Oral Answers to Questions
Torsten Bell Excerpts(2 months, 3 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Gill Furniss (Sheffield Brightside and Hillsborough) (Lab)
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Torsten Bell)
To tackle pensioner poverty, we are both increasing the state pension and running the biggest ever pension credit take-up campaign. Raising the new state pension in line with the triple lock over this Parliament is set to increase it by over £2,000 a year, while 60,000 extra pension credit awards were made in the year to July compared with the previous 12 months.
Gill Furniss
More than a quarter of a million pensioners received compensation from the Pension Protection Fund and the financial assistance scheme, but those who accrued their income before 1997 have suffered a real-terms cut of 24% in the past five years alone. I welcome the Chancellor’s commitment to provide indexation on these accruals, but many of those who will benefit are elderly and in ill health. Can the Minister confirm that he will implement this much-welcomed change as quickly as possible?
Torsten Bell
I thank my hon. Friend for that important question. I, like her, have met and listened to lots of those affected by the lack of indexation on pre-1997 accruals within the PPF and the FAS. I can assure her that, assuming the Pension Schemes Bill receives Royal Assent, the uprating will take place at the next PPF uprating, which means January 2027 on current estimates.
Sir Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)
I am very grateful to the Minister to be in receipt of the triple lock, but it is not an effective way of tackling pensioner poverty and it is bankrupting the country. I am sorry not to be party political, but can we not have a consensus between the parties that we should phase out the triple lock, concentrate resources on pensioners in real poverty and have an agreement on dealing with benefits generally to get people back into work? We should work together.
Torsten Bell
I am always keen to work together with the Father of the House. He mentions the triple lock, but we are doing far more things to tackle pensioner poverty. There were 900,000 pensioners eligible for pension credit under the Conservatives who were not claiming, and that is why we have brought forward the biggest take-up campaign ever seen. The marketing campaign this year will run from September to the end of the financial year, we are carrying out research on what works to encourage take-up of pension credit and we are stepping up data sharing across Departments, including between His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and the Department for Work and Pensions.
Anna Dixon (Shipley) (Lab)
Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)
The Chancellor’s Budget put a cap on salary sacrifice for pension savers at just £2,000. That was to raise an extra £4.8 billion in 2029, and it will affect 3.3 million savers and 290,000 employers. What research has the Pensions Minister done to understand and quantify the negative effects that this will have on pension savings?
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Torsten Bell)
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his question because it gives me a chance to bring the House’s attention to research published after the general election in 2024 but commissioned under the last Conservative Government—I have the document here. What was the research into? It was into capping salary sacrifice pension contributions at £2,000. The hon. Gentleman can read the research published and commissioned by his own party about putting back under control this tax relief, which had got out of hand.
Mark Garnier
Well, it was not us who put it in place; it was Labour.
This policy hits the private sector disproportionately: 14 times as many people save through salary sacrifice in the private sector as they do in the public sector. Whether it is kite-flying about lump sum withdrawal or taxing inherited pension pots, in a week when Labour Together is canvassing Labour members about a new Labour leader, is it not the case that the Chancellor is more interested in throwing red meat to her sad and unfortunate Back Benchers in a vain attempt to save her job than she is in the interests of the savings of our hard-working constituents?
Torsten Bell
There is nothing sad about Labour Members watching wages rise faster under this Government than they did under the Conservatives. There is nothing sad about our Back Benchers seeing the end of austerity and seeing public services being improved right across this country.
Mohammad Yasin (Bedford) (Lab)
Lincoln Jopp (Spelthorne) (Con)
Following the Budget, a furious Labour voter, 30 years old, texted me to say, “I am furious about the salary sacrifice thing. I give up a lot of things to put 20% of my salary into my pension. That’s going to cost me almost two grand a year for being responsible.” Why are the Government so keen on punishing savers?
Torsten Bell
We are taking a pragmatic approach to reforming pension contributions made via salary sacrifice, the costs of which are set nearly to triple to £8 billion between 2017 and the end of this decade. The case for change was made powerfully by a previous Chancellor:
“The majority of employees pay tax on a cash salary, but some are able to sacrifice salary…and pay much lower tax… That is unfair”.—[Official Report, 23 November 2016; Vol. 617, c. 907.]
So said Baron Hammond of Runnymede.
Danny Beales (Uxbridge and South Ruislip) (Lab)
Seamus Logan (Aberdeenshire North and Moray East) (SNP)
I recognise, as do so many Members across the House, the injustice and maladministration suffered by the so-called WASPI women born in the 1950s. I welcome the recent development announced by the Secretary of State, but will he give an undertaking that if compensation is agreed, it will take into account the poverty suffered by so many of these women and include recompense for their significant legal costs?
Torsten Bell
As the Secretary of State set out to the House a few months ago, the decision to which the hon. Member refers is being retaken by the Department, and we have committed to updating the House on that decision in due course.
Tom Hayes (Bournemouth East) (Lab)
Nan Roberts is 92. She was widowed this year and is facing her first Christmas without her husband of 64 years, and she is feeling utterly fobbed off by a creaking DWP system. She is waiting for her “choices letter”, despite having ingoing state pension payments dating back to 1994. The threat of asking this question has already led to some action by the DWP, but will the Secretary of State outline how I can do more to support my constituent?
Torsten Bell
The hon. Gentleman is a powerful champion for his constituents and I am sure that all hon. Members will be unhappy to hear about this case. I know that staff from the Department for Work and Pensions have already been in touch with his office, and I am happy to follow up myself.
Torsten Bell
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his brief question. Pensioner poverty halved under the last Labour Government. It went up under the previous Conservative Government, but it is going to come down again under this Government.
Rachael Maskell (York Central) (Lab/Co-op)
On Friday, I learned of an 81-year-old constituent who had had to return to work because of the cost of living in York. Will the Government take a deep dive and carry out an inquiry into poverty in later life, so that we can ensure that we deal with pensioner poverty once and for all?
Torsten Bell
I thank my hon. Friend for her important question. We have seen poverty rates fall less fast among people approaching the state pension age, rather than those over it. We need to look across the range of policy levers to address that, which includes growing the economy so that wages are rising and building houses so that people’s housing costs come down.
Jayne Kirkham (Truro and Falmouth) (Lab/Co-op)
Cornwall Marine Network in my constituency is a small and medium-sized enterprise members association that provides training and apprenticeship support. It recently celebrated providing 5,000 new jobs and apprenticeships. It will welcome the Government’s youth guarantee and the news that SMEs will not have to pay for apprenticeship training for under-25s. Will the Minister confirm how this Government will increase the capacity of such training providers?
Pension Schemes Bill
Torsten Bell ExcerptsWednesday 3rd December 2025
(3 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Pension Schemes Bill 2024-26 View all Pension Schemes Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 3 December 2025 - large print - (3 Dec 2025)
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Torsten Bell)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government new clause 31—Indexation of periodic compensation for pre-1997 service: Great Britain.
Government new clause 32—Indexation of periodic compensation for pre-1997 service: Northern Ireland.
Government new clause 33—Financial Assistance Scheme: indexation of payments for pre-1997 service.
Government new clause 34—Exemption from public procurement rules.
Government new clause 35—Funding of the Board of the Pension Protection Fund.
New clause 1—Independent review into pension losses incurred by former employees of AEA Technology—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within three months of the passing of this Act, commission an independent review into the pension losses incurred by former employees of AEA Technology who—
(a) transferred their accrued pension benefits out of the UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) public service scheme to AEA Technology (AEAT) on privatisation in 1996, and
(b) suffered financial losses when AEA Technology went into administration in 2012 and the pension scheme entered the Pension Protection Fund (PPF).
(2) The review must examine—
(a) the extent and causes of pension losses incurred by affected individuals,
(b) the role of Government policy and representations in the transfer of pensions during the privatisation of AEA Technology,
(c) the findings of the Public Accounts Committee and the Work and Pensions Select Committee,
(d) the adequacy of safeguards provided at the time of privatisation,
(e) potential mechanisms for redress or compensation, and
(f) the estimated financial cost of any such mechanisms.
(3) The review must be—
(a) conducted by an independent panel appointed by the Secretary of State, with relevant expertise in pensions, public policy, and administrative justice, and
(b) transparent and consultative, including engagement with affected pensioners and their representatives.
(4) The panel must report its findings and recommendations to the Secretary of State and lay a copy of its final report before Parliament within 12 months of its establishment.
(5) The Secretary of State must, within 6 months of the publication of the report under subsection (4), lay before both Houses of Parliament a statement setting out the Secretary of State’s response to that outcome.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review into the pension losses incurred by former employees of AEA Technology.
New clause 2—Transfer of British Coal Staff Superannuation Scheme investment reserve to members—
“(1) Within 3 months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for the transfer of the British Coal Staff Superannuation Scheme investment reserve to members of the scheme.
(2) Those regulations must include—
(a) a timetable for transferring the total of the investment reserve to members of the scheme, and
(b) plans for commissioning an independent review into how future surplus will be shared.
(3) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to set out in regulations a timetable for transferring the whole of the BCSSS investment reserve to members and committing to review how future surplus will be shared.
New clause 3—Terminal illness: means of demonstrating eligibility—
“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision about how a person may demonstrate that they are terminally ill for purposes relating to compensation or assistance from the Pension Protection Fund or Financial Assistance Scheme.
(2) In making regulations under this section, the Secretary of State must seek to minimise the administrative burden placed upon the person with a terminal illness.
(3) Regulations under this section must provide that, where the Department of Work and Pensions (“the Department”) holds a valid SR1 form in respect of a person seeking to demonstrate that they are terminally ill for purposes relating to compensation or assistance from the Pension Protection Fund or Financial Assistance Scheme, the Department must share that form with the Pension Protection Fund or the Financial Assistance Scheme.
(4) Regulations under this section must require the Pension Protection Fund and the Financial Assistance Scheme to make the appropriate payment or payments within a specified time of receipt of a valid application.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to provide, by regulations, for the use of a valid SR1 form to make it easier for a person to demonstrate that they are terminally ill for purposes related to compensation from the PPF or FAS.
New clause 4—Review into investment in defence companies—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, carry out a review into investment in defence companies within Local Government Pension Schemes.
(2) The review must consider how the investment in defence companies—
(a) impacts on, and
(b) aligns with,
the UK Government’s international obligations.
(3) The Secretary of State must prepare a report of the review and lay a copy of that report before Parliament.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to conduct a review into investment in defence companies within Local Government Pension Schemes and how that impacts and aligns with Government international obligations.
New clause 5—Review into defined benefit schemes’ social impact—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, carry out a review into the social impact of defined benefit schemes.
(2) The review must include an assessment of—
(a) the efficacy of investment strategies in delivering social good, and
(b) the potential impact of increasing investment in—
(i) social housing, and
(ii) green technology.
(3) For the purposes of this section—
“social good” means something which benefits society as a whole, and
“green technology” means the use of technology and science to create environmentally-friendly products and services.
(4) The Secretary of State must prepare a report of the review and lay a copy of that report before Parliament.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to review the efficacy of investment in terms of delivering social good and the benefits of directing more investment towards social housing and green technology.
New clause 6—Indexation of pre-1997 service—
“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for indexation on compensation in respect of pre-1997 rights for members of the Pension Protection Fund and the Financial Assistance Scheme.
(2) Those regulations must specify that—
(a) pension payments from the PPF and FAS are increased each year in line with Consumer Prices Index (CPI) inflation for pensionable service before and after 6 April 1997,
(b) where a PPF or FAS member has pensionable service prior to 6 April 1997 which has not increased each year in line with CPI inflation, but which their scheme provided for, the scheme manager must—
(i) determine the annual increase attributable to that service for each year since the date on which the annual payment was first payable, and
(ii) reimburse the member for the amount determined under paragraph (b)(i), and
(c) increased payments must also apply to transferee members, to ill health payments and to payments to surviving dependants.
(3) Regulations under this section—
(a) shall be made by statutory instrument, and
(b) may not be made unless a draft has been laid before and approved by resolution of each House of Parliament.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to provide, through regulations, for indexation on PPF and FAS compensation in respect of pre-1997 rights.
New clause 7—Report on indexation of pre-1997 Pension Protection Fund and Financial Assistance Scheme benefits—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, publish a report on options for providing indexation to pension rights relating to pre-1997 service in the Pension Protection Fund (PPF) and the Financial Assistance Scheme (FAS).
(2) The report must consider—
(a) the current absence of indexation on pre-1997 accrued rights and the financial impact on affected pensioners;
(b) the number of pensioners affected and the mortality rates since the establishment of FAS and PPF, including evidence from the Pensions Action Group;
(c) the feasibility of introducing indexation, in full or in part, for pre-1997 rights;
(d) the potential use of scheme reserves, including residual funds from failed schemes transferred into the FAS, and the implications for taxpayers;
(e) the urgency of reform given the age profile of affected members and the social impact of frozen incomes;
(f) alternative funding mechanisms that could deliver indexation without undermining the sustainability of the PPF; and
(g) comparative approaches to legacy benefit indexation in other jurisdictions.
(3) In preparing the report, the Secretary of State must consult—
(a) the Pensions Regulator,
(b) the Pension Protection Fund,
(c) representatives of Financial Assistance Scheme members,
(d) the Pensions Action Group, and
(e) such other stakeholders as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
(4) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before both Houses of Parliament.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to publish a report examining options for addressing the lack of indexation on pre-1997 pensionable service in the PPF and FAS, with particular regard to evidence provided by the Pensions Action Group, mortality data, scheme reserves, and the urgency of the issue.
New clause 8—Universal Pension Advice Entitlement—
“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations establish a system to ensure that every individual has a right to receive free, impartial pension advice at prescribed times.
(2) Regulations under subsection (1) must provide for individuals to be offered advice—
(a) at or around the age of 40; and
(b) at a prescribed age, not more than six years before the individual's expected retirement age.
(3) The regulations must make provision about—
(a) the content and scope of the free, impartial pension advice, which may include, but is not limited to, guidance on—
(i) pension types (including both defined contribution and defined benefit schemes),
(ii) investment strategies,
(iii) charges,
(iv) consolidation of pension pots, and
(v) retirement income options;
(b) the qualifications, independence, and impartiality requirements for any person or body providing advice;
(c) the means by which individuals are notified of their entitlement to receive the advice and how they may access it;
(d) the roles and responsibilities of pension scheme trustees, managers, and providers in facilitating access to advice;
(e) the sharing member information with prescribed persons or bodies subject to appropriate data protection safeguards.
(4) Regulations under this section may—
(a) make different provision for different descriptions of pension schemes or different descriptions of individuals;
(b) confer functions in connection with the provision or oversight of the advice on—
(i) the Pensions Regulator,
(ii) the Financial Conduct Authority,
(iii) the Money and Pensions Service, or
(iv) other prescribed bodies;
(c) require the provision of funding for the advice service from prescribed sources.
(5) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”
This new clause makes provision by regulations for everyone to receive free, impartial pension advice at age 40 and again around five years before their expected retirement.
New clause 10—Independent review of forfeiture of survivor pensions in police pension schemes—
“(1) The Secretary of State must commission an independent review into the impact and fairness of provisions within police pension schemes that result in the forfeiture, reduction, or suspension of survivor pensions on the grounds of—
(a) remarriage or entry into a civil partnership by the surviving partner of a deceased scheme member; or
(b) cohabitation with another person as if married or in a civil partnership.
(2) The review must examine—
(a) the legal and policy basis for such provisions;
(b) the financial, social, and emotional impact on affected individuals and families;
(c) consistency with other public sector pension schemes, including schemes for—
(i) the Armed Forces,
(ii) the NHS, and
(iii) the civil service;
(d) potential options for reform, including retrospective reinstatement of pensions;
(e) any other matters the Secretary of State considers relevant.
(3) The Secretary of State must—
(a) appoint an independent person or panel with relevant legal, pensions, and public policy expertise to conduct the review; and
(b) publish the terms of reference no later than three months after this Act is passed.
(4) The person or panel appointed under subsection (3) must—
(a) consult with relevant stakeholders, including—
(i) the National Association of Retired Police Officers (NARPO),
(ii) survivor pension recipients,
(iii) police staff associations, and
(iv) pensions experts;
(b) consider written and oral evidence submitted by affected individuals; and
(c) publish a report of its findings and recommendations within 12 months of appointment.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review into the impact and fairness of provisions within police pension schemes that result in the forfeiture, reduction, or suspension of survivor pensions.
New clause 11—Independent review into state deduction in defined benefit pension schemes—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within three months of the passing of this Act, commission an independent review into the application and impact of state deduction mechanisms in occupational defined benefit pension schemes.
(2) The review must consider—
(a) the origin, rationale and implementation of state deduction in the Midland Bank Staff Pension Scheme,
(b) the clarity and adequacy of member communications regarding state deduction from inception to present,
(c) the differential impact of state deduction on pensioners with varying salary histories, including an assessment of any disproportionate effects on—
(i) lower-paid staff, and
(ii) women,
(d) comparisons with other occupational pension schemes in the banking and public sectors, and
(e) the legal, administrative, and financial feasibility of modifying or removing state deduction provisions, including potential mechanisms for redress.
(3) The Secretary of State must ensure that the person or body appointed to conduct the review—
(a) is independent of HSBC Bank plc and its associated pension schemes;
(b) possesses relevant expertise in pensions law, occupational pension scheme administration, and equality and fairness in retirement income; and
(c) undertakes appropriate consultation with—
(i) affected scheme members,
(ii) employee representatives,
(iii) pension experts, and
(iv) stakeholder organisations.
(4) The person or body conducting the review must—
(a) submit a report on its findings to the Secretary of State within 12 months of the date the review is commissioned; and
(b) the Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before Parliament and publish the report in full.
(5) Within three months of laying the report before Parliament, the Secretary of State must publish a written response setting out the Government’s proposed actions, if any, in response to the report’s findings and recommendations.
(6) For the purposes of this section—
“state deduction” means any provision within a defined benefit occupational pension scheme that reduces pension entitlements by reference to the member reaching state pension age or by reference to any state pension entitlement;
“defined benefit pension scheme” has the meaning given in section 181 of the Pension Schemes Act 1993;
“Midland Bank Staff Pension Scheme” includes all associated legacy arrangements and any successor schemes administered by HSBC Bank Pension Trust (UK) Ltd.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review into clawback provisions in occupational defined benefit pension schemes, in particular, the Midland Bank staff pension scheme.
New clause 12—Section 40 commencement—
“(1) The provisions in section 40 shall not come into force except in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary of State.
(2) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (1) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”
This new clause would require that the provisions in clause 40 could only be enacted once agreed through secondary legislation.
New clause 13—Targeted Advice Access for Under-Saving Cohorts—
“(1) The Secretary of State must make regulations to provide enhanced access to pension advice or guidance for cohorts identified as under-saving for retirement.
(2) Regulations may make provision for—
(a) identifying under-saving groups, including but not limited to—
(i) women,
(ii) ethnic minority groups, and
(iii) others affected by long-term pay or pension gaps;
(b) mechanisms to fund and deliver targeted support;
(c) reporting and evaluation requirements to assess take-up and effectiveness.
(3) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”
This new clause allows for the creation of targeted pension advice or guidance interventions for groups at risk of under-saving for retirement.
New clause 14—Cap on cost of advice for pension holders—
“(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations introduce a cap on the cost recoverable for providing pension advice per pension holder under any scheme operating free or subsidised advice.
(2) The cap may vary depending on—
(a) the value of the pension pot;
(b) the type of pension scheme;
(c) the complexity of advice required.
(3) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”
This new clause enables the introduction of a cost ceiling for advice provision to members of pension schemes.
New clause 15—Independent review into the British Coal Staff Superannuation Scheme—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within three months of the passing of this Act, commission an independent review into the treatment of members of the British Coal Staff Superannuation Scheme (BCSSS).
(2) The review must consider—
(a) the origin and operation of the Government’s surplus-sharing arrangements with the BCSSS since 1994,
(b) the adequacy of communication to scheme members regarding the use of surpluses,
(c) the impact of the Government’s retention of scheme reserves on members’ retirement income,
(d) representations made by the Trustees of the BCSSS calling for reserves to be released to members, and
(e) options for reforming how any future surpluses in the BCSSS are shared between the Government and scheme members.
(3) The person or body appointed to conduct the review must—
(a) be independent of the Government and the BCSSS Trustees,
(b) possess relevant expertise in pensions law and scheme administration, and
(c) consult with affected members, Trustees, pension experts, and stakeholder organisations.
(4) The review must report to the Secretary of State within 12 months of being commissioned, and the Secretary of State must lay the report before Parliament and publish it in full.
(5) Within three months of publication, the Secretary of State must publish the Government’s response to the review’s findings.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review into the treatment of members of the British Coal Staff Superannuation Scheme, including the handling of scheme reserves and future surplus-sharing arrangements.
New clause 16—Report on Pension Scheme Eligibility and Access—
“(1) The Secretary of State shall, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, lay before Parliament a report into the operation of occupational pension schemes where certain categories of employees have been excluded on the basis of job classification or employment start date.
(2) The report must examine the case of employees and former employees of Fife Joinery Manufacturing (a subsidiary of Velux), including—
(a) whether affected workers were provided with opportunity to join existing pension schemes,
(b) the adequacy of record-keeping and employer accountability, and
(c) potential remedies to ensure equal access to workplace pensions.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to report on the Velux Pensions case.
New clause 17—Clarification of pension scheme investment duties—
“(1) The Pensions Act 1995 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 36 (Choosing investments), after subsection (9), insert—
“(10) Regulations under subsection (1) must provide—
(a) that when interpreting the best interest or sole interests of members and beneficiaries for the purposes of this section and the regulations, the trustees of a trust scheme may (amongst other matters) take the following into account—
(i) system-level considerations,
(ii) the reasonably foreseeable impacts over the appropriate time horizon of the assets or organisations in which the trust scheme invests upon prescribed matters, including upon members’ and beneficiaries’ standards of living, and
(iii) the views of members and beneficiaries;
(b) that investment powers or discretions must be exercised in a manner that considers and manages the matters specified in subsection (10)(a)(i) and (ii) where they are financially material; and
(c) a prescribed definition of the term “appropriate time horizon” for these purposes.
(11) For the purposes of this section, “system-level considerations” means, over the appropriate time horizon, risks and opportunities relevant to the scheme that—
(a) cannot be fully managed through diversification alone, and
(b) arise from circumstances at the level of one or more economic sectors, financial markets or economies, including but not limited to those relating to environmental or social matters.
(12) Regulations under subsection (1) must come into force no more than one year after the passing of the Pension Schemes Act 2025.
(13) In complying with requirements imposed by this section and regulations, a trustee or manager must have regard to guidance prepared from time to time by the Secretary of State.”
(3) The Financial Conduct Authority must make general rules with effects corresponding to the provisions of subsection (1) for providers of pension schemes to which Part 7A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (inserted by section 48 of this Act) applies.
(4) The Secretary of State must make regulations with effects corresponding to the provisions of subsection (1) for scheme managers of the Local Government Pension Scheme.
(5) The rules and regulations under subsections (3) and (4) must come into force no later than the date on which regulations pursuant to section 36(10) of the Pensions Act 1995 (as amended by this Act) come into force.”
This new clause gives the Secretary of State a duty to make regulations clarifying investment duties of occupational pension schemes, including system-level considerations and other matters including impacts of investee firms, beneficiaries’ standards of living and views. It also imposes duties on the FCA and the Secretary of State to make corresponding rules and regulations for workplace personal pension schemes and the Local Government Pension Scheme respectively.
New clause 18—Report on indexation of pre-1997 benefits—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 6 months of the passing of this Act, publish a report on whether the Pension Protection Fund and the Financial Assistance Scheme should provide indexation on compensation in respect of pre-1997 rights, where pension schemes provided for that.
(2) The report must consider—
(a) the potential benefits for affected pensioners;
(b) approaches of occupational pension schemes to indexation of pre-1997 benefits;
(c) the impact on compensation schemes’ surpluses and on public finances;
(d) international approaches to indexation of legacy pension benefits.
(3) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before both Houses of Parliament.”
This new clause requires the Secretary of State to report on whether the PPF and FAS should provide indexation on compensation in respect of pre-1997 rights, where scheme rules provided for that.
New clause 19—Fossil fuels and climate change risk—
“(1) The Pensions Act 1995 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 41A (Climate change risk), after subsection (6) insert—
“(6A) Regulations under subsection (1) must, within 1 year of the Pension Schemes Act 2025 receiving Royal Assent, prohibit the trustees or managers of schemes of a prescribed description from holding relevant assets.
(6B) The relevant assets in subsection (6A) are issuance by issuers which, in relation to thermal coal—
(a) derive 10% or more of annual revenue from its production, transport or combustion,
(b) produce annually 10 million tonnes or more, or
(c) have 5GW or more of power generation capacity.
(6C) Within 2 years of the Pensions Act 2025 receiving Royal Assent, and every 3 years thereafter, the Secretary of State must carry out and publish a review on whether the definition of relevant assets should be extended to include—
(a) issuance by issuers which, in relation to thermal coal, derive a smaller proportion of revenue, produce a smaller amount or have a smaller amount of power generation capacity than the proportion and amounts specified in (6B),
(b) some or all new issuance by issuers of a prescribed description deriving a prescribed proportion or amount of their revenue from the extraction, transport, trading or combustion of prescribed fossil fuels, or
(c) some or all new or existing issuance by issuers of a prescribed description investing a prescribed proportion or amount in exploring for, or expanding the extraction of, prescribed fossil fuels.
(6D) Regulations under subsection (1) may implement the conclusions of the review referred to in (6C).”
(3) In subsection (8), at end insert—
““thermal coal” means coal and lignite used in the generation of electricity and in providing heat for industrial or residential purposes;
“issuance” means all investable assets, including equity and debt.”
(4) The Financial Conduct Authority must make general rules with effects corresponding to the provisions of subsection (1) for providers of pension schemes to which Part 7A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (inserted by section 48 of this Act) applies.
(5) The Secretary of State must make regulations with effects corresponding to the provisions of subsection (1) for scheme managers of the Local Government Pension Scheme.
(6) The rules and regulations under subsections (4) and (5) must come into force no later than the date on which regulations pursuant to section 41A(6A) of the Pensions Act 1995 (as amended by this Act) come into force.”
This new clause would require Government and the FCA to make regulations and rules restricting exposure of some occupational and workplace personal schemes to thermal coal investments and to regularly review whether the restrictions should be extended to other fossil fuel investments.
New clause 20—Pensions and savings advice allowance—
“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for a tax-free pensions and savings advice allowance which individuals between the ages of 30 and 50 can withdraw from their pensions to access financial advice.
(2) Regulations must specify—
(a) the maximum amount for the pensions and savings advice allowance,
(b) the content and scope of the pensions and savings advice,
(c) the qualifications and independence requirements of any person or body providing pensions and savings advice,
(d) the means by which individuals are notified of their entitlement to the pensions and savings advice allowance and how they may access—
(i) the allowance, and
(ii) advisers who meet the requirements under subsection (2)(c),
(e) the roles and responsibilities of pension scheme trustees, managers, and providers in facilitating access to the pensions and savings advice allowance, and
(f) whether the pensions and savings advice allowance counts towards the Individual Lump Sum Allowance.
(3) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”
This new clause requires the Secretary of State to introduce, by regulations, a pensions and savings advice allowance which individuals between the ages of 30 and 50 can withdraw from their pension savings tax-free to access appropriate financial advice.
New clause 21—Significant life event lump sum—
“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for a significant life event lump sum of up to £5,000 which a person is entitled to before they attain normal pension age.
(2) The regulations may prescribe circumstances in which, and conditions subject to which, a person may become entitled to a significant life event lump sum, including—
(a) purchasing a first home;
(b) getting married;
(c) unexpected loss of employment.
(3) The regulations must specify that the significant life event lump sum counts towards the Individual Lump Sum allowance.
(4) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to introduce, by regulations, a significant life event lump sum of up to £5,000 tax-free which individuals can take from their lump sum allowance prior to reaching pension age.
New clause 22—Indexation of pre-1997 pensions—
“(1) The Pensions Act 1995 is amended as follows.
(2) In Section 51 (Annual increase in rate of pension), omit subsections (1)(b) and (1)(c)(ii).
(3) In subsection (2), leave out from “pensionable service,” to “or”.
(4) In subsection (2), leave out from “commencement day]” to “—".
(5) In subsection (2)(b), leave out from “pensionable service” to “, so much of”.
(6) In subsection (4ZE), leave out from “pensionable service” to “in subsections (3) to (4ZD)”.
(7) In subsection (5)(a), leave out “6 April 1997 or”.
(8) In subsection (8)(a) and (b), leave out “at any time on or after 6 April 1997”.”
This new clause would remove references to 6 April 1997 from section 51 of the Pensions Act 1995 in order to require that annual increases to pension payments in line with CPI and RPI apply to pensionable service both before and after 6 April 1997.
New clause 23—Indexation of pre-1997 service—
“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for the use of Pension Protection Fund surplus/reserve funds for the indexation on compensation in respect of pre-1997 rights for members of the Pension Protection Fund and the Financial Assistance Scheme.
(2) Those regulations must specify that—
(a) pension payments from the PPF and FAS are increased each year in line with Retail Prices Index (RPI) inflation for pensionable service before and after 6 April 1997,
(b) the cap on the annual increase is raised to 7%,
(c) where a PPF or FAS member has pensionable service prior to 6 April 1997 which has not increased each year in line with RPI inflation, the scheme manager must—
(i) determine the annual increase attributable to that service for each year since the date on which the annual payment was first payable, and
(ii) reimburse the member for the amount determined under paragraph (c)(i), and
(d) payments made to reimburse members under paragraph (c)(ii) must be made from Pension Protection Fund surplus funds and future funds.
(3) Regulations under this section—
(a) shall be made by statutory instrument, and
(b) may not be made unless a draft has been laid before and approved by resolution of each House of Parliament.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to provide, through regulations, for indexation on PPF and FAS compensation in respect of pre-1997 rights, for indexation to follow RPI inflation with a cap of 7%, and for retrospective payments to be funded from PFI surplus and/or reserve funds.
New clause 24—Indexation of pre-1997 pensions—
“(1) The Pensions Act 1995 is amended as follows.
(2) In Section 51 (Annual increase in rate of pension), omit subsections (1)(b) and (1)(c)(ii).
(3) In subsection (2), after “52” insert “52A”.
(4) In subsection (2), leave out from “pensionable service,” to “or,”.
(5) In subsection (2), leave out from “commencement day]” to “—”.
(6) In subsection (2)(b), leave out from “pensionable service” to “, so much of”.
(7) In subsection (4ZE), leave out from “pensionable service” to “in subsections (3) to (4ZD)”.
(8) In subsection (5)(a), leave out “6 April 1997 or”.
(9) In subsection (8)(a) and (b), leave out “at any time on or after 6 April 1997”.
(10) After Section 52 (Restriction on increase where member is under 55) insert—
“52A Restriction on increase where a pension scheme is not in surplus
No increase under section 51 in the annual rate of a pension shall not be paid or shall not be paid in full unless the pension scheme is in surplus.””
This new clause would remove references to 6 April 1997 from section 51 of the Pensions Act 1995 to require that annual increases to pension payments in line with CPI and RPI apply to pensionable service both before and after 6 April 1997, with the restriction that annual increases would only be paid if the pension scheme is in surplus.
New clause 25—Review of impact of this Act—
“(1) Within five years of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must carry out a review of the impact of the provisions of this Act on actual and projected retirement incomes.
(2) The review must consider—
(a) the impact of the provisions of this Act on actual and projected retirement incomes, and
(b) whether further measures are needed to ensure that pension scheme members receive an adequate income in retirement.
(3) The Secretary of State must prepare a report of the review and lay a copy of that report before Parliament.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to review the impact of this Act on retirement incomes and whether additional measures are needed to ensure the adequacy of retirement incomes.
New clause 26—Establishment of targeted investment vehicles for pension funds—
“(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for the establishment or facilitation of one or more investment vehicles through which pension schemes may invest for targeted social or economic benefit.
(2) Regulations under subsection (1) must specify the descriptions of targeted social or economic benefit to which the investment vehicles are to contribute, which may include, but are not limited to, investment in—
(a) projects that revitalise high street areas;
(b) initiatives demonstrating social benefit;
(c) affordable or social housing development;
(d) capital projects that meet essential public needs, such as care homes;
(e) clean, renewable energy projects.
(3) The regulations must make provision for—
(a) the types of pension schemes eligible to participate in such investment vehicles;
(b) the governance, oversight, and reporting requirements for the investment vehicles and participating pension schemes;
(c) the means by which the contribution of such investments to targeted social or economic benefit is measured and reported;
(d) the roles and responsibilities of statutory bodies, including the Pensions Regulator and the Financial Conduct Authority, in authorising, regulating, or supervising such investment vehicles and the participation of pension schemes within them.
(4) The regulations may—
(a) make different provision for different descriptions of pension schemes, investment vehicles, or targeted social or economic benefits;
(b) provide for the pooling of assets from multiple pension schemes within such vehicles;
(c) require pension scheme trustees or managers to have regard to the availability and suitability of investment vehicles when formulating investment strategies, where consistent with—
(i) their fiduciary duties, and
(ii) the long-term value for money for members.
(5) In this Chapter, "pension scheme" has the same meaning as in section 1(5) of the Pension Schemes Act 1993.”
This new clause would allow the Secretary of State to establish investment funds to encourage investment in areas such as high streets, social housing, care homes, clean renewable energy, and other investments with clear social benefits.
New clause 27—Review of proposed mandated investment powers and their impacts—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, before making any regulations under this Act relating to mandated investment requirements for pension schemes, lay before Parliament a report reviewing the potential impacts of such powers.
(2) The report under subsection (1) must include an assessment of—
(a) the extent to which any mandated investment requirements may conflict with the fiduciary duties of trustees and managers of occupational and personal pension schemes;
(b) the potential effects of such requirements on the long-term financial returns of scheme members, including—
(i) risks relating to illiquid or politically directed assets,
(ii) risks to diversification, and
(iii) any expected increase in costs borne by savers;
(c) the risk that mandated investment requirements could lead to politicisation of pension scheme decisions or undermine public confidence in the private pension system;
(d) the adequacy of parliamentary oversight and scrutiny of the exercise of powers to mandate investment allocations, including whether additional safeguards are required;
(e) the question of accountability in circumstances where mandated investments perform below expectations, including whether liability would rest with trustees, fund managers, or the Government;
(f) the potential for market distortion arising from requirements that schemes invest in specific UK-based assets, including the risk of asset inflation or the creation of investment bubbles; and
(g) alternative policy measures that could encourage pension scheme investment in the United Kingdom without the use of mandatory requirements, including the removal of regulatory barriers and the creation of suitable investment opportunities.
(3) The report must include a summary of views received from—
(a) industry bodies representing pension schemes, trustees, and fund managers;
(b) relevant financial regulators; and
(c) any other persons the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
(4) The Secretary of State must publish a response addressing the findings and any recommendations contained in the report.
(5) No regulations requiring pension schemes to meet mandated investment allocations may be made under this Act until the report under subsection (1) has been laid before Parliament and the response under subsection (4) has been published.”
This new clause requires the Secretary of State to review the potential effects of mandated investment powers including on risks to returns, fiduciary duties, market distortion, and accountability before any powers can be exercised.
New clause 28—Pension Protection Fund: members who have not attained normal pension age at assessment date—
“(1) Schedule 7 of the Pensions Act 2004 is amended in accordance with subsections (2) to (7).
(2) In sub-paragraph 3(3), for “the appropriate percentage” substitute “100%”.
(3) Omit sub-paragraph 3(4).
(4) In sub-paragraph 11(3), for “90%” substitute “100%”.
(5) In sub-paragraph 14(3), for “90%” substitute “100%”.
(6) In sub-paragraph 15(3), for “90%” substitute “100%”.
(7) In sub-paragraph 19(3), for “90%” substitute “100%”.
(8) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for the retrospective payment of compensation to PPF members, as if the amendments made by this section to Schedule 7 of the Pensions Act 2004 had had effect on the day on which that Schedule came into force.”
This new clause would provide that pension scheme members who have not reached Normal Pension Age by the Pension Protection Fund assessment date receive compensation at a rate of 100% instead of 90%, and provides for retrospective application.
New clause 29—Pension Protection Fund: estimate of cost of increasing compensation for surviving spouses or partners of members—
“(1) The Pension Protection Fund (PPF) must prepare and publish an annual estimate of the cost of increasing the value of compensation paid to surviving spouses or partners of PPF members to a sum equivalent to the value of any payments to which they would have been entitled had the scheme not entered the PPF.
(2) The first assessment under this section must be published before the end of the 2025/26 financial year.”
This new clause would require the Pension Protection fund (PPF) to publish annually an assessment of the costs of increasing compensation to the spouses or partners of PPF members to equal the amount they would have received if the pension scheme had not entered the PPF.
New clause 36—Local Government Pension Scheme: expenses and duties of administering authorities—
“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for—
(a) a cap on the management expenses that can be claimed by administering authorities, such that they do not exceed ten basis points of the asset base of the pension fund,
(b) a cap on the investment management expenses that can be claimed by administering authorities, such that they do not exceed five basis points of the asset base of the pension fund,
(c) a cap on the general administrative expenses that can be claimed by administering authorities, such that they do not exceed five basis points of the asset base of the pension fund.
(2) Regulations under this section must also require administering bodies to provide to the Local Government Pension Scheme Advisory Board—
(a) evidence that they have considered and acted on any guidance issued by the Local Government Pension Scheme Advisory Board, and
(b) evidence of the steps that they have taken to comply with their fiduciary duties in respect of pension scheme members and Scheme employers.
(3) In making regulations under this section, the Secretary of State must consult the Local Government Pension Scheme Advisory Board.
(4) In this section—
“administering authorities” has the meaning given by Schedule 1 to the Local Government Pension Scheme Regulations 2013, and
“Scheme employer” has the meaning given by Schedule 1 to the Local Government Pension Scheme Regulations 2013.”
Amendment 1, in clause 1, page 3, line 7, at end insert “, or
(b) secure employee representation on the company’s board.”
This amendment would add employee representation on boards as a requirement on asset pool companies for Local Government Pension Schemes within the scheme regulations under clause 1.
Government amendments 20 and 21.
Amendment 2, in clause 2, page 4, line 7, at end insert—
“(ba) the funds or other assets for which a scheme manager is responsible (other than money needed for making payments under the scheme from the pension fund maintained by that scheme manager) should be invested in a way that is compliant with the UK’s duty not to aid or assist serious breaches of international law, including genocide and other atrocity crimes, and illegal military occupation.”
This amendment would require that investments of the local government pension scheme should be compliant with the UK’s duty not to aid or assist serious breaches of international law.
Amendment 3, page 4, line 7, at end insert—
“(ba) the funds or other assets for which a scheme manager is responsible (other than money needed for making payments under the scheme from the pension fund maintained by that scheme manager) must be divested from any oil and gas companies within 5 years of the passing of this Act.”
This amendment would require that local government pension schemes divest from oil and gas companies within 5 years.
Government amendments 22 and 23.
Amendment 17, in clause 9, page 9, line 25, leave out from “does” to the end of line 25 and insert
“apply to a scheme that is being wound up unless the trustees determine by resolution that it shall not apply.”
This amendment would ensure that the principles for surplus extraction shall also apply to surplus release after further wind-up, so that employers are not incentivised to wind-up funds rather than release surplus to pensioners.
Amendment 18, in clause 10, page 10, line 21, after “notified” insert “and consulted”
This amendment would ensure that members of pension funds have to be consulted on surplus extraction.
Amendment 4, page 10, line 36, at end insert—
“(e) about the proportion of any surplus that may be allocated, or the manner in which it may be determined, for the purpose of contributing to the provision of free, impartial pension advice and guidance services for scheme members.”
This amendment enables a proportion of surplus funds to be used to fund free pension advice.
Amendment 19, page 10, line 36, at end insert—
“(e) that the trustees are satisfied that it is in the interests of the members that the power to pay surplus is exercised in the manner proposed;
(f) that the trustees have taken full account of—
(i) the extent to which members’ pensions have kept up with the cost of living and inflation (as defined in the relevant rules and deeds), and
(ii) any previously rejected requests for discretionary pension increases.”
This amendment would reinstate the current requirement that ensures trustees consent to the paying of surplus as proposed, and creates an obligation on trustees to take account of any erosion in members’ standards of living.
Amendment 5, in clause 11, page 11, line 38, at end insert—
“(aa) make, publish and keep under review the consistency of—
(i) regulated VFM schemes, or
(ii) regulated VFM arrangements,
with the goals of the Paris Agreement on climate change and clean energy;”
This amendment would require pension funds and managers to show whether their portfolio investments are consistent with the Paris Agreement.
Amendment 6, page 11, line 38, at end insert—
“(aa) make, publish and keep under review the compliance of—
(i) regulated VFM schemes, or
(ii) regulated VFM arrangements,
with statutory and regulatory targets for reducing sewage discharges by water and sewerage undertakers,”
This amendment would require pension funds and managers to monitor and report on the compliance of water and sewerage companies they invest in with targets for reducing sewage discharges.
Amendment 7, page 12, line 10, at end insert—
“(d) publish or share with prescribed persons, for the purpose of enabling VFM assessments to be made, prescribed categories of information (referred to as “climate alignment metric data”) regarding the scheme’s exposure to climate-related financial risks and the alignment of its investments with the goals of the Paris Agreement on climate change and clean energy.”
This amendment, with Amendment 5 would require pension funds and managers to show whether their portfolio investments are consistent with the Paris Agreement.
Amendment 8, page 12, line 10, at end insert—
“(d) publish or share with prescribed persons, for the purpose of enabling VFM assessments to be made, prescribed categories of information (referred to as “sewage discharge compliance data”) regarding the scheme’s exposure to, and investment in, companies holding permits to discharge sewage, including those companies’ performance against statutory and regulatory targets for reducing sewage discharges.”
This amendment, with Amendment 6, would require pension funds and managers to monitor and report on the compliance of water and sewerage companies they invest in with targets for reducing sewage discharges.
Amendment 9, page 12, line 41, leave out “that provides money purchase benefits”
This amendment, together with Amendment 10, would ensure that the value for money provisions introduced by this Bill apply to all occupational pension schemes.
Amendment 10, page 13, line 5, at end insert—
“(14) Value for money regulations may make different provision for different descriptions of relevant pension schemes and must make provision for the application of the value for money assessment with a VFM rating to defined benefit occupational pension schemes.”
This amendment, together with Amendment 9, would ensure that the value for money provisions introduced by this Bill apply to all occupational pension schemes.
Amendment 11, in clause 13, page 14, line 13, at end insert—
“(iv) the consistency of the investment portfolio with the goals of the Paris Agreement on climate change and clean energy, including metrics for assessing climate-related financial risks and opportunities;”
This amendment would require pension funds and managers to show whether their portfolio investments are consistent with the Paris Agreement.
Amendment 12, page 14, line 13, at end insert—
“(iv) the compliance of the investment portfolio with statutory and regulatory targets for reducing sewage discharges by water and sewerage undertakers, including metrics for assessing related environmental and financial risks and opportunities;”
This amendment would require pension funds and managers to monitor and report on the performance of water and sewerage companies they invest in against targets for reducing sewage discharges.
Government amendments 24 to 49.
Amendment 16, in clause 40, page 43, line 38, leave out from beginning to end of line 27 on page 46.
This amendment would remove the ability of the Government to set mandatory asset allocation targets for certain pension schemes, specifically requiring investments in UK productive assets such as private equity, private debt, and real estate.
Amendment 15, page 46, line 9, leave out from “Before” to the end of the subsection and insert
“implementing the first set of regulations under subsection (1) the Secretary of State must—
(a) prepare and publish a report regarding—
(i) what barriers pension funds, based in the United Kingdom, are facing that are preventing them from investing back into the United Kingdom due to—
(A) legislation introduced after The Pensions Act 1995;
(B) regulations introduced by the Financial Conduct Authority, Prudential Regulation Authority, HM Treasury, or Bank of England;
(C) cultural and market behaviours;
(ii) how financial interests of members of relevant Master Trusts and group personal pension schemes would be affected by the proposed regulations;
(iii) what effects the proposed measures could be expected to have on economic growth in the United Kingdom;
(iv) any other matters the Secretary of State considers appropriate; and
(b) respond to any recommendations or issues raised in the report.”
This amendment prevents use of the reserved mandation powers in this Bill until the Government produces a report on the reasons why the powers are needed and the effects of the use of the powers and resolves any issues raised in the report.
Amendment 14, page 48, line 15, leave out paragraphs (a) to (c) and insert—
“(a) The scheme in question demonstrates strong potential for growth and an ability to innovate, and”
This amendment would revert the text of section 28F(2) on the eligibility conditions for new entrant pathway relief to its form in the Bill as introduced.
Government amendments 50 to 85.
Amendment 13, in clause 117, page 120, line 19, leave out “2035” and insert “this Parliament”
This amendment provides that if section 40 is not commenced before the end of the current Parliament in respect of the insertion of certain provisions, then the insertion of those provisions would be automatically repealed at that time.
Government amendments 86 to 89.
Torsten Bell
I start by thanking all hon. Members for their valuable contributions during the Bill’s passage to date. In particular, I thank members of the Public Bill Committee who offered line-by-line scrutiny. They have challenged the Government, but always constructively—that includes the shadow Economic Secretary to the Treasury, the hon. Member for Wyre Forest (Mark Garnier), who is not with us today. That reflects the broad consensus across the House that the Pension Schemes Bill is an important piece of legislation, and it is a consensus for which I am very grateful. The same consensus underpinned the introduction of automatic enrolment under the previous Government.
It is exactly because we as legislators have more than gently nudged people into pension savings that the Bill’s most fundamental job is to drive up returns on those savings. The case for this focus is clear: those retiring in 2050 are currently set to do so with lower private pension income than those retiring today. The Bill also recognises that, with the second largest pension system in the world, pensions matter not just to deliver an income in retirement but for the whole economy as the largest source of domestic capital. With those goals in mind, this Bill builds a solid foundation on which we can build, not least via the Pensions Commission over the next year, exactly as several hon. Members called for on Second Reading.
The vast majority of the amendments tabled by the Government are minor technical amendments, and there are two substantial areas on which I would like to dwell. The first is on pre-1997 indexation within the Pension Protection Fund and the financial assistance scheme.
The PPF is one of the most important legacies of the last Labour Government, but we have all heard about the challenges caused by the lack of indexation of compensation related to pre-1997 pensions. I am grateful for the time that affected pensioners have given me in discussing their experiences directly. I have listened carefully to them and to hon. Members who have kept attention on this issue.
I particularly acknowledge the contribution of my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham East and Saddleworth (Debbie Abrahams) and her Work and Pensions Committee, as well as my hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Luke Murphy) and the hon. Member for Aberdeen North (Kirsty Blackman) who raised this matter in Committee. I am also grateful to the hon. Members for Didcot and Wantage (Olly Glover), for Caerfyrddin (Ann Davies), for Torbay (Steve Darling) and for Belfast South and Mid Down (Claire Hanna), and my hon. Friend the Member for Poole (Neil Duncan-Jordan), for their proposed new clauses and amendments related to this matter.
Olly Glover (Didcot and Wantage) (LD)
I welcome that the Government have tabled these amendments to strengthen the Pension Protection Fund arrangements. However, that will be of little use to those such as the AEA Technology pension campaigners, about whom I have met the Minister. Despite many Select Committee reports and National Audit Office findings, they were badly advised by past Governments and have not been given a route to redress. I invite the Minister to reconsider his past decision and consider new clause 1.
Torsten Bell
I do not agree with the premise of the hon. Gentleman’s question, because I think that members of the scheme he mentions will benefit from the improvement in pre-1997 indexation within the PPF, albeit I am sure they would rather not be within the PPF, which applies to most people who have fallen into it. All I would gently say is that the change we are introducing was refused by Liberal Democrat Pension Ministers during the coalition Government, so this is a big step forward and will make a difference to others.
Sean Woodcock (Banbury) (Lab)
I am delighted by the Chancellor’s announcement in last week’s Budget, having had decades of Tory Governments dithering and delaying while pensioners lost out. It is a great sign of what this Labour Government are delivering on pensions. Could the Minister confirm how much, or by what amounts, those affected are likely to benefit from the changes he has incorporated into this Bill?
Torsten Bell
My hon. Friend has been a powerful campaigner on this issue in the run-up to the Budget, and he brings me on to my next point. We are not just listening; we are acting. We have tabled new clauses 31 to 33 and Government amendment 87 to introduce prospective indexation of Pension Protection Fund and financial assistance scheme payments that relate to pensions built up before 6 April 1997. And directly to his question, these will be consumer prices index linked, capped at 2.5% and apply to members whose former schemes provided for such increases. I thank the Pension Protection Fund for its support on this measure and its implementation, which rests with the PPF.
Dr Al Pinkerton (Surrey Heath) (LD)
I have been contacted by many Surrey Heath constituents who often worked for very large American companies such as Atos. These companies are refusing to offer the pre-1997 uplift, and from what I understand, the pensions fall outside both the PPF and the FAS. Can the Minister offer any reassurance to those pensioners today and explain how they can continue to survive on such diminishing returns from the pensions they paid into?
Torsten Bell
The hon. Gentleman asks an important question, and I shall come to exactly that issue when I finish discussing the changes within the PPF, because as he rightly notes there are wider indexation questions for solvent pension schemes.
On the PPF itself, this issue has been long running and many campaigners have long campaigned on it. Our changes aim to bring the matter to a conclusion. It is a step change that will make a meaningful difference to over 250,000 members. Over five years, the average PPF compensation will be boosted by £400 a year. Of course, I recognise that this does not go as far as some affected members would have wanted, but this change is real progress and rightly balances the interests of eligible members, levy payers, taxpayers and the Pension Protection Fund’s ability to manage future risk. I hope all hon. Members will support this step forward, and on that basis, that those with related amendments will feel content not to press them today.
New clauses 22 and 24 and amendment 19 concern that issue of discretionary increases or pre-1997 indexation in solvent defined-benefit pension schemes more generally. I put on record that we all recognise the impact of the high inflation in recent years on the value of some pensioners’ retirement income in exactly the way that has just been set out.
I want to be straightforward with the House that we do not support retrospectively changing scheme rules. Neither did previous Conservative or Liberal Democrat Governments, given that contribution levels were set on the basis of the scheme rules at the time they applied. As I have said before, and as I discussed recently with my hon. Friends the Members for Llanelli (Dame Nia Griffith) and for Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock (Elaine Stewart), wider changes in the Pension Schemes Bill relating to surplus release will put trustees in the lead in a way that will help on this issue.
Dame Nia Griffith (Llanelli) (Lab)
The Minister will understand just how sceptical pensioners are because, quite frankly, they have seen their trustees try to make the companies do the right thing time and again. Will he agree to meet me and trustees from companies such as 3M and Hewlett Packard Enterprise to explain what mechanism he thinks will be available to them that will actually force the companies to give a decent, index-linked rise to their pensioners?
Torsten Bell
Absolutely, is the short answer. I am always very happy to meet my hon. Friend and near constituency neighbour. I will explain how the change may help in that situation, but I am very happy to take that meeting.
The changes give those trustees overseeing schemes without pre-’97 indexation greater leverage in discussions with employers on discretionary increases, should those trustees see fit. I would encourage them to do so.
The other substantial amendments are on the Pension Protection Fund administration levy paid by DB schemes, allowing the Secretary of State to recover the PPF’s administration costs. It also covers the costs of administering the Fraud Compensation Fund. The levy was initially introduced to allow transparency when these administration costs were significant relative to the PPF’s reserves, but this is no longer the case, with the levy standing at around £18.5 million while the PPF manages over £10 billion-worth of reserves. The PPF is now more than able to cover its administration costs, and transparency can be achieved in the normal way through annual reports and accounts. These amendments therefore abolish the levy, simplifying the pension levy landscape.
I will now briefly cover some minor amendments, starting with those on the local government pension scheme. Amendment 22 exempts the Environment Agency, as a national body, from the requirement on other administering authorities to co-operate with strategic authorities on local investment opportunities.
New clause 34 introduces new wording to clause 4, with amendment 23 deleting the existing wording. Rather than stating in this Bill how procurement law affects the LGPS, new clause 34 will instead move the LGPS exemption directly into schedule 2 to the Procurement Act 2023, future-proofing the exemption from future changes to that Act.
Amendment 28 is the central amendment on small pots. It introduces the concept of a destination proposer. This allows for either a single entity or multiple entities to be designated as the proposer of pot transfers. This reflects recent work by the DWP and Pensions UK to consider a federated model as a potential alternative to a centralised data platform for delivering the small pots policy. I want to add that there is no change to the desired policy intent; this is about the mechanism by which we deliver it. We are committed to exploring both models in full.
Amendments 37 to 53, on the scale clauses, are minor in nature. They include clarifying the circumstances in which schemes may count assets held in other schemes towards the scale condition—the requirement to have at least £25 billion-worth of assets under management by 2030—and clarifying when the transition pathway relief will end. On guided retirements, amendment 54 simply removes a redundant interpretation provision. Government amendments 55 to 86 relate to clauses 100 and 107 of the Bill, on the validity of certain alterations to salary-related contracted-out pension schemes—more often referred to as the Virgin Media case.
Steve Darling (Torbay) (LD)
Would the Minister be kind enough to share the timescale he is working to for these proposals?
Torsten Bell
I thank the hon. Member, who was one of the contributors to our debates on this matter in Committee. I hope to bring forward clarity on the next steps in a matter of months.
Peter Swallow (Bracknell) (Lab)
I thank the Minister for making this important announcement about a consultation on the role of trustees. As part of that consultation, will he keep in mind the important issue of pre-1997 indexation so that we can ensure that trustees are acting in the best interests of their pensioners?
Torsten Bell
My hon. Friend has discussed this challenge with me many times and is a powerful campaigner for his affected constituents. I give him absolutely that assurance, and I extend to him the same offer I have given to other hon. Friends: I will be happy to meet him and affected constituents, or trustees who have been affected by this issue.
Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)
The Minister has indeed been most accessible, and I am extremely grateful to him for the meeting he held with members of the ExxonMobil pensioners group. I am still being lobbied very hard by ExxonMobil pensioners who are concerned that whereas changes introduced in the Budget will benefit members of the FAS and PPF schemes, private defined-benefit scheme members will not benefit. He knows far more about the subject than I do, but can he not see that there is a feeling that they are being discriminated against? Is there nothing he can offer to make them feel somewhat more included in the beneficial steps being taken for members of other schemes?
Torsten Bell
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that and for our conversations on this matter in recent months. Although I think it is completely reasonable that people would feel like that—so would many of us if we had seen the high inflation of recent years eat into our non-index-linked pension payments—let me explain the consistency of the Government’s position. We are providing pre-’97 indexation on compensation relating to pensions now held within the PPF to those who were in schemes that did provide for indexation. There is no question of retrospectively changing the entitlement within the schemes; we are simply requiring that the compensation within the PPF and the FAS recognises that the schemes that people were in did previously recognise the need for indexation.
Other schemes within PPF and outside the PPF, including the one that the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis) mentioned, did not provide for indexation in their scheme rules. He is right to say that, on those matters, the changes that I have outlined today on the PPF do not provide relief. I have gone on to say that because of the changes we are bringing forward in the surplus rules, I think the trustees—as was discussed with some of his trustees—do have more ability and more leverage with which to ask for those discretionary increases, but I completely appreciate that that is different in form from the compensation indexation that we are providing within the PPF.
Sir Julian Lewis
The problem, as the Minister knows from our meeting, is that the trustees are rather hemmed in by not having the leverage or the freedom to act if the company itself—particularly if it is headquartered abroad—is disinclined to pass on any surpluses that it might have available.
Torsten Bell
I recognise the right hon. Member’s point. I think the level of pessimism may be overstated. My view is that our changes on surplus, which put trustees clearly in the driving seat, provide for more ability for trustees to seek to change that balance of power within their relationship. I do not want to prejudge the individual discussions between all trustees and their employers—those will be different in different circumstances—but trustees are in a stronger position given the changes on surplus release that we are introducing through this Bill. But I am not pretending for a second that that solves overnight the points that the right hon. Member is making.
Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)
To take us back to the consultation and action to provide guidance for trustees, we all think that is a good thing, as trustees have a difficult job to do and providing them with more guidance is incredibly helpful. On the timeline for the consultation and the legislation arising from it, it would be incredibly helpful if the Minister could, as soon as possible, provide us with a road map for what that will look like when it returns to the House and, in particular, set out whether it will involve primary or secondary legislation.
Torsten Bell
The hon. Member brings me back to the part of my speech I was coming to. The direct, quick answer to her question is that I would envisage taking powers in primary legislation and then consulting on the statutory guidance relating to the powers provided to the Government. That is the order in which I would think about it, but, exactly as she has asked for, I will endeavour to provide more clarity on the timeline.
As I said, I think there is good support for such a change across the industry—actually, I heard calls for it long before I became Pensions Minister—and it is time that we get on with setting out more details and providing that clarity to trustees so that, rather than debating whether trustees have the ability to invest with these longer-term structural or systemic factors in mind, they can get on with doing so, if they so wish. I should say that this is about giving trustees that ability and not specifying that they must do so.
I hope I have usefully set the scene for the debate. Let me close my opening remarks by reiterating my thanks to everyone who has engaged with the Bill so far. I look forward to hearing hon. Members’ further contributions this afternoon.
James Wild (North West Norfolk) (Con)
Before speaking to new clauses 24 and 25 and amendments 14, 15 and 16, I shall begin by reiterating the position adopted by my hon. Friend the Member for Wyre Forest (Mark Garnier), the shadow Economic Secretary to the Treasury—he is not here today, as the Minister acknowledged—which is that we support many of the planned changes in the Bill because, fundamentally, we all want a pensions system that is more accessible to the average person and gives all our constituents dignity in retirement. We want to see a Bill that helps make the system work better, and some of its measures will undoubtedly do that.
Equally, the higher-tax Budget, of which the Minister was a controlling mind, is relevant. We know from media reports that he feels passionately about the Budget—he used industrial language that is perhaps more expected from industry than from a think-tanker, and it is certainly not for the Chamber. We also know that, because of the briefings that appeared in the press, hundreds of thousands of people drew down their pensions prematurely, damaging their savings income as a result. The Budget also increases taxes on pension contributions. Taxing people’s incomes, savings and pensions more is the wrong political choice.
There is much in the Bill that we agree with, but some fundamental issues remain. Arguably the most pressing issue is the fact that the Bill does not address pensions adequacy. Research from Pensions UK shows that over 50% of savers will fail to meet the retirement incomes set by the Pensions Commission. The simple, uncomfortable truth is that this will affect millions of people, and that is despite the introduction of auto-enrolment and the triple lock introduced under the last Conservative Government.
The Bill was an opportunity to do more, but it does not currently do so. We are therefore giving the Government another chance through new clause 25, which would require the Secretary of State to conduct a review within five years and to recommend further measures. We recognise that the second phase of the pension review is ongoing, and we have faith in Baroness Drake to lead that review, but we have concerns that it will not report until 2027. We maintain that this part of the pensions review should be fast-tracked, so could the Minister at least clarify in which quarter of 2027 we can expect that report to be published?
Amendment 14 would change the wording on the eligibility conditions for new entrant pathway relief back to the form it was in when the Bill was first introduced. This means that schemes would qualify for relief if they simply demonstrated strong growth potential and an ability to innovate. All of us on these Benches understand the economies of scale and agree on the need for them, but we have concerns about the changes to the eligibility requirements. The benefit of the existing market is that its diversity provides choice, creates competition and incentivises innovation. As it stands, though, the Bill will disadvantage niche or boutique funds. Specifically, if the amendment made in Committee is enacted, existing companies that previously qualified for the pathway will now be excluded.
An example is Penfold, whose workplace pension was launched in 2022 and has grown quickly to over £1 billion of assets under management, tripling the rate since the start of 2024. Even with this trajectory, the timing of the scale test gives insufficient time to reach the £10 billion threshold for the transition pathway. We therefore agree with the chief executive officer of Penfold when he said:
“The original drafting created the scale that everyone agrees is vital, while still leaving room for challengers to innovate without the threat of a hard scale deadline that deters private investment”.
He is right. These are exactly the type of businesses that the Government should be supporting.
I shall turn now to the issue of indexation to pre-1997 pensionable service. We all want pensioners to have dignity in retirement, but when people have done the right thing by putting money in their pension and it is not followed through, that does not give pensioners the dignity they deserve. The issue around the pre-1997 indexation is also time-sensitive, like the infected blood scandal, and the longer the can is kicked down the road, the smaller the problem will become, sadly. We therefore broadly welcome the Minister’s commitment to taking primary powers through Government new clauses 31, 32 and 33. Our new clause 24 was seeking to achieve a similar outcome.
We pay tribute to the lobbying from groups including the Pensions Action Group and the Deprived Pensioners Association. Also, my hon. Friend the shadow Economic Secretary to the Treasury wanted to acknowledge our right hon. Friend the Member for Herne Bay and Sandwich (Sir Roger Gale) for his continued representations on this issue. The Minister has already been pressed by a number of Members about the concerns of organisations, such as the Esso Pensioners Working Group, that want to understand further how the Government will ensure that these groups are not forgotten.
Finally, I want to turn to the part of the Bill with which we have our most fundamental disagreement: namely, the part that deals with mandation. Amendment 15 would prevent the use of the reserve mandation powers until the Government produced a report on the reasons why the powers were needed and the effects of the use of such powers, and resolved any issues raised in that report. It simply asks the Government to undertake an analysis of the barriers that pension funds are facing, rather than rushing to use mandation as perfectly reasonable. Amendment 16 would remove the power altogether.
Dame Nia Griffith
The problem is that many of the trustees are trying to get these increases, but the difficulty they are encountering is that the power structure is such that the company has the last word. Sometimes trustees are actually appointed by the company; sometimes it is a unanimous decision that is then rejected by the company, as I mentioned with the 3M trustees. We see time and again the efforts of trustees totally decimated.
I was interested in what the Minister said in his opening speech about the new powers. What we really want from the Front Bench is some support to help these trustees to use the legislation to which the Minister refers—that is, part of this Bill—and to try to make it work.
Torsten Bell
Just reflecting on the excellent speech that my hon. Friend is making, I should add that the Pensions Regulator will be bringing forward guidance to provide exactly that kind of clarity to trustees.
Steve Darling
For people who are lucky in the lottery of life, their pension can be one of their biggest assets, but, sadly, we know that 12 million people across the United Kingdom are not saving enough. That is around the population of Belgium. Talking more broadly, there is much about the legislation to be welcomed. I am sure the Minister had his best birthday ever by spending it in the Bill Committee. I am sure that as a 14-year-old, he dreamed of that day, on Committee corridor—sadly I am not joking.
Ayoub Khan (Birmingham Perry Barr) (Ind)
I hope to devote a large portion of my speech to new clause 36, which stands in my name, but let me first swiftly acknowledge the new clauses tabled by the hon. Member for Poole (Neil Duncan-Jordan), the right hon. Member for Birmingham Hodge Hill and Solihull North (Liam Byrne), the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Manuela Perteghella) and the hon. Member for Llanelli (Dame Nia Griffith).
While pension fund managers should no doubt ensure that they deliver sufficient returns to their clients, they must also reflect on the duties that they have not only to those who make contributions, but to society at large. That means not using public money to prop up industries that rail against our primary objectives, be they preventing violations of human rights, upholding our commitment to net zero or delivering unfettered justice for those who have been wronged, as in the case of those whose pension contributions made before 1997 have not risen with inflation. I wholeheartedly align myself with the hon. Member for Mid Dunbartonshire (Susan Murray) on the need for ethical parameters.
In tabling new clause 36, I hoped to bring a focus to the practices relating to pension funds that fall under the local government pension scheme—those that make provision for the employees of schools, universities, local authorities and police forces, to name just a few. Those pension fund managers preside over £390 billion in assets, under the management of members of the investment banking sector. Given that much, if not all, of the funding that flows from our schools, councils and the like comes from taxpayers’ money, we have a right to ensure that none of it is being put to waste. I regret to report, however, that these local government pension funds are heading for an absolute embarrassment of riches. While public money sits idle in a vault, lining the pockets of the investment bankers who manage the funds, we are experiencing deep funding crises in our schools, our universities and our local councils.
Year after year, since the moment when these pension funds were established, we have seen the same tactics deployed by those who preside over them. Councils, schools and others end up putting too much of their budgets towards employer contributions, leaving them with less money to spend on the things that matter, while obscene amounts of money are left to be used as a lucrative plaything for the investment banking sector.
When calculating the money that councils, schools and the like must pay into their employees’ pensions, the pension fund managers first estimate the annual rate of return that they expect to get from their assets. To do that, they enlist the work of an actuary firm—usually one of the “big four”—which takes into account market conditions and various risk factors in order to come up with a figure. The work of these actuaries is incredibly precise, yet every year they end up drastically underestimating the amount by which the local government pension funds will grow over the next year. Why? Because the local pension boards set the assumptions and parameters on the basis of which they make such calculations, often with the intention of overstating elements that may hit the fund’s assets, such as market volatility and uncertainty. From there, by default, they then skim a substantial percentage off the fund’s assets, usually about 0.5%. While that may not seem a lot, given that, for example, West Midlands Pension Fund holds £21.2 billion-worth of assets, it means that at least £1 billion is being scraped off the top every year.
When a highly conservative estimate for growth is combined with lofty management expenses, the result is one thing, and one thing only: our councils, schools and key institutions end up putting more than they need into the banking sector, under the guise of securing their employees a comfortable retirement. Then, once they get to the end of the year and have mysteriously exceeded their artificially conservative projections for growth, the pension fund managers are left with an even bigger pot of money, from which they take their mandatory percentage fee.
It is this repeated cycle of grossly inflating the contributions of our state institutions that is resulting in more and more taxpayer money being used not to fix our crumbling public services that benefit society as a whole, but for city bankers to make big bets on the market and make profits. It is the equivalent of pension funds setting the rules of the game, marking their own homework and keeping the proceeds for themselves, rather than refunding those who put into the system. It has got to the point that even the LGPS Scheme Advisory Board, which advises local pension boards, has said that they need to stop overcharging their clients and underestimating their growth. Unfortunately, however, all the power lies in the hands of the Secretary of State to make the changes that would put much-needed investment back into our schools, councils and the like.
I will give an example. Research by David Bailey, of the University of Birmingham, and John Clancy, of Birmingham City University, has shown that Birmingham city council has handed over £1.2 billion in employer contributions to the West Midlands Pension Fund in the past 10 years. By 2022 the council was being asked to pay an extra 37% on top of its standard bill, whereas the nine other core city councils in the UK were asked to pay an average of around 17%. Birmingham city council is calculated to have overpaid the West Midlands Pension Fund by roughly £547 million. In 2023 the council declared section 114 bankruptcy, and this year it has approved council tax rises of 21% and £300 million in cuts to vital services.
Hypothetically, had that payment never been made, Birmingham city council would have needed neither to declare bankruptcy, nor to approve budget cuts that reduced its offer to bare-bones skeleton services. The implications that clamping down on the excesses of local pension boards would have for local councils, schools and universities, and for the British taxpayer, are truly incomprehensible, yet as things stand we are shying away from rebalancing the books and from deploying as much of the Government’s investment into public services as we can.
That leads me to my new clause 36, which would put a cap on the investment expenses that can be claimed on LGPS pension funds. In the case of the West Midlands Pension Fund, the management expenses that are charged amount to an increase of four percentage points in employer contributions. Because the fund charges 60 basis points in management fees, Birmingham council tax payers are paying £13.4 million to the investment managers, which works out at £50 on every band D council tax payer’s bill. However, if new clause 36 were to be put in place, only £3.30 would be charged to every council tax payer’s bill. In the same period, the pension fund has consistently failed to report where the investment management expenses that it charges go, and whom they benefit.
As I say, my new clause 36 would implement a cap on the fees that investment bankers can take from pension funds. While that would certainly mark a great step forward in ensuring that excessive wealth gets put into the hands of the private sector, we must also do more to ensure that our schools and councils pay no more in employer contributions than they must, so that they can put more investment into things that really matter—whether that is local government funding for adult social care or for schoolchildren with special education needs, or being able to put more teaching staff in our classrooms.
Torsten Bell
With the leave of the House, I will respond to as many of the points raised as I can manage.
I thank hon. Members for their speeches today. They have shown not only the depth of knowledge in this House, but the breadth of pensions issues that matter to all of us and to our constituents. I start by thanking those who have welcomed some of the changes that we have introduced and set out today. My hon. Friends the Members for Oldham East and Saddleworth (Debbie Abrahams) and for Edinburgh South West (Dr Arthur) spoke about the PPF, and I appreciate their remarks. On the changes we have set out on the statutory guidance for trustees, the speech by my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Hodge Hill and Solihull North (Liam Byrne) is much appreciated, as is that from the hon. Member for Aberdeen North (Kirsty Blackman).
Claire Hanna (Belfast South and Mid Down) (SDLP)
Like others, I was delighted to see in the Budget the pre-1997 indexing. The Minister will know that that softens but does not correct a wrong, and it leaves tens of thousands of former employees of Harland & Wolff and Visteon, including my constituents, without indexation. New clauses 28 and 29, in my name, would address that, and I hope the Minister might be able to incorporate them in the future.
Torsten Bell
I thank my hon. Friend for her intervention. I covered that extensively in my opening remarks.
I want to mention two points raised in the debate. The hon. Member for North West Norfolk (James Wild) asked about the timeline for the Pensions Commission. I can assure him that nothing is going slowly, so the final report will be delivered in early 2027, which is significantly quicker than the last one in the 2000s. I will update the House as soon as I have more to say on that front. The hon. Member for Caerfyrddin (Ann Davies) asked how many people will benefit from the change to the PPF indexation and how many will not benefit. The answer is that 250,000 members will benefit and 90,000 will not benefit, because their schemes did not provide for indexation in the scheme rules in the first place. I hope that answers the question she raised.
Neil Duncan-Jordan
I want to press the Minister slightly more on the need for UK pension funds not to invest in companies that could be guilty of war crimes and breaking international law. Would he like to reflect on that?
Torsten Bell
Specifically on the question of having regard to international law, I emphasise that compliance extends far beyond the LGPS, and it obviously reaches right across Government. That said, the LGPS, as a public sector scheme, has particularly high expectations on responsible investment, and I have heard the points my hon. Friend has made.
The hon. Members for Torbay (Steve Darling), for Horsham (John Milne) and for Stratford-on-Avon (Manuela Perteghella) broadened this debate beyond the LGPS, not least on questions of climate change and the wider social impact of investments. The Department for Work and Pensions is currently conducting a review of the task force on climate-related financial disclosures requirements, and we have also asked the Pensions Regulator to assess the practicalities of transition plans for pension schemes. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, we will also bring forward legislation to clarify that trustees can take systemic factors into account when making their investment decisions. I hope this provides hon. Members with significant reassurance on those points.
The hon. Members for North West Norfolk and for Torbay returned to the issue, which we discussed extensively in Committee and on Second Reading, on the limited reserve or backstop asset allocation power. As I have repeatedly made it clear to this House, we do not currently anticipate it will need to be used. That is precisely because of the industry’s commitment to the Mansion House accord and wider support from the pension industry for greater investment in private assets.
I welcome the recognition of the importance of the pipeline of projects by the hon. Member for Horsham, and I encourage him to make sure that no Liberal Democrat anywhere opposes construction projects—I have seen the leaflets—be they for energy, roads, housing or anything else.
A crucial point was raised in Committee about the importance of monitoring these commitments, and I can confirm that since then the ABI and Pensions UK have committed that they will work together to track progress. I hope that helps answer some of the questions raised in Committee.
The proposals to add to the matters on which the Government must report are, I believe, unnecessary, as any exercise of the power would be subject to a wide range of safeguards—not only the production of a report about the impacts on savers and growth, but a savers’ interest test.
The hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon spoke powerfully to her new clause 3, as did the hon. Member for Mid Dorset and North Poole (Vikki Slade). I believe the PPF works hard to make sure that it can deal quickly with payments for people with terminal illness, and the Bill contains other measures that mean it can do that at an earlier point in someone’s prognosis. The SR1 form would already be sufficient for the PPF to provide the certainty that the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon is looking for. I have checked with the PPF to ensure that currently within the PPF and the FAS we do not currently have any outstanding requests for such payments where they have been unable to make them, for example for the reasons of not having sufficient evidence. That said, she has spoken powerfully on that point and I will speak to the PPF at my next meeting with the chief executive and the chair to see what more can be done. I thank her for raising those issues.
I also thank the hon. Member for Horsham for bringing us back to the question of advice and guidance. Most of us do need help in preparing for retirement. However, I take a slightly more positive view of the current provision of free guidance through the Money and Pensions Service. I also agree a bit more with the hon. Member for Mid Dunbartonshire (Susan Murray) that the task of Government is to reduce the complexity in our pensions system, rather than just hoping that ever more advice will help savers to navigate it. That is exactly why the parts of the Bill on guided retirement and small pots are so important as we move forward.
I would just like to cover some of the commitments I made in Committee. [Interruption.] I know this is going to be electric for all Members. That is the kind of enthusiasm I hope to see from more Members across the House. I will make a quick update on pensions dashboards, which at least one Member will appreciate. User testing on pensions dashboards has begun. I know that will thrill everybody in this House. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”] That is the attitude we need! [Laughter.] It will ramp up over the course of the next year, with greater volumes and more focus on consumer behaviour. We will be conducting a full evaluation of pensions dashboards over the coming years as the service goes live. That will include the impact of dashboards on engagement with pensions. I commit to update the House on that work in due course.
Following on from other issues raised in Committee, I am pleased to report that following the findings of the curriculum and assessment review, the Government will make financial education compulsory in primary schools in England.
One issue raised in Committee was the Department’s monitoring and evaluation plans for the policy programme set out in the Bill, not least the guided retirement measures. Those comments have been taken on board; an updated impact assessment this week lays out how we intend to approach monitoring impact.
I have endeavoured to do justice to the very wide range of different issues raised during the debate today. I hope hon. Members will support Government amendments that build on policies that will make a real difference to all our constituents in the decades to come.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 30 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 31
Indexation of periodic compensation for pre-1997 service: Great Britain
“(1) Schedule 7 to the Pensions Act 2004 (pension compensation provisions) is amended in accordance with subsections (2) and (3).
(2) In paragraph 28—
(a) for sub-paragraph (2) substitute—
“(2) Where a person is entitled to periodic compensation under any of those paragraphs, the person is entitled, on the indexation date, to an increase under this paragraph of—
(a) where sub-paragraph (2A) applies, the aggregate of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2C) and the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2E);
(b) where sub-paragraph (2B) applies, the aggregate of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2D) and the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2E);
(c) in any other case, the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2E).
(2A) This sub-paragraph applies where, immediately before the assessment date—
(a) the admissible rules of the scheme included a requirement for all or any part of so much of the annual rate of a pension in payment under the scheme as is attributable to a person’s pre-1997 service to be increased annually,
(b) that requirement did not apply only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme, and
(c) that requirement applied in relation to pre-1997 service in respect of which the compensation is payable.
(2B) This sub-paragraph applies where—
(a) the scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period,
(b) that accrual was in relation to GMP indexed service in respect of which the compensation is payable, and
(c) immediately before the assessment date the admissible rules of the scheme—
(i) did not include a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a), or
(ii) included such a requirement only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme.
(2C) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is—
(a) the appropriate percentage of the amount of the pre-1997 underlying rate immediately before the indexation date, or
(b) where the person first became entitled to the periodic compensation during the period of 12 months ending immediately before that date, 1/12th of that amount for each full month for which the person was so entitled.
(2D) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is—
(a) the appropriate percentage of the amount of the notional pre-1997 underlying rate immediately before the indexation date, or
(b) where the person first became entitled to the periodic compensation during the period of 12 months ending immediately before that date, 1/12th of that amount for each full month for which the person was so entitled.
(2E) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is—
(a) the appropriate percentage of the amount of the post-1997 underlying rate immediately before the indexation date, or
(b) where the person first became entitled to the periodic compensation during the period of 12 months ending immediately before that date, 1/12th of that amount for each full month for which the person was so entitled.
(2F) In any case where it is unclear to the Board whether, immediately before the assessment date, the admissible rules of the scheme included a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a), this paragraph has effect as if the scheme included such a requirement.
(2G) In any case where it is unclear to the Board whether, immediately before the assessment date, a requirement of the scheme of a kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a) (including such a requirement included by virtue of sub-paragraph (2F)) applied in relation to particular pre-1997 service, this paragraph has effect as if the requirement applied in relation to such service.
(2H) In any case where it is unclear to the Board whether the scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period, this paragraph has effect as if the scheme so provided.
(2I) In any case where it is unclear to the Board whether the accrual of a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme (including by virtue of sub-paragraph (2H)) was in relation to particular GMP indexed service, this paragraph has effect as if the accrual was in relation to such service.”
(b) in sub-paragraph (3)—
(i) in the opening words for “sub-paragraph (2)” substitute “sub-paragraphs (2) to (2E)”;
(ii) for both definitions of “underlying rate” substitute—
““notional pre-1997 underlying rate” means, in the case of periodic compensation under paragraph 3 or 22, the aggregate of—
(a) a prescribed percentage of so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to pre-1997 service, and
(b) so much of the amount within sub-paragraph (3)(b) of that paragraph as is referable to the amount within paragraph (a) of this definition immediately before the indexation date;
“notional pre-1997 underlying rate” means, in the case of periodic compensation under paragraph 5, 8, 11 or 15, the aggregate of—
(a) a prescribed percentage of so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to pre-1997 service,
(b) a prescribed percentage of so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(aa) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to pre-1997 service, and
(c) so much of the amount within sub-paragraph (3)(b) of that paragraph as is referable to the amounts within paragraphs (a) and (b) of this definition immediately before the indexation date;
“post-1997 underlying rate” means, in the case of periodic compensation under paragraph 3 or 22, the aggregate of—
(a) so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to post-1997 service, and
(b) so much of the amount within sub-paragraph (3)(b) of that paragraph as is referable to the amount within paragraph (a) of this definition immediately before the indexation date;
“post-1997 underlying rate” means, in the case of periodic compensation under paragraph 5, 8, 11 or 15, the aggregate of—
(a) so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to post-1997 service,
(b) so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(aa) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to post-1997 service, and
(c) so much of the amount within sub-paragraph (3)(b) of that paragraph as is referable to the amounts within paragraphs (a) and (b) of this definition immediately before the indexation date;
“pre-1997 underlying rate” means, in the case of periodic compensation under paragraph 3 or 22, the aggregate of—
(a) so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to pre-1997 service, and
(b) so much of the amount within sub-paragraph (3)(b) of that paragraph as is referable to the amount within paragraph (a) of this definition immediately before the indexation date;
“pre-1997 underlying rate” means, in the case of periodic compensation under paragraph 5, 8, 11 or 15, the aggregate of—
(a) so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to pre-1997 service,
(b) so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(aa) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to pre-1997 service, and
(c) so much of the amount within sub-paragraph (3)(b) of that paragraph as is referable to the amounts within paragraphs (a) and (b) of this definition immediately before the indexation date.”;
(c) in sub-paragraph (5)—
(i) in paragraph (a), for “sub-paragraph (2), each definition of “underlying rate”” substitute “sub-paragraphs (2C) to (2E), each definition of “notional pre-1997 underlying rate”, “post-1997 underlying rate” and “pre-1997 underlying rate””;
(ii) in paragraph (c), for “sub-paragraph (2), the definition of “underlying rate”” substitute “sub-paragraphs (2C) to (2E), the definition of “notional pre-1997 underlying rate”, the definition of “post-1997 underlying rate” and the definition of “pre-1997 underlying rate””;
(d) in sub-paragraph (6), before the definition of “post-1997 service” insert—
““GMP indexation period” means the period beginning with 6 April 1988 and ending with 5 April 1997;
“GMP indexed service” means—
(a) pensionable service which is within paragraph 36(4)(a) and occurs during the GMP indexation period, or
(b) pensionable service which is within paragraph 36(4)(b) and meets such requirements as may be prescribed;
“guaranteed minimum pension” has the same meaning as in the Pension Schemes Act 1993 (see section 8(2) of that Act);”;
(e) in sub-paragraph (7), for “and “pre-1997 service”” substitute “, “pre-1997 service” and “GMP indexed service””.
(3) In paragraph 29, for sub-paragraph (2) substitute—
“(2) The Board may also determine the percentage that is to be—
(a) the appropriate percentage for the purposes of sub-paragraphs (2C) and (2D) of paragraph 28;
(b) the appropriate percentage for the purposes of sub-paragraph (2E) of that paragraph,
(and where it does so, the definition of “appropriate percentage” in paragraph 28(3) does not apply in relation to the sub-paragraph in question).”
(4) Schedule 5 to the Pensions Act 2008 (pension compensation payable on discharge of pension compensation credit) is amended in accordance with subsections (5) and (6).
(5) In paragraph 17—
(a) for sub-paragraph (2) substitute—
“(2) Subject to sub-paragraph (3), the transferee is entitled, on each indexation date, to an increase of—
(a) where sub-paragraph (2A) applies, the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2E);
(b) where sub-paragraph (2B) applies, the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2F);
(c) where sub-paragraph (2C) applies, the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2G);
(d) where sub-paragraph (2D) applies, the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2H).
(2A) This sub-paragraph applies where—
(a) the transferor's PPF compensation is payable in accordance with paragraph 3, 5, 8, 11, 15 or 22 of Schedule 7 to the Pensions Act 2004 (“the relevant Schedule 7 provisions”), and
(b) immediately before the assessment date—
(i) the admissible rules of the scheme in respect of which that compensation is payable included a requirement for all or any part of so much of the annual rate of a pension in payment under the scheme as is attributable to a person’s pre-1997 service to be increased annually,
(ii) that requirement did not apply only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme, and
(iii) that requirement applied in relation to pre-1997 service in respect of which that compensation is payable.
(2B) This sub-paragraph applies where—
(a) the transferor's PPF compensation is payable in accordance with the relevant Schedule 7 provisions,
(b) the scheme in respect of which that compensation is payable provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period,
(c) that accrual was in relation to GMP indexed service in respect of which that compensation is payable, and
(d) immediately before the assessment date the admissible rules of that scheme—
(i) did not include a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(b)(i), or
(ii) included such a requirement only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme.
(2C) This sub-paragraph applies where—
(a) the transferor's PPF compensation is payable in accordance with the relevant Schedule 7 provisions, and
(b) neither sub-paragraph (2A) nor sub-paragraph (2B) applies.
(2D) This sub-paragraph applies where the transferor's PPF compensation is payable otherwise than in accordance with the relevant Schedule 7 provisions.
(2E) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is the aggregate of the appropriate percentage of the pre-1997 underlying rate and the appropriate percentage of the post-1997 underlying rate.
(2F) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is the aggregate of the appropriate percentage of the notional pre-1997 underlying rate and the appropriate percentage of the post-1997 underlying rate.
(2G) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is the appropriate percentage of the post-1997 underlying rate.
(2H) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is the appropriate percentage of the general underlying rate.”
(b) in sub-paragraph (3), for “(2)” substitute “(2E), (2F), (2G) or (2H) (as the case may be)”;
(c) after sub-paragraph (3) insert—
“(3A) For the purposes of sub-paragraphs (2A) to (2C)—
(a) in any case where it is unclear to the Board whether, immediately before the assessment date, the admissible rules of the scheme included a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(b)(i), those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the scheme included such a requirement;
(b) in any case where it is unclear to the Board whether, immediately before the assessment date, a requirement of the scheme of a kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(b)(i) (including such a requirement included by virtue of paragraph (a)) applied in relation to particular pre-1997 service, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the requirement applied in relation to such service;
(c) in any case where it is unclear to the Board whether the scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the scheme so provided;
(d) in any case where it is unclear to the Board whether the accrual of a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme (including by virtue of paragraph (c)) was in relation to particular GMP indexed service, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the accrual was in relation to such service.”
(d) in sub-paragraph (4)—
(i) in the opening words, for “sub-paragraph (2)” substitute “sub-paragraphs (2) to (2H)”;
(ii) for the definition of “the underlying rate” substitute—
““the general underlying rate” , as at an indexation date, is the aggregate of—
(a) the general indexed proportion of the aggregate of the initial annual rate of compensation and (in the case of compensation payable under paragraph 6), the revaluation amount,
(b) so much of any actuarial increase under paragraph 16A as relates to the amount in paragraph (a), and
(c) so much of any annual increase to which the transferee is entitled under this paragraph in respect of earlier indexation dates as relates to the amounts in paragraphs (a) and (b);
“the notional pre-1997 underlying rate” , as at an indexation date, is the aggregate of—
(a) the notional pre-1997 indexed proportion of the aggregate of the initial annual rate of compensation and (in the case of compensation payable under paragraph 6), the revaluation amount,
(b) so much of any actuarial increase under paragraph 16A as relates to the amount in paragraph (a), and
(c) so much of any annual increase to which the transferee is entitled under this paragraph in respect of earlier indexation dates as relates to the amounts in paragraphs (a) and (b);
“the post-1997 underlying rate” , as at an indexation date, is the aggregate of—
(a) the post-1997 indexed proportion of the aggregate of the initial annual rate of compensation and (in the case of compensation payable under paragraph 6), the revaluation amount,
(b) so much of any actuarial increase under paragraph 16A as relates to the amount in paragraph (a), and
(c) so much of any annual increase to which the transferee is entitled under this paragraph in respect of earlier indexation dates as relates to the amounts in paragraphs (a) and (b);
“the pre-1997 underlying rate” , as at an indexation date, is the aggregate of—
(a) the pre-1997 indexed proportion of the aggregate of the initial annual rate of compensation and (in the case of compensation payable under paragraph 6), the revaluation amount,
(b) so much of any actuarial increase under paragraph 16A as relates to the amount in paragraph (a), and
(c) so much of any annual increase to which the transferee is entitled under this paragraph in respect of earlier indexation dates as relates to the amounts in paragraphs (a) and (b).”;
(e) omit sub-paragraphs (5) and (6);
(f) before sub-paragraph (7) insert—
“(6A) For the purposes of paragraph (a) of the definition of “the general underlying rate”, “the general indexed proportion” is such proportion as is determined in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary of State.
(6B) For the purposes of paragraph (a) of the definition of “the notional pre-1997 underlying rate”, “the notional pre-1997 indexed proportion” is such proportion of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph of Schedule 7 to the Pensions Act 2004 under which the transferor’s PPF compensation is payable that is attributable to pre-1997 service as may be prescribed.
(6C) For the purposes of paragraph (a) of the definition of “the post-1997 underlying rate”, “the post-1997 indexed proportion” is the proportion of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph of that Schedule under which the transferor’s PPF compensation is payable that is attributable to post-1997 service.
(6D) For the purposes of paragraph (a) of the definition of “the pre-1997 underlying rate”, “the pre-1997 indexed proportion” is the proportion of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph of that Schedule under which the transferor’s PPF compensation is payable that is attributable to pre-1997 service.”;
(g) in sub-paragraph (7), for ““the underlying rate”” substitute ““the general underlying rate”, the definition of “the notional pre-1997 underlying rate”, the definition of “the post-1997 underlying rate” and the definition of “the pre-1997 underlying rate””;
(h) in paragraph (9)—
(i) before the definition of “post-1997 service” insert—
““GMP indexation period” means the period beginning with 6 April 1988 and ending with 5 April 1997;
“guaranteed minimum pension” has the same meaning as in the Pension Schemes Act 1993 (see section 8(2) of that Act);”;
(ii) in the definition of “post-1997 service” for “has” substitute “, “pre-1997 service” and “GMP indexed service” have”;
(iii) after that definition insert—
““the assessment date” , in relation to a pension scheme, has the same meaning as in that Schedule (see paragraph 2 of that Schedule);”.
(6) In paragraph 20, in sub-paragraph (1)(b), for “for the purposes of paragraph 17(2)” substitute “—
(i) of the pre-1997 underlying rate and of the notional pre-1997 underlying rate for the purposes of sub-paragraphs (2E) and (2F) of paragraph 17;
(ii) of the post-1997 underlying rate for the purposes of sub-paragraphs (2E), (2F) and (2G) of that paragraph;
(iii) of the general underlying rate for the purposes of sub-paragraph (2H) of that paragraph.””—(Torsten Bell.)
This new clause makes provision for certain compensation paid by the Pension Protection Fund in respect of a person’s pre-1997 pensionable service under legislation extending to England and Wales and Scotland to be increased annually.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 32
Indexation of periodic compensation for pre-1997 service: Northern Ireland
“(1) Schedule 6 to the Pensions (Northern Ireland) Order 2005 (S.I. 2005/255 (N.I. 1)) (pension compensation provisions) is amended in accordance with subsections (2) and (3).
(2) In paragraph 28—
(a) for sub-paragraph (2) substitute—
“(2) Where a person is entitled to periodic compensation under any of those paragraphs, the person is entitled, on the indexation date, to an increase under this paragraph of—
(a) where sub-paragraph (2A) applies, the aggregate of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2C) and the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2E);
(b) where sub-paragraph (2B) applies, the aggregate of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2D) and the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2E);
(c) in any other case, the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2E).
(2A) This sub-paragraph applies where, immediately before the assessment date—
(a) the admissible rules of the scheme included a requirement for all or any part of so much of the annual rate of a pension in payment under the scheme as is attributable to a person’s pre-1997 service to be increased annually,
(b) that requirement did not apply only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme, and
(c) that requirement applied in relation to pre-1997 service in respect of which the compensation is payable.
(2B) This sub-paragraph applies where—
(a) the scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period,
(b) that accrual was in relation to GMP indexed service in respect of which the compensation is payable, and
(c) immediately before the assessment date the admissible rules of the scheme—
(i) did not include a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a), or
(ii) included such a requirement only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme.
(2C) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is—
(a) the appropriate percentage of the amount of the pre-1997 underlying rate immediately before the indexation date, or
(b) where the person first became entitled to the periodic compensation during the period of 12 months ending immediately before that date, 1/12th of that amount for each full month for which the person was so entitled.
(2D) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is—
(a) the appropriate percentage of the amount of the notional pre-1997 underlying rate immediately before the indexation date, or
(b) where the person first became entitled to the periodic compensation during the period of 12 months ending immediately before that date, 1/12th of that amount for each full month for which the person was so entitled.
(2E) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is—
(a) the appropriate percentage of the amount of the post-1997 underlying rate immediately before the indexation date, or
(b) where the person first became entitled to the periodic compensation during the period of 12 months ending immediately before that date, 1/12th of that amount for each full month for which the person was so entitled.
(2F) In any case where it is unclear to the Board whether, immediately before the assessment date, the admissible rules of the scheme included a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a), this paragraph has effect as if the scheme included such a requirement.
(2G) In any case where it is unclear to the Board whether, immediately before the assessment date, a requirement of the scheme of a kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a) (including such a requirement included by virtue of sub-paragraph (2F)) applied in relation to particular pre-1997 service, this paragraph has effect as if the requirement applied in relation to such service.
(2H) In any case where it is unclear to the Board whether the scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period, this paragraph has effect as if the scheme so provided.
(2I) In any case where it is unclear to the Board whether the accrual of a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme (including by virtue of sub-paragraph (2H)) was in relation to particular GMP indexed service, this paragraph has effect as if the accrual was in relation to such service.”
(b) in sub-paragraph (3)—
(i) in the opening words for “sub-paragraph (2)” substitute “sub-paragraphs (2) to (2E)”;
(ii) for both definitions of “underlying rate” substitute—
““notional pre-1997 underlying rate” means, in the case of periodic compensation under paragraph 3 or 22, the aggregate of—
(a) a prescribed percentage of so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to pre-1997 service, and
(b) so much of the amount within sub-paragraph (3)(b) of that paragraph as is referable to the amount within paragraph (a) of this definition immediately before the indexation date;
“notional pre-1997 underlying rate” means, in the case of periodic compensation under paragraph 5, 8, 11 or 15, the aggregate of—
(a) a prescribed percentage of so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to pre-1997 service,
(b) a prescribed percentage of so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(aa) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to pre-1997 service, and
(c) so much of the amount within sub-paragraph (3)(b) of that paragraph as is referable to the amounts within paragraphs (a) and (b) of this definition immediately before the indexation date;
“post-1997 underlying rate” means, in the case of periodic compensation under paragraph 3 or 22, the aggregate of—
(a) so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to post-1997 service, and
(b) so much of the amount within sub-paragraph (3)(b) of that paragraph as is referable to the amount within paragraph (a) of this definition immediately before the indexation date;
“post-1997 underlying rate” means, in the case of periodic compensation under paragraph 5, 8, 11 or 15, the aggregate of—
(a) so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to post-1997 service,
(b) so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(aa) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to post-1997 service, and
(c) so much of the amount within sub-paragraph (3)(b) of that paragraph as is referable to the amounts within paragraphs (a) and (b) of this definition immediately before the indexation date;
“pre-1997 underlying rate” means, in the case of periodic compensation under paragraph 3 or 22, the aggregate of—
(a) so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to pre-1997 service, and
(b) so much of the amount within sub-paragraph (3)(b) of that paragraph as is referable to the amount within paragraph (a) of this definition immediately before the indexation date;
“pre-1997 underlying rate” means, in the case of periodic compensation under paragraph 5, 8, 11 or 15, the aggregate of—
(a) so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to pre-1997 service,
(b) so much of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(aa) of the paragraph in question as is attributable to pre-1997 service, and
(c) so much of the amount within sub-paragraph (3)(b) of that paragraph as is referable to the amounts within paragraphs (a) and (b) of this definition immediately before the indexation date.”;
(c) in sub-paragraph (5)—
(i) in paragraph (a), for “sub-paragraph (2), each definition of “underlying rate”” substitute “sub-paragraphs (2C) to (2E), each definition of “notional pre-1997 underlying rate”, “post-1997 underlying rate” and “pre-1997 underlying rate””;
(ii) in paragraph (c), for “sub-paragraph (2), the definition of “underlying rate”” substitute “sub-paragraphs (2C) to (2E), the definition of “notional pre-1997 underlying rate”, the definition of “post-1997 underlying rate” and the definition of “pre-1997 underlying rate””;
(d) in sub-paragraph (6), before the definition of “post-1997 service” insert—
““GMP indexation period” means the period beginning with 6 April 1988 and ending with 5 April 1997;
“GMP indexed service” means—
(a) pensionable service which is within paragraph 36(4)(a) and occurs during the GMP indexation period, or
(b) pensionable service which is within paragraph 36(4)(b) and meets such requirements as may be prescribed;
“guaranteed minimum pension” has the same meaning as in the Pension Schemes Act (see section 4(2) of that Act);”;
(e) in sub-paragraph (7), for “and “pre-1997 service”” substitute “, “pre-1997 service” and “GMP indexed service””.
(3) In paragraph 29, for sub-paragraph (2) substitute—
“(2) The Board may also determine the percentage that is to be—
(a) the appropriate percentage for the purposes of sub-paragraphs (2C) and (2D) of paragraph 28;
(b) the appropriate percentage for the purposes of sub-paragraph (2E) of that paragraph,
(and where it does so, the definition of “appropriate percentage” in paragraph 28(3) does not apply in relation to the sub-paragraph in question).”
(4) Schedule 4 to the Pensions (No.2) Act (Northern Ireland) 2008 (pension compensation payable on discharge of pension compensation credit) is amended in accordance with subsections (5) and (6).
(5) In paragraph 17—
(a) for sub-paragraph (2) substitute—
“(2) Subject to sub-paragraph (3), the transferee is entitled, on each indexation date, to an increase of—
(a) where sub-paragraph (2A) applies, the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2E);
(b) where sub-paragraph (2B) applies, the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2F);
(c) where sub-paragraph (2C) applies, the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2G);
(d) where sub-paragraph (2D) applies, the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (2H).
(2A) This sub-paragraph applies where—
(a) the transferor's PPF compensation is payable in accordance with paragraph 3, 5, 8, 11, 15 or 22 of Schedule 6 to the 2005 Order (“the relevant Schedule 6 provisions”), and
(b) immediately before the assessment date —
(i) the admissible rules of the scheme in respect of which that compensation is payable included a requirement for all or any part of so much of the annual rate of a pension in payment under the scheme as is attributable to a person’s pre-1997 service to be increased annually,
(ii) that requirement did not apply only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme, and
(iii) that requirement applied in relation to pre-1997 service in respect of which that compensation is payable.
(2B) This sub-paragraph applies where—
(a) the transferor's PPF compensation is payable in accordance with the relevant Schedule 6 provisions,
(b) the scheme in respect of which that compensation is payable provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period,
(c) that accrual was in relation to GMP indexed service in respect of which that compensation is payable, and
(d) immediately before the assessment date the admissible rules of that scheme—
(i) did not include a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(b)(i), or
(ii) included such a requirement only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme.
(2C) This sub-paragraph applies where—
(a) the transferor's PPF compensation is payable in accordance with the relevant Schedule 6 provisions, and
(b) neither sub-paragraph (2A) nor sub-paragraph (2B) applies.
(2D) This sub-paragraph applies where the transferor's PPF compensation is payable otherwise than in accordance with the relevant Schedule 6 provisions.
(2E) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is the aggregate of the appropriate percentage of the pre-1997 underlying rate and the appropriate percentage of the post-1997 underlying rate.
(2F) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is the aggregate of the appropriate percentage of the notional pre-1997 underlying rate and the appropriate percentage of the post-1997 underlying rate.
(2G) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is the appropriate percentage of the post-1997 underlying rate.
(2H) The amount mentioned in this sub-paragraph is the appropriate percentage of the general underlying rate.”
(b) in sub-paragraph (3), for “(2)” substitute “(2E), (2F), (2G) or (2H) (as the case may be)”;
(c) after sub-paragraph (3) insert—
“(3A) For the purposes of sub-paragraphs (2A) to (2C)—
(a) in any case where it is unclear to the Board whether, immediately before the assessment date, the admissible rules of the scheme included a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub- paragraph (2A)(b)(i), those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the scheme included such a requirement;
(b) in any case where it is unclear to the Board whether, immediately before the assessment date, a requirement of the scheme of a kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(b)(i) (including such a requirement included by virtue of paragraph (a)) applied in relation to particular pre-1997 service, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the requirement applied in relation to such service;
(c) in any case where it is unclear to the Board whether the scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the scheme so provided;
(d) in any case where it is unclear to the Board whether the accrual of a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme (including by virtue of paragraph (c)) was in relation to particular GMP indexed service, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the accrual was in relation to such service.”
(d) in sub-paragraph (4)—
(i) in the opening words, for “sub-paragraph (2)” substitute “sub-paragraphs (2) to (2H)”;
(ii) for the definition of “the underlying rate” substitute—
““the general underlying rate” , as at an indexation date, is the aggregate of—
(a) the general indexed proportion of the aggregate of the initial annual rate of compensation and (in the case of compensation payable under paragraph 6), the revaluation amount,
(b) so much of any actuarial increase under paragraph 16A as relates to the amount in paragraph (a), and
(c) so much of any annual increase to which the transferee is entitled under this paragraph in respect of earlier indexation dates as relates to the amounts in paragraphs (a) and (b);
“the notional pre-1997 underlying rate” , as at an indexation date, is the aggregate of—
(a) the notional pre-1997 indexed proportion of the aggregate of the initial annual rate of compensation and (in the case of compensation payable under paragraph 6), the revaluation amount,
(b) so much of any actuarial increase under paragraph 16A as relates to the amount in paragraph (a), and
(c) so much of any annual increase to which the transferee is entitled under this paragraph in respect of earlier indexation dates as relates to the amounts in paragraphs (a) and (b);
“the post-1997 underlying rate” , as at an indexation date, is the aggregate of—
(a) the post-1997 indexed proportion of the aggregate of the initial annual rate of compensation and (in the case of compensation payable under paragraph 6), the revaluation amount,
(b) so much of any actuarial increase under paragraph 16A as relates to the amount in paragraph (a), and
(c) so much of any annual increase to which the transferee is entitled under this paragraph in respect of earlier indexation dates as relates to the amounts in paragraphs (a) and (b);
“the pre-1997 underlying rate” , as at an indexation date, is the aggregate of—
(a) the pre-1997 indexed proportion of the aggregate of the initial annual rate of compensation and (in the case of compensation payable under paragraph 6), the revaluation amount,
(b) so much of any actuarial increase under paragraph 16A as relates to the amount in paragraph (a), and
(c) so much of any annual increase to which the transferee is entitled under this paragraph in respect of earlier indexation dates as relates to the amounts in paragraphs (a) and (b).”;
(e) omit sub-paragraphs (5) and (6);
(f) before sub-paragraph (7) insert—
“(6A) For the purposes of paragraph (a) of the definition of “the general underlying rate”, “the general indexed proportion” is such proportion as is determined in accordance with regulations made by the Department.
(6B) For the purposes of paragraph (a) of the definition of “the notional pre-1997 underlying rate”, “the notional pre-1997 indexed proportion” is such proportion of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph of Schedule 6 to the 2005 Order under which the transferor’s PPF compensation is payable that is attributable to pre-1997 service as may be prescribed.
(6C) For the purposes of paragraph (a) of the definition of “the post-1997 underlying rate”, “the post-1997 indexed proportion” is the proportion of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph of that Schedule under which the transferor’s PPF compensation is payable that is attributable to post-1997 service.
(6D) For the purposes of paragraph (a) of the definition of “the pre-1997 underlying rate”, “the pre-1997 indexed proportion” is the proportion of the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) of the paragraph of that Schedule under which the transferor’s PPF compensation is payable that is attributable to pre-1997 service.”;
(g) in sub-paragraph (7), for ““the underlying rate”” substitute ““the general underlying rate”, the definition of “the notional pre-1997 underlying rate”, the definition of “the post-1997 underlying rate” and the definition of “the pre-1997 underlying rate””;
(h) for sub-paragraph 9 substitute—
“(9) In this paragraph—
“GMP indexation period” means the period beginning with 6 April 1988 and ending with 5 April 1997;
“guaranteed minimum pension” has the same meaning as in the Pension Schemes Act (see section 4(2) of that Act);
“post-1997 service” , “pre-1997 service” and “GMP indexed service” have the same meaning as in paragraph 28 of Schedule 6 to the 2005 Order (annual increase in periodic compensation);
“the assessment date” , in relation to a pension scheme, has the same meaning as in that Schedule (see paragraph 2 of that Schedule).”
(6) In paragraph 20, in sub-paragraph (1)(b), for “for the purposes of paragraph 17(2)” substitute “—
(i) of the pre-1997 underlying rate and of the notional pre-1997 underlying rate for the purposes of sub-paragraphs (2E) and (2F) of paragraph 17;
(ii) of the post-1997 underlying rate for the purposes of sub-paragraphs (2E), (2F) and (2G) of that paragraph;
(iii) of the general underlying rate for the purposes of sub-paragraph (2H) of that paragraph.””—(Torsten Bell.)
This new clause makes provision for certain compensation paid by the Pension Protection Fund in respect of a person’s pre-1997 pensionable service under legislation extending to Northern Ireland to be increased annually.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 33
Financial Assistance Scheme: indexation of payments for pre-1997 service
“(1) The Financial Assistance Scheme Regulations 2005 (S.I. 2005/1986) are amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph 7(1)(b) of Schedule 2 (determination of annual and initial payments), after “(b)(i)” insert “, (ia) and (ib)”.
(3) Paragraph 9 of that Schedule is amended in accordance with subsections (4) to (6).
(4) In sub-paragraph (2)—
(a) in paragraph (a) of the definition of “underlying rate”, after sub-paragraph (i) insert—
“(ia) where sub-paragraph (2A) applies, the product of X multiplied by so much of the expected pension as is attributable to pre-1997 service;
(ib) where sub-paragraph (2B) applies, the product of X multiplied by the relevant percentage of so much of the expected pension as is attributable to pre-1997 service;”;
(b) in paragraph (b) of the definition of “underlying rate”—
(i) omit the “and” at the end of sub-paragraph (i);
(ii) after that sub-paragraph insert—
“(ia) where sub-paragraph (2A) applies, so much of the expected pension as is, proportionally, attributable to pre-1997 service;
(ib) where sub-paragraph (2B) applies, the relevant percentage of so much of the expected pension as is, proportionally, attributable to pre-1997 service; and”;
(c) after the definition of “post-1997 service” insert—
““pre-1997 service” means—
(a) pensionable service (whether actual or notional) which occurs before 6th April 1997; or
(b) where the annual payment is payable to, or in respect of, a qualifying member who is, or was, a pension credit member of the scheme, pension credit rights deriving from rights attributable to service (whether actual or notional) which occurred before 6th April 1997;
“relevant percentage” means such percentage as may be determined by the Secretary of State;”.
(5) After sub-paragraph (2) insert—
“(2A) This sub-paragraph applies where, immediately before the qualifying pension scheme began to wind up—
(a) the scheme rules included a requirement for all or any part of so much of the annual rate of a pension in payment under the scheme as is attributable to a person’s pre-1997 service to be increased annually,
(b) that requirement did not apply only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme, and
(c) that requirement applied in relation to pre-1997 service in respect of which the annual payment is payable.
(2B) This sub-paragraph applies where—
(a) the qualifying pension scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period,
(b) that accrual was in relation to GMP indexed service in respect of which the annual payment is payable, and
(c) immediately before the scheme began to wind up the scheme rules—
(i) did not include a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a), or
(ii) included such a requirement only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme.
(2C) For the purposes of sub-paragraphs (2A) and (2B)—
(a) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether, immediately before the scheme began to wind up, the scheme rules included a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a), those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the scheme included such a requirement;
(b) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether, immediately before the scheme began to wind up, a requirement of the scheme of a kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a) (including such a requirement included by virtue of paragraph (a)) applied in relation to particular pre-1997 service, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the requirement applied in relation to such service;
(c) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether the scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the scheme so provided;
(d) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether the accrual of a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme (including by virtue of paragraph (c)) was in relation to particular GMP indexed service, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the accrual was in relation to such service.
(2D) In sub-paragraphs (2B) and (2C)—
“GMP indexation period” means the period beginning with 6 April 1988 and ending with 5 April 1997;
“GMP indexed service” means—
(a) pensionable service (whether actual or notional) which occurs during the GMP indexation period; or
(b) where the annual payment is payable to, or in respect of, a qualifying member who is, or was, a pension credit member of the scheme, pension credit rights deriving from rights attributable to service (whether actual or notional) which occurred during the GMP indexation period.”
(6) In sub-paragraph (3)—
(a) after “attributable to” insert “pre-1997 service or”;
(b) for “that amount” substitute “the amount in question”.
(7) In paragraph 7(1)(b) of Schedule 2A (determination of ill health and interim ill health payments), after “(b)(i)” insert “, (ia) and (ib)”.
(8) Paragraph 9 of that Schedule is amended in accordance with subsections (9) to (11).
(9) In sub-paragraph (2)—
(a) after the definition of “E” insert—
““EA” means so much of the expected pension as is attributable to pre-1997 service;
“EB” means the relevant percentage of so much of the expected pension as is attributable to pre-1997 service;”;
(b) after the definition of “post-1997 service” insert—
““pre-1997 service” means—
(a) pensionable service (whether actual or notional) which occurs before 6th April 1997; or
(b) where the ill health payment is payable to, or in respect of, a qualifying member who is, or was, a pension credit member of the scheme, pension credit rights deriving from rights attributable to service (whether actual or notional) which occurred before 6th April 1997;
“relevant percentage” means such percentage as may be determined by the Secretary of State;”;
(c) in paragraph (a) of the definition of “underlying rate”, after sub-paragraph (i) insert—
“(ia) where sub-paragraph (2A) applies, the product of X multiplied by (C x EA);
(ib) where sub-paragraph (2B) applies, the product of X multiplied by (C x EB);”;
(d) in paragraph (b) of the definition of “underlying rate”—
(i) omit the “and” at the end of sub-paragraph (i);
(ii) after that sub-paragraph insert—
“(ia) where sub-paragraph (2A) applies, so much of the amount “A” for the purposes of paragraph 2 as is, proportionately, attributable to pre-1997 service;
(ib) where sub-paragraph (2B) applies, the relevant percentage of so much of the amount “A” for the purposes of paragraph 2 as is, proportionately, attributable to pre-1997 service; and”;
(10) After sub-paragraph (2) insert—
“(2A) This sub-paragraph applies where immediately before the qualifying pension scheme began to wind up—
(a) the scheme rules included a requirement for all or any part of so much of the annual rate of a pension in payment under the scheme as is attributable to a person’s pre-1997 service to be increased annually,
(b) that requirement did not apply only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme, and
(c) that requirement applied in relation to pre-1997 service in respect of which the ill health payment is payable.
(2B) This sub-paragraph applies where—
(a) the qualifying pension scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period,
(b) that accrual was in relation to GMP indexed service in respect of which the ill health payment is payable, and
(c) immediately before the scheme began to wind up the scheme rules—
(i) did not include a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a), or
(ii) included such a requirement only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme
(2C) For the purposes of sub-paragraphs (2A) and (2B)—
(a) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether, immediately before the scheme began to wind up, the scheme rules included a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a), those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the scheme included such a requirement;
(b) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether, immediately before the scheme began to wind up, a requirement of the scheme of a kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a) (including such a requirement included by virtue of paragraph (a)) applied in relation to particular pre-1997 service, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the requirement applied in relation to such service;
(c) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether the scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the scheme so provided;
(d) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether the accrual of a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme (including by virtue of paragraph (c)) was in relation to particular GMP indexed service, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the accrual was in relation to such service.
(2D) In sub-paragraphs (2A) to (2C)—
“GMP indexation period” means the period beginning with 6 April 1988 and ending with 5 April 1997;
“GMP indexed service” means—
(a) pensionable service (whether actual or notional) which occurs during the GMP indexation period; or
(b) where the ill health payment is payable to, or in respect of, a qualifying member who is, or was, a pension credit member of the scheme, pension credit rights deriving from rights attributable to service (whether actual or notional) which occurred during the GMP indexation period;
“guaranteed minimum pension” has the meaning given in section 8(2) of the 1993 Act.”
(11) In sub-paragraph (3)—
(a) after “attributable to” insert “pre-1997 service or”;
(b) for “that amount” substitute “the amount in question”.
(12) In paragraph 6 of Schedule 3 (determination of certain annual payments)—
(a) in sub-paragraph (2)—
(i) in the definition of “underlying rate”, after paragraph (a) insert—
“(aa) where sub-paragraph (2A) applies, the product of X multiplied by—
(i) where the beneficiary is a qualifying member or a survivor or surviving dependant of a qualifying member who died on or after the calculation date—
(aa) where the qualifying member is not a qualifying member to whom regulation 17D applied, so much of the revalued notional pension as is attributable to pre-1997 service; or
(bb) where the qualifying member is a qualifying member to whom regulation 17D applied, so much of the sum of R-A as is attributable to pre-1997 service; and
(ii) where the beneficiary is a survivor or surviving dependant in respect of whom a survivor notional pension has been determined, so much of the survivor notional pension as is attributable to the qualifying member’s pre-1997 service;
(ab) where sub-paragraph (2B) applies, the product of X multiplied by—
(i) where the beneficiary is a qualifying member or a survivor or surviving dependant of a qualifying member who died on or after the calculation date—
(aa) where the qualifying member is not a qualifying member to whom regulation 17D applied, the relevant percentage of so much of the revalued notional pension as is attributable to pre-1997 service; or
(bb) where the qualifying member is a qualifying member to whom regulation 17D applied, the relevant percentage of so much of the sum of R-A as is attributable to pre-1997 service; and
(ii) where the beneficiary is a survivor or surviving dependant in respect of whom a survivor notional pension has been determined, the relevant percentage of so much of the survivor notional pension as is attributable to the qualifying member’s pre-1997 service;”;
(iii) after the definition of “post-1997 service” insert—
““pre-1997 service” means—
(a) pensionable service (either actual or notional) which occurred before 6th April 1997; or
(b) where the pension was payable to, or in respect of, a qualifying member who is, or was, a pension credit member of the scheme, pension credit rights deriving from rights attributable to service (whether actual or notional) which occurred before 6th April 1997;
“relevant percentage” means such percentage as may be determined by the Secretary of State;”;
(b) after sub-paragraph (2) insert—
“(2A) This sub-paragraph applies where immediately before the qualifying pension scheme began to wind up—
(a) the scheme rules included a requirement for all or any part of so much of the annual rate of a pension in payment under the scheme as is attributable to a person’s pre-1997 service to be increased annually,
(b) that requirement did not apply only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme, and
(c) that requirement applied in relation to pre-1997 service in respect of which the annual payment is payable.
(2B) This sub-paragraph applies where—
(a) the qualifying pension scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period,
(b) that accrual was in relation to GMP indexed service in respect of which the annual payment is payable, and
(c) immediately before the scheme began to wind up the scheme rules—
(i) did not include a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a), or
(ii) included such a requirement only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme.
(2C) For the purposes of sub-paragraphs (2A) and (2B)—
(a) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether, immediately before the scheme began to wind up, the scheme rules included a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a), those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the scheme included such a requirement;
(b) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether, immediately before the scheme began to wind up, a requirement of the scheme of a kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a) (including such a requirement included by virtue of paragraph (a)) applied in relation to particular pre-1997 service, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the requirement applied in relation to such service;
(c) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether the scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the scheme so provided;
(d) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether the accrual of a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme (including by virtue of paragraph (c)) was in relation to particular GMP indexed service, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the accrual was in relation to such service.
(2D) In sub-paragraphs (2A) to (2C)—
“GMP indexation period” means the period beginning with 6 April 1988 and ending with 5 April 1997;
“GMP indexed service” means—
(a) pensionable service (whether actual or notional) which occurs during the GMP indexation period; or
(b) where the pension was payable to, or in respect of, a qualifying member who is, or was, a pension credit member of the scheme, pension credit rights deriving from rights attributable to service (whether actual or notional) which occurred during the GMP indexation period;
“guaranteed minimum pension” has the meaning given in section 8(2) of the 1993 Act.”;
(c) in sub-paragraph (3), after “attributable to” insert “pre-1997 service and”.
(13) In paragraph 6 of Schedule 5 (determination of certain ill health payments)—
(a) in sub-paragraph (2)—
(i) in the definition of “underlying rate”, after paragraph (a) insert—
“(aa) where sub-paragraph (2A) applies, the product of X multiplied by (C x VA);
(ab) where sub-paragraph (2B) applies, the product of X multiplied by (C x VB);”;
(ii) after the definition of “post-1997 service” insert—
““pre-1997 service” means—
(a) pensionable service (either actual or notional) which occurred before 6th April 1997; or
(b) where the pension was payable to, or in respect of, a qualifying member who is, or was, a pension credit member of the scheme, pension credit rights deriving from rights attributable to service (whether actual or notional) which occurred before 6th April 1997;
“relevant percentage” means such percentage as may be determined by the Secretary of State;”;
(iii) after the definition of “V” insert—
““VA” means—
(a) where the beneficiary is a qualifying member or a survivor or surviving dependant of a qualifying member who died on or after the calculation date—
(i) where the qualifying member is not a qualifying member to whom regulation 17D applied, so much of the revalued notional pension as is attributable to pre-1997 service; or
(ii) where the qualifying member is a qualifying member to whom regulation 17D applied, so much of the sum of R-A as is attributable to pre-1997 service; and
(b) where the beneficiary is a survivor or surviving dependant in respect of whom a survivor notional pension has been determined, so much of the survivor notional pension as is attributable to the qualifying member’s pre-1997 service;
“VB” means—
(a) where the beneficiary is a qualifying member or a survivor or surviving dependant of a qualifying member who died on or after the calculation date—
(i) where the qualifying member is not a qualifying member to whom regulation 17D applied, the relevant percentage of so much of the revalued notional pension as is attributable to pre-1997 service; or
(ii) where the qualifying member is a qualifying member to whom regulation 17D applied, the relevant percentage of so much of the sum of R-A as is attributable to pre-1997 service; and
(b) where the beneficiary is a survivor or surviving dependant in respect of whom a survivor notional pension has been determined, the relevant percentage of so much of the survivor notional pension as is attributable to the qualifying member’s pre-1997 service;”;
(b) after sub-paragraph (2) insert—
“(2A) This sub-paragraph applies where immediately before the qualifying pension scheme began to wind up—
(a) the scheme rules included a requirement for all or any part of so much of the annual rate of a pension in payment under the scheme as is attributable to a person’s pre-1997 service to be increased annually,
(b) that requirement did not apply only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme, and
(c) that requirement applied in relation to pre-1997 service in respect of which the ill health payment is payable.
(2B) This sub-paragraph applies where—
(a) the qualifying pension scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period,
(b) that accrual was in relation to GMP indexed service in respect of which the ill health payment is payable, and
(c) immediately before the scheme began to wind up the scheme rules—
(i) did not include a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a), or
(ii) included such a requirement only in relation to a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme.
(2C) For the purposes of sub-paragraphs (2A) and (2B)—
(a) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether, immediately before the scheme began to wind up, the scheme rules included a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a), those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the scheme included such a requirement;
(b) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether, immediately before the scheme began to wind up, a requirement of the scheme of a kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2A)(a) (including such a requirement included by virtue of paragraph (a)) applied in relation to particular pre-1997 service, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the requirement applied in relation to such service;
(c) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether the scheme provided a guaranteed minimum pension that accrued during the GMP indexation period, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the scheme so provided;
(d) in any case where it is unclear to the scheme manager whether the accrual of a guaranteed minimum pension provided by the scheme (including by virtue of paragraph (c)) was in relation to particular GMP indexed service, those sub-paragraphs have effect as if the accrual was in relation to such service.
(2D) In sub-paragraphs (2A) to (2C)—
“GMP indexation period” means the period beginning with 6 April 1988 and ending with 5 April 1997;
“GMP indexed service” means—
(a) pensionable service (whether actual or notional) which occurs during the GMP indexation period; or
(b) where the pension was payable to, or in respect of, a qualifying member who is, or was, a pension credit member of the scheme, pension credit rights deriving from rights attributable to service (whether actual or notional) which occurred during the GMP indexation period;
“guaranteed minimum pension” has the meaning given in section 8(2) of the 1993 Act.”;
(c) in sub-paragraph (3), after “attributable to” insert “pre-1997 service and”.”—(Torsten Bell.)
This new clause makes provision for certain assistance paid under the Financial Assistance Scheme Regulations 2005 in respect of a person’s pre-1997 pensionable service to be increased annually.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 34
Exemption from public procurement rules
“(1) After paragraph 2 of Schedule 2 to the Procurement Act 2023 (general vertical arrangements exemption from public procurement rules) insert—
2A “(1) A contract between a local government pension scheme manager and an asset pool company providing for the company—
(a) to manage the funds and other assets for which the scheme manager is responsible,
(b) to make and manage investments on behalf of the scheme manager, and
(c) if the contract so provides, to carry out other investment management activities for or on behalf of the scheme manager,
if each of the conditions set out in sub-paragraph (2) is met.
(2) The conditions are—
(a) that more than 80% of the activities of the company are investment management activities carried out for or on behalf of local government pension scheme managers;
(b) that no person exercises a decisive influence on the activities of the company (either directly or indirectly) other than—
(i) the participating scheme managers in the company, acting in their capacity as local government pension scheme managers, and
(ii) where the only shareholder in the company is another company (see section 1(9)(a) of the Pension Schemes Act 2025), that other company;
(c) that the company does not carry out any activities that are contrary to the interests of—
(i) the participating scheme managers in the company, in their capacity as local government pension scheme managers, or
(ii) where the only shareholder in the company is another company, that other company.
(3) The contracts covered by this paragraph include a contract where the local government pension scheme manager concerned is already a participating scheme manager in the company (as well as one where the scheme manager concerned will become a participating scheme manager in the company as a result of entering into it).
(4) An appropriate authority may by regulations make provision about how a calculation as to the percentage of activities carried out by an asset pool company is to be made for the purposes of sub-paragraph (2)(a).
(5) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (2)(b), a person does not exercise a decisive influence on the activities of the asset pool company only by reason of—
(a) being a director, officer or manager of the company, acting in that capacity, or
(b) where the only shareholder in the company is another company, being a director, officer or manager of that other company.
(6) In this paragraph—
“asset pool company” has the meaning given by section 1(7)(a) of the Pension Schemes Act 2025;
“investment management activities” means activities involved in or connected with the management of funds or other assets for which a scheme manager is responsible (including making and managing investments on behalf of the scheme manager);
“local government pension scheme manager” means a person who is, by virtue of section 4(5) of the Public Service Pensions Act 2013, a scheme manager for a pension scheme for local government workers in England and Wales;
“participating scheme manager” , in relation to an asset pool company, means a local government pension scheme manager who participates in the company within the meaning of section 1(9)(b) of the Pension Schemes Act 2025.””—(Torsten Bell.)
This new clause amends the Procurement Act 2023 to create a new category of exempted contract covering certain investment management contracts between a local government scheme manager and the asset pool company. This is intended to replace Clause 4 in the current print of the Bill.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 35
Funding of the Board of the Pension Protection Fund
“(1) The Pensions Act 2004 is amended in accordance with subsections (2) to (5).
(2) Omit section 116 (power of Secretary of State to pay grants to Board of Pension Protection Fund).
(3) Omit section 117 (power of Secretary of State to impose administration levy on pension schemes).
(4) In section 173 (Pension Protection Fund), in subsection (3), before paragraph (a) insert—
“(za) any sums required to meet expenditure of the Board that is attributable to the operation or administration of the Pension Protection Fund,”
(5) In section 188 (fraud compensation fund), in subsection (3), before paragraph (a) insert—
“(za) any sums required to meet expenditure of the Board that is attributable to the operation or administration of the Fraud Compensation Fund,”
(6) No amount is payable to the Secretary of State by virtue of section 117 of the Pensions Act 2004 (administration levy) in respect of the financial years beginning with 1 April 2023 and 1 April 2024.
(7) In the Pensions Act 2008, in Schedule 10 (interest on late payment of levies), omit paragraph 3 (which makes an amendment about interest for late payment of the administration levy that has not been brought into force).”—(Torsten Bell.)
This new clause (which is intended to be added after clause 112) enables administrative expenses of the Board of the Pension Protection Fund to be paid out of the Pension Protection Fund and the Fraud Compensation Fund, and removes the existing administration levy mechanism; it also clarifies that no administration levy is payable for 2023/24 or 2024/25.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 3
Terminal illness: means of demonstrating eligibility
“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision about how a person may demonstrate that they are terminally ill for purposes relating to compensation or assistance from the Pension Protection Fund or Financial Assistance Scheme.
(2) In making regulations under this section, the Secretary of State must seek to minimise the administrative burden placed upon the person with a terminal illness.
(3) Regulations under this section must provide that, where the Department of Work and Pensions (“the Department”) holds a valid SR1 form in respect of a person seeking to demonstrate that they are terminally ill for purposes relating to compensation or assistance from the Pension Protection Fund or Financial Assistance Scheme, the Department must share that form with the Pension Protection Fund or the Financial Assistance Scheme.
(4) Regulations under this section must require the Pension Protection Fund and the Financial Assistance Scheme to make the appropriate payment or payments within a specified time of receipt of a valid application.”—(Manuela Perteghella.)
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to provide, by regulations, for the use of a valid SR1 form to make it easier for a person to demonstrate that they are terminally ill for purposes related to compensation from the PPF or FAS.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Torsten Bell
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
Pensions matter. They are the means by which we deliver on some of the biggest promises we have made to the public: that the prospect of a comfortable retirement, with the option of leisure—hon. Members may choose not to take it—in later life, is there for the many, not just the few. We need not only to encourage people to save, but to ensure that those savings work as hard as possible for them to deliver that comfortable retirement. That is ultimately what this occasionally technical Bill is all about. Better returns mean better retirements, and there are few things more important than that.
The Bill adds wind to the sails of some of the major changes already under way in our pension landscape. Most importantly, it pushes ahead with the shift towards larger, better-governed schemes, better able to access and deliver returns for savers and to invest in a wider range of assets. It introduces a new value for money framework, so that schemes are judged on performance and service, not just cost. It removes one of the big barriers to people engaging with their pensions by consolidating small, inactive pension pots. It delivers reforms to ensure people are building up a pension, not just a savings pot, with simple default pensions that do not require each of us to become a financial expert as we approach retirement.
For defined benefit schemes, the Bill strengthens the local government pension scheme, puts more trustees in the driving seat for managing scheme surpluses, and addresses the lack of pre-1997 indexation within the PPF and the FAS. Those are real improvements shaped by constructive debate and detailed scrutiny in this place and across the pension industry.
I again thank Members from all parts of the House for their contributions and I thank the Clerks for taking us through Committee. I also thank the Bill team—Jo, Amanda, Mike, James, Sagar, Saadia and Steve—and the many officials across DWP and the Treasury who have worked behind the scenes to support the Government in bringing forward this important legislation. I appreciate that it is not a short Bill. The PPF, the Financial Conduct Authority and the Pensions Regulator have also played important roles for which I am grateful. I commend all of them, and this Bill, to the House.
Budget Resolutions
Torsten Bell Excerpts(3 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Sir Mel Stride
That is absolutely true.
Let us look at how we ended up at this sorry pass. In opposition, Labour assured the British electorate that they would not be putting up taxes left, right and centre, and when they got into power, what did they do within a few short months? They slapped taxes—£40 billion-worth—on the British people, £25 billion of that by way of national insurance increases on business alone. It is no surprise that that destroyed employment and growth.
They talked down the economy. They came up with this confected £22 billion black hole. What an irony it was—[Interruption.] There may be chuntering from those on the Front Bench, but what an irony it was that it was at the behest of the Government themselves that the Office for Budget Responsibility was invited to look into this claim and said that it would not legitimise that figure. The damage was done. The animal spirits in the economy were extinguished.
Of course, they did something else that socialists down the ages always do: they borrowed and borrowed and borrowed and spent and spent and spent until they ran out of other people’s money—
Sir Mel Stride
The Minister is having trouble containing himself, such is the punishment that he is receiving at the moment. They borrowed all this money, and what did that do? It stoked inflation, and with inflation higher, interest rates have been higher for longer.
Sir Mel Stride
The Minister says from a sedentary position that inflation is coming down. The International Monetary Fund says that inflation will be the highest in the G7 this year and next year.
We know that with high inflation, interest rates are higher for longer. That means businesses’ borrowing costs are higher. It means that consumer sentiment is dampened. It means that the servicing cost alone on the burgeoning debt that this Government are constantly adding to is currently £100 billion a year—twice what we spend on defence. In fact, if debt servicing were a Government Department, it would be the third largest in Whitehall—not spending money on better public services, as we are often told by the Labour party, but simply paying for the profligacy of the Labour party when it comes to borrowing.
The run-up to this Budget was a farce. We have seen weeks and weeks of uncertainty generated by the Treasury, which has leaked every possible combination of tax increases and then U-turned on some of them. It has flown so many kites that it has blotted out the sun, and a huge shadow has been cast across businesses, which have pressed pause on investment and hiring. The Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury should speak to Andy Haldane, who concludes that what I am saying is absolutely right. It has also weighed down on consumer sentiment. All this hokey-cokey around what is in the Budget has done real damage to our economy on this Government’s watch.
Sir Mel Stride
My right hon. and gallant Friend is entirely right, as usual, and something else has also been going on. I have written to the OBR to ask Richard Hughes exactly what happened with the information that the Treasury appears to have leaked out about the forecasts during the run-up to the Budget. I say that in the knowledge that the OBR’s own guidance says that information exchanged with the Treasury during the build-up to a Budget is provided to Ministers in confidence. Why is it then that the Chancellor herself was on the airwaves before the Budget, opining on the apparent coming downgrade to productivity? I have written to the OBR to ask whether it feels that that was appropriate.
I have also written to the permanent secretary to the Treasury to ask if he is implementing an investigation into the leaks coming from the Treasury. Interestingly, he has written back to me simply to say that in the event that there are suspected leaks, of course there is an investigation. He has not quite answered my question as to whether there is an investigation being undertaken at the moment, but I will be following up with him on that matter.
What has happened in this Budget? The OBR forecasts tell a sorry story: unemployment is higher in every single year of the forecast than it was forecast to be back in the spring. Inflation is up—we have seen the latest figures from the Office for National Statistics. Labour is the party that talks about resolving poverty; it is a disgrace that food inflation in the last set of figures went up way above the headline rate, from 4.5% to 4.9%. That rise is being borne by some of the most vulnerable and some of the poorest in our society.
On growth, of course the Chancellor tells a good story. She says that the growth forecast is up compared with spring this year, but, as the Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury will know, it is down compared with the autumn of last year, when the OBR said that growth would be 2% in this year; it is now forecast to be 1.5%. In in every subsequent year, growth is forecast to be lower than was forecast back at the time of the spring statement. That is the simple fact.
Sir Mel Stride
We will come on to why that is the case momentarily.
What has happened to borrowing? One might have thought that the Government would have learned the lesson that ever-increasing borrowing always leads to disaster, but no: there is £11 billion of additional borrowing on average in every year of the forecast. What has that done to living standards? Real household disposable income—the economists’ measure of economic wellbeing —is down in every year of the forecast compared to the forecast in the spring.
The OBR says—the Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury will like this one—that real income growth across this forecast will be well below the average of the last decade. So this Government should not point a finger at the last one when it comes to living standards.
Dame Harriett Baldwin
I am talking about yesterday’s Budget. The Chancellor herself announced that she was freezing the thresholds for a further three years, and I dare say that the hon. Gentleman will be asked to vote for that in the Aye Lobby next week. I disagree with him, because the Chancellor has just announced that the thresholds will be frozen for an additional three years.
Another person who will pay more tax as a result of the Chancellor’s decisions is a single young person on minimum wage. I do not know whether hon. Members have seen the emigration statistics that were published today, which show that hundreds of thousands of our young people are fleeing this country. That is something that we should all be very concerned about.
A single mother who has just received a lump sum in a divorce settlement will pay more tax as a result of yesterday’s Budget. A sole trader or entrepreneur who runs a business and perhaps pays themselves in dividends will pay more tax as a result of yesterday’s Budget. A driver in my rural constituency who needs to drive to go to work will pay more tax because of yesterday’s Budget. We can see that the choices made by the Chancellor punish the employers, the farmers, the family businesses, the workers, the savers, the pensioners and the drivers—everyone who tries to do the right thing and tries not to be a burden on the state.
I will leave the House with one final point.
Dame Harriett Baldwin
I am looking forward to the Minister’s winding-up speech at the end of the debate, and I will not give way at the moment.
Given the skulduggery that the Treasury seems to have engaged in during the run-up to this Budget, the lingering impression will be that the spectre of further tax hikes looms. The floating of the income tax idea and all the other tax ideas, and all the taxes, will come back like a ghoul in Budgets to come.
The Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury (Torsten Bell)
It is a pleasure to close today’s debate, and I thank all Members for their contributions, including my hon. Friends the Members for North Warwickshire and Bedworth (Rachel Taylor), for Exeter (Steve Race), for South East Cornwall (Anna Gelderd), for Gower (Tonia Antoniazzi), for Norwich North (Alice Macdonald), for Newcastle upon Tyne East and Wallsend (Mary Glindon), for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Adam Jogee), for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West (Dame Chi Onwurah), for Dunfermline and Dollar (Graeme Downie), for North Northumberland (David Smith), for Glasgow North (Martin Rhodes), for Mid Cheshire (Andrew Cooper), for Glenrothes and Mid Fife (Richard Baker), for Earley and Woodley (Yuan Yang), for Congleton (Sarah Russell) and for Calder Valley (Josh Fenton-Glynn), who all made strong cases for this Budget.
I listened carefully as Opposition MP after Opposition MP talked down the British economy, as the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Ben Obese-Jecty) did, talking down British workers and talking down British entrepreneurs. I have been trying to remember what it reminded me of. I was racking my brains, but then it came to me: they are just reading out exactly the same script that they had at exactly this time last year. The shadow Business Secretary, the hon. Member for Arundel and South Downs (Andrew Griffith), frothing with his usual excitement, claimed that Britain would spend 2025 in recession. He said:
“‘Could we be in recession?’ Yes we could.”
That was his forecast.
The actual figures are in, and the truth is that Britain in 2025 did not just avoid recession, but beat the forecast. The OBR has revised up growth this year from 1% to 1.5%. Let us look at wages. As my hon. Friend the Member for Erewash (Adam Thompson) said, wages are up in the forecast and, far more importantly, in people’s pay packets. Wages have gone up more in the first year of this Government than in the entire first decade of the last Conservative Government, and there is much more to do.
Changing Britain was always going to be hard, and we now know that the damage from the last decade of austerity and Brexit was worse than previously thought. That lies behind the productivity downgrade that the hon. Member for West Worcestershire (Dame Harriett Baldwin) rightly raised, but the question is how we respond to that news.
Sir John Hayes
I notice that the Minister is wearing a William Morris—or William Morris-esque—tie, and what Morris understood was the importance of craft and skills. The Government addressed apprenticeships in the Budget in a minor way, but does the Minister know that simultaneously the skills White Paper envisages downgrading apprenticeships by diluting the competencies they confer, thereby undermining their reputation with learners and employers?
Torsten Bell
What I know is that youth apprenticeships fell by 40% under the Conservative party. That is what failure looks like. I am coming on to some of those matters.
We do not want to grow this economy by simply borrowing more, as my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton West (Phil Brickell) rightly pointed out before he turned, at some length, to snails. There is nothing progressive about arguing that we should spend more than £1 in every £10 of taxpayers’ money on debt interest —money that would be better spent on schools and hospitals—so Liz Truss and the leader of the Greens should stay exactly where they belong and where they both started out: in the youth wing of the Liberal Democrats, far away from Government.
We in the Labour party will cut borrowing in every single year—more than in any other G7 country—and more than double the headroom against our fiscal rules. We are cutting borrowing and giving businesses the confidence to invest, and cutting inflation too. We are taking £150 off energy bills, freezing rail fares for the first time in 30 years—as my hon. Friend the Member for Burnley (Oliver Ryan) set out—and extending the fuel duty freeze. All this knocks 0.4% off inflation next year, helping interest rates—which have already been cut five times since the election—to keep on falling, helping businesses to expand and getting mortgages down.
What will not be coming down is public investment, which the OBR says boosts our economy. The pro-growth choice is not to return to the austerity of the past, as my hon. Friend the Member for Cannock Chase (Josh Newbury) set out. Austerity saw Tory Chancellors slash public investment, and repeatedly scrap and delay projects—the worst kind of short-term political fixes, with the worst kind of long-term economic consequences. This Budget presses ahead with an extra £120 billion of capital investment.
It is exactly because this Government are confident about Britain’s future that we are going to invest in it. Sizewell C is going ahead, and we are building the UK’s first small modular reactor at Wylfa—the biggest industrial investment in north Wales for a generation. We are also building the lower Thames crossing. Infrastructure is being built in every corner of Britain. The blockers and the pessimists, and the gloomsters and the doomsters, are being taken on, confronted and defeated. The Opposition parties have never seen a housing development or energy project that they did not want to block, but those days are done. Britain is getting back in the building business.
The Budget also contains necessary and fair choices on tax, which hon. Members have raised repeatedly. We have not hidden from that fact, nor am I hiding from the fact that we are asking everybody to contribute by further freezing tax thresholds towards the end of this Parliament. I hear the chuntering and the howls from the Conservatives, but where did this year’s frozen thresholds come from? Them. Who put in place next year’s freeze? Them. They announced threshold freezes, they defended threshold freezes, they voted for threshold freezes, and they cannot howl with outrage about them now. In case all of that is not clear enough to them, let me spell it out: of the revenue raised from frozen thresholds, over three quarters comes from the choices made on their watch. The difference between us and them is that we are not ducking the long-needed reforms that our tax system needs—reforms that mean we can keep the contribution from workers as low as possible.
We have already abolished non-dom status, raised capital gains tax and ended tax breaks for private schools. The Budget brings an end to the disgrace of someone in a terraced house in Blackpool paying more in council tax than someone in a £10 million mansion in Westminster—or what the shadow Chancellor called an ordinary family home. If he had had more time, I am sure he would have gone on to worry about people with an ordinary family deer park, duck pond and stables.
Torsten Bell
I will come to the hon. Lady in a second, because she and the hon. Member for St Albans (Daisy Cooper) told us that the Liberal Democrats wanted wealth taxes, while continuing their record run of opposing every single wealth tax put in front of them, and conveniently forgetting that the Liberal Democrats tried and failed to introduce just such a wealth tax in government —a level of convenient amnesia matched only by the hon. Member for Clacton (Nigel Farage) when reminiscing about his school days.
Sarah Olney
Because the Minister was maintaining his own running commentary throughout my speech, he probably missed me making the point that, although he keeps saying that this is equalising council tax between poorer areas and richer areas, he must admit that it in fact does nothing of the sort. When people owning £2 million houses in Putney pay their £2,500 levy on top of their council tax, they will still only be paying the same amount of council tax as people living in the lowest band of properties in my constituency. There are arguments to be had about the mansion tax, but can he stop saying that it equalises council tax rates in different parts of the country, because it does nothing of the sort?
Torsten Bell
I did not say anything of the sort. I said that we are not going to have a £10 million mansion in Westminster paying less tax than a terraced house in Blackpool, and that has been brought to an end by this Budget.
I have heard the worries of some Opposition Members about the surcharge, and I want to assure the House that less than 1% of properties will be affected, and even for the £10 million mansion I have mentioned, it will not exceed £7,500 a year. To put that in perspective, it is not even enough to bribe a Russian-sympathising, Putin-praising Reform politician—or a traitor, as we should always call them.
Other reforms in the Budget will ensure that everyone who drives on our roads helps to maintain them. It will address the fact that tenants pay higher taxes than their landlords and tackle some of the tax breaks that have exploded in recent years, disproportionately benefiting the wealthy. That is the fair thing to do, and it is the responsible thing to do.
I know that others want to take a different approach, and I heard representations from some to raise income tax. Who was particularly keen? The shadow Chancellor. He told eager listeners—[Interruption.] I think he should listen. He told eager listeners at the Conservative party conference that he would “go for income tax”. In fact, he was more enthusiastic than that, going on to label it the best “thing to do”. We have not taken his advice, and are instead delivering major reforms—reforms ducked by Tory Chancellor after Tory Chancellor.
We have heard a lot about welfare today, and I recognise why. It is because our welfare system is failing, and we are changing it. We are undoing the huge incentive to be labelled too sick to work that the Conservative party built into universal credit, and the OBR has confirmed that this will move tens of thousands more people into work. The shadow Chancellor claimed he had a plan to reform welfare, but he did not mention that it was quashed by the courts. What he actually did as Secretary of State for Work and Pensions was to oversee the subsidised leasing of luxury cars, with the ordinary taxpayer bearing the cost of tax breaks for Mercedes and BMWs on the Motability scheme. Well, those days are done. The scheme has itself removed luxury cars, and it has committed to half of its cars being built in Britain. We are reforming its tax breaks to save over £1 billion in the coming year.
Torsten Bell
I am afraid that I do not have time to give way.
The last Government cancelled face-to-face assessments for health benefits; this Government are bringing them back. The last Government also oversaw a scandal that has received far too little attention. They allowed people who came to Britain for just a few years—people who left, and never had any intention of returning—not only to buy a state pension, but to buy it on the cheap. The Conservative Government did not just waste money here at home; they wasted it across Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and we are bringing this overseas pension scandal to a close.
What this Government will never do is pretend that the Tory policy of making children poor does anything other than cost us all in the long run. Child poverty costs this country £40 billion a year. A child growing up in poverty is less likely to be in work as an adult, and they earn 25% less at age 30. We tackle child poverty not only because it is a moral imperative, as was laid out by my hon. Friends the Members for Rochdale (Paul Waugh) and for Camborne and Redruth (Perran Moon), but because it is an economic one. This Government will scrap the two-child limit, we will lift over half a million children out of poverty and we will deliver the biggest fall in child poverty of any Parliament on record.
Everyone can see what the Conservatives are trying to do. They cannot defend their record, and we all know why. They have nothing to say about Britain’s future, as the Leader of the Opposition made patently clear yesterday, and now they are salivating at the prospect of trying to hide their total lack of policy behind the cheap, divisive, lazy politics of talking about “Benefits Street”. Well, bring it on, because this Budget is for every street, with potholes being filled, neighbourhood police back on the streets and an NHS that is actually there when we need it. It is a Budget for every street in cutting borrowing because that helps not just mortgage payers, but employers; it is a Budget for every street in cutting energy bills because the cost of living crisis has seeped into everyone’s homes—rich and poor, north and south; and it is a Budget for every street because child poverty exists in every part of Britain, limiting life chances, wasting talents and undermining not just some childhoods, but all of them. With borrowing down, energy bills cut and public services rebuilt, this is a Budget for every street in Britain.
Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Gregor Poynton.)
Debate to be resumed on Monday 1 December.
Pension Investment in UK Equities
Torsten Bell Excerpts(3 months ago)
Westminster HallRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Westminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury (Torsten Bell)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Stringer. I will indeed leave several minutes for the winding-up speech. Like everyone else, I begin by congratulating the right hon. Member for Salisbury (John Glen) on securing this debate, particularly on the Budget eve; it is very kind of him to make my diary relaxed. It is a topic on which he has thought deeply and that we have discussed many times. As ever, I welcome his constructive and practical approach, which befits someone who confirmed to me earlier that he holds the title of longest-serving Economic Secretary to the Treasury. Luckily, he was not on performance-related pay, given the growth of the economy during that time.
Torsten Bell
He may not have been paid at all. His focus at the beginning of his remarks on growth and one of its key enablers, investment, was right. If we stepped back and forced ourselves to ask, “What is the one thing the British economy needs more of?”, it would be public and private investment. As several hon. Members have said, the UK has the second largest pension scheme in the world, worth £2 trillion. It is our largest source of domestic capital, underpinning not just the retirement we all—or at least most of us—look forward to, but the investment on which our future prosperity depends.
That is why this Government launched and concluded a review of pensions investment within a year of taking office. Those reforms are now being taken forward through the Pension Schemes Bill, as the hon. Member for South West Devon (Rebecca Smith) pointed out. First and foremost, the Bill includes measures to deliver bigger and better pension schemes in the DC market. It requires multi-employer defined contribution pension providers to hold at least £25 billion in assets by 2030 or to be on track to do so by 2035.
That requirement will drive scale and sophistication in workplace DC schemes so that they are better positioned to invest in a fuller range of asset classes, including specialist private markets such as venture capital, which we have not heard much about today but which are key. The biggest gap in UK capital markets is growth finance: the gap that holds back our science and tech start-ups, scale ups and pre-initial public offering companies. That does not take away from the challenges we are raising about public markets, but if we look at our capital markets as a whole, that is our biggest gap.
Pensions can be a key source of funding for those economically critical investments and sectors, which my hon. Friend the Member for Buckingham and Bletchley (Callum Anderson) set out, as he has done many times in the discussions on the Pension Schemes Bill. This is not just theoretical; it is actually starting to happen. Legal & General is investing in post-quantum cryptography and Nest is investing in energy generation. Last week, the Chancellor and I met with Aegon UK, NatWest Cushion and M&G, which have all confirmed that they will invest £200 million in the British Growth Partnership, a fund managed by the British Business Bank investing in cutting edge British businesses and building on British strengths in areas such as clean energy, advanced manufacturing and the medical technology that other Members have talked about in the past.
As we have heard, Members are well aware of the Mansion House accord, a voluntary commitment by 17 major DC funds to invest 10% of their main default funds in private assets by 2030, including 5% in UK private assets. That will boost investment across a range of asset classes, including growth market equities, which we have not touched on much today. That is welcome news driven by a focus on giving savers better returns and showing how pension funds can contribute directly to making Britain the best place to start up, scale up and ultimately list companies. I should emphasise that we should think about our capital markets as a ladder up which firms can climb. Our job is to make that climb easier, not just to focus on the ultimate destination.
Several Members raised the question of transparency. The Pension Schemes Bill includes a new framework under which DC funds will need to disclose their investments in more granular detail, including UK-overseas and asset class split. We will be able to see in more detail what individual schemes are doing. We are doing that so that we can measure their value for money. For the first time, we will be able to see where those funds are invested.
Finally, as Members know, the Bill includes a reserve power, which has been discussed today, to ensure that the change that the pension schemes themselves say is needed in the interest of members happens. I will repeat what I said on the “Making Money” podcast—it is very exciting that the hon. Member for South West Devon had time to tune in. I am confident that this power will not need to be used, given the progress the industry is already making. It is designed as a proportionate backstop to the commitments that the industry has already made, with strong safeguards to protect the interests of pension savers.
On mandation, I note—as gently as possible, given the excellent tone of this discussion—that I have spent much of the last six months hearing strong opposition to any mandation backstop while hearing, often from the very same people, language that does not directly contradict that, but gets close to calling for mandation, whether it is social housing, public equities or anything else. I just gently note that tension before as gently moving on to set out some of the wider steps that the Government are taking to support our capital markets, because they go far beyond pensions. It is important to note that although UK equity markets have faced some challenges in recent years, London’s markets remain some of the deepest and most liquid in the world. We want to build on those strong foundations and make the UK as attractive a destination as possible for companies to start, scale and stay. There is a danger here: we need to make sure we are having this discussion about the change we need to see, while also celebrating many of the real strengths that exist in London’s capital markets.
Richard Tice
Is the Minister aware that the quantity of listings on the London stock market has collapsed by about 80% in the last decade, and that the number of companies listed on AIM—the alternative investment market, which was the original growth market 40 years ago—has fallen to a 25-year low, so something fundamental is going wrong with our listed markets?
Torsten Bell
I am. I will just gently say that many people, when discussing the reasons for that, point to a policy of Brexit delivered without any ideas about how it should be delivered in a smaller, home market and without any plans for the future. I would probably pause on that before I started offering anyone views on anything at all.
My Treasury colleagues have already delivered an ambitious programme of reforms: modernising UK listing rules; establishing the private intermittent securities and capital exchange system—PISCES—to support private companies to scale and grow as a stepping-stone to public markets; and making it easier to raise capital and IPO in the UK with new prospectus rules from January of next year. To come directly and more fairly to the question that the hon. Member for Boston and Skegness (Richard Tice) raised, I think it is important to celebrate the fact that we have seen some of that translate into positive momentum recently. Hon. Members will know that the stock exchange has had a very strong year, outperforming most of the rest of the world. We saw listings from Fermi America and Shawbrook last month, and there are other exciting companies in the pipeline. I now regularly see my hon. and learned Friend the Economic Secretary to the Treasury in confetti-filled photographs from the stock exchange, and I look forward to seeing many more in the years to come. I encourage hon. Members to go and engage in similar activities.
Our capital markets are not just about celebration and ceremony; they are critical in connecting retail investors’ capital with businesses in the way that several hon. Members mentioned. Investing offers a powerful way for people to make their money work harder and share in growth. That is why the Government are bringing forward measures to get Britain investing again.
The right hon. Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse) raised a point, which I have heard him discuss before, about risk appetite and the incentives that people have. I would say that if we look at the evidence from the last 25 years, we see that it is not the strength of the incentive that is the issue. Many people holding cash ISAs would have made very significant returns if they had held that in equities instead. I will give an example. If someone, each year since the introduction of ISAs, had put £1,000 into an equity ISA rather than a cash ISA, they would be £50,000 better off. The issue is not purely about incentives, and I think focusing there would miss some of the wider changes we have been seeing, but I am always eager to hear about what more can be done.
What we are doing is working closely with the FCA and rolling out a scheme of targeted support ahead of ISA season next year. That will represent the biggest reform of the financial advice and guidance landscape—mentioned by the hon. Member for South West Devon—in more than a generation. It will revolutionise the support that consumers can receive to invest.
Kit Malthouse
I get the example that the Minister talks about, but I think he misunderstands or perhaps misappreciates how the retail investor thinks. They do not necessarily think, “If I put £1,000 in now, in 20 years’ time it will be worth this.” They think, “If I put £1,000 in now, what is my return going to be next year? What is my running return going to be?” And it will be a percentage return on the dividend. That is why we have a P/E—price-to-earnings—ratio for every share; that is what investors look at. If that is impaired because of taxation and the return is reduced, as it has been over the last few years, they will be less inclined to invest. That, fundamentally, is the pattern that we have seen. The Minister never says this, but in the end, people invest in listed stocks and shares, whether through their pension or otherwise, to make money. They are not doing it for the good of anybody else. They are doing it to make money, and if they are going to make less money, or the perception is that they will make less money, because of Government taxation, they will do less of it. Would he not agree?
Torsten Bell
I am not sure that I fully understood, so I am not going to commit to agreeing. Remember that the capital gains on shares in equity ISAs—investment ISAs—receive tax relief in their entirety, so the tax is not the problem in terms of people’s rates of return; the returns would have been very real indeed over, for example, that 25-year period. However, my basic argument is that we need better advice, and that our targeted changes will make it possible for financial firms to offer that.
We are also supporting an industry initiative to rebalance risk warnings to ensure that firms are offering consumers information about investing, not trying to scare them off with over-the-top warnings. Together, these measures will support savers in securing stronger returns over the long term because, as the right hon. Member for North West Hampshire just said, this is about making money for savers—whether in pension savings or elsewhere—putting money into people’s pockets and further strengthening our world-leading capital markets.
I will make one more substantive point and then conclude. This is not just about capital. In the end, the growth agenda, and needing the investment to make it happen, is about actual investment not just financial flows. Financial flows are an enabler of the investment that ultimately matters to the size of the capital stock, the quality of the infrastructure, the quality of the firms, and the amount of capital that workers have to work with. That is, in the end, what matters, and it means firms wanting to grow, which is why I focused slightly more in my remarks on the whole chain of firms’ access to capital.
This is also about being able to get out and actually get things built. I gently remind Members, when I hear them opposing anything getting built, anywhere, by anyone, at any time—I definitely hear the Lib Dem Front Bench opposing—[Interruption.] I am not talking about the hon. Member for Torbay (Steve Darling), but the Lib Dems have never seen a house that they wanted to be built. That is my lived experience of sitting in the Chamber day after day. We need to actually get things built, and as I said, I agree with the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Bobby Dean) on the pipeline of investment. That is ultimately what we need if we want growth to happen; it cannot just be about changing the flows of existing assets.
I once again thank the right hon. Member for Salisbury for securing today’s debate. A strong pensions industry and thriving capital markets are cornerstones of our capitalism, as I think everybody in this Chamber agrees. We are introducing significant reforms of both the capital markets and the pensions industry, and I am grateful to have had the chance to discuss them this afternoon.
Draft Occupational Pension Schemes (Collective Money Purchase Schemes) (Extension to Unconnected Multiple Employer Schemes and Miscellaneous Provisions) Regulations 2025
Torsten Bell Excerpts(3 months, 1 week ago)
General CommitteesRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury (Torsten Bell)
I beg to move,
That the Committee has considered the draft Occupational Pension Schemes (Collective Money Purchase Schemes) (Extension to Unconnected Multiple Employer Schemes and Miscellaneous Provisions) Regulations 2025.
That should encourage enthusiasm from everyone. The primary purpose of the draft regulations is to extend the legal framework for collective money purchase schemes, commonly known as collective defined contribution schemes, to allow multiple unconnected employers to participate. Until now, CDC schemes have been restricted to single employers or connected employers.
Significant progress has been made in getting more people saving, not least under the previous Conservative Government. We now have 23 million people saving into a workplace pension, but the job is not finished. Currently, pension contributions in defined contribution schemes are going into a savings pot, not a pension, leaving them exposed to the twin challenges of adequacy and risk. The Government believe that CDC schemes have an integral role in helping us address these challenges.
The statutory instrument puts in place a number of key measures to ensure that unconnected multiple employer CDC schemes deliver for members. Part 2 of the statutory instrument amends the Pension Schemes Act 2021—we will be hearing more about that—to allow for unconnected multiple employer schemes and to broaden the range of organisations that can set up a CDC scheme. To become authorised, a scheme needs to satisfy the Pensions Regulator that it meets the authorisation criteria, which are listed in section 9(3) of the 2021 Act. Part 2 of the statutory instrument amends that Act to create additional authorisation criteria specifically for unconnected multiple employer collective money purchase schemes.
We have identified persons who we consider will have an important role in such schemes, and we have brought these people within the scope of the fit and proper persons test, so that they are subject to appropriate scrutiny. It is imperative that our regulations clearly establish who is responsible for a scheme’s business strategy and financial sustainability, and that it is evidenced to the regulator at authorisation. Regulation 10 therefore amends the 2021 Act to require that an unconnected multiple employer CDC scheme has a single scheme proprietor that meets specific criteria and requirements. Regulation 10 also inserts a requirement for the scheme proprietor to prepare, maintain and submit a business plan to the regulator.
The new legislative framework will permit schemes that intend to operate on a commercial basis. To mitigate the risks of schemes overpromising to gain a commercial advantage or mis-selling, we are introducing a promotion or marketing authorisation criterion. The requirement is that no person has carried out promotion or marketing of a scheme that is unclear or misleading without rectification, and that the scheme has adequate systems and processes for ensuring that promotion or marketing is clear and not misleading.
We want trustees of these schemes to focus entirely on the interests of scheme members, and to have complete autonomy to do so. A trustee also acting as a person who promotes or markets the scheme, or as the chief financial officer for the scheme, detracts from this responsibility and creates a clear conflict of interest. Regulation 5 of the statutory instrument amends the 2021 Act to make a separation of these roles an authorisation criterion.
It is the Government’s intention that running an unconnected multiple employer CDC scheme as a closed scheme should always be an option open to trustees, where it is viable to do so and to the extent that it is permitted under wider pensions legislation. Regulation 5 therefore inserts a new authorisation criterion into the 2021 Act to ensure that trustees can choose this option, if appropriate. To deter speculators, part 2 also imposes a mandatory deadline of 24 months from authorisation, by which an authorised unconnected multiple-employer CDC scheme must start being operated—it cannot sit there in abeyance.
Part 3 of the statutory instrument supplements the meaning of “connected” in section 49(2)(a) of the 2021 Act—one of the better sections. This term is relevant for determining whether a collective money purchase scheme is a single and connected employer scheme or an unconnected multiple-employer scheme, and therefore which of the two legislatives frameworks applies to it. Part 4, including schedules 1 to 6, implements the new authorisation and supervisory regime for unconnected multiple employer collective money purchase schemes under part 1 of the 2021 Act. It includes regulations on the application for authorisation, scheme design, financial sustainability, the valuation and adjustment process essential to calculating benefits, and the supervisory regime, both at set up and on an ongoing basis. The new regime will continue to place strong emphasis on regulatory oversight. The Pensions Regulator is empowered to issue risk notices, approve and enforce continuity strategies and, ultimately, withdraw authorisation where schemes fail to meet the required standards.
Part 5 of the instrument contains amendments to the Occupational Pension Schemes (Collective Money Purchase Schemes) Regulations 2022, introduced under the last Conservative Government, to ensure that certain aspects of the single or connected employer collective money purchase schemes regime are aligned with this new regime. Part 6 and schedule 7 make consequential amendments to other relevant primary and secondary legislation.
Unconnected multiple employer CDC schemes are a welcome addition to the UK pensions landscape, as are CDC schemes more generally, as they have come forward on the basis of cross-party consensus over the past few years. When well designed and well run, which this instrument will ensure, they can help boost retirement incomes and benefit the wider economy. I comment the instrument to the Committee.
Torsten Bell
I thank the hon. Members for Wyre Forest and for Horsham for their consensual approach and the clarity of their support for what is a development of CDC schemes that has had good cross-party support. Communications are very important. The truth is that they are important in all pension schemes—particularly within CDC schemes because they are new, and because there is some complexity sitting behind them. That is why we take this particularly seriously.
In response to the questions raised by the hon. Member for Horsham, the regulators will be looking at the overall approach to communication. They are not signing off the individual bits at the initial authorisation. As I said in my opening remarks, the authorisation is not a “one and done”. There will be ongoing monitoring of that. Specifically on communications, for multi employer CDC schemes, the marketing in general will be to employers, not to individuals. That may help allay some concerns about how that is communicated. But even within that, we will definitely want clarity, particularly to savers, about the honesty of what the offer is—this is not a DB scheme; it is not a certain guaranteed income. It is one that is aiming for a target amount, and there can be some fluctuation around that. It is important that we are honest and straight about that, and that those of us who support these schemes are also clear about what they are and are not offering.
The pension landscape does need to change—we all agree about that. Fundamentally, we need to move from having savings pots to delivering actual pensions. CDCs are one of the ways—there are others—in which we can make progress on that. I therefore commend this instrument to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Annually Managed Expenditure Budgets Increase
Torsten Bell Excerpts(3 months, 2 weeks ago)
Written StatementsRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Torsten Bell)
I would like to notify the House that the Department for Work and Pensions has obtained approval from His Majesty’s Treasury for an increase of £1,610,000,000 to non-voted AME—annually managed expenditure—budgets and the total AME budget control, to fund increases to the winter fuel payment in line with the Social Fund Winter Fuel Payment Regulations 2025.
[HCWS1048]
Fund Advance for Cash Paid in to Social Fund: Contingencies
Torsten Bell Excerpts(3 months, 2 weeks ago)
Written StatementsRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Torsten Bell)
I would like to notify the House that the Department for Work and Pensions has obtained approval for an advance from the Contingencies Fund of £1,610,000,000
The voted cash requirement for cash to be paid into the social fund exceeds that provided for in the main estimate 2025-26 due to changes to eligibility in the Social Fund Winter Fuel Payments Regulations 2025.
The Contingencies Fund advance is required to enable payments into the social fund to meet obligations until the supplementary estimate receives Royal Assent.
Parliamentary approval for additional resources of £1,610,000,000 will be sought in a supplementary estimate for the Department for Work and Pensions. Pending that approval, urgent expenditure estimated at £1,610,000,000 will be met by repayable cash advances from the Contingencies Fund.
The advance will be repaid at the earliest opportunity following Royal Assent of the Supply and Appropriation (Anticipation and Adjustments) Act 2026.
[HCWS1047]
Oral Answers to Questions
Torsten Bell Excerpts(4 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Helen Morgan (North Shropshire) (LD)
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Torsten Bell)
I obviously recognise the challenges facing those without inflation protection, particularly after the cost of living pressures of recent years, and I think that recognition is shared by Members on both sides of the House. I met a cross-party group of MPs earlier this year to discuss exactly this issue. Reforms in the Pension Schemes Bill give trustees more flexibility to share surpluses in their DB pension schemes with employers, and to negotiate for members to benefit from any such sharing of surpluses. That could include discretionary increases to address the issue raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Llanelli (Dame Nia Griffith).
Dame Nia Griffith
As a result of the efforts of pensioner associations, we know that there have been unintended consequences of the Pensions Act 1995, which made it legal to stop payment of indexation to the pre-1997 pensioners of successful multinationals such as 3M and Hewlett Packard Enterprise, who, having been recruited with the promise of index-linked pensions, are now suffering hardship. Their pensions have already been frozen for at least 15 years, despite healthy funds and trustees’ pleas. What will the Minister do to stop this dishonourable practice, so that these companies deliver the financial security that they promised?
Torsten Bell
I absolutely recognise the issue that my hon. Friend has raised: any of us in that situation would want those pension increases to continue. She is aware of the legal background, but I should point out that scheme rules govern when inflation-linked increases can be paid. They are not changed retrospectively, but the Pensions Regulator has spelt out that trustees should consider those who are not receiving inflation-linked increases when making their decisions, and should also consider the history of making such awards—particularly in some of the examples that my hon. Friend has given. As I have said, I think that the provisions in the Pension Scheme Bill give trustees more power to argue for those increases.
Helen Morgan
I have been contacted by a constituent who, along with her husband, worked for Hewlett Packard. They accrued their pensions before 1997, and now, along with about 50,000 members of the Pre-97 Alliance, they are facing real financial hardship. In 10 years’ time, their pensions will be pretty much worthless. Will the Minister not consider legislating to ensure that these people are not left in poverty, having been promised proper pensions when they started work for the companies concerned?
Torsten Bell
The hon. Lady has mentioned a specific company, although a small number of others are in the same position. I am sure that not only the people running that company but the trustees will have heard the powerful case made by Members on both sides of the House. These decisions must be made in line with the scheme rules, but no one wants savers to see the value of their pensions fall over time, and I hope that employers will take the case being made in the Chamber seriously.
Iqbal Mohamed (Dewsbury and Batley) (Ind)
I welcome the Secretary of State to his place and wish him well. Last week, I attended a drop-in for the Women Against State Pension Inequality Campaign where I was informed that there are currently 4,320 women in Dewsbury and Batley affected by the WASPI scandal. That number was previously higher, but many of the women have already passed away without justice. On 27 July I wrote to the former Secretary of State regarding her support for the WASPI campaign after being contacted by more than 40 of my constituents, but I have yet to receive a response. With the Government still refusing to engage in civil mediation to deliver justice to the WASPI women, will the new Secretary of State reconsider meeting campaigners to find a just way forward?
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Torsten Bell)
The previous Minister for Pensions met representatives of the WASPI campaign in order to hear directly from them about their experiences. She was the first Minister to do so in eight years. I will look into the details of the letter the hon. Gentleman mentions.
Torcuil Crichton (Na h-Eileanan an Iar) (Lab)
I welcome the Secretary of State to his office and thank the Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, my hon. Friend the Member for Stretford and Urmston (Andrew Western), for a recent visit to the DWP debt and fraud centre in my constituency. There are 95 jobs at the centre doing tremendous work across the UK, proving that civil service job dispersal does work. Is this not a template for other Departments and an example to the SNP Government in Scotland, who have dispersed no jobs, no power and no funds from Edinburgh?
Rachel Gilmour (Tiverton and Minehead) (LD)
I have met many pensionable-age constituents, most of whom live on the Duck estate, who have lost their entitlement to pension credit because of as little as 50p. Does the Minister agree that pension credit, the employment and support allowance and PIP assistance could all do with more common sense and a little less of a “computer says no” mentality?
Torsten Bell
I thank the hon. Lady for her question. In general, lots of life could do with less “computer says no”, so on that basis we will agree. On the specifics of the question she raises about pension credit, the nature of the system is obviously that it provides a guaranteed level of income; it is not setting out an entitlement like universal credit, so there does have to be a limit somewhere, and I am afraid that that does mean that some people will always be on one side of it. What we do not want to see in a system is too many things in that winner-takes-all perspective—I take the point she raises.
Leigh Ingham (Stafford) (Lab)
I recently visited Drake Hall women’s prison in my constituency of Stafford, Eccleshall and the villages, which has the brilliant initiative of a Halfords training centre to support people into employment once they leave the prison estate. It supports people all over the country, not just in my constituency. Can the Secretary of State tell me what conversations are happening with the Ministry of Justice about supporting or expanding schemes like that?
Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)
Alan Marnes is a constituent of mine in Southoe who has staunchly campaigned since 2002 on the issue of the lack of indexation for pre-1997 pension rights, having been one of 140,000 people who lost their occupational pension. I wrote to the Secretary of State more than two months ago asking whether the newly revived Pensions Commission will address the issue of failed pension funds and I have still not received a response. Will the Secretary of State agree to meet me and Alan to provide some much-needed clarity on such a long-standing issue?
Torsten Bell
I am not absolutely clear whether the particular case that the hon. Gentleman is raising relates to people within the Pension Protection Fund and the financial assistance scheme or to a pre-1997 indexation within a solvent pension scheme, but if he writes to me with the details I will absolutely make sure that I come back to him.
Steve Witherden (Montgomeryshire and Glyndŵr) (Lab)
One in three children in my constituency is growing up in poverty. With the Budget approaching, what discussions has the Secretary of State had with the Chancellor of the Exchequer about scrapping the two-child limit—a policy widely recognised as one of the biggest drivers of child poverty in Britain today?
Work and Pensions
Torsten Bell Excerpts(4 months ago)
Written CorrectionsRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Torsten Bell
The clause amends the onboarding conditions in these instances, to allow trustees of a scheme in PPF assessment to seek to secure their liabilities with a superfund at less than full benefits, but more than would otherwise have been secured through a buy-out that was available, given the level of their assets at that point. Based on the evidence from the PPF’s purple book, we anticipate that, on average, five in 10 so-called PPF-plus schemes could benefit each year.
[Official Report, Pension Schemes Public Bill Committee, 11 September 2025; c. 282.]
Written correction submitted by the Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, the hon. Member for Swansea West (Torsten Bell):
Torsten Bell
Based on the evidence from the PPF’s purple book, we anticipate that five to 10 so-called PPF-plus schemes on average each year could benefit.
Torsten Bell
Several hon. Members have said, absolutely rightly, that access to financial advice fell in the aftermath of the reforms over a decade ago, but there is some better news on Pension Wise. The 2024 Financial Lives survey showed that of those who accessed a defined-contribution pot within the last four years, 40% had accessed Pension Wise. I think that is probably more than most hon. Members in this debate would expect, though it may not be enough. However, those people had used Pension Wise when heading towards access; they had not used it as a mid-life MOT product, which is a different thing. That 40% was up from 34% in 2020, so some things have gone in the right direction. I am gently noting that, not claiming any credit for it because it predates the election. There is a lot of overlap between what those systems of advice are providing and the measures in new clause 1.
[Official Report, Pension Schemes Public Bill Committee, 11 September 2025; c. 323.]
Written correction submitted by the Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, the hon. Member for Swansea West (Torsten Bell):
Torsten Bell
There is a lot of overlap between what those systems of guidance are providing and the measures in new clause 1.
Pension Schemes Bill (Eighth sitting)
Torsten Bell Excerpts(5 months, 2 weeks ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
David Pinto-Duschinsky
As ever, my hon. Friend is absolutely right and his intervention goes to a third point: this also feels a bit premature.
As my hon. Friend mentioned, we are in the midst of the incredibly important advice and guidance boundary review. For many of the groups that we want to help, advice might not actually be the right solution, but guidance might be, and we are in the midst of re-tooling that. Similarly, we are in the midst of rolling out dashboards, which will transform the landscape but not fix the problems on their own; we may need to layer new policy initiatives on top. It seems that we are at risk of putting the cart before the horse.
I also add that when I read new clause 1 in detail, I saw that it refers to “advice”. On my reading, that would constrict potential policy responses and force the Government to go down the advice route, rather than provide other services that might be on offer through the advice and guidance boundary review.
The intention is good. I think there is huge consensus on the need to tackle the problem, but the right way to do it is through sophisticated and proper policy making, rather than the blunt instrument of amending primary legislation. For those reasons, I oppose this new clause.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Torsten Bell)
I thank the proposers of these new clauses. I will take them in the way they were intended—to spark debate.
We have had quite a wide debate and I think there is consensus on the subject, but I want to put a slightly different spin on the problem statement we are talking about. We have come at a lot of the discussion on the new clause as if there is too little advice. I would slightly reframe the question when it comes to pensions, which is that there is too much complexity, and too little advice or guidance. I think that is the right way to think about the problem that we are confronting with the system as a whole.
I will broadly outline our approach to try to tackle that problem statement. The task is to reduce the complexity as well as to increase the guidance and the advice that are available. Having watched the pensions debate over the past 15 years, I have observed that we have too often made pensions more complicated, and then said, “If we only had this advice, it would all be fine.” I do not think that is the right answer. That is a mistake about the nature of the system that we are delivering.
Our job is to reduce the complexity, or to reduce the consequences of it being difficult for people to deal with. That is obviously what a lot of the Bill is trying to do. With small pots, the aim is obviously to reduce complexity. That is what the value for money measures are designed to do. Seen through that lens, they are also aimed at reducing the costs of that complexity. The value for money regime is there to reduce the consequences of it being difficult to engage with and members not choosing their own provider.
Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)
The Minister raises an interesting point. We have talked about a lot of different bits and pieces with complexity and all the rest of it. We have not spoken about when we educate people about money.
In the olden days, when I was a newly elected MP, I was one of the chairs of the all-party parliamentary group for financial education for young people. That was about getting financial education into the curriculum. It is probably now more important than ever that we teach people of school age about the importance of financial planning, including pensions. Can the Minister assure the Committee that he will take up with his colleagues in the Department for Education the changes that could be made to bring this type of education into the curriculum for kids, who are all going to be adults soon?
Torsten Bell
I shall take that up directly with the new Economic Secretary to the Treasury, who I am sure will talk to her colleagues in the Department for Education. I can offer the hon. Member some entirely anecdotal optimism on that issue. Whenever I now do school events in Swansea, I am seeing very high levels of financial engagement. After I have given a very worthy speech, most of the questions are not about how to reduce inequality but instead are about personal financial advice. I think the youth of today are all over it—that is my lived experience.
I have mentioned small pots and value for money. I want to flag two other areas. Dashboards have been mentioned, and they are a very large part of how we provide support. The default pensions solutions are crucial to reducing complexity, and that is probably the biggest measure in the Bill. The need to provide more advice or guidance for people to access their defined-contribution pots is reduced significantly because of the existence of default solutions. We definitely still want people to have access to advice and the ability to opt out of those defaults, but default solutions help significantly. That is why the communication of those default pension solutions, which we discussed quite extensively, is so important for people. That is why that is in the Bill.
We have touched on making more support available. We have universal access for people of any age to free impartial support through MoneyHelper—that is what the Money and Pensions Service is providing—and we have a specific focus on support for over-50s in Pension Wise. Several hon. Members have said, absolutely rightly, that access to financial advice fell in the aftermath of the reforms over a decade ago, but there is some better news on Pension Wise. The 2024 Financial Lives survey showed that of those who accessed a defined-contribution pot within the last four years, 40% had accessed Pension Wise. I think that is probably more than most hon. Members in this debate would expect, though it may not be enough. However, those people had used Pension Wise when heading towards access; they had not used it as a mid-life MOT product, which is a different thing. That 40% was up from 34% in 2020, so some things have gone in the right direction. I am gently noting that, not claiming any credit for it because it predates the election. There is a lot of overlap between what those systems of advice are providing and the measures in new clause 1.
Regarding new clause 40, I absolutely agree on how we think about under-saved groups. The groups identified in the new clause are more or less the same groups of people experiencing financial wellbeing challenges whom MaPS targets, so that is a point of consensus, but I am absolutely open to suggestions of what more we can do to make sure that we are tackling that issue. The Pensions Commission is considering the wider question of adequacy, which is why we are looking at not just average adequacy but the fairness of the system.
Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)
Will the Minister give a commitment that the commission will specifically look at groups that are less likely to have a sufficient pension, rather than just looking at an average and increasing that average?
Torsten Bell
I can absolutely give that guarantee, because that is in the terms of reference of the Pensions Commission. I will come back to the wider question of the commission in one second. I will not go into detail, but targeted support is a large part of providing more guidance, and we expect the roll-out of that early next year. There is more coming in that space; we are not relying solely on MaPS.
How should we think about the interaction of dashboards and bigger DC pots? At the moment, for lots of people entering their retirement, their DC pot may be a smaller part of their overall pension income, but as we move forward, it will become the large majority of their income. That will be very visible because of dashboards. One of the reasons MaPS has been reluctant —although I do not want to say “reluctant”—to promise to deliver the kind of automatic enrolment that is being discussed by the Committee is that a lot of planning work is under way to make sure that when dashboards come online, MaPS is ready and set up to deal with the significant increase in demand for help and in engagement that may come from that. The experience of some pension schemes in Australia is that as pension pots become bigger, there is much more demand for support and guidance. We should expect that demand to grow in the years ahead with or without dashboards, but definitely with dashboards and the other measures together.
Kirsty Blackman
When dashboards increase engagement, as we all expect they will, will the Minister report back to the House, or encourage someone to report back to the House, on how much engagement has increased by, so that we all have an awareness of it, rather than it being in stats kept in the background that we do not know about?
Torsten Bell
Absolutely. I think we will want to look at the impact across a range of measures of engagement. Do dashboards help consolidation of pots? Do they encourage people to save more? We also need to be aware of riskier behaviours that dashboards could trigger. We are currently engaged in significant user testing of the system to make sure that we have done what we can to make sure that when people have visibility of their pension pots, they do not adopt behaviours that we do not want.
On the question about the Pensions Commission from the angle of the advice and guidance sector, it is an independent commission so I cannot speak for it. However, I think the commission will have heard the focus of that question, and the length of this debate in Committee.
Turning to the specific question put by the hon. Member for Horsham on what he said was the purpose of this group of new clauses, I assure him that my mind has been entirely focused by him on this issue, and that I will continue to talk to MaPS about what further lessons there are to learn.
Kirsty Blackman
My understanding is that new clause 2 calls for a report. It addresses transparency. It is all well and good that stuff on competition regulations is published—I have no idea where it is published. We are asking for a report to the House, which we would all be able to access. I did not write the new clause, but it would be helpful if the Minister agreed to transparency and to review this in good time so that we can make better decisions on future legislation.
Torsten Bell
The first thing to say is that this is focused on scale. We appreciate that the Bill would lead to major changes to the pensions market—the hon. Member for Torbay is absolutely right—and we want to understand and monitor the consolidation and scale process over the coming years. To state the obvious, market changes such the scale measures we are talking about take time, and many of the measures in the Bill will not even be implemented within the 12 months. On that basis, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will not push the amendment to a vote.
I agree on the wider point about the Bill as a whole and the need for strong monitoring and evaluation. I would probably take a slightly different approach from the hon. Member for Aberdeen North. The Bill contains a large number of measures, and the right way to monitor their implementation will be different for different parts of the Bill. When it comes to the questions of scale, which are the focus of this amendment, the monitoring—[Interruption.] That is not the response I was looking for. The monitoring is slightly more visible because we are talking about the number of workplace schemes, or at least workplace defaults, that exist.
Let me lay out a bit of what we have in place to monitor. We will be able to monitor scale, charges and, because of the interaction with the value for money regime, returns and asset allocation. Lots of the key success metrics that are meant to come with the scale changes, as well as the delivery of scale itself, will be visible. My honest view is that it is on all of us—obviously, it is particularly on the Government—to pay attention to that as we go.
On the wider question of whether we will consider further, I have already committed to do that and to come back and reflect on Report on how we do that. I put on the record my view that that is a reasonable thing to do, and I will do it, but we need to think about it differently for different parts of the Bill.
Steve Darling
I thank the Minister for putting his thoughts on the record. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 5
Report on fiduciary duty and discretionary indexation of pre-1997 benefits
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, publish a report on whether the fiduciary duties of trustees of occupational pension schemes should be amended to permit discretionary indexation of pre-1997 accrued rights, where scheme funding allows.
(2) The report must consider—
(a) the impact of current fiduciary obligations on trustees’ ability to award discretionary increases to pre-1997 pension benefits;
(b) the potential benefits of permitting such discretionary indexation for affected pensioners;
(c) the funding conditions and thresholds under which discretionary indexation could be considered sustainable;
(d) the appropriate level of regulatory oversight and guidance required to ensure that discretionary increases are granted in a fair, transparent, and financially responsible manner;
(e) international approaches to indexation of legacy pension benefits;
(f) the legal and actuarial implications of amending fiduciary duties in this context.
(3) In preparing the report, the Secretary of State must consult—
(a) the Pensions Regulator,
(b) the Financial Conduct Authority,
(c) representatives of pension scheme trustees, members, and sponsoring employers, and
(d) such other experts or bodies as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
(4) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before both Houses of Parliament.”—(Steve Darling.)
This new clause requires the Secretary of State to report on whether the fiduciary duties of trustees of occupational pension schemes should be amended to permit discretionary indexation of pre-1997 accrued rights, where scheme funding allows.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Mark Garnier
I want to follow on from the two powerful speeches by the Liberal Democrat and SNP spokespeople, the hon. Members for Torbay and for Aberdeen North, in highlighting the fact that this problem is—dare I say it—disappearing over time. This feels slightly similar to the ongoing contaminated blood debate, and it is a similar type of thing. The people who would be compensated for the contaminated blood are, for tragic reasons, disappearing. Indeed, I think there are now 86,000 pensioners who were caught up in this particular problem, and the longer this is kicked down the road, the smaller the problem will become, for obvious reasons.
The principle behind this is absolutely right. It is incredibly important that we as a country, society and community look after all these people. Where people have done the right thing and put money into their pension, but it has not followed through, that is a big problem.
One thing does bother me: I do not want to be too political, but the Government have dug themselves a freshly made £30 billion black hole in the last year. Although the SNP spokesperson is absolutely right that the £12 billion in the PPF is available to spend only on pensions, the problem is that because it appears on the country’s balance sheet, if the money to pay the price for this—I think it is £1.8 billion—came out of that, there would be a £1.8 billion increase on the country’s collective balance sheet. The argument would go that it would then reduce it. At some level, fiscal prudence has to come in to make sure we are not creating a deeper black hole. Because of the change of accounting at the back end of last year, this could turn the Government’s £30 billion fiscal black hole into a £32 billion one, even though that money is earmarked only for pensions.
I would like to hear from the Minister how the Government will resolve that. I would like him to make an undertaking that we will hear something about it on 26 November, and that there will be something in the Budget to resolve this fiscal conundrum. We need to know where the money will come from, and that the Government have set it aside. This is a perfect opportunity to deal with a problem that has been going on since 1997, and that becomes more profound every time the Office for National Statistics announces the rate of inflation. If the Minister gave us that assurance, I would trust him—being an honourable and decent man—that he could make his current boss get something done about this on 26 November.
Torsten Bell
Despite the hon. Member’s kind invitation, and as he well knows, I am not about to start commenting on the Budget—something I have heard him say himself many times over the years in his previous roles.
More seriously, the last 50 years tell us that the question of pension uprating is a big deal and very important. By “uprating”, I mean how pensions keep pace with earnings or prices. Obviously, on the state pension we tend to talk in terms of earnings. It is a big issue. The lesson of the 1980s and 1990s was about rising pensioner poverty at a time when the state pension was not earnings indexed but earnings were growing significantly. That is why we ended up with 30% or 40% pensioner poverty during those years. History tells us that those things are important. History aside, they are also obviously important for individuals, as we heard at the evidence session.
Luke Murphy (Basingstoke) (Lab)
I want to add my voice and the calls of my constituents for that issue to be addressed and tackled. I have been contacted by several constituents, one of whom has lost up to 70% of the value of their occupational pension. I add my voice to those calling for the Government to do what they can to address this issue, which I know the Minister recognises is having a huge impact on many people’s lives.
Roger Sainsbury, among others, raised the issue in the evidence session. He said that he had confidence that the Government would come up to the mark and find a way through the perceived difficulties. I seek reassurance from the Minister on behalf of my constituents that the Government will do all they can to ensure that that is the case.
Torsten Bell
I thank my hon. Friend for his questions. Let me come to the two halves; two different issues are actually being raised in these amendments and I want to make sure that we deal with them separately.
New clause 5 deals with discretionary increases for schemes that have not fallen into the PPF—those with solvent employers. Here, as I said in the surplus discussion, the changes on surplus provide a new route for trustees who do not have the power to make those discretionary increases off their own bat to discuss with employers discretionary increases on pre-1997 pension accruals. It is also clear that we need to understand this issue well. The Pensions Regulator has been engaging in surveys on this issue for exactly that reason and will continue to do so. Overall, my argument is that, for those schemes still operating, we are not going to be in the business of legislating to overwrite scheme rules when it comes to whether schemes had indexation in them pre-1997.
Questions of the PPF and FAS represent an important debate, as we heard last Tuesday—I answered questions about that then, and I will not pain everyone by repeating my answers.
New clauses 18 and 19 would not work. The new clauses as drafted would apply to subsets of the PPF population. Some pensioners would receive indexation, and some would not. The same flaws in the new clauses apply to FAS. We will definitely be opposing the new clauses, but that is without regard to the wider questions, which, as I said, I commented on last Tuesday.
Torsten Bell
I thank the hon. Member for Torbay, who has just left us, for moving new clause 7. To clarify, it would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review into the police pension scheme on these particular issues. I know this will be a matter of cross-party consensus, but the most important thing is to stress the value placed on the contribution of police officers across the country. I see them every day, particularly in the centre of Swansea, and they play a really important role.
The rules providing for the cessation of survivor benefits, where a survivor remarries or cohabits, are typically features of legacy public service pension schemes, and we are discussing the 1987 police pension scheme in this case. Reformed public service pension schemes do not include these challenges, as we have moved away from a system with significant inheritable rights. The same also applies to the new state pension system introduced under the coalition Government, which does not include the same degree of inheritability as the basic state pension did.
I want to take a similar approach to the many issues that will be raised in such calls for reviews. It is really important for me to be clear about why we do not support reviews into these schemes—particularly in this case, where it closed 20 years ago—as I do not want to raise expectations that will not be met. That would be deeply unhelpful to people who have been campaigning on this issue for many years.
In this particular case, there is the principle that we will not retrospectively legislate to change the terms of pensions far in the past, around 20 years ago. I am saying this very gently, but the reality is that my position is shared by most parties in this House. If the coalition Government, made up of a Liberal Democrat Pensions Minister and other Conservative Ministers, had wanted to resolve these issues and take an approach different from the one I am setting out today, they would have done it in a previous Parliament.
The last thing I want to do is give false expectations to people who often face consequences from the terms of these pension schemes—terms I do not support, but that is why they have ceased to be part of modern pension schemes. I do not want to give false certainty that we will start reopening public service pension schemes from decades ago. That would lead to false expectations, and that is the last thing we should be doing.
On that basis, we will not be supporting the new clause, but I understand the case that people have made and why people are raising it in this place. As I say, that is our approach to this issue.
John Milne
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 8
Independent review into pension losses incurred by former employees of AEA Technology
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within three months of the passing of this Act, commission an independent review into the pension losses incurred by former employees of AEA Technology who—
(a) transferred their accrued pension benefits out of the UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) public service scheme to AEA Technology (AEAT) on privatisation in 1996, and
(b) suffered financial losses when AEA Technology went into administration in 2012 and the pension scheme entered the Pension Protection Fund (PPF).
(2) The review must examine—
(a) the extent and causes of pension losses incurred by affected individuals,
(b) the role of Government policy and representations in the transfer of pensions during the privatisation of AEA Technology,
(c) the findings of the Public Accounts Committee and the Work and Pensions Select Committee,
(d) the adequacy of safeguards provided at the time of privatisation,
(e) potential mechanisms for redress or compensation, and
(f) the estimated financial cost of any such mechanisms.
(3) The review must be—
(a) conducted by an independent panel appointed by the Secretary of State, with relevant expertise in pensions, public policy, and administrative justice, and
(b) transparent and consultative, including engagement with affected pensioners and their representatives.
(4) The panel must report its findings and recommendations to the Secretary of State and lay a copy of its final report before Parliament within 12 months of its establishment.
(5) The Secretary of State must, within 6 months of the publication of the report under subsection (4), lay before both Houses of Parliament a statement setting out the Secretary of State’s response to that outcome.”—(John Milne.)
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review into the pension losses incurred by former employees of AEA Technology.
Brought up, and read the First time.
John Milne
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review into pension losses suffered by former employees of AEA Technology. It focuses on employees who transferred benefits from the UK Atomic Energy Authority to AEA on privatisation in 1996, and who later suffered losses when the company went into administration. Many former employees experienced significant losses due to circumstances beyond their control, and this review would ensure a transparent, evidence-based assessment of what went wrong. It would also hopefully provide a structured way to explore redress or compensation options for affected pensions.
To summarise, the new clause would ensure that lessons were learned and safeguards were strengthened for future privatisations and pension transfers. We move it in the hope that the Minister will put his thoughts on the record, so that campaigners can at least see them—like them or not, they will know where he stands.
Torsten Bell
I reiterate my overall approach to the issues being raised in relation to historical cases, but we all recognise the difficult position that members of this particular scheme found themselves in. Many scheme members who move into the PPF receive a lower pension than they were otherwise expecting, and I think we are all sympathetic.
The hon. Member will be aware that there have been many reviews of this case, including by the Public Accounts Committee, the Work and Pensions Committee and, obviously, the Pensions Ombudsman. The coalition did not act on this particular case, and I do not want to raise expectations that we are going to reopen it now, given the number of reviews that have already taken place.
However, I can offer slightly more reassurance to the hon. Member going forward. He will be aware of changes in policy that mean that, when there are privatisations of the kind that sits behind this challenging case, workers will remain in public service pension schemes. They would not be moved across into another scheme. That is obviously what sits behind anxieties about the transparency of the advice provided in this case. I hope that that offers the hon. Member the kind of reflection that he asked for, but we are not in a position to support the new clause.
John Milne
I thank the Minister for his observations, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 9
Independent review into state deduction in defined benefit pension schemes
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within three months of the passing of this Act, commission an independent review into the application and impact of state deduction mechanisms in occupational defined benefit pension schemes.
(2) The review must consider—
(a) the origin, rationale and implementation of state deduction in the Midland Bank Staff Pension Scheme,
(b) the clarity and adequacy of member communications regarding state deduction from inception to present,
(c) the differential impact of state deduction on pensioners with varying salary histories, including an assessment of any disproportionate effects on—
(i) lower-paid staff, and
(ii) women,
(d) comparisons with other occupational pension schemes in the banking and public sectors, and
(e) the legal, administrative, and financial feasibility of modifying or removing state deduction provisions, including potential mechanisms for redress.
(3) The Secretary of State must ensure that the person or body appointed to conduct the review—
(a) is independent of HSBC Bank plc and its associated pension schemes;
(b) possesses relevant expertise in pensions law, occupational pension scheme administration, and equality and fairness in retirement income; and
(c) undertakes appropriate consultation with—
(i) affected scheme members,
(ii) employee representatives,
(iii) pension experts, and
(iv) stakeholder organisations.
(4) The person or body conducting the review must—
(a) submit a report on its findings to the Secretary of State within 12 months of the date the review is commissioned; and
(b) the Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before Parliament and publish the report in full.
(5) Within three months of laying the report before Parliament, the Secretary of State must publish a written response setting out the Government’s proposed actions, if any, in response to the report’s findings and recommendations.
(6) For the purposes of this section—
‘state deduction’ means any provision within a defined benefit occupational pension scheme that reduces pension entitlements by reference to the member reaching state pension age or by reference to any state pension entitlement;
‘defined benefit pension scheme’ has the meaning given in section 181 of the Pension Schemes Act 1993;
‘Midland Bank Staff Pension Scheme’ includes all associated legacy arrangements and any successor schemes administered by HSBC Bank Pension Trust (UK) Ltd.” —(John Milne.)
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review into clawback provisions in occupational defined benefit pension schemes, in particular, the Midland Bank staff pension scheme.
Brought up, and read the First time.
John Milne
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 9 would require the Secretary of State to commission an independent review into the application and impact of state deduction mechanisms in occupational defined benefit pension schemes. It focuses specifically on clawback provisions in the Midland bank staff pension scheme and associated legacy arrangements.
We believe that a review is needed because state deduction provisions can reduce members’ pension entitlements, sometimes in ways that are complex or unclear. There are concerns about fairness, transparency and disproportionate impact, particularly on lower-paid staff and women. A review would ensure that members, regulators and Parliament had clarity about the origin, rationale and effect of such provisions.
The review would examine the history and rationale for the deductions, assess the clarity and adequacy of member communications over time, analyse differential impact on pensioners with varying salary histories, and compare state deduction practices with other occupational schemes in banking and the public sectors. It would also consider the legal, administrative and financial feasibility of modifying or removing state deduction provisions. Finally, it would be an independent and consultative process. The clause would ensure transparency and fairness, and it would provide Parliament and Members with clear, evidence-based guidance on the way forward.
Torsten Bell
I am conscious that there was a debate in the main Chamber on this issue before the summer recess, when we were able to go into the issue in much more depth. The debate related to integrated pensions, but in that context people are usually referring to the HSBC historical pension scheme in particular. Without rehearsing everything I have said about our not being in the business of promising to change pension scheme rules, schemes have wide discretion about the nature of their rules and the entitlements that scheme members accrue. It is not for the Government to change those.
The law is very clear that the Government require transparency, just as the hon. Member for Horsham called for, and that includes clear communication of what the entitlement from any given pension scheme is, including issues to do with what is referred to as integrated pensions or clawback pensions. People do have to have received communication that spells that out. The role of the Pensions Ombudsman is to check that that has happened. That is where people can go if they feel that they have not received clear communication about what their scheme entitlements were.
I think we can all understand that if anybody started to receive a pension and was shocked to see a deduction in it when they went over the state pension age, that would be very significant for them. It is the job of the Pension Ombudsman to investigate cases such as that.
John Milne
I thank the Minister and beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 10
Use of electronic mail for direct marketing purposes relating to pensions
“(1) Section 22(3) of the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 is deemed to apply to unsolicited electronic communications relating to pensions when the sender is—
(a) a firm authorised to provide Targeted Support under Article 55A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001 issuing a Targeted Support communication, or
(b) a qualifying pension scheme, as defined in section 16(1) of the Pensions Act 2008.
(2) Subsection (1) applies when the recipient is—
(a) a customer of the firm under subsection (1)(a), or
(b) a member of the pension scheme under subsection (1)(b).” —(John Milne.)
This new clause would require that the provisions relating to the use of electronic mail for direct marketing purposes under the Privacy and Electronic Communications *(EC Directive) Regulations 2003 would apply to communications from firms providing targeted support on pensions or from qualifying pension schemes.
Brought up, and read the First time.
John Milne
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 10 would require that provisions relating to the use of electronic mail for direct marketing purposes would apply to communications from firms providing targeted support on pensions or from qualifying pension schemes. That matters because pension savers deserve protection from unwanted or misleading marketing, especially when they may be vulnerable to scams. I used to work in direct marketing, so I feel a little bit guilty.
John Milne
Obviously, all mine were absolutely above board. Currently, the privacy and electronic communications regulations do not clearly cover pension-related marketing from schemes or targeted support firms. This new clause seeks to close that loophole. People should be able to trust that communications from their scheme or adviser are genuine and not just spam dressed up as guidance. We would position this as a balance, so that legitimate communications to scheme members remain possible, but only within clear safeguards. In summary, it is a simple consumer protection measure that would protect savers from nuisance emails and potential mis-selling.
Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)
I have a query off the back of the comments of the hon. Member for Aberdeen North.
We heard in the evidence sessions that there is a danger that overdoing the requirements for marketing will get in the way of providing guidance. That came up directly in the response to some of our questions, I think specifically from Legal and General and Aviva. Companies are already in a position where, if they are not careful, offering guidance is considered marketing. Therefore, they do have their hands tied by existing legislation.
I am slightly intrigued why this new clause has been tabled, given that Liberal Democrat colleagues will have also heard that evidence. More work is needed on this issue than just adding a new clause to the Bill; I heard from the hon. Member for Hendon that there is a consultation.
Although I understand the point about protecting vulnerable customers from scamming, I feel the evidence we heard demonstrates that more work is needed, work that is not included in the Bill, to make sure that pension companies are able to advertise in such a way that they can play their part in the guidance process that we have debated at length, and in how people get that financial education.
I understand the premise of the new clause, but we have many more questions to answer on this. If anything, I think we need to be making it easier for pension companies, the legitimate people in the room, to be able to communicate. There could be unintended consequential issues; we are trying to deal with scammers, but we might inadvertently stop people accessing information that we are trying to help them to receive.
Torsten Bell
Let me attempt to offer some words of clarification and then come to what the Government are doing on this issue.
To clarify, pension schemes are covered by the rules on direct marketing already. I think the new clause as drafted would probably have the opposite effect to what the hon. Member for Horsham intends, by carving out pension schemes from the limitations on direct marketing. That would be a loosening of the direct marketing restrictions for pension schemes. There are people in the industry that have been calling for exactly that, so that may be where the new clause is coming from, but I clarify that they are covered; the direct marketing rules prevent pension schemes from behaving in those kinds of ways.
What is the context here? We are obviously aware of concerns that the existing direct marketing rules, which apply to pension schemes, may limit providers’ ability to deliver the new targeted support regime that is being developed by the Government, exactly as the hon. Member for South West Devon has just set out. Under targeted support, FCA-authorised firms will be able to proactively suggest appropriate products or courses of action to customers. That could help people to make decisions about access to their pension, but it obviously needs to be done in the right way.
We have heard the feedback from stakeholders on the interaction between that wish for targeted support and direct marketing rules, which is where most of the debate on this area has been. Because targeted support involves recommending specific courses of action, it could be considered direct marketing. That is the cause of the tension.
There are particular issues for pension providers who administer auto-enrolled members, where the individual has not chosen the pension scheme or engaged with them. As a result of that, they cannot generally satisfy the requirements of what is called the soft opt-in, because the provider has not collected the information from the individual at the point at which they were enrolled—it has gone through the employer.
What are we doing about that? We are examining quite a range of policy options at the moment. That includes legislative change, which can probably be done via secondary legislation. I think that is the right way for us to proceed. When we do that, we need to get the balance between enabling targeted support and making sure that we do not have inappropriate direct marketing within the pension space. I definitely would not want to see a carve-out from all direct marketing rules for the pension sector as a whole, as there are risks that come with that. I hope that gives Members some clarity and an explanation of what the Government are doing to take this issue forward.
John Milne
I thank the Minister for his clarification, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
Kirsty Blackman
On a point of order, Ms Lewell, I am aware that I cannot make a speech at this point, but will the Minister write to me on whether he is planning to do anything about pre-1997 indexation of the PPF and FAS? If he writes to me about that, I will be happy not to push new clause 18 to a vote.
Torsten Bell
I suspect that I have already written to the hon. Lady, because she has raised some constituency cases with me, but she can receive another one of those letters.
New Clause 33
Report of defined benefit schemes impact on productivity
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, publish a report on the impact on corporate productivity of defined benefit schemes.
(2) The report must include an assessment of—
(a) investment strategies of defined benefit funds,
(b) the returns on investment of defined benefit funds, and
(c) the impact of investment strategies and returns on productivity.
(3) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report before both Houses of Parliament.”—(Mark Garnier.)
This new clause would require the Government to commission a report on the impact on corporate productivity of defined benefit schemes.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Torsten Bell
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Wyre Forest for tabling the new clauses, and for his impressive consistency; he has spoken to this issue many times not only in this Committee, but elsewhere, and I have heard him. I agree on some of the wider issues he is raising, particularly his reflections on some of the impacts of decisions taken in the late 1990s. Before I come to the more technical responses to the new clauses, the hon. Member’s objective is to see different investment approaches taken by defined-benefit schemes. Many issues that were historically the case have been removed by the passing of time, because they are now closed schemes whose investments are now changing for other reasons, not because of the questions of regulatory pressure in the 1990s and so on. I leave that as an aside.
To give the hon. Member a bit more optimism, based on the Bill, I already have schemes saying to me that they may take different approaches on investments because of the option of a surplus release. That gives a different incentive structure for employers about what they wish to see their pension schemes doing, and for trustees, if there is a sharing of the benefits of upside risk that comes with that. I have had several large employer’s pension schemes raising that issue with me in the recent past. That is to give him some case for optimism to set against the long-term pessimism.
I will turn to the details of the new clauses. New clause 33 would require the Government to produce and lay a report before both Houses of Parliament, with an assessment of the investment strategies of defined-benefit pension schemes and their impact on productivity.
There is already a requirement for defined-benefit schemes to produce much of that information in their triennial valuation and to submit key documents to the Pensions Regulator, including information on investments and changes in asset allocations over time, so the regulator has much of the information already. In addition, multiple reports are already produced annually on defined-benefit schemes and their investments. The purple book is the most obvious example; it is produced by the Pension Protection Fund. I know that everybody here will be an avid reader of it; I promise people that it is reasonably widely read, including in the City.
New clause 34 seeks to change the arrangements for reporting defined-benefit pension scheme liabilities in the employer’s accounts. I am impressed by the wish of the hon. Member for Wyre Forest for us to engage in a Brexit from international financial reporting standards, but he will be unsurprised to learn that the Government are not about to do that. These are globally recognised financial reporting frameworks that allow comparability, and we are not in the business of changing them.
New clause 35 would require the Secretary of State to introduce an alternative basis to disclose schemes’ funding deficits. The Pensions Act 2004 put in place the current regime for valuations. Our view is that that approach has taken some time to implement but it is now well understood and well established, so leaving it in place is by far the best thing that we can do, while also considering in more detail the consequences of other things that drive the choices of pension schemes. On that basis, I encourage the hon. Member for Wyre Forest to withdraw the new clause, and I certainly do not expect to see my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon support it.
Mark Garnier
I am partially reassured by the Minister’s comments, but it really comes down to the kindness of my heart—I would not want the hon. Member for Hendon to be pulled off the Committee and put in an awkward situation. It would be unfortunate to force him to fall out with the Whips so early in his parliamentary career, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 37
Review of impact of this Act
“(1) Within five years of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must carry out a review of the impact of the provisions of this Act on actual and projected retirement incomes.
(2) The review must consider—
(a) the impact of the provisions of this Act on actual and projected retirement incomes, and
(b) whether further measures are needed to ensure that pension scheme members receive an adequate income in retirement.
(3) The Secretary of State must prepare a report of the review and lay a copy of that report before Parliament.”—(Mark Garnier.)
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to prepare a report on the impact of this Act within 5 years of its passing.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Mark Garnier
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Under new clause 37, the review of the impact of the Act would focus on pensions adequacy. The current Government plan to delay the comprehensive consideration of pensions adequacy to future phases of the pensions review. Any resulting reforms from those future evaluations are projected to take several years to develop and implement, and there is widespread concern that without a mandated regular review process, inadequate pension outcomes will persist. Millions of people in the UK therefore risk having insufficient retirement income, particularly lower earners, ethnic minorities, the self-employed and those with interrupted careers.
Automatic enrolment has expanded workplace pension participation and now covers over 88% of eligible employees, but significant savings shortfalls remain. Recent forecasts and analysis warn of a retirement crisis, with many future pensioners expected to have less income than today’s retirees unless action is taken. The Government’s renewed Pensions Commission is due to report in 2027, focusing on the adequacy, fairness and sustainability of the retirement framework, but that report will only come in 2027.
The new clause would create a statutory obligation for the Secretary of State to conduct a full review within five years of the Bill’s passage, focusing on its impact on actual and projected retirement incomes. It would require an assessment of whether current policies and contribution levels are sufficient to ensure adequate retirement incomes. The Secretary of State would have to report the findings to Parliament, increasing accountability and transparency. That would formalise an ongoing review cycle to monitor pension adequacy regularly, preventing the consideration of the issue being indefinitely postponed.
As we all know, pension adequacy is vital to preventing poverty in later life and to ensuring quality of life for retirees. Despite expanded coverage through auto-enrolment, however, many people are still on track to fail to meet retirement income targets. Financial resilience frameworks show disparities in adequacy among lower earners, women and other vulnerable groups, and current retirement income depends on a number of variables, including contribution, sufficiency, investment returns, longevity and state pension level.
The new clause would ensure that the Government take responsibility to monitor and report regularly on pension adequacy outcomes. It would mandate a formal review mechanism, enhancing policy responsiveness and parliamentary oversight. Ultimately, it aims to safeguard millions of future retirees from inadequate incomes, and support a sustainable and fair retirement system.
Torsten Bell
We have now had a few discussions about the case for monitoring and evaluating the Bill and what is going on in the pension landscape more generally. I do not want to repeat everything I have said previously, so I will just address whether this is the right approach or whether it should be done through the Pensions Commission that is under way and looking at most of these issues. My view is that the Pensions Commission is focused on the headline issues that the hon. Member for Wyre Forest has just mentioned. I do not want to confuse that work by having another process consider the same issues at the same time. It is also valuable to have the independence of the commission when doing that.
My main message is that we do not have to wait long, because the Pensions Commission will report in 2027, which is earlier than the five years that we would have to wait for the Secretary of State’s inevitably excellent report as a result of this new clause. We should have faith in Baroness Drake, Ian Cheshire and Nick Pearce to deliver that.
Kirsty Blackman
I am not as au fait with the terms of reference of the review as the Minister. Is it possible that it will say, “We recommend that another review is undertaken in five, 10 or 15 years?” Will it look at whether the review is all we need at this point in time or whether we will need another review in future?
Torsten Bell
I do not want to speak for the commissioners because that would be to prejudge their work. I can tell the hon. Lady what the terms of reference require and they definitely rule out long-grassing in that they require actual recommendations for change to deliver a fair, adequate and sustainable pension system. It would certainly be open to them to say, “Do these things, and we also think that monitoring should be x and y.” That would be for them to say, and as it is an independent commission, I do not want to prejudge that. It definitely cannot be just that; it would have to include recommendations for change.
Mark Garnier
We tabled new clause 37 partly to try to get some reassurance from the Minister. Two years is still quite a long time, as is five, but it is incredibly important that we are on top of what is going on in the pension industry, not least because we do not want any of our constituents to end up with miserable retirements. However, I am marginally reassured by the Minister’s comments. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 38
Guidance on the roles of the Financial Conduct Authority and the Pensions Regulator
“(1) The Secretary of State must establish a joint protocol outlining the roles and responsibilities of the Financial Conduct Authority and the Pensions Regulator regarding their regulatory responsibility of the pension industry.
(2) A protocol established under subsection (1) must include—
(a) an overview of the coordination mechanisms between the two bodies;
(b) a published framework for oversight of hybrid or work-based personal pension schemes;
(c) a requirement for regular joint communications from both bodies to clarify regulatory boundaries for industry stakeholders.”—(Mark Garnier.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Kirsty Blackman
I asked questions earlier about the consultation processes that DWP and the FCA are undertaking and about ensuring consistency in that consultation. This is a similar issue. I like the way that the new clause has been written to ensure that there are protocols so that everybody knows what side of the line they fall on. That can be a particular issue for organisations that have responsibility for both trust-based and contract-based pensions. They may be trying to scale or make efficiencies through investing or having similar default products, even though we are talking about two different types of scheme.
It would be helpful if the Government would commit to ensuring that, where those issues arise, and people are having conversations with the FCA and the Pensions Regulator about what side of the divide they fall on, the Government are keeping a watching brief. If there is regular confusion, the Government should ensure that they clarify the guidance so that people know which side they fall on. Those schemes that are either hybrid or have some sort of umbrella that encapsulates both trust-based and contract-based regulation will then know which side they fall on. They will be able to comply with both regulators, if that is the requirement, or with one of them.
As we said earlier, it is incredibly important that scheme members—current pensioners and prospective pensioners—get an excellent level of service. The vast majority of people do not know, and do not care, whether they are in a trust-based or contract-based pension scheme; all they want is to get as good a pension as possible when they hit retirement. Anything that the Minister can do to ensure that companies have a huge amount of clarity about where they fall, and that scheme members get the best outcomes when they hit retirement, would be helpful.
Torsten Bell
We all agree that we want providers and, most importantly, consumers to operate in this landscape as easily as possible. Particularly in the case of consumers, we do not want them to know the difference between the two. I have been very clear with both regulators that that is the objective, and I have been very clear with both Departments that oversee them that that is what we are doing.
Delivering that in practice requires thinking about how we legislate, and that is what we have done with the Bill to make sure that we are providing exactly the same outcomes through both markets. It is about Government providing clarity to regulators—we are absolutely providing that—and then about how the regulators themselves behave.
I am very alive to the issue that is being raised. There is some good news about the existing arrangements, which need to continue, because they are examples of effective co-ordination between the FCA and TPR. I have seen that through joint working groups, consultations, shared strategies and guidance, and regular joint engagement with stakeholders. The value for money measures in the Bill are probably the most high-profile recent experience of entirely joint working between the FCA, TPR and DWP.
The wider collaboration is underpinned by what is called the joint regulatory strategy and a formal memorandum of understanding that sets out how the two regulators should co-operate, share information and manage areas of overlap. I think that that basically achieves the objectives that the hon. Member for Wyre Forest set out, even if it is provided not by the Secretary of State but by a memorandum of understanding between the two organisations. I can absolutely reassure him and the hon. Member for Aberdeen North that I am very focused on this issue.
Mark Garnier
I am highly reassured by the Minister’s words. The important point is to ensure that if the bodies are to work together and do this, we need to keep them held to account on it. The Financial Conduct Authority was set up as an independent regulator and reports back to such things as the Treasury Committee. Presumably, TPR reports back to the Work and Pensions Committee. Already we can see a potential problem there, because separate Select Committees are doing the investigation. That is an important point, but I am confident that the Minister and his civil servants are aware of the problem and will be resolutely super sharp-focused on this issue to ensure that we have regulatory clarity. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 39
Section 38: commencement
“(1) The provisions in section 38 shall not come into force except in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary of State.
(2) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (1) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”—(John Milne.)
This new clause would require that the provisions in clause 38 could only be enacted once agreed through secondary legislation.
Brought up, and read the First time.
John Milne
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Overall, this Bill has wide cross-party support, as evidenced by the fact that we have been rattling through it at such a pace. However, the power of mandation is undoubtedly the most controversial aspect. To be briefly Shakespearean: to mandate or not to mandate, that is the question.
The new clause would require that the provisions in clause 38—the mandation powers—be enacted only through secondary legislation. It is an attempt to square the circle between two competing views. The Liberal Democrats have concerns about the implications of mandation, frankly, as has much of the pensions industry. For example, Pensions UK, which is a signatory of the Mansion House accords, has stated:
“We believe that the best way of ensuring good returns for members is for investments to be undertaken on a voluntary, not a mandatory basis. We also note powers being taken to specify required investment capability for schemes, and to direct LGPS funds to merge with specific pools. All of these powers will require careful scrutiny.”
Similarly, the Society of Pension Professionals has said:
“The SPP does not support the reserve power to mandate investment in private market assets and recommends its removal from the legislation. The mandation power creates significant uncertainty, including questions about legal accountability for investment underperformance and how eligible assets will be defined. The threat of mandation risks distorting market pricing and could reduce public trust in pensions, as savers may fear that financial returns are no longer the top priority.”
The Minister has stated on a number of occasions that mandation should not be necessary, that he does not expect to have to use it and that the Mansion House accord demonstrates the industry’s willingness to act voluntarily. The obvious response is that if that really is the case, and that UK private markets truly offer the best option for pension savers while meeting the fiduciary duties, the industry should not need any prodding and mandation will not be required. The Minister’s response on previous occasions, and no doubt today, has been to observe the history and point out that thus far, the industry has been slow to make that change.
We recognise that the Minister is wholly committed to the path of giving himself mandation powers, whatever we or anyone else says. Indeed, he sees it as core to the legislation. For that reason, we have proposed the new clause as a halfway house. The power would be put on the books, but it would require secondary legislation to be enacted. It would give the Minister the ability to have access to mandation powers at short notice if he deemed it necessary, without needing primary legislation, but in the meantime, it does not hang over the industry like a sword of Damocles. It may seem just a psychological difference, but psychology matters, and there are other advantages.
Somewhat counterintuitively, sometimes having too much of a stick can be a problem in itself. The Minister would be under pressure to use the stick for the sake of consistency in every case where any company went slightly over the limit or was under the limit, even when he might prefer to take a softer, more conciliatory approach. We therefore see this new clause as a way to help the Minister exercise the powers he needs, but without stepping too heavily on industry’s toes. As he has said, he does not believe that he will ever need to exercise the power, so let us keep it at arm’s length.
Torsten Bell
I will resist the temptation to relitigate the entire argument about clause 38, which we discussed at some length on Tuesday. I entirely agree with the thrust of the new clause, which is that there should be scrutiny of the use of any such powers—that includes the scale measures, not just asset allocation.
I can offer the hon. Member for Horsham some reassurance, because the Bill already provides that all significant regulations made under clause 38, including the ones he is referring to, are always subject to the affirmative parliamentary procedure. That is the effect of the changes made to section 143 of the Pensions Act 2008 by clause 38(15). That should give him a lot of reassurance. It is true that the new clause could put a further vote in the system, but the effect is the same. I have bad news about Governments with majorities: whether they are asked to vote once or twice, the outcome will look quite similar.
For the sake of transparency, I should flag that there are some much less significant measures in clause 38 that are subject to the negative resolution procedure. I will spell them out: regulations made that require regulatory authorities to report information relating to asset allocation to the Secretary of State, regulations made in respect of new information provisions, and regulations made in respect of the regulator’s power to issue a risk notice. The negative procedure is never used for the major aspects of clause 38, which, as the hon. Gentleman set out, is a central part of the Bill. I hope that reassures him that Parliament would have to support any measures to bring in the regulations that will underpin clause 38. As I have said ad nauseam, we intend to bring into effect the scale parts of clause 38, but do not anticipate the need to use the reserve power elements.
John Milne
I thank the Minister for his clarification. I emphasise that the new clause is as much for industry’s comfort as Parliament’s; nevertheless, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 44
Administration levy
“(1) The Pensions Act 2004 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 116 (grants), leave out from ‘expenses’ to end of section.
(3) Omit section 117 (administration levy).
(4) In section 173(3) (Pension Protection Fund), before subsection (3)(a) insert—
‘(aa) any sums required to meet expenses incurred by the Board in connection with the operation or discontinuance of the Pension Protection Fund,’
(5) In section 188(3) (Fraud Compensation Fund), before subsection (3)(a) insert—
‘(aa) sums required to meet expenses incurred by the Board in connection with the operation or discontinuance of the Fraud Compensation Fund,’.” —(John Milne.)
This new clause abolishes the administration levy and provides for the expenses of the PPF and the FCF to be met out of their general funds. It would enable FCF expenses to be covered by the FCF levy.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Torsten Bell
I am grateful to the hon. Member for the new clause. I acknowledge the concerns surrounding the abolition of the Pension Protection Fund admin levy. This is not a new issue; it has obviously been raised significantly by parts of the industry. I broadly support the intent of the new clause. It provides for the expenses of the PPF board and the Fraud Compensation Fund to be met by the PPF levy and the Fraud Compensation Fund levy, instead of the PPF administrative levy. The amendment to section 116 of the Pensions Act 2004 is unworkable as it is currently drafted, but more importantly, I give the hon. Member our assurance that we intend to lay amendments at a later stage that will achieve the same aim. On that basis, I hope that the hon. Member will withdraw the new clause.
Torsten Bell
I am grateful for this new clause, which was tabled by one of my neighbours in south Wales, the hon. Member for Caerfyrddin (Ann Davies). It is obviously an important issue for many ex-mineworkers and for families across Great Britain. It is basically straightforward: I want to reassure the Committee that the Government have been discussing the transfer with the scheme trustees for many months. Those discussions are actively under way. We expect to be able to make an announcement about the way forward in reasonably short order.
I am glad that the new clause will not be pushed to a vote—because if anything, it would risk slowing down the implementation of an agreed outcome—and I totally appreciate the point that the hon. Member for Aberdeen North has made. Any proposal for change will need to be consulted on with the scheme’s trustees on behalf of their members, but that will be coming forward. I hope that provides the Committee with the reassurance it is looking for.
Kirsty Blackman
I appreciate the reassurances that the Minister has given me. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 46
Trustees: independence
“(1) The Pensions Act 1995 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 29 (Persons disqualified for being trustees), after subsection (d) insert—
‘(da) he has a personal or financial interest in the pension scheme, except for member nominated trustees.’”—(John Milne.)
This new clause makes pension scheme trustees truly independent of the sponsoring companies so that they can protect scheme members’ interests without any conflict of interest.
Brought up, and read the First time.
John Milne
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause would have the effect of making pension scheme trustees truly independent of the sponsoring companies so that they can protect scheme members’ interests without any conflict of interest. Trustees should act solely in the best interests of their members, not those of the sponsoring employer.
Currently, conflicts of interest can arise where company-appointed trustees also have personal or financial ties to the scheme sponsor. The new clause seeks to strengthen independence, excluding conflicting trustees while still allowing member-nominated trustees. Members deserve trustees who are free to challenge employers and prioritise pensions over corporate interests. Having strong, independent trustees means stronger protection for savers’ retirement security.
Torsten Bell
I will remark briefly on the new clause. To state the obvious, the quality and independence of trustees is an integral part of our trust-based pensions system. It is very important, and it is right for the hon. Member to highlight it. Within those schemes, there are a range of trustee models. I would not want to put a blanket regime in place within the currently varied landscape. I want to give the hon. Member some different reassurance on this point. We are committed to strengthening scheme governance, including for some of the issues that he has raised. I have already announced my intention to consult later this autumn on measures to improve the governance of trust-based schemes. That work will consider again some of the exact issues that he raises. That is the right way forward, because there are lots of strengths to our current system. The quality of our trustees, their independence and everything they bring to their role are all valuable, but it is important that we maintain that as the best it can possibly be. I hope that the hon. Member will enjoy the consultation later this year.
John Milne
I thank the Minister for his encouragement. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 47
Report on Pension Scheme Eligibility and Access
“(1) The Secretary of State shall, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, lay before Parliament a report into the operation of occupational pension schemes where certain categories of employees have been excluded on the basis of job classification or employment start date.
(2) The report must examine the case of employees and former employees of Fife Joinery Manufacturing (a subsidiary of Velux), including—
(a) whether affected workers were provided with opportunity to join existing pension schemes,
(b) the adequacy of record-keeping and employer accountability, and
(c) potential remedies to ensure equal access to workplace pensions.”—(John Milne.)
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to report on the Velux Pensions case.
Brought up, and read the First time.
John Milne
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause would require the Secretary of State to report on the Velux pensions case. It would require him to report within 12 months on how occupational pension schemes exclude certain employees based on job classification or their start date. The report would specifically
“examine…employees and former employees of Fife Joinery Manufacturing (a subsidiary of Velux)”.
It would review whether affected workers were genuinely offered the chance to join the pension scheme. The report would assess
“the adequacy of record-keeping and employer accountability”
and explore possible
“remedies to ensure equal access to workplace pensions.”
The measure addresses concerns from shop-floor employees who joined before 1998 and were denied pension access despite repeatedly asking for it. The workers dispute claims that they declined pension membership and say they were told that they were not eligible. Attempts to engage Fife Joinery Manufacturing management have been unsuccessful. Workers have been advised to consider approaching the ombudsman, although none has done so yet. The new clause would hold the Government accountable to investigate and push for fairness and transparency. It is supported by my hon. Friend the Member for North East Fife and my Liberal Democrat colleagues.
To summarise, the new clause is a key step to ensure fairness and equality in workplace pension access and to prevent similar exclusions in the future.
Torsten Bell
I am grateful to the hon. Member, as always, for raising those specific issues in this debate. It has been a good opportunity to raise such cases, as he regularly does.
The hon. Member will be totally unsurprised that the Government cannot support the new clause, because it is the Pensions Regulator’s role to regulate occupational pension schemes and, as he mentioned, it is the Pensions Ombudsman’s job to investigate individual complaints from members. We do not want the Government to step over the top of those organisations. I encourage those who think that they have a case to approach the ombudsman, if they have not already—given the hon. Member’s remarks, it sounds like they have not done so. I should add that I am not aware of the details of that individual case.
To be clear, if individuals have concerns about their workplace pension scheme that relate to their employer and the running of the scheme, they should take the issue to the Pensions Regulator, which will investigate. Individuals who think that they should have been a member of a pension scheme can also go to the Pensions Ombudsman, if that makes sense. Depending on the nature of an individual’s complaint, two routes are available. I ask the hon. Member to withdraw his new clause.
John Milne
I thank the Minister for his words. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 98
Regulations: general
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause 99 stand part.
Government amendment 241.
Clause 100 stand part.
Torsten Bell
Clause 98 is a standard provision setting out how regulation-making powers in the Bill may be used. It confirms that all regulations will be made by statutory instrument and allows them to be tailored to different situations and scheme types. The clause ensures that the Bill can work effectively in practice.
Clause 99 sets out how regulations under the Bill will be scrutinised by Parliament, using either the affirmative or negative procedures—we were discussing a particular case relating to clause 38 just now. The clause also allows that regulations that would otherwise be subject to the negative procedure can be made as part of a joint package of regulations under the affirmative procedure.
Government amendment 241 is a technical amendment. The new provisions in chapter 1 of part 4 about changes to Northern Ireland salary-related, contracted-out pension schemes apply specifically to schemes in Northern Ireland. The rest of the provisions in chapter 1 apply to schemes in England, Wales and Scotland. Clause 100 is a standard legislative provision confirming the territorial extent of the measures in the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 98 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 99 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 100
Extent
Amendment made: 241, in clause 100, page 98, leave out line 10 and insert—
“( ) Subject as follows, this Act extends to England and Wales and Scotland only.
(1A) Sections (Validity of certain alterations to NI salary-related contracted-out pension schemes: subsisting schemes) to (Powers to amend Chapter 1 etc : Northern Ireland) extend to Northern Ireland only.”—(Torsten Bell.)
This amendment secures that the new clauses inserted by NC28 to NC30 extend to Northern Ireland only. Northern Ireland has its own pensions legislation, but in view of the retrospective provisions in those new Clauses it is considered appropriate to include material in the Bill for Northern Ireland corresponding to the new clauses inserted by NC23 to NC26.
Clause 100, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 101
Commencement
Mark Garnier
I beg to move amendment 255, in clause 101, page 98, line 22, leave out “Chapters 1 and 2” and insert “Chapter 1”.
John Milne
I feel I ought also to thank everyone, and the Minister especially for a superb performance. I think we can all agree that this is a very good Bill, with lots of really good things in it. I am particularly interested in the investment side of it, with the greater resources to invest in UK plc, which we certainly do need.
Sadly, I expect the Bill will not receive the publicity that many do—it has not been in the headlines so far—and that is a pity. Much more trivial and ephemeral stuff, frankly, gets all the headlines, while something that is interesting and dynamic, like the measures in this Bill, will probably be displaced by the latest resignation.
Torsten Bell
I thank all Opposition Members for those reflections. I will come to my own after I have dealt with the remaining clauses and amendments—we must finish the job.
On the Opposition amendments, I am grateful to the hon. Member for Wyre Forest for his words. I am firmly committed to writing to both him and my hon. Friend the Member for Tamworth, which I shall do before Report. I am glad that the hon. Member will not press his amendments on that basis.
Amendments 225, 227 and 228 address the timing of the implementation of the provisions introduced by clause 38. Amendments 225 and 227 make it clear that the relevant master trusts and GPPs will not have to comply with the scale requirement until 2030. That is a point of clarification. In response to industry concerns, elements of the provision, such as the transition pathway, can be commenced and become operable prior to the scale requirement itself being active. We are responding to those concerns, and the amendment achieves exactly that. Amendment 228 provides clarification on the asset allocation elements of clause 38 by making it clear that those requirements will fall away if not brought into force by the end of 2035. Amendment 226 provides for the commencement of new chapter 3A, which will be inserted by new clauses 12 to 17.
On amendment 263, we have just discussed the PPF admin levy question. Given what we have just discussed about new clause 44, I ask the hon. Member for Torbay not to press the amendment.
Government amendment 242 introduces a commencement provision for the new chapter 1 of part 4 of the Bill on the validity of certain alterations to salary-related contracted-out pension schemes for both Great Britain and Northern Ireland. This measure means that two months after the Bill receives Royal Assent, effective pension schemes will be able to use a confirmation from their actuary obtained under this part of the Bill to validate a previous change to benefits—this is the Virgin Media discussion we had earlier today. Two months after the Bill becomes law, a previous change to benefits under an effective pension scheme will be considered valid if the scheme actually confirms that it met the legal requirements at the time of the change. This measure means that this part of the Bill will come into force two months after the Act receives Royal Assent and is a necessary accompaniment to new clauses 23 to 30.
Turning to the clauses, clause 101 is a standard commencement provision that details the timetable for bringing the Bill’s measures into operation and allowing transitional and saving provisions to ensure orderly implementation. Clause 102 is crucial, because it gives the Bill its short title. I commend those clauses to the Committee.
I will finish by adding my support to the comments made by all hon. Members about the proceedings of this Committee. I thank all hon. Members from all parties for their support—broadly—and also for their scrutiny, which is an important part of everything we do in this place. The Bill is important, but the debate around it is also important, both so that the legislation can be improved and in its own right. Such debate makes sure that issues are brought to the attention of the House and are on the record. I also thank this Chair, as well as several others, including those who have stood in at short notice at various phases of the Bill’s consideration. I am particularly grateful to one individual, and I am also grateful to the Clerks for all their work.
Most of all, I put on record my thanks to all the civil servants in the Department for Work and Pensions, His Majesty’s Treasury, the Financial Conduct Authority and the Pensions Regulator. Many of them have been working on the content of this Bill for many years, far longer than I have been Pensions Minister and, as many hon. Members have kindly reminded me, far longer than I may end up being the Pensions Minister, given the high attrition rate over the past 15 years in modern British politics. I thank them for the warning, and will take it in the way it was hopefully intended.
To be slightly worthy at the end of my speech, it is probably true that pensions legislation does not get the attention it deserves, but looking back over the 20th century, nothing was more important to the progress that this country and others made in delivering leisure in retirement. That very big win was delivered not only by productivity growth, but by Government decisions and collective decisions made by unions and their employers. The Bill goes further in that regard and, on that basis, it deserves all the coverage it gets.
Mark Garnier
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendments made: 225, in clause 101, page 98, line 24, leave out “after 31 December 2029”.
This amendment, together with Amendment 227, means that relevant Master Trusts and group personal pensions will not have to comply with the scale requirement until after 2030, but that Chapter 3 of Part 2 (including provision relating to the scale requirement, such as the application can otherwise be brought into force at any time in accordance with regulations.
Amendment 226, in clause 101, page 98, line 25, at end insert—
“(ba) Chapter 3A comes into force on such day as the Secretary of State and the Treasury jointly may by regulations appoint;”.
This amendment provides for commencement by regulations of the new Chapter referred to in the explanatory statement to NC15.
Amendment 227, in clause 101, page 98, line 30, leave out subsection (5) and insert—
“(5) Regulations under subsection (4)(b) may not provide for the following to come into force before 1 January 2030—
(a) section 38(4), in respect of the insertion of Condition 1 in section 20(1A) of the Pensions Act 2008 (Master Trusts to be subject to scale requirement);
(b) section 38(8), in respect of the insertion of section 26(7A) of that Act (group personal pension schemes to be subject to scale requirement)
(but nothing in this subsection prevents section 38 from being brought into force before that date in respect of the insertion in that Act of other provision related to that mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b)).”
This amendment ensures that schemes will not be legally subject to the scale requirement before 1 January 2030. It allows, however, for provision relating to that requirement (e.g., provision around applications for approval) to be commenced before that date in anticipation of the requirement itself taking effect.
Amendment 228, in clause 101, page 98, line 34, at end insert—
“(5A) If section 38 has not been brought into force before the end of 2035 in respect of the insertion of—
(a) Condition 2 in section 20(1A) of the Pensions Act 2008 (asset allocation requirement: Master Trusts), and
(b) subsection (7B) in section 26 of the Pensions Act 2008 (asset allocation requirement: group personal pension schemes),
section 38 is repealed at the end of that year in respect of the insertion of those provisions.”
This amendment transposes and clarifies the provision currently in clause 38(16). It provides for the key provisions imposing the asset allocation requirement to fall away if they are not brought into force before the end of 2035.
Amendment 242, in clause 101, page 98, line 37, at beginning insert—
“( ) Chapter 1 of Part 4 comes into force at the end of the period of two months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed.
( ) Chapter 2 of”.
This amendment provides for the commencement of the new Chapter relating to the consequences of the Virgin Media case .
Amendment 243, in clause 101, page 99, line 5, after “section 96” insert
“and (Information to be given to pension schemes by employers)”.—(Torsten Bell.)
This amendment provides for the commencement of NC20.
Clause 101, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 102 ordered to stand part of the Bill.