Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eighth sitting)
Tuesday 11th February 2025
(1 day, 13 hours ago)
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The Chair
Will everyone ensure that all electronic devices are switched off or to silent mode? We now begin line-by-line consideration of the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill. The selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room and on the parliamentary website. It shows how the clauses, schedules and selected amendments have been grouped together for debate.
I remind the Committee that a Member who has put their name to the lead amendment in a group is called first or, in the case of a stand part debate, the Member in charge, Kim Leadbeater, will be called to speak first. Other Members are then free to indicate that they wish to speak in the debate by bobbing. At the end of the debate on a group of amendments and new clauses and schedules, I shall call the Member who moved the lead amendment or new clause again. Before they sit down, they will need to indicate whether they wish to withdraw the amendment or the new clause, or to seek a decision. If any Member wishes to press any other amendment—including any of the grouped new clauses and schedules—to a vote, they need to let me know. I shall use my discretion to decide whether to allow a separate stand part debate on individual clauses and schedules following the debate on relevant amendments.
I hope that explanation is helpful. If any Member wishes to make a declaration of interest, they can do so now.
Daniel Francis (Bexleyheath and Crayford) (Lab)
On a point of order, Ms McVey. Yesterday, members of the Committee received notification that, in the last week, we have received a further 242 pieces of written evidence and 159 pieces of correspondence. Last week, I had read every word of the original 110 pieces of written evidence and 56 pieces of correspondence, as well as studying all the amendments and tabling amendments of my own. As I said, however, more than 400 pieces of evidence and correspondence have been uploaded during the past week, with no deadline by which further such evidence needs to be submitted. Given the large number of evidence submissions every day, Members may well struggle to keep abreast of it and be able to say that they have read every piece of correspondence before the tweaking of the Bill.
I find it difficult to believe that any member of the Committee has been able to read all the evidence submitted since last Tuesday. For instance, the written evidence submitted by the chief executive of my local hospice, which she blind-copied me into on 20 January, was available for members of this Committee to read on 7 February, 17 days after she submitted it. That suggests that, as well as Members struggling to keep up, the Clerks are struggling to keep up. Given the sheer volume of evidence, we will not be able to consider it fully before line-by-line scrutiny.
I therefore seek your advice, Ms McVey, on how we can reasonably expected to begin line-by-line scrutiny when in the last week we have been presented with more than 400 documents, in addition to new amendments.
The Chair
I thank the Member for making that point of order. It is normal practice for evidence to come in, and for it to be submitted as it comes in. However, due to the large amount of evidence and its substance, and to the importance of the Bill and this line-by-line scrutiny, I will seek the advice of the Clerk and will come back to him.
Naz Shah (Bradford West) (Lab)
Further to that point of order, Ms McVey. My concern is about written evidence that has been submitted but not yet read—I have certainly not been through the last batch of evidence that we have had. How do we proceed when, for example, we might have gone through clauses 1 and 2, or even up to clause 4 or 5, and we receive evidence related to those clauses? We will have already discussed them in Committee. We have been told we will only get five hours on Report, while on Second Reading more than 100 MPs, including me, were unable to speak. The evidence could inform amendments. I am struggling to understand how this will be workable. I would value your advice.
The Chair
I am pleased that people feel they are free to make those points. It is for the Committee to decide how fast to move through the Bill.
Sojan Joseph (Ashford) (Lab)
Further to those points of order, Ms McVey. I also assume that we are expecting more written evidence to come through. We Committee members are here for the whole day. I hear you say, Ms McVey, that this is normal practice, but considering the importance of the Bill, I assume there will be a lot more written evidence by the end of today. It would be good to consider how Committee members are able to go through that written evidence before we come back here tomorrow morning.
The Chair
As I expressed before, it is for the Committee to decide. Should Members feel they have not had enough time, it is for the Committee to raise a point on that. Should people wish to have an adjourn, they could move that and the Committee would vote on it.
Danny Kruger (East Wiltshire) (Con)
Further to those points of order, Ms McVey. I am grateful for your guidance, and I acknowledge your point that normal process is being followed in this Committee.
Nevertheless, further to the points made by hon. Members, last night we heard through the media that a very substantial change to the Bill will be introduced. We have not yet seen those amendments proposed by the hon. Member for Spen Valley, but we look forward to doing so. This goes to the same point: we are being asked to start line-by-line scrutiny today of a Bill with a huge amount of evidence that we have not yet been able to digest. Furthermore, substantial changes to the Bill that we voted on at Second Reading are being tabled. I appreciate that the process allows amendments to be tabled at any time through the course of the Bill as long as the clause is still ahead. Nevertheless, I value your guidance on whether it might be appropriate to seek an Adjournment so that we can consider the additional evidence, but also allow the hon. Member for Spen Valley to table her amendments, which change the whole scope of the Bill as voted on at Second Reading.
The Chair
I thank the hon. Member for his point of order. As I said, the Committee would have to move and vote on an Adjournment. These are significant points of concern and alteration for the Bill, but that is for the Committee to decide.
Sean Woodcock (Banbury) (Lab)
Further to those points of order, Ms McVey. My point of concern is similar to the one just raised, and is about the fact that on Second Reading a key plank of this proposed Bill was about the role of the High Court judges. We are aware of an amendment coming via the promoter of the Bill, my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, to remove that completely and replace it with something else. I suggest that a lot of the evidence that we have seen, including the new stuff that has been mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford, is based on the expectation of there being a High Court judge in that role; not on there being a new amendment. I suggest that we are missing vital perspectives on the way that any new amendment, and the Bill going forward, would work in the light of that. That is my concern.
The Chair
It is important that everybody has got their point on the record, and that they have said and raised their concerns.
Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)
Further to those points of order, Ms McVey. First of all, it is worth saying that the amendments tabled by the Bill’s promoter, the hon. Member for Spen Valley, are in response to evidence that has been heard by this Committee—oral and written. Certainly the Bill Committees that I have been on have had repeated information coming in as the Bill has evolved. That is an actual process.
It is worth also pointing out to Members that the Bill Committee is not the end of the process, and written evidence that will arrive throughout will be pertinent on Report, when the whole House will have that information available. Then members of the Committee can lead the debate and reflect on information or written evidence that has emerged even after Committee stage, once the completed Bill from that process is seen. It is perfectly possible for this to evolve as we get to Report and Third Reading in the light of evidence that arrives. That is the normal process through which all legislation goes.
Kim Leadbeater (Spen Valley) (Lab)
Further to those points of order, Ms McVey. I take on board people’s comments. There’s no two ways about it; this is a considerable amount of work for members of the Bill Committee to undertake. As has been alluded to, there are a wide range of amendments being proposed. The job of the Committee is to take evidence, look at those amendments, discuss and debate them, and then vote accordingly. That is the process that we are all here to undertake.
Kim Leadbeater
I beg to move amendment 178, in clause 1, page 1, line 3, after “person” insert “in England or Wales”.
This amendment provides that only persons in England or Wales may be provided with assistance in accordance with the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 179, in clause 1, page 1, line 13, after “provided” insert “in England or Wales”.
This amendment limits the assistance that may be provided in accordance with the Bill to assistance in England or Wales.
Amendment 180, in clause 1, page 1, line 20, at end insert—
“(3) The steps to be taken under sections 5, 7, 8 and 13 must be taken—
(a) when the terminally ill person is in England or Wales, and
(b) in the case of the steps under sections 7 and 8, by persons in England or Wales.”
This amendment provides that steps under clauses 5, 7, 8 and 13 must be taken by and in respect of persons in England or Wales.
Amendment 182, in clause 4, page 2, line 21, after “person” insert “in England or Wales”.
This amendment limits subsection (3) to cases where the person is in England or Wales.
Amendment 193, in clause 7, page 4, line 8, at end insert—
“(ca) is in England and Wales,”.
This amendment, which is consequential on Amendment 178, provides that the coordinating doctor must ascertain whether, in their opinion, the person who made the first declaration is in England and Wales.
Kim Leadbeater
It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms McVey, in this very important stage in the consideration and detailed scrutiny of the Bill.
We are discussing assisted dying for terminally ill adults who have a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life, and who have not been subjected to coercion or pressure from anybody else to do so. These are very serious matters and deserve serious consideration, which is why I was determined that this Bill should have an unprecedented level of scrutiny. We have heard from a range of over 50 witnesses with differing views on the Bill and have received written evidence from many, many more.
I am grateful to everyone who has contributed in such a thoughtful and constructive way. It has been widely remarked—and I wholeheartedly agree—that the Second Reading debate on 29 November last year, when the House approved the principle of the Bill by a majority of 55, showed Parliament at its best. I hope and believe that this Committee, as it goes through the Bill line by line, will do so in the same considered, respectful and measured manner.
Danny Kruger
I completely endorse that last point made by the hon. Lady. Does she remember how many Members on Second Reading—including, I think, herself—made reference to the judicial stage of the process and specifically to the High Court judge? Over 60 colleagues have stated on the record that they voted for the Bill on Second Reading because of that safeguard. Does she acknowledge that point?
Kim Leadbeater
I do acknowledge that point—absolutely, as I have acknowledged, the role of a High Court judge is really important in this process. That role will remain with the amendment I have tabled. It will also take account of the very clear evidence we received during the oral evidence sessions from psychiatrists, social workers and other professionals who feel that they have an important role to play in this process. Indeed, I heard the hon. Gentleman say he agreed with that on the radio this morning. It is very important that we hear from those experts. There is no point in having witnesses if we do not listen to what they have to say.
The Chair
Order. I remind Members that they should keep to the amendments being debated.
Kim Leadbeater
Thank you, Ms McVey.
I hope and believe that the Committee will take the same considered, respectful approach that we have taken previously. We have been asked by the House to look at where the Bill can be improved and to amend it, so that Parliament can be presented with a piece of legislation that is robust and workable in order to meet the objectives it is designed to achieve. Most—if not all—the amendments tabled in my name, have been drafted with the help of parliamentary counsel and officials in both the Department of Health and Social Care and the Ministry of Justice. The Government are committed to making the Bill workable and operable, while maintaining a position of neutrality.
I am grateful for the tremendous hard work that has gone into this to make a well-drafted Bill even better. I know the Ministers on the Committee, although remaining neutral, will be here to explain, where necessary, why some drafting amendments were needed to meet their duty to the statute book. There is an old adage that says too many cooks spoil the broth. That may not exactly be parliamentary language, but we will have to bear it in mind as we go along. Over 300 amendments have been tabled—most of them with the intention of improving and strengthening the Bill. I thank all MPs, whether members of the Committee or not, for the time and effort they have put in.
We have a responsibility to maintain the integrity and coherence of the Bill as a whole, so it is evident that we will not be able to accept all amendments. Indeed, we may find ourselves rejecting amendments that sound entirely reasonable in themselves and that undoubtedly come from a good place, but that are perhaps better addressed elsewhere in the drafting. Others might have unintended consequences or create a degree of ambiguity or uncertainty that could undermine the legal authority of the legislation. That might be very good for the pockets of lawyers, but it does not make for good law.
The Chair
Order. I remind the Member that although a brief introduction is acceptable, we should be talking to the amendments in this group.
Kim Leadbeater
Absolutely, Ms McVey—thank you for allowing me to make some introductory comments.
Amendments 178 to 180, 182 and 193 simply clarify that only persons in England and Wales may be provided with assistance in accordance with the Act, and only medical practitioners in England and Wales can carry out the required roles at each stage of the process. Hopefully, this is a nice straightforward one to get us started.
The Minister for Care (Stephen Kinnock)
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley for her introductory comments. The Government will continue to remain neutral on the Bill and do not hold a position on assisted dying. I want to make it clear that I, along with the Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Finchley and Golders Green, are speaking in Committee not as Members of Parliament, but as Government Ministers responsible for ensuring that the Bill, if passed, is effective, legally robust and workable.
To that end, we have been working closely with the hon. Member for Spen Valley and, where changes have been mutually agreed on by herself and the Government, we will offer a technical, factual explanation for the amendments. Therefore, I will not be offering up a Government view on the merits of any proposed changes put forward by other Members, but I will make brief remarks on an amendment’s legal and practical impact to assist Members in undertaking line-by-line scrutiny.
Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)
May I ask how what the Minister has just said interacts with voting? He set out clearly his involvement in the Committee, so how does that impact any votes that he will take part in during it?
Stephen Kinnock
I am on the Committee as a Member of Parliament and I vote as such. When I speak on the Committee, I speak as a Government Minister in order to provide factual and technical explanations. As the Bill is a matter of conscience, I will be voting with my conscience on all the amendments as they come forward.
The amendments that we are now debating have been tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley in consultation with the Government. They relate to the location of the person seeking assistance under the Bill and are designed to ensure that the service can only be accessed by an individual present in England and Wales, with a view to preventing medical tourism.
I will take the amendments in turn. Amendments 178 and 193 would ensure that only a terminally ill person in England or Wales may be provided with assistance in accordance with the Bill. Further to that, a requirement is placed on the co-ordinating doctor to ascertain whether, in their opinion, the person who made the first declaration is in England and Wales as part of their first assessment. Amendment 179 would limit the assistance that may be provided in accordance with the Bill to assistance in England or Wales only. Amendment 180 would require the steps taken under clauses 5, 7, 8 and 13 that relate to both declarations and both doctors’ assessments to be taken by persons in England or Wales.
Amendment 182 would limit the provision of clause 4(3), where a person indicates to a registered medical practitioner their wish to seek assistance to end their own life, to cases where the person is physically present in England or Wales. It would prevent people who are outside of England or Wales from accessing assistance in accordance with the Act—for example, by online consultations from abroad.
As I said earlier, the Government will continue to remain neutral on the substantive policy questions relevant to how the law in this area could be changed. That is, as I have made clear, a matter for the Committee and for Parliament as a whole. However, I hope that these observations are helpful to Members in considering the Bill and the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley.
Amendment 178 agreed to.
Sarah Olney (Richmond Park) (LD)
I beg to move amendment 34, in clause 1, page 1, line 4, leave out “capacity” and insert “ability”.
This replaces the concept of capacity based on the Mental Capacity Act and replaces it with a new concept of ability which is defined in NC1.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 36, in clause 7, page 4, line 7, leave out “capacity” and insert “the ability”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 34 and NC1.
Amendment 37, in clause 8, page 4, line 34, leave out “capacity” and insert “the ability”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 34 and NC1.
Amendment 38, in clause 9, page 6, line 27, leave out “capacity” and insert “ability”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 34 and NC1.
Amendment 202, in clause 9, page 6, line 31, leave out “capability” and insert “capacity”.
This amendment corrects a typographical error.
Amendment 39, in clause 9, page 6, line 31, leave out “capability” and insert “ability”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 34 and NC1.
Amendment 40, in clause 12, page 8, line 2, leave out “capacity” and insert “the ability”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 34 and NC1.
Amendment 41, in clause 13, page 9, line 31, leave out “capacity” and insert “ability”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 34 and NC1.
Amendment 42, in clause 18, page 12, line 23, leave out “capacity” and insert “the ability”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 34 and NC1.
Amendment 43, in clause 30, page 18, line 16, leave out “capacity” and insert “the ability”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 34 and NC1.
Amendment 44, in clause 40, page 23, line 26, leave out from “capacity” and insert “ability”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 34 and NC1.
New clause 1—Ability to make decision—
“The person is to be considered as having the ability to make a decision to request assistance to end their life if they can fully understand, use and weigh the relevant information in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary of State under affirmative resolution.”
This new clause defines the concept of ability which is intended to replace the concept of capacity. This new clause is intended to replace clause 3.
Amendment 45, to schedule 2, page 26, line 36, leave out “capacity” and insert “the ability to make a decision”.
Amendment 46, to schedule 3, page 28, line 1, leave out “capacity” and insert “the ability to make a decision”.
Amendment 47, to schedule 5, page 30, line 14, leave out “capacity” and insert “the ability to make a decision”.
Sarah Olney
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms McVey. I thank the hon. Member for Spen Valley for her opening remarks. I am grateful to be called so early in proceedings, because I believe this is one of the really important issues before us. It is about whether or not somebody
“has the capacity to make a decision to end their own life”
as is stated in clause 1(1)(a). I believe that the word “capacity” in this context is potentially difficult to define. I note that in clause 3, all reference to mental capacity is assumed to refer to the Mental Capacity Act 2005, but I do not believe that that is sufficient for the purposes of the Bill. We heard plenty of voices to support my point of view during the oral evidence, so I want to reflect on that.
I think there are four separate concerns about using the Mental Capacity Act 2005 to judge capacity. The Royal College of Psychiatrists submitted its original written evidence in January, which we have all had sight of, and it said:
“Under the Bill as introduced, a person with a co-occurring mental disorder that is impacting their wish to end their own life would not necessarily be deemed ineligible; only those whose mental disorder was deemed to impair their capacity to make a decision to end their own life would be excluded.”
That means that an individual could have a terminal illness and also separately have a mental illness, such as depression; that would affect their ability to make a decision as to whether that terminal illness was sufficient for them to ask for assistance with dying.
Daniel Francis
The Mental Capacity Act is written to enable people to carry out day-to-day scenarios, such as buying a coffee or doing their banking, so that they are not challenged in every transaction in their life. It is therefore a very low bar to be deemed to have capacity. Does the hon. Member believe that it was written for this kind of scenario?
Sarah Olney
That is an absolutely relevant point. The Mental Capacity Act was not drafted in anticipation of it ever being used for this kind of scenario. Therefore, it is really incumbent upon us to weigh very carefully whether the Mental Capacity Act is the right way of assessing people’s ability to make this decision. As I was saying, it includes the presumption of capacity, and for a decision to end one’s life, an assumption of capacity to make that decision is a low bar, and we have lots of evidence.
Danny Kruger
I am interested in that point about the Mental Capacity Act not having been written with the Bill in mind. That is absolutely true for the minds of its framers and the Parliament that passed it at the time. It is worth noting, however, that we can see from the accounts and records of the Voluntary Euthanasia Society, which became Dignity in Dying a few years later, that it was lobbying at the time covertly—or behind the scenes—for the Mental Capacity Act to be framed in exactly that way. The Voluntary Euthanasia Society was very conscious that, when the time came to pass the law for assisted suicide, it would be very helpful to have a capacity Act on the statute book that had this very low bar. The society was delighted when the Act was passed in the way that it was, and it boasted at the time of the influence it had had on the Act.
Sarah Olney
That is a very interesting intervention. I cannot comment on that because I have no knowledge of how the Mental Capacity Act was drafted or the evidence that was taken.
Dr Simon Opher (Stroud) (Lab)
I do believe that the Mental Capacity Act enables people to make very serious decisions, such as stopping cancer treatment, so I would absolutely dispute the hon. Lady’s interpretation of it.
Sarah Olney
The hon. Gentleman puts his finger on the exact point: it allows people to make a decision about whether or not they want to continue treatment; it has not been used in this way before, and it was not intended to be used for that purpose. I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point: he was trying to say that to stop treatment is akin to making a proactive decision to end one’s life, but I would argue that it is not, and that is why the Mental Capacity Act is unsuitable for this purpose.
It was interesting to reflect on the oral and written evidence we received on this issue. Professor Sir Chris Whitty, the chief medical officer, stated in his oral evidence:
“Issues…around mental capacity…are dealt with every day…every doctor and nurse above a certain level of seniority should be able to do that normally. It may require some slight adjustment.”
He acknowledged that
“the more serious the decision, the greater the level of capacity that someone needs to have.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 30, Q13.]
However, the Royal College of Psychiatrists said that
“an assessment of a person’s mental capacity to decide to end their own life is an entirely different and more complex determination requiring a higher level of understanding.”
Sean Woodcock
During the oral evidence, we heard from three sets of psychiatrists who all cast doubt on the suitability of the Mental Capacity Act for decisions such as assisted dying. Is the hon. Lady’ s amendment an attempt to alleviate those doubts and put that right in the Bill?
Sarah Olney
Yes, that is exactly what I am aiming to do. The hon. Member makes an excellent point. There is a wide variety of views on this, but in actual fact, much as I do not wish to question Professor Sir Chris Whitty, and I acknowledge his seniority as the chief medical officer, he was very much the outlier on this. Everybody else who gave evidence on the sufficiency of the Mental Capacity Act to determine someone’s capability to make this decision for themselves cast doubt on the idea that the Mental Capacity Act was the right way of doing it.
Kim Leadbeater
That is not quite accurate. I think we did have other witnesses who absolutely said that they had confidence in the Mental Capacity Act, and I will speak about them in this debate.
Sarah Olney
I look forward to the hon. Lady’s further comments, but as I said, the psychiatrists were very clear that they did not believe that this was a sufficient safeguard, and we should acknowledge that.
I was unable to put my question to Alex Ruck Keene KC during the oral evidence session, but he kindly agreed to give further evidence in writing in response to a letter I sent to him later that day. That exchange of letters has been published as written evidence. It was his position that, in actual fact, Professor Sir Chris Whitty misinterpreted the Mental Capacity Act when he gave evidence. There is no such requirement in the Mental Capacity Act that states that the more serious the decision, the greater the level of capacity that someone needs to have. Mr Ruck Keene’s view is that that was the common law prior to the Mental Capacity Act coming into force, whereas in actual fact the Mental Capacity Act does not require that the more serious the decision, the more capacity someone needs to be judged to have.
Jake Richards (Rother Valley) (Lab)
I am sympathetic to the problem the hon. Lady has identified of people who have a terminal illness as well as other mental health conditions. Instead of rewriting the Mental Capacity Act for this new context, would it not be better to secure safeguards through clause 9, through which further assessments are potentially going to be mandated, if the amendment from the hon. Member for St Albans (Daisy Cooper) is agreed to, for those cases where there is doubt as to capacity? That would add a further safeguard rather than rewriting the established Mental Capacity Act and case law.
Sarah Olney
I have no intention of rewriting the Mental Capacity Act. It should stand exactly as it is and be used for the purpose for which it is intended. That is not the intention behind my amendment, which merely proposes that we should assess people’s ability to make the decision and not just their capacity. Many of those who provided evidence demonstrated that merely testing somebody’s capacity to make a decision is insufficient in this case.
Dr Opher
We also heard evidence that if we make this more complicated and introduce more terms into the Bill, then there will be less safeguarding for patients. That is why we are all here: we are trying to make this Bill safe for patients seeking assisted dying. Changing it from the Mental Capacity Act will make it less safe.
Sarah Olney
I heard Sir Chris Whitty in particular say that it would be preferable to have a more straightforward Bill that did not have too many bureaucratic hurdles for people to overcome. That was why he was keen for the Mental Capacity Act to be retained. However, I tabled the amendment precisely because, when people are thinking about whether assisted dying is an appropriate decision for them, I do not think that it is safe for them to be judged merely on the basis of their capacity. It is by no means my intention to increase bureaucracy; I am merely proposing that the Act is not sufficient in this case.
Naz Shah
Three psychiatrists gave evidence to the Committee in person: Professor Allan House, Dr Annabel Price, of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, and Professor Gareth Owen. All expressed doubts about the use of the Mental Capacity Act to assess whether a person was in a fit state of mind to undertake assisted dying. Does the hon. Lady agree that we should place great weight on the opinion of psychiatrists when assessing whether the Act should be used to assess applicants for assisted dying? It is a horse before the cart scenario, because the Act was not made for this context; when it was passed, we were not talking about the ability to choose to die.
Sarah Olney
I agree exactly with the hon. Lady’s point. The Act was not designed for this purpose, and it is essential that we carefully scrutinise whether it should be used in this way.
The Chair
Order. I remind hon. Members that interventions are just interventions; there will also be speeches.
Rebecca Paul
I welcome the hon. Member’s attempt to improve safeguarding in the Bill, which I agree is currently not at the right level. Does she agree that the Mental Capacity Act assumes in the first instance that, if there is no evidence to the contrary, a person has capacity, and that whether a person lacks capacity must be decided on the balance of probabilities? Unwise decision making does not indicate a lack of capacity, and supported decision making is considered to be acceptable. We need all to be clear that that is what the Act says.
Sarah Olney
The hon. Member is absolutely right. That would be another weakness of the Mental Capacity Act being used in this context: if someone is judged to have capacity, they are free to make an unwise decision, yet there is nothing in the Bill to provide a safeguard against people who might have capacity and make an unwise decision because their thinking has been obscured by mental illness, depression or something else.
Jake Richards
I have a few questions for the hon. Member. Who does she propose will decide whether a decision by someone who has capacity is wise or unwise? Does she also propose changing the law around patients’ refusing life-saving treatment? Should that be handled under the Mental Capacity Act, as it is at the moment?
Sarah Olney
I am grateful to the hon. Member for his intervention, but I am not proposing to change any legislation other than the Bill before us. All the other legislation to which he refers should remain precisely as it is, and for the purpose for which it was intended. He asks who is to say whether someone is making a wise or unwise decision; that is the job of the people who are instructed to provide assessments under the Mental Capacity Act. As was clear from my response to the hon. Member for Reigate, if someone has been assessed as having capacity, there must not be any further interference in their decision-making process, even if there are distinct concerns that that person may be deciding to end their life not purely because of their terminal illness but because they are suffering from depression. There is no other mechanism in the Bill to enable that further safeguard.
Dr Opher
I use the Mental Capacity Act almost every week in my work. As Chris Whitty said, in the majority of cases, whether someone has capacity is clear and indisputable. For a narrow proportion of people, it is more difficult to decide. The Bill takes account of that by using a panel to decide on those difficult cases of capacity. I would insist that most cases are very straightforward.
Sarah Olney
I have to ask the hon. Gentleman to clarify that. When he says he uses a panel, is he referring to the new amendment that has been proposed? I have not seen it yet and cannot comment on it, and have no idea if it will be adopted.
Dr Opher
If we are not sure about capacity, we must refer to psychiatry, so that a specialist organisation can make a more detailed assessment. However, most people do not fit into that category. Most people clearly have not got capacity or have got capacity, so this is a very narrow cohort.
Sarah Olney
If I may say so, the hon. Gentleman’s intervention precisely illustrates what other hon. Members were raising as points of order earlier. How can we properly scrutinise the legislation when new amendments are being tabled at the last minute that potentially change the entire nature of the legislation that we are attempting to scrutinise? It is very difficult then to speak about the amendments that have already been tabled.
Danny Kruger
Further to that point, the hon. Lady responded to the hon. Member for Stroud, who suggested that a doctor must refer to a psychiatrist in the event of concern over capacity. There is no such obligation in the Bill. There is the opportunity to do so—the second doctor may do so, if they choose—but there is no such obligation. That is something that we could definitely improve.
The hon. Member for Stroud, who is a GP, says that it is always obvious to him when there are issues about capacity. I assume he might think the same about coercion. I wonder if the hon. Lady is aware that one in six older people are subject to abuse—elder abuse. Does she think that the hon. Member for Stroud always spots the one in six of his older patients who are subject to abuse?
The Chair
Order. I remind everybody to stay within the scope of what we are talking about, which is capacity.
Sarah Olney
On that note, I will probably not respond to the hon. Gentleman’s comments about coercion, but I will pick up on what the hon. Member for Stroud said about using the Mental Capacity Act every week. I think that probably makes him unusual among MPs, if not GPs. I personally have no experience of using the Mental Capacity Act, which is precisely what gives rise to my anxiety. We in this room need to properly understand what the Mental Capacity Act means, yet most of us do not have the experience that he has in applying it. However, we are all collectively responsible for ensuring that the legislation is framed properly. I can only go on the oral and written evidence that we have received, and I am paying serious attention to all those who have said that they do not think that the Mental Capacity Act is sufficient. I lack the direct experience that the hon. Member for Stroud has of those matters, and that is the best that I can do.
Liz Saville Roberts (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)
We are discussing the balance of autonomy against considerations such as capacity and coercion. The Mental Capacity Act 2005 has been in existence for 20 years, so it has the advantage of being familiar. Would the hon. Lady agree that if we were to bring in clinical views from different professions, such as from doctors, social workers and psychiatrists, we would have different definitions in place, which would address some of the concerns about different applications?
Sarah Olney
That is an extremely wise observation. I regret enormously that there was not more opportunity, before the legislation was drafted, to have those discussions between experts, advisers and others who really know what the Mental Capacity Act means and whether it is sufficient for this purpose. The best that we can do now is reflect on the evidence that we have received. In many ways, that is what I am hoping to address with my amendment: to redefine “capacity” as “ability”, to transfer the responsibility for defining how ability should be assessed under the Act to the Secretary of State for further analysis and consultation, and then for that to be laid out properly.
When assessing people’s ability to make the decision, we want to take into account their ability to understand, retain, use and weigh information, and to communicate the decision. That will still be at the heart of an assessment of whether an individual is making the decision for the right reasons. A whole range of things might affect a person’s ability to make the decision. I have mentioned many times mental disorders such as depression, which is more common in people nearing the end of their life. Delirium, which is common in people with advanced illnesses, needs to be assessed. There is the complexity of people who have a physical terminal illness alongside a mental disorder; I think particularly of people suffering from an eating disorder, which is primarily a mental health condition but clearly has physical health implications. If the mental health condition is not treated or is resistant to treatment, the physical manifestation of the eating disorder can quickly become a terminal illness. That is a really important point that we need to reflect on.
The feelings of hopelessness that may come alongside a diagnosis of terminal illness may affect a person’s ability to weigh information. Anxiety can amplify their fears of future suffering, and types and doses of medication can affect capacity. All sorts of people can suffer vulnerabilities from external factors such as the lack of realistic alternatives like palliative care services; overt or implicit coercion; personal losses including bereavement; poor housing; financial hardship; and loneliness and social isolation. Understanding and responding to those vulnerabilities is at the centre of suicide prevention, but absent from the Bill.
We have to remember that the Bill would apply to people who are said to be within months of death but may not be, to those who may die within months but otherwise have a very good quality of life, and to people whose trajectories to death vary greatly. In his written evidence, Professor Allan House states that
“careful inquiry is justified because a statement about wanting to end one’s life cannot be simply taken as the result of a straightforward rational decision to choose one type of end of life care over others. Simply checking mental capacity and asking about coercion is not adequate.”
Tom Gordon (Harrogate and Knaresborough) (LD)
I understand the concerns my hon. Friend is raising about assessing mental capacity. Does she acknowledge that throughout this process mental capacity will be assessed not once but multiple times? What does she say to that?
Sarah Olney
I say to that what I have been saying throughout: a test of mental capacity is not sufficient for this Bill. For example, the Royal College of Psychiatrists states that the Mental Capacity Act
“is not sufficient for the purposes of this Bill. Extensive consideration needs to be given to what an assessment of mental capacity should consist of”
for decisions relating to assisted dying or assisted suicide—
“and, indeed, whether a determination through such an assessment can be reliably arrived at in this novel context.”
I believe that what the Royal College of Psychiatrists means by “novel context” is that no legislation of this type has been framed before and we do not have any precedent to guide us in terms of what an appropriate determination of capacity might be.
Dr Opher
I apologise to the hon. Lady for my continued interruptions, but I want to put across some important points. In our medical system, the Mental Capacity Act is currently used to test capacity in cases of withdrawing life support. Does the hon. Lady not agree that that is on the same level as assisted dying?
Sarah Olney
I have a suspicion that the hon. Gentleman may have made that point already in one of his many interventions. Withdrawing treatment is not the same as someone making an informed wish to have their death assisted. That is why we need to be very careful about considering whether the Mental Capacity Act is appropriate for that kind of decision. That Act is being used in a way it was not designed for. To use this definition of “capacity” is to accept the premise that this is just like any other treatment option and not qualitatively different, and fails to recognise the complexity and gravity of the decision.
The Bill also fails to consider that there may be a risk of assessor bias—that sometimes it may well be that a doctor who makes an assessment may well have their own views about the suitability of assisted dying as an option for that particular patient. They may be in favour of it, or they may be against it. If that were to sway them towards making an assessment against capacity, that could have lots of serious implications for the patient.
I have proposed amendment 34 because I think it is the best way forward at this stage, given the variety of evidence we have had and the real difficulty for us in this room of making an appropriate determination of the extent to which the Mental Capacity Act’s use may be modified for this purpose, or of coming up with something entirely new. I think the best way forward is to give the power to the Government—to the Secretary of State—to define the term “ability” in relation to this legislation at a later date.
Dr Marie Tidball (Penistone and Stocksbridge) (Lab)
With respect to the hon. Member for Richmond Park, I do not support her amendments, which seek to replace the references in the Bill to the Mental Capacity Act with the concept of “ability”. First, medical practitioners already know, regularly use and well understand the Mental Capacity Act 2005. As a result, as Professor Chris Whitty said in evidence, where practitioners conduct such an assessment of an individual separately, they are usually in agreement in their decisions about the outcome in relation to that individual. That was also mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud.
Secondly, the term “ability”, unlike mental capacity, is not an existing concept in law that we can draw upon in the context of complex medical decision making about consent to medical treatment. I therefore do not accept that it is a low bar.
Dr Tidball
No, I will make some progress.
To replace the established concept of mental capacity with “ability” would create more problems than it seeks to solve, and is not underpinned by a clear statutory basis. Furthermore, the language the hon. Lady uses in her new clause 1 only echoes the wording of the second leg of the two-stage test in the MCA, in its language of fully understanding, using and weighing the relevant information. It does not, however, have the scaffolding and clarity of the five principles set out in the Mental Capacity Act, and it is a pale imitation of the second stage of the test of capacity, which is already in section 3 of the MCA.
Thirdly, the use and application of the Mental Capacity Act has been applied and litigated upon in our court system over the last 20 years, further nuancing its application in complex medical decision making and explicating, for example, the five principles in the MCA and the subsequent two-stage test for capacity. Contrary to what colleagues on the Opposition Benches have said already, it is used in cases where treatment is withdrawn. It is important to understand that in those circumstances, such withdrawal is not seen as an omission; it is seen as a deliberate act. It is therefore analogous to the usage in the Bill as proposed.
Fourthly, I have deep concerns that the use of the term “ability” and the concept expounded in new clause 1 imports an ableist approach, which I do not welcome, as someone who has worked in disability rights and policy for more than a decade and a half.
To return to my first argument, about the familiarity and usage of the Mental Capacity Act by medical practitioners, clinicians and the wider social care profession for two decades, many family members will be familiar with the term and used to using it as part of the wider care of people with learning disabilities, autism and mental health problems. The boundaries of those who are familiar with the concept go well beyond the walls of only medical practitioners.
In oral evidence, chief medical officer Professor Chris Whitty stated that the Mental Capacity Act
“is used up and down the country by doctors and nurses every day; they know it and they understand it. Although…it is a large piece of legislation, it is one that people have worked through in practice multiple times. If you ask six or seven doctors, ‘Does this person have capacity?’, in almost all cases you will get six or seven identical answers, because people are used to using it.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 33, Q7.]
To unleash the tiger of an unknown and untested concept of ability into a Bill that would benefit better from the well understood, measured and principled approach of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 does not best serve the patients that I know the hon. Member for Richmond Park seeks so carefully to protect. It is therefore worth laying out the paradigm that underpins the MCA and the principles it legislates for, and why it is so important to retain this at the heart of the Bill.
The presumption of capacity in the Mental Capacity Act exists because it is considered a fundamental principle of respecting individual autonomy, meaning that every adult is assumed to have the ability to make their own decisions unless there is clear evidence proving otherwise. This protects against unnecessary interference in people’s lives and ensures that they are treated with dignity and respect, even if they may have a disability or medical condition that could potentially impact their decision-making abilities.
I want also to reflect on the robust language in clause 2(3), which states:
“For the avoidance of doubt, a person is not to be considered to be terminally ill by reason only of the person having one or both of—
(a) a mental disorder, within the meaning of the Mental Health Act 1983;
(b) a disability, within the meaning of section 6 of the Equality Act 2010.”
That provision, the tightly drawn limit on the need for the person’s terminal illness to leave them with only six months to live, and the third stage of the test—using the Mental Capacity Act to understand their decision making—mean that we have a strong set of safeguards.
Dr Tidball
I will give way to the hon. Member for Richmond Park, who asked first.
Sarah Olney
The hon. Lady has moved on considerably from the point that I was going to make, so I took it that she was not going to take interventions. Although I would have liked the opportunity to respond to some of her points, I have kept my counsel. Since she has now given way, I want to make something of a point of order. The hon. Lady mentioned that she thought my use of the word “ability” was ableist, and I want to put on the record that I had absolutely no intention of it being interpreted in that way. I meant no offence, and I hope that the word would not have been considered in such a light. If that caused any offence, I apologise. I hope that the general meaning of the word “ability” is well understood in this context.
Dr Tidball
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for making that statement. That is not the assumption. As I will say later, the term “ableism” is very much grounded in a deficit model of disability, which assumes that somebody is not capable of doing something themselves—for instance, making important decisions—whereas the Mental Capacity Act starts from a different perspective: it presumes that the person will have the ability to do something until proven otherwise. That is why I feel that the concept of ability does not align well with what is needed in understanding and providing autonomy to people making very difficult decisions at the end of their lives.
Danny Kruger
The hon. Lady accurately quoted clause 2(3) about a person not being considered to be terminally ill “by reason only” of having a mental disorder or a disability. That word “only” is very important, as she acknowledged. Does she recognise that that explicitly allows for somebody whose judgment might be impaired by a mental disorder still to be eligible for an assisted death, because they would still be judged to have capacity under the terms of the Mental Capacity Act? That term “only” is in fact not a safeguard; it is an access to an assisted death for somebody with impaired judgment.
Dr Tidball
I appreciate the hon. Member’s intervention, but I do not agree. Taken together, the parameters around the six-month limit, clause 2(3) and the requirement for a mental capacity test cumulatively create a safeguard in the Bill.
Importantly, the MCA’s two-stage capacity test is already underpinned by robust safeguards, which address exactly the issue the hon. Gentleman raised. Stage one asks whether there is a disturbance or impairment in the person’s brain or mind, and stage two asks whether the disturbance or impairment is severe enough that the person cannot make a specific decision. That two-stage test already deals with the issue he raised. The references to the Mental Capacity Act in the relevant clauses of the Bill ensure, crucially, that we import that test too.
Elements of the language in the new concept of ability proposed by the hon. Member for Richmond Park appear to attempt to echo the second stage of the Mental Capacity Act test, as just described. That has four elements: understanding information about the decision to be made, retaining that information in the mind, using or weighing that information as part of the decision-making process, and communicating the decision by talking, using sign language or any other means. It is important to say that those core elements are built on the scaffolding of the five principles of the MCA, working in a progressive way.
Opposition Members talked about the unwise decision, but the principles in the Mental Capacity Act work collectively and cumulatively together. That is only one step, then, which is followed by the fact that decisions must be taken in the person’s best interest, and there is well-worn and well-trodden understanding of how we ascertain that. It is important that those things all work together. The issue is already addressed under the MCA; if we do away with the MCA, we lose not only the scaffolding of the five principles, but the important safeguards of the two-stage test.
Naz Shah
My hon. Friend made reference to that already being done, but where is the evidence that the capacity stage she talked about is actually happening? We had evidence from the Royal College of Psychiatrists and, as she said, Professor Chris Whitty. Where is the evidence that it is being done well, as things stand?
Dr Tidball
I do not have a list of the case law in front of me—I am sure it will be possible for that to be found for my hon. Friend—but it is done regularly. The Mental Capacity Act is used regularly in decisions about the withdrawal of life-support treatment. That is the case, and she is welcome to search for the case law.
Sarah Olney
The hon. Lady talks about the four tests and parts of the Mental Capacity Act; the point I was making was that we want to retain elements of the Act, although using it in its entirety is problematic in this context. The four functional tests about whether someone is capable of making a decision absolutely should be retained—as she said, that is well tested, it works well and people understand in a court of law exactly how to apply it—but some of the other elements of the Mental Capacity Act are problematic. That is why I seek to redraft “capacity” to “ability”—I accept that that might be a problematic word, but I hope the hon. Lady will take on board my earlier comments—and that is what is important. The hon. Lady is saying we should not take out those bits of the Mental Capacity Act that are valuable and important, and I agree.
Dr Tidball
I am pleased to hear the hon. Lady’s agreement. As someone who has worked in this space for a long time, I say that if she does not want to have the impact in law of putting in place a concept that would be ableist and take a deficit model of disability, we need those five principles that are already embedded in the Mental Capacity Act. We also need the stringent two-stage test, the second stage of which has the four elements that I set out. Only then can we be certain that we are approaching the paradigm of this complex and important decision making as one where we understand the autonomy and best interests of groups of people we all wish to best protect.
Dr Tidball
I will make some progress.
The concept set out by the hon. Member for Richmond Park is the bare bones of what is needed in the complex decision making required across various stages of the Bill. In such decision making, the MCA has a wide and well-used toolkit to determine capacity. That leads to my third point. The Mental Capacity Act has been applied and litigated in our court system over the past 20 years. The chief medical officer, Professor Sir Chris Whitty, said in his evidence that the Act
“has the advantage of being tested in the courts. That has gone as far as the Supreme Court, and the various ambiguities that were inevitably in the legislation have been clarified by senior judges. Therefore, to practitioners like me, it feels like a piece of robust and predictable legislation.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 33, Q7.]
He continued later:
“If there were no Mental Capacity Act, there would be an argument, which has been used for a long time, that the Bill would have to define what was meant with a fair degree of clarity.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 36, Q14.]
I do not see sufficient clarity in the hon. Lady’s concept as set out in the amendment.
At a later evidence session, Yogi Amin, a solicitor and partner at Irwin Mitchell, augmented Sir Chris Whitty’s argument by saying:
“I wholly recommend and support the idea…to defer to the Mental Capacity Act for capacity assessments. I have been working in this area for over 20 years, before and after the Mental Capacity Act came in, and I have done cases all the way up to the Supreme Court, as well as day-to-day different cases around the country. It is well understood how capacity assessments are done, and it is ingrained into the practice of practitioners generally and of legal practitioners in the courts.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 140, Q176.]
He continued:
“It is a well settled and understood approach to the law, and producing a new one would throw up a whole new conundrum, where people would be questioning how to approach it, etc. It is not broken—it works well.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 141, Q177.]
Finally, for further clarity, I will vote against the amendment because of the ableist assumption in both language and concept. Ableist language assumes that disabled people are inferior to non-disabled people and perpetuates deficit discourses about such groups. I believe that this does not take the approach that we see in the paradigm of the Mental Capacity Act, which puts disabled people’s choices, autonomy and control over their choices at the heart of this legislation.
Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)
I thank the hon. Member for Richmond Park for tabling the amendments. Fundamentally, I do not agree with them, but I am grateful for her good intentions. I understand the concerns that she has raised, and she makes an eloquent argument, but I fundamentally disagree.
In my view, the amendments would only lead to abandoning the well-established principles codified within the Mental Capacity Act. They would introduce a degree of woolliness and legal uncertainty by introducing of a new term that is, as yet, undefined. That would make the operability of the Bill so much harder and would move us away from the Mental Capacity Act, which has a heritage of some 20 years and is already well established in the use of advance directives around organ transplantation, the withdrawal of treatment and the decision to undergo major operations that can have life-changing or life-limiting consequences.
Danny Kruger
My hon. Friend says that the term “ability” is not yet defined, but it is set out quite clearly in new clause 1, tabled by the hon. Member for Richmond Park. It simply says:
“The person is to be considered as having the ability to make a decision to request assistance to end their life if they can fully understand, use and weigh the relevant information”.
It uses the language of the Mental Capacity Act on understanding and weighing information. The key distinction is that it does not allow for impaired judgment; it requires somebody fully to understand the information in front of them. It is very straightforward, and I do not think that it would be difficult to apply. Does my hon. Friend recognise that the terms are pretty clearly laid out?
Dr Shastri-Hurst
My hon. Friend makes incisive points clearly and concisely, as always, but I cannot agree. This is a short clause that is dealing with a hugely complicated issue that is presently codified within the Mental Capacity Act, which runs to some 183 pages. I do not think that it is as simple as saying that the new clause deals with the issue.
There is also the two-stage test, which determines both the functional ability to make the decision and whether that decision is impaired in any way. It would be an oversimplification to suggest that the provision as drafted would deal with those issues in a satisfactory way that would provide confidence not only—although most importantly—to those who are making a decision around an assisted death, but to the medical practitioners who are part of the process and the courts, which will have to grapple with the issues that will inevitably arise from a new definition.
Sean Woodcock
The Royal College of Psychiatrists highlights that a person’s capacity can change and is decision-specific. It therefore says that the Mental Capacity Act is not suitable for the Bill. What is the hon. Member’s response?
Dr Shastri-Hurst
The hon. Member is absolutely right that capacity can change. It is an evolving piece: someone’s capacity at one point in time will not necessarily be the same as their capacity on a future or a previous date. However, the whole purpose of the Bill is to put a series of mechanisms in place that assess capacity to ensure a robust decision-making process.
I should also mention that the Mental Capacity Act allows the capability of individuals to make an advance directive. Where they have capacity at a point in time to make a decision for a future date, capacity can be inferred at that future date for that decision. That is acknowledged within the 2005 Act.
Kit Malthouse
I have to confess that I am a little confused by the evidence to which my hon. Friend refers. Can he confirm that it is perfectly possible for me to be diagnosed with a terminal disease and make an advance directive, which may apply in three months’ time, that in those circumstances I would decline treatment and would wish to die at that point? The Mental Capacity Act is used to assess me in making that advance directive, having had my terminal diagnosis. If it is good for that decision, I struggle to understand why it would not be good for a similar decision to end my life in similar circumstances.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
As always, my right hon. Friend makes a very good point. The Mental Capacity Act allows for advance directives on a whole variety of choices, including withdrawal of treatment, decisions on care or financial elements, and decisions on having treatment as opposed to not having treatment. It creates that ability and it is deemed robust enough for those purposes. It must therefore follow that it is robust enough for the purposes of the Bill.
Sarah Olney
I just want to probe the hon. Member on the capacity to make a future directive. Is he saying that, under the terms of the Bill as drafted and its reference to the Mental Capacity Act, it would be possible to say, “I may not be eligible now—I may not even be suffering from a terminal illness—but at some future point, because I have capacity today to make this decision, I should like to choose assisted dying”? Would that decision then be honoured at that future date, without any further intervention or assessment?
Dr Shastri-Hurst
The hon. Member makes an interesting point, which I had already considered; in fact, I have tabled a new clause that would address it. It is not grouped with the amendments now before the Committee, but I will touch on it, if I may.
There is an argument that, if an individual with an advance directive has gone through the two-stage test in the Bill and then loses capacity, the advance directive should hold weight. My new clause 6 would deal with that point. Sections 27 to 29 of the Mental Capacity Act deal with exclusions from advance directives, including issues around voting rights, marriage rights and Mental Health Act implications. There may be a mechanism, for example, to exclude an advance directive that deals with assisted death, either through the Bill or through an amendment to the Mental Capacity Act. But I do not disagree with the hon. Lady; she raises an interesting point.
Danny Kruger
Is my hon. Friend suggesting—I think his new clause makes it clear, and I think my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire is making the same point—that it is inappropriate for an advance directive to authorise an assisted death? The Mental Capacity Act authorises somebody to decline treatment at a future point, so my hon. Friend is acknowledging that there is a difference between the principle of declining treatment and the principle of requesting an assisted death. Given his new clause, I do not imagine that my hon. Friend thinks that we should have advance directives that authorise an assisted death. If he acknowledges that, he must recognise that there is a distinction between declining treatment and requesting an assisted death.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
My hon. Friend makes a valid point. I have concerns about public confidence in the Bill without that additional safeguard, as this is such a consequential decision, but of course any advance directive would be predicated on having gone through those two stages first before capacity is lost. I feel that on this occasion additional tightening is necessary so that the public can be confident that a robust process has been gone through.
The MCA is a tried and tested piece of legislation used by practitioners up and down the country. The hon. Member for Stroud uses it every day in his practice; I have to say that I did not, but I was not consenting patients for surgery every day. Every time I did so, however, I had those conversations. Capacity lies on a spectrum: if I am doing major abdominal surgery, the level of capacity required to make a decision will be much greater than if I am removing a small bump or lump on an arm.
As well as having been tried and tested by medical practitioners, the MCA has been tested in the courts, as the hon. Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge said. It has been right up to the highest court in this land, it has been robustly tested and it has been found to be good legislation. The risk we now face is that it will be replaced not only with a new legal concept, but with an entirely different process for assessing capacity in this setting. Although there may be good intentions to improve the system, that will only add to the folly of it and overcomplicate the issue.
Kim Leadbeater
I am sorry that it has taken me a while to find the relevant provision of the Bill. The discussion on the advance directive is a really interesting one, and I am glad that we are having it. Is the hon. Member reassured that clause 18(4) is very clear that on the day that assistance is provided to a patient, a doctor has to assess once again their capacity to make the decision to end their own life, check again that there is a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life, and indeed check everything again on the day, including capacity? I believe that that will negate the issue around the advance directive.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
The hon. Member makes a reasonable point. I agree with her on many issues, but on this issue I have some reservations. Clause 18(4) says:
“The coordinating doctor must be satisfied, at the time the approved substance is provided, that the person to whom it is provided…has capacity…has a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life”.
Of course, under the wording of section 26(1) of the Mental Capacity Act, that decision can be made at an earlier time and deemed to have currency, once capacity has been lost, for its enactment at a later date. I think that there could be a minor tightening of the wording or reassurances from Government to address that, but it is an important point to raise and air.
The Chair
Order. Before we proceed any further, I remind hon. Members that we are discussing capacity and ability.
Naz Shah
I am just trying to understand what the hon. Member is communicating. Under the Bill, if somebody has anorexia, diabetes or kidney failure and has the capacity to make that decision because they meet the criteria for the capacity to refuse treatment, will that mean that they can decide to sign up to this option?
Dr Shastri-Hurst
The Bill is very clear in determining that it is for those who have a progressive illness, disease or medical condition that cannot be reversed by treatment. On my reading of the Bill, it excludes that category of individuals who choose not to engage with treatment that in ordinary circumstances would prevent the progression or deterioration of their condition. I therefore do not see it as analogous with the hon. Member’s scenario of someone who could have a long life expectancy if they had taken their treatment, but who chooses not to. That is not captured within the Bill, in my interpretation.
Naz Shah
I am struggling with this, because it is clear from the evidence from our witnesses that that is the case where somebody has anorexia, for example, and they make that choice. As has been referred to plenty of times in the context of the Bill, the Mental Capacity Act has been used, and is sufficiently used, for people to withdraw treatment. Personally, I think that that is a pretty false equivalence, because when a person’s life support machine is turned off, the decision is made not by the person receiving lifesaving treatment, but by their loved ones.
According to what we have heard this morning, if someone has the mental capacity to use the MCA to withdraw treatment for a condition, that will lead to a diagnosis of terminal illness. It could kill someone. If I refused to take insulin, and I was diabetic, I would have the mental capacity to say, “Actually, I’m not going to take this treatment, so can I make a decision?” I am just trying to check the hon. Gentleman’s understanding.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
With the greatest respect to the hon. Member, I think that she is conflating two issues. Someone can stop treatment under the MCA; over time, that will lead progressively to death, with some conditions—she gave the example of being a diabetic without insulin—but that would not be a terminal illness in reference to this Bill. The Bill is very clear that it is about an inevitable and progressive illness, disease, or medical condition that cannot be reversed by treatment. Diabetes, treated with insulin, is not a progressive condition that becomes a terminal diagnosis; it is terminal only by virtue of somebody refusing treatment, which therefore would not be captured within the Bill.
Rebecca Paul
I would like to understand why my hon. Friend thinks that diabetes could ever be considered reversible. It can be treated and managed, but surely we cannot turn back time.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
My hon. Friend makes a valid point—the Committee can see that I was an orthopaedic surgeon, not an endocrinologist. It is not necessarily a progressive condition; it is a condition that can be managed and maintained. It does not fall within the wording of the Bill. We are not talking about a condition that is inevitably progressive, and for which there is no treatment option available to pause, reverse or prevent its progression. We are talking about a relatively limited group of conditions that will inevitably lead to death when someone, for want of a less blunt phrase, has reached the end of the road in terms of their therapeutic treatment options.
Sarah Olney
I am conscious that the hon. Member for Ipswich sought to intervene before me, but may I press the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley slightly on his point? When I asked Professor Sir Chris Whitty during oral evidence whether there could ever be a defined list of conditions that he would define as terminal, he was very clear that there could not be. Someone may suffer from a range of conditions. Most people who develop cancer survive, so cancer is a terminal illness, but not for everybody.
The question of what is and is not a terminal illness is quite contested; it is not clearcut. As the hon. Member for Bradford West says, it is quite possible that diabetes could be a terminal illness if someone refuses treatment for it. I am not entirely clear why the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley is saying that it is clear from the legislation what is and is not a terminal illness. As we heard in oral evidence, it is not clear.
The Chair
Order. I remind Members that the Committee will discuss terminal illnesses, and extending the list relating to terminal illnesses, under a later clause. Let us remain in scope this morning and continue the debate on the amendments before the Committee.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
I will keep my answer very brief by saying that I will return to hon. Lady’s point when we come to the clause on terminal illness, when perhaps I can elucidate, improve and work on my responses in a way that is conducive to understanding.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
I am aware that the hon. Member for Ipswich is waiting to intervene.
Jack Abbott
I am grateful to the hon. Member; he has given way a number of times, and I am sure he wants to make some progress. To return to the scope of the debate—I am sure you will be delighted to hear that, Ms McVey—part of the rationale cited for making this change from “capacity” to “ability” is depression, and given what we are talking about, there is a very real possibility that someone will become depressed after diagnosis. In the hon. Member’s experience, are patients with a clinical diagnosis of depression currently deemed capable under the Mental Capacity Act of making potentially life-changing decisions about treatment or whatever it might be? Are there any scenarios in which he would offer or remove certain treatment because of their depressed state? What I am getting at is that there are a huge number of scales and considerations to factor in with depression, but does the Act allow us to look at those when it comes to depression?
Dr Shastri-Hurst
The hon. Member is right: there is a huge spectrum of patients when dealing with these complex issues, and it would be absolute nonsense to arbitrarily say that anybody with depression is unable to make an informed decision on any issue. There are individuals who have mild depression—indeed, I suspect that most people with a terminal diagnosis would have some form of depression or reactive disorder, whether formally diagnosed or not, because of their circumstances. That does not mean that they are unable to make a rational, informed decision; we have to look at each patient individually. The Act is a tried and tested piece of legislation that doctors up and down the country use every day. Doctors over the road in St Tommy’s will be using it at this very moment, and they are adept at knowing and sensing when they need to escalate, whether by getting the opinion of a psychologist or a psychiatrist, because they have concerns about underlying issues. The Act is a robust piece of legislation, and we should be using it to enhance this Bill, not introducing further complexity, which will only put us into a quagmire of uncertainty.
Danny Kruger
My hon. Friend does not want uncertainty, so perhaps he could answer this question very directly: would he be content to see somebody who is depressed, and indeed suicidal, successfully apply for an assisted death?
Dr Shastri-Hurst
My hon. Friend puts it with his usual candour. He asked a straight question, so I will give him a straight answer: I think there is a difference between somebody who is depressed and somebody who is depressed and suicidal. I have no personal moral objections if someone who has a terminal illness, who suffers from depression and who has capacity as set out through the two-stage test in the Mental Capacity Act, ultimately wishes to end their life because of their terminal diagnosis. If they are doing it because they are suicidal as a consequence of their depression, that is a different and distinct issue. We are talking about individuals who want to end their life because of their terminal diagnosis, not because of their mental disorder.
Jake Richards
I keep making the point that clause 9 adds a different element to this process. It says that, when undertaking the assessment, one of the two doctors
“may, if they have doubt as to…capacity…refer the person for assessment”
of their capacity by a psychiatrist. Does that reassure the hon. Member that there is a further layer of safeguards in this area?
Dr Shastri-Hurst
That is one of the additional safeguards in the Bill. This Bill has more in-built safeguards than any similar piece of legislation across the world. I think the hon. Gentleman makes a valid point: when a doctor has concerns about somebody’s mental state, they can escalate the case and seek further, specialist opinion.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
I will make some progress, if I may, because I think I have indulged your patience for far too long, Ms McVey.
I am cautious about introducing this new test. I may not have persuaded everyone, but I have set out my reasons. We risk making the system overcomplicated. We would move away from the well-established mechanism under the Mental Capacity Act and into tiger country, with untried and untested systems that the courts have not considered, which will inevitably lead to challenge. There is no need to do that, because we already have robust mechanisms in place and doing so will merely lead to ambiguity and potential complications.
This is not me reaching this conclusion in isolation. Of course, there will always be voices on different sides of the debate, and we can frame the evidence we have heard to favour one set of arguments over another. However, I am significantly persuaded by the chief medical officer, given his wide experience as not just a clinician but a public policymaker. In his evidence to the Committee on 28 January, he said:
“It is not clear to me what problem people are trying to solve by doing that,”
—he means moving away from the Mental Capacity Act—
“given that the Mental Capacity Act clearly makes the point that the more severe the decision, the greater the degree of capacity that has to be assumed before people can actually take that decision.” ––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 37, Q14.]
It is that foundation that we are building on, and it is central to how these things operate in practice.
Although I understand the position of the hon. Member for Richmond Park, and I have a degree of sympathy with those who support the amendments, I invite them to reflect, in the time we have left for this debate, on whether the amendments achieve their stated aim. Do they make the Bill better or do they make it more complicated and convoluted? I say that they make it more convoluted and that, despite the best of intentions, they should not be supported.
Daniel Francis
My hon. Friend the Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge knows I am an ally on many of these issues, but I will humbly disagree with her on some matters. I am not a lawyer or a doctor, but like many people here I speak from lived experience. I speak as the parent of a learning-disabled child, so I see the kinds of decisions that have to be made day to day, and the kinds of arguments and conversations that have to be had with people who presume that my child has more or less capacity than she has. Believe me, that is a constant, daily battle for me and my wife.
My daughter has 12 words and a severe sight impairment, which makes it very difficult for her to make some of her decisions, as well as other complexities—predominantly her cerebral palsy, which caused a brain injury at birth. Therefore, in my own way, although I am not a lawyer or a doctor, I have become a bit of an expert on some of the capacity issues that people encounter day by day. This morning, as I do most mornings, I read to her the three choices for her breakfast. I give her a bit of time to think about them and then I repeat them. We get yes or no to those three choices, and that is the choice she makes. Because of her severe sight impairment, when I put those three options in front of her, I have to lift them up in front of my face so that she can see them; if I put them much lower down, she would not be able to see them and make a choice. She would be able to make the choice through pointing if it was within a certain range.
I have doctors calling my wife and me all the time, asking to have a conversation with my daughter, despite their having read the notes saying that she is an 11-year-old with 12 words and a severe sight impairment. I therefore query—I will refer to some of the oral evidence in a moment—how well some aspects of the Mental Capacity Act are currently being carried out. Equally, I deal with people who suggest that she has a greater level of capacity than she does.
I accept—I have had this conversation with the hon. Member for Spen Valley on a number of occasions—that this legislation would not be applicable to my daughter. However, we heard in evidence from Mencap that the vast majority of people with learning disabilities in this country are not in the same position. They are living their day-to-day lives, living in supported accommodation and making the kinds of decision we have discussed in this debate, such as buying coffee and going to the bank.
As a result of my 20 years as a councillor, and in the last 11 years since our children were born, I have become involved with a number of local disability charities, and I know the decisions that people make when their child is at that transition age. They are trying to understand the complexity of taking a power of attorney for a child, as well as other decision-making issues. I spend a lot of time with parents who do not put those measures in place, because they do not understand the complexity in terms of age. We could therefore have a young adult relying on doctors who do not know them and on a judge—I have not seen an amendment on that issue, so I am still talking about a judge—to make a decision about capacity.
Kim Leadbeater
I do not particularly have a question to ask my hon. Friend, but I want to pay tribute to him for engaging so positively with the scrutiny of the Bill and for the very personal experience he has shared with the Committee. I reassure him that I will do everything I can to work with him, as I have so far through this process, because his fears are real, and I hear them. We have a job to do through the Bill to solve the problems that exist for people who are dying, but we do not want to create other problems. I am happy to continue to work with him to ensure that we address as much of that as we can through the Committee.
Daniel Francis
I thank the Member in charge for her comments. That is the conversation we had when she invited me to join the Committee, and we will continue to have conversations as amendments come forward.
My concern is about some aspects of the Mental Capacity Act, which was not written for these scenarios, and the hon. Member for Richmond Park talked in particular about the statutory principles in it. I am not an expert on these issues, and my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud behind me is more of an expert on some of them. However, there is no obligation in the code of practice under the Act to consult carers involved in a person’s life. The code says:
“if it is practical and appropriate to do so, consult other people for their views about the person’s best interests”.
Therefore, given the way the Act and the code of practice are worded, there is no obligation in the scenarios I am discussing.
There is another issue I was going to raise before I took that intervention. Mencap does considerable hard work. At my local branch, there are many people whose parents are in their 70s and 80s and have cared for their child all their life. I am not being rude, but their child, who is in their 40s or 50s, does feel like a burden to their parents. They know the obligation their parents have to care for them for their whole life. I ask Members to consider what the Mental Capacity Act says: those adults are at a level of capacity to make decisions, but they have been supported in those decisions all their lives and do not—
Jack Abbott
We have spoken a lot today about further safeguards and provisions, beyond the Mental Capacity Act. However, I note that my hon. Friend has tabled amendment 339, which states that if a
“person has a learning disability or is autistic”
they
“must be provided with accessible information and given sufficient time to consider it”
and that, additionally, there must be a “supporter” or “advocate” with them. If that amendment was passed, would that satisfy some of my hon. Friend’s concerns about the Act?
Daniel Francis
I am hearing that that amendment will need some rewording, but it would address some of my concerns. I am working with Mencap, and further amendments will be tabled to later clauses of the Bill. I understand that one of our colleagues has also tabled amendments, which I welcome. However, I would still have concerns about the interpretation—and there are different interpretations—of the current code of practice when it comes to the involvement of carers and loved ones. Those concerns brought me to the place I came to on Second Reading. I did not seek to be the person standing here; indeed, a year ago, not only did I not believe that I would be a Member of Parliament, but I did not believe that I would be on this side of this argument. It is this particular point that has driven me to this position.
I will talk a little about evidence. The Law Society has a neutral position on the Bill, but it has said that, before the provisions become law, a comprehensive consultation should be undertaken to allow resident experts to share views on the appropriate definition of capacity for the purposes of the Bill. That is the position of the Law Society.
Kim Leadbeater
My hon. Friend cites some interesting observations from the oral evidence, and I welcome his doing so. I draw his attention to my amendments 186 and 198, which look at the training. This is something I feel passionately about. If the Bill were to pass, having gold standard training would be vital, as I said during that sitting. I will do whatever I can to embed that in the Bill, and I will certainly consider what that will look like in the instances that we are discussing.
Daniel Francis
I welcome that commitment and look forward to that discussion in due course.
Dr Hussain went on to say:
“Ultimately, I do not think the Mental Capacity Act and safeguarding training are fit for purpose.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 199, Q260.]
Professor Owen said:
“That conveys questionable confidence in the consent processes, of which mental capacity is part, in relation to the decision to end one’s life. It is significant evidence about the confidence that is out there among experienced practitioners.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 228, Q290.]
Dr Price said:
“I…refer back to Professor Gareth Owen’s oral submission, thinking about the purpose that the Mental Capacity Act was drawn up for and the fact that decisions about the ending of life were not one of the originally designed functions of it. We would need to think carefully about how that would then translate into a decision that was specifically about the capacity to end one’s life.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 268, Q349.]
Danny Kruger
I note the point about training, and of course we would all welcome the strongest possible training. As the hon. Gentleman implies, nobody has yet used the Mental Capacity Act to assess somebody for an assisted death; it would be completely uncharted territory for the whole system, including anybody providing training. How does he imagine that training might be designed to allow for the Mental Capacity Act to be applied in this case, when it would be completely novel?
Daniel Francis
As I say, I am not an expert on this matter from a legal or medical background, but those are the concerns that have driven me to the place that I am in.
Dan Scorer, from Mencap—as my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley knows, I was adamant that Mencap would give evidence to us—said:
“building on the previous question about the adequacy of the Mental Capacity Act, there is a question about the adequacy of training, awareness and compliance with that Act now.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 269, Q350.]
He clearly cited what many people know occurred during covid, with “do not resuscitate” orders and decisions being made on people’s behalf. That is what has driven me to this place, and that is why I will support the amendment. I also have further amendments on this issue later on down the line.
I completely understand what my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley said about training in relation to these decisions and scenarios. At the end of life, people should have autonomy and choice, but if that comes at the price of one person, in a borderline capacity decision that is made on their behalf, it will be one death too many.
Danny Kruger
It is a great pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford, and I pay tribute to his powerful speech. I wish more people on our side of the debate and on the Committee had medical backgrounds, but I am glad that we have someone who has such direct personal experience of supporting people with learning disabilities. I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for everything he said and I entirely agree with it.
I want to speak in support of new clause 1, tabled by the hon. Member for Richmond Park, to replace the use of the Mental Capacity Act with a new ability test. This goes to the heart of the Bill: it is absolutely crucial. Clause 3, which her new clause would replace, is in a sense the essence of the Bill. It is the shortest clause, but perhaps the most important one, because it determines the means by which somebody will be assessed to be capable of making this decision. It is a very important protection—and, at its simplest, this is a very confusing and complicated area. I will no doubt confuse myself in the course of my speech, but I have a simple observation to make, which the hon. Lady also made very well. We are dealing with the issue of impaired judgment; currently, under the Mental Capacity Act, it will be possible, through the terms of this Bill, for somebody whose judgment is impaired by virtue of a mental disability or mental illness to successfully apply for an assisted death. I do not think that is what the public want and I do not think it is what the House of Commons voted for. I think it is a misunderstanding of the principle of the Bill, which did win support on Second Reading.
The simple fact is that somebody’s judgment can be impaired under the Mental Capacity Act, but they could still have capacity. We have repeatedly heard points made about how the Mental Capacity Act applies in the normal conduct of life for disabled people—for people with mental disabilities. For instance, people can be anorexic, depressed or suicidal, and of course they can still consent to all sorts of decisions that affect their life, including medical treatments. A person can consent to have surgery on a broken leg while depressed; there is no difficulty whatever with that and of course that is appropriate. That is rightly the basis on which we currently judge capacity.
New clause 1 would build on the terms of the Mental Capacity Act. It would add to the principles of autonomy and of people being able to understand, use and weigh the relevant information. As I said in an intervention, the key point is that using this new test of ability would ensure that the person was fully able to do those things—fully able to understand, use and weigh the relevant information. In the case of impaired ability, they would not be considered to pass the test.
We hear a lot that this is the toughest Bill in the world, with the highest safeguards. It is worth pointing out that in Oregon, which this Bill is largely inspired by, there is an impaired judgment test. There is a capacity test similar to that in the Mental Capacity Act, but people are also required to demonstrate that there is no impaired judgment, and that is exactly what the hon. Lady is seeking to achieve. Her new clause would build on the terms of the Mental Capacity Act with these key principles about understanding information, but would ensure that it was a full understanding, with no impairment. It would strengthen the Bill without complicating it. In fact, it would significantly simplify it, because at the moment—this is the substantial issue with the application of the Mental Capacity Act—a huge complication is involved when we go into the forest of the MCA and try to apply it in these terms. When we try to navigate our way through the MCA in pursuit of an assisted dying application, there is a whole series of complications.
I will cite some of the evidence that we received. The Royal College of Psychiatrists, which we heard from, stated in its written evidence:
“It is the RCPsych’s view that the MCA is not sufficient for the purposes of this Bill.”
We also had evidence from King’s College London’s Complex Life and Death Decisions group, which is a group of world-leading professionals working on issues relating to the end of life. They say that use of the MCA for assisted suicide would be “an entirely novel test”. I note that the hon. Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge—and I think my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley—made the point that an “ability” test would be a novel term. I acknowledge that the term “ability” is not currently set out or recognised in law in the same way that capacity is, but as I said, it is clearly defined in new clause 1, as tabled by the hon. Member for Richmond Park. Of course it is going to be novel—we are talking about something that is entirely novel. Assisted suicide is a new measure that is being introduced, so of course we have to have a new measure by which we define who is appropriate.
Bambos Charalambous (Southgate and Wood Green) (Lab)
I am reading the text of new clause 1, and it is remarkably similar to the text of section 3(1) of the Mental Capacity Act, which says,
“For the purposes of section 2, a person is unable to make a decision for himself if he is unable—
to understand the information relevant to the decision,
to retain that information,
to use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the decision”.
It is not a novel concept—that wording is virtually the same as in new clause 1. I do not see why we need to have the new clause or the new definition, as it is already present in the Mental Capacity Act.
Danny Kruger
The hon. Gentleman’s intervention helps me to explain my point more clearly, which is that the new clause tabled by the hon. Member for Richmond Park builds on the terms of the Mental Capacity Act. It recognises the value of the terms, which have been well established in case law through the MCA—the ability to understand, use and weigh the relevant information.
The key difference is the word “fully”. The case law around the MCA allows for somebody to be deemed capacitous even though their judgment might be impaired. What is proposed in the new clause is the closing of that lacuna, so that it would not be possible for someone to get an assisted death if their judgment was impaired. That is the key difference.
It is also important to exclude the MCA because of the thicket of complications that it would entail. We have heard about the importance of simplification. A much simpler and better way to do the entirely novel thing that we are proposing, which is to authorise assisted suicide by the state, is to have a new definition.
Kim Leadbeater
I do struggle with that terminology. This is not assisted suicide by the state. The state is not involved. It is the person making an autonomous decision based on their choice at the end of life. I will say on the record that the term “suicide” is not accurate for the cases we are talking about. The people we are dealing with are not suicidal. They very much want to live; they do not want to die, but they are dying. It is important that we have that on the record.
Danny Kruger
I think it is totally valid for us to have this argument about terminology periodically. I will repeat the point that we have made before, which is that we are actually amending the Suicide Act 1961—or rather, we are disapplying that Act—in the process set out in the hon. Lady’s Bill. There is no getting away from the fact that we are talking about assisting suicide. I am afraid that I will continue to use the term, and I hope the hon. Lady will forgive me for that.
I am arguing that the MCA is a complicating factor in the process that is being proposed for the Bill; it makes things much more difficult and complicated. The point has already been made—the hon. Member for Richmond Park put it very well—that, in the case for the MCA, a lot of weight is being put on the evidence from Sir Chris Whitty, suggesting that the MCA works very well. I point out that Sir Chris made a significant mistake in his evidence, when he said that
“the more serious the decision, the greater the level of capacity that someone needs to have.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 30, Q3.]
There is no such requirement in the Mental Capacity Act. Of course, we would hope that doctors would take a serious decision more seriously than a trivial one, but there is no such requirement. I cite Alex Ruck Keene KC, who wrote to the hon. Member for Richmond Park after his evidence session; with the greatest of respect to Chris Whitty, the fact that he got that wrong does not inspire confidence in his comments that the Mental Capacity Act is well understood by doctors throughout the country. I very much echo that. We have had so much evidence on how the Mental Capacity Act does not work well in practice that I think it was regrettable for the chief medical to have made the Panglossian observation that every doctor interprets it in exactly the same way and it works perfectly everywhere.
The Mental Capacity Act does not detect coercion. We will discuss coercion more in subsequent debates, but that Act is certainly not the safeguard against it. Professor House made some comments to us about Down’s syndrome and about diagnostic overshadowing. That is a very important concept. I am afraid to say that it is frequently the case, regarding people with severe disabilities, that capacity—or, indeed, incapacity—is not correctly observed because the medical professional will not see beyond the more presenting of their conditions. Observing capacity in someone who does have disabilities is often mistaken; it is harder than it is regarding other people.
Lewis Atkinson (Sunderland Central) (Lab)
Can I clarify what the hon. Member is proposing by introducing a separate test for people accessing assisted dying? Say an individual is on a respirator at the end of their life. Under what the hon. Member is proposing, if they said, “Please turn this respirator off; I want to die”, he thinks that it is appropriate for capacity to be assessed under the Mental Capacity Act 2005, but somehow he thinks that that person should have a different legal test if they said, “I want to take a drug to end my life,” knowing full well that they would have exactly the same result.
Danny Kruger
The simple answer is yes, I do. I think it is a causatively different decision. In fact, this whole Bill entails causative differences between those decisions. I will come to that point more in a moment.
Professor Owen made an important point to us regarding capacity. He said:
“You might be talking about a kind of cognitive impairment that has not reached the threshold for a diagnosis of dementia; you might be talking about a kind of mood problem or an anxiety problem that is sub-clinical; or you might be talking about a level of intelligence that is not clinically a learning disability.”
He talked about
“pressure within a family, let us say, which is often not malign in its intentions, but it exists.”
and about situations
“where there is an impairment and also an interpersonal pressure”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 234, Q297.]
Although we are not talking at this point explicitly about coercion and family pressure, the issues around capacity and coercion are nevertheless intertwined, and it is often very difficult for doctors to determine what is really going on. Again, the challenges around capacity are intense.
The point has been made by hon. Members that under clause 9(3)(b), if the second doctor in the process is in doubt about capacity, they “may” refer the person to a psychiatrist, but the clause in fact refers to “a registered medical practitioner” who “has experience of” the assessment of capacity—so not a psychiatrist, but just someone who has experience, whatever that means, of the assessment of capacity. It is not totally obvious what that means. Amendment 365 has been tabled overnight by the hon. Member for Bath (Wera Hobhouse) which would mean that both the first and second doctor, and indeed the court, if we are allowed to have a court process, “must”—not “may”— refer the person to a psychiatrist. That is not just if they are concerned about capacity, by the way. The court, or whoever it is, must conclude that there is no
“impairment of judgment arising from a mental disorder or other condition”.
I very much welcome that amendment and I hope that we will pass that in due course.
Kim Leadbeater
On that point about clause 9(3)(b), as I think was mentioned earlier, an amendment has been tabled by the hon. Member for St Albans (Daisy Cooper)—an amendment that I would support and I hope the Committee will—that would indeed turn the “may” to a “must”, so that there has to be a referral to a psychiatrist if there is any doubt from either of those doctors.
Danny Kruger
That is excellent news. For the first time so far in the course of this debate, we have a strengthening of the Bill from the hon. Member. That is great news—we can chalk that up as a victory, and as good sense breaking out. I am grateful for that. Let’s see what more we can achieve.
The point that I want to make is that we are in the foothills of understanding the effects of depression, cognitive impairment and social pressure on the decision to end life. That is a point made strongly by a series of witnesses to us in both oral and written evidence: we are still very much in the early stages of understanding how capacity interacts with mental illness, disability and coercion. Then, into the mists of vagueness, we are proposing to insert this single clunking, clumsy question: “Is there evidence of incapacity?” I strongly suggest that the abuse of the Mental Capacity Act that we are seeing here is not a way of simplifying the process of ensuring that there are a small number of strong safeguards; it is a great complication of the process and introduces more complexity, as we see from the many additional things that clinicians should consider. That is in direct contradiction to the principle of the Mental Capacity Act, which simply asks the question: “Is there capacity?”
The point has been made that there is more to the Mental Capacity Act than simply the question of capacity. There are concepts of best interests and supporting decision making. As the hon. Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge suggested, it is a cumulative process. The Mental Capacity Act entails not only the question of capacity but the consideration of best interests and whether we are supporting the decision making of an individual. I am not sure how those terms apply in a situation of assisted dying. It is not similar or comparable to the sorts of decisions that the MCA is intended to apply to.
Lewis Atkinson
This touches on some of the evidence given by Mr Ruck Keene, particularly around the best interests decision. From my reading of this legislation, it is very clear that there is no possibility for someone to make a decision on behalf of or in the best interests of anyone else. As the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley mentioned earlier, there are a number of exclusions in the Mental Capacity Act. For example, someone is not able to make a best interests decision on someone getting married or adopting. Does the hon. Member agree that in order to have a guarantee, without any doubt, on the best interests point, an amendment could be included to clarify that nothing in the MCA would allow a best interests decision under this legislation?
Danny Kruger
That is absolutely right. I do not think best interests can apply in this case. That is why the Mental Capacity Act is being abused. As the hon. Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge said, it is supposed to be cumulative. We are supposed to consider all aspects of the Mental Capacity Act, and best interests should be part of a consideration—but how on earth does one make a best interests decision about somebody deciding to commit suicide? The hon. Gentleman is right that best interests are excluded in the Bill, so the Mental Capacity Act is not being used, except for this most basic, low-level bar to cross, which is the capacity decision.
Dr Tidball
For clarity, I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland Central on what would strengthen the Bill. The exceptions only apply where the right and proper Mental Capacity Act process has been gone through and the person doing that assessment has arrived at the point that that person does not have capacity. It is only in that very narrow set of circumstances where they have determined that the person before them does not have capacity to make the decision at hand that they then go to the second look at whether making such a decision would be in the individual’s best interest. The specific exclusions listed in the MCA only apply in that stage.
What my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland Central is suggesting is that we table an amendment that would add to the list of specific exclusions; that would further strengthen the two stages. First, there would be the full Mental Capacity Act tests that may determine that the person does not have capacity. Such an amendment would give us belt and braces in circumstances where the person does not have capacity. Under the Bill currently, the person would fall out of scope and not be able to seek assistance if it had been determined that they did not have capacity. A belt-and-braces approach would make sure that there is no circumstance in which it could be determined by a medical practitioner or any other that it was in their best interests to follow this course of action.
Under the Bill as currently drafted, those people who have not got capacity as a result of the Mental Capacity Act would not be able to have access to the provisions in the Bill. My hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland Central suggests that we augment that even further so that there can be no doubt that, where it has been determined that the person does not have capacity, following the Mental Capacity Act, we should also add a very clear exception—
Children's Wellbeing and Schools Bill (Thirteenth sitting)
Tuesday 11th February 2025
(1 day, 13 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill 2024-26 View all Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 11 February 2025 - (11 Feb 2025)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
Ellie Chowns (North Herefordshire) (Green)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 5, in the name of the hon. Member for Stroud (Dr Opher), is a probing new clause, and I sincerely hope it will generate debate and action. Its purpose is to make the holiday activities and food programme statutory provision. Following Marcus Rashford’s high-profile campaign, the HAF programme was rolled out across England to provide children with nutritious food, childcare and activities in the holidays. One of its aims is to ensure children receive healthy and nutritious meals during the school holidays.
Nutrition is a key concern. Recent reports show an increase in hospital admissions for nutrient deficiencies, and that data should really ring alarm bells. The longevity of the cost of living crisis—it has been with us for years now—means that food insecurity has become the norm for many families, who are unable to buy staple nutritious products. Stark health inequalities are highly prevalent, particularly when it comes to diet-related poor health. The most deprived communities are affected disproportionately by much higher rates of food-related ill health and disease, including obesity, type 2 diabetes, cardiovascular disease and dental decay.
No doubt the Committee will be concerned by the food insecurity statistics collated by the Food Foundation, which show that 14% of UK households experience food insecurity, but inequalities mean that the number is much higher for certain groups. Among households with children, it is 18%. Among single-adult households with children, it is 31%. Among households of a non-white ethnicity, it is 26%—double the rate for white households. It is 32% for households with an adult limited a lot by disability, but 10% for households with non-disabled adults. Food insecurity and health inequalities go hand in hand.
In that already difficult context, school holidays are a known pressure point for families, which face extra food and childcare costs, and can have reduced incomes due to time of work to care for children. Evaluation of the HAF programme shows multiple benefits to families. In a qualitative review of HAF programme holiday clubs in Yorkshire, parents reported that children were eating more healthily and experiencing a wider variety of foods during those holiday programmes. Analysis of meals in five clubs in areas of high deprivation found that children eligible for free school meals who attended a club had better quality diets on days that they attended the club than on days that they did not attend.
HAF clubs provide free childcare to working families and help to reduce the costs associated with the loss of free school meals, which are significant for families in the holidays. Of course, they help to reduce learning loss over the summer holidays by providing enriching activities and physical activity for children.
But HAF funding is currently committed on a short-term basis. Although the current funding has just been extended for a year, short-term extensions periodically leave local authorities unable to plan provision in the long term. As a former councillor, I have seen for myself that a hand-to-mouth approach to funding creates uncertainty for club providers and leaves children at risk of holiday hunger if funding is not renewed. That is why the holiday activities and food programme must be secured and put on a statutory footing, alongside other crucial parts of the nutritional safety net such as free school meals and the Healthy Start scheme. I sincerely urge the Government to take this important step. Although this is a probing new clause, I very much look forward to the Minister’s response.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Education (Stephen Morgan)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Christopher. I turn to new clause 5, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud (Dr Opher), on the topic of providing healthy meals and activities to children in receipt of free school meals during school holidays. I am grateful to the hon. Member for North Herefordshire for speaking to the new clause. She makes an important point about how local authorities provide support to children who receive a free school meal during term time and during school holidays, and we fully support local authorities in continuing to provide this support through the existing holiday activities and food programme.
The highly regarded HAF programme is established in every local authority across England and is already delivering vital support to children and families across the country during school holidays. The programme’s grant conditions already place an obligation on local authorities to make free holiday club places available to children in their area who receive benefits-related free school meals, and to provide meals that meet our school foods standards and to deliver physical activities in line with the chief medical officer’s guidance. Our non-statutory programme guidance provides comprehensive support to local authorities and holiday clubs on how they might best provide this support.
However, HAF does not provide only meals and activities; it goes much further. HAF clubs work with children to teach them about the importance of healthy eating and maintaining a healthy lifestyle. Children and their families can learn how to cook nutritious and tasty low-cost meals, and clubs can act as a referral point for families to get information, help and access to other services and support when they need it. Our programme does not support just children who receive free school meals. We provide local authorities with the flexibility to use up to 15% of their total HAF budget to work with other children and families who they deem to be vulnerable or at risk, which might include looked-after children with an education, health and care plan, or children who are at risk of exploitation and need somewhere safe during the school holidays.
Flexibility has been key to delivering the HAF programme in thousands of holiday clubs across the country. Placing a legal duty on local authorities to deliver food and activities to free school meal recipients would risk stifling the innovation that local authorities have to deliver HAF in a way that is right for their communities, and to allow them to develop and evolve year to year, whether that is through working with schools to target children with low school attendance rates or working with police and community organisations to support children at risk of involvement in gang violence.
Since they began delivering this programme in 2021, local authorities have built partnerships with organisations across the community and we have seen some wonderful examples of collaboration. One of our 2023 regional champions, based not far from the constituency of the hon. Member for North Herefordshire, was the Venture Community Hub in Gloucestershire, which was recognised for the work that it did with schools, businesses and charitable organisations. The local authority was instrumental in supporting it to build, adapt and develop a HAF programme that met the needs of the diverse community around it.
I am delighted to confirm that this great programme will be continuing for 2025-26, backed by funding of more than £200 million. Future funding for the programme will be determined by the spending review. I am grateful to the hon. Member for North Herefordshire for highlighting this important issue and we look forward to carrying on our work with local authorities across the country to continue to provide vital support for children and families during the school holidays. I therefore recommend that the Committee does not press the new clause to a vote.
Ellie Chowns
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 8
Identification of children eligible for free school meals
“After section 512ZA of the Education Act 1996 (power to charge for meals etc.) insert—
‘512ZAA Identification of children eligible for free school meals
(1) The Secretary of State must identify all children eligible for free school meals in England.
(2) A child’s eligibility for free school meals is not dependent on any application having been made for free school meals on their behalf.
(3) Where a child has been identified as eligible for free school meals, the Secretary of State must provide for this information to be shared with—
(a) the school at which the child is registered; and
(b) the relevant local education authority.
(4) Where a school has been informed that a child on its pupil roll is eligible for free school meals, the school must provide that child with a free school meal.
(5) A local education authority must provide the means for a parent or guardian of a child who has been identified as eligible for free school meals to opt out of the provision of a free school meal under subsection (4).’”—(Ellie Chowns.)
This new clause would place a duty on the Secretary of State to proactively identify all children eligible for free school meals in England, making the application process for free school meals opt-out rather than opt-in.
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 31—Eligibility for free school lunches—
“In section 512ZB of the Education Act 1996 (provision of free school lunches and milk), before paragraph (a) insert—
‘(za) C’s household income is less than £20,000 per year;’”
New clause 67—Registration of children eligible for free school meals—
“After section 512ZA of the Education Act 1996 (power to charge for meals etc.) insert—
‘512ZAA Registration of children eligible for free school meals
(1) The Secretary of State must ensure that all children in England who are eligible to receive free school meals are registered to receive free school meals.
(2) The Secretary of State may make provision for children to be registered for free school meals upon their parents or guardians demonstrating the child’s eligibility through an application for relevant benefits.’”
Ellie Chowns
New clause 8 is another important probing amendment, tabled by the hon. Member for Stroud, that places a duty on the Secretary of State to proactively identify all children eligible for free school meals in England, making the application process for free school meals opt out, rather than opt in. I note that the Minister, in his comments on new clause 5, mentioned that making things statutory made it terribly restrictive. On that basis, why would one ever make anything statutory?
Ellie Chowns
This new clause seeks to address the very real problem that up to 250,000 children, or approximately 11% of those eligible for free school meals, even under the currently very restrictive eligibility criteria, miss out on them because it is an opt-in process. It is simply not okay that so many eligible children are missing out on free school meals. That is in addition to the roughly 900,000 children who are living in poverty, but still not qualifying for free school meals because the eligibility criteria are so tight. I believe that we may be coming on to discuss that a little later.
Early findings from areas with which the Fix Our Food research programme are working show that children from non-white communities, or lone-parent households, are more likely to not be registered for free school meals despite being eligible. Again, inequalities are reproducing themselves when it comes to people accessing their statutory rights. Charities working to address this totally unacceptable situation point to several reasons for the under-registration rate: parents may struggle to fill out complex forms; there may be language barriers for parents; there may be a lack of awareness of free school eligibility; and there may be stigma or embarrassment. The current system is regularly described by schools and local authorities as “cumbersome” and “financially and administratively inefficient”. Receiving statutory benefits should be easy and straightforward for people who are eligible.
There are obvious benefits to the child from getting a nutritious, filling lunch, which we have discussed already today and also on our last sitting day, including reduced food insecurity, improved nutrition and health, and increased attainment and lifetime earning potential, as I set out when I spoke to new clause 2. There are also important wider benefits to the child. Struggling families also miss out on other benefits that free school meal registration would give them access to, including the holiday activities and food programme and uniform grants.
There are also benefits to schools. If children are not registered for free school meals, schools miss out on much-needed pupil premium funding, worth £1,455 per pupil. There are also benefits to local authorities. The Fix Our Food research programme is supporting 66 local authorities to implement an opt-out, or right-to-object approach to free school meal registration. It is identifying and writing to families using existing datasets to inform them that their children will be automatically registered unless they opt out.
As I understand it, in many cases, this has resulted in children, who were previously missing out, becoming successfully registered, and opt-out rates are extremely low. However, only a few councils have successfully adopted this new process. In some cases, despite local authorities’ efforts, data sharing barriers have not been possible to overcome. Some have even been threatened with legal action. The local work still does not capture all eligible children, with families falling through the gaps, as access to datasets is patchy. Further, my understanding is that this process is resource-intensive. Again, it is administratively intensive, incurring onerous governance and administration at council and school level.
Meanwhile, the Greater London Authority has put resource into auto-enrolment. Although that is positive for children in London, the same level of support is not available for most children in the rest of England.
Free school meal auto-enrolment would register eligible families to receive free school meals using benefits data, unless families decide to opt out. This requires data sharing between the Department for Work and Pensions, which holds the data that identifies which children should be eligible for these schemes, and the Department for Education, which administers the scheme. I really hope that, as part of this important Bill,the Government will seriously consider how they can introduce auto-enrolment for free school meals to ensure that all those who are eligible are in receipt of their entitlement. This is a fantastic opportunity to do so now.
As a statutory scheme, funding for the meals for these children should already be available. There is just an administrative barrier that stops far too many children getting what they are entitled to. In the meantime, until this is established, I hope the Government will instigate collaborative working across local government so that we can agree to make progress on this issue.
In conclusion, I want to underscore the fact that we should see this as a first step towards expanding eligibility for free school meals to more children to ensure that no child misses out on a nutritious hot meal at school every day.
Munira Wilson (Twickenham) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this morning, Sir Christopher, on our final day in Committee. I rise to speak to new clauses 31 and 67 on free school meals. New clause 67 largely mirrors the provisions of new clause 8, which the hon. Member for North Herefordshire has just spoken to. I will address the issue of auto-enrolment in a moment.
New clause 31 seeks to expand the eligibility threshold for free school meals to children from households earning less than £20,000 per year, ensuring that no child living in poverty goes hungry at school. The Child Poverty Action Group currently estimates that some 900,000 children living in poverty are missing out on a free school meal, because free school meal eligibility in England is linked to specific benefits, with a household income threshold of just £7,400 per year, after tax, excluding benefits. That leaves many struggling families without support.
The threshold was last uprated in 2018. We know the huge cost of living crisis that households have had to deal with since then. For those on low incomes, that has often meant the difference between heating and eating, and children turning up to school with empty lunchboxes. I saw a mother at my surgery last year who was having to skip her mental health medication to use the prescription money she saved to pay for lunch for her daughter, who is now at college.
Ellie Chowns
The hon. Member makes an absolutely excellent point, not just about the excruciatingly low threshold for eligibility of free school meals, but about the fact that these thresholds, when set in law, get stuck at the numbers. Does she agree that thresholds should be set at, for example, a percentage of average household income, or a similar threshold that moves over time, so that we do not end up with children’s eligibility being squeezed and squeezed year on year as incomes rise but the threshold does not?
Munira Wilson
I certainly agree that there should be a principle in law that thresholds are uprated, by whatever mechanism or measure, because, as we have seen, the threshold has not moved since 2018 and more and more children in poverty are being left without a hot meal at lunchtime.
The threshold is far too low. Both the previous Government’s adviser on food strategy, Henry Dimbleby, and the former Conservative Education Secretary, Michael Gove, have said the threshold should rise, ideally to all those households in receipt of universal credit, but with the public finances so constrained, at the very least to £20,000.
Last week, the hon. Member for North Herefordshire, when speaking to the new clause about universal provision of free school meals to all primary children, set out the moral and economic case for expanding free school meal provision. I will not rehearse all those arguments again, but I say to her and other hon. Members that hunger does not end at the age of 11. Every primary and secondary school child living in poverty should be able to access a hot, healthy meal at lunchtime.
All the evidence points to better concentration, better behaviour and better academic results for those children. While I would love to extend universal free school meals to all children in primary schools—that has long been a Liberal Democrat ambition and policy after we extended it in government to all infant children—we heard from a number of witnesses during the oral evidence sessions that resources would be better targeted at those most in need both at primary and secondary school.
New clause 67 mirrors new clause 8 to a large extent. Frankly, auto-enrolment for free school meals should be a no-brainer for Government. As we have heard, too many are missing out at the moment due to administrative barriers and an unwillingness to apply. These new clauses seek to ensure that no eligible child is left behind.
The exact number of how many children are missing out is unknown. In a recent response to a parliamentary question I tabled, the Under-Secretary of State for Education, the hon. Member for Portsmouth South, admitted that the Department for Education had not made an estimate of how many children were missing out on free school meals since 2013, although estimates suggest that about 11% of children are missing out.
Stephen Morgan
Clause 31 is about the important issue of increasing the earnings threshold when it comes to families who receive free school meals. The Government have a central mission to break down barriers to opportunity for every child, which is why we would roll out a free breakfast club in every state-funded primary school so that children can start the day ready to learn. The continued provision of free school meals to disadvantaged pupils plays a crucial role in this mission, as well as in tackling child poverty.
The Government’s free school meal programme is more important than ever because we have inherited a trend of rising child poverty and a widening attainment gap between children eligible for free school meals and their peers. Child poverty has increased by 700,000 since 2010, with over 4 million children now growing up in a low-income family. Of course, that is the legacy of the previous Government, which the hon. Member for Twickenham has described as shameful. That is why we have committed to delivering a strategy to reduce child poverty through the new Child Poverty Taskforce. The taskforce will consider a range of policies, including free school meals, to assess what will have the biggest impact on driving down rates of child poverty.
I want to reassure the hon. Member for Twickenham about the reach of current programmes, under which 2.1 million disadvantaged children, accounting for 24.6% of all pupils in state-funded schools, are already eligible to receive benefits-based free school meals. A further 90,000 16 to 18-year-old students in further education are entitled to receive free school meals on the basis of low income. In addition, all pupils in reception, year 1 and year 2 in state-funded schools in England are entitled to universal infant free school meals, which benefits around 1.3 million children, ensuring that they receive a nutritious lunchtime meal.
The meals provide much-needed nutrition for pupils and can boost school attendance, improve behaviour and set children up for success by ensuring that they can concentrate and learn in the classroom, and get the most out of their education. In total, we already spend over £1.5 billion on delivering these programmes, and eligibility for benefits-based free school meals provides for the allocation of billions of additional pounds of funding for disadvantaged children.
We appreciate the continued engagement by the hon. Member for Twickenham with the issue of expanding the provision of free school meals to more pupils. We also recognise how important the issue is and want to ensure that free school meals are being delivered to the families who need them most. However, given the funding involved, this matter must be considered through the Child Poverty Taskforce and the multi-year spending review. I therefore ask the hon. Member for Twickenham not to press the amendment.
I turn to new clauses 8 and 67, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud and the hon. Member for Twickenham respectively; of course, the hon. Member for North Herefordshire also spoke passionately to them earlier. The new clauses call for a system to be introduced that would increase registration for free school meals among families who meet the eligibility criteria for them, but are not currently claiming the entitlement.
At their core, we consider that the aim of these measures is to ensure that those who need it receive the support they are entitled to—a goal that we all support. We currently facilitate the process of claiming free school meals through provision of the eligibility checking system. That is a digital portal available to local authorities that makes verification of eligibility for free lunches quick and simple. That checking system is being redesigned to allow parents and schools to check eligibility independently of their local authorities. The system will make it quicker and easier to check eligibility for free school meals, and has the potential to further boost take-up by families who meet the eligibility criteria.
Further to that, we are aware of a range of measures being implemented by local authorities to boost the take-up of free lunches, as we heard earlier. Locally led efforts are more likely to meet the particular needs of the community, and we welcome local authorities taking action to ensure that families access the support for which they are eligible, subject to those activities meeting legal requirements, including those on data protection. In order to support those local efforts, my Department is working with the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology to explore legal gateways that could enable better data sharing.
In the meantime, we will continue to engage with stakeholders to understand the barriers for households who meet criteria for free lunches but are not claiming them. We are also considering further work to improve auto-enrolment. Improved enrolment for meals is needed in the context of the spending review and through the work of the child poverty taskforce. I thank hon. Members for their continued engagement on this policy, but I ask that new clauses 8 and 67 be withdrawn while we continue to keep free meals under review.
Ellie Chowns
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 9
Requirement to provide information about bereavement services
“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations establish a protocol for the collection and dissemination of information relating to bereavement support services for children and young people.
(2) A protocol made under subsection (1) must—
(a) define the bereavement support services to which the protocol applies, which must include services provided by—
(i) local authorities;
(ii) NHS bodies; and
(iii) charities and other third sector organisations;
(b) place a duty on the Secretary of State to publish information, including online, about services to which the protocol applies;
(c) place a duty on specified public bodies and other persons to provide information to children and young people about services to which the protocol applies, including—
(i) specialist services for children and young people;
(ii) services provided online; and
(iii) accessible services for deaf and disabled children and young people;
(d) where a duty under paragraph (c) applies, require the identification of children or young people who may require a service to which the protocol applies.
(3) The Secretary of State must make regulations under this section by statutory instrument.
(4) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by resolution of each House of Parliament.
(5) The Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a draft statutory instrument containing regulations under this section within 12 months of the passing of this Act.”—(Ian Sollom.)
This new clause would place a duty on the Secretary of State to establish a protocol for the collection and dissemination of information about bereavement support services to children and young people.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Ian Sollom (St Neots and Mid Cambridgeshire) (LD)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 52— Bereavement policy in schools—
“(1) The governing body of a relevant school in England has a duty to develop and publish a bereavement policy.
(2) A policy developed under this section must include—
(a) a process for supporting a pupil or staff member facing or following bereavement;
(b) details of how the school will incorporate opportunities to learn about death and bereavement as part of life in its taught curriculum;
(c) details of partnership arrangements with child bereavement services; and
(d) arrangements for staff training.
(3) In developing a policy under this section, the governing body of the school must consult with bereaved pupils and their parents or carers.
(4) The Secretary of State must provide, or make arrangements for the provision of, appropriate financial and other support to school governing bodies for their purposes of facilitating the fulfilling of the duty in this section.
(5) For the purposes of this section, “relevant school” means—
(a) an academy school,
(b) an alternative provision Academy,
(c) a maintained school,
(d) a non-maintained special school,
(e) an independent school, or
(f) a pupil referral unit.”
This new clause would require schools to develop and publish a bereavement policy.
Ian Sollom
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Christopher. I am moving this new clause on behalf of my hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh West (Christine Jardine). According to the Childhood Bereavement Network, around one in 29 school-aged children—about one per classroom—has been bereaved of a parent or sibling. Many more will lose grandparents, and sadly some will have lost their friends. Each year, data is collected on the number of adults bereaved of their husband, wife or child, and until recently data was collected on the number of children affected by the divorce of their parents. However, no similar data is collected on the number who face the devastating loss of their mum or dad or someone else really important in their life.
All that means that when a child is bereaved, there is no obvious way of letting them know what support is available to them, despite a diverse range of services offered by organisations across the country, including Winston’s Wish, Child Bereavement UK and the Childhood Bereavement Network, which all offer online and group sessions with trained professionals and peer-to-peer services for young people to share their experience with each other. Those services are really important in engaging those young people going through quite a diverse range of circumstances, many of which will need quite bespoke support, whether that is specifically around children with disabilities or additional needs, children who might be in a rural community where they are more isolated, or simply the difference between losing someone suddenly versus through a long-term illness.
We know that schools do very good work in supporting vulnerable young people through bereavement, but it is not consistent in every school. Many young people will need help at times when school is not available, such as in the holidays and in the evenings, and they may just feel embarrassed about asking people at school. New clause 9 would finally put in a simple protocol to ensure that every child who is bereaved knows that support is out there if they would like to access it. This is a relatively low-cost, low-effort task that would help those charities to connect with grieving families and young people and provide that support to children to help them to process those difficult, traumatic experiences and, in turn, try to prevent the long-term negative impacts that can arise from bereavement.
Ellie Chowns
I rise to speak to new clause 52 on bereavement policy in schools, which is closely related to new clause 9.
The hon. Member for St Neots and Mid Cambridgeshire has already alluded to the fact that no official data is collected on the number of children and young people who are bereaved of someone important in their lives. In the absence of annual statistics, the Childhood Bereavement Network has estimated that over 46,000 children and young people are bereaved of a parent each year in the UK. That is a huge number—around 127 each day. Data from representative samples suggest that about one in 29 children and young people in school today—roughly one per classroom—has been bereaved of a parent or sibling at some point in their childhood. Some 70% of primary schools have at least one recently bereaved pupil on roll. That means that all schools are likely to be touched by bereavement, and those ripples of grief can be felt across the whole school community.
When somebody in the family is terminally ill or has died, just getting to school, concentrating, getting on with peers and managing emotions can be hugely challenging, and can have major consequences for attendance and achievement in the long term. Parentally bereaved young people’s GCSE scores are an average of half a grade lower than their non-bereaved peers; in one study, girls bereaved of a sibling scored almost a full grade below their matched controls. Bereavement also has long-term effects further in life. The death of a parent by age 16 is associated with women failing to gain any sort of qualification, and both men and women being unemployed at the age of 30.
Schools clearly have a huge role to play in supporting children facing such tragic circumstances. Two years ago, the independent UK Commission on Bereavement surveyed children, young people and adults about their experiences of bereavement. It found some examples of fantastic practice and support in schools, but it was far from universal. Just under half of the bereaved children, young people and adults who shared their experiences said that they got little or no support from their education setting after their bereavement. That is such a tragic missed opportunity.
Many children and young people shared the loneliness, isolation, and lack of acknowledgment and support that they had faced. For example, a young teenager said:
“I knew my teachers all knew, but no-one spoke to me about the fact they knew, so it felt like an unspoken secret.”
A primary-aged child said:
“I felt like I was the only one whose daddy had died.”
Another teenager said:
“Everyone sees it as me just misbehaving. Maybe if teachers and any other adults involved were trained to see the signs I wouldn’t of been left for the last 18 months with no support.”
These young people are crying out for support from their schools and from us.
To address the challenges, the commission recommended that all education establishments should be required to have a bereavement policy, including staff training and a process for supporting bereaved children and their families. In line with wider evidence from parents, teachers, and children and young people themselves supporting the inclusion of grief education in the curriculum, the commission also recommended that students should have opportunities to learn about coping with grief as a life skill.
New clause 52 would directly address the inconsistencies in support that grieving children and young people face, and it would help schools to get on the front foot. At the moment, they often reach out for support in crisis mode when a pupil is facing bereavement or has been recently bereaved. They make contact with local child bereavement services, scrambling for guidance on how to respond, how to tell the rest of the school community, and how to make a plan to support grieving pupils coming back to school. All too often, they wish they had done that work in advance of the crisis. The new clause would help schools to be wise before the event, to respond calmly and consistently, and to help children and young people stay on course as they navigate this most challenging of events in their life.
I have tabled this as a probing amendment; I am interested to hear the Minister’s response. I hope that the Government will consider taking this opportunity to write into legislation the requirement for schools to provide support, consistently across the country, to the children and young people who desperately need it, to ensure that bereavement is addressed by every school to improve the life chances of children facing these most difficult circumstances.
The Minister for School Standards (Catherine McKinnell)
I thank the hon. Members for St Neots and Mid Cambridgeshire and for North Herefordshire for raising those important issues. Bereavement touches the lives of everyone, and it has a unique impact on each person. It is particularly important that children and young people who lose someone close to them are able to access support when they need it.
New clause 9 seeks to improve access to bereavement support services for children. It seeks to establish a duty to make regulations to establish a protocol to provide information on those services. The Government continue to consider how to improve access to existing support. The cross-Government bereavement group, chaired by the Department of Health and Social Care and attended by representatives from the Department for Education, the Department for Work and Pensions and the Home Office, continues to look at how we can improve access to support and options to improve data collection. There are many fantastic charities and community groups—the Childhood Bereavement Network, Hope Again, the Anna Freud centre and the Ruth Strauss Foundation, to name just four—that provide vital support, and schools and other public bodies perform vital roles in supporting bereaved children and families. A legislative solution would therefore not be the most appropriate way to ensure bereaved children and young people access the support they need.
On new clause 52 and the matter of requiring schools to publish a bereavement policy, including the approach to grief education, we know that teachers and other school staff do an excellent job in understanding the specific needs of their pupils and identifying what support is needed for a range of life experiences, including bereavement. To support them in that, the Department for Education provides a list of resources for schools on supporting pupils’ mental health and wellbeing. That includes resources from charities and organisations, including those I just mentioned, and resources hosted on the Mentally Healthy Schools site for mental health needs, which includes supporting children dealing with loss and bereavement.
On the curriculum, following the consultation that ended in July last year, we are currently reviewing the relationships, sex and health education statutory guidance, which sets out the content of what children and young people are taught about these subjects. It is also clear in the current RSHE statutory guidance that teachers should be aware of common adverse childhood experiences, including bereavement. We want to ensure that children’s wellbeing is at the heart of the guidance, and we are looking carefully at the consultation responses, considering the relevant evidence and talking to stakeholders before setting out next steps to take the RSHE guidance forward. It would not be appropriate to pre-empt our response to the consultation, nor the publication of the RSHE curriculum guidance. I hope the hon. Member for North Herefordshire is reassured that we will consider that as part of our work on RSHE. We will continue to provide support from the Department and right across Government to help schools support children and young people who experience bereavement and other significant adverse experiences in their childhood.
Ian Sollom
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 11
Benefits of outdoor education to children’s wellbeing
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, conduct a review on the benefits of outdoor education to children's wellbeing.
(2) A report on the review must be published within six months of the conclusion of the review.”—(Ian Sollom.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 12—Provision of residential outdoor education for children in kinship care—
“(1) A local authority must take such steps as are reasonably practicable to ensure that children living in kinship care receive at least one residential outdoor education experience.
(2) For the purposes of this section, children living in kinship care has the meaning provided for by section 22I of the Children Act 1989 (as amended by this Act).”
Ian Sollom
I am moving the new clauses on behalf of my hon. Friend the Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale (Tim Farron). Many hon. Members will know that he has long been a champion of the benefits of outdoor education. Academic research has shown that greater exposure to natural environments improves learning behaviour and emotional health. Studies have found measurable academic and wellbeing benefits from nature-specific outdoor learning. Even a single outdoor educational experience reduces anxiety, builds resilience and improves focus in the long term, especially for children with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder or anxiety disorders.
We know that children’s wellbeing is suffering. Children are experiencing rising mental health concerns, reduced physical activity and limited access to nature, so there is a real need to support their wellbeing. Outdoor education is proven to improve physical, emotional and social health.
New clause 11 would require the Government to review the impact of outdoor education on children’s wellbeing, with the aim of providing a foundation to embed outdoor education into the curriculum. New clause 12 considers children in kinship care, or those with kinship care experience, and would give them at least one residential outdoor education opportunity and ensure that they are not left behind in accessing those benefits. We would like to hear from the Government about these new clauses.
Catherine McKinnell
I thank the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale (Tim Farron) for his campaign to promote the positive effects of outdoor learning on young people. He clearly has the advantage of living in and representing one of the most beautiful parts of the world.
We believe that all children and young people should have the opportunity to learn about and connect with nature. Access to green space has been shown to have positive impacts on the physical, mental and emotional wellbeing of young people. The national education nature park provides opportunities for children and young people to benefit from spending time in nature, as well as to take positive climate action and to drive solutions to address the growing concerns about climate change and biodiversity loss. The nature park is a key initiative of the Department for Education’s sustainability and climate change strategy, which was launched in 2022.
In the light of progress in the past three years, we are now beginning a process of refreshing and updating the strategic vision for sustainability in the education sector. We are also working with the University of Oxford on research intended to assess the evidence of the impact of nature-based programmes, delivered through schools, on the mental health and wellbeing of children and young people. Once those results are published, I will be happy to share them with the hon. Member for St Neots and Mid Cambridgeshire.
The Government are committed to improving mental health support for all children and young people, and to giving them access to a variety of enrichment opportunities at school. Those are both important parts of our mission to break down barriers to opportunity, helping pupils to achieve and thrive in education.
There is no statutory requirement to offer extracurricular activities, but the majority of schools do because those activities complement a rich and broad curriculum. Schools include a wide range of activities, such as enabling students to take part in the Duke of Edinburgh’s award scheme, supporting them to access local youth services, and building in trips to outdoor education settings. It is right that schools should be free to decide what activities to offer their pupils so as to best support their development, to help them work with others as part of a team, and to support positive wellbeing.
The Department for Culture, Media and Sport’s adventures away from home fund provides bursaries for disadvantaged or vulnerable young people to participate in day trips and residentials to outdoor spaces. There are bursaries available for young people aged 11 to 18—or up to 25 for those with special educational needs and disabilities—who face significant barriers to participation and are under-represented in the sector. We are also extending local authority statutory duties to include promoting the educational achievement of all children living in kinship care, within the meaning of the proposed new section 22I(1) of the Children Act 1989, which will be inserted by the Bill. We will also extend virtual school heads’ duty to provide information and advice to include all children living with a special guardian or a child arrangement order, where the child is living with a kinship carer, within the meaning of proposed new section 22I(6).
On that basis, I ask the hon. Member for St Neots and Mid Cambridgeshire to withdraw new clause 11 and not to press new clause 12 to a vote.
Ian Sollom
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 13
Foster carers’ delegated authority for children in their care
“(1) Where a child (‘C’) who is looked after by the local authority is placed with a foster parent (‘F’) by a local authority, F may make decisions on C’s behalf in relation to the matters set out in subsection (2) where C’s placement plan does not specify an alternative decision maker.
(2) The matters referred to in subsection (1) are—
(a) medical and dental treatment,
(b) education,
(c) leisure and home life,
(d) faith and religious observance,
(e) use of social media,
(f) personal care, and
(g) any other matters which F considers appropriate.” —(Ellie Chowns.)
This new clause would enable foster carers to make day-to-day decisions on behalf of the children and young people they foster.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Ellie Chowns
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I am pleased to speak to new clause 13, which proposes that the Bill should provide a default delegated authority for foster carers to make day-to-day decisions for the children and young people in their care, which I think is quite straightforward.
Foster carers should have delegated authority to make these everyday decisions for children in their care—for example, about day-to-day activities such as school trips, holidays and sleepovers; about important appointments for their health and wellbeing or medical appointments; or indeed about haircuts, which is an issue that has been raised regularly by young people in care and their foster carers.
The guidance around delegated authority has not been strengthened since 2013. As a result, practice varies across fostering services, and foster carers are often unclear about which decisions they can take and which decisions they have to get permission for from elsewhere. Many foster carers report experiencing a lack of communication, clarity and information from social workers, with unnecessary paperwork and box ticking, and complicated processes.
In the Fostering Network’s 2024 state of the nations survey, less than a third of foster carers said children’s social workers are always clear about which decisions they have the authority to make in relation to the children they foster. That lack of clarity is clearly a huge issue for a large majority of foster carers. Only half of foster carers said that social workers are able to respond to requests for decisions in a timely manner; we all know social workers are under huge pressure. Foster carers reported that the most difficult decisions to make were around social opportunities, followed by healthcare, relationships and childhood experiences.
This new clause would set out in legislation that foster carers have default delegated authority on key everyday decisions where the child’s placement plan does not specify an alternative decision maker—and the placement plan can always specify that alternative. That default delegated authority would include decisions in day-to-day parenting, such as healthcare and leisure activities, and it would exclude routine but longer-term decisions such as school choice and significant events, such as surgery. It would provide more clarity, speed up decision making within foster families and for social workers, and provide foster carers with the confidence and autonomy that they need to make day-to-day decisions for the children who are in their care.
I urge the Government to take on board these points, and the content of this new clause, to make it easier for foster carers to make those decisions for children who, after all, they know best as they are caring for them. The new clause would ensure that children and young people do not miss out on the opportunities that they need to live a happy and healthy childhood.
Catherine McKinnell
I appreciate the hon. Member’s concern for foster carers having delegated authority on day-to-day decisions for the children in their care. Foster carers offer crucial support to some of the most vulnerable children in our society. They provide love, stability and compassion to children and young people when they need it most.
All foster carers should have delegated authority in relation to day-to-day parenting of the child in their care, such as routine decisions about health, hygiene, education and leisure activities, and where that is not appropriate, the child’s placement plan should set out reasons for that. That is so that the foster carers can support the child in having a normal upbringing, full of the experiences and opportunities that any other child would have. For all decisions relating to the foster child, the foster carer has delegated authority only if it is recorded in the child’s placement plan. That means that if something is not listed on the placement plan, the foster carer does not have that delegated authority and they have to check with their social worker before any decision can be made.
Foster carers can take decisions in relation to the child in their care only in line with the child’s agreed placement plan and the law governing parental responsibility. New clause 13 would mean that foster carers would, by default, have delegated authority on day-to-day issues, except where an alternative decision maker is listed on the child’s placement plan.
The change outlined in the new clause does not require a change to primary legislation. Delegated authority is outlined in secondary legislation in the Care Planning, Placement and Case Review (England) Regulations 2010. We have begun conversations with foster carers and foster care providers about a proposed change, ensuring that all foster carers have delegated authority by default in relation to day-to-day parenting of the child in their care. We believe that reform to this policy area would benefit from a period of consultation with stakeholders to ensure that any change to delegated authority best reflects the interests of all parties.
Following consultation, we are committed to implementing the necessary amendments to secondary legislation. I hope that in the light of that, the hon. Member will feel able to withdraw the clause.
Ellie Chowns
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 15
National statutory inquiry into grooming gangs
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 3 months of the passing of this Act, set up a statutory inquiry into grooming gangs.
(2) An inquiry established under subsection (1) must seek to—
(a) identify common patterns of behaviour and offending between grooming gangs;
(b) identify the type, extent and volume of crimes committed by grooming gangs;
(c) identify the number of victims of crimes committed by grooming gangs;
(d) identify the ethnicity of members of grooming gangs;
(e) identify any failings, by action, omission or deliberate suppression, by—
(i) police,
(ii) local authorities,
(iii) prosecutors,
(iv) charities,
(v) political parties,
(vi) local and national government,
(vii) healthcare providers and health services, or
(viii) other agencies or bodies, in the committal of crimes by grooming gangs, including by considering whether the ethnicity of the perpetrators of such crimes affected the response by such agencies or bodies;
(f) identify such national safeguarding actions as may be required to minimise the risk of further such offending occurring in future;
(g) identify good practice in protecting children.
(3) The inquiry may do anything it considers is calculated to facilitate, or is incidental or conducive to, the carrying out of its functions and the achievement of the requirements of subsection (2).
(4) An inquiry established under this section must publish a report within two years of the launch of the inquiry.
(5) For the purposes of this section—
‘gang’ means a group of at least three adult males whose purpose or intention is to commit a sexual offence against the same victim or group of victims;
‘grooming’ means—
(a) activity carried out with the primary intention of committing sexual offences against the victim;
(b) activity that is carried out, or predominantly carried out, in person;
(c) activity that includes the provision of illicit substances and/or alcohol either as part of the grooming or concurrent with the commission of the sexual offence.”—(Neil O'Brien.)
This new clause would set up a national statutory inquiry into grooming gangs.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Neil O’Brien (Harborough, Oadby and Wigston) (Con)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The arguments around this issue are reasonably well known, so I will be brief. This discussion started when Oldham asked for a national inquiry into what happened there, which it did because a local inquiry would not have the powers that are needed. For example, a local inquiry cannot summon witnesses, take evidence under oath, or requisition evidence. We have already seen the two men leading the local investigation in Greater Manchester resign because they felt they were being blocked, yet the Government say no to a national inquiry, and that there should be local inquiries instead.
However, there have been years during which those places could have held their own local inquiries, but they have not. In many cases, as is well known, local officials at different levels were part of the problem, and even part of the deflection, so they cannot be the people to fix it. In Keighley, for example, my hon. Friend the Member for Keighley and Ilkley (Robbie Moore) has been calling for an inquiry for years, but even as Ministers argued in the House that there should be local inquiries, local politicians decided again not to hold one.
In these debates the Government often refer to the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse, which was an important first step, but it was not—indeed, it was never intended to be—a report on the grooming gangs. It barely touches on them. IICSA looked at about half a dozen places where grooming gangs have operated, but there were between 40 to 50 places where those gangs operated, and the inquiry touches on them very lightly and does not look at the places where there were the most severe problems. It means that victims in those places have never had a chance to be heard.
Tom Hayes (Bournemouth East) (Lab)
I welcome what the hon. Member says about the importance of victims, as they must be at the centre of all we do in this area. Will he outline whether he has met any victims of child sexual abuse in the past 12 months, and if he has, what they have said about the new clause? Is the new clause based on conversations with victims?
Neil O’Brien
The new clause is based on calls by victims for a national inquiry; I was about to come to that point. Having a proper national inquiry does not stop us from getting on and implementing any of the recommendations in the previous report. Indeed, awareness raising was one of the recommendations that was made. Without a national inquiry, we will clearly not get to the bottom of this issue, and people who looked the other way, or who covered up or deflected, will not be held to account for doing that. So far, nobody in authority has been held to account.
The Labour Mayor of Greater Manchester and the hon. Members for Liverpool Walton (Dan Carden), for Rotherham (Sarah Champion) and for Rochdale (Paul Waugh) have backed some form of national inquiry, and the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the hon. Member for Birmingham Yardley (Jess Phillips), said that there should be a national inquiry if victims wanted one. Numerous victims are calling for an inquiry, so the real question is what we are waiting for.
Neil O’Brien
As a constituency MP I have met victims of sexual abuse, yes, and it is clear, if people have been following the debate, that victims are calling for an inquiry. Indeed, numerous people in the Labour party agree that we should have a proper inquiry, for all the reasons that Oldham originally asked for one, namely that it does not have the powers locally to get to the truth and to get justice for the victims. The new clause would create a national inquiry and we hope that at some point the Government will support it so that justice can be done and those who have let victims down can finally be held to account.
Tom Hayes
I want to press the point about whether any victims of child sexual abuse have been directly consulted about the proposed new clause. Before I became an MP I ran a service to support victims of child sexual abuse. I have sat with survivors and listened to some of the stories they have shared about the worst things that could happen to a human being, in order to understand the difficulties and trauma that they are experiencing. I know that rebuilding their life will involve many long years of painstaking support alongside many types of services, and I know that what they need most is the implementation of the national inquiry that has already concluded, which heard from many victims of child sexual abuse.
Having sat with and listened to victims of abuse, my big concern is that not implementing those recommendations will be a signal to them that all they have shared and said—after significant difficulty—will have been discarded. That will make people who have gone through awful experiences that have made them feel as though they lack dignity, once again feel as though the system that was there to support and listen to them has let them down, and that as a consequence they are not worthy of the dignity that, as human beings, they really ought to be entitled to.
Neil O’Brien
It is wrong to pretend that IICSA was a report into the grooming gangs. It was not; it was never intended to be. It looked a tiny handful of places, so many of the people who were affected by that scandal have never had the chance to have their story told. It has never been clear why having a new national inquiry would prevent us from implementing any of those previous things—it obviously would not. The argument that the Government cannot do two things at the same time is clearly wrong, so it cannot be used as an excuse not to listen to all those who have never had the chance to tell their story.
Tom Hayes
I appreciate that. I will return to the important topic at hand.
The Minister will comment explicitly on what the hon. Member said but I will say that, although I agree that the Government can do more than one thing, a significant amount of time and money would be invested on a second inquiry. I would want that money to be funnelled directly into the support of survivors and victims, who for so many years under a Conservative Government were denied the funding that they require to receive the support that they need in response to some of the worst experiences that a human being can go through.
Neil O’Brien
The hon. Member is in danger of literally saying it is too expensive to get to the truth. He just said that the cost of a national inquiry was the obstacle to having one. I really hope that he will rethink that point.
Tom Hayes
I disagree strongly with the hon. Member. He knows exactly what I said, and he is choosing to put words into my mouth, as he has chosen to put words into the mouths of many other Committee members. If he wants to play that game, let us talk about whether he has focused properly on child sexual abuse in his time as an MP, quite apart from whether he spoke with any victims or survivors before tabling the amendment.
The hon. Member has been in this House since 8 June 2017, a total of 2,849 days. It took him 2,801 days before he spoke in Parliament for the first time about child sexual abuse. He may say, “Of course, I was a Minister for some of that time,” so I calculated the amount of time that you were a Minister. It is approximately 25% of your total time as an MP. I think it is important, obviously—
The Chair
Order. [Interruption.] Sit down, please. The hon. Gentleman is now quite an experienced Member at speaking, but why does he keep using “you” and “your”? Just avoid those expressions, because I am not involved in this debate. I am trying to be neutral. Mr O’Brien may wish to respond to your points, but please try to control yourself in that respect.
Tom Hayes
Thank you, Sir Christopher.
I have made my point about whether the hon. Member for Harborough, Oadby and Wigston has used his time here to press the case on behalf of survivors and victims. I have made the point about whether he has chosen to sit with survivors and victims and listen to their stories before calling for another national inquiry that discards the views that have been given by survivors.
I have talked about the importance of the money that could be spent on a second inquiry being better spent on the support that victims and survivors so desperately need. I really wish that the Conservative party, which did so little in government to implement the recommendations that were called for by survivors, would put down the politics of this issue and stop focusing on a desperate pursuit of Reform voters, rather than the other voters they lost to the Liberal Democrats and Greens.
Lizzi Collinge (Morecambe and Lunesdale) (Lab)
Does my hon. Friend share my puzzlement that, given that the independent national inquiry covered so many types of child sexual exploitation—so many horrors that have been visited upon our young people—only one aspect of it has become the focus of political debate? We should focus on all the children and young people who have been violated, abused and hurt, mostly by men, but they seem to be forgotten even though the national inquiry covered a whole range of child sexual exploitation.
Tom Hayes
I could not agree more, and my hon. Friend helps me make a point that I had forgotten. You urged me to exercise control, Sir Christopher, but as you and other Members can see, I feel deeply about this topic. I feel very strongly about the importance of standing alongside survivors, and I am prepared to work with anybody in this House, of any party or none, to enhance the support that survivors receive. But having sat with survivors, I am not prepared to allow people to play politics with their experience, and for those individuals then to feign disappointment, hurt and abuse. This is not about how Members of this House feel about the honesty and truth of the words I am speaking; it is about the importance of survivors out in our communities, who have been let down for 14 years, who have suffered exploitative, abusive practices, and who will be looking to this House today to do the right thing by them. I call on the Conservatives in this Committee and across the House to do the right thing, stop playing politics, actually read the report if they have not done so already, and as a consequence show some dignity.
Ellie Chowns
Shortly after Christmas, a person came to see me who had given evidence to the IICSA inquiry and who was deeply upset by their perception that their experience, and the experience of others like them, was being used as a political football. They were outraged to find that the conclusions and recommendations of the inquiry had not yet been implemented. In this room, my role is to represent them. Their call is not for another public inquiry but for the implementation of the recommendations of the inquiry that has already been done.
I find it really disappointing that such serious matters are being used as a political football. The hon. Member for Bournemouth East made a valid point about the degree to which these issues were not addressed until very recently. I ask rhetorically: would this new clause even have been tabled were it not for pot-stirring tweets by Elon Musk? I very much doubt it. I therefore think this Committee should do the job we are here to do. We should scrutinise this Bill and not use it as an opportunity to play games with the lives of victims and survivors.
Catherine Atkinson (Derby North) (Lab)
I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East for his incredible experience and work in this area. I rise to speak about new clause 15, and I hope I can be of service to the Committee, having spent the past seven years of my work as a barrister serving on a public inquiry. I went straight from that to representing a constituency in Derby, the city that was the subject of the first local inquiry into grooming gangs in 2010. Those crimes are despicable and must be rooted out in Derby and elsewhere. Without the bravery of the girls in Derby, those crimes would not have been punished.
I am committed to supporting the considerable action that the Government are taking to ensure that others are punished, and victims and survivors protected and supported. I am really proud to sit on this Bill Committee, which will give the next generation of children and young people in Derby better protection and life chances. The Education Secretary rightly described this as the “single biggest piece” of children’s safeguarding legislation in a generation. I will seek to set out why new clause 15 does nothing to contribute to that aim.
Neil O’Brien
Could the hon. Lady say how many different places it looked at?
Catherine Atkinson
I will come to that. First, I make the point that I have the report in my hands; it is an inch thick, printed double-sided and it is nearly 200 pages. That is the specific inquiry into organised networks. Its contents are horrific, and I hope that by the end of my contribution, we will cease to hear the shadow Minister referring to the fact that it “barely touches” on grooming gangs.
For clarity, organised networks that conduct child sexual exploitation, as anyone who has carried out work in child protection will know, are grooming gangs. Organised networks are defined in this report as
“two or more individuals…who are known to (or associated with) one another”.
Section C.3 of the report sets out carefully why that definition was used. In comparison, new clause 15 seeks to define grooming gangs as a group of at least three adult males. As we saw in the convictions of women involved in grooming gangs in Rotherham, Newcastle and elsewhere, involvement in grooming gangs is not limited to men. Sadly, several of the cases mentioned in the investigation into grooming gangs make it clear that they are not always adults, as older children and teenagers can also be involved in grooming.
A further justification for another inquiry, as we heard from the shadow Minister, was that the previous inquiry covered just half a dozen places where grooming gangs have operated—namely, the areas covered by Durham county council, the City and County of Swansea council, Warwickshire county council, St Helens council in Merseyside, the London borough of Tower Hamlets and Bristol city council. The shadow Minister knows, I assume, that that was a deliberate sampling of local authorities from across England and Wales, and they were selected not because grooming gangs operated there—I do not think that was necessarily even known at the time of selection—but to consider a range of features including size, demography, geography and social characteristics. It was to illustrate different policies, practices and performance. It was a deliberate choice not to look again at areas like Rotherham, Rochdale and Oxford, which had already been the subject of independent investigation. Sampling, and looking at particular case studies like this, is very common and good practice in public inquiries. The fact that there were cases of child sexual exploitation by gangs in all six of the case study areas clearly indicated how common and pervasive this disgusting crime is.
On Second Reading, the shadow Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), implied that there was new information that child sexual exploitation takes place in many areas. He said:
“We now believe that as many as 50 towns could have been affected”.—[Official Report, 16 January 2025; Vol. 760, c. 564.]
But as the previous specific inquiry made clear three years ago, on page 4, when it comes to grooming gangs:
“Any denial of the scale of child sexual exploitation—either at national level or locally in England and Wales—must be challenged.”
In looking at whether new clause 15 is a rerun of questions IICSA already considered in the previous specific inquiry into grooming gangs, it is helpful to cross-refer the contents of new clause 15 with the scope of the previous investigations into grooming gangs, which is set out on page 148 of this report. New clause 15(2)(a) seeks an inquiry into grooming gangs to
“identify common patterns of behaviour and offending”.
But the scope of the previous grooming gangs inquiry states that it will investigate “the nature” of sexual exploitation by grooming gangs.
New clause 15(2)(b) and (c) seek another inquiry to look at the
“type, extent and volume of crimes”
and “the number of victims”. The specific inquiry looked at the “extent” of sexual exploitation.
New clause 15(2)(e) seeks a new inquiry to identify failings by
“(i) police,
(ii) local authorities,
(iii) prosecutors,
(iv) charities,
(v) political parties,
(vi) local…government,
(vii) healthcare providers…or
(viii) other agencies or bodies”.
But the grooming gangs inquiry investigated and considered the institutional responses to the sexual exploitation of children, and that specific inquiry also examined the extent to which
“children who were subjected to child sexual exploitation were known to local authorities and other public authorities such as law enforcement agencies, schools and/or the NHS”.
It also examined the extent to which
“relevant public authorities…effectively identified the risk of child sexual exploitation in communities and took action to prevent it”.
It examined the extent to which
“the response of the constituent parts of the criminal justice system was appropriate in cases of child sexual exploitation”.
The inquiry into grooming gangs heard from complainants, academics, local authorities, police officers, voluntary sector representatives, Government officials and representatives from victim support and campaign groups—a list that looks very similar to that set out at new clause 15(2)(e).
New clause 15(2)(g) seeks to “identify good practice” in protecting children. Was that left out of the previous inquiry? No, because paragraph 2.5 of the scope of the investigation makes it clear that the inquiry would also examine
“effective strategies…implemented to prevent child sexual exploitation in the future, and to monitor the safety of vulnerable children including missing children”.
On Second Reading, the hon. Member for Harborough, Oadby and Wigston accused the Government of not wanting to
“hear the voices of the victims.”—[Official Report, 8 January 2025; Vol. 759, c. 951.].
The new clause compounds the last Government’s crime of not listening to the victims when they had the chance to implement the recommendations of the specific national grooming gangs inquiry and the wider IICSA recommendations.
What new clause 15—the hon. Gentleman’s blueprint for a new inquiry—does not include is any requirement to look at the extent to which recommendations in previous reports and reviews were implemented by relevant public authorities at national and local levels. That requirement was in the previous grooming gangs inquiry, which was an attempt to build on learning rather than to be a rerun of previous inquiries. The previous grooming gangs inquiry notes that more than 400 previous recommendations were considered in this, as well as those arising from other recent reports and inquiries. This would be an obvious inclusion in any future inquiry, unless we did not want to draw attention to the previous Government’s failure to carry out a single one of the recommendations of the specific investigation into grooming gangs, or in the wider independent inquiry into child sexual abuse more broadly.
The three main functions of public inquiries are to investigate what happened, why it happened, and what can be done to prevent it happening again. Inquiries can make recommendations. What they cannot do is implement those recommendations; that is our job. Professor Alexis Jay, who knows more about this than anyone on this Committee, does not call for another national inquiry. She says that a new inquiry would cause further delay.
Having spent seven of my 17 years as a barrister on a public inquiry—although not into grooming gangs or the broader IICA—I can say quite forcefully that there is a universal principle here. Public inquiries cost time and enormous amounts of public money, but the biggest tab that they run up is in the hope that they give to victims—the hope that what they suffered will not be suffered in future by others. We must pay our debt to the victims by fully responding to the recommendations and implementing them where we can. If we call for inquiry after inquiry along the same lines, we are undermining the whole system of public inquiries, including public trust in them and public tolerance for the resources of the state that they demand. Therefore, rather than the gesture politics of rerunning an inquiry without the evidence and data that we need, it is the Government’s approach that makes sense, with Baroness Louise Casey’s audit to fill in the gaps that have already been identified by the previous inquiry.
This Government are setting up a new victims and survivors panel not just to guide Ministers on the design, delivery and implementation of plans on IICSA, but to produce wider work around child sexual exploitation and abuse. In the policing and crime Bill, they are making it mandatory to report abuse and will make it an offence to fail to report, or to cover up, child sexual abuse, as well as introducing further measures to tackle those organising online child sex abuse. They are legislating to make grooming an aggravating factor in sentencing for child sexual offences. They are already drawing up a duty of candour as part of the long-awaited Hillsborough law. And they are overhauling the information and evidence that is gathered on child sexual abuse and exploitation to implement the first recommendation of IICSA on a single core dataset on child abuse and protection.
New clause 15(2)(d) seeks to identify the ethnicity of members of grooming gangs. Sections B.5 and H.5 of the 2022 inquiry into grooming gangs identified the widespread failure to record the ethnicity of perpetrators and victims and the inconsistency of definitions in the data, which meant that the limited research available relied on poor-quality data.
Recommendation 5 from the report in February 2022 relates to child sexual exploitation data and states that the data must include
“the sex, ethnicity and disability of both the victim and perpetrator”.
In the final list of IICSA recommendations from October 2022, it was the first recommendation—a single core set of data. We do not have a core dataset, and the ethnicity data that was published in November from police forces has been found to be haphazard, because there is not a proper system for collecting data. It is this Government who have committed to gathering and publishing new ethnicity data, and it is this Government who are providing backing for local inquiries that can delve into local detail and deliver more locally relevant answers and change than a lengthy national inquiry of the type that I was involved in.
Damian Hinds
The hon. Lady makes an important point. This is an incredibly serious issue, and we should not be introducing anything that might inadvertently mislead. The Government control the time of the House of Commons. This Bill should probably have been two Bills to begin with; there are two distinct subjects in part 1 and part 2, but, for some reason, they were put together. There was nothing to stop the Government, at any point, from separating out parts of the Bill and reintroducing them immediately into the House of Commons—they literally control the timetable. On the Order Paper today, there was a statement on the business of the House. The Government can change the time and change what is considered in the House of Commons as they choose.
Catherine Atkinson
Can the right hon. Gentleman imagine if the wrecking amendment—
Catherine Atkinson
I will not, because I am nearly finished—the right hon. Gentleman will then be able to speak about whatever he wants. Grabbing at headlines to call for an inquiry to address the same questions already asked in a national inquiry at the expense of a Bill that will protect children—
Catherine Atkinson
I will not. The hon. Gentleman will have every opportunity to speak. I am nearly finished.
It is important to imagine the case had Conservative colleagues been successful—new clause 15 is a weak echo of that reckless shout for attention on Second Reading, and a shameful reminder. Alongside all the provisions in the Bill, which they agree will keep children safer, they should get behind the actions that the Home Secretary and the Minister for Safeguarding are driving on the issue of grooming gangs—real action, which means a great deal to me and many others in the Committee. Knowing the horrific abuse that girls from my city have gone through, I am hugely thankful for those actions. Opposition Members in Committee should not just withdraw the new clause, but apologise for risking protections for children by recklessly chasing headlines in this way.
Darren Paffey (Southampton Itchen) (Lab)
I pay huge tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Derby North for her frankly masterful navigation through the facts. This moment demands the facts—not misrepresentation and the dismissal of previous inquiries, but the gravitas and experience that she has brought to the debate. I believe that has kept the Committee on the track that it is meant to be on.
I simply make the observation against the new clause that this Bill and this moment require leadership. Leadership looks like getting on with making the changes that we have heard about in great detail. The subject has already been thoroughly and fully investigated, with recommendations made by a leading expert. It is time to make those changes to our country, to our law and to our services, first, to allow us to reflect on the past, and the report does that, and, secondly, so that we can get on with catching those who continue to do such things—and that is the horror of it. We are not just talking about something historical. Without doubt, such things are going on as we speak.
It is time to ensure that the whole of Government work together so that our law enforcement agencies are resourced to catch those who perpetrate such disgusting crimes. Crucially, this is the moment to ensure that we prevent them happening in the future. Several of the report’s 20 recommendations are already in train and implementation should be the absolute priority.
That is what leading looks like at this moment, but when it comes to following I am afraid that I agree with the observation made by the hon. Member for North Herefordshire. Some people have become a little bedazzled by social media suggestion and innuendo from certain individuals, wherever they are in the world. Opposition Members should be honest about it: such individuals have absolutely no genuine interest in the victims whose sufferings are known, but have their own political agenda to follow. They use their social media platform to do that, and none of it moves us any closer to doing what we need to do, which is to reflect, to catch the criminals and to prevent such crimes in future.
Those who are able to separate fact from trend will know that the urgent priority at this moment, as my hon. Friend the Member for Derby North so thoughtfully set out, is to act. Anything that becomes a distraction from that should not be supported.
Amanda Martin (Portsmouth North) (Lab)
I want to start by agreeing with my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton Itchen that leadership and action are needed. Indeed, leadership and action were needed three years ago in February 2022 when the IICSA report came out. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Derby North for her knowledgeable insights and her forensic examination of the Bill, the recommendations and the report. I will spend a moment establishing for the record what exactly those 20 recommendations are asking for, which we as a Government have committed to implementing in full—albeit three years too late for some victims.
Let me list the headings of the report. The first is on a mandatory aggravating factor for CSE offences. The second is on statutory guidance on preventing CSE. The third is on data collection and analysis, and establishing a national database. The fourth is about strengthening the criminal justice response. The fifth is about training for professionals and requiring mandatory training for all professionals working with children, including social workers, police and healthcare staff, to help them recognise the signs of exploitation and act accordingly. The sixth is about a national framework for support, and developing a national framework for services to ensure that appropriate support is available for victims. The seventh is about supporting victims and improving the availability and accessibility of specialised support services for victims. The eighth concerns tailored responses to CSE victims, ensuring authorities provide a tailored response to the specific needs of children who are victims. The ninth is about launching a national public awareness campaign to raise awareness of CSE, educating the public and reducing the stigma that surrounds the victims. The 10th is to strengthen safeguarding in schools and introduce better protocols. The 11th is about tackling perpetrators of CSE, strengthening law enforcement’s abilities to target them. The 12th is for a Government review of safeguarding systems, conducting a review of the national safeguarding system to ensure current measures are sufficiently robust to address child sexual exploitation and victims. The 13th is to ensure adequate local authority resources. The 14th concerns independence for local safeguarding boards. The 15th recommends a review of the placement of settings for vulnerable children. The 16th calls for a stronger legal framework for CSE. The 17th is about increasing the use of risk assessment tools. The 18th is about rehabilitation and reintegration services. The 19th is on specialised support for parents and families and the 20th on a regular review of local authority practices. Each one of those 20 recommendations has the victims at its heart.
Catherine McKinnell
I am grateful to my hon. Friends the Members for Bournemouth East, for Derby North, for Southampton Itchen and for Portsmouth North, and to the hon. Member for North Herefordshire, for their thoughtful and measured contributions on this incredibly challenging issue. The Prime Minister has made clear that as a Government we are focused on delivering the change and justice that victims deserve.
On 7 January, the Home Secretary outlined in Parliament commitments to introduce a mandatory duty for those engaging with children to report sexual abuse and exploitation, making grooming an aggravating factor to toughen up sentencing and introduce a new performance framework for policing.
On 16 January, the Home Secretary made a further statement to the House that before Easter the Government will lay out a clear timetable for taking forward the 20 recommendations in the final IICSA report, which my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth North powerfully set out. All of those recommendations were for the Home Office, including on disclosing and barring, and work on them is already under way.
The Government will implement all the remaining recommendations in IICSA’s separate stand-alone report on grooming gangs from February 2022, and as part of that we will update key Department for Education guidance. As the Home Secretary states, a cross-Government ministerial group is considering and working through the remaining recommendations, and that group will be supported by a new victims and survivors panel.
Other measures that the Government are taking forward include the appointment of Baroness Casey to lead a rapid audit of existing evidence on grooming gangs, to support a better understanding of the current scale and nature of gang-based exploitation across the country and to make recommendations on the further work needed; extending the remit of the independent Child Sexual Abuse Review Panel so that it covers not just historical cases, from before 2013, but all cases since, so that any victim of abuse will have a right to seek an independent review without having to go back to local institutions that decided not to proceed with their case; and providing stronger national backing for local inquiries by providing £5 million of funding to help local councils to set up their own reviews. Working in partnership with Tom Crowther KC, the Home Office will develop a new effective framework for victim-centred, locally led inquiries.
Neil O’Brien
I want to point out a tension between the arguments that we have heard. One type of argument says that the job is done; there is nothing more to find out. It dismisses calls for further work as “gesture politics”—that is one phrase that we heard this morning. The hon. Member for Southampton Itchen said that the grooming gangs had been “fully investigated”. I do not believe that, nor do the victims—in fact, not a single official has been held to account. More importantly perhaps, the Government do not believe it either. They argue that more work is needed—the disagreement is simply whether there should be local inquiries rather than a national inquiry. Members continue to make arguments that the Government were perhaps making at the start of the year, but that is not where the Government are now.
Tom Hayes
On the hon. Gentleman’s point that members of this Committee have said, in so many words, that the job is done and we do not have anything more to learn, I want to be categorical in saying that those are not the words that I use and I did not imply that in anything that I said. I look to Committee colleagues to nod if they agree. All people who spoke today have nodded to affirm that what the hon. Gentleman has just said is not a true representation of what in fact they were saying or even implying, so may I please ask him to withdraw that statement?
Neil O’Brien
The people who read the transcript of this debate or perhaps have been listening to it at home can judge for themselves whether what I said was a fair summary of the arguments put forward by Government Members.
Catherine McKinnell
On the point about putting words in people’s mouths, nobody has said this is job done—quite the contrary. What we have consistently said is that we do not believe another national inquiry is needed. The Alexis Jay report took seven years, engaged 7,000 victims and had 15 separate strands. In the last 12 years, we have had hundreds of inquiries, serious case reviews and 600 recommendations. It is time for action. It is time to put this into practice and provide the justice that these victims deserve. That is what this Government are focused on doing.
Neil O’Brien
I wonder whether the Minister agreed with the hon. Member for Southampton Itchen, who said that the grooming gangs had been “fully investigated”. Does she agree with that? I am happy to take another intervention if she does. She does not want to stand up and say that she agrees with her hon. Friend, so the tension I pointed out is real. On one hand there is an argument that there is nothing more to be found out; everyone who should be held to account has been held to account; and we must not go back into it—there is no need to go back into it. On the other hand there is the Government’s admission that we need more local inquiries.
This whole discussion did not start with some person on social media. This whole conversation started because Oldham council formally asked for a national inquiry into what happened there, and it did so because it did not have, at local level, the powers needed: it cannot summon witnesses, take evidence under oath or requisition evidence. It was that request from a council—a good and sensible request—that started this discussion. I have already listed some of the Labour people who have argued for a national inquiry. I hope that in the end they will win the argument in the Labour party, but until then, I want to put the new clause to the vote.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Neil O’Brien (Harborough, Oadby and Wigston) (Con)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 19—Trust Capacity Fund—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within three months of the passing of this Act, establish a Trust Capacity Fund.
(2) The purpose of the Trust Capacity Fund will be to support the growth of multi-academy trusts.
(3) The Trust Capacity Fund may provide funding to maintained schools and academy trusts which—
(a) are considered by the Education and Skills Funding Agency to be of sound financial health; and
(b) have an eligible growth project that has been approved by the Secretary of State.
(4) The Secretary of State may, by regulations, specify applications for funding to which the Trust Capacity Fund will give particular regard, which may include applications from trusts—
(a) taking on or formed from schools which have received specified judgements in their most recent inspections; or
(b) taking on or comprising schools in Education Investment Areas.
(5) The Secretary of State must provide the Trust Capacity Fund with such funding and resources as are required for the carrying out of its duties.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to establish a Trust Capacity Fund to support the growth of multi-academy trusts.
Neil O’Brien
The proposed new clauses press the Government to restore some schemes they have cut, namely the academy conversion support grant and the trust capacity fund. The latter spent about £126 million over the last Parliament, helping to grow and deepen strong trusts, helping them to do more to help their schools, and helping to create a self-improving system. Unfortunately, the fund was ended on 1 January this year. Its closure is a real loss and there is uncertainty now about who is responsible for school improvement in the Government’s vision. Is that still to be trust-led, or will it be led by RISE from the centre? What happens if ideas from RISE conflict with those of a trust?
The removal of that funding sharpens the sense of a shift away from trusts as the engine for school improvement. The Confederation of School Trusts has said that this funding
“has been very successful in enabling trusts to support maintained schools that need help, especially in areas with a history of poor education outcomes…That will become more difficult to do now. Trust leaders will be especially angry that Ministers have scrapped this summer’s funding round: trusts spent considerable time and effort creating bids and have been waiting for a decision for four months…School trusts have a wealth of experience in school improvement but sharing that effectively takes time and money, and we need to make sure that the wider school sector doesn’t suffer from this decision.”
The confederation also says that it is “incredibly disappointed” at the decision to withdraw the academy conversion grant. It says:
“Ending this grant will leave, in particular, smaller primary schools very vulnerable and without the financial and educational sustainability that comes from being part of a trust. It is a short-sighted decision that will weaken the school system.”
It adds that that will have
“clear consequences for the strength and sustainability of our school system…This is not a neutral decision and will impact the capacity of the system to keep improving.”
Forum Strategy, another membership organisation for school trust leaders, has said of the decision to cut this funding:
“It is difficult to see the vision or strategy that leads to these decisions, or what it means for making the most of the capacity and expertise of the school-led improvement system.”
I hope that Ministers will listen to school leaders and reverse the decisions, as the proposed new clauses suggest.
Catherine McKinnell
We have made it clear that the Government’s mission is to break down barriers to opportunity, by driving high and rising standards, so that all children are supported to achieve and thrive. The Government are focused on improving outcomes for all children, regardless of the type of school they attend. Our energies and funding are tilted towards that, including through the new regional improvement for standards and excellence teams.
Nevertheless, we want high-quality trusts to continue to grow where schools wish to join them and there is a strong case for them to do so. We know that where schools have worked together, sharing their knowledge and expertise, as happens in our best multi-academy trusts and best local authorities, we can secure the highest standards and best outcomes for our children.
We will continue to consider applications from trusts that want to transfer their schools to a high-quality academy trust, or where there is a need locally to form new trusts through consolidation or merger. In September, the Government were supporting a higher number of schools through the process of converting to academy status than at any point under the previous Government, since at least 2018. Voluntary conversion remains a choice for schools. The Government believe that the benefits, including the financial benefits, of joining a strong structure are well understood, and for most schools and trusts that will mean that the case for converting will still outweigh the costs.
It was the previous Government who decided to significantly curtail the availability of the conversion grant—a decision that did not have any negative impact on the rate of voluntary academisation. While I recognise that the sector welcomed the trust capacity fund, the truth is that most multi-academy trusts that expanded in recent years did so without accessing the limited fund, including those that applied to the fund but were unsuccessful.
The current financial health of schools and academies suggests that the cost of conversion, where there is a strong case to do so, is likely to be affordable for them. The latest published figures show that the vast majority of academy trusts and local authority maintained schools are in cumulative surplus or breaking even. We do, however, keep this under review.
Let me also make it clear that, where necessary, and in cases of the most serious concern, the Government will continue to intervene and transfer schools to new management, and we will continue to provide support and funding for trusts that take on those schools eligible for intervention.
For the reasons I have outlined, I kindly ask the shadow Minister to withdraw his new clause.
Neil O’Brien
It is nice to hear from the Minister that, following our decision to increase funding per pupil by 11% in real terms over the last Parliament, most trusts are in surplus or breaking even. None the less, I hope that Ministers will reconsider this matter. There has been something of a change in tone in recent weeks from the Government, particularly regarding academisation, which they say is now going to happen normally in certain cases, so I hope that Ministers will rethink some of their decisions about funding to enable that to happen, and to enable the best trusts to grow, to become stronger and to do even more to turn around our struggling schools. However, on this occasion, we will withdraw the new clause. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 18
School Trust CEO Programme
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within three months of the passing of this Act, make provision for the delivery of a programme of development for Chief Executive Officers of large multi-academy trusts (‘the School Trust CEO Programme’).
(2) The School Trust CEO Programme shall be provided by—
(a) the National Institute of Teaching; or
(b) a different provider nominated by the Secretary of State.
(3) The purposes of the School Trust CEO Programme shall include, but not be limited to—
(a) building the next generation of CEOs and system architects;
(b) providing the knowledge, insight and practice to ensure CEOs can run successful, sustainable, thriving trusts that develop as anchor institutions in their communities;
(c) building a network of CEOs to improve practice in academy trusts and shape the system; and
(d) nurturing the talents of CEOs to lead and grow large multi-academy trusts, especially in areas where such trusts are most needed.
(4) The Secretary of State must provide the School Trust CEO Programme with such funding and resources as are required for the carrying out of its duties.”—(Neil O’Brien.)
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to provide a School Trust CEO Programme.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Neil O’Brien
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 18 essentially raises the same issues as new clauses 17 and 19, but for a different programme—in this case, the trust leadership programme, which helps teachers and heads move up to running a trust and helps to create a self-improving system. A huge amount of work has gone into getting it right in recent years. It has been designed by the profession. It really has had a lot of work put into it, and it is a product of school leaders, not just the Government.
My understanding is that the programme will end after the current cohort completes it, and that there is no plan for another cohort. After all the work that has gone into the programme, that seems a real shame. The new clause would require Ministers to commit to the programme for further intakes and to put it on a permanent basis. I hope that Ministers will make that commitment, and that we can get good news from them today about the continuation of this really important programme.
Catherine McKinnell
The Government are committed to supporting the development of leaders at all levels. As such, we have announced a review of national professional qualifications, which are evidence-based qualifications available to leaders at all levels. The review will include consideration of the training needs of those leading several schools, including large multi-academy trusts. However, committing to a specific service or provider in the Bill would contravene civil service governance procedures and public procurement legislation respectively, so we will not put in place a legal obligation to provide training or commit funding for the development of the chief executive officers of large multi-academy trusts. On that basis, I ask the shadow Minister to withdraw his new clause.
Neil O’Brien
The new clause makes it clear that there would be a choice about who would provide the scheme. We heard from the Minister that there is a review of national professional qualifications going on. I will be happy to take an intervention if she is happy to tell us a date by which we will find out the results of that review. I do not know when school leaders who are currently benefiting from, or hoping to benefit from, this very important programme, designed by the sector, will find out from Ministers what its future will be. It sounds like Ministers are saying that it will not be until the review is completed, so I now have a question about when that will be and when we will have a definitive answer one way or the other. I wonder whether the Minister will consider writing to me to tell us roughly when the review will be complete. She is sort of nodding, but I am not going to probe the point.
We will withdraw the new clause for now, but this is a wonderful scheme and a crucial part of the self-improving system, and I hope that, whatever happens at the end of the review, something along these lines will be maintained. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 20
Approved free schools and university training colleges in pre-opening
“The Secretary of State must make provision for the opening of all free schools and university training colleges whose applications were approved prior to October 2024.”—(Neil O’Brien.)
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to proceed with the opening of free schools whose opening was paused in October 2024.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Neil O’Brien
I beg to move That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause presses Ministers to un-pause the final free schools. In October Ministers “paused” plans to open 44 new state schools, including three sixth-form colleges backed by Eton and, more importantly, by the brilliant Star Trust in Dudley, Middlesbrough and Oldham. Many of the proposals have had years of work put into them, and they are the passion projects of huge numbers of teachers and school leaders. They have the potential to do tremendous good in communities across the country, including some deprived communities. The new clause encourages the Government to end the damaging uncertainty for those schools, which have now been in limbo for a long time.
Free schools generally have fantastic progress scores, which are a quarter of a grade higher across all grades than would be expected given their intakes. That is exceptional across an entire type of school—an amazing result. When we look at Progress 8 scores in this country, free schools dominate the top of the league table. That is an amazing achievement from these passion projects—these labours of love—that have been created by teachers to help communities. We hope that Ministers will unblock the proposals soon, and end the uncertainty, so will the Minister give the Committee some sense of when these schools can expect a decision?
Stephen Morgan
I understand the hon. Member’s desire to ensure that approved free school projects, including two university technical college projects, open as planned, and I acknowledge the work that trusts and local authorities undertake to support free school projects to open. However, accepting the new clause would commit the Secretary of State to opening all projects in the current pipeline, regardless of whether they are still needed or represent value for money.
A range of factors can create barriers to a new school opening successfully, including insufficient pupil numbers to fill the school, or not being able to find a suitable site. That is why the Government have established practice of reviewing free school projects on an ongoing basis. As a result, over the lifetime of the programme, nearly 150 projects have been withdrawn by their sponsor trusts or cancelled by the Department.
The review that this Government announced in October 2024 has a strong focus on the need for places, and will ensure that we only open viable schools that offer value for taxpayers’ money. It would be wrong to spend funding on new schools that cannot be financially viable while existing schools urgently need that funding to improve the condition of their buildings. I therefore ask the shadow Minister to withdraw the new clause.
Neil O’Brien
I am disappointed to hear that from the Minister, and we are also disappointed not to hear any date for when the schools, which all those people—people with an incredible track record in our deprived communities—have worked so hard to bring into existence, will open. Will he commit to write to us to say when those people can expect a decision? The uncertainty, which is so damaging, has been going on for so long. At the moment it is without end, and no one knows when they will get an answer from the Government. I wonder whether the Minister write to us—or, more to the point, to those people—to say when they can at least expect an answer one way or the other.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 21
School attendance: general duties on local authorities
“In Chapter 2 of Part 6 of the Education Act 1996 (school attendance), after section 443 insert—
‘School attendance: registered pupils, offences etc
443A School attendance: general duties on local authorities in England
(1) A local authority in England must exercise their functions with a view to—
(a) promoting regular attendance by registered pupils at schools in the local authority’s area, and
(b) reducing the number and duration of absences of registered pupils from schools in that area.
(2) In exercising their functions, a local authority in England must have regard to any guidance issued from time to time by the Secretary of State in relation to school attendance.’”—(Neil O’Brien.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 22—School attendance policies—
“In Chapter 2 of Part 6 of the Education Act 1996 (school attendance), after section 443 insert—
‘443A School attendance policies
(1) The proprietor of a school in England must ensure—
(a) that policies designed to promote regular attendance by registered pupils are pursued at the school, and
(b) that those policies are set out in a written document (an “attendance policy”).
(2) An attendance policy must in particular include details of—
(a) the practical procedures to be followed at the school in relation to attendance,
(b) the measures in place at the school to promote regular attendance by its registered pupils,
(c) the responsibilities of particular members of staff in relation to attendance,
(d) the action to be taken by staff if a registered pupil fails to attend the school regularly, and
(e) if relevant, the school’s strategy for addressing any specific concerns identified in relation to attendance.
(3) The proprietor must ensure—
(a) that the attendance policy and its contents are generally made known within the school and to parents of registered pupils at the school, and
(b) that steps are taken at least once in every school year to bring the attendance policy to the attention of all those parents and pupils and all persons who work at the school (whether or not for payment).
(4) In complying with the duties under this section, the proprietor must have regard to any guidance issued from time to time by the Secretary of State in relation to school attendance.’”
New clause 23—Penalty notices: regulations—
“In section 444B of the Education Act 1996 (penalty notices: attendance), after subsection (1) insert—
‘(1A) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), regulations under subsection (1) may make provision in relation to England—
(a) as to the circumstances in which authorised officers must consider giving a penalty notice;
(b) for or in connection with co-ordination arrangements between local authorities and neighbouring local authorities (where appropriate), the police and authorised officers.’”
New clause 24—Academies: regulations as to granting a leave of absence—
“(1) Section 551 of the Education Act 1996 (regulations as to duration of school day etc) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1), for ‘to which this section applies’ substitute ‘mentioned in subsection (2)’.
(3) In subsection (2), omit ‘to which this section applies’.
(4) After subsection (2) insert—
‘(3) Regulations may also make provision with respect to the granting of leave of absence from any schools which are Academies not already falling within subsection (2)(c).’”
Neil O’Brien
This series of new clauses on attendance is intended, as with other amendments on discipline, to add to the Bill content on some of the biggest issues that are facing our schools, and which our teachers consistently rate as among the most important issues facing the school system. Although there has been recovery since the nadir of the post-pandemic period, as I look at attendance figures every week I worry that we are topping out at a level that is below pre-pandemic norms. For the current academic year we are at 18.7% persistent absence, compared with 10.9% pre-pandemic. That is a huge increase. When debating proposals in Westminster Hall from people who wanted to make it easier to take children out of schools, we and Ministers strongly agreed about the powerful negative impact that can have. Even small changes in attendance can have unbelievably large effects on overall achievement.
I will not labour the new clauses, because I am conscious of the time we have today and the need for many Members to get in. They were tabled to emphasise how important this issue is. I am sure Ministers agree; we are really just encouraging them to try to do more. In the most recent data, unauthorised absence is slightly up on last year. I am left with a feeling that something big is needed on this front. The new clauses are really just a way of encouraging Ministers to push hard on this vital issue.
Stephen Morgan
New clauses 21 and 22 seek to place new duties on local authorities and schools with regard to school attendance. Absence from school is one of the biggest barriers to success for children and young people, and has soared over recent years. We inherited a legacy of record levels of poor attendance, which impacts the life chances of all our young people, particularly the most disadvantaged. We are determined to work with the sector to tackle that legacy. That includes working with schools, which are uniquely placed to address the issue, and local authorities, which play a key role in supporting pupils whose absence is more entrenched and who face out-of-school barriers to attendance.
We naturally want to see consistency in this area, and to ensure that parents clearly understand how they will be supported if their child is having difficulties. However, we do not need the new clauses to do that. Both schools and local authorities are already subject to the statutory guidance on attendance introduced last summer. Since then, we have been supporting schools through a network of attendance hubs and our recently released attendance toolkit, and local authorities through our team of attendance advisers. Both have made significant progress in improving the support that they offer to children on attendance.
The challenge is to build on that progress, working in partnership. We will continue to ensure that teachers and staff are equipped to make school the best place to be for every child, by delivering free breakfast clubs in every primary school so that every child is on time and ready to learn, by delivering better mental health support through access to professionals, and by improving inclusivity in mainstream schools. We will support local authorities through the £263 million in new funding that we have already announced in the new children’s social care prevention grant, so that families can get the support they need, when they need it.
Schools and local authorities understand their responsibilities to promote school attendance, and we will provide them with the tools that they need to fulfil those responsibilities. The new clauses are not necessary for us to do that. Therefore, for the reasons I have outlined, I kindly ask the shadow Minister not to press them.
New clause 23 relates to the circumstances in which a fixed penalty notice for school absence may be issued. The right approach to tackling school absence is one of support first. One of the most important things that parents do for their children’s learning, wellbeing and life chances is ensuring that they go to school every day, and that they are well enough to do so. We want to support the system and support parents to provide help where needed to overcome attendance problems. However, there are cases where support has been provided and not engaged with, and cases where support would not be appropriate. In such cases, there is a range of legal interventions available to ensure that children are not deprived of their right to an education.
It is important that the system treats families equally and that there is consistency across the country in how fixed penalty notices are considered, but the new clause is not needed to achieve that. The previous Government introduced a national threshold for considering when a fixed penalty notice should be issued, and an expectation that support should be offered first in cases other than term-time holidays. This Government have continued that policy. On the basis that neither this Government nor the previous one considered the new clause to be necessary, I ask hon. Members not to press it.
Finally, I turn to new clause 24. I appreciate hon. Members’ concern on this matter, and their desire for academies to follow rules on granting leave of absence. One of the many ways in which schools encourage regular attendance is by making it clear to parents—
Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Ninth sitting)
Tuesday 11th February 2025
(1 day, 13 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill 2024-26 View all Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 11 February 2025 - (11 Feb 2025)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 8 / Noes: 15 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
Members may remove their jackets if they wish to do so. I reiterate the instruction—you will note that it is an instruction, not a request—that Members address one another through the Chair and do not, therefore, use the expression “you” when speaking. I understand we had a slight problem with that this morning.
I remind the Committee that with amendment 34 we are discussing the following:
Amendment 36, in clause 7, page 4, line 7, leave out “capacity” and insert “the ability”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 34 and NC1.
Amendment 37, in clause 8, page 4, line 34, leave out “capacity” and insert “the ability”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 34 and NC1.
Amendment 38, in clause 9, page 6, line 27, leave out “capacity” and insert “ability”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 34 and NC1.
Amendment 202, in clause 9, page 6, line 31, leave out “capability” and insert “capacity”.
This amendment corrects a typographical error.
Amendment 39, in clause 9, page 6, line 31, leave out “capability” and insert “ability”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 34 and NC1.
Amendment 40, in clause 12, page 8, line 2, leave out “capacity” and insert “the ability”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 34 and NC1.
Amendment 41, in clause 13, page 9, line 31, leave out “capacity” and insert “ability”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 34 and NC1.
Amendment 42, in clause 18, page 12, line 23, leave out “capacity” and insert “the ability”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 34 and NC1.
Amendment 43, in clause 30, page 18, line 16, leave out “capacity” and insert “the ability”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 34 and NC1.
Amendment 44, in clause 40, page 23, line 26, leave out from “capacity” and insert “ability”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 34 and NC1.
New clause 1—Ability to make decision—
“The person is to be considered as having the ability to make a decision to request assistance to end their life if they can fully understand, use and weigh the relevant information in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary of State under affirmative resolution.”
This new clause defines the concept of ability which is intended to replace the concept of capacity. This new clause is intended to replace Clause 3.
Amendment 45, in schedule 2, page 26, line 36, leave out “capacity” and insert
“the ability to make a decision”.
Amendment 46, in schedule 3, page 28, line 1, leave out “capacity” and insert
“the ability to make a decision”.
Amendment 47, in schedule 5, page 30, line 14, leave out “capacity” and insert
“the ability to make a decision”.
Danny Kruger (East Wiltshire) (Con)
Before the break, the hon. Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge gave a helpful account of the operation of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, with particular reference to the concept of “best interests” that applies in that Act. She explained that the best interests consideration kicks in only once the capacity test has been failed—once it has been concluded that someone does not have capacity. Therefore, there would be no best interests consideration in the case of assisted dying. Either a person has capacity and that is that—a rather low bar, which is, as we have discussed, appropriate for buying a cup of coffee, is got over, and they are off to the assisted dying commission, or whatever process we eventually try to set up—or they do not have capacity and are ejected from the system, and there is no best interests consideration.
I reference that because my whole point is that the Bill does not use the Mental Capacity Act; it just uses the definition of capacity that is in it, and that definition is very weak. It is designed to assume capacity in the patient and, as we discussed earlier today, it can include somebody who has impaired judgment—they could be depressed or even suicidal. Indeed, my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley said earlier, very honestly, that he would be content with somebody who had depression accessing assisted suicide, as would be possible under the legislation.
The point is that once the test of capacity has been passed, there is no best interests consideration. It is a great abuse of the Mental Capacity Act, the whole purpose of which is concern for the vulnerable, for that purpose to be ignored once the usefulness of the Act has been fulfilled. This Bill does violence to the Mental Capacity Act in using it for this purpose. The fact is that that Act was designed for the opposite situation: to protect people from having things done to them.
I will conclude shortly, Sir Roger, but that brings me to the point we have discussed at length already today: the crucial question of whether the decision to have an assisted death is different from the decision to decline or to cease treatment. I start by pointing out that case law specifies that to decline treatment is not to commit suicide —I recognise that the hon. Member for Spen Valley does not like the term suicide, and I apologise, but we are using legal terms here. The fact is that there is a distinction in law between the act of suicide and the decision to decline treatment.
I refer in particular to the famous case of Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland in 1993, and quote Lord Goff, of the House of Lords, who said that
“in cases of this kind, there is no question of the patient having committed suicide, nor therefore of the doctor having aided or abetted him in doing so. It is simply that the patient has, as he is entitled to do, declined to consent to treatment which might or would have the effect of prolonging his life, and the doctor has, in accordance with his duty, complied with his patient’s wishes.”
I also quote Sir Thomas Bingham, as he then was, who said that in the case of Tony Bland it was plainly not suicide, and that
“it was not the discontinuance of artificial feeding but the patient’s condition and its underlying cause which caused his death”.
In the withdrawal of treatment, it is not the act of withdrawing treatment that kills someone, but their disease, or the condition they have, whereas in assisted suicide it is the act that kills them. That is a crucial distinction, and that distinction is apparent. We heard it this morning in remarks from my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley and my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire, and I think from the hon. Member for Spen Valley, who pointed out that there is a difference between the two cases, as is evident with respect to advanced directives that allow for the withdrawal of treatment. They do not allow for the active administration of treatment; they allow for the withdrawal of treatment. They would not allow for assisted dying, as the hon. Member for Luton South and South Bedfordshire accurately said.
This goes to the heart of the matter. There is a difference between being left alone and demanding that something is done to us. The state protects our right to be left alone. It does not yet give us the right to have something done to us simply because we asked for it.
Rachel Hopkins (Luton South and South Bedfordshire) (Lab)
The proposal in the Bill is not about someone doing something to someone: it is about self-administration and someone being able to do something to themselves. The point is about the choice to do that.
Danny Kruger
I recognise that, and that the Bill makes a distinction in respect of euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide, which would be the doctor doing it to us. The Bill specifies that the drugs must be self-administered. I do not understand the logic of that distinction, but I recognise that there is an attempt to make the Bill more palatable and that the distinction has been preserved. Nevertheless, the Bill would enable a doctor to prescribe lethal drugs with the purpose of ending a life. That is an act that is performed: a person is prescribed drugs to end their life. Whether they take the pills or press the syringe themselves, the act has been performed, and the prescribed drugs kill the person.
Kit Malthouse (North West Hampshire) (Con)
My hon. Friend will recall the evidence from Professor Hoyano, who said she could not legally see the distinction between a doctor handing the pills to somebody to take themselves and the doctor pulling the plug out of the wall to turn off the ventilator or whatever machine might be keeping the person alive. Both of them are an act by a doctor at the request of the patient to foreshorten their death and avoid whatever they contemplate at the end.
I realise we are dealing with semantics here. We might have an irreconcilable difference about such an act, but I have to say that from the point of view of a patient—the person approaching their death—those two acts seem to be broadly the same. In both circumstances I am requesting that a doctor do something to hasten my death, because I do not wish to continue living in the circumstances presented to me.
Danny Kruger
My right hon. Friend articulates the point well. I do not think it is a semantic decision: there is a real distinction. The fact is that unplugging the ventilator leads to death, but what kills the patient is not the administration of any treatment or drugs that have been provided. The patient dies naturally, whereas the administration of drugs designed to kill them is a qualitatively different event. I agree that of course the ultimate effect is the same, but the act that is performed is qualitatively different, and indeed the intention of the doctor is different.
Kit Malthouse
Forgive me, but surely the whole point of what we are trying to do here is to give people the opportunity to avoid the natural death that is presented to them. We hear again and again, and we heard it from the families who gave evidence, that people profoundly wished to avoid their natural end because it was going to be degrading, unpleasant and profoundly painful on every level. That is the whole purpose of the act. To say that we should avoid that issue seems to me to negate our whole reason for being here.
Danny Kruger
We are trying to avoid suffering, pain and bad deaths. We all share that view. Indeed, later amendments look explicitly at the purpose of an assisted death and the question of the avoidance of pain. I am simply making the important distinction between the decision to withdraw treatment and the decision to administer fatal drugs, which, as I say, are qualitatively different—different in principle and different in practice.
Kim Leadbeater (Spen Valley) (Lab)
To build on the point made by the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire, this is the heart of the issue. You are right that they are slightly different things.
Kim Leadbeater
Sorry, Sir Roger. The hon. Member is correct. It gets to the heart of whether we think this is the right thing to do. The Bill Committee’s job is to put that decision back to the House. It is not for us to decide today; it is for us to have the discussion about how we can improve the Bill and send it back to the House.
The hon. Member is absolutely right to say that it gets to the heart of the issue. I think dying people should be given that choice. In the same way that they are given the choice to have treatment withdrawn or the machine turned off, they should be given the choice to take control and to have the autonomy and dignity that assisted death will provide.
Danny Kruger
The hon. Lady has expressed very well her whole purpose for the Bill. In a sense, all the debates we are having about safeguards, protections, process and eligibility are secondary to her purpose, which is to give autonomy to patients. One has to ask about the purpose of the safeguards, particularly the one on people having to administer the drugs themselves. In all jurisdictions where physician-assisted suicide is legal, that is the option that people overwhelmingly opt for—I certainly would if I were in that situation.
The hon. Lady is right, and that is what she is trying to do: she simply wants the Bill to go through. I take strong issue with her implied point that our purpose here is simply to work out the Bill’s implementation. We are looking at each clause, line by line, to decide whether it is safe or not. As she said herself at the time, the decision on Second Reading was a vote in principle to continue the discussion, which is what we are doing now. We are closely and minutely examining whether every clause is safe.
Kim Leadbeater
On that point, it is not an either/or. It is not just about passing legislation that improves choice and gives autonomy and dignity to dying people, and indeed fixes the current failings of the law as it stands, as we have discussed in great detail. It is about providing safeguards that make sure that is done safely, securely and robustly, and that address the issues and concerns we are discussing. It is not an either/or and it is important to make that distinction.
The Chair
Order. You cannot intervene on an intervention. Let us be absolutely clear about that. The hon. Lady was intervening on the hon. Gentleman who has the floor. If he now wishes to give way, he may do so.
Danny Kruger
If the hon. Lady would like to intervene on me, I would be happy to give way.
Juliet Campbell
To go back to the amendment, we were talking about the Mental Capacity Act. The use of that Act must be drawn into question, because it was never intended as legislation for assisted dying. Much of what has been said in favour of using the MCA relates to it being tried and tested, and people understanding it, and the idea that to use anything else would make life complicated for professionals who use it as part of their day-to-day activities when assessing capacity.
On the surface, those reasons seem reasonable, and it is an easy option. However, if the MCA does not meet the threshold of meeting the needs of everyone, convenience should not be the deciding factor. Convenience cannot be considered as a sufficient reason to use the MCA as a fundamental element of the Bill. The assisted dying Bill in itself is enough reason to have an alternative measure to determine an individual’s eligibility to be considered for assisted dying.
The Chair
Order. I am going to have to draw the hon. Lady to order. An intervention is an intervention. I accept that we have slightly more flexibility in Committee than we do on the Floor of the House, but the hon Lady, and indeed all hon. Members, have to understand that speeches are speeches and interventions are interventions. That said, it is the job of the Chair to make absolutely certain that every Member has the right and the opportunity to speak. If the hon. Lady wishes to make a speech, that is entirely within her right: all she has to do is indicate to the Chair that she would like to be called and she will get called.
Danny Kruger
I am grateful to the hon. Lady; her points are absolutely right. Even if the House concludes that the overall principle is right, as the hon. Member for Spen Valley suggested, if it is not possible to do it safely, we should not do it at all. My great concern is that proceeding with the use of the Mental Capacity Act as it currently stands in the Bill will make the Bill dangerous.
Let me conclude my point about the difference between assisted dying and the withdrawing of treatment. To decline treatment is to assent to nature; it is to let one’s body do what it will. To commit suicide is to contradict nature; it is to do something to one’s body that interrupts its own plans. I recognise that the outcome is the same —it is death—but we are considering the process of decision making in the clause, and the decision is fundamentally different.
The Chair
It might be helpful for the Committee to know that I was bequeathed a list by Ms McVey. I understand that those wishing to speak are the hon. Member for Bradford West, the Minister, and the promoter of the Bill, the hon. Member for Spen Valley. I shall then call the hon. Member for Richmond Park, who tabled the amendment, to wind up the debate.
If anybody else wishes to speak, please indicate in the normal fashion by rising. I will call the hon. Member for Broxtowe if she wishes to speak, but I need to know whether she wants to. If she stands up at the right time, that will be fine. Please be aware that once I have called the mover of the amendment to wind up, there will be no further debate on the subject. That really will be the end of the debate.
Naz Shah (Bradford West) (Lab)
I rise to speak in support of the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Richmond Park.
The key word here is “capacity”. There has been much debate around the Mental Capacity Act. I will go back to the oral evidence we heard, as well as the written evidence and submissions in relation to the amendments and the clause. The psychiatrists who have advised are against it. I appreciate and recognise the contributions from my hon. Friends the Members for Penistone and Stocksbridge and for Bexleyheath and Crayford, who spoke eloquently about the word “ability” from his experience. I recognise that we have not had the opportunity to test the concept of ability.
Dr Marie Tidball (Penistone and Stocksbridge) (Lab)
I appreciate my hon. Friend bringing up that point. It is important to note that all Commonwealth jurisdictions that have assisted dying use the concept of mental capacity. We are basing the utility of the Mental Capacity Act not only on 20 years of the courts and medics dealing with it, but on the learning of other jurisdictions that have put assisted dying in place. The concept of ability, however, has no basis in law.
Naz Shah
I absolutely concur that we are testing in regard to other jurisdictions. In Oregon, there is not just the assessment of capacity but a referral to a counsellor.
We have had lots of evidence when it comes to capacity, and I will go back to some of the key points. The Royal College of Psychiatrists stated explicitly that the Mental Capacity Act is
“not sufficient for the purposes of this Bill.”
Explaining why, the Royal College of Psychiatrists said that assessing the capacity to end one’s life is “entirely different” from assessing for the capacity to decide treatment.
Three psychiatrists who gave evidence to the Committee —Professor Allan House, Dr Annabel Price and Professor Gareth Owen—all expressed doubts about the use of the Mental Capacity Act to assess whether a person was in a fit state of mind to undertake assisted dying. When Professor Allan House was asked why some people might choose assisted dying, he said they are vulnerable. When asked what he meant by that, he said:
“They are not people asserting autonomy and pleasure in their ability to make a choice; they are people describing to you things that are negative influences on their life.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 161, Q202.]
Professor Gareth Owen said:
“I have looked at mental capacity a lot in research, and there is no experience of the decision to end one’s own life. It is outside the experience of the Mental Capacity Act, the Court of Protection, the associated research and practitioners on the ground. The reference to the Mental Capacity Act in clause 3 puts you into an area where there is no experience of the central capacity question under consideration. It is very important that Parliament be clear-eyed about that.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 226, Q287.]
Dr Tidball
On the hon. Lady’s point about being clear-eyed, it is important that we look closely at the drafting of the Bill and the utility of the Mental Capacity Act. There are eight occasions on which a person who might seek assistance can formally consider their decision making, and the Mental Capacity Act would come into play at each of those stages. A person with a terminal illness who wishes to seek assistance does not make a one-off decision; they make the decision eight times during the process, so we have a wide variety of opportunities to ensure that their consent is ongoing.
Rebecca Paul (Reigate) (Con)
A very good point has been made about looking at the Mental Capacity Act at different times during the process. However, it does not matter how many times a bad process is applied; if the process is insufficient and does not have a high enough safeguard, it will never give the right answer. We need to ensure that we have the right test. It is absolutely right that we apply it multiple times, but does the hon. Lady agree that we need to consider the quality of what we are applying in the first place?
Naz Shah
I completely agree.
Professor Owen also said:
“I have had over 20 years of research interest in mental capacity. When I look at the issues relating to mental capacity with the Bill…the other important point to understand is that they are very novel. We are in uncharted territory with respect to mental capacity, which is very much at the hub of the Bill.” ––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 226, Q286.]
Like my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford, I am certainly not a doctor, although I have experience in the NHS, but I do know that we do not have psychiatric experts or experts on capacity in this Committee.
Sean Woodcock (Banbury) (Lab)
Earlier, the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley made a point about public confidence in the Bill. In oral evidence, the representatives from the Royal College of Psychiatrists—we nearly did not hear from them; we had a vote about whether we would, and they were added later—made it clear that they have severe doubts about applying the Mental Capacity Act to the Bill. Does my hon. Friend share those concerns?
Naz Shah
I absolutely share those concerns, which is why I pressed the issue to a vote. As I have explained to my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, I am grateful that the Royal College of Psychiatrists gave evidence. It said that the Mental Capacity Act
“is not sufficient for the purposes of this Bill”.
In oral evidence, Professor Jamilla Hussain, an expert in palliative care and health inequalities, highlighted an inequity in assessment using the Mental Capacity Act. She said that she does not think that
“the Mental Capacity Act and safeguarding training are fit for purpose. For something like assisted dying, we need a higher bar—we need to reduce the variability in practice.” ––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 199, Q260.]
My hon. Friend the Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge mentioned the process in the Bill being repeated eight times, but I want to bring us back to the issue of capacity in relation to coercion. The Royal College of Psychiatrists said:
“In any assessment of capacity, we must also consider whether a person is making the request because they consider that they are a burden or because they do not consider that they have access to effective treatments or good-quality palliative care. At a population level, palliative care, social care and mental health service provision may impact the demand”
for an assisted dying service. Although I appreciate that we will debate this in greater detail later, on clauses relating to coercion, it relates to the issue of capacity. In her evidence to the Committee, Chelsea Roff, a specialist in eating disorders, said:
“One thing I would like to highlight in our study is that all 60 people who died”
by assisted dying after suffering from anorexia, who were mostly young women,
“were found to have mental capacity to make the decision to end their life, so I worry that mental capacity will not be an effective safeguard to prevent people with eating disorders from qualifying under the Bill.
I also note that Oregon and California, where I am from and where we have found cases, have an additional safeguard to mental capacity. That is, if there are any indications that the person might have a mental disorder, that person must be referred for a mental health assessment.” ––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 141, Q177.]
Tom Gordon (Harrogate and Knaresborough) (LD)
I completely agree with the point the hon. Lady is making about mental capacity applying to eating disorders, but would that not be better debated in relation to defining an eating disorder as a terminal illness, rather than in regard to mental capacity?
Naz Shah
I will be speaking to the issue in relation to terminal illness, because it relates to my amendment in another grouping. The reason I am making this point now is that it also impacts on capacity. When we are assessing capacity—again, this talks to the point—the truth is that nobody in this Bill Committee or otherwise can tell me that the Mental Capacity Act has been applied to the question, “Would you like assisted dying?”
Dr Simon Opher (Stroud) (Lab)
First, it is impossible to argue that, because we have never been able to have assisted dying in this country, so it is a spurious argument. However, I do not quite understand the argument here. You are suggesting—
Dr Opher
I am sorry. My hon. Friend is suggesting that a system that has been tried and tested in court and by clinicians throughout the country over the last 20 years is not preferrable to a new system that is completely untried. I thought this Committee was about making these things safe for patients, and I cannot see how the amendment makes them more safe.
Naz Shah
My hon. Friend speaks to my point and the idea that the Act has been tried and tested. When we are talking about coercion, and capacity in relation to coercion, I come back to the point that we in this House have only just, in 2015 and 2021, made legislation using the word “coercion”. It was not recognised before. On the idea that this has been tried and tested for the last 20 years, I simply beg to differ.
Coercion does come into the issue of capacity. We are looking at the Mental Capacity Act, which was introduced in 2005 and is 20 years old. These conversations were not being had in Parliament at that time; the vocabulary did not include “coercion” or “undue influence”, even at the time the Mental Capacity Act was passed by this House. Again, that speaks to my point: are we really saying that we want to test the Mental Capacity Act on something that has never been done before?
Jake Richards (Rother Valley) (Lab)
I am trying to understand my hon. Friend’s argument. In terms of a person choosing to ask their doctor to turn off their life support machine, as opposed to someone offering a person drugs to self-administer, I understand that there are differences in terms of public policy and that, for some, there are differences morally. However, in terms of capacity—the decision as to whether that person can make that choice themselves—why is it different?
Naz Shah
The hon. Member for East Wiltshire answered that question eloquently earlier. Although the outcome is the same, we are asking two different questions. The question is not about turning off and unplugging a machine; it is about whether someone will take drugs to end their life.
Jack Abbott (Ipswich) (Lab/Co-op)
To follow the basic premise of your argument—
Jack Abbott
It is not your argument, Sir Roger; it is my hon. Friend’s argument. I apologise.
To follow the basic premise of my hon. Friend’s argument, she is saying that the Mental Capacity Act is not tried and tested for what we are discussing. However, by definition, neither is this amendment; if anything, it is even worse, because words such as “ability”, which we are discussing here, have absolutely no basis, as was admitted by the hon. Member for East Wiltshire. On that basic premise, my hon. Friend will not agree with any amendment that is tabled today, because none of them is tried and tested. Is that correct?
Naz Shah
My hon. Friend is not wrong, in so far as there can be two truths. There is a truth, for me, that the Mental Capacity Act does not deliver what we need it to deliver, and that is the concern we have heard from people who have given us evidence. We have not talked about the word “ability”—as hon. Members have pointed out, it is not set out in law—so there is a conversation to be had.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, the promoter of the Bill, clearly stated, this is about strengthening the Bill and bringing the best Bill to Parliament to give people a choice. That is what this is about.
Danny Kruger
The hon. Member is making such an important speech, and I am very grateful to her. This is a crucial discussion. The hon. Member for Ipswich suggested that the amendment would make things worse because it would apply a new test.
Danny Kruger
I respect that. The hon. Gentleman is suggesting that there would be a new test, but it is for a new situation. I want to alert the Committee to the purpose behind this amendment. I understand that we are in a slightly polarised discussion. The hon. Member for Bradford West and I both voted against the Bill on Second Reading, and it is not likely that we will ever support it. Nevertheless, I encourage hon. Members to consider that the amendment, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Richmond Park, who is not opposed to assisted dying in principle, is genuinely trying to ensure that the Bill is as safe as it can be. All that has been proposed, as the hon. Member for Bradford West suggests, is a strengthening and a recognition of the importance of the principles of the Mental Capacity Act, without the—
Danny Kruger
I will conclude my intervention very quickly. I fear that I may have mischaracterised the hon. Member for Bradford West when I said that she is opposed to the Bill in principle; in fact, I do not think that is the case. I am not sure what the difference is between opposition in principle and opposition to the detail, but I recognise that she is certainly not opposed to the Bill in principle, so I apologise to her.
Does the hon. Lady agree that the Bill would take a great leap in the dark by legalising assisted dying? At the moment, that leap lands on the uneven ground of the Mental Capacity Act. Does she agree that, if we want to do this properly, we should prepare a solid, cushioned, safe landing space that is appropriate for the Bill, rather than the inappropriate mess that the Mental Capacity Act would induce?
Naz Shah
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his correction. To clarify, I do not think anybody in this House disagrees in principle with the idea of not letting people suffer. I am very much about principle, and I came to this Committee very much in that spirit. When I was asked to join this Committee, I had to sleep on it, and I now realise why.
I am grateful for the interventions from my hon. Friends the Members for Rother Valley and for Ipswich. There are a couple of things that are important for us to understand. The Mental Capacity Act has not been tried in any of the other jurisdictions across the world on which we are basing this law, so we cannot make a comparison.
On the issue of whether it is either/or—whether it is the Mental Capacity Act or the word “ability”—the Secretary of State has the power to change that. If we are to be true to the spirit in which we have come to this debate to make the Bill as safe as possible, given that so many psychiatrists and experts have said that they are not convinced that the Mental Capacity Act is fit for purpose in this regard, surely it is incumbent on us to make that case.
Jack Abbott
My hon. Friend said that the Mental Capacity Act is not tried and tested, and I was challenging the premise that we should apply a concept that is not tried and tested in this or any other country. She is saying, “I can’t support the Mental Capacity Act in its current form because it is not tried and tested,” but, following that argument, she would presumably not support this amendment or any others because what they propose is also not tried and tested.
Naz Shah
This amendment is an attempt to have that conversation and to strengthen the concepts that we are debating. That is the whole point of the Committee. As my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley said, there is no point in having witnesses if we do not listen to what they say. This is what the witnesses said.
My hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich makes a valid point. He asks whether I would, by that definition, support this amendment. I support it because it has led to a debate that we have had all morning, and that we are carrying on into the afternoon. As it is, the Bill does not give me confidence, whether it is due to the use of the Mental Capacity Act or the definition of “ability”. I feel that it needs to go much further, perhaps through the Secretary of State tabling another amendment at a later point.
Sojan Joseph (Ashford) (Lab)
We heard many pieces of oral evidence from expert psychiatrists, including from the Royal College of Psychiatrists, saying that the Mental Capacity Act is not fit for the Bill. Even if we use the Act, many conditions such as depression or delirium —or the effects of some medication—can impact on people’s decision making. It is worrying when someone like Dr Rachel Clarke, who has extensive experience in the Mental Capacity Act and has been training medical students and nurses, says of those mental capacity assessments that
“it is often the case that they are…poorly conducted.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 71, Q85.]
Would my hon. Friend agree that rather than use the Mental Capacity Act, the “ability” amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Richmond Park would be more suitable and make the Bill safer?
Naz Shah
I know that my hon. Friend comes from a mental health background and has worked as a professional in this area. I absolutely agree that we need to strengthen the Bill, which is why I will support the amendment. I feel that we must strengthen it because the Secretary of State can make some interventions.
Kit Malthouse
I want to clarify what the Royal College of Psychiatrists actually said, because I realise that the hon. Member is relying a lot on that evidence. In an exchange with me in their oral evidence, the doctor from the royal college said that if I were to equate the decision to refuse treatment with the decision to request a hastening of my death in extremis as qualitatively the same, and of the same seriousness and outcome, then the Mental Capacity Act may well be appropriate for the decision. The difference was information. We would be relying on the notion of informed consent, and therefore on the information that the person was being given about the consequences of that decision.
We will be debating later in Committee the information that is given to a person to form that decision, but I do not think it is quite the case that the psychiatrist said that it could not be or was not fit for purpose. Actually, they said that it may well be sufficient if we equate those two decisions—and many of us do.
Naz Shah
I know the right hon. Member speaks with a huge amount of experience. I am very new to the subject, but I know that the evidence from the psychiatrist was very certain—not “may well be”. The language that they used, which I referred to earlier, was very clear that it is not a good standard. They said:
“We are in uncharted territory with respect to mental capacity, which is very much at the hub of the Bill”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 226, Q286.]
and there is an inequity in assessment using the Mental Capacity Act. There were other categorical statements made—there was no “maybe” in there. For me, a “maybe” does not cut it at this level; the test should be much higher in order to take the option of assisted death.
Kit Malthouse
If the hon. Lady goes to column 277 of Hansard from that oral evidence session, Dr Price said:
“You are equating a refusal of treatment, in capacity terms, to hastening death by assisted dying. If those two things are equated, in terms of the gravity and the quality of the decision, the Mental Capacity Act may well be sufficient, but there are differences. There are differences in the information that the person would need and what they would need to understand.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 277, Q361.]
It is clear what Dr Price said. To be honest, the question was partly prompted as we had become a little confused, because the whole practice of psychiatry in the UK is founded on the Act at the moment. She seemed to be implying that somehow the entire practice of psychiatry in the UK was on unstable ground—and I do not think anybody is claiming that.
Danny Kruger
It is interesting that my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire has cited that, and I will look at Hansard. However, what I just heard him say, quoting the doctor from the Royal College, was that if we equate the gravity of the cases, it would be appropriate. That is the equivalent of saying that if the two cases are the same, the mechanism can be the same.
Crucially, I do not believe that the Royal College does equate the gravity of the two cases. Its written evidence states that while
“a person’s capacity to decide treatment can be reliably assessed, an assessment of a person’s mental capacity to decide to end their own life is an entirely different and more complex determination requiring a higher level of understanding.”
It regards the two cases as different in principle and therefore requiring different tests.
Naz Shah
I think that the hon. Member’s intervention responds to some of the points of the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire.
We have heard a lot about the equivalence of endings versus decisions. The example given earlier, of somebody pulling the plug because they did not want treatment any more, happens in very few cases. From my experience of working in the NHS and with disabled people, when people are at the end of life, their cases sometimes do end up in court in front of a judge. That may be because there is a difference of opinion—be it medical, between the family, to do with capacity, or whatever the issue is. We are removing that. My understanding is that the promoter of the Bill is removing the need for the judge and is proposing a panel, which is what I read in The Guardian earlier.
Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)
I wonder whether the hon. Lady can help me with an area of her argument that I am conflicted by. I have heard the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for East Wiltshire, drawing the distinction between those who refuse treatment for a condition that is then terminal and those actively seeking assistance in ending their life. There is a third group who choose to refuse food and nutrition. That is not a treatment in the conventional sense, to combat a disease process, that is normal sustenance that would keep someone alive. Given that the MCA applies to that decision and someone’s ability to refuse on that basis, how does that interplay with the amendment as proposed?
Naz Shah
I have tabled an amendment to a later clause that talks specifically to that. The word “only” needs to be removed. We have seen this in Oregon, which I will come to later. We heard in the oral evidence that 60 women assessed to have capacity died because they had anorexia.
Kim Leadbeater
In respect of those numbers, it is important to be really clear that the vast majority of those circumstances were in the Netherlands and in other jurisdictions that have a much broader set of eligibility criteria than the Bill. We are talking about a very small number of cases in jurisdictions with a similar set of criteria to ours. It is important to make that point.
Naz Shah
My understanding, which comes from Chelsea Roff, was that that happened specifically in places such as Oregon and California, but I am happy to revisit that. Coming back to the point, we must ensure that people with an eating disorder such as anorexia or a mental health condition will be excluded from the Bill. That will be my second amendment. I do not know if that answers the question.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
It may well have been the way that I phrased it, but the point I was seeking to make was that the Mental Capacity Act, as it currently operates, can be used for those patients who choose to refuse food and water. My view would be that that is a distinct group of people who are refusing active treatment. Given the hon. Lady’s distinction between those who refuse treatment in the conventional sense and those who are seeking assisted dying and her view that for the latter group the MCA is not the appropriate mechanism, is she saying that for that group of individuals who refuse food and water—effectively choosing to end their life through starvation—the MCA is not an appropriate mechanism to assess their capacity?
Kim Leadbeater
I do not think that the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley is saying that this is about people with eating disorders or anorexia; he is asking about people who are terminally ill who stop eating and drinking. They do that as a course of action to essentially end their own lives. It does happen on a fairly regular basis. We have had testimonies from families who have watched loved ones essentially starve themselves to death. It is different from having an eating disorder or being anorexic.
Rebecca Paul
I think that one of the points being made is the difference between something that is active and something that is passive—for example, someone who chooses not to take that next level of chemotherapy because they have had enough, they have gone through a lot of it or it was painful, and chooses, in the example the hon. Member for Spen Valley just gave, not to eat and drink. That is one case, but it is very different from someone choosing to end their own life, which requires active participation and involves other people too. That would be the key difference, which I wonder if the Member for Bradford West agrees with.
Naz Shah
I do agree. I also want to push back on the idea that it happens fairly regularly. I would welcome my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley giving us the evidence of where it says that, because that is not my recollection of the evidence we have gone through so far. I appreciate that we have not gone through all of it; there might be more that we have not seen.
Sojan Joseph
On a point of clarification, under the Mental Capacity Act, if somebody decided to stop eating and drinking, we would let them do it until they became unconscious, and then their best interests would come into effect. We would take them into treatment if there were a risk to their life. Would my hon. Friend agree that that needs to be clarified?
Naz Shah
This whole conversation has taught me that we are not on top of the Mental Capacity Act or the conversation about ability, which is why it is so important to have these conversations, even if it is just to try to get to the nub of the issue. Amendments that I will speak to later will clarify my position, but from the evidence I have heard, I will be supporting the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Richmond Park. That is because the test needs to be much higher than the Mental Capacity Act on its own when it concerns the issue of choosing assisted dying. For that reason, I will support the amendment.
Juliet Campbell
I thank the Committee for allowing me to reiterate the importance of a stand-alone approach. The use of the Mental Capacity Act must be questioned, as the Act was never intended to legislate for assisted dying. Much of what has been said in favour of using the Mental Capacity Act has been about it being tried and tested, so people understand it and to use anything else would make life complicated for professionals who use it as part of their day-to-day activities in assessing capacity.
On the surface, those reasons do seem reasonable and make the Mental Capacity Act an easy option. If, however, the Act does not pass the threshold of meeting everyone’s needs, convenience should not be the deciding factor. Convenience cannot be considered a sufficient reason to use the Mental Capacity Act, as it is a fundamental element of the Bill. The Bill is in itself enough reason to have an alternative or stand-alone approach to determine an individual’s eligibility to be considered for an assisted death.
Capacity is a complicated issue and cannot be oversimplified for convenience. The MCA may be fit for its current purpose, but it is not fit for the purpose of the assisted dying Bill. I have spent more than 20 years working on the equalities agenda, and one of the things that I have learned—this has been a consistent shortfall—is that we try to address new challenges with old solutions, rather than trying to meet the needs of the people we intend to serve. That is the reason why I will be supporting the amendment.
The Minister for Care (Stephen Kinnock)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Roger. As was noted earlier, the Government remain neutral. My role here is not to offer a Government view on the merits of the amendments but to provide a factual explanation of their technical and practical effect, to assist the Committee in its scrutiny. This group of amendments focuses on the concept of mental capacity. As drafted, the Bill, in clause 3, states that
“references to a person having capacity are to be read in accordance with the Mental Capacity Act 2005”,
with sections 1 to 3 of that Act establishing the principles and criteria for assessing a person’s capacity to make decisions. New clause 1, which would replace clause 3, and amendments 34 to 47, would collectively introduce the concept of an individual having the ability to make the decision to request assistance to end their life. A person’s ability would be determined by whether they could
“fully understand, use and weigh the relevant information in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary of State”.
That is intended to replace the term “capacity”, used in the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which provides a very specific definition of what it means to lack capacity in relation to a particular decision. A lack of capacity under this framework means that a person must be unable to understand, use and weigh information relevant to the decision, and that that must be directly caused by
“an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain.”
The “ability” proposal, as drafted, deals only with the use and weight of information.
Daniel Francis (Bexleyheath and Crayford) (Lab)
To go back to the point I made this morning—I am happy to stand corrected, but nobody has disputed it—two issues continue to concern me in relation to the Mental Capacity Act and the code of conduct. The first is that the doctor would have a choice, under chapter 5 of the guidance, as to whether it is practical and appropriate to consult other people—with regard to learning disability, for instance.
Also, we have not discussed principle 2 in chapter 2, which says that the doctor has to do everything practicable to try to help the person to make the decision for themselves, before concluding that they do not have the capacity to do so. The principal concern for some Members remains those issues in relation to the Mental Capacity Act, which have not been considered for this scenario. I would like the Minister to address them and the fact that that Act, which was written 20 years ago, was not written for this scenario.
Stephen Kinnock
The fundamental position of the Government is that the Mental Capacity Act as it stands is a known quantity. It provides the legal base for a whole range of measures and interventions, and the Government’s view is that it would be an adequate legal base to operationalise the Bill should it receive Royal Assent. Our position on it goes no further than that; it is simply a matter of fact that there is a piece of legislation that is a known quantity.
Naz Shah
The Minister makes an important point. I just want to understand something. He speaks on behalf of the Government and says that the Mental Capacity Act is an adequate legal base as it stands. Perhaps the issue is just that I am new to the process—I am happy to be guided, Sir Roger—but we have not had an impact assessment. Normally, Bills do have impact assessments beforehand and the Government go out to consult; they have a consultation process. None of that has happened because the Bill is a private Member’s Bill. I am just trying to understand: is what has been said still true? How do the Government come to that conclusion without all those robust mechanisms that would normally go before a Government Bill?
Stephen Kinnock
As I set out from the Dispatch Box when we had the money resolution, the Government will publish an impact assessment before Report. Given that this is a highly dynamic Bill, with a whole range of amendments having been tabled, and that it is not really possible to publish an impact assessment on the basis of a Bill that has not cleared a Bill Committee, there is a simple point of sequencing. That is why we are going to publish the impact assessment after the Bill Committee has completed.
Liz Saville Roberts (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)
I was glad to hear what the Minister said about the Government accepting the Mental Capacity Act as a basis. We should remember that in 2005, that Act widened the availability of autonomy for individuals. We are discussing that here: how to enable autonomy for individuals. I also really welcome what the hon. Member for Bradford West said about impact assessments. Can the Minister commit now to an impact assessment specifically for Wales? The context of health and social care there is very different from that in England.
Stephen Kinnock
I thank the right hon. Member for her intervention. We have had a conversation about the need to ensure that the impact assessment has a clear and specific focus on the impact in Wales. I can absolutely assure her that either there will be a separate impact assessment for Wales, or we will ensure that the impact assessment that we produce is absolutely clear in terms of the impact that it will have in Wales; it will be one of those two.
Personally, I am agnostic as to which of those it is. It is simply a question of what works best given the highly integrated nature of the conversation because the criminal justice aspects of it are a reserved competence, while health and care are a devolved competence. What is the best way to present that—having a single document or two separate documents? I am not entirely clear, but I have undertaken to check the matter with officials. I will get back to the right hon. Lady as soon as possible on that point.
Danny Kruger
I am very puzzled, on two grounds. The first is about the impact assessment. I simply do not understand the argument that the Government have to wait until the end of the Committee stage before they can have a view on the Bill and present it for Report. The fact is that the Bill could change again on Report, and the impact assessment would have to be updated further. Why on earth do we not have an impact assessment, which could advise the members of the Committee and the Government themselves on the appropriateness of the measures?
That brings me to my second point of confusion: I simply do not understand what on earth the Minister means when he says that he is neutral about the clauses. He has just given the view, from his position, that he objects to the amendment and that he supports the use of the Mental Capacity Act. He is basing his view— I had understood that, as a neutral member of the Committee, he was not going to express one—on something. What is he basing it on? Secondly, how can he express a view when he is supposed to be neutral?
Stephen Kinnock
The Government choose when to bring forward an impact assessment based on the passage of the Bill through the House. We have had reports today about a very substantial amendment to clause 12 that may well be brought forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, for example. It is not possible for the Government to conduct and publish an impact assessment when quite significant changes are being made.
I also gently point out to the hon. Member for East Wiltshire that this is not a Government Bill; it is a private Member’s Bill. It is also worth noting that it is unprecedented, as far as I know, to have oral evidence sessions for a private Member’s Bill, so we are already on relatively uncharted territory. It is also relatively uncharted territory to have, on a Bill Committee, Ministers who are neutral because the position of the Government is neutral. But that reflects the fact that this is indeed uncharted territory, so that is where we stand.
The hon. Gentleman made a point about our own positions on the subject; I speak also for the Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Finchley and Golders Green. It is a matter of public record that I supported the Bill on Second Reading. It is also the case that we vote, as members of the Committee, on the basis of our conscience because this is a matter of conscience; that is why the Government are neutral on it. There is no whipping from the usual channels.
At the same time, we are articulating the position of the Government. The hon. Member for East Wiltshire asked how we come to that position. It is through the usual process of engaging with officials and experts in the field, and through taking into account all the considerations that the Government need to take into account for the operationalisation of the Bill. The Government then come to a view, and that is the view that I express when I am on the Committee.
Sarah Olney (Richmond Park) (LD)
The Minister says that the Government have made their own choice about when to do the impact assessment on the Bill. Does he not accept that it would have made sense to have done it before the Committee stage? Then, any evidence that the assessment threw up could have given rise to amendments tabled during the Committee stage—that would have made it an appropriate time to have done the impact assessment. The impact assessment could then always have been updated depending on how the Bill was then amended during Committee.
Stephen Kinnock
The hon. Member makes an interesting point. I simply reiterate that this is a very dynamic Bill Committee; I believe that 362 amendments have been tabled. Given the Government’s focus on establishing the Bill’s implementability, the coherence of the statute, the legal dimensions and the complexity of what we are dealing with, we took the position that it was better to wait for the Bill to clear Committee stage before producing an impact assessment. To do otherwise could have involved a large amount of second-guessing based on radical changes that might well have come out of the Bill Committee. I reiterate the logic of that sequencing.
On the point about the established legal framework, which clinicians have been applying since 2007, “capacity” would still be used for other decisions about care and treatment.
I turn to amendment 202, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley on the advice of the Government. It ensures that the assessment of “capacity” is utilised by the assessing doctor, and corrects a typographical error in clause 9 to ensure that an assessment of capacity will apply consistently throughout the Bill. As I said earlier, how and whether the law on assisted dying should change is a matter for this Committee and for Parliament as a whole. However, I hope that these observations are helpful to the Committee when considering potential changes put forward.
Kim Leadbeater
I will try to keep my comments brief. It is excellent that we have had such a thorough debate on this particular issue, but I am also very conscious of time.
I will do the quick and easy bit first. As the Minister has just said, amendment 202 is to correct a typographical error in the initial drafting of the Bill—despite the high level of expertise involved in the initial drafting of the Bill, that one managed to sneak through. The amendment would simply change the word “capability” to “capacity”, to be consistent with the rest of the Bill.
I now come to amendments 34 to 47 and new clause 1. As we have discussed, those would replace the concept of “capacity”, which is based on the Mental Capacity Act, with a new concept of “ability”. I think that suggestion is coming from a good place and is made with good intention by the hon. Member for Richmond Park; I thank her for her positive engagement with the Bill. However, based on the oral evidence that we received, particularly from the chief medical officer and many other experts, the suggestion would seem unnecessary given that we already have—as has been discussed at length this afternoon—a very well established piece of legislation that is effective in this regard.
The primary purpose of the Mental Capacity Act is to promote and safeguard decision making within a legal framework. As the CMO and other colleagues have said, issues around mental capacity
“are dealt with every day, in every hospital up and down the country; every doctor and nurse above a certain level of seniority should be able to do that normally.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 31, Q3.]
That view was supported by Yogi Amin, an expert in Court of Protection work, human rights and civil liberties, who told us during the oral evidence sessions:
“It is well understood how capacity assessments are done, and it is ingrained”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 140, Q176.]
Sean Woodcock
We all understand the evidence of the chief medical officer and why he and others, including Members here, prefer the use of the Mental Capacity Act. It is understood by doctors and it is used every day.
What this debate is fundamentally about is that assisted dying is not done every day. It is not something doctors are used to. As somebody who has said that she wants the toughest safeguards, it is incumbent on my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley to understand that what those of us who have concerns about the Bill are saying is that this is unusual. It is a step into the dark.
The amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Richmond Park is about making sure that the issue is not just about what doctors are used to, but that there is another safeguard to ensure that people are not being exploited. Does my hon. Friend understand that?
Kim Leadbeater
I do. I take my hon. Friend’s comments on board and I will come to address them. As other colleagues have established, it would seem nonsensical to try to introduce a brand new legislative framework rather than use an existing piece of legislation that has stood the test of time. Indeed, Professor Laura Hoyano, emeritus professor of law at the University of Oxford, who has worked in civil liberties, human rights and domestic abuse, said:
“It is interesting that a number of Members of Parliament who are practising physicians pointed out in the debate that they have to evaluate freedom of decision making and absence of coercion in many different medical contexts.”
She talked about the withdrawal of medical treatment, as others have this afternoon, and went on:
“It is considered to be a fundamental human right that lies at the heart of medical law that a patient has personal autonomy to decide what to do with their body and whether or not to accept medical treatment, provided that they have the capacity to do so...Doctors have to make those assessments all the time.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 227, Q289.]
In the light of that evidence, it would seem unnecessary to create a whole new legal framework around the new concept of ability.
However, although I think the Mental Capacity Act is the correct legal framework to use, I strongly agree with palliative care doctor Rachel Clarke when it comes to additional training on assessing capacity for the purposes of this Bill, which relates to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Banbury. She strongly encouraged us to give serious consideration to this matter, saying:
“If there is one thing that I would say to the Committee regarding making the Bill as robust, strong and safe as possible, it is: please consider seriously the matter of education and training from day one of medical school onwards.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 71, Q85.]
The CMO also suggested that training on capacity, as has been discussed, may require some slight adjustment. He said:
“There is an absolute expectation within the Act, for example, that the more serious the decision, the greater the level of capacity that someone needs to have...That training should be generic, but may need some adaption.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 30-31, Q3.]
I agree. As I have said, I think one of the best things about the Bill is the opportunity it gives us to develop gold-standard training around end-of-life care, end-of-life conversations and choice for terminally ill people. That should include training in assessing capacity specifically for the purposes of the Bill, for a decision that is clearly of such a high level of consequence and seriousness.
Daniel Francis
I absolutely accept what my hon. Friend says about training. I know we have separately discussed places in the Bill where we could replace the word “may” for “must” to make the safeguards stronger. However, I come back to the same points as I made to the Minister. The Mental Capacity Act code of practice, which I presume is what we will be relying on, says:
“If it is practical and appropriate to do so, consult other people for their views about the person’s best interests”.
However, it does not say “must”, and for adults with learning disabilities particularly, that remains a principal concern. Chapter 2 of the code of practice says:
“It is important to do everything practical...to help a person make a decision for themselves before concluding that they lack capacity to do so.”
I know this is not my hon. Friend’s intention, but that is the wording that would lead a doctor to have to help somebody make this decision. My question is: how will we overcome that issue?
Kim Leadbeater
That is a point worth making, and something we will look at through the amendments that my hon. Friend has proposed. I am very happy to look at those, as I have already said, but the idea of creating a whole new concept of ability seems wholly unnecessary in the context of a piece of legislation that has stood the test of time for over 20 years.
I come back to training. Although the full details of the training programme that would accompany the Bill cannot be put on the face of the Bill, I have discussed the issue at length with officials in the Department of Health and I have included amendments to that effect. Amendments 186 and 198 specifically state that training must include assessing capacity and assessing whether a person has been coerced or pressured by any other person. Further comprehensive training will be included in regulations set out by the Secretary of State, and the chief medical officer is confident that that is the correct way to proceed.
Furthermore, as has been referred to, there are multiple opportunities within the process to assess capacity by a range of professionals. I have also tabled new clause 8, which would create a duty for the Secretary of State to consult before making regulations relating to training. Within that, there would be a duty to consult not only the Equality and Human Rights Commission, which is important, but persons with expertise in matters relating to whether persons have capacity and whether persons have been coerced.
Naz Shah
To go back to the point about multiple opportunities and capacity, my understanding from this morning’s Guardian is that an amendment has been tabled—it was mentioned earlier; I do not know whether others have had sight of it, but I certainly have not—on potentially having a panel instead of a judge. My hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford has just asked a question, and my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley responded by saying that she would come back to it, but my concern is that we are looking at the clause now, and once we have discussed it there will be no going back to it. I am trying to understand at what stage in the process she will come back and fix it. If we are going to address it under clause 9, clause 8 or wherever, how will that impact on clause 1? How will it address the issues that we are debating right now?
Kim Leadbeater
At the moment, we are addressing the fitness for purpose of the Mental Capacity Act, but there are other amendments that will take on board some of my hon. Friend’s points, particularly about people with learning disabilities. I am very happy to look at that. I am working to table an amendment before the recess, to give the Committee an opportunity to look at it in great detail. My hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West is right that that would provide another opportunity for assessment of capacity with the involvement of psychiatrists and social workers, who have said that that is their expertise and what they excel in, and who feel that they have a valuable role to play in the process.
Naz Shah
At what stage will we know how the amendments that my hon. Friend proposes have an impact on clause 1? If we make amendments later in the Bill, how will that have an impact on the amendments that we have discussed this morning, in particular in relation to capacity?
Kim Leadbeater
Clause 1 is very specifically about the Mental Capacity Act, on which we should get a chance to vote this afternoon. Other amendments can be tabled ahead of Report, but the fitness for purpose of the Mental Capacity Act is a concept on which we will get a chance to vote this afternoon. Other things can be added to the Bill that would enhance other aspects, but the point that we have discussed this afternoon is about the fitness for purpose of the Act. There are different views on the Committee, which is understandable. I believe that using the well-established legal framework of the Mental Capacity Act, introducing gold-standard training and consulting experts in assessing capacity will mean that there is no need to develop a whole new framework around the concept of ability, particularly on the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge. I therefore do not support the amendments.
Sarah Olney
The hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley used an arresting phrase this morning: he said that to abandon the Mental Capacity Act would take us “into tiger country”. The concept appeals greatly to me, but what I would say to him and other Committee members is that it is the Bill itself that takes us into tiger country. It is unprecedented, and this is very new territory for legislation in this country. That is the tiger country, right there. If we are going to let those tigers out into the wild, we need to ensure that the British public, and particularly the most vulnerable members of it, have the right protections. That is what the amendment seeks.
There was not a consensus among those who gave oral or written evidence that the Mental Capacity Act is a sufficient safeguard for the purpose proposed in the Bill. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford for his speech this morning, which illustrated vividly for all of us how the Mental Capacity Act is used in practice. I particularly thank him for his personal reflection.
Let me reiterate what the amendment seeks. The Bill proposes to judge mental capacity for a decision to request assisted dying in relation to the Mental Capacity Act 2005. There are elements of the Mental Capacity Act that are tried and tested, and should be retained in assessments of capacity in relation to this legislation, but as per the written evidence of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, the Mental Capacity Act is not sufficient for the purposes of assisted dying, because it cannot distinguish between those who suffer from a mental disorder and those who do not. It needs to be adapted for the purposes of the Bill.
My amendment 34 would therefore substitute “capacity” with “ability” and reserve to the Secretary of State the power to define ability for the purposes of the Bill. To me, that is a pragmatic response. The debate in the Committee Room today reflects the lack of consensus among the experts who gave witness. That is why I think the matter is better resolved by those experts giving advice to the Secretary of the State, so the definition of ability can be expertly decided on.
The difference between choosing assisting dying and choosing to end treatment was a big topic of debate both this morning and this afternoon. It goes to the heart of the different approaches that people take towards the Bill. I support the observation from the hon. Member for East Wiltshire that the difference is between dying of an illness itself, or dying of the effects of the approved substance, as laid out in the Bill. To me, that is a substantial and material difference, so our approach to establishing capacity should reflect that.
The hon. Member for Reigate made an important point about the difference between a passive and an active choice. That very much reflects what I am trying to achieve through the amendment, which would allow us to strengthen the safeguards around the assessment of capacity. Given that there was not a consensus, among the experts who gave evidence, on whether the Mental Capacity Act is sufficient for the purpose, the pragmatic step is to allow the amendment to create the conditions under which a stronger safeguard can be adopted if necessary.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Danny Kruger
On a point of order, Sir Roger. I wonder whether you can advise me. I am perplexed about the position of the Government Ministers. It is an absolute pleasure to have them here, but I am confused by this Jekyll and Hyde character. They seem to have two personalities on the Committee, voting as private Members but speaking as Ministers. I wonder whether there is any precedent for that in any private Member’s Bill, or indeed any Bill, and whether Parliament admits the split personas that they have.
I totally understand the rationale for having Government Ministers here. It makes me query the whole concept of this being entirely a private Member’s Bill, but I recognise the role of the Government in it. However, if the Government want Ministers present at this Committee, there are Standing Orders that enable Law Officers to attend in their official capacity but not vote. That seems to me to be the appropriate way in which Ministers should be represented here. If they want to speak on the appropriateness of particular measures in terms of Government policy and applicability, that is perfectly appropriate, but I do not understand why they are also voting on this amendment in their capacity as private Members. I wonder whether you can advise me, Sir Roger.
The Chair
Happily, that is not a matter for the Chair. However, let me make it clear that the two Ministers present are members of the Committee in their own right as Members of Parliament and are therefore permitted to speak and vote, as are all other Committee members. Were any Minister to feel that there was a conflict between their personal view and the view that the Government wish to express, my understanding is that that would be a matter for discussion between that Minister and the Government. More than that I am afraid I cannot offer.
Stephen Kinnock
Further to that point of order, Sir Roger. I thank the hon. Member for East Wiltshire for his question. Let us take this back to first principles.
This is a private Member’s Bill. A Bill Committee had to be formed. The Committee was formed in discussions between the Member sponsoring the Bill, the Whips and the House authorities. The principle of formulating the Committee was based in large part on the steer given by the debate and the vote on Second Reading, which delivered a majority of 55 in the House. The numerical composition of this Committee was therefore based on that majority of 55, broadly speaking. My hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley needed to put together a Committee that reflected that.
The position was also taken that there should be Government Ministers on the Committee who had to speak for the Government with neutrality. It is with those two factors in mind that the Committee was put together. The two functions that my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Finchley and Golders Green and I have reflect the two purposes that were in mind when the Committee was put together.
The Chair
Again, that is not a matter for the Chair. Points of order are not matters for debate; they are points of order.
Stephen Kinnock
My apologies, Sir Roger. It was just a point of clarification.
The Chair
That is all right. Nevertheless, I am minded to refer the matter to the Clerk of the House for his consideration. This is no reflection on either of the hon. Gentlemen, or indeed on the Committee, but there are issues here that I think the Clerk of the House perhaps needs to consider in the broader context.
The Chair
No, I am not taking any further points of order on the subject. I have made my judgment. If it is on a different matter—
Kit Malthouse
I was just going to say that it is not unprecedented: it has happened before, in the Tobacco and Vapes Bill.
Kim Leadbeater
On a point of order, Sir Roger. I am not sure that we have voted on amendment 202.
The Chair
We will take it when we get to it. Thank you for raising that point, because this is a learning process for a lot of people. We decide on the amendment that is moved; we will then decide on any further amendments, if any Member wishes to propose them, in the order in which they appear in the Bill. In this case, that is not yet.
Danny Kruger
I beg to move amendment 353, in clause 1, page 1, line 12, at end insert
“, and
(e) is not a prisoner”.
This amendment makes prisoners ineligible for assisted dying.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 356, in clause 1, page 1, line 12, at end insert
“, and
(e) is not homeless within the meaning of section 175 of the Housing Act 1996 (Homelessness and threatened homelessness).”
Amendment 354, in clause 7, page 4, line 12, at end insert—
“(ea) is not a prisoner,”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 353.
Amendment 357, in clause 7, page 4, line 12, at end insert—
“(ea) is not homeless within the meaning of section 175 of the Housing Act 1996 (Homelessness and threatened homelessness).”
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 356.
Amendment 355, in clause 12, page 8, line 9, at end insert—
“(fa) the person is not a prisoner”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 353.
Amendment 358, in clause 12, page 8, line 9, at end insert—
“(fa) the person is not homeless within the meaning of section 175 of the Housing Act 1996 (Homelessness and threatened homelessness).”
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 356.
Danny Kruger
Me again, I’m afraid. The amendments in my name would exclude from eligibility people who are in prison and people who are classified as homeless. In this debate and in our evidence sessions, we have heard it said quite a lot that most people who opt for an assisted death in countries that have it are advantaged—they are middle-class, in our idiom—but the plan is to offer it to everybody; it would be a universal right. My amendments would address some of the most disadvantaged people in our country.
I have had a very privileged life, but for 20 years I have run a charity working in London prisons; I spent about 10 years as full-time chief executive and have spent another 10 years as chairman. I have known hundreds of prisoners and ex-offenders, and I still do. Although I firmly believe in criminal justice—indeed, I think we need to be tougher on certain categories of offender—I recognise from my personal experience the dignity in all prisoners and the absolute necessity of respecting their dignity. In fact, I once wrote a speech for a Conservative leader of yesteryear that made some of those points and got headlined “Hug a hoodie”.
Kim Leadbeater
Did the polling ask people’s view on whether terminally ill homeless people should have access to assisted dying, or on whether it should be offered to homeless people just for being homeless? That would seem very strange.
Danny Kruger
The hon. Lady might well be right. I totally take that point. I dare say it is people who are homeless. I think the question put was, “Should those who are homeless simply be able to ask for assisted dying?” People in this country say no. In Canada, asked the same question, a quarter of people say yes. The effect of the law has been to institute this principle of assisted dying being an acceptable choice under any circumstances, which is indeed, I am afraid, what happens.
I will end with a powerful quote from Fazilet Hadi, who spoke to us representing disabled people. She said:
“This Bill is not an abstract exercise; it will land in a society that is rife with inequality.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 185, Q242.]
She said that the society the Bill will land in is the thing that needs to change, not the Bill. She thinks we need to change our society before we do anything like introducing assisted dying. I agree.
Kit Malthouse
I should start by recognising that my hon. Friend the Member for East Wiltshire, who is my constituency neighbour, has devoted much of his adult life to public service. He should know that I have always admired him for that, and particularly for his work with the vulnerable and underprivileged in prisons. As he knows, I have spent much of my time in politics working with a similar population, so, like him, I understand their particular vulnerabilities. However, I oppose his amendments, and I hope he will bear with me while I enumerate why.
I believe that there are some definitional problems with the amendments, as well as some quite serious moral and ethical problems, and they compound into a practical difficulty. The first definitional one is who exactly my hon. Friend means by “prisoners”. As he knows, not all prisoners are the same. Would he seek to deny assisted dying to prisoners on remand who have yet to be found guilty of a crime but are being held in advance of the criminal justice process? Would he deny assisted dying—which will be available to everybody else if the Bill passes—to people who are held in prison for not paying their council tax, for example, or for contempt of court? There is a variety of vulnerability in the criminal justice system, and prisoners are inside for different lengths of time and in different institutions. Quite a lot of white-collar criminals go to open prisons, for example. Would he seek to deny them?
To me, if my hon. Friend’s objective is to protect vulnerable prisoners, the definition that he is using is far too wide. There are many people who may well find themselves in extremis while they are in prison and are likely to be released at some point, after a short sentence or because of the nature of their sentence, who would therefore have their ability to access assisted dying foreshortened.
Similarly, when my hon. Friend speaks of homeless people and uses the definition in the Housing Act 1996, I think he actually means rough sleepers. The definition of homelessness that he referred to includes people who are staying with friends, people who are moving between homes and people who are likely to become homeless at some point in the future. It is a very wide definition, which covers a large number of people, some of whom would not necessarily be classified as vulnerable and may well be assessed as perfectly capable and have the capacity to make this decision. So my first point is that there is a definitional problem with the broad terms that my hon. Friend has chosen.
Danny Kruger
I accept those points. Nevertheless, the Bill itself has broad definitions and large exclusions—people who have more than a six-month prognosis, and so on. The Bill, I am afraid, operates in pretty broad brush strokes in order to try to defend large categories of people, so I think it is appropriate to exclude all people who are currently incarcerated—people who are in prison—whatever the reason or the length of their sentence, until they are released, and then they can start the process if they wish to and if they qualify.
On homelessness, yes, we should use the official definition of homelessness, which basically means “in precarious housing”. The purpose of the Bill is to enable people who have full autonomy to make a decision in their own best interest. I think it is legitimate to ask whether people who are living in insecure accommodation, whose lives are in flux, who are experiencing extreme precariousness in their lives, should meet the appropriate criteria for autonomy that we wish to set out.
Kit Malthouse
I was about to come on to the fact that those questions would indeed be asked through the assessment that takes place. As my hon. Friend knows—we have had a long discussion about it—the Mental Capacity Act relies to a certain extent on context to assess capacity.
Turning to my hon. Friend’s point on prisoners, this may come as a surprise to him, but some people who are held on remand are found innocent and are released from prison. During their period on remand, which could be quite lengthy, they would be denied access to something they would not otherwise be denied access to.
Danny Kruger
My objection is not on the basis of criminality, innocence or guilt. I would not deny criminals this right because they are criminals. I would deny them what I regard as a dangerous opportunity because they are vulnerable. Whether guilty or not, whether they are on remand or not, they are in an equally precarious position and equally vulnerable, and that is why they should be excluded.
Kit Malthouse
I understand my hon. Friend’s point, but we are talking about people who do not have much time. We have to remember throughout this debate that we are talking about people who have limited time; they have been diagnosed, and their prognosis is six months or less. In fact, the experience from overseas is that quite a lot of people come to assisted dying beyond six months. We are operating on the basis that suddenly everybody at six months decides they are going to apply for it. Quite a lot apply with just days or weeks to go; time is therefore important to them, and so it should be to us. I am concerned that the definitions interfere with that.
Secondly, there is a distinct moral issue about the denial of services, particularly medical services, to groups of individuals based on their circumstances. We do not currently do that. We do not deny medical services to prisoners because they are prisoners. We believe it is a sign of a civilised society that they access the same healthcare as everybody else through our national health service. The same is true of those homeless groups. That includes allowing them to make the kind of decisions that we have talked about in the previous debate: decisions about life-threatening surgery and about the continuation of their life. It is certainly the case, as my hon. Friend will know from his work in prisons, that a number of prisons have developed hospice facilities within the prison to deal with end-of-life issues. Indeed those that do not have hospice care work closely with NHS palliative care outside and very often bring in specialists to deal with end-of-life issues in the prison.
Rebecca Paul
Some incredibly important points have been made. I would like to give an example. Let us consider someone who is homeless. Perhaps they are staying with friends, as my right hon. Friend said. If they find themselves to be terminally ill, they may well face difficulties in accessing palliative care and getting the right treatments simply because they are homeless. This is about protecting that vulnerable group from choosing assisted dying simply because they are in a precarious and difficult situation and assisted dying seems like the best option in the light of lack of palliative care and their current circumstances. Would my right hon. Friend concede that that is what my hon. Friend the Member for East Wiltshire is trying to address?
Kit Malthouse
I would certainly concede that; absolutely, I agree. The whole purpose of the safeguards in the Bill is to protect those who would be vulnerable, to ensure they have the capacity to make the decisions they want to make, and to ensure that they are making them for the right reasons. However, I think a lot of people would find it unfair and immoral that they were excluded not because of their own sense of themselves and their ability and capacity but simply because of their circumstances. As I am trying to point out, those who are homeless or prisoners in the widest definition of those words can find their circumstances changing quite significantly within the timeframe of six months. Given that they have only got six months under this Bill, we should not interfere with that and say, “Well, you are in; you are out.”
This may seem like a narrow example, but imagine that somebody diagnosed with a progressive disease were to commit a criminal act and end up going to prison, and during their time in prison, they reach the six-month period. Are they to be denied assisted dying if it is available to everybody else in the population? To me, that would not seem morally right, particularly given that we have a duty to deliver, and we do deliver, end-of-life services to them in the prison to help them cope with those circumstances. As my hon. Friend will know, there are charities which provide end-of-life care in prison as well.
Danny Kruger
In the circumstances my right hon. Friend is describing, the prisoner would be eligible for the compassionate release scheme.
Danny Kruger
That is what I hope would happen if it was necessary for the prisoner to be released in order to avail himself of opportunities on the outside. If he is terminally ill, that is what should happen.
Kit Malthouse
I am very pleased my hon. Friend raised that issue, because I was about to come to the practical difficulties that this presents, for exactly that reason. As he rightly pointed out, for a large number of prisoners, subject to assessment of the safety of the public, if they contract a terminal disease in prison, as they reach the end of their life, they qualify for compassionate early release. Often, that is within weeks of their death—naturally, as one would expect. It is carefully reviewed by prison governors and, I think, has to be signed off by the Secretary of State, as a final control. The problem with denying them the services while they are in prison is that if they are eventually compassionately released, they may have only a matter of weeks or days to go through what will be quite an onerous process to avoid a horrible death.
Naz Shah
I support the amendment for a number of reasons. I have a huge amount of experience of dealing with women, domestic violence and prisons. The first time I came to this House was to lobby the then Labour Home Secretary to reduce my mother’s tariff, because she served 14 years in prison. When my mother was in prison, I was left homeless, so I have experience of that as well. I have experience of, while I was homeless, attempting suicide on two occasions, and I ended up having my stomach pumped. I therefore speak with a reasonable amount of experience in dealing with this.
From a domestic violence point of view, which is why my mother killed an abusive partner, and having been a victim of domestic abuse, I also understand the vulnerabilities concerning women in particular—less so men, although I know the hon. Member for East Wiltshire has done a lot of work on that in his adult life. The majority of women who end up in prison—we have seen this from review of the courts, time and again—are victims of abuse, whether sexual, domestic or another kind. The majority of our women prisoners are in that position.
The suicide rate among the population in England and Wales is 11.4 per 100,000, but for prisoners, that goes up to 108 per 100,000, which is nearly 10 times as high. We also know from research that one third of female prisoners in England and Wales self-harm. We know from the Home Affairs Committee report in the last Parliament on health in the English prison system that standards of health deteriorated in recent years due to budget reduction, loss of prison officers, staff shortages and overcrowding. We know that the Government have had to bring forward early releases, because the prison system is not fit for purpose after the cutbacks of the last 14 years.
All this speaks to me of vulnerability. I hear the points that both the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire and the hon. Member for East Wiltshire have made that, in an ideal world, people should absolutely have equal access to healthcare, but the problem is that we are not in an ideal world. From my perspective, we have a prison system that has had to have emergency interventions since the Labour party came into government, because it is not fit for purpose.
From a healthcare perspective, going back to what Dr Jamilla said and the numerous bits of evidence we heard about health inequalities, I know from a place such as Bradford West that people from ethnic minority backgrounds have less trust in healthcare services. I know that we do not have equity in healthcare services. As a former NHS commissioner, I know that those health inequalities impact on quality of life and that it is a postcode lottery. I am thinking about New Hall women’s prison in Wakefield and Armley prison, which is near Bradford. I am not familiar with London prisons, but I imagine the vulnerability of the women at New Hall. This comes back to the conversation about capacity: by some definition, they might have capacity.
However, we also heard from eminent psychiatrists that when someone has a diagnosis, it impacts on their mental health. In this instance, we are talking about six months, which the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire referred to a number of times. In that six months, access to visitors might not come for another few weeks. A person might not even have a member of their family next to them when they get that diagnosis. They could well be innocent; they could well have been a victim of domestic violence and ended up in prison because they killed an abusive partner after years of abuse.
They could be in a number of situations, but the one thing I concur with is the amount of vulnerability here, in particular for women, which speaks to the issues of capacity and coercion. It speaks to all the things that we are debating here, which is why I support this amendment: it would protect those who are vulnerable. If there was a diagnosis, prison systems would kick in. If someone was given less than six months to live, they would invoke compassionate grounds to leave the prison system, but I would be really uncomfortable seeing anybody in prison being given the option without that comfort.
I cannot imagine being in the position of, say, my mum. I cannot imagine—I would not dare imagine; I do not think I could handle it—the idea of being taken away from my family and being incarcerated, rightfully or wrongfully, guilty or not guilty. I would be in a place, a system and an institution where, depending on which category of prison I was in, the institutional wraparound and the interventions are very different. It depends on the stage of the sentence that somebody is in. If they are in at stage 1 at a category A prison, there are much stricter rules and regulations. Imagine a person being faced with all that and finding out that they have six months to live. As the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire said, there is no guarantee that it is six months—more than 40% of those diagnoses do not turn out to be correct, and they could live longer. What would the impact be on that person? Could they make that decision? From a capacity point of view, I am not sure that that would exist.
Kit Malthouse
The hon. Lady is feeling towards the point I was trying to make, perhaps slightly incoherently. The point is that in my view, whether or not those people have access to this service, it should be based on an assessment of them as themselves, including their mental capacity, particular characteristics and their settled will, just as it would be for everyone else under the Bill. The fact that they are, at that point, a prisoner impacts on the context in which their capacity is assessed, which must be the critical factor. Having a blanket ban on all prisoners, capable or otherwise, seems cruel, if I am honest.
We know that prisons have to assess capacity in difficult circumstances. There are prisoners who decide to decline food and water and starve themselves to death. They are assessed as having capacity, if that is not the case, and in certain circumstances they are force fed, if it is seen that they do not have the capacity to take that decision themselves. In fact, the reason why prisons have created hospices within prisons is to deal with exactly such end of life decisions.
If we are doing it for non-assisted dying, why would we deny people the choice and autonomy, having been assessed as capable of making the decision, to do it in prison? Worse than that, if we are going to release them on compassionate grounds, why would we give them a shorter period to access the service than anybody else?
Naz Shah
I appreciate where the right hon. Member is coming from—I sincerely do. It comes back to the heart of the issue around capacity. We heard from the psychiatrist—her name escapes me, but she was on the right-hand side—that, where there is an increase of vulnerability, if somebody is told they would get pain relief, they would choose an alternative path. Those were similar words, and I will find the reference.
My point is that we do not have equal healthcare access in prison. We provide prisoners with healthcare, but it is in no way equitable. The health inequalities that exist outside prison are bad enough. Palliative care is not fit for purpose in our country—it is a postcode lottery. Depending on which prison someone goes to, that will determine what kind of access they have to palliative care. It is not a level playing field.
Naz Shah
It would be if we were making treatment equitable, but if we apply the test of legality, and this is about pain—we have already seen the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough, which would widen the scope from six months to 12 months—where do we draw the line in terms of equity and legality? The Bill is open to a lot of legal challenges, and if we want to go down that route, there would be plenty of them.
Tom Gordon
There is a fundamental difference between trying to ensure that people have equal access to assisted dying and prohibiting a specific group or category. Does the hon. Member understand that?
Naz Shah
I understand that perfectly well. On the idea of not giving people assisted dying, as the Bill stands, the category also includes people who decide to stop eating or taking insulin and people who decide not to go on dialysis. It includes a whole host of illnesses. If we are talking about the legal challenges, which my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud started with, the legal challenges for the Bill are vast as it stands.
Danny Kruger
On the point of legality, of course a law could be challenged under the European convention on human rights, but Parliament is sovereign. If Parliament decides to exclude a particular category, we in this place have to take this enormous responsibility—we make the law in this country.
Kim Leadbeater
My hon. Friend has listed certain categories of people, and we will come on to the definition of terminal illness. I am confident that, given the definition of terminal illness in the Bill, some of the groups of people she has talked about will not be included in its scope.
Naz Shah
Where does it specify that? I know we are going to debate that subject later, but right now there is nothing that gives me assurance that those people will be excluded. Unless there is an amendment that my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley will support, the Bill, as drafted, would still apply to somebody if they decided not to carry on with treatment, or if they decided they did not want to take their insulin or other medication and that would lead to their death. I am happy to give way to my hon. Friend so that she can explain how she is going to deal with that.
Kim Leadbeater
I will. Let me read from the Bill. The definition of “terminal illness” under the Bill is that
“the person has an inevitably progressive illness, disease or medical condition which cannot be reversed by treatment”.
The conditions that my hon. Friend is describing can be reversed by treatment and are not inevitably progressive. We will come to that debate in due course, but that definition is crucial.
Naz Shah
I beg to differ on the wording that my hon. Friend just used. It actually makes my point. As it stands, if I were an insulin-dependent diabetic—and I have been so on three occasions, with my children— I could say that if I stopped taking that insulin, I would become terminally ill. In the Bill as it stands, and as it is drafted, I would meet the criteria.
Kim Leadbeater
My hon. Friend would not meet the criteria. She might be describing a condition that cannot be reversed, but it is the “inevitably progressive” part that we are talking about. Because it can be treated, it is not an
“inevitably progressive illness, disease or medical condition”.
The Chair
Order. A debate about the definition of “terminal illness” will come later in the Bill, and it might help us all if we were to swiftly move forward to that point.
Sean Woodcock
My hon. Friend the Member for Stroud, in his rebuttal to my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West, described assisted dying as “medical care”. Personally, I do not regard assisted dying as medical care. Does my hon. Friend agree?
Naz Shah
I am still having that debate in my head, and I am not convinced. I will not digress—I will come to the point—but there is a conversation about whether it is “treatment”, “assisted suicide” or “assisted death”. Those terms have been bandied about. I genuinely think that, ultimately, we have to use the word “suicide” because we are amending the Suicide Act 1961. I appreciate the context in which the promoter of the Bill puts it forward, but the truth is that it is about taking one’s life, so that is how I respond to that question.
To come back to the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for East Wiltshire, the reason why I will support them is that I have way too much experience of people in vulnerable positions, and I have a lifetime of experience of seeing what happens. I do think there are options when somebody has a diagnosis of terminal illness. The prison systems are set up to be able to give them compassionate leave and to explore other avenues. Once they are outside that system, they can access support and have their vulnerability reduced.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
Will the hon. Lady help me to understand her position? Is it a fundamental disagreement with any prisoner having access to assisted dying, or is it a fundamental issue with completing the final act, as set out in clause 18, while being a prisoner? For example, the hon. Lady touched on early release on compassionate grounds. Under those circumstances, there may be a prisoner who has been given a six-month diagnosis, and their early release may not be until the last couple of weeks of their life. Should they be deprived of going through the process and the assessment, albeit not enacting the final act until they have been released?
Naz Shah
Yes, I think there should be a deprivation of that final act, because there are vulnerabilities with that prisoner while they are inside a prison. What they need is not an option of assisted death at that point. That speaks to the amendment that I tabled, which is about making sure that we do not have the conversation in the first four weeks in any case, because a diagnosis of terminal illness affects people’s mental capacity and mental health. We know that: we have heard it from the psychiatrists. It is common sense; it does not take a genius to work it out.
We know that people in prison have additional vulnerabilities. We are having a debate about the issue of capacity, which we have clearly not agreed on. A person-centred care package needs to be about supporting the person, removing vulnerabilities, giving autonomy, and offering choices around accessing palliative care and medication, so that they are in a much stronger position to make an informed choice.
Kit Malthouse
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for allowing me to intervene again. Can she not see that by supporting the hon. Gentleman’s amendment she is basically defining all prisoners as de facto vulnerable? It is not the case. Although many are vulnerable, both my hon. Friend the Member for East Wiltshire and I have met a lot of criminals and prisoners in our time, and quite a lot of them are smart, capable people who made a stupid decision. They are not vulnerable; they deeply regret what they did and go on to live perfectly functional lives.
We should be applying to prisoners exactly the same criteria of assessment—around capacity, vulnerability and settled will—at the time they are diagnosed with a terminal disease as we do to everybody else, because if we are not going to differentiate among prisoners, in many ways we are dehumanising the entire population. We are saying, “You are all vulnerable—no question—and we are excluding you completely on that basis.” As the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough said, that is in many ways a fundamental denial of a basic human right.
Naz Shah
The idea that it is the fundamental denial of a human right is not quite correct. We are talking about the denial of a provision in a Bill that has not come into law. It is a potential legal position; it is not necessarily a human right yet. If the Bill comes into force, at that point it becomes an option that could be denied. There are many prisoners. Prison serves many purposes, one of which is to reform. There will be many prisoners who go in there and get a degree in criminality because they are surrounded by other prisoners. There are people who make choices.
In the first four weeks we should not have the conversation around assisted death in any case. I have tabled an amendment to that effect and will speak to it when we come to it. In the meantime, a person has an added layer of pressure if they are in prison. It does not mean that everybody is necessarily vulnerable from a starting position. I agree that there may be prisoners who are not vulnerable, but there is an added pressure if somebody is homeless or in prison, not having family or security, that would no doubt compound their mental health. Whether that is a slight or a large impact is for somebody else to assess, but as it is I support the amendment.
Tom Gordon
I can understand where the hon. Lady is coming from, but I wonder whether she has any specific examples of groups such as people who are homeless or prisoners having other rights denied to them. That is what I am struggling with, although I can understand her point about people being vulnerable. The only other example that strikes me is that people who are incarcerated are unable to vote. I cannot think of any other instance where people would have any particular right removed from them. Does the hon. Lady have any other examples or comparable situations she can share to help us?
Danny Kruger
Prisoners are denied their liberty, not just their vote. They are treated as a single class of people who the state has specific responsibilities for, because it essentially owns them for the time that they are incarcerated. Prisoners have particular protections, but they are also denied a whole range of human rights and opportunities that the rest of society can have. It is not inappropriate to treat prisoners as a distinct class of people to whom the state has a specific responsibility.
Sojan Joseph
I want to contribute to this discussion based on my experience as a mental health nurse. I worked in mental health services for 22 years, including managing a medium secure forensic unit. I have worked with many homeless people and people who were detained under the Mental Health Act by the criminal justice system in those medium secure units and who had been involved in criminal activities.
With my experience, I can categorically say that that group of people is very vulnerable. As the hon. Member for East Wiltshire said, self-harming and suicidal tendencies are very high among that group. As part of the risk assessments that we carry out in the mental health system, one of the questions is whether they are homeless. That question is asked to identify that vulnerability.
These amendments bring up the importance of a psychosocial assessment, which was highlighted in many pieces of our oral evidence. If we are looking to bring more safeguards into this Bill, that is something we should consider to safeguard this group of people.
I want to make one more point about what the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire said: not all homeless people are homeless in the same way; some people choose to sleep rough. I am not clear whether, if somebody is sleeping rough and is diagnosed with a terminal illness, we are looking to bring them back into an NHS bed to assist them to die. I do not know whether there is a provision to identify how we would manage those sorts of situations.
Kit Malthouse
I was not necessarily saying what the hon. Member said that I said—that all homeless people are the same. However, it is the case that, for rough sleepers in particular, a number of charities, such as St Mungo’s, have had to develop on-street palliative care services for the rough sleepers who sadly do contract terminal diseases or are reaching the end of their lives. Very often, part of that service is to try to encourage them to come into some kind of institutional environment, such as a hospital, where their healthcare can be better served. It is a particular difficulty with that group, and there is a high incidence of mental health problems among the street homeless—not homeless people generally, but the street homeless—but that, in my view, would be caught by the general assessment that takes place.
In fact, the hon. Member may be interested to know that there is quite a lot of on-street mental health assessment taking place for people. People who are living on the street develop all sorts of disorders—indeed, there are often people with quite significant mental health problems on the street—and they are dealt with as closely as possible to the front end.
Therefore, it would not be beyond the capability of the state to make assessments about individuals that are appropriate to the context. I am trying to stress the point that we need to see the person as an individual, as well as within their context. With a blanket ban on particular groups, the human right that I was referring to is denied—it denies them the right to be seen as an individual and assessed as an individual, which is what we do in every other service that we provide to them.
Sojan Joseph
I thank the right hon. Member for that intervention. To clarify, not all patients who are diagnosed as terminally ill are necessarily bedridden. They may be capable of carrying out their day-to-day activities as normal, even though they have been diagnosed with a terminal illness and have been given a prognosis of six months. They may still be walking around. Not everybody needs palliative care, in fact.
My question was: if somebody who is a rough sleeper is diagnosed with a terminal illness and they want help with assisted dying, will we make provision to bring them back into an NHS bed to facilitate their dying? It would be great to have that clarification. I support the amendment, as I have seen many highly vulnerable people who would be more likely to choose the path to end their life if they were given the option.
Stephen Kinnock
The amendments relate to the criteria that individuals would need to meet to request assistance to die under the Bill. All the amendments seek to amend the eligibility criteria in some manner. To reiterate, the Government have no view on the policy questions pertaining to the amendments, and my role here is to offer observations on the legal and practical impact of amendments tabled. The legal impact of these amendments will be the main focus of my remarks.
Amendment 353 seeks to make prisoners ineligible for assisted dying services even if they meet the definition of having a terminal illness. Amendments 354 and 355 are consequential amendments that would make it a requirement for the co-ordinating doctor in the first assessment and the court process to ascertain whether a person seeking assistance to end their own life is a prisoner.
Aside from the right to liberty, article 5 of the European convention on human rights requires that prisoners should have the same rights as those who are not prisoners. The rights engaged by the amendment are article 8 on the right to respect for private and family life and article 14 on the protection from discrimination. Making prisoners ineligible for assisted dying would, on the face of it, lead to a difference in treatment between prisoners and non-prisoners that would need to be objectively and reasonably justified. The justification test requires that the treatment in question is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.
Naz Shah
I note that the Minister used the word “treatment” twice, but we are not talking about a treatment; we are talking about assisted death. I think someone mentioned earlier that it is a treatment, but it is not a treatment, is it? I would welcome his clarification on that.
Stephen Kinnock
I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. My understanding is that it is termed as a treatment under the law. The Government do not take a view on the semantics of the word; my understanding is that that is how it is classified under the law.
Sarah Olney
It is really important that we establish whether this will be defined as a treatment or indeed as something quite distinct in law. My understanding is that the word “treatment” should never apply to assisted dying. I would be grateful for the Minister’s clarification.
Stephen Kinnock
I apologise; I think I misunderstood the intervention of my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford West, so my comments were not clear. I meant the treatment of this matter under the law. As I said, the justification test requires that the treatment in question is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. That means the way in which the matter is treated under the law. That is what I meant; I think we got our wires crossed.
Finally, let me address amendments 356, 357 and 358, whose purpose is to exclude those who are homeless within the meaning of section 175 of the Housing Act 1996 from the definition of a “terminally ill person”. The effect of amendment 356 would be to amend the definition of a “terminally ill person”, as set out in clause 1 of the Bill, to expressly exclude a person who, notwithstanding that they met all the other requirements set out in paragraphs (a) to (d) of subsection (1), was homeless within the meaning of section 175 of the Housing Act 1996.
Amendments 357 and 358 seek to make consequential amendments to clause 7 on the first doctor’s assessment and clause 12 on court approval. These amendments would require the co-ordinating doctor and the court to be satisfied that, in their opinion, the person was not homeless within the meaning of section 175 of the Housing Act 1996 before making their statement or declaration to allow the person to proceed to the next stage of the assisted dying process.
Article 14 states that the rights set out in the ECHR should be secured for everyone without discrimination on any ground. This amendment engages article 8 on the right to respect for private and family life. Making those who are homeless ineligible for assisted dying would lead to a difference in treatment that will need to be objectively and reasonably justified. The justification test requires that the treatment in question is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.
I hope these observations may be helpful to Members in considering these amendments and making a determination about who should be eligible for accessing assisted dying services, should the Bill pass.
Danny Kruger
What an interesting debate—I am grateful to all hon. Members who participated.
I am interested in what the Minister was saying about the ECHR. Notwithstanding my general point about the sovereignty of Parliament, when Lord Sumption gave evidence to the Committee two weeks ago, he stressed the wide margin of appreciation given to member states on the ECHR. Does the Minister think that that will apply in this case to ensure that the British Parliament could vote to exclude these categories of people? If his view is that the Bill could be subject to challenges on discrimination grounds, however, particularly under article 14, I think we will have a lot of problems in applying the Bill. I wonder whether, in due course, we will be able to tease out how the ECHR will intersect with the Bill.
As the Minister says, the crucial point is that any discrimination must be justified on the basis of achieving a legitimate and proportionate aim. My suggestion is that there is an absolutely legitimate aim, and that this is a proportionate means of achieving it.
The debate got quite philosophical, which I found very interesting. I observe that my constituency neighbour, esteemed colleague and great Conservative, my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire, has a vision of our particular political creed that is entirely individualistic. He stresses the absolute importance of individual autonomy, treating everybody as an individual without reference to the context in which they live. I suggest to him, and to the Committee, that our freedom and autonomy depend on our relationships. Our autonomy proceeds from our socialisation. We do not emerge fully formed into the world with all our values and attributes; we acquire them by virtue of the people around us.
The crucial thing about the prison experience is that it disrupts the relationships that can make an individual genuinely free. Homelessness does likewise, and it sets up all sorts of new relationships and new socialisations that can often be very negative.
Kit Malthouse
I am grateful for my hon. Friend’s kind words, but he will know that the foundation of our beliefs stretches from Magna Carta through to Mill and is based on a legal notion that I am to a certain extent my own island—that I have autonomy over myself. From habeas corpus to making decisions about my own medical treatment, I should have rights. That is not to say that my decision-making capacity should not be assessed within the context in which I live.
What I was trying to communicate to my hon. Friend and his supporters in respect of this amendment is that I think it profoundly wrong to paint all prisoners with the same brush and see them as a homogeneous whole, rather than seeing them for the individuals they are, specifically when they are taking a very individual, personal and private decision about their own life and death.
Danny Kruger
I trace our liberties to an evolution of British law, and of English law, that recognises the essential nature of our individuality as being socialised. We belong to one another and we derive our freedom from other people. Our autonomy, Magna Carta and all the liberties of the individual proceed from that. None of us, no man, is an island. That is what I suggest to my right hon. Friend. His point was about treating everybody as solitary individuals, making independent private decisions. That is not the way any of us operate; it is certainly not the way people in the most vulnerable circumstances operate. What actually happens is that we are heavily influenced by the people around us, by our circumstances and by the choices before us.
To descend from the abstract, let us consider an actual case, albeit a hypothetical one. Someone is in prison. They have committed some crime, or they have not committed a crime but have been remanded. Their whole family life has been smashed to pieces over the years, or just recently. They then get the terrible diagnosis of a terminal illness. A doctor says to them, because they are allowed to do so under the Bill, “You know, one of your options is an assisted death.” I think that that would be incredibly influential, to the point of serious concern, for those of us who know how vulnerable people in prison are. The same applies to people living on the streets, the people my right hon. Friend was describing.
Sean Woodcock
I believe that what the hon. Member has just espoused, and what has prompted this amendment, is the sort of thing that would have come out if we had had an impact assessment. If this were a Government Bill, some sort of consultation would have flagged up the potential issues ahead of the next stage. I believe that that is the exercise in which he is engaged. We have been promised a Bill with the strongest possible safeguards. He comes from a position similar to mine, which is that there is no stronger safeguard than preventing people from having assisted dying. I believe—I am happy to be corrected—that what he is trying to do in the absence of that is flag up potential issues that mean that more safeguards are needed than are being offered in this Bill. Is he prepared to comment on that?
Danny Kruger
The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. Once again, it is a shame that we are feeling our way in the absence of that assessment. Nevertheless, I think we all have experience and we can draw on the evidence. The hon. Member for Bradford West made a very powerful point, and she was absolutely right. I spoke earlier about the evidence on suicide among the male prison population; I have experience of working with women in prison as well. There is a genuine danger of chronic, almost epidemic, self-harm among the female prison population. Likewise—this is a fact that we need to bear in mind throughout the debate—suicide is itself contagious. That is why it is so important to discuss it in a responsible way. The option—I use the term advisedly—of assisted suicide is itself dangerous in the context of a prison population in which these ideas are contagious.
My right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire talks about the need to assess each case on its own merits, individually. I recognise that, and in principle of course that is what we should be doing. Nevertheless, that assumes that the safeguards in the Bill are adequate to the challenge of dealing with people in such particularly vulnerable circumstances. I am concerned that they are not adequate anyway. I believe very strongly that they are not appropriate to people in these circumstances and that therefore it is appropriate to have what he calls a blanket ban.
As I said in an intervention earlier, we have to treat particular classes of people in the same way. We do that all the time, with respect specifically to the prison population. The fact is that we have to draw the line somewhere. We are drawing the line in all sorts of places in this Bill—around the age limit and around diagnosis and prognosis. I think it would be very appropriate, given the extreme vulnerability of these populations, to draw it around them and protect them from the vulnerabilities and dangers that I think all Members recognise might apply in certain circumstances. They will apply in heightened likelihood to these populations.
I do not propose to press these amendments to a vote, but I am grateful to hon. Members for the points that they have made, and I hope that the concerns have been noted. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment made: 179, in clause 1, page 1, line 13, after “provided” insert “in England or Wales”.—(Kim Leadbeater.)
This amendment limits the assistance that may be provided in accordance with the Bill to assistance in England or Wales.
Juliet Campbell
I beg to move amendment 109, in clause 1, page 1, line 17, after first “and” insert “demonstrably”.
This amendment reflects the changes in Amendments 110 to 112 that change the requirement from having to establish that a person who wishes to end their own life under the Act has clear, settled and informed wish, to a clear, settled and demonstrably informed wish.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 110, in clause 7, page 4, line 13, after “and” insert “demonstrably”.
This amendment requires the coordinating doctor to ascertain whether, in their opinion, the person has a “demonstrably” informed wish to end their own life.
Amendment 111, in clause 8, page 4, line 36, after “and” insert “demonstrably”.
This amendment requires the independent doctor to ascertain whether, in their opinion, the person has a “demonstrably” informed wish to end their own life.
Amendment 112, in clause 9, page 6, line 13, at end insert—
“(da) be satisfied that, in their opinion, the person has demonstrated their understanding of the matters in subsections (2)(b) to (2)(d).”
This amendment requires the assessing doctor to be satisfied that, in their opinion, the person has demonstrated their understanding of the matters that have to be discussed and the information provided under subsections (2)(b) to (2)(d).
Juliet Campbell
The amendment would strengthen the Bill by establishing a benchmark for the level of understanding of assisted dying and its process that the person needs to demonstrate to start the process. That will help to ensure that the person requesting assisted dying understands what they are asking for, so that doctors and other professionals can be assured that those who are engaged in the process have come to their own informed choice. Being informed conceptually is meaningless; it adds nothing to the Bill unless we can establish that the person can demonstrate to healthcare professionals and others that they understand assisted dying and the process.
Kit Malthouse
I understand what the hon. Member for Broxtowe is trying to achieve, but I believe that her amendments are unnecessary. “Demonstrably” is a word that is commonly used in British law, effectively to emphasise that something is important, but also to ensure that something is proven. She will have seen that I have tabled amendments to the Bill to require two declarations to be produced: one by the patient, to say that they have had the conversation about all their options, understand their options and understand what their prognosis is likely to be; and one by the co-ordinating doctor, to say that they have had the conversation and that the patient is in full possession of all the facts they need and understands what has been communicated to them.
My view is that those declarations, as well as the assessment that the doctor has to go through to confirm that the person has a settled wish to do this, are enough to show that the person demonstrably wants to access the service for themselves. I am concerned that amendment 109, like other amendments that we will debate later, would insert into the Bill a series of individual words that will unnecessarily complicate its contemplation by doctors. We heard in evidence that for the Bill to work, it needs to be simple and understandable by everybody who is dealing with it. The more we can minimise the number of words that may be open to interpretation by lawyers —and we certainly have plenty of lawyers in the room— the better. From that point of view, I will oppose the amendment. I understand what the hon. Lady is trying to achieve, but I believe that we have achieved it by different means.
Stephen Kinnock
The amendments in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe relate to an individual who seeks to access assisted dying services demonstrating their wish to end their own life and demonstrating their understanding of the process by which that happens. To support the Committee’s deliberations, I will briefly summarise the Government’s analysis of the effect of the amendments.
Amendments 109, 110 and 111 would modify the requirement that the co-ordinating doctor and the independent doctor must undertake an assessment to ascertain whether, in their opinion, the person has a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life. That would be amended to require the person to have a clear, settled and demonstrably informed wish. The term “demonstrably” would not provide further practical guidance beyond the words already in the Bill and could create uncertainty as to what constitutes being demonstrably informed.
I turn to amendment 112. Clause 9 currently provides that the co-ordinating and independent doctors must explain and discuss a number of matters with the person being assessed. These matters are set out in clause 9(2)(b), (c) and (d). In the interests of time, I will not go through each of those matters, but they include an explanation and discussion of the person’s diagnosis and prognosis, any treatment available and the likely effect of it, and the further steps that must be taken before assistance can lawfully be provided to the person under the Act.
The amendment would create an additional requirement for the co-ordinating and independent doctors. It would require them both to be satisfied that, in their opinion, the person seeking assistance has demonstrated their understanding of the matters that have been discussed under clause 9(2)(b), (c) and (d). The amendment does not specify in any further detail what the doctors would be required to look for to satisfy themselves that a person has demonstrated their understanding. That would be left to their professional judgment, with training, support and guidance, as with other concepts in the Bill. The amendment would leave it to the co-ordinating and independent doctor’s professional judgment to determine what “demonstrated their understanding” looked like in respect of each individual person.
I hope that those observations are helpful to the Committee.
Danny Kruger
I have just a few points to make. I very much applaud the hon. Member for Broxtowe for her amendment, which would genuinely—demonstrably, I might say—strengthen the Bill. It does not seem in any sense hostile to the principle or purpose of the Bill; it supports it.
To make a gentle criticism, I think that there is a concern about the lack, throughout the Bill, of a proper trail of documentary evidence following the applicant through the process. For example, the two conversations with the doctor would take place behind closed doors, and no record of their discussion would be made. I do not think that conducive to trust. There is no way to assess whether the safeguards are actually in operation.
Kit Malthouse
I am afraid that that is not actually correct. If my hon. Friend is willing to look at my amendments—I appreciate that he might not have got to them yet—he will see that one of them would require the doctor to produce a report on their assessment of the patient. Obviously a two-way declaration would also be required that the conversation pursuant to clause 4(4) has taken place and that in the doctor’s view the person is in possession of all the facts that they need in order to make the judgment that we are asking them to make. That detail and documentation will be inserted into the Bill if my amendment is agreed to.
Danny Kruger
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend. I particularly applaud his amendment’s aspiration to ensure that the doctors’ conversations are properly recorded.
Kim Leadbeater
Further to the comment from the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire, all of that will obviously be recorded on the patient’s medical records as well. The idea that it is not being recorded is just not correct.
Danny Kruger
The decisions will be recorded, but the conversations that the hon. Lady stipulates should take place under the Bill need further recording, in my view, with further evidence of what was discussed in order to ensure that the safeguards have been properly applied. I also point out that for the chief medical officer to effectively carry out the review under clause 34, they must have evidence available, not just a few schedules that have been signed off.
Likewise, I am glad to say that the opportunity remains for a legal appeal, in so far as we still have a judicial process, but I am concerned that the lack of any documentary evidence makes the application difficult for any external party or the Court of Appeal to review. Currently, there is a great paucity of information that the High Court judge considering the application can request. I think it is important that the High Court judge—or, indeed, the panel, if we move to that approach—should have access to a much fuller range of documentation to ensure that the process has been properly followed.
Tom Gordon
The hon. Member makes a valid point about ensuring that there is documentary evidence. Does he not feel that that will be covered at a later point in the Bill when we debate the amendments on training, and specifically on ensuring a coherent way in which all the doctors and people in the process set about recording?
Danny Kruger
The hon. Gentleman is a great stickler for doing things in the right order. I am grateful to him for calling us to order on that point again. I dare say that he is absolutely right. All these issues are rather interwoven through the Bill.
I will finish on a point about the role of the Court of Appeal. A rejected application—although not an approved application, I am sorry to say—can be appealed under clause 12. For the Court of Appeal’s review to be substantive, it must surely be able to review the evidence as fully as possible on what happened throughout the terminally ill person’s application.
Juliet Campbell
I still think that it is important to add “demonstrably”. The word should be included; I do not see that it would create any additional confusion. The right hon. Member for North West Hampshire said that he had tabled some amendments later on in the Bill. However, that is later on. Putting in “demonstrably” here would strengthen his proposal.
Naz Shah
Does my hon. Friend share my frustration that when the Minister says, “This is the Government’s position,” he says so in the absence of an equality assessment or impact assessment? I appreciate that the Government have outlined that the process is different, but in the absence of those assessments, where do we find the weight to support those positions?
Juliet Campbell
I absolutely agree. The word “demonstrably” could produce that weight. It could add to every other part of the Bill that a person must be able to demonstrate to health and social care professionals that they understand what assisted dying is and understand the process that will be gone through. The person needs to be able to demonstrate to other professionals that they understand. A written report by a health or social care professional is not enough; the person themselves will have to demonstrate that they have a full and clear understanding.
Juliet Campbell
I will not push it to a vote, Sir Roger. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Bambos Charalambous.)
Children's Wellbeing and Schools Bill (Fourteenth sitting)
Tuesday 11th February 2025
(1 day, 13 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill 2024-26 View all Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 11 February 2025 - (11 Feb 2025)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
New clause 22—School attendance policies—
“In Chapter 2 of Part 6 of the Education Act 1996 (school attendance), after section 443 insert—
“443A School attendance policies
(1) The proprietor of a school in England must ensure—
(a) that policies designed to promote regular attendance by registered pupils are pursued at the school, and
(b) that those policies are set out in a written document (an “attendance policy”).
(2) An attendance policy must in particular include details of—
(a) the practical procedures to be followed at the school in relation to attendance,
(b) the measures in place at the school to promote regular attendance by its registered pupils,
(c) the responsibilities of particular members of staff in relation to attendance,
(d) the action to be taken by staff if a registered pupil fails to attend the school regularly, and
(e) if relevant, the school’s strategy for addressing any specific concerns identified in relation to attendance.
(3) The proprietor must ensure—
(a) that the attendance policy and its contents are generally made known within the school and to parents of registered pupils at the school, and
(b) that steps are taken at least once in every school year to bring the attendance policy to the attention of all those parents and pupils and all persons who work at the school (whether or not for payment).
(4) In complying with the duties under this section, the proprietor must have regard to any guidance issued from time to time by the Secretary of State in relation to school attendance.””
New clause 23—Penalty notices: regulations—
“In section 444B of the Education Act 1996 (penalty notices: attendance), after subsection (1) insert—
“(1A) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), regulations under subsection (1) may make provision in relation to England—
(a) as to the circumstances in which authorised officers must consider giving a penalty notice;
(b) for or in connection with co-ordination arrangements between local authorities and neighbouring local authorities (where appropriate), the police and authorised officers.””
New clause 24—Academies: regulations as to granting a leave of absence—
“(1) Section 551 of the Education Act 1996 (regulations as to duration of school day etc) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1), for “to which this section applies” substitute “mentioned in subsection (2)”.
(3) In subsection (2), omit “to which this section applies”.
(4) After subsection (2) insert—
“(3) Regulations may also make provision with respect to the granting of leave of absence from any schools which are Academies not already falling within subsection (2)(c).””
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Education (Stephen Morgan)
It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Mr Betts. Before we adjourned, I was about to turn to new clause 24. I appreciate the concern of hon. Members in this matter and their desire for academies to follow rules on granting a leave of absence. One of the many ways in which schools encourage regular attendance is by making clear to parents the circumstances under which leave of absence can and cannot be granted. All schools, however, including academies, are already required to have regard to statutory attendance guidance and are expected to follow the rules on granting a leave of absence.
Headteachers understand the responsibilities and know how important it is that children are in school. We have very little, if any, evidence of misuse of power in academies or big increases in the number of leaves of absence. All the indications are that academy heads follow the guidance and apply the exceptional circumstances test to relevant requests for leave, only granting them where it is met. We will continue to monitor this and support them to make school the best place to be for every child, but new clause 24 would not help us to do that. I invite the hon. Member to withdraw new clause 21.
Neil O'Brien (Harborough, Oadby and Wigston) (Con)
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 25
Report on the impact of charging VAT on private school fees
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within two years of the passing of this Act, publish a report on the impact of charging VAT on private school fees.
(2) A report published under subsection (1) must include the following information—
(a) how many private schools have closed as a result of the decision to charge VAT on private school fees;
(b) how many pupils have moved school because of the decision to charge VAT on private school fees;
(c) an analysis, considering paragraphs (a) and (b), of the impact of the decision to charge VAT on private school fees on maintained and academy schools, including on—
(i) the availability of school places nationally and in areas where private schools have closed;
(ii) the percentage of children which are placed at their first-choice school; and
(iii) the number of schools which have had to increase their Publish Admissions Number.”—(Neil O'Brien.)
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to publish a report on the impact of charging VAT on private school fees.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Neil O'Brien
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Around my constituency, we have seen the closure of a couple of local independent schools, which have blamed the decision to introduce VAT. This will mean more people looking for places in local state schools that are already oversubscribed and, in turn, fewer people getting their first choice. New clause 25 is not about the principle of the tax, but about having a proper mechanism to monitor the impact on the state system, among other things.
An importance piece published in The Times over the weekend found, based on freedom of information requests, that at least 27 local authorities have no spare school places in certain year groups, which will make it difficult to find places for children forced to move schools. Those are exactly the kinds of issues that we need to monitor very carefully, which is why this new clause calls for a report on the impact of the policy.
Munira Wilson (Twickenham) (LD)
I rise to speak in support of new clause 25, which seeks to monitor the impact of VAT on private school fees. There is, however, something missing in the new clause, which I have urged Ministers repeatedly to look at. I hope that even if they will not publicly talk about it, they are looking privately at the impact of this policy on the 100,000 children with special educational needs in private schools who do not have education, health and care plans, and may be displaced into the state sector. That will have an impact on the state sector and the demand for EHCPs, which is already in crisis. When Ministers respond, I hope they might address that point.
Stephen Morgan
New clause 25 would introduce a requirement for the Government to publish a report within two years of passing of the Bill on the impact of removing VAT exemption on private school fees. The report would need to provide details of any private school closures, the number of pupils from private schools who have moved schools, the availability of state school places at local and national level, what percentage of children are offered a place at their parents’ first-choice school, and whether any admissions authorities have increased their published admissions numbers as a result of VAT policy.
Before proceeding any further, I would like to note that the issue of VAT on private school fees has been subject to extensive debate during the course of the Finance Bill and the Non-Domestic Rating (Multipliers and Private Schools) Bill. As the Government have noted on many occasions now, a thorough impact assessment of the removal of VAT exemption has been conducted. A comprehensive tax impact and information note was published alongside the autumn Budget and provides much of the information sought by the hon. Members for Harborough, Oadby and Wigston and for Central Suffolk and North Ipswich. This policy, as Members will be aware, took effect from 1 January 2025.
Damian Hinds (East Hampshire) (Con)
Does the Minister not accept that there is a fundamental difference between a projection of what is expected to happen and the reporting on what has actually happened? It is the latter that helps with future policy development by learning from experience.
Stephen Morgan
I thank the right hon. Member for his interventions, and I ask him to be a bit more patient in the light of what I am going on to say. The Government’s impact assessment shows that we expect the number of private school closures to remain relatively low and that will be influenced by various factors, not just this VAT policy. Around 50 private schools, excluding independent special schools, close each year, and the Government estimate that 100 schools in total may close over the next three years in addition to the normal levels of turnover, after which closures will return to historical norms.
The Government also estimate that, in the long-term steady state, 35,000 pupils are expected to move from private schools to UK state schools. That represents less than 0.5% of all state school pupils and the resultant impact on the state education system, as a whole, is therefore expected to be very small. Differences in local circumstances will mean that the impact of this policy will vary between parts of the UK. The number of private school pupils who might seek state-funded places will vary by geographical location, and that will interact with other local place pressures.
In addition to the impact assessment, regular data is published by the Department for Education on pupil numbers and pupil moves. Data on the numbers of pupils in private schools is collected and published through the annual school census, and data on how many parents receive offers from their preferred schools in the normal admissions round is also collected from local authorities and published annually. We cannot definitively correlate pupil moves with the ending of the VAT exemption, as pupil numbers in schools fluctuate regularly for a number of reasons.
Moreover, admissions decisions must strictly be made in accordance with a school’s published admissions criteria only. We should therefore be cautious of measures that would require parents to state the reason why they are choosing to move their children to a different school, to avoid any impression that this information may be misused. School’s published admission numbers may be raised to respond to a wider local demand; in some cases and in some areas that may include, but will not necessarily limited to, increased numbers of pupils from the private sector. Where schools wish to raise their published admission number, they should do so in co-operation and collaboration with the local authority, and with a view to what is needed in the local area. Indeed, there are other measures in the Bill that stress the importance of co-operation on this issue.
Local authorities will consider pressures following the removal of the VAT exemption on school fees alongside other pressures as part of the normal place-planning cycle—this is business as usual. The Department for Education will be monitoring place demand and capacity using our normal processes and will be working with local authorities to meet any pressures. While I am grateful to Members for their interest in the issue of removing the VAT exemption on private schools, I hope that they are reassured that the Government have already addressed the impact of this policy and continue to monitor it.
Damian Hinds
I have been trying to exercise my best patience as the Minister entreated me to do. I think he is saying that it will never be possible to know, in reality, what the effect of this tax change is. Is that right?
Stephen Morgan
I know the right hon. Member will have been listening very carefully to what I said, and I made it very clear that there is a census published each year, which sets out those figures. We will work very closely with local authorities to understand the impact that the policy has.
The hon. Member for Twickenham made a number of points on children with SEND. The vast majority of pupils who have special educational needs are educated in mainstream schools—whether they are state-maintained or private—where their needs are met. Where parents have chosen to send their child to a private school but their special educational needs could be met in the state sector—such as in England where children do not have an EHCP—VAT will apply to fees. The Government do not support the new clause for the reasons that I have outlined, and I ask the hon. Member for Harborough, Oadby and Wigston to withdraw it.
Neil O'Brien
I think it is clear from the Minister’s response that there are certain things we will not be able to find out in the absence of this new clause. We will not be able to see the numbers moving from the private sector to the state sector. In particular, as the hon. Member for Twickenham raised, we will not be able to see the critical flow of those with undiagnosed or unofficially recognised special needs, as they potentially move into the EHCP process and into state schools. Nonetheless, we will continue to monitor the impact of this policy over time, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 30
Publication of details of preventative care and family support
(1) Every local authority, must within six months of the passing of this Act, publish details of all preventative care and family support available to people in their area.
(2) Information published under subsection (1) must be made available—
(a) on the authority’s website, and
(b) in all public libraries in the authority’s area.”—(Munira Wilson.)
This new clause would require all local authorities to publish information about preventative care and family support and to ensure it is freely available to people living in the area.
Brought up, and read the First time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss:
New Clause 72
Duty on local authorities to provide family support services
(1) In the Children Act 1989, after section 19 (review of provision for day care, child minding etc) insert—
“19A Duty on local authorities to provide family support services for children and families
(1) A local authority has a duty to provide, so far as is reasonably practical, family support services to all children and parents residing in their area.
(2) Family support services provided by a local authority must—
(a) be provided within the authority area;
(b) seek to improve the health and educational outcomes of children in the relevant area; and
(c) seek to reduce the number of children in their area who suffer ill treatment or neglect.
(3) In this section, “family support services” refer to services which provide children and parents with—
(a) advice, guidance or counselling;
(b) social, cultural or recreational activities; or
(c) accommodation while receiving services provided under subsections (3)(a) and (b).
(4) In fulfilling its duty under subsection (1), a local authority must have regard to—
(a) the availability of and demand for family support services in its area;
(b) the availability of and demand for family support services in its area which are capable of meeting different needs; and
(c) the location of family support services and the equality of access across the authority area.
(5) A local authority must publish information about family support services—
(a) on the authority’s website, and
(b) in all public libraries in the local authority area.
(6) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision relating to the provision of family support services by local authorities.
(7) In this section—
“local authority” means—
(a) a county council in England;
(b) a district council in England;
(c) a London borough council;
(d) the Common Council of the City of London (in their capacity as a local authority);
(e) the Council of the Isles of Scilly;
(f) a combined authority established under section 103 of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009;
“children and parents” means—
(a) a child under the age of 18;
(b) a young person aged 18-25 who has a diagnosis of special educational needs;
(c) the parents of a child or young person;
(d) a person who has parental responsibility for a child or young person; or
(e) a person who is pregnant.””
This new clause would introduce a requirement on local authorities to provide family support services for all children and parents in their area.
Munira Wilson
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this afternoon, Mr Betts. New clause 30 is a simple clause that would put into statute the duty on every local authority to publish the details of their available preventive care and family support, because we know that those are crucial forms of early intervention for children who may be at risk of going into care or where families are struggling. They can prevent things getting to crisis point for families and children.
We know that a huge amount of good work is going on in local authorities up and down the country. Spending on preventive care is falling, while late intervention spend is rising, so it would be good practice for all local authorities to make that information freely and easily accessible to all families in the way that we have already legislated for, for instance, with the kinship care offer. I hope Ministers will seriously consider this simple new clause.
Ellie Chowns (North Herefordshire) (Green)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Betts. I rise to speak in particular to new clause 72, which is on a similar topic to new clause 30, although arguably is not quite as simply drafted. The number of children in care is at an all-time high, and outcomes for those children remain poor. Evidence from the children’s charity Action for Children shows that children who have any interaction with social care are twice as likely to fail an English or maths GCSE than their peers. We need to change those outcomes, preferably through early intervention.
We have spent much time in Committee discussing the Bill’s provisions on improving care for children who need to live with a foster family or in a residential home. It is important that the best possible support is available for those children who, for whatever reason, cannot live with their birth families. However, to significantly improve children’s social care, we need to radically reset the system with a much greater focus on helping families earlier on.
I welcome the Ministers’ comments in our previous debates that the Government are committed to helping children growing up in our country to get the best start in life through wider investment in family hubs and parenting support. However, as drafted, the Bill does little to do this. Only one section of the Bill, which covers family group decision making, and which we discussed right at the start, directly addresses the need for more early intervention. Unless we amend the Bill to go further, we will continue to have a system heavily balanced towards working with families when they reach crisis point, rather than one that seeks to prevent problems before they start.
As we have discussed, families in England face mounting pressures from the lingering effects of covid-19, the high cost of living and economic uncertainty. At the same time, there have been significant cuts to services to support families. I find this statistic shocking: between 2010-11 and 2022-23, spending on early help, such as family homes and children’s centres, decreased by 44%, while spending on late intervention, including children in care, increased by 57%. The skew is going the wrong way, and it does not have to be this way.
Since the late 1990s, several initiatives have been aimed at providing support to families in their communities. That includes the Sure Start centres—first established in 1997, with more than 3,500 children’s centres having been developed by 2009—and the latest family hubs, which provide support to parents from pre-birth all the way through to 18. These centres provided welcome, non-stigmatising support for families. The services they offer and have offered are varied, but often include provisions such as stay-and-play sessions, speech and language support or benefit and employment advice for parents.
While welcomed by families themselves, too often such services are seen as a “nice to have” and subject to cuts when funding is short. It is perhaps not surprising that evidence suggests that around 1,000 such centres have shut since 2009, but we know that cutting early support for families is a false economy. It does not benefit children and families, who are too often left to struggle alone, and it does not save money in the long term. In fact, spending on early intervention programmes has repeatedly been shown to be cheaper than spending later. And this is not just about the finances; it is about the wellbeing of children and families.
The Minister for School Standards (Catherine McKinnell)
I appreciate the intention of the hon. Member for Twickenham in tabling new clause 30, and I agree that local authorities should be transparent about the services available to support children and families. However, our statutory guidance, “Working Together to Safeguard Children,” already requires local authorities and their statutory safeguarding partners to publish accessible information about the services that they offer children and families, including preventive services and family support.
I welcome the reference that the hon. Member for Twickenham made to preventive services and family support. The Government are committed to rebalancing the children’s social care system towards earlier intervention and reversing the trend of unsustainable spending at the crisis end of the system. Ou reforms to family help and multi-agency child protection, backed by over £500 million of investment in the next financial year, will improve access to early intervention services and ensure that more children and families can access the help and support that they need at the earliest opportunity.
I appreciate the intention of the hon. Member for North Herefordshire in tabling new clause 72, and I agree that local authorities should have a range of services available to support all children and young people and their families, but we have already planned investments of over £600 million for family services, across the spectrum of need—from universal services through to children’s social care interventions—in 2025-26. Through the family hubs and Start for Life programme, 75 of the most deprived local authorities in England have received funding to set up family hubs with integrated Start for Life services at their core. An additional 13 local authorities have been supported in opening family hubs through an earlier transformation fund.
By joining up and enhancing services, family hubs provide a welcoming front door to vital support to improve health, education, and the wellbeing of babies, children, young people and their families. More than 400 family hubs are funded through that programme. In 2025-26, local authorities will receive a further £126 million of combined funding from the Department for Education and the Department of Health and Social Care.
Our reforms to family help and multi-agency child protection, backed by over £500 million of investment in the next financial year, will improve access to early intervention services and ensure that children and families with multiple and/or complex needs can access the help and support they need at the earliest opportunity. I hope that that response is reassuring and that the hon. Member for Twickenham feels able to withdraw the amendment.
Munira Wilson
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 31
Eligibility for free school lunches
“In section 512ZB of the Education Act 1996 (provision of free school lunches and milk), before paragraph (a) insert—
‘(za) C’s household income is less than £20,000 per year;’”—(Munira Wilson.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Munira Wilson
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
There has been an explosion of mental health issues among our children and young people. The need and waiting lists for support were already high and growing prior to the covid pandemic, and the impact of lockdowns only made that worse. The demand for services—whether they are school-led, community-led or health service-led—is rising, and those services are struggling. The NHS estimates that one in five students under the age of 16 has a probable mental health disorder, and that figure rises to an astonishing 23% of students between the ages of 17 and 19, so we need urgent action.
I note that the Labour party manifesto committed to having a mental health professional in every secondary school, and in recent months Ministers have intimated that they intend to expand existing mental health support teams established under the previous Government. The roll-out of mental health support teams is far from complete, however. I do not have the latest data as of today, but I know that it was previously projected that by the end of 2024, only about half of secondaries and a quarter of primaries would have access to a mental health support team. With half of all lifetime mental health conditions arising before the age of 14, early intervention is key.
The new clause would place a duty on school governing bodies to ensure that every maintained and academy school in England, whether primary or secondary, has a dedicated mental health practitioner on site, with collaborative provision in place for smaller schools where it would perhaps not be sensible to have a dedicated person. That may particularly be the case in small schools. These dedicated practitioners would be trained to a graduate or postgraduate level through sources commissioned by NHS England.
There is growing evidence linking mental wellbeing to academic success. Many schools are already working incredibly hard and stretching their limited resources to provide support, but too often heads and governors tell me that they desperately need to do more. With ever-tightening budgets, mental health provision in many schools is in line to be cut. The duty that we have set out in the new clause would be accompanied by funding from central Government. The Liberal Democrats propose to fund this by trebling the tax on big tech giants and social media companies, which we know are fuelling the growth in poor mental health among our young people.
Having a dedicated mental health practitioner in all schools, both primary and secondary, would ensure that students received timely and professional support. It is the right thing to do for our children and young people.
Stephen Morgan
I am grateful for the opportunity to discuss access to mental health practitioners in schools—something this Government obviously support. We know that having the right mental health and wellbeing provision in schools is key to ensuring that children and young people can achieve and thrive, and that access to early support can address problems before they escalate.
Already, 44% of children and young people have access to an NHS-funded mental health support team in school, and we expect that to increase to around 50% by April. These teams include a new workforce of education mental health practitioners with qualifications earned through an NHS-commissioned course, as the hon. Member for Twickenham has previously referenced. However, that is still not enough, and I want to reassure the hon. Lady that outside of this Bill, the Government are committed to providing access to specialist mental health professionals in every school, and that progress is being made to achieve this.
The Government are clear that it would be impractical for schools to pay for and oversee NHS-trained mental health practitioners, especially when workforce recruitment, training, pay and conditions, important clinical supervision arrangements, continuous professional development and established systems for reporting and evaluating outcomes already exist within the NHS. This new clause would not add to the provision of mental health professionals, but would in practice switch the responsibility for an NHS-trained health service from the NHS to schools. Mandating this responsibility for schools would add a further unnecessary burden on them, as the health sector is better placed to make arrangements for education mental health practitioners in school.
Munira Wilson
The Minister said “every school”. Will he clarify on the record that he means every primary and secondary school?
Munira Wilson
Will he give us a timeline for that? This commitment has been made repeatedly, but we have heard nothing about when the services will be expanded.
Stephen Morgan
I am very happy to take the hon. Lady’s intervention; she will know that the Bill delivers a range of measures that will support children’s wellbeing. The Government are obviously committed to improving mental health support specifically, which is why we introduced the Mental Health Bill last November, which delivers on our manifesto commitment to modernise mental health legislation more broadly. We are committed to providing access to specialist mental health professionals in every school, and we are working through that at pace, alongside the existing work of the mental health support teams.
We will also be putting in place Young Futures hubs, including access to mental health support workers, and are recruiting an additional 8,500 new mental health staff members to treat children and adults. With that in mind, and with my assurance that we will deliver on our important manifesto commitment, I ask the hon. Lady to withdraw her new clause.
Munira Wilson
I wish to press the new clause to a vote.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Munira Wilson
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause seeks to introduce a tutoring guarantee so that every disadvantaged pupil who may have fallen behind gets the extra support they absolutely deserve. Members across the House will recall that on the back of covid, we had the national tutoring programme, which, according to all evidence, despite being beset with all sorts of challenges when it was rolled out, helped to boost attainment, confidence and school attendance. Sadly, the money for the national tutoring programme and the 16 to 19 tutoring fund ran out in July of last year.
Catherine McKinnell
I appreciate the hon. Member’s concern, and I thank her for raising this issue. We believe that schools are best placed to understand the needs of their pupils and should be able to choose from a range of options to best suit those needs, with tutoring being one option, but not the only one.
Although the national tutoring programme ended on 31 August 2024, schools can continue to provide tutoring through the use of their pupil premium and other school funds. The pupil premium is funding to support the educational outcomes of disadvantaged pupils, and schools can direct spending where they think the need and impact is greatest. The Department for Education has already published guidance, based on evidence gathered through the national tutoring programme, on how to plan and deliver tutoring to pupils to support schools that wish to use this option. Pupil premium guidance sets out approaches, including tutoring, that can be used to support disadvantaged pupils, including those in the groups identified in the new clause. With that in mind, I kindly ask the hon. Member for Twickenham to withdraw the clause.
Munira Wilson
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 36
Establishment of a National Body for SEND
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, establish a National Body for SEND.
(2) The functions of the National Body for SEND will include, but not be limited to—
(a) national coordination of SEND provision;
(b) supporting the delivery of SEND support for children with very high needs;
(c) advising on funding needed by local authorities for SEND provision.
(3) Any mechanism used by the National Body for SEND in advising on funding under subsection (2)(c) should be based on current need and may disregard historic spend.”—(Munira Wilson.)
This new clause would establish a National Body for SEND to support the delivery of SEND provision.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Munira Wilson
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
We all know across this House that the special educational needs system is in absolute crisis across the country. Ministers have recognised the need for reform on multiple occasions. We have been assured that Ministers are working on it, and I have no doubt that they are working incredibly hard. New clause 36 provides them with a first step on that road to reform.
The new clause would establish a new dedicated national body for SEND, which would act as a champion for children with complex needs. It would also ensure that standards are being met across the country and that children are receiving the tailored support they need. We know that spending on high needs has trebled since 2015, but as the schools Ministers herself has pointed out on a number of occasions, educational outcomes for SEND pupils have remained stagnant, with only 8% meeting expected standards at the end of primary school.
The proposed body in the new clause would have three functions: national standards for SEND provision, ensuring consistent and equitable support for children across all the regions; supporting the delivery of SEND support for children with very high needs, providing targeted assistance to those requiring intensive support; and advising on funding for local authorities, offering guidance based on current need—[Interruption.]
The Chair
Order. A Division has been called in the House. We will suspend the sitting for 15 minutes if there is one vote, and 15 minutes extra for every other vote. I hope—going back to our primary school education—we can all work those sums out.
Munira Wilson
I will pick up where I left off, on the third of the three key functions that this national SEND body would have. Those functions are advising on funding for local authorities, offering guidance based on current need and moving away from outdated spending models.
The second function provides families and local authorities with the assurance they need that, when a child with very high needs is identified, funding for those needs is available and can be met through a central pot. When I am asked about that, I liken it to highly specialised NHS commissioning for rare conditions. It would eliminate the postcode lottery for families and the funding risk for local authorities; when a local authority comes across a child who has very, very complex needs and requires support, it can put a big pressure on its high-needs block.
This body would ensure consistency in standards across the country and drive continuous improvement. It is an important piece of the puzzle in reforming a SEND system that was described as “lose, lose, lose” by the previous Conservative Education Secretary, Gillian Keegan.
Catherine McKinnell
I thank the hon. Lady for raising the issue. As she knows, we are absolutely aware of the challenges in the SEND system and how urgently we need to address them, but, as I know she appreciates, these are complex issues and need a considered approach to deliver sustainable change. We do not believe that the SEND system needs another body that would add to the bureaucracy in the system. The focus is on making the system less bureaucratic and getting support to children and young people who need it quickly and efficiently.
The Children and Families Act 2014 requires local authorities to work with a wide range of partners, including schools, colleges, health and, crucially, parents and young people, to develop their local offer of services and provision for special educational needs and disabilities. That recognises the differing circumstances of each local area and places decision making with the local authority. Crucially, decisions about provision for individual children and young people with statutory education, health and care plans are currently made by the local authority, which will know its schools, colleges and settings and the provision that they can offer in a way that a national body could not.
I absolutely recognise the challenges of supporting children with very high needs, particularly those who require highly specialist provision. Local authorities have statutory responsibilities to make joint commissioning arrangements about education, health and care provision for all children and young people who have special educational needs or a disability in the local authority’s area. We do not believe that a new body is required to support local authorities to deliver on those duties. The Government keep the funding formula and other arrangements that the Department uses to allocate funding for children and young people with SEND under review, and it is important that there is a fair education funding system that directs funding where it is needed. The input of stakeholders will be invaluable as we review current arrangements, but there is no need for a new national body to do that. Although I absolutely take on board the intentions and concerns of the hon. Member for Twickenham, I kindly request that the new clause be withdrawn.
Munira Wilson
I shall disappoint the Minister: I would like to press the new clause to a vote.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Ian Sollom (St Neots and Mid Cambridgeshire) (LD)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Betts. Home education is a choice taken by parents for a number of different reasons, as we have previously heard when debating this Bill. However, just because a parent chooses to educate their child at home and not take up a local authority school place, it should not mean that their child cannot access the examination system. At present, access to examinations for home-educated children is extremely limited, as there are only commercial providers in that space, which means that it becomes very expensive for parents. Examination space is often limited, especially for those with SEND. This new clause would ensure that all children can access and sit national examinations in order to prepare for life in further education and the world of work.
In the interests of time, I will keep my remarks brief. I look forward to hearing from the Minister.
Stephen Morgan
The new clause, tabled by the hon. Member for Twickenham, seeks to create a duty for local authorities to make provision for children who are eligible to be included on the children not in school registers to sit any relevant national examination should a parent request that, and
“to provide financial assistance to enable the child to sit”
such examinations. Electing to home educate is not an easy decision, and home educating children is a massive undertaking. I applaud those parents who work tremendously hard to do so. However, parents who choose to home educate assume full responsibility for the education of their child, and our guidance is clear on that.
The choice to home educate should be an informed one, with full awareness of potential challenges and the associated costs. That includes considering and planning in advance how to access examinations and qualifications for the child, including making inquiries with local centres as early as possible. To assist with that, the Joint Council for Qualifications publishes a list of centres that are available to private candidates to take their examinations. Parents can also contact exam boards, which may be able to direct them to a centre where their child can sit exams.
The Bill introduces a duty on all English local authorities to provide support in the form of advice and information to all eligible families who request it. For the first time that creates an established baseline of support to ensure that wherever home educating families live, they have access to a reliable level of support from their local authority. Within that duty, I expect local authorities, when requested, to provide advice and information to private candidates about how to access and navigate the examination system.
Local authorities retain discretion to provide further support above that baseline to families in their local area if they choose to do so. Some may choose to contribute towards the cost of examinations for families in their area. That is a decision for each local authority, depending on its budgetary position and local need. I therefore ask the hon. Member for St Neots and Mid Cambridgeshire to withdraw the new clause.
Ian Sollom
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 38
Consultation on the structures of governance for local authority and academy schools
“(1) The Secretary of State must conduct a public consultation on the current structures of governance within both local authority and academy schools.
(2) The consultation conducted under subsection (1) must consider—
(a) the role of school governors;
(b) the statutory duties of school governors;
(c) ways to encourage people to become school governors; and
(d) any other matters that the Secretary of State may see fit.
(3) The Secretary of State must issue the consultation conducted under subsection (1) within one year of the commencement of this Act.
(4) The Secretary of State must, within three months of the consultation closing, publish and lay before Parliament his response to the consultation.” —(Ian Sollom.)
This new clause instigates a review of school governance in light of the severe shortage of school governors and the increasing responsibilities that volunteer governors are taking on.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Ian Sollom
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I move this new clause on behalf of my hon. Friend the Member for Hazel Grove (Lisa Smart), who is herself a school governor, to highlight the severe shortage of school governors and the increasing responsibilities they face. The recruitment of governors has become increasingly difficult. Indeed, the National Governance Association estimates that in 2022 vacancies hit a six-year high at 20,000. Its latest report last year revealed that 76% of schools found it difficult to recruit governors, while 44% of boards had two or more vacancies, up from 33% three years ago. Moreover, 30% of governors considered resigning because of an inability to balance their governance responsibilities with their jobs.
Evidence shows that the responsibilities of school governors have significantly increased over time, and Ofsted said that since schools’ autonomy increased, starting with the Education and Inspections Act 2006, the role has become more important but also more complex. Historically, school governors provided formal oversight, but they are now also expected to ensure regular performance reviews and financial oversight, and to hold school leadership accountable. The position has become increasingly professionalised, and Ofsted has identified that growth in responsibility as a key factor in many schools struggling to achieve a good or higher rating. That is largely because governors fail to focus on holding school leadership accountable, and have that split responsibility with other aspects of the role. The new clause seeks to probe that issue more, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Catherine McKinnell
I am grateful for the opportunity to discuss governance structures in schools and academies. I sincerely thank the incredible volunteer force, which is a vital part of our system. I have such admiration for those in our communities who step up and invest their precious time and energy in our schools and young people. Governors and trustees work tirelessly in the interests of pupils and students in what we recognise is an often challenging environment. We really do owe them a debt of thanks.
Ian Sollom
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 39
Establishment of Child Protection Authority
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, establish a Child Protection Authority for England.
(2) The purpose of such an Authority will be to—
(a) improve practice in child protection;
(b) provide advice and make recommendations to the Government on child protection policy and reforms to improve child protection;
(c) inspect institutions and settings at some times and in such ways as it considers necessary and appropriate to ensure compliance with child protection standards; and
(d) monitor the implementation of the recommendations of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse and other inquiries relating to the protection of children.
(3) The Authority must act with a view to—
(a) safeguarding and promoting the welfare of children;
(b) ensuring that institutions and settings fulfil their responsibilities in relation to child protection.”—(Munira Wilson.)
This new clause would seek to fulfil the second recommendation of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse in establishing a Child Protection Authority for England.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Munira Wilson
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I rise to speak to new clause 39, in my name and those of a number of my hon. Friends, which seeks to fulfil the second recommendation of the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse by establishing a child protection authority in England, which would be an arm’s length body of the Government on a par with organisations such as the National Crime Agency. As the inquiry set out, its role would be to
“improve practice in child protection by institutions, including statutory agencies;…provide advice to government in relation to policy and reform to improve child protection, including through the publication of regular reports to Parliament and making recommendations; and…inspect institutions as it considers necessary.”
I recently met Professor Jay and a member of the panel who was involved in that review, and they felt that there are certain gaps in the inspection regime across the country, so having this overarching national body with a focus on child protection is a really important recommendation and step forward. Indeed, it was the report’s second recommendation. The child protection authority would monitor the implementation of the inquiry’s recommendations.
I am very grateful that the Government have already committed to implementing the recommendations, but I gently say to Ministers that this Bill, which we have spent several weeks going through in detail, already focuses on a number of safeguards and child protection measures. One of the many reasons that the previous Government gave for not implementing some of the recommendations was a lack of legislative time, which I struggle to understand given the number of times the House rose early in the previous Parliament. Given that the IICSA recommendation requires legislation and we are considering a very relevant Bill, I am not entirely sure that the Government are committed to implementing it as they are not legislating for a child protection authority.
When we discussed new clause 15 this morning, the hon. Member for Southampton Itchen said that many of the crimes explored in the report are undoubtedly ongoing. Therefore, what could be more important than putting these provisions in place? I very much hope Ministers will seriously consider implementing this recommendation quickly and using the legislative opportunity. Even if they will not accept my new clause, there is time as the Bill progresses through Parliament to put into legislation one of Professor Jay’s key recommendations.
Catherine McKinnell
As the Prime Minister has made clear, we are focused on delivering the change and justice that victims deserve. As I set out earlier in response to new clause 15, on 6 January, the Home Secretary outlined in Parliament the commitments to introduce a mandatory duty for those engaging with children to report sexual abuse and exploitation, making grooming an aggravating factor to toughen up sentencing, and introducing a new performance framework for policing.
On 16 January, the Home Secretary made a further statement to the House that before Easter, the Government will lay out a clear timetable for taking forward the 20 recommendations from the final Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse report. Four were for the Home Office, including on disclosure and barring, and I know that work is already under way on those. As the Home Secretary stated, a cross-Government ministerial group is considering and working through the remaining recommendations, and that group will be supported by a new victims and survivors panel. Again, as I mentioned, the Government will also be implementing all the remaining recommendations in IICSA’s separate stand-alone report on grooming gangs from February 2022, and as part of that we will update key Department for Education guidance.
This landmark Bill will put in place a package of support to drive high and rising standards throughout our education and care systems, so that every child can achieve and thrive. It will protect children at risk of abuse and help to stop vulnerable children falling through cracks in service. I therefore urge hon. Members to support the Bill and the measures, and to withdraw the new clause.
Munira Wilson
I am still at a loss to understand why, if the Government support the recommendations, they are not using this legislative opportunity. I will therefore press the new clause to a vote.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Munira Wilson
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 42 would impose a requirement on the Secretary of State to introduce a national wellbeing measurement programme for children and young people throughout England. I set out the need and the case for mental health support provision during our debate on new clause 33, and I pay tribute to #BeeWell and Pro Bono Economics, which have done a lot of work on the national wellbeing measurement. As we heard from witnesses in oral evidence a few weeks ago, despite having the word “wellbeing” in the Bill’s title, the legislation lacks measures that will improve the wellbeing of this country’s children and young people.
England’s young people have the lowest level of wellbeing in Europe and are in the bottom 5% worldwide, according to the OECD’s programme for international student assessment survey. During our oral evidence sessions, Anne Longfield, Dr Carol Homden from Coram and Mark Russell from the Children’s Society all made the case for the systematic national measurement of children and young people’s wellbeing.
Many of us are well aware that data on children’s wellbeing and mental health is fragmented across the NHS, schools and local authorities. Indeed, in the last Parliament, I sought to introduce a private Member’s Bill to address that gap, with regular annual reporting to Parliament on mental health and wellbeing data. Sadly, it was rejected by the Conservative Government at the time and talked out.
On the other hand, and given the Minister’s already stated commitment to improving the mental health of our children and young people, I hope that the Labour Government will take the opportunity to introduce a national wellbeing measurement to focus efforts and provide a measurable standard from which we can mark progress. That would give all children and young people a voice on the issues that matter to their mental health and wellbeing, allow regular tracking of national progress, support detailed service planning within local communities, enable targeted support for groups of young people struggling the most, help school leaders to understand how they are performing and support the development of new evidence on what works for improving children’s wellbeing.
Stephen Morgan
New clause 42 is intended to require the establishment of a national children and young people’s wellbeing measurement programme. The Government are committed to improving the wellbeing of children and young people. Alongside improving health outcomes, we will break down barriers to opportunities, supporting all children to achieve and thrive. We know that elements of thriving, such as positive school belonging and childhood physical and mental wellbeing, are associated with academic attendance and the development of key life skills. The Bill, and our plan for change, will help us to achieve that.
We acknowledge the value of understanding wellbeing. A wide range of data on children and young people’s wellbeing is already collected nationally to inform policy development. That includes DFE and Government-funded surveys such as the Office for National Statistics data on children’s wellbeing; the DFE parent and pupil voice panel surveys and recent national behaviour survey reports; the Department of Health-funded survey of the prevalence of mental health disorders, which is currently paused; and the health behaviours of school-aged children study, which is currently seeking funding. Surveys also include the Children’s Society “Good Childhood Report” and international data from PISA.
Damian Hinds
There have now been four waves of updates from the children and young people’s mental ill health prevalence survey conducted by the NHS. That invaluable resource has provided annual data and enabled us to look at ourselves against other countries, although the data are not perfectly comparable. I gather that there is no current commitment to wave five. I know the Department of Health and Social Care said that it would keep an open mind, but will the Minister join me in strongly encouraging his colleagues at the Department to maintain that data series, because it is incredibly important?
Stephen Morgan
I will certainly take away that point. I know that the right hon. Member cares passionately about the wellbeing of children and young people, and I am happy to explore that further.
We know that many good schools and local areas already measure pupil wellbeing to inform local action. The Department encourages that, with identifying need and monitoring impact being one principle of an effective whole-school approach to mental health and wellbeing. Although we do not currently have plans to introduce a standardised national wellbeing measurement programme, we continue to engage with schools to increase the understanding of wellbeing measurement approaches and impact.
It is not clear that the benefits of a national programme would outweigh the burdens on schools, or the reduction in their ability to select tools to suit their cohorts. We would also need to consider the potential effect of a national measure on school accountability. Should the case for a national measure be made, there is likely to be scope to introduce the kind of voluntary participation programme envisaged in the new clause without recourse to primary legislation. On that basis, I invite the hon. Member for Twickenham to withdraw the new clause.
Munira Wilson
I wish to press the new clause.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Neil O’Brien
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
When I was on the Science and Technology Committee in 2018, I got us to do a report on screen time, social media and children’s mental health. Even then the evidence was alarming; now it is absolutely terrifying. Children are now given smartphones at a very early age. A quarter of the UK’s three and four-year-olds own a smartphone, and by the end of primary school, four out of five kids have one. Over the past decade, there has been an explosion in mental health problems among young people all over the world. Over the exact same period, smartphones and social media became dominant in children’s lives. The growth in anxiety and mental health problems that we are seeing is focused almost entirely in young people, not older people.
There are many channels through which smartphones and social media cause problems for children. First, they displace time in the real world with friends. US data shows that prior to 2012, children spent more than two hours a day with friends. By 2019, that had halved. The proportion of kids feeling lonely and isolated at school has exploded all over the developed world.
The invention of infinite-scroll social media has always reminded me of the famous social science experiment with the bottomless soup bowl. In this experiment, people were invited to eat from a soup bowl that was, unbeknownst to them, invisibly refilled from below. The constant refilling made people eat nearly twice as much as they would with a normal bowl—in some cases absurd amounts of soup.
This is not just about a time sink; there is also the lack of sleep. Kids are tired in school. Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder has increased massively, and concentration is impaired. This is a feature, not a bug. Apps are designed to be addictive and drip-feed the user dopamine. The same problems are happening not just in the English-speaking world, but in the Nordic nations and all across western Europe. Alternative explanations do not fit the data.
Well-funded efforts by the tech industry to lobby, muddy the water, run interference and sow confusion are unconvincing. These problems are not just a coincidence. There is more and more evidence for a causal link to the disaster hitting our kids. Sapien Labs asked questions about adults’ mental health and combined them into a mental health quotient. They asked the same people when they got a smartphone. Some 28,000 people answered and the results were stark: the earlier a person gets a phone, the worse their adult mental health. That was particularly the case for girls.
On new clause 33, we heard from the hon. Member for Twickenham about the mental health challenge. Data from the OECD’s PISA found that, on average, two thirds of 15-year-olds across OECD countries reporting being distracted using digital devices, including phones, in most or every maths class. In addition, around 60% of pupils got distracted by other pupils using digital devices. That PISA data showed a “tangible” association between the use of digital devices in schools and bad learning outcomes. Students who reported being distracted by peers using devices in some or most maths classes scored significantly lower in maths tests, equivalent to three quarters of a year’s-worth of education. The effects are large.
Other studies have found that the use of smartphones in classrooms leads to students engaging in non-school-related activities—unsurprisingly—which adversely affects recall and comprehension. One study found that it can take students up to 20 minutes to refocus on what they were supposed to be learning after engaging in a non-academic activity.
Many parents know the problems with smartphones, but we face a collective action problem. We worry that our kids will miss out if they are the only ones without them, and we need to solve this problem. Across the country, there has been an explosion of parent-powered campaign groups aiming to fight back, including Smartphone Free Childhood, Safe Screens, and Delay Smartphones, to name but a few. They are doing inspiring work. Mumsnet has started a “Rage Against the Screen” campaign.
The Children’s Commissioner said:
“I honestly think that we will look back in 20 years’ time and be absolutely horrified by what we allowed our children to be exposed to.”
She is right. The shift to a screen-based childhood is having bad effects on young people, from mental health to school readiness to children simply turning up exhausted because they have been on their phone all night. These effects are set to widen gaps in achievement unless something decisive is done.
There are many things that the Government should do, but the first is to implement a proper ban on phones in school. The last Government issued guidance, but that is not enough. Although 90% of schools would say that they have some sort of ban, a survey by Policy Exchange last year found that only one in 10 schools had a full start-to-finish ban, which is the policy that we know works best. Lots of schools are still trying policies where kids have phones on them but are not supposed to have them out. The effect is that kids are distracted, teachers have to tell them to put them away, and all the issues to do with bullying and social media are in play during break times and more.
Ellie Chowns
The hon. Gentleman is making a powerful case for banning smartphones in schools, but does he agree that banning smartphones in schools will not, in and of itself, tackle the problems that he has articulated? A recently published study, the first proper nationwide study of its type, shows that banning smartphones in school does not generate any statistical differences in various outcomes, because there is no difference in the amount of time that children are spending on their devices. Although there are strong arguments for banning them in school—and I recognise that there is a strong call for that from parents, teachers and, indeed, many students—a much more holistic approach is needed to tackle the harms that he has outlined.
Neil O’Brien
The hon. Lady makes a thoughtful point. There is a fantastic meta-analysis published by the London School of Economics and the 5Rights Foundation of all the different studies that have been done on this around Europe. The hon. Lady referred to a specific study, which I hope to speak to the authors about. It is a good study, and perfectly sensible, but the issue is that it cannot find anything statistically significant because it looked at only 30 schools, with a sample size of about 1,200 pupils. It does not look at any natural experiments either, so it does not look at schools that are changing their policies.
Where we have good RCT-like evidence, like in the great study in Spain, where they looked at a province that changed its policy wholesale, we can see from those natural experiments the really powerful effects of in-school policies. I agree with the hon. Lady that this is not the only thing that we should do. The study she mentioned was not wrong; it just could never show us the things that people are interested in. Indeed, there is plenty of other evidence out there in these meta-analyses, and from Jonathan Haidt’s website, of really powerful in-school effects.
A study in the US shows that a class time-only rule does not give teachers as much benefit as they might expect. Research from the National Education Association found that 73% of teachers in schools that allow phone use between classes find that phones are disruptive during classes. The same is true here. The Department for Education’s national behaviour survey, published in April 2024, found that 35% of secondary school teachers reported mobile phones being used during lessons without permission. The problem is more pronounced for older children, unsurprisingly. Some 46% of pupils in years 10 to 11 reported mobile phones being used when they should not have been during “most or all” lessons. That is nearly half of pupils in most or all lessons reporting disruption, so the problem is absolutely there in the DFE’s data.
The idea that guidance has done the trick and that there is no longer a problem to solve is contradicted by the Department’s evidence. Work by the company Teacher Tapp, also known as School Surveys, similarly finds very high levels of problems and no signs of progress. Instead of guidance, all schools should be mandated and funded to have lockers and pouches, and to get kids to put smartphones away for the whole day, including breaks. Schools should be the beachhead and the first place that we re-create a smartphone-free childhood—seven hours in which we de-normalise being on the phone all the time for young people.
Why do we need a full ban, and not just guidance? I already gave some of the data showing that the guidance has not worked, but there are two other reasons. First, we need to support schools and have their back. From speaking to teachers and school leaders, I know that the pressures from parents to allow phones can be really severe on schools. Some parents, unfortunately, can be unreasonably determined that they must be able to contact their child directly at any minute, even though they are perfectly safe in schools. In the sorts of places where three and four-year-olds have smartphones, that is, I am afraid, normalised now, so a national ban would make things simpler and take the heat off schools.
Secondly, a full and total ban is needed as part of a wider resetting of social norms, as the hon. Member for North Herefordshire said, about children and smartphones. Smartphones and social media are doing damage to education even when they are not being used in schools. Our new clause 48 aims to be proportionate, and subsection (2)(b) would allow for exceptions as appropriate, having learned the lessons of what has been done in other countries.
To come to the hon. Lady’s wider point, when I was a Health Minister, I wanted us to get going an equivalent of the famous five bits of fruit and veg a day for this field—other Members might remember “Don’t Die of Ignorance” or “Clunk Click Every Trip”. We need some big things to reset the culture and wake up a lot of people, who are not necessarily going to read Jonathan Haidt’s book, to dangers that they may be unaware of. The heavy exposure of our kids to addictive-by-design products of the tech industry is the smoking of our generation. As with smoking, the tech industry comes up with fake solutions that do not actually make things safe. In the 1950s, it was filters on cigarettes, and now it is the supposed parental filters on social media. Just like with smoking, there is unfortunately a powerful social gradient to unmonitored internet access, with the worst effects on the poorest.
I do not know what Ministers will do about our new clause this time round, and I do not know what they will do as the Bill goes through the other place, but I hope that they will end up implementing this idea at some point. I will take my hat off to them when they do.
Munira Wilson
I come at this new clause first and foremost as a parent before I look at it as an MP. Looking at it with both hats on, though, I have long supported the previous Government’s guidance to schools to try to ban mobile phones during the school day. For a long time, I have needed convincing that a legislative ban was required, but I have finally concluded that we probably need to move towards one, partly for the reasons that the hon. Member for Harborough, Oadby and Wigston outlined. Some heads and school staff come under a lot of pressure from parents to allow the use of phones during the school day, but if this were a statutory requirement, the Government would have to provide the support needed to implement it.
Just this week, I talked to the headteacher of a secondary school in my constituency. He is very keen to implement a ban on phones during the school day, and he is trying, but kids are getting their phones out at various times and not staying off them. It is a fairly new school, but for some reason it was built without lockers, so there are no lockers. He has looked into purchasing lockers or Yondr pouches—the phone pouches that I believe the Irish Government have bought wholesale for every school in Ireland—and he said that that would cost him about £20,000, which he did not have in his budget. Putting the ban into statute would give headteachers and teaching staff the clout they need with parents who particularly want their children to have their phones during the school day, and the Government would need to resource the ban so that schools could implement it.
I draw Members’ attention to subsection (2) of the new clause, which deals with exemptions, because that is a very important point. Proper exemptions are important for young carers or children with health conditions that need monitoring via apps. School leaders and teachers know their children best, and they know which children need exemptions. I would be interested to know what the consequences would look like—would they fall on the school? I do not think the hon. Member for Harborough, Oadby and Wigston touched on that, but I would be interested in discussing another time how he thinks this ban could be enforced. It is just one of a suite of measures that we as policymakers need to take now, given the harm that phones and access to social media are undoubtedly doing to our children and young people.
Tom Hayes (Bournemouth East) (Lab)
I have some sympathy with the point that the hon. Member for Harborough, Oadby and Wigston has made about the addictive quality of screen time. I also draw attention to the fact that the addictive nature of screen time is obviously a result of technology, but it is also due to a lack of competition from other uses of a child’s time.
As such, it still staggers me that the first debate in eight years on playgrounds took place only because I secured it. The Conservative Government did not call a debate on playgrounds in their 14 years in government, and the only strategy ever on national play was launched by Ed Balls and Andy Burnham in 2008, with £230 million made available. Several years later, the coalition Government drew a red line through that strategy. We have also seen a hollowing out of children’s centres and Sure Start centres—really, of the whole fabric of what a child’s early developmental years could be. The places where parents could get support—not just to be parents alongside each other, but to raise their children and help them to develop—have all been hacked away. We need to look at children’s wellbeing in that context.
I have reservations about the hon. Member’s proposal, partly because I think we need a clearer distinction between a mobile telephone and a smartphone. As somebody who was born in the 1980s and grew up in the 1990s, I see mobile telephones as typically restricted to SMS—I think that is what the kids call it these days—voice calls and maybe an alarm. A smartphone is something far more advanced, which has destructive social media, addictive apps, games and the like. Greater clarity about the distinction between mobile phones and smartphones might be helpful as we navigate this debate.
It was interesting to hear the Conservative spokesperson call for collective action. I am always a fan of that, and I encourage him to continue down that path. I am happy to have a cup of coffee with him as we discuss it.
Neil O'Brien
I anticipated that the hon. Member would say something of the sort. His argument is perfectly reasonable, and I tried to answer that exact point in my speech. We think that aspects of the Bill are too micro-managing, but we want central Government to take the heat for schools on this issue. That is both to make it easier for schools and, as the hon. Member for Twickenham said, because there should be a proper plan to roll this out at scale, as is happening in other countries in Europe.
Tom Hayes
I understood the point that the hon. Member made in his speech, and I understand his clarification. I still struggle to see how the new clause fits in with what I regard as the Conservative party’s ideology around schooling and children’s wellbeing. It feels anomalous to ask headteachers and teachers to work within a ban, rather than trusting them to use the flexibility that the previous Government gave them.
One highlight of the Committee’s debate over the last few weeks has been the recognition that our teachers and headteachers know their students best. It is important that we give them all the trust and support that they deserve. I sympathise with what the hon. Member says about addictive apps, but for me it is not about banning, per se; it is about creating a viable and better alternative that gives children and teenagers much better things to do with their time.
Damian Hinds
I rise to speak in favour of the new clause. Unusually, I will start by saying what the new clause will not do, and the limits of the change it proposes.
The truth is that the vast majority of online harm does not happen at school. Banning phones or social media in school will not necessarily reduce the total amount of time that children spend online or address schools’ worries about kids being online, such as the concern about the increasing number of children who turn up to school having not slept sufficiently to be ready for the day. Nor does the new clause address the wider problems—not day to day, but more chronic—with attention span and eyesight. We have recently heard a lot about the greater prevalence of myopia.
Rules in this area are still important, however, and behaviour in school is crucial for teacher recruitment and, particularly, retention. Three big things have changed in schools in the last few years. The first is an attitudinal shift that came about around the time of covid, and that it will take us some years to understand. The other two are vapes and phones. It cannot be overstated how much those three things affect what happens in a school, the feel of the school and what teachers and headteachers report back.
The first thing that schoolchildren need for learning is to be able to concentrate. There is good reason to believe that even when a child is not using a phone, the fact that it is in their pocket—that it could buzz, vibrate or whatever at any point—can distract them. I think it is an important principle that the entire school day, including break time and lunch time, should be reserved for what school is about: learning, developing and being with friends. The question, as always, is whether we leave that to individual schools or have a national rule, and the hon. Member for Bournemouth East was right to speak about the tension between the two. I confess that that is a question I have personally had to grapple with on more than one occasion, and there is not a single, simple answer.
In the Bill, there are many national rules for things that arguably do not need a national rule, and that could be left to individual schools so that they can do what is best for their school community—from the precise number of school uniform items to the exact length of breakfast. The hon. Member is right that the Labour instinct is to say, “Let’s have a national rule on everything; we like consistency.” There is nothing wrong with consistency. He is also right that our instinct is to say, “Leave those rules to the schools wherever possible.” There are, however, times when an overriding national rule is beneficial and makes sense.
In 2019, when I was at the Department for Education, this question came up for me. At the time, we decided not to put a national rule in place. Politicians are always expected to have a firm and clear view on everything, and Ministers are expected to be absolutely certain about every decision they make, but it does not always work like that. Things can often be argued both ways. I was never 100% sure at the time that I was doing the right thing, but I thought I was. In 2024, we introduced non-statutory guidance on how the use of mobile phones should be prohibited throughout the school day, which, crucially, included breaks. We were also clear that there was the option to make the guidance statutory if necessary.
The world has continued to change since then. As my right hon. Friend the shadow Minister described, when it comes to mobile phone use and our worries about children, that change has not made things slightly less bad than they were before. Worries have only deepened and intensified.
Tom Hayes
That is not the point on which I am intervening. I was going to say that by using the language of mobile phone and smartphone interchangeably, we are confusing the debate. If our debate is confused, I am not sure how we can arrive at a certain policy.
I called for agreement with the Government around national rules. I want to clarify that I did not mean on everything, but only on the things in the Bill that I think need national rules. I agree with the right hon. Member that that is what provides consistency.
Damian Hinds
The hon. Member is right about the difficulty with defining the term smartphone. People talk about a brick phone, a feature phone, a basic phone, a Nokia, a smartphone and an iPhone, but the truth is that there is no definition; smartphone is just a term. It originally came about when people did not want to use the brand name iPhone, because Samsung phones and other types of phone were available. It just means a smarter phone; it has more stuff on it. Some of the things that people worry about are not necessarily only available on smartphones. I looked recently at iMessage, and it is starting to look more like WhatsApp. Anything that can be used for a group chat has some of the issues that we find in schools that cover the teenage and sub-teenage years.
There are other things that people can get on a smartphone but not on a Nokia that are perfectly benign. Some parents are quite keen for their kids to be able to look at the weather. Some are keen to be able to use the tracking device to follow their child, or for their child to be able to use the mapping device to find their way home, so I agree with the hon. Member.
Damian Hinds
This is in danger of turning into a much longer speech than I anticipated.
Neil O'Brien
It is good to have this point of clarification. The clause uses the rather quaint phrase “mobile telephones” to capture everything, because the distinction between these devices is blurred. Among those who are interested in the smartphone issue, there is a separate debate about the use of dumbphones for things like walking to and from school, but there is no reason why even a dumbphone cannot cause massive distraction if it is out in class. A child could be texting somebody, for example, and, as my right hon. Friend pointed out, the distinction between these things is blurred these days. That is why we have this catch-all term. It is clear, and it is possible to legislate on that basis, notwithstanding our other discussions outside the scope of this debate.
Damian Hinds
I am grateful to my hon. Friend the shadow Minister for refocusing what I was saying, and he is absolutely right. Some of our worries in relation to children apply regardless of the piece of technology. Anything that demands our attention and is ever-present brings such risks.
Tom Hayes
I want to labour this point, as it were, because I understand entirely the point that the hon. Member for Harborough, Oadby and Wigston made. It is important to do so, because there are parents and children who wish to retain the option of being in contact with each other for safeguarding or wellbeing reasons. Such parents typically draw the distinction between a mobile phone, which allows for SMS and voice calls; and a smartphone, which typically has addictive social media or games, or particular apps that might cause wider safeguarding concerns. That is why I am trying to draw the right hon. Gentleman into focusing on mobile phones—brick phones, Nokia phones or the ones that Snake can be played on—as opposed to more sophisticated phones.
Damian Hinds
I appreciate what the hon. Gentleman says. I had my most recent constituency session with parents on the matter last Friday, and with some things, there is a bit of a grey area. Lots of parents say, “I don’t really mind so much about this”, but others do mind. With tracking technology, for example, some parents say that they really do not like being able to know where their child is. There is some variance, but the one imperative that is common to almost every parent is, “I want my child to be able to call me if they are in trouble, and I want to be able to call them on the way to and from school.” Parents want to hear from children if a club has been cancelled and they will be coming home at a different time, or if they are worried, or whatever it is. It is possible to do that on essentially any phone on the market, from the highest iPhone—I do not know what number they are up to these days—down to the most basic sub-Nokia brick phone.
There are other questions about functionality, and about what social media is. The Australians are having a bit of a debate about that at the moment, because to ban social media, they have to know what they are trying to ban. However, to address directly the point that the hon. Member for Bournemouth East made, much of this discussion relates to all manner of electronica that a child might have in their pocket or bag.
Ellie Chowns
Are we not getting a bit distracted? The new clause is about banning things from the start of the first lesson to the end of the last, not on the way to or from school when children might want to call their parents.
Damian Hinds
The hon. Lady is quite right. I was only going to speak about this for three minutes or so, but the hon. Gentleman tempted me into other areas. On the promise that he was making one last intervention, I indulged him, and I am grateful to him.
In an earlier intervention on the Minister for School Standards, I mentioned the NHS mental health of children and young people survey, which shows us what has happened over time to children’s mental health. There is an inflection point and it comes, contrary to what most people believe, before the covid pandemic. That is the first critical data point to understand.
The second critical data point is that when we look beyond that study at other countries’ studies, we see that none of them are perfectly comparable, but studies in countries such as Germany, France and the United States follow basically the same pattern. There is an increase in the prevalence of mental ill health conditions in all the published data that I have seen for other countries. Whatever people say about domestic politics, whichever party was in Government here and whatever they did, that cannot explain what happens in France or the United States. The fact is that there is a global trend, or at least a trend in the western world, of an increasing prevalence of mental ill health conditions among children.
Catherine Atkinson (Derby North) (Lab)
Will the right hon. Member assist me in identifying where the new clause makes it clear that it is only in relation to children, as opposed to anyone in our schools?
Ellie Chowns
“Are you going to ban teachers from carrying phones?”, I think is what she means.
Damian Hinds
We can have the classic, “Oh, the wording is technically flawed” argument—which to be fair to the Government, they have not deployed in this Bill Committee yet. We hope the amendment will be subsumed into the Bill, but the Government would never say, “Oh, we’ll just take that amendment and put it in.” Whoever is in Government never says that; they say, “Right, we accept this point. Now we’ll work on the detailed wording”.
Neil O’Brien
To answer the question that the hon. Member for Derby North asked directly, subsection (2)(b) says the policy
“is to be implemented as the relevant school leader considers appropriate.”
I think this is—
The Chair
Order. There is only one speaker at a time and there can be one intervention—I also say to the right hon. Member that there is only one Chair, so let us get it right.
Catherine Atkinson
Does the right hon. Member agree that when we are looking at proposed new clauses in Committee, it is absolutely fundamental that what is written is capable of making meaningful legislation?
Damian Hinds
Yes, of course; we are legislating, and that is the case. It is also the case that, in my experience in Committee, the Government side never just accept an amendment put forward by the Opposition or another opposition party—or indeed by their own Back Benchers. If that has ever happened in modern history, it has yet to come across my bows. What we do is we debate what we are trying to do. If the new clause—which was drafted with expert help from the House of Commons—was accepted by the Government, as I very much hope it will be, they would without doubt say, “Oh, well, you need to change this, that and the other, and we’d do it slightly differently.” They would then bring forward their own Government new clause, and we would then vote on that on Report. We can have an elongated discussion about this, but I would rather just get to the end of what I was going to say about banning mobile phones in schools, and then—I believe I am right in saying—the hon. Lady may also speak. That is probably the easiest way to do it.
The increasing mental ill health of children and young people should be a matter of very serious concern for all of us. We should remember that it is something that is mirrored in other countries as well. Now, it is entirely scientifically invalid to infer from a correlation of two things—the increasing prevalence of social media and electronica, and the increasing prevalence of mental ill health—that one caused the other. Even if we cannot find any other potential cause that would have affected all those countries in the same way over the same timeframe, it is still scientifically invalid to directly infer causality. Logic has its limits, and I know a few people who seriously contest the idea that the spread and use of, and the very high amounts of time devoted to, mobile phones and social media has been a significant causal factor in that.
There are lots of different ways that one might address that and there are lots of things going on. The Online Safety Act 2023 was a landmark piece of legislation, and how it now gets implemented by Ofcom is very important. There is also the private Member’s Bill from the hon. Member for Whitehaven and Workington (Josh MacAlister)—I think he became a Parliamentary Private Secretary overnight, so we hope there is still a good future for that private Member’s Bill. That is one part of what is going on. I also mentioned Australia, where there is a ban of some type to come in.
The school phones ban also plays a part. To be clear, it is not a ban on children carrying a mobile phone of any sort, brand or functionality to and from home and school. Nor does it preclude children who need to use a phone because of special educational needs, medical conditions, monitoring requirements or some other reasons from carrying one. Those things can be determined locally by the school. It is not a panacea—far from it—but it will make a difference in schools.
It is often said that mobile phones are already banned in the vast majority of schools, so a ban is not needed and will not have any effect. That is true to an extent. There are virtually no schools without policy. Clearly no one is allowed to whip out a phone and make a call in the middle of a maths lesson—in fact, we never actually see teenagers use a phone to make a call—and there are going to be some rules to some extent. In the Internet Matters survey, 43% of schools reported having an “out of sight” policy. It is true that lots of schools allow phone use in breaks and at lunch—I know that because I visited a lot of schools where kids had been using their phones in breaks and at lunch.
There is sometimes a bit of a hierarchy in how people assess these bans. One gets a slightly different assessment of the situation from Ministers, headteachers, classroom teachers and kids. According to the Youth Endowment Fund survey, which is huge—I think it surveys 7,500 13 to 17-year-olds—53% of children said they used mobile phones in break times, and one in six said they used their phone in lessons.
Having a national policy does not solve everything—kids still break rules sometimes—but it does make it easier for everyone. As I say, it does not preclude carrying a phone to and from school, and it does not preclude children with whatever additional needs from carrying them, but it supports leaders and teachers in what they are doing. It also makes it clear to parents that they cannot contact children during the school day—they can, but they do so through the school office, just as would have been the case in the old days. As my hon. Friend the Member for Harborough, Oadby and Wigston said, a national policy would set a firm norm.
More widely, the Government will have to return again and again to all the issues around online safety, social media use and the use of electronics, and they must study the mental health aspects in more detail. However, I suggest that, pending proof—the smoking example speaks to this—it is necessary to take a precautionary approach. When we put things in the hands of children, we tend not to say, “Let’s wait to see if it’s dangerous”; we test them first to make sure they are safe. I hope also that the Minister can speak with colleagues in the Department of Health and Social Care about the provision of more NHS guidance on safe and reasonable levels of mobile phone use for children’s early brain development.
I have gone on a long time, and much longer than I anticipated. I will stop there.
Amanda Martin (Portsmouth North) (Lab)
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his comments.
We have spent a great deal of time in Committee hearing from Opposition Members about autonomy: headteachers’ autonomy, school autonomy, and school leaders knowing exactly what is best for their pupils and communities. Subsection (2)(b) of the new clause states that the policy
“is to be implemented as the relevant school leader considers appropriate”,
but that means that the school leader could choose not to ban mobile phones for anybody in their school; there are exemptions, and they could decide that that is what they need. But that was not what I was going to talk about.
The use of mobile phones in schools should be decided at school level. It should reflect school values, processes and procedures, and not be decided in a directive or legislation from Government. Deciding it at school level would allow for the reasonable use of phones and technology, and it would allow for a balanced approach to technology. It could involve the school community in a discussion about what the phones and technology are being used for—a simple ban would not do that—and could include conversations about digital wellness and promoting healthier relationships, both offline and online, and a healthy approach to using technology at school, in the workplace and in the wider world. If we banned kids from using phones in school, we probably should ban people in their offices and in meetings from using them, because they do not pay attention either. Given how often we look up and see people not even bothering, how on earth can children learn while using mobile phones and technology in a measured and supportive way?
I want to draw the Committee’s attention to the Birmingham study from February, which was mentioned previously. It found that banning smartphones in schools did not directly improve student academic performance or mental health. However, that research indicated that excessive phone use correlates with negative outcomes, yet there were no significant differences between the kids who had bans in their school and those who did not. It is about the wider picture, which has been talked about. I also draw the Committee’s attention to a survey conducted in November 2024 of over 1,000 teachers. One in five believed that a school-wide ban would not improve the relationships and attainment levels of children, and 41% agreed that they used smartphones as a teaching tool within their classrooms.
Neil O’Brien
The hon. Lady talks about the use of pupils’ own smartphones as a teaching tool in class. Does she have any worries about the equity of that? What happens to the kids who do not have smartphones in those situations?
Amanda Martin
That is a good point. Although we have to resource our schools properly to ensure appropriate iPads and computers that can be used, we would not want the situation the hon. Member described to continue either. We must ensure that schools are resourced.
We have talked about disruption in classrooms, and 20% of teachers said that the unauthorised use of mobile phones was one of the main causes. However, chatter and not sitting still accounted for 80% and 75% respectively, and disrespect to other pupils was much higher than the use of mobile phones. When asked whether a whole-school ban would improve learning, 18% felt that it would, but actually 57% felt that a class size reduction would improve behaviour much more. We need to give our schools the autonomy to have that conversation with their communities and to involve their students. We have student councils and we have parent groups, and we must involve them in the conversations on mobile phone use in schools so that we can teach digital wellness now and for the future.
Catherine Atkinson
Call me a lawyer—that increasingly seems to be a term of abuse in this place—but I want to be clear that voting for this new clause would be voting to enable the banning of adults, including staff, parents and visitors, from using and carrying mobile phones in schools. I thought that scrutinising line by line was literally our job in this Committee.
Stephen Morgan
New clause 48 would prohibit the use and carrying of certain devices during the school day. I thank the shadow Minister and my hon. Friends the Members for Bournemouth East, for Portsmouth North and for Derby North for their contributions, as well as the hon. Member for Twickenham and the right hon. Member for East Hampshire. I appreciate the thoughtfulness with which Members have contributed to the debate on the new clause.
We recognise the negative impact that mobile phones can have on children’s learning. Every pupil deserves to learn in a safe, calm classroom, and we will always support our hard-working and dedicated teachers to make that happen. That is why the Government’s “Mobile phones in schools” guidance is already clear that schools should prohibit the use of mobile phones throughout the school day, including during lessons, the time between lessons, break times and lunch time. It is for school leaders to develop and implement a policy, while ensuring that they adhere to the public sector equality duty and the Equality Act 2010.
New clause 48 lacks the flexibility required to accommodate some individual needs, such as a mobile phone as an adaptation for a disabled child. We know that schools are already prohibiting the use of mobile phones, including through outright bans. Even before guidance was published, around 97% of all schools in England had policies restricting mobile phone use in some way. There are a range of ways in which a mobile phone-free school can be achieved. We trust headteachers to develop a mobile phone policy that works for their own schools and for the school community.
Neil O’Brien
We have had an important and interesting debate, and we have heard a mix of arguments—some better than others, I think. The argument about drafting does not hold water. Subsection (2)(a) talks about students, subsection (4) talks about pupils, and subsection (2)(b) would allow a policy to be implemented in a sensible way. If Members do not agree with the new clause, they can just say so, rather than find lawyerly arguments against it.
However, there were some good points made. More than one thing can be a problem at a time, and this new clause is not the silver bullet. There are lots of problems with smartphone use outside of schools, as well as other things on top of that that we need to do. That is why I talked about this as a beachhead—as the first thing we should do. It is interesting that all over the world things are changing. In the US, the overwhelming majority of states either already have a ban or are on their way legislatively to getting one. The US is ground zero for a lot of these problems, and it is interesting that it is moving to take decisive action. I think we will, too.
For Ministers, there will always be a load of people who want to come to them and say that, “It’s all very complicated—I have been working with the industry,” “It’s correlation not causation,” or, “We should just let be.” There are things in the Bill where the Opposition have been critical of the Government for being more directive than we think is appropriate for the subject. On this issue, however, we think the subject is so important. In this House, we now all talk constantly about the mental health crisis among young people—it is such a big thing. It seems to be pretty incontrovertible that one of the main causes of that is the rise of the smartphone-based childhood. This provision could be an important first step towards tackling that massive national crisis.
I hope that at some point Ministers will think again about the provision when they have more time to reflect. The guidance on its own is not working; we can see from the data that it is not changing things enough. That is why I will press the new clause to a Division.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 70—Appointment of Anti-Bullying Leads—
“In section 89 of the Education and Inspections Act 2006 (Determination by head teacher of behaviour policy), after subsection (2A) insert—
“(2B) For the purposes of preventing bullying under subsection (1)(b), the head teacher of a relevant school in England must appoint a member of staff to be the school’s Anti-Bullying Lead.
(2C) The Anti-Bullying Lead will have responsibility for developing the school’s anti-bullying strategy, which must—
(a) outline the steps which will be taken by the school to prevent all forms of bullying among pupils, particularly in relation to those pupils with protected characteristics;
(b) state how incidences of bullying are to be recorded and acted upon by the school; and
(c) detail the training relating to bullying awareness and prevention which will be made available to school staff.””
This new clause would require headteachers to appoint Anti-Bullying Leads, to lead on the development of anti-bullying strategies.
Neil O’Brien
We have a run of new clauses here—49, 50 and 51—and I will speak about them at the appropriate moment. I will not move new clause 50 in the interests of time. During lockdown a lot of parents, including me, gained an even greater respect for the teaching profession, yet we do not treat teachers like other professionals. We do not expect doctors or lawyers to put up with the kind of abuse that is sadly still far too common for schoolteachers. The Bill does many things, some of them good, but as an editorial in the TES pointed out, it is strangely silent on discipline and the right of teachers and pupils to have a safe place to work. To fix that, we have tabled these new clauses, which can be taken together.
The first concerns properly managing and measuring the situation. What gets measured gets managed, but at the moment we have far too little data on the state of discipline in our schools and in alternative provision. That is why new clause 49 provides for an annual report, and it locks in the current national behaviour survey, which is so important and creates wider and regular reporting of Government action on this subject. Endless polls show that it is one of the top issues facing teachers. It is one of the most important things to them, and we know that it drives good people out of this most valuable profession.
New clause 50, which I will not move today, would create an annual report on alternative provision for exactly the same reason, as well as for reasons concerning achievement and behaviour in AP. I will speak about new clause 51 at the appropriate moment, but it is about encouraging Ministers to go further on the discipline agenda, which I know they want to do. It is so vital to academic achievement in our schools, but it is also vital to a decent childhood, to not having to live in fear and to an orderly society.
Ellie Chowns
New clause 70 concerns anti-bullying work in schools. Bullying is a serious and a widespread problem. Each year, one in five children report being bullied. It has devastating effects on children’s mental health, their sense of belonging and their ability to thrive. It is a leading cause of school refusal, failure to attend school and disruptive behaviour.
Children who are afraid to attend school miss opportunities to learn and grow. Bullying creates long-term harm. Victims of bullying often suffer lasting consequences into adulthood, including poor mental health, unemployment and a lack of qualifications. People who are bullied may also struggle with relationships and lack life chances. Bullying has unequal effects; it affects different groups unequally. Some groups are significantly more at risk, including children with special educational needs and disabilities, those living in poverty and young carers. Bullying also costs the economy an estimated £11 billion annually due to its impact on education, health and productivity, so it is a serious problem.
The new clause would require the appointment of anti-bullying leads in schools. Evidence shows that a whole-school approach is the most effective way to tackle bullying, but that requires co-ordination by a senior staff member. Appointing an anti-bullying lead potentially alongside and within existing roles such in safeguarding or pastoral support ensures a focused and effective strategy. It is important to record bullying. Systematically recording incidents helps schools to identify patterns, implement interventions and measure progress. This duty, which is already in place in Northern Ireland, can be streamlined with digital tools. Transparent reporting fosters trust, supports accountability and creates safer and more inclusive schools without burdening staff.
It is also important to look at teacher training. Currently, there is no requirement for trainee teachers to receive anti-bullying training, and nearly half—42%—of teachers report feeling ill equipped to address bullying. The new clause will require schools to outline what anti-bullying training is provided to staff. Short, targeted training equips teachers to prevent and respond to bullying effectively, creating safer schools and improving wellbeing and learning outcomes for all pupils.
This matters because of the effects that I talked about on children and young people. We hear heartbreaking stories all the time. The Anti-Bullying Alliance collects testimonies from children and young people. One young person said,
“All the way through year 10 and 11, I ate my lunch in the toilet.”
Another child said that it “scars you for life.” Bullying has devastating effects, but it is not inevitable. With the right systems and the right leadership in place, we can make a difference and make schools safe for everyone. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to this new clause.
Stephen Morgan
New clause 49 sets out a requirement to publish an annual report on the behaviour of pupils in mainstream state-funded schools, and I will explain why the hon. Member for Harborough, Oadby and Wigston should withdraw it. The Department for Education already publishes the data from the NBS—the National Behaviour Survey—in an annual report. That is publicly available on the gov.uk website.
Neil O’Brien
This is a very positive moment. Will the Minister commit to continuing that survey, which is, as he says, so important?
Stephen Morgan
I will certainly take that point away.
The NBS reports provide an accurate, timely and authoritative picture of behaviour across England. The surveys allow us to build up a national picture over time, and act as a signpost to what schools need. By triangulating the views of professionals, children and parents, Government officials can gain better understanding of behaviour and of what is needed to support teachers and school leaders in practice. My Department will continue to use data from the NBS to inform future strategy and policy improvements on behaviour in schools.
Mr Betts, you will be pleased to hear that this is the last new clause that I expect to respond to. I conclude by thanking you and all the Chairs for expertly chairing the Committee; all Clerks and civil servants who have supported the smooth running of our proceedings; and all Committee members who have contributed so diligently to this landmark legislation. As a Government, we are determined to break down barriers to opportunity for every child in every part of the country. This Bill is one step further in our plan for change for children and families.
New clause 49 creates a redundancy and we do not believe it is necessary to legislate on this issue. I therefore ask the hon. Member for Harborough, Oadby and Wigston to withdraw the clause.
Neil O’Brien
I echo those words, Mr Betts, and I thank the Minister for them.
I was pleased to hear the Minister’s positive comments about the National Behaviour Survey, though we have a paucity of data about this most vital issue, and it would be better to go much further. I also agree with the comments made by the hon. Member for North Herefordshire, who spoke so powerfully about the impact of bullying. One can never be too much on that absolutely vital issue. We will not press the new clause today, but we look to the Government to go beyond what already exists, and at least to maintain what exists now. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 51
Duty for schools to report acts of violence against staff to the police
“(1) Where an act listed in subsection (2) takes place which involves the use or threat of force against a member of a school’s staff, the school must report the incident to the police.
(2) An act must be reported to the police where—
(a) it is directed towards a member of school staff or their property; and
(b) it takes place—
(i) on school property; or
(ii) because of the victim’s status as a member of a school’s staff.
(3) The provisions of this section do not require or imply a duty on the police to take specific actions in response to such reports.” —(Neil O’Brien.)
This new clause would create a duty for all schools to report acts or threats of violence against their staff to the police. It would not create a requirement for the police to charge the perpetrator.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Neil O’Brien
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
This new clause is a continuation of the debate we were just having. It is time to ensure that all acts and threats of violence against teachers are reported to the police. It is very clear from the drafting of the clause that we are not looking to criminalise children, but we should not expect teachers to suck up abuse that we would never expect other professionals to. If we log what is going on, we have a chance of avoiding things that can escalate over time.
At the moment in Scotland, members of NASUWT are taking industrial action because of the failure of authorities to create discipline. The unions say that teachers
“report being told at debriefing meetings that their lessons are ‘not fun or engaging enough’”
That is absolutely extraordinary. NASUWT notes:
“A culture where there are no consequences for poor behaviour is not setting up pupils well for adult life and fails the employers’ duty of care towards its staff”.
It also says:
“The wholesale adoption of the restorative approach to pupil discipline has definitely been a problem”.
Mike Corbett of NASUWT said:
“You can’t offer a quiet chat and no serious consequences for this level of disruptive behaviour.”
We find ourselves, on this matter, in total agreement with the teaching unions and their wise words on this subject. In England, a Channel 4 exposé sadly showed the incredible extent of the problem and why we need to do far more to address it.
We want those who would lift their hands to a teacher and engage in an act of violence, intimidation or threat to know that it will absolutely be reported to the police. It is sometimes good to make a credible pre-commitment to things, and people need to know it is never acceptable to do those things. They need to know that there will be automatic consequences and that they should not expect that people will just turn the other cheek. People who are trying to help them—dedicating their lives to helping them—should not be used as punch bags. That is only one of the things we need to do, but this new clause is about resetting expectations around behaviour. If the Government will not support the new clause as drafted, we hope that they will support some version of it.
Catherine McKinnell
I agree with the sentiments behind the new clause. Any form of violence in school is completely and utterly unacceptable and should not be tolerated. By law, schools must have a behaviour policy. In the most serious cases, suspensions and permanent exclusion may be necessary to ensure that teachers and pupils are protected from disruption.
Schools or trusts as employers already have a statutory duty, outlined in the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 and the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999, to protect the health, safety and wellbeing of school staff at work. Where violence is involved on school premises, schools should take immediate and appropriate action. Should the incident constitute a potential criminal offence, it is for the school as an employer to consider involving the police, having followed the advice contained in the “When to call the police” guidance for schools and colleges by the National Police Chiefs’ Council, written in partnership with the Department for Education and the Home Office.
There are already appropriate provisions and guidance for schools to prevent and respond to violence on their premises. That includes guidance on when to involve the police, so the new clause is likely to impose an additional administrative burden on school leaders. Clearly, important points have been made, but, on the basis I have outlined, I invite the hon. Member to withdraw the clause.
Neil O’Brien
I absolutely agree with the Minister’s sentiment—of course she wants only the right thing for pupils and teachers. However, I will push the new clause to a vote, because we want to think about how we can go further on all these things to create the safe workplace that both teachers and pupils deserve.
In another part of the forest, there is an argument about non-crime hate incidents and logging them. The arguments made by the Government about logging them is that one thing leads to another. As I said before, we do not wish to criminalise children, but logging where actual acts of violence are taking place is an important resource for the police and other social services. We think that something along those lines would be useful, and I am keen to push this to a vote, but I know the Minister will think about everything extra that she can do to try to create a safe workplace.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Neil O’Brien
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Government are obviously reviewing the national curriculum at the moment. During our earlier debates in Committee, my right hon. Friend the Member for East Hampshire pointed out that control of the national curriculum is an incredible power, yet, to date, it has operated really on precedent, custom, tradition and everyone being reasonable. This new clause aims to formalise that process a bit more.
At the moment, of course, the Government are taking advice from an independent review—very sensibly—but, legally, they do not actually have to take account of that; they could make whatever decision they wanted. In another Bill—the Institute for Apprenticeships and Technical Education (Transfer of Functions etc) Bill—the Government are centralising control over a whole bunch of stuff about qualifications and standards.
This new clause just sets up, for the first time, a proper process to formalise how the national curriculum is revised. It is an incredibly strong power and yet it is one that has operated—in one sense, nobly—on the assumption of everyone just behaving reasonably and people being “good chaps”, as it were, in the old parlance. This measure would put an actual formal legal process around such hugely important changes.
Catherine McKinnell
The current system for reviewing the curriculum works well, as the ongoing independent curriculum and assessment review shows, and has stood the test of time for successive Governments. The legislation gives Ministers the flexibility to review and develop the curriculum in the most appropriate way for the circumstances of the time, while requiring them to consult, and to provide Parliament with appropriate levels of scrutiny.
Requiring the creation of new organisations and processes is rarely the best way to improve outcomes. The proposed system would be inflexible and bureaucratic rather than helpful. New clause 55 would mean that, following any review of whether to change the national curriculum, such as through our curriculum and assessment review, the Secretary of State would have to set up another independent review to advise how to change the programmes of study.
Also, by requiring a positive, rather than negative, resolution of changes, and of any changes beyond the review’s recommendations, this measure could add unnecessary delays and uncertainty for teachers about what was going to be changed in the curriculum and when. On that basis, I invite the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.
Neil O’Brien
While our concerns remain, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 58
Right to review school curriculum material
“Where requested by the parent or carer of a child on the school’s pupil roll, a school must allow such persons to view all materials used in the teaching of the school curriculum, including those provided by external, third-party, charitable or commercial providers.”—(Neil O’Brien.)
This new clause would ensure that parents can view materials used in the teaching of the school curriculum.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Neil O’Brien
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Over recent years, we have been in an absolutely extraordinary situation. Very controversial materials from various third party private providers have been used in RSE—relationships and sex education—lessons, yet parents have been denied access to the materials that are being used to teach their children, even though it is them paying, as taxpayers, and it is their children who are being exposed to these materials. That is obviously unacceptable.
Various private providers of this material, including for-profit companies, have tried to hide behind copyright law, or have tried to make parents sign agreements, such as that they can see the materials, but only on the strict conditions that they do not quote from them or talk about them, effectively crippling and ending public debate about them. Parents need to see, and to be able to act upon what they see, including discussing it in public and making formal complaints. That requires having a copy of the material and being able to refer to it openly.
An important case brought by the campaign group “No Secret Lessons” may establish such rights, but, despite a hearing five months ago, we are still—strangely—awaiting a verdict in its case. I pay tribute to its work in trying to bring back some common sense here.
New clause 58 seeks to put into statute the right to have access to the materials that are being used to educate our children about controversial subjects. That, itself, should not be a controversial idea. The intent is that this right, in primary legislation, would cut through the issues around copyright and prevent the industry from trying to stop public discussion that actually needs to happen.
The context is that the Government’s response to the consultation on gender-questioning children and RSE is long overdue, and we look forward to hearing the outcome of those processes soon. I hope that the Minister may be able to say some more about when we can expect to see those things.
However, whatever the outcome of those reviews, I hope that we can agree on an important principle: that parents should be allowed to know what their children are being taught, and that there should be no secret lessons.
Tom Hayes
I wish to speak briefly about the new clause, mainly to test the waters with the hon. Gentleman who tabled it. Does he, like me, have concerns that, if parents and carers are able to access teaching materials, they may meet with the teachers who drew up the materials and raise significant concerns, which may not always be well founded?
For instance, a teacher I spoke with recently raised concerns about a parent who had demanded to see their teaching materials on the basis that they cited Marcus Rashford as an example of somebody campaigning for social justice, which the parent was deeply concerned about. The teacher raised with me their concern that the conversation with the parent had had a chilling or stifling effect on their willingness to cite Marcus Rashford as a social justice hero in the future.
Would it not be a better way forward for teachers to be held accountable for their materials by the headteacher and the school’s governing body? That would protect parents or guardians from the minority of parents or carers who raise concerns based on unfounded reasons that have a wider impact on the teaching that is delivered.
Neil O'Brien
I am grateful to the hon. Member for giving way so that I can directly answer the question he posed to me. The problem is not schools, which are bound by freedom of information, but a bunch of private for-profit providers that are inappropriately hiding behind copyright law to deny people the right to even see what is being taught. Different people can have different opinions on what is being taught—that is reasonable in a democracy, and it is important that we have sensibly founded conversations and all those things—but does the hon. Member agree that, given that a parent is paying for their kid’s education, they should have the right to see what they are being taught?
Tom Hayes
I welcome that clarification. I continue to have concerns, because whether or not somebody is paying for their child’s education—I would obviously wish that they were not paying—I still think it is important to have quality education and critical thinking and to potentially use inspirational figures and history to make points. That goes across all types of educational provider, so my concern remains. Thinking back to the conversation I had recently with a teacher, the last thing I want is for them to go into a classroom feeling wary or in any way diminished in their ability to freely and critically educate and provide children with access to all kinds of information, and not just narrow viewpoints.
Catherine McKinnell
It is right that parents and carers should be able to access and understand what their child is taught at school, so that they can continue to support their child’s learning at home and answer questions. However, that should be achieved in a way that does not increase school and teacher workload.
The new clause could require schools to maintain and collate a substantial number of materials across various platforms, covering all subjects and school years, down to every single worksheet, presentation, planning document or text. That is not necessary. There are already many ways in which parents can engage with their child’s curriculum that would not add to teacher workload. The national curriculum, which will be taught in academies and maintained schools, is published on gov.uk. Maintained schools and academies are required to publish details of how a parent can access further information about the school’s curriculum.
Schools must also have a written policy for relationships and sex education, which must be developed in consultation with parents. The statutory guidance is clear that this should include providing examples of the resources they intend to use, to reassure parents and enable them to continue conversations at home. We will make sure that that is reinforced when we update the guidance. Finally, parents can be reassured that Ofsted reviews curriculum materials to ensure that they support pupils to achieve good outcomes.
The new clause is a sledgehammer to crack a nut. There is no evidence of a widespread problem that would justify the extra burden and bureaucracy it would create for schools. If parents have concerns, there are ways of dealing with them. On that basis, I urge the hon. Member to withdraw his new clause.
Neil O'Brien
I listened to the hon. Member for Bournemouth East and, broadly speaking, agree with everything he said. I am absolutely in favour of a balanced diet and the free exchange of different ideas, and nothing we are proposing in any way speaks against that. What we propose is in fact a way to ensure that that happens, by allowing parents to see what their children are being taught.
I find myself out of sympathy with the Minister’s argument that this is somehow a massive bureaucratic requirement. With state schools, there is FOI, so parents are able to access these materials. The problem has come with private providers using copyright law to escape the same transparency that we expect of schools normally, which is not right.
I do not accept that the new clause would require people to have 20 years-worth of materials. It simply states that
“a school must allow such persons to view all materials used in the teaching of the school curriculum”.
That is in the present tense, so this is not some huge bureaucratic burden. The school has the materials, and the only question is whether the parents can see them, take them away and talk about them to other people.
At the moment, free debate on such things is being stifled, and a hugely important principle is being denied to people. We have a right to see what our kids are being taught in schools. For that reason, we will press the new clause to a vote.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 60—Kinship care allowance—
“(1) A person is entitled to a kinship care allowance for any week in which that person is engaged as a kinship carer in England.
(2) For the purposes of this section, a ‘kinship carer’ has the meaning given in section 22I of the Children Act 1989, as inserted by section 5 of this Act.
(3) A person is not entitled to an allowance under this section unless that person satisfies conditions prescribed in regulations made by the Secretary of State.
(4) A person may claim an allowance under this section in respect of more than one child.
(5) Where two or more persons would be entitled for the same week to such an allowance in respect of the same child, only one allowance may be claimed on the behalf of—
(a) the person jointly elected by those two for that purpose, or
(b) in default of such an election, the person determined by, and at the discretion of, the Secretary of State.
(6) Regulations may prescribe the circumstances in which a person is or is not to be treated for the purposes of this section as engaged, or regularly and substantially engaged, in caring for a child under an eligible kinship care arrangement.
(7) An allowance under this section is payable at the weekly rate specified by the Secretary of State in regulations.
(8) Regulations under subsection (7) may specify—
(a) different weekly rates for different ages of children being cared for, or
(b) different weekly rates for different regions of England.
(9) Regulations under subsection (7) must specify a weekly rate that is no lower than the minimum weekly allowance for foster carers published by the Secretary of State pursuant to section 23 of the Care Standards Act 2000.”
New clause 61—Extension of pupil premium to children subject to a kinship care arrangement—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, for the financial year beginning 1 April 2026 and for each year thereafter, provide that an amount is payable from the pupil premium grant to schools and local authorities in respect of each registered pupil in England who is who is a child living in kinship care.
(2) The amount payable under subsection (1) must be equal to the amount that is payable for a pupil who is a looked after child.
(3) In this section—
‘a child living in kinship care’ is to be interpreted in the same manner as given in section 22I of the Children Act 1989, as inserted by section 5 of this Act.
‘looked after child’ has the same meaning as in the Children Act 1989;
‘pupil premium grant’ means the grant of that name paid to a school or a local authority by the Secretary of State under section 14 of the Education Act 2002 (power of Secretary of State and Senedd Cymru to give financial assistance for purposes related to education or children etc).”
New clause 62—Admissions arrangements relating to looked after children and children in kinship care—
“(1) For section 88B of the School Standards and Framework Act 1998 (admission arrangements relating to children looked after by local authority) substitute—
‘88B Admissions arrangements relating to looked after children and children in kinship care
(1) Regulations may require the admission authorities for maintained schools in England to include in their admission arrangements provision relating to the admission of children who are—
(a) looked after by a local authority in England, or
(b) living in kinship care as may be prescribed.
(2) Regulations under subsection (1) may in particular include provision for securing that, subject to sections 86(3), 86B(2) and (4) and 87, such children are to be offered admission in preference to other children.
(3) In this section, “children who are living in kinship care” is to be interpreted in the same manner as given in section 22I of the Children Act 1989, as inserted by section 5 of this Act.’”
Munira Wilson
The end is in sight for all of us—we are on to the last column of the selection list. I will speak to new clauses 59 to 62, which are in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for St Neots and Mid Cambridgeshire. The new clauses all refer to support for kinship carers and children growing up in kinship care.
In clauses 5 and 6 in part 1 of the Bill, we discussed and agreed a number of encouraging provisions on defining kinship carers, setting out the support they are eligible for and providing additional educational support for the subset of children growing up in kinship care. However, what we have already agreed in Committee falls far short of the ambition that I heard the Secretary of State herself set out at a reception for kinship carers just a couple of months back.
At that reception, the right hon. Lady—unusually for a Secretary of State—called on campaigners and policymakers to keep pushing her. I think that that was in order to give her the clout in Government to go further. The four new clauses seek to do just that, and I hope Ministers will receive them in that spirit.
New clause 59 would ensure that kinship carers are entitled to paid employment leave. New clause 60 would put into statute an entitlement to an allowance on a par with that for foster carers. New clause 61 would extend pupil premium plus to all children in kinship care, based on the definition the Committee has agreed. Finally, new clause 62 would prioritise those same children for school admissions.
Kinship carers are unsung heroes, often stepping up at no notice to look after a child they are related to or know, because the parents can no longer do so. In oral evidence, Jacky Tiotto of the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service told us that
“the kinship carer’s life will not continue in the way it had before, in terms of their ability to work, maybe, or where they live.
We know that local authorities are under huge resource pressure, so there is going to have to be something a bit stronger to encourage people to become carers, whether that is related to housing or the cost of looking after those children. People will want to do the right thing, but if you already have three kids of your own that becomes tricky.”––[Official Report, Children's Wellbeing and Schools Public Bill Committee, 21 January 2025; c. 34, Q78.]
Time and again, we hear from kinship carers that they want to do the right thing—out of love for those family members—but financial and other barriers often stand in their way. One survey revealed that 45% of kinship carers give up work, and a similar number have to reduce their hours permanently, putting financial strain on the family. Those carers are disproportionately women and are over-represented in healthcare, education and social care, which simply exacerbates our workforce crisis in public services. Extending paid employment leave would enable more people to step up and provide a stable, loving home.
On allowances, there are not just long-term savings to be made in terms of the well-evidenced better health and education outcomes for children; there are also immediate cost savings to be had for the taxpayer. Compared to the cost of the alternative—local authority care—the saving is approximately £35,000 a year. Every child we manage to divert from local authority care into kinship care can deliver that saving for the taxpayer immediately. Surely Ministers can tempt their colleagues in the Treasury with that immediate spend-to-save argument?
In Kinship’s 2022 “Cost of Loving” survey of more than 1,000 kinship carers, one third said they may not be able to continue caring for their child as a result of financial pressures. I spoke to one kinship carer in my borough who had avoided putting the heating on and skipped all sorts of things, including food for herself, so that she could put enough food on the table for her grandson. Her story is far too common. A national, non-means-tested allowance would end the system of patchy means-tested allowances that reflect the postcode lottery of support that councils can afford to provide.
Ministers have already recognised in the Bill the need for additional educational support for children in kinship care. Why are we not treating all children equally, so that it is not just those who were previously looked after who are entitled to additional pupil premium funding or priority admissions? The trauma and needs of children in kinship care are often similar to those of children who were previously looked after. We should extend the same provisions to all children in kinship care.
I know that Ministers understand the sacrifices that kinship carers make and the trauma that children in kinship care have been through. The Schools Minister herself headed up a parliamentary taskforce on kinship in the last Parliament, and she was very active in the all-party parliamentary group on kinship care. I know that she is very familiar with these issues, and I hope she is sympathetic to the call in these new clauses. I hope to hear something positive and that Ministers—even if, as we know, they never accept Opposition new clauses in a Bill Committee—will seek to address these inequalities and support these unsung heroes, kinship carers, and the children they look after.
Catherine McKinnell
I thank the hon. Members for Twickenham and for St Neots and Mid Cambridgeshire for these new clauses. I want to start by emphasising how much I value kinship carers, who come forward to provide loving homes for children who cannot live with their parents. We absolutely recognise the challenge that many kinship carers face in continuing to work while dealing with the pressures of raising a child unexpectedly.
The support offered by the Government to kinship carers is a floor, not a ceiling, and we encourage employers to go further, where they can. One example of that is the Department for Education, which employs more than 7,500 public sector workers and has recently joined a small number of private sector employers, including Card Factory, Tesco and John Lewis, in offering a paid leave entitlement to all eligible staff who become kinship carers.
Employed kinship carers may already benefit from a number of workplace employment rights that are designed to support employees in balancing work alongside caring responsibilities. Those rights include a day one right to time off for dependants, which provides a reasonable amount of unpaid time off to deal with an unexpected or sudden emergency involving a child or dependant, and to put care arrangements in place. There is also unpaid parental leave for employees who have or expect to have parental responsibility, which we are making a day one right through the Employment Rights Bill. An employee may not automatically have parental responsibility as a result of being a kinship carer, but may do if they have acquired parental responsibility through, for example, a special guardianship order. If they are looking after a child who is disabled or who lives with a long-term health condition, they would also be entitled to carer’s leave, which would allow them to take up to a week’s leave in a 12-month period.
All employees also have a right to request flexible working from day one of employment. The Government will make flexibility the default, except where it is not feasible, through measures in the Employment Rights Bill. We have also committed to a review of the parental leave system to ensure that it best supports all working families. Work is already under way on planning for its delivery.
On new clause 60, again, I am grateful for the opportunity to discuss financial support for kinship carers. In October 2024, the Government announced £40 million of new funding for a kinship financial allowance pilot, which will test the impact of financial support for kinship carers. This is the single biggest investment made by Government in kinship care to date. It could transform the lives of vulnerable children who can no longer live at home by allowing them to grow up with their families and communities, reducing the disruption in their early years so that they can focus on schooling and building friendships. The pilot will provide a weekly financial allowance to kinship carers to support them with the additional costs incurred when taking on parental responsibility for a child.
Our ambition is that all kinship carers get the support they need to care for their children and to help them thrive, but it is important that we build the evidence first to find out how best to deliver that financial support. Decisions about future roll-out will be informed by the findings of the evaluation. The Government will confirm the eligible cohort for the pilot as well as the participating local authorities soon, and we expect the pilot to go live in autumn 2025.
New clauses 61 and 62 would extend pupil premium eligibility to children living in kinship care, and provide those children admissions in preference to other children, in the same way as children who are or were looked after by a local authority in England are currently given preference. We are providing over £2.9 billion of pupil premium funding to improve the educational outcomes of disadvantaged pupils in England, including looked-after and previously looked-after children. Pupil premium is not a personal budget for individual pupils, and schools do not have to spend the funding so that it solely benefits pupils who meet the criteria. Schools can direct funding where the need is greatest, including to pupils with other identified needs, such as children in kinship care. They can also use pupil premium on whole-class approaches that will benefit all pupils, such as high-quality teaching. There are no plans to change the pupil premium eligibility at present. However, we will continue to keep it under review to ensure that the support is targeted at those who need it most.
All state-funded, non-selective schools are required to provide the highest priority in their admissions over-subscription criteria to looked-after and previously looked-after children. Those children are among the most vulnerable in our society, and wherever possible, they should be admitted to the school that is best able to meet their needs. Some children in kinship care may share some of those characteristics. Indeed, many children in kinship care may already be eligible for the highest priority for school admission—for example, where a child is looked after by their local authority and then fostered by a kinship carer, or where they were previously looked after. We think that this approach is the best way of ensuring that the most vulnerable pupils of this cohort, who would benefit most from priority admissions, are able to access the school place that is right for them.
It is also worth noting that the school admissions code provides another protection to children in formal kinship care, irrespective of whether they have spent time in local authority care. The admissions code ensures that such children are eligible to be secured a school place through the fair access protocol, which is the local mechanism for ensuring that those struggling to secure a school place via the usual admissions processes are found one.
Given those existing protections, we do not consider it necessary at this time to extend the existing priority for looked-after and previously looked-after children in England to include all children in kinship care. We are also extending local authorities’ statutory duties to include promoting the educational achievement of all children living in kinship care within the meaning of new section 22I(1) of the Children Act 1989, which will be inserted by the Bill. We will also extend the duty of virtual school heads to provide information and advice to include all children living with a special guardian or under a child arrangement order where the child is living with a kinship carer within the meaning of new section 22I(6) of the 1989 Act. On that basis, I ask the hon. Member for Twickenham not to press the new clauses.
Munira Wilson
I thank the Minister for her response. It is obviously disappointing that Ministers will not go further, particularly on allowances. The pilots that were set out in a tiny number of local authorities with a very small subset of kinship carers were not ambitious enough. On that basis, I would like to press new clause 60 on allowances to a vote, but I am happy to leave the others. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 60
Kinship care allowance
(1) A person is entitled to a kinship care allowance for any week in which that person is engaged as a kinship carer in England.
(2) For the purposes of this section, a “kinship carer” has the meaning given in section 22I of the Children Act 1989, as inserted by section 5 of this Act.
(3) A person is not entitled to an allowance under this section unless that person satisfies conditions prescribed in regulations made by the Secretary of State.
(4) A person may claim an allowance under this section in respect of more than one child.
(5) Where two or more persons would be entitled for the same week to such an allowance in respect of the same child, only one allowance may be claimed on the behalf of—
(a) the person jointly elected by those two for that purpose, or
(b) in default of such an election, the person determined by, and at the discretion of, the Secretary of State.
(6) Regulations may prescribe the circumstances in which a person is or is not to be treated for the purposes of this section as engaged, or regularly and substantially engaged, in caring for a child under an eligible kinship care arrangement.
(7) An allowance under this section is payable at the weekly rate specified by the Secretary of State in regulations.
(8) Regulations under subsection (7) may specify—
(a) different weekly rates for different ages of children being cared for, or
(b) different weekly rates for different regions of England.
(9) Regulations under subsection (7) must specify a weekly rate that is no lower than the minimum weekly allowance for foster carers published by the Secretary of State pursuant to section 23 of the Care Standards Act 2000.—(Munira Wilson.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Neil O'Brien
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
As Ministers look at new clause 63, they may think it seems strangely familiar, and I must confess that it is a piece of stolen intellectual property. As you will recognise, Mr Betts, it is a rip-off of new Labour’s Education Act 2002. Funnily enough, it is a part of that Act that was passed as legislation but never commenced. It is a good thing in itself, as it enables Ministers to set up areas of innovation in our schools, and it is a part of a wider good thing: the spirit of innovation and reform in our schools of the early Blair years, which we want Ministers to return to.
In the health service, there has been a 40-year discussion about why innovation is so hard and why innovations do not spread in the NHS. In schools, although the situation is not perfect, it is definitely better because of parental choice and the reforms under Lord Baker, Lord Adonis, the coalition and beyond. I commend to all members of the Committee Lord Adonis’s superb book “Education, Education, Education: Reforming England’s Schools”, which brilliantly captures the spirit of that era and what that Government were trying to achieve.
Although we think this would be a useful power, our purpose of drawing attention to it is as much about the spirit of what we want to see in our schools. There have been some changes of tone from Ministers during the course of this Bill Committee, and we hope we can persuade them to go further in the same direction. That is why we have discussed this new clause, but we will not be pressing it to a vote.
Catherine McKinnell
Things really can only get better—[Laughter.]
I thank the hon. Gentleman for drawing attention to the existing provision in part 1 of the Education Act 2002, and his open admission that the new clause draws its inspiration from it. That Act, in the early days of academies, introduced powers to facilitate innovation that were designed to encourage schools to consider barriers to raising standards for their pupils in their particular circumstances, and to explore innovative options that might not previously have been considered. It provided a means of promoting school freedoms and flexibilities, and was an effective strategic tool that enabled schools, local authorities and the Department for Children, Schools and Families, as it was, to test new ideas. It encouraged schools and local authorities to re-examine their existing practices and make use of freedoms and flexibilities that they already had. It was not designed to allow long-term flexibility, as this new clause is; rather any exemption is time limited.
The Act provoked consideration of real and perceived barriers to raising standards, and many schools discovered that not all innovative ideas require an exemption from legislation, because the necessary freedoms and flexibilities already exist. Annual reporting shows that only 32 orders were made between 2002 and 2010 using the power. We understand that the last order under the power was made in 2012. Since then, schools and trusts have innovated and tested ideas without the 2002 powers being necessary or used. Evidence-based practice and innovation is now the norm in many of our schools and trusts. There is a range of programmes, such as curricular hubs, behaviour hubs and teaching schools, geared to driving schools towards spreading evidence-based practice, and away from doing other things.
The Department works closely with the Education Endowment Foundation, which is independent from Government and trusted by the sector, to understand which interventions and approaches are most effective in terms of school improvement and raising attainment, and to provide guidance and support to schools on that. As part of that, it carries out trials of new approaches that look to have a high potential to improve outcomes. Where a new and innovative practice works, we want schools to be able to implement it. For example, based on robust EEF evidence of impact, programmes such as embedding formative assessments and mathematics mastery are being provided to the sector at greater scale, supported by Department for Education funding that subsidises the cost of participation.
The Bill guarantees a core provision for all children. Through it, we are providing a floor, not a ceiling, and the measures do not prevent schools and trusts from innovating and adapting above that framework. Our vision for driving high and rising standards centres on expert teaching and leadership in a system with wide freedoms, high support and high challenge, backed up by the removal of barriers, so that every child can achieve and thrive. We believe that more of the flexibility currently offered to academies should be offered to all schools, and we are working with teachers, leaders and the sector to design our wider reforms. If attempts to innovate are prevented by legislation, we want to hear about it, because we want all children to benefit from the best the system has to offer. On that basis, I ask the hon. Member for Harborough, Oadby and Wigston to withdraw his new clause.
Neil O'Brien
It is nice to hear the Minister praising the resources that are there for school-led improvement, so we hope that Ministers will look again at the recent decision to cut or curtail things such as mathematics, physics, Latin, computing and the like. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 64
Pay and conditions of school support staff in England
“(1) A School Support Staff Negotiating Body shall be created to make recommendations to the Secretary of State about the pay and conditions of school support staff in England.
(2) The Secretary of State may by order set out the recommended pay and conditions for school support staff in England based on the recommendations of the School Support Staff Negotiating Body.
(3) The Secretary of State may by order make provision requiring the remuneration of support staff at an Academy school to be at least equal to the amount specified in, or determined in accordance with, the order.
(4) Subsection (5) applies where—
(a) an order under this section applies to a member of school support staff at an Academy, and
(b) the contract of employment or for services between the member of school support staff at the Academy and the relevant proprietor provides for the member of school support staff to be paid remuneration that is less than the amount specified in, or determined in accordance with, the order.
(5) Where this subsection applies—
(a) the member of school support staff’s remuneration is to be determined and paid in accordance with any provision of the order that applies to them; and
(b) any provision of the contract mentioned in subsection (4)(b) or of the Academy arrangements entered into with the Secretary of State by the relevant proprietor has no effect to the extent that it makes provision that is prohibited by, or is otherwise inconsistent with, the order.
(c) In determining the conditions of employment or service of a member of school support staff at an Academy, the relevant proprietor must have regard to any provision of an order under this section that relates to conditions of employment or service.”—(Neil O’Brien.)
This new clause would mean that Academies could treat orders made by the Secretary of State in relation to pay and conditions for school support staff as a floor, not a ceiling, on pay, and would allow Academies to have regard to the conditions of employment for school support staff set out by the Secretary of State while not requiring Academies to follow them.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Neil O'Brien
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Minister just talked about the principle of having a floor, not a ceiling. Through our debates, we have now established that for teachers, but of course teachers are not a majority of the school workforce. The majority of the workforce are those who are sometimes called school support staff. These people are no less worthy than teachers of our praise and admiration. They fulfil all manner of roles, from the most essential to the most demanding.
Through this new clause, we ask that the same principles that are to be applied to teachers’ pay—we hope that those will translate into reality—should apply to the majority of school staff: school support staff. Although trust leaders anticipated the school support staff negotiating body, some were surprised about the proposal for it to cut across academy funding arrangements, and not all had anticipated that it would apply to them. A number have said to me that they will be very concerned if their freedoms to pay more to retain the best school support staff were, in effect, taken away from them, because that would have a devastating effect on their schools.
Legislation on this issue is being considered in another place, but I hope that we can establish that Ministers will maintain that vital freedom to pay more, particularly in high-demand areas, to retain good people in our schools. A person does not have to be a teacher to play a crucial part in the education of our children, and what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. We hope that the same principles that Ministers say will apply to teachers can also be established for the rest of the school workforce.
Catherine McKinnell
I welcome the hon. Gentleman’s celebration of school support staff. He is absolutely right: they are the beating heart of schools up and down the country. For that very reason, provisions to reinstate the school support staff negotiating body are currently going through Parliament as part of the Employment Rights Bill. That Bill’s clause 30 and schedule 3, which pertain to the SSSNB, were debated in Committee in the House of Commons on 17 December 2024, and the Bill is about to move to Report stage in the House. Any amendments relating to the school support staff negotiating body should therefore be considered as part of the Employment Rights Bill, and the issues that the hon. Gentleman outlined will be considered as part of the work of the school support staff negotiating body. I therefore ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his new clause.
Neil O'Brien
I am glad to hear the Minister endorse the principle of a floor, not a ceiling, for school support staff. We will withdraw the new clause but press it elsewhere, so that we can establish that principle, on which I hope we can all agree. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 67
Registration of children eligible for free school meals
“After section 512ZA of the Education Act 1996 (power to charge for meals etc.) insert—
‘512ZAA Registration of children eligible for free school meals
(1) The Secretary of State must ensure that all children in England who are eligible to receive free school meals are registered to receive free school meals.
(2) The Secretary of State may make provision for children to be registered for free school meals upon their parents or guardians demonstrating the child’s eligibility through an application for relevant benefits.’”—(Munira Wilson.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Munira Wilson (Twickenham) (LD)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 69—Collection and publication of data relating to summer-born children—
“(1) A local authority must collect and publish data on—
(a) the number and proportion of summer-born children who started school in the local authority’s area outside of their normal age group;
(b) the number and proportion of summer-born children—
(i) with EHC plans, and
(ii) without EHC plans,
who started school in the local authority’s area outside of their normal age group and who have been required to join their normal age group; and
(c) the number and proportion of summer-born children with EHC plans who started school in the local authority’s area outside of their normal age group and who have been required to join their normal age group in a—
(i) special school;
(ii) mainstream school.
(2) The Secretary of State must annually—
(a) conduct a statistical analysis of, and
(b) publish a report on the data collected by local authorities under subsection (1).”
Munira Wilson
I am moving the new clause on behalf of my hon. Friend the Member for St Albans (Daisy Cooper), who has raised the issue that summer-born children with SEND are often placed in the following year group at school, often at the request of their parents, but when they transfer into or out of special or mainstream school, they are then placed back into their chronological year and, as a result, end up missing a whole year of education. Guidance exists for summer-born children who do not have EHCPs but not, strangely, for those who do. New clauses 68 and 69 would simply require guidance to be published for local authorities and school admissions authorities on the admission of summer-born children with education, health and care plans and would require local authorities to collect and publish data relating to summer-born children.
Catherine McKinnell
The Government agree with the hon. Member for Twickenham that local authorities have important and complex decisions to make when parents ask for a summer-born child with an EHC plan to be placed outside the usual year for their age. The Department’s existing guidance for the admission of summer-born children without education, health and care plans sets out a recommended approach for those key decisions. Many of the considerations in that guidance will be similar for children with an education, health and care plan. Getting those decisions right can make a huge difference to the child’s outcomes and their experience of school, so such decisions need to be made thoughtfully and fairly, with due consideration given to what the parents want for their child. That is why, in July last year, in response to a parliamentary question from the hon. Member for St Albans, I committed to consider whether we should publish guidance on how these decisions are best made. We have been doing just that, and will confirm our decision in the coming months. In the meantime, it would not be appropriate to pre-empt the content of any such guidance by confirming the details now. However, I can say that we have been giving careful consideration to many of the matters outlined in the new clause and deciding how best to proceed.
On new clause 69, the Department conducts a voluntary biennial survey of local authorities about the admission of summer-born children. That asks local authorities to include data, where they hold it, about all schools in their area. The Department publishes a report on the findings of the survey, those findings show that only a small proportion—1.5%—of parents of summer-born children ask for them to be admitted to reception at age five. The vast majority of such requests—nine out of 10—are approved. The first summer-born children admitted out of their normal age group are now transitioning to secondary school. Our next survey will ask local authorities for data about the number of children who remain out of their normal age group at that point. The survey does not currently ask local authorities to specify how many requests relate to children with an education, health and care plan but we regularly review the survey, and that is something that we may consider in the future. Given that the existing arrangements to collect data about the admission of summer-born children are working well, it would seem disproportionate to impose a new statutory duty to make the data collection mandatory. I therefore respectfully ask the hon. Member to withdraw the new clause.
Munira Wilson
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.