently covered by the negative procedure, by virtue of current Section 293 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992.

It is worth noting that most of the access regulations are already subject to the affirmative procedure. Indeed, as the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, mentioned, only four of the 12 delegated powers are subject to the negative procedure. Given the technical nature of those delegated powers, and to save parliamentary time, the Government are of the position that making them subject to the affirmative procedure would not be appropriate.

Further to this, as mentioned in previous debates, all regulations under Clause 57 will be consulted on via public consultation, the outcome of which will be published for all to see. This is an important process, which will help ensure that our policy development is informed by the practical experience and needs of trade unions, businesses and stakeholders.

The noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, and the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, will have noted in previous debates in this place that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee said that

“it is heartening that in a Bill with so many delegated powers”—

the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, mentioned 173—it had

“only found four on which to raise concerns”.

Clause 56 was not one of those. Therefore, I ask that the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, to withdraw Amendment 257B.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Londesborough (CB)]

My Lords, I address Amendment 287 on the creation of an office for a freelance commissioner in the name of my noble friends Lord Clancarty, Lord Freyberg and Lord Colville of Culross, who has managed to beat our limited motorway system but arrived just too late to speak, sadly.

I am somewhat conflicted about this thought-provoking amendment, in that I have argued at Second Reading and in Committee against the overreach of the Bill and its sheer complexity and burden on employers, especially for small and micro businesses. On the noble Baroness’s comment, I do not want to be seen to be adding baubles to the Christmas tree. However, I agree that year by year the arguments grow for the establishment of a freelance commissioner, partly because the number of freelancers is growing and will continue to do so. The current 2 million plus freelancers will easily rise to 3 million within the next 10 years in the UK alone as employers shed staff from payroll, weighed down by the combination of increased national insurance contributions, national minimum wages increasing much faster than the rate of inflation and all the new rules and regulations coming in this very Employment Rights Bill.

Just look at the recent and alarming drop reported last week by the ONS of 274,000 workers coming off payroll during the past 12 months. We do not yet have the data to track how many of them are transitioning to freelance or self-employment. Indeed, as my noble friends have pointed out, the data on this area of freelancing and self-employment is poor and not up to international standards, and that is a real problem when we are trying to assess exactly what their contribution is to the economy.

I am going to muddy the water slightly, but you could argue that there is a need for an independent commissioner for the self-employed. We have been talking about freelancers, but there are 4.2 million self-employed people, including freelancers, in the UK. Those numbers are going to increase given the impact of technology, digital communications, AI and, particularly, the practice of working from home. I accept that there are key differences between freelancers and many self-employed people, for example, sole traders or those running their own businesses or partnerships, perhaps with just one or two contractors, but freelancers, although independent and project-based, are also self-employed and are treated just the same way for tax purposes by HMRC.

I accept that freelancers and the self-employed are not as valued or appreciated by Governments of all parties as they should be. This was brutally exposed during the pandemic with furlough and other schemes. If we want to develop a proper entrepreneurial spirit and environment in this country, we should do much more to value and look after those who create their own jobs and face up to all the risks and jeopardy that that involves. That includes freelancers, not just in the creative industries, but in other sectors where they are prevalent, which are as diverse as construction, professional services and agriculture. The Government need to give Amendment 287 serious consideration and, while doing so, think through how the interests of all the self-employed, not just freelancers, should be represented.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Freyberg, Lord Clancarty and, particularly, Lord Clement-Jones, for their valuable contributions and amendments in this group and for the thoughtful way they have introduced them. I am very grateful for their tireless advocacy on behalf of the freelance workforce, who so often find themselves on the margins of employment policy. I will speak in particular to Amendments 301 and 302, tabled the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, which I was happy to sign.

Amendment 301 introduces a new clause which, for the first time in statute, provides a clear and much-needed definition of a freelancer. This definition acknowledges the reality of modern working life, where individuals are often engaged on short-term contracts, operating through their own companies or via intermediaries and managing their own tax and national insurance affairs. These individuals, who are distinct from employees or workers as defined under current legislation, are nonetheless a vital and growing component of our labour market, as the noble Lord, Lord Londesborough, has just pointed out. The amendment does not seek to blur the lines between employment statuses, but rather to draw a necessary and clarifying distinction that enables policy and legislation to recognise freelancers in their own right. The inclusion of the provision for the Secretary of State to issue guidance ensures that the definition can evolve with working practices and case law, and that is both sensible and future-proofed.

Amendment 302 builds on this by creating a duty—a statutory obligation—for relevant government departments to have due regard to the freelancer workforce when shaping new policy. Too often freelancers are treated as an afterthought, and they fall between the cracks of legislation designed for binary employment categories. This amendment seeks to correct that omission. It ensures that the realities of freelance working are considered proactively in policy design, not reactively after the damage has been done.

Furthermore, the amendment ensures that the freelance commissioner, a role established to advocate for and advise on matters affecting freelancers, is appropriately consulted in the policy-making process. That is a modest yet essential safeguard to ensure that expertise is brought to bear when policies may significantly affect freelance professionals, particularly in sectors such as the creative industries, technology and media, where freelancing is not the exception but the norm.

These are thoughtful and proportionate amendments. They do not create undue bureaucracy, nor do they entrench rigid definitions. They offer clarity, fairness, and recognition to a workforce that contributes enormously to our economy and cultural life, yet is often unprotected and unheard in legislative terms. These proposals are not about privileging one form of work over another. They are about ensuring that our legal and regulatory frameworks reflect the diversity of modern work. I commend the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and his cosignatories on bringing these matters before the Committee, and I urge the Government to give serious consideration to these amendments as practical and principled improvements to the Bill.

I will take this opportunity to speak more broadly regarding the wider group of amendments concerning the impact of this legislation on freelancers and the cultural and creative sectors. Amendment 285 proposes a temporary waiver for small and independent cultural organisations in financial hardship. This is a pragmatic and compassionate measure. We all support robust employment protections, but a one-size-fits-all rollout risks devastating unintended consequences: closures, lay-offs or the collapse of small institutions that are already on the financial brink. The idea of a grace period and progressive enforcement is a proportionate way of balancing worker protections with organisational survival.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

262: After Clause 86, insert the following new Clause—
“Impact on industrial action (1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the day on which this Act is passed, publish an independent assessment of the impact of this Act on the number of working days lost to strike action.(2) The assessment must include data comparing the number of working days lost to strike action in the 12 months following the passing of this Act with the 12 months prior.(3) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of the assessment before Parliament.”

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, my Amendment 262 concerns an issue of considerable importance, not merely for those involved directly in industrial relations but for the health of our broader economy, the stability of our public services and the legitimacy of this legislation. The amendment would require the Government to commission and publish, within 12 months of Royal Assent, an independent assessment of the impact of this Act on the number of working days lost to strike action, specifically comparing the 12 months following its enactment with the 12 months preceding it. That report would then have to be laid before Parliament. This amendment is modest in scope. It does not seek to obstruct the Bill or alter its provisions. It merely seeks transparency, accountability and, above all, vital evidence-based analysis in due course.

There is a striking—if I may use that word without inflaming the debate—absence of hard data or persuasive analysis in support of the central justification for these changes, namely that repealing certain elements of the Trade Union Act 2016 will result in better industrial relations. Indeed, the Government’s own impact assessment acknowledges that there could be a benefit

“if Trade Union reforms lead to better industrial relations”.

I emphasise “if”. Hope is not a good substitute for policy. Nor should legislation of this consequence be built on assumptions rather than analysis. I will therefore structure my remarks around three core questions which the Government have failed to answer convincingly and which this amendment would help to address.

If we are to repeal elements of the 2016 Act, we must first understand what standard the Government are using to declare that Act a failure, or at the very least to assert that it is no longer fit for purpose. The Trade Union Act 2016 introduced significant changes: minimum turnout thresholds for strike ballots; requirements for information on ballot papers; limits on picketing; and restrictions on facility time in the public sector. It was controversial, certainly, but it was also justified by the Government of the time as necessary to ensure that industrial action had a strong democratic legitimacy, and that the wider public were protected from excessive disruption.

Now we are told that these measures must be rolled back, but we have at no stage been told what objective, or even subjective, measure of success or failure is being applied. Are we to believe that the 2016 Act failed because it did not eliminate all industrial action, because it was unpopular with some stakeholders or because it placed an administrative burden on unions—or, more worryingly, is it being repealed simply as a matter of political preference? To look at some figures, according to the Office for National Statistics, the number of working days lost to strike action was at a historic low throughout the period following the 2016 Act until a sharp rise in 2022-23, partly driven by inflation, the consequential erosion of real-terms pay and broader discontent in the traditional public sector.

Are we being told the legislation was ineffective because strikes still happened in 2022? If so, that ignores the very different macroeconomic context we now face. Or is the claim simply that industrial relations will somehow improve if these legal constraints are lifted? In any of those cases we must ask: compared with what? Compared with the pre-2016 environment? Compared with our European neighbours? Or compared with a model of workplace consensus that may not exist in reality? Without a baseline for comparison, the Government’s argument is essentially unfalsifiable and unjustifiable.

Let us assume for the sake of argument that the Government believe that these changes will lead to more equitable bargaining, greater union engagement and ultimately improved relations between employers and workers. Even if that were true, we must still ask at what cost. If these reforms lead to a rise in industrial action, that will have implications not only for the affected sectors but for the public at large. Trains will be cancelled, schools will be closed, hospital appointments will be postponed, bin collections will be missed and courts will be adjourned. These are not abstract costs, so it is extraordinary to repeal a major piece of industrial relations legislation without offering any quantification of the risks of increased disruption and without explaining how those risks will be mitigated.

The impact assessment leans heavily on the idea that increased union involvement could lead to improved communication and better outcomes, and perhaps it could. But the fact remains that the cost of getting this wrong will be borne not by policymakers but by the public. That is why this amendment is so crucial. It simply asks the Government to return to Parliament within a year and tell us whether this has worked. Has industrial action decreased or increased? Are we seeing the promised harmony or the feared escalation? If it is the latter, we as legislators have a responsibility to know that and to act accordingly.

Perhaps the most fundamental question of all is: what actual, empirical, verifiable evidence do the Government have to support their central claim? We have not been given a retrospective analysis of the Trade Union Act 2016 and its impact. We have not been provided with consultation data that robustly supports repeal. We have not seen sector-by-sector breakdowns of how these measures will improve the industrial landscape. We have not even seen clear articulation of the problem the Bill is trying to solve. Indeed, the rationale appears to be more ideological than evidential. It seems to be based on the belief that loosening legal constraints will somehow foster good will and reduce conflict. All the academic research and literature on industrial relations remind us that legal frameworks matter, that institutions shape behaviour, and that rules, when clear, consistent and fairly applied, help prevent conflict and not exacerbate it.

If the Government are so confident in their position, why not test it? Why not commit to measuring its effect? Why not, a year on, lay before this House and the other place an honest assessment of whether their theory of change has delivered the desired result? If the evidence proves them right, they will be vindicated. If not, Parliament should be empowered to revisit the legislation. There is, after all, considerable flexibility inherent in legislation so riddled with Henry VIII powers. I look forward to the Minister’s reply and I beg to move.

[Lord Fuller (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to support Amendment 262 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, and others, because I want to talk about a simple economic truth. One of the provisions in the Bill will reduce the thresholds at which industrial action may be called or authorised. The truth is that when you reduce the threshold, the likelihood of industrial action does not grow linearly; it grows exponentially. The amendment is needed because the Bill, sadly, will provide the world with a real-life experiment that will inform political and economic science of that simple truth.

It could be worse than that. My experience comes from local government and my relationship with the National Joint Council. Local government employs 1.8 million local government workers. There are three principal unions: Unite, UNISON and GMB. Within the cohort of local government workers, I have negotiated with the craft workers, the Salisbury workers and the coroners. There is a red book, a green book and a blue book; there is even a gold book covering senior fire officers and police officers. There are 136 different activities that local authorities do and, of course, there are 350 principal councils. I have engaged with all this complexity over about 10 years sitting on the National Joint Council, the device through which the employers engage with the unions. I have sat alongside the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, on that body for many years, and now we both find ourselves in here.

As part of the gang of four, the top four local government councillors engaged in these important negotiations, I have learned a lot of things. There is less beer, there are fewer sandwiches and there are palatial premises built by one of the unions in Euston. It has not been easy work, but we have had a series of national agreements engaging on a respectful basis. It has been valuable work. The important point is that there have been powerful incentives to avoid industrial action. The bar has not been impossible, but it has been a high bar against which strike action must be called. It has sort of worked, because there has been an equilibrium between the employer and the employees across 1.8 million unionised workers —just under a third of them all—in this country.

That equilibrium has meant that when there is a strike, it is serious. When people down tools, it is in the news. The Birmingham bin strike is a case in point: there is a strike, and it is serious. My anxiety about so many of the provisions in the Bill is that it is going to dissolve the powerful incentives to avoid industrial action and instead, arithmetically and structurally, put in the provisions where it is encouraged. The Bill sets the wrong balance, because we are not talking about simple organisations with single unions and small workforces in local government. We are talking about a very complex landscape. If you reduce the thresholds, people are more likely to strike because a minority, as little as 10%, of workers could call a strike. When 10% hold the 90% over a barrel, that is clearly not in the interests of the public; it is not in the interests of the workers; and I do not believe that in the long term it is in the interests of the unions.

Amendment 262 calls for a robust assessment of the effect of the Bill on days lost to industrial action. Not only is that the right thing to do but we would do a service, because it would demonstrate once and for all that simple efficiency of labour relations: if you reduce the threshold to call industrial action, the number of days lost to strikes will go up geometrically. I regret that we are going to do a service to political and economic science, but if that is the way it is, Amendment 262 is the way to achieve it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Leong (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, for their contributions. I will be brief; I do not want to stand between noble Lords and their dinner break.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, for his Amendment 262. We have already debated impact assessments at great length and I will not repeat the same arguments. Any industrial action is regrettable and all parties have a duty to seek a resolution to such disputes. Failure to do so is basically a lack of management and leadership by all. We have also debated the repeal of the 2016 Act in previous debates. I will not mention that either. Furthermore, it is a manifesto commitment.

Despite its good intentions, the amendment would impose a review procedure that in effect repeats what the Government already intend to do. We recognise the importance of ensuring that the impacts of these policies on workers, business and the economy are considered, and that analysis assessing these impacts is published. Our impact assessment also outlines a plan for monitoring and evaluating the impact of the Bill and subsequent secondary legislation.

As noble Lords will see from the impact assessment, our Employment Rights Bill could have a positive direct impact on economic growth, helping to support the Government’s mission for growth and ensuring that we raise living standards across the country and create opportunities for all. The Bill is expected to benefit people in some of the most deprived areas of the country by saving them up to £600 in lost income from the hidden costs of insecure work.

To conclude, I reassure your Lordships that we already have robust plans in place to assess and review the Bill’s impacts, including on industrial action. My commitment in an earlier debate to meet noble Lords to discuss the impact assessment further still stands. I therefore ask the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, to withdraw Amendment 262.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Leong, for his answer, but I am, of course, disappointed. I must say to him that of course he could not repeat the argument about the impact assessment because it is manifestly inadequate and overreliant on the word “could”, which he just used again.

So it is with a sense of frustration that I close this debate on Amendment 262 because, let us be blunt, the Regulatory Policy Committee has already deemed the Government’s own analysis inadequate. It found that the assessment underpinning this Bill failed to consider important variables, lacked robust modelling of strike-related costs and omitted any real evaluation of how the repeal of the 2016 Act provisions might drive up the number of working days lost to industrial action. That is criticism born not of political bias but of technical expert judgment, but the Government persist in asserting that an independent stocktake of actual strike days would be superfluous.

During the Bill’s passage, no fewer than 160 government amendments were tabled on Report, some of the most consequential of which would fundamentally alter the trade union landscape: changes to ballot thresholds, as my noble friend Lord Fuller explained; adjustments to picketing rules; and alterations to facility time arrangements. Many came late, with scant time for meaningful consultation and no accompanying update to the impact assessment. In effect, we are being asked to sign off on a statute the final shape of which was revealed only in piecemeal fashion and for which no comprehensive evaluation has ever been produced. There is more flesh on the skeleton now, but it still makes for a pretty unsavoury sight.

The consequences of this are already evident. Businesses stand in limbo. They are unsure how to prepare—again, the lack of an implementation plan. HR directors, legal advisers and finance teams are all left guessing which rules will apply. If the Government can point to a single one who is not, could they please say so, because we have spoken to very many and cannot find a single one who is not left guessing? They require clarity, not uncertainty. They need to know, for instance, whether a union ballot will again require a 50% turnout, or whether the conduct of pickets will be governed by new or old prescriptions. In their absence, investment decisions are deferred, retention and, especially, recruitment strategies are on hold and the workforce, unsure of its rights and obligations, faces unnecessary anxiety.

To deny acceptance of this amendment is to deny the very notion that policy should be tested against outcomes and treats legislation as unchallengeable, rather than a living instrument whose impacts must be monitored, and it tells employers, workers and the public alike that we legislate in the dark. So I regret deeply that the Government have chosen to reject the amendment. Doing so signals a reluctance to subject themselves to the discipline of evidence, shirks the responsibility to measure the real-world consequences of their own handiwork, and turns a blind eye to the limbo in which businesses and the public languish. That is not acceptable. If the Government’s reforms truly will deliver better industrial relations, they should welcome the chance to prove it. If Ministers are as confident as they claim to be, let them fast-track the assessment. Let them demonstrate that strike days are falling, that workplaces are more harmonious and that public services are protected. For now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 262 withdrawn.

Employment Rights Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 16th June 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

263ZA: Clause 87, page 107, line 12, at end insert—
“(3A) A person may not be appointed as an enforcement officer under this section unless they—(a) possess professional qualifications relevant to the enforcement of labour market legislation;(b) have undergone prescribed training in the exercise of statutory powers, including rights of entry, inspection, and seizure.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that enforcement officers possess appropriate professional qualifications, training, and suitability.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I will speak to Amendments 263ZA, 263ZB, 263B, 263C and 271ZA in my name. I will also briefly refer to Amendments 268 and 271 tabled by my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond who sends apologies that he cannot be here this evening.

Amendments 263ZA and 263ZB go to the heart of what it means to enforce employment and labour rights in a manner that is consistent with the values of competence, fairness and democratic accountability. They correct a notable deficiency in the current drafting of the Bill and help to align the enforcement regime with the expectation of the workers it is meant to protect and the legal and moral standards of the state that commissions that protection. The role of an enforcement officer is not merely administrative. It is a position of public authority. It carries with it the power to enter workplaces, examine records and question individuals and in some circumstances to impose sanctions or refer matters for prosecution. These are not trivial tasks. They are functions which, if carried out poorly, inconsistently or abusively, can cause serious harm, not only to employers but to vulnerable workers who may already be in a precarious or marginalised position.

Under the clauses currently drafted, there is no explicit requirement for enforcement officers wielding these powers to possess any formal qualifications or specific training. That silence is troubling and perplexing. We would not allow an environmental health inspector to carry out food safety inspections without the requisite public health training, we would not permit a planning enforcement officer to issue legal notices without understanding the statutory framework in which they operate, yet here we are contemplating giving substantial and often intrusive powers to individuals without requiring that they meet even a basic threshold of professional competence. This amendment seeks to address that omission in a way that is clear, proportionate and entirely consistent with how enforcement is handled in other regulatory spheres. It is not enough to presume that competence will arise through experience alone or that the Secretary of State will voluntarily set high standards through policy or guidance. Experience in other areas has shown that when qualification and training requirements are not embedded in statute, they become vulnerable to erosion, particularly when budgets are tight or political pressures arise.

The second amendment proposing new subsection (4A) is of equal importance. It would require the Secretary of State to ensure that enforcement officers maintain records of all enforcement actions, that they provide written notice to the persons affected by those actions explaining the reasons for the intervention and that they submit activity reports to an independent oversight body. Again, this is not a matter of administrative detail but a fundamental principle. Enforcement that is opaque is enforcement that is liable to error, inconsistency and, in the worst cases, abuse. The powers under this part of the Bill are extensive and potentially disruptive. They can lead to business interruptions, reputational damage and personal distress. For these reasons, it is only right that enforcement activity be recorded, explained and subject to independent scrutiny.

The requirement to maintain accurate records of enforcement action is essential not only for the protection of those being investigated, but for the proper functioning of the enforcement system itself. Without such records there can be no effective auditing of performance, no analysis of systemic trends and no evidentiary basis for defending an action should it be challenged in the employment tribunal or the courts. Similarly, the obligation to provide written notice to those affected by enforcement actions is a basic requirement of procedural fairness. It ensures that individuals and businesses understand why a given action was taken and gives them the opportunity to challenge it if they believe it to be unjustified or disproportionate. It is a protection against not only state overreach, but the perception of arbitrary or unfair behaviour by agents of the state. Perhaps most importantly, the requirement for regular reporting to an independent oversight body injects an essential layer of democratic accountability into what is otherwise a closed executive process.

The oversight body would not be tasked with micromanaging individual cases. Rather, its function would be to ensure that the enforcement regime as a whole operated in a manner consistent with the rule of law, with proportionality and with respect for the rights of those subject to state power. The amendments would protect businesses from inconsistent or poorly executed interventions, and they would protect the integrity of the enforcement regime itself from reputational damage and legal challenge.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

I said earlier in my contribution that the letters of appointment made to these people will spell out their duties. Obviously, their relationship to the Secretary of State will be spelled out in the letter of appointment. I have said several times now that they will be operationally independent, so that could be a key message in those letters of appointment.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am very grateful to the Minister for her extensive answer and to my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lady Coffey, the noble Lords, Lord Carter of Haslemere, Lord Londesborough and Lord Stoneham, for their contributions to this short but very interesting debate.

As we come to the end of our discussion on these amendments to the Employment Rights Bill, I express my thanks to noble Lords who have contributed with such clarity and conviction and my disappointment with the Government’s response. Amendment 269, tabled by my noble friend Lady Noakes, fits very neatly with the requirement on the Secretary of State to produce annual reports under Clause 92. The Secretary of State has a duty to consult the advisory board, so I simply cannot understand why the Government would reject the idea of just combining the two and getting on with it. Equally, I do not understand why they would not want to take the suggestions of my noble friend Lady Coffey to tighten up the requirement. Nothing under those terms for the advisory board or the reports that need to be produced by the Secretary of State require a great deal of external information.

We have tabled amendments that are measured, constructive and rooted in principle. We have not sought to gut the Bill or to frustrate its aim of enforcing fair and lawful treatment in the labour market. On the contrary, we have sought to strengthen it and to ensure that the powers that it grants are effective and accountable, that enforcement is robust and fair and that ordinary businesses, especially small and micro enterprises, are not crushed under the weight of uncertainty, disproportionate penalties or faceless bureaucracy.

The noble Lord, Lord Carter, made excellent points about accountability. Enforcement is about not just force but legitimacy. It is about trust, and trust is only sustained when those who wield power are subject to oversight, transparency and to reasonable limits. That is not red tape. It is just a democratic principle. That is why we ask for qualifications and training to be made a prerequisite for enforcement officers, an obvious step given the serious powers that they will be entrusted with.

The Minister rejected my amendment introducing that notion, saying that it was not necessary because of Clause 87(6), just referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Carter. I note that Clause 87(3) says:

“In this Part ‘enforcement officer’ means a person appointed by the Secretary of State under this section”—


note that it says, “a person”, not necessarily “a qualified person”—whereas Clause 87(6), on which the Minister replied, says:

“A person appointed under this section may exercise any powers of an enforcement officer to the extent specified in the appointment”.


As the noble Lord, Lord Carter, informed us, there is no notion in there of independence, skills or anything else. That argument as to why our amendment is not necessary falls based on what is in the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Faulkner of Worcester) (Lab)]

I advise the Committee that if this amendment were agreed to, it would not be possible for me to call Amendment 264A for reason of pre-emption.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Coffey for her amendment in this group and for her introduction. I will speak to Amendments 266 and 267 in my name. These amendments are not presented in opposition to the spirit or general objectives of the Bill. Indeed, we fully support the aims of enforcing employment rights and ensuring that bad employers do not undercut fair ones. These amendments respond to a real and serious concern about the breadth of the power that the Bill currently gives to Ministers—a power that, if left unchecked, would allow a future Government to expand the remit of the fair work agency with far-reaching consequences but only the most minimal parliamentary oversight.

Paragraph 35 of Schedule 7 allows the Secretary of State to add to the list of enactments that fall under the enforcement remit of the fair work agency by way of regulations. That list, set out in Part 1 of Schedule 7, includes a range of statutory rights covering pay, working time, sick pay and protections against exploitation. The current drafting allows for the addition of any enactment that relates to employees, workers, employers or trade unions. That is an extraordinarily broad formulation. It would allow the Secretary of State to bring into the fair work agency’s scope virtually any area of employment or labour law, potentially even those governing union recognition, industrial action or collective bargaining, by secondary legislation and with no meaningful boundary in statute.

Amendment 266 seeks to address this by narrowing the scope of this delegated power. It would limit the types of enactments that can be added to those that relate to hours, pay or holidays. These are, after all, the core minimum terms and conditions of the employment relationship. They are well understood, capable of objective enforcement and already subject to statutory minima in other parts of the Bill. They also reflect the matters over which the recognised trade unions typically have statutory bargaining rights. There is, therefore, a clear and principled rationale for limiting the fair work agency’s enforcement jurisdiction to these domains.

We put forward this amendment on the grounds that it is both reasonable and proportionate. It would still allow Ministers to respond to emerging issues in labour markets, such as new forms of pay abuse or evasion of working time rules. It would, however, prevent this power being used to draw the FWA into controversial or contested areas of employment law, or into territory where individual enforcement through tribunals is more appropriate than systemic enforcement by a regulator. It would preserve the coherence of the agency’s function and protect against mission creep over time.

We anticipate that Ministers will argue that this amendment is too prescriptive and does not allow sufficient flexibility to bring in related rights that may not neatly fall into the categories of pay, hours or holidays, but that are none the less important for fair work—for example, information rights, certain protections from detriment or emerging contractual abuses not yet addressed by current law. The Government may say that drawing such hard lines in primary legislation is undesirable and that a degree of discretion is necessary for effective future-proofing.

If the Government do not accept Amendment 266 on the grounds that it is too narrow, it follows that the strength of Amendment 267 becomes even more essential. This amendment would require that any regulations made under paragraph 35 be subject not merely to the affirmative resolution procedure but to the super-affirmative resolution procedure, which I know the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, is fond of, as defined in Section 18 of the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006.

The super-affirmative procedure is not some theoretical or obscure mechanism. It exists precisely for circumstances such as this, where Parliament grants the Executive a broad power to amend the application of primary legislation by secondary means. The procedure ensures that Parliament is properly consulted, that draft regulations are subject to scrutiny before they are laid and that there is an opportunity for representations to be made, considered and reflected in the final statutory instrument.

The two amendments offer a choice. If the Government agree with us that the power to amend Schedule 7 should be tightly confined, they can accept Amendment 266. If they prefer to retain flexibility, they must accept that that comes with the responsibility of subjecting that power to a higher standard of parliamentary scrutiny, in which case Amendment 267 is the minimum safeguard necessary. What would be constitutionally unacceptable is for the Government to reject both amendments, leaving in place a broad and undefined power exercisable by ordinary affirmative resolution. That would be to hand the Executive a blank cheque over the shape and scope of labour-market enforcement in this country, without adequate safeguards in place.

To conclude, I urge the Government to consider carefully the implications of paragraph 35 as currently drafted. It is not enough to say that Ministers do not intend to use this power in a wide-ranging or politically contentious way. We are legislating not just for the current Secretary of State but for future ones, too. If the Government want discretion, Parliament must have oversight, and if they want latitude, we must have safeguards. The amendments give the Government the opportunity to make a choice: define the limits of this power clearly or accept the heightened scrutiny that wide powers properly demand.

[Lord Leong (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, for tabling Amendment 264ZA, which concerns the fair work agency’s remit. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, for Amendments 266 and 267, which seek to alter the delegated powers in Part 2 of Schedule 7.

Amendment 264ZA would seriously restrict the fair work agency’s ability to tackle labour exploitation of a more serious nature where the threshold does not meet the requirement under the Modern Slavery Act. There are no other enforcement provisions in the Bill that would cover this scenario. Currently, a number of Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority investigations have to be abandoned when the modern slavery threshold is not met. Since 2023, 104 cases have been dropped. That is bad for labour abuse victims and for taxpayers.

We are adding elements of the Fraud Act to the fair work agency’s remit precisely to address this issue. It will allow the fair work agency to investigate cases of financial fraud by abuse of position. That has specifically been included within the Bill following extensive discussions with stakeholders, including the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority and the Home Office. Removing the Fraud Act offences from the fair work agency’s scope would truly limit the agency’s effectiveness, and I must therefore respectfully resist this amendment.

Amendment 266, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, would drastically narrow the scope of the power. This would undermine the very purpose of the fair work agency, which is to simplify and consolidate the enforcement of labour market legislation. The fair work agency will be greater than the sum of its parts as its remit is further expanded. This will relieve pressure on a struggling employment tribunal system, which I have heard many times from noble Lords across the aisle.

The power to expand the fair work agency’s remit has appropriate safeguards and limitations. Any expansion of its scope will be informed by the advice from the agency’s tripartite advisory board, and with consideration of the overall enforcement strategy. Furthermore, any changes to the remit will be through affirmative-resolution regulations that will be laid before Parliament and, where relevant, will require the consent of the relevant Northern Ireland department. This power is crucial to the long-term flexibility of the fair work agency. By enabling the remit to expand over time, it can respond to developments in the labour market. If we were to restrict the power to such a narrow range of issues, we would be tying our own hands.

Amendment 267, also in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, would require that a super-affirmative resolution procedure be used when the Secretary of State exercises the delegated power in Part 2 of Schedule 7. In my almost three years in this House when the party opposite was in government, I never heard them bring any super-affirmative resolution in any of the Bills they brought before this House, so I do not understand the sudden change of heart.

This amendment is unnecessary. The Bill provides for appropriate parliamentary scrutiny as use of this power will be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. I also highlight that the recent report by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee did not raise any concern with this power as currently drafted. The additional scrutiny this amendment calls for would place unneeded burdens on parliamentary time, which is currently stretched. With this point in mind, I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw Amendment 264ZA.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, I will also speak to Amendments 267ZA, 267AA and 267AB in my name in this group. Schedule 7 tries to bring together a whole bunch of legislation in a meaningful and sensible way so that it can handily be used in future. I could have extended some of these amendments, but I decided to focus Amendment 266A on paragraph 35(5)(b) of Schedule 7, which relates to Clause 89 on the delegation of functions. I could have considered a whole number of these, because this is a classic Henry VIII clause—put something in primary, shove something through regulations and, hey presto, a whole Act can change before our very eyes. In particular, Clause 89(6), which I address in Amendment 267AB, stood out to me.

My concern is that we start off with this agency, the enforcement officers and all these different things, but Clause 89(1) says:

“The Secretary of State may make arrangements with a public authority”.


I do not think “a public authority” is defined anywhere else in legislation at all. This is the first time I have seen it defined, as

“a person certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature”.

That could be a whole bunch of people. What does it really mean? Are they seeking to act in the public interest, or in a different way?

The Explanatory Notes do say what they are, but, as the Minister and the Committee will know, they are not part of legislation. One of the reasons for bringing this out is to try to understand from the Minister precisely what it means. The consequence of these bits of the legislation is that, by statutory instrument, this novel area that we are getting into could be changed very quickly, away from what might have seemed a sensible agency, though I appreciate that the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, would rather have operational independence.

This is why I have peppered through my amendments in this group the very specific point that it should be a public authority that has civil servants in it and is not a non-ministerial department. I think that there are about 24 non-ministerial departments. Perhaps really only two—the Supreme Court and the Crown Prosecution Service—should be non-ministerial, recognising the accountability that, understandably, Parliament and the public expect.

The difference of a non-ministerial department is that it is accountable to Parliament. The device to do that is principally through the Select Committee in the House of Commons, perhaps the Public Accounts Committee, not so much in the House of Lords. Therefore, significant parts of the work being done are left to an occasional accountability meeting, whereas if civil servants are not in a non-ministerial department, the Secretary of State is directly responsible and can be held to account by Parliament and can hold those civil servants to account. I am therefore very nervous about how easy it will become to change Clause 89(6) and what that then means. It would be better for the Government to have more in the Bill about what it is.

As we are starting to get into Part 5, could it be that the public authority starts to become not-for-profit groups of solicitors who start to have these enforcement functions? Could arms of trade unions suddenly start enforcing and be able do all these different elements and to take employers to court so this starts to spread? The reason for my amendments is to try to get better legislation about what this is supposed to be. I am desperately trying to make sure that the only people to whom these things can be delegated will be civil servants who honour what the Government have set out in Part 5 and that the variety of enforcement officers and the fair work agency will be directly accountable and have the executive powers of the Secretary of State. That can be done only if people are civil servants and they are not in a non-ministerial department. I beg to move.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Coffey for her amendments that comprise this group, and I speak in support of them. They bring much needed clarity and constitutional discipline to the question of to whom the Secretary of State may delegate important public functions.

Clause 89, as drafted, grants the Secretary of State, as my noble friend has explained, broad discretion to delegate enforcement and other key responsibilities to a public authority. However, the current definition of that term is overly expansive. It could include not only departments under direct ministerial control, but also non-ministerial departments and other bodies with a degree of operational independence from the Government, which raises fundamental issues of accountability.

If enforcement powers, which could be potentially intrusive and far-reaching, are to be delegated, they should be exercised by those within the direct chain of ministerial responsibility. They are civil servants who operate under the authority of Ministers and who are, in turn, accountable to Parliament. Amendment 267ZA, therefore, rightly confines the scope of Clause 89 to public authorities that are comprised of civil servants and are not non-ministerial departments. That would ensure such functions are not handed to bodies that lack clear ministerial oversight or democratic accountability.

Amendment 267AA serves as a necessary consequential safeguard because it ensures that any legal substitution of the Secretary of State with another authority in the eyes of the statute is similarly limited to such core public bodies. Without this clarification, we risk a situation where statutory references to ministerial powers are extended, potentially without scrutiny, to entities with a more ambiguous constitutional status. This is not about casting aspersions on the competence or integrity of non-ministerial departments. Many do good work, but they are deliberately designed to operate at arm's length from Ministers. They should not be the recipients of powers that the public rightly expects to be exercised under ministerial responsibility.

[Lord Leong (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, for Amendment 266A, 267ZA, 267AA and 267AB.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 267BA, 267BB and 267D in my name. This is where we get to the composition of the board. In this group of amendments, the most important that I have tabled is probably Amendment 267D. It would remove the words “trade unions” but would insert “employees”. I am conscious that, of course, trade unions represent employees, but I was surprised by the composition of the board: that the word “employee” did not turn up as to who the members of the board were supposed to represent. To that end, one reason why I laid Amendment 267D is that we should remember that only 22% of UK workers belong to a trade union. That leaves 78% who, at the moment, may not necessarily be represented in the consideration of the advisory board. I think it is important that we rectify that.

It is possible that independent experts and others may be involved. By the way, this happens on a variety of other bodies—I think it is so on the Health and Safety Executive. Usually, the organisations representing employees are trade unions, but the point is made that it does not have to necessarily be trade unions. It could be professional associations—that has happened in the past as well, from my recollection.

In looking at the composition of the board, I noticed that my noble friends on the Front Bench have come up with a slightly different approach. Mine has tried to be pretty straightforward and to, in effect, insert an independent chair, who should be put forward to the relevant committee in the House of Commons for consideration before their appointment.

Deliberately, I have put in some specifications as to who should chair the board. Recognising that this is all going to be about enforcement of legislation, considering a wide range of issues including taking legal action when it has not been requested by people, by workers, I have specified that we should consider this board, which is going to be very important to the Secretary of State because there are a number of situations where the legislation says that the Secretary State “must” consult the advisory board. To that end, it would be worth while to have somebody who is a qualified barrister, a KC, but who shows a particular level of accomplishment without needing to look to tribunal judges or similar to chair that board. I beg to move.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 267B, 267C and 268A standing in my name, and I also thank my noble friend Lady Coffey for introducing her amendment, and, of course, my noble friend Lady Noakes for signing them. Amendments 267B and 267C are not mere technicalities; they are a matter of principle. They are a matter of representation and ensuring that the new fair work agency advisory board truly reflects the full diversity and complexity of the modern UK labour market.

As drafted, Clause 90(4) proposes a tripartite board composed equally of individuals representing trade unions, employers and so-called independent experts. While the intention of the balance is commendable, the provision as it stands is both overly simplistic and insufficiently representative of the contemporary workface. As my noble friend highlighted, trade unions, for all their historic importance, now represent only 22.4% of employees across the United Kingdom, 12.3% of the private sector—so the bulk of those are in the public sector.

As my noble friend also pointed out, that leaves a staggering 77.6% of working people whose voices, interests and concerns are not captured through union representation. To restrict employee representation on this advisory board solely to trade union nominees is to exclude the overwhelming majority of the workforce. That is neither democratic nor representative. It is outdated.

This amendment seeks to rectify that imbalance by introducing a more inclusive and nuanced structure. It proposes that the board includes two representatives from the trade unions, rightly acknowledging their important role; three representatives of employees beyond the trade union movement, an expansion that ensures that the voices of non-unionised workers, gig economy participants, freelancers and precarious workers are also heard; five employer representatives to be appointed only after the Secretary of State has sought advice and recommendations from recognised business representative organisations, a process that will ensure that these appointments are rooted in sectoral legitimacy rather than political expediency; and three independent experts to provide critical objective insight grounded in academic, legal or practical labour market expertise. That structure would do three things. It would broaden representation, professionalise appointments and future-proof the board against the ever-evolving nature of work.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for tabling these amendments. I will begin by addressing Amendments 267AC and 267BB, which relate to the chair of the advisory board. The Bill already provides for a strong and credible chair, and we are confident that appropriate appointments can be made under the current drafting. These amendments would significantly narrow the pool of qualified candidates and exclude highly capable candidates. There is no precedent for such restrictions among similar bodies.

For example, the current chair of the Equality and Human Rights Commission is the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner of Margravine. She brings deep expertise in public policy, regulation and public service to the role, but she is not a practising barrister. The focus should be on appointing the best candidate through a rigorous merit-based process, not restricting eligibility by profession. Moreover, there is no precedent for these amendments. Similar bodies, such as the Low Pay Commission and the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service, do not impose this level of restriction or require parliamentary approval. These models work precisely because they allow the Secretary of State to appoint individuals with diverse and complementary expertise. We fully support a strong, credible chair, but that is best achieved through a robust and flexible appointments process, not through rigid statutory constraints or exclusions.

On Amendments 267B and 267BA, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, and the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, we have no objection in principle to a larger advisory board, but this should be balanced against an increased cost to the taxpayer. In practice, we anticipate there will be nine members of the board mirroring the make-up of the Low Pay Commission, which has operated successfully for 25 years. The current drafting provides flexibility so that the Secretary of State may appoint more than nine members, but it is unwise to lock a specific number into primary legislation without operational justification. The amendment would create a fixed number of advisory board members. Clause 90 already provides for what the amendment seeks to achieve.

Turning to Amendments 267C and 267D, these amendments risk compromising the balanced representation of the advisory board. The current drafting has been carefully chosen to reflect the social partnership model that has served the Low Pay Commission and ACAS well for so many years with a mixture of employer, union and independent representation. Amendments 267C and 267D also seek to broaden employee representation on the advisory board by reducing the emphasis on trade unions. Let me be clear: trade unions serve to protect and advance the interests of all workers, and they are best placed to represent workers’ interests on the advisory board. Moreover, the Secretary of State has broad discretion to appoint members with relevant expertise as independent experts. The Government are also committed to ongoing engagement with relevant stakeholders through a variety of formal and informal means, so the advisory board is only one part of the landscape.

This leads me on to Amendment 268A, also in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe. The independent experts are intended to bring deep subject matter expertise and a perspective not already captured by the other members of the advisory board. The existing drafting already protects against partiality, as an independent expert is a person who does not fall within the groups mentioned in Clause 94. The Bill already provides a sound and balanced framework for the board’s composition, one that is adaptable, proportionate and future-proof. I must therefore resist these amendments.

I must also respectfully resist Amendment 269, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, which risks undermining the very purpose of the advisory board. Transparency in governance is vital, and the Government share the commitment to ensuring appropriate parliamentary scrutiny. Placing a statutory duty on the advisory board to publish its advice could compromise that level of confidentiality and flexibility which we believe is essential for it to carry out its role effectively. Mandating a separate annual report also risks formalising what should remain a responsive advisory relationship, potentially limiting the board’s ability to offer genuine, timely and informal guidance on emerging issues.

Introducing even more reporting requirements would place a confusing and unnecessary reporting burden on enforcement teams, potentially diverting staff and resources away from front-line inspection and enforcement work, where they are most needed.

With this in mind, I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw Amendment 267AC.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My noble friend Lady Coffey and I raised the increasing statistical irrelevance of the trade unions. I do not think the Minister addressed that point. She also seemed to write off the idea of the advisory board amendments that we proposed, on the basis that they would be expensive to the taxpayer. But Clause 90(6) says:

“The Secretary of State may pay such remuneration or allowances to members of the Board as the Secretary of State may determine”.


They could determine to pay nothing, presumably, so why would that be an expense to the taxpayer?

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

I thought I covered those points. As I said, we anticipate that the advisory board will have nine members, but we are building in some flexibility. We were trying to avoid locking a specific number into the primary legislation without any operational justification. I think that answers that point.

On the point about the unions, of course, if we stick with the social partnership model, they will be in a minority anyway. They will have the expertise and the knowledge to represent all employment issues on behalf of the workers.

Employment Rights Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 18th June 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

271ZB: Clause 94, page 112, line 13, at end insert “under Schedule 7, Part 1, paragraphs 1-12, 22 to 34 inclusive”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to ensure that any ‘fishing expedition’ actions of enforcement officers enabled by subclause (a) are limited to the most serious breaches, thereby preventing a broad expansion of an enforcement officer’s ability to enter business premises to include entering at any point to check on minor matters.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 271ZB I will speak also to Amendments 271ZBA, 271ZD and 273LA in my name. Amendment 271ZB ensures that the powers being granted to enforcement officers under this part of the Bill are used proportionately and only in response to the most serious breaches of labour market law. Without this amendment or something very much like it, we risk handing enforcement officers sweeping powers to enter business premises with very little constraint.

As currently drafted, Clause 94(1)(a) grants enforcement officers the authority to “enter any premises” for “any enforcement purpose”. That is an extraordinarily broad power. This amendment would limit such warrantless powers of entry to those paragraphs of Schedule 7 that deal with the most serious forms of labour market abuse, namely child labour offences, the failure to pay the minimum wage, unlawful deductions from wages and exploitation through forced labour. These are the areas where strong enforcement action is absolutely justified.

However, is it appropriate that the same powers—entry without warrant or consent—could be used to check whether someone forgot to keep a copy of an employment agency contract on file or perhaps miscalculated a payslip by a few pounds? We must not lose sight of the bigger picture. The vast majority of employers want to comply with the law; they invest time and money in doing so. However, if we allow overly broad enforcement powers, we risk creating an atmosphere of distrust, regulatory overreach and disproportionate intrusion, particularly into smaller businesses which may not have the resources to constantly defend themselves against investigatory overkill. The Government say they want better enforcement, and so do we, but good enforcement is not the same as unchecked enforcement.

Turning to Amendment 271ZBA, as currently drafted, Clause 95 restricts the power to enter dwellings to those occasions where a warrant is issued by a justice. This is a well-established and necessary safeguard, reflecting the heightened privacy interests we attach to a person’s home, but there is a conspicuous gap in the safeguards applying to entry into non-dwelling premises, such as business premises, offices or other places of work.

Clause 94 grants enforcement officers wide powers to enter any premises for enforcement purposes, without the same explicit requirement for a warrant or judicial authorisation, unless it is a dwelling covered by Clause 95. This gap means that, unlike the protections for residential premises, business premises can be entered and searched by enforcement officers without prior judicial approval. This is a significant and unwarranted imbalance. The intrusion into a business, especially a small or medium enterprise, is a serious matter. Entry and seizure powers can disrupt operations, damage reputations and create an atmosphere of suspicion.

That is all quite apart from the rather sinister nature of this power. For many small businesses, their premises are their livelihoods. The difference between a home and a business may be one of degree, but the right to protection from arbitrary state intrusion should be similarly robust. Judicial oversight ensures that these powers are used only when there is a legitimate and evidenced basis for entry, and it prevents abuse or overreach.

The requirement for a magistrate to authorise a warrant is a safeguard that protects due process, proportionality and the rule of law, and is of course very well established. It requires that enforcement officers demonstrate reasonable grounds and the necessity for the warrant. That is not a bureaucratic hurdle; it is just a check that balances the state’s legitimate enforcement interests with individual and business rights.

On Amendment 271ZD, as it stands, the appeal process focuses primarily on the accuracy of the sums claimed or the penalties imposed. It is essential that underpayments and penalties are correctly calculated and justified, but this narrow scope overlooks a critical element: the manner in which enforcement powers are exercised.

Enforcement officers hold significant authority when issuing notices, including entry, inspection and seizure powers. However, these powers must be exercised lawfully, proportionately and with respect for those affected. This amendment allows tribunals to consider whether enforcement officers have acted beyond their legal authority or used their powers excessively or unfairly. It further empowers tribunals to cancel or vary notices where misconduct or disproportionate enforcement is found and to award compensation as appropriate. This is not only a matter of protecting businesses and individuals from overreach but is vital to maintain public confidence in the enforcement regime. When enforcement is perceived as fair, transparent and accountable, compliance will improve and the number of disputes will reduce.

On Amendment 273LA, at this stage, the Bill does not define who enforcement officers are in any detail—we started this discussion on Monday—nor does it set any clear limits on the powers they may exercise when carrying out their functions. This lack of clarity is deeply concerning, especially given the serious nature of the enforcement powers being proposed, which include entry, inspection and seizure of documents and property. It is vital to establish unequivocally that enforcement officers, who are not police offices and do not have the training or mandate of the police, must not be allowed to use physical force or authorise others to do so. The use of force is an extreme measure that can be justified only in very specific and regulated circumstances, and generally only by trained law enforcement personnel. The amendment simply ensures that enforcement officers cannot resort to physical coercion, which is not appropriate for officials tasked with regulatory enforcement in the labour market. That is a matter of basic human rights and dignity. It is also a safeguard for businesses and individuals who may otherwise be subject to intimidation or physical harm.

I have absolutely no doubt that Ministers on the Government Front Bench have no interest in physical coercion being a part of these powers. In that case, they should accept this amendment because, if they do not, the implication is clear: they accept that physical coercion is acceptable. I do not believe that is what they want and I beg to move.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I support the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Sharpe. I declare an interest as a director of a very small business—a think tank.

As an employer, the idea that we have no warrant or judicial oversight of an enforcement officer’s intrusive visit to a business to seize or take copies of documents and to check up is intrusive on the time and output of the business. It is also an infringement of a business freedom to conduct the business to the best ability of those in the office or the business.

Both clauses in fact contain very intrusive proposals. As my noble friend pointed out, one of the things that is deeply worrying about them is we do not know who the enforcement officers will be or exactly what their powers will be. We have seen, even with the best trained police force in the world, the Metropolitan Police and local police forces, a certain amount of over-zealousness in pursuing certain types of crime. Therefore, with an untrained and unknown quantity and with such powers, we need very clear limitations, and we need to focus on the most serious crimes and those outlined in these amendments. For those reasons, I support both the amendments in the name of my noble friend.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, for his intervention, because I was about to raise a similar point. It has been a long time since, as a policeman, I applied for a warrant, but we did not routinely notify the intended recipient of our visit that we were about to do it. I do not buy the argument that that would see an awful lot of documents destroyed or anything that they might have been pre-warned being removed from the premises—they would not know. I do not see why it should be different for enforcement officers and the police, who obviously are, in some cases, investigating much more serious crimes.

On the use of force arguments that the noble Lord, Lord Katz, deployed, surely the point is that these powers are being extended and, yet again, we are relying on future guidelines, comments or statements that will be written into their terms of employment. I simply do not believe that that is enough. The public deserve the reassurance of having this in the Bill or, at the very least, clarified in a Dispatch Box Statement.

As we bring this debate to a close—my noble friend Lady Lawlor, I think, homed in on this point—the fundamental concern that underpins all these amendments is that the Government have not yet provided a clear definition of who the enforcement officers will be, what precise powers they will hold, and what training or accountability measures will govern their conduct. The absence of clarity is not a minor oversight; it is a significant gap that leaves businesses and individuals vulnerable to potential overreach and misuse of authority. Enforcement officers will be vested with extraordinary powers of entry, inspection and seizure, but we have no clear picture of the safeguards that will be put in place to prevent abuse.

These amendments are not about obstructing enforcement or denying the Government the tools that they need to tackle serious breaches of labour market law; on the contrary, we recognise the importance of robust enforcement. However, enforcement must be lawful, proportionate and accompanied by proper oversight and accountability, or it will risk losing public trust.

We have sought to introduce reasonable limits on when and how enforcement—

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

Does my noble friend agree that, in addition to the problems he has raised, there is a very great danger of vexatious claims being made without evidence, and of disproportionate actions and intrusions taking place as a result?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I absolutely agree with my noble friend; that is one of the reasons that we are seeking more clarity in the Bill. As I said, without transparency, accountability and a clear definition of what the powers will be—they are unarguably vague —all those concerns remain. It is disappointing that the Government have not fully recognised the risks inherent in the broad powers envisaged by the Bill. We argue that the Government should, at a very minimum, provide clear guidance on these roles and responsibilities and on the limits of enforcement officers. This subject is so important that I think we will have to return to it. For now, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 271ZB withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

271D: Clause 113, page 124, line 31, at end insert, “and the worker has provided written consent to the Secretary of State to bring proceedings on their behalf,”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment requires the worker’s informed consent before the Secretary of State can initiate legal action, preserving individual autonomy and control over personal legal matters.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 271D, I shall speak also to Amendments 272ZZA, 272ZZB, 272ZZC, 272ZZD, 272ZZE, 272ZB, 272ZC, 272AA, 272AB and 272AC.

There is a troubling message throughout this legislation of the fundamental belief that third parties, whether they be unions or the state in Part 5, will make decisions on behalf of individuals rather than individuals being able to make decisions for themselves. The challenge with third parties making decisions is that they pay no price when they are wrong, and that is evidenced in this clause. Clause 113(6) states:

“The Secretary of State is not liable to any worker for anything done (or omitted to be done) in, or in connection with, the discharge or purported discharge of the Secretary of State’s functions by virtue of this section”.


That is an unacceptable subsection in this clause, hence my Amendment 272ZZE.

The reality is that workers whose claims are taken up or not taken up by the Secretary of State risk having their rights mishandled or ignored, yet, under the clause as drafted, they would have no recourse, remedy or ability to challenge that failure. We think that that sets a dangerous precedent, because we are granting power without responsibility. We would be creating a regime in which decisions that affect individuals’ livelihoods and legal rights can be made from behind a veil of immunity. That is neither just nor consistent with the principles of good governance. We need to be clear that, if a private employer or a trade union behaved with this level of impunity, we would not accept it, so why are we accepting it from the state?

The fundamental principle underlying Amendments 271D, 272ZZA, 272ZZB, 272ZZD and 272ZC is consent. Clause 113 currently allows the Secretary of State to initiate legal action in a worker’s name without requiring that worker’s consent. That is deeply problematic. Legal proceedings, particularly employment proceedings, can be deeply personal, reputationally sensitive and complicated. To bring such proceedings without the individual’s explicit and informed consent is a serious encroachment on personal autonomy. My Amendment 271D would insert a requirement that the worker must provide written consent before the Secretary of State may act on their behalf. That is not a mere administrative formality; it is the cornerstone of the individual’s control over their own legal affairs.

What if consent was not initially required or given but circumstances change? That is addressed in my Amendment 272ZZA, which would establish a clear opt-out mechanism. It would ensure that the worker is given notice before proceedings begin and is afforded 28 days to object. If they do, the case does not proceed. Surely this strikes a balance between the state’s interest in pursuing enforcement and the worker’s right to decide how their own case is handled. Legal action is not always welcome, even when it is justified. The consequences of litigation, especially in employment, can be damaging professionally and personally. Workers may prefer alternative dispute resolution.

However, consent and opt-out are not enough on their own. Even with consent, the state must be bound by a duty to act in the worker’s best interests. That is why I have proposed an amendment requiring that the Secretary of State should have regard to the worker’s stated objectives, the potential impact on their current and future employment, and the proportionality of taking legal action in the specific context. That is a safeguard to prevent well-meaning intervention becoming harmful or heavy-handed.

Then there is the matter of control. A worker may initially consent to the Secretary of State taking the lead but later wish to take back control of the proceedings, perhaps because they have secured private representation or circumstances have changed. My Amendment 272ZZD addresses this. It would ensure that the worker retains the right to reclaim their case and that the Secretary of State must accommodate that request. It affirms that ultimate control remains with the individual and not with the state.

Finally, my Amendment 272ZC would introduce a fundamental principle, that of subsidiarity. The state should not intervene unless there is absolutely no other viable route to justice. If the worker has representation or access to advice or union support, that route should be exhausted first. Legal action by the Secretary of State should be a last resort, not a first impulse.

These amendments are not intended to frustrate enforcement—far from it. They are designed to ensure that enforcement is fair, consensual and genuinely in the interest of the person whose rights are at stake. Workers are not passive subjects of policy; they are individuals with agency, judgment and a right to decide how they wish to pursue justice. We must ensure that the Bill does not cross the line from protection into paternalism.

I turn to Amendments 272AA and 272AC. Amendment 272AA simply calls for an annual report—nothing excessive, just a basic record of how often these powers have been used, what types of claims have been pursued, the outcomes and any costs or awards recovered. This is a common-sense transparency measure. If the state is litigating on behalf of private individuals, we should, at the very least, be keeping track of how that power is being exercised and with what effect.

Amendment 272AB, however, is the more pressing amendment because it would place a sunset clause on the power, causing it to expire at the end of the next Parliament unless it is actively renewed. It would also require an independent review to assess whether this power has delivered real value for workers, for justice and for public money, because the truth is we simply do not know if this clause is necessary. We do not know if workers even want the state litigating on their behalf; we do not know if the outcomes justify the costs; and we certainly do not know if this is the most effective way to improve enforcement. If this power is to remain, Parliament should be given clear evidence that it works and works better than the alternatives.

Finally, Amendment 272ZB would introduce a simple but important safeguard: a public interest test before the Secretary of State can bring proceedings on a worker’s behalf. Without this, we risk allowing the state to pursue claims that may be frivolous, politically motivated or unnecessary, potentially at public expense and also to the detriment of both workers and employers. Litigation should not be used to make a point; it should be used to deliver justice where it truly matters. This amendment would ensure that such powers are exercised responsibly and proportionately, and only where there is a clear public benefit. I beg to move.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, I oppose the Question that Clause 113 stand part of the Bill. I raised this in Second Reading, and I appreciate the discussions that have taken place with officials and the Minister since, but I genuinely believe these are novel powers.

I appreciate that we are perhaps just not going to agree today on how far the Equality Act 2006 goes, but when I tabled Questions to the Minister, they were passed to the EHRC. The commission said that, since it had received those powers—I think it was commenced in 2007—no powers had been used to initiate legal proceedings that were not judicial review or as an intervener. It gave me the distinct impression that it did not necessarily believe that it should be initiating legal proceedings in this regard. It has its own policy and that is under consultation. However, it does beg the question, given some of the other consultations that the Government have initiated, whether they will in future seek to take over any such duties or powers that the EHRC has in a variety of legal proceedings, because the EHRC is not using powers that the Government think it has. However, I think that is still really a matter of debate.

Building on the amendments that have been tabled by my noble friends on the Front Bench, I think this is an odd situation. I appreciate we have discussed elements of Clause 113 before; indeed, the other day we debated my noble friend Lady Noakes’s sensible amendment that this should be in the public interest. It would be helpful to understand from Ministers what they see will happen as a consequence of this. Where are we getting to? What is going on?

I have deliberately degrouped some parts of this discussion on Clause 114—about the money side—but it is useful to understand that, for the purposes of this clause, this is not just about people who are working; it is about people who do not have a job with the person they are seeking to take to court. We had a debate some time ago about why that could be, and we got into a debate about what sort of special privileges there might be. Nevertheless, this seems quite an extraordinary shift in the capability of the Government, first, to initiate these proceedings anyway and, secondly, to do so when the worker involved does not intend to do so. That is why, I appreciate, the legal wording really restricts any inclusion of the worker at a future date, which specifically seems to be ruled out in various provisions in the clause, except in Clause 113(5), which allows the worker to be brought in at an appeal stage. However, I am concerned more generally about this approach of a new agency.

Another element that really concerns me is subsection (6), which in essence provides:

“The Secretary of State is not liable to any worker for anything done (or omitted to be done)”.


I expect that is there to cover circumstances—we may have had a brief exchange on this already—in which the worker says, “You didn’t go after this bit or that bit”; it is kind of “Tough luck”. As it stands, it is not clear to me whether, if the worker is unhappy with the action taken, double jeopardy is allowed: will the worker be allowed to initiate separate claims against the employer, if they feel that the Secretary of State and the enforcement officers have admitted different things?

Overall, this clause is an unnecessary innovation. I am concerned about it, and I would be grateful for some broad examples of how it could be used in the future.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

On that point of clarification, I will write to the noble Baroness.

In conclusion, the civil proceedings powers within the Bill align with our manifesto commitment to strengthen enforcement and improve outcomes for workers through a fairer, more accessible system. We need to let the fair work agency operate with the tools it needs, guided by the statute but not constricted by inflexible restrictions or ministerial bottlenecks. I therefore ask the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, to withdraw Amendment 271D.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her reply. She will not be surprised to know that I am afraid I did not buy any of those arguments.

I am extremely grateful to my noble friends Lady Coffey, Lady Lawlor, Lord Jackson, Lord Ashcombe and Lady Verma for their interventions; they all made extremely good points. I will return to the points raised by the noble Lords, Lord Carter of Haslemere and Lord Murray of Blidworth, in a second.

We have just heard this clause described variously as “beyond belief”, “especially bonkers”, “an utter mess”, “quite extraordinary” and “perverse and unheard of”. Do you know what? It is all of those things. This has been an extraordinary debate, and so many interesting points have been made that it is hard to sum up. However, there is one point that was brought to my attention by the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, who was sitting next to me at the time. He pointed out that this clause might be in contravention of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights: the right to respect for private and family life. This needs to be explored, and it is important for the Minister to take account of, because, under Section 19(1)(a) of the Human Rights Act 1998, she has to sign on the front of this Bill that it is compatible with the rights under that convention.

I will read the relevant article, so it is on the record:

“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence … There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”.


I do not expect the Minister to answer this now, but I would be very grateful if she could at least allude to the legal advice that she was given before she signed the Bill to confirm that it did not contravene Article 8.

I appreciate that government legal advice is rarely published, but, having had some experience of government lawyers and their risk-averse nature, I would be very surprised if they had considered this in its entirety. I would be grateful if the Minister would come back to that issue, perhaps in the letter to my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth. This is clearly one of the subjects to which we will have to return, because, as both the noble Lord, Lord Carter, and my noble friend Lord Murray have explained, this is extraordinary and positively Kafkaesque.

I will leave the last words to my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth, who pointed out that we could end up in a state where we have litigation about litigation on behalf of someone who does not want to litigate. That is frankly absurd. For now, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Before I sit down, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Fookes, on her 55 years of public service. I believe that she was first elected on 18 June 1970 to represent Merton and Morden—many congratulations.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes) (Con)]

That is most kind, but we must not be diverted from the business in hand. Is it your Lordships’ pleasure that this amendment be withdrawn?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, my Amendment 279GZA seeks to understand what “and, in certain cases” means in Clause 149. I would be grateful for an explanation. I looked extensively in Schedule 12 and saw only the insertion of a regulation to do with Northern Ireland. I would be grateful to understand that.

I am happy to support Amendment 323, which seems a sensible way of trying to ensure that justice is delivered effectively and people can still have fair access while also making sure that we make the best use of employment tribunal judges’ time.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Coffey for introducing her amendment and also to the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, for speaking to the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Fox, the first of which proposes a report on the expansion of legal aid in employment tribunals. It would not itself change entitlement but seeks to prompt a structured exploration of the options. Legal aid is, of course, a complex and often contested area, and this amendment simply calls for a government-led review that considers both employer compliance and the financial position of workers. It is reasonable to assess whether the current system adequately supports access to justice in employment disputes.

I have a question for the noble Lord, Lord Fox. I will discuss with him outside but, just to get it on the record, I am curious to know whether the “report on the options”, which he describes in subsection (1) of the proposed new clause in his lead amendment, extends to small and medium-sized employers as well. I am interested to know whether he thinks they should be included within that survey based on the fact that many of them will also suffer some financial hardship.

On the proposed new clause on summary judgments in employment tribunals in Amendment 323 by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, such a power could offer a means of reducing the burden on tribunals, improving efficiency and focusing resources on cases where the issues genuinely require full examination. In short, both amendments are interesting and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, I will first speak to Amendment 279H in my name, which increases the time limit for making a claim to an employment tribunal in relation to paid time off for employee representatives in consultations on certain changes to occupational and personal pension schemes from three months to six months. This would amend the employment tribunal time limit that is set out in the Schedule to the Occupational and Personal Pension Schemes (Consultation by Employers and Miscellaneous Amendment) Regulations 2006.

This amendment is essential to ensure consistency with the time limits for the majority of tribunal claims which are being amended to six months throughout the Bill. This is a technical amendment which brings the provisions on consultations on pension schemes in line with the other clauses in the Bill regarding the increase in time limits which have been set out.

Increasing tribunal time limits will provide employees and employers more time to resolve disputes internally or through the conciliation process as well as more time for employees to consider the merits of bringing a claim to an employment tribunal. Judges will continue to have the discretion to hear out-of-time claims on a case-by-case basis.

Amendment 279GZA from the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, seeks to provide that the extension of employment tribunal time limits from three to six months does not apply in respect of industrial tribunals in Northern Ireland. We have worked closely with the Northern Ireland Executive to develop an approach to extending time limits which respects the Northern Ireland Assembly’s competence to legislate on devolved matters. Where time limits are in UK-wide legislation that extends to Northern Ireland and that relates to matters that are reserved, such as the National Minimum Wage Act 1998, this Bill amends the time limits for bringing a claim to the industrial tribunal in Northern Ireland. We will continue to work with the Executive to consider implementation and, if appropriate, these changes may come into force at different dates for Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The Bill does not amend time limits in legislation that extends to Northern Ireland and is transferred—that is, devolved powers.

On Amendments 273 and 323, I understand the motivation of the noble Lord, Lord Fox, in tabling his amendments, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, for speaking to them so ably. In order for the reforms we are making through this Bill to be effective, it is vital that workers can enforce their employment rights. As noble Lords know, tribunals, including employment tribunals, are designed to be informal, accessible and low-cost means of accessing justice. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, that the backlog of tribunal claims at the moment is unacceptable. We are taking steps to address that backlog in conjunction with the Ministry of Justice, and the fair work agency can also play a part in easing that load. We will be able to debate the measures that we are taking further in later groups.

However, I would like to reassure the noble Lord that legal aid is available, subject to means and merits tests, in relation to discrimination and breaches of the Equality Act 2010. Where an issue falls outside the scope of legal aid, funding may still be available through the exceptional case funding scheme. Of course, members of trade unions will receive advice and representation anyway as part of their membership.

Turning to the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Fox, on employment tribunal summary judgments, I can reassure the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, that employment tribunals have a wide range of existing powers to address weak claims or responses, including strike-out and default judgments, to achieve the aims set out in this amendment. The strike-out rule in its framing and application is already similar to that of Rule 24 in the Civil Procedure Rules. It allows employment tribunals to strike out half or all of a claim or response, including where there is no reasonable prospect of success. I therefore ask the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, to withdraw Amendment 273.

Employment Rights Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 18th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

Yes, I would.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, that was a most interesting exchange, and I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and my noble friend Lord Jackson for it. As I have said many times, I am not a lawyer, but as a broader observation, there seems to be a slight philosophical discussion developing this evening between intervention and initiation when it comes to various state interventions in certain areas of law.

I have no doubt at all that the intention behind the noble Baroness’s amendment is to strengthen the enforcement of equal pay laws. As she rightly says, we all support that objective, but we feel that this particular proposal is somewhat flawed, not least because we just do not think it will work. At its core, the amendment risks conflating pay disparity with unlawful discrimination. It assumes that if a pay gap exists, there must therefore be wrongdoing. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, acknowledged, it is not that simple, because pay disparities can and often do arise for entirely legitimate reasons, such as differences in experience or qualifications, performance geography or even negotiated terms, to my noble friend Lord Jackson’s point. To suggest that a mere statistical difference is indicative of discrimination is to abandon the nuanced legal framework carefully set out in the Equality Act 2010. While paying a great deal of respect to the arguments—and there is considerable merit in this—we cannot support this amendment.

[The Minister of State, Office for Equality and Opportunity (Baroness Smith of Malvern) (Lab)]

My Lords, like my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti, I am also an occasional visitor to this Committee, but I am very pleased to be here this evening to address her Amendment 275. I thank her for recognising the engagement there has been with the Government and others on this up to this point.

Certainly, the Government want to make very clear that we share the broad aims behind this amendment. Over 50 years after the Equal Pay Act 1970 and 15 years after the Equality Act 2010, it is clear that equal pay has not yet been achieved. That is why the Government have committed to strengthen the equal pay regime and end pay discrimination. I share the concerns of my noble friend in identifying the challenge of enforcement in this case. There is more we can do to ensure that the onus does not fall only on women to find out whether they are receiving the same pay as their male colleagues for equal work and to take enforcement action against employers in the case of a breach.

It is possible to envisage, in relation to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, a system in which you have both the contractual arrangement and the ability to take individual action as is the case now and an enforcement body that supports people doing that in general terms and identifies thematic or consistent ways in which equal pay is being breached. That is why the Government are committed to establishing an equal pay regulatory and enforcement unit with the involvement of trade unions. As part of this, we will carefully consider how we can improve the enforcement of the equal pay scheme.

On 7 April we launched a call for evidence on this issue and wider equality law to ensure that any steps we take will lead to a meaningful strengthening of protections against pay discrimination—an objective that I am sure my noble friend will share. It is important that the Government are able to develop these changes in partnership with business, trade unions and civil society to ensure that the law works for everybody. For that reason, I hope my noble friend will recognise that this will be a more appropriate process through which to address these issues. As she suggests, we will give these areas very close consideration in advance of the equality, race and disability Bill.

In relation to some of the specific points my noble friend raises about the way this might operate, we certainly recognise the benefits that can arise from government departments, including HMRC, working together. HMRC already has a number of joint working and data-sharing arrangements with departments and agencies. The Government are therefore not closed in principle to establishing new data-sharing arrangements with regulatory authorities where this can support their regulatory functions.

My noble friend made a very interesting point about the use of AI. It would not be sufficient simply to compare the pay of different people working within a workplace unless you could also have some analysis of how that applied to the nature of the work and whether that was work of equal value. It may well be that advances in technology, including AI, would be a way in which we could support that monitoring.

Policy is at a very formative stage. My officials will explore a wide range of options to improve the enforcement of equal pay rights. While taking great care to ensure that safeguards are put in place in relation to personal data, particularly where that relates to discrimination and protected characteristics, I suspect the sort of description that she gave of the contribution of AI is very much part of what, across government, we are wanting to see in terms of its use in future.

We are sympathetic to the ultimate objectives of my noble friend’s amendment. I hope she recognises that and the progress that we intend to make on that pledge to deliver stronger enforcement mechanisms and, in particular, an equal pay regulatory and enforcement unit. With that assurance, I hope she feels able to withdraw her amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

279ZZB: After Clause 146, insert the following new Clause—
“Impact assessment on enforcement of holiday pay compliance(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the day on which this Act is passed, lay before Parliament an impact assessment of the ability of businesses to comply with the enforcement provisions of this Act relating to holiday pay entitlements.(2) The assessment under subsection (1) must include—(a) an evaluation of the practical, administrative and financial implications for employers in meeting the requirements relating to holiday pay,(b) consideration of the capacity of small and medium-sized enterprises to comply with those requirements, and(c) an analysis of any barriers to compliance identified during implementation.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment places a duty on the Secretary of State to assess how effectively businesses—particularly small and medium-sized enterprises—are able to comply with the enforcement mechanisms relating to holiday pay under this Act, and to identify any practical barriers or burdens.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 279ZZB and 305 to 309, which are in my name.

Turning first to Amendment 279ZZB, we firmly support the principle that workers must receive their full entitlement to holiday pay and that those rights must be enforceable. However, we believe that achieving that goal in practice, particularly under the new framework set out in the Bill, requires us to be clear-eyed about the real-world challenges that many businesses face. Holiday pay is one of the most complex areas of employment law and has only become more so following the changes introduced in January of this year.

While some employers regrettably seek to avoid their obligations and should rightly being sanctioned, the reality is that many more are simply trying to navigate a legal framework that is very confusing, technical and still evolving. For small and medium-sized enterprises in particular, compliance is not always a question of willingness but of capacity and clarity. That is why this amendment is both timely and proportionate: it asks only that the Secretary of State undertakes an impact assessment to consider how businesses—particularly SMEs—are coping with the new enforcement provisions. It would require an evaluation of the practical, administrative and financial implications of compliance and establish whether any barriers have emerged during implementation.

Crucially, this is not about weakening enforcement. In fact, it is quite the opposite: it is about ensuring that the fair work agency, which we hope will become a cornerstone of enforcement under this Bill, is properly resourced, modernised and equipped to support both workers and employers in meeting their obligations.

Turning to Amendment 305, this Government have managed to get unemployment to hit its highest since the pandemic—4.6%, according to the most recent ONS figures. This is not a figure that we can shrug off because, of course, behind it are real lives, real households and real businesses that are facing uncertainty. At the same time, the business environment is under considerable strain. Recent changes to national insurance contributions have forced employers to make extremely difficult decisions. The employer rate has risen from 13.8% to 15% and the threshold has been lowered, placing even greater pressure on payrolls.

Research from S&W has shown that around a third of UK business owners are still planning further job cuts as a direct result of these changes. Many have already begun reducing headcount. Others are cutting hours, freezing pay or raising prices—moves that will impact both employees and consumers. So, the question that has to be asked is: how will this legislation affect employment in that context? I should also have mentioned, of course, that May showed a very significant drop in payroll numbers.

It is easy to sit in Westminster and write these rules. It is much harder to understand how the rules will play out in towns and factories, in small businesses, in hospitality, in logistics, and across the many sectors that make up our labour market. That is why this amendment is vital.

I turn to Amendment 307. The British Retail Consortium has warned of a potential “high-street bloodbath”, with one in 10 retail jobs at risk over the next three years, if the Bill’s measures are implemented without careful consideration. Retailers are already grappling with rising costs and squeezed margins, and these additional employment burdens could accelerate job losses in an industry that is vital to our economy. I believe that 180,000 jobs—I forget the precise number—are at risk through to 2028, according to the BRC.

Similarly, the Institute of Directors has published stark findings showing that nearly three-quarters of its members—72%—believe that this legislation will dampen economic growth. Some 49% of business leaders say they plan to reduce hiring; 36% of them intend to outsource more roles; and 52%, more than half, anticipate investing further in automation as a response. These figures paint a clear picture: employers are preparing to scale back on job creation and are likely to replace human roles with technology, in response to rising costs and compliance demands.

The Federation of Small Businesses echoes these concerns. SMEs are the backbone of the UK economy, yet many are telling us that the cumulative impact of new regulations, increased national insurance contributions and rising wage floors are forcing them to reconsider recruitment plans or even reduce existing staff. The FSB has called for a more balanced approach that safeguards workers’ rights without stifling the very businesses that create these jobs, and the growth. Can the Minister name a single business that expects to increase hiring because of the measures in the Bill?

On Amendment 306, what of our youth? At a time when the Government should be prioritising opportunities for young people entering the workforce, the figures are concerning. Between January and March 2025, an estimated 354,000 young people aged 16 to 24 were not in education, employment or training; that is up by 21,000 compared with the same period last year. The Government will no doubt argue that the provisions in this Bill, such as the right to guaranteed hours and changes to statutory sick pay, are designed to protect vulnerable workers, many of whom are young and may be on the margins of employment. However, the reality is more complex. Although well intentioned, these changes will make it more costly and complicated for employers to hire young people, who often lack the experience and are seeking flexible or part-time work to get started in their careers. The burden of additional costs and rigidities can discourage employers from offering entry-level roles or apprenticeships—exactly the opportunities that young people desperately need to develop skills and build work histories.

On Amendments 308 and 309, let me turn to a specific sector in the UK: manufacturing. In the north-west, manufacturing is not only a significant contributor to the regional economy but a vital source of skilled employment and innovation. Many manufacturers there are actively seeking to invest in advanced technologies, including artificial intelligence and automation, to improve productivity and to remain competitive on the global stage. However, these ambitions risk being undermined by the additional costs and compliance burdens imposed by this Bill. Manufacturers are already grappling with the challenges of global tariffs, supply chain disruptions and inflationary pressures; adding further regulatory and financial strain threatens to hollow out this critical sector.

If the increased labour market enforcement and associated costs become too great, there is a real risk that manufacturers will reduce investment, scale back hiring or even relocate operations. The knock-on effects on local economies, particularly in regions depending on manufacturing, would be severe, affecting jobs, skills development and regional growth. While the objectives of the Bill—to protect workers’ rights and promote fair employment practices—are indeed laudable, we must ensure that they do not come at the expense of vital industries and communities. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Leong (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness for that. Figures go up and down every month but let us look at it in the longer term. We are creating new jobs and that is what is really important. In conclusion, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am enormously grateful to the Minister for his passionate defence of his Government and for his remarks. I am genuinely delighted that he has taken on a new role in small business because, unlike the vast majority of his Government, he actually knows what he is talking about when it comes to small business. We are very pleased to hear that and we welcome his general remarks. I also agree with Jamie Dimon about the growth agenda, but the fact is the Bill will not help the growth agenda. That is the argument we are trying to make.

I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, for his remarks. He accused me of being doomy and gloomy, but I did not get those statistics out of thin air; they were all supplied by the employer organisations that we referenced. If he would like, I will happily put him in touch with them all. The fact is that, once again, the Minister could not rise to the challenge of naming a single business that expects to increase hiring because of the measures in the Bill, and references to the strategic defence review do not help that argument.

The other reason why I am doomy is because, the other day, I came across a notice in a window in London that said, “After much reflection, and as a result of the substantial business rate and national insurance cost increases imposed on us in this year’s Budget, we have made the difficult decision to close. Our final day of service will be 28 June 2025”. That is a real business going out of business—that is disgraceful.

The Government’s impact assessment of the Bill, which we have debated a number of times and which I know irritates the Minister every time we bring it up, was simply inadequate. There is not enough detailed rigorous analysis to understand how these enforcement measures will affect businesses and employment across the country. Without that, we are walking blindly into serious economic risks. At this rate, if the Bill proceeds without the necessary amendments and safeguards, it will not just fall short, it will create unemployment. The additional burdens on employers, especially small and medium-sized businesses and crucial sectors like manufacturing, threaten to reduce hiring, stall investment and ultimately cost jobs. This is not speculation; it is happening, as my noble friend Lady Noakes pointed out. It is a clear and present danger based on the evidence that we have seen, and the trend is unlikely to diminish.

We support workers’ rights, but not at the expense of widespread job losses and economic harm. The Government have to provide a proper, thorough impact assessment—one that honestly addresses these risks—before we proceed further. I am grateful to the noble Lord for his offer of a meeting to discuss this, but I am not sure what there is to discuss without the actual impact assessment or the commitment to hold it as soon as possible. If this does not happen, the Bill will fail both workers and employers, and we will face the consequences of higher unemployment as a result. That is something no one wants. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 279ZZB withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I will be very brief. I feel like the support act, really, because the substance, the meat, of this issue and this clause has been debated, although I am delighted that this is the final schedule and the final part, so we are on the final stages of the Bill. I just say very briefly, with respect, to the Minister, that we often ask the Minister to write to elucidate the remarks that she and her colleagues have made in the course of the Committee’s proceedings. We are watching that and making sure that we do get replies and, if we do not get proper replies, we will raise those issues on Report. I do hope, very gently, that the Minister is aware of that. Of course, we understand that information is not always at her disposal or her colleagues’ disposal, but we will need that information in order to make an informed decision on Report if the House divides at that juncture.

The second issue that I think it is appropriate to raise, raised several Committee days ago by my noble friend Lady Coffey, is impact assessments. The Cabinet Office guidelines say that impact assessments should be updated as the Bill goes through. To the best of my knowledge, that has not happened, and I am not sure that the Minister has satisfactorily answered the question that my noble friend asked earlier. With that in mind, I think that the rationale that the Minister used for the extension from three to six months was not even tepid and not even weak; it was just non-existent. To say that the Law Commission has done a consultation I do not think cuts the mustard. We on this side believe firmly that extending that period will bring more uncertainty to business, will be more costly, will encourage more litigation and workplace strife and will be a false economy.

I look over at the Government Benches and I see the pawprints of the trade unions in this. I do not know why they would want to do this, but, as on so much of the Bill, they are seemingly pulling the strings and I think that, in the end, it will not be in the best interests of workers for this to happen, not least because, as my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral said, the system is creaking. It is no good saying, “Oh, well, it was creaking under you”; this Government have been in power 12 months now, it is incumbent on them to fix the system with their legislation and I think that this is a retrograde step. It will not work, it will backfire, and on that basis, I think that neither Clause 149 nor Schedule 12 should stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, most of what I needed to say was said in the last group, so I will not labour the points, except to add a bit of colour, because my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral and I consult quite widely. We consulted this morning with a distinguished employment lawyer, who told us that, if you apply now to an employment tribunal, you will have no chance at all of getting even a preliminary hearing for 10 months. That is next April. In order to get a resolution, a case resolved, you would be looking probably at December 2027. That is nearly two and a half years away. It will take a lot more than the number of judges the noble Baroness mentioned that they have recruited so far in order to fix that particular problem. I wish her good luck and I hope she succeeds, but I really do not think that we should be doing this.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, the first thing I will say to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, is that if we say we are going to write, we will write: we do not need to be told that this is being monitored in some way. I would say that I feel that we on these Benches have bent over backwards to engage with noble Lords, not only in debates but outside, by having meetings and trying to work through some of these issues in more detail. So I do resent the accusation that we are somehow hiding from accountability on these issues. We are bending over backwards to be accountable.

I also say to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, that we have updated the impact assessment and written to the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, about it already. As noble Lords have said, we have now debated this issue quite extensively. We argue that the proposals we are putting forward will benefit not only employees but employers, by increasing the time within which workplace procedures and conciliation can be completed, creating an opportunity for more disputes to be resolved without the need for litigation.

Current ACAS performance data shows that that around a third of early conciliation notifications go on to submit an employment tribunal claim. Therefore, the longer period of time for resolving disputes internally and/or via conciliation will simplify the time limits for making employment tribunal claims and improve access to justice.

I have heard the arguments of the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, and, as I say, we have now debated this extensively. I can assure your Lordships that this clause and schedule are essential for those who need to bring a claim to a tribunal in order to have adequate time to prepare a robust claim. I therefore ask that they stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Noakes for so expertly introducing her amendment, and I welcome the contribution from my noble friend Lady Penn regarding the establishment of an employment law advisory committee.

We believe my noble friend’s amendments would significantly strengthen the framework for effective and balanced labour market regulation. The creation of a dedicated advisory committee, modelled on the Social Security Advisory Committee, seems a prudent and timely measure. It would provide the Secretary of State with expert independent advice that draws from a diverse range of perspectives: employers, workers, and independent experts alike. This inclusive composition is vital to ensuring that any regulations developed under the enacted Bill are well-informed, fair and workable in practice.

Moreover, the proposed committee’s clear statutory function to scrutinise draft regulations before they are laid before Parliament would introduce an important additional layer of oversight and transparency. It would help to ensure that regulations and the views of all relevant stakeholders are carefully considered. The requirement for the Secretary of State to publish the committee’s report alongside any laid regulations, including an explanation when recommendations are not followed, would enhance accountability and public confidence in the regulatory process.

In sum, we think that these amendments represent a balanced and constructive approach to policy-making in the complex area of employment law. They would help guard against rushed or poorly considered regulations, support better policy outcomes and uphold the principles of consultation and transparency that are essential to good governance.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, for her Amendments 299 and 300. The Government have already committed to consulting on the detail of implementation and have already undertaken extensive engagement with employers, businesses and workers’ representatives, trade unions and experts. We will continue with this approach as we develop our secondary legislation.

There are some specific instances, such as in the enforcement space, where we are proposing setting up an expert group. Upgrading the enforcement of workers’ rights is an important and complex task, where it is right to draw on expertise from businesses, workers and independent representatives.

That is why the Bill requires the Secretary of State to establish an advisory board. It will play a critical role in providing advice and insight to the Secretary of State on their enforcement function under Part 5 of the Bill, which they will in practice deliver through the fair work agency. This is a proportionate and necessary step to help ensure the agency’s effectiveness. But this is not required across the Bill and wider labour market legislation as a whole. The committee proposed by the noble Baroness would be a repetition of the planned engagement and consultation on the Bill. We have already engaged with more than 190 different stakeholder organisations on our Plan to Make Work Pay, including employers of all sizes, from SMEs to large corporations, trade unions and representative organisations representing thousands of businesses and millions of workers.

We have held round-table discussions focused on particular topics, such as zero-hours contracts, and with particular groups, such as leaders of small businesses or retailers. As a Government, we are committed to engaging closely on our plans, and we will continue to do so. This engagement will continue throughout implementation, including as we develop regulations under the Bill.

On parliamentary scrutiny, the Select Committees will of course scrutinise the government proposals and reforms as they are rolled out. The Economic Affairs Committee had an inquiry on the labour market, and the noble Baroness was herself a member of that committee, so we know that there are already bodies in the parliamentary network that can be used to provide that scrutiny. On the basis of our proposed consultation and the parliamentary scrutiny available, I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her Amendment 299.

Employment Rights Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 24th June 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

313: After Clause 150, insert the following new Clause—
“Social mobility impact reportingWithin 12 months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must publish an independent assessment of its impact on social mobility.”

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, in some ways, we are continuing a theme with Amendment 313 in my name. The Government have talked about supporting those on the fringes of the labour market; this is a goal that I hope we all share. We know that different individuals face different work challenges, whether due to educational background, employment history, health circumstances or socioeconomic factors. The question before us is whether this legislation achieves that laudable objective or whether it inadvertently makes it harder for precisely those individuals whom the Government claim they want to help.

I start with the day-one right concerning unfair dismissal, and I pose a fundamental question: why would any employer take on what might be considered a high-risk hire? Why would they take a chance on a young person seeking their first opportunity? Why would they hire a student who did not attend a top-tier university? Why would they consider a person from a lower socioeconomic background, who may lack conventional credentials but definitely possesses untapped potential? When employers face immediate legal liability for dismissal decisions, they naturally become more risk averse in their hiring practices. They gravitate towards candidates with proven track records, established credentials and minimal perceived risk. This is not callousness; it is rational economic behaviour in response to the regulatory environment.

The Government’s refusal to include a meaningful probationary period at this stage compounds the problem significantly. I have little doubt that, fairly soon, the Government will be arguing that they intend to consult and to continue with a light-touch probationary regime, which, it is suggested, could last for up to nine months. That is all well and good, but what does it mean in practice? What does the phrase “light-touch” mean and how will it be defined? Who are they going to be consulting, and on what? What are the Government thinking about this? It needs to be in primary legislation. Make no mistake: this uncertainty is affecting business decision-making now.

It looks as if the Government fundamentally fail to understand that employment relationships involve mutual discovery. In the short term, virtually all jobs represent a cost to business. Employers hire workers not because they are immediately profitable but because they are confident that, over time, these workers will develop skills, reach their peak performance and productivity, and ultimately become a net benefit to the company or employing organisation. This process of development and mutual learning requires flexibility. It requires the ability for both parties to recognise when a match is not working and to part ways without excessive legal complexity. By removing this flexibility from day one, the legislation creates a powerful incentive to hire only the safest and the most predictable candidates—precisely the opposite of supporting those on the fringe of the labour market.

The same perverse logic applies to the day-one right to sick pay. Consider the position of someone who has been absent from the workforce for an extended period. There are businesses that will make a point of hiring such individuals, recognising their potential and being willing to provide them with opportunities. But now the cost calculation has fundamentally changed. An employer considering such a hire must now factor in the immediate liability for sick pay from day one, combined with an inability to part ways if the employment relationship proves unsuccessful. The rational response is fairly obvious: avoid the risk entirely.

This is not theoretical speculation; it is how labour markets function when faced with regulatory constraints. No amount of academic opinion can state otherwise. I urge the Government to review the impact on social mobility, so that they can adapt the legislation to avoid the unintended consequences I have highlighted. Like my noble friend Lord Deben on the last group, I would like to be proved wrong on this. If I am, I invite the Government to gloat to their hearts’ content about that, but I think we need the evidence. I beg to move.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend’s excellent amendment, as we reach the end of Committee. Before I get into the substance of that, I will offer some praise. Noble Lords know that, last week, I took issue with the Government Front Bench about the potential lack of response to letters from individual noble Lords who had raised specific points during Committee. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, who is no longer in her place, took some issue with that, resiled from my analysis and said that it was not the case. However, over the last few days, I have received a plethora of epistles from the Government in my email. As Private Eye may have said in the past, are those two occasions by any chance related? That was my praise; I thank the Government for coming forward with those letters and we will hold them to account when we reach Report. I am grateful for small mercies, nevertheless.

I commend to the Government the excellent report of the Social Mobility Commission, State of the Nation Report 2024: Local to National, Mapping Opportunities for All. I probably say this at every juncture, but my noble friend’s amendment is helpful, because there is a cross-party consensus that we should all be working to help young people in particular into work, innovative employment, and skills and training. As we all know, and as has been found by apolitical third parties such as the charity the Sutton Trust, which focuses on improving social mobility, there are disparities across the country. There are sectoral and geographic disparities, and disparities in people’s backgrounds, race, ethnicity, age et cetera. As far as is practicable, we should be designing legislation that tackles issues around improving life chances, training and skills, and innovation.

More fundamentally, we need to be designing legislation that tackles endemic, entrenched inequalities, and that is what this amendment is about. My noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom is absolutely right that this is about opportunity cost. Many employers, given the chance, will try to help young people by giving them a chance to improve their life chances and skills, and by paying for their exams and training, et cetera—via apprenticeships, for instance. But the legislative regime will be such that they are encouraged not to employ that person, because they may have a disability, may be late to the employment market or may not be socialised—they may not understand the protocols of going to work each day, of being on time and of being dressed smartly, which are very basic things that we take for granted. That risk aversity, employers not wanting to employ those people, will have a negative effect as the corollary of this Bill.

Ministers have a chance at least to engage with this amendment and, when we come to Report, I hope to accept it; it would make a real difference to the lives of people who find it tough to enter and stay in the employment market. I encourage Ministers to look at the report to which I referred, and at the work that has been done to support the Bill and its laudable objectives. My noble friend offers this amendment in good faith in order genuinely to improve the Bill. On that basis, I hope that the Minister will look on it favourably and incorporate its ideas into the finished Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank the Minister for his answer. I am also grateful to my noble friends Lord Jackson, Lady Lawlor and Lady Cash for their supportive comments and to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, who raised some very interesting points.

I gently suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Leong, that we are not just talking about it either; we are proposing to do something about it. We want to protect social mobility, which is why we have tabled this amendment. He sounded disappointed that we have to keep returning to this debate—so are we, but we do not feel that we are getting meaningful answers on the subject of the consultation, which we have brought up on numerous occasions. Until we get those meaningful answers, we will continue to return to this debate.

The Government may not deem a comprehensive impact assessment necessary for these provisions, but they have not given a satisfactory response to the serious concerns raised about social mobility and opportunity creation. In our opinion, this represents a failure to engage with the economic realities of how the employment market functions, and the Minister knows this as well as I do.

We must judge policies by their results, not their intentions. Results are not dependent on the nobility of our intentions but on the incentives that policies create in the real world. This Bill creates the wrong kinds of incentives. It incentivises employers to become more risk-averse, not more inclusive. It incentivises the hiring of safe, conventional candidates over those who might bring fresh perspectives but lack traditional credentials. It incentivises the protection of those already in employment at the expense of those seeking to enter it. In the words of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, it disincentivises taking a punt.

Do not just take my word for it, take those of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales. Its most recent survey stated:

“Members say that, at a time when the government needs business to drive growth by taking risks, the Bill, along with these other pressures, will make businesses more risk averse. ‘We worry businesses will start playing it too safe, choosing a “safe pair of hands” over bold, innovative talent that could drive real change’”.


These are not the incentives of a modern, dynamic economy that seeks to maximise opportunity and social mobility. They are the incentives of a system that entrenches existing advantages and fundamentally will make it harder for those without them to break through. We think that is a tragedy. This legislation will be judged a failure because of the standards its proponents have set for it. When employment opportunities for young people decline, social mobility stagnates and those on the fringes of the labour market find doors closing rather than opening, we will see the true measure of these policies, and that will be regrettable. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 313 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I will see my noble friend Lord Fox tomorrow and I will tell him what he has been missing. I think the noble Lord, Lord Leong, is already making history by using the phrase “very, very soon”—or was it “very, very, very soon”? In my experience, I do not think I have heard that, so it is probably arriving tomorrow morning.

Amendment 318 seeks to introduce specific provisions for dependent contractors. It proposes the insertion of a new section into the Employment Rights Act 1996, by way of a new clause after Clause 150. It is intended to address a significant gap in our current employment law by recognising essential rights and extending them to a growing segment of our workforce. This is a serious and rather surprising omission from the Bill; certainly, it is a gap my party promised to fill in its manifesto last year. I feel an obligation to put this amendment forward today.

The Minister spoke about employment rights in a modern labour market. I do not believe we can secure proper employment rights in a modern labour market without addressing the issue of the dependent contractor. We know that the nature of work has changed and is changing. More and more individuals are engaged to perform work or services personally, relying primarily on a single employer or contractor for their income, yet they fall outside the traditional definitions of employee and fully autonomous independent contractor.

These dependent contractors are often subject to a degree of control over how, when and where they work, leaving them in a precarious position, without adequate employment protections. No doubt this Committee will be familiar with many of those who work in the gig economy—delivery workers, contracted drivers, piece-rate workers, home workers and even consultants who work almost exclusively for a single client. Granted, some Uber drivers and Hermes couriers went to court and managed to establish that they are in fact workers and not independent contractors, but more needs to be done. We need explicit statements about the status of such workers and explicit rights set out in this Bill.

The amendment seeks to rectify the situation by defining dependent contractor status clearly within the Employment Rights Act. Crucially, it proposes to extend several key employment rights to these individuals, treating some of the measures in the Bill as applicable to them. Specifically, this amendment would ensure that dependent contractors are entitled to the rights set out in proposed new subsection (2) of my amendment. This includes payment at or above the national minimum wage for all work performed; the right to payment for cancelled, moved and curtailed shifts, which mirrors the vital protections the Bill introduces for zero-hours workers; statutory sick pay from day one of sickness, aligning with the Bill’s improvements to SSP; day one rights to paternity and parental leave, and the new right to bereavement leave.

The amendment also includes a statutory right to disconnect from work-related communications outside of normal working hours, and protection from detriment for exercising this right, as the Bill establishes for other workers. It also includes protection from unlawful deductions from pay, and against discrimination. It further includes an entitlement to guaranteed hours if regular and predictable hours are worked for a defined period, moving beyond just the right to request and aligning with the new provisions for qualifying zero-hours workers.

It is also important to note that this amendment respects the distinct nature of dependent contractor relationships. It acknowledges that, unless specified otherwise in their contracts or by future regulations, dependent contractors would not automatically be entitled to statutory redundancy pay or general minimum notice periods for termination, so there would continue to be a distinction between employment and dependent contractor status.

Furthermore, the amendment would empower the Secretary of State to issue further regulations to define key terms and the specifics of these rights, ensuring flexibility and the ability to adapt to evolving working practices. It would also mandate the issue of guidance, including an online tool to aid in determining dependent contractor status in disputed cases. By accepting the amendment, we would have the opportunity to bring fairness and greater security to a significant and growing portion of our workforce. We could ensure that individuals who are deeply reliant on a single employer received fundamental employment rights reflecting the modern realities of the work. I very much hope that the Government will support this vital addition to the Bill. I beg to move.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for his amendment. As we consider this legislation, it is timely to reflect on how it would interact with one of the most significant shifts in our labour market in recent decades: the rise of the gig economy. This sector has delivered considerable benefits, including increased flexibility, new income opportunities and innovative business models. It has allowed many individuals to engage with work on terms that suit their circumstances, whether as a primary or supplementary source of income.

However, with any new form of work comes a degree of legal complexity. Our current employment framework was designed largely in a different era—one where work tended to take place in fixed locations, during fixed hours and under traditional contracts. The gig economy challenges many of those assumptions. For businesses, this complexity can lead to inconsistencies in regulation, administrative uncertainty and litigation risk; for individuals, it can mean uncertainty about rights and entitlements, and for policymakers, it raises the broader issues of whether and how the legal definitions of employment need to evolve to reflect modern working practices.

The Bill, while not focused exclusively on the gig economy, touches on matters such as workplace rights, regulation and the role of secondary legislation that will inevitably affect it. We should therefore consider whether the legislation provides sufficient clarity for businesses operating flexible models, whether it supports fair and predictable frameworks for all parties, and how future regulations will ensure that any changes to employment classifications or entitlements are based on clear, evidence-led analysis.

The question before us is not so much whether the gig economy is good or bad—it is part of the modern labour market, and it will obviously continue to grow and remain so. The more pressing question is whether the labour market is equipped to keep up with that evolution, and whether the Bill provides the right foundation for doing so. In that context, thoughtful and measured discussion about emerging work patterns such as dependent contracting, platform work, freelancing —which we discussed the other day—and other hybrid models are not only appropriate but very necessary. I look forward to further discussions with the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and others, on this subject.

Before I sit down, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Leong, for the great courtesy with which he has always conducted himself in his discussions and deliberations with our side. I enjoyed his valedictory remarks. I felt that he was perhaps slightly irked by the fact that we have had some relatively lengthy debates—perhaps because he did not agree with the premises of some of them. I would say very gently that that is the point of Committee; we are not supposed to agree, we are supposed to probe. As a former Home Office Minister, I have to say that these debates are not long; they are brief. These debates are like Usain Bolt; ours were like Mo Farah.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business and Trade and Department for Science, Information and Technology (Baroness Jones of Whitchurch) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for tabling Amendment 318. He raises an important issue. As we have been discussing, the changing nature of work and the gig economy are a real challenge for us, and we recognise the complexity and shortcomings of the UK’s current employment status framework.

I can reassure the noble Lord that the Government have committed to consulting on a simpler framework for employment status, and this remains our intention. We have been clear that, as a result of the complexity, some of the reforms in the plan to make work pay will take longer to undertake and implement. We want to get the potential changes to the framework right, and we will consult on the fundamental aspects of employment law before taking action. I think that in part echoes the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, who recognised the complexity and the need to think it through before we get it right. We are determined to follow this through and take action.

I am sympathetic towards the noble Lord’s aims to extend the protection of employment law. The self-employed make a huge contribution to the UK economy. As the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, said, while many enjoy being their own boss and the flexibility that self-employment brings, others can find themselves highly dependent on one particular client with little choice, which can bring them challenges and problems.

I appreciate that the noble Lord is seeking to address this with his amendment by introducing a new employment status of “dependent contractor” and extending employment protections to those individuals. However, the amendment would further complicate what is already a highly complex area—one where, as I am sure the noble Lord knows, there have been several high-profile Supreme Court judgments in recent years. We want to avoid introducing an additional employment status before we have had the opportunity to reflect and consult further.

In addition, I can assure the noble Lord that the Government are committed to supporting and championing the self-employed. We have already announced a package of measures to help the self-employed thrive in good-quality self-employment, including measures to tackle late payments to small businesses and the self-employed. I urge the noble Lord to listen to our reflections and our determination to look at the whole issues around the gig economy, and to give us a little bit of space to do that. For this reason, I ask him to withdraw Amendment 318.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, for bringing forward this amendment requiring a review of safe homeward transport for workers. I also welcome her back from her brief visit to the Maoist utopia on her last amendment. The safety and well-being of workers, particularly those finishing their shifts late in the evening, is a matter of significant importance. Many sectors operate outside traditional working hours, and the challenges faced by employees in securing safe and affordable transportation home after 11 pm are real and varied.

Understanding these issues is crucial, especially for vulnerable groups, including women and girls, for whom late-night travel can present heightened risks. It is also important to recognise that safe transport arrangements can contribute positively to worker morale and retention and may even play a role in reducing crime or accidents. The review has the potential to shed valuable light on current practices and challenges and provide a basis for informed discussion about how best to support workers who face late-night journeys home. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, for tabling Amendment 321. We recognise the concern underpinning the amendment and agree that workers finishing late at night should be able to travel home safely and affordably. We are aware that for some workers, particularly those in hospitality, healthcare and security, late shifts can pose challenges when public transport options are limited. We also acknowledge and welcome that some employers, including firms in the City of London, have taken proactive steps to support their staff with safe transport home.

While we do not believe that it is appropriate to legislate for a review at this time, I hope I can reassure your Lordships’ House that we are committed to supporting workers’ well-being and safety. That commitment is evident throughout the Bill. For example, as we discussed on the second day of Committee in early May—another opportunity for a history lesson, it seems so long ago—the Bill strengthens the right to request flexible working from day one of employment. This flexible working provision empowers workers and employers to agree working patterns that better suit individual circumstances, including, where appropriate and reasonable, avoiding late finishes. We are also taking steps to improve enforcement of existing rights and to ensure that employers meet their obligations to provide safe working conditions.

Although it is not the subject of this legislation, the Government are also committed to reviving, rejuvenating and investing in public transport, not least through the Bus Services (No. 2) Bill, the creation of GBR, improvements to rail services and the huge amounts being invested across the country, particularly in the north, in new transport projects, all of which will provide a greater level of options and service for not just people working late but those who want to enjoy the night-time economy and to use public transport more generally.

While we cannot support this amendment, we share the underlying concern and will continue to work to ensure that all workers are protected and supported. I therefore ask the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, to withdraw her Amendment 321.

Employment Rights Bill

Lord Sharpe of Epsom Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 24th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 323E, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, is a curious but important proposal, addressing a very real challenge in the evolving world of work. The noble Lord, Lord Russell, pointed this out, as has the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and the noble Lord, Lord Hendy.

The amendment seeks to clarify that substitution clauses in app-based platform work, such as food delivery, courier services and private hire transport, are valid only where the right to substitute is genuine, viable and actually used in practice. As many of us will know, much of our employment legislation was developed in an era when the labour market looked very different. The rise of app-based platforms and the gig economy has created new forms of work that do not always fit into the traditional categories of employment or self-employment, as has been said by previous speakers.

This amendment seeks to clarify one such grey area: the use of substitution clauses in platform work. It rightly asks whether these clauses are, in practice, genuine and workable, or whether they are being used to deny individuals the worker status that they would otherwise be entitled to. The noble Lords, Lord Russell and Lord Hendy, and others have explained in detail how that works in practice.

The broader point is that the Government must ensure that our workers’ rights framework is not stuck in the past. It must be up-to-date and dynamic enough to reflect the modern patterns of work and provide reasonable security for those engaged in them.

Too often, the flexibility of gig work is celebrated without enough attention being paid to the insecurity that can come with it: uncertain hours, low pay—which has been mentioned, including lower pay than the normal driver—and limited recourse to rights. Ensuring that the legal definitions we rely on are not open to exploitation is a vital step in protecting workers and maintaining fairness in the labour market. As other noble Lords said, this amendment may not be the final word on the matter, but it makes an important contribution to a conversation—the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, used the word “discussion”.

I give my compliments to the noble Lords, Lord Hendy and Lord Russell, and the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and others for this conversation—or discussion. I hope that the Minister and the Government will see that there is a gap in employment legislation that needs to be looked at. We ought to deal with people, such as couriers and drivers, who are substituting to people paid even lower wages—and then scooting in front of you at the traffic lights, trying to push up the number of deliveries or collections they are making—in primary legislation, not in a statutory instrument somewhere down the line. I hope that the Government will look at this before we get to Report.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, with whom I agree pretty much entirely.

This has been a much more fascinating debate than I was anticipating, and that says a lot more about me than it does about the debate. I was particularly struck by the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Hendy; I had no idea that such practices had been accepted by the courts. That seems to be one of the cases, as we discussed in an earlier group, where the gig economy workplace is evolving rather faster than the law. That clearly needs to be looked at, otherwise we will end up with what seem to me, as a lay man, relatively perverse situations.

I have to say to the noble Lord, Lord Russell, that the thought of a peanut butter and pineapple pizza sends a rather nasty shiver down the spine. Do people really eat that? I would seriously hope not.

The gig economy and platform-based work are obviously integral parts of the modern labour market. We should not forget that the sector offers flexibility that many workers value, because it allows people to choose when, where, how much and how they work. For some, that flexibility is vital; it means they can balance their work with other commitments or supplement their income in ways that traditional employment models do not allow.

I completely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, who introduced his amendment so eloquently, that there seems to be an incentive to come to this country. If we were able to control this, there would be an opportunity to help at least stem the flow of the boats, which is something that used to occupy a lot of my time.

On the amendment before us, which seeks to regulate the substitution clauses and redefine certain worker classifications, at this stage, we approach it with some caution, while acknowledging that it is clearly a subject to which we should all return and which demands further consideration. The intention to protect gig economy workers is commendable, but we should not make regulatory changes that unintentionally undermine the entire industry. With that in mind, I look forward to the Minister’s comments, but I do not believe that this subject will go away any time soon.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Berkeley for tabling Amendment 323E and everyone who contributed to this short but important debate on the issue of substitution clauses.

To be absolutely clear, the Government are very alert to the risks that my noble friends Lord Berkeley and Lord Hendy and the noble Lords, Lord Russell of Liverpool and Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, all raised on substitution. We recognise that substitution in the platform economy is an issue, and we share the concerns about the impact that it can have on working conditions and the prevalence of illegal working.

Some of the critiques that my noble friend Lord Berkeley made about e-bikes and e-scooters, and some of the comments made by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, fall a little outside what we are talking about tonight. One only has to be in the Chamber at Oral Questions on a regular basis to understand that noble Lords across the whole House share concerns about the impact that e-bikes and e-scooters are having on general society, as well as their attitudes towards the noble pursuits of cycling, walking and sharing public spaces.

There is growing awareness of substitution clauses and their use to deny workers core protections, including the national minimum wage and holiday pay, as set out by many noble Lords this evening, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool. Clearly, in extremes this can lead to abusive and exploitative treatment of workers, and we are looking at it closely.

My noble friend Lord Berkeley raised the issue of illegal working as reported in today’s edition of the Sun. It is important in considering this issue to realise that the Government recently introduced an amendment to the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill on Report in the other place to extend the scope of the requirement on employers to carry out right to work checks on limb (b) workers or individual subcontractors, such as those working in the platform economy.

We must remain in step with modern labour market models. The purpose of these changes is to require businesses that employ individuals in new labour markets to check that only those with a right to work in the UK are eligible to participate in these arrangements, and to enable Immigration Enforcement to issue penalties where they are not. This ensures that compliance is equivalent for traditional employers. That, as I understand it, is the core of the issue raised in the newspaper report described by my noble friend Lord Berkeley.

The links between substitution and employment status demonstrate how complex this area is. As my noble friend Lady Jones said earlier this evening in discussing Amendment 318, we are committed to consulting on a simpler employment status framework. My noble friend Lord Hendy said that we should look at this holistically. I am confident that this will provide an opportunity to hear views from a wide range of stakeholders on the use of substitution clauses and the interactions with employment status. This is an important issue, but I am also aware that there is a complex interplay with measures we are going to discuss shortly in Committee on the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill. In that context, it might be useful for me to take this back to colleagues in the Home Office and see how best to pursue it further.

I therefore ask my noble friend Lord Berkeley to withdraw Amendment 323E. In so doing, as this will be my last opportunity to speak in Committee, I would like to take this opportunity to thank all noble Lords who have taken part in the wonderful 11 days in Committee on this Bill for their constructive engagement and, indeed, at times, stimulating debates—who would have thought we would get so many days in Committee? I take note of what the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, said earlier about the pace of progress during immigration legislation. As I am going to be on the Front Bench for the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill later this week, all I can say is: I simply cannot wait.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

325: Clause 153, page 148, line 31, at end insert—
“(3A) The Secretary of State must have regard to the following objectives when making any regulations under this Act—(a) the international competitiveness of the economy of the United Kingdom, and(b) its growth in the medium to long term.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to have regard to the objective of the international competitiveness of the economy and its growth in the medium to long term when making any regulations under the Act.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendments 325, 326A and 329B, and briefly allude to Amendments 330BA and 330E, tabled by my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley.

The Government have stated that this Bill represents the biggest upgrade to workers’ rights in a generation. Given the tremendous importance that the Government have placed on this piece of legislation, one would reasonably have expected them to have conducted a comprehensive and thorough impact assessment. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Leong, argued earlier that the Government had done just that. However, the fact remains that Regulatory Policy Committee has awarded the Government’s impact assessment a red rating, which encompasses several critical areas, including the Trade Union Act 2016 repeals, day-one rights provisions, flexible working arrangements, and measures addressing harassment by third parties. Such a rating indicates fundamental deficiencies in the Government’s analysis of this legislation’s potential consequences—a point that has been argued from this side of the Chamber on a number of occasions.

I will illustrate precisely how inadequate this impact assessment is by examining one particularly striking example. It states that:

“There could also be wider impacts on society, including … a reduction in days lost to strike action if Trade Union reforms lead to better industrial relations, which will prevent significant costs on the economy. Rail strikes alone are estimated to have cost the UK economy at least £1.7 billion over the eight-month period to January 2023”.


This statement exemplifies the superficial and speculative nature of the Government’s analysis. Rather than providing concrete evidence and detailed economic modelling, they have resorted to hypothetical scenarios and broad generalisations. They suggest that their reforms might lead to better industrial relations, which could potentially reduce strike action and in turn prevent economic costs. However, this chain of assumptions lacks any of the rigorous analysis which legislation of this magnitude demands.

Furthermore, although the Government cite the economic impact of rail strikes, they fail to provide a comprehensive analysis of how their specific proposals would address the underlying causes of industrial disputes. They offer no detailed examination of the potential unintended consequences of their reforms, nor do they adequately assess the costs that businesses and workers might face during the implementation of these new rights. The mention of implementation affords me an opportunity to again remind the noble Lord, Lord Leong, that we will very soon be delivered an implementation plan.

On Amendment 325, we have heard Ministers trumpet on a number of occasions PwC’s global CEO survey, which ranked the UK as the second most attractive destination for international investment. Unfortunately, that claim collapses under scrutiny. The survey was conducted before the current Chancellor’s first Budget and before the Government began systematically dismantling the pro-growth, pro-enterprise environment that we left in place. Since then, the UK’s position has collapsed to 29th in IMD’s world competitiveness rankings. We are now considered less competitive than Oman, Saudi Arabia and the Czech Republic. We are barely ahead of Kazakhstan and Kuwait. That is not a global powerhouse. What is the Government’s response? Instead of halting the slide, they are doubling down with a raft of measures that will make the UK even less attractive to investors, less hospitable to entrepreneurs and less viable for businesses that are looking to grow.

At the centre of this is the Employment Rights Bill. This legislation threatens to make Britain one of the most rigid and punitive labour markets in the developed world. Let us be clear: the Bill introduces day-one rights for employees to bring legal claims, dramatically increasing the litigation risk for employers from the moment a contract is signed. It expands rights around dismissal, probation and workplace disputes, turning even small staffing decisions into potential courtroom battles. It removes key flexibilities that employers rely on to respond to changing economic circumstances. This may all sound very appealing in the abstract. The Government will say that it is modernising employment rights, but in practice job creation will slow, entrepreneurial risk will drop and, crucially, offshoring will accelerate, because businesses can choose to hire in other jurisdictions —and they will.

We are already seeing warnings from business leaders that the cost of employing in Britain is simply becoming too high, not just financially but legally and procedurally. A recent survey by Saffery and Ward found that employers are planning layoffs and the relocation of operations abroad in direct response to increasing national insurance contributions and regulatory burdens, and now the spectre of hostile employment legislation. EY has warned that high energy costs and slow growth are deterring investment, while major employers are now reviewing UK operations due to the cumulative cost of doing business here.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

We on these Benches meet with members of the SME sector all the time for various purposes. As well as the formal meetings, we meet them in all sorts of guises—for example, to discuss the industrial strategy and some of the digital growth policies. I do not think it practical to do what the noble Lord has asked, but I can assure him that the more formal consultation meetings happen regularly.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank the Minister for her response. It is clear that there is significant disagreement on this subject. Indeed, there is a degree of disagreement on the statistics. We seem to be quoting statistics that contradict each other. I have to say that I think ours are rather more up to date—but I would say that.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden. I completely agree with everything he said, as I do with everything said by my noble friends Lord Leigh of Hurley and Lady Neville-Rolfe. It is very concerning that, in the other House, the Government tabled further amendments with no meaningful assessment of their economic or practical impact, and no proper consultation with the stakeholders that this will affect. This is not how good legislation is made. It is not the standard Parliament or the country should accept.

The Minister just described the Bill as the biggest upgrade to workers’ rights in a generation. If that is the case, one might reasonably expect a thorough and credible impact assessment, not one that is rated red by the Regulatory Policy Committee. That is not a minor procedural footnote; it is a warning and a signal that the economic, legal and operational consequences of this legislation have not been properly understood.