Employment Rights Bill

(Limited Text - Ministerial Extracts only)

Committee stage
Tuesday 10th June 2025 Lords Chamber

Debate on whether Clause 60 should stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to express my deep concern about the inclusion of the clause repealing Section 116B of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, and to urge that it be removed in its entirety from the Bill. The clause does not merely tidy up legislation or modernise outdated provisions, it seeks to dismantle a vital safeguard that upholds the principle that taxpayer funds should not be used to subsidise the activities of private organisations, no matter how long-standing or worthy those organisations may be.

Section 116B was introduced to ensure that where public sector employers agree to deduct trade union subscriptions directly from employees’ pay, a service commonly known as check-off, the administrative cost of doing so is reimbursed by the union. This is a reasonable and proportionate expectation. After all, unions are private membership organisations. It is not the role of the taxpayer to underwrite the cost of maintaining their finances, especially when alternative methods of payment, such as direct debit, are readily available and commonly used by the unions themselves. Repealing this provision would, in effect, shift the cost burden for this private financial arrangement on to public sector employers and, by extension, the taxpayer. These are costs that would be no longer recoverable, whether they involve payroll staff time, IT systems or administrative oversight.

Although each individual deduction might seem minor, across large public bodies—for example, the NHS, schools, local authorities or Whitehall departments —these costs accumulate. The public purse, as noble Lords opposite do not need reminding, is already under immense pressure and it should not be expected to shoulder this additional financial responsibility. There is a very real risk that this repeal, however well-intentioned, would result in taxpayers unknowingly subsidising trade union operations.

Moreover, Section 116B introduced a measure of transparency and accountability into the system. It ensured that unions have to make active choices about how they collect their subscriptions and whether to invest in alternative systems, such as direct debit. It also gave employees greater awareness of and control over how they supported union activity. Removing this provision without putting any comparable mechanisms in place risks eroding that transparency. It suggests a return to a one-size-fits-all approach in which the employer bears the cost and the worker has little visibility over the arrangements.

There is also the issue of equity. Public sector employers are distinct in that they are funded by the state and their accountability is to the taxpayer. In the private sector where check-off arrangements still exist, employers and unions are free to negotiate the terms of such systems, including where the cost should be reimbursed. Why should public employers uniquely be placed in a position where they must provide these services at their own expense without any form of compensation? It is a contradiction that undermines the rationale for removing Section 116B.

The proposed repeal would also remove the flexibility that currently exists in the system. Under Section 116B, the Secretary of State has the power to make regulations specifying exceptions, such as for devolved Administrations or specific categories of public bodies. That allows the provision to be adapted in a way that respects local autonomy; for example, in Wales, where different arrangements have been supported by the devolved Government. By removing the entire provision, this clause strips away that flexibility and imposes a blunt uniformity that does not reflect the complexities of public sector governance across the United Kingdom.

Finally, we must consider the broader message that this repeal sends. It risks creating the impression, fair or not, that trade unions are being afforded preferential treatment and being allowed to impose their operating costs on to the taxpayer without scrutiny. At a time when public trust in institutions is fragile and when every pound of public spending is rightly under the microscope, this is a deeply unhelpful signal to send.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business and Trade and Department for Science, Information and Technology (Baroness Jones of Whitchurch) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, for posing arguments against Clause 60 standing part of the Bill.

This clause seeks to repeal Section 15 of the Trade Union Act 2016 by amending the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 to remove Section 116B. Section 15 required trade unions to pay public sector employers where they administer payroll deductions for trade union subscriptions, known as check-off. It further required that this service be made available only where workers have the option to pay their union subscriptions by other means.

The Trade Union (Deduction of Union Subscriptions from Wages in the Public Sector) Regulations 2024 were introduced as a cost-saving measure, with estimated annual savings of £1.6 million, totalling £12 million over the following 10 years. However, as the impact assessment acknowledged, the regulations would bring a cumulative cost of £17 million to public sector employers and trade unions over that period. This is far higher than the estimated cost savings.

The current system places bureaucratic processes on both trade unions and public sector employers that can be clearly simplified to support productive trade union relations. There should be no costs to employers associated with withdrawing the check-off regulations. Employers will have the choice to continue with or amend any agreed arrangements regarding the deduction of union subscriptions from their employees’ wages, in discussion with their recognised trade unions.

We feel that there is a need to simplify this process, which is what our proposals intend to do. While I thank the noble Lord for this very short debate, I urge him to support this clause, for the reasons I have set out.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank the Minister for her explanation, although I am not particularly persuaded.

Clause 60 agreed.

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[Lord Goddard of Stockport (LD)]

My Lords, these amendments, proposed by the noble Lords, Lord Hendy and Lord Woodley, are I think as people have outlined. I have been on the wrong end of that legislation on a number of events—official strikes, unofficial strikes and secondary picketing. As a shop steward you are responsible for taking those actions for a company; there are consequences and I have suffered consequences from that.

It is not that I agree with the rights being taken away, but I think times have changed and unions have moved on now. The right of anybody to remove their labour, if they are pushed to it, should be a universal right, but it should be used very sparingly and in very special circumstances. It is all very well rushing to legislation and quoting the European Court, but we live in the real world and when things happen to people at work and people are treated badly, sometimes we have not got time to go and contact the KC and get case law. We just do the things that we used to do and take that action straight away. Sometimes that resolves the matter fairly quickly, because a reasonable employer will see the action you have taken as a direct result of another manager doing something that was not in agreement. So I get the thrust of this.

I have had notes typed and I have been writing my own notes, but I think the top and bottom for me is the amendment is seeking to restore a trade union’s flexibility in choosing which members to ballot and removing some procedural requirements and obligations to notify employees in advance of ballots. I think that time has gone as well.

Reinstating rights for prison officers, the group currently subject to significant legal limitations, is one I would like to slightly explore. The intent behind these amendments is to strengthen trade union rights and promote collective bargaining. The concern is potentially around impact, industrial relations and public safety, especially with the actions of prison officers. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, and to the Government that the way to protect prison officers is not to enshrine the right to strike but to remove the reasons why they would want to strike. That really is about improving the Victorian conditions that we have in 2025 prison systems, where people go into prison and come out worse criminals or nine out of 10 as drug addicts or whatever.

Governments, instead of trying to give extra law for prison officers, should be looking at the root cause. I know there is a prison plan being built and we are trying to get more education into prisons—if you want to speak to the noble Lord, Lord Timpson, he can give you chapter and verse on that, as I have listened to him doing. I hear why it is being done, I understand why it is being done and I know that it is not got a hope in somewhere else of getting through. But I thank the noble Lord for bringing it forward, because sometimes it is good to realise that things that we used to do are perhaps today not even politically correct to do. Human rights and the rights of people who go every day to work, to earn a living and support their family, need airing and need protecting. I know this is a probing amendment, but I thank the noble Lord for bringing it because it is interesting. Now and again it is good to be reminded of how it used to be and how it can be now.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I join the general thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Hendy. I thought it was a most interesting introduction and I learned a great deal. I particularly liked the phrase “constitutional benediction”, which I am planning to nick—although not in this context, because I rise to join the Minister and express my clear and firm opposition to the proposed new clause after Clause 64. It seeks to enshrine in statute a so-called positive right to strike even in breach of contract, as opposed—if I follow the noble Lord’s arguments correctly—to the freedom to strike. It strikes me as somewhat semantic in terms of the practical outcome, which I suspect is an argument we will hear again.

Let us be absolutely frank about what the amendment would entail. It would insert into the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 a wholly unprecedented and therefore dangerously broad provision that every worker shall have the right to take industrial action, whether or not it is in breach of any contract. It would not be subject to employer agreement or tethered to lawful procedures but would be an absolute statutory right to break contract terms and withdraw labour.

Industrial action, particularly strike action, is obviously a serious matter, and I think everybody would agree on that. It affects not only the employer but the public, the economy and, critically, the most vulnerable in society, who rely on public services. That is why we believe our existing legal framework strikes a careful balance. It protects the right to strike but does so within clear procedures and obligations: balloting requirements, notice periods and protections against unlawful disruption. This amendment would ride roughshod over all that.

What does it mean to have a right to breach your contract, regardless of process or proportionality? Surely, that is not a right; that is just carte blanche. This provision would displace the carefully constructed framework that governs how industrial action can be taken lawfully and responsibly. It would empower disruption without accountability. The purpose of employment law is not to tilt the playing field in one direction or another but to ensure that fairness, order and mutual obligations between employers and workers are respected. The right to withdraw labour must remain conditional on lawful procedures and not granted in the abstract, regardless of impact or legality.

Moreover, the proposed amendment would likely bring the UK into direct conflict with established contract law and create endless legal uncertainty. If workers are told that they have a statutory right to strike, even in breach of a contract, what does that mean for essential services, public safety, or the ability of schools, hospitals and transport systems to function with any consistency?

I do not think we should be mistaken. This amendment is not some minor clarification; it is a fundamental rewrite of the basis of workplace relations. It would undermine the principle that contracts entered into freely carry obligations and it would sweep away the balance between rights and responsibilities. I also have to ask: once a principle of contract breaking is established, how long before that is used as precedent in other contractual disputes?

Nobody denies that workers must be able to organise, speak up, bargain collectively and act where necessary. That is already protected in the legal framework. This amendment would take a sledgehammer to that balance. It would replace legal clarity, we believe, with legal radicalism, and accountability with absolutism. For those reasons, I urge the Government to reject the amendment.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Hendy for tabling Amendment 238, which would establish a broad statutory right to strike. I thank him also for our constructive and amicable meeting a few days ago and for his impressive tour of international conventions this evening. I have to say to him that anything I subsequently say does not mean that I do not take our international obligations seriously. In fact, in this increasingly uncertain world, we have more of an obligation to work collaboratively across countries. I think there is a lot to be gained from countries if we do that, not only on these sorts of issues but obviously on other issues of social justice as well.

I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox and Lady Jones, for adding to this short debate and the noble Lord, Lord Goddard. He raised some of the issues around prisons. I will be addressing those in the next group of amendments, but the point is well made that we certainly have to look after and defend our prison officers and recognise the service that they do for us.

The Government recognise the intention to reinforce protections for industrial action but it is important to emphasise that the right to strike is already protected under UK law, as set out in Sections 219 and 244 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, provided clear conditions are met. Introducing a specific codified right to strike would cut across the uncodified nature of the UK constitution and lead to a far-reaching and undefined statutory right that risks legal uncertainty and conflict with long-established frameworks that carefully balance the rights of unions and employers.

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[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

My Lords, I will quickly follow and agree with my noble friends Lady Coffey and Lord Jackson of Peterborough in their speaking against the amendments in this group. We feel that these amendments collectively represent a dangerous and retrograde step that would just take us back to the industrial chaos of the 1970s.

Such amendments would fundamentally undermine the carefully balanced framework of industrial relations that has served this country well for, now, over 30 years. I suppose the conventions of the House require me to address each amendment in turn, starting with Amendment 239. As the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, described, this would remove Section 223 of the 1992 Act, which currently renders unlawful any industrial action taken in response to dismissals for unofficial action.

When workers engage in unofficial action—that is, action not sanctioned by their trade union and without proper balloting procedures—they are essentially taking the law into their own hands, so employers must retain the right to dismiss workers who breach their contracts in this manner. To permit official industrial action in response to such lawful dismissals would create a vicious circle where lawlessness begets more lawlessness. It would effectively immunise unofficial action from any meaningful consequences, and encourage workers to bypass the proper, democratic procedures that unions themselves have surely fought hard to establish.

Amendment 240 is perhaps the most pernicious of all these proposals. It would restore secondary action, the ability of workers not just to strike against their employer over their conditions, but to support disputes elsewhere. We banned secondary action for compelling reasons. It allows disputes to spread like wildfire across the economy, dragging innocent third parties into conflicts that have nothing to do with their industrial relationships. A dispute between workers and one employer could paralyse entire supply chains, disrupting businesses that have committed no wrong and harming workers who have no stake in the original dispute.

The amendment would also remove the sensible restrictions on picketing, allowing pickets to target any workplace, rather than just their own. This opens the door to flying pickets and the mass intimidation tactics that we witnessed in the darkest days of industrial conflict. When pickets can descend on workplaces with which they have no employment relationship, the result is not legitimate industrial pressure but mob rule. Furthermore, by changing the definition of trade disputes from those “wholly or mainly” relating to employment matters to those merely “connected with” such matters, this amendment would politicise industrial action. Strikes could be called on the flimsiest of pretexts, with only the most tenuous connection to genuine workplace issues. This is a recipe for politically motivated disruption that serves no legitimate industrial relations purpose.

Amendment 241 would restore the right to strike for union recognition. We have established statutory procedures for union recognition that are fair, democratic and effective. These procedures protect workers’ rights to choose whether they wish to be represented by a union, without the coercion that inevitably accompanies strike action. When recognition can be achieved through industrial action, the process becomes tainted by intimidation, rather than informed by genuine worker preference. No worker should ever face the choice between supporting their family and supporting union recognition demands.

Amendment 242 would remove the requirement for unions to provide employers with notice of strike ballots. This seemingly technical change would also have profound practical consequences. Employers need advance notice to make contingency arrangements, to protect vulnerable service users and to engage in meaningful dialogue that might resolve disputes before they escalate. In essential services—our hospitals, schools and transport networks—such notice is crucial for public safety. To remove this requirement would be to abandon the vital principle that industrial action should and must be a last resort rather than a first response.

Amendment 243 would eliminate the requirement for separate workplace ballots, allowing unions to aggregate completely different workplaces and employment relationships into single ballots. This strikes at the heart of democratic participation. Workers in one workplace may face entirely different conditions and concerns from those in another. They should not be bound by the votes of workers with whom they share nothing but a common union membership. Workplace-specific ballots ensure that industrial action has genuine support from those who will participate in it, rather than being imposed by a union hierarchy pursuing its own agenda.

Taken together, these amendments would create a perfect storm of industrial instability. They would restore the legal framework that gave us the winter of discontent, when rubbish piled up in our streets, bodies went unburied and hospital patients were turned away by striking workers. They would empower union leaders to spread disputes across entire industries, to bypass democratic procedures and to hold essential services hostage to political demands. We must not forget the lessons of history. The industrial relations reforms of the 1980s and 1990s did not destroy trade unionism; they civilised it. They required unions to be accountable to their members and responsive to legitimate concerns while preventing the abuse of industrial power.

The noble Lord, Lord Hendy, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb and Lady O’Grady of Upper Holloway, would have us believe that they simply want to restore workers’ rights. But rights without responsibilities are merely privileges, and privileges being exercised without regard for their impact on others quickly becomes tyranny. The right to strike is not an absolute right; it is a powerful tool that must be used judiciously and with proper safeguards.

Moreover, these amendments would do nothing to address the real challenges that face working people today. They would not raise a single wage, improve a single workplace or create a single job. Instead, as my noble friends pointed out, they would create uncertainty, discourage investment and ultimately harm the very workers that they purport to be helping. Businesses need stability and predictability to grow and prosper. Industrial relations law that encourages conflict and chaos will drive investment elsewhere, taking jobs and opportunities with it.

I urge this Committee to reject these amendments. They represent not progress but regression, not liberation but license, and not workers’ rights but workers’ wrongs. We must maintain the balanced approach that has served our economy and our society so well. Let us resist the siren call of those who would drag us back to an era of industrial warfare that all of us hoped that we would never see again. The choice before us is clear. We can preserve a system that protects workers’ legitimate rights while maintaining economic stability and social peace, or we can return to those bad old days of secondary picketing, political strikes and industrial anarchy. I think and I hope that I know which path this Committee would choose.

[Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)]

I thank my noble friend Lord Hendy for his amendments on the right to strike and for raising the issue of prisoner officers’ right to strike, which was strongly debated in the other place.

I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, has taken such a strident approach to the issues which my noble friends have raised. Although we do not necessarily agree with everything that my noble friend has put forward, I would say equally that we distance ourselves from the tone and attitude that has been presented by the other side this evening.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow my noble friends Lady Coffey and Lord Moynihan, and the noble Lords, Lord Goddard and Lord Hutton. I will come back to their amendments shortly.

I will speak to Amendments 245, 251B and the question of whether Clause 68 should stand part, which is tabled in my name. On the clause stand part, this clause represents a dangerous step backwards. The noble Lord, Lord Goddard, objected to it in the sense that he thought it might introduce a lack of clarity. But the fact is that the clause itself is a step backwards in transparency and democratic accountability that this Committee must not allow to pass unchallenged.

The provisions that Clause 68 seeks to remove, notably subsections (2B) to (2D) of Section 229, are not bureaucratic obstacles but fundamental pillars of informed democratic participation. They require that voting papers should include a summary of the dispute, specify the types of industrial action proposed and indicate when such action is expected to take place. These are not unreasonable burdens. They are the basic information any voter needs to make an informed decision.

Democracy thrives on transparency, not opacity. When we ask working people to vote on whether to take industrial action—a decision that may affect their employment, their families’ livelihoods and their future prospects—surely they are owed the courtesy of clear, comprehensive information about what they might be voting for.

Consider the absurdity of what this clause actually proposes. It is a ballot paper that asks, “Are you prepared to take part in industrial action short of a strike?” without specifying whether this means a work-to-rule, an overtime ban, a refusal to cover additional duties or any combination of actions. How can any reasonable person make an informed choice without knowing what they are agreeing to participate in?

The Government may well argue that these requirements impose administrative burdens on the trade unions, which is an argument we have heard on a couple of groups tonight. But since when did we consider informing voters to be an administrative burden rather than a democratic duty? We would not accept a general election ballot that failed to specify what office candidates were seeking or what their party stood for, so why should we accept industrial action ballots with less information?

Furthermore, these information requirements serve to protect union members themselves. Clear information helps ensure that workers understand not just what they are voting for but the potential consequences of their actions. This protects both their interests and those of their unions by reducing the likelihood of disputes over the course, scope or nature of mandated action.

Turning to Amendment 245, I agree with the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, and the noble Lord, Lord Goddard. I will speak to this amendment, although I must emphasise that my primary concern is not with the amendment itself but the Government’s fundamentally flawed approach to this critical issue. To be absolutely clear, the 50% turnout threshold for industrial action ballots should be maintained. This threshold exists for the very good reason that it ensures that strikes and other industrial actions have genuine democratic legitimacy, as the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, pointed out, and that they represent the will of a substantial portion of union membership and not merely an activist minority.

If the Government are determined to weaken these democratic protections, and regrettably it appears that they are, they must not compound this error by hiding behind secondary legislation. Businesses across this nation deserve better. They need to know the regulatory framework within which they will operate—a theme to which we have returned a number of times through the Bill. They cannot plan for investment, assess risk or make employment decisions when fundamental aspects of industrial relations law are left hanging in regulatory limbo. The Government’s approach creates precisely the uncertainty that undermines economic confidence and job creation.

I urge the Government to reconsider entirely and maintain the 50% threshold to provide the certainty that businesses need and the democratic legitimacy that industrial action requires. If the Government insist that they are going to lower the threshold, which we think will be disastrous, it should be in the Bill, so that we can scrutinise it fully, which is what my amendment would ensure. As my noble friend Lord Moynihan pointed out, a 20% threshold could lead to only 10% of a workforce supporting strike action. The House deserves the opportunity to examine and debate such fundamental changes properly and not have them smuggled through in statutory instruments with minimal parliamentary oversight.

I will speak very briefly to Amendment 251A, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hutton. I could not agree with him more. It would be a very regrettable error if the Bill were to inadvertently introduce an unintended consequence of potentially swingeing fines for airlines, for reasons that are not really any fault of their own. It is to be supported, and I hope he will return to the theme.

My Amendment 251B proposes a modest but vital extension, from 10 to 14 days, of the notice period required before industrial action can commence in the railway sector, for slightly different reasons. This is not an attempt to restrict workers’ rights but rather a recognition of the unique role that our railway system plays in the economic and social fabric of the nation. The railway network is not just another industry. As my noble friend Lady Coffey pointed out, it is the circulatory system of the economy and it moves millions of passengers and vast quantities of freight every single day. When railway services are disrupted, the effects cascade through every sector of society, from healthcare workers unable to reach hospitals to students missing examinations and businesses losing millions in productivity. The current 10-day notice period that is proposed is simply insufficient for the complexity of railway operations. I could go on, but I think I have said enough on the subject.

Four additional days may seem modest, but, in the context of the operations of the railway and airlines, it represents the difference between chaos and managed disruption. It allows time for proper contingency planning, for negotiations to continue and for the travelling public to make alternative arrangements. With that, I shall wind up, but I hope the Government are paying attention and will at least listen to these carefully considered amendments.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Goddard of Stockport, and my noble friends Lord Hutton of Furness and Lord Hendy for tabling amendments on the subject of industrial action ballot mandates, thresholds and notice. Despite the late hour, I recognise that there is significant interest here. I will try to do justice to all those amendments and to the opposition to certain clauses standing part of the Bill.

Before I go into the detail, I want to make it clear that a lot of what we are discussing relates to the repeal of the great majority of the Trade Union Act 2016, which was a clear manifesto commitment for this Government. I think it is worth framing why that is the context. This does, in a way, speak to a lot of what the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, mentioned. Far from supporting the economy, the strike legislation in the 2016 Act that we inherited from the then Opposition did not actually prevent strikes. In 2022, we lost more days to strikes than France. In 2023 and 2024, NHS strikes alone cost the taxpayer £1.7 billion.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

With respect, there are definitely elements in the group of amendments we are talking about that relate to the 2016 Act. I was simply setting out the context for my remarks. Perhaps the noble Lord will let me make some progress, and, if he is still not satisfied towards the end of the speech, we can spend a bit more time on this.

As I was saying, 2.7 million working days were lost to strike action in 2023, up from 2.5 million in 2022, and these were the highest annual number of working days lost to strikes since 1989. Put frankly, the 2016 Act did not achieve its objective of reducing strikes—in fact, it made things worse.

Amendment 244, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, and Amendment 245, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, both seek, in different ways, to remove the repeal of the 50% industrial action ballot turnout threshold. The Bill as drafted repeals this threshold in its entirety, returning us to the situation pre 2016, where only a simple majority of members voting in favour of strike action was required for industrial action to be deemed lawful.

We want to create a positive and modern framework for trade union legislation that delivers productive, constructive engagement, respects the democratic mandate of unions and reduces bureaucratic hurdles. The date for repeal of the 50% threshold will be set out in regulations at a future date, with the intention that it is aligned with the establishment of e-balloting as an option for trade unions. In combination with the delivery of modern, secure workplace balloting, we hope that this will ensure that industrial action mandates will have demonstrably broad support.

I turn to the opposition to Clause 66 standing part. In answer to the concerns expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, this clause does indeed seek to amend Section 226 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act to reverse the change made by Section 3 of the Trade Union Act 2016. Section 226 is amended to omit subsections (2A) to (2F), thereby removing the requirement for industrial action ballots in six defined public services—health; fire services; education for those aged under 17; transport; decommissioning of nuclear installations, management of radioactive waste and spent fuel; and border security—to have the support of at least 40% of those entitled to vote for the industrial action in order to be valid.

Alongside Clause 65, which removes the turnout threshold, a trade union will need only a simple majority of those voting in the ballot to vote in favour of industrial action for the industrial action to be deemed lawful. This was the case prior to the Trade Union Act 2016. This clause is a key part of the Government’s agenda. Again, I want to be clear that this is part of our commitment to repeal the Trade Union Act 2016.

I turn to Amendment 246, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Goddard of Stockport, and will speak to the opposition to Clause 69 standing part of the Bill. The noble Lord’s amendment seeks to retain the current six-month mandate period for industrial action following a successful ballot. The Government want to strike the right balance between ensuring that industrial action is based on a recent vote and reducing the need for re-ballots. Strike action is always a last resort; it is costly to workers as well as employers. For this reason, we consulted on the appropriate length of time before a trade union should re-ballot its members.

In that consultation, trade unions were very keen to have no need to re-ballot for a mandate at all. However, following the consultation, the Government have set the mandate period at 12 months, because the majority of industrial action concludes within that time. This will ensure the appropriate balance between reducing the costs of re-balloting and allowing mandates to continue for longer where they are likely to have continued members’ support, without prolonging disputes or permitting action to be called based on a more than year-old mandate. Retaining the six-month mandate period would prevent the Government delivering on their commitment substantively to repeal the Trade Union Act 2016.

I turn to the opposition to Clause 68 standing part from the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom. The purpose of this clause is to reduce the information that unions are required to include on a voting paper for industrial action, through repealing Section 5 of the Trade Union Act 2016, which introduced additional requirements into Section 229 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992. Section 5 of the 2016 Act required trade unions to include on the ballot paper a summary of the issues that are in dispute between the employer and the trade union; the type of industrial action that amounts to action short of a strike; and an indication of the time period during which it is expected that those specific types of action are to take place.

Repealing Section 5 will not remove all the information requirements. Under Section 229, the ballot paper will still require unions to ask their members on the ballot paper whether they support industrial action and which type of action they want to take part in, expressed in terms of whether it is strike action or action short of a strike. The noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, made an analogy with ballot papers not containing details such as the names of candidates or the nature of the election. I respectfully point out that there is a danger in that analogy; I do not think it is fair. After all, noble Lords opposite would not expect democratic elections for elected office to carry the kind of mandate threshold that they are insisting trade union ballots should have. Whether they want to make the analogy that democratic elections are like union ballots or not, there is a bit of a pick and mix going on—

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

That is fair enough; I accept the noble Lord’s point when it comes to general elections but, in effect, this is a referendum, which is usually much more clear-cut.