Employment Rights Bill

Baroness Jones of Whitchurch Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 21st May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Young of Acton for his expert introduction to the amendments in this group. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Monks, about common sense, but I fear that went out of the window of an employment tribunal some years ago. As my noble friend Lord Young laid out in an earlier group, this Bill threatens to restrict free expression in some cases with its provisions. It is for this reason that I support the amendments, which seek to safeguard political opinion and affiliation within our employment laws.

At the heart of any thriving democracy lies the freedom to hold and express political beliefs without fear of retribution. In a democratic society, freedom of speech and freedom of belief are not luxuries; they are fundamental rights that underpin our entire system of governance and civil life. The workplace, where so many of us spend a significant portion of our lives, must be a space where individuals can hold and express their political views without fear of unfair treatment or dismissal. As it stands, our existing laws provide only patchy protections for political beliefs, and they leave many workers vulnerable. My noble friend Lord Young’s examples are truly shocking, and I would like to take this opportunity to wish, in particular, Mr Poursaeedi well in his ongoing battles.

We should draw upon the timeless wisdom of John Stuart Mill, who was one of the great architects of liberalism. He argued in his seminal work On Liberty that the truth emerges only through free and open debate, and he warned against the suppression of any opinion, because no one person or group holds a monopoly on truth. Even opinions that we may find mistaken—perhaps such as democratic socialism—or indeed offensive, must be heard and challenged openly, for only through such dialogue can society discern truth from error. Voltaire was right on this. I must admit I find it a bit disappointing that the Liberal Democrat Benches are not more enthusiastic about these amendments.

By protecting employees from dismissal or discrimination based on their political opinions or affiliations, these amendments would ensure that the workplace remains a forum where diverse ideas can be expressed, scrutinised and debated. Suppressing political expression risks silencing valuable perspectives and preventing the emergence of truth through robust discussion.

We in this House pride ourselves on opening our minds to a broad range of political views. Obviously, that involves robust engagement, challenging each other and refining our positions through vigorous debate. If such diversity of opinion is essential to the functioning of this Chamber, why would it not apply beyond these walls, and particularly in other workplaces? Workers, like us, should be free to express their political beliefs without fear of losing their jobs or being discriminated against.

In conclusion, I urge the Government to accept my noble friend’s amendments. To go back to the great liberal John Stuart Mill, he also said:

“A person may cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and in either case he is justly accountable to them for the injury”.


This is not the time for inaction. These amendments not only would protect workers from unfair dismissal and discrimination but would uphold our fundamental democratic values. By embedding these protections into our laws, we would reaffirm our commitment to free expression. I am afraid saying just that they are not necessary is not good enough. They clearly are necessary, as we heard in the examples from my noble friend.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business and Trade and Department for Science, Information and Technology (Baroness Jones of Whitchurch) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken. I think it would be helpful if I first clarify where the law stands on this.

On Amendment 101B, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, let me make it clear that religious and philosophical beliefs are already protected by the Equality Act 2010, including in the workplace. However, political belief—in the sense of a party-political affiliation or opinion—was not included as a protected characteristic in the Equality Act 2010. The noble Lord referred to the Grainger case. That case and the definition that the noble Lord read out referred to the issue of philosophical belief, which is already protected by the Act.

In 2015-16, the Equality and Human Rights Commission reviewed whether Great Britain’s equality and human rights legal framework sufficiently protects individuals with a religion or belief and the distinction of a religion or belief organisation while balancing the rights of others protected under the Equality Act 2010. The review found that the definition of religion or belief in the Equality Act is sufficiently broad to ensure wide protection for many religions or beliefs. It recommended no change to the definition of religion or belief or to the approach that the court should take in deciding whether any particular belief is protected under the Act.

We are not convinced that a political opinion or affiliation should be specifically protected by amendment to the Equality Act 2010 in contrast to other religions or beliefs. The extent of protected beliefs has been developed in case law, and we have not been presented with strong evidence that any legislative amendment is necessary. The amendment the noble Lord is proposing would potentially cause legal uncertainty over its relationship to the protected characteristic of religion or belief in Section 10 of the Equality Act, which has a much wider application than just the workplace.

The Government frequently receive calls for new protected characteristics—there have been over 21 suggested to date. While some of these carry merit, it simply would not be practical to include these all in the legislation, which would quickly become unmanageable for employers and service providers to follow, and for courts and tribunals to process and judge.

The noble Lord referred to the European Convention on Human Rights. The courts and tribunals will always be required to balance competing rights on the facts of a particular case, including the rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and freedom of expression under Articles 9 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as academic freedom.

Noble Lords have referred to a number of individual cases. They will appreciate that I cannot comment on individual cases. However, I can assure them that free speech is a cornerstone of British values. We are firmly committed to upholding the right of freedom of expression, which is protected by Article 10. I also absolutely agree with my noble friend Lord Monks that, in many cases—and preferably in all cases—it is ideal for these issues to be resolved by common sense at the workplace.

Turning to Amendment 141A, I seek to reassure the noble Lord that further legislative provision on this matter is not needed. Through the Bill, the Government are creating a day one right against unfair dismissal. As the noble Lord, Lord Young, acknowledged in his explanatory statement, additional protections for employees already exist under Section 108(4) of the Employment Rights Act 1996, which currently ensures that claims for unfair dismissal on the grounds of political opinion or affiliation are not subject to any qualification period. I can reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, that, while dismissal on the grounds of political beliefs and affiliations is not automatically unfair, if brought to a tribunal, the tribunal could find that it was unfair based on the circumstances at hand.

As we have said, these issues will very often have to be decided by a tribunal, based on the facts of the case. This will obviously also have to apply to the noble Lord’s amendment as well. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, that the delays in employment tribunals are a very real challenge that we are very conscious of, and we have already reported elsewhere in other debates on the Bill that we are taking steps to address this.

Relevant case law sets out the circumstances where political beliefs may constitute a philosophical belief for the purpose of the Equality Act 2010. In these cases, discrimination provisions could apply. Following a judgment from the European Court of Human Rights, the qualifying period for bringing a claim of unfair dismissal relating to political opinions or affiliation was removed, further strengthening employees’ access to justice in instances of unfair dismissal based on political views. The Bill ensures that claims for dismissal on this basis continue to be treated in the same way as claims for automatic unfair dismissal by carving them out in a new Section 108A from the requirement that any employee must have started work before a claim can be brought.

We regard this as the right approach. Making dismissal for political opinions automatically unfair, as this amendment seeks to do, would fundamentally change the way that free speech is considered in relation to dismissal for the holding of views or the expression of views that the employer regards as unacceptable. It could sweep up such a wide range of views as to be unworkable. As sufficient protection against dismissal for political beliefs already exists, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw Amendment 101B.

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

I thank all noble Lords who spoke in support of my amendments. I echo the tribute made by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, to the journalist Patrick O’Flynn, who has just been taken from us so ahead of his time. I appreciate the remarks from the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, who I note did not oppose the amendments, although she was a little bit sceptical about the case I had made. I also thank my noble friend Lady Verma for her intervention.

In response to the Minister’s remarks, as she says, some political beliefs are protected by the Equality Act. The issue is that not all political beliefs are protected by the Equality Act. I gave some examples and I will give just one more: an employment tribunal decision that a belief in Scottish independence is protected, but a belief in unionism is not. There is often not much rhyme or reason to these employment tribunal decisions, because the Grainger test leaves so much room for bias, interpretation and subjective judgment. I am merely asking the Government to bring the Equality Act into line with the European Convention on Human Rights. Article 14 lists the characteristics that should be protected and includes the words “political … opinion”. That means all political opinions, not just those you disagree with.

Finally, I come to the intervention from the noble Lord, Lord Monks, and point out that Saba Poursaeedi did not lose his job at the housing association because he was tactless or undiplomatic; he lost it because he was intending to stand as a candidate for Reform UK. The association had no misgivings about his performance in his role; indeed, it promoted him. He was a model of tact and diplomacy when dealing with the residents managed by the housing association. That was not the reason he was fired. The noble Lord is, of course, welcome to join the Free Speech Union, and I hope that he does. I have reached out to Gary Lineker, not to defend him in any case he might want to bring against the BBC—which I do not think he intends—but because the police have said they may now be investigating his remarks. I reached out to him and said that, if that happens, we will provide him with a solicitor and, if necessary, a barrister.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, and my noble friends Lady Neville-Rolfe and Lord Lucas for their amendments and their thoughtful contributions in this group. It has been a most interesting debate. I will speak to my Amendments 103, 113 and 123.

I completely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, that it would be much better to get this right now rather than pursuing Amendment 103 in particular, which returns to the Government’s insufficient impact assessment. The assessment that has been produced states that this provision will have one of the highest impacts, yet, as we have mentioned before, the Regulatory Policy Committee has given the Government’s analysis in this section a red rating. The RPC’s critique is not a matter of minor technicalities because it identifies serious deficiencies in the Government’s case for intervention in the options that they have considered and in the justification for the policy that they propose. The Government’s impact assessment admits that it lacks robust data on dismissal rates for employees with under two years’ service. To answer the question from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, there is no evidence for that. It proceeds regardless, however, with only superficial reference to “asymmetric information” and without any substantive analysis of any market failure.

The RPC highlights the impact assessment’s failure to consider how long-serving employees might view the equalisation of rights for new joiners—an issue of fairness and workplace cohesion that the Government have ignored. The impact assessment itself mentions that options such as reducing the qualifying period to 18 months or one year were considered and rejected without detailed assessment. No real exploration of probation periods was provided. That is not a balanced appraisal of possible alternatives; it is a justification for a predetermined decision.

On the justification of the preferred option, the impact assessment is again found lacking. The RPC calls for clarity on the costs to businesses—the costs of managing performance, handling disputes and the increased settlements to avoid tribunal risks. It also questions whether the Government have considered evidence from existing unfair dismissal claims and how risks might vary across sectors or job types, particularly in roles where reputational damage from a claim might deter employers from hiring at all.

More significantly, the Government have not addressed indirect and dynamic labour impacts, such as whether day-one rights might lead to more cautious hiring, greater use of temporary contracts or weaker overall job security. These are not abstract concerns as they go to the heart of how this policy might reshape employment relationships across the country. Noble Lords might be interested in a real example. I was talking this morning to a senior executive at a FTSE 100 company. It is an exemplary employer in every way; for example, offering many day-one rights. But this year—partly as a result of the jobs tax but also in anticipation of the Bill—it has reduced its hiring by 84%. I repeat that for the record: 84%. This is not abstract or theoretical. This is real, this is now.

It is important to note that these likely labour market impacts are not accounted for in the £5 billion cost to businesses, so the real cost is likely to be significantly higher. The result is a policy with high ambition but little practical clarity, as the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, has just noted. How will unfair dismissal rights interact with a statutory probationary period? Will employers still have access to the same set of fair reasons for dismissal? Will there be a different threshold for acting reasonably during probation? Can probation be extended if needed? None of those questions has been clearly answered.

The noble Lord, Lord Leong, reminded us of the light-touch, nine-month proposal, but what does that mean in practice? My noble friend Lady Meyer asked that. At the same time, the Government’s own analysis predicts that granting day-one rights for unfair dismissal alone will result in a 15% increase in employment tribunal claims. Using the statistics given by the noble Lord, Lord Barber, that is an additional 750 claims per year, on top of the 50,000 backlog already waiting 18 months to two years. The noble Lord argued that this is, in effect, a statistical irrelevance, but it is not to the 750 business owners who are being dragged through courts. That is a substantial impact. It represents direct costs to businesses in terms of time, legal risk and, of course, the chilling effect on recruitment.

The tribunal system itself needs to be looked at. Without significant new investment it is hard to see how the system will cope with this 15% increase. The result could be longer delays, greater costs and justice deferred for all parties. In an earlier group we heard about a case that is going to take more than two years to come before a tribunal. Yet the Government intend to bring these changes into force in 2026. On what basis? There is nothing in the impact assessment that explains why 2026 has been chosen or how the system will be ready by then. Businesses will need time to revise contracts, restructure probation processes and train managers on the new rules. What assessment has been made of whether 2026 is realistic, with all those things in mind? What engagement has been carried out with employers, particularly SMEs, about what implementation will require?

It is not unreasonable to ask the Government to explain how the timeline was determined and whether it is genuinely achievable, given the lack of clarity in both the policy detail and the supporting evidence. We all agree that employees deserve fair treatment, particularly in the vulnerable early stages of employment, but employers must also have a reasonable opportunity to assess performance, capability and suitability without the immediate threat of litigation.

We have established that there is no evidence for any of this clause. In fact, when the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, was arguing his point, he said that it is very difficult anyway for employees to take a case to an employment tribunal. The noble Lord, Lord Barber, as I just mentioned, said it is, in effect, a statistical irrelevance. If there is no evidence, it is too difficult and it is a statistical irrelevance, why are we bothering at all?

I want to raise a final point that others, particularly my noble friends Lady Neville-Rolfe and Lady Noakes, have referred to. It is not just about the policy itself; it is a more troubling concern. The policy will create unintended incentives, but for whom? It is not just about employers scaling back hiring overall but about who they stop hiring. If we remove the qualifying period for unfair dismissal and provide no workable probationary mechanism, we tilt the hiring incentives away from risk-taking, as we have heard. It will, in effect, stop employers taking a punt.

Right now, a small business owner might be willing to take that chance on someone with no formal qualifications, or from a non-traditional background, or re-entering the workforce after a time away. That chance exists because the employer has a short window to assess their suitability—and vice versa, of course—before facing the full weight of employment litigation risk. If that safety net is removed and exposure begins from day one and the probationary period lacks clarity or legal protection, that same employer will think twice. They will play it safe.

Noble Lords opposite should pay attention to those of us who have employed people. It is a simple fact. Who is going to suffer? It is not the already advantaged candidate with a polished CV. It is the young person with gaps in education, the career switcher with no references, the working parent returning after years out of the labour market, or the person coming back to work after a long period of illness. Noble Lords opposite should reread the speech given by my noble friend Lord Elliott, with his experience of the Jobs Foundation. He explained this much more eloquently than I just have. Those are the people who benefit from flexibility and second chances and who may now find those doors quietly closed.

This goes to the heart of social mobility and genuine workplace diversity. I would like to ask the Government a rhetorical question: have they considered the incentives this policy creates? If they have not—both common-sense experience of real working life in the private sector and, indeed, the RPC suggest that they have not—we risk designing a policy that sounds progressive but, in practice, reduces opportunity for the very groups that we should be helping the most. We need a decent impact assessment, and my amendment would allow for it.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. As there have been a number of questions about our intentions with these clauses, I think it would be helpful to clarify them and put them on the record.

Clause 23 introduces Schedule 3 and repeals Section 108 of the Employment Rights Act 1996, thereby removing the two-year qualifying period for protection against unfair dismissal. Schedule 3 further amends the 1996 Act, including the introduction of a statutory probationary period in legislation. Schedule 3 also removes the two-year qualifying period for the right to request written reasons for dismissal. Any employee who has been dismissed after the statutory probationary period will have the right to written reasons for dismissal within 14 days upon request.

The legislation will introduce a statutory probationary period that will maintain an employer’s ability to assess any new hires. Schedule 3 allows the duration of a statutory probationary period to be set in regulations by the Secretary of State following consultation. The Government’s preference, as we know, is for this probationary period to be nine months in length. Schedule 3 also creates the power to modify the test for whether dismissal during the probationary period is fair for reasons of performance or suitability for the role.

The Government’s intention is to use this power to set light-touch standards for fair dismissal during probation. The power will be limited to the following reasons for dismissal, which, under Section 98 of the Employment Rights Act 1996, qualify as potentially fair reasons: capability, conduct, illegality or some other substantial reason relating to the employee. The Government will consult on the light-touch standards and proceed to set out in regulations what specific reasons relate to the employee and when.

Schedule 3 amends the delegated power to set the maximum compensatory award for unfair dismissal so that a different maximum can be set for dismissals during the probationary period and when the light-touch standards apply. It is our intention to consult before the introduction of any new cap on awards.

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[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

The noble Baroness is absolutely right. She will know that I share her ambitions for the tech sector. The UK remains the number one country for venture capital investment, raising $16.2 billion in 2024—more than either Germany or France—and since last July we have secured £44 billion in AI investment. Strengthening employment rights and giving day-one protections can help support talented people to take the leap into a start-up company.

I turn to Amendment 104, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. Setting a statutory probationary period during which light-touch standards will apply is a crucial part of our plan to make work pay. I can reassure the noble Lord that setting out the detail in regulations is fundamental to fulfilling this commitment. It is not necessary to make this a requirement in legislation.

The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, asked a number of questions. He, the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, and others asked why the Government are doing this. The UK is an outlier compared to other OECD countries when it comes to the balance of risks and entitlements between the employer and the employee. We believe that it is an important principle that employees should have greater security at work. Our reforms will mean that around 9 million employees—31% of all employees —who have been working for their employer for less than two years will have greater protection against being unfairly dismissed.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I hate to interrupt the noble Baroness at this late hour, but that is just a repeat of what has been said before; it is not a tangible quantified reason for doing this. Yes, for a short period of time, they will have greater security in theory, but the downsides of this—they are in the Government’s own impact assessment—are really clear. The Government say that this will reduce the life chances of people who are riskier hires. It will cost business hundreds of millions of pounds. There is no quantification of that benefit against those downsides, and I am still not hearing that.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

I will talk about the impact assessments in more detail shortly, but the noble Lord will know that it is a lot easier to identify the costs in impact assessment than the benefits. We have worked with academics who are looking at this subject. I reassure the noble Lord that we have looked at this and are confident that the benefits in this particular case will outweigh the risks.

I will pick up the point made by other noble Lords about cultural fit and other reasons why an employer might want to dismiss somebody during their probationary period. Dismissal for “some other substantial reason” is a catch-all category designed to allow employers to terminate an employment contract where no other potentially fair reasons apply. There can be cases where dismissal is legitimate and reasonable; “some other substantial reason” dismissals depend on the facts and circumstances of the employment relationship. “Some other substantial reason” is broad, and case law supports personality clashes in workplace teams or a business client refusing to work with an employee being a potentially fair reason for dismissal. The Government do not believe that an employee not being a cultural fit within an organisation should be a fair dismissal per se. We would expect an employer to be able to dismiss someone fairly only if any cultural misfit was relevant in a reasonable manner to the employer’s business objectives and the needs of the workplace.

The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, mentioned employees with spent convictions. I gently point out to her that dismissing an employee solely for having spent convictions is currently unfair and potentially grounds for an unfair dismissal claim—

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

I never mentioned spent convictions; I referred merely to the risk of employers taking on ex-offenders. I cannot think of a point I could have made in relation to spent convictions. The issue is these categories of potential employees who a represent higher risk in terms of judgment to employers, and I was using former offenders as one example of that.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

I apologise if I misunderstood the noble Baroness’s point. I can only reaffirm the point I was making: with all these issues, there can be reasons for fair dismissal during the probationary period, and we have set out quite clearly what the grounds for that would be.

Amendment 107A was tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas. As always, he thinks outside the box and comes up with interesting ideas, including the idea of a probationary period here in your Lordships’ House, which I am sure we all have strong views about. Going back to the specifics of his proposal, the Government have expressed an initial preference for a nine-month statutory probationary period. We intend to consult with stakeholders and the wider public before committing to a duration, which will be set by the Secretary of State through secondary legislation after this consultation has taken place. Maintaining this flexibility allows the duration and calculation of the statutory probationary period to be adapted in light of future changes in employment practices.

Amendment 108, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, would also amend Schedule 3 to the Bill. It is of great importance to this Government to get the length of the statutory probationary period correct. The Government have already stated in Next Steps to Make Work Pay their preference for the statutory probationary period to be nine months in duration. However, this is subject to consultation, and I hope that this reassures the noble Lord, Lord de Clifford, on that matter.

On Amendment 334, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, while I recognise what the noble Lord is seeking to achieve with his amendment, I reassure him, and the noble Baroness, Lady Meyer, that the Government have no intention of removing the two-year qualifying period until the regulations setting out the statutory probationary period are in force. We will, of course, give businesses time to prepare, and we are engaging with them already. These provisions will not commence before autumn 2026, which will give time to prepare. I hope that this reassures the noble Lord, Lord Goddard.

I move on to address Amendments 103 and 123, from the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe and Lord Hunt, in respect of their mandates for further impact assessments. The Government have already produced a comprehensive set of impact assessments, published alongside Second Reading, and based on the best available evidence of the potential impact on businesses, employees and the wider economy. Our analysis includes an illustrative assessment of the impact on employment tribunal cases, which we intend to refine over time by working closely with the Ministry of Justice, His Majesty’s Courts & Tribunals Service, ACAS and wider stakeholders. I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Hendy for setting the record straight about the impact of tribunals, and the thorough ways in which they conduct their proceedings. Many cases settle in advance, and we want to encourage more cases to reach a settlement with proper advice and support. I am also grateful to my noble friend Lord Barber for putting the scale of the problem in perspective, with only 5,000 cases referred to ACAS in 2023-24.

We will publish an enactment impact assessment once the Bill receives Royal Assent, in line with the requirements of the Better Regulation Framework. This will account for ways in which the Bill has been amended in its passage through Parliament, to the extent that those changes significantly change the impact of the policy on the enforcement system. This impact assessment will then be published alongside the enacted legislation.

To follow up on the impact of this, we acknowledge that the policy is expected to benefit close to 9 million employees, driven by well-being benefits arising from increased job security for those with under two years of tenure. There will be costs to businesses, including familiarisation and compliance costs, from this change. However, businesses could benefit through improving their people management and hiring practices, which could deliver medium to long-term benefits, such as higher labour productivity. In addition, increasing employee well-being could increase worker productivity. These benefits will be tested further during consultation.

The Government have also pledged to conduct a consultation on unfair dismissal policy, to collect feedback from employers and employees. Specifically, the Government have outlined that we will consult on the length of the statutory probationary period, and the potential cap on compensatory awards for unfair dismissal occurring during the statutory probationary period. I can reassure the House that there is no need for the Bill to require the Government to undertake further assessment of the impact on tribunals before commencement. We will be updating our impact assessments in any case, alongside the consultation on implementing the various provisions in the Bill.

I turn to Amendment 113, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom. The Government are not proposing to expand the five potentially fair reasons for dismissal that have been a central part of employment law for decades. An employer’s decision to dismiss an employee in the early stages of their employment or otherwise will have to be underpinned by a fair dismissal reason, such as capability or conduct. It stands to reason that these would be the most likely dismissal reasons when employees fail their probation.

I am grateful to all noble Lords for tabling these amendments but, for the reasons set out, the Government cannot support them. I therefore ask that Amendment 103 be withdrawn.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Again, we are being promised a blizzard of consultations, but can the Minister give me any idea when those consultations will take place? Can we also have some assurance that all the employer organisations will be consulted on this occasion? From our conversations with many of them, they do not feel particularly consulted up to now.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

First, on the issue of consultation, I assure the noble Lord that there have been a considerable number of consultations, not only with the main employer organisations but in terms of working parties working on particular aspects of the Bill, and those will continue. That consultation will continue—and I have now forgotten his other question.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Will the Government consult with employer organisations?

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

Yes, I can confirm that that is the case.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

The Minister has not addressed the fact that there are already powers in existing legislation to modify the qualifying period. The Minister talks about going into consultation, but that consultation on the probationary period could start right now with the SI, and that element. I struggle to understand why we have to wait such a long time when, actually, the Government could get on with their policy a lot more quickly.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

That has reminded me that that was the other question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe—so I thank the noble Baroness for raising it.

As we have said before, we are working on an implementation plan, which we hope to share with noble Lords as soon as we can. It is in my interests as well as noble Lords’ interests that they see it sooner rather than later, but there is no point in sharing something that is not complete. Noble Lords will see that—and it will set out exactly what we are planning to do and where the consultations will fit in with all of it. I hope that when noble Lords see it, it will reassure them.

To go back to the particular question from the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, we see this as a wholesale package. It is right that it is introduced to employers as a package; it will have appropriate timescales in it. We do not want to do things on a piecemeal basis, we want to do them in the round. That is why we are attempting to address this in the way that we are proposing today.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

Unfortunately, that is our concern—that we do not know what the detail is, and we are being asked to pass a Bill without all that detail, as I said in my speech.

There was a more technical point that I wanted to raise with the Minister, if she wants to come back to me. I set out how having to cover an extra 9 million employees is going to lead to huge amounts of extra compliance costs. She emphasised the benefits for the workers, but she did not at all address the monumental amount of paperwork. My noble friend Lord Sharpe raised a similar point. As he explained, all managers in all companies are going to have to prepare for this and work out how they treat their employees from day one and what paperwork is required. I am not convinced that there is any understanding of that.

When we had similar consultations on the minimum wage, when I was in business, which the noble Lord, Lord Monks, mentioned, there was a great deal of detailed consultation very early on on how it would work. I said in another debate how I was consulted about whether we could put it on the payslips—and I explained that it would cost us £2 million, so it would cost the whole economy an awful lot just to put the minimum wage on the payslip. That sort of detail is incredibly important, if you are bringing in regulation that affects all employers and potentially benefits all employees.

I urge the Minister to think about these things and not say that it is going into the long grass and that we will get an impact assessment ex post, but think about how employers will actually manage this.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

I can assure the noble Baroness that not only have we thought about this but we are working very closely with the business sector to get this right. We understand that some of these things will take time. It takes time to change systems, and a lot of it is about changing computer systems for processing and so on. We are aware of this and, when the noble Baroness sees the implementation plan, it will reassure her that we have allowed space and time for it, as well as proper consultation with those who will be affected.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, it has been a long debate so I will try not to detain the Committee much longer. I thank the many noble Lords across the Committee who have contributed. It has been long because this is really important. I confess that I come out of the end of this debate feeling somewhat depressed. I still have not heard really why we are doing this, and what the real, tangible benefits are, to offset against the very real negative impacts, particularly on those who are looking for employment and are perhaps disadvantaged in one way or another: they have not worked before, they are young, they have a gap—we heard all the various examples. The Minister did not really address that point terribly clearly in her speech, and it is so important.

This may be, as the Government have regularly called it, a Bill for workers. However, as I said at Second Reading, it is not a Bill for people who want to work—the potential workers who were mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Elliott. He stole my Charlie Mayfield quote, but I will not worry about that. It is true that Denmark has much easier hire and fire, and he was using that as a paragon of virtue because it allows people who are harder to hire to get into employment, which is so important.

In the interests of being constructive, I hope the Minister understands the real concerns about those people and the impact the Bill is going to have on them, and the negative impacts this section of the Bill will have. I hope that she will be prepared to spend a bit of time with us between now and Report to try to find solutions to those negative impacts, to minimise the problems and downsides that they will cause. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Monks: I am not making this up, or crying wolf, as with the national minimum wage, as the noble Lord suggested. This is what the Government say will be the impact. I cannot emphasise that enough. It is not me saying that; the Government say this will be impact. If we can try to work together before Report, to try to find ways of knocking the edges off this and reducing the negative impacts, that would be very helpful. With that, I will not oppose Clause 23 standing part of the Bill.