Employment Rights Bill

Baroness Coffey Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 18th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I wish to speak on the issue of the labour market enforcement strategy in support of Amendment 274 to which I have appended my name and to build on the excellent remarks of my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral and the specific points raised by my noble friend Lady Lawlor. For transparency, I declare that I have been a member of the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development for more than 20 years. The CIPD estimates that the People Skills HR support service which it has mooted, working with ACAS, would cost about £13 million under the new regime when this Bill becomes an Act. We already know, following on from my noble friend’s comments, that the cumulative cost of the existing bodies doing similar work, with analogous workstreams, is about £40 million.

Amendment 274 is important because in this country we have a strange anomaly. Unusually for an advanced country, we generally do not put the architecture of scrutiny and oversight in primary legislation. I want to know how this agency is going to be accountable in terms of the costs, who it employs, its policies et cetera. No doubt the Minister will say, “Well, once it becomes an Act, there will be what was the Business Select Committee, or there might be the National Audit Office, or there might be the Public Accounts Committee”. But we are being asked to sign a blank cheque for this without knowing how precisely this agency is going to operate and, most fundamentally, at what cost. We have not seen a detailed impact assessment focusing on the work of this body. On that basis, I ask the Minister specifically how he sees the process of accountability working and whether there will be any work by his department, and Ministers more generally, to work out what the costs are likely to be.

I accept at face value that this Government are committed to reducing the regulatory burden, particularly on small and medium-sized enterprises. I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Leong, will bend the Minister’s ear on that, having come from the background that he came from as a champion of small businesses from the Labour side. It is therefore not unreasonable for us to ask what the cost will be and how we will be able to hold this agency to account once it is established.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, Amendments 277 and 328, which I expect the noble Lord, Lord Goddard of Stockport, to speak to shortly, are an interesting element. Amendment 277 talks about the review of the fair work agency. Considering that a number of questions have come up about this, that is a fair assessment, given that there is still a considerable amount of consultation to be done. Amendment 328 would basically strip out the commencement of any part of the Act until that review has been done and

“a Minister of the Crown has tabled a motion in both Houses of Parliament for debate … and the review has been approved by a resolution”—

not just regulations.

The reason I say this is that I continue to assert that some of the powers here are going to be novel. Even if the Equality Act 2006 may give powers to the EHRC, it has never used them to institute legal proceedings, only as an intervener or for judicial review, rather than taking on individual cases; I am conscious that there is a consultation there. The amendment from the Liberal Democrats is an interesting way to think about how we are looking at the details of what the new agency is going to do.

[Lord Goddard of Stockport (LD)]

My Lords, before I begin my comments about the various amendments, I have news from afar. Councillor Fox—sorry, not councillor; that is going back a bit. My noble friend Lord Fox wants to pass on his thanks to Members of the House from all sides who have sent best wishes for a speedy recovery. I signed his card today from the Lib Dem group with the sentiment, “Don’t hurry back. I fully enjoy sitting until midnight doing the employment Bill on your behalf”—which I think, with my noble friend’s irony, he will get. His amendments would require detailed review of the fair work agency’s remit, funding powers and accountability structures, and parliamentary overview before commencement.

We are fairly neutral on Amendments 271ZZA, 274 and 278 from the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, which aim at transparency and reviews. They are broadly procedural, but I have some sympathy with the noble Lord’s three-year review, which could be quite sensible. He explains those two amendments with clarity and brings out the blindingly obvious—the lack of cost and the lack of understanding of how this thing will be set up and work in reality.

I intend to ask the Minister some direct questions as well as supporting my noble friend Lord Fox’s amendments regarding the implementation plan, the opportunity for scrutiny and further consultation. First, I turn to what the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, has been talking about, the fair work agency. We debated its creation and power across several earlier groups and I will not labour that point today, but I want to speak clearly in support of Amendments 277 and 328 tabled by my noble friend Lord Fox, and again place on record my regret that he is not able to be with us today. These amendments are central to establishing a credible and accountable agency. Amendment 277 would require a full review of the agency’s remit, powers, funding and relationship with other enforcement bodies, and would be subject to review, as the noble Lord has said. Amendment 328 would link the commencement of the Act to that process.

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[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, I support several of the amendments tabled by my noble friend. The stand part notice in my name on Clause 134 is also in this group. We are getting into an interesting bit, in a legal sense, about what information is being gathered and how it can be used. I was somewhat struck by this. I found Clause 130 interesting in that, quite surprisingly, no evidence that has been provided relating to the information can be used in a criminal prosecution, apart from that which is directly related to perjury. That made me wonder how this works.

I want to probe why HMRC is—apart from the intelligence services, which I completely understand—singled out in Clause 134 as a body for which extra permission has to be given before its information can be disclosed to all these other different parties. That does not apply for information about the national minimum wage. I remind the Committee that HMRC is a non-ministerial department, so no Minister can be involved in directing HMRC in any way whatever. That is why it surprises me that it is felt that extra permission is needed. I would love to hear further from the Minister on that.

To turn to other amendments in this group, Amendment 273PB is an important one. I appreciate that there are further amendments later about the wider aspects of immigration, but in recognising that this new body will take over from the gangmaster authority on the extension of the Modern Slavery Act, it makes perfect sense that it should be proactively working—not just on cases that “may” be disclosed—with the Government’s agency that is responsible for tackling illegal immigration and all the impacts that come as a consequence of it. I support my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough in that regard.

I have a cheeky point to make about Amendment 273N. For reasons of procedural purposes, my noble friend does not believe that Schedule 9 should be allowed because it contains Henry VIII powers. However, the Minister has already amended, or at least debated, Schedule 9 during the passage of the Bill. I am quite struck that the Low Pay Commission is one of the bodies to which information may be disclosed in relation to Clauses 113 and 114. I am not aware that it is an enforcement body; I thought that it was, in effect, a research body that comes up with recommendations about the minimum wage and so on.

I also noticed that under “Other persons”, Scottish Ministers have for some reason been left out of the equation and may need to be added. Recognising that Part 5 applies to Scotland as well and that Welsh Ministers will receive information, I am surprised that Scottish Ministers are not there.

To make a broader point, we will of course start to see a lot more co-ordination, even with local government. It might be something for Ministers to share with their colleagues. We need to start thinking about combined authorities and also mayoralties—the Greater London Authority is accounted for, but others are not. The intention of this is, I think, to allow more co-ordinated efforts to try to stop abuse of employment law, including issues relating to modern slavery. I am afraid that, for once, I disagree with my noble friend on this occasion. The Government desperately need to be able to amend the bodies under Schedule 9. My main point was probing, particularly on HMRC.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 271D, I shall speak also to Amendments 272ZZA, 272ZZB, 272ZZC, 272ZZD, 272ZZE, 272ZB, 272ZC, 272AA, 272AB and 272AC.

There is a troubling message throughout this legislation of the fundamental belief that third parties, whether they be unions or the state in Part 5, will make decisions on behalf of individuals rather than individuals being able to make decisions for themselves. The challenge with third parties making decisions is that they pay no price when they are wrong, and that is evidenced in this clause. Clause 113(6) states:

“The Secretary of State is not liable to any worker for anything done (or omitted to be done) in, or in connection with, the discharge or purported discharge of the Secretary of State’s functions by virtue of this section”.


That is an unacceptable subsection in this clause, hence my Amendment 272ZZE.

The reality is that workers whose claims are taken up or not taken up by the Secretary of State risk having their rights mishandled or ignored, yet, under the clause as drafted, they would have no recourse, remedy or ability to challenge that failure. We think that that sets a dangerous precedent, because we are granting power without responsibility. We would be creating a regime in which decisions that affect individuals’ livelihoods and legal rights can be made from behind a veil of immunity. That is neither just nor consistent with the principles of good governance. We need to be clear that, if a private employer or a trade union behaved with this level of impunity, we would not accept it, so why are we accepting it from the state?

The fundamental principle underlying Amendments 271D, 272ZZA, 272ZZB, 272ZZD and 272ZC is consent. Clause 113 currently allows the Secretary of State to initiate legal action in a worker’s name without requiring that worker’s consent. That is deeply problematic. Legal proceedings, particularly employment proceedings, can be deeply personal, reputationally sensitive and complicated. To bring such proceedings without the individual’s explicit and informed consent is a serious encroachment on personal autonomy. My Amendment 271D would insert a requirement that the worker must provide written consent before the Secretary of State may act on their behalf. That is not a mere administrative formality; it is the cornerstone of the individual’s control over their own legal affairs.

What if consent was not initially required or given but circumstances change? That is addressed in my Amendment 272ZZA, which would establish a clear opt-out mechanism. It would ensure that the worker is given notice before proceedings begin and is afforded 28 days to object. If they do, the case does not proceed. Surely this strikes a balance between the state’s interest in pursuing enforcement and the worker’s right to decide how their own case is handled. Legal action is not always welcome, even when it is justified. The consequences of litigation, especially in employment, can be damaging professionally and personally. Workers may prefer alternative dispute resolution.

However, consent and opt-out are not enough on their own. Even with consent, the state must be bound by a duty to act in the worker’s best interests. That is why I have proposed an amendment requiring that the Secretary of State should have regard to the worker’s stated objectives, the potential impact on their current and future employment, and the proportionality of taking legal action in the specific context. That is a safeguard to prevent well-meaning intervention becoming harmful or heavy-handed.

Then there is the matter of control. A worker may initially consent to the Secretary of State taking the lead but later wish to take back control of the proceedings, perhaps because they have secured private representation or circumstances have changed. My Amendment 272ZZD addresses this. It would ensure that the worker retains the right to reclaim their case and that the Secretary of State must accommodate that request. It affirms that ultimate control remains with the individual and not with the state.

Finally, my Amendment 272ZC would introduce a fundamental principle, that of subsidiarity. The state should not intervene unless there is absolutely no other viable route to justice. If the worker has representation or access to advice or union support, that route should be exhausted first. Legal action by the Secretary of State should be a last resort, not a first impulse.

These amendments are not intended to frustrate enforcement—far from it. They are designed to ensure that enforcement is fair, consensual and genuinely in the interest of the person whose rights are at stake. Workers are not passive subjects of policy; they are individuals with agency, judgment and a right to decide how they wish to pursue justice. We must ensure that the Bill does not cross the line from protection into paternalism.

I turn to Amendments 272AA and 272AC. Amendment 272AA simply calls for an annual report—nothing excessive, just a basic record of how often these powers have been used, what types of claims have been pursued, the outcomes and any costs or awards recovered. This is a common-sense transparency measure. If the state is litigating on behalf of private individuals, we should, at the very least, be keeping track of how that power is being exercised and with what effect.

Amendment 272AB, however, is the more pressing amendment because it would place a sunset clause on the power, causing it to expire at the end of the next Parliament unless it is actively renewed. It would also require an independent review to assess whether this power has delivered real value for workers, for justice and for public money, because the truth is we simply do not know if this clause is necessary. We do not know if workers even want the state litigating on their behalf; we do not know if the outcomes justify the costs; and we certainly do not know if this is the most effective way to improve enforcement. If this power is to remain, Parliament should be given clear evidence that it works and works better than the alternatives.

Finally, Amendment 272ZB would introduce a simple but important safeguard: a public interest test before the Secretary of State can bring proceedings on a worker’s behalf. Without this, we risk allowing the state to pursue claims that may be frivolous, politically motivated or unnecessary, potentially at public expense and also to the detriment of both workers and employers. Litigation should not be used to make a point; it should be used to deliver justice where it truly matters. This amendment would ensure that such powers are exercised responsibly and proportionately, and only where there is a clear public benefit. I beg to move.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, I oppose the Question that Clause 113 stand part of the Bill. I raised this in Second Reading, and I appreciate the discussions that have taken place with officials and the Minister since, but I genuinely believe these are novel powers.

I appreciate that we are perhaps just not going to agree today on how far the Equality Act 2006 goes, but when I tabled Questions to the Minister, they were passed to the EHRC. The commission said that, since it had received those powers—I think it was commenced in 2007—no powers had been used to initiate legal proceedings that were not judicial review or as an intervener. It gave me the distinct impression that it did not necessarily believe that it should be initiating legal proceedings in this regard. It has its own policy and that is under consultation. However, it does beg the question, given some of the other consultations that the Government have initiated, whether they will in future seek to take over any such duties or powers that the EHRC has in a variety of legal proceedings, because the EHRC is not using powers that the Government think it has. However, I think that is still really a matter of debate.

Building on the amendments that have been tabled by my noble friends on the Front Bench, I think this is an odd situation. I appreciate we have discussed elements of Clause 113 before; indeed, the other day we debated my noble friend Lady Noakes’s sensible amendment that this should be in the public interest. It would be helpful to understand from Ministers what they see will happen as a consequence of this. Where are we getting to? What is going on?

I have deliberately degrouped some parts of this discussion on Clause 114—about the money side—but it is useful to understand that, for the purposes of this clause, this is not just about people who are working; it is about people who do not have a job with the person they are seeking to take to court. We had a debate some time ago about why that could be, and we got into a debate about what sort of special privileges there might be. Nevertheless, this seems quite an extraordinary shift in the capability of the Government, first, to initiate these proceedings anyway and, secondly, to do so when the worker involved does not intend to do so. That is why, I appreciate, the legal wording really restricts any inclusion of the worker at a future date, which specifically seems to be ruled out in various provisions in the clause, except in Clause 113(5), which allows the worker to be brought in at an appeal stage. However, I am concerned more generally about this approach of a new agency.

Another element that really concerns me is subsection (6), which in essence provides:

“The Secretary of State is not liable to any worker for anything done (or omitted to be done)”.


I expect that is there to cover circumstances—we may have had a brief exchange on this already—in which the worker says, “You didn’t go after this bit or that bit”; it is kind of “Tough luck”. As it stands, it is not clear to me whether, if the worker is unhappy with the action taken, double jeopardy is allowed: will the worker be allowed to initiate separate claims against the employer, if they feel that the Secretary of State and the enforcement officers have admitted different things?

Overall, this clause is an unnecessary innovation. I am concerned about it, and I would be grateful for some broad examples of how it could be used in the future.

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[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

Although I did talk about migrant workers as an example, this is meant to capture all vulnerable workers and all workers who are exposed to unfair practices or intimidation—which happens rather more than noble Lords opposite like to acknowledge.

In conclusion, the civil proceedings powers within the Bill align with our manifesto commitment—

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

The Minister explained subsection (7)(a)(i) of this clause with regards to zero-hours contracts. In subsection (7)(a)(ii), I am struggling to understand how an individual

“seeking to be employed by a person as a worker”

could be a whistleblower. I would be grateful to understand that better, but I am happy for the Minister to write.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

On that point of clarification, I will write to the noble Baroness.

In conclusion, the civil proceedings powers within the Bill align with our manifesto commitment to strengthen enforcement and improve outcomes for workers through a fairer, more accessible system. We need to let the fair work agency operate with the tools it needs, guided by the statute but not constricted by inflexible restrictions or ministerial bottlenecks. I therefore ask the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, to withdraw Amendment 271D.

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Moved by

[Baroness Coffey]

272BA: Clause 114, page 125, line 34, at end insert—
“(1A) This section only applies to an individual, not a trade union or a person acting on behalf of a trading union, seeking to take action against an employer.”

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, in moving my Amendment 272BA, I will speak also to Amendments 272D to 272L and to oppose Clause 114 standing part of the Bill. With Amendments 272J to 272L, I will consider parts of Clause 115.

I have looked at the Labour Party’s manifesto plan, Make Work Pay. In a previous debate, we talked about enforcement, but no reference was made to this being done without the consent of the worker involved. The manifesto is silent on providing funds, so I thought it was worth debating why we are having this, who it will go to and what amount of money we are considering. Consequently, I have proposed a number of amendments. They were actually tabled before we had the debate on Monday in which covered elements of this. At that time, I noted the response of the Minister, who said that the word “person” used in this legislation—I am not a litigator but a legislator, and I continue to learn about some of these matters—could also include an employer, which I also somewhat address in aspects of some of these amendments.

One of my questions is: who will this benefit? My reason for putting forward Amendment 272BA is to try to make it explicit that we are not talking about money going off to a trade union, which might provide legal advice or legal assistance. When we discussed it the other day, we never got to the bottom of what “any other … assistance” may be. I appreciate that that might be a catch-all, but it would be helpful to get some examples of what Clause 114(2)(c) would cover.

When we get into this—I appreciate that the noble Lord, Lord Fox, has tabled an amendment about legal aid in a later group—it is important to ask: where is this really going? The EHRC has some similar powers to finance proceedings. When I asked the EHRC to set out the amount of money, it said that, as of last month, there were four live cases and that, since April 2020—five years ago—it had spent £1.2 million on this sort of provision. Recognising that the EHRC can already provide assistance on aspects of discrimination and the like, I wanted to try to explore, in this clause stand part debate, what the Government were signing themselves up to and, as I pointed out, to whom it would go.

Amendment 272D is intended to be a probing amendment to examine how much an individual could claim—whether for advice or for representation—and to consider how often people might be turning to the fund that the Government seek to put forward. Should we cap that? How many times can somebody go to get basically free advice? I do not know who would even provide it. We could well consider that it should be provided by only the government legal service, under the auspices of the Attorney-General. I cannot imagine that that is what the Government are thinking, but it would be useful to understand who they think will deliver this and how.

Part of the role of the single enforcement body was supposed to be a place for anyone to go to get advice for free. So I am trying to understand what further is in this. By the way, the Government’s intention— I think it is in their manifesto and other papers they have developed—is that employers can go to the new fair work agency to get advice on how this all works and what they should do as employers. So I am interested to understand where else this could be.

Turning to Amendment 272E, I am conscious that—as was rightly pointed out to me a few weeks ago by, I think, the noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady of Upper Holloway—Clause 114(2) says “may provide”, rather than “must”, so it will not become a right to get this money. But it would be fair for statutory guidance to be developed and published—ideally, as quickly as possible—on the result of this subsection coming into effect. Candidly, if people anticipate that extra funding will be available, it is important that they understand what expectation they should genuinely have.

In Amendment 272F, I am trying to address the situation that just came up in the debate on Clause 113. I find it hard to understand how we can be in a situation where, having taken over a case, it would go against the sense of natural justice that the worker themselves would then not be able to make representations to the tribunal, or indeed to other courts, to help consider why it has been taken over, when they did not want such action to do. I felt that it was important that, frankly, the Government should pay for that. For me, that felt like a sense of natural justice in that regard.

Amendment 272G concerns something I have raised before, but I wanted to specifically address it. I find it astonishing that the Government are opening up this fund for people to get advice—which, I assume, they cannot get from the fair work agency—but they will not be allowed to use it towards mediation. The answer given in previous debates was, “Well, people can just go to ACAS”. That is right, they can—and ACAS is free. However, while it is free for early conciliation, it is not free for more advanced mediation.

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[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I do not want to extend the debate too much or do too much quoting across the Dispatch Box but, to counter that, Labour’s Plan to Make Work Pay talks about establishing a single enforcement body that

“will have the powers it needs to undertake targeted and proactive enforcement work and bring civil proceedings upholding employment rights”.

To a fair-minded person that is pretty clear.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, this has been an exceptionally revealing debate on this group of amendments and the clause more broadly. I somewhat agree with the Minister on creating the ability to initiate legal proceedings—which, by the way, continues some of the work already being done by the existing authorities—but the Bill does not refer to being able to do that without the consent of the worker, which will surprise a lot of people, and absolutely does not make reference to the level of financing, which we have just discussed in relation to Clause 114.

Another point I noted is that, on Monday, the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Whitchurch, referred to “employees and employers”, but the Minister at the Dispatch Box today has been very clear that this is also about funding trade unions. As I said, this has been a revealing debate and one that, after I discuss it with my Front Bench, we may explore further on Report. With that, however, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 272BA withdrawn.

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[Lord Goddard of Stockport (LD)]

My Lords, for the sake of clarity, we on these Benches fully support the Government on expanding employment legal aid beyond discrimination cases to improve fairness and efficiency and also on the importance of maintaining the power of employment tribunals to ensure summary judgment, speed up proceedings and reduce unnecessary hearings. However, we have concerns over the existing backlog of employment tribunals, which we have debated several times on previous evenings, which is causing delays of up to two years and making the system very difficult to navigate.

I strongly support Amendment 273, tabled by my noble friend Lord Fox, which would

“require the Secretary of State to report on the impact of expanding the right to legal aid in employment tribunals within 6 months of the passage of this Act”.

This modest but important proposal recognises the reality facing too many claimants today. Legal aid in employment cases is currently restricted almost entirely to discrimination claims, leaving workers pursuing other serious issues such as unlawful deduction of wages, unfair dismissal and whistleblowing without any publicly funded legal support. These are not simple matters.

For claimants without legal training, navigating the tribunal process, understanding evidential requirements and articulating legal arguments can be incredibly challenging. This lack of access undermines both fairness and efficiency. If claims are poorly presented or inadequately understood, they are less likely to succeed and more likely to absorb more of the tribunal’s valuable time. Given the current backlog of employment tribunal cases in which claimants often wait for more than two years before their cases are heard, the process can feel effectively impossible to engage with. This amendment would, based on evidence, begin to build the case for change. I hope that the Minister will look on it constructively.

I also welcome my noble friend Lord Fox’s Amendment 323, which seeks to ensure that employment tribunals continue to have the power to make summary judgments in cases brought under this Act. Tribunals already use this mechanism to resolve matters early when one party has no reasonable prospect of success. It is an essential part of an efficient system that avoids unnecessary hearings and reduces pressure on the tribunal’s time. With the Bill creating new routes to claim and potentially increasing the volume of cases, the continued ability to make summary judgments in those procedures will be more important than ever. It provides certainty to respondents facing unmeritorious claims and reassures claimants that their cases will be dealt with proportionally and swiftly when they are clearly valid. I will be grateful if the Minister can confirm that this power will remain fully enforced under the new regimes and that guidance will reflect the continuing relevance of these points.

Lastly, I note that Amendments 279GA, 330ZA, 330D and 334A by the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, are concerned with ensuring that the employment tribunal system has the capacity and resourcing to absorb these responsibilities. Those are legitimate concerns and considerations that the Minister should address. Tribunal delays are already a source of frustration for many users, and it is right that we consider how implementation will interact with the wider system. I urge caution, however, against any suggestions that reform must wait until conditions are perfect. A parallel process is needed, with sensible, targeted reform on one hand and sustained investment in the system on the other. I beg to move.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, my Amendment 279GZA seeks to understand what “and, in certain cases” means in Clause 149. I would be grateful for an explanation. I looked extensively in Schedule 12 and saw only the insertion of a regulation to do with Northern Ireland. I would be grateful to understand that.

I am happy to support Amendment 323, which seems a sensible way of trying to ensure that justice is delivered effectively and people can still have fair access while also making sure that we make the best use of employment tribunal judges’ time.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Coffey for introducing her amendment and also to the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, for speaking to the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Fox, the first of which proposes a report on the expansion of legal aid in employment tribunals. It would not itself change entitlement but seeks to prompt a structured exploration of the options. Legal aid is, of course, a complex and often contested area, and this amendment simply calls for a government-led review that considers both employer compliance and the financial position of workers. It is reasonable to assess whether the current system adequately supports access to justice in employment disputes.

I have a question for the noble Lord, Lord Fox. I will discuss with him outside but, just to get it on the record, I am curious to know whether the “report on the options”, which he describes in subsection (1) of the proposed new clause in his lead amendment, extends to small and medium-sized employers as well. I am interested to know whether he thinks they should be included within that survey based on the fact that many of them will also suffer some financial hardship.

On the proposed new clause on summary judgments in employment tribunals in Amendment 323 by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, such a power could offer a means of reducing the burden on tribunals, improving efficiency and focusing resources on cases where the issues genuinely require full examination. In short, both amendments are interesting and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

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[Baroness O'Grady of Upper Holloway (Lab)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 273PA in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. I want to give an example of why this amendment is so important. Following a five-month freedom of information battle, the Bureau of Investigative Journalism was finally given access to 19 farm inspection reports produced by the Home Office between 2021 and 2022. Nearly half of the 845 seasonal migrant workers interviewed raised welfare issues including racism, wage theft and threats of being sent home. In nearly two-thirds of farms inspected, workers said that they were not always paid for the hours they spent at work, off sick or travelling, or that they faced pay deductions beyond the maximum allowed by law. Workers who complained were ignored or told they could leave the farm and go back to their home countries. One visa sponsor was recorded saying:

“Look, do you want to go home? Shush then”,


by workers protesting about working conditions.

A report by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration found that none of the allegations raised during these inspections was ever investigated by the Home Office. Workers understandably concluded that the Home Office was more interested in checking their immigration status than upholding their rights and dignity at work. The only way that the fair work agency can do its job of stamping out exploitation is to guarantee safe reporting. Only then can migrant workers speak out about exploitation at work without fear that it will result in a bad employer silencing them by removing their visa. Ultimately, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, the rights of all working people are only ever as strong as those of the most vulnerable workers. This amendment seeks safe reporting that will benefit workers and decent employers alike. I hope my noble friend the Minister can support it too.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

My Lords, I am conscious of the sentiments expressed here, but it would put the Government and the Secretary of State in a very difficult legal situation if they were to hold information that they were not allowed to pass on to relevant authorities within the rest of government. I hear what the noble Baronesses have said, but I do not know, with all the other rights that are starting to come through this Bill, why anyone should be afeared, especially when they are here on a legitimate visa as in the example to which the noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady of Upper Holloway, has just referred. I am conscious of some of the exploitation, but I believe that same sponsor was suspended from sponsoring any more visas. I was not aware of what the Home Office did or did not do, but restricting the Secretary of State from formally upholding the law is quite a worrying trend.

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, whom I had the honour to serve when she chaired the Home Affairs Select Committee. She has raised a number of key points, as has the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and I thank the noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady of Upper Holloway, and my noble friend Lady Coffey for their speeches as well.

Let me make it absolutely clear: modern slavery remains one of the gravest human rights abuses of our time, and tackling it requires vigilance, clarity and effective enforcement. It is crucial that the agencies tasked with identifying and assisting survivors and with co-operating closely with the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner have clear mandates and necessary powers to act decisively. While the specific amendments before us seek to clarify the transfer of roles from the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority to the fair work agency, the wider point is this.

Enforcement bodies must be both effective and well co-ordinated to respond to the complexities of modern slavery. Without this, vulnerable individuals risk slipping through the cracks, and the machinery of justice and protection loses its impact. Ensuring transparency about which bodies are responsible for what and guaranteeing that they are properly equipped underpins our broader commitment to eradicating modern slavery. It is not just about legal technicalities but about safeguarding human dignity and upholding fundamental rights.