(9 years, 6 months ago)
Commons Chamber1. If she will ensure that the proposals in the draft Investigatory Powers Bill are limited to the police and security services.
A small number of public authorities have the ability to use investigatory powers where it is necessary, proportionate and for limited purposes. All public authorities that have powers to acquire communications data have made a strong operational case to retain those powers. In his review of investigatory powers, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, David Anderson QC, said that there was no public interest in reducing the number of such bodies.
The United Nations has condemned the Bill, which introduces mass surveillance, as having a chilling effect. Will the Home Secretary be kind enough to clarify how many organisations, including local authorities, and employees would have access to communications data as a result of the draft Bill?
I assure my hon. Friend that the United Kingdom does not and has not participated in, or undertaken, mass surveillance. The investigatory powers in the Bill are necessary, and they are used proportionately by the police and other agencies. They are particularly important for the police, including those in his own Hertfordshire force, in dealing with not just terrorists and serious criminals, but the area of child protection, in which he has a particular interest. There is only one new power in the draft Investigatory Powers Bill, which is access to internet connection records, and I can reassure my hon. Friend that local authorities will not have access to such records.
The Secretary of State will be aware of concerns among journalists that these powers, which the security services and the police need to keep us safe, might have a chilling effect on their ability to publish and to report. What steps is she taking to try to guarantee free speech for journalists within the Bill while enabling the security services and the police to have access to the information that they require to keep us safe?
I am well aware of the concerns of journalists, specifically about the powers to access information that might lead to the identification of their sources. They feel that that could have a chilling effect. We have already made a change in the code of practice to require a higher level of judicial authority to allow access to something that could relate to journalists’ sources, and we will legislate on that in the draft Investigatory Powers Bill.
The David Anderson report refers to Cambridgeshire county council’s Operation Magpie, which relied on communications data to protect more than 100 elderly and vulnerable persons from attempts to defraud them. Does the Secretary of State agree that such operations may benefit from the powers in the Bill to protect the most vulnerable?
My hon. and learned Friend raises a very important case, and provides a good example of why it is necessary sometimes for local authorities, such as Cambridgeshire county council, to have access to such powers so that they can do that important job of keeping people safe. After the Government were elected in 2010, we increased the requirements on local authorities in terms of gaining access to the most intrusive surveillance powers, but as she makes clear, in trading standards and other such areas, these powers are necessary to keep people safe.
2. What steps the Government are taking to prevent abuse of the immigration system.
7. What steps she is taking to promote co-operation between police services.
The Government are supporting local policing leaders to invest in cross-force capabilities and collaborative initiatives by protecting police funding over the course of this Parliament, using the police innovation fund to incentivise collaboration, and providing new transformation funding to drive further investment and innovation.
That is a very encouraging answer, but bearing in mind the work of the ministerial taskforce on child protection, what steps is the Home Secretary taking to make sure that the police co-operate well with other agencies in schools, in the healthcare system, and in social work?
My hon. Friend raises a very important point about the police’s interaction with other agencies in dealing with child protection. On Friday, I visited a school and talked to people there about the work they do with the multi-agency safeguarding hub in bringing together police and various parts of the school and the local authority to deal with those issues. We recognise the role that schools have to play, including through personal, social, health and economic education and through sex and relationships education. We also announced in March, when we launched our “Tackling Child Sexual Exploitation” report, that we will be looking at the training of staff, to enable them to be better able to spot the signs of where children may be being exploited in that way.
Is the Home Secretary aware that, although there is a lot of good co-operation across the police services in Yorkshire, many criminals in our part of the world flee to Pakistan and, given that we do not have an extradition treaty, that is becoming a great burden on the police services when dealing with very serious crimes?
I am, of course, aware of a small number of particular cases where concern has been expressed. I would not want to comment on individual ongoing police investigations, but both we and the police recognise the significance of the issues. Indeed, as the hon. Gentleman says, some of the cases involve very serious crimes indeed.
As my right hon. Friend will know, Avon and Somerset police and Wiltshire police are working together strategically to help increase efficiency. The police and crime commissioner elections are coming up in May. Does she agree that PCCs across the south-west should work together to help merge the authorities in order to not only increase the efficiency of the police, but help tackle cross-authority crime?
I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend. Some weeks ago, I visited the new combined firearms training facility that is being used in that way by the Avon and Somerset, Wiltshire and, indeed, Gloucestershire forces. That is a very good example of collaboration. It is absolutely right that police and crime commissioners should also be looking for ways in which they can collaborate, not just in relation to the police, but, increasingly, in relation to fire services.
Such co-operation is vital for the Disclosure and Barring Service to meet its target of 40 days to deal with applications, but it is taking much longer in many cases, including that of a constituent of mine who has been waiting five months since his initial application, causing serious hardship. Is the Home Secretary aware of such delays, particularly within the Metropolitan Police, and what steps will she take to correct the situation?
I assure the hon. Lady that I am aware of the delays taking place in the Metropolitan Police, which is a matter that the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Staffordshire Moorlands (Karen Bradley), is taking up and looking into in detail.
Northamptonshire has been extremely innovative in developing new policing models, particularly in relation to rural crime, so what steps will the Home Secretary take to share that best practice nationally?
Northamptonshire has indeed taken a number of initiatives and I am very pleased to say that, in collaboration, the police and crime commissioner, Adam Simmonds, has been particularly innovative in his thinking, looking at ways in which collaboration, not only between police forces but with other agencies, can take place. It is part of the role of the College of Policing to ensure that good practice, where it occurs, is spread so that other forces are aware of what action can be taken, to help them deal with the same issues, such as rural crime.
Could the Home Secretary update us on the progress she is making on co-operation between emergency services, be they the police, the NHS or the fire services?
Yes, I will refer later to some of the steps the Government are taking in relation to that collaboration. We are encouraging police forces and fire services in particular to look for collaboration where they can find it. In some parts of the country, such as Northamptonshire, the police and crime commissioner is also actively looking to see what action can be taken in relation to ambulance services, too.
8. What her policy is on the inclusion of international students in net migration figures.
15. What steps the Government have taken to tackle violence against women and girls.
Tackling violence against women and girls is a key Government priority. We have introduced a new offence of domestic abuse and are consulting on new measures to protect victims of stalking. We have already committed £40 million between 2016 and 2020 to support victims of domestic abuse. We will publish shortly a refreshed violence against women and girls strategy, setting out how we will do more still to support all victims.
Following the meeting with the Derbyshire police and crime commissioner candidate, Richard Bright, I was shocked to learn that on average between July and September last year one rape a week was reported to Derbyshire police, linked to nights out in Long Eaton, Ilkeston and Derby. Will my right hon. Friend outline what is being done to ensure that victims receive a good level of practical and emotional support following a sexual assault? What can be done to help the police bring predators to justice?
My hon. Friend raises a very important point. First, we have generally seen an increase in the number of reports of rape and other sexual violence. It is good that people have more confidence to come forward, precisely because of the support they now feel they will get from the police and other services. It is, of course, important to ensure that support is available to individuals, for example at Rape Crisis centres. I am pleased to say that over the past five years the Government have made money available to ensure that new Rape Crisis centres have opened, unlike under the previous Labour Government when they were closing.
It is believed that 170,000 women and girls in the UK have endured female genital mutilation. It is right that the Government have introduced legislation and are funding projects in Africa and training NHS and education staff, but without significant UK grassroots intervention to change cultural norms, we will never prevent this horrific child abuse. When will the Secretary of State change her approach and invest in helping communities to prevent FGM, rather than failing to prosecute once the crime has been committed?
As the hon. Lady knows, we have taken the question of forced genital mutilation extremely seriously, which is why we have significantly strengthened the law on FGM and have issued a range of materials to support professionals in being able to understand these issues and spot signs of somebody being taken out of the country. I commend the work of the all-party parliamentary group on female genital mutilation and, in particular, of the Under-Secretary of State for Health, my hon. Friend the Member for Battersea (Jane Ellison), who has ensured that information is made available to communities and community groups about what can be done to prevent forced genital mutilation and to ensure that people can spot the signs and stop it taking place.
T1. If she will make a statement on her departmental responsibilities.
Colleagues across the House will recognise the dedication and commitment of the emergency services in response to the current widespread flooding. It has been a demonstration of public service at its best and a testament to the ability of our police and fire and rescue services to work together to keep the public safe from harm. We believe we must build on this foundation and encourage greater collaboration between local police and fire services—an issue raised in questions previously. On 5 January, the Prime Minister informed the House that responsibility for fire and rescue policy in England had transferred to the Home Office with immediate effect, and I am delighted that the Minister for Policing, Crime and Criminal Justice, himself a former firefighter, is the new fire Minister, in addition to his policing, victims and criminal justice responsibilities.
This machinery of government change is a natural progression of the Government’s work on emergency services collaboration. Police and fire services are sharing control rooms and back-office services, and we will shortly publish legislative proposals to enable police and crime commissioners to take on the governance of local fire and rescue services where a local case is made. I am keen to go further still and apply the lessons of police reform in the last Parliament to the fire and rescue service and ensure that policing learns from the tremendous success of fire prevention in recent years.
That was extremely informative but far too long. We need to be briefer from now on.
I shall take the Home Secretary back to a question she was asked several times last week but refused to answer. In late 2014, a terror suspect from east London well known to the UK security services skipped police bail and walked freely out of the UK to Syria via Dover. Let me try again: when was she first informed that this individual had absconded and were any checks made on his passport before he left?
I said to the right hon. Gentleman and other of his colleagues last week, and I will say it again today: I will not comment on individual cases because of issues relating to police investigations and proceedings. I would say, however, that this Government have taken significant steps to enhance our border security, including by establishing the UK Border Force, thereby taking it out of the failed UK Border Agency, which was set up by the last Labour Government.
That is not good enough. The public are concerned about this and deserve answers. A UK terror suspect broke police bail and walked out of this country unchecked, but it gets worse: yesterday, it was reported that the mastermind behind the Paris attacks last year freely entered this country, through Dover again, despite being known to the authorities in Europe. Is this true, and were any checks made on this individual on his arrival in the UK?
I make it absolutely clear to the right hon. Gentleman that this Government have taken steps to enhance our border security, taken the UK into the second-generation Schengen information system, introduced exist checks, and decided to do what the last Labour Government failed to do: put the UK into the Prüm system.
Two straight questions; no answers. On matters as serious as this, that is simply not good enough. Terror suspects are freely walking in and out of the United Kingdom on this Home Secretary’s watch. Terror suspects know the sea border is a weak link, partly because she delayed UK involvement in the Schengen Information System, which would have given the UK access to EU security checks. The British public need answers, not Ministers hiding behind excuses. Will she today order an urgent review of our border security at our ferry terminals and of the police bail regime for terror suspects?
As my right hon. Friend the Minister for Immigration indicated earlier, we take a number of steps in relation to our border security, and indeed always look to see whether more can be done in relation to our border security, but I repeat what I said earlier—indeed, I said it to the right hon. Gentleman last week. The Labour Government had opportunities in relation to SIS II and Prüm. The Labour Government failed to get this country into Prüm; it is this Conservative Government that have taken the action necessary.
T2. People across the country are rightly very anxious that the Government do everything they can to keep our borders safe at this moment in time. On that basis, for the Secretary of State to stand there and blame a Government that have not been in power for five and a half years is an absolute dereliction of her duty. What can she say to constituents across the country who want to know what she is doing and what responsibilities she is taking to keep our borders safe, in the light of the incidents raised by my right hon. Friend the Member for Leigh (Andy Burnham), which people are justly concerned about?
The hon. Gentleman mentions people’s concerns about border security. It is precisely because this Government recognise the importance of border security that we have taken the steps to enhance our border security that I outlined in response to the shadow Home Security, the right hon. Member for Leigh (Andy Burnham). It is this Government that have ensured that the UK is now a member of SIS II and can join Prüm. It is this Government that have introduced exit checks. All these are measures that enhance our border security.
T7. Following the horrendous attacks in Paris, what steps are the Government taking to ensure that young people’s minds in the UK are not poisoned and that they are not radicalised by the poisonous ideology put forward by Daesh?
The Home Secretary said earlier that she had extended the vulnerable persons scheme to help those who were at risk of being trafficked. On that basis, will she ensure that it is extended further to help vulnerable children, who are at more risk of trafficking and exploitation than anyone else and who are alone and abandoned in Europe? Masud, whom she heard about earlier, suffocated to death in the back of a lorry.
I thank the right hon. Lady for her question, which gives me an opportunity to clarify what I said earlier. I apologise if the way in which I put it gave the wrong impression. I said that we had extended the criteria of vulnerability that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was using to determine who should be resettled under our Syrian refugees resettlement scheme. However, we have also, separately, offered extra support to the French authorities in relation to the identification in the camps of those who have been trafficked.
T10. Given that 1.5 million migrants entered the European Union in 2015 and a similar number will do so in 2016, will the Home Secretary confirm that all European leaders are aware of the impact on fellow EU nations and, in particular, on the United Kingdom, which is already experiencing unsustainable levels of migration?
(9 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberWith permission, Mr Speaker, I will make a statement about our work to counter the threat that we face from terrorism, in the light of the latest propaganda video from Daesh.
This weekend, Daesh released a video depicting the sickening murder of five men whom they had accused of spying for Britain. The video also featured a young boy. Let me echo the Prime Minister's words: this is a barbaric and appalling video. Daesh seek to intimidate and spread hateful propaganda, but in doing so they only expose their own depravity, and the emptiness of their proposition.
The House will understand that this is an ongoing police investigation. and that I cannot comment further while that investigation continues. To do so could prejudice the outcome of any future judicial process. For the same reason, I cannot comment on the alleged identity of the man or the child in the video.
Since the start of the conflict in Syria, more than 800 people from the UK who are of national security concern are thought to have travelled to the region, and we believe that about half of them have returned. Those who have travelled include young women and families. We have seen deadly Daesh-inspired terrorist attacks in Europe and other countries, including the attacks last year in Paris, Lebanon, Turkey, Kuwait and Tunisia, where 30 British nationals, along with others, were murdered at a tourist resort.
It is imperative that the police and security services have the resources and the powers that they need to keep us safe. Since 2010, we have protected the counter-terrorism policing budget, and, as we announced in November, through the strategic defence and security review, we have made new funding available to the security and intelligence agencies. That will provide for an additional 1,900 officers, an increase of 15%, at MI5, MI6 and GCHQ, and will enable us to respond better to the threat that we face from international terrorism, cyber-attacks and other global risks. We have also strengthened the powers available to the police and security and intelligence agencies.
In 2013, I updated the criteria governing the use of the royal prerogative, which allows the Government to cancel the passports of those planning to travel to engage in terrorist-related activity overseas, and in 2014 I removed 24 passports from people intending to travel for terrorism-related activity. Last year, the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act provided new powers to deal specifically with the problem of foreign fighters and to prevent radicalisation. This included a new power to temporarily seize the passports of those suspected of intending to leave the UK in connection with terrorism-related activity. These powers have been used on more than 20 occasions and in some cases have led to longer-term disruptive action such as use of the royal prerogative to permanently cancel a British passport. In November, we published the draft Investigatory Powers Bill, which is currently undergoing pre-legislative scrutiny.
Since April last year, exit checks have been in place on all international commercial scheduled air, sea and rail services using the UK. The information this provides is already supporting our intelligence work, enabling us to make appropriate interventions. In addition, the UK has joined the European watch list system—so-called SIS II—meaning we are now alerted when any individual is stopped at a border checkpoint or by police anywhere in Europe and is checked against the system. Through our Prevent and Channel programmes we are working to protect people from being drawn into terrorism. In partnership with industry, we are working to secure the removal of extremist videos through the police counter terrorism internet referral unit. They are currently securing the removal of around 1,000 pieces of unlawful terrorist-related content every week.
It is clear that Daesh will continue to try and poison minds, and to hurt people in Europe and other parts of the world. We must not let that happen and we stand with all those who want to stop it. Time and again we have seen people of all faiths and backgrounds join together and demonstrate their opposition to terror, and their stand for democracy and freedom. Britain will not be intimidated by Daesh, and together we will defeat it.
As the Home Secretary has just said, people will have been sickened to see images from the latest Daesh video on their television screens last night. What makes it even more disturbing are the British voices in the video and reports that one of them is a UK national who absconded to Syria while on police bail for terrorism-related offences. Clearly, something has gone seriously wrong. People will rightly want to know how on earth this could possibly have happened and will want reassurance that steps are in hand to prevent a repeat
The Home Secretary has not provided that today. I do appreciate that there is a limit to what she can say, but she is only saying anything at all because we applied for an urgent question that was upgraded by the Government into this statement. I believe the public are owed more than that so I want to set out the questions that she will need to answer, if not today, then over the coming days and weeks, both on the specifics and the wider implications of this case.
I will deal first with the case itself and the reports concerning Mr Siddhartha Dhar. Whether or not he is the person in the video does not matter; the system has failed because it allowed him to abscond to Syria, and it is the system’s failings I want to focus on, rather than the identities of people in the video. He was well known to the authorities having been arrested six times on terror-related offences before being placed on police bail in 2014 and asked to surrender his passport. It was when he failed to comply with those bail conditions that it emerged he had absconded. This brings me to my first question: can the Home Secretary tell the House when she was first made aware that this individual had absconded? Did she order an inquiry at that time, and if she did, can she tell us what it revealed and what immediate action she took to tighten up procedures? If she did not order a review, can she say why she did not do so? Was he placed on a watch list and, if so, when? If not, why not?
At the heart of this case is the system of police bail for people arrested for terrorism-related activity and whether it offers the potential for loopholes. Can the Home Secretary tell the House whether the authorities followed the correct procedures between arrest and the bail hearing?
Even if the correct procedures were followed, I have evidence that they were far too weak. I have here the letter sent to Dhar setting out his bail conditions after he was bailed on 26 September 2014. It reminds him that he was due to surrender his travel documents by 3 October 2014, but this letter was sent over a month later, on 7 November. Let me quote from the letter. It states: “It has come to our notice that condition number 3 has not been complied with, or so our records suggest. Are there any changes to your circumstances that the police need to be aware of? Could you please contact the police on the telephone number listed above as a matter of urgency?” Does that in any way sound like an adequate response to the seriousness of the charges? It is clear that Mr Dhar had left this country long before that letter was sent. As I have said, regardless of which individuals might be in the video, this particular individual has absconded and the Home Secretary needs to provide answers.
I turn now to the wider implications of this episode. Will the Home Secretary tell the House how many other individuals are currently on bail for terror-related offences? Is she satisfied that their bail conditions and the monitoring of those individuals are adequate? Is this the only example of an individual absconding while on police bail, or are there others? On the question of the passport, can she say whether, in cases of this type, the authorities should seize a passport immediately rather than waiting for it to be surrendered voluntarily?
Will the Home Secretary also tell us whether individuals in terrorism-related cases should immediately be placed on the watch-list for all airports and seaports at the point of arrest? There are also wider implications about border checks, and anecdotal reports suggest that people continue to be waved through at seaports. The Government committed to check all passports on exit from the UK by the end of the last Parliament. Has that been implemented? If every passport is not currently checked, when will the figure reach 100%? Even if Mr Dhar’s passport was not checked here, it should have been checked on arrival in the Schengen area. However, at the time he went through the border, the UK was not party to the Schengen Information System, which allows the sharing of our watch-lists across Europe, because the Home Secretary had delayed our participation in it. In retrospect, does she now accept that that delay was a mistake and that it weakened our security arrangements? Can she confirm that we are now playing our full part?
We know that the Border Force has undergone a huge upheaval since 2010, involving losing staff, and that it is today facing further cuts. Does the Home Secretary believe that the numbers of border staff are adequate to the meet the threat level and that further cuts will not leave us exposed?
In conclusion, we appreciate that this is an ongoing police investigation, but the fact that this individual could abscond while facing major charges raises serious questions about counter-terrorism policy. We need a commitment from the Home Secretary today that there will be an inquiry into this episode and that its findings will be made available to the House. There has clearly been a major lapse in security, and the onus now is very firmly on the Home Secretary to demonstrate that she is taking all the necessary action to strengthen our systems of monitoring people who pose a risk to our country.
The shadow Home Secretary has asked a number of questions. He is right to say that I will not comment on individual reports in the papers relating to the Daesh video. That is an ongoing investigation. An initial assessment has been made, and work on it is continuing. He asked further general questions about the conditions for police bail and on checks at the border. I assume that, as shadow Home Secretary, he knows that the decision whether to place someone on police bail, and the conditions relating to that bail, are operational matters. Those decisions are taken by the police. I seem to recall that when counter-terrorism legislation has gone through the House in the past, the official Opposition supported proposals from organisations outside the House that more use should be made of police bail for terrorist offenders.
The right hon. Gentleman asked about border checks and about whether the procedures had been tightened up. As I indicated in my statement, we have introduced exit checks. They are now taking place at the various ports of exit and in a variety of ways, according to how the information about someone’s exit is being held. We have introduced the checks and they are now providing support for our intelligence operations. He also talked about the border system that I referred to—the Schengen Information System II—suggesting that somehow this Government had delayed joining it. I seem to recall that SIS II was first proposed when the Labour party was in government, and that it was this Government—the coalition Government followed by this Government—who actually ensured that the UK went into SIS II and is now able to make use of it. We are looking across Europe to see how—I talk with my European counterparts about this—we can continue to enhance the use that can be made of SIS II. It is an important tool and we think there are ways in which we can make better use of it. We are discussing those and will be bringing them into place. We continually look to ensure that we can make any necessary moves to enhance our ability to deal with these issues, and we have done so—people can see the counter-terrorism legislation we have introduced in the past five years. We are continuing to do that, because we recognise our role and responsibility as a Government to keep people safe.
It seems to me that the one key issue that arises from this story is whether the Home Secretary is satisfied that there is an adequately rapid notification procedure following somebody being granted police bail and where the withdrawal of their passport is included, and in the event of a request that somebody surrender their passport if they appear in court. As long as those two things are now happening expeditiously, I venture the suggestion that the problem being talked about today is unlikely to recur through a mechanism of failure of notification. Having listened to the exaggerated froth that has come from Opposition Members this afternoon, I simply add that the single biggest change is the exit checks that my right hon. Friend is responsible for introducing.
My right hon. and learned Friend is right about the importance of the exit checks that have been introduced. He asks about notification in relation to when the surrender of a passport is requested. Passports will be surrendered under different powers and in different circumstances so the whole process will be carried out on a case-by-case basis. For example, when a royal prerogative is being exercised a different process will potentially be used from when a police bail decision has been undertaken. In the latter case, it is up to the police to determine the speed with which it is necessary to remove the passport.
The contents of this video are utterly abhorrent, and we hope that appropriate measures are taken to clarify the identity of this individual as swiftly and accurately as possible. A reasoned and proportionate response to this threat is essential. The Scottish National party is committed to supporting all efforts to counter terrorism and to working to safeguard the lives of citizens of this country. If someone has a passport removed as a condition of their bail, are additional options open to a judge to prevent that person from fleeing the country? What more could have been done or can be done in similar circumstances?
I thank the hon. Lady for her comments about the video, echoing the remarks that both I and the shadow Home Secretary made about the appalling and barbaric nature of not only the video, but the organisation of Daesh. She referred to bail that has been ordered by a judge, but of course bail will often be ordered by the police. If someone has not been charged with an offence, the police will determine their bail to return on a particular date and the conditions applied to that bail. As I have indicated, there are a number of processes whereby other measures can be taken. For example, if the police determine at the port, under the new powers that we have introduced, that somebody’s passport should be temporarily removed for further investigation, that can lead to its permanent removal through a royal prerogative being exercised or to other action being taken. The exercise of a terrorism prevention and investigation measure—a TPIM—can also contain measures aimed at preventing an individual from travelling. All of these decisions as to which powers should be exercised are taken on a case-by-case basis.
I have formed an impression from media coverage, which may not be accurate, that a disproportionate number of violent Islamist extremists are converts to the Muslim faith. Is there any basis for that impression and, if there is, has any analysis been done about the way in which these people were converted in the first place?
I am not aware of any figures that show overall what proportion of jihadists have previously been allied to another faith and have converted to Islam. It is certainly the case that there have been reports in the press, obviously recently but also previously, of individuals who have converted to Islam. A lot of work has been done and continues to be done on this whole question of how people are triggered into radicalisation and terrorist activity. In most cases, a number of factors come together that lead to an individual becoming radicalised, potentially to the point of undertaking violence. What we do with our counter-radicalisation programmes, particularly with Prevent and Channel, is aim to interrupt that process and stop people who have started down that route to radicalisation.
I am asking not about the vile video that the Home Secretary has rightly condemned, but about Siddhartha Dhar and the factual questions that have been raised. Will she tell the House when she was told that he had absconded, whether she asked for an inquiry and also whether the Home Office holds figures on the number of people who abscond while on police bail for terrorist offences?
I said that I would not speak about the individual who has been named in the press. I apologise to the shadow Home Secretary, because he did ask me about the number of people who have absconded while on police bail for terrorist offences. Those figures are not collected. Figures are collected for the number of people who are convicted of failing to surrender to bail, but those are not separated into those who have undertaken terrorist offences.
My right hon. Friend has been working closely with her opposite numbers in the EU—Ministers of the Interior and so on. Will she update the House on what further co-operation is now taking place given the fact that, over the past six months, there have been a number of incidents in which intelligence exchange has obviously failed?
My right hon. Friend has raised an important issue. There has been considerable progress recently in looking at the exchange of information between intelligence services around the European Union. I am talking about not just the exchange of intelligence that takes place between intelligence services, but the role of Europol. I have been talking with my opposite numbers specifically about a better exchange of information on criminal records, including terrorism offence records, further to enhance our ability to identify people who may pose a threat and to take the appropriate action. As I said earlier in response to the shadow Home Secretary, we are also looking at how the SIS II system can be improved to ensure that maximum information is available and dealt with properly.
The Home Secretary is aware of the fact that Daesh is probably the most media-savvy terrorist group that ever existed. It is very welcome that, through a combination of the police and their partners in the industry, 1,000 pieces of content are taken down every week, but for that to happen those pieces of content must have been put up in the first place. Will she undertake to ask the internet providers to monitor more closely content going up so that it does not get on there in the first place?
The right hon. Gentleman raises a very important point. A number of initiatives are already taking place. In the UK, we hold a regular dialogue with the internet service providers. In December, the European Commission brought together EU Interior Ministers with representatives from some of the major internet service providers to discuss precisely those issues about how we can better prevent material from getting on to the internet in the first place and ensure that that material can be taken down. Here in the UK, we have had a long-standing view—across both the previous Labour Government and this Government—that we should work with the internet service providers to encourage them to use their terms and conditions as far as possible to remove material so that it is not available to promote that sort of propaganda.
A key part of our counter-terrorism narrative is that in the United Kingdom we respect religious freedom, which makes even more disturbing the increasing reports of verbal and physical assaults on ladies who wear a veil or hijab while out shopping or taking their children to school, so can my right hon. Friend assure me that she will carefully monitor the number of such incidents and the effectiveness of the police’s response?
My hon. Friend, too, raises an important point and I can assure him that through the reports to Tell MAMA we look at the instances of Islamophobia that take place, as well as looking at the instances of anti-Semitic incidents that take place. We are committed to ensuring that police will now record hate crime which has an Islamophobic element to it so that we can get a better understanding of exactly what is taking place.
The Home Secretary is aware that the terror threat was already “severe”, which means that a terrorist attack is highly likely. In view of the content of this vile video and the imminence of the first anniversary of the Charlie Hebdo attacks, has she put in place better protection for UK media, institutions and citizens against an attack within the UK?
We constantly look at the measures that we need to take here in the United Kingdom to protect against an attack. Following the Charlie Hebdo attack, discussions were held by the police with various media outlets to discuss with them their security. Of course, following the terrible attacks that took place in Paris on 13 November last year, we have looked further at the whole question of protective security. The right hon. Lady is right—the current national terrorist threat level is at “severe”—a terrorist attack is highly likely. The decision as to what that threat level should be is a matter for the independent joint terrorism analysis centre.
In 2014 I was very grateful to my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary for increasing Prevent funding to Crawley constituency. Can she give assurances to the House that she will continue those efforts to ensure that young British Muslims are not tempted by the vile and sick propaganda of Daesh that she has rightly condemned?
I can absolutely give my hon. Friend that assurance. We have taken a number of steps in relation to an uplift in Prevent funding that is taking place. Also, an important step that we took was putting the Prevent duty on a statutory basis. From everything I have heard, I think that is already having an impact out there and ensuring increasingly that those in the public sector who come into contact with young people and others, but particularly young people, are looking to spot the signs that somebody may be being taken down the route of radicalisation, and to take appropriate action.
The House will understand and accept the Home Secretary’s concerns about interfering in a live police investigation, but she must surely accept that the information that is already in the public domain risks undermining public confidence in the police bail system. She or somebody in the police service today or some other time will have to give the information to the public to assure that there is no risk as a result of the operation of that system. The videos that we are concerned with today are—it is almost trite to say it—abhorrent and horrific, but they are merely the symptom of the wider disease of radicalisation. It is believed by many people that the radicalisation process is funded from sources in Saudi Arabia. Will the Home Secretary undertake today to investigate whether that is the case and, if it is, will she undertake to do what is necessary to shut off that source of funding?
The right hon. Gentleman raises an important point about looking at the source of funding for extremism and terrorism here in the United Kingdom. There is a specific piece of work that we will be undertaking, which the Prime Minister referred to when he gave his statement to the House in November in relation to Syria. That will be done through the extremism analysis unit that has been set up in the Home Office, looking specifically at the funding of the extremism here in the United Kingdom.
I appreciate the work of the security services and the police in dealing with counter-terrorism. Clearly a great deal of their work is focused on overseas issues and security within the capital. Can the Home Secretary assure me that she is confident that enough counter-terrorism work is being done to ensure the safety and security of the British people in other cities and towns up and down the country?
I hope that I can reassure my hon. Friend by saying that counter-terrorism units exist not just in London, but elsewhere in the United Kingdom. Following the Paris attacks last November, a piece of work has been started—we are now finessing it—in relation to armed police response, looking across the United Kingdom to ensure that we have the appropriate numbers of trained armed officers in the right places.
Of course, the Home Secretary has form when it comes to absconding. Can she update the House on the current whereabouts of Ibrahim Magog, who absconded in a black cab in January 2013? Can she update the House on the whereabouts of Mohamed Ahmed Mohamed, who absconded wearing a burqa in November 2013? Both were on terrorism prevention orders at the time, under the instruction of the Home Secretary.
The Home Secretary quite rightly said that there has been enhanced funding for the security and intelligence services, but may I ask—this adds to the point my hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle (John Stevenson) made—that those extra resources and armed response units also go to our regional towns and cities, not just the capital?
As I indicated in response to our hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle (John Stevenson), the work that we are undertaking looks across the country at what is appropriate for armed response availability and response times. There will be an uplift in the number of armed officers within the police. As I have said, the exercise is looking precisely at how that should be done and where those officers should be, and it is not only looking at London.
I thank the Home Secretary for yet again putting clear blue water between our fellow Muslim countrymen and those who are extremists and involved in terrorism within this country. To reinforce that point, does she accept that it would be better to pursue counter-extremism and counter-terrorism right across the country, irrespective of geographic location, race or creed? With that in mind, are there any aspects of the counter-extremism strategy that could be operated in Northern Ireland?
I thank the hon. Gentleman for the confidence he has shown in the counter-extremism strategy and in the work that we have developed and are developing on counter-extremism. As he knows, we have had discussions with the devolved Administrations on how the strategy should apply in those parts of the United Kingdom, particularly Northern Ireland and Scotland. Of course, work is already undertaken in Northern Ireland, in a separate strand of action, and that has been shown to be very valuable. Obviously, as he will be aware, at the moment the counter-extremism strategy that we are developing does not apply to Northern Ireland.
Internet-based propaganda does a huge amount to radicalise and brainwash people living in the UK into planning atrocities or travelling abroad to fight. Does my right hon. Friend agree that the additional resources invested in our security services, including GCHQ, which is based in my constituency, significantly enhance our ability to hunt that material down and remove it?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Importantly, we have enhanced the resources going into our security and intelligence agencies. He of course has a particular interest in GCHQ, given his constituency. The work being done there is very important, not just because of the information and intelligence that might be helpful in counter-terrorism, but because of what is done there to counter the cyber-security threat we face.
Many people in Waltham Forest are extremely shocked at the possibility that someone who lived in our community could be involved in atrocities. They would want me to make it clear that we do not consider that he represents either our community or Islam, and we condemn utterly his ideals and actions. However, the Home Secretary will also be aware that there are growing concerns that innocent individuals and families may be unfairly caught up in the activities necessary to keep our country safe. Will she meet me and other MPs representing those UK citizens who have been denied the right to travel to discuss their experiences and how we can reassure them that efforts to tackle terrorism are based on good intelligence and effective partnership, not prejudice?
First of all, I thank the hon. Lady for the remarks she made about Waltham Forest in her constituency and her constituents’ condemnation of the barbaric activities of Daesh and anybody involved in them.
The hon. Lady asks me about the whole question of those who have been denied the opportunity to travel through the exercise of the royal prerogative. If she wishes to bring up particular cases, I am sure that the Minister for Security will be happy to meet her. But I have to say to her that on the one hand her party’s Front Benchers are encouraging us to exercise greater powers and make greater use of the power to prevent people from travelling while she is indicating concern about it. They ought to get their story straight.
One of the chilling aspects of the latest Daesh video is the exploitation of a very young child. On the issue of the radicalisation of children, what progress is being made by the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for Education on ensuring that all madrassahs are registered and that all of them, even those that are unregistered, are monitored in order to safeguard our national security and our national way of life?
We have been working with the Department for Education. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has been developing proposals for the registration of madrassahs, starting with those providing a certain length of time of more formalised teaching. Action is under way in relation to that particular issue.
My hon. Friend raises a matter that concerns many people about children involved in Daesh in Iraq and Syria—children who may be taken away by their families and taken abroad to that environment. In the last year, in a significant number of instances, court powers have been used to prevent families from going abroad. This is quite simply a safeguarding issue and local authorities are increasingly looking at the issue and taking action.
When was the Home Secretary told that Siddhartha Dhar had breached his police bail conditions? What actions did she take as a consequence of that information?
I have been asked this question before and have said that I am not giving indications in the Chamber today about any particular individual. Decisions about whether somebody should be on police bail are taken by the police. They decide the conditions of police bail, and that is as it has always been.
Many of my constituents tell me that they are not particularly perturbed at radicalised extremists who are leaving the country, but they are very perturbed about them coming into the country. What could the Home Secretary tell us about what she is doing to make sure that these people are not allowed back into the country, whether they are British citizens or not?
We have taken a number of increased powers in relation to people who may be coming into the country to do us harm. First of all, we put our no-fly scheme on a statutory basis in legislation that we passed early last year. We also introduced in that same legislation the new temporary exclusion orders, which enable us to manage the return of individuals of concern when they are British citizens and cannot be rendered stateless. Decisions on that are taken on a case-by-case basis.
We also enhanced the ability of the Government to remove British citizenship from those who might be in the position of having alternative citizenship. We have increased our ability to take citizenship away from those individuals when there is a concern about the threat they might pose to the United Kingdom.
Further to the question by my right hon. Friend the shadow Home Secretary, will the Home Secretary confirm what increase she has made in the number of Border Force staff to enable her to carry out full exit controls? When does she plan to have full controls for the people who are returning, and what implications will that have? How will she deal with the issue of biometric passports when people are returning on that basis?
For the benefit of the House, let me say that I think there are some inaccurate assumptions about the way in which exit checks are undertaken. It is not the case that every single exit check will be undertaken by a member of Border Force staff checking somebody’s passport as they go through a point of exit. A lot of this information comprises data that are being gathered electronically, and it is therefore not necessary for Border Force staff to be available to undertake that task.
As well as propaganda online, much planning for modern terrorism takes place on the internet. The Home Secretary mentioned the draft Investigatory Powers Bill. Will she reassure the House that she is determined to come to a workable arrangement with the major internet companies to make sure that there is no safe space online to plot terror?
Absolutely. We continue our discussions with the internet companies on a variety of aspects, not least the operation of the forthcoming Investigatory Powers Bill and elements within it. It is important that we work with the internet service providers, which have a very key role to play in this area in relation to propaganda that can appear on their systems and the response that they give to warrantry requests from the authorities.
The Home Secretary will be aware of concerns I have had for a number of years about exit checks, following the worrying situation in which an individual known to the security services was able to travel with a passport from my constituency to Syria. Will she be absolutely clear on the point about exit checks? Are all individuals leaving the UK through a port of exit by commercial means being checked electronically at the point of exit on their passport, yes or no, and if not, why is that not being considered?
As I have indicated, the way in which the information is being taken varies from port of exit to port of exit. Some of the information in relation to flights, for example, is the advance passenger information that is available to the authorities and has been for some time. At other ports a specific swipe of a passport will be taken. All this information is being held electronically.
Does my right hon. Friend agree that it was quite right to conduct a review of the operation of the Prüm convention before deciding to opt into that convention before Christmas? Does she agree that cases like the one that the House is discussing today show why that was exactly the right decision?
My hon. Friend is right to point out that it was a sensible approach to look at a proper business case for going into Prüm so that we were not just making a decision based on no evidence. It was clear from the evidence available to us that there were advantages to Prüm, and I am glad to say that an overwhelming majority of Members of this House supported it. It is indeed absolutely right and it will be a very valuable tool for us.
I am not asking about the correctness of the decision to bail Dhar, but what I would like to know is this: did the Home Secretary learn from Home Office officials, from the police or from the media that he had absconded?
I think there is somehow, somewhere, a view on the Opposition Benches that Home Secretaries spend all their time scouring the media, or indeed anything else, looking at individual cases. As I said earlier, decisions as to whether somebody should be put on police bail are operational matters for the police. I receive regular security briefings from the police and from the security and intelligence agencies on individuals of concern and on high-priority cases.
I welcome what the Home Secretary has said about the Government’s work to stop Daesh poisoning young people’s minds with its perverted ideology. Will she join me in praising community groups across the UK, including Building Bridges Pendle in my constituency, for their great work on community and inter-faith cohesion?
It is absolutely right that across the United Kingdom many groups are working very carefully and very hard within communities to build bridges within their various faith communities. I commend Building Bridges Pendle, the organisation in my hon. Friend’s constituency. One of the elements of the counter-extremism strategy that we are developing is precisely to try to find ways in which we can help those community groups to further enhance the work that they are doing to increase their voice so it is the mainstream voice that is heard.
I think the House, and maybe even the public, might be interested to know what interest the Home Secretary thinks she is protecting by refusing to tell us when she was advised that Siddhartha Dhar had absconded and whether she did anything about it.
Daesh represents such a serious threat largely because of its widespread use of technology and social media to radicalise people in their bedrooms, on their smartphones, covertly but sadly compellingly. Does my right hon. Friend agree that our security services and police need special powers to collect internet connection records and bulk communication data to protect the nation’s security and stay ahead of the terrorists in this complex environment?
My hon. Friend puts her point extremely well and she is absolutely right. It is important that we are able to access these internet connection records and to have the powers that we are hoping to introduce in the Investigatory Powers Bill. It is entirely right that the Government should continually look to see what further measures we need to take to enhance the powers of the police and security and intelligence agencies to keep us safe, and that is exactly what we are doing.
Given recent events, will the Home Secretary let us know when we will finally have the counter-extremism strategy?
I am not able to give an absolute date for the hon. Lady, but I hope to be in a position to be able to—[Interruption.] In fact, the counter-extremism strategy has been published, and we are now looking at the question of the legislation that we would undertake through it. The specific piece of work by Louise Casey on the cohesion of communities will not be available for some weeks, or potentially months, because it is ongoing. I would hope to be able to update the House soon on any legislative proposals.
(9 years, 6 months ago)
Written StatementsToday, I am launching a public consultation on reforming the governance structure of the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC). The consultation proposals form part of the Government’s continuing programme of policing reforms, including changes to the police complaints and disciplinary systems.
Public confidence in the police is the basis for our long-established model of policing by consent. The IPCC plays a critical role in securing and maintaining public confidence, providing independent oversight of the police complaints system and investigating the most serious and sensitive matters involving the police. I am committed to ensuring that the IPCC has the resources and powers it needs to perform these vital functions.
In March 2013, I announced that resources would be transferred to the IPCC to enable it to expand to undertake many more independent investigations. This major change programme is progressing well and in 2014-15 the IPCC started more than twice the number of investigations it began in the previous year. The IPCC are taking on more again this year, while concluding more cases than ever before.
On 12 March 2015 I gave a statement to the House in which I set out a number of radical reforms on police integrity which included giving the IPCC new powers and strengthening its role as an independent oversight body. The Government will be legislating for these changes in the forthcoming policing Bill.
As part of this package of reforms, I also asked the IPCC to consider reforms to its governance arrangements and structure to help it, as a significantly larger organisation, to deliver more cases and to increase public confidence in the reformed police complaints system.
Following the publication of the IPCC’s proposals in August, I invited Sheila Drew Smith OBE, a member of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, to undertake an independent review of the IPCC’s proposals, in particular to consider their likely impact on public confidence and, as appropriate, provide recommendations for alternative reforms to governance structures.
Today I am publishing Sheila Drew Smith’s report alongside the public consultation on the Government’s proposed reforms to the IPCC’s governance. I am proposing that the existing commission model should be replaced by a single Crown appointee, supported by a unitary board, providing one single, clear line of decision-making in the organisation from top to bottom. These changes, and others set out in the consultation, are designed to deliver a more capable, more resilient IPCC, with clear lines of accountability and decision-making, and will help ensure that complaints made against the police are responded to in a way that builds trust and public confidence, and allows lessons to be learned.
I would like to record my thanks to the IPCC and to Sheila Drew Smith for their efforts in considering these important changes.
The public consultation will run until 28 January 2015. Following the publication of a response to the consultation, the Government intend to legislate as soon as practicable. Copies of the consultation document and of Sheila Drew Smith’s report will be placed in the Library of the House and also published alongside the public consultation via the Home Office pages on the gov.uk website.
I hope that those with an interest in the IPCC will take the time to respond to the consultation.
[HCWS424]
(9 years, 6 months ago)
Written StatementsOn 9 and 10 December 2015, the UK hosted the most recent meeting of the informal G6 group of Ministers of the Interior.
I chaired the meeting which was attended by the Interior Ministers of Germany (Mr Thomas de Maiziere), Spain (Mr Jorge Fernandez Diaz), France (Mr Bernard Cazeneuve), and Italy (Mr Angelino Alfano) and the Polish Ambassador to the UK (Mr Witold Sobkow). The United States of America were represented by the Attorney General (Ms Loretta E. Lynch) and the Secretary of Homeland Security (Mr Jeh Johnson). The European Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship (Mr Dimitris Avramopoulos) also attended.
The meeting commenced on the evening of 9 December with a working dinner where we discussed the threat from Daesh/ISIL and how the Governments represented can collectively step up the fight against terrorism. Our discussion focused on the importance of sharing information, aviation security, and the practical steps we can take to counter extremism and radicalisation, including by working with and empowering communities. We had a very productive and informative discussion and there was collective agreement to publish a statement outlining our shared commitment to countering terrorism through a strong yet proportionate national and international response. The draft was produced overnight and agreed the following day when I introduced the statement to a group of selected journalists. The statement is available on gov.uk at the following link:
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/g6-statement-commitment-to-fighting-terrorism
On 10 December we reconvened at Lancaster House and began the day with a plenary discussion on migration and asylum. The discussion reflected on the unprecedented flows of people into Europe and the developments over the autumn, including the relocation mechanism, hotspots and the importance of identification. The discussion also touched on the broader questions of how best we ensure asylum systems are helping the right people, addressing migratory flows at source and upstream and reducing the abuse of asylum systems.
The second plenary session of the day covered data protection and the importance of striking an appropriate balance between privacy and security. There was a discussion on the recent developments in data protection, including the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the case of “Schrems” (C-362/14), the new EU data protection package and the role of communication service providers and how we can work effectively with them.
Over lunch, the discussion turned to modern slavery and I invited the UK’s independent anti-slavery commissioner, Kevin Hyland, to introduce the session by sharing his experiences on upstream prevention and innovative approaches in source countries. All those at the table shared their experiences of tackling modern slavery which varied in approach and success. The discussion then moved on to the question of working with business to eliminate demand in supply chains. In conclusion there was collective agreement on the importance of the sharing of best practice between countries to address this appalling issue.
The final plenary discussion of the day addressed the threat posed by illicit firearms and built on the recent discussions at the Justice and Home Affairs Council. The European Commission noted the UK’s longstanding contribution on this debate and gave a clear exposition of their approach to the firearms deactivation regulation and the amendments to the firearms directive. The discussion covered the benefits of enhanced information sharing and the importance of tracking the movement of firearms. I concluded the discussion by noting the collective agreement on the direction partners were taking to tackle the threat from illegal firearms and encouraged others to consider this issue and share their experience.
The informal chairmanship of the G6 group will now pass to Italy, who will host the next meeting.
[HCWS425]
(9 years, 7 months ago)
Written StatementsThe Government take policing integrity very seriously. It is at the heart of public confidence in the police and underpins the model of policing by consent. It is what gives rank and file officers the legitimacy to do their jobs effectively. The Home Office has responded to public confidence in police integrity by introducing a programme of measures to improve standards of conduct in the police. This follows various high-profile cases on police failures both current and historic, as well as numerous HMIC inspections and IPCC reports relating to corruption.
We are already expanding the IPCC to deal with all sensitive and serious cases involving the police. We have introduced legislation to prevent officers from escaping dismissal by retiring or resigning; we have introduced the holding of disciplinary hearings in public; and we are introducing legally qualified chairs in disciplinary hearings. The college has produced the code of ethics; laid in Parliament (July 2014) as a statutory code of practice.
In 2016 we will go further with an important programme of reform including primary legislation in the upcoming Bill. We will make the police complaints system more independent of the police through an expanded role for PCCs. We will change the definition of a complaint and simplify the system, making it easier for the public. We will introduce a system of super-complaints to enable systemic issues to be raised.
The “Improving police integrity” consultation, and the previous Government’s response to it in March 2015, set out several proposals to strengthen the IPCC. We will bring forward legislation to implement these proposals. They include the following measures: ending managed and supervised investigations; providing the IPCC with the power of initiative to instigate investigations; clarifying the ability of the IPCC to make determinations; giving the IPCC the power of remedy; and ensuring the IPCC can present its case at disciplinary hearings following an IPCC investigation.
The measures the Government have implemented and the further reforms announced will ensure that local communities continue to trust the police to uphold the highest standards of integrity—but that where they do not, the public are able to hold the police to account.
[HCWS400]
(9 years, 7 months ago)
Written StatementsI am pleased to announce that I am, today, publishing the annual report of the National DNA Database (NDNAD) Strategy Board.
Chief Constable Chris Sims, Chair of the National DNA Strategy Board, has presented the annual report of the National DNA Strategy Board to the Home Secretary. Publication of the report is a statutory requirement under section 63AB(7) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 as inserted by section 24 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.
The report provides demonstrates the important contribution of the NDNAD to the investigation of crimes. I am grateful to the Strategy Board for its commitment to fulfilling its statutory functions.
Copies of the report will be available from the Vote Office.
[HCWS389]
(9 years, 7 months ago)
Written StatementsSection 19(1) of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (the Act) requires the Secretary of State to report to Parliament as soon as reasonably practicable after the end of every relevant three-month period on the exercise of her TPIM powers under the Act during that period.
The level of information provided will always be subject to slight variations based on operational advice.
TPIM notices in force (as of 30 November 2015) | 2 |
TPIM notices in respect of British citizens (as of 30 November 2015) | 2 |
TPIM notices extended (during the reporting period) | 0 |
TPIM notices revoked (during the reporting period) | 0 |
TPIM notices revived (during the reporting period) | 0 |
Variations made to measures specified in TPIM notices (during the reporting period) | 15 |
Applications to vary measures specified in TPIM notices refused (during the reporting period) | 8 |
The number of subjects relocated under TPIM legislation | 2 |
(9 years, 7 months ago)
Written StatementsA meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council was held on 3 and 4 December: 3 December was the justice day, and the Minister for Immigration, my right hon. Friend the Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (James Brokenshire) and my noble Friend Lord Faulks QC, Minister for Civil Justice, attended; 4 December was the interior day, and I attended on behalf of the UK.
The justice day began with the Council reaching political agreement on a regulation on promoting the free movement of citizens and businesses by simplifying the acceptance of certain public documents in the EU, a successful outcome for the UK. The regulation covers a number of civil status documents and will reduce the bureaucratic and financial burden on citizens who need to show such documents issued by one member state to the authorities of another member state. The Commission urged swift implementation and a future review to consider including business documents.
On the directive for the protection of the Union’s financial interests, the presidency updated Ministers on progress since the October JHA Council. Negotiations on this directive will now be taken up by the Dutch presidency, with the issue of VAT fraud remaining the main area of contention.
Ministers reached agreement in principle on articles of the proposed regulation to establish the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), covering the EPPO’s competence and related matters. The UK is clear that it will not participate in an EPPO.
During lunch, the presidency facilitated a discussion on the fight against online hate speech which was broadly welcomed by the UK, in particular the voluntary notice and take-down procedures. The UK maintained that the EU should consider this work stream within its broader extremism strategy to avoid separate discussions and duplication of work. The UK also spoke against moving towards common European standards on hate speech, and reminded others of the continuum between illegal and simply unpleasant behaviour. The UK suggested that the take-down procedure should be speeded up, and that the EU should provide support in maintaining pressure on the IT industry to continue to improve the process.
The Council discussed the proposed regulations on matrimonial property and the property consequences of registered partnerships. The UK has not opted in to either proposal. Two member states made it clear that they could not accept the latter proposal because, in their view, it would require indirect recognition of same-sex relationships that are not provided for under their national laws. Given that unanimity was required, and the desire for the proposals to be agreed as a package, the presidency concluded that agreement was not possible. Other members states expressed their profound disappointment at this negative outcome to such a long and difficult negotiation. A significant number of member states confirmed that they would be willing to pursue enhanced co-operation, work on which will be taken forward under the Dutch presidency.
The presidency put a number of questions to Ministers about the situation across member states on the collection and retention of communications data, in the wake of the invalidation of the data retention directive by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruling in the case of Digital Rights Ireland (C-293/12). The presidency noted that the picture was fragmented across the EU, with some member states maintaining their domestic legislation, some introducing new measures, and a few finding their frameworks struck down by their domestic courts. Ministers were asked several questions including whether an EU or member state response was the best approach, and whether the Commission should be invited to present new legislation. The Commission stated that it had no intention of coming forward with a new proposal.
The UK, supported by four member states, urged caution, noting that access to communications data was of utmost importance and we should not rush to implement a measure if this risked ultimately reducing our operational capabilities. A number of member states supported new EU legislation, but many stressed the need to at least await the outcome of cases pending before the CJEU before proceeding. The presidency concluded that member states agreed on the legality of bulk data retention itself and that while many supported an EU measure, there was also a desire among many to await the outcome of those cases currently before the CJEU.
The presidency presented a paper on the challenges of evidence in the digital age, an issue to which the Dutch presidency will return at the informal Justice and Home Affairs Council in January. The Commission reminded member states of the importance in this context of implementing the European investigation order in full and to time. The Commission expressed concern about direct approaches to internet service providers, arguing that it could be outside a legal framework and could violate EU rules and undermine the new data protection regime. There was consensus on the need to address the challenges posed by e-evidence. The UK intervened to support looking at alternatives to formal mutual legal assistance where appropriate, acknowledging the importance of safeguards and oversight.
The presidency presented a paper on the migration crisis: judicial co-operation and the fight against xenophobia, updating Ministers on actions discussed at the October JHA Council.
The presidency and Commission provided an update on current legislative proposals. The Commission highlighted in particular the importance of reaching agreement swiftly on the data protection regulation and directive, and its optimism that this was possible before the end of the year.
The presidency noted that the western Balkans conference on 7 and 8 December will focus on migratory flows, terrorism, trafficking, firearms and judicial co-operation.
Finally, the Netherlands presented their three justice priorities: criminal co-operation on cybercrime, victims’ rights and a European forensic science area. Regarding the legislative agenda, the focus of the Dutch presidency will be the consolidation and implementation of existing instruments.
The interior day began with a discussion on passenger name records where I urged member states to take the opportunity to conclude the proposed directive. The Council agreed the compromise text negotiated with the European Parliament. Over lunch, Ministers agreed a Council declaration that all member states would make use of the option to collect data on internal EU flights and allow collection from non-carrier economic operators such as travel agencies and tour operators, with the aim of sending a strong message about the necessity of processing PNR, in advance of a vote in the European Parliament, scheduled for 10 December.
The Council approved the compromise text agreed with the European Parliament on a draft regulation on Europol. Formal adoption of the regulation is expected in the coming months. The UK has not opted in to this regulation, but will consider opting in post adoption.
Denmark updated the Council on the outcome of their referendum on moving from a block opt out of all EU Justice and Home Affairs measures to the UK and Irish opt-in model. Denmark expressed regret at the “no” vote and noted that this would make it very difficult for Denmark to participate in important EU initiatives, in particular co-operation with Europol. Denmark explained that the referendum had been heavily influenced by the uncertainty created by the situation at the borders.
The presidency updated Council on the implementation of the internal security strategy.
The presidency reminded Ministers of the strong commitments made in the 20 November Council conclusions in response to the terrorist attacks in Paris and called for rapid implementation. I noted the positive progress made, citing the Syria strategic communications advisory team, Europol’s internet referral unit and stronger standards for deactivation of firearms, but stressed that further work was required on a number of fronts: first, to reduce terrorists’ access to weapons, particularly through improving our collective understanding of firearms trafficking through better exchange of information, including on ballistics. Secondly, it was necessary to make enhanced use of existing systems; in particular the Schengen information system, and to improve the interoperability of the various EU databases, including SISII and Eurodac . Thirdly, member states needed to step up co-operation with middle east and north African states to improve their capabilities, especially on aviation security. Finally, I stressed that all of this had to be underpinned by strong strategies to challenge extremist ideologies and prevent people from turning to terrorism in the first place.
Ministers were briefed on the EU-US dialogue which took place in Washington on 13 November.
The Council received an update on the migration situation, with the Commission calling for implementation of measures already agreed, and the EU agencies (EASO; Frontex: EU-Lisa) providing updates on their efforts regarding the external borders. Some progress was reported on hotspots but as there had been over 800,000 arrivals this year the situation remained critical.
There was broad support for the need to strengthen the external borders of the EU, with some member states advocating the development of a proposal for a European border guard.
I joined others in pressing for further, immediate progress on hotspots, reiterating the UK’s willingness to provide practical assistance. I stressed that it was critical for member states to tackle abuse of the asylum system by economic migrants, and that the principles underlying the Dublin regulation remained sound and should be retained. I set out that we are making good progress in our national resettlement scheme; but stressed that any further expansion of resettlement activity should be linked to actions by third countries to reduce illegal migration flows and avoid unintended “pull factors”.
The presidency provided an update on the negotiations on the permanent crisis relocation mechanism. Three meetings had taken place at technical level. However, several member states were against such a mechanism and wanted to wait to evaluate and draw lessons from the temporary mechanism. The Government do not support relocation as it is the wrong response to the migratory pressures the EU faces. It undermines the important principle that asylum should be claimed in the first safe country and does not address the causes of illegal migration.
The presidency said it would continue to progress proposals for a common EU list of safe countries of origin. Three areas for discussion were fundamental rights assessments, the interaction with national lists and the nature of implementing acts.
The Council reached political agreement on a directive on the admission of third country student and researchers, which is aimed at harmonising member states’ requirements governing the entry and stay of these groups. The United Kingdom has not opted in to the measure.
Under AOB, the presidency noted the outcomes from the Valletta conference and the EU-US ministerial meeting. The presidency also noted the upcoming EU-western Balkans forum meeting in Sarajevo on 13 December.
[HCWS386]
(9 years, 7 months ago)
Written StatementsIn May 2015, I announced at the Police Federation conference a comprehensive review of targets in policing, to be led by Chief Superintendent Irene Curtis. I said that the review would examine the use of targets in each force to understand where, how and why targets are being used, and analyse the impact of targets on police officers’ ability to fight crime.
I am pleased to tell the House that the review has now concluded. I am grateful to Irene Curtis for her thorough investigation and analysis of the use of targets in policing.
The review sheds light on current practice among forces and confirms the problems I have long noted with numerical targets: skewing priorities; causing dysfunctional behaviours; and reducing officer discretion. It shows that the police need to go further in order to tackle the culture of narrow target-chasing and bureaucracy that has hampered and limited officers, preventing them from exercising their professional judgment. Quite rightly the public expect to see forces serving their communities, not chasing arbitrary targets. The police need performance management systems that help effective decision-making to improve performance, while also enabling individuals to be appropriately held to account.
The review makes recommendations for the leading organisations and individuals in policing: chief constables, who are tasked with improving their performance measurement, monitoring and reporting processes; Police and Crime Commissioners, who will need to develop a more sophisticated dialogue with the public on police and crime “success” factors; the College of Policing in developing a set of principles for performance management; and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary to improve the presentation of performance data and communication of monitoring processes. It will be for each organisation to consider its own response but I welcome the evidence the review provides. Its implementation will help improve performance measurement and management practices across policing.
Irene Curtis’s review has highlighted the importance of understanding the demands upon the police. A key step to achieving this is a robust and consistent framework for recording those demands—both crime and non-crime incidents. We will engage with our partners to consider options for greater alignment of National Standard for Incident Recording (NSIR) with the National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS).
The review also recommended that the Home Office review the annual data requirement for victim satisfaction data. A police-led review of user satisfaction surveys, to ensure that changes proposed to the data requirement are of assistance to police forces, will be undertaken by April 2016. The Home Office will consider its findings as part of the 2017-18 annual data requirement process. In the meantime, the current annual data requirement for user satisfaction surveys will continue for 2016-17.
A copy of Chief Superintendent Irene Curtis’s report will be placed in the Library of the House. It can also be found at:
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications?departments%5B%5D=home-office.
[HCWS367]
(9 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move,
That this House, wishing to see serious crimes solved, to counter terrorism and to see foreign criminals prosecuted and deported, supports opting in to the Prüm Decisions; notes the views of senior law enforcement officers that the Prüm Decisions are an important aid to tackling crime; notes the success of a pilot that demonstrated that the Prüm Decisions mechanism is both swift and effective; and further notes that only a subset of the relevant national DNA and fingerprint databases, containing data relating to individuals convicted of recordable offences, will be made available for searching by other participating States, and that the higher UK scientific standards will be applied to matches in the UK.
Recent events in Europe, particularly in Paris, have highlighted the very real need to co-operate with other countries in order to keep our citizens safe and to hunt down criminals and terrorists. Following the attacks in Paris, we know that the French authorities have been co-operating and co-ordinating with a wide range of law enforcement agencies in other countries, and that one of the tools they have found most effective has been the Prüm mechanism, the subject of today’s debate. Indeed, it is thanks to Prüm that they were able to identify at least one of the attackers so quickly.
Prüm—so-called after the German town in which it was agreed to develop the mechanism—is about the sharing with other countries, in strictly controlled circumstances, of DNA profiles, fingerprints and vehicle registration data in order to prevent and investigate crime. My French counterpart, Bernard Cazeneuve, wrote to me recently to set out his first-hand experience of Prüm and his hopes that the UK and France can improve our co-operation through it. While I never accept the views of others unquestioningly, I think it is wise to listen carefully to those with recent experience of such chilling events, and they believe this system to be hugely beneficial. The experience of France and others, and our own detailed study of Prüm, leads me to conclude that it is in the national interest to sign up to it, and I will set out in more detail why I think so.
I am sure that my right hon. Friend accepts that the dreadful carnage in France was to some extent the result of the failures of the authorities in that country. Why should we place so much trust in those who have had that kind of experience?
I have to say that the blame for the carnage in France lies fairly and squarely with the terrorists who caused it. I believe it is absolutely right to listen to those with experience. I will come on to describe other examples of how the exchange of data is beneficial in a variety of circumstances. Before I do so, it might be helpful to the House if I set out how we have come to this point, exactly what the system is and what it is not.
As I have said, Prüm is primarily about the sharing of DNA profiles, fingerprints and vehicle registration data with other countries in order to prevent and investigate crime. It is worth noting at the outset that we already share such data with other countries via Interpol, so this debate is not about whether we should do so, but about how. This system automates the front end of an existing manual process to access that information. It will make information exchange subject to the touch of a button, rather than a lengthy manual process. That means that it will be quicker and easier for our police to check the national databases of other member states, hugely increasing the reach of UK law enforcement. It is important to remember that this is not a centralised EU database.
My right hon. Friend makes a very strong case for this technical function, but I am concerned that the threats we face extend far beyond Europe and the European Union. Will she say more about why it is so difficult to get Interpol and its member countries to adopt a similar system?
Because of the number of countries involved in Interpol and the amount of information that is available, there are very real difficulties and physical issues in getting all those countries to agree to such a system. In the European Union, countries have come together and decided that it would be beneficial to have such an automated process. So far, Interpol has retained the manual processes. Later, I will exemplify the difference in timing between the automated process of Prüm and the manual processes of Interpol.
The Home Secretary is absolutely right to opt in to this mechanism. It is not about giving information away in its totality, but about sharing information. One of the lessons from Paris is the importance of EU countries knowing who is coming through the external borders. Does she agree that it is essential that when countries have concerns about individuals, they put them on the databases as quickly as possible?
The right hon. Gentleman makes an important point. One of the arguments that we are making in Europe is that we should make better use of other databases, such as the Schengen Information System II border database, to ensure that we do the job that we all want to do. Criminals and terrorists do not recognise borders and do not stop at borders. It is therefore important that data are shared between countries so that we can identify them and bring them to justice.
Ideally, we would want Interpol to come to a similar agreement on the sharing of information through an automated system. The fact that Interpol is not in that position today does not mean that we cannot take action now with our European partners and share the information in an automated fashion. Given the tragic events in France, is this not a time for further collaboration and co-operation with our European partners, rather than retrenching into our own silo?
My hon. Friend makes an important point about the interplay between Prüm in the European Union and Interpol, and he is right that now is the very time when we need to work more in collaboration with our partners to ensure that we share the data that are necessary to keep us safe.
I am very grateful to the Home Secretary. As someone who wishes her to use all decent means to track down terrorists, I think it is a good idea to get access to more information, but I also want her to help us uphold our manifesto promise that there will be no transfer of powers to the EU and that there will be a reduction in the EU’s powers, so why can we not do this by intergovernmental agreement, rather than by submitting it to the European Court of Justice?
My right hon. Friend has challenged me on similar issues in relation to justice and home affairs measures in the past. The fact is that because Prüm already exists within the European Union, attempts to exchange these data in other ways would require not only an intergovernmental agreement, but the building of separate systems. That would take far longer, and we would not have access to the data for a significant period. Other member states would point out that a mechanism is already available, and that if we wish to exchange data in such a way we should join that mechanism.
Let me explain a little more about the sort of data exchanged and the processes. For DNA, a crime scene profile is sent from one country to all the other countries simultaneously, and it is automatically searched against the profiles held in those countries’ databases. If there is a match, the requesting country receives a hit report back. At that stage no information is exchanged that would allow a person to be identified—none.
Prior to any personal details being released, all hits must be verified scientifically. In broad terms that is the same system as for fingerprints. Hits are reported within 15 minutes for DNA, and within 24 hours for fingerprints. With Interpol the same manual process means that the average time to report a hit is more than four months. For vehicle registration data, a country that is investigating a crime in which a foreign-registered car is believed to have been involved can request details of that vehicle. Those details are provided in 10 seconds. I think that bears repeating: our police would be able to get details of foreign-registered vehicles in 10 seconds, rather than the months it can take at the moment.
As I said to this House in July last year, Prüm is about the
“easy, efficient and effective comparison of data when appropriate”.—[Official Report, 10 July 2014; Vol. 584, c. 492.]
Right hon. and hon. Members will no doubt recall that Prüm was part of the 100 or so measures that we opted out of last year when we exercised an opt-out that the Labour party negotiated but had no intention of using—that was the greatest repatriation of powers in this country’s history.
I welcome the Home Secretary’s statement. Have there been any discussions with the Republic of Ireland about introducing Prüm, and does she believe that that will happen in future?
I have not held any of those discussions. Within the European Union a small number of member states have not yet joined Prüm, but they are being encouraged to do so precisely because of the value that has been noted by member states already using the system.
As I said, we repatriated those powers, but we did not seek to rejoin Prüm at that time. That was because although the Labour party signed us up to a measure, it did nothing to implement it. If we had then rejoined, that would have opened us up to fines for non-implementation that could have run into tens of millions of pounds. A pragmatic decision was taken at the time, but as I also said:
“All hon. Members want the most serious crimes such as rapes and murders to be solved and their perpetrators brought to justice. In some cases, that will mean the police comparing DNA or fingerprint data with those held by other European forces. Thirty per cent of those arrested in London are foreign nationals, so it is clear that that is an operational necessity. Therefore, the comparisons already happen, and must do so if we are to solve cross-border crime. I would be negligent in my duty to protect the British public if I did not consider the issue carefully.”—[Official Report, 10 July 2014; Vol. 584, c. 492.]
By way of consideration, I promised to run a small pilot with a small number of other countries focused on DNA, and to produce a full business case on Prüm. I also made clear that the final decision on whether to sign up to Prüm would be one for this House. We have now run that pilot, and we have published a thorough business case by way of a Command Paper. We are here today to debate and decide whether we should participate in Prüm or not. I believe strongly that we should.
In such matters there are inevitably balances to be struck between sometimes conflicting interests. I think that the Home Secretary has broadly got this one right, and she will have the support of the Liberal Democrats. She will be aware that the briefing provided from Big Brother Watch today refers specifically to the European arrest warrant. What will be required for the use of a match coming from Prüm and relating to extradition under the EAW?
If, for example, the DNA profile is sent, the first response is about whether or not there is a hit on the database. There is then a separate process to determine whether the individual’s personal details will go forward. As I will come on to say, we intend for there to be scientific consideration of the match to ensure that it meets the requirements and thresholds that we set. We will be setting higher thresholds than other countries. It will be possible, if the other country wishes, to move to a European arrest warrant to arrest an individual if there is sufficient evidence. We have brought in extra safeguards in relation to the use of European arrest warrants. It will also be possible, through the EAW, for foreign criminals here to be extradited elsewhere and for criminals who have undertaken activity here in the UK but have then gone abroad to be brought back to the UK for justice.
On that specific point, will the second check—the second set of scientific safeguards, as I believe the Home Secretary called them—be a manual check done by a human, or will the process be automated?
I think there will be an automated element to it. If my hon. Friend is concerned that the whole system will immediately undertake the check, there is a decision to make that check and we are setting a higher threshold. I am getting into scientific waters that I am perhaps not best qualified to refer to, but the issue is what are called the matches of loci on the DNA. Many countries will use six, or potentially eight, loci. We will actually use 10 loci, which is the threshold we normally set in the UK. If 10 loci are being matched, the chances of a false positive are less than one in a billion—an important safeguard that we have.
One reason I believe we should opt in to Prüm is the result of the small-scale pilot we conducted and to which I just referred. I was very clear that the exchange could only occur after we had put memorandums of understanding in place with the Netherlands, Spain, Germany and France, and that exchange would only take place under tight safeguards. Matching profiles found at crime scenes in the UK against the four overseas databases saw an impressive 118 hits. That is nearly double the number of profiles our police sent abroad for checking in the whole of 2014. We got hits from each of the four countries. We got hits to serious crimes. We got hits to people who were French, Dutch, Romanian and Albanian, and from various other countries. We did not get hits to Britons. Crucially for the police, this is leading to the arrests of foreign nationals that would not otherwise have taken place—foreign criminals whom we can then kick out of the country, making our streets safer.
A DNA crime scene profile recovered from an attempted rape was sent to all four Prüm pilot countries. The profile hit against a profile held in France, following an arrest there for a burglary. Following the verification of the hit, and after further co-operation with France, the National Crime Agency obtained demographic information on a Romanian national. This individual was stopped in London on 10 November 2015 on suspicion of a motoring offence, which would not have led to a DNA swab being taken or any search domestically of our DNA database. Owing to the Prüm hit, however, the warrant for his arrest was revealed. He was arrested and charged with the attempted rape and is currently on remand. In other cases of rape, we know the police have requested extradition papers. As the director general of the National Crime Agency, Keith Bristow, has said,
“these would not have been detected without the pilot”.
It is because of cases like this that Director of Public Prosecutions, Alison Saunders, has said that Prüm will:
“reduce the number of unsolved crimes, such as murder and rape, committed by foreign nationals, and provide an improved service to the public, victims and their families”.
If the House votes to re-join Prüm, we will be setting in place a process that will catch foreign nationals who have committed crimes here. We will be setting in place a process by which these criminals can be deported. We will be setting in place a process by which foreign nationals who have committed crimes in the UK can be linked to crimes abroad and sent to those countries to stand trial. In short, it will be a vote to keep foreign criminals off our streets and make our communities safer.
The numbers here are stark. If, and I hope when, the UK connects with all other Prüm countries, the evidence suggests there could be up to 8,000 verifiable hits following the initial connection. That is up to 8,000 foreign criminals our police can track down for crimes they have committed in the UK. There will then be an ongoing daily process that will produce more hits. Such exchanges will become part of business as usual, with the reach of our law enforcement extended across Europe at the touch of a button. This is the sort of progress we must grasp. Experience from those already operating the system in other countries shows just how important it really is.
To those who say we do not need to be in Prüm to do this and that we can do it already, I just say look at the figures. The existing processes are so cumbersome and convoluted that last year police sent just 69 DNA profiles abroad. The ease of the processes we used in the pilot means we have already sent 14,000% more this year. Furthermore, changing the Interpol process would require the agreement of all Interpol members, which would be a near impossibility. It simply is not true to suggest, therefore, that we can go on with the current processes or can easily improve them.
For fingerprints, there is an additional benefit. Countries signed up to Prüm can also check the EU database containing the fingerprints of asylum seekers and others detained illegally crossing the EU’s borders. It was this ability to make checks with that database that allowed the Austrian authorities to identify eight of the 71 people so tragically found dead in the back of a lorry on 27 August. It was that same ability that allowed the Austrians to identify one of the suspects in that case. We also know that one of the individuals involved in the Paris attacks entered the EU via Greece. With the unprecedented flows of migrants at the moment, it is clear that the police would benefit from having this capability. By that, I mean police from across the whole of the United Kingdom.
During this process, we have engaged closely with the Scottish Government, Police Scotland, the Northern Irish Department of Justice and the Police Service of Northern Ireland, whose views the Government have given great weight in formulating policy. That is why the Scottish Government, Police Scotland, the Scottish Police Authority, the Northern Irish Department of Justice and the PSNI will have places on the oversight group. Their views will continue to be important to me personally and the Government more generally as we progress this matter, and we will of course consider the representations from the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) about other bodies. We will ensure that every corner of the United Kingdom has its voice heard. I am sure that is why I have received letters of support for linking us up to this capability from Police Scotland, the Scottish Government and the PSNI.
I have also received support from Bernard Hogan-Howe, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, who has said:
“The scale of the potential for individuals to commit crime across Europe is such that a solution such as Prüm, with all the necessary safeguards, is the only effective way to track down these highly mobile and potentially dangerous criminals.”
I agree wholeheartedly.
I am as keen as anybody to ensure that our streets are safe. Will my right hon. Friend assure the House that these powers could be exercised by our immigration authorities at the point of entry in relation to anybody seeking to enter this country, whether they be an EU or non-EU citizen?
There are separate arrangements of course. One reason we opted back into SIS II was to give our immigration officials the opportunity to deal with these issues as people crossed the border. As I said, it is possible to check the EU database for the fingerprints of asylum seekers and others detained crossing the EU’s borders illegally. I welcome my hon. Friend fully supporting our being able to take measures to tackle criminals and identify those who should be brought to justice, and I look forward to his joining me in the Lobby to support our entry into Prüm.
While it is incumbent on us to give the police the tools they need, it is also incumbent on us to balance that against any civil liberties worries that some may have. The Government have not made this decision without looking hard at how to protect British citizens. I was proud to be a member of the Government who abolished identity cards, stopped the indefinite retention of DNA profiles and fingerprints of those arrested and not convicted of offences and reformed stop and search. Where there have been genuine concerns, I have listened.
The first concern I have heard about this system is that innocent Britons could get caught up in overseas investigations. I believe this should be about catching criminals, so we will ensure that only the DNA profiles and fingerprints of those convicted of a crime can be searched against. We will write that into legislation. Innocent Britons will have nothing to fear. Secondly, I know there has been concern that some countries use lower scientific standards than the UK does when assessing DNA, as I mentioned earlier, and that this could lead to false positives in matches. That is why we will legislate to ensure that UK scientific standards apply before any personal data can be provided. As I said in response to my hon. Friend the Member for Daventry (Chris Heaton-Harris), this means there will be a less than one in a billion chance of the match not being a true one. We accept these standards domestically, and I will ensure that we apply them internationally. To suggest we go beyond that, however, would be to harm our ability to solve crimes.
Yes. How we deal with the data on the databases held here is a national matter. The European Court of Justice does have some jurisdiction—my hon. Friend is right about that in respect of some matters—but its jurisdiction is over the “hit/no hit process” or mechanism. Beyond that, how we hold the material on the database is a matter for national decision.
No. I have to explain to my hon. Friend that we are able to determine the database, and that how we hold that database and the information that is held on it are matters for national decision. Articles 2(1) and (3) of the principal Prüm decision say that we need to inform the general secretariat about which profiles will be made available for searching under Prüm, while article 5 makes it clear that the follow-up process to a hit is subject to national law, not EU law.
My right hon. Friend is making a very persuasive case. I ask for a moment of clarity regarding the expansion of judicial engagement into areas that have formerly been for the court of Parliament, which has been a form of mission creep that can be seen in various areas. Will my right hon. Friend make very clear the precise remit of the UK courts on this matter, so that when it comes to a judicial review—as I am sure, sadly, it will—or a trial in front of the Supreme Court, it will be able to look back at the words my right hon. Friend has spoken from the Dispatch Box today. It would then be able to see the will of Parliament in the decision and not the interpretation that is chosen at that particular moment.
I am happy to confirm that I am willing to comment on the application of the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice and how it affects our position. As for the legislation that we are bringing forward, if my hon. Friend looks at the command paper, he will see that we are making clear those areas where national laws apply. As I tried to explain earlier, the Prüm decisions are all about the exchange of data, not the manner in which the data are held here in the UK. Article 72 of the treaties makes it clear that how we deal with DNA for our own security is a matter for member states, not for European jurisdiction. As a further safeguard, we will ensure that if a person was a minor when the DNA or fingerprints were taken, demographic details could be released only if a formal judicial request for assistance were made.
Finally, I referred earlier to an oversight board and I will establish an independent oversight board to ensure that Prüm operates in a just and effective manner. Both the biometrics and information commissioners will have seats on that board, and so will the Scottish Police Authority and the other bodies from Scotland and Northern Ireland that I have mentioned.
It was on account of all those clear and stringent safeguards that the National DNA Ethics board felt that it could write to me in support of our decision to recommend participating in this system. I therefore hope that those who I accept have principled civil liberties concerns will listen to its views.
Costs are associated with implementing this capability. When the Labour Government initially signed us up to Prüm, they estimated that it would cost about £31 million —about £49 million in today’s prices. That was without providing any safeguards and without ensuring that Scotland and Northern Ireland would benefit fully and be fully involved. I have looked at this very carefully and am pleased to tell the House that at the same time as ensuring that the operational benefits are nationwide and that UK citizens get the protections they deserve, the Government will need to spend only £13 million. The money spent implementing Prüm will be recouped many times over in savings that the police will make through using it.
Hon. Members will have read about Zdenko Turtak, who earlier this year attacked and raped a woman, leaving her for dead in Beeston. In investigating this crime, the West Yorkshire police had only the victim’s statement and the attacker’s DNA on which to proceed. Suspecting that the assailant might have not been British, they submitted forms to Interpol and had the DNA profile searched against profiles held in other European countries. It took over two and a half months for a match finally to be reported by Slovakia. During that time, the police pursued over 1,400 separate lines of inquiry at a cost of £250,000. If the United Kingdom and Slovakia had been connected through the Prüm system, that initial hit, instead of taking two and a half months, would have taken 15 minutes. Just think of the time and money that that would have saved the police, not to mention the benefit to the victim of knowing that her attacker would be brought to justice.
Will my right hon. Friend give way?
If my hon. Friend will permit me, I need to make progress. I am nearing the end of my speech.
I agree with Russell Foster, the assistant chief constable in West Yorkshire, who has said:
“I can state without any doubt whatsoever that enabling the EU Prüm Decisions in this country will be of significant benefit to all UK law enforcement agencies.”
So, do we want to save the police time and money? Do we want to catch more foreign criminals and kick them out of the country? Do we want to speed up and improve our co-operation with some of our closest allies, such as France? Do we want to extend the reach of our police across Europe, and help to solve serious crimes like rape? Do we want to benefit the whole of the United Kingdom, and help to keep our citizens safe? The answer to all those questions must be yes, and, given the safeguards that I have set out today, I am confident that we can protect the British public while also protecting their civil liberties.
Prüm means more crimes solved and justice for victims, more foreign criminals caught and removed, money saved, the whole United Kingdom benefiting, and civil liberties protected. It is clear to me that signing up to Prüm is in the national interest, and I commend the motion to the House.
Why should it not, if the co-operation is improved by those institutions? The hon. Gentleman is putting an in-built dislike and distrust of them ahead of the actual issue before us. That is what some Conservative Members are doing, but they should judge this on its merits. Surely the better we can facilitate that co-operation, the more benefits it will bring back to the police and security services. I would imagine that co-operation will be enhanced by working with established institutions, as opposed to making ad hoc arrangements, Government to Government. That is the benefit of the European Union, although I know he probably does not accept that.
The Government have come to the right decision, albeit in a roundabout way, but I wish to press the Home Secretary on a few points of detail, the first of which is on the cost. She said that in the original assessment the cost of opting into Prüm was put at £31 million, but she now says it is £13 million. We are prepared to accept that at face value, but can she say what is responsible for such a significant reduction in the cost? The business and implementation case says that the estimate is based on “high level requirements”, which implies that it is based not on a fully fledged implementation of Prüm but just on the “high level requirements”. Will she say more about that? What are the “downstream operational running costs” to which the business case refers? How much will it cost every year to run the system, set against the benefits that she said it would bring? My next point may be of interest to those who have signed the amendment. Will the Home Secretary say what the UK will be liable to pay back to the EU if the House does not back this decision this evening? I understand that it is a significant sum, and perhaps it would help the House to know what it is.
I now wish to deal with the safeguards. We welcome the appointment of the oversight board, although there is concern that extradition should not be possible under a European arrest warrant purely on the basis of a DNA or fingerprint match. I think this was the point that the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael) was raising earlier. The point was that other corroborating evidence should always be required before extradition can be granted. I think the Home Secretary was confirming that was the case, but it would help the House if she or one of her Ministers could say a little more on that at some point.
I am grateful for the opportunity to do that, and I apologise to the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael) if I slightly misunderstood his question. It would be my expectation that an EAW would require more evidence. We have put a number of safeguards into the way in which EAWs are operated, to ensure that we do not see people erroneously being extradited from the UK, and I would expect there would be more evidence as the basis for issuing an EAW. And those normal EAW processes will apply even when there has been a Prüm hit.
I think the whole House will find that explanation helpful. I would share the concerns of the hon. Member for Stone and others if the match could then trigger a European arrest warrant immediately without any other evidence. I think everybody would find that worrying, but the right hon. Lady has reassured the House on that point.
It is also reassuring that only people convicted of recordable crime can be searched by another police force. That still does not take away the higher level of concern that there would be over the sharing of DNA profiles from named individuals. Does the Home Secretary feel that there should be a higher proportionality test in this area, linked to more serious crime and terrorism, and does she favour a stricter test before DNA information can be shared with another police force? That is an area in which a higher safeguard could be introduced. It might be effective in limiting blanket person-to-person searches, which bring potential for abuse.
Who will take the decision to share personal information if a match is made? Will it be a designated individual in a police force or will all decisions be taken at a national level by NCA officials? It is important to be clear about who will be making these decisions. Will it be an individual who makes only one or two such decisions in the course of a year, or an official who deals with many of them? I think people will have more confidence in someone who deals with a good number, because they will be able to weed out the more frivolous requests.
Will all participating nations collect DNA profiles and fingerprints from crime scenes using a shared quality assurance standard? There is concern about the lack of uniformity across Europe, and people will want some reassurance on that matter. Finally, will the Home Secretary expand on the role of the European Court of Justice when it comes to the Prüm decision, if we choose to opt into it? As I understand it, it is quite a minor extension of its jurisdiction and there is not the fear that has been expressed by some in the motion.
With those caveats—I insist that they are just caveats—I conclude by saying that we on the Labour Benches believe that the Government have reached the right decision, albeit they have done so in a roundabout way, and that they deserve our support this evening. I hope they agree that this whole issue and the way in which we have arrived at this point illustrate how our continued membership of the European Union enhances the security of our country in these difficult times. The Home Secretary has made a convincing and powerful case tonight to rejoin the Prüm decision, and she will have our support in taking an important step to catch more criminals and keep our country safe.
It does not. The reasons why that terrible carnage took place have a great deal to do with insecurity and instability as a result of the failures of border controls and the manner in which people made their way to Paris. We do not have time to go into all those matters, and they are not the subject of this debate, but I question whether national security for United Kingdom citizens, which is our prime concern, will be advanced by surrendering these powers to the European Court of Justice.
The Government concede that accepting the Court’s jurisdiction is not risk-free. They should have explained what practical impact they expected the extension of the Court’s jurisdiction in relation to the UK to have, and they have not done so.
Thirdly, the Government say that they intend to put into place extra safeguards to ensure that Prüm would operate in a way that
“respects fully the civil liberties of British citizens.”
Liberty gave evidence to the House of Lords on a number of matters in this respect.
In the report of the European Scrutiny Committee that was published the other day, we make it clear that there is an important balance to strike between law enforcement co-operation, especially when it involves the exchange of personal data, and the need to protect individuals against the risk of false incrimination and unwarranted interference with their right to privacy. The Government’s business and implementation case can provide only anecdotal evidence of cases in which Prüm has been instrumental in advancing an investigation or securing a conviction. The paucity of evidence that we have been given on the value and impact of Prüm in respect of law enforcement makes it difficult to measure its added value and to ensure that an appropriate balance is being struck. We find that lack of transparency and accountability troubling.
I can only assume that I slightly misheard what my hon. Friend said. He seemed to say that the only evidence that we had given about the benefits of Prüm was anecdotal. We have undertaken a pilot with four other EU member states. That pilot was based on the exchange of a certain number of DNA profiles. It led to hits. As in the case of the Romanian that I identified, it led to someone being charged, who is now on remand. That is not anecdotal; someone has been brought to justice as a result of Prüm.
I think that the Home Secretary used the expression “pilot scheme”. She surely concedes that it was a small scale pilot scheme. That is the basis on which I question the extent to which the evidence is sufficiently broad-based to justify this extremely grave extension of powers to the European Court of Justice. The main risks highlighted by the Government are the remaining possibility of false positives, leading to the false incrimination of innocent individuals, cost, conferral of jurisdiction to the Court, and a high volume of requests, bearing in mind the fact that the UK has the largest criminal fingerprint and DNA databases.
Thank you for calling me, Mr Deputy Speaker. There was not much choice left on this side of the Chamber. You have a distinct advantage over many Members here, in that when you entered the Chamber about 10 minutes ago, you at least knew what the subject matter was. I have sat through the debate for almost two hours, and some of the contributions would lead people to think that this was a dangerous proposition that posed a fundamental threat to our country. I do not believe that that is the case.
I am incredibly grateful to the Home Secretary and, in particular, to the Minister for Immigration for our conversations over the past few weeks, for their thoughtfulness and their willingness to assuage our concerns, and for preparing and publishing the Command Paper. If Prüm was about the United Kingdom Government sending shedloads of data to 27 other EU member states, I would be voting against it. If it was about asking 27 other EU member states to come over to the United Kingdom and have full, unfettered access to our data, I would also vote against it. However, that is not what is being proposed. The indications from the Home Secretary and from the Command Paper that the cost has been significantly reduced, from £31 million to £13 million, are to be welcomed.
I would be grateful if the Minister or the Home Secretary could help me with a little confusion arising from the contribution of the right hon. Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz). He suggested that we needed to put certain information on a database. My understanding was that we had three databases—one for vehicle registration, one for DNA and one for fingerprints—and that it was through those existing databases that the information would be handled.
I am grateful for this opportunity to confirm what the hon. Gentleman has just said. There is a DNA database—we will restrict the information that is available for the Prüm checks—a vehicle registration database and a fingerprint database. The Chairman of the Home Affairs Select Committee, the right hon. Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz), mentioned a whole variety of databases. There are some issues within the European Union about the connectivity of certain databases to help us to catch terrorists and so forth, but in regard to the Prüm decisions, the hon. Member for Belfast East (Gavin Robinson) is absolutely right to say that it is those three databases that we are talking about.
I am grateful for that explanation. It satisfies my confusion, as opposed to there being any error on the part of the Chairman of the Home Affairs Select Committee.