Employment Rights Bill

Baroness Noakes Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 21st May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I have added my name to the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe, but I also support all the other amendments in this group. Both the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and my noble friend have already fairly comprehensively treated the issues that concern a number of us, so I will not repeat all those points.

I just underline three brief points. We are trying to look for a balance between the legitimate expectations of employees and employers, because we need those to work in harmony. At the end of the day—as my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe pointed out—employers will be producing the growth that the economy needs, so their hiring plans will be critical and anything that harms this balance will damage the economy.

From an employer perspective, anybody who has undertaken recruitment as an employer knows that most employers approach this extremely responsibly—it is not a cheap process to get the right people into the jobs—but we also know that, however diligent you are in screening, interviewing and assessment processes, you do not always get it right. You can usually test whether a person has technical skills, although sometimes you need to see them in practice before you know whether they really have them. The important area is whether an employee fits with an organisation. That is really difficult to tell until the person turns up and starts working. Do they share the same values as the rest of the workforce? Do they have ways of working that are just not compatible with the culture of the organisation? This is particularly important for small organisations: if you have one employee who does not fit in a very small organisation, that is a significant proportion of the workforce and can be very damaging to the business of a small business.

The last point that I underline is that this Bill will make it much more difficult for the difficult categories of people who want to find a job but cannot. There has been much talk about NEETs, and ex-offenders are another case. Why would any employer want to take on an ex-offender with day-one rights? We know some of them make excellent employees but quite a lot of them do not. They can become quite difficult to handle in the workplace. If employers fear that they will not be able to easily overcome mistakes in recruitment they simply will not hire, which will harm people who want to work.

[Baroness Verma (Con)]

My Lords, as an employer who has employed people over the past 40-odd years, I know that the difficulty for an SME—any small business such as my own—is the ability to manage all the bureaucracy that is entailed with it.

For businesses in the social care sector, for example, unfortunately you cannot really understand how good or bad a care worker will be until they have worked a little while in the organisation, even with the training. However, if we are to give the rights from day one, the difficulty will be that we will end up with a sector already very short of workers needing to hire more workers in case any are not suitable for the role. We would have to release them, knowing that they may then apply workers’ rights on day one without proper probation periods and take us to tribunal. It is a difficult sector.

There are many sectors like the care sector, and it is particularly challenging for small businesses in the wider sector of delivering something that is so important. If the care worker is not the right fit, it does not really matter how big or small the organisation is—that person is just not suitable for the role. We need to have the ability to dismiss the person without having to go through the bureaucracy of all the Government’s intentions in this part of the Bill. I therefore support my noble friend and the noble Lord on these amendments.

It is time to have a strong rethink about how we can come to a good middle ground, where employers are not fearful of employing. I have been talking to a lot of SMEs over the past few months, and the difficulty that noble Lords across the House will have found, when they have talked to businesses in their own communities, is the worry around what will happen when the legislation in this Bill is enforced.

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[Lord Hendy (Lab)]

My Lords, I get the impression that there is a bit of a misunderstanding around the nature of employment tribunals. I spent the first half of a long career at the Bar doing employment tribunal cases, many of them unfair dismissal cases. In fact, the first case I ever did—pro bono, by the way—was an unfair dismissal case in 1972, under what was then the very new unfair dismissal legislation. Unfair dismissal cases are difficult for employees to win. Most cases that go to a full hearing result in the employer being vindicated.

I want to make two points. The first is that employment tribunals now have robust procedures for weeding out vexatious cases; such cases never go to a full hearing. Secondly, I remind your Lordships of the law on unfair dismissal in Section 98 of the Employment Rights Act 1996. The test is in two parts. First, the employer must demonstrate that the reason for the dismissal is capability, qualifications, conduct or redundancy or the fact that the employment is in breach of some enactment. Once the employer has shown that that is the reason, the test for the tribunal—I shall read it out—is whether the dismissal is fair, which,

“depends on whether in the circumstances (including the size and administrative resources of the employer’s undertaking) the employer acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the employee”.

So all the factors that one would expect to have to be taken into consideration are taken into consideration.

The tribunal then has to determine that,

“in accordance with equity and the substantial merits of the case”.

The Court of Appeal has added yet another burden. When the tribunal decides whether the employer acted reasonably or unreasonably, it is not about what it considers was reasonable or unreasonable; it is about whether it considers that the dismissal fell within the band of responses of reasonable employers. It is at two stages removed. It is not like an ordinary negligence case where the court decides whether an employer was reasonable or not reasonable in putting a guard on the machine. It must decide. Even if it thinks that the decision was unreasonable, if it finds that, nevertheless, reasonable employers would say that it might be possible that the reason was fair, that would be legitimate.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

The noble Lord referred to the likelihood of cases succeeding if they got as far as the tribunal. Does he accept that the vast majority of cases that are initiated never get as far as a tribunal because there is a huge incentive in the system for employers to settle? The costs of taking a case right the way through are huge—not just in the monetary cost of employing clever employment lawyers but, in particular, in the diversion of management effort within the organisation. I have seen this in large organisations, where swathes of the management team can be tied up for long periods of time. Employers cannot afford that in the broadest sense. If you put that in the context of smaller organisations, they absolutely cannot cope with it.

Whatever happens at the tribunal and whatever the law says, the mere initiation of an action nearly always results in an economic decision, made by the employer, to settle. That is one of the most difficult aspects and is why extending that into the early period of employment causes so many worries for employers.

[Lord Hendy (Lab)]

I absolutely agree that most cases never get to a full hearing; only a tiny minority ever do. The noble Baroness is right that many cases settle, of course. Many are conciliated, because there is now compulsory conciliation by ACAS, but many are withdrawn by the employee. You have to visualise it, as I am sure the noble Baroness does: most employees bringing an unfair dismissal claim are completely unrepresented. They are on their own, so all the expense, research and preparation that have to be done must be done by them personally. That is a huge disincentive. Many claims—tens of thousands of them—are simply not brought because it is not worth the employees’ while to do it.

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[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

I will talk about the impact assessments in more detail shortly, but the noble Lord will know that it is a lot easier to identify the costs in impact assessment than the benefits. We have worked with academics who are looking at this subject. I reassure the noble Lord that we have looked at this and are confident that the benefits in this particular case will outweigh the risks.

I will pick up the point made by other noble Lords about cultural fit and other reasons why an employer might want to dismiss somebody during their probationary period. Dismissal for “some other substantial reason” is a catch-all category designed to allow employers to terminate an employment contract where no other potentially fair reasons apply. There can be cases where dismissal is legitimate and reasonable; “some other substantial reason” dismissals depend on the facts and circumstances of the employment relationship. “Some other substantial reason” is broad, and case law supports personality clashes in workplace teams or a business client refusing to work with an employee being a potentially fair reason for dismissal. The Government do not believe that an employee not being a cultural fit within an organisation should be a fair dismissal per se. We would expect an employer to be able to dismiss someone fairly only if any cultural misfit was relevant in a reasonable manner to the employer’s business objectives and the needs of the workplace.

The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, mentioned employees with spent convictions. I gently point out to her that dismissing an employee solely for having spent convictions is currently unfair and potentially grounds for an unfair dismissal claim—

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

I never mentioned spent convictions; I referred merely to the risk of employers taking on ex-offenders. I cannot think of a point I could have made in relation to spent convictions. The issue is these categories of potential employees who a represent higher risk in terms of judgment to employers, and I was using former offenders as one example of that.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

I apologise if I misunderstood the noble Baroness’s point. I can only reaffirm the point I was making: with all these issues, there can be reasons for fair dismissal during the probationary period, and we have set out quite clearly what the grounds for that would be.

Amendment 107A was tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas. As always, he thinks outside the box and comes up with interesting ideas, including the idea of a probationary period here in your Lordships’ House, which I am sure we all have strong views about. Going back to the specifics of his proposal, the Government have expressed an initial preference for a nine-month statutory probationary period. We intend to consult with stakeholders and the wider public before committing to a duration, which will be set by the Secretary of State through secondary legislation after this consultation has taken place. Maintaining this flexibility allows the duration and calculation of the statutory probationary period to be adapted in light of future changes in employment practices.

Amendment 108, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, would also amend Schedule 3 to the Bill. It is of great importance to this Government to get the length of the statutory probationary period correct. The Government have already stated in Next Steps to Make Work Pay their preference for the statutory probationary period to be nine months in duration. However, this is subject to consultation, and I hope that this reassures the noble Lord, Lord de Clifford, on that matter.

On Amendment 334, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, while I recognise what the noble Lord is seeking to achieve with his amendment, I reassure him, and the noble Baroness, Lady Meyer, that the Government have no intention of removing the two-year qualifying period until the regulations setting out the statutory probationary period are in force. We will, of course, give businesses time to prepare, and we are engaging with them already. These provisions will not commence before autumn 2026, which will give time to prepare. I hope that this reassures the noble Lord, Lord Goddard.

I move on to address Amendments 103 and 123, from the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe and Lord Hunt, in respect of their mandates for further impact assessments. The Government have already produced a comprehensive set of impact assessments, published alongside Second Reading, and based on the best available evidence of the potential impact on businesses, employees and the wider economy. Our analysis includes an illustrative assessment of the impact on employment tribunal cases, which we intend to refine over time by working closely with the Ministry of Justice, His Majesty’s Courts & Tribunals Service, ACAS and wider stakeholders. I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Hendy for setting the record straight about the impact of tribunals, and the thorough ways in which they conduct their proceedings. Many cases settle in advance, and we want to encourage more cases to reach a settlement with proper advice and support. I am also grateful to my noble friend Lord Barber for putting the scale of the problem in perspective, with only 5,000 cases referred to ACAS in 2023-24.

We will publish an enactment impact assessment once the Bill receives Royal Assent, in line with the requirements of the Better Regulation Framework. This will account for ways in which the Bill has been amended in its passage through Parliament, to the extent that those changes significantly change the impact of the policy on the enforcement system. This impact assessment will then be published alongside the enacted legislation.

To follow up on the impact of this, we acknowledge that the policy is expected to benefit close to 9 million employees, driven by well-being benefits arising from increased job security for those with under two years of tenure. There will be costs to businesses, including familiarisation and compliance costs, from this change. However, businesses could benefit through improving their people management and hiring practices, which could deliver medium to long-term benefits, such as higher labour productivity. In addition, increasing employee well-being could increase worker productivity. These benefits will be tested further during consultation.

The Government have also pledged to conduct a consultation on unfair dismissal policy, to collect feedback from employers and employees. Specifically, the Government have outlined that we will consult on the length of the statutory probationary period, and the potential cap on compensatory awards for unfair dismissal occurring during the statutory probationary period. I can reassure the House that there is no need for the Bill to require the Government to undertake further assessment of the impact on tribunals before commencement. We will be updating our impact assessments in any case, alongside the consultation on implementing the various provisions in the Bill.

I turn to Amendment 113, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom. The Government are not proposing to expand the five potentially fair reasons for dismissal that have been a central part of employment law for decades. An employer’s decision to dismiss an employee in the early stages of their employment or otherwise will have to be underpinned by a fair dismissal reason, such as capability or conduct. It stands to reason that these would be the most likely dismissal reasons when employees fail their probation.

I am grateful to all noble Lords for tabling these amendments but, for the reasons set out, the Government cannot support them. I therefore ask that Amendment 103 be withdrawn.