Employment Rights Bill

(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)

Committee stage
Tuesday 10th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business and Trade and Department for Science, Information and Technology (Baroness Jones of Whitchurch) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, for posing arguments against Clause 60 standing part of the Bill.

This clause seeks to repeal Section 15 of the Trade Union Act 2016 by amending the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 to remove Section 116B. Section 15 required trade unions to pay public sector employers where they administer payroll deductions for trade union subscriptions, known as check-off. It further required that this service be made available only where workers have the option to pay their union subscriptions by other means.

The Trade Union (Deduction of Union Subscriptions from Wages in the Public Sector) Regulations 2024 were introduced as a cost-saving measure, with estimated annual savings of £1.6 million, totalling £12 million over the following 10 years. However, as the impact assessment acknowledged, the regulations would bring a cumulative cost of £17 million to public sector employers and trade unions over that period. This is far higher than the estimated cost savings.

The current system places bureaucratic processes on both trade unions and public sector employers that can be clearly simplified to support productive trade union relations. There should be no costs to employers associated with withdrawing the check-off regulations. Employers will have the choice to continue with or amend any agreed arrangements regarding the deduction of union subscriptions from their employees’ wages, in discussion with their recognised trade unions.

We feel that there is a need to simplify this process, which is what our proposals intend to do. While I thank the noble Lord for this very short debate, I urge him to support this clause, for the reasons I have set out.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank the Minister for her explanation, although I am not particularly persuaded.

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[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Jackson of Peterborough and Lord Sharpe of Epsom, for their amendments relating to the provision of facilities to trade union officials and representatives, and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Wirral, for speaking to them. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, for initiating debate on Clause 62, to which I will also speak.

In Amendments 224 to 233, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, he seeks to amend Clause 61 to maintain, as he argues, a reasonable balance of obligations and responsibilities between employers and employees. Like the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, I take the amendments at face value: they are probing and not wrecking, and the noble Lord is trying to understand the appropriate balance. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, that the clause already seeks a reasonable balance of obligations and responsibilities between employers and employee representatives. The paid time off that trade union representatives receive is often insufficient to fulfil all their trade union duties. Many union representatives use significant amounts of their own time to support workplace relations. Indeed, in some sectors, in some companies, in some firms, their trade union activity is carried out very much on a voluntary basis rather than it being about people having full-time release and doing nothing towards the organisation apart from conducting trade union duties.

The Government want to rebalance obligations and responsibilities by ensuring that union workplace representatives are able to take sufficient paid facility time and have sufficient access to facilities to enable them to fulfil their union representative duties. While the clause grants trade union representatives the right to facility time and accommodation and other facilities from their employers, it does so by having regard to a relevant code of practice issued by ACAS. The ACAS guidance will help employers to implement these measures and will be updated in partnership and through consultation with both employers and trade unions. It will therefore help to ensure that a balance of obligations and responsibilities is secured, and ACAS is a very appropriate and worthy organisation to undertake that role.

Greater facility time will lead to improved work representation and better industrial relations by giving trade unions and workplace representatives the freedom to organise, represent and negotiate on behalf of their workers. This will result in more mature industrial relations and increased co-operation between employers and unionised workers, leading to beneficial outcomes for businesses and the economy. This is a framework to promote more co-operation and understanding at work, not more scope for conflict.

Amendments 234 to 236 concerning Clause 62, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, require that a performance condition must be met before facility time for equality representatives is provided by public sector employers. This would make the provision of facility time contingent on the employer already meeting certain performance standards, although the amendment is not specific about what those standards are.

We fully recognise the importance of strong public sector performance and accountability. However, linking facility time for equality representatives to performance conditions is both disproportionate and counterproductive, as it would create a barrier to improvement and creating stronger industrial relations. These amendments would require the Secretary of State to certify that a public sector employer is meeting relevant statutory performance standards before facility time can be granted. Together, they would pose heavy administrative burdens on both employers, who would need to apply and provide evidence, and central government, which would have to assess compliance for every employer.

I hesitate in suggesting this, but in speaking to other amendments on the Bill in Committee, those on the Benches opposite have been very quick to point out the administrative burdens that they assume are being placed on employers across all sectors by various measures in the Bill. The kind of burdens that this amendment would place on the public sector would not be tolerated by them on the private sector. More fundamentally, they would risk delaying facility time precisely for those organisations most in need of support and undermine the very purpose of equality representatives. Furthermore, a Secretary of State-led certification process would create legal uncertainty and potential disputes. It could also harm industrial relations in the public sector.

Finally, I turn to the opposition of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, to Clause 62. This clause inserts new Section 168B into the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 and requires that an employer must permit an employee who is

“a member of an independent trade union recognised by the employer, and an equality representative of the trade union, to take time off during the employee’s working hours”

for specified purposes. However, this applies only if

“the trade union has given the employer notice in writing that the employee is an equality representative of the union”,

or will be undergoing or has completed training to become an equality representative. Sufficient training is that which is sufficient for fulfilling the purposes of an equality representative role, having regard to a relevant code of practice issued by ACAS or the Secretary of State.

Clause 62 also requires that the employer must permit the employee to take paid time off during working hours to undergo training relevant to their role as an equality representative and, where requested, provide the employee with accommodation and other facilities to enable them to fulfil their role, having regard to the relevant code of practice issued by ACAS. Should an employer fail to permit the employee to take time off or to provide the employee with facilities as required, the employee may present a complaint to an employment tribunal, at which it will be for the employer to show that the amount of time off that the employee proposed was not reasonable. So far on those grounds, it is as for any other recognised rep status.

Trade unions have long fought for equality: from Grunwick to the Bristol bus boycott, to campaigning on Section 28, to recently standing up for retail workers—mostly female—who have to cope with violence in the workplace, particularly from customers. It is important to recognise, as, it is fair to say, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, did in her remarks, that equality reps have a key role in raising awareness and promoting equal rights for members, as well as in developing collective policies and practices that enable organisations to realise all the benefits of being an equal opportunities employer.

The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, gave some specific examples. I join with the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Wirral, in saying that the cases the noble Baroness recounted, of Nurses Jennifer and Peggie, were horrific experiences you would not want to see anyone encounter. However, I am unsure that using that single brush to tar the feathers of the whole equality reps proposal is proportionate. There may be some correlation, but I am not sure that there is causation.

Clause 62 recognises a trade union equality representative as a person appointed or elected in accordance with the trade union rules, in a manner consistent with the Equality Act 2010. I contend that equality reps have a key role to play in raising awareness and promoting equal rights for all members, as well as in developing collective policies and practices that will enable organisations to realise all the benefits of being an equal opportunities employer. It is pure speculation but, had equality reps been in place in local authorities in earlier decades, and had there been more awareness of inequality in women’s pay, those local authorities facing significant equal pay claims today might not be facing them. Who can say?

I am not sure how rhetorical the questions were from the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, on the sort of equality. For the purpose of the clause, it is defined in the Equality Act 2010.

Turning to Amendment 237—

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, as the Minister asked a direct question, I might as well answer it now. I gave individual examples. I am sorry if the personalised examples made it sound as though they are one-off cases. I was simply trying to bring alive trends, not say, “Nurse Peggie”. There are loads of them, but I only had 10 minutes. They are trends, but I have brought them alive, I hope.

I ask the Minister to reflect on two things. As the Equality Act 2010 defines equality, I used the example that many trade unions are saying that they will refuse to acknowledge the Supreme Court clarification of what equality means under that very Act. They are going to defy it in the name of equality—trans inclusion and so on. How do you square that circle?

Secondly, the Minister read out the points about training. In part, I was challenging whether the Government care what the content of that training is. My argument was that the training being used in the name of equality is divisive and may not be helpful in the workplace, and is in fact likely to turn worker against worker, rather than the reverse. Do the Government consider any of that, or do they just hand it over to the reps?

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I will try to address those points now. Of course we care whether reps, when undertaking any role—whether it is health and safety, learning, or workplace negotiation—comply with the law and are trained in a suitable manner. That does not mean we should necessarily be scrutinising every single thing they do, because one would not expect that in the normal way of things.

I certainly did not mean to belittle the examples the noble Baroness gave, and I am sure they are not the only ones. But at the same time, one cannot make the generalisation that this is endemic across all workplaces where there is union representation. I will also speculate —as we are sort of speculating here—that the engagement and involvement of equality reps might prevent the kind of activity the noble Baroness outlined in the case of Nurses Sandie Peggie and Jennifer. That is counterfactual speculation; one cannot say either way, but it is worth positing if we are serious about discussing this.

I should add, without wanting to stray too far from my brief and, indeed, land myself in some kind of legal hot water, that the Government’s expectation is that all organisations will comply with equalities law in every manner while carrying out their duties. Whatever equality law clearly specifies, we expect all organisations, employers and trade unions to follow that.

[Baroness Verma (Con)]

May I just ask the Minister a very small question? In business, we already comply with the Equality Act. Most businesses do it because it is mandated, but we would do it anyway because it is a good thing to do. Reflecting on the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, my only concern is the cultural sensitivities that may arise from equality reps taking into account, or not taking into account, some communities’ internal machinations regarding how they see certain equality roles.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

For what it is worth, my experience of working in businesses is that most employers, large or small, understand the importance to the nuts and bolts of economic growth and productivity of having harmonious workforces and being respectful employers who listen to the needs of their workforces, however they manifest themselves.

Again—a hypothesis. I think I understand what the noble Baroness is getting at. In a workforce that largely comes from a particular BME community, but that has a management not of that community, the presence of an equality rep from the majority community in the workforce who can make representations concerning sensitivities around religious observance, modes of dress, and modes of communication, could be to the good for that workplace in creating a greater understanding between the management and the workforce. One is only speculating here.

Before the noble Baroness stands up again, as I sense she might, I will say that equality reps are a new idea. They already exist in voluntary organisations, but the Government think that it would be good for workplaces to have more of them in place and that they would promote more harmonious and productive workforces. I observe that having health and safety reps has led to better adherence to health and safety laws and regulations, with fewer issues with health and safety misdemeanours, accidents and the like in workplaces. Similarly, union learning reps have been a fantastic innovation in promoting learning and skills in different workplaces. The notion of promoting equality and cultural sensitivities in different workplaces, as the noble Baroness put it, is a noble aim.

[Baroness Verma (Con)]

I thank the Minister, but I think he is going to tie himself in knots on this one, because there are challenges that will not be rightly represented. To indulge the Minister, maybe I could have an offline conversation with him to explain where I am coming from.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I am very happy with that and I apologise if I have misunderstood the point that the noble Baroness was trying to make. This has been a fascinating debate but, in the interests of time, I want us to make progress and finish.

Amendment 237 was tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom. The Government resist this amendment, which unnecessarily asks the Government to conduct a sectoral cost assessment of trade union facility time. We strongly dispute the notion that facility time represents a significant cost to employers. We have already conducted an impact assessment that covers the measures in the Bill. This assessment noted that the cost of facility time is not likely to be significant for particular employers. Instead, it could benefit business performance in the form of increased worker training and support greater worker retention through a reduction in dismissals and voluntary exits.

It is worth noting that the estimated percentage of public sector pay bills spent on facility time in the first year of reporting regulations that were enforced in 2017-18 was 0.07%, and that, for the 2023-24 reporting year, the figure was 0.06%. That suggests a minimal impact of facility time in the public sector. Before I turn to Amendment 333, it is worth saying that we expect further savings from the Exchequer resulting from more positive industrial relations, which come about through greater facility time. For instance, we expect enhanced facility time to result in a reduction in the number of disputes going to an employment tribunal. This again makes the point that more harmonious workforces are more productive workforces.

Amendment 333 was also tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom. Again, the Government strongly dispute the notion that facility time represents a significant cost to employers and we have already conducted an impact assessment covering the measures in the Bill. The amendment is therefore not necessary and would simply delay the implementation of this clause and the benefits that equality representatives would bring.

I therefore ask the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, to withdraw Amendment 224 and I hope that noble Lords agree that Clause 62 has a rightful place in the Bill.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I am happy to withdraw my amendment.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I join the general thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Hendy. I thought it was a most interesting introduction and I learned a great deal. I particularly liked the phrase “constitutional benediction”, which I am planning to nick—although not in this context, because I rise to join the Minister and express my clear and firm opposition to the proposed new clause after Clause 64. It seeks to enshrine in statute a so-called positive right to strike even in breach of contract, as opposed—if I follow the noble Lord’s arguments correctly—to the freedom to strike. It strikes me as somewhat semantic in terms of the practical outcome, which I suspect is an argument we will hear again.

Let us be absolutely frank about what the amendment would entail. It would insert into the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 a wholly unprecedented and therefore dangerously broad provision that every worker shall have the right to take industrial action, whether or not it is in breach of any contract. It would not be subject to employer agreement or tethered to lawful procedures but would be an absolute statutory right to break contract terms and withdraw labour.

Industrial action, particularly strike action, is obviously a serious matter, and I think everybody would agree on that. It affects not only the employer but the public, the economy and, critically, the most vulnerable in society, who rely on public services. That is why we believe our existing legal framework strikes a careful balance. It protects the right to strike but does so within clear procedures and obligations: balloting requirements, notice periods and protections against unlawful disruption. This amendment would ride roughshod over all that.

What does it mean to have a right to breach your contract, regardless of process or proportionality? Surely, that is not a right; that is just carte blanche. This provision would displace the carefully constructed framework that governs how industrial action can be taken lawfully and responsibly. It would empower disruption without accountability. The purpose of employment law is not to tilt the playing field in one direction or another but to ensure that fairness, order and mutual obligations between employers and workers are respected. The right to withdraw labour must remain conditional on lawful procedures and not granted in the abstract, regardless of impact or legality.

Moreover, the proposed amendment would likely bring the UK into direct conflict with established contract law and create endless legal uncertainty. If workers are told that they have a statutory right to strike, even in breach of a contract, what does that mean for essential services, public safety, or the ability of schools, hospitals and transport systems to function with any consistency?

I do not think we should be mistaken. This amendment is not some minor clarification; it is a fundamental rewrite of the basis of workplace relations. It would undermine the principle that contracts entered into freely carry obligations and it would sweep away the balance between rights and responsibilities. I also have to ask: once a principle of contract breaking is established, how long before that is used as precedent in other contractual disputes?

Nobody denies that workers must be able to organise, speak up, bargain collectively and act where necessary. That is already protected in the legal framework. This amendment would take a sledgehammer to that balance. It would replace legal clarity, we believe, with legal radicalism, and accountability with absolutism. For those reasons, I urge the Government to reject the amendment.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Hendy for tabling Amendment 238, which would establish a broad statutory right to strike. I thank him also for our constructive and amicable meeting a few days ago and for his impressive tour of international conventions this evening. I have to say to him that anything I subsequently say does not mean that I do not take our international obligations seriously. In fact, in this increasingly uncertain world, we have more of an obligation to work collaboratively across countries. I think there is a lot to be gained from countries if we do that, not only on these sorts of issues but obviously on other issues of social justice as well.

I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox and Lady Jones, for adding to this short debate and the noble Lord, Lord Goddard. He raised some of the issues around prisons. I will be addressing those in the next group of amendments, but the point is well made that we certainly have to look after and defend our prison officers and recognise the service that they do for us.

The Government recognise the intention to reinforce protections for industrial action but it is important to emphasise that the right to strike is already protected under UK law, as set out in Sections 219 and 244 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, provided clear conditions are met. Introducing a specific codified right to strike would cut across the uncodified nature of the UK constitution and lead to a far-reaching and undefined statutory right that risks legal uncertainty and conflict with long-established frameworks that carefully balance the rights of unions and employers.

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[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

My Lords, I will quickly follow and agree with my noble friends Lady Coffey and Lord Jackson of Peterborough in their speaking against the amendments in this group. We feel that these amendments collectively represent a dangerous and retrograde step that would just take us back to the industrial chaos of the 1970s.

Such amendments would fundamentally undermine the carefully balanced framework of industrial relations that has served this country well for, now, over 30 years. I suppose the conventions of the House require me to address each amendment in turn, starting with Amendment 239. As the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, described, this would remove Section 223 of the 1992 Act, which currently renders unlawful any industrial action taken in response to dismissals for unofficial action.

When workers engage in unofficial action—that is, action not sanctioned by their trade union and without proper balloting procedures—they are essentially taking the law into their own hands, so employers must retain the right to dismiss workers who breach their contracts in this manner. To permit official industrial action in response to such lawful dismissals would create a vicious circle where lawlessness begets more lawlessness. It would effectively immunise unofficial action from any meaningful consequences, and encourage workers to bypass the proper, democratic procedures that unions themselves have surely fought hard to establish.

Amendment 240 is perhaps the most pernicious of all these proposals. It would restore secondary action, the ability of workers not just to strike against their employer over their conditions, but to support disputes elsewhere. We banned secondary action for compelling reasons. It allows disputes to spread like wildfire across the economy, dragging innocent third parties into conflicts that have nothing to do with their industrial relationships. A dispute between workers and one employer could paralyse entire supply chains, disrupting businesses that have committed no wrong and harming workers who have no stake in the original dispute.

The amendment would also remove the sensible restrictions on picketing, allowing pickets to target any workplace, rather than just their own. This opens the door to flying pickets and the mass intimidation tactics that we witnessed in the darkest days of industrial conflict. When pickets can descend on workplaces with which they have no employment relationship, the result is not legitimate industrial pressure but mob rule. Furthermore, by changing the definition of trade disputes from those “wholly or mainly” relating to employment matters to those merely “connected with” such matters, this amendment would politicise industrial action. Strikes could be called on the flimsiest of pretexts, with only the most tenuous connection to genuine workplace issues. This is a recipe for politically motivated disruption that serves no legitimate industrial relations purpose.

Amendment 241 would restore the right to strike for union recognition. We have established statutory procedures for union recognition that are fair, democratic and effective. These procedures protect workers’ rights to choose whether they wish to be represented by a union, without the coercion that inevitably accompanies strike action. When recognition can be achieved through industrial action, the process becomes tainted by intimidation, rather than informed by genuine worker preference. No worker should ever face the choice between supporting their family and supporting union recognition demands.

Amendment 242 would remove the requirement for unions to provide employers with notice of strike ballots. This seemingly technical change would also have profound practical consequences. Employers need advance notice to make contingency arrangements, to protect vulnerable service users and to engage in meaningful dialogue that might resolve disputes before they escalate. In essential services—our hospitals, schools and transport networks—such notice is crucial for public safety. To remove this requirement would be to abandon the vital principle that industrial action should and must be a last resort rather than a first response.

Amendment 243 would eliminate the requirement for separate workplace ballots, allowing unions to aggregate completely different workplaces and employment relationships into single ballots. This strikes at the heart of democratic participation. Workers in one workplace may face entirely different conditions and concerns from those in another. They should not be bound by the votes of workers with whom they share nothing but a common union membership. Workplace-specific ballots ensure that industrial action has genuine support from those who will participate in it, rather than being imposed by a union hierarchy pursuing its own agenda.

Taken together, these amendments would create a perfect storm of industrial instability. They would restore the legal framework that gave us the winter of discontent, when rubbish piled up in our streets, bodies went unburied and hospital patients were turned away by striking workers. They would empower union leaders to spread disputes across entire industries, to bypass democratic procedures and to hold essential services hostage to political demands. We must not forget the lessons of history. The industrial relations reforms of the 1980s and 1990s did not destroy trade unionism; they civilised it. They required unions to be accountable to their members and responsive to legitimate concerns while preventing the abuse of industrial power.

The noble Lord, Lord Hendy, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb and Lady O’Grady of Upper Holloway, would have us believe that they simply want to restore workers’ rights. But rights without responsibilities are merely privileges, and privileges being exercised without regard for their impact on others quickly becomes tyranny. The right to strike is not an absolute right; it is a powerful tool that must be used judiciously and with proper safeguards.

Moreover, these amendments would do nothing to address the real challenges that face working people today. They would not raise a single wage, improve a single workplace or create a single job. Instead, as my noble friends pointed out, they would create uncertainty, discourage investment and ultimately harm the very workers that they purport to be helping. Businesses need stability and predictability to grow and prosper. Industrial relations law that encourages conflict and chaos will drive investment elsewhere, taking jobs and opportunities with it.

I urge this Committee to reject these amendments. They represent not progress but regression, not liberation but license, and not workers’ rights but workers’ wrongs. We must maintain the balanced approach that has served our economy and our society so well. Let us resist the siren call of those who would drag us back to an era of industrial warfare that all of us hoped that we would never see again. The choice before us is clear. We can preserve a system that protects workers’ legitimate rights while maintaining economic stability and social peace, or we can return to those bad old days of secondary picketing, political strikes and industrial anarchy. I think and I hope that I know which path this Committee would choose.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

I thank my noble friend Lord Hendy for his amendments on the right to strike and for raising the issue of prisoner officers’ right to strike, which was strongly debated in the other place.

I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, has taken such a strident approach to the issues which my noble friends have raised. Although we do not necessarily agree with everything that my noble friend has put forward, I would say equally that we distance ourselves from the tone and attitude that has been presented by the other side this evening.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow my noble friends Lady Coffey and Lord Moynihan, and the noble Lords, Lord Goddard and Lord Hutton. I will come back to their amendments shortly.

I will speak to Amendments 245, 251B and the question of whether Clause 68 should stand part, which is tabled in my name. On the clause stand part, this clause represents a dangerous step backwards. The noble Lord, Lord Goddard, objected to it in the sense that he thought it might introduce a lack of clarity. But the fact is that the clause itself is a step backwards in transparency and democratic accountability that this Committee must not allow to pass unchallenged.

The provisions that Clause 68 seeks to remove, notably subsections (2B) to (2D) of Section 229, are not bureaucratic obstacles but fundamental pillars of informed democratic participation. They require that voting papers should include a summary of the dispute, specify the types of industrial action proposed and indicate when such action is expected to take place. These are not unreasonable burdens. They are the basic information any voter needs to make an informed decision.

Democracy thrives on transparency, not opacity. When we ask working people to vote on whether to take industrial action—a decision that may affect their employment, their families’ livelihoods and their future prospects—surely they are owed the courtesy of clear, comprehensive information about what they might be voting for.

Consider the absurdity of what this clause actually proposes. It is a ballot paper that asks, “Are you prepared to take part in industrial action short of a strike?” without specifying whether this means a work-to-rule, an overtime ban, a refusal to cover additional duties or any combination of actions. How can any reasonable person make an informed choice without knowing what they are agreeing to participate in?

The Government may well argue that these requirements impose administrative burdens on the trade unions, which is an argument we have heard on a couple of groups tonight. But since when did we consider informing voters to be an administrative burden rather than a democratic duty? We would not accept a general election ballot that failed to specify what office candidates were seeking or what their party stood for, so why should we accept industrial action ballots with less information?

Furthermore, these information requirements serve to protect union members themselves. Clear information helps ensure that workers understand not just what they are voting for but the potential consequences of their actions. This protects both their interests and those of their unions by reducing the likelihood of disputes over the course, scope or nature of mandated action.

Turning to Amendment 245, I agree with the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, and the noble Lord, Lord Goddard. I will speak to this amendment, although I must emphasise that my primary concern is not with the amendment itself but the Government’s fundamentally flawed approach to this critical issue. To be absolutely clear, the 50% turnout threshold for industrial action ballots should be maintained. This threshold exists for the very good reason that it ensures that strikes and other industrial actions have genuine democratic legitimacy, as the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, pointed out, and that they represent the will of a substantial portion of union membership and not merely an activist minority.

If the Government are determined to weaken these democratic protections, and regrettably it appears that they are, they must not compound this error by hiding behind secondary legislation. Businesses across this nation deserve better. They need to know the regulatory framework within which they will operate—a theme to which we have returned a number of times through the Bill. They cannot plan for investment, assess risk or make employment decisions when fundamental aspects of industrial relations law are left hanging in regulatory limbo. The Government’s approach creates precisely the uncertainty that undermines economic confidence and job creation.

I urge the Government to reconsider entirely and maintain the 50% threshold to provide the certainty that businesses need and the democratic legitimacy that industrial action requires. If the Government insist that they are going to lower the threshold, which we think will be disastrous, it should be in the Bill, so that we can scrutinise it fully, which is what my amendment would ensure. As my noble friend Lord Moynihan pointed out, a 20% threshold could lead to only 10% of a workforce supporting strike action. The House deserves the opportunity to examine and debate such fundamental changes properly and not have them smuggled through in statutory instruments with minimal parliamentary oversight.

I will speak very briefly to Amendment 251A, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hutton. I could not agree with him more. It would be a very regrettable error if the Bill were to inadvertently introduce an unintended consequence of potentially swingeing fines for airlines, for reasons that are not really any fault of their own. It is to be supported, and I hope he will return to the theme.

My Amendment 251B proposes a modest but vital extension, from 10 to 14 days, of the notice period required before industrial action can commence in the railway sector, for slightly different reasons. This is not an attempt to restrict workers’ rights but rather a recognition of the unique role that our railway system plays in the economic and social fabric of the nation. The railway network is not just another industry. As my noble friend Lady Coffey pointed out, it is the circulatory system of the economy and it moves millions of passengers and vast quantities of freight every single day. When railway services are disrupted, the effects cascade through every sector of society, from healthcare workers unable to reach hospitals to students missing examinations and businesses losing millions in productivity. The current 10-day notice period that is proposed is simply insufficient for the complexity of railway operations. I could go on, but I think I have said enough on the subject.

Four additional days may seem modest, but, in the context of the operations of the railway and airlines, it represents the difference between chaos and managed disruption. It allows time for proper contingency planning, for negotiations to continue and for the travelling public to make alternative arrangements. With that, I shall wind up, but I hope the Government are paying attention and will at least listen to these carefully considered amendments.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Goddard of Stockport, and my noble friends Lord Hutton of Furness and Lord Hendy for tabling amendments on the subject of industrial action ballot mandates, thresholds and notice. Despite the late hour, I recognise that there is significant interest here. I will try to do justice to all those amendments and to the opposition to certain clauses standing part of the Bill.

Before I go into the detail, I want to make it clear that a lot of what we are discussing relates to the repeal of the great majority of the Trade Union Act 2016, which was a clear manifesto commitment for this Government. I think it is worth framing why that is the context. This does, in a way, speak to a lot of what the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, mentioned. Far from supporting the economy, the strike legislation in the 2016 Act that we inherited from the then Opposition did not actually prevent strikes. In 2022, we lost more days to strikes than France. In 2023 and 2024, NHS strikes alone cost the taxpayer £1.7 billion.

[Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)]

The noble Lord and others keep referring to the 2016 Act, but the amendments that we have been addressing in this section are all amendments to the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

With respect, there are definitely elements in the group of amendments we are talking about that relate to the 2016 Act. I was simply setting out the context for my remarks. Perhaps the noble Lord will let me make some progress, and, if he is still not satisfied towards the end of the speech, we can spend a bit more time on this.

As I was saying, 2.7 million working days were lost to strike action in 2023, up from 2.5 million in 2022, and these were the highest annual number of working days lost to strikes since 1989. Put frankly, the 2016 Act did not achieve its objective of reducing strikes—in fact, it made things worse.

Amendment 244, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, and Amendment 245, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, both seek, in different ways, to remove the repeal of the 50% industrial action ballot turnout threshold. The Bill as drafted repeals this threshold in its entirety, returning us to the situation pre 2016, where only a simple majority of members voting in favour of strike action was required for industrial action to be deemed lawful.

We want to create a positive and modern framework for trade union legislation that delivers productive, constructive engagement, respects the democratic mandate of unions and reduces bureaucratic hurdles. The date for repeal of the 50% threshold will be set out in regulations at a future date, with the intention that it is aligned with the establishment of e-balloting as an option for trade unions. In combination with the delivery of modern, secure workplace balloting, we hope that this will ensure that industrial action mandates will have demonstrably broad support.

I turn to the opposition to Clause 66 standing part. In answer to the concerns expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, this clause does indeed seek to amend Section 226 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act to reverse the change made by Section 3 of the Trade Union Act 2016. Section 226 is amended to omit subsections (2A) to (2F), thereby removing the requirement for industrial action ballots in six defined public services—health; fire services; education for those aged under 17; transport; decommissioning of nuclear installations, management of radioactive waste and spent fuel; and border security—to have the support of at least 40% of those entitled to vote for the industrial action in order to be valid.

Alongside Clause 65, which removes the turnout threshold, a trade union will need only a simple majority of those voting in the ballot to vote in favour of industrial action for the industrial action to be deemed lawful. This was the case prior to the Trade Union Act 2016. This clause is a key part of the Government’s agenda. Again, I want to be clear that this is part of our commitment to repeal the Trade Union Act 2016.

I turn to Amendment 246, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Goddard of Stockport, and will speak to the opposition to Clause 69 standing part of the Bill. The noble Lord’s amendment seeks to retain the current six-month mandate period for industrial action following a successful ballot. The Government want to strike the right balance between ensuring that industrial action is based on a recent vote and reducing the need for re-ballots. Strike action is always a last resort; it is costly to workers as well as employers. For this reason, we consulted on the appropriate length of time before a trade union should re-ballot its members.

In that consultation, trade unions were very keen to have no need to re-ballot for a mandate at all. However, following the consultation, the Government have set the mandate period at 12 months, because the majority of industrial action concludes within that time. This will ensure the appropriate balance between reducing the costs of re-balloting and allowing mandates to continue for longer where they are likely to have continued members’ support, without prolonging disputes or permitting action to be called based on a more than year-old mandate. Retaining the six-month mandate period would prevent the Government delivering on their commitment substantively to repeal the Trade Union Act 2016.

I turn to the opposition to Clause 68 standing part from the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom. The purpose of this clause is to reduce the information that unions are required to include on a voting paper for industrial action, through repealing Section 5 of the Trade Union Act 2016, which introduced additional requirements into Section 229 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992. Section 5 of the 2016 Act required trade unions to include on the ballot paper a summary of the issues that are in dispute between the employer and the trade union; the type of industrial action that amounts to action short of a strike; and an indication of the time period during which it is expected that those specific types of action are to take place.

Repealing Section 5 will not remove all the information requirements. Under Section 229, the ballot paper will still require unions to ask their members on the ballot paper whether they support industrial action and which type of action they want to take part in, expressed in terms of whether it is strike action or action short of a strike. The noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, made an analogy with ballot papers not containing details such as the names of candidates or the nature of the election. I respectfully point out that there is a danger in that analogy; I do not think it is fair. After all, noble Lords opposite would not expect democratic elections for elected office to carry the kind of mandate threshold that they are insisting trade union ballots should have. Whether they want to make the analogy that democratic elections are like union ballots or not, there is a bit of a pick and mix going on—

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

That is fair enough; I accept the noble Lord’s point when it comes to general elections but, in effect, this is a referendum, which is usually much more clear-cut.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

The point remains that there was not a threshold mandate for the few referendums that we have had. I maintain my point that ballots and elections are not really analogous, and there is danger for everyone in trying to compare the two.

The removal of the initial requirements imposed by the 2016 Act will reduce the red tape on trade union activity that works against their core role of negotiation and dispute resolution.

On the opposition to Clause 69, the purpose of the clause is to amend Section 234 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 to change the mandate period for industrial action following a successful ballot from six months to 12 months without the possibility of extension, which we have already discussed in Amendment 246. Among other things, the clause brings the appeals process back in line with the position before the Trade Union Act 2016 and many other enforcement bodies of employment law. For example, appeals against the decision of employment tribunals are considered only on points of law, not points of fact.

Amendment 249, tabled by my noble friend Lord Hendy, would require unions to publish results of industrial action ballots on a publicly accessible website, removing the current obligation to notify individual members and employers directly. The Government recognise that the current arrangements can impose a communications burden on trade unions, especially where first-class post is used to provide the notification to members and employers. However, removing the requirement to send direct notification risks reducing the accessibility and certainty of this information to those entitled to receive it. In our view, it undermines transparency and thus confidence in trade unions and the balloting process. Relying solely on a website assumes that members and employers will proactively seek out information, which could lead to disputes over whether that proper notification has occurred. Direct notification ensures clarity and transparency.

To address concerns about the administrative burden associated with these communication standards, the Government intend to update the Code of Practice: Industrial Action Ballots and Notice to Employers to encourage the use of email in place of posts where practicable. This approach preserves the principle of direct communication while reflecting modern methods of engagement and reducing administrative costs. For these reasons, I am afraid the Government do not support this amendment.

Amendment 251, again tabled by my noble friend Lord Hendy, seeks to simplify requirements on trade unions when issuing notices. While the Government understand the desire to streamline procedures, these notice provisions serve a vital purpose in ensuring that employers have the necessary information to plan for and respond to industrial action. The Government are already reducing the minimum notice period for industrial action from 14 days to 10 days, and removing the specific requirements that unions must provide in notice for industrial action, such as to disclose the number of employees in each category. This amendment risks removing too much detail, potentially leaving employers unclear on the nature, scale and timing of the action being proposed. Again, I am afraid, this is why the Government do not support my noble friend’s amendment.

The last amendments in this group are Amendments 251A, tabled by my noble friend Lord Hutton of Furness, and Amendment 251B, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom. The Government do not support either of these amendments because our general position is not to make sectoral carve-outs from the limitations and conditions which apply to industrial action. This is consistent with our repeal of the 40% support threshold for industrial action and ballots in the repeal of the Strikes (Minimum Service Levels) Act that set further conditions on industrial action in some public services. The same statutory notice period for industrial action across all sectors ensures a simple rule that is clear for all parties involved and that applies in all circumstances. It is then for employers in each sector to manage their industrial relations and their businesses accordingly. However, my noble friend Lord Hutton has some specific concerns around the airline industry and we are happy to meet to understand these concerns further.

The issue of the Clause 71 standing part of the Bill was raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey. Alongside our manifesto commitment to repeal the 2016 Act, the Government are committed to bringing in a new era of partnership that fosters meaningful engagement between government, employers and unions, and this is grounded in co-operation and negotiation. We recognise the importance of striking a balance between allowing for effective strike action while also ensuring that employers are able to reasonably prepare for industrial action when, sadly, it has to occur—I should say when workers have voted for it to occur.

Clause 71 makes targeted changes to Section 234A of the 1992 Act to simplify the process by which trade unions provide that notification. Specifically, we are removing one element from the current requirements: the need to specify the number of affected employees in each job category. Employers will continue to receive essential information, including the overall number of employees affected, the categories they belong to, and the workplaces concerned. This strikes a sensible balance between reducing bureaucracy and enabling employers to plan to mitigate the impacts of industrial action.

Clause 71 also reduces the notice period for industrial action from 14 days to 10 and, consequently, Section 8 of the 2016 Act will be repealed. Moving from a 14-day notice period to a 10-day notice period provides a more flexible, workable approach that reflects modern industrial relations practice.

We acknowledge that some groups argued for a return to the previous seven-day notice period, and that others have called for the current 14-day period to be retained. In our view, 10 days represents a balanced compromise. It is the appropriate balance in allowing employers the ability to plan to mitigate the impact of and reduce the disruption and knock-on impacts of strikes, while respecting the right to strike. It reflects consultation feedback, and allows employers time to prepare, while reducing the burden and uncertainty faced by trade unions. Taken together, these reforms simplify the industrial action framework and reduce unnecessary burdens and legal risk for trade unions.

Finally, Clause 72—

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

Before the Minister sits down, I particularly focused on the NHS. I was not trying to see it as a sector—I was thinking of the categories and the number by category. I appreciate it is late, so if the Minister wants to write to me, I would be happy to receive that.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

For the sake of brevity and time and all of us staying awake, I will undertake to write to the noble Baroness.

Finally, Clause 72 seeks to reverse the effect of Section 10 of the 2016 Act, removing the requirement under Section 220A of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 for trade unions to appoint a picket supervisor and to meet other administrative burdens in relation to this supervisor, such as taking reasonable steps to provide their name to the police.

As the period of disruption that I have already referred to between 2022 and 2024 has shown, administrative requirements and bureaucratic hurdles only make it more difficult for trade unions to engage in good-faith negotiations with employers. These changes will bring trade union law into the 21st century and fix the foundations for industrial relations that have not delivered for workers, employers or unions.

However, the Government recognise that regulations regarding picket lines are important. To be clear, the Bill is repealing only those measures introduced by the 2016 Act in relation to the role of a picket supervisor. Other legislation and an amended code of practice on picketing will remain in place. Picketing must take place at a lawful location and must be peaceful, and those on picket lines must not intimidate or harass workers who choose to attend work. We are returning the law on picketing to what it was prior to 2016, when it was working well and was understood by all parties.

In summing up, I hope my justification for these clauses and how they meet the Government’s intentions has been clear to noble Lords, and I ask the noble Lord, Lord Goddard of Stockport, to withdraw Amendment 244.