Nationality and Borders Bill

Bambos Charalambous Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 20th July 2021 Commons Chamber

[Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)]

We have had a lively debate, and I want to pay tribute to the many excellent speeches made on this side of the House. On the issue of the broken asylum system, I want to thank colleagues including my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Riverside (Kim Johnson), my right hon. Friend the Member for East Ham (Stephen Timms) and my hon. Friends the Members for Vauxhall (Florence Eshalomi), for Sheffield Central (Paul Blomfield), for Salford and Eccles (Rebecca Long Bailey), for Liverpool, Wavertree (Paula Barker) and for Bermondsey and Old Southwark (Neil Coyle), who all spoke about the length of time it takes to process claims.

On the need for safe routes, I want to thank colleagues including my right hon. Friends the Members for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) and for Kingston upon Hull North (Dame Diana Johnson), my hon. Friends the Members for Streatham (Bell Ribeiro-Addy), for Swansea West (Geraint Davies) and for Edmonton (Kate Osamor), and my right hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) for pointing out the need for those routes.

On the issue of the two-tier system, which penalises asylum seekers in breach of the 1951 refugee convention, I want to thank colleagues including my hon. Friends the Members for York Central (Rachael Maskell), for Wirral West (Margaret Greenwood), for Birkenhead (Mick Whitley), for Jarrow (Kate Osborne), for Cynon Valley (Beth Winter), for Leeds East (Richard Burgon), for Newport West (Ruth Jones), for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western) and for Cardiff North (Anna McMorrin), as well as my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy), who also spoke about Einstein’s experience during the 1930s when he was a refugee here.

On the issue of strong support from the community for refugees, I want to thank my hon. Friends the Members for Sheffield, Hallam (Olivia Blake), for Bristol East (Kerry McCarthy) and for Dulwich and West Norwood (Helen Hayes), who spoke about their cities of sanctuary and their community groups that are ensuring that there is support for refugees in their communities.

As many hon. Members have mentioned, next week marks the 70th anniversary of the refugee convention. I am proud of the leading role that the UK played in coming together with our international partners in the aftermath of the second world war to offer refuge to people seeking sanctuary here and across Europe, and to help to rebuild a shattered Europe. That legacy goes hand in hand with the British values of fair play, decency and respect for international law, but this Bill steps back from that agreement and once again further diminishes the UK’s international standing in the world. It is a dangerous, draconian, dog-whistling piece of legislation. It threatens those values, it is ill conceived and it is being rushed through for media headlines rather than getting to grips with our broken asylum system.

The basis of the Bill was the Government’s consultation, the “New Plan for Immigration”. The consultation was meant to inform the Government and help to shape policy, but as yet we have not been told what the responses to the consultation said and we have not seen the Government’s response to the consultation. Instead, we have this rushed Bill. Like the Queen of Hearts in Alice in Wonderland, the Bill is a case of sentence first, verdict afterwards. That is how the Government want to treat asylum seekers: criminalising them first and checking their claims later.

[Mr Steve Baker (Wycombe) (Con)]

The hon. Gentleman has said twice that the Bill was rushed, but we are now at the end of the second day of debate on Second Reading. This is extremely rare, in my short experience in this House. How many days of debate would he want before he would say that it was not rushed?

[Bambos Charalambous]

The hon. Member misunderstands me. It is the process of the Bill getting here that has been rushed, not the debate we have had today.

There is also no impact assessment accompanying the Bill. We have no idea how much it will cost or what the overall impact will be.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The Bill has seven placeholder clauses—something I have never seen before—so the House will not see what the Government are up to until the Committee stage where most Members will not take part.

[Bambos Charalambous]

The hon. Member makes an excellent point.

Less than a week ago, we had hon. Members rightly berating the Minister for Care, screaming blue murder at her failure to produce an impact assessment for the health and social care regulations. Where are those howls today? Not a word. I dare not ask about the legal advice that was sought to formulate this Bill, but if there was an Olympic event for legal gymnastics, it would definitely win a gold medal.

The Bill is riddled with holes. It is fatally flawed and it will not work. It will not work because of the glaring omission of the lack of bilateral agreements with France and other EU countries. Conservative Members can huff and puff all they like, but it should begin to dawn on them that without any such agreements the Bill will not work and it will not stop any channel crossings.

[Aaron Bell]

If France will not take people, does the hon. Gentleman agree with the proposal in the Bill that we find a safe third country that is willing to take them—we may have to pay it—and they can be processed over there? It worked in Australia and it saved thousands of lives.

[Bambos Charalambous]

The hon. Member is running roughshod over international law. I would be interested to see which third countries would be interested in taking people. If there were such third countries, I am sure the Minister would have introduced them today.

Many colleagues have spoken about the broken asylum system, but let us be clear about who broke it. The Government have had 11 years to fix the system but there is nothing in the Bill about how they will fix the current scandalous state of affairs. I know many hon. Members who have constituents who have been waiting for a decision about their asylum status. I have had one case where a constituent from Afghanistan had to wait seven years for his claim to be processed. It took my direct intervention with a Minister for his claim to be determined. It should not take the direct intervention of MPs for the system to snap into action. With fewer claims being made—yesterday the Home Secretary mistakenly said that claims have gone up when in fact they have gone down—it should not be taking longer to process applications. If the asylum system was operating as a business, it would be going bust by now.

[Mr Goodwill]

Does the hon. Member accept that the basic principle of asylum is that people should claim asylum in the first safe country that they meet? As far as I am aware, France is a safe country, Greece is a safe country and Italy is a safe country. There are a lot of safe countries that people cross before they arrive on our shores.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I invite the right hon. Member to read the refugee convention and he will find there what the actual law is. On the basis of his logic, we would only be taking asylum claimants from France, Ireland and Belgium.

Looking at the detail of the Bill, many hon. Members have quite rightly highlighted the odious clause 12, which creates a two-tier system for refugees based on how someone arrives in the country and their mode of transport, not on the strength of their claim. As my hon. Friend the Member for York Central (Rachael Maskell) put it, it is

“judging them on how they arrived, not what they have left.”—[Official Report, 19 July 2021; Vol. 699, c. 757.]

Once again, sentence first, verdict later.

[Tom Hunt]

It is wrong to say that there is no difference between somebody who has broken the law by coming here from another safe European country illegally and somebody who has come here through a legal process. Surely they should be treated differently.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Criminalising people who have come to this country irrespective of what they have left behind makes them criminals. What law have they broken when they are seeking refuge here?

What we have seen playing out in the channel crossings over the past few days occurred because the Government have closed down all safe routes for refugees to travel to the UK for protection. People are being driven to make dangerous journeys because they are out of options. To this callous Government, it is all a game—pure theatre. The Tories use all migrants, an ever-easy target, as a distraction from their own institutional failings and the gross inequality that falls upon their citizens.

The Bill does nothing to propose refugee resettlement or family reunion routes and will only put more pressure on Britain’s broken asylum system. About 10% of arrivals are expected to be unaccompanied children. The Government should be properly addressing the issue of safe routes for claiming asylum and helping unaccompanied children. Penalising refugees is a clear breach of article 31 of the refugee convention, but even more disconcerting is that clauses 27 to 36 seek to interpret the refugee convention to suit the Government’s whim. Unilaterally deciding how international law should be interpreted never ends well for the Government. The reason they feel the need to do so here is that they know they will be humiliated when those clauses are challenged. Once again, it is not so much a case of marking their own homework; more a case of being judge, jury and executioner.

One thing the Bill will almost certainly do is ensure that people seeking asylum here are kept longer. Whether through imprisoning asylum seekers for four years in our prisons or detaining them in barracks, that is an awful lot of money to spend on something that is not going to work. I dread to think what impact that will have on our creaking criminal justice system. Again, we have not seen the sums. Why not? Surely the Home Secretary will have cleared this with the Chancellor and costed it?

[Sir John Hayes]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Bambos Charalambous]

I am conscious of time. I have to sit down in three minutes.

The Law Society of England and Wales warned yesterday that the Bill risks putting England’s global reputation for justice at risk—shameful. This is the Government who are reducing the country’s global standing so significantly. As if the inhumanity in the way the Government propose to treat asylum seekers is not bad enough, they go further by deciding to punish victims of modern slavery. The Bill peddles the Government’s signature toxic politics of fear and hostility by changing the standard of proof for determining if someone has a well-founded fear of persecution and making it more difficult for people to be recognised as victims of human trafficking. Despite choosing to start by disbelieving trafficked victims, there is nothing in the Bill about setting up a national operating standard procedure to train those whose first point of contact is clearly to identify victims of modern slavery. Why is that not in the Bill? Once again, it is just like the Queen of Hearts: sentence first, verdict afterwards.

We should most definitely be going after the traffickers and people-smuggling criminal gangs, but without international co-operation we will struggle to do that. The Bill is high on rhetoric, but low on action. Without introducing any safe routes, the Bill will be a boon for the international criminal gangs and a boost for their profits. Rather than breaking the business model, the Government have breathed new life into it by pushing people further into the arms of smugglers. Having reduced our ties with Interpol and tarnished our reputation with the international community, we have lost the soft power that things such as our commitment to international aid bought us.

We have been asking for safe routes to replace Dublin III since last year, but we have had nothing from the Government. Meanwhile, the Bill gives the Secretary of State new powers to act like the playground bully in delaying or suspending visa processing for citizens of countries that she believes are unco-operative with removals. In all honesty, if the Government seriously think that that will work in getting international co-operation, they are deluded. It is the same desperate politics that created the hostile environment and the Windrush scandal. Labour strongly opposes this misleading and deeply flawed legislation, and urges the Government to engage responsibly in a debate that recognises the humanity of those who have to flee their homelands and seek protection, no matter how they arrive in the UK.

This Bill is nothing more than a house of cards. It does nothing to address the crisis in our asylum system. It is deeply flawed and will end up collapsing if there are no bilateral agreements with our EU neighbours. We on the Labour Benches will be opposing the Second Reading of the Bill.

Nationality and Borders Bill (Second sitting)

Bambos Charalambous Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st September 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Q 23 I ask the witnesses to please introduce themselves.

Lucy Moreton: Good afternoon. My name is Lucy Moreton, and I am the professional officer for the ISU, which is the union that represents borders, immigration and customs staff.

Zoe Gardner: Good afternoon. My name is Zoe Gardner. I am actually policy and advocacy manager at the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants—I think my title was communicated wrongly before. JCWI is one of the oldest organisations in the country representing migrants and refugees going through the UK immigration system.

[Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)]

Q The premise of the Bill, according to the Government, is to fix the broken asylum system. In your opinion, will the Bill do that? If not, what needs to happen to fix the system?

Lucy Moreton: I think that if we knew how to fix the system, we would all have much quieter and easier lives. The Bill addresses some of the issues with the current asylum system, but without a significant underpinning of resources it will not make the difference that is anticipated. We have reached the situation that we have with the structures, both above and below the border, breaking, if not in fact broken, because of under-resourcing. You can set up an additional fast-track appeals process, for example, but if you do not resource the courts to enable them to have the rooms to hold the hearings, the judges to make those adjudications and the clerks to promulgate them, it will make no difference. You can express wishes in a Bill to return migrants to a safe third country, process them offshore or turn them back before they reach UK waters, but all that requires the co-operation of international partners, and if you cannot achieve that, it is nothing more than words on a bit of paper.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q Zoe, do you have a response to that?

Zoe Gardner: Yes. Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today. The short answer is that the available evidence does not support the approach being taken in this Bill. The aims of the Bill that the Government have put forward are to create a fairer asylum system and to discourage the use of irregular journeys by asylum seekers using smuggling routes. A fair asylum system would provide protection to refugees based on their need. The Bill does not propose a system that would do that. Furthermore, the evidence from similar policies enacted in other countries, or previously enacted in the UK, shows us that this approach is unlikely to deter people from seeking to come to the UK using irregular means, because it does not provide meaningful alternative ways for people to travel. In short, the Bill will not work. The only people who will be celebrating its implementation will be the criminal smuggling gangs.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q Lucy, according to a recent report there are 399 asylum claims in the system that have taken 10 years and still not been processed. Is that more than just a resourcing issue?

Lucy Moreton: I do not know the details of those 399 cases. If they have been in the system for more than 10 years—about 10 years ago, I was an asylum decision maker—it is likely that there will be other elements within that that are more complex. It is possible to repeatedly delay conclusion of a case through the late submission of evidence, for example. Whether that is the case in any or some of that group, I do not know. Clearly, the needs of anyone genuinely seeking protection in the UK are not served by being stuck in the system for months, let alone years.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q Clause 10 treats people differently based on how they arrive. If you arrive via regular routes, you are given protection. Lucy and Zoe, do you think that achieves the aims of the Bill?

Lucy Moreton: My understanding is that the stated aim is to deter irregular migration. I cannot see how some theoretical change, which is what it is at the moment, to how you might eventually be treated when you are finally granted asylum here would deter irregular migration. One element proposed for the group 2 refugees —the ones who have entered irregularly—is that it may limit their family reunion rights. Absolutely accepting the political balancing act that has to be done here, if you prevent people from travelling through a regular route, they will use an irregular route, so that alone seems to be circuitous.

Zoe Gardner: I agree with that assessment. The available evidence shows that the people who are making these journeys in order to seek asylum do not know the detail of different refugee protection regimes in different countries. They base their decision making on where to go. Either they do not make the decision at all themselves and it is in the hands of the smugglers who transport them, or they make the decision based on their connection to a country—so having family members in a country, speaking the language, or having other connections. In the case of Afghans at the current time, they might be ex-colleagues who have worked with the British military in Afghanistan. That might be a reason for their trying to come to the UK. The details of the system will not deter anybody.

With regard to the aims of the Bill, which is concerned with fairness, if we look at how the inadmissibility rules have operated so far, in the first six months of their operation since January, 4,500 people have been issued with a notice of intent under the inadmissibility rules, and 173 of those are from Afghanistan. This means that in effect their asylum claim has been put on hold for at least six months while the Government seek to find another place to send them—anywhere else but here. That is obviously not in the interests of fairness when it comes to people from Afghanistan who are clearly fleeing a dangerous situation.

JCWI has a client from Syria who is 19 years old. He was individually targeted by the Syrian military and was forced to flee at a moment’s notice. He had no other option but to take an irregular route. He has two sisters living here in the UK, so that was what motivated his choice to pay a smuggler to make a desperate escape and come to the UK. He is now in the inadmissibility process, and his mental health is deteriorating because of his fear that he will be sent away. The Government have told him that they are considering his removal to Austria or France or to anywhere else—anywhere else being somewhere that has no legal obligation to take him in and where he will have no family members. If he were to be removed, we would potentially be giving the smuggling gangs a repeat customer, because he would obviously have reason to seek to come back to the UK.

It also does not make any sense to pause that client’s claim for the time being, and the claims of 4,500 others—probably more at this stage—and have them wait in this limbo system, at great cost to the taxpayer and great harm to their mental health, on the basis of agreements to return people here, there or anywhere that we do not actually have yet. This approach is not going to achieve its aims whatsoever. The only thing it will achieve is cruelty, delay, additional bureaucracy and, as I say, lining the pockets of the smuggling gangs.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Thank you. I will let other Members ask questions now. If there is time, I would like to ask some more later.

[The Chair]

I call Stuart McDonald.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart Anderson]

Thank you.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q Mr Kirby, I want to ask about the issue you raised of people raising a defence and there being a delay. The national referral mechanism is meant to make decisions quite speedily, nut it is not doing that. Do you agree that if the NRM were to make decisions more quickly, that would stop this practice?

Assistant Chief Constable Dave Kirby: I think that would assist hugely. The delay can still be there, because people can choose when to bring the defence, and sometimes that is even at trial. But, yes, more speedy decisions from the civil competent authorities would be helpful, because investigators—we all know that resources are very stretched in every force area—could then focus on the areas they really need to.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q What international co-operation do you have with Europol or countries such as Albania in trying to stop international gangs trafficking people in the first place?

Assistant Chief Constable Dave Kirby: At a national level, we have had some quite good interaction and support from Albania and other countries, including Lithuania—in fact, my own force in Derbyshire has had a joint investigation with the Lithuanian authorities around forced labour exploitation. So I would say that the support is good; in general, it is conducted in conjunction with Europol or the National Crime Agency. Given the complexities in achieving that level of co-operation, it tends to be for our higher level investigations, where we have mapped organised criminality working at an international level, as opposed to the day in, day out criminality and exploitation that we uncover.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q Final question from me. Do you not think it is right that somebody who claims to be a victim of trafficking should be treated as a victim and that if they choose to disclose something later, that should not count against them?

Assistant Chief Constable Dave Kirby: I think what you are getting at is correct. The reason is that some of these people are under a huge amount of duress, including their families being threatened. Their families remain in Albania and other countries, so they cannot protect them, and violence is often used by these groups. If people are told not to claim that they are a victim and to go through the criminal justice process, and then at some point change their minds for whatever reason, I think that needs to be allowed and not counted against them. The difficulty is, of course, those who would exploit the system and raise a defence at a late stage in order to cause complications for the prosecution and who are in fact criminals, sometimes at a fairly high level. That is where the police and other agencies always need to be cognisant that that defence can be raised and to run those parallel investigations.

[Anne McLaughlin]

Q Good afternoon. I will start by saying that none of us here can possibly understand how complex the work is that you and your colleagues do. I am trying to understand some of it. I know that recently you said that you have spotted a trend of people who were arrested in drug busts claiming to be victims of slavery when you did not believe that to be the case. I think that, as a result of those concerns, the Home Secretary is overseeing plans to roll out a new public order definition that will allow police forces to refuse NRM protection to those committing serious crimes.

That turns the presumption of innocent until proven guilty on its head. Do you think that that is the most helpful way to go forward and, if so, are there other circumstances in which we should not offer support to people because we do not believe them, before they have had the opportunity to prove otherwise? If you do not think that it is helpful, how would you amend the legislation to be more helpful, while recognising that we do not know whether people are victims of slavery at the point at which they are arrested?

Assistant Chief Constable Dave Kirby: There are a few areas there. First, the existing legislation does not apply to a lot of crime types in any event—some of the more serious crime types that you mentioned, such as kidnapping and manslaughter, and lots of offences included in the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and firearms legislation, so some of that is there already. I do not think that it is right to say that policing is turning the presumption of innocent until proven guilty on its head. What I would say is that, where we already have information and intelligence in relation to individuals and their place within a criminal hierarchy, at that point it may be appropriate to turn that presumption on its head.

To illustrate, there is a recent case in Derbyshire where an Albanian gang has been dismantled only in the last couple of weeks. There have been 24 arrests, and I think 12 of those people were Albanians, running cannabis growers and other types of criminality in the region. More than one of those people claimed to be victims, but we had a covert investigation behind us that showed their level of control, their ability to communicate, the resources that they had and various things that clearly went against that claim. Absent that information and intelligence, I do not think that we would say, “We don’t believe this person,” in the first instance. An investigator should, and in all investigations does, go into that situation with an open mind. This person could be a victim or could, in fact, be a criminal. They start at that point, not on one side or the other.

The other part of your question was about what we do to make things easier for investigators to understand the true position. I think that, again, that would be some sort of duty to co-operate, because it is quite difficult if somebody claims to be a victim and then, for example, refuses to provide a phone passcode, and so on. Perhaps a duty there would assist us. I mentioned whether a person should have to declare straightaway, because often there are delays, but I think that a lot of genuine victims would suffer that way.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

Thank you, that is very helpful.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q I have some follow-up questions to that. You mentioned the Balkan states, in particular Albania and Lithuania. Is it generally the Balkan states which are involved in the criminal gangs you have come across?

Assistant Chief Constable Dave Kirby: At the moment, there is a heightened threat from people from those areas. That is what we are seeing most of in terms of foreign national offenders in Derbyshire and the east midlands, and I am fairly confident that is also the pattern elsewhere. To illustrate, we used to see Vietnamese organised criminals involved in cannabis growing, sex trafficking and other issues, but more often than not we now see Albanians in control, potentially exploiting those Vietnamese people, or, if not, working together. Some alleged groups are so well-organised and disciplined that they are able to effectively out-perform other criminal gangs. That is the threat we are seeing most in terms of foreign national criminality.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q On the issue of how often the slave defence is being used, how much of a problem do you see it as being? Does it happen all the time, not at all, by many people, or a few?

Assistant Chief Constable Dave Kirby: It is happening very regularly. However, we are uncovering victims very regularly, so in their cases that is a very positive thing. Forgive me, could you repeat the last part of the question?

[Bambos Charalambous]

How often is it occurring? How much of a problem do you see it as being?

Assistant Chief Constable Dave Kirby: I think it is occurring a lot, but whether I would classify it as a problem or not is another issue. When it is being used genuinely for victims in some of the most terrible circumstances imaginable, I would not classify that as a problem. However, the abuse is real; it is actually organised and, in some cases, quite systematic.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q You mentioned that when you find these criminal gangs, you come across many victims as well. How do you differentiate between the two?

Assistant Chief Constable Dave Kirby: From a domestic point of view, we would look at things like if they have access to communications, do they have their own phone or not? Have they got an evident network of contacts or friends? Have they got control of their own finances? Have they got control of their own documents? Are they able to come and go, or are they locked into a premises, for example? There are not many people within the sex-trafficking area of exploitation who are there voluntarily, of course, so we look at all of those factors.

Really, we are looking at someone’s freedoms; their access to resources, including money, telephones, that kind of thing; and whether they have a normal pattern of life, a normal pattern of life for a criminal, or if they are very much restricted in what they can do. That is one of the ways we can identify people as victims. We would also conduct more detailed work around finances. For example, if benefits are being claimed, who are they being collected by? Which accounts are they being paid into? Are we seeing the same account more than once, which might show an element of organisation and coercion? Those kinds of things.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q Is there not a danger, with some of the clauses, that you will also catch genuine victims of trafficking if they do not disclose something early on?

Assistant Chief Constable Dave Kirby: Again, I think it is really important that victims are allowed to make that claim at any point. I say that because of the coercion that exists, including threats to family members and so on. If somebody is arrested for whatever offence and know that they are a victim, they dare not claim to be so because their bosses say, “Don’t do that.” They know that if they plead guilty, and indicate that they will do so, the investigation is likely to be stopped short, saving further investigation into the organised crime group. The person is told to toe that line because of the threat to their family. It is difficult to say that they must declare early in those circumstances.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q But the Bill does not distinguish between the genuine victims and those who are trying to evade the system.

Assistant Chief Constable Dave Kirby: No, it does not, and again, it is down to the skill, knowledge and understanding of the investigators and other agencies to spot the signs and be alive to the fact that they are not just investigating whatever criminality is reported; they are also investigating the status of those involved.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Thank you.

[The Chair]

If there are no further questions, I thank our witness for his evidence. We will move on to the next panel.

Examination of witnesses

Councillor Roger Gough and Councillor Rachael Robathan gave evidence.

[Chair]

We will now hear oral evidence from Councillor Roger Gough, from Kent County Council, who is joining us virtually, and Councillor Rachael Robathan, from Westminster City Council, who is here in person. We have until 4pm. Would the witnesses introduce themselves for the record?

Councillor Roger Gough: I am Roger Gough. I am the leader of Kent County Council. I also chair the South-East Strategic Partnership for Migration.

Councillor Rachael Robathan: I am Rachael Robathan, I am leader of Westminster City Council.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q I thank both witnesses for coming today to give evidence. I just wonder about your experience of the pressures of having to look after asylum seekers in your respective authorities. I know that it will be different for each of you but what pressures have your councils been under?

Councillor Rachael Robathan: Just to give a current picture; we have 638 Afghan refugees who have come in as part of the current settlement in one hotel on the Edgware Road. We have a further 589 refugees who were in Westminster prior to that, spread across five hotels. Our experience is that clearly there is a lot of pressure on local services in terms of identifying health, educational and other support needs. There is not always the advance warning that local authorities would wish to have in terms of knowing about the placements before they arrive. Clearly, as much notice as we can be given from the Home Office, Clearsprings or whoever is placing the asylum seekers is very much to our advantage so that we can prepare and know what we are dealing with.

The other thing to stress is that there are particularly significant issues that arise. For example, over a third of the current Afghan refugees placed in Westminster are children and of those 10% are not with their parents or guardians, and have not travelled with them, so there is an immediate safeguarding issue, which the local authority needs to step in and deal with. While there is funding for the people placed in the hotels, there are undoubtedly significant pressures and concerns about how we support other people. It is unclear how long those refugees will be staying in those hotels. We are working on three months, but it could be longer than that, or it could be less. Those are the main things.

The current Afghan refugee settlement has been more co-ordinated than previous asylum-seeker placements, because there has been more of a joined-up approach. Westminster has a lot of tourist hotels in the centre of our city, which currently are not as full as hopefully they otherwise would be, so in areas where there is an availability of hotels there tends to be a disproportionate placement of asylum seekers, without necessarily the recognition of the pressure that that puts on the surrounding area.

Councillor Roger Gough: As you indicated in your question, clearly we have a very specific set of circumstances in Kent which relate to the Channel crossings and in particular to unaccompanied asylum-seeking children. Taking asylum overall first, most of the adult and accompanied child asylum seekers who arrive in Kent do not spend very long in Kent. There has been an exception to that for the last year, which is the use of the Napier Barracks near Folkestone, which has been a source of some challenge and controversy throughout its period of use. Most adult asylum seekers are rapidly moved on and dispersed. For us, the big issue has been unaccompanied asylum-seeking children. As you may know, we have twice in the last year had to suspend full operation of our statutory duties. Between August and, I think, early December last year and again between June and earlier this month, we did not collect young people from the port because our services at that point were put under extreme pressure.

To give an idea of what that means, there was great pressure on accommodation capacity since, this year in particular, we started to see more younger young people––under-16s––than we had in previous years. That certainly put pressure on fostering placements. For the slightly older young people, there was also pressure on some of the accommodation that they were placed in. That meant that young people were being placed outside the county, which clearly has significant impact in terms of oversight, safeguarding and so on. You must then add to that the fact that case loads and the pressure on our social work teams were reaching levels that we viewed as unsafe. Those are the sort of pressures that we were seeing in that area, and we have been working with the Home Office to try to make that a more manageable situation.

Turning to some of the wider areas, adult asylum dispersal, with the significant exception of Napier Barracks, has not been a factor for us very much in recent years. In terms of resettlement schemes, Kent, along with other parts of the south-east, played a full role in the Syrian scheme and is now looking to do so to the greatest possible extent with the Afghan scheme. We have three hotels in Kent that are being applied to Afghan families who are arriving.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q I have a follow-up question for you, Councillor Gough. You mentioned the issue around children. The adults, apart from at Napier Barracks, are dispersed: they come in, get processed and are taken to another part of the country. In relation to the children, do you get any additional resources from the Government to deal with the problem? Is it enough or do you need more resources to deal with the issues that you face?

Councillor Roger Gough: Historically, resources in the sense of money have been an issue for us. That has changed in the last year and a bit. Historically, we carried a loss, if you like: a difference between what we received from the various grants—chiefly Home Office grants—and what we spent of between £1.5 million and £2.5 million a year. In the summer of last year, there was a significant increase in the rates paid by the Home Office, particularly targeted on those of us in authorities with large numbers of unaccompanied asylum-seeking children. As part of the launch of the latest version of the national transfer scheme, there were some further enhancements to rates including some things on the care leavers area. That has made a real difference to us financially, so the point that I have made constantly is that when we speak about pressure and the areas in which Kent is feeling the impact, it is to do with the capacity of our services to respond. It has not been a case of financial resources this year or last, but historically it was.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q Councillor Robathan, you mentioned the pressure of unaccompanied asylum-seeking children on Westminster City Council’s resources. Can you give me an idea of those pressures and whether you have had additional support to deal with that from the Government?

Councillor Rachael Robathan: As Councillor Gough mentioned, it is not currently so much around the financial support; it is more to do with the wider pressure on services across the piece. For example, at the moment, we in Westminster, like Kent, have more than our allocated number of unaccompanied asylum-seeking children, which represents a significant responsibility because of the length of time that they are likely to be in receipt of services. There is a very significant pressure there, but it is more the wider pressure on overall services.

At the moment, we have 638 Afghan refugees in one hotel on the Edgware Road. We are having to put significant resources into trying to understand exactly who is there and what their needs are—all that information we need to gather in order to be able to look after those people safely while they are here. There is also the question of uncertainty. We do not know how long they will be within the borough and in need of our services. There are issues around education. Do we provide education within the hotel for those children? Clearly, if they were to go into our schools, that is disruption for the school and for the children themselves, as well as for the other children in that school.

So there are a number of other issues that need to be taken into account so that we can look after the children properly. That is why there needs to be more planning on where the asylum seekers are placed, and full co-ordination between the Government and local authorities on this.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q On dispersal and asylum accommodation elsewhere, many councils, including those of many of the Members sitting around the table here, take asylum seekers and they are resettled in those council areas, but some do not. Do you think that all councils should have to take their fair share?

Councillor Rachael Robathan: Yes, I think there should be a balanced approach to the whole process. Recognition needs to be made of the services and the housing accommodation that is available in different areas. Clearly, in inner-city areas there is more pressure. For example, the current Afghan refugees that we are seeing tend to have larger families, so there is more of a need for four-bedroom or even five-bedroom properties, which are under more pressure in an inner-city area than in other areas. Some balance needs to be made. Absolutely, in terms of dispersing and further placement, that needs to be balanced.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q Councillor Gough, what is your view?

Councillor Roger Gough: I agree with that. What we have to remember is that there are different schemes for different groups of asylum seekers and others being resettled. The rhetoric that is always applied by central Government and the authorities is a place-based approach. Many of us would say that in practice that does not always work out.

When it comes to unaccompanied asylum-seeking children, in Kent we have been vociferous that the scheme should be mandatory. At the moment, the Government are still very much committed to a voluntary scheme. We will have to see how that works out. The Government are seeking to make it work, but we have a view on that.

On adult asylum seekers, part of the difficulty is that you have a very different mechanism being applied and very different responsibilities for the authorities or areas that are taking part. For instance, the south-east is massively under-represented in terms of adult asylum seekers within its population by comparison with, say, the west midlands or the north-west. The problem is not so much that the authorities are unwilling to step up to the plate. It is much more to do with the cost and availability of housing and developing the infrastructure. To some extent, once you have established the infrastructure, it can support more arrivals; it is getting it started that can be the issue. That has generated a slightly vicious circle, in terms of where you get concentrations of asylum seekers. That is something that the Home Office and groups such as the regional migration partnerships were working on over the last couple of years. It was quite a major strand of work prior to the pandemic striking. There is very much a variation.

The other key point, which fits in with what Councillor Robathan has just mentioned, is engagement with local authorities. Many of us would say that the resettlement scheme—what started as the Syrian scheme—has been a great model of very effective engagement with local authorities, and that has been reflected in the fact that authorities across the country have played their part in it. Not all schemes work quite as well.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q I have one final question for Councillor Gough. You mentioned Napier Barracks in Kent. The Government announced that they want to extend the period of time that they are using Napier Barracks for asylum accommodation. I just wondered what your thoughts were on that, and how it has gone down locally.

Councillor Roger Gough: Clearly, it is not welcome that we have another element of this particular picture in a part of the country that very visibly experiences large numbers of arrivals. In a sense, having a presence of this kind in east Kent is not ideal, and we have always been clear—both Kent County Council and our colleagues in the local district council, Folkestone and Hythe—that this is a decision taken by the Home Office, not by the local authorities, and is not something we were in support of.

That said, I think that a great deal of work has been undertaken to seek to address some of the problems that produced the real crisis in and around Napier Barracks in the early part of this year, where we saw some disorder and a significant covid outbreak. Significant steps have been taken on that, although there are still concerns about that facility.

[Paul Howell]

Q Can we change the direction slightly? We have heard lots about the stresses that illegal immigration is putting on local councils. Looking at the Bill as it stands, can you tell me whether there are things in there that help the situation for you, and are there things that you would like to have seen in there—things that would have helped if they had been put in? I am trying to see what difference the Bill would actually make to your life.

Councillor Rachael Robathan: Yes, there are certainly some things that we would welcome, although it would be good to see some more detail when the secondary legislation comes forward. Just to back up slightly, a further issue that we have in Westminster, as many of you will be aware, is the significant number of rough sleepers. Our latest count was 171, which is actually fewer than there have been previously. We worked very closely with Government on the Everyone In programme and so on last year, which was very successful, but we still have 70 in a bridging hotel within Westminster, so there is a significant issue around rough sleeping.

Over half of those people have no recourse to public funds. All of the asylum seekers in Westminster have come through the sanctioned route, so they would be in category 1 under this Bill, but one of the concerns for us would be if there is more clarity, if you like, in terms of no recourse to public funds for category 2, whether some of those people who would have no recourse to public funds might slip into rough sleeping. There is always a draw to the centre of Westminster: it is known that an aggressive beggar can make up to £500, or sometimes more, on our streets in Westminster, so if people find themselves on the street, there is an economic pull into the centre. That could lead to increasing numbers within Westminster.

Speaking very specifically about Westminster, the issue is that we then have an issue with tented accommodation, and the point about tented accommodation—I have had a number of meetings with the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice about this—is that there is a very high bar for the police or others to be able to gain entry to the tents. Not only is it difficult to enforce against those who would be illegally there but, much more importantly, it is very difficult to address issues around trafficked women and other people who are on the streets and need support and help, because we are unable to deliver that. That is a concern.

One of the things that we would welcome—I think this has come through in what both Councillor Gough and I have said—is a more organised approach to the way asylum seekers are looked after and accommodated. More planning around the process would help. I think we have also both said that the Afghan resettlement has been much better in terms of being able to have planning and co-ordination with local authorities, so that is something we would welcome.

Also in Westminster, I welcome the measures around modern slavery, but also the greater sanctions to stop people coming back into the country if they have been convicted of criminal activity. Once again, we have people on the streets in Westminster who engage in criminal activity to earn money. That activity is not at a very high level, but they are still things that have a real impact on our residents’ lives. We would welcome the moves around electronic travel authorisation and other measures to make re-entry into the country more difficult for those people who are here to commit criminal activity.

Councillor Roger Gough: I would endorse what Councillor Robathan has said; I agree with all those points. There are a couple of specifics from our side. One slightly begs the question as to how effective the measures will be, ultimately, because others looking at the Bill can judge that better than me. The basic principle of seeking to promote safe and orderly routes at the expense of those that involve things like the small boat routes would be very welcome. There is no doubt, and it has been much emphasised, that that route is very dangerous. It creates a degree of political tension because it is so visible. It is something that we very much wish to avoid. Those issues come home to those of us who are border authorities, particularly in the case of the small boats in areas such as Kent. The measures to try to shift the balance between the two ways in which people get here would in principle be very welcome.

The second area I want to touch on relates to age assessment. Broadly, the direction there seems to me to be a favourable one. The attempt to create a national body, not to carry out or provide support to local authorities, unless it is requested, so much as to provide some consistency and regularity to a very time-consuming process that can wrap up huge amounts of time from very qualified social workers and which often has no very obvious end to it because it is relatively loosely guided, is welcome. Establishing best practice as well as providing support for local authorities, many of which will be less experienced in this area than authorities such as mine, would be very welcome.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

We will now hear evidence from Tony Smith, from Fortinus Global Ltd, who is joining us virtually. We have until 4.30 pm. Could the witness please introduce himself for the record?

Tony Smith: Good afternoon, everybody. My name is Tony Smith. I am now an independent international border management consultant, but I am probably better known as a former director general of UK Border Force, with 40 years’ experience of working in the Home Office in immigration and border applications.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q Mr Smith, thank you very much for agreeing to give evidence today. We very much welcome your insights, with your many years of experience. The premise of the Bill is to fix the broken asylum system. You have mentioned your 40 years of experience, and some of that was as an immigration caseworker, I understand. I just wondered what your ideas were about what needs to be fixed to fix the broken asylum system and whether you think the Bill achieves that.

Tony Smith: I think there is a broad consensus that the system is broken. I spent a great many years working in the areas of immigration enforcement, border control or immigration control, and asylum. I think what has happened recently has been a new method of gaining entry to the UK. This channel crossing was not an issue in my time. I retired in 2013, and at that time most of our energies were devoted to securing the port of Calais and preventing illegal migrants from concealing themselves in vehicles, to reduce that route.

In some respects, we have been victims of our own success, in that the smugglers will not give up; they constantly try new methods to get around our controls. This method has been used only in the last two or three years; they have found a gap in our defences. I think, therefore, the Bill is right to try to distinguish those asylum seekers that enter in this way—coming across the English channel in small vessels and claiming asylum on arrival—many of whom have spent a good deal of time in another safe third country, from those that are being evacuated by the UNHCR or through the Afghan programme. I think the Bill does that. It does attempt to distinguish the method of entry by redefining article 31 of the refugee convention, and to distinguish those people that are immediately fearing persecution from those that are not, so that we can get back some form of control of that part of our border, which at the moment I fear we have lost.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q You mentioned people coming in via lorries. Clearly, that is still going on. It is not just the channel crossings that are the issue; it is also people who would be coming in via that route.

Tony Smith: Yes, but as I say, I worked in senior positions in the immigration service when we had our really big asylum influx, which was in 2001. I am afraid corporate memory in the Home Office is not all that it might be, but at that time we were on the cusp of introducing the juxtaposed controls in northern France, because over 100,000 came in 2001 and the Government of the day saw it as a priority to reduce asylum intake from France. The effect of the juxtaposed controls was that by moving the UK border to Calais, it was not possible to claim asylum in the UK, because the applicants were not within the jurisdiction, so people were originally coming on forged passports—initially by air and then by ferry—and claiming asylum. Once we introduced those measures, they resorted to concealment in vehicles. We were then able to establish an agreement with our friends in France that we would have a British control zone in France, which would enable us to conduct our own searches in the UK zone. Subsequently, I was involved in a lot of the berthside checks to prevent people pervading through the fences and getting on to the vessels berthside.

We did a lot of work to secure that part of the border and in collaboration with our colleagues in France. That worked in terms of the targets, which were to reduce asylum intake via these methods, coupled with other measures that were taken, such as the third country unit to return people to safe third countries. We had the detained fast track system for manifestly unfounded cases. A lot of these things were tried previously and did work to an extent. As I say, the maritime environment is an extraordinarily complex one, as the Committee will no doubt be hearing, in terms of the complexities of international law and what we can do in our domestic law to manage that. I do think the attempt is a bold one to make this distinction, because I think we are conflating two different issues here, in terms of people who are travelling across between two safe third countries, and those that are genuinely in need of resettlement—of whom the numbers far outweigh the levels that the western world is prepared to take, I am afraid.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q You mentioned the juxtaposed controls from 2001. That was done in co-operation with France, but clearly things seem to be very different now. I just wondered what your take was on the need for international co-operation to resolve the issue of illegal migration.

Tony Smith: After the first signs of Brexit, we did have an APPG, more on freight rather than people, about what we were going to do about the border with France. I participated in that with some French officials and a number of MPs. The ending of free movement is in itself a significant challenge for that border. There were certainly some overtures from French politicians that they wanted not just to retain the juxtaposed controls but to work with us on joint enforcement measures because they really did not want international organised crime groups working in the Hauts-de-France region. Nor did they want large numbers of irregular migrants, shall we say, who are already in the Schengen zone––as you know, there are no borders in the Schengen zone––effectively migrating into the Hauts-de-France in the hope of being able to get across to the UK.

I did think there was an element of goodwill there, in terms of continuing to work with them, and we have seen some of that. We have persuaded the French police to conduct checks on the beaches and to prevent people boarding small vessels to get across. The difficulty we have is that once they are seaborne, the French position is that they will not intervene because they see this as a search-and-rescue operation, which is covered by international conventions. The migrants do not want to be rescued by the French police or coastguard because they would be taken back to France. They want to be rescued by the UK Border Force. For the UK Border Force, our primary mission at sea ought to be the preservation of life on both sides. Once we bring people aboard a Border Force vessel, they are within our jurisdiction, they can claim asylum and that just fuels the business model that the human smugglers are exploiting.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q On the Border Force issue, what the Bill suggests doing is pushbacks, which many people would agree would be a dangerous activity. What are your thoughts about pushbacks and how that sits with maritime law?

Tony Smith: I think it is highly dangerous. I am in touch with former colleagues from the Australian Border Force, which is often held up as a model for pushbacks. That was an entirely different model from the one that we are proposing. These are dangerous waterways and very vulnerable vessels. I fear for the worst. We have already had drownings. They are not as well reported as they should be but we have had them. We do not know how many, of course, because bodies have not always been retrieved. We will certainly see the smugglers resort to tactics, as we saw in Australia, such as vessels literally being holed so that they sink and lifejackets being thrown overboard in the trust, hope and expectation that those on board will then be rescued, which we have an international duty to undertake.

The only real way out of this is to come to an accommodation with the French Government, which I have been advocating for some time. There is provision under article 98 of the UN convention on the law of the sea for countries to establish regional arrangements, so it is possible, with political agreement with France, that we could have joint patrols on the English channel. We could have British officers on their vessels and they could put French officers on our vessels, but the premise would be that if you are returned to either side, there is no risk of refoulement because both countries are signatories to the 1951 refugee convention and you would get a full and fair asylum hearing on either side. I do think that is possible, but there is a reluctance on the part of the French Government to go down that road at the moment because they have significant immigration problems of their own. They cannot control their own southern border because they are part of the Schengen group and there is a significant lobby in France saying, “Why would we stop people crossing to the UK when we have plenty of irregular migrants already coming into France?”

[Anne McLaughlin]

Q Good afternoon. You have already answered some of what I was planning to ask you about. I read recently that you said the preservation of life should be the UK’s top priority. You have repeated that today, so I do not need to ask you the question about whether you support the pushing back of children, men and women who arrive in boats, because you clearly do not.

You talked about Australia, which I was going to bring up. I am sure I read recently that Australia also criminalised those who rescued people who were seeking asylum and arriving by boat, but made the exception that if the vessel was not seaworthy they would not be criminalised. I think that is what you referred to when you talked about the traffickers putting holes in the boats so that they became dangerous. That sort of thing assists traffickers now that they know what to do. First, would you caution the UK against making that caveat and perhaps urge it to drop the pushback thing altogether? Would you caution against the criminalisation of people who rescue people at sea?

Tony Smith: We could spend a lot of time talking about the Australian model, which we do not have, but you are talking about a much, much longer stretch of water there. The Australian Border Force—I was down there helping it to set up—took the view that its maritime response was significantly different from ours. The vessels it deployed are significantly different from the UK Border Force cutters. The cutter fleet that we have in the Home Office are legacy Customs cutters. They are not designed to bring people ashore or to process people. They were even processing people on some of the Australian vessels to determine whether they were admissible to the asylum system before they brought them ashore. In the end, they invested in vessels of their own. They could then move the individuals from the unseaworthy vessels that they were encountering into their own vessels that they had purchased and escort them back to Indonesian waters. There was a significant investment by the Australian Government in doing that, which did work, but trying to compare that with what we see on the English channel is a different question.

Yes, of course we should preserve life, and I think the French should do that, too. There is an obligation on both sides of the channel for us to work together to find a way to stop human smugglers. The current model simply demands, “You pay €5,000 to me and I will put you in an unseaworthy vessel, and I really don’t care whether you drown or not because I have got my money.” I am afraid that is the way the mind of the human smuggler operates. They are getting the upper hand, we are seeing numbers going up and we will see more drownings. It is difficult to lay this at the door of the UK Border Force, who have a lot of other pressures on their resources at the moment.

We need to find a way, if we can, of getting common sense to prevail on a joint strategy with France. We already have a significant number of bilateral treaties with the French that have survived Brexit and that would enable us to fix this problem, but I do not think we have been able to find anybody in a senior position in the French Government who would go that far.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

We will now hear oral evidence from Rob Jones, director of threat leadership at the National Crime Agency. What a great job title. We have until 5.15 pm. Will the witness please introduce himself for the record?

Rob Jones: My name is Robert Jones. I am one of the operational directors at the National Crime Agency. I tackle all the serious organised crime threats and my particular interest in this is that I tackle organised immigration crime as one of the national priority threats that the agency deals with.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q I would like ask you some questions about the work of the National Crime Agency in breaking the crime gangs that are smuggling people into the country. Clearly, a lot of those gangs operate internationally. What is your experience around working internationally to try and break those gangs?

Rob Jones: Obviously, there is a lot of interest in the small boats business model. I will talk about the whole route first and then focus on small boats. For some time, we have operated with our international liaison network and international partners to try to deal upstream from the UK with smuggling gangs that are targeting the UK for profit. That is a big part of what we do. That has involved targeting people who use high-risk methods of clandestine entry, where they pack people into concealments in lorries and move them overland from as far afield as Turkey, typically via an overland route.

For a variety of reasons, beginning in 2018 over the Christmas period, we have seen a movement towards the use of the small boats business model to execute clandestine entry into the UK. That has been driven by a number of factors. Obviously, during the period of lockdown when we had a long period of benign weather, almost perfect conditions and the traffic through the Schengen area and traditional border crossings was supressed, we saw those same smuggling gangs recognising an opportunity and beginning to exploit the small boats model.

Our stated intent is to disrupt as much of this as far away from the UK as possible. That means operating in a range of different environments, which we do. We also work very closely with French, Belgian and German authorities to try to disrupt smuggling gangs that are much closer to home. The emphasis, particularly post exit and particularly because of small boats, on that relationship in the near continent is ever more important. The centre of gravity for small boats is not in the UK; it is in France, Germany, Belgium and further afield.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q Could you elaborate a bit? How do you actually break the gangs? How do you stop them operating?

Rob Jones: When we can identify crime groups in the UK, we target them and we use a range of investigative tactics to bring them to justice and take them through the criminal justice system. A big part of what we do is intelligence collection, where we share intelligence about known smuggling gangs with overseas partners. We do that very effectively with the French through a joint unit that we set up; we also work with German and Belgian partners in a similar bilateral way. Crucially, if we have lead intelligence that a boat is being supplied to a smuggling gang, an engine is being supplied to a smuggling gang, or smugglers are moving migrants to lay-up points where they are then going to be involved in small boats crossing, we pass on that intelligence as quickly as possible for action to prevent that crossing from happening. The stated intent for all of this is to prevent loss of life. Our biggest concern is a mass casualty event in the English channel, so everything we do is driven by that article 2 responsibility.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q Some of the people who have been trafficked do not come in across the channel in small boats. What steps are you taking to tackle people who are trafficked, either for sexual exploitation or modern-day slavery?

Rob Jones: We work closely with national policing and we are one of the first responders for dealing with modern slavery, so we proactively investigate controllers and traffickers who keep people in debt bondage in the UK, and we bring them to justice through the criminal justice system. Through our liaison network, we also try to disrupt that threat further afield. That work has led to some powerful results through Project Aidant, where we worked with policing partners to look at things thematically. You talked about sexual exploitation, and with that, forced labour and all the areas that form the modern slavery threat, and we operate against them to try to disrupt them. That involves encountering victims, setting up reception centres and dealing with the victims of trafficking as well as with the perpetrators who keep them in debt bondage.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q You have just mentioned victims, and obviously the NCA and most police enforcement operate on intelligence. Some of that intelligence comes from people who have been victims or who are perpetrators. One thing that concerns me about the Bill is the disclosure of information straight away. I wondered what your experience was of that.

Rob Jones: Some victims disclose relatively quickly. We recognise that others will not and that there are some people who, because of their level of vulnerability, need safeguarding and will need time before they can talk about their experiences. What I would say about the legislation and proposed changes is that we now have a national system for recognising the victim engrained. I do not see any of this changing that. First responders have become very good at recognising a victim, and we have significantly improved the picture nationally with national policing. In the victim-suspect paradigm, what are you dealing with? The intent is always to recognise the victim as quickly as possible. I recognise that it takes some time and is not straightforward.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q Would that be because of threats back home, or something else?

Rob Jones: A range of different scenarios. Many of these people are in debt bondage and there is leverage on their families, or they have already committed to working in an area that might be illegal, such as cannabis cultivation. It is a complex area, but we have a lot of experience of dealing with it and we deal with victims very carefully to ensure that we get the safeguarding right and whatever intelligence dividend we can.

You mentioned small boats in the context of modern slavery, so to deal with that really quickly, it does not really lend itself to the typical exploitation model. That said, we have seen some evidence of some nationalities coming through on small boats where there are some signs of that business model being used. I say it does not lend itself to that business model because these people are coming pretty much straight into the asylum system and to first responders. Traffickers do not like that; they do not want it. They would prefer those individuals to arrive in a truly clandestine fashion, so that they are not met by first responders and debriefed.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q So people who are trafficked do not come across the channel in boats, but by some other route—on the back of a lorry, for instance?

Rob Jones: Potentially. I am not saying that it does not happen at all, but that business model does not lend itself to trafficking as much as it does to organised immigration crime.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q Going back to the question of victims who might not disclose the information early on, one thing the Bill does is treat them differently if they do not disclose that information for some reason—you have given some examples. Again, that might make them less likely to co-operate with the authorities. Do you think that that will be a problem in getting more information to detect the real people behind organised crime?

Rob Jones: This is a really difficult area. In the practical application of those provisions, it is really important that the level of oversight we have now is maintained. The other side of that coin is that you need to ensure that the defences available to people involved as victims in modern slavery are not abused. We see both sides of this. Our tactical advisers and expert witnesses disprove false claims from people claiming to be the victims of slavery and support legitimate claims. It is really important that the system maintains its credibility by having some appropriate tension and challenge without undermining victims.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q Is that more investment in first responders and the referral to the NRM?

Rob Jones: It is recognising victims, understanding what is in front of you and making sure that you are consistent in applying safeguarding where it is needed.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q Going back to small boats, clearly if we are working with the French authorities to disrupt the people behind smuggling, it does not seem to be going so well. How could we work better with the French to try to stop that?

Rob Jones: This is inherently challenging: 150 km of coastline and it is not a canalised control point, so it is not like juxtaposed controls. The level of ambition required to tackle this is similar to that required to set up juxtaposed controls. The Le Touquet agreement set up what was then an unprecedented system for joint controls over immigration, and indeed customs. Where we find ourselves now is that we work really closely with the French on meeting that challenge.

Ultimately, it is for French law enforcement to deal with those departures and, from our perspective, our intent is to make sure that the disruption of departures is as far away from beaches as possible. That means that smuggling gangs are disrupted away from beaches and that the French do not have to chase migrants on beaches. That is not the best way to do this. It is an intelligence-led, planned response. That is the aspiration of the relationship with the French, which we build on every day with colleagues in the Clandestine Threat Command from immigration enforcement. Dealing with people who are leaving a border that is not controlled in the way that a typical border would have been controlled is inherently challenging. Those controls need to push back inland from the border, so that there is an intelligence-led proactive response. The French are working very closely with us to try to achieve that.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q You also mentioned some other countries, such as Belgium, Germany and Turkey. Are you working closely with them?

Rob Jones: We are, absolutely. We have very positive relationships with those countries. The supply of boats to northern France and of engines in the infrastructure that supports these crossings is something that those partners can help us with.

[Tom Pursglove]

Q I heard your answer in relation to modern slavery, but in terms of wider criminality and what you are seeing on the ground, what impact do you think the proceeds of small boat crossings are having on criminal gangs?

Rob Jones: We know that that route is more and more attractive to organised crime. That is why we need to break the momentum that is pushing the viability of that route. People who are involved in the facilitation of migrants are also involved in drug trafficking and other serious organised crime. We have seen that polycriminality with HGV companies that will one day smuggle drugs and another day smuggle migrants.

One of the good things about these provisions is that they, to coin a phrase, level up the sentencing for people involved in the facilitation of migrants with that for those who are dealt with for drug trafficking. It cannot be right that, at the moment, if you smuggle 20 kg of class A drugs, you could face a life sentence, but if you conceal 20 people in a false floor in a lorry, which is one of the things that we encounter at the border, it is 14 years. Some of the provisions here, including the life sentence for facilitation, are a useful deterrent that we feel will help with that broader organised crime threat where some of this money is reinvested in other crimes.

Nationality and Borders Bill (First sitting)

Bambos Charalambous Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st September 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Before we begin, I have a couple of preliminary announcements. I encourage Members to wear masks when they are not speaking, in line with Government guidance and that of the House of Commons Commission. Please give each other and members of staff space when seated and when entering and leaving the room. Hansard colleagues would be grateful if Members emailed their speaking notes to [e-mail]. Any doubt about that, please ask the Clerk at the end. We must ensure that Hansard gets the notes. Please ensure that all your mobile phones are switched to silent. I remind Members that tea and coffee are not allowed in Committee. If you want to have coffee, you have to go outside the Committee Room.

Today, we will consider the programme motion on the amendment paper. We will then consider the motion to enable the reporting of written evidence for publication and the motion to allow us to deliberate in private about our questions before the oral sessions begin. In view of the time available, I would like to take those matters formally. I have discussed it with the Minister and he agrees. I call him to move the programme motion standing in his name, which was discussed yesterday by the Programming Sub-Committee.

Ordered,

That—

1. the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 10.25 am on Tuesday 21 September) meet—

(a) at 2.00 pm on Tuesday 21 September;

(b) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 23 September;

(c) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 19 October;

(d) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 21 October;

(e) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 26 October;

(f) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 28 October;

(g) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 2 November;

(h) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 4 November;

2. the Committee shall hear oral evidence in accordance with the following Table:

[Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)]

On a point of order, Sir Roger. On the initial list of witnesses there were some Home Office officials. On the present list, there are no Home Office officials, which makes it much harder for the Opposition to scrutinise the Bill. We had certain questions that we wished to pose to Home Office officials. I put it on the record that they were initially on the list of witnesses but are no longer there.

[The Chair]

That is not strictly a matter for the Chair; it is a matter for the usual channels. That should be discussed between the Government and Opposition Whips. I had better ask for the relevant parties to do that privately, and to have a conversation with you. It is not something, I am afraid, that I can adjudicate, but you have made your point. The opportunity to discuss it was at the Programming Sub-Committee yesterday, where it should properly have been raised. It was not raised on that occasion.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Thank you very much indeed for taking the trouble and the time to join us this morning.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q Mr Featonby, I am going to ask you some questions about the Bill in which the Red Cross has indicated some interest. According to the Government, the main objectives of the Bill are to increase fairness in the asylum system; to better protect those who are supported and in need of asylum; and to deter illegal entry into the UK and break the business model of people smuggling networks. To what extent do you think this Bill achieves those objectives?

Jon Featonby: I will start off by saying that as the British Red Cross, we very much welcome this opportunity to give evidence to the Committee today, but the short answer to that question is that we do not think the Bill is going to meet those objectives at all. To build on that a bit, we take that from our role as the largest independent provider of advice and support to refugees and people seeking asylum in the UK. We work with around 30,000 people each year in all four countries of the UK, supporting people throughout the asylum process, from when they first enter it to when they get decisions, and in making decisions about what happens next. Through that work, we see that there are three key elements of an asylum system. First, it must be safe for people to access it; secondly, it must be fair and efficient and make decisions in a timely way and, thirdly, those people who are in the system, while they are in the system, should receive the advice and support they need.

At the moment, there are a number of challenges to that, as shown by the number of people taking dangerous journeys to reach the UK, the increasing backlog in asylum decision making and the length of time people are having to wait for a decision on their application. There are also challenges that local authorities, organisations such as our own and, importantly, people in the system face in terms of the support they receive, whether that is support with accommodation, mental health or other areas. We believe those should have been some of the priorities for both this piece of legislation and the new plan for immigration that runs alongside it.

That work is also informed by the people we work with. We run the VOICES Network, which is a group of people with lived experience of the asylum system. They were among those who gave evidence to the Government during the consultation on the new plan, and when we speak to them about this legislation, one of their key messages, as people who have made that dangerous journey, is that there is nothing in the Bill or in the new plan that would have changed the decisions they made.

We absolutely agree that there are too many people making those dangerous journeys; we want to see a reduction in the number of people making dangerous journeys in small boats across the channel as much as anybody else does, but we do not believe the measures in the Bill will do that.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q As a follow-up, how do you think a reduction in those dangerous journeys would be better achieved?

Jon Featonby: There is no simple answer to that; as the Home Secretary said on Second Reading, there is no silver bullet for many of these challenges. If there were, I am sure some country would already have come up with it. However, there are some key things that the Red Cross believes could be explored further.

The expansion of safe routes for people seeking protection is prime among those things. We welcome the Afghan citizens resettlement scheme announced recently. The UK has a good recent record of providing resettlement places, and we believe that on top of that Afghan resettlement scheme there is the need for a wider global scheme. There is the UK resettlement scheme, the successor to the Syrian resettlement programme, but there is no annual quota for that. On top of that 5,000 commitment for the Afghan scheme we would like to see an additional 5,000 for the global scheme.

We also call for refugee family reunion. One of the core bits of work that the Red Cross does in the UK is support refugees being reunited with their family members. As the new plan for immigration stated, family reunion is currently the largest safe route for people to get to the UK. Over the five years to 2019, 29,000 people arrived in the UK through refugee family reunion, compared with 25,000 through resettlement over the same period.

From what we see in our work supporting families, as much as that reunion is a moment of joy for so many people, there are other families whom the current rules do not allow to reunite. One of the prime examples is that the rules do not cater for adult dependent children. A parent in the UK who has refugee status can sponsor their parent, their partner or spouse and any children under the age of 18 to come and join them, but we see that often there are people whose child may have turned 18 or 19, potentially while they were in the asylum process, who face a difficult decision about whether they leave that child overseas, or just do not bring any of their family to come and join them.

We believe the Bill is an opportunity to expand the rules. One of our key concerns about the Bill, in clause 10 on the differential treatment of refugees, is that there is potential for family reunion to be limited, although the Bill does not quite state how.

Alongside those safe routes, we recognise that the UK cannot alone solve all those issues. However, it has a vital role to play internationally, ensuring that no matter where people are after they have been forced to flee their home, they can access protection systems, whether in the UK, France, Germany or close to the countries from which they first leave.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q You mentioned clause 10 in your answer. What other problems do you see with clause 10, which treats people differently depending on how they arrive?

Jon Featonby: The starting point for the British Red Cross is that people’s protection should be based on their protection needs, and not on how they have entered the UK. Clause 10 provides a power that would move away from that and treat people on the basis of how they arrive in the country. It is difficult to ascertain what some of the impact would be, because clause 10 just creates a power for that to be introduced later in the immigration rules. Certainly, our concern is that the list of the ways in which leave can be differentiated for those people recognised as refugees is an example list and non-exhaustive, and there is therefore scope within the immigration rules to follow for that differentiated treatment to be undertaken in a much wider way.

In terms of the impact of that differentiated treatment, which I am sure falls within the Bill’s aim to deter people from making dangerous journeys, we certainly do not believe that it will do that. From the people we work with, we know it is rare for people making those journeys—even if they have any element of choice over where they are going to end up—to have any clear idea about what their rights and entitlements will be when they arrive, so we do not believe it would deter dangerous journeys.

We also believe there would be negative impacts from some of the ways people’s leave will be differentiated. Some of that concern draws on the evidence from Australia, which has used temporary protection visas, similar to those that clause 10 would allow to be introduced, on and off for the past two decades. One of the key findings is that that has increased the insecurity people feel when they have that protection status. This is a group of people who will have been recognised as refugees by the UK Government, but one way they will be treated differently is that those who have arrived irregularly will only get temporary protection for maybe two and a half years, which will then be extendable at each point.

The lack of security around that has an impact on not only people’s mental health, but their prospects for integration and their ability to get jobs and rebuild their lives. Employers looking at that type of temporary leave are less likely, we believe, to employ that person, compared with somebody who might have indefinite leave to remain, as a refugee arriving under the resettlement programme would have.

I have already mentioned our concerns about the potential impact on family reunion. It is important to note that those people arriving in the UK through family reunion are predominantly women and children; 90% of all family reunion visas currently granted are to women and children. Limiting access to family reunion for the refugee in the UK is taking away a safe route for his—in most cases—wife and children to be able to come and join him. The evidence from Australia was that where that happened, it incentivised and increased the number of dangerous journeys being made by women and children, which is something the British Red Cross believes should absolutely be avoided.

One of the other potential routes for differentiation is giving those people granted refugee status no access to public funds. Most of the refugees we support struggle when they are first granted status, and one of the main groups of people we support across all our services in the UK is people who are destitute, at all stages of the asylum process. Around one third of the people we have supported in our destitution services over the past year are people with refugee status, and often that is because they fall into the gap between Home Office and local authority support when they are first granted status and the Home Office support ends.

Without giving people access to the social security and welfare system, you risk embedding some of that destitution at that point as well. Not only is that bad for those individuals, putting them at great risk, but it puts extra pressures on local authorities. We see that within our services at the moment.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q Moving on to clause 11, on asylum accommodation, I know in the past the Red Cross has been critical of the Government’s using Napier Barracks to house asylum seekers. What are your thoughts on clause 11 and dispersal, and what lessons can be learned from the problems with Napier Barracks?

Jon Featonby: The issues with accommodation and the challenges the Home Office faces in providing it are well known and serious, and there is no simple solution to many of them. Some of the problems around the shortage of accommodation were caused by the covid pandemic. We welcome the Home Office’s move at the start of the pandemic not to evict people from asylum accommodation, but that obviously meant that fewer people were moving through the system.

Some of the challenges with the dispersal system and the shortage of housing are also caused by the increasing backlog in asylum decision making. There are now around 70,000 people waiting for an initial decision, the majority of whom have been waiting longer than six months. That includes people from places such as Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and Eritrea, who will almost certainly go on to get refugee status, but the lack of throughput in the system has created that pressure. Several Members on this Committee represent areas that do great work hosting people through the dispersal system, but we do not think the Bill will do anything to help them.

The accommodation centres in clause 11 are part of the response to that pressure. As you rightly said, the Red Cross has raised concerns around some of the Ministry of Defence sites that have been used over the last year, and their suitability for people seeking asylum. In particular, we were operational in Penally Barracks in south Wales when that was open, and we continue to support people in Napier.

From our experience, we think that the best way to accommodate people while they are in the asylum system is within communities. They can feel a part of those communities and receive the support that they need. It is also beneficial for those communities, in terms of social cohesion. That relates to some of the negative impacts that we have seen, where people have been accommodated in some of the military barracks.

We also have some concerns about the way that clause 11 currently works. Reading the explanatory notes, what seems to be happening is that, rather than the Bill itself setting out the framework for an accommodation centre, it relies on the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. That legislation was passed almost 20 years ago during a very different time: asylum applications were far higher, the length of time that people waited for a decision was far shorter, and far fewer people were then getting positive decisions after going through that system.

The 2002 Act has quite a few concerning aspects, including not allowing children in accommodation centres to access local authority schools. We see that as being quite serious. It may well be that the idea behind the centres, and the Government’s proposed use of the centres, would include families or children being accommodated there, but that is not clear from what is currently in the Bill. The Bill does, however, change the 2002 Act around some of the limits on the length of time that people can stay in one of those accommodation centres. Currently, under the 2002 Act, somebody in an accommodation centre could only be accommodated there for up to six months. The Bill gives the Home Secretary the power to increase that length of time.

It is noteworthy that, in the recent special development order, which was laid before Parliament to extend the use of Napier Barracks by an additional five years, one of the ways in which the Home Office changed the operation of that site was to limit the length of time that somebody could stay there to 90 days. Therefore, we would certainly see that one of the safeguards around the use of accommodation centres would be to limit the length of time that somebody could stay there, rather than extending it.

[The Chair]

I must offer other Members the opportunity to ask questions. I will come back to you if there is time, Mr Charalambous.

Nationality and Borders Bill (Third sitting)

Bambos Charalambous Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 23rd September 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

We shall now take evidence from the Hon. George Brandis QC, high commissioner for Australia to the United Kingdom. We have until 12.45 pm for this session. Good morning, Sir, and thank you for joining us. Could you please identify yourself for the record?

George Brandis: Good morning, Mr Chairman. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. My name is George Brandis and I am the high commissioner for Australia to the United Kingdom.

[Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)]

Q108 Thank you, High Commissioner, and welcome to today’s session. I would like to ask some initial questions about the timeline of the borders policy in Australia, or what became Operation Sovereign Borders. What the Bill before us tries to achieve happened in Australia over a period of time, so I would like to establish the timelines.

George Brandis: Yes, I can tell you that. Operation Sovereign Borders was a policy introduced by the Government of Mr Tony Abbott, which was elected in September 2013, and administered under the leadership of the then Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, now the Prime Minister, Scott Morrison.

Perhaps it would be helpful if I gave the Committee a little context. The purpose of Operation Sovereign Borders was to address a problem that had grown increasingly acute in the previous years: the arrival or attempted arrival by boat—almost always ramshackle, small, unsafe boats—across the seas, particularly the Timor sea, to the north-west of Australia, of irregular maritime arrivals. In the years prior to Operation Sovereign Borders coming into effect, there had been more than 50,000 illegal arrivals to the north-western coast of Western Australia in 827 vessels. That is the number of people we know about who made the journey.

We also know that a large number of people who attempted to make that journey drowned. There will never be a reliable figure for what that number was, because we simply do not know how many there were, but because we have counted, sadly, from the corpses, we know of 1,204 people who drowned. Whether the actual number was a multiple of that, or many hundreds more, it is impossible to tell, but certainly more than 1,200 people drowned.

Operation Sovereign Borders was introduced to address that dreadful problem. The implementation phase lasted approximately nine months, during which the flow continued. However, as the policy began to take effect and be effective, that flow dwindled to a point where some nine months later, by July 2014, it had ceased completely. Since then, there has not been a single irregular maritime arrival on Australia’s shores, as far as we can tell.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q You said that these boats were coming to the north-western part of Australia. Where were they coming from?

George Brandis: Primarily the southern shores of Indonesia.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q How far is Indonesia from the north-western shore of Australia?

George Brandis: It is a great distance. I cannot give you the exact figure, but it is certainly more than 1,000 km.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q Other aspects of the immigration policy before Operation Sovereign Borders were offshoring and detention accommodation. Do you recall when those were introduced?

George Brandis: They were part of Operation Sovereign Borders. There were three elements to Operation Sovereign Borders: disruption and deterrence activities; turnarounds, where it was safe to turn the vessels around; and offshore processing. I will speak briefly to each of those elements.

With the co-operation of the Indonesian authorities, the people smugglers’ activities were disrupted at the points of embarkation on the southern shores of Indonesia, so it became more difficult for them to publicise and assemble the clientele to embark on these unsafe vessels. Generally, they were run-down fishing vessels.

The turnaround operation, which was conducted in international waters, repelled the vessels and returned them to the Indonesian shore, where it was safe to do so.

Regional processing, through a series of agreements that Australia made with Nauru and New Guinea in particular, meant that people who were not turned around and were taken onboard Australian vessels—they were rescued, in effect, because they could not be safely turned around—were processed offshore in countries where they were not at risk.

It is important to stress that Australia’s obligations under the 1951 refugee convention were complied with at all times, for several reasons. First, Indonesia in particular was a transit country for these people—none of them claimed to have been persecuted by the Indonesian Government. Secondly, the countries to which they were sent for regional processing were safe countries, where they were not exposed to the perils against which the refugee convention protects. Lastly, Australia observed its non-refoulement obligations at all times.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q In relation to the offshoring in Papua New Guinea, is it correct to say that Papua New Guinea declared the transfers illegal, so offshoring had to stop because of the decision made there?

George Brandis: There was litigation in New Guinea about the agreement between their Government and the Australian Government in relation to a particular processing centre on the New Guinea mainland. It is not my understanding that that affected the other processing centre within New Guinea, on Manus Island.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q But there was a class action brought by people from Manus Island in relation to the way they were treated. Do you recall the outcome of that?

George Brandis: I am not in a position to speak in relation to that, but I make the point that that is entirely a matter for the Government of New Guinea. From an Australian point of view, the legal and constitutional validity of the offshore processing arrangements were challenged in the High Court of Australia, which in the Australian system is the equivalent of your Supreme Court. The High Court ruled that under the regional processing agreements that existed between Nauru and Australia, and between New Guinea and Australia, the regional processing centres were not Australian centres; they were in no respect under the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth of Australia. They were centres operated by the Governments of Nauru and New Guinea respectively.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q But was that not part of the reason why Australia was reported to the International Criminal Court for processing in Nauru and New Guinea?

George Brandis: I do not think that is correct. I think it would be correct to say that there was a complaint made by people who disagree with the policy to the United Nations Human Rights Council.

[The Chair]

This will have to be your last question, Mr Charalambous.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q Do you have any figures on the cost of offshoring?

George Brandis: I do not have those figures in front of me. Under the regional processing agreements that Australia entered into with Nauru and New Guinea, the establishment of those centres, which required capital works and so on, was contributed to by Australia.

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

Q Thank you for giving up your time this morning, Mr Brandis. On the capacity of the offshore centres, am I right to say that it would be in the region of around 3,000 offshore places in total?

George Brandis: There were always more in Nauru than in New Guinea. Whether at the maximum point they reached as many as 3,000, I am not sure, but I would not be surprised if it was roughly that figure.

Nationality and Borders Bill (Fourth sitting)

Bambos Charalambous Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 23rd September 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

We will now hear from Rossella Pagliuchi-Lor, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees representative to the UK, and Elizabeth Ruddick, senior legal associate, both representing UNHCR UK. We have until 2.30 pm for this session. Will you please both introduce yourselves for the record?

Rossella Pagliuchi-Lor: Good afternoon to everyone. My name is Rossella Pagliuchi-Lor. I am the UNHCR representative to the United Kingdom.

Elizabeth Ruddick: Good afternoon. My name is Elizabeth Ruddick. I am a senior protection associate with the UNHCR in the United Kingdom.

[Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)]

Q137 Welcome, Elizabeth and Rossella. I will ask you a few questions, primarily about the legality of the Bill in relation to international law. In your opinion, do various clauses in the Bill comply with international law?

Rossella Pagliuchi-Lor: Thank you very much for this question, but I would like to start with a short statement, which will also cover that. It is, of course, one of the areas of particular interest and concern to us.

You know, of course, that UNHCR has already published two sets of opinions: one on the policy document and the other on the Bill. I want to start by saying that we actually support the broad intent—the broad aims—of this Bill: combating smuggling networks, having fairer and faster procedures, and facilitating the return of those who are found not to be in need of international protection. However, we believe that the Bill is unlikely to achieve those aims, and may further exacerbate some of the identified issues.

Our concerns revolve around three areas. The first concerns the breach of international law, as the Bill contravenes the UK’s obligations under the 1951 refugee convention. The Bill revolves around the notion that refugees are required to seek asylum in the first safe country they find. To be clear, that principle is not found in the refugee convention, and it is not a requirement in international law. It is also unworkable because it would further increase pressure on those few countries that find themselves at the frontier of a crisis. The risk, of course, is that they would be overwhelmed, and that might impact on both their capacity and their good will to provide protection and solutions.

The Bill, as it stands, will cause significant suffering to people who are guilty of nothing more than seeking asylum in the UK. It makes unauthorised arrival and presence in the UK a crime punishable by up to four years in jail, without the defences that are actually provided for by the 1951 convention. It would also keep refugees in a situation of enforced precarity for up to 10 years, with no access to public welfare unless destitute, and under threat of removal to another country, if that were possible. This is really going to create massive problems not only for these individuals at a personal level, but for their communities, local councils and the NHS.

Lastly, the system as described would exacerbate the current backlog and increase costs by making procedures longer. That will delay the integration of those who are eventually found to be refugees, and will hamper the return of those who are not found to be in need of protection. It will have a number of unintended negative consequences that will impact on the very aims that the Bill purports to pursue.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q Just to paraphrase, you think that the Bill will not achieve its objectives because it will mean that people stay here longer, and because it does not comply with international law as you see it?

Rossella Pagliuchi-Lor: Absolutely. As I said, there is no requirement in international law that refugees should seek asylum in the first safe country they find. We believe that there will be consequences if countries start reneging on or trying to diminish their responsibilities and commitments under the convention. There is a risk of triggering a race to the bottom. We have to perceive that every time we make it harder or try to discourage refugees from reaching our shores, we are diverting them to another country. It risks creating a chain in which refugees will find it harder and harder to find asylum anywhere. The international system is based on the good-faith application of the commitments that have been freely undertaken by states. When states do not fully embrace those commitments, the result is the erosion of international law. International law is nothing more than a contract between states, and it lives or dies by states’ willingness to comply with it.

Yes, we are very concerned, and we are concerned also because we are frankly in a position of constantly advocating for asylum and doing so with countries that have way more refugees than the UK. The element that has been lost in this discussion is that the UK, by reason of its geographical position and its relative distance from crisis countries, in fact receives a pretty small number of refugees. I am not suggesting that this is something you want, and there are certainly more than you would wish for, but in the big scheme of things it is a relatively small number. This is also true, by the way, of countries around you. The UK has a fairly stable number of asylum seekers in the range of 35,000 per year. France has just under 100,000 per year, with some variations. Germany has around 150,000, and Spain, Greece and Italy all receive more applications than the UK. Of course, I am not even mentioning countries closer to the crisis. Let us not forget that 73% of all refugees and asylum seekers remain in countries neighbouring their own, and that about 85% or 86% remain in developing or middle-income countries. I would like to encourage you to look at this matter in perspective. The channel crisis is certainly a challenge, but I think it has to be looked at in a broader perspective of a global challenge for all countries with respect to displacement.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q Just to follow up about other countries that neighbour areas where there are war zones and conflicts, can you talk about an example of one of the countries that border Syria, such as Jordan or Turkey?

Rossella Pagliuchi-Lor: Turkey at the moment has the largest number of refugees, as you know. We are talking about upward of 4 million or maybe even more. At one stage, Lebanon had one Syrian refugee for every four people; a huge percentage of its population were refugees. If you are talking about Afghanistan, there is a registered population of Afghan refugees of 780,000 in Iran, plus probably 1.5 million—maybe more—who are non-registered. Likewise, Pakistan has, between registered and unregistered, well above 2 million people. It has, I think, 1.4 million registered and maybe quite as many unregistered. So you are talking about numbers that are, frankly, enormous, relative to the numbers who come to Europe and, even more so, to the ones who come to the UK.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q As you have indicated, the Bill seeks to punish people on how they arrive in the UK, by giving them less temporary protection. Are you aware of any other countries that do that apart from Australia? We heard this morning from the high commissioner for Australia.

Rossella Pagliuchi-Lor: There have been attempts by other countries, and of course the case that comes to mind is Denmark, which has been in the media, particularly in relation to the question of returns of Syrians. But I would like really to focus on the UK, rather than on other countries, if you will allow me. First, obviously there are principles that are applicable across the board. Obviously, we are asking all countries to act in a manner that is consistent with their international obligations. I think that we tend to forget that situations are sometimes different in terms of the practical applications. I know that you had the Australian high commissioner here this morning, even though I did not listen to his presentation. But of course the situation in Australia is very different from the situation in the UK. In any case, I would strongly recommend you not to follow that example, frankly.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q The vulnerable persons resettlement scheme closed. Do you think that the closure of schemes like that has an impact on the increased numbers of people seeking asylum in places like the UK?

Rossella Pagliuchi-Lor: Yes and no. Having resettlement schemes and other legal pathways, such as a well-functioning and perhaps slightly more generous family reunion mechanism, will certainly allow certain people to come legally where they might otherwise have been tempted to do so irregularly. However, the reality is that resettlement programmes—even a generous and well-run resettlement programme such as the VPRS—are really a bit of a drop in the bucket. You have to consider that, in any given year, we manage to resettle a fraction of 1% of the refugees who would be in need of resettlement. There is really a vast disproportion. That is why we say that resettlement is extremely valuable, is a life-saving mechanism—and we really commend the UK for its efforts in this sense—but is not an offset for granting asylum.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I know other colleagues wish to come in, so I will leave my questioning there. Thank you very much.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Welcome to all our witnesses. Who would like to start?

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q The purpose of the Bill is to increase fairness, better protect people seeking asylum, deter illegal entry to the UK, break the business of human trafficking and remove more easily those who have no right to be in the UK. In your opinion, does the Bill achieve those aims? Can I start off with Lisa?

Lisa Doyle: In our opinion, it does not meet those aims. Previous witnesses you have heard from in the last few days have also said this. There is little evidence that putting deterrents in place actually stops people arriving in the UK. People are pushed into situations where they seek safety. Research that we have conducted, and that the Home Office conducted a while ago, showed that people often did not have information about the rights and entitlements they would be greeted with in the UK.

Because there are not enough safe and regular routes for people to come to the UK, they are forced to rely on smugglers and others to reach here, and they get different types of information. The deterrents do not work. There is not evidence that they work. Our concern with lots of the provisions in the Bill is that they seek to punish or disadvantage or make vulnerable people even more vulnerable, rather than giving them the protection they need.

Mariam Kemple-Hardy: Thank you very much for having me today. I want to say that I will be giving evidence based not just on the work that Refugee Action do as a service provider. Over July and August we held a series of focus groups with refugees and people in the asylum system to consult with them on what they thought the impact of the legislation would be.

First, at Refugee Action we have really welcomed the warm words of the Government recently in response to the Afghanistan crisis. They have said that they want to give a warm welcome to refugees fleeing that horror, and we welcome that. However, that warm rhetoric is not matched by the harsh reality that we see in this Bill.

As Lisa has said, the Bill is about punishment. It is not about protection. We understand there are two key objectives of this legislation, the first being to make a fairer asylum system and the second being to deter people from making dangerous crossings. We believe the legislation fails on both counts.

When it comes to making a fairer asylum system, what we actually see is this legislation creating a deeply unfair system, where, for the first time ever in UK law, refugees will be judged based on how they enter the country, not on their protection needs.

Secondly, when it comes to deterring dangerous journeys, this legislation is likely, as per the Government’s own equality impact assessment last week, to make people take even more dangerous routes. Far from breaking the business model of people smugglers, this legislation plays into that business model. If you make it harder to enter the country, smugglers can charge more and encourage people to take even more dangerous routes. We are likely to see more people losing their lives as a result of this.

The key disrupter to that business model is providing safe routes to safety, but we do not see anything said about that in this legislation. There is nothing to increase refugee resettlement, nothing to increase access to family reunion and nothing about humanitarian visas. It is all about punishment. It is not about protection.

Alphonsine Kabagabo: Thank you for giving us this opportunity. We will be focusing on the impact of this Bill on women, because we represent that area. We are an organisation that supports women to safety in the UK and defends their rights. As other people have already said, this new Bill will have a great impact on women.

As you know, quite a lot of women in our network have survived gender-based violence. They have been traumatised through being raped, being forced into marriage, being forced into sexual exploitation or through FGM. For them to access a safe route has got to be an option for me, because it is not a choice. It is an issue that they cannot avoid. This Bill makes it even harder for those victims to access safety.

We are also concerned about some of the detail, such as providing evidence when you arrive, as soon as possible. Women who have been traumatised, because they have been violated, raped and all that, cannot provide that evidence straight away. They need time to heal, to be protected, to access mental health support. They need time to understand the system, so that is retraumatising them even more.

We are also very concerned because there is even a clause about being a member of a particular social group, and gender is not one of the groups. That really will absolutely affect some of the women we are fighting for. We were also surprised that the Bill is at odds with the Government policy on violence against women and girls, which proposes to support survivors of gender-based violence. Instead of offering safety and support, this new Bill will actively harm and traumatise women. So, I will say that, but my colleague Priscilla might want to add something. Over to you, Priscilla.

Priscilla Dudhia: That was fantastic—nothing to add.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q Picking up on what Alphonsine mentioned about late provision of evidence and disclosing evidence, which is mentioned in clause 23, and about people being penalised for not disclosing evidence that they may not be willing to share straight away, what are your thoughts on that? Also, what are your thoughts on the inadmissibility clause and about clause 10, the two-tier clause about treating people differently based on how they arrive?

Lisa Doyle: In terms of the two-tier system, it seems incomprehensible that you would treat somebody differently based on their mode of arrival, not because of their protection needs. You could have a perverse situation with next door neighbours from Afghanistan, with one fortunately finding their way on to the formal resettlement route and the other being forced to take the decision to make a dangerous journey, then, on reaching UK shores, getting a different level of protection and rights than their next door neighbour, even though they are fleeing the same persecution and threats. People’s protection needs are not based on how they travel, how much money they have or what their identity is—in terms of whether men might be more prone to travel or not. People make decisions, when they are forced to rely on smugglers, about who they will prioritise to send to a country, and then hope that they can apply, through refugee family reunion, for others to join them afterwards. Having differential treatment based on mode of arrival seems grossly unfair.

Mariam Kemple-Hardy: I agree with everything Lisa has just said. Afghanistan is a really instructive example. In August, the whole world witnessed what it is like when a country enfolds itself in crisis—how chaotic it is. We saw how few and how precious those places on those planes were.

It is fantastic that the Government have committed to taking in 20,000 refugees from Afghanistan over the next two years, but we know that that is a drop in the ocean. We saw people clinging to the sides of planes. That is how desperate they are to reach safety. Although we welcome the fact that the Government have said that they will take in 20,000 Afghan refugees, we are very concerned about what will happen to the 20,001st Afghan refugee who arrives after this legislation. That Afghan refugee, as Lisa says, will be fleeing the same horror, but they will be treated as a second class of refugee.

When we spoke to our focus groups, they said that if they were to get this second-class version of refugee protection, their life would be one of “You can’t. You can’t. You can’t.” They said, “Look, this temporary protection is no protection at all.” They thought that, with very unstable immigration status, all the building blocks of rebuilding your life—being able to access a job, to rent somewhere, to send your children to university—would be far, far beyond them. As a result of that, we believe that this whole concept of temporary protection is, as I said, no protection at all. It is a system of punishment, not protection.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q I ask the same question to Alphonsine and Priscilla.

Priscilla Dudhia: Without repeating what has already been said, we would like to highlight that, as well as distinguishing between refugees based on their mode of arrival, the Bill also distinguishes between refugees based on the point at which they claim asylum and punishes those who have not claimed asylum “without delay”.

As an organisation that, as Alphonsine highlighted, supports a large network of women who have survived the most horrific cases of sexual and gender-based violence, we are concerned about the fact that women who had survived that violence would be punished by this. We know that women who have experienced that kind of violence have issues in disclosing that.

Those issues are well acknowledged in Home Office policy. That policy talks about the barriers that feelings of shame and guilt can create, the stigma that comes with sexual violence and the fear that some women might have of reprisals from community and family members. That same policy goes on to say that late disclosure should not automatically prejudice a woman’s credibility. In clause 10, we have a direct contravention of that acknowledgement of the very real challenges that women who have fled gender-based violence face in sharing their experiences.

Alongside that, there are other situations in which women might not be able to claim asylum at the earliest opportunity. For instance, many of the women to whom we have spoken in our network had no idea that they could claim refugee protection on the basis of the gender-based violence that they have faced. There are other women who have fled violence and did not intend to stay in the UK for a long time—who came here on a visa, wanting to escape persecution but with the intention of going back—but later discovered that, “Actually, no, there is a grave threat to my safety still, and I need to stay.”

I would like briefly to share the story of one such woman, called Agnes, who is a refugee from a west African country. Agnes fled political persecution. She fled her country—she was in danger—and eventually decided to go to the UK, where her daughter was studying. She was the only family member that she could be with. She wanted to return, but once she was here she realised that political opponents were still being targeted. A lady for whom Agnes was working as an assistant was in prison at the time when Agnes was in the UK, and she realised that it was not safe for her to go back.

Agnes said that she was expecting to go back home quickly, but she could not: “When I realised my visa was going to expire, I went to Croydon to ask what to do to apply for asylum, and that is what I did.” Unfortunately for Agnes, she was locked up in detention, which she found hugely traumatising given her previous experience of incarceration. Her claim was refused at the initial stage and on appeal, and she had to lodge a fresh claim. Today Agnes has refugee status and we are immensely honoured to say that she is part of our team at Women for Refugee Women, where she works as a detention campaign spokesperson. I say all this to highlight that there may be legitimate reasons why vulnerable women are not able to claim right away, and we do not think that it is acceptable to be punishing them.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q Thank you. I have one more question on something that Priscilla touched on, about how the Bill will increase the need for asylum accommodation. We have heard about the issues at Napier Barracks. People from Afghanistan are being kept in hotels at the moment. What are your thoughts on the clauses to do with accommodation and their impact? I will ask Lisa first.

Lisa Doyle: At the Refugee Council we are really concerned about having large-scale accommodation centres set up where people are kept away from communities that, should they get refugee status, they would want to be able to integrate into, so they will have little contact with friends, neighbours and volunteers. Those kinds of things are a real worry. The dispersal policy as it works now is that people are housed within communities. There are little details about the accommodation centres, and we are aware that the Home Office has started to tender out for those, but a lot of the detail on that is privileged to those who want to bid. We want to know who would be put into those centres. Napier Barracks is a really good case of looking at suitability for people. We know that with covid there were particular risks, and independent inspectorates showed that parts of Napier were not fit for human habitation.

In terms of vulnerability, the Home Office has alluded to the fact that it would not necessarily put vulnerable people into large-scale accommodation centres, but it does not have a very good track record of identifying vulnerable people at an early stage. Many people were removed from Napier because of their vulnerabilities, because non-governmental organisations and charities took legal cases against the Home Office and then the Home Office removed them. The safeguards are not there. If people are outside communities, there is not oversight and that will really damage people’s chances to integrate and rebuild their lives should they get refugee status.

Mariam Kemple-Hardy: The first thing to say is that asylum accommodation has been in crisis for years. In the last 12 months, five of our clients have had the ceilings where they live fall on them. The two-year-old toddler of one of our clients was hospitalised because their head was split open. We have had whole families having to live in just one room. We have had people stuck in hotels for years. There is a crisis of accommodation. However, what we see in the Bill is that it doubles down on that injustice that we see.

When it comes to accommodation centres, we are against them on a point of principle and also because of the practice at Napier and Penally Barracks over the last 12 months. When it comes to the point of principle, as Lisa says, the idea of segregating part of our society and othering them is something that we disagree with. It takes people away from the communities that they want to integrate into; it takes them away from the healthcare that they may need to access—they are very traumatised people who have particular mental health and physical needs in many instances; and it takes them away from opportunities to get education and so on. On a point of principle, we are very much against that practice. However, in terms of actual practice, over the last year in Napier and Penally Barracks, we have seen appalling situations where people have tried to take their own lives. We saw, at the height of the pandemic, people being forced to live with 28 other strangers in dormitories. In Napier Barracks, there was an outbreak when 197 people tested positive for covid-19. Traumatised people in Penally Barracks were next to an active firing range. In terms of the way this has been put into practice, we are deeply concerned about the plans.

I want to make two quick final points about the how the legislation is currently drafted. First, the legislation would give the Home Secretary the ability to extend the maximum amount of time that someone can be in an accommodation centre. At the moment, the maximum is six months. The Bill does not say how long someone could be in the accommodation centre—arguably, it could be unlimited.

Secondly, the Bill also allows people in those conditions to be put under residence conditions, such as being told that they were not able to leave that accommodation for a certain period of time during a day. We are seeing the potential for unlimited de facto detention as a result of the Bill. Someone in our focus group said, “Let’s be honest; it’s not a camp, it’s a prison. Let’s call a spade a spade”. This is not something that we want to see in our refugee protection system.

[The Chair]

I am terribly sorry to our witnesses on Zoom, but I would like to get some more questions in, if that is okay. I call Jonathan Gullis.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Howell]

I agree that it is a difficult one either way—children to adult or adult to children. It is just a question of where the boundaries sit and making sure we get those in the right place.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q I have some questions for Adrian about enforcement and the legal parts of the Bill. I will start with clauses 23 and 24. This is about the late provision of evidence, giving weight to the late provision of evidence and then, following on from that, appeals. What are your thoughts in relation to that? You probably need to look at it in conjunction with clauses 16 to 20. Just give us your assessment of those clauses.

Adrian Berry: This is an attempt to be prescriptive on the way in which, first, the Home Office and, secondly, judges will assess credibility in a range of situations in relation to claims on human rights grounds and asylum claims. It is not the first time that we have had credibility clauses put into Bills to tell judges what their job is and how to approach witness evidence. Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 tried to do that, and now we see a range of these provisions spattered across the Bill. The problem is that they always set early cut-off dates for providing evidence and then say, “Well, if you provide the evidence late, you’re penalised on credibility.” But the obvious question is this: what is the instrumental connection? If the evidence is good and proves that you are in need of international protection, why is your credibility damaged? You have done what you are supposed to do, and the UK obligations are engaged.

It attempts, effectively, to usurp the judicial function, to take it away from judges, who are expert at assessing past facts of what has happened in foreign countries, foreign laws and protection risks, and to say, “Well, here we’re going to discipline the task for you, regardless of the merit of the application, and penalise a person who may have difficulty getting evidence, who may be traumatised by their journey to the UK and who may lack funding to get things properly translated or to commission expert reports.” It says to them, “We’re going to penalise you, regardless of the merits of your claim, because we have set an early cut-off date and you haven’t met it.” It is introducing yet one more hurdle. It has not worked before, under the 2004 Act, and it is unlikely to work in this Act.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q I also want to ask about the impact on appeals, because there is a limit on where you can appeal to. What do you think the impact of that will be on decision making?

Adrian Berry: Severe, in fact. If you look at the provision for priority removal notices and expedited appeals, there are some serious concerns. If you introduce a claim for asylum and you provide evidence after the cut-off date given, in a priority removal notice you are given what is called an expedited appeal. That begins in the upper tribunal. Your first punishment is that you lose your right of appeal and hearing in the first-tier tribunal. The second punishment—much more serious—is the return of the ouster clause. It is that the upper tribunal hearing is final; there is no onward appeal to the Court of Appeal. That is something that was first tried in clause 11 of the 2004 asylum and immigration Bill, before it became the 2004 Act. And it is wrong—one first-instance appeal on human rights grounds or asylum grounds in the upper tribunal. Mistakes happen. They need to be corrected. There would be a reason for the Court of Appeal to be available, and thereafter the Supreme Court. And there is no vice in allowing that, because of course the appeal tests, for permission to appeal, are tightly controlled and policed by judges making permission decisions. An expedited appeal leaves you with one shot—no rights of appeal. It has serious implications for the rule of law that the first-instance tribunal decision cannot be reviewed.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q Adrian, still on the issue of telling judges and courts what to do, clauses 62 and 63 are on wasted costs orders. I just wondered what your thoughts were on those clauses.

Adrian Berry: There are three things. First, there is no need for them. We already have three ways of controlling advocates in court. First, there are case management powers in the tribunal system to regulate conduct of a case. Secondly, under section 29 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, there is a wasted costs and unreasonable costs jurisdiction, which is applied in the tribunals. Thirdly, there is the ability of tribunals and courts to refer practitioners who are considered to have behaved improperly or negligently to their regulatory bodies, such as the Solicitors Regulation Authority. We already have all those constraints.

Adding in charges, which would be paid to the state, rather than being costs between the parties, and making provisions for unreasonable costs orders, is absolutely unnecessary. There is not any evidence in the explanatory notes as to why that needs to be done, because there is no evidence of any deficiencies in the existing three mechanisms that I have outlined. It will chill the ability of other people to take difficult points on behalf of vulnerable people.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q Looking at the enforcement part of the Bill, I am looking at clause 41, which is about maritime enforcement and introduces new schedule 5, which relates to the Immigration Act 1971. It is to do with pushbacks and other associated measures. What is your interpretation of what this clause does and how effective it will be?

Adrian Berry: Maritime enforcement provisions butt up against the United Nations convention on the law of the sea and its article 98 duty of rescue. That is a part of customary international law. If you are at sea as master of a ship and see someone at risk of losing their life because they are in an insecure vessel or are in distress and they ask for assistance, you are obligated to help them. That is the basic position. This provision not only creates powers to allow Home Office vessels to leave UK territorial waters and enter international and foreign waters, but it enables them to stop, board and then divert vessels away from the UK and back to foreign ports.

That creates a situation where there may be a risk to life and limb, because these vessels are often very insecure. Although Home Office staff may not board them, in circling them and trying to press them back, they are making those lives insecure. There may be a question of extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Human Rights Act 1998 for such behaviour. It also risks their lives. It cuts across the duty of rescue, which applies not just to the Royal National Lifeboat Institution or to merchant vessels; it also applies to those very Home Office vessels. They, too, are subject to the duty of rescue, regardless of the fact that they are trying to hustle asylum seekers back out of UK territorial waters.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q There is a clause in the Bill that removes the words “for profit” from one of the pieces of legislation on rescuing, so that would clearly impact on anybody rescuing anybody in distress. Is that your reading of it?

Adrian Berry: Yes, that is clause 38, which removes the “for gain” provision from assisting an asylum seeker to enter the United Kingdom. That could prejudice a prosecution that is brought on people who are involved in search-and-rescue operations, which is also part of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, by the way. In addition, an asylum seeker who might be piloting an unsecured vessel across the channel could be prosecuted, even though they too are an asylum seeker. There is no article 31—of the refugee convention—defence to that criminal charge, and it would undoubtedly be a penalty, because it would be frustrating the operation of the refugee convention, in terms of the UK’s obligations under that.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q A number of clauses seek to interpret the 1951 refugee convention, particularly clauses 27 to 36. By trying to do that, does it put the UK in a better position or would that be laughed out of court, for want of a better phrase?

Adrian Berry: Judges are not necessarily meant to laugh in court, but the question is: what is the purpose of it? When we were in the European Union and had the common European asylum system, we had a system of common standards, so the refugee qualification directive specified the way in which refugee convention terms were to be applied, because we needed to have common methods and systems throughout the European Union. We have left, as we all know, and the status quo ante ought to apply, where we just apply the refugee convention as determined by our courts and the provisions thereunder.

This specification in primary legislation is unnecessary. These terms are well understood. The only attempt here is to change the settled law, including from the highest judicial courts—the previous judicial House of Lords, now the Supreme Court—and other decisions of binding authorities. We see an attempt to change the standard of proof for the assessment of past facts in refugee cases from “reasonable chance” to “the balance of probability”. That cuts straight across binding authority in this jurisdiction in the case of Karanakaran v. Secretary of State for the Home Department. We see an attempt to revise the definition of “particular social group” so that the two tests are now cumulative rather than the alternative. Again, that cuts across binding authority. It is an attempt to write out the settled view of the courts on the interpretation of the United Kingdom’s international obligation, where the UK courts’ interpretation is consistent with international practice and the terms as defined in the Bill are not.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q A final question from me. Looking at the Bill as a whole, bearing in mind that it seeks to make the system fairer, to deter people from using illegal routes and to break the smuggling model, do you think that it will achieve any of those objectives?

Adrian Berry: No, not at all. If you want to end smuggling routes, you have to open safe and legal routes to claim asylum in the UK, which may mean humanitarian corridors. It may mean bringing people to the UK to claim asylum rather than allowing them to be exploited by smugglers and traffickers. It may mean improving and having a fast and fair procedure in the United Kingdom that allows claims to be determined swiftly and robustly. The main reason why there is a smuggling industry is that there are no safe and legal routes, and therefore one can make a profit out of these vulnerable people.

[The Chair]

Thank you. I call the Minister.

Nationality and Borders Bill (Fifth sitting)

Bambos Charalambous Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 19th October 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, and welcome to what will be for some of you the first sitting of a Committee for a very long time, and for others probably the first sitting of a Public Bill Committee. Please switch electronic devices to silent. I am afraid that food and drink are not allowed in the Committee Room, so if any Member feels obliged to get a coffee or something, I am afraid they have to drink it outside in the corridor. Water, of course, is permitted.

Members are encouraged to wear masks when they are not speaking, in line with current Government guidance and that of the House of Commons Commission. Please also give each other and members of staff space when seated and when entering. I shall mainly not be wearing a mask, I am afraid, because my glasses steam up and I need to be able to see my papers. I mean no discourtesy to any Members who feel either inclined or obliged to wear a mask. Hansard will be grateful if Members could email their speaking notes to [e-mail].

The format of the Committee Room this morning is slightly changed as a result of the pandemic. It is a sadness to me and to the Clerks that civil servants are now required to sit in the Public Gallery rather than where they would normally sit, along the side. That makes life slightly difficult for parliamentary private secretaries, who may wish to communicate messages from the civil service to the Minister. I gather that that is now done electronically, but if there is a problem please let me know. I hope that the system will work, but we need to know if there is a difficulty.

We are about to commence line-by-line consideration of the Bill. Before we do that, at the risk of teaching granny to suck eggs, I will give a very modest tutorial. I am fully aware that, as Committees have not sat for some time, there will be Members present who have never sat on a Public Bill Committee. Even those who have and, dare I say it, even Chairmen sometimes get things wrong or do not understand what is going on. It is a fairly arcane process. All the papers that are needed, in case you have not already worked this out for yourselves, are on the table in front of me. You are not supposed to walk in front of the Chair, but I will not bite your head off if you suddenly find that you need a paper that you do not have, so feel free to come and get it. I should have said at the start that when I am in the Chair—this may not be the case with Ms McDonagh; it is up to her to decide—if Members wish to remove their jackets they may do so. Given the weather, you may not wish to.

Coming to the selection list, which I hope you all have a copy of, you will note that amendments are grouped by subject of debate, which may or may not be in the order that the Bill dictates. The order is dictated by subject matter, not the sequence in which amendments have been tabled. That is why you will find that the groupings appear to be out of order. The first grouping—amendments 29 and 84—relates to clause 1, so that is pretty straightforward. The second grouping under clause 1 relates not only to clause 1 but to other clauses. If you wish later to move an amendment, only the lead amendment may be moved. Therefore, amendment 29 may be moved, but not amendment 84, and amendment 8 but not the rest of the group. The other amendments may be moved when they are reached in the Bill. The amendments to clause 10 will be debated now but moved formally when we reach clause 10.

I am sure that is as clear as mud, but it will become clear. If Members have doubts about this or any other procedure, please do not hesitate to ask; like the man from the Inland Revenue, we are here to help you.

Not all amendments will be moved. All Government amendments will be moved, but if an Opposition Member wants to move an amendment that does not appear at the start of a group, please tell us. The Clerk will note it and you will be asked to move it at the right point in the Bill.

I hope that is relatively clear. Unlike in proceedings on the Floor of the House, any Member who wishes to speak should indicate as much to the Chair—I do not have second sight. We will try to accommodate you. You may intervene more than once in Committee, whereas only one speech may be made of the Floor of the House.

At the end of clause 1 there will be a stand part debate, offering an opportunity to debate the whole clause, as amended. If I consider that every conceivable thing that can, should or needs to be said about clause 1 has already been said, I shall not permit a stand part debate: that is in my gift, not yours. I always say that you may have one bite of the cherry, but not two. I normally allow a fairly wide-ranging debate on the first group of amendments—Siobhain might take a different view—but please bear it in mind that if you avail yourself of the opportunity I am unlikely to permit a stand part debate: you cannot say the same thing twice.

I shall try to guide you as we go along, but I am probably no less rusty than you. Let us see how we get on.

Clause 1

Historical Inability of Mothers to Transmit Citizenship

[Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)]

I beg to move amendment 29 in page 2, line 10, leave out “parents been treated equally” and insert

“mother been treated equally with P’s father”

[The Chair]

With this, it will be convenient to debate amendment 84 page 2, line 14, leave out

“had P’s parents been treated equally”

and insert

“had P’s mother and P’s father been treated equally”

[Bambos Charalambous]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Roger.

I thank colleagues from across the refugee and asylum sector for their considerate and constructive scrutiny of all the proposals made in the Bill’s evidence session in September.

As part of the Opposition’s detailed scrutiny, we will express our serious concerns about the Bill, which we believe does nothing to address the crisis in our broken asylum system and seeks to penalise the most vulnerable people in our society.

I shall first consider the Bill’s impact in addressing historical injustices in British nationality law concerning discrimination, specifically in relation to British overseas territories citizenship. We generally support the proposals in clauses 1 to 5, which seek to close important loopholes.

I pay tribute to the efforts of the British Overseas Territories Citizenship Campaign, which has campaigned tirelessly over many years for the nationality and citizenship equality rights of the children of British overseas territories citizens who have suffered under UK law owing to loopholes that we shall discuss in detail. These people feel a strong connection to the UK and deserve our support.

British nationality law can be complex. Some of the complexity arises from the British history of empire and Commonwealth. In passing the British Nationality Act 1981, Parliament created British citizens and British overseas territories citizenship. In doing so, it abolished citizenship in the UK and colonies—abbreviated to CUKC—which was a unifying citizenship for all persons of the UK and its colonies. This meant that the status of some children had the potential to be changed to overseas citizens, even though they had been born and raised in the UK.

Persons unified by CUKC were therefore separated by the 1981 Act into two groups, but amendments made since mean that the two groups are no longer aligned in British nationality law.

The Bill’s early clauses seek to bring into line the two elements of British nationality—British citizenship and British overseas territories citizenship. For the benefit of those on the Committee, I point out that British overseas territories citizenship is the citizenship of people connected to the territories that the UK has retained. It includes the following territories: Anguilla, Bermuda, the British Antarctic Territory, the British Indian Ocean Territory, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, the Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Montserrat, Pitcairn Islands, St Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, and the Turks and Caicos Islands.

Clause 1 would create a registration route for the adult children of British overseas territories citizens and for mothers to acquire British overseas territories citizenship. Before the 1981 Act commenced on 1 January 1983, British nationality law discriminated against women, whose children could not acquire British citizenship through them. The Act removed that discrimination, but did not address the impact of that discrimination prior to the Act. Many people, therefore, would have been born British but for this discrimination and continue to be excluded from British nationality after the passing of the Act.

It is clear that a historical anomaly was created. Changes were made under section 4C of the 1981 Act to rectify the situation of children of British citizens, but no such rectification was made for the children of British overseas territories citizens. Members of the Committee will know that under the 1981 Act a number of cases arise in which an individual who would have qualified for automatic British overseas territories citizenship, British citizenship or the right to register or naturalise as a citizen is unfairly prevented from doing so through no fault of their own, as has been the case with the adult children of British overseas territories citizens.

We need to rectify that injustice. The historical inability of mothers to transmit citizenship should be corrected, and I am glad that is being addressed in the Bill. Clause 1 sets out to correct that and create a registration route for the adult children of British overseas territories citizen mothers to acquire British overseas territories citizenship.

The Opposition generally support the changes proposed in clause 1 to close that important loophole. None the less, our amendment refers to a technical matter in relation to the drafting of clause 1—specifically, that it does not follow the language previously accepted to address the injustice, as used in section 4C of the 1981 Act.

I am sure that the Committee will agree that clarity is crucial in matters of citizenship and nationality law. The language used in clause 1 is not sufficiently clear. I will explain why. For example, the clause introduces proposed new section 17A, subsections (a) and (b) of which include the terms “had P’s parents been treated equally”. As Amnesty International and the Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens outline, the difficulty with such wording is that it tells us nothing about the direction in which equality is to be achieved or indeed in what place.

[Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that clarity is absolutely crucial, given the mistrust of the Home Office that often exists because of its high error rate in some citizenship and wider visa decision making processes?

[Bambos Charalambous]

My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. Citizenship, clarity and consistency in the law are essential, which is why we seek to rectify the position. The provisions of one Act cannot be inconsistent with those of another.

The amendment would address the difficulty by inserting the wording,

“had P’s mother been treated equally with P’s father”,

in clause 1. It would clarify the clause and the positive intention behind it. I think that there is broad agreement in the Committee on the need to address the historical inability of mothers to transmit citizenship.

[The Chair]

Ordinarily, unless the Minister wishes to intervene, we now have a debate in which any Member may take part. At the end of the debate, the Minister exercises his right to respond and the mover of the motion decides whether he wishes to press the amendment to a Division or withdraw it. If it is the latter, I seek the leave of the Committee for him to do so.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

The short answer, based on my understanding, is no. The connected provision in the Act talks about parents and not the mother and the father, so that is why we think this is the appropriate route to take for BOTCs. I am satisfied that the current wording does what is required so I ask hon. Members not to press their amendments.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I have heard what the Minister has said, but we could avoid going down the path of seeking to clarify the current wording if the same wording that was used in the 1981 Act were used here. We do not see what the problem would be. If the wording in the 1981 Act is adequate, why not just repeat it in the Bill? It would provide clarity and stop problems occurring in the future. Our belief is that everyone should be treated equally, and we should not have a separation, which the amendment tries to correct, between British overseas territory citizens and British citizens. Regrettably, we will press the amendment to a vote.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

The hon. Gentleman has been entirely in order throughout his remarks. He has quoted from a number of documents. Would he please make sure that paper copies—or electronic copies, preferably—are made available for Hansard? Thank you.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I will be brief. I entirely support amendment 8 and the associated amendments on fees. The starting point is rectifying the injustice that has been done, and fees should not be a barrier to rectifying that injustice. We support the waiver of fees in those cases, because there has clearly been an anomaly that has disproportionately affected the people in this case. Fees should never be used as a barrier and they will clearly be a barrier in this instance, and that is why we support amendment 8 and the associated amendments in the group. If the intention is to make it easier for people to acquire citizenship, we want to remove barriers, not add them. That is what the amendment would do and that is why we support it.

There has been discussion about the cost of the administration of fees. My hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark has made the point that the Government are meant to be carrying out a review following legal challenges. I hope that we see the fruits of that review before the Bill goes through its parliamentary stages, so that we can have greater certainty. I am sure the Minister will clarify that. We also need to make sure that awareness is raised about the access to rights to citizenship and the impact that the fees will have. For those reasons, we commend the amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

There is no need to have a stand part debate on clause 2. There are no amendments to clause 2, but I do not wish to curtail debate if hon. Members have anything they wish to say.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I have some remarks, which I will try and keep as brief as possible. As outlined in the Committee, opening clauses 1 to 5 seek to close the important loopholes in British nationality law. As we have already heard, British nationality law has discriminated against women and that will be corrected by clause 1 and the Opposition amendments. Clause 2 deals with children born out of wedlock, who have been prevented from deriving nationality from a British father if unmarried. That is another historical injustice and I am glad it is being considered in the Bill.

As Committee members know, before 1 July 2006, children born to British unmarried fathers could not acquire British nationality through their father. Registration provisions have since been introduced to rectify that issue for the children of British citizens through sections 4E and 4I of the British Nationality Act 1981, but that was not changed for children of British overseas territory citizens. Let us pause for a moment to reflect on the impact of the inconsistency: a child has no control over its parents’ choices, yet British overseas territories children, now adults, have been discriminated against because their parents were unmarried. Due to a loophole in British nationality law, those children would not automatically acquire British overseas territory citizenship as the law failed to provide unmarried fathers with the ability to transmit citizenship. Therefore, through no fault of their own and without knowing why, that group of British overseas territories children did not acquire rights as British overseas territories citizens—rights they deserved and should have been entitled to, including, for example, holding a British passport or gaining consular assistance from the UK.

As we know, injustices that relate to nationality and citizenship span generations, and it is right the Government seek through clause 2 to correct the historical inability of unmarried fathers to transmit citizenship. The clause will insert new sections 17B and 17G to the British Nationality Act to provide for registration as British overseas territories citizens for persons born before 1 July 2006 to British overseas territories citizen fathers, where the parents were unmarried at the time of their birth. The provisions provide an entitlement to be registered for those who would have become British overseas territories citizens automatically had their parents been married at the time of their birth and for those who would currently have an entitlement to registration were it not for the fact that their parents were not married at the time of their birth. As the clause creates a registration route for the adult children of unmarried British overseas territories citizen fathers to acquire British overseas territories citizenship, the Opposition welcome and support clause 2. It shows that the adults who have slipped through the cracks in UK nationality law over many years are no longer punished and, instead, are finally placed on an equal footing with mainland UK children born under the same circumstances.

[Tom Pursglove]

Following clause 1, this clause also seeks to rectify a historical anomaly in British nationality law for people who would have become British overseas territories citizens. The purpose of the clause is to insert a new registration provision for people who, first, would have become BOTCs automatically had their parents been married and, secondly, would currently have an entitlement to registration as a BOTC but for the fact that their parents are not married. That has long been awaited. We are aware of people who would have become British had their parents been married and see citizenship as their birthright.

Nationality and Borders Bill (Sixth sitting)

Bambos Charalambous Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 19th October 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Tom Pursglove]

The amendment remedies a drafting issue. The clause as a whole creates a route to register as a British citizen for people who have registered as a British overseas territories citizen under the new routes introduced by clauses 1 and 2. The British Overseas Territories Act 2002 made BOTCs British citizens as well, so it is right that we allow those who missed out on British overseas territories citizenship to become British citizens as well. However, we also want to cover those who have already taken steps to become a British overseas territories citizen, such as through registration or naturalisation in a territory. The amendment introduces the wording of section 4K(3). As that section is currently worded, it means that only those who have been registered as a BOTC can register as British citizens using this clause. The amendment will mean that people who have naturalised as a BOTC will also qualify.

More broadly, on clause stand part, this is an important change aimed at giving British citizenship to those who become British overseas territories citizens under the provisions introduced by clauses 1 and 2. As we have heard, two groups missed out on becoming BOTCs because of anomalies in British nationality law: people born to BOTC mothers before 1983, and people born to unmarried fathers before 1 July 2006. Clauses 1 and 2 will correct this, giving them the opportunity to acquire the BOTC status that they should have had.

We also recognise, however, that changes to the law in 2002 mean that they should also have become British citizens. Under the British Overseas Territories Act 2002, on 21 May 2002 all British overseas territories citizens who had that citizenship by connection with a “qualifying territory” became British citizens. For children born in a qualifying territory after 21 May 2002, British citizenship is acquired automatically if either parent is a British citizen or settled in that territory. This means that this group have missed out on both BOTC and British citizenship, so we need to create a route for them to acquire both.

We recognise that some people who did not become BOTCs automatically may have already taken steps to acquire that status by applying for registration or naturalisation in a territory. Some may also have applied to become a British citizen under existing provisions, but for those who did not, this clause allows a person who would have become a British citizen, had women and unmarried fathers been able to pass on status at the time of their birth, to register as a British citizen if they are now a BOTC.

Home Office officials are working with territories to develop the process for these applications, including in respect of whether this can be a done as a “one-stop” approach, with a person being able to apply for BOTC and then also opt in to apply to be a British citizen at the same time.

We regularly receive representations on this issue, from individuals and governors, and so understand the strength of feeling. We are aware of families where cousins have different statuses because women and men could not pass on citizenship in the same way, or because a child’s parents did not marry. Those in this position understandably feel that they have been unfairly prevented from holding a status that they should have acquired by birth. It is therefore important that we make this change, and I commend clause 3 to the Committee.

[Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms McDonagh.

Opposition Members will not oppose amendment 59, and I will speak primarily to clause 3 stand part. The clause refers to the creation of the new statutory entitlement for British overseas territories citizens who have been affected by the injustices that we have heard about this morning in relation to clauses 1 and 2 to become citizens by registration. While all those with BOTC status additionally became British citizens in 2002, by virtue of section 3 of the British Overseas Territories Act 2002, we know of the loopholes that have existed due to the fact that women could not pass on citizenship, or because their parents were not married, and as a result many were unable to become British citizens under the 2002 Act. I am pleased that the Government are committing to new routes for adult children of British Overseas Territories Citizen parents to be registered as BOTCs and, in turn, as British citizens.

Clauses 1 to 3 would benefit people born to BOTC mothers and BOTC unmarried fathers who could not pass on citizenship to their child due to nationality laws at the time of the child’s birth, which, as we have heard this morning, is deeply unfair and is rightly being addressed in this legislation. Clause 3 creates a route to becoming a British citizen for people who registered as a BOTC under the new routes introduced by clauses 1 and 2.

However, we must also discuss the implementation of clauses 1 to 3. Accessibility is all-important and while we welcome the changes made to British nationality law outlined earlier today, I have concerns about rights being inaccessible, which we have seen time and again in the UK, with devastating consequences. If we take perhaps the clearest and most heartbreaking example of the Windrush scandal—one of the most shocking and contemptible episodes in the UK Government’s history—I am sure colleagues across the Committee will agree that the Windrush generation were treated shamefully after a lifetime of working hard, paying their taxes, bringing up their families and contributing to our society. They were left facing uncertainty about their legal status in the UK and lost access to their homes, jobs and healthcare, through no fault of their own.

As last year’s “Windrush Lessons Learned Review” highlights, changes made to British nationality law in the 1980s

“progressively impinged on the rights and status of the Windrush generation and their children without many of them realising it.”

Therefore, to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past, the rights that are to be established for British overseas territories citizenship must be accessible. The Home Office must provide assurances as to when and how these rights will be made public and widely publicised for those affected. I make the point around accessibility now as we discuss clause 3, and I hope we can return to it later on, as I believe it is very important.

Overall, the Opposition none the less support clause 3 as it provides the framework to tidy up inconsistencies in British nationality law and acknowledges those who have suffered under UK law due to loopholes outlined in clauses 1 and 2.

Amendment 59 agreed to.

Amendment proposed: 10, in clause 3, page 8, line 18, at end insert—

“(4) The Secretary of State must not charge a fee for the processing of applications under this section.”—(Stuart C. McDonald.)

This amendment would prevent the Secretary of State from charging a fee for British citizenship applications by certain British overseas territories citizens.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Question negatived.

Clause 3, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 4

Period for registration of person born outside the British overseas territories

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Tom Pursglove]

We have been clear that the nationality provisions within the Bill seek to tackle historical unfairness and inequality in British nationality law. As with earlier clauses, this legislation gives us the opportunity to amend provisions for British overseas territories citizens to mirror the comparable requirements already in place for British citizens.

Section 17(2) of the British Nationality Act 1981 provides a registration route for a child whose parent is a BOTC by descent where that parent had been in a territory for a continuous period of three years at some point before the child’s birth. At present, an application to register a child under this route must be made within 12 months of the child’s birth. However, the parallel provision for British citizens, section 3(2) of the 1981 Act, was amended in 2010, replacing the requirement for an application to register a child to be made within 12 months of the child’s birth, with a requirement for the application to be made while the child is a minor.

Clause 4 seeks to amend the BOTC registration route in the same way. Rather than requiring applications to be lodged within 12 months of the birth, the clause would allow an application to be made at any time before the child’s 18th birthday. Consequently, the provision for the Secretary of State to exercise discretion to extend the registration period from 12 months to six years in section 17(4) will be removed as it is no longer needed.

Entitlement remains limited to children with a particular parental and residential connection to the relevant territory. In line with the British citizenship route, we do not propose extending the route to adults. Other adults seeking to become BOTCs, such as by naturalisation, must demonstrate a personal connection with the territory and cannot rely merely on the residence of their parents, and we want to ensure that this amendment remains consistent with other existing provisions. The aim is to ensure fairness across British nationality law, not to create further discrepancies. Clause 4 will bring the provisions for BOTCs in line with those already in place for British citizens.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Clause 4 also refers to an additional aspect necessary to align British citizenship and British overseas territory citizenship. The clause removes a requirement that applications for registering a child as a BOTC must be made within 12 months of birth, amending section 17(2) of the 1981 Act. As the Committee will know, section 17(2) provides a registration route for a child whose parent is a BOTC by descent and had been in a territory for a continuous period of three years at some point before the child’s birth. At present, an application under this route must be made within 12 months of the child’s birth; however, the same provision for British citizens was extended throughout childhood with the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, which replaced the requirement for the application to be made within 12 months of the child’s birth with a requirement for the application to be made while the child is a minor.

Clause 4 amends the BOTC registration route in the same way, so the same extension from within 12 months of the child’s birth to throughout childhood is applied to BOTCs. The Opposition support this clause and would be interested to know how many people will be affected once clauses 1 to 4 have been implemented.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 4 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 5

Disapplication of historical registration requirements

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Tom Pursglove]

This clause seeks to amend British nationality law to remove historical registration requirements and to reflect recent case law. As we have already heard, before 1983 women were unable to pass on British citizenship, and before 1 July 2006 unmarried fathers were unable to pass on citizenship. Under the previous legislation, the British Nationality Act 1948, citizenship could normally only be passed on to one generation of children born outside of the UK and colonies.

However, section 5(1)(b) of the 1948 Act permitted transmission through a father to a further generation if the child was born in a foreign country and their birth was registered within a year at a British consulate. The period could be extended at the Secretary of State’s discretion. An example of this might be where the child’s grandfather was born in the UK and their father was born in the United States of America: the child’s birth could be registered at the British consulate in the United States and they would have become a citizen of the United Kingdom and colonies as a result. However, a British mother or unmarried British father could not register their child’s birth at a consulate, because they were unable to pass on citizenship at that time.

There are already measures in place for people to register as a British citizen if they would have been able to acquire that status automatically if women and unmarried fathers had been able to pass on citizenship under the 1948 Act. This clause means that a person will not be prevented from registering under those provisions if the only reason they cannot qualify is that their parent was unable to register their birth at a consulate.

[Bambos Charalambous]

As we move through part 1 of the Bill, we turn to British citizenship in clause 5. This clause again seeks to correct historical problems in British nationality law concerning discrimination against women. The current statutory language has caused significant problems in implementation. Under the 1948 Act, citizenship could normally only be passed on for one generation to children born outside the UK and colonies, but section 5(1)(b) of the Act permitted it to be passed on to a further generation if the child was born in a foreign country and the birth was registered within a year at a British consulate. The child of the British mother or unmarried British father could not be registered because they were unable to pass on citizenship at the time.

British women, therefore, although able to inherit their fathers’ nationality when born abroad, have historically been denied the right to pass it on to their own children in the same circumstances. Although when it came into force on 1 January 1983 the British Nationality Act 1981 equalised the rights of men and women as regards the nationality of their children, it did nothing to remedy the discrimination against women that had persisted up to that point. That discrimination was demonstrated in the Supreme Court on 9 February 2018, in the Advocate General for Scotland v. Romein. Ms Romein was born in the USA in 1978 and her father was a US citizen. Her mother was born in South Africa to a Scottish mother and a Welsh father, from whom she inherited her British national status. Despite her family’s connections to the United Kingdom on both sides, as a result of the discrimination inherent in British nationality law—specifically, at that time, section 5 of the British Nationality Act 1948—she was unable to pass her British national status on to her own child, despite wishing to do so.

Clause 5 therefore amends eligibility requirements for registration under section 4C and 4I of the British Nationality Act 1981, to disapply the requirements for a birth to have been registered at a British consulate within 12 months. In effect, it will tidy up the language of British nationality legislation to make clear the Supreme Court’s judgment in Ms Romein’s case, which confirmed the right of British women to pass their nationality on to their children born abroad. The Opposition support the clause, which creates no new rights, but rather makes clear the existing rights in UK law. We welcome that.

Question put and agreed to. 

Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. 

Clause 6 

Citizenship where mother married to someone other than natural father  

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Tom Pursglove]

Picking up on the earlier question that the shadow Minister asked, I should say that my understanding when it comes to this amendment is that the clause will affect only a small number of people. But it is an area of law out of touch with modern society, so it is right that we should make this change.

The issue is that in British nationality law the mother’s husband is the child’s father, even if she has been separated from him for years and the child is not biologically related to her husband. That can create difficult cases—for example, when a child’s biological father is a British citizen, but their father for nationality purposes is the mother’s estranged non-British husband. The child misses out on British nationality as a result.

Generally, we think it is right that the mother’s husband should be treated as the child’s father for nationality purposes. The common law presumption is that a child born during a period of marriage is the child of the mother’s husband, unless shown otherwise. For nationality purposes, however, there should be certainty about a child’s status, which should not be subject to change at a later date if paternity is disputed. But we need a solution for the child whose father is not the mother’s husband, so that they do not miss out on becoming British through their natural father.

Until now, we have been registering such children as British citizens using the discretion that the Home Secretary has to register any child under the age of 18 under section 3(1) of the 1981 Act. We recognise that those children would have been British automatically were it not for their mother being married to someone else, so we made that a fee-free route last year.

However, the inconsistency has been highlighted by the courts. In the case of K, the court ruled that, although it was a correct interpretation of the legislation for the child not to be a British citizen automatically, the fact that the only remedy was through discretionary legislation was incompatible with the European convention on human rights.

We must take this opportunity to create a specific route for children in this position to be able to acquire British nationality. That is achievable by removing from existing registration provisions the requirement for children of unmarried fathers to have been born before 1 July 2006. People in this position may not see any practical difference, as they can currently make a fee-free application under section 3(1), but the important point is that the provision gives this group a legal entitlement to registration, rather than their having to rely on the exercise of discretion.

We are also using the clause to allow a child of a non-British member of the British armed forces to make an application to register as a British citizen, despite their mother being married to someone other than their biological father at the time of their birth. That will bring them in line with other children whose parents were serving overseas at the time of the birth.

[Bambos Charalambous]

It is deeply regrettable that British statutory law has long discriminated against children born out of wedlock, preventing British nationality from being derived from a British father if he was not married to the child’s mother. The British Nationality Act 1981, when first passed, did not correct that discrimination relating to British citizenship, but since then there have been various attempts to remove it. Those amendments have created rights to be registered as a British citizen for some of the people affected by that discrimination. However, no corresponding right has been introduced for people who would have become British overseas territory citizens. As we have seen, clause 2 is intended to correct this omission, and the Opposition support it.

However, clause 2 is not sufficient in itself to correct the discrimination relating to British citizenship; indeed, the relevant legislation has led to an anomaly. That anomaly, which is to be corrected by clause 6, which we also support, is that people who would have been born a British citizen but for their father not being married to their mother now have the right to be registered as a British citizen if they were born before 1 July 2006. That applies whether or not the mother was married to someone else at the time of the person’s birth.

However, people born on or after that date, who would similarly have been born a British citizen but were not because their father was not married to their mother, do not have a corresponding right. The courts have declared that discrimination to be incompatible with the Human Rights Act 1998. Clause 6 is intended to correct that injustice, and we therefore support it. It does so only for British citizenship. That is because the correction for British overseas territories citizenship is built into clause 2.

As has been said, our primary concern with clauses 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 is not with the text or with the fundamental intentions behind them but with the fact that, when commenced, the rights that are to be established must be accessible. There are too many examples of British nationality rights being inaccessible. The Windrush scandal is but one especially painful relevant example.

The following matters are therefore crucial. We would like the Minister to give assurances as to how these rights will be made public and will be sufficiently widely publicised, not least because many of the beneficiaries will be in other territories or countries.

Ministers must equally give assurances that evidential and procedural obstacles will, to the fullest extent practical, be removed or reduced. Biometric registration and overseas and mandatory citizenship ceremonies, for example, must not be prohibitive to the exercise of these rights, as they have been in the past. Biometric registration must not be prohibitively expensive or inaccessible. Ceremonies can be waived, and that should be done where a person wishes to do that, or where a ceremony cannot be offered without undue cost or delay to the person being registered.

Where relevant information is available and can be confirmed by the Home Office or the Passport Office, that should be done. People must not be obstructed by unreasonable demands for evidence. It must be understood that, for some people, there may be considerable obstacles to securing evidence of their rights so many years after the original injustice—for example, due to age, somebody passing away, or separation, including by reason of abuse or violence. The Home Office or Passport Office must be as helpful as possible to facilitate the exercise of these rights.

In conclusion, we support the clause and the intention behind it, but it is of great importance that the Minister also ensures that these rights are fully accessible.

[Tom Pursglove]

Let me respond briefly to the point that has understandably and rightly been made. As I said in response to earlier clauses, there is a very constructive working relationship between the Home Office and the various overseas territories for which these provisions are relevant, as well as with the various governors. There is good engagement, and we are keen to see this information cascaded.

The point I would strongly make is that we are seeking through the provisions in the Bill to put right past injustices, and we would want this information to be as readily available as possible to people who may find themselves affected. The hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate has my undertaking that I will take that point away and monitor it very closely to ensure that that happens.

In the discussion on an earlier clause, my right hon. Friend the Member for Scarborough and Whitby showed an interest in relation to proof of paternity. In relation to this clause, regulations will set out what can be accepted as proof of paternity—first, being named before 10 September 2015 as the child’s father on the birth certificate issued within 12 months of the birth and, in all other cases, any evidence such as DNA test reports, court orders or birth certificates considered by the Secretary of State to establish paternity. I know that my right hon. Friend had an interest in that issue in relation to the earlier clause, but I thought that it would be useful to say something about it here as well.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 7

Citizenship: registration in special cases

[Bambos Charalambous]

I beg to move amendment 35, in clause 7, page 9, line 36, at end insert—

‘(1A) In section 1 (acquisition by birth or adoption) subsection (5)—

(a) in paragraph (a), for “minor” substitute “person”; and

(b) after paragraph (b), for “that minor shall” substitute “that person or minor (as the case may be) shall”.’

This amendment seeks to bring British nationality law in line with adoption law in England and Wales. In those nations, an adoption order made by a court may be made where a child has reached the age of 18 but is not yet 19. Yet such an adoption order currently only confers British citizenship automatically where the person adopted is under 18 on the day the order is made.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 13, in clause 7, page 9, line 40, leave out “may” and insert “must”.

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to approve applications for British citizenship by people who have previously been denied the opportunity to acquire it on account of historical legislative unfairness, an act or omission of a public authority, or exceptional circumstances.

Amendment 30, in clause 7, page 10, line 25, at end insert—

‘4M Acquisition by registration: equal treatment

(1) Where a person (P) is registered as a British citizen under subsection 4L(1), the Secretary of State must—

(a) ensure that other persons applying to be registered are so registered where the same unfairness, act or omission or circumstances apply unless there are material factors relevant to their applications that were not relevant to P’s application;

(b) amend or make policy or guidance in line with the registration of P;

(c) make that new or amended policy or guidance publicly available; and

(d) take such other steps as may be reasonably necessary to draw attention to that new or amended policy or guidance among other people affected by that same unfairness, act or omission or circumstances.

(2) In each Parliamentary session, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a report of any historical legislative unfairness on the basis of which any person has been registered under subsection 4L(1) and which remains to be corrected by amendment to the British Nationality Act 1981 or such other legislation as may be required.

(3) The report required by subsection (2) must both explain each case of historical legislative unfairness to which it relates and set out the period within which the Secretary of State intends to make the necessary correction to the British Nationality Act 1981 or other legislation.’

This amendment requires that the Government publicise any change in policy or guidance in order to ensure that there is no unfairness in treatment of British citizens or those who are applying to be registered as British citizens. It also requires the Secretary of State to report and explain any historical legislative unfairness.

Amendment 14, in clause 7, page 10, line 30, leave out “may” and insert “must”.

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to approve applications for British citizenship by people who have previously been denied the opportunity to acquire it on account of historical legislative unfairness, an act or omission of a public authority, or exceptional circumstances.

Amendment 31, in clause 7, page 11, line 8, at end insert—

‘17I Acquisition by registration: equal treatment

(1) Where a person (P) is registered as a British Overseas Territories citizen under subsection 17H(1), the Secretary of State must—

(a) ensure that other persons applying to be registered are so registered where the same unfairness, act or omission or circumstances apply unless there are material factors relevant to their applications that were not relevant to P’s application;

(b) amend or make policy or guidance in line with the registration of P;

(c) make that new or amended policy or guidance publicly available; and

(d) take such other steps as may be reasonably necessary to draw attention to that new or amended policy or guidance among other people affected by that same unfairness, act or omission or circumstances.

(2) In each Parliamentary session, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a report of any historical legislative unfairness on the basis of which any person has been registered and which remains to be corrected by amendment to the British Nationality Act 1981 or such other legislation as may be required.

(3) The report required by subsection (2) must both explain each case of historical legislative unfairness to which it relates and set out the period within which the Secretary of State intends to make the necessary correction to the British Nationality Act 1981 or other legislation.’

This amendment requires that the Government publicise any change in policy or guidance in order to ensure that there is no unfairness in treatment of British Overseas Territories citizens or those who are applying to be registered as British citizens. It also requires the Secretary of State to report and explain any historical legislative unfairness.

Amendment 34, in clause 7, page 11, line 8, at end insert—

‘(4) After section 23 (Citizens of UK and Colonies who are to become British overseas territories citizens at commencement), insert—

“23A Acquisition by registration: special circumstances

(1) If an application is made for a person of full age and capacity (“P”) to be registered as a British Overseas citizen, the Secretary of State may cause P to be registered as such a citizen if, in the Secretary of State’s opinion, P would have been, or would have been able to become, a British Overseas citizen but for—

(a) historical legislative unfairness,

(b) an act or omission of a public authority, or

(c) exceptional circumstances relating to P.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(a), “historical legislative unfairness” includes circumstances where P would have become, or would not have ceased to be, a British subject, a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies, or a British Overseas citizen, if an Act of Parliament or subordinate legislation (within the meaning of the Interpretation Act 1978) had, for the purposes of determining a person’s nationality status—

(a) treated males and females equally,

(b) treated children of unmarried couples in the same way as children of married couples, or

(c) treated children of couples where the mother was married to someone other than the natural father in the same way as children of couples where the mother was married to the natural father.

(3) In subsection (1)(b), “public authority” means any public authority within the meaning of section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, other than a court or tribunal.

(4) In considering whether to grant an application under this section, the Secretary of State may take into account whether the applicant is of good character.”’

This amendment seeks to extend the remedy in Clause 7 to those who would have been British Overseas Citizens but for historical unfairness.

Clause stand part.

[Bambos Charalambous]

It is the view of the Opposition that British nationality law is out of kilter with adoption law in England and Wales and needs to be rectified. In those countries where an adoption order has been made by a court, it may be made where a child has reached the age of 18 but has not yet reached the age of 19; yet such an adoption order confers British citizenship automatically only where the person adopted is under 18 on the day the order is made. It seems evident to the Opposition that that is a slip that results in unnecessary unfairness.

The adoption law as it stands was enacted some 20 years after the relevant nationality law, and apparently the inconsistency that it created was overlooked. It has never been suggested that the adoption law and British nationality law should be out of step where a court in England and Wales authorises a person to be adopted by a British citizen parent. It is important for every member of the Committee to know that the stated problem is not merely a theoretical one; it generates victims in real life, including a university graduate who was 18 but not yet 19 when she was adopted by her aunt after her mother died of cancer, and who will have no basis on which to enjoy family life in the UK with her new adopted mother once her student status has ended.

We therefore believe that the position needs correcting. The Bill is the right vehicle to make that correction, which is not controversial and which we do not believe should divide Committee members on party lines. The amendment, which should command cross-party support, would bring British nationality law in line with adoption law, so that where our courts make an adoption order in respect of a person who is 18 but not yet 19, and the adoptive parent was a British citizen, British citizenship is conferred automatically on the person adopted. No adoption order may be made in respect of a person who has reached the age of 19, so the proposed amendment affects only those who are 18 but not yet 19 when the adoption order is made.

It is also important to point out that it is no answer to the problem to say that an 18-year-old adopted by a British citizen will be able to apply for registration by an adult as a British citizen at the Secretary of State’s discretion under proposed new section 4L of the British Nationality Act 1981, provided for in clause 7. The problem relates to those persons who should be treated as British citizens automatically from the date of their adoption by a British citizen. Where the only solution is a subsequent application for British citizenship at the Secretary of State’s discretion, there is the risk that such an application may be overlooked, or refused on another basis, such that the intention of Parliament to confer British citizenship on a person adopted by a British citizen will be frustrated. We therefore believe that the sole solution is to make this simple amendment to align British nationality law with adoption law.

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms McDonagh. I will speak in support of amendments 13, 14, 30 and 31. I also support amendments 34 and 35. Amendment 35 in particular seems to make perfect sense—although it relates exclusively to England and Wales. I confess that I have not managed to ascertain whether a similar issue arises in relation to either Northern Ireland or Scotland and, depending on what the Minister says in response, that is perhaps something we can all do our homework on before Report stage.

On the other amendments, this brings us back to the point I made when making the case for no fees for introducing applications, or at least restricted fees. These fees put people off from accessing their rights, especially when there is discretion or subjective criteria are used that mean people can have only a limited idea about whether paying a fee and making an application will result in anything positive happening. If they can afford it and if they know that they meet the criteria, people will pay a fee, but this would not necessarily make it easier to see in advance whether they would be able to show historical injustice or exceptional circumstances, or that the fault lay with the public authority.

We have already debated the fee aspect and made the case for lower fees to ensure that people are not put off from seeking to fix injustices that they have suffered. These amendments taken together address the other side of the coin: what can be done to make the criteria more transparent so that people can feel confident with their applications?

Amendments 30 and 31 seek to ensure that both officials and the victims of injustice are aware of how the provisions brought about by clause 7 are being implemented. If a new type of injustice in UK nationality law is discovered, or circumstances are deemed so exceptional that the Secretary of State decides that registration is merited and she grants such an application, she will first need to ensure that policy and guidance are updated so that those processing other similar applications are aware of that fact and people applying in the same circumstances are successful. More than that, she will also be required to take steps to try and ensure that people who might be entitled to register in the same circumstances know that they can do so.

Again, as I said earlier, we know from Windrush how important taking such action to make people aware of their rights can be. In short, people will have a greater understanding of whether their application will be successful and those who meet the criteria set out in policy will apply. Those who are making decisions will be aware that in previous cases similar applications have been granted and those applications will therefore be successful.

Amendments 13 and 14 challenge a Minister to explain why the provisions introduced by clause 7 are expressed entirely as “may” rather than “must”. If a person proves they are a victim of an injustice, which is carefully defined in the clause, then why should the Home Secretary still have a totally unlimited power to refuse registration in any event? Similarly, if a person shows they were denied citizenship because of an act of omission by a public authority or by exceptional circumstances, why should the Home Secretary have a totally unfettered power to say no?

The big fear is that the Secretary of State has the broadest discretion possible regardless of whether a person meets other criteria. Who will make an application, particularly if there is a fee involved? I can see possible flaws in going completely the other way to a situation where it is a requirement and a must, but that would be better than the totally unlimited discretion that is in the Bill right now. I simply challenge a Minister to come up with a better form of this.

[Bambos Charalambous]

On amendment 30, we want to make sure that the Secretary of State is required to take all reasonable and necessary steps to ensure that the right to registration under clause 7 is made accessible to all its intended beneficiaries. We also want to ensure that historical legislative unfairness is corrected. We do not believe that it is sufficient to rely on that being done ad hoc, subject to the discretion of any particular Secretary of State.

As has been obvious from discussions on previous clauses, several injustices have been identified in British nationality law in our policy and practice over the years. Important provisions in the Bill are necessary to correct some of that, including changes to previous amendments to the British Nationality Act 1981, which only partially corrected a particular injustice.

The Opposition understand and accept that the broad purpose of clause 7 is to provide the means to correct further injustices, and we broadly support its aims. We are concerned, however, about the implementation of the clause, and the amendment serves to address that.

Hon. Members will be aware that clause 7 introduces a new discretion to register adults as British citizens or British overseas territories citizens where that is immediately necessary or appropriate in view of some historical injustice, an act or omission by a public authority, or other exceptional circumstances. As it stands, that provision is welcome and reflects the underlying purpose of all rights of registration under the British Nationality Act 1981 to ensure that citizenship is the right of all persons connected to the UK or the British overseas territories.

However, given that clause 7 relates to historical legislative unfairness, it raises a concern that it may be relied on by Ministers to avoid making necessary future amendments to the 1981 Act, required specifically to correct such injustice. We are deeply concerned, because when such an injustice is identified, Ministers must take the appropriate action to correct it in the Act. It is not enough to rely on the opinion of any particular Minister or group of Ministers. For that reason, we want to insert the following in clause 7:

“Where a person (P) is registered as a British citizen under subsection 4L(1), the Secretary of State must—

(a) ensure that other persons applying to be registered are so registered where the same unfairness, act or omission or circumstances apply unless there are material factors relevant to their applications that were not relevant to P’s application;

(b) amend or make policy or guidance in line with the registration of P;

(c) make that new or amended policy or guidance publicly available; and

(d) take such other steps as may be reasonably necessary to draw attention to that new or amended policy or guidance among other people affected by that same unfairness, act or omission or circumstances.”

Clause 7 must genuinely be given real practical effect—it must not become a mere token statutory provision. Registration requires someone to make a formal application, so the clause will be ineffective if uncertainty over the result of an application, coupled with any cost or other impediment to do so, deters people from making applications. In such circumstances, clause 7 could stand redundant on the statute book because no one to whom it ought to apply knows about it or is sufficiently encouraged or enabled to apply for the discretion to be exercised.

For those reasons, the following matters must, at a minimum, be addressed. It is generally inappropriate, as with registration more generally, for the Secretary of State to charge prohibitive and above-cost fees to prevent people from exercising their rights to British citizenship. The fees are made even more prohibitive if it is not possible to assess in advance that an application will be successful because there are no fixed criteria by which the right to be registered will be assessed.

Ministers should also be pressed to give an assurance that when an individual application is successful, there will be positive action to ensure that other potential applicants are made aware of their equal or similar right to register at their discretion. Under amendment 30, if an unfairness, act or omission by a public authority or exceptional circumstances are identified that make it necessary to exercise discretion, appropriate publicity must be given to it, and there should be a formal updating of public-facing policy. It must be made clear that others in the same circumstances will succeed with their applications to register, if they make them; otherwise, people will continue to be excluded from citizenship in circumstances where it is clearly intended that they should not be.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anne McLaughlin]

I was speaking in support of all the amendments in the group and will use evidence given to the Committee by Amnesty International and Free Movement before adding a couple of points. The clause introduces the discretionary route for registration as an adult. Discretion can be exercised where, in the Secretary of State’s opinion, that person would have been able to become a British citizen if it were not for a number of things. I want to look first at the exceptional circumstances.

Free Movement’s concern, shared by a number of people, including me, is about the reference to the Secretary of State’s opinion. A future Secretary of State—let us not say the current Secretary of State, because we would not want to personalise this—may hold an opinion generally considered to be disproportionate, unreasonable or ridiculous. They may not be from the current party in government—I am not saying that it is more likely to happen under one particular party—but where does it end? There is nothing to say that their opinion can be curbed. I am wondering what is meant by that reference. How could a legal challenge be mounted against a decision that the Secretary of State is allowed to make based on their opinion? I would like something from the Minister on that.

I turn to historical legislative unfairness, which we have talked about a lot today. It has been defined with specifics. We have talked about the unequal treatment of mothers, children of unmarried couples, and children of mothers married to someone other than their natural father, but the list does not include discrimination on the basis of ethnicity and race. The list is not definitive. Is there scope to consider the role played by such discrimination in terms of historical unfairness? I would like the Minister’s thoughts on that.

On the act or omission by a public authority, it is always useful to say when we think somebody has got it right—and we have said that a number of times today. I want to reiterate that, as Free Movement has said, there have been a number of concerns that local authorities responsible for children who become entitled to British citizenship under their care do not always get the applications made on those children’s behalf. Sometimes that is because there has been a misunderstanding, and at other times it is deemed to be not in the child’s interest at that time and it is not always included in their care plan. By the time they are an adult, it is too late for them to make that decision themselves, so I am quite supportive of measures to deal with that.

I want to talk about a concern that Amnesty has expressed—I am sure the Minister has seen this—which is that clause 7 has to be given real, practical effect, and that the measure will be ineffective if uncertainty over the result of an application, along with the excessive fees that we have talked about, deters people from making applications in the first place. I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East has made those points.

Amnesty has asked for the following matters to be addressed. First, we have talked about fees at length, but I reiterate that several organisations are very concerned about the fees. Secondly, Amnesty has asked for assurances that where an individual application is successful, the Government will take positive action to ensure that other potential applicants are made aware of their equal or similar right to register at discretion. This means that where an example is identified of, as the Bill says, unfairness, an act or omission by a public authority or exceptional circumstances on which it is right or necessary to exercise the discretion, there should be publicity and awareness raising. We have talked a lot about that, but Amnesty wants to know that that will happen, and that members of the public who could use the legislation to the same positive effect will have that information. Lastly, Amnesty has asked for an assurance that awareness raising will apply equally to British citizenship and British overseas territories citizenship.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I want to speak to amendment 34, which deals with people who would be British overseas citizens today but for historical unfairness in the law, an act or omission of a public authority or other exceptional circumstances. The Opposition welcome the fact that clause 7 attempts to rectify the position for those who would be British citizens or British overseas territories citizens today but for such an error. However, the clause does nothing for people who would be British overseas citizens today, and that is wrong.

Those who would be BOCs but for such an error should not be excluded from the proposed remedy. They have suffered from historical unfairness, just as those who would be British citizens or BOTCs today have done. Prior to 1983, there was one substantive class of British nationals, citizens of the United Kingdom and colonies. When the British Nationality Act 1981 came into force on 1 January 1983, CUKCs were divided and reclassified into three categories: British citizens, connected to the UK; British dependent territories citizens—now BOTCs—connected to the remaining British overseas territories, such as the Falkland Islands and Gibraltar; and BOCs, connected to the former British colonies.

The Home Office acknowledges that past unfairness in British nationality law includes where men and women were unable to pass on citizenship equally, and where unmarried fathers could not pass on citizenship. The Home Office acknowledges that in the case of people who could be British citizens or BOTCs, but many persons who would be overseas citizens today also suffer from such prejudice. As a result of the British overseas expansion and later decolonisation, there are pockets of BOCs around the world—for example, in Kenya, Malaysia, South Africa and anglophone west Africa, including places such as Sierra Leone. The category of BOC was created under the British Nationality Act, and it gave effect to the fact that BOCs were British nationals and should remain so. The newly created status gave no home or right of abode in the UK or any other remaining British territory.

Although BOCs have no right to come to the UK or a remaining British overseas territory, the status still has real value. It enables a person to seek to use the UK BOC passport, and possession of such a passport enables BOCs to seek UK consular assistance in a third country and to seek residence and permission to work in third countries under local laws. It may be useful where the passport of another nationality that those people hold is considered unreliable, and where their children are born stateless, to benefit from UK laws that reduce statelessness.

BOCs around the world make active use of that status. For example, many persons of Somali heritage born in Aden in Yemen when it was a British colony are reliant on BOC status, as they were, and are, shut out from the Yemeni nationality. Their BOC passports enable them to obtain lawful residence and permission to work in Gulf states, and to secure a visa to study in other countries. The Home Office proposal in clause 7 helps those affected by historical unfairness in British nationality law, an act or omission of a public authority, or exceptional circumstances to become British citizens or BOTCs. However, potential BOCs would also have suffered from such historical unfairness in British nationality law, acts or omissions of public authorities, or other exceptional circumstances. All those classes of British nationals were CUKCs prior to the British Nationality Act 1981, and all suffered from these problems. Clause 7 should therefore be supplemented to provide for registration as a BOC on the same basis as it enables registration as a British citizen or BOTC.

[Tom Pursglove]

I will deal with each of the amendments proposed, and then I will of course pick up on a number of the points, questions and challenges that have been raised throughout the course of this debate.

I thank the hon. Members for Enfield, Southgate and for Halifax for having tabled amendment 35, which would allow a person to become a British citizen automatically following their adoption in the UK if the order was made after the age of 18 but before the age of 19, but the adoption proceedings started before their 18th birthday. I have noted the unusual situation, highlighted by hon. Members, in which newly adopted young people can find themselves as a result of differences between the Adoption and Children Act 2002 and the British Nationality Act 1981. An adopted person can automatically acquire British citizenship, provided they are under 18 on the date the adoption order is made. However, under the 2002 Act, it is possible for an adoption order to be made where someone is already 18 years old but has not yet turned 19.

I am aware of cases in which individuals are affected by those nationality provisions, and I have some sympathy for them. However, I am also conscious that a person aged 18 will normally be capable of making their own life choices. At 18, someone can purchase alcohol, accrue debt, join the Army, or vote in an election. From a legal standpoint, at 18, an individual is fully fledged and can theoretically live independently of other family members. It is therefore consistent that a person aged 18 or over who is seeking to acquire British citizenship should normally do so only on the basis of their personal connections with this country, not those of their new family.

I must consider the wider position of adopted children, and I am satisfied that to extend the nationality rules to cover persons who have attained the majority would move nationality out of step with immigration routes. For example, young people over the age of 18 must meet the requirements of the immigration category they are applying in, and are unable to rely on other family members for a claim to residence. I have sympathy for those young adults who feel that they have lost out, but other routes are available that would allow them to choose whether they wish to naturalise or register as British citizens.

Turning to amendment 13, again I thank hon. Members for tabling the amendment and for drawing attention to clause 7, which we believe is a positive move that will allow the Home Secretary to grant British citizenship to those who have missed out on acquiring it, potentially due to reasons beyond their control. Clause 7 will apply to anyone who

“would have been, or would have been able to become, a British citizen but for—

(a) historical legislative unfairness,

(b) an act or omission of a public authority,”

or their exceptional circumstances. This means that the clause covers not just those who would have become citizens automatically, but those who might have had an entitlement to registration or could have registered or naturalised at the Home Secretary’s discretion. As such, we think it right that the provision remains discretionary, to allow the Home Secretary to take into account the criteria that she might have taken into account at the time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

The point that I would make is that we keep evolving circumstances and individual cases under review. It is right that we consider cases individually and properly take account of their individual circumstances. That is why we are arguing strongly that the discretionary means of tackling this is the correct way to do so. I am confident that through the provisions, we will right many historical injustices and wrongs, and that is something we should all welcome.

In the light of the debate that we had about fees, whether or not applications will be free under the clause is an important point. That will be an issue for the appropriate fees regulations in due course. As I set out when dealing with earlier clauses, those regulations will be subject to parliamentary scrutiny. I note the views that have been strongly expressed today. Members will have heard what I have said about this previously, and I would be very happy to engage with them in the development of those regulations that we would then bring forward. With that, I would ask hon. Members not to press their amendments.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I wish to press amendment 35, and all other amendments in my name and in the names of the other Members.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

Another example could be that of someone from the Windrush generation who had lived in the UK for many years but was prevented from returning and was able to do so only four years ago. Despite their long connection with the UK, this requirement creates a barrier to naturalisation. The clause rectifies this, and quite rightly so, enabling the Secretary of State to waive the requirement for a person to have been physically present in the UK or British overseas territory at the start of that residential qualifying period. It will allow us to grant citizenship in compelling circumstances. We will set out in guidance when we might expect to exercise discretion, as we do for other requirements in which there is discretion. This is a positive change that could benefit those who have close connections with the UK but were outside the UK five years prior to their application, particularly when the absence was down to circumstances beyond their control.

[Bambos Charalambous]

The clause seeks to enable the Secretary of State to waive requirements for naturalisation as a British citizen under section 6, naturalisation as a British overseas territories citizen under section 18, or registration as a British citizen under section 4 of the British Nationality Act 1981. At present, there is no power to waive the requirement to have been present in the UK at the start of the qualifying period except in relation to applications for naturalisation as British citizens from current or former members of the armed forces, which presents a barrier in otherwise deserving cases.

The immediate necessity for the clause arises from the circumstances of people of the Windrush generation, many of whom were deprived of their rights to register their British citizenship by the Home Office’s failure to ensure that people were aware both of their rights and of the need to exercise them. It has since become necessary to use naturalisation without a fee as a means to put people in the position they should have been in all along as British citizens. However, since some people were wrongly exiled from the UK, the remedy has been inadequate for some people who were only recently able to return.

The main barrier stems from the requirement for naturalisation that a person must be present in the UK at a fixed point five or three years before the date of their application to naturalise. The clause therefore seeks to amend the 1981 Act to allow the Secretary of State to waive the requirement that the individual must have been present in the UK or relevant territory at the start of the qualifying period in the special circumstances of a particular case. The waiver will be introduced in relation to the requirements to naturalise a British citizen under section 6 of the 1981 Act, to naturalise as a British overseas territories citizen under section 18 or to register as a British citizen under section 4.

The clause would not have been necessary had the Windrush scandal not happened in the first place, and we wish to place on the record our concerns that it happened because of the hostile environment that was created by the Home Office. Although we welcome clause 8 and will support it, we wish that it had never been necessary because of the injustice of what happened to all those people.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I want to pick up on one thing the shadow Minister mentioned in his speech. He is right that the most profound implications of the clause relate to the correction of wrongs that were done to the Windrush generation, but I slightly disagree with him when he says that it would not have been necessary but for that.

Certain nationality applications always have caused some awkwardness. In the dim and distant past, when I was one of these wicked immigration lawyers, I would have people come to me who were applying to register, and the requirement that they had been in the country five years ago at the start of the residency period would sometimes cause problems. I do not know what I was doing five years ago today, and sometimes it would require a hell of a lot of checking to work it out.

There were the odd occasions where the Home Office kindly returned the applications, because it was going to have to refuse them as the person had perhaps gone abroad for a couple of weeks five years ago. If the Home Office had not done that, it could have just banked the fees and refused the application. The most profound implication is in relation to Windrush, but I think overall that this is a good thing to do anyway and a slightly broader discretion is welcome.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

As I have said, we are aware that this is happening. We think it is right to take steps through the Bill, so that those going through the process are not disadvantaged relative to those who are seeking to make use of this loophole.

[Bambos Charalambous]

We believe that clause 9 will disentitle many stateless children who were born and grew up in the UK from their existing statutory right to British citizenship. I have heard what the Minister said. I think it would require a fair bit of cunning and conniving to conceive a child, wait for five years and not register them before applying for citizenship. This applies not just to children aged five, but to children aged five to 17. There may be many children caught up in those circumstances. We therefore strongly oppose this clause and believe that it should be removed.

Let us be absolutely clear about what the Government are trying to change with this clause. The existing law in section 36 of the British Nationality Act 1981 gives effect to schedule 2 expressly for the “purpose of reducing statelessness”. Paragraph 3 of schedule 2 is designed to prevent children born in the UK from growing up without nationality. As Ministers made clear during the passage of the 1981 Act, the provision was needed to ensure continued compliance with our international obligations under the UN convention on the reduction of statelessness, to which the Minister referred. In accordance with that convention, the provision entitles someone under the age of 22 born stateless in the UK who has lived in the UK for five continuous years at the point of application and who has always been stateless to register as a British citizen.

Clause 9 inserts a new paragraph 3A into schedule 2 of the 1981 Act for stateless children aged five to 17, requiring the Secretary of State to be satisfied that the child was unable to acquire another nationality before the child is permitted to register as a British citizen. It considers that a child can acquire a nationality where the nationality is the same as that of one of the parents, the person has been entitled to acquire that nationality since birth, and in all circumstances it is reasonable to expect them, or someone acting on their behalf, to take steps to acquire that nationality.

We oppose clause 9 because it is unethical and puts children’s rights in jeopardy. It unnecessarily restricts a vital safeguard intended to protect the rights and best interests of a small group of marginalised children born in the UK. For those affected, statelessness can mean problems accessing rights and services, denied opportunities, unfulfilled potential and a sense of never quite belonging. As worded, the new provision would give the Secretary of State wide discretion to prevent a stateless child born in the UK from acquiring British citizenship, perpetuating their statelessness. The Opposition believe that clause 9 creates an additional and unjustified hurdle to stateless children’s registration as British citizens and to satisfying the Secretary of State that they cannot secure some other nationality. This is in addition to the child having to show that they were born stateless in the UK, have remained stateless throughout their life and have lived at least five continuous years in the UK at the point of exercising their statutory entitlement to be recognised as a British citizen.

For many years, the existing requirements have together proved a high barrier to stateless children securing citizenship of the UK, which is where they were born, where they live and where they are connected to. Clarification of the relevant law by the High Court in 2017 and awareness raising by the Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens, the European Network on Statelessness and others have enabled several children to apply to be registered under statutory provisions that are expressly intended to reduce statelessness. Prior to this, applications were so few as to be negligible. That indicates the profound inadequacy of the Home Office’s previous operation of the provision, and the strong likelihood that there have been a growing number of children living stateless in the UK, in contravention of the original parliamentary purpose, and following the UK’s international commitment to reducing statelessness.

The purported justification for the draconian clause 9 bears no relation to any matter over which the child has any control or influence, or for which they have any responsibility. It is suggested that some parents may choose not to exercise a right to register their child with the nationality of another country, and may leave their child stateless for the purpose of securing British citizenship, but no evidence has been presented for the idea that some parents may choose not to exercise the right to register their child with the nationality of another country. In any event, an application for registration of a stateless child’s entitlement to British citizenship is a complex matter, and that itself has been an effective and unjust deterrent to the exercising of the right.

The UK Government have provided no evidence to justify restricting children’s rights in such a way. In fact, the leading organisations in the field have evidence to show that stateless children and young people born in the UK already face significant barriers to acquiring British citizenship under existing law, and that has a significant detrimental impact on their wellbeing. Young people have described how their inability to acquire British citizenship leaves them feeling alienated and excluded.

Nationality and Borders Bill (Seventh sitting)

Bambos Charalambous Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 21st October 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Anne McLaughlin]

I would absolutely support that. I had no intention of speaking for any more than five minutes, but Members keep on interrupting and goading me. I want to make two more little points, if I may. The Bill is being brought in because there is a mistaken belief that asylum seekers across the world are desperate to get to the UK. I am not sure why they would be if they ever watch parliamentlive.tv, but the fact is that most people coming to Europe as a whole think that Europe is one homogenous place. They do not think in terms of countries. This is not anecdotal; studies have been done on people who come to live here. Similarly, people often think that Africa is a country, when it is more than 50 countries.

Asylum seekers are not looking to go to a particular country. If they choose to come to the UK, it is perhaps because they have family or friends here, which is hugely important, or because they speak the language. They do not speak French or German, but they do speak English and do have family here. Imagine the turmoil when people’s city is bombed. They do not recognise the streets any more, and they do not know where their family are. They know that they could be raped, tortured or murdered at any moment. Imagine the trauma from that. People know that they have to get away. Of course they do not want to leave, but they have to do so. We should all think about that happening to us. We are so lucky that it will probably never happen to us. If it did, we would want to be with people who made us feel safe. If someone has family or friends in the UK, they should be able to join them. Yes, that is a pull factor, as is the language. There is also a mistaken belief that the great British empire was all-welcoming, all-democratic and all-supportive of human rights, which is another reason why people come to the UK.

The truth is that most people who arrive by boat have not decided that they are coming here; the smugglers have decided it. As my Friend the Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East said, we should be targeting the smugglers, not their victims. We should take away their market, and the only way to do that is to provide the safe and legal routes on which we apparently all agree. But where are they?

I will make one more point, which is about France. We have established that, under the international legislation that the UK played a major role in developing, there is no requirement to claim asylum in the first so-called safe country that somebody arrives in. However, it is important to understand why someone fleeing persecution, and probably suffering from mental health impacts such as post-traumatic stress disorder, might not want to claim asylum in France—I am using France as an example. Why would an asylum seeker choose to make a dangerous crossing? As I said, most people are not choosing; the people smugglers are choosing. Why might they choose to make a dangerous channel crossing, when they could claim asylum in France? I have spoken about the fact that people do not choose their route, but it is well established that the asylum system in France has a reputation for being harsh. I know there are Members present who like the idea of harshness, but we do not.

A 2020 ruling by the European Court of Human Rights condemned France for inhumane living conditions for asylum seekers. Having spent a few days with my hon. Friend the Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East in the jungle in Calais a few years ago, I saw exactly what the court meant. France might take in many more people than we do in the UK—I believe that we do not treat asylum seekers as well as we should do when they arrive here, and we certainly will not do so if the Bill passes—but France is not where I would want to be if I needed international protection, especially if I had to recover from trauma.

Even during the pandemic last year, when we all agreed that there should be a break in evictions and that everyone should have a roof over their head, asylum seekers sleeping in tents in France where thrown out of their tents and tear-gassed, no doubt triggering terrible memories for many of them. When I was in the jungle, parents there told me that their children no longer played in the little playpark nearby because far-right activists set off fireworks to terrify them, and terrify them it did, as these kids fled, thinking that they were being bombed again.

In addition, the housing situation for asylum seekers in France has only got worse, with asylum seekers such as Hussain, interviewed by the New Humanitarian in April, being forced to sleep rough on the streets of Paris over a year after he submitted his application. The French National Consultative Commission on Human Rights went so far as to say:

“It is true that the conditions in France make people want to leave”.

Nicolas De Sa-Pallix, a French asylum lawyer, condemned the French Government’s approach, and his words should act as a warning for Government Members:

“They talk about being both humane and tough in migration policies, but these don’t go together…You can’t have both.”

I agree, so why not just respond to the plight of these people, facing things that none of us will ever have to face, with humanity?

[Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)]

We have heard two excellent speeches, and the Opposition totally support the position of the Scottish National party.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

I simply cannot in all conscience support anyone of any nationality putting their lives in the hands of evil people-smuggling gangs, and I think that that would be the unintended consequence of what the hon. Lady is trying to achieve. I do not doubt the generosity of spirit behind the amendment, but I do not think that putting it into the Bill is the right thing to do. It is right that we continue to develop the safe and legal route as quickly as possible, and make sure that people are able to come here. I cannot, in all good conscience, support an amendment that would simply afford opportunity to evil criminal gangs. With that, I ask the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East to withdraw it.

[Bambos Charalambous]

The Afghan resettlement scheme would have a cap of 5,000 per year. If that 5,000 limit had been met, anyone who came here via other routes would be deemed to be in one of the group 2 categories, and they would have fewer protections. On guidance, which my hon. Friend the Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark mentioned, the issue around how they would be treated would certainly be in play. They would be treated as group 2, and we must bear in mind that the guidance would say that they could not return to Afghanistan. Does the Minister have any comments on that?

[Tom Pursglove]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for the intervention. I think there is a timing issue here. We are debating this Bill in Committee today and we have several more weeks of Committee, and then Report and Third Reading in the Commons, followed by Lords consideration in full, and consideration of any amendments that those in the other place wish to send to us. As a result, we are some way away from this Bill becoming law. By that time, I fully expect that the safe and legal route will have been established and people will be able to avail themselves of it. The overriding point is that all cases are considered on a case-by-case basis, taking into proper account all the relevant considerations.

Nationality and Borders Bill (Eighth sitting)

Bambos Charalambous Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 21st October 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:

Amendment 161, in clause 10, page 13, line 40, at end insert—

“(10) Nothing within the Act or this section authorises any treatment or action which is inconsistent with the UK’s obligations under the Refugee Convention.”

This amendment seeks to ensure consistency of clause 10 with the UK’s obligations under the Refugee Convention.

Clause stand part.

[Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)]

The Opposition strongly oppose the clause. We believe that it contravenes the 1951 refugee convention, that it sets a dangerous precedent by creating a two-tiered system for refugees and that it is deeply inhumane. The clause seeks to dehumanise refugees in many insidious ways, and I believe that it threatens our very sense of who we are as a civilised nation. I will set out all the ways in which the clause does that, but before I begin, I would again like to thank the many organisations from across the refugee and asylum sector for their invaluable help in our scrutiny of the clause.

I will talk first about the differential treatment of refugees in groups 1 and 2. As all members of this Committee will know, at the heart of clause 10 is the creation of two tiers of refugee under UK law. Only those refugees who meet specific additional “requirements” will be considered group 1 refugees and benefit from the rights currently granted to all refugees by the refugee convention. Under clause 10 of the Bill, the requirements for group 1 refugees are that

“they have come to the United Kingdom directly from a country or territory where their life or freedom was threatened (in the sense of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention), and…they have presented themselves without delay to the authorities.”

The clause also states:

“Where a refugee has entered or is present in the United Kingdom unlawfully, the additional requirement is that they can show good cause for their unlawful entry or presence.”

Other refugees, who are not deemed to meet the criteria, will be designated as group 2 refugees. The Secretary of State will be empowered to draft rules discriminating against group 2 refugees with regard to the rights to which they are entitled under the refugee convention, as well as the fundamental human right to family unity.

To explain this differentiation between refugee groups further, clause 10 makes provision for different treatment of people recognised as refugees on the basis of how they travelled to the UK and the point at which they presented themselves to authorities. Those who travelled via a third country, do not have documents or did not claim asylum immediately would routinely be designated as group 2 refugees. The clause goes on to set out how the length of limited leave, access to indefinite leave, family reunion and access to public funds are likely to become areas for discriminating against group 2 refugees.

The Opposition strongly argue that such an approach is deeply flawed and fundamentally unfair. Furthermore, the attempt to create two different classes of recognised refugee is inconsistent with the refugee convention and has no basis in international law. The refugee convention contains a single, unitary definition of refugee, which is found in article 1A(2). That defines a refugee solely according to their need for international protection because of feared persecution on the grounds of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. Anyone who meets that definition and is not excluded is a refugee and entitled to the protection of the refugee convention. We heard in evidence from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees representative to the UK that in her opinion this clause and the Bill were inconsistent with the UN convention and international law.

[Anne McLaughlin (Glasgow North East) (SNP)]

The hon. Gentleman mentions the UNHCR, which is the guardian of the refugee convention. Does he agree with me that on that basis, if we are to listen to anybody’s opinion about this issue, it would be the UNHCR and that should be therefore the final word on it?

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[Bambos Charalambous]

The hon. Lady makes an excellent point. It is not just the UNHCR. It is the custodian of the UN refugee convention, so we should listen to what it says, but many other commentators across the board have commented on how this clause and the Bill breach international law, and we need to heed what they say. I have yet to see the Government’s legal advice that says that they do comply with international law, but hopefully that will be available.

I will set out for the Committee the reasons why the distinction between groups of refugees is so unfair and inhumane. I will start by addressing the issue of distinguishing between refugees on the basis of how they arrived in the UK. By penalising refugees for how they were able to get to the UK, the Bill builds walls against people in need of protection and slams the door shut on many seeking a safe haven. Most refugees have absolutely no choice about how they travel, as people on all sides of the political divide understand.

Do the Government seriously intend to penalise refugees who may have found irregular routes out of Afghanistan? In fact, Government Ministers have been on national news programmes in recent weeks, urging such a course of action for those wishing to flee Afghanistan. Are the Government saying that people are less deserving of our support if they have had to take dangerous journeys? Is an interpreter from Afghanistan who took a dangerous journey to our shores less deserving than a refugee who was lucky enough to make it here on one of the flights out of the country?

[Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)]

Does my hon. Friend share my concern that those who fought alongside or were trained by UK forces, or who guarded our diplomatic personnel in Kabul, were betrayed in being left behind and are being doubly betrayed by the provisions in the Bill?

[Bambos Charalambous]

My hon. Friend makes an excellent point, and he is absolutely right. People linked to my constituents are Chevening scholars who were told to go to Kabul airport. They got no assistance and are still stuck in Afghanistan, with no way to get out. It is deeply concerning, and they feel let down.

It clearly makes no sense to seek to penalise and, in some cases, even criminalise those who have been forced to take dangerous journeys. In our view, it is an insidious way of dehumanising a group of people who deserve our support—it is victim blaming of the most crass and immoral type. Penalising people for how they have arrived in the UK has particular implications for already vulnerable groups of refugees, such as women and those from LGBT communities. Women are often compelled to take irregular routes to reach safety, as we can see only too clearly in Afghanistan. There are simply no safe and legal routes that exist. Even the Government’s much-vaunted resettlement scheme relies on women escaping from a regime in which they are forbidden to walk around freely in the streets.

In many cases, even if the Government created new safe routes from dangerous parts of the world, they would simply not be available to all those in need of protection. Many women would not be able to safely reach an embassy or cross a border to access a resettlement programme, if those routes did indeed exist. Some women would be able to disclose their need for protection only once they reached a country that they considered safe. Under the proposed changes, however, women who arrive irregularly, including through a safe third country, would be penalised. Furthermore, a woman could be prosecuted, criminalised and imprisoned for one to four years. All these obstacles apply to those from LGBT communities as well. We simply ask the Government: how on earth does this draconian and inhumane treatment of vulnerable groups sit alongside British values of fairness?

Another huge flaw in this part of clause 10 is that many of the journeys facilitated by people smugglers are undoubtedly dangerous. Much attention has been directed by the Home Secretary and certain sectors of the press to the minority of people who enter the UK’s asylum system via boat crossings of the channel. However, that is far from the only dangerous journey that is made to enter the UK; the Home Secretary emphasised that when referring to the tragedy of the 39 Vietnamese people who lost their lives in a container found by Essex police in 2019.

Again, as the Home Secretary identified in her speech, the dangers are not limited to the journeys but are also a feature of the violent and exploitative treatment by people smugglers, traffickers and other abusers. Moreover, many of the people who make dangerous journeys to reach the UK from the continent will already have made dangerous journeys by land and sea, including across the Mediterranean.

The fallacy of the Government’s position in penalising people for making irregular routes to the UK is the same as the fallacy inherent in the stated objective of breaking the business model of people smugglers. Unless the Government can provide safe routes—they plainly have not done so in the case of Afghanistan and elsewhere—penalising people for making unsafe journeys is simply cruel. By not providing safe routes, the Government are also fuelling the business model of people smugglers and then penalising the victims they have a responsibility for creating. Do they not understand or are they simply willing to turn a blind eye? In America in the 1920s, prohibition drove the sale of alcohol underground, and a similar thing will happen here: more people smuggling will take place rather than less. The Government are fuelling the people smuggling business model.

It appears that Ministers and those advising them do not appreciate the compulsion to make these journeys, which is strange because they clearly acknowledge that the journeys are very dangerous and sometimes fatal. They are often highly traumatic, physically and mentally, and generally involve at some point extremely violent and cruelly exploitative people.

To give one example, it has long been documented that there is a practice among the women and girls seeking to cross the Mediterranean from Libya of taking contraceptive medication prior to the journey. That is because those women and girls anticipate that they will be raped. Do Ministers have any idea of the desperation involved in making the decision to take such medication? It is clear that although the women and girls fully understand the danger involved in the journeys, they are still compelled to make them, because the alternative of not doing so is even worse.

If people truly had a reason to believe that they were or would be safe where they are, they would not make the journeys. Simply making the journey more dangerous or the asylum system more unwelcoming will not change that. A salutary lesson ought to be taken from the example in 2014 when pressure from the EU, then including the UK, led to Italy’s decision to abandon its organised search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean. The immediate impact over several months before the Government relented was a huge increase in the number of people dead. The need for the journeys had not changed, so the journeys continued. The dangers of the journeys were greatly increased, so hundreds more people lost their lives. Discriminating against refugees obliged to arrive spontaneously will not prevent desperate people from making dangerous journeys. There is strong evidence that a policy focused on closing borders forces migrants and refugees to take more dangerous journeys and leaves them more vulnerable to traffickers.

That brings me to section 2(a) of the clause, which states that group 1 refugees must have

“come to the United Kingdom directly from a country or territory where their life or freedom was threatened”.

In other words, the Government are setting an expectation that to be a refugee who is supposedly deserving of the support usually afforded, the UK must be the first safe country in which they have sought asylum. I cannot state strongly enough how requiring refugees to claim asylum in the first safe country they reach would undermine the global, humanitarian and co-operative principles on which the refugee system is founded. The UK played a key role in developing those principles 70 years ago when it helped draft the refugee convention, and, together with the other members of the United Nations General Assembly, it recently reaffirmed them in the global compact on refugees.

The proposed clause designed around the maxim that asylum seekers should claim asylum in the first safe country they reach and can be penalised if they do not, including by being designated as group 2 refugees, will impact not only refugees but fellow host states and the ability to seek global, co-operative solutions to global challenges.

The expectation that refugees should claim asylum in the first safe country they reach is also unworkable in practice. The Government are aware that there are 34.4 million refugees and asylum seekers worldwide, and the vast majority—73%—are already hosted in countries neighbouring their countries of origin. Some 86% are hosted in developing countries. Low-income countries already host 86% of the world’s refugees compared with the UK, which hosts just 0.5%. To insist that refugees claim asylum in the first safe country they reach would impose an even more disproportionate responsibility on the first safe countries both in Europe and further afield, and threaten the capacity and willingness of those countries to provide protection and long-term solutions. In turn, that would overwhelm the countries’ hosting capacity and encourage onward movement.

It is also worth noting that even within Europe most of the countries that refugees pass through on their way to the UK already host significantly more refugees and asylum seekers per population than the UK does. According to the Home Office’s own statistics, the UK is 17th in terms of the numbers it takes, measured per head of population.

[Mike Wood (Dudley South) (Con)]

Does the hon. Gentleman recognise that very few other countries resettle as many refugees as the United Kingdom or take as many through safe channels from United Nations camps in some of the most troubled parts of the world?

[Bambos Charalambous]

Since Dublin 3 ended, there are very few resettlement routes available. That is one of the problems. Unless there are safe resettlement routes, we are just fuelling dangerous journeys.

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

It is repeatedly asserted that the UK has an exceptional record in terms of resettlement. It has a decent one; it is about mid-ranking in the European Union, in terms of the number it has taken per head of population over the years. Similarly, it is mid-ranking in terms of the number of asylum cases it assesses. It is good, but it is not exceptional and it is not a justification for the measures in this Bill.

[Bambos Charalambous]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. Unless safe routes are developed, all that will happen is that there will be an increase in dangerous crossings, because that will be the only way in which people can reach the UK.

[Mr Robert Goodwill (Scarborough and Whitby) (Con)]

As we have already discussed, the majority of the people who come to our shores come from France. There is a safe route from France. Is the hon. Gentleman suggesting we should give these people Eurostar tickets?

[Bambos Charalambous]

France takes three times more asylum seekers than the UK, as does Germany. As I mentioned, the UK is 17th by population in the number of asylum seekers it takes. The right hon. Gentleman is being slightly disingenuous. There are many other countries—Lebanon, for instance, has taken 1.9 million refugees from Syria. Jordan has taken 1 million over the last 10 years. Turkey has taken 4.3 million refugees. We are talking about a tiny fraction of those numbers. I think we need to stand up and take our share of the refugees. These countries will collapse if they are forced to take refugees because they neighbour countries where there is conflict.

[Neil Coyle]

Does my hon. Friend agree that there is a bit of a dichotomy here? People talk up the tradition and reputation of the UK at the same time as presenting legislation that undermines that reputation. Does my hon. Friend share my concern that global Britain seems less compassionate, less generous and less Christian than the Great Britain that proudly helped draft the refugee convention?

[Bambos Charalambous]

My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. The refugee convention was enshrined in UK law in 1954 when Winston Churchill was the Prime Minister. It was one of his beliefs, and that of the Government of the day, that it was a very important part of the UK’s global position in the world. We should not do anything that would trash our reputation, because we will all be diminished by that.

The clause makes no practical or moral sense at all. Global provision for refugees could not function if all refugees claimed asylum in the first safe country they came to. As Members across the political divide know, most refugees are hosted in developing countries and the UK receives fewer asylum applications than most other European countries. Furthermore, it is an important aim of the refugee convention that there should be no penalisation of refugees who arrive irregularly. It is very important to make that point and to repeat the point that the refugee convention does not state that refugees must claim asylum in the first safe country they come to; it permits refugees to cross borders irregularly to claim asylum.

Let me give the Committee an example to illustrate why this part of the refugee convention is so vital. This is a real-life scenario that faced a refugee to the UK, who, in this situation, I am going to call Aaron.

Aaron is a refugee who travelled to the UK via other countries. He was a young teenager when he had to leave Eritrea without his family. His father had been conscripted into the country’s brutal military service and came home to see his family. When he left again, he told his family that he was going back to his base, but he never showed up there. The family did not know anything about his whereabouts. The military came to Aaron’s house looking for his father and told Aaron’s mother that they would take her children, including Aaron, if they could not find his father. Aaron had no choice but to leave. He says:

“People really suffer. They don’t want to leave their country but their country forces them because military service in Eritrea is the worst thing. You have to serve the military forever. There is no life, there is nothing.”

He left Eritrea and spent two years looking for safety before arriving in the UK. He travelled via Sudan and Libya, both of which were very dangerous. He then went to Italy, where he felt unsafe sleeping outside under bridges, and to France, where he ended up in the Calais jungle. He explained:

“They didn’t treat us like human beings”,

Aaron came to the UK in the back of a lorry. “I wasn’t expecting anything,” he remembers,

“I just escaped to keep my life, to be safe. That’s the most important thing.”

He was initially refused asylum and had to submit a fresh claim. He was in the UK asylum system for seven years before finally being recognised as a refuge—and as having been one all along. He now plans to study IT.

Under international law, the primary responsibility for identifying refugees and affording international protection rests with the state in which an asylum seeker arrives and seeks that protection. The idea of seeking asylum in the first safe country is unfair, unworkable and illegal in international law.

That brings me on to the suggested strictures on group 2 refugees in clause 10(6), which sets out a non-exhaustive list of ways in which refugees who arrive irregularly may be treated differently, with reduced leave to remain, more limited refugee family reunion rights, and limited access to welfare benefits. The explanatory notes for the Bill state:

“The purpose of this is to discourage asylum seekers from travelling to the UK other than via safe and legal routes. It aims to influence the choices that migrants may make when leaving their countries of origin—encouraging individuals to seek asylum in the first safe country they reach after fleeing persecution, avoiding dangerous journeys across Europe.”

However, the Government have provided no evidence to show that the stated aim will result from the policy.

Evidence from many refugee organisations suggests that refugees seek asylum in the UK for a range of reasons, such as proficiency in English, family links or a common heritage based on past colonial histories. Many sector organisations have told us that refugees do not cite the level of leave granted or other elements of the asylum system as decisive factors. In fact, it seems likely that those are not even details refugees would tend to be aware of.

However, the proposed strictures will certainly result in a refugee population who are less secure, because they have a shorter amount of leave and are less able to integrate because they have reduced access to refugee family reunion. They will punish those who have been recognised, through the legal system, as needing international protection—girls fleeing the Taliban in Afghanistan, Christian converts fleeing theocracy in Iran or Uyghurs fleeing genocide in China.

These strictures are likely to retraumatise people who have already been subjected to horrific abuse. To take one example in more detail, clause 10(5) gives the Home Secretary broad discretion to set the length of any limited period of leave given to group 2 refugees, such that they may be indefinitely liable for removal. Both the new plan for immigration and the Bill’s explanatory notes confirm that group 2 refugees who have a well-founded fear of persecution will be given only temporary protection status—no more than 30 months, according to the new plan—after which they will be reassessed for return or removal. The extreme uncertainty that this will cause, along with the inability for people to move forward with their lives, is tantamount to inflicting mental cruelty.

The explanatory notes also state that 62% of asylum claims in the UK up until September 2019 were from people who entered irregularly. This means the policy intention is to impose strictures on the rights and entitlements of the majority of refugees coming to the UK, even though we take fewer than comparable countries, as has been noted.

Furthermore, these strictures would deny recognised refugees rights guaranteed to them under the refugee convention and international law. They would also create a series of significant civil and criminal penalties that would target the majority of refugees who will seek asylum in the UK. Those penalties would target not just those who had entered the UK irregularly or who had made dangerous journeys, but all those who have not come directly to the UK—regularly or irregularly—from a country or territory where their life or freedom was threatened; those who have delayed claiming asylum or overstayed; and even those who arrive in the UK without entry clearance and who claim asylum immediately.

In short, these strictures can only be seen as cruel and as a way to obstruct integration. Barriers to resettlement in the UK would force refugees to live under the perpetual threat of expulsion, denied a chance to rebuild their lives. Subjecting refugees to no recourse to public funds conditions would leave refugees vulnerable to destitution and exploitation. Meanwhile, reducing family reunion rights interferes with the right to family life, and is cruel. It constitutes a reduction of safe, managed routes for people seeking sanctuary.

I will now look in more depth at the practical consequences of the strictures of group 2 status that have just been outlined. It is worth stating that this clause envisions that group 2 status will be imposed on recognised refugees—people who are at risk of persecution, who have been forcibly separated from their homes, families and livelihoods, and who in many cases have suffered trauma. The mental health challenges they face are well documented, yet this clause will stigmatise them as unworthy and unwelcome, and if the intentions expressed in the explanatory notes were carried out, it would maintain them in a precarious status for 10 years, deny them access to public funds unless they were destitute, and restrict their access to family reunion. Multiple studies have shown that that precarious status itself is a barrier to integration and employment, yet despite these challenges, the Bill would specifically empower the Secretary of State to attach a no recourse to public funds condition to the grant of leave to group 2 refugees, and according to the explanatory notes their status

“may only allow recourse to public funds in cases of destitution.”

The adverse consequences of no recourse to public funds conditions will fall not only on the refugees themselves, but on their families, including children who travel with them, who are able to join them later or who are born in the UK. Those consequences have been documented in numerous studies, as well as in the context of litigation. They include difficulty accessing shelters for victims of domestic violence; denial of free school meals where those are linked to the parents’ benefit entitlement; and de facto exclusion from the job market for single parents, largely women, who have limited access to Government-subsidised childcare, as well as significant risks of food poverty, severe debt, substandard accommodation and homelessness. These consequences in turn hinder integration and increase the financial cost to local authorities, which in many cases have statutory obligations towards children and adults. The Home Office’s own indicators of integration framework identifies secured immigration status as a key outcome indicator for stability, which is

“necessary for sustainable engagement with employment or education and other services.”

It is also worth noting that among the public relief measures defined as public funds in this context are those specifically intended to support children, such as child benefit, and the particularly vulnerable, such as carer’s allowance and personal independence payments. Moreover, children born to group 2 refugees in the UK normally have no right to British nationality for 10 years, or until their parents are granted settlement; given that refugees may put their status and perhaps their security at risk were they to approach the embassy of their country of origin to register their children, many would have no effective nationality at all. With the possibility of applying for family reunion foreclosed, more women and children are likely to attempt dangerous journeys, either at the same time as the men who might previously have sponsored them under current laws, or joining them afterwards. That risk has been recognised by the Council of Europe, among others, and has been borne out in Australia, where the abolition of family reunion rights for holders of temporary protection visas was followed by a threefold increase in the percentage of refugees trying to reach Australia who are women and children.

I will now turn in more detail to how clause 10 contravenes the refugee convention. As a party to the convention, the UK has a binding legal obligation towards all refugees under its jurisdiction that must be reflected in domestic law, regardless of the refugee’s mode of travel or the timing of their asylum claim. The obligations in the convention are set out in articles 3 to 34. They include, but are not limited to, the following obligations that are directly undermined by clause 10: providing refugees who are lawfully staying in the country with public relief on the same terms as nationals, which is article 23, and facilitating all refugees’ integration and naturalisation, which is article 34.

The Bill is inconsistent with those obligations in at least three significant ways. First, it targets group 2 refugees, not only for unlawful entry or presence but for their perceived failure to claim asylum elsewhere or to claim asylum promptly, even if they entered and are present in the UK lawfully. Secondly, it would empower the Secretary of State to impose a type of penalty for belonging to group 2 that is at variance with the refugee convention: namely, the denial of rights specifically and unambiguously guaranteed by the convention to recognise refugees. Thirdly, it would empower the Secretary of State to impose a penalty on group 2 refugees that would be inconsistent with international human rights law: namely, restrictions on their rights to family unity. There are many other ways in which the Bill as a whole contravenes the refugee convention in clauses other than clause 10, as we will discuss in later debates.

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[Neil Coyle]

Does my hon. Friend share my concern that, once again, the Government will extend the number of people in the UK subject to no recourse to public funds conditions, requiring emergency support from councils and creating a new burden for local authorities of every political colour up and down the country, which will have to provide millions more pounds in support, when people could be supporting themselves and moving on with their lives?

[Bambos Charalambous]

My hon. Friend is exactly right. The burden will fall on all local authorities looking after asylum seekers and their families; they will have no choice but to provide that service. The Government have stayed silent on what provisions they will make for local authorities. I am not sure how far they have even consulted local authorities as to whether they accept what has been proposed.

Clause 10(6) would give the Secretary of State the same power to discriminate against family members of group 2 refugees. At present, the Secretary of State’s powers in that regard are constrained by section 2 of the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993, which states:

“Nothing in the immigration rules (within the meaning of the 1971 Act) shall lay down any practice which would be contrary to the Convention”,

which would appear to preclude the adoption of some of the immigration rules set out in the explanatory notes.

It is worth restating that nothing in the refugee convention defines a refugee or their entitlements under the convention according to their route of travel, choice of country of asylum or the timing of their asylum claim. The Bill is based on the premise that

“people should claim asylum in the first safe country they arrive in”.

That principle is not found in the refugee convention, and there is no history of it in the convention.

[Mike Wood]

The shadow Minister says that there is no history of distinguishing between refugees depending on their route into the country, but that was not the approach taken by the previous Labour Government with the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004. Baroness Scotland said:

“When a person leaves their country through fear, we consider that, as a general principle, such a person should seek protection in the first safe country where they have the chance to do so. It has been said that nowhere in international law is such a requirement imposed. There may not be such a law, but that does not dilute the argument that a person who is in genuine fear should seek shelter at the earliest opportunity.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 5 April 2004; Vol. 659, c. 1683.]

She was right, wasn’t she?

[Bambos Charalambous]

I do not know the context in which Baroness Scotland said that, but I disagree with her. I very much believe that that would have been breaching international law, as I have stated throughout my speech.

[Neil Coyle]

Perhaps Government Members would have greater standing on the issue if they were not betraying their own manifesto and cutting aid to countries where people might be able to seek support or stay longer if UK support was not retracted.

[Bambos Charalambous]

My hon. Friend makes an excellent point.

[Mr Goodwill]

Just for the record, did the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate just say that the last Labour Government was breaking international law?

[Bambos Charalambous]

Nice try. No, I did not say that.

The clause represents a fundamental change to the principle of refugee protection in the UK, introducing a two-tier system where any refugee reaching the country who has not benefited from a place on a resettlement programme may have their claim deemed inadmissible and be expelled to another country, or eventually granted temporary status with restricted rights to family reunification and financial support.

It is worth pointing out here that the UNHCR, the guardian of the 1951 refugee convention and the 1967 protocol relating to the status of refugees, tells us that the core principle is non-refoulement, which asserts that a refugee should not be returned to a country where they face serious threats to their life or freedom. That is now considered a rule of customary international law. Clause 10 therefore represents the shameful undoing of the commitment to the refugee convention and the British values that led to that commitment in the first place.

[Anne McLaughlin]

It is clear to all on the Opposition Benches that if this goes ahead, we will be breaching our international legal obligations. Does the hon. Gentleman share my concern that in doing so, the damage done both to the UK’s reputation as a global legal centre and to its trade strategy will be immense, at a time when we really need to find new trading partners?

[Bambos Charalambous]

I very much share those concerns. It is clear that some countries wishing to trade with the UK may also insist on certain measures in relation to visas and access, and in some of the new clauses tabled by the Government more recently there is a suggestion that they would be willing to withdraw visas to some countries. I do not know who they have discussed it with, but that seems contrary to the intention of trading with other nations.

There is no doubt, therefore, that the clause stands in clear contravention of the refugee convention—no small thing, given that the convention, sometimes known as the Geneva convention of 1951, anchors the status of refugees in international law. Around the most desperate and terrorised people on earth, the convention throws the shield of international protection. Since the horrors of the second world war, it has been an article of faith for every decent society, as required today as it was 70 years ago by all those fleeing war, torture and persecution of all kinds, and by all those women and girls who undertake their journey in the knowledge that they may well be raped en route to finding safety.

The Opposition are clear that accepting this clause would set a dangerous precedent by creating a two-tier system for refugees that is deeply inhumane. Furthermore, we hold that its consequences, intended or not, would undermine our binding legal obligations to all refugees. We oppose it because we believe the 1951 convention and all that goes with it speaks profoundly to the core values of the British people. Given the multiple, deeply negative consequences of the clause—mental ill health, poverty, debt, substandard accommodation and homelessness, to say nothing of the financial costs to local and national Government—it should be removed from the Bill.

In short, group 2 status is not only inconsistent with the refugee convention; it is a recipe for mental and physical ill health, social and economic marginalisation and exploitation. The human cost to refugees and their families, including their children, is obvious enough, and it should shame us that this Bill would actively cause harm if clause 10 is adopted. We will oppose clause 10 stand part.

[Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate on his comprehensive critique of clause 10. I want to add only a few points on what is clearly at the heart of the Government’s approach in this Bill: seeking to create a hostile environment for refugees and splitting them into the two groups of which my hon. Friend spoke.

I was interested to hear the Minister talk earlier about the Bill as just one part of a multifaceted approach to tackling the problem, of which international diplomacy was at the core. I would welcome his reflections, when he comes to make his remarks, on how far he thinks our position in international diplomacy is strengthened by a Bill that the UNHCR, the guardian of the 1951 convention, denounces in clear terms as

“The creation of an unlawful two-tier system in which most refugees are denied rights guaranteed by the Refugee Convention and essential to their integration”.

I think that our position in terms of how we play our cards in international diplomacy will be weakened by setting ourselves against the international community. This proposal appals all organisations that have worked with those coming to our country to flee war, terror and persecution, and Labour shares their view. However, I appreciate that this Government, in contrast with previous Conservative Administrations, revel in setting themselves against the international consensus and are happy tearing up treaties to which they have been signatories.



We should examine the clause in the context of the Government’s own objectives. They say it is part of a deterrent to break the business model of people smugglers by dissuading those seeking asylum from taking what the Government consider to be irregular routes. We are all agreed on the objective of breaking the appalling business model of people smuggling and we all agree that we want to end the situation that leads people to take the most desperate journeys across the channel. As I said earlier, and clearly the Minister struggled to respond to that point, even the Government’s own impact assessment says,

“evidence supporting the effectiveness of this approach is limited.”

I know that he had a problem with evidence when we were talking about clause 9 under part 1.

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[Bambos Charalambous]

The hon. Gentleman talked about the broken asylum system, but we actually have more people working in it and processing fewer cases. May Bulman, the journalist from The Independent, wrote an article recently in which she identified 399 people who have been waiting 10 years for their asylum claim to be processed. How can it be that the system employs more people but is processing fewer claims? How can it be allowed that people are waiting 10 years for their claims to be processed? That is the broken system. If it were a business, it would be bankrupt.

[Jonathan Gullis]

The issue is that we inherited a ruinous backlog from the Labour Government, and we have gone through a multitude of challenges recently—covid, for example, which brought the very challenging situation of working from home. I understand—I am a constituency MP like everyone else. We all do our bit and write to the Home Office. We get frustrated by the time that certain cases can take to process, but ultimately, we are trying to fix the system. That is one strand, and there are other parts of the Bill that we will examine, such as offshoring, which I support. There are other methods to help to deal with the backlog and speed up the processing of asylum claims.

I am more than happy to welcome genuine asylum seekers; what I am unhappy about is the illegal economic migrants continually crossing our channel, coming to our shores and costing millions of pounds to the British taxpayer, and the lawyers obsessed with taking money out of the British purse to stop people being deported. Let us not forget, there are convicted criminals dragged off the plane at the last minute, leaving the UK taxpayer to pick up the tab. They are criminals who should not be here and rightly should be deported. Sadly, I see too many Labour Members celebrating those lawyers’ work to prevent those people from being deported from our country. It is a very sad state of affairs to see those letters written to the Home Secretary. I hope clause 10 will stay as is and will be a part of a wider strategy to deter.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

One thing that occurred to me throughout the debate was why any Member of this House would feel that it was necessary for anyone to get into a small boat on the French coastline in order to come to the United Kingdom. France is without doubt a safe country, and I like to think that we could recognise that across the House. Those journeys are completely unnecessary against that backdrop. I am staggered that that point is not recognised more widely. Based on some of the remarks we have heard, one might think that that was not the case. In my mind and those of my colleagues, there is absolutely no need for anyone to get into a small boat to try and cross the English channel or to take irregular journeys.

On the point about what this relates to, the principle is fundamental in the common European asylum system. Without enforcement of it, we simply encourage criminal gangs and smugglers to continue to exploit vulnerable people, and I make no apology for my determination, and that of the Home Secretary and the Government as a whole, to bring these evil criminal gangs to justice and to stop the dangerous channel crossings. We have to stop them, for the reasons that my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent North alluded to. We have a moral obligation to do that, and that is what the measures in the Bill, and the wider package of measures that we talk about very often in the House, are seeking to achieve.

[Bambos Charalambous]

The clause does no such thing. It actually encourages people to make unsafe journeys and to contact criminal gangs, because there are no safe routes. That is the crux of it. If safe routes were available, fewer people would make the journeys, but nothing that the Government have said creates any safe routes. Since Dublin III ended, there are no safe routes for people to come to the UK to claim asylum.

[Tom Pursglove]

I am afraid that I just do not accept that characterisation. As I have said on several occasions in Committee, we continue to resettle genuine refugees directly from regions of conflict and instability, which has protected 25,000 people in the last six years—more than any other European country. It is central to our policy that we advocate safe and legal routes and put them at the heart of our policy making. I have talked about several of them. Of course, this is something that we keep under constant review as the international situation evolves and as needs require. I have no doubt that that will continue to be the approach that we take—establishing routes that are appropriate to the circumstances that we find ourselves in.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am grateful, because that clarifies the issue. Amendment 104 is in the name of our Labour colleagues, but it has our full support. It makes the point that it is essential that accommodation centres are not de facto detention centres or prisons, in the way that Napier has been, with basic liberties and freedoms more theoretical than real. It raises a crucial question about how we can ensure that such places have accountability and oversight.

The Government will be using sections of the 2002 Act that are not yet in force to implement many of their policy goals, but there is still dubiety about precisely which ones. Section 33 of the Act would have created advisory groups for each accommodation centre, with powers to hear complaints from residents and report to the Home Office. Is that section to be commenced? If not, what alternatives do the Government propose to ensure that such centres are subject to appropriate oversight? I will leave it to the shadow Minister to flesh out that point.

Amendments 102 and 160 take us back to how the Home Office engages—or, rather, does not engage—with other tiers of Government. The Minister was perhaps asleep at the wheel earlier, because his answer was short on detail about engagement with local authorities, and in particular, the devolved Administrations. I accept that asylum is reserved, but these institutions touch on all sorts of powers and services that are the remit of devolved Governments and Parliaments or local authorities, including planning policy and the provision of health, social or other welfare services and education services. In particular, consistent with our championing of local government autonomy and the idea that local government should be seen as a partner rather than an assistant of the Home Office, amendment 102 demands that these centres not be built in a local authority’s territory without consent from that local authority.

The way in which local councils were treated in relation to both Napier and Penally was disgraceful. The Home Office did not even consult Folkestone & Hythe District Council and Kent County Council about the extension of planning permission at Napier because, it said, of urgency, and yet as the House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee notes, it must have known for at least 12 months that planning permission would have expired. It had 12 months in which to carry out consultation, but that was still the excuse.

As I said at the outset, we pose all these questions with a view to ascertaining what precisely the Government intend and why there are not greater constraints in the Bill, but ultimately we believe that this is not the right direction of travel. We support community dispersal—improving that system, making it work better, and involving more councils. We hope that the Government come back to that view and make that system work instead.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I will speak to the three amendments that are in my name and the names of others, but I will start by speaking to amendment 104.

No one on this Committee can fail to have seen the extremely worrying track record of the Government when it comes to accommodation for asylum seekers. The appalling headlines in connection with Napier Barracks cannot have failed to reach anyone who takes any sort of interest in the news. We are deeply concerned, therefore, that in clause 11 there are provisions for creating asylum accommodation centres. The clause suggests a possible wide-scale replication of the type of accommodation seen at Napier Barracks. That is because clause 11 gives the Government powers to house different groups of asylum seekers in undefined accommodation centres. It seems that these centres will involve congregated living in hostel-type accommodation, which has been shown to be unsuitable to house people in the asylum system for long periods. Such a move away from housing in the community is likely to impede integration prospects and will make access to needed support and services more difficult.

Clause 11 also creates new powers to provide different types of housing—namely, accommodation centres—for those at different stages of their asylum claim, including those with “inadmissible” asylum claims. The rationale given in the explanatory notes to the Bill is that that will

“increase efficiencies within the system and increase compliance”,

although again no evidence is given to support that claim.

The term “accommodation centre” is not clearly defined, although the implication is that it will mean that more people seeking asylum will be living in large-scale congregated settings. It is important to state clearly that this represents a wholescale move away from the current dispersal system, whereby people live in homes in the community across the country.

There is therefore a clear indication that the Government are seeking to replicate the kind of inhumane accommodation that we have seen at Napier. As I will set out, this prison-like, isolated and dystopian accommodation provides an extremely poor environment for engaging with asylum claims. There is strong evidence that such accommodation is likely to retraumatise extremely vulnerable people and hinder future integration.

The Government may seek to deny that a punitive approach is part of their agenda, but such a denial would not tally with the actions of the Home Secretary in August, when she visited the notorious reception centre on the Greek island of Samos; campaigners have described it as “prison-like” and “inhumane”. It is shocking that, having visited the Greek reception centres in the summer, the Home Secretary appears to wish to emulate the system whereby more than 7,500 refugees, including 1,700 children, are being detained in refugee camps in unsanitary and inhumane conditions.

However, the evidence that that is indeed the intention seems clear, because in August the Home Secretary also published a prior information notice for the procurement of new accommodation centres, with initial submissions invited by the end of September 2021. The details of the tender are subject to commercial confidentiality and therefore the details are known only to potential contractors who have signed non-disclosure agreements. What is public is that the contract is to be delivered in accordance with part 2 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, and it is stated that it is for housing up to 8,000 people for periods of up to six months. The tender raises serious concerns about how that approach will interact with provisions set out in clause 11, given that contracts will be awarded before the Bill receives Royal Assent. There are also clear concerns about how accountability and standards can be maintained in asylum accommodation when there is no public access to these contracts.

It is also worth stating for the record that since April 2020, the Home Office has been using two large-scale accommodation centres for asylum-seeking men who have arrived in the UK by boat—Napier barracks in Kent, and the Penally camp in Wales, which is now closed. A report by the all-party parliamentary group on immigration detention noted that, although legally speaking, those are not detention centres, they none the less replicate

“many of the features found in detained settings—including visible security measures, shared living quarters, reduced levels of privacy, and isolation from the wider community”.

Our amendment would take away the detention element of those accommodation centres, as we feel that those de facto detention conditions are completely cruel and wholly inappropriate, and will hinder future integration.

[Neil Coyle]

It is not just the detention centres. The Government seem to have learned nothing from Napier. Most recently, they put 500 men in a 73-bed hostel in my constituency.

[Bambos Charalambous]

That is deeply concerning and shows that the Government have not learned any lessons from Napier.

Before I come to the specifics of the amendment, I will first set out exactly why the Government’s record on Napier barracks, alongside the provisions in clause 11, sets such alarm bells ringing. In doing so, I will demonstrate why the amendment is so necessary.

Organisations from the refugee sector that have worked with people held in Napier have identified and documented the following conditions:

“A pattern of spiralling mental health among people placed at Napier. Many people arrive already struggling with self-harm and/ or suicidal ideation, so this is a profoundly harmful context for them.

Chronic sleep deprivation among residents at Napier.

Conditions that are cold and dirty and afford no opportunity for privacy or social distancing.

An isolated and prison-like setting.

A total lack of mental health support onsite; very minimal healthcare onsite, and problems for residents in accessing healthcare in the community.

A sense among residents, in line with HMIP’s observation, of being trapped on site.

Profound vulnerabilities and histories of trauma among residents at Napier are not always obvious on the surface and can be difficult for individuals to disclose in general. Napier is then a very poor context for disclosure, as the prison-like setting is not conducive to building trust. We are therefore concerned that it is not possible to create a screening mechanism for Napier that would pick up all relevant vulnerabilities.

There is very little communication with residents about their asylum case.

Additionally, it is very difficult for individuals to access adequate legal advice, and they frequently go ahead with asylum interviews without having consulted a legal adviser. Virtually no one placed at Napier is able to access face to face meetings with legal advisers, and this seriously obstructs identification and disclosure of trauma.”

Residents of Napier and Penally who have given evidence to the APPG on immigration detention have described the Napier and Penally sites as feeling “prison-like”. Prison conditions have a traumatising effect on people who are already vulnerable as a result of previous experiences that have forced them to seek protection. Ministers must surely be aware that there are bound to be serious concerns about the potential use of such draconian accommodation centres for asylum-seeking men.

[Tom Pursglove]

I might be able to help the hon. Gentleman. The accommodation centres that we are proposing are not detention centres. Individuals can leave the centres at any time—they may have obtained accommodation with friends or family, for example.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I welcome the Minister’s comments, but it would have been helpful if that information had been provided beforehand, because we are still in the dark about what the accommodation centres will be like.

[Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)]

While acknowledging the Minister’s point, Napier and Penally barracks may not have been detention centres, but a number of freedoms and rights were impeded at those sites, and that is why we need to press this point.

[Bambos Charalambous]

My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. She is absolutely right: even if rights are only restricted, that is not acceptable.

[Neil Coyle]

On a quick point of clarification, I said “500 men in a 73-bed hostel”, but that is certainly not what the Home Office has done in my constituency. They are 73-bed rooms.

The Minister has made a claim that is not the lived reality of the people the Home Office has placed in my constituency, including those 500 men. They have stewards, in effect, who have been telling those people not to leave hotel and hostel accommodation. They were not provided with interpreters; they were not provided with any means of accessing the internet; and the Government have prevented inspectors from going in, including Bishop Paul Butler and the Refugee, Asylum and Migration Policy project, who were promised access to Napier barracks and other accommodation by Ministers. The Government have rescinded that commitment. Perhaps the Minister could tell us why bishops and others are being kept out? What are the Government trying to hide?

[Bambos Charalambous]

My hon. Friend is right about those conditions not being conducive to being able to make a claim with any confidence or certainty.

I was talking about asylum-seeking women. As we highlighted in the debate on clause 10, many such women are survivors of rape and other forms of gendered violence, and such large-scale accommodation is characterised by a lack of privacy. The APPG on immigration detention further notes that at Napier and Penally,

“The lack of private space was also forcing residents to hold sensitive discussions, for example with lawyers, within earshot of other residents and/or staff.”

For many asylum-seeking women who have experienced rape and other gender-based violence, disclosure of their previous experience can be very difficult as a result of the shame and stigma they feel. Accommodation centres lacking privacy is likely to have a specific impact on them, and make it particularly difficult for them to get their claims to protection recognised.

Coupled with that, the punitive detention-type elements of the centres as they are currently run are likely to be retraumatising. We are therefore deeply concerned that clause 11 seeks to expand inappropriate large-scale detention-style accommodation centres. In short, it seems like a way of actively inflicting increased harm on already vulnerable people. Our amendment seeks to ameliorate some of those centres’ worst aspects.

Given everything that has been outlined, it is hardly surprising that the High Court made a damning assessment of Napier barracks. Mr Justice Linden ruled on 3 June 2021 that the accommodation at Napier barracks was inadequate, in that it did not meet the minimum standards required by the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. Both the process for selecting people to be sent to Napier barracks and the process for monitoring its ongoing suitability while those people were there were flawed and unlawful, and from 15 January 2021, the residents were given an order to not leave the site until they were permitted to do so. The claimants were unlawfully detained, both under common law and the European convention on human rights.

Similarly, the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons’ report on Napier and Penally raised a number of serious concerns about Napier, including, inter alia, the following: the screening of potential residents for physical and mental health problems was “wholly inadequate”, with all of those interviewed at Napier reporting feeling depressed and a third feeling suicidal, and extremely poor communication with the people accommodated at Napier. Again, we argue that our amendment is necessary to ensure safeguards that will prevent similar future judgments.

Of course, we know why the Government are taking a more draconian approach to asylum accommodation: it is part of the continuing hostile environment ethos that takes a punitive, negative stance on all matters relating to asylum. Their approach is also clearly fuelled by the misguided idea that taking such a punitive stance will act as a deterrent to those seeking asylum. However, as we stated in the debate on clause 10, there is no evidence that that is the case. Desperate people who are determined to make dangerous journeys will not be deterred when their lives are at stake. The idea that the kind of accommodation awaiting them at the other end has any bearing on people seeking refuge is laughable. People escaping for their lives are not weighing up accommodation in the same way that Ministers might weigh up the merits of a Hilton hotel versus a Travelodge. The idea that making accommodation punitive could in any sense act as a deterrent shows a fundamental misunderstanding of why refugees are prepared to risk their lives to find safety.

However, the kind of accommodation that awaits refugees can do extreme damage if it hinders integration and retraumatises vulnerable people. When the accommodation provided—as in the case of Napier—dehumanises people, puts them in danger of covid-19 and is found to be unlawful, that corrodes the values that make us a civilised society, undermines our reputation as a tolerant and welcoming nation, and gives the nod to some of the most undesirable attitudes that would seek to demonise those in need.

[Neil Coyle]

Does my hon. Friend share my concern about increased criminality by gangs targeting the accommodation to get people involved in criminal activity? That is a direct result of policy from the Department that is meant to oversee law and order.

[Bambos Charalambous]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. These are vulnerable people, and they are subject to being exploited if appropriate measures are not taken to prevent that from happening. Having them all in one place allows criminals to prey on them.

I come on to the specifics of amendment 104. As I have set out, we have the gravest doubts about the clause. I find it disturbing. Our amendment seeks to ameliorate some of the worst aspects. I will set out each of its aims in more detail.

Presently, persons held in barracks and hotel accommodation are sometimes prevented from entering or leaving their place of accommodation at certain times and some places of accommodation prevent visitors from entering. The amendment addresses this inappropriately draconian situation by inserting proposed new section 22B into the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. It would qualify that the measure—in new section 22A, which relates to accommodation provided under sections 95A and 98A of the 1999 Act—to allow for the provision of accommodation in an accommodation centre, must allow for persons to be supported to enter or leave the accommodation centre at any time.

Although some controls on entry may be required to prevent persons hostile to residents of accommodation centres from entering, we believe that those held in such centres should be allowed to invite their own visitors. They should also not be precluded from communication with the outside world. The amendment would therefore introduce the right for the supported person

“(b) to receive visitors of their choice at any time; or

(c) to use communications equipment such as telephones, computers or video equipment.”

People working with persons supported in accommodation centres report that some persons in accommodation centres are unaware of their conditions of bail and may not have been provided with the conditions of their bail in writing. That places them at risk of arrest and detention for unknowingly breaching those conditions, or being unable to evidence their identity. The amendment would therefore introduce the provision that persons supported in accommodation centres must be provided with a written document setting out any conditions of bail.

Where controls or restrictions on freedom of movement of supported persons or their visitors are in place, a process for submissions by way of a complaints procedure needs to be in place, and the amendment would introduce a complaints procedure relating to the conditions of the accommodation and a procedure for appealing any decisions that may restrict the person’s freedoms, which will not apply to their bail conditions.

As has been argued, legal action taken against the Government over the suitability of Napier barracks for certain vulnerable groups has shown that the existing system has failed to maintain appropriate safeguards. The possibly widespread expansion of the system that the clause seeks to implement is very alarming and should be deeply concerning to any Member of this House.

The move away from community-based housing is poorly defined. Accommodation centres will unquestionably lower living standards for those seeking asylum. That is not an accident—it is the very design of the Bill and the clause. By the same measure, they will impede integration and advance a more draconian, prison-like setting for asylum seekers, who are, by their very definition, already traumatised individuals. If we do not agree our amendment, asylum seekers will find themselves in cold, dirty, isolated conditions, with all but no support services.

Given the widespread denunciations of the Home Office’s decision to house asylum seekers in Napier barracks, not least by the High Court, it is remarkable that the Government now seek to replicate it elsewhere. It should be noted that Mr Justice Linden criticised what he called the “detention-like” setting for the men there. Our amendment seeks to take away the detention element of the accommodation centres. They are de facto detention centres with prison-like conditions, which are cruel, wholly inappropriate and damaging to the individuals concerned. They can do nothing but increase harm and stress on already marginalised and vulnerable people whom we are beholden to protect under our international treaty obligations.

To speak plainly, the Government have got the wrong end of the stick. Clause 11 helps no one. They will find themselves on the wrong side of history with their ever-more draconian and hostile approach to asylum accommodation and, unamended, this clause starkly highlights that point. Amendment 104 should be supported to rectify that situation and ensure safeguards for the future. It would be utterly shameful if the clause, as it stands, enabled a repetition of the appalling situation at Napier barracks.

Without amendment, clause 11 will undermine the UK’s duty to support and protect those making asylum claims. We believe that the current dispersal system, whereby people seeking asylum live in regular housing in the community, is much better for supporting future integration and ensuring that people seeking asylum are able to access services that they need. We would rather see safeguards in place than the kind of appalling situation seen at Napier.

[Anne McLaughlin]

We heard that the devolved Governments were prevented from taking part in the consultation because it took place during purdah in the run-up to their elections. However, Shona Robison MSP, the Cabinet Secretary for Social Justice, Housing and Local Government in the Scottish Government, wrote a comprehensive response last month, in which she stated:

“This Government is clear that people should be supported to integrate within our communities from day one of arrival in line with the key principle of our New Scots refugee integration strategy. We are committed to the principle of community based integration for refugees and people seeking asylum. The New Scots approach is not compatible with use of remote and institutionalised camps. Such asylum accommodation will also not fix the underlying issues causing shortages in the asylum estate, which include the fairness, quality and timeliness of the asylum application and decision process.”

The position of the Scottish Government is the complete opposite of that of the UK Government, but their hands are tied. We cannot do what we want to do in Scotland to support our asylum seekers. That cannot be right.

Shona Robison also said:

“The Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration’s report highlighted significant issues”,

as we have heard,

“with the management of Napier Barracks and Penally, their suitability, safety and the impact this type of accommodation had on people living there. The report also raised concerns about contingency of healthcare if people are moved around the asylum estate. I would add to this contingency of legal representation, essential services and support networks, which must be considered.”

However, we are not talking only about barracks; there are many other types of accommodation that people had to live in. People were taken out of their homes where they were settled and put into Glasgow hostels and hotels last year. The Minister says things like, “This is not our intention.” I do not imagine that it was anyone’s intention for the men I met in the hostel close to where I live to be living in dirty accommodation, but they were, because they had nothing to clean up after themselves with. What most upset them the day I first met them was that they had nothing to clean their toilets with. They were living in tiny rooms, and if they did their washing in the tiny sink in what we will call the en suite—the toilet was in the room—they had to leave their wet clothes on the bed to dry off. I can tell hon. Members that, in Glasgow, that does not happen quickly; our temperatures are slightly different. They said that they could not keep the toilets clean and that there was no support. They were not looking for people to clean up after them, but because their access to finance had been taken from them, they could not even go and buy a toilet brush and bleach. It was a pretty awful situation.

There is also the so-called mother and baby unit that Mears has set up on behalf of the Home Office in Glasgow. I spoke to women who, without any notice, got a visit and were told, “Pack your bags. You and the baby”—or the bump; some were pregnant, some had just given birth—“are moving”. They were settled in communities among friends, they knew where the GP and the shops were and they knew how much things cost, but they were taken out of those communities at almost no notice. Many of them were told that they could take two carrier bags’ worth of goods and no more. These people had babies. I do not know anybody with a baby who can leave the house with fewer than two bags, but they were told by agents acting on behalf of the Government that they could take two carrier bags of stuff.

One of them said, “I was living in Pollok”, on the south side of Glasgow, “and was surrounded by wonderful neighbours. It was my baby’s first Christmas and all the neighbours had come round with Christmas presents.” That is why we want community dispersal. We want people to be part of a community. It benefits not just asylum seekers but everybody in the community—and that community certainly supported that woman and her baby. They took round Christmas presents, but then she was told to leave them behind because there was no room for them in the mother and baby unit. She was devastated because those presents were a symbol of acceptance and love from her community.

Nationality and Borders Bill (Ninth sitting)

Bambos Charalambous Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 26th October 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Stuart C. McDonald]

It almost certainly would, and it would meet the criteria in the Bill. However, that is not really the issue, because, as drafted, the definition of “safe country” goes way beyond who would meet those criteria in the EU. That is what I am driving at. Again, we struggle to see how clause 14 can be justified and how it can possibly be said to be appropriate or consistent with the convention. As the UNHCR put it:

“This would be a significant break from…international practice”.

Amendment 20 would simply mean that if there is no reasonable likelihood of removal to a third country in a reasonable period or there are exceptional circumstances that mean that the Home Secretary should consider the claim, then she “must” do so. As it stands, she “may” do so, but she also may not. Surely it is odd to want to give the Secretary of State the power not to consider a claim when she has decided that

“the claim should be considered”.

The amendment should probably also have taken out the reference to “exceptional circumstances”. After all, if the unexceptional circumstances suggest that the claim should be decided here, where is the logic in not doing that?

Amendment 21 sets out circumstances in which claims should, on any reasonable view, be processed here rather than attempts made to move them elsewhere. In short, if there is not an agreement with a third country that will allow for the transfer of cases, the Home Office should just get on with considering it. If the third country refuses the transfer or does not reply in three months, the Home Office should, again, just get on with considering the case. And if in the circumstances, including the best interests of any children affected, it is better for the claim to be decided here, the Home Office should get on and do it.

Amendments 18 and 22 to 24 take us to the current definition of “connection” to be introduced into law by clause 14. Amendments 23 and 24 remove from the Bill two circumstances in which it is currently said that a connection is sufficient for the purpose of the inadmissibility regime. Amendment 24 would remove what is termed “condition 5”, which is so vague as to be almost incomprehensible and allows the Secretary of State to decide that a connection has been established in an almost unlimited number of scenarios. There is reference to “the claimant’s particular circumstances” but no explanation of what is meant by that.

Amendment 23 takes out “condition 2”, so that a connection can be provided only by proper and full-blown refugee status in accordance with the convention, and not a substandard or pale imitation of it. Amendment 22 puts the full-blown refugee status as a possible connection in the clause.

Amendment 25 is similarly motivated. In short, if the making of an asylum claim in another country is to establish the connection necessary for an inadmissibility declaration, it must be the case that the protection status offered in that other country to a refugee is fully compatible with the 1951 UN refugee convention. Again, it is absolutely not enough for a substandard asylum regime to be in place, and it would be outrageous for the UK Government to say otherwise and to be seen to be tolerating the watering down of refugee rights across the globe.

All these amendments provide ways to fix the flaws in the scheme. We could also have tabled other amendments to fix the inability of anyone to challenge inadmissibility decisions on any grounds. The Government say that this is all about deterring onward movements from France and other neighbours, but the clause is drafted in a way to allow removal to any old regime, regardless of how they treat asylum seekers and refugees. That is not remotely good enough, so the Minister must accept the flaws in the drafting and engage with the UNHCR on changing them.

[Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)]

I speak in support of the Scottish National party amendments and against clause 14 standing part. Once again, we are faced with a draconian, punitive clause that we the Opposition believe risks putting vulnerable people in danger and depriving them of the protection that they deserve under international law. I will begin by setting out what clause 14 does. Again, I thank the many sector organisations that have helped us to analyse the likely impacts of the clause.

Clause 14 puts in the Bill an existing immigration law on inadmissibility that makes any asylum claim inadmissible in a number of circumstances, including if the claimant has passed through a safe country or if they have a connection to a safe third country. The result of a finding of inadmissibility is that, unless the Secretary of State decides that there are exceptional circumstances, the claimant will be denied access to the United Kingdom’s asylum system for a “reasonable period”—currently defined as six months by Home Office policy—while the UK seeks to transfer them to “any other safe country”.

Before getting to the extremely problematic moral and legal aspects of clause 14, I want to draw hon. Members’ attention to the unworkable practical aspects of it. Members know that the current regime is unworkable even as it stands because the UK Government do not have returns agreements with European Union member states, namely the “safe third countries” that refugees are most likely to have passed through. With the huge backlog and delays currently in the system, it is truly impossible to understand how adding another six months to the asylum process will help an already dysfunctional system.

Any Member who is familiar with dealing with asylum cases will be only too familiar with cases that have dragged on for years and seemingly been lost in the system, and the many refusal cases that are overturned on appeal. The current system is not working and by adding extra time to it before a case can even begin suggests a huge increase in the processing backlog. As an ex-lawyer, I know that justice delayed is justice denied, and therefore I have grave reservations about the time stipulations in the clause.

To put the Government’s actions so far into greater context, it is worth noting that in the first six months after implementation of the inadmissibility provisions of the immigration rules—they are echoed in the statutory provisions we are currently considering—the asylum claims of more than 4,500 people were put on hold by the issuance of notices of potential inadmissibility. Incredibly, the UK sought to transfer only seven of those cases—seven out of 4,500. Surely that demonstrates that the concept of inadmissibility is deeply flawed, and that attempts to enforce it by statute, as currently envisaged in clause 14, are equally flawed.

To make matters even worse, the inadmissibility rules set out in clause 14 have a far broader reach than anything that has gone before. First, let us consider the clause’s reference to a “safe third country”. The clause creates a disturbingly low standard for when a state would be considered safe for a particular claimant. The criteria are that their

“life and liberty are not threatened there by reason of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”

That state must be one from which “a person” will not be removed in breach of a non-refoulement obligation under the refugee convention or the European convention on human rights, and that “a person” may apply for refugee status there and, if recognised, receive protection in accordance with the refugee convention. According to clause 14, therefore, a country could still be considered safe even if the applicant had been, or perhaps continues to be, at real risk of being subjected to human rights violations in that country which either fall short of threats to life or liberty, or to which they were not exposed for reasons of a refugee convention ground.

Equally worrying is that, according to clause 14, although that safe state must be one in which in general a person “may” apply for refugee status and receive protection

“in accordance with the Refugee Convention” ,

it is not clear from the terms of the Bill that that possibility needs to be available to the particular applicant. Given the reference in the Bill to “a person”, it appears that it may be sufficient that, in general, there is the “possibility” of applying for refugee status in that state. That is hardly reassuring. In fact, it means that the supposed “safe” third country might not be at all safe for any particular individual. That surely makes a mockery of the term “safe” as commonly understood.

In addition, in order to be found to have a connection to a safe third state, the particular applicant need not have had a reasonable opportunity to access refugee status there. It is worth examining that in more detail. The terms of the clause imply that although the state would have to be one in which, in general, the possibility existed for a person to apply for refugee status, an individual claimant could be found to be inadmissible because they had received nothing more than protection against removal, in violation of the refugee convention or article 3 of the ECHR, or had made or had a reasonable opportunity to make a “relevant claim” for such protection in that state.

Furthermore, we need to look at the use of the term “connection” in clause 14. The clause makes it clear that the mere presence in a safe state where it would have been reasonable to expect the applicant to make a “relevant claim” would be sufficient to establish a “connection”. That in turn would be enough to trigger inadmissibility. Overall, the use of the term “connection” is nothing short of Orwellian. The framing of that term suggests that it could be an otherwise unelaborated connection—in other words, in the claimant’s particular circumstances, it would have been hypothetically reasonable for them to have gone to a given state to make such a claim, even if they had never been there.

--- Later in debate ---

Provision of evidence in support of protection or human rights claim

[Bambos Charalambous]

I beg to move amendment 36, in clause 16, page 20, line 8, at end insert

“, subject to subsection (1A)”

This amendment is consequential to the amendment which would remove the ability to serve an evidence notice on certain categories of person.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 37, in clause 16, page 20, line 8, at end insert—

“(1A) The Secretary of State may not serve an evidence notice on a person—

(a) who has made a protection claim or a human rights claim on the basis of their sexual orientation or gender identity;

(b) who was under 18 years of age at the time of their arrival in the United Kingdom;

(c) who has made a protection or human rights claim involving sexual or gender-based violence; or

(d) is a victim of modern slavery or trafficking.”

This amendment would remove the ability to serve an evidence notice on certain categories of person.

Amendment 153, in clause 16, page 20, line 8, at end insert—

“(1A) The Secretary of State must not serve an evidence notice on a person—

(a) who has made a protection claim or a human rights claim on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics;

(b) who was under 18 years of age at the time of their arrival in the United Kingdom;

(c) who has made a protection or human rights claim on the basis of gender-based violence;

(d) who has experienced sexual violence;

(e) who is a victim of modern slavery or trafficking;

(f) who is suffering from a mental health condition or impairment;

(g) who has been a victim of torture;

(h) who is suffering from a serious physical disability;

(i) who is suffering from other serious physical health conditions or illnesses.”

This amendment would prevent the Secretary of State from serving an evidence notice on certain categories of people.

[Bambos Charalambous]

We are extremely worried about the implications of clause 16 and its possible effects on vulnerable people. We tabled these amendments because we wish to further understand the Government’s intention with regard to certain particularly vulnerable groups. We believe that the impact of this clause, if it remains unamended, will further retraumatise vulnerable people.

As the Committee will know, clause 16 provides for an evidence notice to be issued to a claimant requiring them to provide evidence in support of their claim before a specified date. If they fail to do so, the provision of evidence will be deemed to be “late” and the claimant will be required to provide a statement setting out their reasons for providing that evidence “late”. The consequence for not complying with the evidence notice without good reason is that a decision maker may give minimal weight to the evidence. Apart from potentially impacting on a claimant’s credibility, the late provision of evidence in respect of evidence notices, under clauses 16 and 17, and priority removal notices, under clauses 18 and 20, may prejudice the weighting that a decision maker may give to the evidence. As we will see later, clause 23 states:

“Unless there are good reasons why the evidence was provided late, the deciding authority must, in considering it, have regard to the principle that minimal weight should be given to the evidence.”

It is unclear what “minimal weight” or, indeed, a decision maker having “regard to” this principle would mean in practice.

We are therefore extremely concerned that this clause and the others alongside it may potentially compound discrimination faced by people with protected characteristics. It is well established that people with different traumatic experiences may find it more difficult to disclose on demand their experiences of persecution, especially if they lack effective access to legal advice. Indeed, the Government’s message about legal aid to PRN recipients is insufficient amid the broader gutting of legal aid for the immigration sector since the legal aid cuts in 2013. This on its own is reason to doubt that individuals are likely to receive adequate legal support in terms of submitting evidence.

The situation may be compounded for people with protected characteristics. For example, women who have experienced sexual and/or gender-based violence may find it particularly difficult to disclose information about their experiences. The Home Office itself acknowledges the particular difficulties that LGBTQI+ asylum seekers may have in substantiating their claim or providing full disclosure, including experiences of discrimination, hatred, violence and stigma.

The stipulation about late evidence in clause 16 also has profound implications for the victims of trafficking and modern-day slavery. Frontline anti-trafficking organisations have previously highlighted how lack of identification is compounded because victims of trafficking are often unaware that there is a system to protect people who have experienced exploitation. The Government’s own guidance on the national referral mechanism provides that

“Victims may not be aware that they are being trafficked or exploited, and may have consented to elements of their exploitation, or accepted their situation.”

It is highly concerning that an individual could potentially be punished for failing to give evidence on time, in that such late disclosure might affect the credibility and/or weighting given to their evidence, which in turn would adversely affect their chances of a protection or human rights claim succeeding. It is clear that this is likely to lead to compounding of the discrimination experienced by certain groups, and make it harder for them to make the best possible case for themselves.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

I do not accept the hon. Gentleman’s latter point. I would expect there to be extensive training for decision makers on guidance when it is issued. Again, I make the point that the approach we are adopting is intended to be responsive to individual circumstances, and cases should be considered on a case-by-case basis. That is the entire approach we are taking here.

The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate, raised the issue of refoulement, and I just want to be clear on this point. Again, individuals will not be removed if there is a risk of refoulement, and the provisions are drafted to ensure this.

On the point made by the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark about legal aid, it is generally not available to individuals who are seeking advice or assistance with citizenship applications or on nationality matters. That is because it is not an issue within scope of the legal aid scheme—in other words, it is not an issue that Parliament has expressly provided for in statute as something for which legal aid can be provided.

For any issue where legal aid is not available, individuals can apply for exceptional case funding. The test for this is whether, without legal aid, an individual’s human rights might be breached. The only group of people who can routinely receive advice on nationality and citizenship are separated migrant children, as that is provided for in statute. We will come on to later clauses in which the legal aid provisions in this Bill, which relate to priority removal notices, will no doubt be debated as part of our consideration.

The hon. Gentleman also asked me whether a child rights impact assessment has been carried out on clauses 16 to 23. As part of our obligations under the public sector equality duty, equality impact assessments have been completed in respect of these clauses, and those assessments incorporate a consideration of the impacts on children.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Having looked at the amendments, I think amendment 153 is more substantive than my amendments 36 and 37. On the understanding that the spokesperson for the Scottish National party, the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East, will be pressing amendment 153 to a vote, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

I remind the Committee that this will also be considered a clause stand part debate.

[Bambos Charalambous]

As with clause 16, the Opposition are deeply concerned that clause 17 will contribute to a culture of disbelief that will harm vulnerable people who deserve our support. We will oppose the clause because we do not believe there is any way that it can be amended to be more reasonable. Clause 17 builds on the false premise established by clause 16 that evidence given after a certain date lessens the weight and, in turn, the credibility of the claimant. Clause 17 would extend that to the possible use of evidence in appeals.

Before I go further, I would like to draw the Committee’s attention once again to the startling statistics I referred to in the debate on clause 16. I do not believe they can be stated enough to illustrate the fallacy inherent in the culture of disbelief being pushed by the Government. Let me state again for the record: the proportion of successful asylum appeals allowed in the year up to March 2021 was 47%, and that has been steadily increasing over the past decade.

That is in a context where legal aid has been decimated. The Home Office is notoriously floundering with delays and a sclerotic process within the context of the hostile environment encouraged by the Government. If with those factors, nearly half of appeals are successful, how on earth can the Minister think it is fair to introduce another arbitrary hurdle for vulnerable people? What kind of civilised society implies that people who have escaped the most horrific situations imaginable are likely to be acting in bad faith? Clause 17, along with clause 16, will shame us and UK values if it reaches the statute book.

All the arguments that apply to clause 16 apply once again. As Ministers well know, there are many reasons why people who are escaping sexual abuse, gendered violence, torture and trauma cannot produce evidence by a particular date. Well-known psychological processes, such as dissociation, PTSD and denial of sexual trauma, militate against the so-called efficient delivery of evidence. That is before we get to the dysfunctional lack of legal aid and advice available, and the broken nature of the asylum system as a whole, as we discussed with reference to clause 16. Again, the Government seem to want to blame their own failings on vulnerable people, and scapegoat them for 11 years of a broken asylum system.

I will give an example of how unfair clause 17 is, and why someone’s credibility is in no way contingent on their ability to provide evidence by an arbitrary date. The example, concerning someone I will call “Gloria”, is a real case that was described to me by the excellent organisation Women for Refugee Women.

Gloria and her husband were supporters of the Opposition political party in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. When the Government started to suspect that her husband was talking to journalists about human rights abuses, they targeted both him and Gloria. Gloria was raped by soldiers and taken to prison. Upon release, she and her husband fled the Congo, but they were forced back into the DRC and targeted by the Government again. Gloria was violently raped again by several soldiers and held in a detention centre from where she was trafficked to the UK.

When she arrived here, Gloria was detained in a house and forced to have sex with several men for weeks, until a cleaner helped her to escape. This woman encouraged her to claim asylum, but Gloria was too scared to talk about her traffickers in the interview, so she could not explain why she had not claimed asylum earlier. Her male interpreter at the interview did not speak Lingala fluently and got angry with her when she tried to clarify points. She had no mental health support so was unable to discuss the extreme sexual violence she had experienced, and her lawyer never explained to her that the experience of being trafficked was relevant to her claim.

Gloria was refused asylum and taken to Yarl’s Wood, which she found highly traumatic, given her previous experience of incarceration in the DRC. She was released from Yarl’s Wood and then came to seek help from Women for Refugee Women, as she was homeless. She joined one of the organisation’s creative projects and, over time, began speaking about her story. Gloria now has a positive reasonable grounds decision and is preparing further submissions for a fresh asylum claim. Under clauses 16 and 17, Gloria could be prohibited from presenting evidence of the violence that she faced, with the ultimate risk of being returned to her persecutors. Gloria continues to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, depression and suicidal thoughts.

Surely when hearing of cases such as Gloria’s, Ministers must pause and realise that provisions such as clause 17 are inappropriate. Worse than that, calling into question the credibility of people who are traumatised is severely harmful. As discussed with reference to clause 16, the ultimate risk of undermining the credibility of applicants and denying the validity of their evidence is refoulement and is in contradiction of the refugee convention.

The one-stop process being proposed in the group of clauses that include clause 17 would force traumatised women to raise all the reasons why they need protection at the outset. If they fail to do so, their credibility could be damaged, according to the clause. It is worth stating again that, as with clause 16, this goes directly against the Home Office’s guidance, which states that late disclosure should not automatically prejudice a woman’s credibility.

As highlighted, moreover, many women do not realise that their experiences of gendered violence may constitute an asylum claim. Poor legal advice compounds that problem, so women do not raise these experiences in their initial claim. Clauses 16, 17 and 23 will result in more women being wrongly refused protection and so becoming liable for detention.

Clauses 16, 17 and 23 create a mechanism that forces people to produce relevant evidence by a fixed date. If that deadline is missed, the evidence could be given “minimal weight”, which will impact on a decision maker’s assessment of an applicant’s LGBT+ status and/or whether they have a well-founded fear of persecution. That would be acutely detrimental to LGBT+ people because of the difficulties in gathering and providing evidence that helps to confirm their sexual orientation or gender identity. Many LGBT+ people may have spent a long time trying to hide their sexual orientation or gender identity from other people not only in their countries of origin, but in the UK. Further, it can be an enormous challenge, if not impossible, to obtain supporting evidence from former partners, friends or family members in their country of origin, who can be too afraid to write a witness statement. For trans people specifically, many are unable to access healthcare in their countries of origin and to receive timely support in the UK, and, again, struggle to offer supporting evidence as a result.

If LGBT+ people get evidence such as letters from those who can testify to their sexual orientation or gender identity, proof of membership of LGBT+ organisations or photos at Pride, it may not be until they are more comfortable and confident in being open about their sexual orientation or gender identity, and therefore easily after any deadlines for evidence are imposed by the Home Office.

Clauses 17, 20 and 23 direct or encourage decision makers, including immigration judges on appeal, to exclude evidence or reject the credibility of a claimant. That exclusion or rejection is arbitrary. It is not on the basis of the decision maker’s assessment of the relevance or probity of the evidence or truthfulness of the claimant. It is not on the basis of any individual assessment of all the relevant material and circumstances.

Nationality and Borders Bill (Tenth sitting)

Bambos Charalambous Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 26th October 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Tom Pursglove)]

I was about to conclude by saying that paragraphs (a) and (c) of subsection (7) suffice to capture every scenario. Removing paragraph (b) does not affect how the clause operates or who it impacts. I commend the amendments and the clause to the Committee.

[Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)]

We intend to oppose the clause standing part of the Bill. The clause is an entirely new provision. Its stated aim is to reduce the extent to which people may frustrate removals through sequential or unmeritorious claims, appeals or legal action. It does so by providing for a priority removal notice, or PRN, to be served on anyone who is liable for removal or for deportation. Factors might include where a person has previously made a human rights or protection claim.

According to the explanatory notes, subsection (3) defines a PRN. It states that the notice imposes a duty on the claimant to provide a statement setting out the reasons for wishing to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, any grounds on which they should be permitted to do so, and any grounds on which they should not be removed or required to leave the United Kingdom. The notice also requires them to provide any information relating to being a victim of slavery or human trafficking as defined by clause 46.

The notice also requires them to provide any evidence in support of any reasons, grounds or information. The statement, grounds, information and evidence must be provided before the PRN cut-off date included within the notice. Intended as a warning to the person that they are being prioritised for removal, the notice gives them a period of time—the cut-off period—within which to access legal advice and to inform the Home Office of any grounds or evidence that they want to provide in support of a claim to be allowed to remain in the UK.

The clause and the introduction of priority removal notices are part of wider proposals to fast-track claims and appeals, and to create a one-stop process for claims to asylum to be brought and considered together in a single assessment up front. The consequences of the clauses related to priority removal notices will make it harder for people to bring evidence after making an initial asylum claim and penalise delayed disclosure. Indeed, if anything required by the PRN is provided after the specified cut-off date, a decision maker—when determining a protection or human rights claim, or making a decision as to whether the person is a potential or actual victim of trafficking—will treat it with scepticism and it will be considered damaging to the person’s credibility and their claim.

The requirements related to the PRN are extensive. It requires all manner of claims and evidence to be provided, covering all grounds for resisting removal and all evidence in support. When implemented, that could have incredibly damaging consequences for people seeking asylum, as it requires them to provide extensive supporting evidence by a specified date. For example, it will seriously disadvantage vulnerable people and victims, such as those who suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, or those who have been trafficked, as well as those who are LGBTQ, as I have mentioned previously.

The introduction of priority removal notices fails to acknowledge the reality of situations that people seeking asylum may encounter. There are many reasons that evidence may be provided late but in earnest, as we have explored already, for example with traumatised victims. The ultimate consequence of people not being able properly to present evidence relating to their claim, or being deemed to lack credibility as a result of failing to present such evidence on time, is that claims may be rejected and people may be wrongly subject to removal. The Opposition are very concerned that these measures may give rise to a significant risk of refoulement and will consequently abandon the UK’s obligations under international law.

In short, the proposals are unacceptable. They form a package of measures that seek to create a one-stop process for asylum claims and fail to do so in a fair or humane way. They are widely condemned by the sector. The Opposition are vehemently opposed to the introduction of priority removal notices and, when they are taken in conjunction with the series of clauses in part 2, are incredibly concerned about these measures. Its potentially strict application risks having a severe impact on asylum seekers and refugees, in terms of both procedural fairness and ensuring that people are protected by the refugee convention. We therefore oppose the clause.

Amendment 60 agreed to.

Amendment made: 61, in clause 18, page 22, line 28, leave out paragraph (b).—(Tom Pursglove.)

This amendment removes a superfluous paragraph (any person within paragraph (b) would in any event fall within either paragraph (a) or (c)).

Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

This clause is supplementary to clause 18, which we have just discussed. It makes provision for the validity and effect of a priority removal notice. A priority removal notice imposes requirements to provide any reason and supporting evidence as to why a person should be allowed to remain in the UK. This will reduce the extent to which removal can be frustrated.

Where a priority removal notice has been issued, it will remain in force for a period of 12 months after either the cut-off date specified in the notice or after the recipient has exhausted their appeal rights. A period of 12 months will provide sufficient time for the person’s removal to be enforced. Following the service of a priority removal notice, any previous evidence notice, slavery or trafficking information notice, or notice under section 120 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, will cease to take effect. Any appeal right arising from a protection or human rights claim received after the cut-off date will be subject to the expedited process as provided for by clause 21, unless the claimant provides good reasons for late disclosure.

The amendments are minor and technical and are intended to ensure that the new priority removal notice will work as effectively as possible. Amendments 62 to 64 provide for a priority removal notice to remain in force for a period of 12 months after the recipient’s appeal rights are exhausted. Amendments 65 and 66 clarify that a priority removal notice will remain in force where the recipient is no longer liable to removal or deportation from the UK. This makes it clear that where the recipient of a priority removal notice makes an application to the EU settlement scheme that is later refused, they will remain subject to the priority removal notice.

[Bambos Charalambous]

The Opposition will oppose the clause standing part of the Bill. It forms part of the Bill’s new PRN regime, as initially set out in clause 18, and states that the PRN will remain in force until 12 months after the cut-off date or the person’s appeal rights become exhausted, whichever comes last. The Opposition believe that preventing people from being able to bring further evidence for 12 months after they have been issued with a PRN is wrong. It is unfair and it fails to consider the reasons for delayed disclosure, which range from psychological and cultural barriers to the crucial fact that those who are seeking asylum have fled their homes and may not have access to evidence immediately.

When applied narrowly and in conjunction with other clauses in part 2, the proposed provisions potentially risk significant breaches of the refugee convention and the principle of non-refoulement. For those reasons, and reasons discussed in the debate on clause 18, we will be voting against clause 19.

Amendment 62 agreed to.

Amendments made: 63, in clause 19, page 23, line 3, at end insert—

“(1A) In subsection (1) ‘relevant claim’ means a protection claim or a human rights claim brought by the PRN recipient while the priority removal notice is in force.”

See the explanatory statement to Amendment 62.

Amendment 64, in clause 19, page 23, line 4, after “rights” insert

“in respect of a claim”.

See the explanatory statement to Amendment 62.

Amendment 65, in clause 19, page 23, line 11, at end insert—

“(2A) A priority removal notice remains in force until the end of the period mentioned in subsection (1) even if the PRN recipient ceases to be liable to removal or deportation from the United Kingdom during that period.”

This amendment clarifies that although a priority removal notice can only be served on a person if they are liable to removal or deportation, the fact that the person ceases to be so liable does not mean that the notice will cease to have effect.

Amendment 66, in clause 19, page 23, line 23, leave out subsection (6) and insert—

“(6) Expressions used in this section that are defined for the purposes of section 18 have the same meaning in this section as in that section.”—(Tom Pursglove.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 65.

Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship again, Ms McDonagh. As the hon. Member for Sheffield Central said, clause 20 instructs decision makers to take into account

“as damaging the PRN recipient’s credibility…the late provision”

of information and evidence. I absolutely support the hon. Gentleman’s amendment to explore “good reasons” for evidence, including post-traumatic stress. Our amendment 154 provides other examples, such as mental health issues or where a person has been a victim of torture or other crimes that can impact on their ability to provide information. That is similar to debates we have already had.

Amendment 41 revisits earlier arguments about taking into account all the evidence, including lateness in providing it, when assessing a case. It is not appropriate to tell decision makers what conclusions to draw. We say decision makers will often find people to have credibility if lots of new information is provided with respect to that explanation. That is a matter that should be left to them. It is not for parliamentarians to tell decision makers how to analyse claimants.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Clause 20 introduces the concept of a priority removal notice and, under subsection (3), specifies that the Secretary of State or the competent authority must consider evidence being brought late as damaging to a claimant’s credibility, unless there are good reasons why it was brought late.

As we have made clear during the course of the Bill’s passage, the Government are trying to make it harder for refugees and asylum seekers to gain protection here in the UK. That is undeniable. The priority removal notices regime is part of a package of measures and provisions to achieve that end, both in deterring refugees from seeking protection and in making it more difficult for refugees admitted to the UK to be recognised as such.

One of those measures is directing decision makers, including judges, to doubt an applicant’s credibility if they fail to provide evidence under the strict conditions described in clauses 18 and 19. It is worth noting that the Home Office and the courts have always been able to consider the timing of a claim as a factor in determining credibility, and that might determine an appeal. None the less, clause 20 seeks to reduce the weight that is given to any evidence that is submitted after the cut-off period stipulated by the PRN.

According to the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association:

“Rather than allowing decision-makers to sensibly consider whether the late provision of evidence is a reason to doubt its credibility, weighing all the evidence on the whole, the government proposes to strait-jacket decision-makers with a series of presumptions. The caveat that decision-makers will be allowed to use their own judgment if there is a ‘good reason’ why evidence was provided late does not mitigate these concerns.”

Indeed, there are many so-called bad reasons that evidence might be provided late that do not indicate dishonesty, and many more reasons that it may not be possible for someone to present all relevant information in support of their claim at the earliest opportunity. We have already heard in detail the problems felt by certain groups and individuals with this approach, such as LGBTQ asylum seekers and victims of torture, sexual or gender-based violence, or trafficking.

One long-standing concern for the sector, which we have yet to cover in detail, is failings within the asylum process itself, particularly poor-quality, shortened or inadequate interviews. The consequences of poor interviews conducted with an individual can be devastating in the moment and potentially have grave long-term effects, including the risk of being returned to persecution because the Home Office did not have the information it needed to make a fair and informed decision.

For the Home Office, asylum appeals have been rising steadily over the last decade, which points to the importance of protecting asylum appeals as a vital safeguard for the most vulnerable and to the fact that the Home Office often gets decisions wrong first time. More widely, a system that relies on the appeal process to correct its errors is inefficient, costly and inhumane. For that reason, we can describe the asylum system in the UK as broken, and we can point to the last 11 years of Conservative government as a reason for us having that broken system.

[Mr Goodwill]

Would the hon. Gentleman include foreign national offenders who are being removed, who may have committed crimes including rape and murder or been involved in the drugs trade, among the people who should be given the sort of latitude he is talking about?

[Bambos Charalambous]

Priority removal notices will apply to all people to whom they apply. If they qualify, they will qualify under that regime. I do not think people can be distinguished on the basis on their offences.

Clause 20 and the wider proposals around priority removal notices will penalise the most vulnerable and those who have been failed by the system by reducing the significance of any evidence submitted after the applicant has been through the one-stop process. That could include independent expert medical evidence, such as medico-legal reports, which often prove determinative in asylum appeals.

Ultimately, the provision around late compliance risks people not being given protection even though they deserve it and are in need of it. For the reasons I have specified, we will oppose clause 20 standing part of the Bill.

[Tom Pursglove]

By introducing the statutory requirement to provide information or evidence before a specified date, clauses 16 and 18 will contribute to the swift resolution of protection and human rights claims, enabling decision makers to consider all the evidence up front and, where appropriate, grant leave. It is right that where evidence or information is provided late, that should impact on a person’s credibility, and that the decision maker must consider whether to apply the minimal weight principle, unless there are good reasons why it was brought late.

Clauses 20 and 23 both recognise that it may be harder for some people to engage in the process and provide evidence before a specified date. That may be the result of trauma they have experienced, a lack of trust in the authorities or the sensitive and personal nature of their claim. Amendment 41 removes the possible credibility implications stemming from late evidence in response to a priority removal notice. It is right that where evidence or information is provided late, that should impact on a person’s credibility, unless there are good reasons why it was brought late. Where there are good reasons that information or evidence was provided late, the penalties in clauses 20 and 23 will not apply.

Clause 20 recognises that there may be good reasons that evidence was provided late. Where there are good reasons, the associated credibility provisions in clauses 20 and 23 will not apply. Therefore, amendment 41 is unnecessary, as the clause already meets its aim that late evidence should not necessarily be damaging to the claimant’s credibility. As with amendment 39, by removing the possible credibility implications stemming from late provision of evidence, amendment 41 would make such a measure inappropriate for primary legislation and render it pointless. Amendment 154 places a statutory obligation on decision makers to accept that there are good reasons for late evidence where an individual’s claim is based on certain factors, or the individual falls into a particular category. That would apply to Home Office decision makers and, under amendment 154, the competent authority as well as the judiciary.

--- Later in debate ---

Schedule 2 is a necessary accompaniment to clause 21. This important part of the Bill will disincentivise the use of delay tactics to thwart removal actions, while protecting appellants’ access to justice by establishing an expedited appeal for persons who bring unjustifiably late claims.

[Bambos Charalambous]

We will oppose clause stand part.

[Mr Goodwill]

When we discussed the previous clause, there were a lot of complaints about the time it took to process people whose claims were rejected and who were removed, and those who had genuine claims. Should the hon. Gentleman not welcome the expedited process because it will enable people to get their decisions more quickly and stop those whose vexatious use of the law delays things?

[Bambos Charalambous]

There is such welcome generosity from Conservative Members. The measures will do no such thing; all they will do is clog up the upper tribunal system, which I will address later.

The Bill’s system of penalisation includes curtailing appeal rights, as set out in clause 21. The clause creates an expedited appeal route for those who have been served with a priority removal notice and who have provided evidence or a claim after the PRN cut-off date. Most importantly, the right of the appeal will be limited to the upper tribunal.

According to the Law Society, the proposals would essentially result in single-tier appeals with increased pressure on judges and more appeals to the Court of Appeal, as well as undermining access to justice, which is crucial in asylum cases. The Government’s proposals on priority removal notices and expedited appeals risk impinging on people’s rights and access to justice. In many instances, asylum seekers are highly vulnerable and may experience difficulties when it comes to the legal intricacies of the asylum process—studying legal determinations, gathering evidence and preparing submissions for appeals, for instance.

It is also worth clarifying that when unfounded or repeat claims are made, accelerated procedures as part of the asylum process are necessary and important safeguards. The difficulty is that more complex cases—where there are legitimate reasons for evidence being provided at a later date, for example—may be included in those accelerated processes, with devastating consequences. The Committee has heard some of examples of that today.

The Committee heard from Adrian Berry of the Immigration Law Practitioners Association about clause 21 during our evidence session. It is worth revisiting his evidence and the severe concerns that he raised on 23 September. First, he spoke about the expedited appeal, which begins in the upper tribunal. Therefore those who introduce a claim for asylum and provide evidence after the cut-off date in a priority removal notice receive an expedited appeal and lose their right of appeal and a hearing in the first-tier tribunal. Secondly, he raised concerns that the upper tribunal hearing is final. There is no onward appeal to the Court of Appeal. That is wrong for a number of reasons.

Mistakes, unfortunately, do happen in asylum claims, but under the current provision, individuals would be left, in the words of Adrian Berry, “one shot” to appeal and correct the mistakes. The fact that the first instance tribunal decisions cannot be reviewed has serious implications for the rule of law. It also creates a wider time-pressured, accelerated decision-making process operating on the tribunal system, which is likely to have a negative effect on the quality of decisions made. That is well documented and an issue that we have touched on previously, but it is worth repeating for the benefit of the Committee.

Appeals have been rising for many years. Between 2016 and 2018, 57% of first-tier tribunal asylum appeals were dismissed. It was only 52% in 2019-20. The right of appeal is fundamental in protecting individuals’ rights and preventing potential miscarriages of justice.

I should like to cite an example to illustrate that point and wider concerns about the priority removal notices regime introduced in part 2. I will call my example AT, a Gambian national who unsuccessfully sought asylum in the UK. He was married to a Gambian woman who had been granted indefinite leave to remain in July 2016 as she was unable to return to Gambia. His wife was heavily pregnant with their child but their relationship had not been raised or considered by the Home Office as part of his asylum claim. He was given a “notice of liability to removal” and was detained after the notice period had ended. Before his detention, he was unsuccessful in securing an appointment with his solicitors.

During AT’s detention, his wife gave birth to their son—a British citizen. The Home Office refused AT’s human rights claim based on his family life, focusing on the late stage at which he raised it. He was removed from the UK before he could access legal advice and challenge that decision. His subsequent judicial review proceedings were successful and he was allowed to return to the UK to exercise his right of appeal to the first-tier tribunal against that decision. The Home Office subsequently conceded his article 8 family life claim, and granted him leave to stay in the UK with his wife and son. If the priority removal notice provisions of the Bill had been in force in this case, AT’s right of appeal, even after he had succeeded in a judicial review, would have been severely circumscribed. He would only have been able to appeal directly to the upper tribunal. The appeal would have been decided on an expedited basis and the tribunal would have been required to treat AT’s claim to a family life as lacking credibility. If the upper tribunal had found against him, he would have had no right of appeal to the Court of Appeal.

That case highlights some of the severe consequences of clause 21. Are Committee members, on all sides of the debate, happy to put speed over justice? That is what the Bill’s attempts to expedite appeals seeks to do, and without acknowledging the harm that that will cause. It risks people having their human rights violated as a result of a truncated appeals process for asylum claims.

Clause 21 has serious consequences for the rule of law, procedural fairness and the rights of individuals. It will inevitably lead to the wrong being decisions made that will then go unchallenged. Closing off avenues for appeals risks closing off access to justice. An incorrect decision can cost an individual their safety, security and livelihood. Therefore the clause presents an unacceptable risk of breaching the UK’s non-refoulement obligations under the refugee convention and the European convention on human rights. As such, the Opposition will oppose that clause 21 stand part of the Bill.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I agree with everything the shadow Minister said. I want to speak in support of amendment 42, which would preserve onward rights of appeal in certain circumstances.

The overall danger of clause 21 is that it risks expediting appeal processes so that mistakes are made and people are denied justice. Given the dangers that are posed by speeding up such processes, it is all the more important that there is access to the supervisory jurisdiction of the higher courts in case errors are made. We are not talking about minor issues; these are matters of life and death. Assessments have been made about a risk of persecution. Errors will have catastrophic consequences for individuals concerned.

All tribunals make mistakes, so in such circumstances, it seems reckless not to have any right of appeal. I absolutely accept that there can be restrictions and that the grounds for such an appeal can be phrased in a way to try to prevent abuse, but to exclude it altogether goes way beyond what can be justified. Expedited appeals without any possibility of onward appeals creates a double danger of getting those decisions wrong. The fact that claims are made late does not remotely mean that they are necessarily without merit, nor does it mean that they can be decided any quicker than another claim and it should not automatically lead to accelerated appeals processes.

Again, I think that all this is missing the point. The tribunal was actually functioning pretty well. It is the Home Office that has to focus on getting its house in order, and the whole clause is completely misconceived.

Amendment 67 agreed to.

Amendments made: 68, in clause 21, page 24, line 28, after “be” insert “brought and”.

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 67.

Amendment 69, in clause 21, page 24, line 32, leave out from “is” to end of line 33 and insert

“to be continued as an appeal to the First-tier Tribunal and accordingly is to be transferred to that Tribunal”.—(Tom Pursglove.)

This amendment is a drafting amendment to clarify that where the Upper Tribunal is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to do so it has power to order that an expedited appeal is instead to be heard subject to the usual procedure by the First-tier Tribunal.

Amendment proposed: 42, in clause 21, page 24, line 37, leave out subsection (2). —(Stuart C. McDonald.)

This amendment would protect the right to an onward appeal from an expedited appeal decision by the Upper Tribunal in certain cases.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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We hope that the clause will encourage all individuals with a priority removal notice to seek legal advice and ensure that the Home Office is aware of the individual’s full circumstances before any removal action is taken. The clause will work to the benefit of all parties involved, from the individuals in need of advice, who can access free and impartial advice, to the Home Office, which will continue to fulfil its duties to protect those in need of its protection and remove those who have no valid reasons to remain in the UK. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Clause 22 provides for up to—but no more than—seven hours of legal aid to be available to those served with a priority removal notice, enabling them to receive advice on their immigration status and removal. This provision is necessary due to the new priority removal notices regime introduced in part 2 of the Bill, and while we welcome the introduction of the legal aid requirement in the Bill, it does not go far enough. Seven hours is not enough time for a legal representative to take instructions from, advise and represent individuals who are often among the most vulnerable people in society.

The Government’s one-stop approach to asylum claims means that there is a significant risk of claimants being unable to obtain legal advice properly despite the provisions set out in the clause, because they have not been given enough time to develop a relationship of trust with their legal advisers and the legal authorities. We know about the difficulties many asylum seekers—for example, those who are victims of torture, sexual gender-based violence, or trafficking—face in disclosing evidence, and the time constraints imposed by clause 22 will likely negatively impact people who have difficulty disclosing information related to their claim due to an initial lack of trust in the advisers or authorities.

More widely, organisations in the sector have rightly made the connection between the Government’s offer of legal aid to the recipients of PRNs in this clause and the broader cuts to legal aid in the immigration sector that have become the hallmark of the Government’s time in office. According to Bail for Immigration Detainees,

“This meagre provision comes after the gradual decimation of the legal aid immigration sector since the legal aid cuts in 2013”,

and the clause

“will not be a sufficient safeguard to ensure access to justice”.

It is, of course, essential that people who need legal advice can access that advice in practice, and support must be provided for those who need help navigating the system. In many instances, asylum seekers are highly vulnerable, and may experience difficulties when it comes to the legal intricacies of the asylum process, such as studying legal determinations or preparing submissions for appeals. It is equally clear that the wider proposals in part 2 of the Bill will not achieve the Home Office’s aim of creating an immigration system that is fairer and more efficient. As we know from reading the Bill, clause 22 comes alongside a set of sweeping legislative changes that, for example, limit access to appeals, speed up the removal process and penalise late submissions of relevant evidence. These measures can hardly be described as fair, and they fail to make the system more efficient.

We must take the proposals about legal aid in clause 22 in conjunction with other clauses in part 2 that seek to fast-track asylum claims and appeals, and make conditions harder for asylum seekers and refugees here in the UK. When implemented together and in strict draconian fashion, the Bill’s provisions therefore inhibit access to justice, risk inherent unfairness, are contrary to the common law and violate procedural requirements. Most importantly, they may give rise to a significant risk of refoulement, which would violate the UK’s internal obligations.

While we welcome the introduction of legal aid, we do not believe that the clause goes far enough: we believe that much more should be done to provide more legal aid, particularly in relation to the immigration sector.

[Neil Coyle]

Members will be pleased to know that I will be brief, not least because my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate has been so comprehensive, but also because I spoke on this issue a lot this morning. However, I would like to ask some specific questions—three, I think.

If children are covered by clause 22, perhaps the Minister will take the opportunity—despite failing to do so on the two previous chances I have provided—to outline what the equality impact assessment means when it says,

“We will also provide increased access to legal aid.”

As I have explained, the Ministry of Justice seems to be unaware of this extension, and there are previous answers I have yet to exploit. However, it would be useful to know—indeed, I believe we are entitled to know—what cost to Government this will have. What is the cost of this extension to the taxpayer? Is it relevant to clause 22, and how many children or people will benefit from such an extension as we go forward? I hope that the Minister will be able to answer that or, at least, send another letter. I am enjoying our correspondence so far.

My second question is about the organisations that might be providing this advice. Is it the Government’s intention, under clause 22, to have a defined list of organisations that will be willing to provide it? As I mentioned, at an asylum hostel in my constituency yesterday, there appeared to be a Home Office list of legal aid providers that is given to asylum seekers in an induction pack. That should be made public, so that we can explore whether those are the best organisations and whether the list could be expanded. I hope the Minister will tell us whether that list will be published, and whether clause 22 will involve a defined set of organisations.

Thirdly, if the Government are serious about genuinely tackling the delays and the pace of these cases, perhaps they would consider expanding legal aid to all cases to make it a genuinely fast, fair and effective system. That is sadly not what we have before us today.

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Amendment 44 is a bit different. It provides an example and illustrates the absurdity of the provisions that we have been debating so far. It would mean that the clause did not apply where the evidence provided proves that a claimant is at risk of persecution by the Taliban. Let us say that a claimant from Afghanistan provides very little evidence of particular individual risk, but then—we might say through sheer stupidity or stubbornness—they provide late evidence that shows conclusively that they are at specific risk from the Taliban. How on earth could we then say that that evidence should be given minimal weight? Perhaps the evidence is a threatening letter. Perhaps it is a photo showing torture or punishment. Perhaps it is news footage of the Taliban condemning the claimant publicly and offering a bounty for his capture. How does the clause operate in those circumstances? Why should minimal weight be given to something that is conclusive or clear? Are we going to remove people to Afghanistan even if we know that they are at risk, simply because of this outrageous provision? The whole idea is dangerous and absurd.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I will speak to amendments 38 and 131, and will seek to press amendment 131.

We do not believe that it is fair that some evidence is deemed to have minimal weight when there are practical and psychological reasons that it cannot be disclosed by a particular date. We have grave concerns about the clause, in particular because of the awful impact it could have on vulnerable women and other groups such as the LGBT+ community. That is why we have tabled the amendments. We want a cast-iron and legal guarantee that groups who have good reasons for late evidence are protected under the law. Otherwise, there is a danger that the persecution they have fled will be compounded by the inappropriate disregard of their late evidence.

The clause instructs decision makers to give regard to the principle that minimal weight be given to later evidence unless there are good reasons, which are undefined in the Bill and are therefore left entirely to the discretion of the Home Secretary. There are many good reasons why, for instance, women who have fled sexual and gender-based violence cannot share relevant experiences right away. This is even acknowledged in Home Office guidance that refers to

“guilt, shame, and concerns about family ‘honour’, or fear of family members”.

The same guidance acknowledges that women who have been trafficked to the UK may be facing threats from their traffickers at the time of their interview, such that they are unable to speak openly. Some women who have fled persecution because of their sexual orientation are not able to disclose their sexuality during the time of their initial claim. They may still be coming to terms with it themselves—a process that can take years. Other women or people who have fled sexual violence or torture may be suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, and may experience disassociation from their experiences, which is a well-known psychological phenomenon in the aftermath of sexual violence.

Women therefore already face significant barriers to the full investigation and recognition of their protection claims. The clauses on late evidence will worsen those obstacles if they are not given additional protections. As well as causing harm to women in desperate need of safety, if unamended the clause will lead to greater unfairness in the system, an increasing number of incorrect decisions and ultimately, therefore, an increase in the backlog of cases.

With reference to women and late evidence, the Bill taken as a whole goes directly against Home Office policy, which states that late disclosure should not automatically prejudice a woman’s credibility. The backlog of asylum cases urgently needs addressing, but restricting the ability of vulnerable women or other vulnerable people to bring evidence is neither a fair nor an effective solution. That is why we believe the amendment that provides the specific categories as set out is so needed.

Introducing a rigid deadline for providing evidence and penalising those who provide late evidence also risks negatively impacting trans people specifically from applying for asylum. Trans people already face difficulty in “proving” their gender identity, due to the innateness of someone’s gender identity together with social expectations and stereotypes ostracising a population of trans people from protection. We see a similar difficulty in respect of other LGBT+ identities in so far as it is by nature next to impossible to prove something so intimate, without its becoming disproportionately invasive. Therefore we believe that these groups, too, are adversely impacted by the provisions around late evidence.

For people under 18, there are obvious reasons why their evidence may be late. It seems ridiculous that without amendment, the clause seriously suggests that we punish children by giving their evidence less weight if they cannot meet an arbitrary date. How on earth is it appropriate that children who may have escaped the worst imaginable situations, and who are likely to be suffering from trauma, are then further traumatised with arbitrary conditions placed on evidence and its weight?

Clause 23 creates the principle that a decision maker must give minimal weight to evidence raised late by a claimant, unless there are good reasons why that evidence was provided late. We are deeply concerned about the clause and the impact of the Bill’s measures around delayed disclosure in part 2. There are many reasons why it may not be possible to present all information in support of an asylum claim at the earliest opportunity. Women who have been trafficked to the UK may be facing threats from their traffickers at the time of interview. Others who have fled persecution because of their sexual orientation may be unable to disclose their sexuality during the time of their initial claim. They may still be coming to terms with themselves—a process that can take years.

If implemented, the Government’s proposals would adversely impact those vulnerable people. We propose that the Government introduce a cast-iron legal guarantee that groups that have a good reason for late evidence are protected under the law. Failing to do so risks penalising the most vulnerable people and those who have been failed by the system.

[Neil Coyle]

Clause 23 is deeply pernicious and comes at a time that suggests that the Government have rushed this legislation. Last Tuesday, there was a meeting between the Prime Minister’s special envoy for freedom of religion or belief and the right hon. Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh). That meeting was to discuss the case of Maira Shahbaz, a 15-year-old Christian who has fled Pakistan having been kidnapped, forced to convert religion and forced to marry one of the men who kidnapped her. She managed to escape and is seeking asylum, but she was held for a significant time, so she would not necessarily meet the original timeframe and she might fall foul of the measures in this legislation.

For the Prime Minister’s special envoy to be willing to meet and discuss that case suggests that there should be a process by which someone in those circumstances is able to avoid the provisions of this legislation. I am deeply concerned that one bit of the Government are off having discussions elsewhere, while the Home Office is bringing forward plans that could prevent someone in those exact circumstances from benefiting from any exemptions they might have discussed in that meeting last Tuesday. It suggests once again that this is more about culture wars and headlines than it is about the practical reality of the system that exists or building towards a system that is fairer, more effective and faster.

I wanted to quickly raise issues around sexuality. I am deeply grateful to Rainbow Migration, who provided some examples and evidence for the Committee to all members. It said that clause 23 specifically

“would be acutely detrimental to LGBT+ people because of the difficulties in gathering and providing evidence that helps confirm their sexual orientation or gender identity. Many LGBT+ people may have spent a long time trying to hide their sexual orientation or gender identity from other people…in the UK”,

never mind in regimes where it is specifically illegal or unlawful, and could be punished.

Earlier, I asked the Minister what a gay man would need to provide to meet the initial evidence threshold, to avoid PRNs and to avoid being punished by clause 23. If someone has been persecuted on the grounds of their sexuality—persecuted for having the temerity to fall in love with someone of the same gender—in their country of birth, they may inevitably worry about revealing that identity, having managed to escape such an horrific regime.

I ask the Minister again to explore some of the practical realities of those circumstances before penalising someone specifically on the grounds of sexuality, because I think that it will fall foul of existing UK law, if not other international obligations. I am very mindful that I have a live case of a gay man trying to flee Lebanon where he is being forced, as the only son in a family, to marry against his wishes. He is seeking to escape Lebanon in order to not be forced to subjugate his sexuality in the interests of his family’s wishes.

I hope that the Minister can give more information on what the burden of proof would be, because I do not understand. Producing a boyfriend or girlfriend, or a love letter from someone still living in a regime where it is impossible to do that, will not necessarily be possible; yet the Government are legislating to penalise people in exactly those circumstances. Members across the House are deeply worried about the implications of such a measure.

On 3 February 2020, the Home Office was asked in question 11509 when it

“plans to update the House on the progress of the review into the way asylum claims based on religious grounds and LGBT+ grounds are assessed.”

The response was:

“The review into the way asylum claims on the basis of religious and LGBT+ grounds are assessed has been completed.”

That review has never been published. The Government refused to publish it in February last year, and they have refused to do so in answer to many subsequent questions. It is troubling that, while the Government withhold information on how existing processes have not necessarily dealt with faith and sexuality-based cases very well, we now have measures before us that deliberately penalise people who will find it harder to prove discrimination or persecution on faith and sexuality grounds. I hope that the Minister will agree that the review should be made public during the Bill’s passage, and certainly before anyone is penalised and has their case impeded on those grounds.

We talked about PTSD. Under clause 23 someone could face having their case undermined before their PTSD symptoms were, importantly, fully diagnosed. I will not repeat what I said this morning, but it would be ludicrous to legislate that someone be forced to have that diagnosis when they cannot access healthcare and not all symptoms will necessarily be evident.

Finally, the Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit has provided a case of a Nigerian woman whom it has just listed as “X”. Promised a career in the UK as a hairdresser, she was forced into sex work, when in the UK, for nearly a year before she managed to escape. She was unable to meet the time limit, could be subject to a PRN and could be subject to clause 23 if she finally makes a case. The Minister had said that trafficking victims would not be subject to those provisions; but the Home Office initially declared that specific woman, X, not to be a victim of trafficking. By the time the Home Office had admitted its mistake, she could have gone through that process. She could have had the PRN imposed before the Home Office was willing to accept that, and before she had the legal advice to support her to make the case that proved she was the victim of human trafficking. I see no safeguards before us today that would prevent her from being subject to clause 23, and having less weight applied to her case or being removed from the country before she could make that case. The Government need to come forward with more safeguards before they progress these measures any further.

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[Stuart C. McDonald]

Clause 24 establishes a system of fast-track appeals for those in detention. The explanatory notes state that in 2019-20 it took almost 12 weeks on average for detained immigration appeals to progress from receipt in the first tier tribunal through to disposal, and the aim is for faster decisions in certain cases

“to allow appellants to be released or removed more quickly”.

That sounds almost benign, and who does not want appeals to take place as quickly as possible? But the key issue is whether they can be decided fairly within the timeframe set down in the clause. We are talking not about trying to take three or four weeks off the average time, but about reducing it by almost three quarters. Clearly, the Government believe that the tribunal is wasting a lot of time but I do not see any evidence for that, and I do not see any analysis of why that 12-week average exists.

Five days is an incredibly short timeframe in which to launch an appeal, particularly when a person is detained in an immigration detention facility, often in the middle of nowhere, and where the chances of securing proper legal advice and consultation in that time are incredibly slim. Amendment 45 would delete that requirement.

Amendment 46 would also mean that the tribunal would be required to stop treating an appeal as an accelerated appeal if it was in the interests of justice to do so. Again it is not clear to us why the tribunal should be empowered to continue an accelerated appeal when that is not in the interests of justice. More generally, the clause gives rise to the question of why the Secretary of State should have any say in which appeals can be disposed of expeditiously. Why is she not required just to assess the fairness of a case or give consideration to how complex a case is? Why not leave the tribunal to make those determinations? It would be far better placed to make that assessment.

As Members will know, in 2015 the Court of Appeal found similar rules to be unlawful and held that they created a system in which asylum and human rights appeals were disposed of too quickly to be fair. The Court said that the timetable was

“so tight that it is inevitable that a significant number of appellants will be denied a fair opportunity to present their cases”.

It also said that the policy did not appreciate the problems faced by legal representation obtaining instructions in such cases or the complexity or difficulty of many asylum appeals, and the gravity of the issues raised by them. I have absolutely no reason to think that the proposed policy is any better than that one.

The Government now intend to replace the entire clause with new clause 7, principally it seems to expand the categories of appeal that could be subject to the proposed procedure. My party opposes that expansion and opposes the clause.

[Bambos Charalambous]

We oppose the clause. It seeks the return of the detained fast-track system and to recreate it in primary legislation. The clause imposes a duty on the tribunal procedure rules committee to make rules for an accelerated timeframe for certain appeals made from detention that are considered suitable for consideration within that timeframe.

In the explanatory notes, an accelerated detained appeal is defined as being

“an appeal brought by an appellant who…received a refusal of their asylum claim while in detention…remains in detention under a relevant detention provision…is appealing a decision which was certified by the Secretary of State as suitable for an accelerated detained appeal”.

That system previously existed but was found to be illegal by the High Court in a landmark case brought by Detention Action. The system was found to be unfair as asylum and human rights appeals were disposed of too quickly to be fair. The Court of Appeal described the timetable for such appeals as

“so tight that it is inevitable that a significant number of appellants will be denied a fair opportunity to present their cases”.

It also emphasised, perhaps instructively for this Committee, that speed and efficiency must not trump justice and fairness—something of a feature of part 2 of the Bill. Indeed, hundreds if not thousands of cases have had to be reconsidered by the Home Office or the tribunal because they were unfairly rushed through the process that the Government now seek to recreate. Those cases include survivors of trafficking and torture and other individuals who, on the basis of a rushed and unfair procedure, will have been removed to places where they fear persecution or are separated from their families. There was no adequate system for ensuring that such people were removed from the fast track and given a fair opportunity to present their claims.

Despite that background, the Bill aims to create this unjust and ineffective procedure by reintroducing the detained fast-track process through this clause. It will put that same system, which was deemed unlawful in 2015, on a statutory footing, which will insulate it against future legal challenges.

The clause provides for the Secretary of State to certify a decision if she considers that an appeal would be disposed of expeditiously. It requires the tribunal procedure committee to introduce the following time limits: a notice of appeal must be lodged no later than five working days after the decision was received; the tribunal must make a decision no later than 25 days after the appeal date; and an application for permission to appeal to the upper tribunal must be determined by the first-tier tribunal not later than 20 working days after the applicant was given notice of the tribunal’s decision.

The clause would deny access to justice. First, five days is insufficient to prepare an appeal against a negative decision, particularly where the individual is detained and where their access to legal advice is poor and an individual’s wellbeing may be affected by their detention. For those detained in prison, the situation is even worse. For example, in a case in February of this year, the High Court declared the lack of legal aid immigration advice for people held under immigration powers to be unlawful. More widely, Home Office decision making is frequently incorrect or unlawful. As we know, half of all appeals against immigration decisions were successful in the year leading up to June 2019. It is therefore vital that people are able to effectively challenge decisions through the courts.

The detained fast track is unjust. It is also unnecessary. As the Public Law Project and Justice have pointed out, the tribunal has adequate case management powers to deal with appeals expeditiously in appropriate cases and already prioritises detained cases. The Home Secretary should not be trying to force the hand of the independent tribunal procedures committee to stack the cards in her favour in appeals against her decisions. The Bill does not learn the lessons of the past and seeks to resurrect an unworkable system of accelerated detained appeals. The clause proposes that the appeals process be fast-tracked. I am very worried that provisions in part 2 of the Bill will therefore disadvantage the most vulnerable.

By allowing the Home Secretary to accelerate appeals when she thinks they would be disposed of expeditiously, the clause is clearly unjust. Once again, it also seems to violate the refugee convention. As my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western) said on Second Reading:

“It is more than regrettable that the convention appears now to be held in such little regard by this Government.”—[Official Report, 19 July 2021; Vol. 699, c. 769.]

For those reasons, we will oppose that the clause stand part.

[Tom Pursglove]

I understand the motivation behind amendment 45. However, the Government oppose the amendment, as it is contrary to our policy intention and would undermine the effective working of the accelerated detained appeals process.

The period of five working days strikes the right balance, achieving both speed and fairness. The detained fast-track rules put in place in 2003 and 2005 allowed only two days to appeal. The 2014 rules set the same time limit. The current procedure rules allow a non-detained migrant 14 days to lodge their appeal against a refusal decision.

On amendment 46, I can assure hon. Members that it is not necessary, as the Bill already achieves the objective sought. The Government’s aim is to ensure that cases only remain in the ADA where it is in the interests of justice for them to do so. The consideration of what is in the interests of justice is a matter of judicial discretion. Where a judge decides that it is not in the interests of justice to keep a case in the ADA process, we would expect that they would use their discretion to remove the case. The current wording of the Bill—“may” rather than “must”—is consistent with the drafting of the rules that govern all appeals considered in the immigration and asylum chamber.

For these reasons, I invite the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate to withdraw the amendments. On the detained fast track and wider points about the Government’s intentions, although the courts upheld the principle of an accelerated process for appeals made in detention, we have considered the legal challenges to the detained fast track carefully. We are confident that the new accelerated detained appeals route will ensure fairness as well as improving speed. All Home Office decisions to detain are made in accordance with the adults at risk in detention policy and reviewed by the independent detention gatekeeper. Changes made to the screening process, drawing on lessons learned, will enable us to identify appellants who are unsuitable for the accelerated detained appeals route at the earliest opportunity. Suitability will be reviewed on an ongoing basis and the tribunal will have the power to transfer a case out of the accelerated route if it considers that that is in the interests of justice to do so.

The timescales proposed for the accelerated route are longer than under the previous detained fast track. Appellants will have more time to seek legal advice and prepare their case. We are confident that the new route will provide sufficient opportunity to access legal advice. I am also conscious that Members are interested in what happens in the eventuality that a migrant misses the deadline to appeal a refusal decision. Provided that there are no other barriers to return, removal will be arranged. It is open to a migrant and/or their legal representatives to submit an appeal after the deadline and ask a judge to extend the time and admit the appeal late.

On new clause 7, the Government are committed to making the asylum appeals system faster, while maintaining fairness, ensuring access to justice and upholding the rule of law. In particular, it is right that appeals made from detention should be dealt with quickly, so that people are not deprived of their liberty for longer than is necessary. New clause 7 sets out a duty on the tribunal procedure committee to make rules for the provision of an accelerated detained appeals route. That will establish a fixed maximum timeframe for determining specific appeals brought while an individual is detained.

Currently, all immigration and asylum appeals are subject to the same procedure rules. Appeals involving detained appellants are prioritised by Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service but there are no set timeframes. It often takes months for detained appeals to be determined, resulting in people being released from detention before their appeals are concluded.

Changes to procedure rules are subject to the tribunal procedure committee’s statutory consultation requirements and procedures. However, the Government’s intent is to ensure that straightforward appeals from detention are determined more quickly. Under a detained accelerated process all appellants will benefit from a quicker final determination of their immigration status, spending less time in limbo, and getting the certainty they need to move forward with their lives sooner.

Those whose appeals are successful will have their leave to remain confirmed earlier than if the standard procedure rules had been followed. Meanwhile those with no right to remain will be removed more quickly, as they can be detained throughout the process, which reduces the risk of absconding.

The courts have been clear in upholding the principle that an accelerated process for asylum seekers while detained, operated within certain safeguards, is entirely legal. I made that point earlier. We have considered the legal challenges to the previous detained fast track carefully and we are confident that the new accelerated detained appeals route will ensure fairness as well as improving speed. We will ensure, through regulations and guidance, that only suitable cases will be allocated to the accelerated route. Cases will be assessed for whether they are likely to be able to be decided fairly within the shorter timeframe, and individuals will be screened for vulnerability and other factors that may impact their ability to engage fairly with an accelerated process.

As an additional safeguard, the clause makes it clear that the tribunal can decide to remove cases from the accelerated route if it considers it is in the interests of justice to do so. The new accelerated detained appeals route will contribute significantly to the timeliness with which appeals are decided for those in immigration detention. It will allow us to swiftly remove from the country people found not to need protection, while those with valid claims can be released from detention more quickly.

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[Tom Pursglove]

Protection or human rights claims that are certified as clearly unfounded are those so clearly without substance that they are bound to fail. The refusal of such claims can currently be appealed after the person has left the UK. By contrast, there is no right of appeal against the rejection of further submissions received after a protection or human rights claim has previously been refused, where those submissions do not create a realistic prospect of success. That approach is right: there should be no right of appeal unless there is something of real substance for the tribunal to consider.

The clause removes the out-of-country right of appeal under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 for those whose protection or human rights claims are certified as clearly unfounded and bound to fail, bringing them into line with how we treat further submissions that have no realistic prospect of success. It will apply only to claims that are certified after the clause comes into effect. I would like to be clear that removing the right of appeal for certified claims does not prevent a person from applying for a judicial review to challenge a certification decision. It provides a necessary and effective safeguard in the event that a claim is incorrectly certified as clearly unfounded.

[Bambos Charalambous]

It is ironic that we are debating this clause as the Judicial Review and Courts Bill is receiving its Second Reading. We oppose the clause. We have heard time and again that the Government are aiming to make it harder for a person in the UK to establish their refugee status and entitlement to asylum. Clause 25 further restricts appeal rights for people seeking asylum. This clause removes the in-country and out-of-country rights of appeal for human rights and protection claims certified as clearly unfounded. It is concerning as, once again, it seeks to limit the rights of individuals, while failing to increase efficiency in the system and in turn decreasing fairness, with regrettable consequences for individuals. In respect of articles 6 and 8 of the ECHR, it represents a clear breach and will give rise to legal challenge. That was seen in the case of Kiarie and Byndloss v. the Home Secretary in 2017. At present, where the Home Secretary certifies a case as clearly unfounded, any appeal may be brought only after removal from the UK. In cases concerning protection claims or article 3 human rights claims, such appeals are incapable of providing an effective remedy, because the feared harm will have eventuated before the appeal can be heard.

As the explanatory notes to the Bill acknowledge, the right of appeal is rarely exercised; instead, challenges are brought by way of judicial review. This provision therefore contributes to the general trend in immigration and asylum law away from rights of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal and towards unappealable decisions, which are amenable to judicial review.

For the reasons specified in my speech, we will oppose clause 25 standing part of the Bill.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

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People smugglers are profiting from the misery of those who endanger their lives by undertaking dangerous and unnecessary journeys. We must act to fix our broken system and reduce the draw of the UK. The changes in clause 26 and schedule 3 are key components of the system-wide efforts that we are making to prevent irregular migration. For those reasons, I ask hon. Members not to press the proposed new clause and schedule.

[Bambos Charalambous]

The Labour party will oppose clause stand part. Clause 26 opens the door to offshoring by permitting the removal of asylum seekers from the UK while their claim is being determined or while the UK decides whether to take responsibility for the claim.

The clause introduces schedule 3, which allows the Government to remove people who are seeking asylum to countries outside the UK, and hold them in detention there while their asylum claims are being processed—in other words, offshoring. It is our strong belief that the clause should be deleted, and we will vote against clause stand part and against schedule 3. We believe that, through the clause, the Government are seeking to emulate the Australian system as a model. It has been reported that the Home Office is in talks with Denmark to share costs on an offshore detention centre in Rwanda, and a number of other places have also been mentioned.

It is worth examining the available empirical evidence on the ideas underpinning the clause. In 2015, a United Nations report found that Australia’s offshore detention regime was systematically violating the international convention against torture. In addition, in 2020, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court said the regime was “cruel, inhuman or degrading”, and unlawful under international law.

We are deeply concerned that the Government’s plan appears to emulate a failed system that has been widely condemned for its human rights abuses. When we look in more detail at the Australian model that the Government seem to want to emulate, we find more causes for concern. In 1992, the Australian Government introduced mandatory indefinite detention for asylum seekers who arrive by boat—that policy remains in place. In 2001, they introduced the Pacific solution, whereby boats were intercepted by the navy and taken to processing centres on Manus and Nauru. In 2008, the Australian Labour Government ended that practice, branding it an “abject policy failure”, only to reintroduce offshore detention in the early 2010s. Approximately 4,180 people were transferred offshore between 2012 and 2014, at which point the transfers stopped.

Conditions and events inside the centres were secretive; journalists and legal representatives were generally banned from entering. That created the conditions for the systematic abuse of asylum seekers by those running the facilities. In 2016, The Guardian released records of more than 2,000 incident reports from Nauru—known as the Nauru files—documenting widespread abuse and neglect in offshore detention. That included systematic physical and sexual assault on children and adults, the use of blackmail by guards, and attacks and harassment by people on Nauru or Manus Island. At least 12 people are reported to have died in the camps, with the causes of death including medical neglect, suicide and murder by centre guards.

Aside from the immeasurable human cost, this failed system has been dismantled by its own architects. A recent research report by the Kaldor Centre found that there is no evidence that the policy achieved the stated aim of “stopping the boats” and that since 2014 the Government have been trying to distance themselves from the policy. Thanks to the powerful stories of the people affected, it has been increasingly rejected by the Australian public. It has cost billions of Australian dollars. The policy has clearly failed disastrously, and we are deeply concerned that this Government are seeking in this clause to bring the policy to the UK.

The impact of offshore detention on mental health cannot be overstated. In the Australian example, conditions in offshore detention centres have been inhumane and unfit for human habitation. The mental and physical health impact of offshore detention has been colossal. In 2014, the Australian Human Rights Commission found that 34% of children in detention suffered from mental health disorders of a seriousness that would require psychiatric referral if the children were in the Australian population, and paediatricians reported that the children transferred to Nauru were among the most traumatised they had ever seen. Medical experts working with the UNHCR found rates of mental illness in people in offshore detention to be among the highest recorded in any surveyed population. Médecins Sans Frontières reported that the suffering on Nauru was some of the worst that it had ever encountered. There is absolutely no way, in our view, that the UK Government should be risking huge harm against children in terms of their mental health by emulating that failed policy.

Furthermore, the financial cost of the Australian system is astronomical and regularly more than $1 billion a year. The Refugee Council of Australia compiled a detailed breakdown of offshoring costs and found that it had cost the Australian Government $8.3 billion between 2014 and 2020. The annual cost per person of holding someone offshore in Nauru or Papua New Guinea has been estimated to be $3.4 million—per person. Again, we are deeply concerned that the UK Government are seeking to emulate a policy that is extremely likely to have extortionate costs in financial terms. The financial impact of this policy will be huge. That all these increased costs go simply to stopping boats, as a deterrent, which the Minister alluded to, shows that it is a failed policy. This is fiscal incompetence from the Government: in their own prediction of what the policy costs, they have estimated exceeding that every year. It will be a budget impossible to predict, based on the number of people whom they propose to offshore. We have the Budget tomorrow, so I will be interested to see what provision the Chancellor of the Exchequer has made in relation to that and the comprehensive spending review.

Let us look in more detail at what the Government are risking with this policy in terms of the human cost. There are countless stories of the lives destroyed by the policy of offshoring. Loghman Sawari, whose story was covered by The Guardian, is still detained, despite having been accepted by Australia as a refugee in 2014. Eight years after the initial detention, he told The Guardian that the days have begun to run one into another and his memory is failing. The Maghames family arrived in Australia by boat in 2013 and were detained on Christmas Island before being transferred to Nauru in March 2014. Hajar Maghames, along with her parents and younger brother, has been in detention ever since, despite being granted refugee status in 2019. In 2020, they were transferred to Australia so that her father could receive medical care, and they are now in cabins at the back of Darwin airport. They are now the only people held there.

I would be grateful if the Minister clarified whether people being processed wherever they are offshored will, if their claim is successful, be brought back to the UK, and what estimate he has made of the cost of that.

To continue with my examples, Reza Barati, who, like the family to whom I just referred, had fled Iran, is one of the 18 people to have died in offshore detention. He was beaten to death by guards and other workers on Manus Island after a protest turned violent and the centre was attacked. He died four days after his 24th birthday. His family are suing the Australian Government and G4S for negligence. During the same incident over two days in February 2014, 70 refugees and asylum seekers were injured. One lost his right eye. Another was shot in the buttocks. One man was attacked from behind by a G4S guard who slashed his neck, causing a 10 to 12 cm horizontal slit across his throat. There have been many others, including the high-profile cases of author Behrouz Boochani or the Tamil family from Biloela, whose harrowing stories have ultimately helped to turn public opinion against this policy.

Offshoring in large accommodation centres poses particular risks to LGBT+ people seeking asylum because of their particular vulnerability. Organisations such as Rainbow Migration and Stonewall have raised concerns that housing people in such centres outside the UK will result in systemic verbal, violent and sexual abuse of LGBT+ people who are in need of protection and who have higher rates of self-harm and suicide.

There is much evidence that LGBT+ people already experience systemic abuse and harassment in the UK’s current accommodation and detention system, led by staff and others with whom they are housed or detained alongside. The problems tend to continue, even when people are moved to a new property. Documented examples provided by organisations that deal with victims have included unwanted sexual advances, threats, invasions of privacy, verbal abuse, being prevented from sleeping, pranks and sexual assault.

It is therefore deeply worrying that offshore processing centres are likely to escalate the homophobic, biphobic and transphobic abuse that LGBT+ people experience in existing asylum accommodation and detention centres. It is even more shocking when one considers that many refugees in the LGBT+ community have fled their home countries specifically because of abuses and persecution that they have experienced there.

Offshoring also presents a significant risk of harm to women who have survived rape and sexual exploitation. It is difficult to see how women who have survived such atrocities would be exempt from offshoring because it is clear that the Government’s key objective for offshore detention is deterrence. According to the Government’s logic, there can be no exceptions to this policy, because otherwise the objective of deterrence is undermined.

This was seen when offshore detention was reintroduced by the Australian Government in 2012. All people seeking asylum who arrived by boat were liable for removal to the islands of Nauru or Manus

“even if they...had characteristics warranting special consideration, such as being an unaccompanied minor, a survivor of torture and trauma, or a victim of trafficking”.

It is clear that the UK Government, by introducing such provision for offshoring, must be willing to subject children, pregnant women, survivors of trafficking and other vulnerable people to offshore detention.

[Tom Pursglove]

I hope that I can help the hon. Gentleman somewhat by making it very clear that children will not be transferred overseas for their claims to be processed.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I am grateful to the Minister for clarifying that point, but there are still others with vulnerable characteristics, including pregnant women and survivors of trafficking who will be subject to offshore detention.

I hardly need to outline the inhumanity of this policy as it applies to women victims of rape and sexual violence. I am deeply concerned about the conditions in which women will be held, and particularly the risk to them of further sexual violence and abuse. In detention centres in the UK, where there are a range of safeguarding mechanisms in place, it has not been enough to protect people in detention from abuse. The 2015 Lampard report on Yarl’s Wood, which until last year was the main detention centre for women in the UK, highlighted that between 2007 and 2015, 10 members of staff had been dismissed for incidents involving “sexual impropriety” towards women held there. Such “impropriety” included the repeated sexual harassment and abuse of a 29-year-old woman by a male healthcare worker.

When it comes to offshoring, the UK Government will have even less control over the treatment of detainees in offshore detention centres. The risk to women of sexual violence and abuse in such centres will be increased. The sexual harassment and violence to which women detained offshore by the Australian Government were subjected has been well documented.

There is no empirical evidence to support the effectiveness of offshoring as a deterrent strategy in respect of those fleeing persecution. A recent report by the Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law highlights that in the year following the Australian Government’s reintroduction of offshore detention

“more than 24,000 asylum seekers arrived in Australia by boat. This number was considerably more than at any other time since the 1970s, when boats of asylum seekers were first recorded in Australia. Moreover, as the months passed, and news of the policy presumably reached some of those who were contemplating travelling by sea to Australia, there was no noticeable change in the rate of arrivals, with boats of varying numbers of people (from two to more than 200) continuing to arrive on average several times per week.”

That brings us back to the fundamental fact, discussed earlier in reference to other clauses, such as clauses 10 and 11, that policy measures that rely on deterrence assume that people have a choice in the decisions they make. People who are forced to flee their countries because of violence and persecution have no such choice. Therefore, deterrent measures will not stop them making the journey to find safety. The likelihood is that offshoring will be completely ineffective in its aims, as well as deeply inhumane.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The amendment is a probing one. The basic point is that if someone is at risk of persecution, we must be incredibly careful when creating gaps, loopholes and exceptions that would still see that person subject to removal to the very place where they would be at risk. The convention creates and recognises very specific exceptions to the fundamental principle of non-refoulement.

If someone is a danger to security here or has committed a particularly serious crime, they constitute a danger to the community. The amendment challenges the attempts in the clause to broaden the scope of the exceptions so that persons are automatically deemed and not just presumed to have committed a serious offence if they are sentenced to one year in prison, rather than two years. We have particular concerns about the circumstances where the crime has been committed overseas. How do the Government intend to be sure about the safety and appropriateness of prosecution, conviction and sentence?

Nobody is saying that refugees should not face appropriate punishment for their crimes, but the danger is that those sentenced to one year or more face an additional punishment that puts them at risk of persecution, torture and death. That is way beyond what is merited by the crime. The withdrawal of refugee rights should not be done in anything other than the most serious circumstances. We fear that the clause goes beyond what the convention envisages.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I just wish to add to the points made by the SNP spokesperson. The whole UK criminal justice system is based on having magistrates courts that deal with the less serious offences, which have a maximum sentence of up to 12 months, and we then have the Crown court, which deals with the more serious offences, with a sentence above 12 months. Defining something as serious with 12 months’ imprisonment seems to be contrary to other aspects of our judicial system.

Labour also has concerns about people who have been trafficked who may have been forced to commit offences. They may have been convicted of a criminal offence as a result of their trafficking, whether that is because of drugs, prostitution or another such offence that might attract a penalty above 12 months. We have some concerns about the redefinition and I wonder whether the Minister can clarify what might happen to someone who has been trafficked, has committed an offence and has received a sentence of 12 months. Would the clause apply to them, because that does raise concerns about it? I do not know whether he will be able to assist in that regard.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Certain very important provisions in the Bill refer to a state providing protection in accordance with the convention. In particular, it is incredibly important to the inadmissibility provisions in justifying removal to so-called safer countries. We need to define it, and we would do so through amendment 55 by referencing all the rights set out in the refugee convention. We thereby seek to ensure that the standards of that convention have been fully upheld. The amendment poses the question to the Government of whether they are a champion of the full range of rights in the convention, or are requiring people to claim asylum in countries where little more than lip service is paid to it, and nothing more than a protection against refoulement is provided. That is the issue at stake, in a nutshell.

[Bambos Charalambous]

In order to save time—I know that we have had a very long day—I will bear in mind that the wording of amendment 135 is almost identical to that of the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East. He did it justice when speaking to it, and we will support it.

[Tom Pursglove]

I thank hon. Members for tabling the amendments. I have listened carefully to the arguments that they have put forward. I agree about the importance of the United Kingdom continuing to meet its obligations under the refugee convention, including through the rights that we provide to refugees. The amendments to clause 36 relate to the inadmissibility provisions set out in clause 14. I understand the spirit of the amendments in wishing to define protection in accordance with the refugee convention where we may seek to remove an individual to a safe country. However, clause 14 as drafted ensures that the principles of the refugee convention should be met if we are to remove an individual to that country.

If individuals have travelled via, or have connections to, safe countries where it is reasonable to expect them to have claimed asylum, they should do so. They should not make unnecessary and often dangerous onward journeys to the UK; however, if they do, we will seek to remove them to a safe country. We will only ever return inadmissible claimants to countries that are safe and where the principles of the refugee convention are met. For those reasons, I cannot support the amendments, and I ask that the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East withdraw amendment 55.

Nationality and Borders Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Bambos Charalambous Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 28th October 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Jonathan Gullis]

I appreciate your patience, Sir Roger, and of course I will.

I will wrap up quickly by saying that clause 37 tells people that if they enter this country illegally, it will count against them. That is exactly what we should be doing, and I look forward to seeing that progress. Ultimately, we have illegal economic migrants making the journey across the English channel from Calais. The French need to do more, and the threat from the Home Secretary of not sending the additional £54 million has clearly worked—suddenly, I have never seen so many videos and photographs of French activity on their shores to try to prevent the small boats from leaving. It is about time that the French stood up and did what was right, because it is British taxpayers’ money that is funding the additional support they need.

This is about stopping the illegal economic migrants who are funding criminality by putting money into the hands of criminal people-smuggling gangs. That is probably funding wider criminality in the United Kingdom, particularly drugs in our community, and therefore it is right that we stop them. Let us not forget that 70% of those making these illegal crossings are men aged between 18 and 35, whereas we want to be protecting women and children. We have done that in Afghanistan and with Syria: the safe and legal routes are the appropriate way of doing it.

Clause 37 is saying to those illegal economic migrants that we need to make sure they go through those safe and legal routes, or, as Baroness Scotland—the former Labour Minister, back in the years when the Labour party was electable—said, they should be claiming asylum in the first safe country they reach. There is nothing wrong with Greece, Italy or France. I am more than happy to holiday there, and I am sure anyone in mainland Europe would be more than happy to make such a place their home.

[Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)]

It is very interesting to follow the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent North, but I will not rise to the bait.

Clause 37 is one of the most controversial new provisions in part 3 of the Bill. It expands the existing offence of illegal entry so that it encompasses arrival in the UK without a valid entry clearance. It also increases the maximum penalty for those entering without leave or arriving without a valid entry clearance from six months to four years’ imprisonment. I have a question for the Minister. On Tuesday we debated clause 35, which reduced the penalty for a particularly serious offence from two years’ imprisonment to one year. Is it the Government’s intention to make entry a particularly serious offence for the purposes of the Bill? That is what the clause could do.

In effect, the Government’s proposals criminalise the act of seeking asylum in the UK. The Opposition wholeheartedly oppose the measures and urge the Government to consider the following facts. First, clause 37 breaches article 31 of the refugee convention, which prohibits penalisation for irregular entry or stay when people are seeking asylum. The new offence of unlawful arrival is designed to—and will in practice—penalise refugees based on their mode of travel. That goes against everything that the convention stands for.

Article 31 of the refugee convention says that states

“shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees…where their life or freedom was threatened…provided they present themselves without delay…and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.”

Clause 37 clearly violates the non-penalisation clause in the convention and is therefore in breach of the UK’s obligations under international law.

When taken in combination with clause 12, which excludes UK territorial seas from being considered a place of claim, clause 37 has significant implications for access to protection and the risk of refoulement. Under the proposed changes, those who arrive irregularly, including through a safe third country, could be prosecuted and imprisoned for between one and four years. That is because it is not possible to apply for entry clearance for the purpose of claiming asylum in the UK, and yet an asylum seeker must be physically in the UK to make a claim. Bearing that in mind, 90% of those granted asylum in the United Kingdom are from countries whose nationals must hold entry clearance to enter the UK.

[Neil Coyle]

This is more a point of order than an intervention, Sir Roger. I have been contacted with a correction to the record: Islington has actually taken refugees, contrary to what the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent North said. Does my hon. Friend congratulate Islington on its record in taking refugees and asylum seekers, contrary to the inaccurate—I was going to say “deceitful”, but I am not sure whether that is parliamentary language—and I am sure accidentally misleading comments from the hon. Gentleman?

[Bambos Charalambous]

I congratulate all local authorities that take asylum seekers. All local authorities should take their fair share—not just in Stoke-on-Trent or Islington, but those across the country.

In practice, someone with a well-founded fear of persecution arriving in the UK intending to claim asylum will be committing a criminal offence if clause 37 is implemented. Even if they have a visa, they will be committing an offence because their intention to claim asylum will be contrary to the intention for which the entry clearance or visa was issued. We have heard the example of students: if a student entered on a student visa and claimed asylum in the UK, they would be in breach of that visa. The clause will impact tens of thousands of people, leading to people with legitimate cases serving time in prison for these new offences, followed by continued immigration detention under immigration powers. In this context, the Government are proposing to criminalise asylum-seekers based on their journey—which, in all likelihood, was the only viable route available to them.

Secondly, the proposals are unworkable. While criminalising those we should be seeking to protect, the Bill also fails to introduce safe and legal routes to claim asylum. Clause 37 comes amid a glaring lack of lawful routes for claiming asylum in the UK. Although we welcome things like the resettlement programmes, they are not a solution for those claiming asylum because they are so limited. They cover those who are already recognised as having the protection they need.

--- Later in debate ---

Assisting unlawful immigration or asylum seeker

[Bambos Charalambous]

I beg to move amendment 33, in clause 38, page 37, line 22, leave out subsection (2).

This amendment deletes the subsection which removes “and for gain” from section 25A(1)(a) of the Immigration Act 1971. Currently, under section 25A(1)(a), a person commits an offence if the person knowingly “and for gain” facilitates the arrival in the UK of an individual who the person knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is an asylum seeker. This amendment preserves the status quo.

Following on from clause 37, clause 38 proposes to remove the words “and for gain” from section 25A of the Immigration Act 1971. Presently, under section 25A(1), it is an offence for a person knowingly and for gain to facilitate the arrival or entry, or attempted arrival or entry, of an asylum seeker into the UK. Clause 38 therefore seeks to broaden the section 25A offence to allow the Home Office to charge more people for facilitating the arrival of asylum seekers to the UK. Under the clause, someone acting purely altruistically to help an asylum seeker would be committing a criminal offence. It extends who could be convicted of the offence of knowingly facilitating the entry to the UK of an asylum seeker to individuals acting out of compassion for other people for no financial benefit.

As the Committee will know, the clause has received widespread criticism, and rightly so. I am not, for example, the first to observe that clause 38 would almost certainly have criminalised and prosecuted the likes of Sir Nicholas Winton for his life-saving actions in rescuing hundreds of children on the Kindertransport in 1939. Indeed, in July, when the Bill passed its Second Reading, many highlighted that clause 38 is so draconian that it could criminalise the Royal National Lifeboat Institution and its volunteers for helping those in danger at sea. If they were deemed to be facilitating asylum seekers’ arrival in the UK, they could face life imprisonment—life in prison for saving lives! I ask the Minister and this Committee: when did saving lives become a criminal offence?

These measures will criminalise friends, family members and individuals with humanitarian motives. The Minister’s predecessor, the hon. Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), attempted to provide reassurance on Second Reading by claiming that the Government have

“no intention in this Bill to criminalise bona fide, genuine rescue operations”.—[Official Report, 20 July 2021; Vol. 699, c. 915.]

However, the Bill as it is currently written does not provide any similarly explicit reassurances.

The Refugee and Migrant Children’s Consortium is especially concerned about the clause and its impact on people who provide assistance to vulnerable young people seeking asylum. It is concerned that such measures must in no way serve to deter people from saving the lives of babies and children at sea, with tragic examples demonstrating the cost of there being no safe and legal routes to the UK for families fleeing persecution. The Opposition have repeatedly drawn attention to that in Committee.

For asylum seekers who assist each other in coming to the UK to claim asylum, the implications of this measure are incredibly serious. Clause 38 increases the penalty for this offence to life imprisonment. These increased sentences, as raised by Zoe Gardner of the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants in one of the Committee’s evidence sessions, risk being used to prosecute asylum seekers themselves, not the smuggling gangs and members of international criminal gangs they are intended for.

For example, according to the National Crime Agency, there is evidence that asylum seekers can often be forced to carry out work without pay for smuggling gangs. In an investigation by The Independent newspaper, migrants reported traffickers taking their money for crossings to the UK, only to then demand that they work for free in order to make the journey, and that work includes being forced to steer vessels during dangerous crossings.

In The Independent investigation, one Yemeni man demonstrated how traffickers are aware that they can criminalise asylum seekers and refugees in this way. He described the power this gives them, in that a smuggler

“told me, ‘I can kill you here, no one will identify me and I will escape.’ He took videos of me and of my friends while we were preparing boats for other journeys. He said, ‘I could now accuse you of being a smuggler, you could be in jail.’ ”

This proves how the persecuted can be coerced and controlled by these criminals, and will in turn in effect become criminals themselves under the punitive policy making of the Home Office.

Of course, the prosecution of victims for the crimes of their perpetrators is something that the refugee convention, drafted 70 years ago, considers. Article 31 of the convention is intended to protect refugees from prosecution for irregular entry because refugees are, by definition, forced into dangerous and risky situations during their flight. This is something the Government are deliberately trying to wash their hands of—and to do what? To pursue a reckless policy that will prosecute those who are demonstrably not criminals, but genuine asylum seekers and refugees.

It is worth considering whether clause 38 is indeed workable. As we know, clause 37 is likely to be unenforceable and clause 38 is equally, if not more, outrageous. In relation to our international law obligations, there does not appear to be any consideration of how this clause and the new expanded criminal offences in clauses 37 and 38 will be compatible with the duty of a ship to attempt to rescue persons in danger at sea. For example, article 98(1) of the United Nations convention of the law of the sea provides that every state shall require ships

“to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost”,

and

“to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress”.

More interestingly in relation to clause 38, paragraph 2.1.10 of the annex to the international convention on maritime search and rescue 1979—the SAR convention—explicitly obliges

“that assistance be provided to any person in distress at sea. They shall do so regardless of the nationality or status of such a person or the circumstances in which that person is found.”

With these rules in mind, it appears that the UK cannot legally prohibit vessels from rescuing asylum seekers at sea, and I urge the Minister to consider the Opposition’s amendment 33, which will preserve the status quo.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

I am grateful to the hon. Members for Enfield, Southgate and for Halifax for providing the opportunity to explain the difficulties involved in securing convictions for an odious crime that targets and exploits vulnerable people and allows organised criminals to thrive.

Gain can be obtained in many ways, but cannot always be proved to the evidential standard required for a successful prosecution: for example, money transfers made by other family members abroad or made cash in hand, promises of servitude by the asylum seeker or others, or the provision of assistance in the facilitation act, such as by avoiding paying a fee by agreeing to steer a small boat. It is right that all available evidence should be considered and all relevant behaviour taken into account in investigating a serious offence. We are, at present, limited by what is an unrealistic evidential requirement that does not take account of the reality of how international organised crime operates.

In amending the offence, we are mindful of the excellent work of those acting from humanitarian motives both now and in the past. I understand fully hon. Members’ concerns that the wrong people will be drawn into the investigative and judicial process. We are therefore retaining the defence available to organisations whose aim is to assist asylum seekers and who do not charge for their services. I also recognise the bravery of volunteers working for the RNLI and lifeboat crews who undertake vital work in protecting lives at sea.

I will set out my intention to amend this clause on Report to ensure that organisations such as the RNLI, those directed by Her Majesty’s Coastguard, and individuals who fulfil their obligations in rescuing those in distress at sea may continue as they do now. We also intend to ensure that this provision does not prevent those responsible for vessels from complying with their obligations if they discover stowaways on board as they journey to the UK. I understand that some members of the Committee would prefer to have those amendments ready to debate now, but the issues are complex and we must ensure that we do not inadvertently provide loopholes to be exploited by criminal gangs who will look for any means to avoid prosecution.

The effect of amendment 33 is that, by retaining the constraint and having to prove the offence was committed again, we will only rarely be able to respond to and deter those committing the offence and will continue to place an unrealistic burden on our law enforcement officers and prosecutors. I therefore ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment, although I hope he will be reassured that I intend to table on Report an amendment to address the crux of the issues that he raised. I hope that hon. Members across the House will feel able to support the amendment that I intend to table.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I heard what the Minister said, but Second Reading was back in July and there has been plenty of time to table an amendment. What could be achieved by his amendment can easily be achieved by voting for this one, so I wish to press our amendment.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Nationality and Borders Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Bambos Charalambous Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 28th October 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Jonathan Gullis]

I have one daughter and a son on the way in early February, which I am pleased to announce to the House. What a lucky father I am going to be. The hon. Lady said it—there is nothing dangerous about France, Italy or Greece. People’s lives are not at risk. They may well be in Afghanistan or Syria. People will have left those countries and made that dangerous journey, which they should not have done because there are safe and legal routes to the UK. Other countries across mainland Europe could look to us as an example. They can claim asylum in those countries and not risk their lives by crossing the channel from France to the United Kingdom.

As I said, 70% of people making that illegal crossing are men between the age of 18 and 35. Predominantly, women and children are not coming with them but staying in those dangerous countries, which is why what we did with Afghanistan and Syria was so brilliant—we took women and children from a terrorist regime that I have no time for whatsoever, who treat women as second-class citizens and force certain children into slavery. We need to ensure that those women and children are protected.

I therefore believe that we should give commanders the confidence to do that again if they believe it to be safe. It is the commanders who will make that decision, and I have full faith that they will do so knowing the law, and the legal system in this country will have their back. Most importantly, they will take into account the condition of the waters at the time and the passengers onboard, so they can decide what is safe. The French can then do what they are meant to do when boats are in French territorial waters—stick to the obligations they sign up to for the money they get from British taxpayers and take those people back.

The people of Stoke-on-Trent North, Kidsgrove and Talke are so angry about what is going on that they want us to pick people up and take them straight back to Calais. I am sympathetic to their viewpoint, and that is one way to deter. This is a legal opportunity for us and the right one for the Government.

[Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent North. He has shown a real insight into seafaring from Stoke-on-Trent, which we all know is a coastal town.

It will come as no surprise that we will vote against clause 41 and schedule 5. Both plan to extend and enhance the new maritime enforcement powers beyond the UK territorial waters into international waters. They seek powers to stop, board, divert and detain foreign ships and ships without nationality.

The overarching goal of clause 41 is to push back asylum seekers, and for Government to redefine ships in legal terms, as the hon. Member for Glasgow North East mentioned. They broaden that definition to include fragile and insecure vessels that cross the English channel. At present, the definition of “ship” includes every description of vessel, including hovercraft, used in navigation. That definition is to be supplemented so that “ship” also includes any other structure, with or without means of propulsion, constructed or used to carry persons, goods, plant or machinery by water. To be more precise, it is referencing the small boats that cross the English channel.

The clause would grant new powers to the Home Office to stop or board ships, take them to any place on land or water in the UK or elsewhere, retain them there or require them to leave UK waters, if it has reasonable grounds to suspect that a relevant immigration-related offence is being committed. The powers may be exercised in relation to a UK ship, a ship without nationality, a foreign ship or a ship registered in another British territory. In addition, extensive new enforcement powers are to be conferred in this clause, and the power to seize and dispose of ships will be conferred in schedule 5. The problem with the power to divert ships bound for the UK is that it raises profound questions about the safety and wellbeing of the people on board, and ultimately presents a risk to lives. There is no proof that the diversion of a ship would occur only where safe, no suggestion of how it would be policed and enforced, and no intention from the Government to act in accordance with international law. Such intentions are likely to be assessed meaningfully only in retrospect, once people have been harmed.

--- Later in debate ---

Removals: notice requirements

[Bambos Charalambous]

I beg to move amendment 137, in clause 43, page 40, line 8, leave out subsections (3) to (5).

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

Government new clause 28—Removals: notice requirements.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Clause 43 refers to no-notice removals and presents another problem of access to justice in the Bill. The clause aims to provide a statutory minimum period to enable individuals to access justice prior to removal and makes provisions for removing individuals following a failed departure without the need for a further notice period. It also includes the provision of written notices of intention to remove and departure details. It makes clear in statute the duty of the Home Office to give people a maximum of five working days’ notice when they are going to be removed from the UK.

For more than 10 years, the courts have recognised that that duty to give notice of removal is essential to accessing justice and the rule of law. As the Committee will acknowledge from our discussions on the Bill so far, it is vital that, when officials decide people should be removed, those people can access the courts to challenge that decision if they have a legitimate case.

However, while this clause sets out to provide access to justice, its effectiveness in doing so is very unclear. If the purpose of the notice period is, as stated, to enable those facing removal to access legal advice and the courts, it is essential that people served with a notice are able in practice to access that advice.

For example, the clause does not explain how the Government will ensure that access to legal advice will be provided. Asylum seekers can be highly vulnerable and may experience difficulties in effectively accessing legal advice and in understanding the legal intricacies of the asylum process, such as studying legal determinations or preparing submissions. As we know from our earlier scrutiny, clause 22 in part 2 provides for up to but no more than seven hours of legal aid for those served with a priority removal notice to receive advice on their immigration status and removal. We do not believe that provision goes far enough, but this clause is worse still. Unlike the provisions for priority removal notices, there is no specific provision in part 3 for ensuring that those who are served with notice of intention to remove can access legal advice within the notice period. The scheme therefore depends on existing legal aid provision, which has of course been decimated by the Conservatives for more than a decade. There are serious limitations in the availability of this provision for those both in detention and in the community.

Subsection (8) inserts new section 10A in the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. It sets out potential scenarios where a further notice period is not required, which includes, for example, where the person was not removed on the date specified in the first notice due to matters reasonably beyond the control of the Secretary of State, such as adverse weather conditions, technical faults or transport delays, or disruption by the person to be removed.

Disruption is very broad of course, and can be interpreted on a very broad basis. It could be applied to a person refusing to leave their room in detention because they want to speak to their lawyer. The fine print also states that a new notice of intention to remove and a further notice period are also not required where the person was not removed on the date specified in the first notice as a result of “ongoing judicial review proceedings”.

That point is even more problematic. It applies where a planned removal does not proceed because of judicial review proceedings. If those proceedings are resolved in a way that means removal can proceed, the Home Office does not have to give any notice of removal if it is carried out within 21 days of the court’s decision.

As the Public Law Project and JUSTICE have pointed out, that decision could come weeks, months, or even years after the first notice of removal. Over time, the person’s circumstances could have changed fundamentally, important new evidence could have come to light or the situation in their own country might have changed dramatically. Such changes can happen virtually overnight, as recently witnessed in Afghanistan. Yet once the previous judicial review proceedings, which were potentially based on completely different facts and circumstances, are decided, a person can be removed without any notice or opportunity to raise these new circumstances with the Home Office or to access the court. If implemented, that could give rise to significant injustices.

I have one example to highlight this point—I thank the Public Law Project and JUSTICE for sharing this example. MLF is a Sri Lankan national whose asylum claim had been dismissed. During judicial review proceedings, in which he was unrepresented, he submitted further representations to the Home Office based on new evidence of the killing of three male relatives. That new evidence could not be considered in the judicial review proceedings because it post-dated the decision being challenged. The Home Office’s barrister informed him that the material would be forwarded to the relevant part of the Home Office for consideration.

MLF was subsequently served with a decision that refused to consider his fresh representations. He was subsequently removed to Sri Lanka on the same day without any notice or opportunity to access the court. In hiding in Sri Lanka, MLF applied for judicial review of his removal without notice. The Home Office conceded that he had been unlawfully removed and arranged for MLF to return to the UK. He has since been granted refugee status on the basis of evidence that post-dated his original appeal, including that which he had submitted during his judicial review proceedings.

If clause 43 was implemented in that case, it would have authorised the removal of MLF without notice. To avoid situations where people are wrongly removed and evidence is not considered properly, amendment 137 seeks to delete subsections (3) to (5) of new section 10A of the 1999 Act. That change would ensure that people are required to be given notice of removal directions and an opportunity to ask the court to issue an injunction preventing their removal while additional elements of their case are considered or in order to present fresh evidence to challenge an initial decision.

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

The shadow Minister has raised lots of sensible questions. I have one other brief question for the Minister, on new clause 28. He may not be able to answer it today, but I would like it clarified, if possible.

Proposed new section 10E to the 1999 Act that the new clause would add is supposed to apply when a person has applied for judicial review and the court has made a decision authorising the removal. To be clear, does that decision relate to the judicial review, or could it relate to any prior decision? That point will not affect lots of people, but it will be important. I appreciate that the Minister may not be able to answer immediately, but I hope we will get clarity on that in due course.

--- Later in debate ---

Government new clause 28 will ensure that migrants have ample time to access justice. The cumulative result will be a more efficient and streamlined removals process. I commend our amendment to the Committee.

[Bambos Charalambous]

We are not convinced by the Minister’s response and wish to press amendment 137 to a Division.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Bambos Charalambous]

The Government will disagree to clause 44 and replace it with new clause 8, although I understand that new clause 8 has fundamentally the same principle as the clause. Clause 44 and new clause 8 will extend the length of time a foreign national offender can be considered for early removal from the last nine months to the last 12 months of their sentence if they become eligible for the scheme. The Opposition have concerns that increasing that time limit will lead to unfairness in accessing justice for foreign national offenders as well as leaving them with inadequate time to obtain access to legal representation.

In our already overpopulated and overworked prison system, foreign national offenders have limited access to legal support and resources even when compared with people detained in immigration detention centres. They have no access to mobile phones or the internet. In the limited time that they do have access to a phone, the contacts they can call are vetted by the prison and this process can take many weeks. Thus, acquiring adequate legal representation becomes near impossible. Time is of the essence to these individuals and increasing this early removal widow will only lead to exacerbating these difficulties.

Bail for Immigration Detainees produced a report in 2017 on the lack of legal advice available to prisoners, which found that only five of the 86 prison detainees surveyed had received independent advice about their immigration case. They found that detainees in prison are routinely denied access to basic information that might help their immigration case. Cuts to legal aid have only made this situation worse. The High Court earlier this year held that detainees in prison have suffered discriminatory treatment due to obstacles in getting legal advice—in particular, exemptions from legal aid eligibility.

Despite what high-profile recent Home Office failings might imply, when it comes to deportations the already heavily stacked deck is stacked against the deportee. Not having proper legal representation means that the detainees will almost certainly be denied the fundamental right to a fair hearing. It would mean that they could be deported to countries in which they face persecution, or it would be in breach of their human rights. We should not undermine that right by extending the length of time they have for removal. Charities such as Bail for Immigration Detainees are already stretched to breaking point trying to support these vulnerable individuals. Instead of limiting access to justice, the Government should work on increasing its efficiency so that foreign national offenders who have committed serious crimes are dealt with swiftly and those who have claims to remain are given a fair hearing.

Question put and negatived.

Clause 44 disagreed to.

Clause 45

Matters relevant to decisions relating to immigration bail

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Tom Pursglove]

For too long, individuals with no right to remain in the UK, including foreign criminals, have been gaming the system in order to get released from detention and frustrate their removal. We have seen individuals making asylum claims while in detention, but then delaying the resolution of that claim through their own deliberate actions, such as refusing to be interviewed. The current system incentivises non-compliant behaviour. By creating obstacles, bail is more likely to be granted due to the time it will take to resolve the claim and any subsequent appeals. It is not right that a person’s non-compliance enables their release.

Similarly, an individual may refuse to provide fingerprints for a travel document or may lie about their true nationality, thereby obstructing the returns documentation process. This again makes the prospect of removal more remote and increases the likelihood that bail may be granted. From an operational perspective, non-compliance is difficult to tackle and becomes much harder to counter once individuals are released from detention into the community, where they have the ability to abscond or continue with non-compliance. Therefore, eliminating the risk and impact of non-compliance is a key benefit that arises from the use of immigration detention if appropriate in the individual case.

We must have an immigration system that encourages compliance. The purpose of clause 45 is to ensure that, so far as possible, appropriate weight is given to evidence that a person has not been co-operative with the immigration or returns processes without reasonable excuse when making immigration bail decisions. This is currently not explicitly referenced as one of the specific mandatory criteria for considering whether to grant immigration bail.

[Tom Pursglove]

I do not accept that depiction. We are requiring decision makers to take into account co-operation with removal proceedings and immigration processes when considering applications for immigration bail. We are mindful that non-compliance may already be considered, and that the tribunal takes such behaviour into account when deciding whether to grant bail. However, the intention behind the provision is that there be the same focus on evidence of non-compliant behaviour as there is on those factors already particularised and considered in every case. As we have always made clear, we do not detain indefinitely, and the clause will not mean that people will be detained solely due to non-compliance, as there must always be a realistic prospect of removal within a reasonable timescale.

[Bambos Charalambous]

We will oppose the clause. It makes it more difficult for individuals to get bail and leaves them stranded in immigration detention indefinitely.

The clause would require decision makers to consider previous failure “to cooperate with” certain immigration processes when considering whether to grant immigration bail. That is extremely vague and broad language. There is a risk of it being misconstrued and used to penalise those who use their legal rights to resist or appeal against immigration decisions made against them.

The Public Law Project has stated that if detainees are given the impression that any resistance to a decision of the Home Office may be held against them, it would increase unfairness and have a significant chilling effect on those bringing legitimate legal challenge. There is already an uneven playing field; the clause risks tipping things still further in the Home Office’s favour. The Home Office is expanding its powers of detention, while preventing independent judicial oversight of its decisions to detain.

Immigration detention is a harsh measure. It has no time limit and little judicial oversight, and should be used only when necessary and for the shortest time possible. The Government hold vulnerable people in prison-like immigration detention centres for periods ranging from days to several years. That includes people who have lived in the UK since childhood, people fleeing war and persecution, torture survivors and victims of human trafficking. Such vulnerabilities cannot be managed in detention and will no doubt be worsened by the prospect of bail being denied.

Since 2000, 49 people have died in immigration detention centres, and incidents of self-harm are now recorded at more than one a day. The Home Office’s immigration detention facilities are not fit for purpose, and narrowing the availability of immigration bail will only make the situation worse.

The uncertainty of indefinite detention is cruel not only for the detainee, but for family members waiting for them at home. Research by Bail for Immigration Detainees, which helps 3,500 detainees to apply for bail every year, shows that children of detainees are often British citizens, and suffer a range of physical and mental effects due to separation from their parent. Those are compounded by further, unexpected separation. For those children, cutting off the prospect of bail will lead to further mental ill health and suffering.

The majority of people in detention do not need to be there. More than 60% of people taken into detention are eventually released, their detention having served no purpose, at a cost of £76 million a year, according to Matrix Evidence research. BID has said that the Home Office repeatedly breaks the law and detains people unlawfully. In the past two years, the Home Office has paid out £15.1 million to 584 people whom it had detained unlawfully.

The clause will make it tougher for people to get bail and leave them trapped in detention for longer. The Government have committed to reducing detention, but this measure is counter to their own rhetoric. It means less justice for detainees, more harm for vulnerable refugees and more wasted costs for the taxpayer. That is why Labour opposes the clause.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

As I said in my intervention on the Minister, the decision has to be based on whether there is a reasonable prospect of imminent removal, and included in that is the question of the likelihood of the person absconding if bail is granted. If any historical non-compliance has any sort of relation to that question—if it is relevant—the tribunal will obviously already be able to take it into account. Today, the Minister is asking us to tell the decision makers to take into account historical non-compliance even where it has absolutely no bearing, in the decision maker’s view, on the fundamental question of whether someone should be interned. That is moving from weighing up those considerations in the question about removal to using detention almost as a form of punishment. It is completely unjustified, and I echo what the shadow Minister has said.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Nationality and Borders Bill (Fourteenth sitting)

Bambos Charalambous Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 2nd November 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Anne McLaughlin (Glasgow North East) (SNP)]

I will be brief, as I have just a couple of questions. Ethics aside, as is the want of this Government—if that is not the case, why are they running away from the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Sheffield Central?—I want to look at the issue of estimating the maturity of a child’s skeletal system by comparing images with databases of children of the same age and gender. Do children in Ethiopia develop at a comparable rate to children in the UK, because I understand that that is who they are going to be compared to? Do children in Eritrea and Sudan develop at the same rate? The British Medical Association seems pretty certain that they do not. If that is the case, how long will it take to build databases of comparable images for each country or region, and has that work started?

[Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)]

The Government have tabled new clauses 29 to 37 to replace clause 58, which was a placeholder clause on age assessments. Colleagues have already made the point about lack of scrutiny. Having received these new clauses so late in the day, we have not had a chance to see proper evidence, because we were not aware of what has been said. Clearly, as part of its role a Committee must have time to scrutinise. I am sure we will do the best we can with the time we have been given, but it really is not best form to have so many Government new clauses so late in the day on such an important issue.

We are concerned that the age assessments referred to in new clauses 29 to 37 risk violating children’s rights. I thank the Refugee and Migrant Children’s Consortium, a coalition of over 60 organisations, for its excellent briefing on these new clauses and for sharing its concerns about their inclusion in the Bill. If implemented, the new regulations and measures on age assessments will significantly increase the risk that children in the system will be treated as adults and criminalised. Before we discuss specific measures, it is worth noting that age assessments are not straightforward, nor are they an exact science. The measures in this Bill fail to recognise that it is impossible to determine age precisely, especially when there is an absence of documentation, which is often the case. By introducing a higher standard of proof in age assessments, more children in the system will be wrongly treated as adults, with devastating consequences.

For unaccompanied children in the asylum system, age is fundamental to receiving the support and protection they need. In the UK, age determines how or whether someone is supported by children’s services and has access to education; whether they are provided with asylum support by the Home Office and dispersed to a different part of the UK; and whether they are accommodated or detained with adults. It is imperative that we get age assessment right, and we all agree that there are clear safeguarding issues when people claiming to be children are later found to be adults, but it is also true that the effects of children being wrongly treated as adults are significant. I therefore urge colleagues to consider those safeguarding risks in relation to new clauses 29 to 37.

New clause 29 defines various terms, including “age-disputed person”, which governs the persons to whom the provision on age assessments will apply. As it stands, new clause 29 will mean that age assessment is required whenever there is insufficient evidence to be sure of age. Of course, as we know, this is true in many if not all cases. In practice, this clause therefore puts the burden of proof on a child to prove that they are under 18.

This is problematic for a couple of reasons. Children who come to the UK on their own from countries such as Afghanistan face challenges when asked to prove their date of birth. First, the registration of births and the importance placed on chronological age differs across the world. Secondly, and perhaps more significantly, there is often a lack of documentation. For example, many children who come to the UK have never had official identity documents in the first place, or have had documents taken from them or destroyed during their journey to the UK.

It is worth sharing an example, and I thank the Refugee and Migrant Children’s Consortium for bringing it to the Committee’s attention, as it highlights both the challenges in determining age accurately and the impact of wrong decisions. This case refers to a young person named K, who arrived in the UK from Iran and was held in a police station. He was 16 years old when he left Iran, and he told the staff at the police station his date of birth. They explained that, based on the date of birth, he was now 17.

K was then questioned by someone—he believes they were from social services—who did not believe he was 17, as they believed he looked older. Before entering the UK, K had been living in the jungle in Calais, and had not properly washed for a long time and had grown a beard. K was pressured into accepting he was 18 years old, and the Home Office recorded his age as 18. This meant he was not referred to a local authority for a full age assessment and was dispersed into adult asylum support accommodation in a hotel. He was the only child in the hotel and was left very scared. He reported that adults in the accommodation were taking drugs and he could not eat during his time there.

K managed to get in contact with the British Red Cross, and a safeguarding referral was made to the relevant local authority. The local authority promptly arranged to visit the young person, and two social workers agreed that it was highly likely that K was the age he was claiming to be. K was immediately moved and provided with full support under section 20 of the Children Act 1989. The local authority completed a full needs assessment and quickly took action to refer him to a GP, dentist, optician and immigration solicitor, and supported him to enrol in college. He had been suffering from asthma, and had not received any medical support since he arrived in the UK.

K’s case highlights what can happen when a young person is wrongly considered an adult in the asylum system, and the effects are stark. They lose access to the support and protection they need. That is why we must be incredibly careful to develop appropriate and fair age assessments, and also ensure that they are a function of the child protection and safeguarding system more widely.

In relation to K’s case, I have mentioned the fact that children are in hotels, and there is a real question about what safeguarding goes on in hotels. I know the Minister is deputising today, but could he look into that for me and to write back to me, or ask officials to do so at some stage, about what safeguarding for children does go on in hotels?

In new clause 30, the Home Office will be given the power to make regulations on how to assess age and introduce a standard of proof on the balance of probabilities for age assessments. The current standard when age is disputed in the context of an asylum appeal, developed through years of case law, is that of a reasonable degree of likelihood. Given the complicated nature of assessing age, introducing such a high standard of proof would significantly increase the risk of children being wrongly treated as adults. Indeed, new clause 30 undermines current statutory guidance from the Department for Education, which makes it clear that age assessments

“should not be a routine part of a local authority’s assessment of unaccompanied or trafficked children”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Craig Whittaker]

Clause 61 is one of six clauses drafted as placeholder clauses, as we have said. New clause 11 is intended to replace clause 61. The new clause makes changes to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 that are required to safeguard sensitive material. Current legislation allows for any immigration appeals and those judicial review challenges against exclusion, deportation or naturalisation and citizenship decisions to be certified so that they are heard by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission if certain criteria are met. Where a case is heard by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, sensitive information can be relied upon to defend the decision which, if publicly disclosed, would be damaging to the public interest.

Not all immigration decisions can currently be certified, however. For example, a person refused entry clearance as an investor, or who is seeking to work or study in the UK, cannot have their judicial review challenge to that refusal decision certified for SIAC. In contrast, a person appealing a decision to refuse them asylum could have the appeal against the refusal of their claim certified. The effect of not being able to certify a decision is that where there is a judicial review challenge to that decision a range of sensitive information that might otherwise be used to defend that challenge cannot always be disclosed. That has the potential to be damaging to national security.

The new clause will extend the power to certify immigration decisions to cover those cases that carry no right of appeal and where a JR challenging the decision cannot currently be certified. That will ensure that the JR can be heard before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. The test for certifying immigration decisions is not being changed by the new clause. It will still require the Secretary of State to certify that the decision being taken relies partly or wholly on information that, in her opinion, should not be made public in the interests of national security, in the interests of the relationship between the UK and another country, or otherwise in the public interest.

[Bambos Charalambous]

New clause 11, which replaces clause 61, significantly expands the jurisdiction of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. On the face of it, this is a highly draconian measure that has been introduced at a very late stage in the Bill’s passage through Parliament, limiting the scrutiny. The new clause will enable SIAC to consider applications and set aside immigration decisions where the Secretary of State certifies that information on which her decision is partly or wholly based should not be made public on national security grounds, in the interest of the relationship between the UK and another country or otherwise in the public interest.

That means that information relating to the decision will not only not be made public; it will also not be provided to the person to whom the decision applies. If we unpick that, the cases to which the new clause applies include a decision of the Secretary of State concerning an entitlement to enter, reside in or remain in the UK, or a person’s removal from the UK. We are therefore talking about not only immigration decisions but nationality decisions. The extended powers in the new clause affect not just foreign nationals but British citizens, and do not concern merely migrants but residents. It is a huge expansion of power, and when combined with broad interpretations of the public interest, as mentioned, the power will put British citizens and others with the right to remain at risk of being excluded from the UK. They will also be left with no information regarding why that decision has been made, because the Government believe that it is in the public interest to withhold it from them.

The new clause is not limited to cases where a person’s entitlement to enter or stay in the UK is said to be in the interest of national security; it applies also to cases where the denial is authorised by information that the Secretary of State says is in the public interest—information that is kept from the person affected. How are any of those people, including the British citizens, able to defend themselves against expulsion, or even exile, in such circumstances? The power given to the Secretary of State is enormous, and in practice the measures will curb justice by allowing the Secretary of State to process appeals by SIAC, instead of normal processes, denying people their rights to a full case.

--- Later in debate ---

[Bambos Charalambous]

I will also speak to clause 63, because the two clauses seem to be interconnected.

We think that these provisions are unnecessary and should be removed from the Bill. The Government’s proposals in both clauses are unnecessary. The Bill requires the tribunal procedure committee to give the tribunal the power to fine individuals exercising a right of audience or a right to conduct litigation, or an employee of such a person, for

“improper, unreasonable or negligent behaviour”.

This broad formulation could have a chilling effect on the willingness of solicitors to take on difficult cases, for fear of risking personal financial liability. That may also extend to Home Office presenting officers who would similarly be liable under the measure.

The immigration tribunals already have all the case management, costs and referral powers that they need to control their own procedure. Giving new powers to immigration tribunals without establishing a basis in evidence for them is not warranted. The clauses will therefore make it harder for lawyers acting for people with immigration cases to do their job in immigration tribunal hearings.

Immigration law practitioners fulfil a key role in enabling access to the courts and therefore access to justice, so that a person who is the subject of an immigration decision may make their case properly and seek vindication. Lawyers, both solicitors and barristers, play an important role in facilitating the smooth functioning of the asylum process, helping their clients to navigate the system and providing an additional layer of filtering against meritless cases.

All lawyers have a responsibility to uphold the rule of law and are strictly regulated by several bodies to ensure that they act to the highest professional standard. As a former lawyer myself, I am aware of the rigorous regulatory regime of the Solicitors Regulation Authority, which includes duties to the court and duties of integrity. Solicitors also act in the best interests of their client, and that is vital in ensuring effective access to justice. Those who provide services to people seeking asylum in England and Wales are also likely to be doing so on a legal aid basis, for which the Legal Aid Agency provides a further means of scrutiny and oversight.

In acting for people subject to immigration control, among other things, immigration lawyers work with clients who may lack funds and legal aid entitlements; whose documents may be incomplete, missing or badly translated; and whose statements as to their past experiences may be hard to secure, on account of the ill treatment they have suffered in their country of origin.

In addition, much is at stake in immigration proceedings. A person subject to immigration control who loses their case may be subject to expulsion from the UK and face a risk of harm in their country of origin. They may be separated from their family, or may lose the life they have built up in the UK over many years, leaving their lawyer in the position of making difficult but arguable points on their behalf. The proposals in clauses 62 and 63 of the Bill will only make that task harder.

Labour shares the concerns of the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association and the Law Society that immigration lawyers are being needlessly targeted by the new costs orders and charge orders, which are not necessary and do not apply in other areas of law. Immigration tribunal judges already have all they need by way of case management powers, costs powers and referral powers. Making the task of immigration lawyers harder prejudices access to justice, and has not been shown to be necessary by the evidence.

[Craig Whittaker]

Does the hon. Gentleman not agree that costs orders will only be made where representatives have been badly behaved and unreasonable without justification? In those circumstances, it is right that a representative should be required to pay wasted costs.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I will come on to that topic, but those powers already exist, and I do not think that further regulation of this type—forcing the tribunals committee to supply this information—is the correct way of going about this.

[Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)]

We have just heard about the new special court, the new special tribunal and the new special advocate. We have new processes, new bureaucracy and new costs. Does my hon. Friend agree that this clause represents the veneer of the Home Office’s pretence to actually give a damn about value for money any more?

[Bambos Charalambous]

My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. Throughout this Bill, some crumbs of legal aid have been provided in different circumstances, yet the Bill makes it difficult for lawyers to assist those people for whom legal aid is provided, and now they seem to be penalised for not being able to put forward the best case they can.

It is a well-established fact that access to justice includes equal protection under the law. Solicitors are fundamentally obliged to act in their clients’ best interests, which may involve adjourning a case due to a change in circumstances that they are not at liberty to disclose. That principle admits of no distinction between British nationals and foreign nationals, and those who are subject to UK law are entitled to its protection. In the context of UK immigration tribunal hearings, through which people subject to immigration control—non-citizens who cannot exercise democratic rights to shape the legislation to which they are subject—seek to vindicate their position against the state, that principle ought to warn against bearing down on them and their lawyers through an extra costs order and charging order regime that is inapplicable to British nationals in the wider courts and tribunals system.

Immigration tribunals already have the powers that they need to regulate their own procedures—as I have mentioned, they have case management powers, a costs jurisdiction and referral powers. Taking each in turn, they have extensive case management powers, as set out in rules 4 to 6 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014. Those tribunals already have a costs jurisdiction that enables them to make wasted costs orders against lawyers through the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007:

“(4) In any proceedings mentioned in subsection (1), the relevant Tribunal may—

(a) disallow, or

(b) (as the case may be) order the legal or other representative concerned to meet,

the whole of any wasted costs or such part of them as may be determined”.

Wasted costs are defined as

“any costs incurred by a party—

(a) as a result of any improper, unreasonable or negligent act or omission on the part of any legal or other representative or any employee of such a representative, or

(b) which, in the light of any such act or omission occurring after they were incurred, the relevant Tribunal considers it is unreasonable to expect that party to pay.”

That costs jurisdiction is given further effect by the rules of procedure set out in rule 9 of the 2014 rules. An order for wasted costs may be made

“where a person has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting proceedings. The Tribunal may make an order under this rule on an application or on its own initiative.”

In practice, tribunals have the power to regulate their own procedure to avoid its abuse. In the context of applications for judicial review in the High Court, it is recognised that the Court may refer a lawyer to their professional regulatory body, such as the Solicitors Regulation Authority, where their conduct warrants it, thus potentially leading to disciplinary proceedings. A legal representative may be asked to show why the conduct should not be considered for referral to the relevant body, or why they should not be admonished. An immigration tribunal might consider making such a referral in appropriate cases. Alternatively, it may decide that the conduct might not be so serious after all and restrain itself.

In clause 62, the Government seek to give immigration tribunals additional new powers, so that they may charge a participant an amount of money if it is considered that the participant

“has acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently, and

(b) as a result, the Tribunal’s resources have been wasted”.

The fine would be a separate matter from the costs incurred by a party, and it would be payable by the other party. The charge would be paid to the tribunal. In this context, participants who may be ordered to pay a charge in respect of immigration tribunal proceedings include

“(a) any person exercising a right of audience or right to conduct the proceedings on behalf of a party to proceedings,

(b) any employee of such a person, or

(c) where the Secretary of State is a party to proceedings and has not instructed a person mentioned in paragraph (a) to act on their behalf in the proceedings, the Secretary of State.

(4) A person may be found to have acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently…by reason of having failed to act in a particular way.”

However, we are not told what that “particular way” is.

Clause 62 provides that rules may be made and may include the “scales of amounts” to be charged, and it is wrong that no framework has been provided for the scales of amounts to be charged. As a rationale for this innovation, it is said that:

“High levels of poor practice around compliance with tribunal directions, which disrupts or prevents the proper preparation of an appeal, can lead to cases being adjourned at a late stage.”

No actual evidence is adduced to support that proposition or to demonstrate that existing case management powers, wasted costs powers and powers of referral are inadequate to deal with such matters.

Clause 62 seeks to amend the cost provisions in the 2007 Act in order to put greater emphasis on making an order on grounds of unreasonable behaviour. A tribunal may make an order in respect of costs in any proceedings if it considers that a party, or its legal or other representative, has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting the proceedings. This is a power to make a costs order against a party and/or their lawyer. Unlike in considering wasted costs, the behaviour identified is solely that which is unreasonable, not behaviour that is improper or negligent. In carving out unreasonable behaviour in this way, there is a risk that the high threshold that applies in the wasted costs jurisdiction is lowered, and that such orders are made where the ordinary difficulties of running an immigration case have impeded its progress. It is unclear why additional regulatory measures are thought to be needed, indicating that the proposal is unnecessary. The tribunal procedure rules already have provisions for wasted costs, and tribunals have the power to refer cases of improper behaviour to the regulator.

Clause 63 provides that:

“Tribunal Procedure Rules must prescribe conduct that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, is to be treated as—

(a) improper, unreasonable or negligent for the purposes of”

a charge in respect of wasted resources. Where the prescribed conduct occurs, the person in question will be treated as having acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently unless they can show evidence to the contrary, so there is a rebuttal presumption in relation to this. Here too there is a risk that conduct that does not meet the test for being unreasonable allows a wasted costs order to sneak back in. It is also not clear how wasted resources will be defined or quantified, which may lead to satellite litigation challenging the fine itself or the amount imposed, further increasing the burdens on a system already under immense pressure. The rules make provisions to the effect that if the tribunal is satisfied that the conduct has taken place, it must consider whether to impose a charge or make a costs order, though it is not compelled to do so.

According to the Home Office, in immigration tribunals,

“A range of conduct on the part of legal and other representatives…in the way proceedings are conducted or pursued”

is

“disrupting or preventing the proper preparation and progress of an appeal”,

but once again, no evidence is adduced to support that proposition, or to demonstrate that existing case management powers, wasted costs powers, and the power to refer are inadequate to deal with such matters.

Introducing further overlapping and potentially duplicative regulatory requirements may have the perverse impact of undermining the effectiveness of all relevant regimes, and increase complexity and bureaucracy. If solicitors are held personally liable for costs that arise for reasons outside their control, it could risk driving a wedge between them and their clients by creating a conflict of interest. The immigration tribunals already have all the case management cost and referral powers that they need to control their procedures. Adding new powers for immigration tribunals without establishing a basis for them in evidence is not necessary and is counterproductive. For the reasons I have outlined, we oppose clauses 62 and 63.

--- Later in debate ---

[Craig Whittaker]

Thorough consideration has been given to the impact of clause 64 and what it adds to existing requirements under immigration rules and wider provisions. We have also taken into account the views of stakeholders. After further reflection, we have decided to remove the clause from the Bill in its entirety. As a stand- alone provision, that will not impact on the wider measures in the Bill. Consequently, clause 64 requires an amendment to remove reference to it, which is the purpose of Government amendment 81.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Am I right that the Government will vote against the clause?

[The Chair]

I understand that the Government plan to vote against the clause.

Question put and negatived.

Clause 64 accordingly disagreed to.

Clause 65

Pre-consolidation amendments of immigration legislation

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Bambos Charalambous]

This might seem innocuous but my concern is that it may be a power grab by the Secretary of State because the clause contains some quite strong measures on what the Secretary of State can do in relation to other parts of legislation. Can the Minister reassure me that my fears are not borne out by the consolidation measures in clause 65?

Nationality and Borders Bill (Fifteenth sitting)

Bambos Charalambous Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 4th November 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Briefly, there are two reasons why I do not think this new clause makes any sense at all. First, there is the point that I just alluded to. The danger is that if someone who has a PRN served on them is contemplating disclosing further information or making a claim and the deadline passes, and they are acting in the way that the Minister wants to get at here and trying to “play the system”, they will simply not make that disclosure. Their existing claims will proceed to appeal through the normal channels, to a first tier tribunal with onward appeal rights. So the proposals do not make sense, even by the Government’s own logic. Can the Minister address that?

Secondly, we object to the new clause from a point of principle. The rare occasions when I would accept that an expedited appeals process can be justified are where the justifications relate solely to manifestly unfounded or repeat claims, but that is not what this is about; this is about expediting appeals and rights to appeal, but not because of the substance of the appeal—it has absolutely nothing to do with the merits of the claim or the related appeal at all. So the proposals make no sense from the point of view of principle, as well as being rather illogical.

[Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)]

Again, briefly, I agree with everything the Scottish National party spokesperson, the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East, has just said. We do not know at what stage the other appeal will be; it may not be ready to be heard. One problem we have in this country is the delay in the appeals processes because of severe underfunding in our court and tribunal systems, so it seems that the new clause will not work.

The new clause will also cause more problems than it solves. I am not sure that there is a huge problem with multiple outstanding appeals in any event, but the new clause could actually make things worse. If the intention in the Bill is to provide fairness, the new clause will not achieve that, because speeding up an appeal could cause unfairness. So for the reasons outlined by the SNP spokesperson we will not support the new clause.

[Tom Pursglove]

The bottom line is that we simply disagree on this matter. Clause 21 ensures that appeals relating to late human rights or protection claims are dealt with expeditiously, with decisions by the upper tribunal being final. This provides appellants with a swift determination of their claim. It also disincentives late claims and seeks to prevent sequential or multiple appeals from being utilised as a tactic to thwart removal.

However, the Government recognise that in certain circumstances an individual may exercise other appeal rights, in parallel with their expedited appeal. This could give rise to a situation whereby a person has an appeal in a first tier tribunal and an expedited appeal in the upper tribunal. Consequently, the expedited appeal may conclude while an individual has an outstanding appeal in a first tier tribunal. If the appellant was unsuccessful in their expedited appeal, the ongoing appeal in the first tier tribunal would prevent their removal from the UK. This outcome is undesirable and undermines the Government’s intention to disincentivise late claims by ensuring that appeals relating to such claims are determined quickly and conclusively.

The new clause ensures that where a person has an expedited appeal, any related appeal will also be subject to the same expedited process. Therefore, following the conclusion of the expedited process, the appellant’s right to remain in the UK will be determined with finality and, where an individual has no right to remain in the UK, removal action can take place. That is the logical and sensible approach that we propose to take.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 6 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 1 would lift the Afghan citizens resettlement scheme’s limit of 5,000 people per year. The Labour party wants to see the removal of the 5,000 person limit and the opening of safe routes for refugees fleeing the Taliban. In the summer, the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan captured the world’s attention, as images of thousands of Afghans, desperate but also determined to escape the Taliban’s grip on the country, dominated the media. As the UK has been one of the countries most directly involved in Afghanistan for the last two decades, the British public’s reaction to the refugees’ plight was one of compassion and benevolence. Hundreds offered hospitality, and many more donated support to arriving newcomers.

The Government reacted instantly to the public’s demand for welcome and refuge by announcing the Afghan citizens resettlement scheme, offering refuge in the UK to 5,000 Afghans, up to a total of 20,000 in the long term. The Prime Minister also promised to house a town’s worth of refugees, while the Home Secretary rushed to Heathrow airport—along with news camera crews—to receive some of those airlifted out of Kabul, as the Government launched Operation Warm Welcome.

The Government believe that Britain’s bespoke scheme for Afghan refugees is one of the most generous in the country’s history, and the Home Secretary has argued that it is not possible to take in any more refugees. In truth, the Government’s response to the Afghan catastrophe is hardly generous. The idea of a fixed quota for refugees in such emergencies is meaningless. The figure of 5,000 meets the Government’s political needs rather than the needs of those on the ground in Afghanistan. I note that in the new plan for immigration, the Government seem very happy to welcome up to 5 million Hongkongers via the British national overseas scheme, which I will address later.

Although we welcome the commitment to provide 5,000 places to Afghan refugees through the Afghan citizens resettlement scheme, the scheme appears to be a carbon copy of the Syrian vulnerable persons resettlement scheme. The difference is that while the Syrian scheme placed people who were already in refugee camps in Turkey and Jordan—a position of relative safety that made it easier to process and admit them—in this case, many have fled Afghanistan to neighbouring countries in fear for their lives, or are in hiding in Afghanistan, where they live in fear.

Just yesterday, a constituent of mine, whose sister had run a school teaching girls and had campaigned for free elections and women’s rights in Afghanistan, told me that her sister’s friend had been found and murdered, and that her sister was in hiding with her husband, petrified about what could happen to her. Despite being told by the Foreign Office to go to Kabul airport, some Chevening scholars and people who had helped the British military were prevented from getting on any flights out of the country. The problem is that some of those people who are trapped in Afghanistan are at high risk and may not survive until the end of the year, let alone the four years the scheme is meant to run. The scheme is not even open yet; two months down the line from the fiasco of the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan, we are no closer to finding out any details of the scheme.

From what I understand, the Government control who does and does not have access to the scheme, so they will choose who makes it on to the scheme. They also control the numbers, but an arbitrary annual cap of 5,000 people is meaningless and could cost lives if stuck to rigidly. In the Government’s response to the new plan for immigration consultation, the section entitled, “Protecting those fleeing persecution, oppression, and tyranny”, states:

“The Government will pilot an Emergency Resettlement Mechanism, starting in the autumn, to enable refugees in urgent need to be resettled more quickly so that life-saving protection is provided in weeks rather than months. Beyond this, the Government will provide more flexibility to help people in truly exceptional and compelling circumstances by using the Home Secretary’s discretion to provide rapid assistance.”

The Government have failed to live up to those words because life-saving protection was not provided in weeks, but months, and there is no sign of rapid assistance.

If the arbitrary annual limit of 5,000 people is reached, Afghans who helped the UK military and who have been able to escape Afghanistan could arrive seeking protection in the UK only to be treated like criminals for how they have arrived. It is worth noting that the Government’s advice to Afghans was to leave Afghanistan when they ran out of time for flights to the UK in August. Under the Bill, they would be penalised if they came to the UK via irregular routes. That would plainly be wrong and inhumane, and the Government could avoid that by having no cap on the resettlement scheme.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that intervention, and no doubt we will have a conversation about his visit to Dover.

[Bambos Charalambous]

As I mentioned in my speech, the Government chose who came into the UK through the voluntary resettlement scheme and they will do so under this scheme as well. Remarks about giving unfettered or unlimited access to everyone are therefore ludicrous, because the Government will be in control of who can enter the UK from Afghanistan through this scheme. To make such aspersions is clearly wrong and misleading.

[Tom Pursglove]

The shadow Minister interrupted me while I was responding to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent North, and, of course, I was happy to take his intervention. The scheme we intend to bring forward is structured and it should not be seen in isolation in relation to Afghanistan. It is important to consider it in the context of the Afghan relocations and assistance policy, which has been invaluable and plays an important role in our efforts to provide sanctuary to those fleeing Afghanistan. That is very important to consider.

To continue with my point about the participation of civil society in community sponsorship, we have been working around the clock to stand up support with local authorities and to secure accommodation for the scheme. There is a huge effort under way to get families who have already been evacuated to the UK into permanent homes so that they can resettle and rebuild their lives. Clearly, we do not want families to remain in bridging accommodation for long periods, so it is sensible to have a limit on the number of places we offer on the scheme.

The new clause seeks to bring the Afghan citizens resettlement scheme into force within 30 days from the date of Royal Assent. We are working at pace to open the scheme, and the new clause would likely result in significant delays in resettling individuals under the scheme.

During the passage of the Bill, we have had many debates relating to Afghanistan. I said previously that I would ensure that the Minister for Afghan Resettlement was made aware of the Committee’s comments, and I will endeavour to do that again. It is important that all views are heard as we work at pace to shape this scheme and to make sure that we get it right, so that we are able to provide sanctuary to those to whom Members across the Committee and across the House want to provide it.

Previous schemes have not been delivered through legislation. I would argue that it is best to be responsive and flexible, and that not putting the scheme on a statutory basis has that effect. The shadow Minister used the word “rigid”. I would argue that not going down the statutory route ensures we can be flexible as to the evolving situation, and provide proper care and support to people who come here.

We want coming to the UK to be a positive and life-changing experience, and we want to provide sanctuary and care for those individuals. I am confident that that is precisely what we will do in delivering this scheme and that our country will be able to be incredibly proud of it. We owe it to those individuals to provide them with sanctuary, and that is precisely what we will do. With that, I ask the hon. Members to withdraw the new clause.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I am not convinced by the Minister’s arguments, which clearly amount to a new cap on immigration. I will repeat the number for the benefit of the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent North: there are 5 million people potentially eligible to come to the country via the British national overseas visa scheme; we are just asking that more than 5,000 people are able to come from Afghanistan. If that limit is rigidly applied, people’s lives could be in danger.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The Opposition urge the Government to adopt a mandatory dispersal and asylum accommodation scheme that will require all local authorities to contribute towards supporting asylum seekers and the Government to fully fund any additional expenditure for those authorities. Having listened to the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent North speak about his local authority taking its fair share of asylum seekers in dispersal asylum accommodation, I can honestly say that, on this and this alone, I agree with him, and I know he will have no difficulty in supporting our new clause.

Local authorities currently volunteer to participate in dispersal arrangements. The Home Secretary has reserve powers to ensure that local authorities co-operate in the provision of accommodation for asylum seekers through sections 100 and 101 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. The current dispersal system is unfair and inefficient, with the majority of asylum seekers housed in disadvantaged local authority areas while dozens of councils support none. This has led to some councils that have been incredibly generous and kind in taking asylum seekers, such as that in the great city of Stoke-on-Trent, feeling undermined by councils that have not and threatening to leave the Government’s voluntary scheme.

In the Committee’s evidence session on 21 September, I asked the leaders of Kent County Council and Westminster City Council, Councillor Gough and Councillor Robathan, whether they thought that all councils should have to take their fair share of asylum seekers. Both agreed that they should as they spoke about the pressures on services for their local councils. In August, the Local Government Chronicle ran a story about council leaders demanding a fairer distribution of refugees, in which Coventry City Council leader George Duggins said:

“All local authorities need to take their fair share of the dispersal programme—no opting out, no excuses”.

It also included Walsall Council leader Mike Bird saying that the dispersal of asylum seekers was

“an issue for the whole of the country, not just the urban areas”,

and Stoke-on-Trent City Council leader Abi Brown, whom I am sure the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent North will be familiar with, saying that it was “really sad” that many councils had still not pledged to take any Afghan refugees, adding:

“How do we counter this if there isn’t some national scheme?”

[Jonathan Gullis]

The hon. Gentleman rightly quotes the leader of Stoke-on-Trent City Council. My hon. Friends the Members for Stoke-on-Trent South (Jack Brereton) and for Stoke-on-Trent Central (Jo Gideon) and I agree that other parts of our United Kingdom should step up to the plate and do much more. I reiterate and put on the record that I support Stoke-on-Trent City Council, which is currently looking to withdraw from the voluntary dispersal scheme because it is unhappy with how it works at present. Therefore, while I have a lot of empathy with what the hon. Gentleman’s new clause seeks to do, I will—reluctantly, in some ways—not vote for it. However, I would absolutely like to work with the hon. Gentleman and Opposition and Government Members to make sure that the scheme becomes much fairer and works for other parts of our United Kingdom.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I look forward to having that conversation with the hon. Gentleman after the debate, because we need a fairer system; too much of the burden is clearly being put on some local authorities and not enough on others.

Local authorities are vital partners in providing suitable accommodation and support for people seeking asylum. The system works best when central Government, the devolved Governments and local government work together, alongside the voluntary sector and community groups. This requires local authorities to be fully on board with plans to accommodate people in their area. However, figures have shown that more than half of those seeking asylum or who have been brought to Britain for resettlement are accommodated by just 6% of local councils, all of which represent areas with below average household incomes.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

I agree with some of the intention behind new clause 2. It is right that all parts of the UK make a reasonable contribution to ensuring that adequate accommodation is available for asylum seekers who would otherwise be destitute, but it is important to recognise that not every area of the UK has appropriate services or affordable accommodation to appropriately support them. Additionally, some local authorities have very few asylum seekers accommodated by the Home Office in their areas but support large numbers of other migrants. For example, the Home Office does not accommodate many adult asylum seekers and their children in Kent or Croydon, but both local authorities support large numbers of unaccompanied asylum-seeking children.

It is also important to note that not all asylum seekers are accommodated by the Home Office. The proportion varies over time, but historically around 50% find accommodation with friends or family. That group often live in areas where there are few supported asylum seekers, but they still require access to the same health and education services. It is not therefore sensible to have a rigid set of rules that require destitute asylum seekers to be accommodated in areas in direct proportion to the population of those places. The other factors that I have described must be taken into consideration.

Since the introduction of part 6 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, successive Governments have employed a policy of seeking the agreement of local authorities prior to placing asylum seekers within an area. However, the legislation does not provide local authorities with a veto on the placement of asylum seekers in their areas. If a local authority objects to proposals by our providers to use accommodation not previously used to house asylum seekers, the Home Office can consider and adjudicate on the matter.

A lot of work has none the less been done on increasing local authority participation in asylum dispersal since 2015. Prior to 2015, there were around only 100 local authorities participating. There are now around 140. We have established the local government chief executive group to bring together senior representatives from local authorities, with the aim of expanding the dispersal system and improving the process for the people who use it. We are planning a wider review of the dispersal process and will be consulting local authorities and others.

The local government chief executive group is working collaboratively to evidence any additional costs to local authorities by the dispersal proposal and to identify the appropriate funding mechanism. In light of what I have said, I hope that the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate will withdraw the motion.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I am sorry, but I suggest that we vote on the new clause.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

We believe that new clause 3 is necessary because of an issue relating to comprehensive sickness insurance, which has been affecting EU citizens and babies born in the UK to EU parents. The issue is preventing naturalisation or automatic access to the right to be registered as British born. We believe that that is unfair and incorrect. Historically, access to the NHS for European economic area and Swiss citizens was free at the point of use, on the same terms as residents who are British citizens, without the need for any further insurance.

The Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016 included a requirement for comprehensive sickness insurance, but this requirement was not routinely communicated to EEA and Swiss citizens, and was only required at the point of applying to the Home Office. This has led to a situation where individuals have been refused permanent residence documents, naturalisation applications and citizenship at birth, and have lost family reunion rights under the separation agreements following a discretionary grant of naturalisation. Not only was the requirement for comprehensive sickness insurance not made clear prior to applying to the Home Office, but CSI might not have been relevant to EEA or Swiss citizens, such as during periods of study or self-sufficiency.

I will set the issue in a wider context. The UK has set up the EU settlement scheme, which allows EU citizens to acquire settled status, but many want to become British. They want the right to vote and the security of the nationality of their adopted home, the United Kingdom. However, the requirement to have an obscure health insurance policy is putting applications at risk of refusal and is discouraging many from applying. The British Nationality Act 1981 requires applicants to have not been in breach of immigration laws for any period relied on in the application. While a lot of EU citizens need only to have been living in the UK, students and those who are self-sufficient must also be in possession of comprehensive sickness insurance. However, the possession of CSI has never been a requirement for EU citizens to live in the UK or use the NHS, so most people do not and never have had it.

More concerning is the fact that the Home Office never communicated clearly to EU students and self-sufficient people that they would need to have CSI to become British. The Home Office, which is in charge of decisions relating to applications for citizenship, has maintained the policy despite questions from various organisations, including the3million. In May 2020, updated guidance to caseworkers confirmed the policy, changing the application process to ask for CSI and directing caseworkers to check for it. The guidance introduced a vague power of discretion, but no details were provided as to how that discretion should be applied.

In the Opposition’s view, it is clearly unfair that this anomaly relating to CSI has led to historical and ongoing injustices. It is not fair that what appears to be an additional random requirement for one group of citizens—not communicated prior to application—has, in effect, defined people’s ability to naturalise or claim citizenship.

We therefore believe that the new clause is needed to make the law fair. The historical requirement demanding that individuals hold CSI should also be satisfied by them having had free access to the NHS at the point of use without further insurance. The addition of historical access to the NHS as a satisfying condition would be much fairer. I will give some examples to further illustrate the need for this.

Roberto is Portuguese and arrived in the UK in 2006. He did an undergraduate degree in the UK, where he met his wife. During their university years, they studied full time and did not have CSI as they were never made aware of that requirement for full-time EU students in the UK. They had a son in the UK in 2011 and applied for his British passport, believing that he would automatically be born British.

However, when Roberto and his wife contacted the Home Office for information about the passport application, they were told that as they had not had CSI in the five years preceding the birth, he was not considered to be British. This new clause would address this problem, as the parents’ CSI requirement would have been met by their having had access to the NHS. Consequently, the fact that the child should have been born British can now be addressed by registering for British citizenship at no charge.

I would like the Committee to consider another example illustrating the need for this new clause. Lara is a Brazilian-Italian citizen who has been living in the UK since 2014. Between 2014 and 2017, Lara was in work, but she started a full-time degree at the University of Cambridge in September 2017. In July 2019, Lara was granted settled status under the EU settlement scheme and was looking forward to applying for naturalisation as a British citizen in 2020 after holding settled status for a year. Lara has since started working again, and has been made aware that she should have held CSI while she was at university—a requirement she was never made aware of by either her university or her GP.

If Lara applies for naturalisation, she may fail the lawful residence requirements due to the absence of CSI and may have her application refused. Since late 2020, caseworkers have had the discretion to grant citizenship when there are compelling grounds, although those are not clearly defined in any Home Office guidance. Therefore, like many other EU citizens, Lara is afraid of taking the risk of paying the £1,330 naturalisation fee and not obtaining a positive outcome.

Our new clause would mean that the period of residence that led to the grant of settled status would be considered to be lawful residence, and that the good character requirement could not be failed for a lack of CSI. That would give EU citizens like Lara the confidence to apply for naturalisation, knowing that they would meet all the criteria.

It is important to note that if Lara applies for citizenship and is granted it through caseworker discretion, the CSI issue is likely to still affect her in the future. If she then wished to be joined by a family member in the UK, the complex appendix EU immigration rules, which define the EU settlement scheme, mean that she would fall outside the definition of “qualifying British citizen” due to her historical lack of CSI, and therefore lose the scheme’s right to family reunion. If Lara does not become a British citizen, she would have that right through having settled status.

The new clause would mean that for future decisions taken under the immigration rules, the CSI requirement would be met by access to the NHS, meaning that EU citizens like Lara would not unexpectedly lose the rights they had before naturalising. We believe that this new clause is needed to address this unfair anomaly around CSI.

[Tom Pursglove]

I thank the hon. Members for tabling the new clause, which relates to the requirement, in certain circumstances, for EEA nationals to have had comprehensive sickness insurance to have been residing lawfully in the UK. Regulations set out the requirements that EEA nationals needed to follow if they wished to reside here lawfully on the basis of free movement. In the case of students or the self-sufficient, but not those who were working here, the possession of CSI has always been a requirement.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

The hon. Gentleman will appreciate that this matter falls within the portfolio of the Minister for Future Borders and Immigration, so if the hon. Gentleman does not mind, I shall take away that suggestion and ask the Minister to consider it. If the hon. Gentleman wants to follow up in writing with the Minister, I am sure my hon. Friend would consider that and come back to him. I will certainly make sure that he is aware of the suggestion the hon. Gentleman raises.

The new clause would amend the naturalisation requirements for EEA nationals who did not have CSI and so had not been in the UK lawfully before they acquired settled status. We cannot accept that, as all applicants are required to meet the same requirements for naturalisation in terms of lawful residence and it would not be right to treat certain nationalities differently.

The third part of the new clause would amend the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 such that a person is treated as having had CSI if they had access to the NHS in practice or held a CSI policy. However, there is no mention of CSI in the rest of that Act, nor is there any mention of CSI in residence scheme immigration rules. The EU settlement scheme does not test for CSI and there is no need to have held it in the past, or to hold it now, in order for EEA nationals to obtain settled or pre-settled status. As such, that part of the new clause would have no practical effect. I therefore ask the hon. Members to withdraw their new clause.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I will press the new clause to a Division.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I thank the Chagossians who spoke to the shadow Minister and myself, and Fragomen solicitors for facilitating that discussion and drafting the new clauses. As Members, and particularly Conservative Members, will know, the hon. Member for Crawley (Henry Smith), in whose constituency we find the UK’s largest Chagossian diaspora, has championed Chagossians for many years. On Second Reading I asked the Government to consider introducing a clause to rectify some of the injustices that Chagossians have faced for more than half a century. I understand that they will bring in an amendment on Report to do that, but today we seek to probe their initial thinking.

We could speak all day about how outrageously the Chagossians were treated by the UK and the US. They were removed from their islands simply to make way for an airbase, dumped in Mauritius and elsewhere and basically forgotten about. There are myriad injustices that are still to be put right. The new clauses do not fix everything, but they would fix significant injustices in relation to nationality—exactly what part 1 of this Bill was supposed to do—and family. Some Chagossians would benefit from provisions in part 1 of this Bill, which is welcome, but the Bill needs to go much further if they are to have access to the citizenship that is rightly theirs and that has been denied them only by the outrageous events of the late 1960s and the early 1970s.

As we touched on during debates on part 1, citizenship by descent in British and British overseas territories’ nationality law usually stretches to only one generation. If someone moves abroad, the children they have there will be British by descent, but if those children remain abroad and later have kids they would not be able to pass on that British citizenship. That reflects the idea that the family have made a voluntary decision to loosen their links to the UK and to build a new life elsewhere. Therefore, citizenship of the country where they now live is probably more appropriate.

Exceptions are made—for example, if the only reason the person was abroad was Crown service or if the parent who could not pass on citizenship has actually lived in the UK for three years previously or goes on to do so. All of that illustrates the point that reflecting the idea of a voluntary link to the UK justifies continued transmission of UK citizenship.

None of that can apply to the Chagossians; the situation there is obviously manifestly different. The only reason why Chagossians cannot pass on their British overseas territory citizenship is that they were forcibly removed from their islands. Nobody chose to make a new life in Mauritius or anywhere else—far from it. Nobody can say that they have voluntarily chosen to take on a new identity elsewhere. Any undermining or breaking of the link was completely forced on them in quite the most outrageous circumstances; that in itself should be enough to justify new clause 15.

The knock-on effect is that when the law was changed in 2002, while some Chagossians became British citizens as well as British overseas territory citizens, others missed out. They are now in the horrible situation where some have the right to rekindle their British identity and return here, but others do not. If I was a Chagossian whose parent was born just before being forcibly removed from the islands, and was therefore BOTC by birth, I am likely to be in a far better position than, for example, my cousin whose parents were born just days after being forced from the islands, and therefore cannot transmit their BOTC or British citizenship. When introducing the Bill, the Home Secretary said that it would mean children unfairly denied British overseas territory citizenship will finally be able to acquire citizenship, as well as British citizenship. What happened to the Chagossians, and what they still face today, is an absolute scandal. The least that we can do is ensure that all of them can access the nationality that the UK and US action deprived them of.

New clause 4 would fix another unfairness. I absolutely detest the restrictive rules that the Home Office has put in place on family visas, which say that someone must be earning certain sums of money before they can bring their non-national spouse or children here. Putting that to one side for the moment, even accepting the Government’s own logic, these provisions should not apply to the spouses and family members of Chagossians. Essentially, the Government logic is that if people choose to build a family life elsewhere and then come back to the UK, they should have certain financial means to support themselves and knowledge of the UK. However, again, Chagossians did not choose to make their family life outside British overseas territories—that was forced on them. It would now be totally unfair to restrict the right to come to the UK by imposing those rules on the families as if this was a choice they made.

It was a step in the right direction to provide British citizenship to some in 2002, but it is cruel to deny effective access to these routes by denying family members the right to come here. It is particularly cruel, given that the reason many will not be able to meet the financial threshold is the horrendous way they have been treated for decades and the extraordinary deprivation they have had to endure. I hope the Home Office will look to fix two of the many injustices that have been visited on the Chagossians.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I will speak to new clause 15, which is grouped with new clause 4. I fully endorse what the spokesperson for the SNP said.

New clause 15 seeks to rectify a long-standing issue in British nationality law that affects a relatively small number of people—the Chagossian people, descendants of the Chagos islanders, who were forcibly removed from the British Indian Ocean Territory in the 1960s. Between 1968 and 1974, the UK forcibly removed thousands of Chagossians from their homelands on the Chagos islands. The removal was done to make way for a US military base on Diego Garcia. The Chagossians were a settled population on the islands. Their origins trace back to 1793. They were removed and deported to Mauritius and the Seychelles, more than 1,600 km away from the Chagos islands, and have faced extreme poverty and discrimination in those places.

Because of the removal, many descendants of the Chagos islanders, despite being the grandchildren of people who were British subjects in the British Indian Ocean Territory, have been denied rights to British citizenship. The British Overseas Territories Act 2002 granted British citizenship to resettled Chagossians born between 1969 and 1982—the children of those born on the British Indian Ocean Territory. However, many Chagossians have still been denied citizenship, including second-generation Chagossians born outside those dates.

The grandchildren of those born on the British Indian Ocean Territory, third-generation Chagossians, do not have rights to British citizenship, as citizenship has not automatically passed to them, even if in some cases they migrated to the UK with their British parents at a very young age. That group therefore often become an undocumented presence in the UK once they reach the age of 18, and are denied access to jobs, housing and healthcare, despite having lived in the UK since a very young age.

The Chagossian community is divided between Mauritius, the Seychelles and the UK. Broken and divided families are therefore a direct consequence of this injustice in British nationality law. For 60 years, the Chagossian people have faced dispersal, poverty and separation. That has severely limited their life chances and damaged the health and wellbeing of generations of people.

The Bill in its current state does not cover the British citizenship and immigration issues that the Chagossian community faces. That is why the Opposition are introducing this new clause and why we wish to raise the issue today. It is worth exploring this unfairness in more detail, and the reasons why legislation has failed to rectify it to date.

Under British nationality law, citizenship is normally passed only to one generation born abroad. However, the situation of the Chagossians is fundamentally different from that of other inhabited British overseas territories, and applying that restriction to the Chagossians is unacceptable. As we know, their parents and grandparents were forcibly removed from their homeland and deported to Mauritius and the Seychelles. Since then, the Chagossian people have been born outside the Chagos archipelago and receive citizenship from Mauritius or the Seychelles, with no recognition of their long-standing ties to British nationality.

It is not possible for the descendants of the Chagos islanders to be born on the islands of the British Indian Ocean Territory due to the Order in Council since 2004, which bans any Chagossian from living on their native land. That is deeply unfair. They have not severed links with their British citizenship voluntarily; they have been excluded by the UK Government. At this point I would like to share the personal experiences of those affected by that injustice. Like many in Committee, I have been contacted by members of the community, and I pay tribute to their campaigning efforts in incredibly distressing and difficult circumstances, including groups such as Chagossian Voices. Pascal Francois is one of those affected. He resides in Mauritius and is Chagossian. He says:

“For years we have suffered from the separation of our families, through no fault of our own. We are as British as you and the next person. We wish to be known as British, we belong to the UK & her territories. The Chagossian people in exile no longer want to live in the shadows of others. We want to belong and be British by descent.”

The battle for Chagossians’ rights has been raging for decades, and this group of people have been badly let down by the UK. Most Chagossian families, already financially impacted by their enforced exile, are paying—and have paid for many years—huge and increasing visa, immigration and citizenship fees, health surcharges and legal expenses for spouses and children with pending or rejected applications. This process has significantly damaged their health, wellbeing and livelihoods. It has caused immense stress. There is understandable frustration at the lack of support from the Home Office.

Nationality and Borders Bill (Sixteenth sitting)

Bambos Charalambous Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 4th November 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Holly Lynch]

I live in hope that anyone who can run a marathon for Justice and Care would understand the value of the independent child trafficking guardians and the victim navigators, and with that in mind, I very much look forward to the Minister’s further commitments in writing. If we are not satisfied, we will come back to this issue on Report, but I trust that he will do everything he can on those two fronts. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 46

Permission to work for people seeking asylum

“(1) The Immigration Act 1971 is amended as follows.

(2) After section 3(2) (general provisions for regulation and control) insert—

‘(2A) In making rules under subsection (2), the Secretary of State must make provision for persons seeking asylum, within the meaning of the rules, and their adult dependants to have the right to apply to the Secretary of State for permission to take up employment, including self-employment and voluntary work.

(2B) Permission to work for persons seeking asylum and their adult dependants must be granted if—

(a) a decision has not been taken on the person’s asylum application within six months of the date of that application, or

(b) a person makes a further application which raises asylum grounds and a decision on that new application, or a decision on whether to treat such further asylum grounds as a new application, has not been taken within six months of the date on which the further application was made.

(2C) Permission for a person seeking asylum and their adult dependants to take up employment shall be on terms no less favourable than the terms granted to a person recognised as a refugee.’”—(Bambos Charalambous.)

This new clause amends the Immigration Act 1971 to allow people seeking asylum to be granted permission to work after 6 months.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

I will try to be brief in the interests of time. I thank the Lift the Ban campaign for its sterling work on why this new clause is so necessary and why it would be so beneficial. Current immigration rules dictate that asylum seekers can apply for permission to work only if they have been waiting for a decision for over 12 months and only for jobs that are on the Government’s highly restrictive shortage occupation list, which includes professions such as classical ballet dancer and geophysicist. That has not always been the case. Until 2002, people were able to apply for permission to work if they had been waiting for a decision for more than six months. Only in 2010 was the right to work restricted to jobs on the shortage occupation list.

Today, 76% of people waiting for a decision on their asylum claim have been waiting for more than six months, according to the Government’s latest immigration statistics. During the long waits for claims to be processed, people seeking asylum are unable safely to protect themselves and provide for their families. They are forced to depend on the pitifully low asylum support payments of £5.66 a day, and people must often choose between essential items of food, medicine and cleaning products while being prohibited from using their skills and experience.

Work provides a route out of poverty, and there would be a big economic benefit from lifting the ban. The Lift the Ban coalition has calculated that, if 50% of those currently waiting more than six months for a decision on their claim found work, the net economic benefit from increased tax and national insurance contributions and from lower asylum support payments would be £178 million per year. Lifting the ban also has widespread business backing. In 2019, the Lift the Ban coalition polled 1,000 businesses for their views on whether people seeking asylum should have the right to work, and 67% of the businesses polled agreed.

In addition, lifting the ban would bring the UK into line with policy in all other comparable countries. Lifting the ban also makes sense in the covid-19 pandemic or post-pandemic context in which we find ourselves. The skills and desire to work possessed by many stuck in the asylum system could have been invaluable during the recent covid-19 crisis. Very importantly, lifting the ban would support integration. It stands to reason that early access to employment increases the chances of smooth economic and social integration by allowing people to improve their English, acquire new skills, and make new friends and social contacts in the wider community. Crucially, it enables them to be self-sufficient. The policy is also popular with the public. According to Lift the Ban coalition’s research conducted in 2018, 71% of the public support lifting the ban.

[Holly Lynch]

My hon. Friend is making a powerful speech. I intended to speak in full in favour of new clause 46, but I will just make an intervention. On that 71% figure, he will be aware that Lift the Ban conducted research in every constituency across the country. Bearing in mind that 73% of the people of Eastleigh, 72% of the people of Calder Valley and 66% of the people in the constituency of the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent North support ending the ban on the right to work, does my hon. Friend share my hope that the hon. Members for those areas will reflect on the public’s support for new clause 46?

[Bambos Charalambous]

My hon. Friend makes an excellent point and I hope beyond hope that hon. Members will support our new clause.

In December 2018, the then Home Secretary stated that a Home Office review of the policy would be taking place. Subsequent contributions in 2019 from the Prime Minister and Home Office Ministers confirmed that the review would continue under the new Government, but to date no detail has been provided regarding the content or methodology of that review. The Government have appeared divided in their own ranks on the issue. In recent months, senior Cabinet Ministers have expressed disquiet about the Government’s position. Surely, it is therefore time that the Government listen to voices from across the political spectrum on this issue and do the right thing by adopting our clause on lifting the ban on work for people seeking asylum.

[Tom Pursglove]

I should start by noting that, as hon. Members know, the Government’s current policy does allow asylum seekers to work in the UK if their claim has been outstanding for 12 months, where the delay was caused through no fault of their own. Those permitted to work are restricted to jobs on the shortage occupation list, which is based on expert advice from the independent Migration Advisory Committee.

I should like to set out the rationale for that policy position. The policy is designed to protect the resident labour market by prioritising access to employment for British citizens and others who are lawfully resident, including those granted refugee status, who are given full access to the labour market. That is in line with wider changes we have made through the points-based immigration system. We consider it crucial to distinguish between those who need protection and those seeking to come here to work, who can apply for a work visa under the immigration rules. Our wider immigration policy would be undermined if individuals could bypass the work visa rules by lodging unfounded asylum claims in the UK.

[Tom Pursglove]

I have been very generous throughout the duration of the Committee, but I am afraid I need to make some progress at this point.

It is also the case that unrestricted access to employment opportunities may act as an incentive for more migrants to choose to come here illegally, rather than claim asylum in the first safe country they reach. While pull factors are complex, we cannot ignore that access to the UK labour market is among the reasons that an unprecedented number of people are taking extremely dangerous journeys by small boat to the UK. I trust that hon. Members would agree with me that the UK cannot have a policy that raises those risks, and that we must do everything in our power to put a stop to those journeys.

Relaxing our asylum seeker right-to-work policy is not the right approach in this respect. Indeed, in an article earlier this month, the French newspaper Le Figaro noted the perspective in France that the “economic attractiveness” of the UK is a reason migrants attempt to cross the channel in small boats. In addition, removing restrictions on work for asylum seekers could increase the number of unfounded claims for asylum, reducing our capacity to take decisions quickly and support genuine refugees.

I would like to take this opportunity to make it clear that I do acknowledge the concerns of hon. Members. The Government are committed to ensuring that asylum claims are considered without unnecessary delay to ensure that individuals who need protection are granted asylum as soon as possible and can start to integrate and rebuild their lives. It is important to note that those granted asylum are given immediate and unrestricted access to the labour market.

I absolutely agree with hon. Members that asylum seekers should be allowed to volunteer. That is why we strongly encourage all asylum seekers to consider volunteering, so long as it does not amount to unpaid work. Volunteering provides a valuable contribution to their local community and may help them to integrate into society if they ultimately qualify for protection.

We have been clear that asylum seekers who wish to come to the UK must do so through safe and legal routes. Where reasons for coming to the UK include family or economic considerations, applications should be made via the relevant route: either the new points-based immigration system or the refugee family reunion rules. We absolutely must discourage those risking their lives and coming here illegally.

The Nationality and Borders Bill will deliver the most comprehensive reform in decades to fix the broken asylum and illegal migration system, and our asylum seeker right-to-work policy must uphold that wider approach. There is, of course, a review of the 2018 report currently under way and I reassure hon. Members that the findings of the updated recent report will be built into this. For all those reasons, I invite the hon. Members for Enfield, Southgate and for Halifax to withdraw the new clause.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I am not convinced by the Minister’s response, so I will be pushing this to a vote. Hopefully, we will be joined by other Members across the Committee.

Question put,

 That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

First, that was not a fair interpretation of the new clause: it was certainly not advocating for an unlimited number of people to have access to that route. Nevertheless, it is surprising that we are expected to be encouraged about family reunion at a time when this very Bill is proposing to strip the overwhelming majority of asylum seekers and refugees of those family reunion rights. At the end of the day, the issue is one we will have to revisit on Report. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 48

Six month time limit for determining asylum applications

“(1) The Secretary of State must make regulations providing for—

(a) a six month time limit for determining applications for asylum; and

(b) an officer of Director level or above to be required to write to the Home Secretary a letter of explanation on a quarterly basis in the event of any failure to meet the six month time limit.

(2) The Secretary of State must report to Parliament any failure to meet the six month time limit.”—(Bambos Charalambous.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

This new clause could be a silver bullet to solve a lot of the ills in the immigration and asylum system. We believe that, were it to be adopted, it would have many beneficial social and financial effects. It would obviate the need for some of the other clauses we have proposed, such as lifting the ban on working. The new clause would undo a host of negative consequences that arise because of the current endemic delays in the asylum system, which are creating huge social and financial costs.

During the course of this Committee, we have heard testimony from people trapped inside the system for years. We have heard about the toll on mental health and the re-traumatising of people who have fled abuse and torture. We have heard about the way in which being trapped in limbo prevents integration and how being banned from working enforces poverty. None of these negative effects would exist if our six-month time limit for processing cases were adopted. Furthermore, costs to the taxpayer, such as those currently spent on long-term accommodation and subsistence benefits, would all be hugely reduced.

Let us not be under any illusion: the current asylum system is broken. According to the House of Commons Library, as of June 2021 the total “work in progress” asylum case load consisted of 125,000 cases—57,000 of those were awaiting an initial decision at the end of 2020.

[Jonathan Gullis]

I was in Dover yesterday, where I spoke to people from Border Force about the situation. Does the hon. Gentleman agree with them, and with me, that one big issue putting pressure on the system is that tens of thousands of illegal economic migrants are crossing the English channel right now? That is leading to our having to speed up and process people as quickly as possible, while not having the facilities available in detention centres. We are therefore having to use hotels, which is taking up a huge amount of taxpayers’ money. That is where the real strain is. This Bill, which Border Force backs, will go a long way towards helping, as we are going to a six-month process with a one-time appeal, rather than multiple appeals, which are currently being exploited by certain lawyers.

[Bambos Charalambous]

There is so much to respond to in that. I question the hon. Gentleman’s facts first of all, but clearly we are talking about the situation as it is now, which has been built up over the past decade, and not as he would like it to be. In any event, I disagree about what this Bill does. It does not solve the problem; it keeps people here for longer.

As I was saying, what is masked by these numbers are the hundreds of people who have waited nearly 10 years or more for a decision on their asylum claims, left in limbo while they wait for an answer. In August, a freedom of information request from The Independent newspaper revealed that there were more than 1,200 asylum seekers in the system who had been waiting more than five years for a decision, with 399 people who had been waiting more than a decade. Separate figures obtained by the Refugee Council through an FOI request earlier this year revealed that the number of applicants waiting for more than a year for an initial decision, not including appeals, increased almost tenfold between 2010 and 2020, from 3,588 to 33,016. More than 250 people had been waiting for five years or more for an initial decision on their case, with dozens of children among them. As of December 2020, 36,725 asylum seekers had been waiting more than a year for a decision.

Those kinds of figures just smack of a broken system. Having tens of thousands of people waiting for more than a year for an initial decision is just totally unacceptable. I am sure that most MPs can think of asylum cases they have been dealing with that have stretched on and on, sometimes for years. I can cite the case of a constituent—I shall call them F—who came to the UK from Afghanistan as a child and applied for asylum in August 2013. It took seven and a half years, and my involvement as his MP, for the matter to be resolved in February this year. It really should not take an MP’s involvement to reach such a conclusion.

The human cost to people’s mental health and the cost to the taxpayer of these endemic delays in the system is high. We know that people in the asylum system become increasingly mentally unwell as the years of uncertainty, trauma and demonisation erode their mental and physical health. The Refugee Council reported earlier this year that this has led to an increase in the numbers of individuals self-harming and reporting suicidal thoughts. The Children’s Society report “Distress Signals” also outlined serious concerns about the damage done to children’s mental health in those conditions— this is damage done at a formative age that will last a lifetime.

Beyond the human cost of these delays is the financial cost. The backlog adds considerably to the overall cost of the asylum process. The Refugee Council has calculated that for every month of delay the additional cost to the Home Office per person is at least £730.41, equating to £8,765 per year. The delays make absolutely no financial sense. Not only that, but on the Home Office’s own figures more people are being employed but they are processing fewer cases. Paying more for less productivity is not acceptable. If this was a business, it would go bust.

A commitment to a six-month target as set out in the new clause would therefore save a huge amount of money to the Treasury and taxpayers, improve the mental health of those caught in the system, and help with integration.

[Tom Pursglove]

I have been clear throughout Committee proceedings that the Government are committed to overhauling the current asylum system, which is obviously broken and in critical need of reform. The number of non-straightforward cases awaiting a decision has grown rapidly, meaning that in October 2018 it became clear to us that the service standard of six months from the date of claim no longer best served those who used our services. For those reasons, former Ministers agreed that we should move away from the service standard.

Although I cannot accept the new clause, as we consider it too restrictive, Members will have detected from what I have said throughout the proceedings that we want to see the faster processing of cases. I entirely recognise the shadow Minister’s point on the financial costs of delay, and the impact on individuals of delay. That is why I and my ministerial colleagues want cases to be dealt with more speedily. That is, of course, the right objective to be working towards. We are working to reintroduce a service standard that will align with changes brought about by the new plan for immigration. I encourage the shadow Minister to withdraw the new clause.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I will push the clause to a vote; we are not convinced by the Minister’s response.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Through new clause 49, we hope to shed light on some of the murkiness that has existed in the Home Office in relation to agreements reached with agencies and other Governments to prevent unlawful border crossings and dangerous journeys. The new clause would require the Secretary of State to disclose the contents of any agreements with any international Governments or agencies reached in order to prevent unlawful border crossings, and for this information to be laid before Parliament within three months of any such agreement being entered into. This would mean that, for example, information pertaining to the UK-French agreement to tackle dangerous crossings in the English channel in July could be properly understood and scrutinised, including the use of £54 million of taxpayers’ money.

Information about that agreement and its impact has been limited, and although information has been limited, the confusion has been clear for all to see. There have been conflicting briefings between the British and French authorities regarding the use of £54 million of British taxpayers’ money. There have been reports, for example, that the UK is threatening to withhold the money. The Home Secretary appeared before the Lords Justice and Home Affairs Committee last week and this question was asked. The Home Secretary stated that the agreement is “based on results”, and includes preventing people getting to beaches, intelligence sharing, policing operations around the Belgian-French border, and technology.

For more than two years, the Home Secretary has repeatedly committed to stopping channel crossings in small boats by making the route unviable, yet unprecedented numbers of people have made the journey in this period, including a staggering 20,000 this year alone. Clearly, if we are working with the French authorities to disrupt people smuggling gangs and prevent dangerous crossings, it does not seem to be working very well, and parliamentary scrutiny of how taxpayers’ money is being spent is important if we are to learn more about the Home Secretary’s plans and why they have once again failed to deliver. For example, has anything been paid to France? Is the agreement for payment by results? If so, what are the metrics? How can we scrutinise whether this is value for money, or whether that money could be better spent elsewhere? It seems astonishing that the Home Secretary can just be given £54 million of public money to spend, but we do not know what on. There must be some accountability for that to Parliament.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

What is being sought is further detail on the relationship that we have with France in particular to tackle these dangerous channel crossings. As I say, we must put nothing in the public domain that risks undermining that constructive collaboration through the arrangement that we have with the French, which is vital to stopping these dangerous crossings and protecting lives at sea. To do so would also result in a betrayal of trust with our international partners, who own some of this information, and could prevent us from reaching future agreements with international partners, impacting our ability to prevent illegal migration and small boat crossings. That is why the Government feel unable to support the new clause and I encourage the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate to withdraw it.

[Bambos Charalambous]

There is not enough scrutiny, so we wish to press the new clause to a vote.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause would shorten the route to settlement from 10 years to five years for children and young people who have grown up in the UK and know no other home. This issue has a big impact on a relatively small number of people. These are bright young people who want to contribute to society but face a long, uncertain and financially demanding journey before their futures in the country they call home are secure.

I pay tribute to the brilliant charity We Belong, which is led by young people who themselves have been impacted by the unforgiving immigration rules. The Greater London Authority estimates that more than 330,000 children and young people who came to the UK as children have precarious immigration status. The young people who face this predicament are mainly Commonwealth citizens who are bright and want to contribute, but they have to wait 10 years before they reach settlement, at a cost of £12,771, through applications for leave to remain every 30 months.

Costs for leave to remain applications have risen astronomically in recent years, increasing by 331% since 2014. Often, more than one family member will be going through the process at the same time, so there are multiple fees to pay. That means that in many families, for at least a decade, earnings that could otherwise go towards securing a decent home or be invested in a child’s education instead have to be funnelled out of the family and paid to the Home Office. Before we even start to consider legal fees, we are asking families and young people to save more than £1,200 per year per person just to remain in the UK, when 30% of people in the UK have less than £1,000 in total savings and the average low-income family has just £95 in savings.

Each time they have to apply for leave, we raise the bar for these young people, asking far more of them than we ever would of those fortunate enough to be born with a British passport. Each time, they meet these almost impossible hurdles, often working several jobs to keep themselves and their families on this long and narrow 10-year path to security. These are clearly exceptional individuals, but it is not fair that we keep asking this of them.

For Arkam, who came to the UK aged 10, the 10-year route has meant being stuck in unsuitable accommodation. His family has lived in a one-bedroom house for 10 years because, he says

“the rent is so low and it has to be low because the Home Office fees are so high and our quality of life was non-existent.”

For Andrew, it has been the trigger for a string of evictions. His family were left without enough money to pay their rent and lost their home several times.

My own constituent, Tashi, arrived in the UK when she was seven and has since lawfully resided in the UK for almost two decades. When Tashi was just 10 years old, she was held unlawfully in immigration detention, and that experience has traumatised her ever since. Each limited leave renewal ignites the uncertainty and precarious nature of her status. If she makes a mistake on an application form, she could be back in detention and face deportation, even though she knows no other home. Living with limited leave to remain means decades of living with unrelenting uncertainty.

The more times that young people go through the LLR application process, the more they have to lose. If applicants are unable to afford the fee or fail to renew on time, they will have to begin the 10-year process from the very beginning.

That happened to Natasha, who came to the UK from Nigeria at the age of seven. Natasha was granted limited leave to remain when she was 18. When it came to renewing her visa, her family could not afford to renew due to the high fees and Natasha fell out of legal status. Unable to work, Natasha became homeless. Living in the shadows of society, it was only when she was 26 that she was able to raise enough money from family and friends to apply for LLR again and restart the 10-year route. She must renew this status every 30 months over a 10-year period. She will be 36 before she can apply for settlement and 37 years old when she can finally apply for citizenship.

How is this fair? For all this Government’s rhetoric about the importance of social integration, they continue to preside over an immigration system that isolates and stigmatises young migrants who have no other home but the UK. As highlighted by We Belong, many young people will undoubtedly be driven into poverty or lose their lawful status as a result of these high costs.

Speaking in July 2019, during his campaign to become leader of the Conservative Party, the Prime Minister said:

“I want everybody who comes here and makes their lives here to be, and to feel, British—that’s the most important thing”.

Across this Committee, I think we all agree with that sentiment. We should be proud of our country and encourage our residents to seek British citizenship, so why are we putting every hurdle in the way of ambitious young people who are already integrated into the fabric of our society? We Belong’s experience with young people on the 10-year route reveals how the demands of this process can reverse years, even decades, of integration.

The unforgiving 10-year route sows division and fear among young people, damages mental health, limits life chances and condemns even the hardest-working families to at least a decade of intense financial strain. The instability and onerous demands created by the limited leave to remain route serve nobody, and certainly not employers, educators or communities.

The financial and other constraints imposed by the 10-year process mean that many young migrants reaching early adulthood are denied the opportunity to realise their ambitions, causing prolonged financial and emotional stress. Ten years of multiple applications and multiple fees only increase the likelihood that young people will inadvertently fall out of status and have their lives ruined as a result. A five-year LLR path to settlement would be fairer and give them parity with other migrant groups, which is what this new clause aims to do.

We welcome the Home Office’s recent published guidance to case officers, which opens up a narrow discretionary five-year route for some young people. It shows that the Home Office acknowledges that there is a problem here. However the guidance is limited to those between 18 and 25, among other limitations. Many of the people in the case studies I mentioned, and many others who came to the UK as young children, are now over the age limit and will not be able to benefit from this scheme. Can the Minister tell me when the Home Office plans to rectify this anomaly?

[Tom Pursglove]

I hope I might be able to satisfy the Committee by saying that both this proposed new clause and the related proposed new clause 45 are commendable, but we are already doing what they seek. We will consolidate our actions in the immigration rules as part of the simplification of the rules in the next 12 months. Home Office officials have discussed the proposed changes with the We Belong group of young migrants, who have indicated that they are supportive of the way the changes will be implemented. With that, I hope the hon. Gentleman will feel able to withdraw this proposed new clause.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I very much welcome the Minister’s comments, and I look forward to having more information. Based on what he has told me, I am willing to withdraw the new clause, and I look forward to progress being made in this area. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 51

Safety plan for child victims of human trafficking

“(1) The Children Act 1989 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 22, after subsection (3C) insert—

“(3D) In respect of a suspected child victim of trafficking who is looked after by the local authority, the duty of a local authority under subsection (3)(a) to safeguard and promote the welfare of the child shall include in particular a duty to consider and take all reasonable steps to ensure that arrangements of accommodation and support to meet the child’s needs and takes account of and addresses the child’s safety with a view to preventing the risk of re-trafficking.”

(3) In section 22, after subsection (4)(d) insert—

“(e) independent guardians (within the meaning of Section 48 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015) as a relevant person who the local authority shall, so far as is reasonably practicable, consult with before making any decision with respect of a child who they are looking after and who is entitled to an independent guardian.”

(4) In section 22C, after subsection (7)(c) insert—

“(d) where accommodation is arranged for a suspected or identified child victim of trafficking, due regard shall be paid to the potential risks of harm and re-trafficking and the child’s safety shall be a primary consideration.””—(Holly Lynch.)

This new clause seeks to provide child victims with a safety plan to prevent retrafficking.

Brought up, and read the First time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Holly Lynch]

I think I followed what the Minister said and that he heard my concerns about some of the gaps in the provision. I will look to that statutory guidance for further detail. I will not press the new clause, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 52

Effect of British National (Overseas) visas

‘(1) Within six months of this Act being passed, the Secretary of State must commission and lay before Parliament an independent assessment of the effect of British National (Overseas) visas and the Government’s implementation.

(2) The Secretary of State must appoint an Independent Chair to conduct the assessment.

(3) The assessment must consider such matters as are deemed appropriate by the said Independent Chair.’—(Bambos Charalambous.)

This new clause would require the Government to publish an independent assessment of the effect of the British National (Overseas) visa scheme.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

We believe that the new clause is needed because there is clear evidence that the British national overseas scheme may not end up working as it was intended. That is particularly the case for young Hong Kong nationals. As everyone on the Committee knows, the BNO scheme has, in theory, been designed to offer a path to citizenship for Hongkongers. This was particularly designed in the wake of Beijing’s national security law being imposed last year, which has led to Hongkongers facing police brutality and severe repression. Although we in the Opposition therefore very much welcome attempts to support all those facing repression in Hong Kong, we believe that there is a need to examine how the BNO visa scheme is operating in practice and whether it is having the desired effect.

As the Home Affairs Committee pointed out in July, there are reasons for concern about individuals and groups who may be missing out on offers of support. There remain worrying gaps in the offer of support, and loopholes in the way that the BNO scheme may be implemented. That is particularly the case for younger pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong. It is evident that people under the age of 24 cannot benefit from the BNO visa scheme because of how it has been defined. That is because younger people do not hold BNO passports, which were issued in 1997. The BNO scheme requires that applicants hold a BNO passport. Those documents were issued to citizens following the handover of Hong Kong from the UK to China in 1997. Obviously, that means that a lot of people will be excluded from the scheme even if their parents or older siblings would qualify for it.

As a result of that, some people who have fled police brutality are now battling with the sclerotic and inefficient UK asylum system. That is simply because they are arbitrarily excluded from the Home Office settlement route due to their age. It has nothing to do with the validity of their claims, the severity of the oppression that they have experienced or the danger that they face in Hong Kong. All of those would have qualified them for a BNO visa had they been lucky enough to have been born a little earlier.

As we know, there are huge problems with the UK asylum system. We know that the average waiting time for an initial decision on an asylum case in the UK is between one and three years. Last week, some young Hongkongers told The Independent newspaper that they have been waiting for a year or more for a decision. Of course, the current inhumane rules of the Government’s hostile environment also mean that these same young people are banned from working, and often prevented from studying, while waiting for a decision. As Johnny Patterson, policy director of Hong Kong Watch, said, these Hongkongers in the asylum system are subjected to an “agonising wait”. Furthermore, the ban on them being able to work is undermining their chances of integrating in the UK.

The problem is only going to get worse unless it is tackled head on. Home Office figures show that there were 124 asylum claims from Hong Kong nationals in the year to June 2021, compared with 21 the year before and just nine in the 12 months to June 2019. It is even more concerning that 14 of those claims in the past year were unaccompanied minors, marking the first time on record that the UK has received asylum claims from children from Hong Kong.

We believe that the BNO visa scheme should be independently assessed to take account of the realities on the ground in Hong Kong. The truth is that it tends to be young people who were at the forefront of demonstrations to defend democracy and who are therefore likely to face the most repression. As well as that, people who are here under the BNO visa scheme have raised a number of concerns, such as their qualifications not being recognised, access to work, formal access to English language classes, and access to housing and banking services because they do not have a credit or renting history. There are also concerns about the lack of co-ordination between Government and local authority services. There are lots of reasons, therefore, why a review is needed.

It may well be the case that older parents wish to remain in Hong Kong while their children need to flee because they are in greater danger. Although the scheme allows applicants to bring relatives, including adult children, with them to the UK, the reality is that many young people will need to flee alone. They cannot rely on the parents coming to the UK who would have made their claim valid under the BNO scheme. We think it would be worth the Government exploring a revision of the scheme so that a child of a BNO Hong Kong citizen could make an application independently of their parents.

If such anomalies remain unaddressed, it will be deeply unfair on young Hongkongers. It is those young people who have often been on the frontline of the pro-democracy protests opposing the Chinese Government’s unlawful power grab. If they remain excluded from the BNO route for reasons entirely beyond their control, they will face an agonising wait in the UK asylum system, which we all know is beset with huge delays.

Given the UK’s deep connection to Hong Kong, should we not be offering a life raft to all Hongkongers who need one? The Opposition believe that the Government should accept independent scrutiny of the BNO scheme, with a view to exploring such steps as allowing children of BNO visa-eligible parents to make independent applications, provided there were evidence of their parents’ status, of course.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

The Hong Kong British national overseas route was launched on 31 January 2021, and the route has already been a success. As of 30 June, approximately 64,900 applications to the route have been made by BNO status holders and their family members who have chosen to make the UK their home. An impact assessment was published on 22 October 2020, setting out the projected impacts of the BNO route on the UK. As well as the direct impacts for the Government of operating the route, the impact assessment sets out the expected net benefit to the UK of between £2.4 billion and £2.9 billion over five years.

We believe that a review is not necessary. The policy is generous and barriers have been minimised. As the shadow Minister said, the Home Affairs Committee recently published a report on the route, and we have responded in full. I encourage him to withdraw the new clause.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I will not press new clause 52 to a vote, but I do hope that the Government will keep monitoring the system and provide the protection for young Hongkongers that I outlined. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 53

Electronic monitoring: conditions and use of data

“(1) Schedule 10 to the Immigration Act 2016 is amended as follows.

(2) In paragraph 2, in sub-paragraph (3)(a), leave out ‘must’ and insert ‘may’.

(3) In paragraph 2, in sub-paragraph (3)(b), leave out ‘by virtue of sub-paragraph (5) or (7)’.

(4) In paragraph 2, after sub-paragraph (3) insert—

‘(3A) If immigration bail is granted to a person subject to an electronic monitoring condition, the electronic monitoring condition shall cease to apply on the day six months after the day on which immigration bail was granted to the person, unless sub-paragraph (3B) applies.

(3B) This sub-paragraph applies if the Secretary of State or the First-tier Tribunal (as the case may be), when granting immigration bail to the person, has directed that the electronic monitoring condition shall not cease to apply in accordance with sub-paragraph (3A).

(3C) But the Secretary of State or the First-tier Tribunal (as the case may be) shall not make a direction under sub-paragraph (3B) unless the Secretary of State or the First-tier Tribunal (as the case may be) is satisfied that there are very exceptional circumstances which make the continued application of the electronic monitoring condition necessary in the interests of—

(a) public protection; or

(b) national security.’

(5) In paragraph 2, after sub-paragraph (7) insert—

‘(7A) Sub-paragraph (3)(a) does not apply to a person who is granted immigration bail by the First-tier Tribunal if the Tribunal considers that to impose an electronic monitoring condition on the person would be—

(a) impractical, or

(b) contrary to the person’s Convention rights.

(7B) Where sub-paragraph (7) or (7A) applies, the First-tier Tribunal must not grant immigration bail to the person subject to an electronic monitoring condition.’

(6) In paragraph 4, after sub-paragraph (2) insert—

‘(2A) The Secretary of State must not process any data collected by a device within the meaning of sub-paragraph (2) which relates to the matters in sub-paragraph (1)(a) to (c) except for the purpose of, and to the minimum extent reasonably necessary for, determining whether P has breached a condition of his bail.

(2B) In sub-paragraph (2A), “processing” has the same meaning as in section 3(4) of the Data Protection Act 2018.’”.—(Stuart C. McDonald.)

This new clause would place certain safeguards and restrictions on use of electronic monitoring.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 53 is really just to probe the Government on a new issue that has started to arise this year: the significant increase in the use of the GPS monitoring of certain people on bail for immigration purposes, largely foreign national offenders awaiting deportation. I am not for a moment suggesting that such monitoring does not have its role. It absolutely does; indeed, there would be occasions on which I would be upset with the Home Office if it did not use it. There is a genuine concern, however, about the lack of safeguards and limits on its use, and on how data from GPS tracking is being used. Indeed, even compared to the criminal justice system, it seems that the safeguards and limits are somewhat light touch. Cases have arisen where it seems that use was totally inappropriate.

New clause 53 suggests putting in place some appropriate safeguards and restrictions. It is designed to prompt the Minister, if not today then in due course, to answer certain questions. First and foremost, how will data be used in practice and in what circumstances will it be used in relation to somebody’s article 8 claim? That is an area of controversy, in that the use of tracking goes way beyond the original intention in previous relevant legislation, which was to prevent people from absconding.

Secondly, the criminal justice system imposes strict limits and safeguards on how long electronic monitoring is used for and in what circumstances, with limits on collection, processing, storage and use of data. Why, therefore, are those electronic monitoring safeguards absent in the immigration system?

Thirdly, why have the Government not made the data protection and equality impact assessment for such an intrusive scheme available to the public? Fourthly, what guarantee can the Government give that they will not expand their use of this technology and use it on people who have come to the United Kingdom to seek asylum? Can the Minister give us assurances on that today?

Finally, the Government’s own data suggests that absconding rates are exceptionally low. A recent FOI response found that of people granted bail between February 2020 and March 2021, there were 43 cases of absconding out of 7,000, so what evidence does the Home Office have that this intrusive measure is really necessary on anything other than a very limited scale?

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am grateful to the Minister for his answers. He is certainly candid, as he has been throughout Committee proceedings. I am bitterly disappointed about the answer in relation to the remote areas pilot scheme. Those areas are really suffering, not just in terms of labour shortages and the accompanying economic challenges, but even with depopulation.

I will hang on and finish on an optimistic note in that there is a possibility that the Government will commission a review of the salary threshold for family visas. I very much hope that that does happen and they look at how that route operates all together. I cling to that little bit of silver lining. With that, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Schedule 1

Prisoners returning to the UK: Modifications of Criminal Justice Act 2003

‘This is the Schedule to be inserted after Schedule 19A to the Criminal Justice Act 2003—

“Schedule 19B

Prisoners returning to the UK: Modifications of Chapter 6 of Part 12

Modification of dates for referral to the Board

1 Paragraph 2 applies where section 244ZC(2), 244A(2) or 246A(4) (when read with section 260(4A)) would require the Secretary of State to refer a person’s case to the Board on a day falling before the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the day on which the person is returned to custody.

2 The applicable provision is to be read as requiring the Secretary of State to refer the person’s case to the Board at any time up to the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the day on which the person is returned to custody.

3 For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2, a person returns to custody when the person, having returned to the United Kingdom, is detained (whether or not in prison) in pursuance of their sentence.

Person removed after Board had directed release but before being released

4 Paragraphs 5 and 6 apply where, before a person’s removal from the United Kingdom—

(a) the Board had directed their release under section 244ZC, 244A or 246A, but

(b) they had not been released on licence.

5 The direction of the Board is to be treated as having no effect.

6 The person is to be treated as if—

(a) they had been recalled under section 254 on the day on which they returned to the United Kingdom, and

(b) they were not suitable for automatic release (see section 255A).

Person removed after referral to the Board but before disposal of the reference

7 Paragraph 8 applies where—

(a) before a person’s removal from prison their case had been referred to the Board under section 244ZB(3), 244ZC(2), 244A(2) or 246A(4), and

(b) the reference lapsed under section 260(4B) because the person was removed from the United Kingdom before the Board had disposed of the reference.

8 Section 244ZC(2), 244A(2) or 246A(4) (as applicable) is to be read as requiring the Secretary of State to refer the person’s case to the Board before the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the day on which the person is returned to custody.

9 For the purposes of paragraph 8, a person returns to custody when the person, having returned to the United Kingdom, is detained (whether or not in prison) in pursuance of their sentence.

Person removed after having been recalled to prison

10 Paragraphs 11 and 12 apply where, at the time of a person’s removal from prison under section 260, the person was in prison following recall under section 254.

11 Any direction of the Board made in relation to the person under section 255C or 256A before their return to the United Kingdom is to be treated as having no effect.

12 The person is to be treated as if—

(a) they had been recalled under section 254 on the day on which they returned to the United Kingdom, and

(b) they were not suitable for automatic release (see section 255A).”’—(Tom Pursglove.)

This new schedule inserts a new Schedule 19B into the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to make modifications of that Act in relation to prisoners who have returned to the UK after their removal from prison. It is introduced by section 261 of that Act, which is amended by NC12.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Schedule 3

Working in United Kingdom waters: consequential and related amendments

‘Immigration Act 1971

1 The Immigration Act 1971 is amended as follows.

2 In section 8 (exceptions for seamen etc), after subsection (1) insert—

“(1A) Subsection (1) does not apply in relation to a member of the crew of a ship who is an offshore worker within the meaning of section 11A.”

3 In section 11 (references to entry etc), after subsection (1) insert—

“(1ZA) See also section 11A (additional means by which persons arriving in United Kingdom waters for work can enter the UK).”

4 In section 28 (proceedings for offences)—

(a) before subsection (1) insert—

“(A1) Proceedings for an offence under this Part that is committed in the territorial sea adjacent to the United Kingdom may be taken, and the offence may for all incidental purposes be treated as having been committed, in any place in the United Kingdom.”;

(b) in subsection (2A), for “section 25 or 25A” substitute “this Part”.

5 In section 28L (interpretation of Part 3) —

(a) in subsection (1), at the beginning insert “Subject to subsection (1A)”;

(b) after subsection (1) insert—

“(1A) In this Part ‘premises’ also includes any artificial island, installation or structure (including one in the territorial sea adjacent to the United Kingdom).”

6 In section 28M (enforcement powers in relation to ships: England and Wales), in subsection (2)(a)—

(a) for “section” substitute—

“(i) section 24B,”;

(b) for “, and” substitute “, or

(ii) section 21 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, and”.

7 In section 28N (enforcement powers in relation to ships: Scotland), in subsection (2)(a)—

(a) for “section” substitute—

“(i) section 24B,”;

(b) for “, and” substitute “, or

(ii) section 21 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, and”.

8 In section 28O (enforcement powers in relation to ships: Northern Ireland), in subsection (2)(a)—

(a) for “section” substitute—

“(i) section 24B,”;

(b) for “, and” substitute “, or

(ii) section 21 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, and”.

9 (1) Schedule 2 (administrative provision as to control on entry etc) is amended as follows.

(2) In paragraph 2—

(a) in sub-paragraph (1), for the words from “who have” to “United Kingdom)” substitute “within sub-paragraph (1A)”;

(b) after sub-paragraph (1) insert—

“(1A) The persons are—

(a) any person who has arrived in the United Kingdom by ship or aircraft (including transit passengers, members of the crew and others not seeking to enter the United Kingdom);

(b) any person who has arrived in United Kingdom waters by ship or aircraft who the immigration officer has reason to believe is an offshore worker.

(1B) In sub-paragraph (1A), ‘offshore worker’ and ‘United Kingdom waters’ have the same meaning as in section 11A.”

(3) In paragraph 27—

(a) after sub-paragraph (1) insert—

“(1A) Sub-paragraph (1) also applies to the captain of a ship or aircraft arriving in United Kingdom waters if—

(a) there are offshore workers on board, or

(b) an immigration officer has informed the captain that they wish to examine any person on board in the exercise of the power under paragraph 2.

(1B) In sub-paragraph (1A), ‘offshore worker’ and ‘United Kingdom waters’ have the same meaning as in section 11A.”

(4) In paragraph 27B—

(a) after sub-paragraph (1) insert—

“(1A) This paragraph also applies to ships or aircraft—

(a) which have offshore workers on board, and

(b) which—

(i) have arrived, or are expected to arrive, in United Kingdom waters, or

(ii) have left, or are expected to leave, United Kingdom waters.”;

(b) after sub-paragraph (9A) insert—

“(9B) ‘Offshore worker’ and ‘United Kingdom waters’ have the same meaning in this paragraph as in section 11A.”

(5) In paragraph 27BA—

(a) after sub-paragraph (1) insert—

“(1A) The Secretary of State may also make regulations requiring responsible persons in respect of ships or aircraft—

(a) which have offshore workers on board, and

(b) which—

(i) have arrived, or are expected to arrive, in United Kingdom waters, or

(ii) have left, or are expected to leave, United Kingdom waters,

to supply information to the Secretary of State or an immigration officer.”;

(b) in sub-paragraph (2), after (1) insert “or (1A)”;

(c) after sub-paragraph (5) insert—

“(5A) For the purposes of this paragraph, ‘offshore workers’ and ‘United Kingdom waters’ have the same meaning as in section 11A.”

10 (1) Schedule 4A (maritime enforcement powers) is amended as follows.

(2) In paragraph 1(2), after the opening words insert—

“‘the 2006 Act’ means the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006;”.

(3) In paragraph (2)(1)(a), for “25 or 25A” substitute “24B, 25 or 25A of this Act or section 21 of the 2006 Act”.

(4) In paragraph (3)(1)(a), for “25, 25A and 25B” substitute “24B, 25, 25A or 25B of this Act or section 21 of the 2006 Act”.

(5) In paragraph 4(1), for “25, 25A or 25B” substitute “24B, 25, 25A or 25B of this Act or section 21 of the 2006 Act”.

(6) In paragraph 12(2), after the opening words insert—

“‘the 2006 Act’ means the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006;”.

(7) In paragraph 13(1)(a), for “25 or 25A” substitute “24B, 25 or 25A of this Act or section 21 of the 2006 Act”.

(8) In paragraph 14(1)(a), for “25 or 25A” substitute “24B, 25 or 25A of this Act or section 21 of the 2006 Act”.

(9) In paragraph 15(1), for “25 or 25A” substitute “24B, 25 or 25A of this Act or section 21 of the 2006 Act”.

(10) In paragraph 23(2), after the opening words insert—

“‘the 2006 Act’ means the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006;”.

(11) In paragraph 24(1)(a), for “25 or 25A” substitute “24B, 25 or 25A of this Act or section 21 of the 2006 Act”.

(12) In paragraph 25(1)(a), for “25 or 25A” substitute “24B, 25 or 25A of this Act or section 21 of the 2006 Act”.

(13) In paragraph 26(1), for “25 or 25A” substitute “24B, 25 or 25A of this Act or section 21 of the 2006 Act”.

Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006

11 In section 21 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 (offence of employing a person who is disqualified from employment by their immigration status), after subsection (3) insert—

“(3A) Proceedings for an offence under this section that is committed in the territorial sea adjacent to the United Kingdom may be taken, and the offence may for all incidental purposes be treated as having been committed, in any place in the United Kingdom.

(3B) Section 3 of the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act 1878 (consent of Secretary of State for certain prosecutions) does not apply to proceedings for an offence under this section.”’—(Tom Pursglove.)

This new schedule makes consequential and related amendments in NC20.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

Question proposed, That the Chair do report the Bill, as amended, to the House.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I want to put on the record my thanks to the Clerks, in particular Sarah Thatcher and Rob Page, for their amazing work in getting our new clauses and amendments into some form of legible parliamentary-type wording. I also thank the other staff, those in the room in particular, the Doorkeepers and those keeping a record of our sometimes very long speeches. I also thank you, Ms McDonagh, and Sir Roger, for the excellent way in which you chaired proceedings of the Committee.

I thank the members of the Committee—the Minister and all members, but in particular my friends and colleagues in the Opposition for their support and for helping us get to where we are today. I put on the record my thanks to my fellow shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax, and my hon. Friends the Members for Bermondsey and Old Southwark, for Sheffield Central and for Coventry North West, and to the hon. Members for Glasgow North East and for—I will attempt to say the name—Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East.

Finally, I thank my staff, Katherine Chibah, Giulia Monasterio, Cian Fox, Charlotte Butterick and Tashi Tahir, for all their hard work on the research and the speeches, and for their general support. It has been a challenging Bill Committee and I am pleased that we have got to the end of it in one piece.

[Tom Pursglove]

Before you adjourn the Committee for the final time, Ms McDonagh, I also take the opportunity to thank everyone who has been involved, in particular the Opposition spokesmen of both parties, who have put an awful lot of work into their preparations. I know that it is not just them involved in their work, but their teams, who go to extraordinary lengths and really look at the detail of the measures that the Government are proposing to draw up suggested new clauses. It is a herculean effort, so I thank the spokesmen and those working with them.

I thank you, Ms McDonagh, and Sir Roger, for your firm but fair chairing of the proceedings. That is always much appreciated, and you have done a brilliant job at keeping us all in order in—I think it is fair to say—a controversial Bill, which Members come at with very strong opinions on all sides.

I also thank my colleagues and in particular our departmental Whip, who as ever has done a fantastic job and stood in at very short notice for my absence on Tuesday. It was extraordinary.

[Bambos Charalambous]

We were gentle with him.

[Tom Pursglove]

He did very well. I was concerned that I would not be wanted back. I also thank our standing departmental Parliamentary Private Secretary.

I also thank my officials, without whom it simply would not be possible to do this, for all the work they put in behind the scenes. I thank the Clerks of the House, too, who do a fantastic job in structuring the proceedings and ensuring that everything runs in an orderly fashion.

To finish, Sir Roger’s comments as he departed the Chair this morning put it rather well. These are controversial matters that people feel strongly about. Passions run high, but it is fair to say that the Committee has considered the matters in great detail and, I would argue, has done consideration of the Bill great justice.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Bambos Charalambous Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 7th December 2021 Commons Chamber

[Henry Smith]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his support, and I agree with every word he said.

We have had over half a century of appalling injustice, in many different regards, for this community. It is now time that this House rights the wrongs that they have suffered. In allowing British overseas territories citizenship for the descendants of the Chagos Islanders, we can go a long way towards doing that. Chagos islanders were forcibly removed from their homeland not by this House but by an Order in Council. This issue has never had the proper scrutiny of this elected House, which can now play its part in righting a significant historical injustice. I therefore call on Members from across the House to support new clause 2.

[Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to follow the excellent speech by the hon. Member for Crawley (Henry Smith) in proposing new clause 2. I pay tribute to his commitment to this cause, which has been a long-standing one for him and his constituents. I wish to put on record the Opposition’s support for the new clause, which seeks to rectify the long-standing injustice in British nationality law that affects a relatively small number of people—Chagossian people, descendants of the Chagos islanders, who were forcibly removed from the British Indian Ocean Territory in the 1960s. The fact that British citizenship does not automatically pass to second and third generation Chagossians despite some of them migrating to the UK with their British parents as very young children is nothing short of a scandal. I hope that hon. Members on both sides of the House will support new clause 2.

Whereas the hon. Member for Crawley is seeking to rectify an injustice, the Nationality and Borders Bill does the opposite and seeks to create chaos and injustice. I will focus my comments on part 1. Clause 9 provides the Government with dangerous and unprecedented powers to deprive UK nationals of citizenship, without warning. We are wholeheartedly opposed to this. Through clause 9, the Government seek to amend the long-standing position under the British Nationality Act 1981 that an individual must be notified if they are to be deprived of their nationality. It exempts the Government from giving notice of a decision to deprive a person of citizenship if authorities do not have the subject’s contact details or if it is not “reasonably practical” to do so. The Government’s proposal also allows such secret deprivations to take place solely on the basis that the Home Office deems it “in the public interest” or in the interest of “foreign relations”. Effectively, this means that the Home Secretary can strip someone of their citizenship without informing them because it would be internationally embarrassing for her to do so. This abhorrent proposal therefore enables the Government to remove basic fairness, on top of an already dangerous power.

Like many measures in the Bill, there is no practical reason for this change. Present rules already allow for citizenship deprivation letters to be delivered to an individual’s last known address. The real purpose of this rule appears to be to introduce measures that remove the right to appeal. These measures make lawful previously unlawful citizenship stripping. They ask Parliament to pretend that an unlawful decision was lawful all along. It is shameful and Orwellian in equal measure.

[James Daly (Bury North) (Con)]

I wonder whether the hon. Gentleman could cast his mind back to the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, where, for the first time, people who had acquired British citizenship through birth were made subject to citizenship deprivation powers. So what he has just commented on was brought in and voted through by a Labour Government. Could he address that point?

--- Later in debate ---

[Bambos Charalambous]

As I mentioned, any reasons to strip people of citizenship are given on notice, but this deprives people of the right to—

[James Daly]

Do you agree with the principle?

[Bambos Charalambous]

I do not agree with the principle of it: it should be done on notice.

Clause 9 means that individuals will not be able to challenge deprivation of their nationality as they will not be aware or told that they are no longer British citizens, and the time limit for appeal may run out before the individual becomes aware that their rights have been stripped. As Reprieve has pointed out, under these proposals, a person accused of speeding would be afforded more rights than someone at risk of being deprived of their British nationality.

[Stephen Timms (East Ham) (Lab)]

I very much agree with the point that my hon. Friend is making. Is he aware of the very widespread alarm that clause 9 is creating up and down the country?

[Bambos Charalambous]

My right hon. Friend is exactly right.

In recent years, the Government have unlawfully failed to satisfy the simplest of obligations in relation to citizenship deprivation: providing notice to people that they are seeking to deprive them of their rights. Having been found to have unlawfully stripped people of citizenship without telling them, the Home Secretary now seeks to undo these unlawful actions.

[Paul Bristow (Peterborough) (Con)]

Can I just ask the hon. Gentleman very simply: does he agree with the principle of citizenship revocation? Forget the issue of duty of notice—does he agree with the principle of it?

[Bambos Charalambous]

The British Nationality Act has been in law for the last 40 years and that provides the power to strip people of citizenship. What we are talking about here is doing it without notice.

[Kim Leadbeater (Batley and Spen) (Lab)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that to deprive a person of their citizenship without warning or explanation would be a flagrant breach of natural justice and that to do so as an alternative to submitting that person to due process under the law risks undermining our national security, rather than enhancing it?

[Bambos Charalambous]

My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. She is exactly right. How can it be right that somebody is able to be stripped of their citizenship without knowing about it? That is clearly a breach of natural justice.

[Hilary Benn (Leeds Central) (Lab)]

My hon. Friend has made a very important point about people not knowing that they have been deprived of their citizenship and how that might affect their ability to appeal. Clause 9 says that someone subject to these new rules

“may appeal against the decision to the First-tier Tribunal.”

However, as I understand it, rule 8 of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission gives individuals 28 days to appeal deprivation of citizenship if they are outside the United Kingdom. Does not he agree that the Minister, in responding today, has to give absolute clarity that that 28-day period will be extended?

[Bambos Charalambous]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. How can someone know when the 28 days are going to run if they have not received notice of the decision to strip them of their citizenship? It is basic.

[Imran Hussain (Bradford East) (Lab)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that at the heart of this matter is the complete stripping away of due process? A person does not have to be given notice, or a reason why they are being stripped of their nationality. This has a disproportionate impact on our black, Asian and minority ethnic communities.

[Bambos Charalambous]

My hon. Friend makes a very good point. This measure will clearly affect people who have other citizenships available to them, because it is unlawful to deprive someone of citizenship and leave them stateless. Clause 9 is about people’s citizenship, identity and, ultimately, rights; without citizenship, people do not have rights, and that leaves them without an identity or a sense of belonging.

[Richard Graham (Gloucester) (Con)]

Will the hon. Member give way?

[Bambos Charalambous]

I will give way one last time, but I need to make progress; otherwise, there will be very little time for anyone else to speak.

[Richard Graham]

I am grateful to the hon. Member. He is a reasonable man, so I am sure that he will agree that when it comes to sensitive issues, such as the very small number of people whose nationality may be revoked by the Home Secretary, as has been possible for the past 100 years, it is incredibly important that they are not the subject of rather embarrassing scaremongering, such as that being done by the hon. Member for Bradford East (Imran Hussain). Will the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate (Bambos Charalambous) confirm at the Dispatch Box his clear understanding that when someone has a single nationality, they cannot have their nationality revoked and be sent abroad, as the hon. Member for Bradford East has implied?

[Bambos Charalambous]

Many people have dual nationality in the UK, and those are the people who are in fear of the measure being introduced. I will now make progress.

The clause not only represents a total disregard for justice and the rule of law, but also says to certain British citizens that despite their being born and raised in the UK, their rights will always be precarious and subject to change, because, in the words of the Home Office,

“British citizenship is a privilege, not a right.”

The consequences of that are drastic. It is a threat to all, but particularly to those from ethnic minority backgrounds. According to analysis by the New Statesman, nearly 6 million people in England and Wales could be affected, and under this proposal, two in five people from an ethnic minority background are eligible to be deprived of their citizenship without being told.

Have the Government learned nothing from the Windrush scandal? They are repeating the same mistakes time and again. How can we trust the Government and the Home Office? How can we trust them with the measures proposed in clause 9? Simply put, we cannot, and I therefore commend the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) on bringing forward amendment 12, which would remove clause 9 from the Bill. We support that amendment in the name of fairness and in order to uphold the rule of law.

Another aspect of part 1 that we are concerned about is statelessness and, in particular, clause 10, which is intended to disentitle stateless children in the UK from their statutory right to British citizenship. I thank my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman) for tabling amendment 111, which would give effect to the recommendations made by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which published an excellent report on the Bill earlier this month. I wish to put on record my thanks, and I am sure the whole House’s thanks, for the enormous contribution she has made as a parliamentarian to preserving rights and demanding equality. She will be sorely missed when she steps down at the next election.

Clause 10 proposes amending and restricting a vital safeguard in British nationality law that prevents and reduces childhood statelessness. Under our international obligations, we have safeguards that mean that a child who was born in the UK and has always been stateless can acquire British citizenship after five years of residing here. The Government’s proposals to restrict and amend that obligation are an affront to children. They will impose the most profound of exclusions on children: the denial of any citizenship, and particularly citizenship of the place where they were born and live—the only place they know. This exclusion and alienation, when inflicted on a child in their formative years, will be highly damaging to their personal development and their feelings of security and belonging. The Government consistently failed, on Second Reading and in Committee, to explain what assessment has been made of the impact of this proposal on statelessness. That is unacceptable.

We Opposition Members therefore welcome amendment 111, and support its intention of ensuring that the Government act in compliance with article 1 of the 1961 UN statelessness convention. It would amend clause 10 so that British citizenship was withheld from a stateless child born in the UK only when a parent’s nationality was available to the child immediately, without any legal or administrative hurdles. This is a necessary amendment, as the Government have failed to protect the existing safeguards, which are in line with international law, in this Bill; on the contrary, they have introduced cruel and unworkable proposals that will only exacerbate the challenges for children and young people in the UK.

New clause 8, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Streatham (Bell Ribeiro-Addy), is on an issue that follows on from that of child statelessness. We support that new clause, which concerns the fee—£1,012 for a child—that people must pay to exercise their right to be registered as a British citizen. Like hon. and right hon. Members across this House, I have raised many cases on behalf of constituents navigating this inefficient, ineffective and expensive system. The fees imposed by the Home Office deny people their rights. Application fees are one barrier, and Home Office delays and inefficiencies are another. If we look at the figures, we see that the unfairness is extremely stark—even to the former Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Bromsgrove (Sajid Javid), who rightly described the registration fees for children as

“a huge amount of money to ask children to pay”.

[Mr Barry Sheerman (Huddersfield) (Lab/Co-op)]

I have heard that when the Bill was being prepared, the Children’s Commissioner was not consulted at all about its implications for the status of children. Can that possibly be right? Can my hon. Friend enlighten the House on that point?

[Bambos Charalambous]

My hon. Friend makes a very good point. I am not aware that the Children’s Commissioner was consulted, but I am sure the Minister will clarify whether they were.

The fee for a child to register as a British citizen stands at £1,012. The Home Office confirms that the cost of registration is only £372. The remaining £640 is, therefore, money made after delivery of the service. Home Office registration fees do not reflect the cost of registration. On the Government’s watch, people are being prevented from accessing the immigration system, and that leads to exclusion and isolation for the children and young people who are denied citizenship due to the barriers in their way.

Citizenship should not be about cost; it should be about contributing to our communities and inclusivity, but under the current system, it is about cost. By design, it is about astronomical application fees. Rather than fixing these problems through this legislation, which, despite its draconian measures, provides a unique opportunity to right this wrong, the Government concern themselves with outlandish and unworkable policies. I strongly urge Members from all parts of the House to carefully consider new clause 8, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Streatham. It would deliver fairness where the Government have failed to, and it has our full support.

Finally, I wish to speak about another issue that has broad cross-party support—a further important and unique opportunity to right wrongs. New clause 5, in the name of the right hon. Member for Ashford (Damian Green) and others, relates to the British national overseas visa scheme. As we know, the BNO scheme was, in theory, designed to offer a path to citizenship for Hongkongers, but in practice the scheme is not working as well as it could. Indeed, there are worrying and significant loopholes in it that mean individuals and groups of individuals are being left in limbo. That is particularly true for younger Hongkongers who have fled the country over fear of repercussions, as those born after 1997 do not hold BNO passports, and are therefore unable to settle in the UK via the BNO route. The result of this loophole in the BNO scheme is that young people who have fled police brutality find themselves fighting for their rights within the sclerotic and inefficient UK asylum system, having been arbitrarily excluded from the scheme because of their age.

Hongkongers born after 1997 do not hold a BNO passport. Those documents were issued to citizens following the handover of Hong Kong from the UK to China in 1997, so those aged under 24 cannot benefit from the BNO scheme. Home Office figures show that there were 124 asylum claims from Hong Kong nationals in the year to June 2021, compared with 21 the year before and just nine in the year to June 2019. This is a growing problem, and it cannot be swept under the rug. For those stuck in the system, there is, in the words of Hong Kong Watch, an “agonising wait”. That should not exist, and could be fixed in the BNO scheme. Again, the Opposition proposed that in Committee, and naturally we fully support new clause 5. There are deep and historical ties between the UK and Hong Kong. The Government must not waiver in their commitment to people whose way of life has been put at risk. By accepting new clause 5, they could take a significant and immediate step towards that, with the Opposition’s support.

The Government’s decision to offer the Hong Kong BNO scheme is a welcome expression of the UK’s historical relationship with the citizens of Hong Kong. Individuals and families arriving from Hong Kong will enrich the UK’s cultural life and contribute to our economy. However, without amendment, the scheme is in danger of being just more warm words. As I have said on other amendments and new clauses, despite our deep concerns about the Bill’s draconian, dog-whistle politics when it comes to refugees and asylum seekers, it provides an opportunity to right wrongs in our system. I will leave my comments there, as I know that many hon. Members wish to speak.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

--- Later in debate ---

[Bambos Charalambous]

This Bill is a sham. It does nothing to create safe routes for resettlement, nothing to garner international support for breaking people-smuggling gangs, and nothing to support victims of modern-day slavery. Instead, the Nationality and Borders Bill creates unworkable policies, lets down victims who have been trafficked, and breaks our international obligations. The Bill is a smoke-and-mirrors trick, designed to deflect attention from the Government’s failings and incompetence in the area of asylum and refugee protection.

It is shameful that since the abandonment of the Dubs amendment, the UK has turned its back on unaccompanied child refugees and young people in need of protection. Young people are having to turn to people-smuggling gangs. We need to make sure that the model is broken. People have died during dangerous crossings, and it is important that we tackle the criminal people-smuggling gangs. To do that, we need international co-operation and greater security, and that is why Labour Members have tabled new clause 50, which would make advertising people-smuggling routes via social media an offence. If the Government are serious about tackling the gangs, we cannot see why they would have any problem supporting the new clause.

Smugglers and trafficking gangs are putting people’s lives at risk, and they use social media to promote, encourage, advertise and organise these dangerous crossings. Too often, when the National Crime Agency asks Facebook, TikTok and others to take down dangerous material, they refuse. We have to strike at the heart of this illegal and dangerous operation. That is why we propose a new, additional criminal offence; it would not replace existing offences. The new offence would make it clear beyond doubt that such material is illegal and dangerous, that we will prosecute those responsible for it, and that we expect social media companies to take it down.

It is well known that people-smugglers promote dangerous routes on social media platforms including Facebook and TikTok. They often promise easy journeys at an extremely high cost. Those who are interested may be told to send private direct messages to the smugglers, because they know that private conversations are encrypted and much more difficult for police and intelligence agencies to access. If the Government are serious about tackling the criminal gangs profiting from people’s desperation, they must take urgent action to tackle the problem online. At the moment, they talk tough, but the policing and intelligence response is failing to keep up. The Government should back Labour’s new clause 50 today. Those seeking to profit online from people’s desperation must be made to feel the full force of the law.

As everyone in the Chamber knows, the Dubs amendment was passed in May 2016 by David Cameron’s Government in the wake of an increase in refugees arriving from Europe. It required Ministers to relocate and support asylum-seeking children from the continent. It was initially envisaged that the Dubs scheme would offer settlement to 3,000 children, but the number of places was capped at 480. In May 2020, it emerged that the smaller quota had been filled, and the scheme was abandoned. Ever since, Members from across the political spectrum have warned that this bad decision would force hundreds of vulnerable children to turn to people-smuggling gangs for assistance in travelling to Britain, placing them at greater risk of trafficking.

The Government’s inaction has been deeply depressing. Ministers have shown a callous disregard for the plight of children. When debating these issues, Ministers have made the shameful claim that so-called pull factors for refugees are a reason not to help unaccompanied children to safety.

[David Simmonds (Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner) (Con)]

Does the hon. Member recognise that since 2015, the number of unaccompanied children arriving in the UK and going into the care of local authorities has doubled from an average annual run-rate of just over to 2,000 to significantly over 4,000, and that the Syrian resettlement scheme included an element of specifically identifying vulnerable children and bringing them to the UK as a place of safety? Does he therefore accept that it is simply not true that the Government have turned their back on refugee children?

[Bambos Charalambous]

At the moment, there are no safe routes for children to come to the UK. That is why there has been an increase in crossings and more unaccompanied children crossing.

[Tim Loughton]

I have heard a lot of attacks on what the Government are trying to do, and a lot about social media; now we are hearing about children. I have some sympathy with the Dubs scheme—indeed, the shadow Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), and I previously tabled amendments in support of it—but I have not seen, in any of the amendments tabled, or heard of, in any of our debates, a single practical measure that Labour would take to deter adults from paying the people traffickers and taking to boats for these dangerous journeys. What is Labour’s plan for real solutions to a serious problem? I have not heard a single solution yet.

[Bambos Charalambous]

If the hon. Member will allow me to continue, he may be interested in what I will say on new clause 49, which addresses his point. I will try to make some progress; I was told off in the last debate for taking too long because I allowed interventions.

Labour believes that it is time that the Government showed global leadership, instead of shirking their commitments enshrined in the refugee convention. We urge them to support new clause 48, which proposes the reintroduction of Dubs.

In new clause 49, the Opposition ask the Government to produce a negotiating mandate that sets out proposed reciprocal arrangements with the EU for safe returns and safe legal routes. Such arrangements were covered by the Dublin III agreement, which has now ended. It is ridiculous that the Government are resorting to dangerous tactics such as push-backs in the channel, when we used to have civilised reciprocal agreements with our geographical neighbours.

[Alex Sobel]

I thank the shadow Minister for giving way, because the Minister would not. The Government seem to think that the Bill will end small boats crossing the channel, but as he said, the ending of Dublin III has increased the number of small boats making that crossing. Does he not think that, because of the Bill, we will be back here debating this in three years, when there will be even more small boats and even more children and adults dying in the channel?

--- Later in debate ---

[Bambos Charalambous]

My hon. Friend makes an excellent point. The Bill will fail if there are not reciprocal arrangements, and that is deeply worrying. Not having those arrangements will encourage more dangerous crossings.

[Mr Bone]

Will the hon. Member give way on that point?

[Bambos Charalambous]

I will, but then I must make progress.

[Mr Bone]

The hon. Member is making his speech in a quiet and reasonable way, but does he not think the problem is that the French are refusing to allow returns? It is not this country; it is the French.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I agree with the hon. Member, but that is directly because we no longer have reciprocal arrangements. That is the crux of the problem with the Bill. We need more reciprocal arrangements with our international partners to allow other measures to be put in place.

[Matt Rodda (Reading East) (Lab)]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Bambos Charalambous]

I will make progress.

The agreements we had previously, such as Dublin III, gave people who were eligible a safe route here, and they also allowed us to send people to other safe countries when that was appropriate. It is well known that family reunion leads to better outcomes in terms of the ability of people to integrate. It is also well known that it is only with international co-operation that we can expect other countries to accept the safe return of individuals, where appropriate. We believe that new clause 49 is a sensible and proportionate measure to tackle the issues we face.

This brings me on to new clause 51, which does two things. First, it places the Afghan citizens resettlement scheme on a statutory footing to make sure that it is fully implemented. Secondly, it calls on the Government to draw up the scheme in a way that helps prevent people from being exploited by people traffickers and smugglers. The Government have accepted that safe and legal routes are important as an alternative to dangerous routes run by criminal gangs, but they have not implemented or designed safe and legal routes. That is why we propose that the resettlement scheme be designed in a way that allows those fleeing persecution in Afghanistan who have family in the UK to apply to be included in the resettlement scheme. There would be a specified opportunity for family members to apply under the scheme. The Government have already consulted on ensuring that these family members do not end up being exploited by criminal gangs, and have promised them a route to reuniting with their family members, so we see no reason why the new clause should be controversial, or why the Government would not open the scheme and allow family reunion within it.

It has been absolutely shocking to hear at first hand the stories of desperate people who are eligible to come here from Afghanistan being effectively abandoned. I have had Chevening scholars contact my constituency office who have been left without any support at all, and without any prospect of a safe route from that country. Other MPs have told me about people who have worked closely with the British but have also been left vulnerable—interpreters, women who worked as lawyers, and many others whose lives are under threat from the Taliban. Again, if the Government are serious about drawing people away from the people smugglers and offering them safe routes, then they need to get a grip of this situation.

[Matt Rodda]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for making that point. Does he agree that at the core of this is the poor quality of our relations with some of our nearest neighbours, and, indeed, our falling standing in the international community, which I am afraid—[Interruption.] If I may finish, I am afraid that that is a result of Government policy over the Brexit deal and a number of other matters. Does he agree with me on that point?

[Bambos Charalambous]

As I have previously said, international co-operation is at the root of dealing with the problems that this Bill will purportedly address.

[Shailesh Vara (North West Cambridgeshire) (Con)]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Bambos Charalambous]

I will give way one last time, but then I really must make progress.

[Shailesh Vara]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. As a point of clarification, the comment was made in the previous intervention that Brexit was a Government policy. Does he agree that the Government were fulfilling the mandate of the British people at a referendum?

[Bambos Charalambous]

We have already had that debate—in the last Parliament. As is proposed in the Dublin III amendment—new clause 49—our safe and legal routes need to be replaced now that we have left the European Union. That is absolutely integral to making sure that we have the measures in place to deal with the problems we face.

Ministers have talked a lot about the Afghan citizens resettlement scheme, but where are the results? We have been waiting since August for the scheme to be implemented, and it still has not been. People are dying. They do not have four years to wait. It is time for action, not words.

We should be looking after people who put their lives on the line by loyally serving the nation. It is nothing short of outrageous that visas for foreigners who served in the UK armed forces cost £2,389. In 2020, there were 5,110 Commonwealth citizens serving in the armed forces. Each year, about 500 of them choose to leave, and those who choose to stay in the UK are compelled to pay extortionate visa fees. A Government consultation has, as we know, proposed scrapping the fees for those who have completed 12 years’ service in the armed forces. Labour has campaigned long and hard for that change, but we believe the proposed qualification period is far too long, and we call on the Government to right that wrong and change the period of qualification. I am grateful to the two largest veterans charities, the Royal British Legion and Help for Heroes, for their campaigning work on this issue. They are clear that they believe the current situation is gravely unfair, and it is time the Government started honouring their promise to the armed forces.

[Stephen Doughty (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)]

I have met many Commonwealth soldiers in my constituency, including Fijians who have worked closely alongside Welsh regiments, and others from Commonwealth backgrounds who have come to our armed forces—indeed, I think they make up something like 11% or 12% of current Army recruitment. I have heard horrifying stories about how they have been treated in relation to visas and settlement, as well as with healthcare costs. It is completely wrong for that to be happening, and for them to be treated in such a way when they have served our country so bravely.

[Bambos Charalambous]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. To ask servicemen and women to pay for the privilege of living in the country that they fought for and were prepared to defend is completely unreasonable. The current situation is embarrassing, and we ask the Government to do the right thing and waive fees for veterans seeking citizenship.

[John Redwood]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Bambos Charalambous]

I will give way one last time, but I must make progress.

[John Redwood]

The hon. Gentleman is generous. Does Labour think there should be any limit on the number of people we invite in each year as migrants, and if so, what should that limit be?

[Bambos Charalambous]

As I have made clear, I am speaking about Commonwealth veterans who are fighting for us, defending our country. We very much support waiving the fees for them to become British citizens.

I will move on. Clause 11 is a particularly pernicious part of the Bill. As well as creating two tiers of refugees, it seeks to criminalise some refugees according to how they arrive in the UK. Criminalising people who are seeking our protection is a clear breach of the refugee convention and our obligations under international law. Let us consider the implications of that. Under clause 11, it is possible that an Afghan national facing persecution from the Taliban, Uyghur Muslims facing persecution in China, or a Syrian national facing persecution in Syria, could be criminalised. They could be criminalised merely for the way they arrive in the UK, yet their claim for asylum due to the persecution they faced has not lessened because of their means of arriving in the UK—of course it hasn’t. While the Government do little to secure safe and legal routes for persecuted groups, it is cruel to criminalise people who are escaping torture or death. Moreover, no evidence has ever been produced to suggest that such a measure will deter those irregular journeys, as the Government claim.

As a report by the Joint Committee on Human Rights pointed out, the Bill is littered with measures that are simply incompatible with human rights law and the UK’s obligations under international treaties. That is one reason why Labour believes that amendments 105 and 98 are necessary. By removing the term “for gain”, the Government are creating a situation where anyone in the channel who helps people in distress, as is their duty under maritime law, could be criminalised. That is clearly wrong, both morally and legally, and we strongly urge the Government to accept amendment 105. It is equally the case, as stated in amendment 98, that there should be safeguards against endangering life at sea. As the Joint Committee on Human Rights recommended, it must be made certain that maritime enforcement powers cannot be used in a manner that would endanger lives.

This is a bad Bill, and we hope that the Government will take heed of the amendments we support. Only through international co-operation, safe and legal routes, and targeted measures against criminal gangs can we, with our international partners, improve the current situation.

[Johnny Mercer (Plymouth, Moor View) (Con)]

I will not take too long in my remarks, Madam Deputy Speaker, but I wish to make a couple of clear points about foreign and Commonwealth service personnel who serve in our armed forces and then have to pay to live in this country afterwards, and to use public services. There has been wide, broad, and deep support for action on this issue over the past few days, including from people who really do not like to get involved in politics. Whether it is the Royal British Legion, Help for Heroes and the veteran community or beyond, in our communities up and down the country, people recognise the morality behind the issue of charging those who serve to live in this country.

I speak to all sorts of people in the veterans community. Last night, I had a conversation with Prince Harry about this. He has contributed hugely to the veterans debate and I wanted his view. He said to me, “It’s not only morally right but would mean so much to those who have given so much.” That is not a political intervention; it demonstrates the moral purpose of this measure. It is an almost “effortless change”, as he said, for this Government to make, for us to finally see through what we have said to these people for so long. We owe it to them. They are our brothers and sisters. They have served with us over many years. I recognise that there are things going around today saying how we should not be doing this in primary legislation, for lots of reasons. I will come to that in a minute, but this has been going on for 20 years for these people, and at some point we have to grasp the nettle and make sure that we look after them.

The money is meaningless. I will address the figures that have been put out by the Government and others. On Monday, I was told that the Government could not do this because it would cost £160 million. That is garbage. Do not take my word for it; look at the Royal British Legion, which has campaigned on this issue for many years. I pay tribute to Members across the House, including those on the Conservative side, who have been Defence Ministers and have tried to deal with this problem but have hit the same issues we are hitting at the moment.

On that £160 million, the Royal British Legion has studied the figures. If someone who served in the military in this country applies for a visa, all their dependants use a special code. Someone can only use that code if they have served or they are a dependant, so we can pull the data between 2016 and 2020. It has never cost more than £1 million a year, so the majority of those fees are profit—a charge on our service personnel to stay here.

Let me address the consultation issue and the 12-year period. I do not want to air dirty linen in public, but I was there when that 12-year figure was decided on. It was done on a visit. It was plucked out of the air. There is no evidence whatsoever to back it up. There is evidence in the Department that someone from a foreign or Commonwealth country who serves in the military is likely to serve between six and seven years. Twelve years is well outside that. It is well beyond what our peer nations do, it is well beyond what our allies do, and it is incredibly unkind to these individuals who have worked and served for so long.

I have given the moral case and the financial case, but ultimately this decision comes down to Conservative Members. The whole country is aligned on this issue, and it has been for a very long time. All the political parties will support new clause 52 except the Conservatives, and we are the ones who made a promise that we would do something about this. That is unconscionable. Colleagues can of course take the calls from the Defence Secretary and others, with these figures that I have demonstrated are not true, or they can think about what they are here to do.

I am here to represent the Fijian family in Plymouth who left the military after nine years having fought in Afghanistan and Iraq; they may have been members of the United Kingdom Special Forces group—a relentless operational tempo. Finally they leave, their kids go to school and they save up for a house, but they have to pay a £10,000 bill to stay in this country that they fought for over so many years. Can colleagues really look that family in the eye and say, “No, you have to pay; we have to make a profit out of you for you to stay in this country, despite the fact that you were prepared to commit so much to the privileges and the freedoms we enjoy”?

Finally, I say to colleagues that the tide changes very quickly in politics. This issue has been around for 20 years now, and the tide changes. I know what it is like when people put the screws on and ask you to vote a certain way, but the tide changes. All we can do is what we think is right on the day. The moral and financial case for this measure has never been clearer, and I urge colleagues to consider it carefully before they cast their vote.