Wednesday 18th June 2025
(1 year, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberEmployment Rights Act 2025 View all Employment Rights Act 2025 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Amendment Paper: HL Bill 81-X(a) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Tenth Marshalled List) - (17 Jun 2025)
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe of Epsom and—in absentia—Lord Fox, for tabling Amendments 271ZZA, 274, 277, 278 and 328. Before I go any further, I think we all join the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, certainly from our Benches, in wishing the noble Lord, Lord Fox, the very best and speediest of recoveries. We hope to see him back in his place at the earliest opportunity.
I will speak first to Amendment 271ZZA moved by the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom. This amendment is unnecessary, as Clause 91(3) provides full discretion for the Secretary of State to revise the labour market enforcement strategy at any time, including following a general election. That means that a new Government are not locked in. They can act swiftly, decisively and in line with their mandate. Were the party opposite to win power again sometime in the distant future, however difficult that is to imagine, its hands would not be tied by these proposals.
Of course, businesses, workers and enforcement bodies all benefit from clarity, consistency and strategic continuity. Automatically scrapping an enforcement strategy, just as the Government are finding their feet, risks creating exactly the kind of disruption we should be avoiding. To reassure the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Wirral, the Bill is about strengthening our ability to tackle non-compliance and exploitation in the labour market, including, in the very worst cases, the scourge of modern slavery. The intention and mandate of the fair work agency are to catch the bad actors, not to trip up the good guys. This amendment risks instability rather than accountability.
Turning to Amendments 274, 277, 278 and 328 tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Fox, I want to be absolutely clear that the Government are committed to effective, transparent enforcement of workers’ rights. The creation of the fair work agency is a major step forward and we want to get it right, but these amendments are wholly unnecessary, duplicating myriad reports and recommendations over several years. By our count, there have been 33 government reports and strategies about the effectiveness of labour market enforcement over the past nine years. One could argue that this subject has been reported and scrutinised to death. The Director of Labour Market Enforcement produces an annual report and strategy that reviews the effectiveness of the labour market enforcement system. These documents are available in the Library of the House.
Additionally, our impact assessment for establishing the fair work agency sets out the current running costs of the enforcement bodies and initial estimates of set-up costs for the agency. I also refer noble Lords to reviews published by previous Administrations, including the Taylor review, which assessed the labour market enforcement system and found it wanting.
Ongoing oversight of employment rights enforcement is provided for in Clauses 91 and 92. They require the Secretary of State to publish a three-year labour market enforcement strategy and annual reports, which must be laid before Parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly. To address the question of the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, they will be subject to parliamentary scrutiny in the usual way, which could well involve scrutiny by a Select Committee in the other place.
While the Bill does not explicitly require that the enforcement strategy and annual report address the agency’s funding, I can confirm to the Committee—and to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, in particular—that the annual report will indeed include an assessment of the fair work agency’s budget and how this has been spent.
Turning to Amendment 328, establishing the fair work agency is not and should not be contingent on its reporting. I remind all noble Lords, particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, that this was not only a Labour Party manifesto commitment; it was the policy of all the major parties at the general election to introduce a single enforcement body in some shape or form.
Baroness Lawlor (Con)
Just because one side of the House or the other—or, indeed, both—brought it in does not necessarily mean it is the right policy. Does the Minister not agree that, if we have a chance to review some of the weaknesses in inherited policy, it is a very good time to do it? The 2017 Taylor review, on which some of the then Government’s policy was based, focused particularly on the most vulnerable workers and certain categories. It was not a very wide focus.
Lord Katz (Lab)
We have had a fair amount of scrutiny of the wider proposal, rather than the Bill’s specific fair work agency proposals. As I said, over the past nine years since 2016, there have been 33 different strategies and reports, including—but certainly not limited to—the Taylor report. This is not an area that has not been considered and scrutinised to some degree. I also say to the noble Baroness that the Single Enforcement Body—as it was called by the previous Administration—was the policy of successive Conservative- led and Conservative Administrations. I am not going to intrude on the great policy disagreements on that side of the House. We feel it important to establish the fair work agency and to ensure that we have strong enforcement of labour market regulations. I therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw Amendment 271ZZA.
Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)
My Lords, this has been a very significant debate, because I believe it is the first time I have heard from the Government Front Bench an acceptance that the Opposition will eventually take over government again. He and I may disagree on when this will happen—of course we disagree: I just happen to believe that it is going to happen at the next general election. That is why these amendments are so important.
I also want to say how much we miss the noble Lord, Lord Fox. I was very disturbed indeed to hear about his unfortunate accident, but I am very pleased to hear that he may shortly be with us. I hope that, by speeding up the process to Report in July, he will still be able to be with us, because he has always brought a note of common sense—despite coming from the Liberal Democrat Benches. Now I am upsetting everyone. All I want to say to the noble Lord, Lord Goddard of Stockport, is that he has been a marvellous substitute, if one can say that. His pragmatic approach to the Bill has been enormously valuable, but we do miss the noble Lord, Lord Fox.
I thank my noble friend Lady Lawlor, who is quite right: we are moving into unknown territory. Although the Minister might remind us that the Conservative Government were committed to looking at stepping in this direction, we are still moving into unknown territory and, as my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough pointed out, the CIPD cost estimates are really worrying. I do not think the Minister properly addressed his key question on the whole issue of accountability.
However, here we are. I am surprised that the Government have rejected Amendment 271ZZA. It is a reasonable and pragmatic amendment that simply recognises the basic democratic principle that a new Administration should have the ability to review and, if necessary, revise a labour market enforcement strategy to reflect new economic realities and public priorities. Despite the amendment to which he referred—which is at the margin—the Government have always insisted that a labour market enforcement strategy must run its full term without reset, regardless of elections or changes in government. But why should a new Government be bound by a strategic direction set by their predecessor? That is not consistent with the democratic mandate bestowed on any incoming Government. Surely it is neither logical nor democratic to compel a newly elected Government to implement a strategy they did not design, especially in a labour market that is dynamic and constantly evolving.
Economic landscapes can shift dramatically within short periods, whether due to international events, technological change or domestic challenges. Flexibility to adjust enforcement priorities accordingly is essential. It is not only a question of governance, but of ensuring that enforcement remains effective and responsive to current labour market conditions. The Government have already recognised the importance of periodic review and the resetting of the labour market enforcement strategy every three years, as set out in Clause 91. If I am not mistaken, that periodicity is built into the framework precisely to ensure that the strategy remains relevant and responsive.
The main feature of this debate has been the cogent arguments put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Goddard of Stockport. His insights, and those of my noble friend Lady Coffey, highlight the pressing need for a substantive independent review of the proposed fair work agency. While the promise of increased efficiency in enforcement is welcome, we must remember that there are intentions and then there are results. We must understand how such efficiency will be achieved and at what cost, what other alternatives were considered, and why they were rejected.
To date, the Government have not committed to publishing any specific details about the establishment of the fair work agency—details that are crucial for proper scrutiny. We lack clarity on the expected costs of this new body, the standards by which compliance will be measured and the criteria that will guide enforcement decisions. Without that transparency, it is difficult to assess whether the creation of this body will represent genuine progress or simply add another layer of bureaucracy, which, as the noble Lord, Lord Goddard of Stockport, stressed, will impinge on smaller businesses in particular.
There remains much to discuss and questions to be answered about the fair work agency. Unfortunately, I find myself unconvinced by the Government’s arguments against the amendments proposed by myself and the noble Lord, Lord Goddard of Stockport. Our proposals are not about obstruction but about ensuring proper oversight, accountability and flexibility in this important area of labour market governance. I am sure that we, and the Liberal Democrats, will return to these issues on Report, but for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Lawlor (Con)
My Lords, I support the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Sharpe. I declare an interest as a director of a very small business—a think tank.
As an employer, the idea that we have no warrant or judicial oversight of an enforcement officer’s intrusive visit to a business to seize or take copies of documents and to check up is intrusive on the time and output of the business. It is also an infringement of a business freedom to conduct the business to the best ability of those in the office or the business.
Both clauses in fact contain very intrusive proposals. As my noble friend pointed out, one of the things that is deeply worrying about them is we do not know who the enforcement officers will be or exactly what their powers will be. We have seen, even with the best trained police force in the world, the Metropolitan Police and local police forces, a certain amount of over-zealousness in pursuing certain types of crime. Therefore, with an untrained and unknown quantity and with such powers, we need very clear limitations, and we need to focus on the most serious crimes and those outlined in these amendments. For those reasons, I support both the amendments in the name of my noble friend.
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, for tabling amendments relating to the fair work agency’s powers. Clause 94 introduces a single power to enter business premises and inspect workplaces. The noble Lord’s Amendment 271ZB would limit this power to such an extent that effective enforcement of the legislation, including the national minimum wage, would be extremely difficult. We are not amalgamating labour market enforcement into one single agency to diminish its effectiveness. This amendment would, in effect, prohibit the site visits that most minimum wage investigations rely on and bring an end to a system of state enforcement that has worked well for 25 years. The result would likely be an increase in claims to the employment tribunal. Given the noble Lord’s concern about employment tribunal capacity, I urge him to withdraw his amendment.
I turn to Amendment 271ZBA. While powers of entry are generally exercised on a consensual basis, in some situations it is critical that officers are able to carry out their duties quickly, particularly if they suspect that giving advance notice could give rogue employers time to destroy or tamper with evidence. None the less, in response to the concerns raised by both the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, an officer will not enter a premises if a person is not present but will instead notify the person to rearrange a time to enter the premises. As the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, mentioned, a warrant could be issued by a justice only if they are satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for entry, and judicial oversight ensures that warrants are granted only when appropriate, protecting businesses from unwarranted inspections while enabling legitimate investigations.
Clause 128 and Schedule 8 were added to the Bill to put in place appropriate safeguards relating to the execution of warrants. As I said, this approach will continue under Part 5 of the Bill, but with additional safeguards, such as needing a warrant before exercising powers to enter a dwelling. Extending this warrant requirement further to include all business premises would be a disproportionate and retrograde step in enforcement terms. It would introduce additional powers and bureaucracy, and create an unnecessary burden on the warrant system.
Amendment 271ZD is unnecessary. There are already extensive safeguards in the Bill around the use of investigatory and enforcement powers. These safeguards are designed to ensure that the use of enforcement powers is lawful and proportionate. In addition, enforcement officers are highly trained and carry out investigations under a strict code of conduct.
Clause 107 largely carries over the existing appeal grounds from the notice of underpayment regime contained in the National Minimum Wage Act 1998, which, as I said, has been functioning successfully for over 25 years. In fact, I recall debates in previous days of Committee around the effectiveness of minimum wage enforcement and the fact that not enough rogue employers have been named and shamed. The process as it stands is well known and understood by businesses and individuals. Changes risk adding confusion and uncertainty, leading to additional complexity and litigation.
Amendment 273LA would constitute a drastic downgrade in labour exploitation enforcement. The Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority can and must occasionally use force under PACE powers to rescue victims of modern slavery and tackle serious labour exploitation. Indeed, it is through the use of those powers that we saw two modern slavery convictions and 13 slavery and trafficking risk and prevention orders in the last reporting year of 2023-24. To reassure the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, as is currently the case, the use of PACE powers will be strictly limited to a small number of officers, as set out in their letters of appointment, and subject to stringent IOPC oversight functions and complaints and misconduct procedures.
I am sure the whole Committee will agree that we must tackle the scourge of modern slavery. The Bill is designed to strengthen employment rights in a clear, coherent and enforceable way. Unnecessary additions or alterations, however well-meaning, could compromise that aim. On that basis, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Carter of Haslemere (CB)
My Lords, I think the Minister explained that the reasons against requiring a warrant to be issued by a magistrate included the fact that an employer might destroy documents that were the purpose of the need to enter the premises. In those circumstances, why could the clause not say that, if the enforcement officer can show the magistrate reasonable cause to have concerns about the destruction of a document, they could apply on an ex parte basis for the search warrant? That would mean there would not be that risk of the destruction of documents in advance.
Lord Katz (Lab)
The noble Lord raises an interesting point, though I fear straying into legal territory, which I am not adequately briefed to comment on. I will write to him with further detail on the specific example he set out.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
I will speak to the significant number of amendments in this group in my name. This is quite an interesting cornucopia of amendments, a number of which are, in essence, probing amendments. The very nature of the work we are undertaking is to look at the minutiae of the Bill and to see it through the prism of how it impacts on small businesses. It is very important, when we consider the fair work agency’s powers, that we look at the Bill’s real-world ramifications and consequences.
Although some of the amendments may seem somewhat obscure, I think they are nevertheless quite compelling and worthy of the Minister’s attention. In addition, the Clause 95 stand part notice is in my name; I will come to that shortly. I also have a more substantive amendment near the end of the group on a duty on the UK border agency and the new enforcement agency, the fair work agency, to collaborate or co-operate.
I begin by considering the clause stand part notice. I remind noble Lords that, ostensibly, Clause 95 circumscribes the powers available in respect of using a warrant to enter a dwelling. On the face of it, the clause looks pretty innocuous, but I do not think it should be in the Bill because its wording is quite loose and opaque. I have serious concerns about the use of permissive, wide-ranging powers, particularly in subsection (3)(b), which says
“that it is not practicable to communicate with any person entitled to grant access to the documents or equipment”.
Further, paragraph (d) says
“that the purpose of entry may be frustrated or seriously prejudiced unless an enforcement officer arriving at the dwelling can secure immediate entry to it”.
I would like to interrogate the Minister’s perception and interpretation of these powers. For the avoidance of doubt, I think that the question of whether this clause should stand part of the Bill is worthy of our consideration. Although, of course, it was not considered by the statutory instruments committee—the name of which escapes me—to be a particularly egregious example of permissive or Henry VIII powers, I nevertheless think that it could be misconstrued.
I will now consider the other amendments in my name. Amendment 273A would require the Secretary of State to have “an evidential basis” for believing that a labour market offence is being or has been committed in order to request an LME undertaking, as opposed to requiring merely that the Secretary of State “believes” this to be the case. This amendment is important because what I am attempting to define more clearly the limits of the powers being conferred—in other words, to make it explicit that there has to be a firm evidential basis for exercising those powers. We do not want a situation in which the Secretary of State may do as he wishes as long as he pleads that he believed an offence was being committed.
I am not a lawyer, but I make reference to powers being conferred on a Minister based on subjective jurisdictional criteria. Let us look at—I am sure that the Minister will be advised of this—Customs and Excise Commissioners v Cure & Deeley Ltd 1962, in which it was found that Parliament would never presume on courts adopting a particular approach to statutory construction, especially when it comes to the subtleties of administrative law. I think that this reasonable and rational amendment would tighten up the wording.
Moving on, Amendment 273B would mean that the Secretary of State could impose a prohibition, restriction or requirement as an LME undertaking only where they considered it “proportionate” as well as “just and reasonable”. The test of proportionality is, of course, at the heart of adjudication and the justice system; it is the bread and butter of administrative decision-making, especially in respect of our human rights regime. It is good practice to have statute clear in order to direct Ministers to undertake the kind of judgments which the legal framework will impose on them anyway, and which otherwise will have to be communicated by the production of additional guidance material. That is the basis for that amendment.
Amendment 273C would reduce the maximum period for which an LME measure can have effect from two years to one year. This is a practical amendment, because there is no obvious reason why any necessary measures cannot be imposed and changes expedited within 12 months. It is better, for one thing, that a business falling foul of standards should be made to get its house in order quickly and to be compliant with any LME measure within a reasonable space of time. We are talking not about a month but about 12 months; I think that is a reasonable reduction from two years. It is also better for the economy, public expenditure and Civil Service efficiency to have a shorter timescale.
Amendment 273 would require the Secretary of State to bring the end of the LME measures to the attention of “all” other persons likely to be interested in the matter, rather than “any” such persons, and the subject of the measures. This is clearly straightforward. If you are in a business, you will have multiple partners, directors or people with a significant interest in the business. Therefore, to avoid bureaucratic mistakes and errors, I think it is fair to involve as many people as practicable.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business and Trade and Department for Science, Information and Technology (Baroness Jones of Whitchurch)
My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt. I am trying to follow the noble Lord’s arguments, but I think Amendment 273 is in a different group.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
I am grateful to the Minister for giving me the opportunity to clarify where I am: it is Amendment 273D. My apologies if I have not been clear enough.
This amendment would make a small clarifying adjustment: where the text currently says that the Secretary of State must take whatever steps she or he considers appropriate to bring the end of LME measures to the attention of
“any other persons likely to be interested in the matter”—
that is, other than the subject of the measures—it would use the words “all other persons”. It is important for business certainty, good faith and, indeed, fairness that all those who are affected or likely to be affected by a quite significant measure are kept properly informed about it. Otherwise, we may see messy episodes unfold where there is a misunderstanding or extra, hidden penalties imposed on businesses in the form of the costs of informing the other people affected by the LME measure that it has, for instance, come to an end.
Amendment 273E to Clause 119 would require notice of LMEs against a partnership to be given to “all partners”, rather than just “any partner”. This does not reflect what running a business with multiple partners is like, perhaps in multiple locations or running multiple business units as partners, whether it is an accountancy firm, solicitors or others—I know that there is a different regime for solicitors. It is not sensible to advise only one partner of a significant infraction or issue arising from an LME. If you want businesses to co-operate in ameliorating the issues identified in the LME, you would really need—I admit, at some modest cost—to advise all the partners. You need also to cultivate good faith in order to make the changes necessary arising from the LME.
Furthermore, it is possible that the courts will decide that notice has been given as a matter of law in circumstances where the one partner who was theoretically served it had not actually seen it and was not subjectively aware of it. Better, then, to require that all partners be given notice to ensure that businesses are genuinely aware of the ramifications and the LME decisions.
I am mindful of the time, so I will move with greater alacrity. Amendment 273F would increase the proposed burden of proof for court orders of LME measures from balance of probabilities to beyond reasonable doubt. There is reason to fear that a future Government will use the provision of Clause 117(3), which empowers the Secretary of State to create new kinds of LME measures by regulation, to create measures which go beyond regulation and become punitive, in which case the criminal proof standard will be appropriate. More generally, good faith between businesses and government, which aids compliance, will be better cultivated if they are required to comply with LME measures only in cases where there has been a clear violation.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
My Lords I thank noble Lords who have spoken. I am responding to the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe, Lord Hunt and Lord Jackson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, who have tabled amendments on the powers of the fair work agency and oppose Clauses 95 and 134.
I accept the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, that some of his amendments are probing amendments. I will attempt to respond to each in turn. Forgive me if I repeat some points that my noble friend Lord Katz made in the previous debate, which covered similar ground. I think we covered some of this ground in debates on a previous day. I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, that I have no need to justify the unjustifiable in my response.
I will speak first to the fair work agency’s investigatory powers and address the opposition of the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, to Clause 95. I listened to the noble Lord, but investigatory powers are common to all regulators. The fair work agency’s powers are based on those set out for existing enforcement bodies in the Employment Agencies Act 1973, the National Minimum Wage Act 1998 and the Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004. Employment rights enforcement agencies have had power to enter premises used as dwellings since their inception. For example, HMRC’s minimum wage inspectors can and do regularly visit business premises used as dwellings to gather evidence. It is right that officers should be able to gather evidence from such premises. Businesses operating from premises used as dwellings is nothing new. Pubs, for example, often have flats above the public area where the business’s documentation is kept.
Today, more and more businesses operate from home. Current law makes no distinction for dwellings. This Government believe in stronger safeguards for such powers. That is why Clause 95 introduces a new requirement for a warrant to enter dwellings. Together with the additional safeguards in Clause 128 and Schedule 8, this clause strikes the right balance between protecting the privacy and rights of individuals and allowing the fair work agency to go about its job of enforcing labour market legislation. I hope that I have reassured noble Lords on this point, and that noble Lords can agree that Clause 95 should stand part of the Bill.
The noble Lord, Lord Jackson, also addressed his amendments to Clause 128. I recognise the intent behind these amendments, but there are already extensive safeguards around the use of investigatory powers in Part 5, including the new requirement for a warrant when entering a dwelling. Clause 128 is a sensible provision that sets out that any enforcement officer has the right to execute a warrant and, as long as the enforcement officer is present, they can be accompanied by an authorised person or persons if they deem it relevant to the investigation—for example, an IT specialist.
Turning to Amendment 271ZC from the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, enforcement of holiday pay is a key part of the fair work agency’s remit. Large numbers of workers are missing out on their statutory right to paid annual leave. The Trade Union Congress estimates that 2 million people lose around £3 billion per year by not receiving holiday pay to which they are entitled. We recognise that this disproportionately affects the lowest-paid workers. The fair work agency will not be able to meaningfully support workers to recover the holiday pay they are owed if it cannot issue notices of underpayment. This is a power that is already available in the national minimum wage enforcement regime, which has been successful in ensuring that workers receive the arrears that they are owed. Therefore, I must respectfully resist this amendment.
I turn now to the amendments to Clauses 116 to 121 inclusive, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Jackson, Lord Sharpe and Lord Hunt, together with the amendments to Clauses 126 and 136. These pertain to the labour market enforcement undertakings and orders regime. Although these amendments touch on important aspects of the Bill, they either duplicate existing provisions and introduce unnecessary complexity, or risk undermining the careful balance that has already been struck in the drafting. The labour market enforcement regime was introduced by the 2015 to 2017 Conservative Government. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, at that time in the other place, voted in favour of this regime consistently during the passage of the Immigration Act 2016.
It is a regime that works and works well. It promotes a compliance-first approach, as employers are first encouraged to enter into voluntary undertakings to correct their behaviour. Only persistent or egregious offenders are issued with a compulsory order to stop. As of March 2024, there have been 140 labour market enforcement undertakings and just 14 labour market enforcement orders. These amendments seek to water down the regime and increase legal tests and administrative burdens for its use. By making the labour market enforcement regime more cumbersome and less effective, the fair work agency would have to resort more often to prosecution, which could be disproportionate and time-consuming for all concerned. The effects of these amendments would be to make enforcement more heavy-handed, less efficient and less focused on helping businesses to comply. This is not what businesses or workers want or need, and it is not what the fair work agency is about.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
I hear what the Minister says, but surely she would agree that, if one looks at Amendment 273F, which moves from having “a balance of probabilities” to “beyond reasonable doubt”, if you are taking forward an LME infraction case beyond reasonable doubt, you are more likely to succeed, and the corollary of that is that you are not taking forward cases on which you have a paucity of evidence. So, with all due respect to the noble Baroness, I disagree. If you are bringing in proportionality and “beyond reasonable doubt”, you are going to have sharper cases that tackle the most egregious examples of infractions of the legislation and do not waste a lot of time—and consequently save the taxpayer money.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
The evidence shows that the current wording is proportionate. There has not been a huge number of cases. Maybe we could argue about whether there should be more cases, but the fact that there has not been a huge number of cases is a reflection of that. What we do not want to do is set the barrier so high that we cannot take the cases that are necessary to deliver the changes and the better worker protection that we seek to achieve.
I turn to the noble Lord’s Amendment 273N. I agree that effective sharing of information and pooling of knowledge will be crucial to the success of the fair work agency. The list of bodies that the agency will be able to share information with is limited to those with a need for access, and safeguards are provided for. However, the power to update the list is necessary to ensure that the fair work agency can respond to future changes in the wider labour market and the regulatory landscape. It means that we can keep the list of bodies under review and remove bodies where the need to share information no longer applies. This is good data information governance.
The noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, asked about the Low Pay Commission being listed. The fair work agency will be able to share information with the bodies in Schedule 9 if it is for the purposes of a function of the body. This does not need to be about the enforcement functions. I also say to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee expressed no concern with this power in its report on the Bill.
On the opposition of the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, to Clause 134, HMRC data is critical for investigating and enforcing various employment rights, not just the national minimum wage. However, I say to the noble Baroness that much of HMRC’s data is confidential, and it is therefore prudent to require an extra level of approval before this information is shared further.
Clause 134 restricts the sharing of confidential HMRC data without authorisation from HMRC commissioners. This will ensure that the fair work agency operates in line with the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act. This is a standard safeguard which is necessary to ensure responsible data sharing between HMRC and the fair work agency.
In relation to Amendment 273PB from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, I reassure him that the Bill already gives the Secretary of State the power to share information with border authorities, such as the National Crime Agency and immigration officers. Rather than enhancing enforcement, the amendment risks introducing unnecessary complexity and diverting attention away from the fair work agency’s core task. The amendment’s intended effect can be achieved through the existing Bill drafting.
I turn to the noble Lord’s Amendment 273R to Clause 140. The ability to recover enforcement costs in relation to the time spent is a matter of fairness. Restricting the use of hourly rates would in practice force the fair work agency to adopt fixed fees. A fixed approach to cost recovery could mean that a small business ended up paying the same as a much larger organisation, regardless of the scale or complexity of the case, and that is not fair. This clause is an enabling power. Regulations made under it will be subject to the affirmative procedure. Parliament will be able to scrutinise and debate whether to adopt a fixed-fee or variable-fee regime at the point where the regime is proposed, and it is right that we afford that flexibility in design at this stage.
In conclusion, while I appreciate the intention behind the amendments, they either replicate what is already achieved by the Bill’s existing provisions or risk unsettling a framework that has already been carefully constructed. I therefore ask the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, not to press Amendment 271ZC.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
I thank the Minister for that comprehensive canter through my amendments. I defer to the poetic licence of my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral and accept that it is not a cornucopia, but my cup overfloweth nevertheless.
I appreciate the spirit in which the amendments were received. I was attempting to improve the Bill. Not for the first time, my noble friend Lord Hunt put it much more succinctly than I did in that, certainly with regard to proportionality and “beyond reasonable doubt”, notwithstanding the excellent drafting by officials, the amendments would have improved the Bill.
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would enable an application for an order enforcing a requirement in a notice of underpayment to pay a sum to an individual to be made in Scotland to a summary sheriff (as well as to a sheriff).
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
My Lords, I begin by saying what a pleasure it was to be chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Fookes, who is celebrating 55 years of public service today. I congratulate her.
Back to the not-so-inspiring business: I am responding to the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, on his amendments relating to civil proceedings and the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, and the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, for giving notice of their opposition to Clause 113. The Government are committed to ensuring a fair playing field for all employees and businesses. This includes enabling the fair work agency to challenge breaches of employment rights and labour abuse where individuals may not be able to pursue this for themselves or where these cases are not suitable for other enforcement routes.
I am sorry to hear that some noble Lords cannot envisage the circumstance in which these powers might be necessary but, as we rehearsed on a previous group of amendments, many vulnerable workers, especially migrant workers, are reluctant or unable to bring their case to the tribunal to enforce their employment rights. Rogue employers exploit this, break employment law and get away with it. That is unfair for the majority of businesses that do right by their staff. It is unfair for the vulnerable workers involved in being denied their rights. It is unfair for British workers who are denied work opportunities due to illegal practices undercutting them. That is why, in the plan to make work pay, which was a manifesto commitment, we set out that the fair work agency will have the power to bring civil proceedings to uphold employment rights. This is why the Secretary of State will have the power to bring proceedings in place of a worker. It will mean that all employers are held to the same standards.
I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, and the noble Lord, Lord Carter, that these provisions on civil proceedings are modelled on the Equality Act 2006, which allows the Equality and Human Rights Commission to institute legal proceedings that are connected to the commission’s functions. This includes bringing proceedings for breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights and assisting individuals who are party to proceedings related to the Equality Act 2010.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
If the noble Lord lets me finish this point, I may answer his question.
The Employment and Human Rights Commission does not need consent for this and has issued proceedings in its own name before. When acting as an intervenor, the EHRC has also previously received court approval to take over conduct of an appeal on behalf of an appellant when the appellant decided to withdraw from the legal proceedings. This was done with the consent of the Supreme Court in the case of MS (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department. I give way.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
I am grateful to the Minister for reaching the end of that paragraph. She agrees that the power for the EHRC to intervene in proceedings is not a power to take over and institute proceedings if people do not want to. Instead, it is a power to intervene and carry on proceedings in the event that somebody wants to withdraw. That is not based on any statutory provision; this is still extremely novel. I am sure that the Minister will agree that there is no statutory precedent for the kind of power that the Government want to take in Clause 113.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
As the noble Lord has more legal expertise than me, I am happy to write to him on that point because it is an important point that we need to clarify. Of course, these are relatively new powers that we are taking on board, and we are taking them for very good reasons. I am sorry that noble Lords opposite do not see the case for this, because, certainly, an awful lot of workers are being exploited out there. At the moment, they do not have the power to speak for themselves in the way that many others who are better informed can do.
While I respect the intention of the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, behind some of his amendments, I must state they are unnecessary. Some of the provisions of the amendments are already provided for, either within the existing drafting of the specific clauses or in other clauses of the Bill. Regarding Amendments 271D, 272ZZA and 272ZZD, as I mentioned on Monday, normal practice would be for the Secretary of State to bring proceedings with a worker’s consent and involvement. However, in the worst cases of serious exploitation and intimidation, workers may fear the repercussions that they may face from their employer should they be de-anonymised. By allowing the Secretary of State to take a case forward without consent, it would be harder for employers to attribute blame to individual employees. Therefore, limiting this power in the way that these amendments seek to do could prevent the Secretary of State pursuing serious breaches in some of the most egregious cases.
Amendment 272ZZB is an unnecessary amendment. Legally privileged material and confidential information is already protected under the Data Protection Act, as well as under usual legal rules and principles that apply to proceedings.
On Amendment 272ZZC, normal public law principles already take account of all considerations referenced in this amendment, including the best interests of a worker. This is therefore another unnecessary amendment.
Amendment 272ZZE is yet another unnecessary amendment. Clause 113(6) does not provide a blanket exclusion from all liability, and it is self-evident that the Secretary of State would be held accountable if they undertook actions that were unlawful. This is a basic principle of the rule of law.
On Amendment 272ZC, it is clearly in the interests of enforcement authorities and all parties that the most effective and proportionate means of enforcement is chosen. The Bill already provides that civil proceedings cannot be initiated where a notice of underpayment has been given. It would be inappropriate to impose hurdles on the fair work agency’s use of its powers; it should be able to decide how best it will use this and its other powers to enforce labour market legislation in each case.
On Amendment 272AA, Clause 92 already provides for the fair work agency to prepare and publish an annual report, which we would expect to cover all of its activities. It is simply not necessary to require individual reports on individual powers.
We strongly resist Amendment 272AB. Ultimately, the business of the next Parliament should be for that Parliament to decide and not for us to dictate now.
Briefly on Amendment 272AC, only officers with appropriate knowledge and training will carry out these powers. Clause 87(6) already clearly provides that a person can exercise the powers of an enforcement officer only to the extent specified in their appointment by the Secretary of State. This amendment would duplicate that existing provision.
To summarise, Clause 113, together with Clauses 114 and 115, delivers a manifesto commitment. It provides a new power that will enable fair work agency enforcement officers to bring proceedings to an employment tribunal in place of a worker. It is designed to address situations where a worker has a legal right to bring a claim but, for various reasons, including fear of retaliation, lack of awareness or language barriers, they are unable to do so. This clause enhances the state’s ability to support the most vulnerable workers in accessing justice and will be particularly valuable in cases involving labour exploitation or breaches of minimum employment standards.
It will bring broader benefits. The fair work agency will be able to bring multiple complaints simultaneously. This will save time and costs for workers and employers alike. It has the potential to reduce the burden on the employment tribunal system over current practices, where most claims are brought individually.
Importantly, the clause is tightly drawn. The fair work agency’s tribunal proceedings will follow the same process as if they were brought by workers. This includes a requirement for ACAS consultation. Additionally, the power cannot be used in cases where a notice of underpayment has been issued under Section 100. This ensures that there is no duplication of enforcement mechanisms. Both the Secretary of State and the worker can appeal a decision, recognising that both parties have a legitimate interest in the outcome. The clause includes safeguards to ensure that the Secretary of State cannot be held liable to the worker for how they exercise this power, reflecting the discretionary and strategic nature of enforcement.
This clause forms a crucial part of the fair work agency’s toolkit, enhances the effectiveness of labour market enforcement and delivers a manifesto commitment upon which Members in the other place were elected. It should stand part of the Bill.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
I am listening very carefully to the Minister, and she did not address either of my specific points. Given that she is saying that this rather strange clause is to defend the interests of new migrants and black and minority-ethnic folk, many of whom work in agriculture, particularly in the east of England and other parts of the UK, why is there a carve-out for agricultural workers? The Minister did not answer my question on why that happened. Secondly, can I press her on my specific point on why de facto unemployed people fall under the purview of subsection (7) of this clause, allowing the Secretary of State to insert state apparatus into their litigation, when they are not even in gainful employment?
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord. My apologies; I should have answered both of those questions. On the issue of agricultural workers, I do not know the answer, so I will write to the noble Lord. On his question about why subsection (7) covers people who are not yet employed, the clause was worded in that way to capture whistleblowers and was amended to widen it to include zero-hours contract workers. I hope that answers the noble Lord’s questions.
Baroness Verma (Con)
I am slightly confused. This seems to be quite a heavy-handed way of capturing workers who may have difficulties understanding their rights. Instead of being so heavy-handed about the whole approach and making it look like a two-tier system is being created, in which migrant workers in particular are focused on, maybe we can look at how we can inform both employers and employees about their rights, without taking such an approach. The people we are trying to protect will most definitely not be protected by this.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
Although I did talk about migrant workers as an example, this is meant to capture all vulnerable workers and all workers who are exposed to unfair practices or intimidation—which happens rather more than noble Lords opposite like to acknowledge.
In conclusion, the civil proceedings powers within the Bill align with our manifesto commitment—
Baroness Coffey (Con)
The Minister explained subsection (7)(a)(i) of this clause with regards to zero-hours contracts. In subsection (7)(a)(ii), I am struggling to understand how an individual
“seeking to be employed by a person as a worker”
could be a whistleblower. I would be grateful to understand that better, but I am happy for the Minister to write.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
On that point of clarification, I will write to the noble Baroness.
In conclusion, the civil proceedings powers within the Bill align with our manifesto commitment to strengthen enforcement and improve outcomes for workers through a fairer, more accessible system. We need to let the fair work agency operate with the tools it needs, guided by the statute but not constricted by inflexible restrictions or ministerial bottlenecks. I therefore ask the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, to withdraw Amendment 271D.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her reply. She will not be surprised to know that I am afraid I did not buy any of those arguments.
I am extremely grateful to my noble friends Lady Coffey, Lady Lawlor, Lord Jackson, Lord Ashcombe and Lady Verma for their interventions; they all made extremely good points. I will return to the points raised by the noble Lords, Lord Carter of Haslemere and Lord Murray of Blidworth, in a second.
We have just heard this clause described variously as “beyond belief”, “especially bonkers”, “an utter mess”, “quite extraordinary” and “perverse and unheard of”. Do you know what? It is all of those things. This has been an extraordinary debate, and so many interesting points have been made that it is hard to sum up. However, there is one point that was brought to my attention by the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, who was sitting next to me at the time. He pointed out that this clause might be in contravention of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights: the right to respect for private and family life. This needs to be explored, and it is important for the Minister to take account of, because, under Section 19(1)(a) of the Human Rights Act 1998, she has to sign on the front of this Bill that it is compatible with the rights under that convention.
I will read the relevant article, so it is on the record:
“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence … There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”.
I do not expect the Minister to answer this now, but I would be very grateful if she could at least allude to the legal advice that she was given before she signed the Bill to confirm that it did not contravene Article 8.
I appreciate that government legal advice is rarely published, but, having had some experience of government lawyers and their risk-averse nature, I would be very surprised if they had considered this in its entirety. I would be grateful if the Minister would come back to that issue, perhaps in the letter to my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth. This is clearly one of the subjects to which we will have to return, because, as both the noble Lord, Lord Carter, and my noble friend Lord Murray have explained, this is extraordinary and positively Kafkaesque.
I will leave the last words to my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth, who pointed out that we could end up in a state where we have litigation about litigation on behalf of someone who does not want to litigate. That is frankly absurd. For now, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Before I sit down, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Fookes, on her 55 years of public service. I believe that she was first elected on 18 June 1970 to represent Merton and Morden—many congratulations.
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the definition of “worker” being inserted into Part 5 by my amendment of clause 148 at page 147, line 9.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I do not want to disappoint the noble Lord, but I am afraid he is stuck with me again. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, for tabling amendments on legal assistance and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, for notifying us of her opposition to Clause 114 standing part of the Bill.
I will start with Amendment 272BA. To be fair, the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, and others indicated that this has overlapped with not only previous discussions today but discussions of groups on previous days in Committee. As my noble friend Lady Jones said on Monday, the drafting of Clause 114
“was carefully thought through and is deliberately broad and inclusive”.—[Official Report, 16/6/25; col. 1883.]
It is only fair that it covers not just employees but employers and trade unions. To answer a specific question from the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, about what other assistance could be provided, this could include help in understanding procedural requirements, preparing documents or accessing expert input. It is designed to be flexible and responsive to individual needs. Given this, we cannot support Amendment 272BA.
Amendment 272D would restrict the amount of support that could be offered to any individual through this power. It is not a reasonable measure. I understand that it is a probing amendment, as the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, said, but the small amount proposed in the amendment would leave the power meaningless. As we have discussed, this would be, although it is not intended as such, tantamount to a wrecking proposal, because it is such a small amount. Obviously, as we have discussed, this is a manifesto commitment. The fair work agency should be able to decide how much support it can offer, without being constrained to random financial limits for no good reason.
Amendment 272E would create an additional process before the power can be used. Part 5 of the Bill already calls for the fair work agency to publish an annual strategy, as we discussed on an earlier group. Requiring yet another administrative document in this way would be burdensome and unnecessary, and I think we share across the Committee a desire to reduce bloated bureaucracy—a phrase that has already been used this afternoon.
Turning to Amendment 272F, the powers under Clause 114 will operate in tandem with those in Clause 113, but workers will not always want to be separately represented in proceedings brought by the fair work agency. They can be represented, but they do not have to be. Therefore, we cannot support this amendment.
Amendment 272G would mean that the fair work agency would duplicate ACAS’s existing responsibilities regarding dispute resolution. This power is not intended to be a replacement or a duplication of existing support. We cannot support this amendment, as it would complicate the enforcement landscape when we are trying with this Bill to simplify it.
Amendment 272H would limit the scope of this power. It would create situations where legal assistance would have to cease, even if proceedings continued, leading to unfairness. It could lead to people being unable to continue their cases, which could cover other matters such as discrimination, because support could no longer be offered. The fair work agency should be able to decide what is appropriate and fair in each case.
Amendment 272I would put an unnecessary burden on the Secretary of State to have insurance in place before being able to provide advice on a settlement agreement. To be fair to the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, she sort of indicated uncertainty around this. To be clear, this amendment wholly contradicts established government practice. I refer her to paragraph 4.4 of Managing Public Money, which sets out that the Government should generally not take out commercial insurance and it is not good value for money.
To summarise on Clause 114, the legal system can be intimidating, particularly for vulnerable workers or those from marginalised backgrounds. To repeat what my noble friend Lady Jones said in the previous group, many vulnerable workers are reluctant or unable to bring their cases to tribunal to enforce their employment rights, and this has serious consequences. Rogue employers exploit this, breaking employment law, and get away with it. For instance, Citizens Advice suggests that high-paid workers are more likely to file a case with an employment tribunal than lower-paid individuals, despite the latter being more likely to have their rights infringed. As I said, this lets rogue employers off the hook, and that is unfair for the vast majority of businesses, which we all know do the right thing by their staff and want to. It is unfair for the vulnerable workers involved—to state the obvious—who are being denied their rights, and it is unfair for the rest of the workforce, who are denied work opportunities due to illegal practices undercutting them.
As was said in the last group, that is why, in the plan to make work pay—again, a manifesto commitment—we set out that the fair work agency will have powers to bring civil proceedings to uphold employment rights. The Bill will give the fair work agency the power to bring civil proceedings in the employment tribunal to uphold rights. This is a critical power, particularly for situations where a worker feels unable to bring proceedings themselves. But there are occasions where a person is able to bring proceedings in the tribunal or another court but needs assistance, or where the case has wider ramifications and the person concerned could benefit from the fair work agency’s expertise.
Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)
My Lords, can the Minister remind us to what extent there has been consultation with the Secretary of State for Justice? Has the Lord Chancellor been involved in putting together this scheme, which is going to sit alongside legal aid, for which she is responsible? It would be really helpful if the Minister could make sure that the Government is joined-up in putting forward what is, in a way, as my noble friends have pointed out, quite a blank cheque, which has not properly been costed. Can he put us right on all this, please?
Lord Katz (Lab)
I am more than happy to. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, anticipates the comments that I was just about to come to—but we can address the point now. The noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, focused on this as well. This is not expanding legal aid. The power is intended to give the fair work agency a discretion to provide support in employment-related cases. It is not an alternative to legal aid and it will be used in specific cases. The Government will set out how and when the fair work agency will exercise its power in due course and will discuss this with a range of stakeholders. I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, we have regular conversations with the Ministry of Justice, including on the Bill’s implementation.
I return to what I was saying about the importance of ensuring that the power of legal advice is appropriately bounded. It cannot be used to fund dispute resolution facilities delivered through other routes. Importantly, the clause protects the integrity of the courts and tribunals by confirming that nothing in the clause overrides existing restrictions on representation imposed by legislation or judicial practice. This clause complements the fair work agency’s wider role in promoting access to justice and fair treatment in the workplace. It provides a vital lever for supporting individuals who might otherwise face legal barriers alone or for ensuring compliance with relevant law, and it delivers our manifesto commitment on which Members in the other House were elected.
The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, asked about the costs. These will be set out in due course and will be discussed with a range of stakeholders, particularly employers, trade unions and employees.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
That was a rather surprising statement. Is the Minister saying that these costs are not included in the estimates that have already been given for the costs of the fair work agency, which were included in the various documents surrounding the Bill? He has just implied that it will be done later. It is rather extraordinary to produce a clause in a Bill without having a costing for it. Can I press him again on what the costs are, whether they are included in the existing estimates of costs for the fair work agency and, if not, when they will actually be made clear?
Lord Katz (Lab)
I thank the noble Baroness for that intervention. The costs are not factored in. As I said, they will be set out in due course, following discussions with a range of stakeholders. I hope that this has persuaded the noble Baroness that Clause 114 should stand part of the Bill.
I turn finally to the amendments on recovering costs for legal assistance. Regarding Amendment 272J, if an individual has received free legal assistance from the fair work agency, any cost award should be returned to where that assistance came from. To be clear, a cost award is separate from any other awards a tribunal may make in favour of an individual. This amendment will prevent the fair work agency recovering costs and could lead to situations whereby individuals receiving legal assistance could receive money for costs they had not incurred. I hope noble Lords will agree that this is completely unreasonable.
On Amendments 272K and 272L, removing the ability to provide for the appointment and expenditure incurred is unreasonable and could lead to uncertainty about what expenditure of the Secretary of State is recoverable. In addition, while Amendment 272L looks consequential to Amendment 272K, it would actually remove the requirement for regulations under Clause 115(5) to be subject to any parliamentary procedure. I am sure that this is not the intention of the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey. Needless to say, we oppose removing requirements of parliamentary procedures in this way.
In response to noble Baroness’s question on why the regulation for Clause 115(5) is negative, this follows precedent from the Equality Act. I indeed note and point out to the noble Baroness that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has raised no concerns with the Government about this power.
The legal assistance powers within the Bill are necessary to deliver our manifesto commitment to strengthen enforcement and improve outcomes for workers through a fairer, more acceptable system. These amendments would hamper that goal and might even unintentionally limit access to justice. The current drafting has been carefully considered. It is both deliberate and necessary. I therefore ask the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, to withdraw Amendment 272BA.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
In the case of the noble Lord’s response to this group of amendments, and the response to the previous group of amendments by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, the Ministers have claimed that these clauses are covered by manifesto commitments. The Labour Party manifesto is not something I carry around in my handbag, but, from memory, I do not think it covered these particular clauses. What makes me so sure that this is the case is that these two clauses were introduced in the other place on Report. They were not part of the original Bill that was introduced. That means, inter alia, that they received no substantive examination or discussion whatever in the other place. More importantly, this suggests to me that they were not a part of the original package that can claim manifesto support. I think we will want to examine that extremely carefully. If the Minister has a response now, with a chapter and verse in the manifesto, I will be happy to look it up afterwards, but I think we find unconvincing this part of the Government’s defence of these clauses.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I do not have chapter and verse but a page number. Noble Lords can find it on page 16 of the Labour’s Plan to Make Work Pay document, which was part of our manifesto.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
I must press the Minister. I have looked at the Labour’s Plan to Make Work Pay document and it does not make reference to de facto legal aid. It says:
“We will also consider measures to provide accessible and authoritative information for people on their employment status and what rights they are owed, tackling instances where some employers can use complexity to avoid legal obligations”.
That is very different to what the Minister has outlined to your Lordships’ House.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I do not want to extend the debate too much or do too much quoting across the Dispatch Box but, to counter that, Labour’s Plan to Make Work Pay talks about establishing a single enforcement body that
“will have the powers it needs to undertake targeted and proactive enforcement work and bring civil proceedings upholding employment rights”.
To a fair-minded person that is pretty clear.
Baroness Coffey (Con)
My Lords, this has been an exceptionally revealing debate on this group of amendments and the clause more broadly. I somewhat agree with the Minister on creating the ability to initiate legal proceedings—which, by the way, continues some of the work already being done by the existing authorities—but the Bill does not refer to being able to do that without the consent of the worker, which will surprise a lot of people, and absolutely does not make reference to the level of financing, which we have just discussed in relation to Clause 114.
Another point I noted is that, on Monday, the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Whitchurch, referred to “employees and employers”, but the Minister at the Dispatch Box today has been very clear that this is also about funding trade unions. As I said, this has been a revealing debate and one that, after I discuss it with my Front Bench, we may explore further on Report. With that, however, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Coffey for introducing her amendment and also to the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, for speaking to the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Fox, the first of which proposes a report on the expansion of legal aid in employment tribunals. It would not itself change entitlement but seeks to prompt a structured exploration of the options. Legal aid is, of course, a complex and often contested area, and this amendment simply calls for a government-led review that considers both employer compliance and the financial position of workers. It is reasonable to assess whether the current system adequately supports access to justice in employment disputes.
I have a question for the noble Lord, Lord Fox. I will discuss with him outside but, just to get it on the record, I am curious to know whether the “report on the options”, which he describes in subsection (1) of the proposed new clause in his lead amendment, extends to small and medium-sized employers as well. I am interested to know whether he thinks they should be included within that survey based on the fact that many of them will also suffer some financial hardship.
On the proposed new clause on summary judgments in employment tribunals in Amendment 323 by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, such a power could offer a means of reducing the burden on tribunals, improving efficiency and focusing resources on cases where the issues genuinely require full examination. In short, both amendments are interesting and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
My Lords, I will first speak to Amendment 279H in my name, which increases the time limit for making a claim to an employment tribunal in relation to paid time off for employee representatives in consultations on certain changes to occupational and personal pension schemes from three months to six months. This would amend the employment tribunal time limit that is set out in the Schedule to the Occupational and Personal Pension Schemes (Consultation by Employers and Miscellaneous Amendment) Regulations 2006.
This amendment is essential to ensure consistency with the time limits for the majority of tribunal claims which are being amended to six months throughout the Bill. This is a technical amendment which brings the provisions on consultations on pension schemes in line with the other clauses in the Bill regarding the increase in time limits which have been set out.
Increasing tribunal time limits will provide employees and employers more time to resolve disputes internally or through the conciliation process as well as more time for employees to consider the merits of bringing a claim to an employment tribunal. Judges will continue to have the discretion to hear out-of-time claims on a case-by-case basis.
Amendment 279GZA from the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, seeks to provide that the extension of employment tribunal time limits from three to six months does not apply in respect of industrial tribunals in Northern Ireland. We have worked closely with the Northern Ireland Executive to develop an approach to extending time limits which respects the Northern Ireland Assembly’s competence to legislate on devolved matters. Where time limits are in UK-wide legislation that extends to Northern Ireland and that relates to matters that are reserved, such as the National Minimum Wage Act 1998, this Bill amends the time limits for bringing a claim to the industrial tribunal in Northern Ireland. We will continue to work with the Executive to consider implementation and, if appropriate, these changes may come into force at different dates for Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The Bill does not amend time limits in legislation that extends to Northern Ireland and is transferred—that is, devolved powers.
On Amendments 273 and 323, I understand the motivation of the noble Lord, Lord Fox, in tabling his amendments, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, for speaking to them so ably. In order for the reforms we are making through this Bill to be effective, it is vital that workers can enforce their employment rights. As noble Lords know, tribunals, including employment tribunals, are designed to be informal, accessible and low-cost means of accessing justice. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, that the backlog of tribunal claims at the moment is unacceptable. We are taking steps to address that backlog in conjunction with the Ministry of Justice, and the fair work agency can also play a part in easing that load. We will be able to debate the measures that we are taking further in later groups.
However, I would like to reassure the noble Lord that legal aid is available, subject to means and merits tests, in relation to discrimination and breaches of the Equality Act 2010. Where an issue falls outside the scope of legal aid, funding may still be available through the exceptional case funding scheme. Of course, members of trade unions will receive advice and representation anyway as part of their membership.
Turning to the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Fox, on employment tribunal summary judgments, I can reassure the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, that employment tribunals have a wide range of existing powers to address weak claims or responses, including strike-out and default judgments, to achieve the aims set out in this amendment. The strike-out rule in its framing and application is already similar to that of Rule 24 in the Civil Procedure Rules. It allows employment tribunals to strike out half or all of a claim or response, including where there is no reasonable prospect of success. I therefore ask the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, to withdraw Amendment 273.
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment makes a minor drafting change.
“The Security Industry Authority.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would enable information obtained in connection with the exercise of enforcement functions under Part 5 of the Bill, or functions under or by virtue of clause 113 or 114 (powers in relation to civil proceedings), to be disclosed to the Security Industry Authority for the purposes of its functions.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for tabling Amendments 279ZA and 279ZB and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for her Amendment 273PA. I reflect that on an earlier group we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough—whom I am glad to see now in his place—with his Amendment 273PB, so we have seen two ends of the spectrum in terms of an approach to information sharing and enforcement with modern slavery. One might speculate that perhaps we have, in a Goldilocks way, achieved the right balance with what we are proposing in the Bill. I hope noble Lords agree.
Turning to Amendment 279ZA and 279ZB, I understand that these are probing amendments and the noble Lord is seeking reassurances that the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority’s vital work tackling labour abuse will continue under the fair work agency. Let me provide that reassurance very clearly now. Action on labour abuse and modern slavery will be core and central to the mission of the new fair work agency. I am happy to join in the sentiment set out by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Wirral. Modern slavery is a stain on our society as well as on our economy. We are determined as a Government to continue the work of previous Administrations in stamping it out. My noble friend Lady O’Grady of Upper Holloway set out very starkly for us why this continued exploitation needs our continued focus and vigilance.
All the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority’s functions, including in relation to labour abuse, will transfer to the Secretary of State. Its vital work in this area will continue. We are also committed to ensuring that there is no disruption as we set up the fair work agency. The fair work agency will continue to work in close partnership with Eleanor Lyons, the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner, as the GLAA does now, to identify and disrupt patterns of exploitation across sectors such as agriculture, construction and adult social care. The Bill lays the foundation to build on that successful working relationship between the commissioner and the GLAA. Clause 132 and Schedule 9 together will enable the two-way sharing of information between them where this will help both fulfil their statutory functions. To address the questions from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, the fair work agency will still have first responder status and a duty to notify.
Regarding Amendment 273PA in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, I appreciate the noble Baroness’s concerns but there is a need for information to be shared with the Home Office to help protect the public, including vulnerable migrants, from harm. The need for this was recognised by Parliament in the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. Mechanisms already exist to support those of insecure immigration status who may be victims of abuse. The national referral mechanism is in place to ensure that individuals can be properly identified and supported, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. The NRM is a framework for identifying and referring potential victims of modern slavery and ensuring they receive the appropriate support. The online process allows first responders to submit an NRM referral through a single online form, regardless of their location in the UK or whether the victim is an adult or a child. This provides a structured and compassionate route for potential victims of modern slavery to receive help without fear of immediate immigration consequences.
I am concerned that creating a legislative blocker to information sharing could have unintended consequences and make it harder for the vulnerable individuals concerned to get the help that they need and deserve. My department will continue to work with the Home Office to ensure that we strike the right balance between protecting vulnerable workers and maintaining the integrity of our immigration system. I therefore ask the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, to withdraw Amendment 273PA.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady. I was not surprised that she was able to produce that example; there are lots of examples.
I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, that there is data protection for a good reason. I cannot say that the current situation “breaches” it, as it is not illegal, but it does not observe that data protection.
The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, is of course right about human rights abuse. He used the important term “safeguarding”. Obviously, I am disappointed with the response from the Minister—I will have a good read of it. I think we might be returning to this issue in the next Home Office Bill that is coming to us—the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, has not reacted.
With regard to my noble friend Lord Paddick’s amendments, I still do not follow quite how the assurances can be implemented. I ask the Minister—though perhaps I shall go back to Dame Sara Thornton and the Rights Lab to be sure that I have not got it wrong—to write to my noble friend and me explaining just how those assurances work their way through in the legislation, because to have just the assurances without a statutory underpinning seems not to be enough.
Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Member's explanatory statement
The effect of this amendment is that enforcement costs recovered by the Secretary of State under clause 140 will be payable into the Consolidated Fund.