(5 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberI welcome this debate. It is a historic day for this Parliament and for the power of MPs. In that spirit, I will keep my remarks very short, because this is a day for Back Benchers and for those putting forward their case for particular propositions. I believe there are some 47 Members who want to speak.
Labour’s approach today is that we will support amendments that are consistent with the two credible options we have set out on a number of occasions: a close economic partnership based on a customs union and close single market alignment; and a public vote to prevent no deal or a damaging Brexit. We will oppose those amendments that either offer no route forward or set out an approach that is inconsistent with our policy. In that spirit, I can confirm that we will be whipping tonight to support: amendment (K), in my name and in the name of the Leader of the Opposition; amendment (J), the customs union amendment tabled by the Father of the House, the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke); and amendment (M), in the name of my right hon. Friend the Member for Derby South (Margaret Beckett), which was tabled, of course, after much consultation and support from my hon. Friends the Members for Hove (Peter Kyle) and for Sedgefield (Phil Wilson). I will come on to amendment (D) in just one moment.
Let me start with motion (K), which mirrors the five pillars of the plan that we have set out on many occasions, both in this House and in the letter from the Leader of the Opposition to the Prime Minister in February.
Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?
I will make some progress, because I have spent a lot of time at this Dispatch Box and I have been able to make my case. Others want to make their case today and I want to give them the opportunity to do so.
Motion (K) mirrors the plan that we have set out. It was in the letter from the Leader of the Opposition to the Prime Minister in February. I remind the House that the pillars are a comprehensive and permanent customs union with the EU, close alignment with the single market, dynamic alignment on rights and protections, accompanied by much stronger commitments on agencies and security. We have never pretended that this will be easy or painless to negotiate. It involves compromise and negotiation, but we believe that it could be negotiated, and it would form the basis of a deal that protects jobs, rights and the economy.
Turning to motion (J) on the customs union, Labour’s support for a customs union is well known. I want to be clear that a customs union on its own is not enough. A customs union protects manufacturing supply chains and is relevant to the protection of the border in Northern Ireland, but it has to be part of a wider package, hence our motion (K), which sets out the package that we believe is needed. However, motion (J) is worded to specify that a customs union is a minimum part of any deal and we will support it on that basis.
Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?
I will just make some progress and then I will. Turning to motion (M), we will support this motion tonight, because at this stage it is now clear that any Brexit deal agreed in this Parliament needs further democratic approval. That is what this motion would do. It would put a lock around any deal that the Prime Minister forces through at the 11th hour or any revised deal that comes about at this very late stage. It would ensure that any Tory Brexit deal is subject to a referendum lock and it is consistent with commitments that the Leader of the Opposition and I have made from this Dispatch Box in recent weeks.
In relation to motion (D)—the common market and Norway motion—I want to be clear that we have concerns about this proposal, and it has not been our preferred option. We have concerns about the lack of a commitment to a permanent and comprehensive customs union, although I listened carefully to the words that were just exchanged in the House. However, we recognise that this motion would deliver a close economic relationship with the EU and would help to protect jobs, rights and the economy. It is credible and it is deliverable, so we believe that this motion should remain an option and continue in the process. We will therefore be recommending that Labour Members vote for it tonight.
This is an extremely important and welcome debate. It is frankly two years overdue. This is the debate that the Prime Minister should have started two years ago at the beginning of the process, but we are where we are, and Parliament finally has the chance to shape the way out of the Prime Minister’s mess.
(5 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move,
That this House has considered the matter of the length and purpose of the extension of the Article 50 process requested by the Government.
Thank you, Mr Speaker, for granting this debate, which provides a vital opportunity to scrutinise the Prime Minister’s letter to the President of the EU Council and, of course, the wider Government approach to seeking an extension. An issue of this importance should not have to be dealt with through a debate under Standing Order No. 24. The Prime Minister should be here to answer questions. There should have been a full statement to the House. I appreciate that we had Prime Minister’s questions earlier, but this is a very important decision about the future of the United Kingdom, and the Prime Minister should be here to make a full statement setting out why she has applied for the extension she has applied for, and to answer such questions as there are across the House. It is symptomatic of the way the Prime Minister has approached many Brexit issues, which is to push Parliament as far away from the process as possible.
The House has rejected the Prime Minister’s deal twice, and not by small margins. It has voted to rule out no deal, and it voted to require the Prime Minister to seek an extension of article 50. I appreciate that on Thursday the last words of the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union at the Dispatch Box were:
“I commend the Government motion to the House”—[Official Report, 14 March 2019; Vol. 656, c. 628.]
before he promptly went off to vote against it, which caught me slightly by surprise—he is probably rather hoping that we do not divide this afternoon. However, given where we got to last week, when we ruled out no deal and required the Prime Minister to seek an extension of article 50, one might have expected the Prime Minister, in the intervening days, to reflect on where we are at and to recognise, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Doncaster North (Edward Miliband) said earlier, that perhaps she is the roadblock to progress. She could, at this stage, act in the national interest and, frankly, show some leadership and take a responsible approach, which I think would be to seek an extension to prevent no deal and to provide time for Parliament to find a majority for a different approach.
I think many Members are yearning for the opportunity to move forward and break the impasse, but the letter to President Tusk makes it clear that that is not the Prime Minister’s intention. It says:
“The UK Government’s policy remains to leave the European Union in an orderly manner on the basis of the Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration agreed in November”.
The letter continues,
“it remains my intention to bring the deal back to the House”—
not a new deal, a changed deal, or a deal, compromise or position agreed by this House, but
“the deal back to the House.”
It does not speak of seeking time for change or to consider other options that could win support in Parliament. The only mention is of
“domestic proposals that confirm my previous commitments to protect our internal market, given the concerns expressed about the backstop.”
There is nothing new; it is just the same deal, to be brought back as soon as possible.
My right hon. and learned Friend is making a powerful speech about the real predicament and crisis we currently face. There have been indications from the Government of France that they may well not permit an extension to article 50. Faced with that proposition, does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that the Government are in a real fix? Unless they meaningfully change the deal that is on offer to Parliament and bring it back urgently, the Prime Minister will be faced with the difficult choice of whether to revoke article 50 or crash out with no deal.
I do understand the difficulty, but I do not think it is appropriate for me to respond to or comment on what may or may not have been said by Heads of State about what may or may not be agreed tomorrow. The point I am making is about the expectation of this House as to the approach that the Prime Minister would take. There is an even greater expectation—a yearning, which I can feel across the House and which I could feel last week—that this House be given an opportunity to break the impasse for itself by finding a way forward. I am afraid the Prime Minister’s approach is the same old blinkered approach, which is, “All I’m going to do is seek time to put my deal, exactly the same, back before the House for another vote.”
Based on the Prime Minister’s letter, I am not entirely clear why the EU would grant an extension in the first place, but the question for us all is the length of the extension that it would grant, and for what purpose. What is the Labour party’s policy?
I shall come to that later, but I will make this point. The period should of course be as short as possible, but it must be long enough to determine the purpose. In other words, the purpose has to determine the length. One of the mistakes we have made in the past two years, on which we have struggled and challenged the Prime Minister, is that if we let the clock, rather than the purpose, dictate we end up exactly where we have ended up now.
Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that it is absolutely ridiculous to suggest the idea of participating in democratic elections this May as the main reason for this House, or this nation, not to do what is in our national interest? It is complete nonsense.
Last week we touched on the difficulty of the EU elections and discussed the legal position and what the political position may be, and we need to bear that in mind. Of greater importance is that, given that we are discussing the future of the United Kingdom and its relationship with the EU, we take time to find the purpose of the extension and a majority that the House can get behind, so that we know why we are seeking the extension. That will begin to answer the question of how long an extension should be for.
I fully agree with my right hon. and learned Friend’s last point. The problem really is that the EU negotiators have said that there would have to be significant changes before they would look at an extension. The problem we have, certainly on the Back Benches and I am sure shared by my right hon. and learned Friend, is that nobody knows what the Prime Minister is going to ask the EU for in relation to that extension. Does he agree that it is disgraceful for the House to be kept in the dark in this way?
The problem with the Prime Minister’s approach is that last week we voted on a motion that said she would seek a short extension if the deal was passed by today—that was in paragraph (2) of the Prime Minister’s motion—and it has not been put before the House today, and that she would seek a longer extension if that was not the case. So, there was an expectation that the Prime Minister would do the opposite of what she has done today. Equally important is that there is a growing expectation that the House needs to have time to decide what happens next. A different Prime Minister might have reflected on what happened last week and come to the House this week to say, “I recognise that my deal is not going to get through as it is and I, the Prime Minister, will provide a process of some sort, or ask the House to help me with a process of some sort, to decide where there is a majority, so that we can move forward.” That is what is being missed in the letter.
As ever, the right hon. and learned Gentleman makes a powerful speech. He has given a description of what he would have expected the Prime Minister to do in the circumstances; what explanation does he put forward as to why the Prime Minister has not behaved in that way? Is it because she is stubborn, or is it because she is in the pockets of the European Research Group—the hard Brexiteers who are essentially running this country and this Brexit process? What does he think the explanation is?
The immediate concern is that the Prime Minister does not appear to be acting in accordance with her own motion of last week, but the deeper problem, which is what I am most concerned about, is that the Prime Minister still thinks that the failed strategy of the past two years, “My deal or no deal”—a blinkered approach with no changes and no room for Parliament—should be pursued for another three months. In other words, all she will do is use the three months in exactly the same way to bring back the deal over and over again—or as many times as she can without breaching the rules of the House—and try to force it through. That is the strategy that she has been pursuing throughout these negotiations and it has failed badly. We must not allow another three months to be used up on the same approach.
The letter sent by the Prime Minister this morning makes two requests to the Council—that it approves the documents agreed in Strasbourg on 11 March, and that it allows three months for the Prime Minister to get the same deal through Parliament. If I have read and understood the letter properly, I think the Prime Minister may be planning to bring the deal back on the basis that the documents that were before us last time have now been approved formally at the Council, and that some domestic arrangements have been agreed with possibly other parties, which means that she can then say that the deal can now be put to another vote, notwithstanding the fact that the documents on the table are exactly the same as the ones that we voted on last week. Obviously, that will raise the issue as to whether that is in accordance with the Standing Orders of the House, which will have to be addressed at the time.
The letter continues,
“it remains my intention to bring the deal back to the House.”
That is not a new deal, but the same deal. That is extraordinary, given how the House voted last week. It does not reflect the motion that was passed. Paragraph (2) of the motion clearly mentioned a short technical extension if the deal was passed by today—that was when the Prime Minister had the intention of bringing the deal back for today—or a longer extension if that was not the case.
I thank the right hon. and learned Gentleman for giving way. He said a few moments ago that there was no point in asking for an extension, particularly a long one, in the absence of a clear purpose. I gather from those remarks that he thinks a long extension is appropriate; can he confirm that? If he does think it is appropriate, will he tell the House what his purpose would be?
I wonder whether the right hon. and learned Gentleman can clarify something that he appeared to say just now, which was that the Prime Minister was not following her own motion because she had said in the third part of it that she would seek a longer extension. However, after reading the motion, I can say that it does not appear to say that. The first part says that she will seek an extension. The second part says that if the deal went through by today, she would seek a short extension, and the third part merely notes that if the deal did not go through and a longer extension was sought, it would require participation in the European elections. She did not say that she would seek a longer extension. I should be grateful if he could clarify that for the record.
I am grateful for that intervention because it allows me to read out what the Minister for the Cabinet Office said on this motion from the Dispatch Box. He was promoting the motion, and he actually voted for it, so perhaps what he said can be taken seriously. He said this at that Dispatch Box last week:
“In the absence of a deal”—
what he meant by that was a deal going through by today—
“seeking such a short and, critically, one-off extension would be downright reckless and completely at odds with the position that this House adopted only last night, making a no-deal scenario far more, rather than less, likely.”—[Official Report, 14 March 2019; Vol. 656, c. 566.]
Those are the words spoken from the Government Benches on the interpretation of the Government’s own motion. In other words, if a deal had not gone through by now, the Minister for the Cabinet Office said that, in those circumstances, simply to go for a short, one-off extension would be “downright reckless” and would make a no-deal scenario more rather than less likely. Members in this House should be concerned about that.
I am very grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend. He is making a powerful case. The motion that the House agreed made it clear that, if there was not a deal by today, the likelihood would be that the European Council would require a longer extension. Is it his view that when the European Council meets tomorrow, they are likely to require that?
We will have to wait until tomorrow to see what the Council’s response is. It may simply say that it will consider any request, but it does need to know what the purpose is. This is where the Prime Minister may get into some difficulty. If she says that the only purpose is to allow her to keep putting her deal for the next three months, that may or may not be seen as realistic with regard to what will happen in the next three months. None the less, it is a question that the Prime Minister will have to answer.
I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Gentleman for giving way. Just going back on his point—and he may agree with this—it is apparent that the remarks of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster were made not just out of the air, but in order to explain and justify the Government’s wording of that motion, which came in for a considerable amount of criticism as appearing to be opaque. He may agree with me that the words uttered at the Dispatch Box could be taken authoritatively as the Government’s assurance about what they intended to do.
I do agree with that. The reputation of the Minister for the Cabinet Office in this House is that he is someone in whom others invest assurance and confidence because of what he says and the way in which he says it. It may also have been some preparation for the meaningful vote to come back this Tuesday with the message, “If you don’t vote for it next Tuesday, then the Government will have to apply for a different extension.” There was at least that dual purpose.
The emphasis on the word “short” is subjective, because for many people short is long and long is short—[Interruption.] It is by definition subjective. Perhaps the right hon. and learned Gentleman is comparing one statement of “short” with another statement of “long”, but the matter is purely subjective even in that case.
I suppose that I accept the proposition that one person’s short may be another person’s long, but the words of the Minister for the Cabinet Office did not come in isolation or out of the blue; they came in the middle of a debate, which was quite heated at times, about what the motion meant and how we should interpret it. I do not think that anyone who was in that debate would, in all honesty, doubt what the Minister for the Cabinet Office was saying and what he meant by it, and I took
“a short and, critically, one-off extension”—[Official Report, 14 March 2019; Vol. 656, c. 566.]
to mean an extension for up to three months with a cliff-edge at the end.
Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman not find it extremely regrettable that the Government’s strategy on such an important issue for the nation is to bamboozle everybody, so that nobody knows what was meant or what was said?
I certainly agree that this is not the first time that most of the people voting for a motion think it to be pretty clear, only to find that what it meant is disputed within a week.
Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman as confused as I am? Given that we have had assurances from the Prime Minister and other Ministers that they know the will of the people and that the matter has been decided, if they are so sure, why are they so fearful of asking the people again?
That is really a question for the Government. My point is that we have to find a way through this impasse, and that requires us to come together as a House to consider and vote on the options and to provide a process for that. It is not helpful to put the deal, which has already been rejected, over and over with differing threats. Having accepted a motion last week to take no deal off the table, the Prime Minister is now trying to put no deal back on the table within a week by just changing the date of no deal, so that she can again ram the deal up against the deadline with the old “my deal or no deal,” response. I have no doubt that the three months will be run down and that we will get close to the June deadline with exactly the same strategy, which is the great cause for concern.
Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that it is absolutely outrageous for the Government to bring back the same deal, just a week later, to see whether MPs have changed their minds, but completely refuse, almost three years later, to give the public the opportunity to say that they have changed their mind?
That is a powerful point. The argument that we were making last week was that, realistically, the deal had not changed since the first time it was put eight weeks earlier. There was obviously the suggestion that the Government would simply bring it back this week, without even pretending that there had been any changes, and just say, “It’s now a week further on. How would you like a different threat?” to see whether they could get it through. That has to stop.
I am unsure whether the right hon. and learned Gentleman is aware that today is the International Day of Happiness. Does he agree that one way of making both sides of the Chamber happy might be to have a people’s vote on the Prime Minister’s deal that included the option of staying in the European Union? We can then all be happy, including him.
I am not sure how another day with me at this Dispatch Box and us here discussing Brexit could be considered a happy day in anybody’s book.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman is being very generous in giving way. I am sure he is aware, though it may have escaped his note, that the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster made the purpose of the Government’s motion very clear in his opening remarks on Thursday 14 March, and that it is recorded in column 562 of that day’s Hansard. As the right hon. and learned Gentleman has already told us, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster made it clear that the motion was to deal with this House approving the withdrawal agreement and a short extension, and he then said:
“If for whatever reason that proves not to be possible, we would be faced with the prospect of choosing only a long extension”—[Official Report, 14 March 2019; Vol. 656, c. 562.]
The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster has said that more than once, and the purpose of the motion was extremely clear to the House.
I really do think it was clear to anybody who was in that debate. The Minister for the Cabinet Office also went on at least to hint that if the deal did not go through this week, he at least would be open to some sort of process by which the House could come to a different agreement and move forward; I think he indicated that that would be next week. Of course, on Monday we are due to vote and possibly amend the section 13 motion that the Government have to table as a result of the last meaningful vote failing.
Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that this is about not the length of the extension but its function? The EU will need to see either a change in the process—that is, a vote of the people of this country—or a very different deal. The Prime Minister’s deal is clearly dead and cannot come back to life.
I agree. Also, it is not very seemly for the United Kingdom to be in a situation in which a deal is simply put and re-put and re-put and re-put. If it eventually got through by just a few votes after many times of trying and with threat levels changing, it would not be a proper basis for the future relationship with the EU because it will have lost all credibility; the meaningfulness is sucked out every time this process is repeated.
Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?
No, I am going to make some progress. I will give way in a moment.
We are now acting in the absence of a deal, with the express will of this House to prevent no deal. One of my biggest concerns is that the Prime Minister’s actions make no deal far more likely, not less—and that is the very issue that we were trying to deal with last week. If agreed by the EU, a short extension for the purposes of forcing through this deal would simply push the cliff edge back to 30 June, and we would start down the same track. The Prime Minister is repeating the same flawed strategy that she has been pursuing for two years in order to recreate the binary choice between her deal and no deal that this House rejected last week.
Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?
I am just going to make some progress before I take any more interventions.
After voting as we did in last week’s debate, we recognise that an extension to article 50 is now needed, and it is the failure of the Prime Minister’s approach that has caused the requirement for an extension. Of course, any extension should be as short as possible, but it has to allow a solution to the mess that the Prime Minister has got the country into—to provide a route to prevent no deal, not to make it more likely. It also has to provide a way for this House to prevent the Prime Minister from forcing the same deal on us over and over again. That is why we believe that the focus in the coming days and weeks should be on finding a majority for a new direction—to allow the House to consider options that can resolve the current crisis.
For Labour, that centres on two basic propositions: a close economic relationship with permanent customs union and single market alignment; and a public vote with credible leave options and a remain option. Those propositions, and possibly others, need to be discussed and tested, and we need to come to a consensus to see whether we can move forward. That is what extension should be about, not about the narrow interests of the Conservative party and trying to keep the Prime Minister in post.
Thank you again, Mr Speaker, for allowing this debate today. I look forward to hearing the Secretary of State explain the Government’s approach and how they plan to prevent Parliament from going back to the same place in three months’ time.
Mr Speaker, thank you again for granting this debate today. The extension of article 50 is an important issue and this has been an important debate, and it would not have happened but for this Standing Order No. 24 application and debate. I thank everybody who has contributed. There have been some very powerful speeches, and I think that there is a clear theme: a deep concern about the course of action that the Government are pursuing. It is reckless to seek just a short extension for the purposes of putting the same deal back up and to introduce a new cliff edge at the end of the exercise, and it does increase the risk of no deal. That has been the constant theme through so many of the speeches this afternoon. It is not what this House voted for last week, both in terms of the motions that were passed or the spirit of those motions; it is clearly not what this House wants.
I hope that the Government have been listening to the debate, and I hope that they will—even at this eleventh hour—reflect on the course of action and take a different course, which is to recognise that this deal is not fit to be put before the House for a third time, and that the alternative course of providing a process so that the House can come together, find a majority, move forward and break the impasse is needed now more than ever. It is my privilege to close this debate on this important issue.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That this House has considered the matter of the length and purpose of the extension of the Article 50 process requested by the Government.
I now have to announce the result of today’s deferred Divisions. In respect of the Question relating to consumer protection, the Ayes were 313 and the Noes were 267, so the Question was agreed to. In respect of the Question relating to the annulment of amendments to the Integrated Care Regulations 2019, the Ayes were 216 and the Noes were 317, so the Question was negatived. In respect of the Question relating to organic production and control of imports, the Ayes were 315 and the Noes were 39, so the Question was agreed to. In respect of the Question relating to organic production and control, the Ayes were 315 and the Noes were 38, so the Question was agreed to.
[The Division lists are published at the end of today’s debates.]
Rating and Valuation
Motion made, and Question put,
That the draft Non-Domestic Rating (Rates Retention and Levy and Safety Net) (Amendment) and (Levy Account: Basis of Distribution) Regulations 2019, which were laid before this House on 21 February, be approved.—(Jeremy Quin.)
The House proceeded to a Division.
(5 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberMy hon. Friend will have seen the announcements about the Treasury guarantee for the funding measures she mentioned. We are also exploring more long-term alternatives, so this work is ongoing.
Thirty days ago the Government backed the Brady amendment and the Prime Minister said she would try to obtain
“legally binding changes to the withdrawal agreement that deal with concerns on the backstop”.—[Official Report, 29 January 2019; Vol. 653, c. 788.]
It is clear from yesterday’s debate that some Members on the Government Benches have a high expectation that legally binding changes may yet be agreed, even at the eleventh hour. Against that background, will the Secretary of State confirm that, although discussions have taken place about work streams and possible additional words to further explain the backstop, in the 30 days since the Brady amendment, the Government have not drafted or put forward to the EU any proposed words that could conceivably be described as “legally binding changes to the withdrawal agreement” in relation to the backstop?
The right hon. and learned Gentleman is right to refer to the package of measures that we are putting before the European Union, and the Prime Minister touched on that in her remarks on Tuesday. In terms of the specific wording, these are obviously live discussions and need to be given the space to be conducted. As the Prime Minister set out in her statement on Tuesday, we have been very clear with the European Union that the effects of these changes have to be legally binding. That is what the Brady amendment required and it is the clear will of the House; that is the crux of the issue that we are discussing with the European Union.
Well, this may be Brexit questions, but it is clearly not Brexit answers. The Secretary of State can evade questions all he likes, but his evasion tells its own story. He knows and I know that the Government are not even attempting to change a single word about the backstop in the withdrawal agreement, and he knows the expectation among his hon. Friends that there are going to be those changes to the withdrawal agreement. Can he not simply admit that the only plan the Government have is to run down the clock and attempt to force MPs to choose between the same basic deal that was rejected in the first meaningful vote and no deal?
With respect to the right hon. and learned Gentleman, there is an inherent contradiction in his question. He says that the Government are trying to run down the clock while, at the same time, we gave a clear commitment yesterday to give the House a vote, if the meaningful vote does not go through on the 12th, on whether the House would then support leaving without a deal. That is not in the Government’s interest. It is also not in our interest to run down the clock because, as he is well aware, we need to ratify the agreement through the withdrawal agreement Bill prior to leaving, and therefore we need time for that ratification to take place, so there is a contradiction within his question.
It is not in our interest to run down the clock, and, further, it is not in the interests of the business community, because they want the uncertainty ended as soon as possible. I gently say to the right hon. and learned Gentleman, while congratulating him on perhaps winning a battle on his Front Bench on a second referendum when so many of his fellow shadow Ministers have spoken out publicly against it, that a second referendum will prolong the uncertainty, and I do not think that is in the interests of business.
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberI rise to support amendment (a) in my name and that of the Leader of the Opposition. The Secretary of State ended by saying that we have to “hold our nerve”, but he was all over the place this afternoon on all the important issues.
It is obvious—obvious—what the Prime Minister is up to. She is pretending to make progress while running down the clock: a non-update every other week to buy another two weeks of process, and inching ever closer to the 29 March deadline in 43 days’ time. We should not be fooled. Let us look at the history of recent months and set it against the exchanges today. The Prime Minister pulled the meaningful vote on 10 December, promising to seek further reassurances on the backstop. She feared a significant defeat, and it was obvious that the backstop was the problem way back then, as it had been through the autumn. That was 66 days ago, and there were then 109 days until 29 March.
I will in a minute.
And the Prime Minister returned with nothing—warm words in the margins of the EU summit in December, and a letter, coupled with a statement about Northern Ireland, that simply repeated already existing commitments. That is what she came back with. The meaningful vote was then put on 15 January, and it was lost heavily. That evening, the Prime Minister stood at the Dispatch Box and promised to explore ideas with the European Union, following cross-party talks on how to proceed. That was 30 days ago, and there were then 75 days until 29 March.
Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?
I will in just a minute.
Two weeks after that, on 29 January, the Prime Minister voted for the so-called Brady amendment.
Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?
I will give way in just a minute.
The amendment called for the backstop to be replaced with alternative arrangements. It was extraordinary: a Prime Minister voting to support her own deal only on condition that it is changed—conditional support for her own deal. Nobody prepared the business community for that, and nobody prepared Northern Ireland or EU leaders for that. Anybody who has spoken to businesses, been to Northern Ireland or spoken to political leaders in the EU in recent days knows that, by three-line whipping her own MPs to vote against the deal she negotiated, the Prime Minister has lost a good deal of trust in the process.
Can the right hon. and learned Gentleman not understand the nonsense of his own argument? He suggests on the one hand that the Prime Minister is trying to run down the clock, and then he lists the various occasions when she has attempted to stop the clock, get a deal and exit the European Union.
I am grateful for that intervention: I think the hon. Gentleman has missed the point. The Prime Minister has spent weeks—[Interruption.] The hon. Gentleman wants an answer and then interrupts while I am trying to speak. The Prime Minister has spent weeks and weeks trying to negotiate changes to the backstop—it started way before the vote was pulled on 10 December, and it has gone on ever since—and she has got absolutely nowhere.
Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?
I will just make the next point and then I will give way.
The idea that the vote on 29 January for the Brady amendment gave clarity is for the birds. The Government united around a proposition that they want an alternative to the backstop, but uniting around an alternative that means different things to different people does not get anybody anywhere, and that is the central problem.
I will in just one minute.
On Tuesday, in another non-update from the Prime Minister, she said what she wanted on the backstop and listed three things: a time-limited backstop; an ability unilaterally to end the backstop; or alternative arrangements. That is how she put it. The first two of those have been repeatedly ruled out by the EU for months, and there is no sign of any movement. The Secretary of State, from his discussions in Brussels in recent days, knows that very well—there is no room for a move on those two fronts.
I will in just a second.
The third option—alternative arrangements—remains undefined, and when the Prime Minister is pressed, either here or in Brussels, about exactly what she means, she does not say. The Malthouse compromise and the answer the Secretary of State gave about it give the game away. If that was a serious proposition and the Government were engaging with it, they would adopt it as policy and put resource into it, but they are not doing so. What signal does that send to Brussels about what the Government really think about the Malthouse compromise?
May I commend the right hon. and learned Gentleman for his courage and bravery in standing up for his own alternative arrangements, which of course include a second referendum? I just wonder how he is getting on with that in his own party. More importantly, does he believe a second referendum would increase or decrease investor and business confidence in the United Kingdom?
I am grateful for the concern, and I am getting on fine, thanks very much. I will tell the hon. Gentleman and the House one thing on business certainty. I have been talking to hundreds of businesses across the country. Even in the last 10 days, I have been in Belfast, Cardiff, Birmingham and Dublin talking to businesses. What they are most concerned about is the uncertainty of the situation that we are in now, and all of them would welcome anything that prevents a no-deal Brexit.
Are not all these meetings and activity that my right hon. and learned Friend is outlining, when it comes to these alternative arrangements, really just a repetition of the Brexit unicorns on no hard border that we have heard time and again? The reality is that the Government’s strategy on this is the same as it has always been, which is the desperate hope that Chancellor Merkel will come to the rescue and the European Union will throw Ireland under the bus.
My right hon. and learned Friend has been talking to businesses, as I have. Does he agree that the issue of no deal is a matter not simply for 28 March, but for now? Exports can take six weeks and companies need to make decisions now about how they are planning to trade.
I do agree with that. One of the things that saddens me most from the discussions I have had in the last two or three weeks—the Secretary of State and others who have had such discussions know exactly what is being said—is that decisions are having to be made because of the fear of no deal. Such decisions are being triggered, but the chilling bit from the discussions I have had is that some of those steps are now irreversible. This is the first time we have come to that point.
Is not the thing this House has to understand that the backstop is there in case the Malthouse compromise turns into the Malthouse fantasy—if all the technologies are technological fantasies —and that Europe cannot give up on the backstop just because of all the wishy-washy promises from the UK Government? The EU has to stick with it, and Conservative Members just do not understand that.
The EU has been very clear about the backstop. It is to be observed that there are hon. Members working on the Malthouse compromise, but it is equally to be observed that the Government have not adopted it as their policy position.
I will just make a bit of progress on this point.
So it goes on, and so it will go on. The simple and painful truth is this: if there had been a viable alternative to the backstop, there would never have been a backstop. The negotiating parties, as everybody knows, searched for months for that elusive alternative. If there had been an alternative, the Prime Minister would never have signed up to the backstop and neither would the EU. They searched and they searched, and they did not find it, and everybody who has observed the negotiations knows that. The chances of a breakthrough now, in 43 days, seem to me to be slim.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman is making a powerful point, as always, about the ineptitude of this Government. We know that there is not a whole lot of love, even on St Valentine’s Day, for the Government’s deal—we know that—and we know that we are in danger of crashing off the cliff edge, with the damage that that will cause, and he is right to highlight it. Will he back our amendment (i), which very simply asks for an extension of no less than three months to ensure that we can avoid such a no-deal Brexit?
I have sympathy with the point that we will need an extension to article 50 sooner or later, whether a deal goes through or not, and that the question is what is the right binding mechanism for doing that. We will support measures proposed by others on that issue in due course, and I will return to that point.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman is being generous with his time. In contrast to what he just claimed, the Secretary of State’s point was admirably clear. A good deal is preferable to no deal, but if there is no deal we will leave the EU on 29 March on those terms. Labour Members have an unfortunate habit of taking everything that the EU says as gospel, which is clearly not the case, and they ignore the fact that the EU could write the textbook on 11th-hour deals. Have some optimism in the ability to achieve a deal.
As for the Prime Minister taking us out of the EU on 29 March this year without a deal—we’ll see about that. I do not think that the majority in this House will countenance that; I think the majority in this House will do everything they can to prevent it. Having worked with the Prime Minister when she was Home Secretary and I was Director of Public Prosecutions, I know that she has a deep sense of duty. Deep down, I do not think that this Prime Minister will take us out of the EU without a deal on 29 March, and that is the basis on which we should be having this discussion.
My right hon. and learned Friend is right in what he says about business and the need for clarity, and it is clear for all to see that the Government will need to apply for an extension to article 50 to avoid no deal, or even if there is a deal. The reason they are not doing so, and the reason why the Brexit Secretary is not saying what he should to give certainty to business, is that the Conservative party will not face down the party within a party that is the European Research Group. Face those people down!
I am grateful for that intervention, and my right hon. Friend puts his finger on it.
Is my right hon. and learned Friend as astonished as I am that we have a Prime Minister and Government who are willing to take this reckless gamble with the future prosperity of our country, just to keep their rotten party together?
I will make some progress. I have taken a lot of interventions, and I will take some more in a minute. My simple point, which I stand by, is that both sides have been searching for this alternative for most of the negotiations, and certainly since the phase 1 agreement in December a year ago. People have been searching for an alternative and they have not found it. If they had found it, we would not have a backstop. The likelihood of them finding that alternative in the next few weeks seems to me very slim, and even if they do, the chances of the deal getting through, with everything that has to follow by 29 March, are even slimmer. So many pieces of legislation and statutory instruments still need to be resolved.
That exposes what is really going on—this has come out in comments from across the House—which is a Prime Minister who is running down the clock and hoping to get to March, or even the end of March. The House should remember that the next EU summit is on 21 March, and if we get real changes to the deal, that is when they are likely to be signed off. At that late stage, the plan is essentially to send the same deal back to this House as a binary choice: my deal or no deal. There might be additional words that the Attorney General can say have real significance, but it will essentially be the same deal. That is not holding our nerve; that is playing recklessly, and we must say no.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman is being extraordinarily generous in giving way. No self-respecting businessman or woman would walk into negotiations on a deal and take no deal off the table. The United Kingdom is negotiating the biggest business deal in its history. It therefore makes sense to keep no deal on the table, because we know from the history of the EU that it makes concessions at the last minute. We need to hold our nerve. If we do, then at the wire we will get a good deal in the interests of both the EU and the United Kingdom.
I do not know how to let the hon. Gentleman down gently, but let me try this: we are so patently unprepared for no deal that it is not credible. Let me give an example. There are very serious allegations against people in custody across the EU under the European arrest warrant, which goes between our country and the EU27, and vice versa. If we leave without a deal, no arrangements are in place to deal with that. The idea that we will leave in such a way is simply not credible.
I have heard the argument that if we face the truth and say that no deal is not credible, that somehow plays into the EU’s hands. We have heard that for the past two years. I stood here and said that the Government needed to publish a plan of their objectives—remember the days when they said that they could not even do that because it would give the game away and the negotiations would be over? Then they published a plan. I stood here and argued that we needed an impact assessment. What was the response? They said, “If we publish impact assessments, the show will be over. Nobody in a negotiation would do that.” I stood here and said that we needed legal advice, and we got the same argument: “If we do that, the show will be over. We will give into the EU.” Now we have the same thing with a no-deal scenario. It is not credible, and it is not going to work.
I thank the right hon. and learned Gentleman so much for giving way—I was beginning to think I had an invisibility cloak on. Just over a week ago there was a debate on a petition about extending article 50, which was signed by more than 100,000 members of the public. I spoke in that debate, which was sparsely attended, but I did not hear from the shadow Front Bencher that Labour policy is to extend article 50. Indeed, some speakers made it sound as if Labour policy was to have a people’s vote. Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman confirm what Labour is arguing for?
I am sure the question of policy is important, but I am facing the practical reality. We are 43 days away from 29 March, and no credible alternative is in sight. Either we accept that or we do not. The Prime Minister keeps coming back and giving a non-update: “I’m meeting people”—she does not say she has agreed anything—“can I have another two weeks?” We have been going on like that for weeks, and it must stop.
I am going to make some progress. Labour’s amendment is intended to put a hard stop to running down the clock. It states that on 27 February the Government must put a deal to the House for its approval, or table an amendable motion so that the House can take control of what happens next. It is essential that we do so. Businesses are saying that they cannot wait any longer. They are putting off investment decisions, and they cannot tolerate the threat of no deal. They are making and implementing contingency plans, some of which are irreversible.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman is making a strong point about the perils of no deal. Does he agree that the Government’s position on no deal is not just criminally reckless, it is also plain stupid? The EU knows as well as we do that a no-deal scenario would hurt us an awful lot more than it would hurt it. Threatening to put a gun to our own head is not a clever negotiating strategy.
I agree and I am grateful for that intervention. That is really the point. If it is not credible that we can leave on 29 March without a deal, and it is not, it is actually not a negotiating stance at all. It has never been seen in that way and it does not work. It is just farcical to suggest that we have to keep up the pretence that we are ready because then the EU will back down. It is ridiculous.
Let us put some detail on this. We have heard the warnings from Airbus and Nissan about future jobs and investment in the UK. Yesterday, Ford, another huge UK employer, said that no deal would be
“catastrophic for the UK auto industry and Ford’s manufacturing operations in the country”,
and that it will
“take whatever action is necessary to preserve the competitiveness of our European business.”
The right hon. and learned Gentleman is right to say that business wants certainty—he has made big play of that—but it was the CBI, the Federation of Small Businesses and GE Aviation in my constituency that said, “For goodness’ sake, back the Prime Minister’s deal.” He did not do that. He must understand that in failing to do so he and the Labour party become complicit in a crash-out.
Well, I am not going to take that lying down for this reason: on the Government Benches, did they vote for the deal on 29 January? [Interruption.] Hang on, hear me out. The answer to that is no. Anybody who voted for the Brady amendment was saying that it is conditional on change, so do not lecture anybody else about voting for the deal. Even the Prime Minister says, “On reflection, I’m not voting for my deal unless there are changes.” The hon. Gentleman really cannot throw the challenge across the House and say that the Opposition have to support the unchanged deal but the Prime Minister wants it changed.
Some on the Government Benches will casually dismiss the threat of job losses as “Project Fear.” It is not “Project Fear”—it is “Project Reality.” It is the jobs and livelihoods of those we represent that are at stake.
I am going to make some progress and then I will give way again.
Therefore, we need to take whatever steps are necessary to prevent a no-deal exit. Two weeks ago, this House voted to approve the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Erdington (Jack Dromey) and the right hon. Member for Meriden (Dame Caroline Spelman). That was hugely welcome and it is just as binding on the Government as what else was passed that evening—you can’t choose one part and not the other. It showed what the Opposition have always said: there is no majority in this House for a no deal.
I have listened carefully today. In defence of the Secretary of State, he has made it quite clear that the Government’s policy, if it comes to it and the deal does not pass in the week beginning 25 March, is to leave with no deal. Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman clear in his mind what his party’s position will be in the same circumstances?
I am. Happily, we discussed that at our party conference and agreed unanimously—something I do not think happened at the hon. Gentleman’s party conference—[Interruption.] He knows very well what it is. It is to vote on the deal; if the deal does not go through, to call for a general election; and if that does not happen, there are two options: a close economic relationship and a public vote. We committed at our party conference to ensure we take whatever steps are necessary to avoid a no-deal exit and we will do so.
Excuse me, I have a bit of a head cold. The amount of white flags being thrown would give anyone a head cold. Can the shadow Brexit Secretary confirm that the Labour party’s position is that there must be legally binding changes to the withdrawal agreement on the backstop? That is the same position as that of DUP Members.
The position of the Labour party is that we have concerns about the backstop. [Interruption.] This is a very serious point and I intend to answer it. I have not yet met anybody who does not have concerns about the backstop, both here and in Brussels, but we also recognise that, at this stage, with the article 50 window all but closed, we need a backstop, and it is inevitable that we need a backstop. That is our position.
I thank the shadow Brexit Secretary for allowing me to intervene on that very important point. He is very knowledgeable about Northern Ireland and is a great friend to Northern Ireland. He will recognise the importance of the backstop to the people of Northern Ireland and indeed across the United Kingdom. There seems to be some confusion about what the leader of the Labour party says about the backstop and what he, the shadow Brexit Secretary, says. I think the people of Northern Ireland—indeed, this House—are entitled to clarification from the right hon. and learned Gentleman about what exactly the position of the Labour party is on the backstop.
I am grateful for that intervention. As the hon. Lady knows, I worked in Northern Ireland for five years with the Northern Ireland Policing Board. I know how deeply this is felt in Northern Ireland across all communities. I was there for two days last week. I made the point there that, although we have concerns about the backstop, we do accept that there must be a backstop, it is inevitable and that, therefore, notwithstanding those concerns, we support a backstop. That is very important.
I thank the right hon. and learned Gentleman for giving way because I actually find that I agree with a great deal of what he is saying. He is saying that leaving with no deal would bring huge consequences for our economy and we should not countenance it. He is also saying that within the withdrawal agreement he sees the need for a backstop. I have listened closely to what he said before: that he also agrees on the elements about needing a transition period and certainty on citizens’ rights. Given that he now appears to agree with everything that is in the withdrawal agreement, why will he not vote for it and what more does he need?
I am not sure the hon. Lady carefully read the proposition we were voting for on the meaningful vote. It was the withdrawal agreement and the political declaration taken together. The statute requires them to be taken together, because we cannot read the withdrawal agreement without reference to the political declaration and vice versa. What I have said about the backstop is important and it is important I say it for the whole of the United Kingdom, but particularly for people in Northern Ireland, and I stand by it.
Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman able to clarify in plain English at what point the Leader of the Opposition will unequivocally back a people’s vote?
The policy we have adopted is clear about what the options are. What we are trying to do today is to put a hard stop to the running down of the clock. That will enable options to be considered in due course. I hope that will happen. When they are considered, we will take our position and we will see where the majority is in the House.
The backstop is taking up a lot of the discussion today because it is incredibly important. May I remind my right hon. and learned Friend that, in the debates leading up to the meaningful vote, concerns about trade were mentioned three times more than the backstop? Can I encourage him to move on now from the backstop and talk about all the other problems that Members across the House have with the deal?
I am grateful for that intervention. One of the central problems in all this is that the political declaration is 26 pages long, it is vague in the extreme and simply talks about a “spectrum” of outcomes. The main theme of the political declaration is that the extent of any checks at borders will depend on the degree of alignment; therefore, there is a spectrum of outcomes. I think that we all understood that within hours of the referendum. That is why there is all this pressure on the backstop—because the political declaration is so ill-defined.
Following my right hon. and learned Friend’s replies to the hon. Members for Bracknell (Dr Lee) and for Totnes (Dr Wollaston), does he agree that the Government have clearly rejected Labour’s offer of a less damaging Brexit, and that to wait until the end of March to activate our unanimously agreed conference policy in favour of a public vote would be far, far too late?
Just as I am about to give the answer I am asked from a sedentary position what the answer is. Perhaps those on the Government Front Bench should just listen. The position is this. As the House knows, we set out the Labour party’s position in a letter to the Prime Minister. We set out in clear terms what a close economic relationship would look like. What was written in that letter has been well received, not only in the United Kingdom, by businesses and trade unions, but by the EU and EU leaders. It is a credible proposition.
I just want to complete this point, because it is important. The Prime Minister has replied in non-committal terms—one could say that that was inevitable—and we are having discussions, as the Secretary of State says. I am not going to disclose at this stage what those discussions are about because they are, by their nature, confidential. They are ongoing, I think the Secretary of State would want them to be kept confidential—that is the only way in which they can properly be held—and there are plans for further meetings. To go back to the point raised by my right hon. Friend the Member for Exeter (Mr Bradshaw), there must come a point at which the options are clarified, reduced and voted on—I agree with that proposition—and it needs to be done before the end of March.
My right hon. and learned Friend is making some important and good points about the Prime Minister’s running down the clock, but he took that round of applause—that standing ovation—at the Labour party conference when he talked about a people’s vote with a remain option, so I have been waiting patiently for the section of his remarks in which he will perhaps dissociate himself from the remarks of the general secretary of Unite, who said yesterday that it would not be in the country’s interests to have remain on the ballot paper in a public vote. We are aware that sections in letters and remarks sometimes have a habit of being redacted by others, perhaps further up the pay chain. Will my right hon. and learned Friend assure us that at the next available opportunity we will be voting in favour of a people’s vote?
I do not think I need to associate with or dissociate from anybody on what my views are. I think they are pretty clear. As for the timetable, I have set out the order of events.
I am going to make some progress and then I will take more interventions. I have taken a lot of interventions and I am conscious that a lot of people want to speak in this debate.
Let me go back to the amendment that was passed in respect of no deal, because it was passed by a majority in this House and is just as important as the other amendment that was passed. Let us make no mistake, though: on its own it is not enough. If Parliament wants to prevent no deal, it has to take further action. We cannot be bystanders; we have to act. The simple truth of it is that we cannot declare that we are against no deal and then do nothing. The Government are failing to act, so we must act. Hence, the next step is to ensure that there is a hard stop to running down the clock.
Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?
Not at the moment.
The hard stop would ensure that on 27 February the Prime Minister must either put her deal to a vote or allow Parliament to decide what happens next. Let us be clear, though: other steps need to be taken, beyond today’s amendment. They will include the Bill introduced by my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), which would provide a further safeguard against no deal and allow the House to decide whether the Government should seek an extension of article 50 if no deal has been agreed by 13 March. I hope that anyone who genuinely opposes no deal would see that by that date, 13 March, an extension would be unavoidable.
Will my right hon. and learned Friend clarify something for me? I am sympathetic to and almost supportive of the efforts of my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) and her Bill, which was introduced with good sincerity. What is the Labour party Front-Bench position, though? Were we to have an extension that went further than the three months, would my right hon. and learned Friend intend that we would participate in European Union parliamentary elections? Those of us going on the knocker this weekend ought to know.
As I have said from this Dispatch Box, so far as the extension is concerned, it obviously depends on the period and the period the EU has indicated might be available is the period till 1 July, because that would avoid involvement in the parliamentary elections. It is not our policy to participate in the parliamentary elections——[Interruption.] For obvious reasons, we will not be—[Interruption.] This is a really serious point. There is this casualness about no deal—that we can somehow, in a macho way, march off the cliff and it will all be fine; it will be so good for the country. The point is that if, by 13 March—just over two weeks before the potential for no deal—there is no deal, we have to take action if we are serious about avoiding the calamity and catastrophe of no deal. I do not mind standing up here and saying that I will take whatever steps are necessary to avoid no deal, because I will never be persuaded—never—that it is a good negotiating tactic or could possibly be good for our country.
The House will then need to debate and vote on credible options to prevent no deal. We have been clear that those options are either the close economic relationship that includes a customs union and close alignment to the single market that we set out in the letter to the Prime Minister, or a public vote on a deal or proposition that can command the support of the House. There are no other credible options remaining, and those options are miles away from the approach that the Government are currently taking. First, though, we need to stop the Government further running down the clock, put in a hard stop and allow this House to take control of the process. That is what today is about and I urge all Members to support our amendment.
(5 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberUnderstandably, we have big debates in the House about goods, but 80% of our economy is services, so my hon. Friend is quite right to draw attention to that. The political declaration contains the opportunity to have a good and constructive relationship that reflects the dominance of the UK position on financial services, for example. That is why the package of the withdrawal agreement and the political declaration together is so important.
There are 64 days until 29 March, and the deal has gone down. On Monday, the Prime Minister made a statement about what she is going to do now; to put it politely, she was vague about her intentions. She said that she would “take the conclusions” of any discussions with MPs “back to the EU”, as if she is in a parallel universe in which we are somehow at the start of the process. I have a simple question: when the Prime Minister goes to the EU, will she be seeking legally binding changes to the withdrawal agreement, simple reassurances or, still less, clarifications?
The right hon. and learned Gentleman is always polite, so I will reciprocate and say that there are 64 days to go but we still do not know what Labour’s position is. It appears—
I always listen to the Secretary of State with the keenest possible interest and attention, but I must say to him in all courtesy that he is filibustering his own right hon. and hon. Friends, who might not get in on this session. It must be clear that he is culpable, because the Chair is not.
The Secretary of State gives the definition of a non-answer. [Hon. Members: “What’s your policy, then?”] Our policy is a comprehensive customs union and single market deal—[Interruption.] It is in our manifesto, and I think that there would be a majority for it in this place, if it were put to a vote.
I look forward to tomorrow’s headlines, but I doubt they will say that Len McCluskey and the Prime Minister have agreed on the way forward. I asked the Secretary of State a question, and I would like an answer. Does the Prime Minister intend to put her deal to the House again and, if so, when?
Self-evidently, whatever deal we bring forward will need to secure the confidence of the House, and that will entail a vote. The right hon. and learned Gentleman talks about his policy and actually, unlike the Leader of the Opposition, he has been quite clear. His policy appears to be to remain in the European Union by triggering a second referendum, and he has indicated his personal view that, following that vote, we should remain. His policy is not consistent with the Labour manifesto, so I ask him again: is his policy the Labour policy, or is his policy different from that of the Leader of the Opposition?
(5 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberIt is a pleasure finally to be able to resume this debate.
Thirty days ago, on 10 December, the Prime Minister told the House that the meaningful vote would be deferred. She did, of course, do so without consulting the House on the issue. The ground that she laid out on 10 December was that if the Government
“went ahead and held the vote”,
which was due to take place the next day,
“the deal would be rejected by a significant margin.” —[Official Report, 10 December 2018; Vol. 651, c. 23.]
That was her judgment call. She said that she would do everything possible “to secure further assurances”, particularly over the issue of the Northern Ireland backstop.
The Leader of the House went further, saying:
“going back to the EU and seeking reassurances, in the form of legally binding reassurances”
was
“absolutely doing the right thing”.
The implication was that this was a pause to allow further assurances—legally binding reassurances, according to the Leader of the House. The International Trade Secretary, with his usual foresight, said:
“It is very difficult to support the deal if we don’t get changes to the backstop.
I am not even sure the Cabinet will agree for it to be put to the House of Commons.”
That was his assessment.
Those were senior members of the Cabinet, indicating to Parliament and to the country that the deal, the proposition before the House, needed to be changed if it were to be voted on and not defeated by a substantial majority. They were, of course, challenged. They were challenged on the basis that this was just a way of delaying and avoiding a humiliating defeat, and they were running down the clock. Now, 30 days on, those rebuttals ring hollow.
The Prime Minister is often mocked for saying that nothing has changed, but this time nothing has changed. The proposition before the House today is the same proposition as the one that the Prime Minister put before the House on 5 December, when she opened the initial debate. I have my own copies of these two documents, but the two copies that I have here were laid on the Table at the beginning of the debate. They are the proposition that is before the House, and, as everyone in the House knows, they are precisely the same two documents that were put before the House on 5 December. When we go through the Lobby next Tuesday, we will be voting for or against these two unchanged documents.
Given that the right hon. and learned Gentleman has just picked up the withdrawal deal, I am sure that, being the learned gentleman he is, he has read, on page 307, the guarantee and the protection for the Good Friday agreement—the Belfast agreement—and the consent principle. Twenty years ago, his party, the Labour party, was the architect—thank the Lord—of that agreement, which put an end to the appalling violence of more than 30 years in Northern Ireland, when 302 police officers lost their lives and thousands of innocent people lost theirs in the terrorist campaign. Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman explain to the House, and to the Irish diaspora in Labour constituencies, how it is that the Labour party is voting down a deal that guarantees the agreement?
Let me take that point head on, because it is very important. Our party—both parties—played an important part in the peace process, and I genuinely think that there is a consensus, or a near-consensus, across the House on the importance of that agreement. We have been very proud of upholding it. Even in the course of these debates over the last two years, every time it has come up there has been a reiteration of the principles. I myself worked in Northern Ireland for five years, with the Policing Board, implementing some of the recommendations of the Good Friday agreement, and I therefore have first-hand knowledge of how both communities see it, what the impact was before change, and what it is now. However, I do not think it fair to characterise anyone who says that these two documents are not the right deal for our country as undermining the Good Friday agreement. That simply means that there can be no criticism, no issue, no challenge to the Government, which cannot be right.
In addition, I have stood at this Dispatch Box and moved amendment after amendment whose objective was a customs union and a single market deal, which I genuinely believe constitute the only way of securing no hard border in Northern Ireland. On every occasion, the Government voted those amendments down. To say at this stage that we have tried to do nothing to protect the position is simply not right. [Interruption.] I will come to the issue of the need for a backstop—I will tackle that issue—but I wanted to deal with the intervention.
I do not think that the right hon. and learned Gentleman has answered the key question asked by the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon). I cannot understand why the Labour party is joining in the criticisms of the Irish backstop. The right hon. and learned Gentleman has repeated his commitment to a permanently open border. He has also repeated—and I agree with him about this—that there can only be a permanently open border if there is a customs union and regulatory alignment. If they are to be permanent, that must be kept permanently.
What the critics on this side of the House are saying about the backstop agreement is “We are not allowed to cancel it unilaterally.” If they are given that power, it is no longer a permanently open border. With the greatest respect, it does smack of opportunism that the Labour party is joining opponents of the backstop with whom it has no agreement whatever politically. The answer is to have the same open border for the whole United Kingdom and for the United Kingdom to be in a single market and regulatory alignment, and that is not inconsistent with the referendum.
That suggests that the customs arrangements under the backstop are the same as customs arrangements that we have currently, but they are not. I have read the document in detail several times, and I know what the customs union that we are in looks like and I know that the one under the backstop is fundamentally different. It is fundamentally different from the amendments that we have been faithfully tabling for 12 or 18 months. It is therefore unfair to say that because it is called a “customs arrangement” or a “customs union” that it is all the same; it obviously is not. The arrangements for Northern Ireland are different from those for England, Wales and Scotland, and even the arrangements for England, Wales and Scotland are not the same as the customs union that we are in now.
Among the deficiencies is that we would not have any say over future trade agreements during any period in the backstop, which has not been built in because the Government are pretending that any period would not last long. I will address the point about having a say, but we would not be able to strike our own agreements and would take no advantages from trade agreements struck by the EU. That is a fundamental deficiency of being in the backstop. It is not right or fair to pretend that such issues do not exist, that we cannot seriously engage with them, or that the importance that the Labour party puts in the Good Friday agreement is somehow undermined. That just removes the ability to challenge. The withdrawal agreement is a serious document, and it is what the Government have put before us to analyse and vote on, so we are entitled to say that it is not good enough. However, that does not mean in the next breath that we do not stick by the commitments in the Good Friday agreement.
I will make some progress and then take further interventions.
The withdrawal agreement is the same document that was before the House when the Prime Minister announced that she was postponing the vote. It is the proposition that she said she thought would be defeated by a significant margin. No changes have been made either to the 585-page, legally binding withdrawal agreement or to the incredibly vague political declaration. There is no new text for this House to consider.
Some of us expected the Prime Minister to make a statement on Monday to tell the House what had happened while we were in recess, to update us on any meetings or discussions that she may have had—we read about them in the press—and to say whether anything had changed. She did not come to make a statement. The Brexit Secretary handled an urgent question, the central thrust of which was about what progress had been made and what changes there had been. The Brexit Secretary defended his position with a smile, attacking the Opposition, as he always does, by asking, “What’s your proposition?” while ignoring the fact that we are voting on the withdrawal agreement, not on what anyone else is saying. He smiled, attacked the Opposition and swerved challenges, but he did not answer the question, and the reason why is that there has been no meaningful change.
Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?
I will just make this point and then give way.
I was here for Prime Minister’s questions today, and I carefully noted what the Prime Minister said in answer to the first question from my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition. First, she said that the changes that she is now relying on are the results of the December European Council summit, at which the EU agreed that it would use “its best endeavours” to secure the future relationship as quickly as possible. What else could it say? Of course, we would hope that it would do that. However, the EU also said at the same summit that the withdrawal agreement cannot be renegotiated, so that does not take us very far.
Secondly, the Prime Minister said that further clarifications might be “possible” by Tuesday, so we are in exactly the same position as we were on 10 December, with a hope for possible assurances—there may be something coming.
Thirdly, the Prime Minister referred to the paper on Northern Ireland published this morning, and the Brexit Secretary referred to it, too. Members may not have had the chance to read this 13-page document, but I have read it. I do not dismiss anything that marks a step towards ensuring that the concerns in Northern Ireland and across the whole United Kingdom are addressed, whatever they are, so I am not dismissing this document. However, on my reading—if I am wrong, I will correct this or be corrected—I think I am right in saying that the document does not contain any new commitments. It brings together the unilateral commitments made in other places at other times into one document. I have been going through the document as I have been in the Chamber, so if I am wrong, I will be challenged but, as far as I can see, it just builds on the unilateral commitments in paragraph 50 of the phase 1 joint report document from December 2017 and adds the commitments that the Prime Minister has made in Belfast and other places. I am not saying that those commitments are not important or are without significance. I do not dismiss them, but we need to see the document for what it is, which is a bringing together of existing commitments. The position has not changed between 10 December and today.
The fourth thing that has been relied upon as a change that the House needs to take into account is that it is now said that Parliament will have a role in July 2020 when we must choose whether to apply for an extension of the transition or to go on to the backstop. There are several points about that, one of which is that it does not change the options, and I will develop why I think that those options will have to be exercised. Arguably, it is the logic of the article 50 case in the Supreme Court, certainly if we go on to the backstop, because the whole argument in the Supreme Court was that if we change the rights of individuals in this country as a matter of international law then we have to have a vote in this House, so I am not sure that this is much of a gift or concession from the Government.
The other point is the practical reality, which we have seen today and yesterday: the idea that the Prime Minister or anybody else was going to get away with freezing Parliament out of that decision in July 2020 is misconceived. We were always going to have a say on that, because it is such an important position. So the proposition on the table is not altered. The Brexit Secretary did not answer substantively on Monday because the December summit does not really take us anywhere: further clarifications may be possible but they are still long awaited, the Northern Ireland paper is a bringing together of existing commitments that does not change anything, and Parliament was always going to find a way of having a say in July 2020 as to which option we take.
I promised earlier to take an intervention from my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty), so I will give way to him first.
I concur with my right hon. and learned Friend that nothing has changed. Does he therefore agree that the Prime Minister’s decision to delay was not only wrong, but irresponsible, because on every single day that has gone by during that time we have seen the Treasury spending more and more taxpayers’ money to prepare for a no deal that it says it does not want, businesses cancelling investment plans, and jobs being put at risk? All of that is deeply irresponsible, particularly when nothing has changed.
I agree with that, because if the Prime Minister’s own judgment is right that this deal as it was on 10 December is likely to go down by a significant margin, that brings into sharp focus the role of this House in debating and deciding what happens next, and the more time we have for that, the better. We have just been deprived of 30 days of that because we will not now get on to it, probably, until next week.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman has listed a series of things that have not changed. One thing that I note has not changed are the terms of his and the Leader of the Opposition’s amendment in calling for
“a permanent UK-EU customs union”,
a perfectly clear phrase that we all understand completely, and a “strong single market deal”. I am one of those in this House who would like in some way or another at some point or another in the not too distant days to arrive at some cross-party agreement about something we could actually go forward with, and therefore I ask the right hon. and learned Gentleman to explain to the House what kind of “strong single market deal” would need to be delivered in order to get an agreement.
I can deal with that because, as Members know, I have been talking to the EU and the EU27 for quite a long time now, not to undermine the Government’s position—it was actually facilitated by the first Brexit Secretary of State in some respects—but to explore what other options are possible. At present the customs union operates on the basis that the Council sets the mandate for the Commission, the Commission does the negotiating, and Parliament then has a role. So if we want a customs union that replicates the benefits of the current customs union and we want the UK to have a say in that we must find something that is similar to that, but obviously not the same as it, and the central question I have been addressing is whether the EU would be interested in a discussion about what that sort of working customs union would look like. [Interruption.] I actually had the discussion. [Interruption.] It is very easy for Members on the Treasury Bench to chunter, but I have been responsible and actually gone and had the conversation asking whether there is a basis for a discussion about a customs union that would work in that way. I have been very clear that if it ended up as something akin to the Turkey customs union—which works for Turkey—that really would not be good enough.
As for a single market deal, my own view is that there are advantages in what we call the Norway model but that there are also disadvantages in that, and therefore it must be possible—again, I have had discussions—to explore a close economic relationship that keeps alignment, with, of course, oversight and enforcement mechanisms to go with it, but which is not simply the EEA.
I say all that in some detail in order to reassure the right hon. Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin) that when we talk about a close economic relationship, a customs union with a say, and a close single market deal, we are talking about concepts that I have surfaced only after I have had discussions with EU27 countries and the EU about their possibility. I am not going to stand here and pretend that that will be easy; rather, I am standing here saying that we have been pressing for at least 12 or 18 months to have that. One of the major problems—this is at the heart of the debate and the fractiousness about it—is that the Prime Minister and the Government have pushed Parliament away. They had a choice—
I will give way in a moment, but I want to make this point because it is very important.
I campaigned to remain; I wanted to remain.
I agonised over whether we should trigger article 50, but I worked out that, having accepted the result of the referendum, it was not open to me to stop the Prime Minister starting the negotiations. What I wanted is for this House to have a proper role—by consensus, or at least by majority, if possible—in finding a way forward.
It was obvious that the sorts of arguments that are happening in the House, particularly among Conservative Members, if I may say so—I do not think that is controversial—would break out. It was obvious because for 30 years there has been a discussion, for want of a better word, in the Conservative party about not just the relationship with Europe but the vision for our country. That argument was always going to break out, and it was always going to divide Conservative Members. That is obvious, and it is not just an Opposition point. In those circumstances, a different Prime Minister might have said, “I can see what is going to happen down the line, and I need to bring Parliament into this.” That has been refused at every twist and turn.
Let us be honest that we are having a vote on Tuesday only because we fought to have it. I coined the phrase “meaningful vote”, and, working across parties, we got the amendment, which was resisted by the Government. They went through the Lobby to say no. We said, “You have to publish a plan,” and the only reason we got a plan was that we won an Opposition day motion—the Government were going to oppose that motion. We said that we wanted to know what the impact would be, and the Government said, “You can’t.” We had to get it via a Humble Address. We have seen the Supreme Court and the idea of even voting on article 50 in the first place, and then the Attorney General’s advice. The Government have persistently voted down every motion. The one thing I remember the first Brexit Secretary saying to me, over and again, on the article 50 Bill was that he wanted a clean Bill: “I want a clean Bill, and I will make sure that every amendment is voted down.” That was his avowed aim.
I completely accept the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s central point, which is that there is space for completely honourable debate within and between political parties in this House about the outcome of the negotiations on the future permanent relationship between this country and the EU27, and the various options, from Norway to Canada and every variation in between, have their champions in this place. But from his conversations with the EU institutions and with members of the 27 Governments, surely he will have accepted that the essential and unavoidable gateway to any such destination of a final agreement has to be the withdrawal agreement, which covers citizens’ rights, the Irish border and the financial settlement, which is the key document that we are being asked to endorse and ratify. What is his objection to that document?
I accept that there has to be a withdrawal agreement, and I accept that it has to cover citizens’ rights and that there are payments. I have on more than one occasion stood here and said that the progress on citizens’ rights under the withdrawal agreement is a step in the right direction, although it does not go far enough—we have quibbled about that, but there will always be an argument about whether we have gone far enough.
I have also stood here and said that we will have to fulfil our financial obligations, for the very reason the Brexit Secretary said, which is that we will not get very far in trying to reach trade agreements, or any agreements, with anybody else on the international plane if, at the same time, we are walking away from the international agreements or obligations that we have.
That does not mean I do not have concerns about the withdrawal agreement, and about the backstop in particular. The backstop has become the central issue for two reasons: first, the lack of progress on the future relationship, and I will develop that point in just a moment; and, secondly, the avowed aim of some Conservative Members to diverge as far as possible from EU alignment. It is that fear that has driven the debate on the backstop, and it could have been avoided months ago.
I am doubly grateful to the right hon. and learned Gentleman for giving way again. It is helpful to address this point after the intervention of my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Minister for the Cabinet Office.
Can the right hon. and learned Gentleman take this one stage further? If there were a cross-party agreement on the terms of an EU-UK customs union of the kind he describes, and if there were some variant of a “strong single market deal”—whether Norwegian or otherwise—is he saying it is the position of the Labour party that it would then co-operate with Her Majesty’s Government to arrive at an agreement about how to reshape the political declaration in such a way as to enable the withdrawal agreement and the political declaration to go forward so that we can exit on 29 March?
There is the customs union point and the single market deal point, and there are other issues relating to rights and protections, whether they are workplace rights or environmental rights and so on. Obviously, at some stage, if we are to leave other than without a deal, there has to be a consensus in this House for something. That is why the wasting of the past 30 days has been so regrettable, because that is where we need to get to. At no point have the Government reached out across the House at all, even after the snap election. I actually personally thought that at some stage somebody might give me a ring and ask what would be the main features that we could at least begin to discuss, or whether it was worth even having a discussion about them.
The second point gives meat to this. Time and again we have tabled amendments along the lines I have been talking about, and time and again the Government have just blindly whipped against them, without any regard to whether they were good, bad or indifferent; they were just Opposition amendments, so they were going down.
We know from the author of article 50 that it was drafted with the intention that it should never be used, so 29 March is an arbitrary date. It is only now that the Government have started to reach out and indicate that they might be willing to discuss Brexit with other parties in this House in order to get consensus, but we have run out of time. Surely the Government now have to listen and consider the fact that we may have to suspend article 50, or even to seek its revocation.
I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. I do accuse the Government of running down the clock, and it is a serious allegation. The article 50 window is two years—it is very short. The Government started the two years by having a snap general election, and lost two or three months. They then went through to the end of the phase 1 agreement, but it was not until June last year that we even had a Chequers plan, so the two-year window has in effect been run down. There is a question of the extension of article 50, which may well be inevitable now, given the position that we are in, but of course we can only seek it, because the other 27 have to agree.
The other serious question with which I have been engaging is about the appetite of the EU, after the negotiations have gone the way they have, to start again and to fundamentally change what is on the table. I have to say, with regret, that I genuinely think that the way the Government have gone about the negotiations, particularly in respect of the red lines that the Prime Minister laid down in the first place, has undermined a lot of the good will that would otherwise have been there.
I will give way once more and then I really am going to get on, because I have been giving way for around half an hour.
This is my last intervention. To go back to the intervention by my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin), which was pertinent to the situation we are all in, he asked whether the right hon. and learned Gentleman was saying on behalf of the Labour party that, if there were a cross-party agreement on a form of customs union, sufficient regulatory alignment and so on, his party would join in that positively, with a view to reaching a solution and moving on to the serious negotiations. The right hon. and learned Gentleman has turned that question into an attack on the Government, and I agree with him. I share his criticism that the Government should have made serious overtures to the Opposition long, long ago; but as we are now so short of time and we are all in danger of going towards a no-deal exit, which only a small minority in the House positively wants, is it not time for him to answer the question from my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset? Is the Labour party available for discussions with a positive view to reaching a conclusion on a customs union and sufficient regulatory alignment to keep open borders?
I have been available for discussions for the whole time I have been in this post. I have spoken to Members on all Benches about amendments, some of which have had cross-party support. We are going to have to have a discussion—I think starting after Tuesday—about where we go next. We will all have to enter that in the right spirit, because I genuinely think that leaving with no deal would be catastrophic. I also genuinely think that we cannot do it on 29 March this year; it is simply not viable for so many practical reasons. We are going to have to look at what available options are realistically still on the table and what now are the merits of each of them. There are different options; we are just discussing one of them. There are other options that I know members in my own party feel very strongly about, such as a public vote. But we are going to have to sit down and consider credibly what are the options and how Parliament takes control of what happens next. We will enter that in the right spirit, but we will all have to acknowledge, I am afraid, that some of the options that may have been there a year or two ago are not there in the same shape and form as they would have been at the time of the manifestos.
No, I really am going to make some progress now because I have been giving in—hopefully, I have been giving way, though I may have been giving in as well!
I have made the point about this being the same proposition on the table, but let me just go to the heart of the problem of why we are so stuck on this question of the backstop on which I have been challenged. At the heart of the problem is the future relationship document. The truth is that there has been barely any progress on the future relationship. It is a flimsy 26-page document. In truth, it is an options paper—a 26-page options paper—which could and should have been written two years ago. Paragraph 28—I know that everyone has marked it up, but it is worth having another look at—covers the implications for checks and controls. This is the future relationship. It says:
“The Parties envisage that the extent of the United Kingdom’s commitments on customs and regulatory cooperation, including with regard to alignment of rules, would be taken into account in the application of related checks and controls, considering this as a factor in reducing risk.”
It then goes on to say that there is a “spectrum of different outcomes”. What it is saying is that we do not know yet what the commitments on customs and co-operation will be. We do not know what the alignment will be. If it is close it might lead to one result; if it is not close it might lead to another result—a spectrum of different outcomes.
The document has 26 pages, at the heart of which is a “spectrum of different outcomes”. We keep calling it a deal, but this is not a deal; it is an options paper. It is an options paper that has been written by others. We have all mocked up an options paper, as have various academics. Let me contrast this with what the previous Brexit Secretary, the right hon. Member for Esher and Walton (Dominic Raab), said. We were challenging him over the summer about the future relationship and trying to get an assurance from him that we would have a precise and detailed document that we could vote on so we know where we are going. He said this:
“What is important is that it is clear and specific enough”—
the future relationship document—
“that we are not talking about options for negotiations”—
that is what it would not be—
“but we are clear on the choice of model”—
so it is a clear model that he said we would have—
“and therefore that it reads as a direction for the UK and the EU to get on with it—that we are really implementing heads of terms for an agreement.”
This is miles away from that. This is not a deal, and that is the cause of the problem.
The cause of the problem is this: whatever the Secretary of State says, nobody but nobody who is serious about this thinks for one moment that this document will turn into the future relationship and come into force on 1 January 2021. Nobody credible thinks that. It is a complete myth. It is precisely the same as the myth that this would all have been negotiated by now, which is why there is such anxiety about the backstop. The backstop should never have been the driving force—the focus. We should have been so far advanced in this part of the negotiation that the backstop would have been a bit of a non-issue.
I just want to make this point. We need to understand why this document is so flimsy. It is not just an accident. It is not just that people were not working hard. It is not just that the civil servants, who have worked really hard in all this, were not doing their job. It is for two primary reasons.
The first was that the Prime Minister laid down her red lines in autumn 2016 without consulting the House and, I think, without consulting the Cabinet. She said that those red lines were: outside the customs union, outside the single market and no role for the European Court of Justice. She added the suggestion that
“if you believe you’re a citizen of the world, you’re a citizen of nowhere.”
That was an interpretation of the referendum—we can argue whether it was a good or bad one—by a small team of, I think, three of four people. That was not even the interpretation of the Cabinet, and certainly not of this House. We only have 26 pages on the future relationship, because that got us off to the worst possible start to the negotiations. Those were political choices, not necessities. They were the Prime Minister’s choices, which set her on a path, and this is where it ended.
Add to that the fact that we only got the Chequers proposal in June last year. Anybody who visited Brussels between the triggering of article 50 and June 2018 will have heard the same complaint that I heard: “We don’t know what the UK is actually asking for, and therefore we can’t really advance the negotiations.” When we first got the Chequers proposal in June last year, those in Brussels acknowledged that at least there was now a plan on the table. Of course, Chequers did not unlock the problem, because it was a plan that led immediately to Cabinet resignations, that MPs were quick to say they opposed and would not agree to in any circumstances, and that the EU rejected. That is why there are only 26 pages, which expose the thinness of the proposals.
I will just crack on.
What we see from this document is that the envisaged future relationship will not deliver frictionless trade; it does not aspire to any more. There is no plan for a permanent customs union and no certainty for financial services. In fact, there is almost nothing for financial services. On workplace rights and environmental protections, there is nothing to ensure that standards do not fall behind over time. No wonder the general secretary of the TUC said:
“This is a bad deal for working people: bad for jobs and bad for rights.”
It also places us outside a whole raft of common EU programmes and agencies. Again, much of that flows directly from the Prime Minister’s insistence that there should be no role whatever for the European Court. She put that red line down, and once she had done so, any meaningful participation in those bodies became very difficult.
For five years, I was the representative of the UK in Eurojust, which, as the House will know, plays an important part in the investigation and prosecution of very serious offences across Europe, as do other agencies. In order to have the full participation that makes sense, we have to accept the oversight and enforcement mechanisms that go with it, but the red line made it impossible and led to such a thin document as this.
I have heard colleagues ask the right hon. and learned Gentleman repeatedly about the Labour party’s proposals and whether it would work on a cross-party basis. He indicated at the Dispatch Box that he would enter into cross-party discussions. Is he speaking for the Labour party or as an individual, and what proposals does he have?
I have to say that I love this. We are voting on the Government’s deal, but Members are attacking the Labour party’s plan. Well, that makes a lot of sense. Whatever else we are going to do next Tuesday, we are not going to vote on our plan. Let us be serious.
The hon. Gentleman asked me a question and I am answering him. Whether we like it or not, the Government’s deal is what we are voting on. We are not voting on what any one of us may think, say or do. Having not made any attempt to engage seriously with the Opposition on amendments and proposals, it is a bit rich for Government Members to now say that it is somehow the Opposition’s fault that the Government are in a mess and cannot get their deal through. I gently say that there is huge interest in what the Opposition think. Why? Because, in an ordinary set of proceedings and absent the snap general election, there would be a majority on the Government Benches for the Government’s own proposition. This challenge needs to be put in its proper context: it is because Conservative Members know full well that they are not all going into the same Lobby.
If anyone wants to intervene on me and say that the Conservatives are all going into the same Lobby, they can, but I do not think that is the case. The point is that the Government are so divided that they cannot get their own deal through. That is the truth of the matter.
Order. I am well aware that the hon. Lady is a former chair of the Internal Market Committee of the European Parliament. In case there are people present who were not aware of that, among the litany of achievements that she can proclaim, I have done a public service in advertising that important fact. However, it does not give her an automatic right to intervene. The right hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) will decide whether he wishes to give way to the hon. Lady, and at the moment he is not giving way.
I am not going to give way.
It is no good us pretending about this. I have said in recent weeks and months that the future relationship document is 26 pages long and that it is thin and flimsy, and the answer that now comes back occasionally is, “It was always going to be that way. What did you expect? It’s a future relationship.” Well, I will tell Members what the Prime Minister expected. I see nods from Conservative Members, but the Prime Minister was very clear about what she expected, and she set it out in her Lancaster House speech on 17 January 2017:
“I want us to have reached an agreement about our future partnership by the time the two-year Article Fifty process has concluded.”
I repeat:
“I want us to have reached an agreement.”
She continued:
“From that point onwards, we believe a phased process of implementation, in which both Britain and the EU institutions and member states prepare for the new arrangements”.
At the time, I was proposing that that was a transition period, and the Prime Minister and various Secretaries of State for Brexit kept insisting it was not a transition period, because that would imply that we were negotiating in it; instead it was an implementation period, because—[Interruption.] No, this is what they argued. They said that the agreement would have been reached and all we would need to do was implement it—to phase it in—during the two-year period. So the idea that this is as it was always going to be—that a blind Brexit was inevitable or an inherent part of the process—is completely contradicted by the Prime Minister’s own words when she said what was going to be achieved.
There are very serious consequences to having such a flimsy document on the future relationship. First, it invites this House to vote on a blind Brexit. I and other Labour Members have very strong views on what the future relationship should look like. Given a document that does not set out whether it might end up as a distant Canada-style model of some sort, or a closed Norway-style model, how can one expect any responsible Member of this House to say, “I don’t know where this is going to end, I don’t know what it’s going to look like, it could actually turn out to be an agreement I fundamentally disagree with, but I shall vote for it”? That just cannot be right. That is the problem—it is a blind Brexit. Secondly, as I have said, because the document is so thin, nobody serious, either here or in Brussels, is suggesting for one moment that the agreement is actually going to be ready by January 2021.
That means that we are going on to either an extended transition or the backstop. That is going to happen. If anybody is intending to vote next week on the pretence or understanding that we are not going to be here arguing about this in July 2020, I genuinely think they are labouring under a misconception—they are wrong. We will either be going on to the transition or going on to the backstop if the deal goes through in this form. We cannot escape that and simply pretend it is not going to happen.
I have said a few words about the backstop. As the Secretary of State rightly said, it provides for citizens’ rights and financial obligations. I do not shy away from the commitments made under the Good Friday agreement. I certainly have no truck with those who play down the importance of the Good Friday agreement—it is not the Secretary of State, the Government or the Prime Minister—or even say that their version of hard Brexit somehow overrides it. Those commitments are serious, and they have to be kept.
I also accept that, given the lack of progress in the 26-page document that we have, at this stage, sadly, some sort of backstop is inevitable. Having got to this stage of the article 50 exercise, it is now inevitable that we cannot finish the exercise within the transition period. There are risks under the backstop, and the Attorney General’s advice, which we fought to uncover last year, set them out pretty starkly. There is the fraught question of whether the backstop would, in truth, be indefinite or temporary. We can have views on that, but we cannot avoid the fact that it is a live dispute, and the Attorney General gave his view on that.
It is also indisputable that once we are in the backstop, if that is what happens in January 2021, it will introduce barriers to trade between England, Wales and Scotland and the EU. That is spelled out in the document. We are putting up barriers to trade in January 2021 if we go into the backstop. I have already touched on the inadequacy of the proposed customs arrangements.
I am sure the right hon. and learned Gentleman will have seen the article written over the weekend by Peter Hain and Paul Murphy—both former distinguished Members of this House and Secretaries of State for Northern Ireland who played an important part in the peace process—in which they made the case that the backstop is an important element that we must honour. Has he had an opportunity to reflect on that?
I have read the article, and I reflect on it. I used my words carefully; I said that there are risks in the backstop, which the Attorney General’s advice set out, and they are real risks.
There is a risk that we should not be blind to. The Attorney General spelled out in his advice that the backstop, as a matter of international law, may well be indefinite—he said that it is arguable either way—and that we therefore cannot get out of it unilaterally. We know that, and we have had a discussion about it. However, he went on to say that we cannot get out of it even if the negotiations completely break down and an allegation of bad faith is found. That is not just—
indicated dissent.
He did say that. I flushed that advice out, and I have read it over and over again. It is absolutely clear. The Attorney General says that if an allegation of bad faith is found, the only remedy is to ask the parties to act in good faith. That is spelled out in the advice. I know that the Minister is an honourable man and will concede that. I am not suggesting for a moment that there is bad faith—of course I am not. I do not think that the negotiations have been or will be negotiated in bad faith, but a country ought to pause before it simply says that an international agreement with those sorts of arrangements is to be waved through because we have used so much time up that we cannot do anything else.
The point I was making—I apologise for making it from a sedentary position—is that the Attorney General said that, on the balance of probabilities, the backstop would not be entered into. He also pointed out that it could be challenged legally under European law were it ever to be entered into.
I understand the argument that article 50 can only be a vehicle for a temporary arrangement and not a permanent one. The Attorney General addressed that, and it is obvious to anybody who has read and understood article 50 rightly. However, the point the Attorney General was addressing was the circumstances in which we could bring the backstop to an end once we were in it, as a matter of international law. Whether article 50 permits it or not, or what the Court would do if it were challenged, is an open question.
The Attorney General said that the backstop may be indefinite—he did not say it was indefinite—but he called into question the argument that it will be temporary. I have noticed that the Prime Minister is very careful in the way she puts it: she always says that the backstop is intended to be temporary. I do not think she has ever used any other phrase, presumably because she is bearing in mind what the Attorney General has advised. I am not saying that there does not need to be a backstop or arrangements to protect the Northern Ireland situation, but we cannot simply and casually say that these are matters to which we should not have too much regard. I honestly cannot think of another treaty that the UK has ever entered into that it could not exit in such circumstances. We might say that that is a good thing or a bad thing, but it is a very unusual thing to be doing.
I want to address the notion that rejecting the deal somehow leads to no deal. I have never accepted that, and it is deeply irresponsible of the Government to pretend that this is a binary choice. No Prime Minister has the right to plunge the country into the chaos of no deal simply because the deal has been rejected, or to run down the negotiations. I believe that that view is shared across the House. There is no majority for no deal. I pay tribute to my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), the right hon. Member for Loughborough (Nicky Morgan) and others for the amendment to the Finance Bill that the House passed yesterday. It will not formally prevent no deal, but it will give consequences to a non-endorsed deal.
The amendment is also symbolic, in that it shows that the House will not simply sit by and allow a no-deal exit. I do not think that the Prime Minister would attempt that, because I think she understands that a no-deal exit in March this year is not practically viable. I have been to Dover several times to look at the customs arrangements, and it would be impossible to get from the arrangements as they are today to those that would need to be in place on 29 March in the time available. Whatever anyone else says, it would be impossible to do that. There are plenty of other examples. However, if the Prime Minister attempts a no-deal Brexit, we will fight her tooth and nail every inch of the way.
Every Member of this House has a solemn duty to consider the deal before us—not the deal that the Prime Minister pretends to have negotiated or the deal that she promises to change between now and when we go through the Lobby, but the text before us. Labour is clear that the deal is not in the national interest. It does not come anywhere near to meeting our tests, it will make the country poorer and more divided and it will not protect jobs and the economy. I say that with sadness, because I have shadowed three different Brexit Secretaries, and the fact that we now have a deal that is so demonstrably not uniting the country and not able to command the support of this House is a tragic waste of the two years that have been available for negotiations and a miserable end to this part of the process. We will have to vote on the deal next Tuesday. After that, it will be time for this House to decide what happens next.
Order. The House is now embarking on the resumption of the debate started on 4 December and interrupted. A lot of Members put in to speak on 9 and 10 December, and the order just agreed allows those who have already spoken the possibility of a second speech. I must tell hon. and right hon. Members that if they wish to speak on any of the next four days of debate, they should put their names in to my office, and that they cannot rely on notification that was given a month ago. Apart from anything else, the days have changed and my team cannot be expected to anticipate the thought processes of hon. and right hon. Members, so if people would notify my office, that would be greatly appreciated.
(5 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move,
That this House has considered the matter of the Cabinet’s decision to accelerate preparations for a no-deal outcome to Brexit, following the Prime Minister’s failure to allow this House promptly to express its views on the Government’s deal, in the light of the significant public expenditure involved.
The background to this debate is well known. This House was due to vote on the Government’s deal on 11 December. The day before that vote, the Prime Minister pulled the vote, recognising that she was going to lose the vote, as she said, by “a significant margin” and saying that she wanted more time to “secure further assurances” on the backstop. I was in the House when the Prime Minister made her statement on 10 December, and in my view the majority were clearly against deferring the vote. No doubt for that reason the Prime Minister did not have the courage to put her decision to defer the meaningful vote to a vote, preferring instead for the Government not to move their own business.
The problem with the Prime Minister’s approach is obvious, which is why the majority were against deferring the vote. First, the Prime Minister is highly unlikely to get meaningful changes to the withdrawal agreement. Secondly, unless meaningful changes to the withdrawal agreement are made, the majority in this House are not likely to support her deal, whenever it gets put. That is a point bluntly accepted by the International Trade Secretary, who said recently:
“It is very difficult to support the deal if we don’t get changes to the backstop. I don’t think it will get through.”
The first problem about getting meaningful changes to the withdrawal agreement was laid bare last week. After informal talks on Monday and Tuesday of last week between the Prime Minister and other leaders, and then the EU summit on Thursday and Friday, the EU made its position clear. The President of the Commission said that there is
“no room whatsoever for renegotiation”.
The Commission spokesperson said:
“The European Council has given the clarifications that were possible at this stage, so no further meetings with the UK are foreseen.”
The EU Council also made it clear that the withdrawal agreement is “not open for renegotiation”. That is why there have been such strong calls this week for the vote to be put back to this House this week.
Many of us, right hon. and hon. Members in this House, are becoming increasingly suspicious that the reason why this Brexit can is being kicked further and further down the road by the Prime Minister is to take us to the eleventh hour, and then hold the British public and parliamentarians in this House to ransom, saying, “It is my deal or no deal.” Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that that is a disastrous and reckless policy, which is not in our national interest?”
I do agree and I will elaborate on that in just a moment. The strong calls this week for the vote to be put this week are so that, the deal having been defeated, as it inevitably will be, this House can get on with assessing what then are the available and achievable options for the future.
Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman agree that if this were a company and we were living outside the Westminster bubble, in the real world, we would not be allowed to take Christmas holidays while such an existential crisis is happening to our country? Does he agree that we should all be put on standby by this Government so that at the first available minute we can have a vote on this important matter?
I certainly agree that we need the vote as soon as possible, and I really do think it should have been on 11 December—if not then, it should have been this week. To elaborate on the point just made, the only purpose now in deferring the vote until 14 January is to run the clock down, and to attempt to present the vote as a binary choice between the Prime Minister’s deal and no deal.
Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that it is deeply dangerous to use the sort of scare tactics we saw being briefed out from No. 10 this morning, when it was said that somehow 3,500 troops were going to be put on the street? I asked the Home Secretary repeatedly about that after his own permanent secretary had told me that there were no such plans for troops to be used at our borders. Somebody is not telling the truth here—it is either the briefings coming out of No. 10 or somebody else.
I share my hon. Friend’s concern and will elaborate on that point in just a minute. To build on that comment, as I have been saying for some time, I do not think for one moment that this House is going to accept the binary choice that the Prime Minister will attempt to put before us. A choice between bad and even worse is not a meaningful choice. Nor is leaving the EU on 29 March next year without a deal viable. It has never been viable, and as every day goes past it becomes less and less viable.
I am sure that my right hon. and learned Friend is going to do this in his speech, but one thing that would greatly reassure not only the public but businesses and some of our public services, which are now being forced to spend unnecessarily billions of pounds that would be best spent on other things, would be if he could talk through how Parliament will ensure that no deal cannot happen.
I really think it is the duty of the Government and the Prime Minister to stand at the Dispatch Box and rule out no deal. That is the first thing, and that is the easiest way, because I think the vast majority of Members of the House would agree with it. If the Government will not do that, I am absolutely sure that this House will take the first opportunity to express its view. Whether by way of amendments to the motion in January, through other amendments, or by whatever means, the voice of this House and the majority who will not countenance no deal must be heard and will be heard. I have said it before, but I say it again: I think that deep down this Government and this Prime Minister know jolly well that no deal is not viable. That calls into question the expenditure that has been announced as additional expenditure, not the only expenditure.
Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman accept that there is not a no deal, because if we leave without signing the withdrawal agreement, there will be various deals? Would he welcome the agreement on the common transit convention? Would he welcome the air services agreement? Would he welcome the facilitation of trade agreement? There are going to be plenty of agreements so that we can trade perfectly successfully—will he stop his scaremongering?
I shall come to that point in a minute, but simply listing all the things that need to happen between now and 29 March to get to a so-called managed no deal only makes the point: it is not going to happen in the three months available.
Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that the clock is now ticking and the Government need seriously to start to think about extending article 50 so that they can send in some decent negotiators to negotiate a deal? Or we can put this back to the British people in an election.
I do agree that serious consideration needs to be given to the timetable now set by article 50, because by 14 January we will be just nine weeks away from the proposed date of leaving the EU. On any view, the Government will then have to make a choice about what to do next. No plan B has ever been forthcoming. In the week or so before the deferral of the vote last week, the question everybody was asking was, “What is the Prime Minister’s plan B?” When she pulled the vote and ran away, we learned that she does not have a plan B. The Prime Minister will have to come to the Dispatch Box and make a statement about what she proposes happens next. If she stands at that Dispatch Box and says that she intends to take the UK out of the EU without a deal, I genuinely believe that Parliament—this House—will do everything that it can to stop that course of action.
Given that it is the only route that gives legal certainty to be able to stop no deal, can I take it from what my right hon. and learned Friend is saying that if we get to the end and the only thing to do is revoke article 50, the official Opposition would support that, alongside Government Members?
What I have said is that I genuinely think that the majority in this House is against no deal. One reason why I feel strongly that the vote should be put as soon as possible is that the discussion and the debate about what happens next need to happen sooner rather than later because they will take time. We need then to assess what the options are and to see where the consensus of the House is. All that is happening in this deferment of the vote for weeks is wasting the time of the House that should be spent on the question of how we prevent leaving without a deal.
I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Gentleman for giving way. Let me congratulate him on achieving this important debate this afternoon. On the question of the extension of article 50, is he, like me, not hearing from interlocutors in the EU that the EU would be unlikely to grant an extension of the article 50 period for further negotiation, but that it would grant an extension of the article 50 period for either a general election or a people’s vote?
I am grateful for that intervention. As the hon. and learned Lady knows, I have had a number of discussions about the issue of extension with the Commission, the Council and various EU countries. The clear message from them is that the only basis for an extension would be if it was coupled with a good reason for the extension. Therefore, again, that is why we need to get on to the debate about what happens if and when this deal is voted down because these are very serious considerations.
Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman agree that it is grotesque and obscene that we have a homelessness crisis in this country, which is visible right outside this building; elderly people not getting the care they need; special needs children not getting proper support; people waiting far too long for mental health support; and hospitals full up—all burning injustices—and this Conservative Government are spending billions of pounds preparing for a no deal, which is not necessary?
I do agree. I will be corrected if I am wrong, but I am given to understand that, tragically, one of those sleeping just outside the entrance and exit to this place died in the past 24 hours, and that underscores the point that has just been made.
The words of the right hon. and learned Gentleman are that it is highly unlikely that there will be meaningful changes to this deal. If that is right, does he agree that it is vanishingly unlikely that a completely new deal along the lines that Labour, or indeed anyone else, might propose would also be agreed by the 29 March timetable? If that is right, and if it is also right that the EU would not extend article 50 to renegotiate a new deal, it effectively means that, by not supporting this deal, the Labour party risks becoming the handmaiden to no deal, and that is a real concern, does he not agree?
No, I do not accept that. I have had more conversations with people in Brussels than probably most people in this House about the question—the very important question—of what the position would be if the red lines that the Prime Minister laid down were different. The EU’s position in private is confidential. Its position in public has been repeated over and again. It has said that if the red lines had been different, a different negotiation could have happened. If the logical conclusion to the hon. Gentleman’s point is that we on these Benches must simply support whatever the Prime Minister brings back because no deal is worse, then that is an extraordinary position. It means that there is no critical analysis and no challenge even if it is a bad deal, or the wrong deal for the country, and that, somehow, we must support it because of this binary choice, and we will not do so.
My right hon. and learned Friend is making a very powerful speech about the absurd lack of leadership from the Government on this critical issue facing our country. Does he recognise that a cross-party letter, which was published on Monday and organised by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Erdington (Jack Dromey), has confirmed that, indeed, 19 Members on the Government Benches support ruling out a no-deal option in the national interest? Therefore, it is a matter of mere arithmetic that there is certainly no support for a no-deal crash out of the European option in this House. It is the duty of this Government to come to this House immediately and reflect the wishes of Parliament.
I am not sure that I am making a speech; I think that I am responding to interventions. I will take one more and then I really will make some progress.
I thank my right hon. and learned Friend. Does he agree that it is significant that, this morning, the new First Minister of Wales, Mark Drakeford, had a meeting with the Prime Minister and told her very clearly that she had a moral obligation to make sure that this country did not leave the EU without a deal?
I agree with my hon. Friend. I will take further interventions when I have made some progress.
The point that I am really making is that leaving the EU on 29 March next year without a deal is simply not viable, and I do not think that any responsible Government would do it.
Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?
I will give way in a moment.
Treasury estimates of a no-deal outcome would mean a 9.3% decline in GDP over 15 years. That would be an act of economic self-harm that no responsible Government should take. It would see every region of the UK worse off and would mean that there would be no common security arrangements in place and, of course, a hard border in Northern Ireland. In any event, the truth is that the Government simply have not prepared for it and it is now too late.
Let me give two very specific but obvious examples. Over the summer, the previous Brexit Secretary published 106 technical notices—the Government’s view of what needed to be done in order to prepare for no deal. What comes out of those 106 documents is that, taken together, they commit the Government to the creation or expansion of 15 quangos, further legislation in 51 areas, the negotiation of 40 new international agreements with the EU or others, and the introduction of 55 new systems and processes. That is the Government’s own analysis of what they need to do to prepare for no deal. Let us just stand back and consider that. The meaningful vote is scheduled for the week of 14 January. It is then just over nine weeks to 29 March. It is simply not credible to pretend that even the bare minimum in the Government’s own technical notices can be delivered in that nine weeks.
The second example is just so powerful. Two weeks ago today, the Chancellor answered a question from the hon. Member for Dover (Charlie Elphicke) about preparations at Dover, which is a pretty busy port—the busiest. Some of us have been down there a number of times to talk to the staff and management about what needs to be done, and they are very worried. This is what the Chancellor said:
“if we were to end up having a WTO-type trading arrangement with the European Union”,
that
“would involve some very significant infrastructure works that could not be done in a matter of months; they would take years to complete.”
However much money we throw at it now, how can we get over that problem—that the infrastructure at Dover will take years, not months? The Chancellor did not say that it would take months if there was more money; he said years, not months. The idea that we could somehow manage a no deal nine weeks after the meaningful vote only has to be put against that example to be seen to be ridiculous. This was confirmed by the National Audit Office, which said bluntly in October:
“The government does not have enough time to put in place all of the infrastructure, systems and people required for fully effective border operations on day one”.
Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman aware that the non-disclosure agreements that were stopping officials sharing with business the Government’s plans for no deal were lifted—I think it was only last week—to enable businesses to be aware of what the Government were planning for in relation to no deal?
I am grateful for that point. I think that businesses have begun to make their voice heard in the last day or two, expressing their concerns about a no- deal exit.
On 6 December in Exiting the European Union questions, when we were supposedly still in the middle of the debate on the deal, I sought reassurance about the supply of medical radioisotopes, which simply cannot be stockpiled because they have a half-life of hours. I was told to google what the French Government were doing. Well, in googling “radioisotopes” and “no deal”, I have found no reassurance. Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman agree that this pantomime around no deal is frightening patients, doctors and people who run the NHS, and that it is a disgrace?
I agree wholeheartedly and thank the hon. Lady for making that point. We need only mention the reports—of course, we do not know—that there were discussions in Cabinet about medicines being supplied by ferries to show why this is not viable.
Indeed, we have heard evidence in the Exiting the EU Committee that we could see a delay of two to three years in new medicines coming to the UK if the Government proceed as they intend. Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that while the cost to businesses is now being talked about far more openly, there is a real cost to our citizens, with a leaked Department for Work and Pensions report suggesting that the Government are planning a strategy to deal with potential rising homelessness, poverty and suicide? Is this not a horrific place for our country to have reached, and far removed from what people thought they were voting for?
I am grateful for that intervention; I heard that point made earlier in a point of order. My hon. Friend underscores not just the concern about that very issue but the fact that the Government should have made a statement today about no-deal preparations. It is unsatisfactory that we have had to go through this process just to get a debate. There should have been a statement so that Members could then ask specific questions of the Government about exactly those sorts of issues.
If anyone thinks that the EU is going to ride to the rescue and put in place a raft of reciprocal side deals, or waive their rules and laws for the UK, I would encourage them to read the EU’s plans for no deal, which were updated and published only at lunchtime today. On contingency measures, the EU says that they will only be taken where strictly necessary and in the interests of the EU, they should not replicate the benefits of membership of the Union, and they can be revoked by the EU at any time. This is what a no-deal exit looks like. On information and data exchange, it says that work strands are in place such as the disconnection and adaption of databases and IT systems and other platforms for communication and information exchange to which the United Kingdom should no longer have access. On air transport, it says that UK air carriers will not be able to conduct EU-to-EU flights. On road haulage, it says that a permit system would allow for considerably less traffic than currently takes place between the Union and the United Kingdom. On goods, it says that all relevant EU legislation on imported goods and exported goods will apply after 29 March. That means customs checks, declarations, and origin tests. It means a raft of checks on agriculture. It means severe friction, and it comes nine weeks after the meaningful vote.
Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that it is utterly irresponsible of the Prime Minister to threaten Members of Parliament into a deal or a no-deal situation, given what is happening, and given the dangers and risks? She is playing Russian roulette with people’s lives and livelihoods, and she will be responsible for causing chaos in this country if she does not rule it out right now, before we go into recess.
I agree wholeheartedly. I cannot believe that the analysis that the Opposition have undertaken is not the same as that undertaken by the Government. They know very well that no deal is not viable and they know very well the risks involved, and that calls into question the decisions that were made yesterday.
Coming towards Christmas, I am sure that Members across the House will have people coming into their surgeries, as I have: the mum and son who lost their jobs because of Brexit and were referred to the food bank; the dad who came on another issue, breaking down, weeping and saying, “I’m having counselling, I’m on anti-depressants”, because of a no deal Brexit—he is paying workers and he is worried about their mortgages and their Christmas. When we start worrying about stockpiling food, we know that only the poorest suffer who cannot afford to stockpile and cannot afford the most expensive food. I am sure that does not happen in the restaurants in Mayfair. Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree?
I do agree. I am sure that Members across the House have had concerned constituents coming up to them in advice surgeries, or on buses and trains and in the street, expressing their concern about the state of politics, the place we have got to in these negotiations, and the prospect of no deal. It is not often that members of the public talk about politics in the way that they are doing at the moment. They are talking about it in a very anxious state because they realise just how badly these negotiations have gone.
I do not think the Government accept the level of chaos that this will provide. My Ford factory has 24 deliveries of parts a day. If one of those lorries does not arrive, the factory will have to stop production for a day, which means a loss of half a million pounds. Zimmer Biomet makes knee and hip replacements and sends all its products from the Netherlands, which arrive in our hospitals on the day of surgery. It cannot guarantee that if the lorries are not coming through. There will be chaos in every aspect of life in this country.
I am grateful for that powerful point, and it applies to the whole of manufacturing. In the last two years, I have tried to visit all the major manufacturers across the UK and see for myself the systems they are running. Automobile manufacturing is a classic example, with goods coming in from the EU all the time. Those goods are tracked, so that it is known to the hour when they will arrive. In some operations, the components arrive four hours before they go on the production line. That is why any interruption of the current arrangements poses a real threat to manufacturing and why what is said about Dover not being ready for years, not months, is significant for manufacturing.
My right hon. and learned Friend is making an extremely powerful case. Does he share my puzzlement—nay, exasperation—that some people in government and on the Government Benches appear to think that they know more and better about the implications of no deal than the businesses that make things, export things, import things and transport things? Those businesses have formed a queue to meet all of us, and no doubt Ministers, to express their concern about what this will mean. Does that not show just how irresponsible it is of the Government to suggest that this could happen?
I could not agree more. I have spoken to hundreds of businesses across the whole of the UK, either one on one or in small groups—I am not talking about halls full of businesses—and I have not come across any business that says that no deal could be a satisfactory outcome. Anybody who suggests that businesses in some way would support that approach needs to point me to the businesses they have been talking to, because I have obviously been talking to lots of businesses that they are not talking to. In every case, when they lay out their concerns to me, I faithfully ask them whether they have said the same to the Government, and I ask them to say the same to me as they say to the Government. On a number of occasions, I have made it my business, in a friendly way, to point the Brexit Secretary to businesses that have talked to me and suggest he has a conversation with them.
I will make some progress, because I have given way many times.
The point is this, and it has come out through all the interventions: there is no such thing as a managed no deal. That is why I have repeatedly said that no deal is not credible and not viable. It is a political hoax intended only to put pressure on Members of this House to back the Prime Minister’s deal.
Yesterday, instead of trying to find a viable way of getting a deal through the House, the Cabinet agreed to ramp up no-deal preparations, notwithstanding all the valid points that have been made. An additional £2 billion of taxpayers’ money has been allocated to that, which includes half a billion pounds to the Home Office, £400 million to the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and to Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, and £200 million for the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. That funding will be welcomed by some in the European Research Group.
However, let us look at the reaction of businesses. The biggest customs firm inside Dover told “Channel 4 News” yesterday that crashing out of the EU without a deal would create “Armageddon” for the UK. That is business speaking. That is what it said to “Channel 4 News”. It is not me or anybody in this House; it is businesses that are running Dover telling us what they think the outcome would be. Five British business groups, including the Confederation of British Industry, said this morning:
“it is clear there is simply not enough time to prevent severe dislocation and disruption in just 100 days.”
That is the voice of business.
No wonder it is reported that there was considerable conflict of views around the Cabinet table. The Justice Secretary is reported to have told the Cabinet that a managed no deal is not a viable option. He apparently added that
“the responsibility of Cabinet ministers is not to propagate unicorns but to slay them.”
The Work and Pensions Secretary is reported to have told the Cabinet:
“Just because you’ve put a seatbelt on, it doesn’t mean you should crash the car.”
I agree with them. The first duty of the Government is to protect the public, and a no-deal Brexit would put the public at risk. That is not scaremongering; it is reality.
Even if the Government did choose to push ahead with a no deal, I am convinced that Parliament would stand in their way. The overwhelming majority of Members in this House would not countenance a no deal Brexit. I pay tribute to the, I think, now three hon. Members opposite who have already said that they would quit the Conservative party if the Government pressed ahead with no deal. I suspect that they are not alone. No Government have the right to plunge the country into chaos because of their own failure, and this Parliament will not let them.
I am not so sure that the Government grasp the seriousness of this situation. There are 800,000 jobs in the automobile industry alone at stake and about 300,000 in the west midlands, so we have to get some sort of deal, but not the deal that these are proposing. Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree about that?
I do agree, and at this stage of the negotiations, what I think should happen is that the deal should be put to a vote and the vote taken, and then we should have a grown-up conversation about what the real options are and stop pretending that some sort of managed no deal is the default position. It is not, and this House will never accept that it is the default position.
My right hon. and learned Friend has said several times—and I understand why—that this House will not allow the Government to proceed on the basis of no deal, but one of the difficulties that we have, as we have seen over the last fortnight, is that the power of the Government to manage the business and completely ignore any motions of this House that are not legally binding is quite phenomenal. Do we not need to address that inherent problem in our system if we are really going to have a chance of success?
That is a very powerful point, and what the last few weeks have shown are some of the inadequacies in the procedures of this House. The idea that the Government can simply not move their business and do not have to have a vote on it is not acceptable. The fact that we have to have an SO 24 debate on an issue of this significance, because we cannot force a statement, shows the inadequacies.
The only other thing I would say on that very important point is this: given that there have to be at least 51 changes to legislation—even on the Government’s own analysis—under the 106 technical notices, there will be opportunities for amendments in this House, unless the Prime Minister says, “I am simply not going to take any business until April, of any sort whatsoever.” I do not think that this Prime Minister would do that. I knew her when she was Home Secretary and I was Director of Public Prosecutions. I know how seriously she takes security and counter-terrorism issues. I do not think that this Prime Minister would try to force no deal on this House without the necessary precautions—even on her own case—with legislation.
Given the experience that we had just over a week ago, what guarantees do we have that the Prime Minister will not, on 10 or 11 January, decide that she has some sign from the European Union that might mean that she will get the better deal at that point that she has not managed to get in the meantime, and then pull the vote yet again?
Well, we have no guarantees. Like everybody else, I heard various Members of the Prime Minister’s Cabinet on the radio on the morning of 10 December assuring all listeners and viewers that the vote was 100% guaranteed for the next day, only for it to be pulled at the last minute.
Having shadowed three Brexit Secretaries this year alone, I know as well as anyone that the House has been consumed by Brexit. However, at the end of the year, let us look at where we are. We have a Prime Minister unable to put her deal to the vote and no prospect of further renegotiation. Rather than trying to reach across Parliament to break the deadlock, we have a Government who are now actively pursuing a policy that is not supported by the Cabinet, not supported by Parliament and not supported by the country. It is reckless and irresponsible. It is an indictment of a wasted year. Even now, I urge the Government to take no deal off the table and find a sensible way forward.
This has largely been a good debate, with clear and powerful points being made on both sides of the House on which we all need to reflect.
Despite the Minister’s valiant attempts, he was not convincing in his defence of the preparations for no deal. No deal is not viable and not credible, and if that is true, it will not serve the Government’s intended purpose in bringing this to a binary choice, and we should not be wasting money on it. No deal should be taken off the table, and then we could have a sensible discussion about what happens next.
A lot was said by the hon. Member for Broxbourne (Mr Walker) about the national interest. I will not sink to misrepresenting his views, even though he sank to misrepresenting mine.
I am really fascinated to know what deal the right hon. and learned Gentleman would accept from the Prime Minister.
If the hon. Gentleman listened, he might actually understand what I have been saying for month after month and not sink to mispresenting my view. I have argued for a permanent customs union and a single market deal. I have bothered to go to Brussels over two years to discuss whether that is viable, and I would not have proposed it if I did not think it viable. That is something I have done over and above what he has done.
I really think the hon. Gentleman should not embarrass himself any further.
What is not in the national interest are the red lines that the Prime Minister agreed not with her Cabinet, and not even with this House, but with a group of three or four people in the autumn of 2016. We have all had to live with those red lines ever since, and we have had no say. That was not in the national interest.
It was not in the national interest to push Parliament away at the beginning of the process, perhaps recognising that, in the end, we would have to reach consensus. It was not sensible to push Parliament away after the snap general election of 2017, when it was obvious that what is happening now would happen. It was not in the national interest never to reach across to the Opposition. It was not in the national interest to take as long as until June 2018 to come up with the Chequers proposal.
Every time I had debates and discussions with people in the EU27 before June, they said, “What is your Government trying to achieve. We don’t even know that.” That was not in the national interest, and it was not in the national interest to propose a Chequers deal that, hopelessly, was not accepted even by Conservative Members and that was immediately rejected by the EU. That is the central concern.
The reason why we are talking about the backstop and an additional transition is that the future relationship is so hopelessly underdeveloped. Nobody here and nobody in Europe thinks for a moment that the future relationship will be ready for January 2021. It is another of those myths that we have had for two years. It is not going to happen, which is why there is great anxiety about the backstop.
A backstop in which England, Wales and Scotland are out of the single market will have repercussions, and having a future relationship that is so blind that we do not know whether it might be economically close or distant is not something that any responsible Opposition could vote for.
It was not in the national interest to resist a meaningful vote. We are now all enjoying the fact that we will have a meaningful vote in January, but we would not have had it if Opposition Members, and some Conservative Members, had not voted for it. I do not know whether the hon. Member for Broxbourne did. I think he probably voted against it, voting not to have a say, not to have this debate and not to have the chance to have a say—just wave it through.
It is because of my Committee that Parliament has the meaningful vote.
Order. I am determined to prove this evening that the House can be well behaved.
It was not in the national interest to resist the meaningful vote. It was not in the national interest to resist any disclosure of impact assessments, which had to be forced. It was not in the national interest not to disclose legal advice that was relevant but not, in truth, confidential. And it was not in the national interest to pull the vote and prevent what needs to happen next.
I have been consistent in arguing for my proposition. We have tabled amendments before the House time and again, and they have been voted down time and again through blind loyalty. Instead of a Prime Minister and a Government who are prepared to work across the House for true consensus, what is happening now among Government Members was utterly predictable at 10 o’clock, when the result of that snap election came in. At that moment, the Prime Minister should have realised and thought about the long-term prospect of getting a deal through, and that meant working in a consensual way, taking on board the proper points that have been made by Opposition Members. That is what acting in the national interest is all about.
Question put and agreed to.
Resolved,
That this House has considered the matter of the Cabinet’s decision to accelerate preparations for a no-deal outcome to Brexit, following the Prime Minister’s failure to allow this House promptly to express its view on the Government’s deal, in the light of the significant public expenditure involved.
On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. Last night, a man sleeping rough on Parliament’s doorstep died. This is the second time that that has happened. I know individual MPs and staff do what they can to help people, but I wonder whether you are aware of any strategy that Parliament might be seeking to put in place to support people who are homeless. I also wonder whether there has been any indication from Ministers that they will be making a statement on this tragedy and on their failure to address the crisis of homelessness that we see every day in our communities up and down the country.
(5 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberI thank the SNP for securing this debate and the Speaker’s Office for granting it.
It is obvious that we have reached an impasse. The Prime Minister spent two years negotiating a deal that she now knows cannot command the support of this House. I am not trying to make a point against the Secretary of State, but I think he acknowledged just a moment ago that he accepts that the deal currently before the House is not going to get the support of the House. That is therefore the position of the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State.
But rather than confront that reality, the Prime Minister refuses to put her deal forward for a vote this week, instead kicking it into the new year. The problem for the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State is that it is accepted that this deal cannot command the support of the House, but abundantly clear from last week’s EU Council that the Government cannot renegotiate the withdrawal agreement. So the one thing the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State know needs to happen for the position to change was rebuffed last week, and, at most, only non-binding “clarifications” could be possible. That is the impasse.
The President of the EU Commission said that there is “no room whatsoever” for renegotiation. The Commission spokesperson said:
“The European Council has given the clarifications that were possible at this stage, so no further meetings with the United Kingdom are foreseen.”
I do not suppose that informal meetings cannot go on, but there will be no formal meetings. I think some of us thought that there might just be the chance, coming out of last week’s summit, that there would be a further round, or a few days, of further negotiations by the teams, but that is not going to happen. The EU Council statement made it clear that the withdrawal agreement is “not open for renegotiation”.
However much the Prime Minister or the Secretary of State—for understandable reasons, perhaps—pretend otherwise, that is now the reality that we face, and that is why the vote needs to come back to this House this week. This deal cannot be changed by the Prime Minister, new negotiations are not even taking place, and we have only three months before the 29 March deadline. The Government’s response—to delay, to play for time, and to hope somehow that the deal will look more appetising in the new year—is not going to work. The reality is that the Government are running down the clock, but running down the clock is not governing, and it is certainly not governing in the national interest. Observers sometimes say to me that the Prime Minister is resilient, but this is not resilience—it is recklessness.
It might be argued that the Government are not the only part of this House to be kicking the can down the road, and that the right hon. and learned Gentleman may well have been wanting to participate in a different debate today. Is that not happening because his right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition is inept, or invertebrate?
I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will forgive me for my caution in taking advice from the Government on when the Opposition should table a motion of no confidence in the Government. Last week, I heard plenty of Conservative Members say, “Bring it on.” In the role that I currently occupy, many people on both sides of the House give me their opinions all the time, and very rarely do two people agree on the way forward.
It is wholly unacceptable to delay the meaningful vote for another month in the knowledge that there is no realistic chance of delivering material changes to this deal. Yesterday, the right hon. Member for Loughborough (Nicky Morgan) said in this House that the Prime Minister is
“asking the House to accept a deferral for several weeks of the meaningful vote on the draft withdrawal agreement, on the basis that further assurances can be agreed with the European Union, but there is nothing in what she has said today or in what has been reported from the EU Council to suggest that those further assurances are likely to be given.”—[Official Report, 17 December 2018; Vol. 651, c. 540.]
That is the problem. That is why, rather than having this debate today, the Government should be putting their deal to the House, because if that deal is defeated, everybody then needs to put the national interest first. We need to confront what the achievable and available options are and decide, as a House, what happens next in a way that protects jobs and the economy.
But what we hear from the Government is the opposite: delay over a meaningful vote, and then the distraction of no deal, hence today’s headlines about £2 billion for no-deal planning. Talking up no deal has always been misguided and, in my view, deeply irresponsible. The Treasury estimates that a no-deal outcome would mean a 9.3% decline in GDP over 15 years. It would see every region of the UK worse off. It would mean 20% tariffs on agri-foods and significant tariffs on manufactured goods. It would mean no common security arrangements in place, and a hard border in Northern Ireland. It would be catastrophic for the UK. That is why no deal has never truly been a viable option. It is a political hoax, and I think that, deep down, the Government and the Prime Minister know it. I know from personal experience how seriously the Prime Minister takes the security arrangements of the United Kingdom, and to put ourselves in a position where they would be jeopardised is not, I think, something that, deep down, she thinks could possibly be acceptable for this country.
My right hon. and learned Friend is making a most forceful case. I agree that the Government understand the risks just as well as we do. Given that, what possible purpose does he think is served by the Government continuing to pretend that they are prepared for the country to go over the edge of a cliff at the end of March? Would it not help, in this crisis we face, if the Government said, “We’re not going to let that happen”? Then the alternatives that we will have to consider if the deal is defeated would become even clearer than they can be for as long as no deal appears to exist as a possibility when every single one of us in this Chamber knows that it cannot happen.
What I think is happening—it saddens me to say so—is that the Government are running down the clock in order to put maximum pressure on Members to face what the Government will present as a binary choice between the proposed deal that is before us and no deal. That is the only purpose left in this delay. Yes, it would help a great deal if we could have clarification now that no deal is not a viable option. It would allow us to focus on other options and to take the necessary steps to advance those options in the time that is available. I call on the Secretary of State to give that clarification if he feels able.
If the Government had ever been serious about delivering a no-deal outcome, they would not be panicking like this at the 11th hour—they would already have had extra staff trained and resources in place. They would already have had the vast infrastructure that would be needed at UK borders and ports.
It is all very well those on the Government Front Bench shaking their heads—[Interruption.] If they will just listen, I will quote their own Chancellor, who said two weeks ago in response to a question from the hon. Member for Dover (Charlie Elphicke) that
“if we were to end up having a WTO-type trading arrangement with the European Union”,
that
“would involve some very significant infrastructure works that could not be done in a matter of months; they would take years to complete.”
If I was making that point, people might say, “Well, that’s just the Opposition,” but that is the Chancellor’s assessment. When the Chancellor says that, what is the answer from the Prime Minister or those on the Front Bench? What is the answer from the Government?
In a report in October, the National Audit Office said:
“The government does not have enough time to put in place all of the infrastructure, systems and people required for fully effective border operations on day one”,
and that
“organised criminals and others are likely to be quick to exploit any perceived weaknesses or gaps in the enforcement regime. This, combined with the UK’s potential loss of access to EU security, law enforcement and criminal justice tools, could create security weaknesses”.
The NAO has also said—this is a serious point that I have raised a number of times but not heard an answer from the Government on:
“If customs declarations are required for trade between the UK and the existing EU, HMRC estimates that the total number of customs declarations could increase by around 360%, from the 55 million currently made on non-EU trade to 255 million.”
That is an increase in customs declarations from 55 million to 255 million three months from today, in a no-deal Brexit. What is the answer to that?
Support the deal!
The cries to support the deal would have a lot more authority if those on the Government Benches were supporting the deal. The Government are utterly split on this. Last Wednesday’s no-confidence vote exposed the fracture, and there is no point pretending it is not there.
Over the summer, the previous Brexit Secretary published 106 technical notices setting out the Government’s case for preparing for no deal. They did not get a huge amount of attention at the time, but it is worth reading and re-reading them, as my team and I have done, and as the Institute for Government has done. Those technical notices make it clear that the Government’s managed no deal would require the creation or expansion of 15 quangos, further legislation in 51 areas, the negotiation of 40 new international agreements with either the EU or other countries and the introduction of 55 new systems and processes. That is the analysis of the 106 technical notices—the Government’s own assessment.
The case I am making is that the argument that there should or could be no deal on 29 March is completely lacking in any viability whatsoever. The very idea that there could be legislation in 51 areas, 40 new international agreements, 15 new quangos and 55 new systems and processes in the next three months only has to be spelled out. That is not my assessment; it is the Government’s own assessment. It is not credible to pretend that that can be done by 29 March.
I have a great deal of respect for the right hon. and learned Gentleman, but not for the Opposition in this respect. He makes a good point—so are the Opposition now going to do their job of being an effective Opposition? By way of example, will we see an urgent question being asked in this place tomorrow about the Government’s plans for no deal? The Opposition have to put their money where their mouth is.
I respect the right hon. Lady, but what the Opposition do is a matter for us. It is not for the Government to give the Opposition advice on how to proceed with a no-confidence motion. If I am wrong, I will be corrected, but I think I heard her criticising us for not laying the motion last week so that she could get on and vote against it. I did not find that advice helpful in trying to come to a decision on how the Opposition should proceed.
Legislation on a proposed no deal would have to be passed by a Government who can no longer pass legislation, and these preparations now come with a £2 billion price tag. That is throwing good money after bad. I hope the Secretary of State will set out as soon as possible how that money will be spent, whether Parliament will have the chance to approve those measures and when no-deal legislation will be put before the House—at least in draft form, for us to see what it looks like and comment on it.
By now, the Government intended to have a deal agreed by the House. It is obvious that that is not going to happen. The Government need to get a grip and bring forward the vote. Let this House vote, then let us have a debate about the available and achievable options—and no deal cannot be one of them. I do not think for a minute that a majority in this House would countenance a no-deal Brexit. The price of delay will, as ever, be paid by the British people, businesses and communities, and that is a very sorry end to a year of failure.
(5 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberWell, that is hypothetical. That does not mean that it is not an important question, but it is hypothetical at this stage. I am not sure that I could give such an automatic assurance to the hon. Gentleman. It may be that efforts would have to be made to secure a commitment to the release, or publication, of that advice. I think there would be a strong moral basis for expecting that that advice would be published, in the light—
I am very heartened to see a former Director of Public Prosecutions nodding vigorously in assent to my proposition, considering that he is a distinguished lawyer and I am not. There is a strong moral basis for believing that that to which the Government eventually acceded last week would be something to which they would accede in the new circumstances, especially as the new circumstances were the result of failure to reach agreement on the earlier proposals and their own actions thereafter.
(5 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberMy right hon. Friend makes an extremely important point, and I am very conscious of it in the East Anglia region. The border delivery group is working with Departments to ensure that plans are in place to engage fully with traders in advance of exit and indeed, it has visited each of the 135 port and airport locations. My right hon. Friend brings considerable experience to the subject and I am happy to meet her to discuss it further.
I welcome the Secretary of State to his place and genuinely wish him well in his role.
On 15 October, the Prime Minister made an important point from the Dispatch Box to reassure MPs who were worried about the backstop arrangement. She said that
“if the EU were not to co-operate on our future relationship, we must be able to ensure that we cannot be kept in this backstop arrangement indefinitely.”—[Official Report, 15 October 2018; Vol. 647, c. 410.]
Does the Secretary of State agree?
I thank the right hon. and learned Member for his generous welcome. I also take the opportunity, as I did on Monday night—although technically it was Tuesday morning—to pay tribute to him for serving as shadow Secretary of State throughout this period. On the core of his question about the UK’s ability to exit from the backstop, he will know, as a former lawyer, that the legal process is clear in terms of the role of the Joint Committee and the arbitration, and that there is legal wiring in the withdrawal agreement that requires the EU to act in good faith. Those issues were explored in much more detail with the Attorney General on Monday, but in short I very much agree with the Prime Minister because there is a legal connectivity between the withdrawal agreement and the backstop arrangement.
That is a very sensible position. The Secretary of State suggests that he agrees with the Prime Minister that, if the EU does not co-operate, we cannot be kept in the backstop indefinitely. The problem is that the Attorney General’s legal advice, which was published yesterday states, in terms,
“in international law, the”
backstop
“would endure indefinitely.”
He went on to say:
“This remains the case even if parties are still negotiating many years later, and even if the parties believe that the talks have clearly broken down”.
That is the complete opposite of what the Prime Minister said she intended to achieve.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman makes the same point in essence as my very distinguished predecessor, my right hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Dominic Raab), about where the balance of risk sits. The right hon. and learned Gentleman quoted the Attorney General, so it is worth drawing the House’s attention to exactly what the Attorney General said on that point. [Interruption.] Well, he quoted part of what the Attorney General said, but my right hon. and learned Friend said more than what has been quoted in isolation, and the right hon. and learned Gentleman will be the first to accept that when considering these issues, one looks at the whole, not selective comments. The Attorney General said:
“I do not believe that we are likely to be entrapped in the backstop permanently”.—[Official Report, 3 December 2018; Vol. 650; c. 552.]
However, he also said that
“the matters of law affecting the withdrawal can only inform what is essentially a political decision”.—[Official Report, 3 December 2018; Vol. 650, c. 546.]
It is a question of where one assesses the balance of risk to be. I looked at that very issue when I considered the matter. The Attorney General has addressed that, as is reflected in his comments to the House on Monday.