Serious Crime Bill [Lords]
Baroness May of Maidenhead Excerpts(9 years, 11 months ago)
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The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mrs Theresa May)
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
In November, this House passed a Modern Slavery Bill to tackle the appalling crime of modern slavery, to pursue and prosecute those who trade in human beings for profit, and to protect and support victims. Modern slavery is just one of the many manifestations of serious and organised crime, and while organised criminals operate globally, the effects of their crimes reach deep into our communities, shattering lives and affecting us all in different ways: the pensioner who loses his life savings to a sophisticated scam; the family who have their home burgled by someone addicted to drugs; the internet user who has their credit card details stolen; the person who buys goods such as alcohol or medicines and discovers they are dangerous fakes; and people who find their insurance premiums inflated because of fraud. Organised crime can also relate to the disgusting and devastating sexual exploitation of children.
There are over 5,500 organised criminal groups operating in the UK, with 36,000 people engaged in organised criminal activity. Organised crime is thought to cost this country at least £24 billion a year, and the cost to the UK from organised fraud is thought to be around £9 billion. It is a threat with many impacts, which must be fought on many levels. Yet, in 2010, when the Government came to power, it was clear that the response to serious and organised crime—both in policy and operational terms—was woefully lacking. So alongside our programme of radical police reform, we overhauled the response to serious and organised crime.
The strategic policing requirement now makes it clear to chief constables and police and crime commissioners that they need to work across force boundaries to address national threats, including those from organised crime and cybercrime. We have strengthened regional organised crime units so that there is an effective and cohesive response at a regional level; we have legislated to break down barriers to information-sharing between law enforcement agencies, and to toughen up penalties for those trading in illegal firearms; and in 2013 we launched a new crime-fighting body, the National Crime Agency, with the powers and mandate to task and co-ordinate law enforcement organisations and assets. In its first year of operation, the NCA led and co-ordinated numerous operations, leading to the arrests of 2,048 people in the UK and 1,181 overseas, and 415 convictions. It seized nearly 213 tonnes of drugs and over 700 firearms, and safeguarded or protected over 1,300 children. On the same day as the NCA was launched, we published our serious and organised crime strategy. It details the action we expect from across Government, agencies and partners in order to drive our collective and relentless response to organised criminality.
Building capacity and capability at a national, regional and force level is vital, but we must also ensure that the NCA, police forces and other law enforcement agencies have the powers they need to bring offenders to justice, to deprive criminals of the proceeds of crime, and to prevent them from engaging in further criminality.
Keith Vaz (Leicester East) (Lab)
I am grateful to the Home Secretary for giving way so early in her speech. As she knows, I support the creation of the National Crime Agency and the Select Committee has recently taken evidence from Keith Bristow on his first year in office. Given the failings of the Serious Organised Crime Agency—or, to put it another way, the failure of SOCA to meet the expectations and ambitions of Parliament and Ministers—does she feel the NCA is on the right track and enough has been seized, given the figures given to the Committee and the figures she has given today and the fact that she puts the amount of serious and organised crime at £24 billion?
Mrs May
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for the support he has shown for the National Crime Agency. I think that the agency is on the right track. There is always more that can be done, but the NCA is obviously building up its operations and capabilities. One crucial difference between the NCA and SOCA is the way in which the NCA operates with police forces around the country. There is also a clear intelligence hub at the heart of the NCA, which means that operations are being focused on the most harmful threats. In every case, a decision is taken on whether it should be a collective operation, an individual force operation or an NCA operation, and on what assets should be brought to bear in those operations.
I shall talk about those aspects of the Bill that will strengthen our ability to get hold of criminals’ assets, as that forms an important part of the work that is being done. Criminals want to make a profit out of their activities, and the more we can do to disrupt them and to access that money, the better. Of course, there is always more that can be done. Parts 1 to 4 of the Bill deal with ensuring that we are able to give the NCA and other agencies the powers that they need to bring offenders to justice, to deprive them of the proceeds of crime and to prevent them from engaging in further criminality. Under this Government, asset recovery has been stronger than ever before. We have recovered around £746 million of criminal assets. We have returned some £93 million to victims, and denied the use of £2.5 billion-worth of assets that have been frozen by the courts. However, we can and must do even better.
Mr Elfyn Llwyd (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)
I fully endorse the provisions of the Bill that will make it easier to attach assets resulting from criminal behaviour. The Home Secretary referred earlier to pensioner scams, of which there have been many in my constituency recently, as well as in other parts of north Wales and in Cheshire. Sometimes we have the Cheshire police, the Greater Manchester police and the North Wales police all investigating the same crime. Surely we need better co-ordination if we are not to waste effort in such an unproductive way.
Mrs May
The way in which the National Crime Agency operates involves a decision on how best to deal with any particular organised crime group that comes to its attention. The agency works with individual police forces as well as with the regional organised crime units to ensure that assets are being used as effectively as possible against the organised crime groups. I am not saying that a situation such as the one the right hon. Gentleman describes could never happen, or that different forces are never involved in investigating the same crime. However, before the NCA came into being, we set up an organised crime co-ordination centre to consider precisely that issue. We do not want anyone to slip through the net, but we also do not want police officers operating against an organised crime group to be put in danger because of the operations of another force. There might be more work to be done in this regard, but there is now a much greater ability to co-ordinate, particularly through the regional organised crime units.
Mr David Burrowes (Enfield, Southgate) (Con)
On the point about co-ordination, we must also remember the incentive scheme that encourages the many bodies involved to investigate and to confiscate the proceeds of crime. Has the Home Office reviewed that scheme yet to see whether it needs to be revised, as was suggested to the Public Accounts Committee last year? Given that the Home Office receives 50% of those assets, despite having no operational role in the process, does the Home Secretary envisage a change being made to that percentage?
Mrs May
My hon. Friend raises an important point. We are continually looking at that issue. Indeed, the Criminal Finances Board, under the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Staffordshire Moorlands (Karen Bradley), has looked into it.
I want to talk about those parts of the Bill that will enable us better to access criminal assets, because that is an important part of what we do. As I said, organised criminals are primarily motivated by profit, and we need to be able to do all we can to strip them of their ill-gotten gains and send the message that crime does not pay. In part, this is about more effective enforcement, and my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary, who has responsibility for dealing with modern slavery and organised crime, is currently overseeing the implementation of our plan to improve the recovery of criminal assets. We must also ensure that organised criminals are not able to exploit loopholes in our legislation to frustrate asset recovery and avoid the reach of the law, which brings me to the proposals in the Bill.
Part 1 of the Bill makes a number of significant changes to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. First, we are lowering the threshold for granting a restraint order—the means by which a defendant’s assets are frozen. It will now be easier to secure a restraint order immediately before effecting an arrest as the test for both will be aligned, thus removing the window of opportunity for a defendant to dissipate his or her assets. Secondly, we are halving the maximum amount of time that may be allowed by the court for payment once a confiscation order is made. That will mean that the victims of crime will receive recompense more quickly, and it will also further deprive criminals of the opportunity to live off or conceal their assets.
Yvette Cooper
Can the Home Secretary tell the House why, under the current legislation, the use of restraint orders to freeze assets has dropped by a third since 2010?
Mrs May
The whole point of what we have been doing, in aiming to improve our ability through the Bill to get at assets and the other work being done by the Minister with responsibility for dealing with modern slavery and organised crime, which I have described, is to ensure that every part of the legislation we have is being operated fully and properly. [Interruption.] Well, the number of orders for over a particular sum of money has in fact been about the same for the past couple of years. The shadow Home Secretary is raising a point about the legislation that the Labour party put in place—the 2002 Act. What I am saying to her is that we have looked at how these things operate to see whether we might operate them better, and I am describing to the House precisely how we are improving that.
Yvette Cooper
The point is to make sure that legislation is enforced; we all support improvements to legislation but we also want to know that it is being enforced. Can the Home Secretary explain why the number of restraint orders used to freeze assets dropped from 1,878 in 2010-11 to 1,368 in the most recent figures? Frankly, her commitment to tackling the problem of the proceeds of crime looks rather weak if all she is prepared to do is change laws but never actually enforce them.
Mrs May
The number has been dropping year on year but it is understood—the prosecution agencies believe that this is the most likely explanation—that that is due in part to the Court of Appeal judgment in the 2011 case of Windsor v. the Crown Prosecution Service. The Court ruled that suspicion that the defendant had benefited from criminal conduct was not sufficient grounds under existing legislation to grant a restraint order. That is a legal interpretation of the previous legislation—the 2002 Act—and how it was being operated by the courts. We are reducing the test from a “reasonable cause to believe” that the defendant has benefited from criminal conduct to a “reasonable suspicion”. We believe that will enable restraint orders to be applied at an earlier stage of the investigation. We have identified that a piece of legislation, as it has been operated by the courts, has had an impact that has led to a drop in the number of restraint orders, so we are addressing that in the legislation we are putting forward. I said that I would give way to my hon. Friend the Member for Dartford (Gareth Johnson), so I will now do so.
Gareth Johnson
I am grateful to the Home Secretary for giving way, and I welcome these measures to seize assets resulting from ill-gotten gains. As she has pointed out, the whole principle behind the measures is to ensure that crime does not pay. Will she assure the House that offenders are not able to avoid having their assets seized simply by absconding from the judicial process, by skipping bail for example? Will she assure us that that issue will be tackled?
Mrs May
Perhaps it would be helpful to the House if I went through the other measures in the Bill that will strengthen our ability to deal with how, under existing legislation, offenders can sometimes make efforts to hide their assets or to ensure that their assets are not available. There are a number of areas in which we need to ensure that those assets can be accessed so that somebody cannot do what my hon. Friend has said and avoid having their assets seized.
Michael Ellis (Northampton North) (Con)
As someone who has prosecuted these matters in the Crown court and dealt with the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 on many occasions, I believe that reducing the test to one of suspicion will have a considerable and positive impact on the Crown’s ability to secure more funds. Lowering the standard to that extent will clearly allow the judges greater recourse to restraint orders.
Mrs May
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for sharing his experience with the House. As I said earlier, it is clear that there is concern from the courts about the operation of the existing legislation, which is why it is important for us to clarify the situation so that it is easier to issue restraint orders at an earlier stage. It will now be easier to secure a restraint order immediately before effecting an arrest, as the test for both will be aligned.
The third point about accessing assets is that the courts must have the necessary powers to ensure that a confiscation order is paid. The Bill will allow the courts to impose any restrictions or prohibitions they consider necessary as part of a supplementary “compliance order”. In particular, courts will be required to consider whether to impose an overseas travel ban on the defendant. That partly answers the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Dartford raised earlier.
Fourthly, we are extending the powers currently available to the National Crime Agency and other law enforcement agencies to investigate the amount and whereabouts of assets—for example to enter and search premises under warrant—so that they can also be used to trace assets once a confiscation order has been made.
Fifthly, we are increasing the time in prison facing those criminals who default on the payment of higher value confiscation orders, so as to deter offenders from choosing to serve time in custody rather than paying up. At the upper end of the scale, namely confiscation orders for more than £10 million, someone who defaults on payment will now face 14 years in prison compared with the current five years. That will act as a very real incentive to payment. We will review the impact of that change on offender behaviour and, if, as we expect, it leads to a greater proportion of higher-value orders being settled on time, we will consider using the order-making powers in the Bill to strengthen the default sentences for other lower-value confiscation orders.
Finally in relation to part 1, we are bringing forward the consideration of third-party claims from the enforcement stage to the confiscation hearing. Although there are undoubtedly third parties who have a legitimate interest in assets that may be used to satisfy a confiscation order, it is often the case that spouses and other third-party associates of the defendant will submit late claims with the deliberate intention of frustrating and delaying the confiscation process. The Bill will enable the court to make a binding determination of third-party claims at the point at which the confiscation order is made, allowing the enforcement of the order to proceed more efficiently.
Maria Miller (Basingstoke) (Con)
Just before my right hon. Friend moves on, I understand why there are provisions in the Bill for confiscating assets without a conviction being needed—she has made a very powerful case for that—but, given that the provisions are quite powerful, will she also outline what she is doing to protect the civil liberties of those involved?
Mrs May
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for declaring that the provisions in the Bill are quite powerful. The whole point is to try to increase our ability to deal with these issues. Obviously, judgments have to be made about any of the issues with which we are dealing, but until now it has been possible for people to use third-party assets and timing loopholes to ensure that their assets cannot be accessed. They can put the finances that they have made as a result of their organised crime out of the reach of the authorities.
It is important that we tighten that and increase our ability to confiscate the assets of crime. Decisions will be made by courts as part of these processes and they will be properly considered in relation to the individuals concerned, but I am also concerned about the civil liberties of all those who are the victims of organised crime. I think that it is our job to try to ensure that we reduce organised crime as much as possible, and dealing with the assets and profits of organised crime is one way of sending a clear message to criminals and ensuring that they desist or that it becomes less attractive for them to undertake such activities.
Yvette Cooper
The Home Secretary said something interesting about default sentences a few minutes ago. She said that if, as the Government expect, the provision raises money, they will extend it to sentences for those who owe less than £10 million. She will be aware that her party has today produced a rather dodgy dossier claiming to cost a Labour proposal that assumes that changing default sentences does not raise any extra money at all. Does she therefore think that her own dodgy dossier is nonsense?
Mrs May
The right hon. Lady will have to try harder. We have indeed issued a document today that shows that the Labour party has committed to £20.7 billion of extra spending in one year alone, 2015-16. That means extra borrowing and extra debt for the future. It is no good her trying to rubbish the figures in that document. They are very clear, they have been tested and they have gone through the proper processes. The only dodgy figures come when Labour Front Benchers make all sorts of claims without funding their spending commitments.
In part 2 of the Bill we are strengthening the provisions of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 to ensure that we have robust legislation in place to tackle cybercrime. In particular, the part creates a new offence so that the most serious cyber-attacks are appropriately punished—for example, those on essential systems controlling power supplies, communications or fuel supplies. Such cyber-attacks are already an offence under section 3 of the 1990 Act and attract a maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment. We do not believe that that adequately reflects the harm that can be caused and the new offence therefore provides for a maximum sentence of life imprisonment when a cyber-attack leads to loss of life, serious illness or injury, or serious damage to national security. When the attack results in serious economic or environmental damage or social disruption, a maximum sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment would apply.
Targeting and convicting those involved in the wider organised crime group, such as corrupt and complicit professionals, can prove difficult under current legislation. Part 3 seeks to address that. It creates a new offence of participating in the activities of an organised crime group. Such activities may include services such as transporting persons or goods and providing storage facilities or, indeed, professional legal or accountancy services. Those who do that might know or at least reasonably suspect that their services are contributing to the activities of an organised crime group but choose to turn a blind eye and prefer to pretend that the business is entirely legitimate, asking no questions while taking their share of the rewards in the criminal enterprise. We must use all possible means to disrupt and dismantle organised criminal groups. The threat of prosecution and a sentence of up to five years will discourage complicit professionals and others who help such groups to function.
Offenders must be brought to justice, but wherever possible we must prevent people from being drawn into serious and organised crime and deter them from re-engaging in criminality. Civil preventive orders have proved effective in preventing, restricting or disrupting a person’s involvement in serious crime. To support such interventions, part 3 strengthens the framework governing serious crime prevention orders and gang injunctions. Extending serious crime prevention orders to Scotland will bring the benefits of a unified regime across the whole UK. Updating the criteria for the granting of gang injunctions, which currently can be used to address only gang-related violence, will support early interventions to tackle gangs involved in the drugs market. That will allow gang injunctions to be used more widely to break down gang culture and help gang members to exit those destructive groups.
Part 4 deals with an aspect of the illegal drugs market wherein organised crime groups substantially increase their profits from the supply of illegal drugs, particularly cocaine, by adulterating the raw product with cutting agents. Typically, drug gangs use lawfully available substances, such as benzocaine, which mimic some attributes of the illegal drugs, but there are currently no bespoke powers available to law enforcement agencies to seize, detain and destroy such cutting agents. Part 4 addresses this gap. The process will be subject to appropriate judicial oversight to ensure that the interests of any legitimate owners of suspected cutting agents are properly protected.
Part 5 takes us into different territory. Here, we seek to strengthen the protection of children and vulnerable women. Crimes against children, especially very young children, are particularly heinous, and all the more so when they are perpetrated by the very people—their parents or carers—who are supposed to protect, nurture and love them. There has been a bespoke offence of child cruelty since 1868. It is now enshrined in section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, but the language of the offence is, in places, clearly antiquated. The Bill therefore updates section 1, in particular to make it explicit that the offence covers cruelty that causes psychological, as well as physical, suffering or harm.
Mr Burrowes
I commend this part of Bill, which I know has cross-party support, including from the Solicitor-General, the late Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East, who played an active part in its promotion, me and others. I welcome the updating of the Victorian language of the previous legislation and the extension to non-physical harm, but is this not an appropriate opportunity to go further and update the language on wilfulness? As I understand it, even after clause 65 is passed, the word “wilful” will remain in the legislation. Should we not take this opportunity to remove the word “wilful” and to make it clear that it should equate to recklessness? That already applies in case law and it should also apply in statute.
Mrs May
I believe that the proposals we have put forward are appropriate, but my hon. Friend makes a serious point, which I assume reflects some of his legal experience. I am willing to take that point away and have a further look at it, but I think the proposals in the Bill as we have set them out are sufficient to ensure that we are able to update the offence on the statute book and make sure it covers all types of harm to young people.
Meg Munn (Sheffield, Heeley) (Lab/Co-op)
May I suggest that, because this is a complex area and there are questions about recklessness and wilfulness as well as neglect, the Home Secretary will want to consider whether guidelines should be issued after the Bill is enacted, to make sure that prosecutors and all professionals are clear about the Government’s and Parliament’s intentions?
Mrs May
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her suggestion. Crown Prosecution Service guidelines are already in existence. The CPS will want to make sure that the guidelines are appropriate to the changes we make, so that people are aware of the changes in what, as she says, can be a tricky area when it comes to definitions and determinations in such cases.
A particular form of cruelty inflicted on some young girls is genital mutilation. There is absolutely no cultural, religious or any other justification for female genital mutilation. It has no place in this country, or indeed anywhere else in the world, and the Government are committed to eradicating the practice. The Bill as originally introduced included an extension of our ability to take jurisdiction over FGM offences committed abroad. At the girl summit last July, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and I undertook to bring forward a number of further legislative changes to tackle FGM in this country, and these were added to the Bill in the House of Lords.
First, to encourage victims to come forward, the Bill now provides for lifelong anonymity from the point at which an allegation is made. Secondly, to target those parents who allow this dreadful practice to be inflicted on their daughters, we have now provided for a new offence of failure to protect a girl from the risk of FGM. Thirdly, to stop FGM being inflicted on a girl in the first place, we have now provided for FGM protection orders, which are modelled on and build on the success of forced marriage protection orders.
Mrs May
May I make a little more progress?
In July, we announced a range of other measures, including the creation of a new cross-Government FGM unit to work with criminal justice agencies, children’s services, health care professionals and affected communities. I hope that, together, these measures, including the changes to criminal and civil law, will help to tackle this appalling practice.
Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)
Will my right hon. Friend give way on that point?
Fiona Mactaggart
In preventing FGM, will the Home Secretary consider the provision of refuge places for girls who are at risk? These girls are frightened of reporting this or talking to a doctor, and their families are putting them under pressure. They need refuge, and in my experience Britain currently has inadequate refuge places for any woman who is at risk of violence.
Mrs May
The hon. Lady makes a point not just about FGM but more generally about refuges. Before Christmas, the Government announced the availability of a further £10 million for refuges as a recognition of the valuable work they do, particularly in relation to women who are leaving a domestic environment where they have been subject to domestic abuse. On female genital mutilation, it is important to ensure that the young people involved are aware of what they are able to do in order to escape this danger. It is also important that we send out very strong messages from this place, and generally, about the fact that it is a criminal act that we are not willing to accept in this country, and that we will make every effort we can to ensure that we eradicate the practice.
Sir William Cash
I commend my right hon. Friend and the Government for this incredibly important provision and the manner in which it has been handled in the House of Lords. My hon. Friend the Member for Mid Derbyshire (Pauline Latham), who is away at the moment, is chairman of the all-party group on FGM, of which I am also a member. We wonder whether it will be possible to insert in Committee arrangements ensuring that where the court makes an order it should protect a girl against not only the commission of but the risk of commission of a genital mutilation offence. I will deal with that when, I hope, I speak subsequently in this debate. Will my right hon. Friend be interested in listening to those arguments?
Mrs May
I look forward to hearing what my hon. Friend says about this later and the detail that I am sure he will fill in. We are addressing the whole question of the risk that an individual may face from female genital mutilation in the new offence of failing to protect a girl from the risk of FGM. It is important that those who have responsibility for these young girls and are aware of what might be happening recognise that they need to do something to ensure that the individual is not at risk and is not put through FGM. I look forward to hearing the arguments that my hon. Friend will advance later in relation to his point.
Part 5 of the Bill includes another child protection measure in making it an offence to possess so-called paedophile manuals—material that contains practical advice on how to commit a sexual offence against a child. It beggars belief that such things actually exist, but regrettably the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre, a command of the National Crime Agency, has seen a number of examples. That being the case, it is right that we act to outlaw the possession of such material. In doing so, I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Mole Valley (Sir Paul Beresford), who has campaigned assiduously on the issue.
If there are other gaps in child protection legislation, we are determined to take the necessary action to safeguard those at risk of harm. That is why last month my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister announced that we will amend the Bill to make it an offence for an adult to communicate sexually with a child. Many hon. Members have supported the campaign by the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, and I pay tribute to them for highlighting this gap in the law.
Before leaving this part of the Bill, I confirm that we will table amendments in Committee to strengthen the protection afforded to the victims of domestic abuse. As the House knows, over the summer the Home Office ran a consultation seeking views on whether a specific offence was needed to criminalise coercive or controlling behaviour in intimate personal and family relationships, and 85% of respondents agreed that the law in this area needed to be strengthened. With over 1 million calls for assistance to the police each year for domestic abuse-related incidents, but only 78,000 prosecutions, it is clear that the criminal justice response to domestic abuse is woefully inadequate. The new offence will provide an additional charging option where there is a pattern of non-violent controlling conduct, the cumulative impact of which can be no less traumatic for the victim.
Mrs May
Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will allow me the next sentence.
I am aware that a number of hon. Members, including the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Mr Llwyd), have campaigned for the introduction of such an offence. I pay tribute to Members who have brought this important matter to the attention of the House. Does the right hon. Gentleman still wish to intervene?
Mr Llwyd
I want to say that I am delighted by what the Home Secretary has said. I thank her for her preparedness to discuss the matter over the past few weeks, and I am grateful for this move forward. As always, the devil is in the detail, but I am greatly encouraged by her comments.
Mrs May
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for the interest he has taken in this subject and the way he has pursued it.
Finally, the Bill will close a gap in our current legislation in relation to terrorism. Clause 72 extends the reach of the UK courts so that those who prepare or train for terrorism abroad can be prosecuted should they return to this country. As the House is aware, a significant number of UK nationals or residents have travelled to Syria and Iraq to take part in the conflicts in those countries. We face the very serious threat that those fighters may seek to return to the UK and carry out attacks or radicalise people here. Extending extra-territorial jurisdiction for the offences in sections 5 and 6 of the Terrorism Act 2006 will bolster our law enforcement agencies’ ability to protect the public—but we will need to do more. Later this week, the House will have the opportunity again to debate the wider provisions of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, which is designed to disrupt the ability of people to travel abroad to fight and to counter the underlying ideology that feeds and supports terrorism. Given the immediacy of this threat, we will bring forward amendments in Committee to provide for the provisions in clause 72 of this Bill to come into force on Royal Assent.
Before I conclude, I want to advise the House of one further amendment that we will bring forward in Committee. The use of unauthorised mobile phones in prison poses a significant threat to prison security, as well as affording prisoners the opportunity to continue engaging in serious and organised crime while serving their sentence. While significant effort is put into tackling this problem within prisons, physically detecting handsets, let alone SIM cards, is clearly challenging given the ease with which they can be hidden. We need to find a more cost-effective way of denying prisoners the use of mobile phones. Our amendment will therefore confer a power on the civil courts to require mobile network operators to disconnect unauthorised mobile phones in use in prison.
Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)
The Home Secretary has not found time in her speech to mention the provision on the possession of knives in prison, which ensures that that can be dealt with by the courts. Alongside the Attorney-General’s willingness to prosecute when prison officers are threatened with knives, that is very welcome.
Mrs May
My right hon. Friend highlights another important aspect of the Bill. When this was first brought to my attention, it seemed strange to me that the use of knives in prisons could not be dealt with in the same manner as the use of knives in other scenarios in public places. As he says, we have done the right thing in bringing that into the Bill.
The Bill contains a range of measures to protect the public from those who would do them harm. It will give law enforcement agencies and the courts greater powers to strip criminals of their ill-gotten gains and to prosecute those who support and benefit from organised crime, and ensure that no one is beyond the reach of the law. It will enhance the protection of vulnerable women and children who face violence and abuse at the hands of the very people who should care for them most. It will close a gap in our current terrorism legislation. Together, these measures will help law enforcement agencies to keep the public safe and secure. There can be no greater aspiration than that, and I believe it is an objective that all right hon. and hon. Members can support. On that basis, I commend the Bill to the House.
Daniel Morgan
Baroness May of Maidenhead Excerpts(10 years ago)
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The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mrs Theresa May)
Further to my statement of 10 May 2013 announcing the creation of the Daniel Morgan independent panel to shine a light on the circumstances of Daniel Morgan’s murder and my statement of 3 July 2014 announcing the appointment of Baroness Nuala O’Loan as the new chairman of the panel, I can today announce that two additional members will join the panel:
Professor Rodney Morgan—Emeritus Professor of Criminal Justice at the University of Bristol.
Samuel Pollock OBE—Chief Executive of the Northern Ireland Policing Board.
The work of the independent panel is set out in the full terms of reference which were placed in the Library of the House in May 2013. These provide that the panel will seek to complete its work within 12 months of the documentation being made available.
Violence Against Women and Girls
Baroness May of Maidenhead Excerpts(10 years ago)
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The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mrs Theresa May)
Domestic abuse is a serious crime that shatters the lives of victims, trapping them in cycles of abuse that too often end in tragic and untimely deaths. There are over a million calls for assistance to the police each year for domestic abuse-related incidents, but only 78,000 prosecutions. It is clear that the criminal justice response to domestic abuse can be improved and I am determined to achieve this.
In September 2013 I commissioned Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary to review the police response to domestic abuse because I was concerned that it was not as good as it should be. Sadly, when HMIC reported their findings in March, my concerns were realised. I am clear that there must be an immediate and lasting change in the police response to domestic abuse. This means a change in culture right from the officers in charge to those on the front line. I am chairing a National Oversight Group to make sure this happens. This work remains a priority, however I am also keen to ensure the police and other frontline agencies have the tools they need to respond to domestic abuse.
The Home Office ran a consultation over the summer seeking views on whether the law on domestic abuse needs to be strengthened. Some 85% of respondents agreed that the law in this area is inadequate, and 55% agreed that it should be strengthened with a new offence to close the gap in the law relating to coercive and controlling behaviour in intimate relationships.
Today, I can inform the House that we will be tabling amendments to the Serious Crime Bill at Committee stage to strengthen the protection afforded to the victims of domestic abuse. A new offence of domestic abuse will provide an additional charging option where there is continuous or repeated coercive or controlling conduct, the cumulative impact of which can be no less traumatic for the victim than physical violence.
I will place a copy of the consultation response document in the Library of the House.
Police Bail: Statutory Time Limits
Baroness May of Maidenhead Excerpts(10 years ago)
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The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mrs Theresa May)
The College of Policing published last week the results of its consultation on improving the way pre-charge bail is managed, which provides the police with welcome guidance on the way they should operate the current system. However, as I announced in my speech to the college’s annual conference on 15 October, we also need to look at statutory time limits on the use of pre-charge bail, as that is the only way we can ensure that people do not spend months or even years on bail only for no charges to be brought.
I am today publishing a consultation paper setting out potential changes to the legislation underpinning pre-charge bail that would result in the greatest reform of that legislation since it was passed 30 years ago. The end result of the proposed changes should be to reduce both the number of individuals subject to, and the average duration of, pre-charge bail. The measures being consulted upon include:
Enabling the police to release someone pending further investigation without bail in circumstances where bail is not considered to be necessary;
Setting a clear expectation that pre-charge bail should not last longer than a specified finite period of 28 days, as recommended by the College of Policing;
Setting the extenuating circumstances in which that period might be extended further, and who should make that decision;
Establishing a framework for the review by the courts of pre-charge bail;
Considering whether extension of pre-charge bail should only be available in certain types of case, such as fraud or tax evasion, or in all cases where there are exceptional reasons for an extended investigation;
Considering how best to enable the police to obtain timely evidence from other public authorities; and
Considering whether individuals subject to pre-charge bail should be able to challenge the duration as well as the conditions in the courts.
The consultation document is available online at http://tinyurl.com/hocons and a copy will be placed in the Library of the House; the closing date for responses is 8 February 2015.
Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill
Baroness May of Maidenhead Excerpts(10 years ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Temporary Chair (Mr Gary Streeter)
With this it will be convenient to consider the following:
Clauses 3 to 10 stand part.
Amendment 14, in clause 11, page 7, leave out lines 16 and 17 and insert—
““specified individual” means a person named in a notification and managed return order and in relation to whom Conditions A-D of section [Notification and managed return orders] are met.
“a carrier” has the same meaning as at section 18.”
Amendment 15, page 7, leave out lines 20 to 24.
Amendment 16, page 7, leave out line 41.
Clause 11 stand part.
New clause 4— Notification and managed return orders—
‘(1) A “notification and managed return order” is an order requiring a person (“a carrier”) to notify the Home Secretary that—
(a) a specified individual intends to travel to the UK, and
(b) the date, time and location of the specified person‘s scheduled arrival.
(2) The Secretary of State may impose a notification and managed return order if conditions A to D are met.
(3) Condition A is that the Secretary of State reasonably suspects that the specified individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism related activity outside the United Kingdom.
(4) Condition B is that the Secretary of State reasonably considers that it is necessary, for purposes connected with protecting members of the public in the United Kingdom from a risk of terrorism, for a notification and managed return order to be imposed on a carrier in relation to a specified individual.
(5) Condition C is that the Secretary of State reasonably considers that the specified individual is outside the United Kingdom.
(6) Condition D is that the specified individual has the right of abode in the United Kingdom.
(7) During the period that a notification and managed return order is in force, the Secretary of State must keep under review whether condition B is met.”
New clause 5—Notification and managed return orders: supplementary provision—
‘(1) The Secretary of State must give notice of the imposition of a notification and managed return order to the specified individual and the carrier.
(2) Notice of the imposition of a notification and managed return order may include notice that the specified individual may be stopped, questioned and detained on return to the United Kingdom.
(3) A notification and managed return order—
(a) comes into force when notice of its imposition is given; and
(b) is in force for the period of two years (unless revoked or otherwise brought to an end earlier).
(4) The Secretary of State may revoke a notification and managed return order at any time.
(5) The Secretary of State must give notice of the revocation of a notification and managed return order to the specified individual and the carrier.
(6) If a notification and managed return order is revoked, it ceases to be in force when notice of its revocation is given to the specified individual and the carrier.
(7) The validity of a notification and managed return order is not affected by the specified individual—
(a) returning to the United Kingdom, or
(b) departing from the United Kingdom.
(8) The imposition of a notification and managed return order does not prevent a further notification and managed return order from being imposed on a carrier in relation to the same specified individual (including in a case where an order ceases to be in force at the expiry of its two year duration).
(9) The imposition of a notification and managed return order does not prevent a further notification and managed return order from being imposed on another carrier contemporaneously or consecutively in relation to the same specified individual.”
New clause 6—Penalty for breach of notification and managed return order—
‘(1) The Secretary of State may make regulations setting out the penalties to be imposed for breaching a notification and managed return order.
(2) Regulations under subsection (1) must make provision—
(a) about how a penalty is to be calculated;
(b) about the procedure for imposing a penalty;
(c) about the enforcement of penalties;
(d) allowing for an appeal against a decision to impose a penalty;
and the regulations may make different provision for different purposes.
(3) Provision in the regulations about the procedure for imposing a penalty must provide for a carrier to be given an opportunity to object to a proposed penalty in the circumstances set out in the regulations.
(4) Any penalty paid by virtue of this section must be paid into the Consolidated Fund.
(5) Regulations under this section are to be made by statutory instrument; and any such statutory instrument may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before each House of Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House.”
New clause 9—Imposition of terrorism prevention and investigation measures—
‘(1) The Secretary of State may by notice (a “TEO”) impose a “temporary exclusion order” which requires an individual not to return to the United Kingdom on an individual if conditions A to E in section [Conditions A to E] are met.
(2) 1n this Act “temporary exclusion order” means requirements, restrictions and other provision which may be made in relation to an individual by virtue of section [Conditions A to E] “prior permission of the court” and Schedule [“Proceedings relating to temporary exclusion orders”].
(3) An individual subject to a TEO may not return to the UK unless—
(a) the return is in accordance with a permit to return issued by the Secretary of State before the individual began the return, or
(b) the return is the result of the individual’s deportation to the United Kingdom.”
New clause 10—Conditions A to E—
‘(1) Condition A is that the Secretary of State reasonably suspects that the individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity outside the United Kingdom.
(2) Condition B is that the Secretary of State reasonably considers that it is necessary, for purposes connected with protecting members of the public in the United Kingdom from a risk of terrorism, for a temporary exclusion order to be imposed on the individual.
(3) Condition C is that the Secretary of State reasonably considers that the individual is outside the United Kingdom.
(4) Condition D is that the individual has the right of abode in the United Kingdom.
(5) Condition E is that—
(a) the court gives the Secretary of State permission under section 3, or
(b) the Secretary of State reasonably considers that the urgency of the case requires a temporary exclusion order to be imposed without obtaining such permission.
(6) During the period that a temporary exclusion order is in force, the Secretary of State must keep under review whether condition B is met.”
New clause 11—Prior permission of the court—
‘(1) This section applies if the Secretary of State—
(a) makes the relevant decisions in relation to an individual, and
(b) makes an application to the court for permission to impose measures on the individual.
(2) The application must set out a draft of the proposed TEO notice.
(3) The function of the court on the application is—
(a) to determine whether the relevant decisions of the Secretary of State are obviously flawed, and
(b) to determine whether to give permission to impose measures on the individual and (where applicable) whether to exercise the power of direction under subsection (9).
(4) The court may consider the application—
(a) in the absence of the individual;
(b) without the individual having been notified of the application; and
(c) without the individual having been given an opportunity (if the individual was aware of the application) of making any representations to the court.
(5) But that does not limit the matters about which rules of court may be made.
(6) In determining the application, the court must apply the principles applicable on an application for judicial review.
(7) In a case where the court determines that a decision of the Secretary of State that condition A, condition B, or condition C is met is obviously flawed, the court may not give permission under this section.
(8) In any other case, the court may give permission under this section.
(9) If the court determines that the Secretary of State‘s decision that condition D is met is obviously flawed, the court may (in addition to giving permission under subsection (8) give directions to the Secretary of State in relation to the measures to be imposed on the individual.
(10) 1n this section “relevant decisions” means the decisions that the following conditions are met—
(a) condition A;
(b) condition B;
(c) condition C; and
(d) condition D.”
New schedule 1—Proceedings relating to Temporary Exclusion Orders—
Introductory
1 In this Schedule—
“appeal proceedings” means proceedings in the Court of Appeal or the Inner House of the Court of Session on an appeal relating to temporary exclusion order proceedings;
“the relevant court” means—
(a) in relation to TEO proceedings, the court;
(b) in relation to appeal proceedings, the Court of Appeal or the Inner House of the Court of Session;
“rules of court” means rules for regulating the practice and procedure to be followed in the court, the Court of Appeal or the Inner House of the Court of Session.
Rules of court: general provision
2 (1) A person making rules of court relating to TEO proceedings or appeal proceedings must have regard to the need to secure the following—
(a) that the decisions that are the subject of the proceedings are properly reviewed, and
(b) that disclosures of information are not made where they would be contrary to the public interest.
(2) Rules of court relating to TEO proceedings or appeal proceedings may make provision—
(a) about the mode of proof and about evidence in the proceedings;
(b) enabling or requiring the proceedings to be determined without a hearing;
(c) about legal representation in the proceedings;
(d) enabling the proceedings to take place without full particulars of the reasons for the decisions to which the proceedings relate being given to a party to the proceedings (or to any legal representative of that party);
(e) enabling the relevant court to conduct proceedings in the absence of any person, including a party to the proceedings (or any legal representative of that party);
(f) about the functions of a person appointed as a special advocate (see paragraph 10);
(g) enabling the court to give a party to the proceedings a summary of evidence taken in the party’s absence.
(3) In this paragraph—
(a) references to a party to the proceedings do not include the Secretary of State;
(b) references to a party’s legal representative do not include a person appointed as a special advocate.
(4) Nothing in this paragraph is to be read as restricting the power to make rules of court or the matters to be taken into account when doing so.
Rules of court: disclosure
3 (1) Rules of court relating to TEO proceedings or appeal proceedings must secure that the Secretary of State is required to disclose—
(a) material on which the Secretary of State relies,
(b) material which adversely affects the Secretary of State’s case, and
(c) material which supports the case of another party to the proceedings.
(2) This paragraph is subject to paragraph 4.
4 (1) Rules of court relating to TEO proceedings or appeal proceedings must secure—
(a) that the Secretary of State has the opportunity to make an application to the relevant court for permission not to disclose material otherwise than to the relevant court and any person appointed as a special advocate;
(b) that such an application is always considered in the absence of every party to the proceedings (and every party’s legal representative);
(c) that the relevant court is required to give permission for material not to be disclosed if it considers that the disclosure of the material would be contrary to the public interest;
(d) that, if permission is given by the relevant court not to disclose material, it must consider requiring the Secretary of State to provide a summary of the material to every party to the proceedings (and every party’s legal representative);
(e) that the relevant court is required to ensure that such a summary does not contain material the disclosure of which would be contrary to the public interest.
(2) Rules of court relating to TEO proceedings or appeal proceedings must secure that provision to the effect mentioned in sub-paragraph (3) applies in cases where the Secretary of State—
(a) does not receive the permission of the relevant court to withhold material, but elects not to disclose it, or
(b) is required to provide a party to the proceedings with a summary of material that is withheld, but elects not to provide the summary.
(3) The relevant court must be authorised—
(a) if it considers that the material or anything that is required to be summarised might adversely affect the Secretary of State‘s case or support the case of a party to the proceedings, to direct that the Secretary of State—
(i) is not to rely on such points in the Secretary of State‘s case, or
(ii) is to make such concessions or take such other steps as the court may specify, or
(b) in any other case, to ensure that the Secretary of State does not rely on the material or (as the case may be) on that which is required to be summarised.
(4) In this paragraph—
(a) references to a party to the proceedings do not include the Secretary of State;
(b) references to a party’s legal representative do not include a person appointed as a special advocate.
Article 6 rights
5 (1) Nothing in paragraphs 2 to 4, or in rules of court made under any of those paragraphs, is to be read as requiring the relevant court to act in a manner inconsistent with Article 6 of the Human Rights Convention.
(2) The “Human Rights Convention” means the Convention within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998 (see section 21(1) of that Act).
Rules of court: anonymity
6 (1) Rules of court relating to TEO proceedings or appeal proceedings may make provision for—
(a) the making by the Secretary of State or the relevant individual of an application to the court for an order requiring anonymity for that individual, and
(b) the making by the court, on such an application, of an order requiring such anonymity;
and the provision made by the rules may allow the application and the order to be made irrespective of whether any other TEO proceedings have been begun in the court.
(2) Rules of court may provide for the Court of Appeal or the Inner House of the Court of Session to make an order in connection with any appeal proceedings requiring anonymity for the relevant individual.
(3) In sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) the references, in relation to a court, to an order requiring anonymity for the relevant individual are references to an order by that court which imposes such prohibition or restriction as it thinks fit on the disclosure—
(a) by such persons as the court specifies or describes, or
(b) by persons generally,
of the identity of the relevant individual or of any information that would tend to identify the relevant individual.
(4) In this paragraph “relevant individual” means an individual on whom the Secretary of State is proposing to impose, or has imposed, measures.
Initial exercise of rule-making powers by Lord Chancellor
7 (1) The first time after the passing of this Act that rules of court are made in exercise of the powers conferred by this Schedule in relation to proceedings in England and Wales or in Northern Ireland, the rules may be made by the Lord Chancellor instead of by the person who would otherwise make them.
(2) Before making rules of court under sub-paragraph (1), the Lord Chancellor must consult—
(a) in relation to rules applicable to proceedings in England and Wales, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales;
(b) in relation to rules applicable to proceedings in Northern Ireland, the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland.
(3) But the Lord Chancellor is not required to undertake any other consultation before making the rules.
(4) A requirement to consult under sub-paragraph (2) may be satisfied by consultation that took place wholly or partly before the passing of this Act.
(5) Rules of court made by the Lord Chancellor under sub-paragraph (1)—
(a) must be laid before Parliament, and
(b) if not approved by a resolution of each House before the end of 40 days beginning with the day on which they were made, cease to have effect at the end of that period.
(6) In determining that period of 40 days no account is to be taken of any time during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued or during which both Houses are adjourned for more than 4 days.
(7) 1f rules cease to have effect in accordance with sub-paragraph (5)—
(a) that does not affect anything done in previous reliance on the rules, and
(b) sub-paragraph (1) applies again as if the rules had not been made.
(8) The following provisions do not apply to rules of court made by the Lord Chancellor under this paragraph—
(a) section 3(6) of the Civil Procedure Act 1997 (Parliamentary procedure for civil procedure rules);
(b) section 56(1), (2) and (4) of the Judicature (Northern Ireland) Act 1978 (statutory rules procedure).
(9) Until the coming into force of section 85 of the Courts Act 2003, the reference in sub-paragraph (8)(a) to section 3(6) of the Civil Procedure Act 1997 is to be read as a reference to section 3(2) of that Act.
Use of advisers
8 (1) In any TEO proceedings or appeal proceedings the relevant court may if it thinks fit—
(a) call in aid one or more advisers appointed for the purposes of this paragraph by the Lord Chancellor, and
(b) hear and dispose of the proceedings with the assistance of the adviser or advisers.
(2) The Lord Chancellor may appoint advisers for the purposes of this paragraph only with the approval of—
(a) the Lord President of the Court of Session, in relation to an adviser who may be called in aid wholly or mainly in Scotland;
(b) the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland, in relation to an adviser who may be called in aid wholly or mainly in Northern Ireland;
(c) the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, in any other case.
(3) Rules of court may regulate the use of advisers in proceedings who are called in aid under sub-paragraph (1).
(4) The Lord Chancellor may pay such remuneration, expenses and allowances to advisers appointed for the purposes of this paragraph as the Lord Chancellor may determine.
9 (1) The Lord President of the Court of Session may nominate a judge of the Court of Session who is a member of the First or Second Division of the Inner House of that Court to exercise the function under paragraph 8(2)(a).
(2) The Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland may nominate any of the following to exercise the function under paragraph 8(2)(b)—
(a) the holder of one of the offices listed in Schedule 1 to the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002;
(b) a Lord Justice of Appeal (as defined in section 88 of that Act).
(3) The Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales may nominate a judicial office holder (as defined in section 109(4) of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005) to exercise the function under paragraph 8(2)(c).
Appointment of special advocate
10 (1) The appropriate law officer may appoint a person to represent the interests of a party in any TEO proceedings or appeal proceedings from which the party (and any legal representative of the party) is excluded.
(2) A person appointed under sub-paragraph (1) is referred to in this Schedule as appointed as “special advocate”.
(3) The “appropriate law officer” is—
(a) in relation to proceedings in England and Wales, the Attorney General;
(b) in relation to proceedings in Scotland, the Advocate General for Scotland;
(c) in relation to proceedings in Northern Ireland, the Advocate General for Northern Ireland.
(4) A person appointed as a special advocate is not responsible to the party to the proceedings whose interests the person is appointed to represent.
(5) A person may be appointed as a special advocate only if—
(a) in the case of an appointment by the Attorney General, the person has a general qualification the purposes of section 71 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990;
(b) in the case of an appointment by the Advocate General for Scotland, the person is an advocate or a solicitor who has rights of audience in the Court of Session or the High Court of Justiciary by virtue of section 25A of the Solicitors (Scotland) Act 1980;
(c) in the case of an appointment by the Advocate General for Northern Ireland, the person is a member of the Bar of Northern Ireland.”
The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mrs Theresa May)
I am very pleased to be able to participate in this part of the debate on an important Bill, and particularly pleased to be able to talk about temporary exclusion orders. Let me begin by explaining the background.
Earlier this year, the joint terrorism analysis centre raised our national terrorist threat level from substantial to severe. That means that a terrorist attack is highly likely. Approximately 500 individuals who are of interest to the police and security services have travelled from the United Kingdom to Syria and the region since the start of the conflict, and it has been estimated that half of them have returned.
In the context of that heightened threat to our national security, we need a power that will allow us to disrupt the travel, and control the return, of British citizens who have travelled abroad to engage in terrorist-related activity, and to manage the threat they pose. The temporary exclusion power will do just that. It will make it an offence for an individual who is subject to an order to return to the UK without first engaging with the UK authorities. It will also allow for the imposition of certain limited requirements on the individual on his or her return.
Let me make it clear that this is a discretionary power, which will be considered for use on a case-by-case basis. Let me also reassure the Committee again that it will not render any individual stateless. British nationals who are made subject to an order will have the right—which their citizenship guarantees—to return to the UK. Clauses 2 to 11 relate to this TEO and set out the way it will operate and issues around the permits to return.
Mrs May
I appreciate the eagerness with which the hon. Lady rises to refer to that case, but I have to say to her that I am not going to comment on a particular case. As the Minister indicated earlier, however, the Bill is not, of course, restricted in the type of terrorism it refers to, and it does refer to those who have taken part in terrorist-related activity outside the UK, but I emphasise that situations would be looked at case by case, so this is not a power that will automatically be applied to any individual who satisfies those criteria. It is a matter of looking on a case-by-case basis to determine where it is appropriate to apply this power.
Mr Grieve
I have listened carefully to what my right hon. Friend has said, particularly about our compliance with our own national and international legal obligations. One anxiety that has been expressed about this measure is that a person could be particularly vulnerable during the period before they might return, if they are located in a country whose human rights record is inadequate. I wonder whether my right hon. Friend might focus on that issue, because my understanding has been that consular protection would remain for such an individual in exactly the same way as for somebody whose passport was still working.
Mrs May
I am very happy to respond to that point. We as a country take the issue of human rights responsibilities very seriously in dealing with other countries and their treatment of individuals, but the individual would remain a British citizen and, notwithstanding that their passport had been cancelled and they had to apply for the permit to return, as a British citizen consular facilities would be available to them in those circumstances.
Frank Dobson (Holborn and St Pancras) (Lab)
How would the person concerned prove to the British consular service that they were the person they claimed to be?
Mrs May
In such circumstances, the passport will probably still be in the individual’s possession, although it will have been cancelled in the sense of its ability to be used to provide access to the United Kingdom, so I would expect them to have that document available to provide that proof.
On the points made about the individual being in another country, if an individual subject to an order attempts to travel to the UK, we will work closely with the host country and consider appropriate action. This may include detention pending deportation action, but only where appropriate under the laws of the other country, and, again, where appropriate, UK police officers will escort the individual back to the UK.
We are discussing this proposal with other Governments, in particular France and Turkey, in order to agree how it will work best in practice. The problem of foreign fighters travelling to Syria and Iraq and then seeking to return home is one we share with many of our international partners, and so far these discussions have been constructive.
Once in the UK, the police may interview the individual in order to explore their activities abroad. We may then subsequently require them to engage with a programme, potentially comprising reporting, notification of change of address and de-radicalisation activities.
I turn now to the amendments tabled by the shadow Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), and her colleagues. New clauses 9, 10 and 11 and new schedule 1 all require the Secretary of State to apply for permission from the courts before imposing a TEO. The mechanism provided for in these amendments is almost identical to that in the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011—indeed, it appears to have been copied so directly that the right hon. Lady may want to reconsider the title of new clause 9, which refers to the imposition of terrorism prevention and investigation measures, which I suspect might be an error.
As the Minister with responsibility for national security, it is right that I, as Home Secretary, and not the courts, impose an order of this kind. As I have said, this is a discretionary power that will be used only in a limited number of cases where it will have the greatest impact. With oversight of all other national security and counter- terrorism matters, I am best placed to make an informed judgment about whether a TEO is appropriate in each case, taking into consideration the wider context of the terrorist threat we face. For the same reasons, to vest the power to impose one of these orders in the Secretary of State without first requiring an application to the courts is in line with the comparable use of the royal prerogative to cancel the passport of a British citizen.
We must also consider in this context the level of interference with an individual’s rights as a result of the power. A TEO does not take away the right of an individual to return to the UK, and the in-country elements that might be imposed on an individual as part of it are much less restrictive than those available under TPIMs, and for this reason do not require the same level of review. There is therefore no need for a requirement to apply to the courts before imposing an order, and it will of course remain open to an individual to apply for judicial review of the decision to impose an order.
Caroline Lucas
The way the Home Secretary is describing how people can respond to a TEO suggests they would be able to access legal services. It does not take into account that they might be in a failed state, for example, or be being controlled by others or not have sufficient money. Does she not accept that in those circumstances, a TEO could actually mean a loss of intelligence about the suspect’s whereabouts and a loss of control?
Mrs May
But we are talking about an individual who, having had a TEO placed on them, attempts to travel to the UK, at which point they would have to apply for a permit to return and the arrangements for them to be accompanied by a police officer could be put in place. I recognise that there could be some circumstances in which a person might not have immediate access to the legal review, but they would be able to get it at the point at which they chose to return to the UK. This is about having the ability to ensure that certain people return to the UK on our terms, and that it is a managed return.
Frank Dobson
When would such an order become valid—when it was served on the person concerned? How would the British officials involved identify the person in order to serve the order on them? Would the process be triggered only if the person sought to come to this country?
Mrs May
A temporary exclusion order will be in place, and it will come into effect when it is served or deemed to be served on an individual. The arrangements relating to its being served are similar to those that we use for certain immigration rules relating to people outside the country.
I was about to talk about how the carriers will know whether to carry someone, because that subject has been mentioned in some of the other new clauses. On the question of whether the courts or the Home Secretary should make the decision, the Government and I are absolutely committed to the appropriate and proportionate use of this temporary exclusion power and, for the reasons I have set out, I believe that the Secretary of State is best placed to ensure that it is used in that way. I would hope, therefore, that the shadow Home Secretary will not press her new clauses to a vote.
Opposition Members have also tabled new clauses 4, 5 and 6 and amendment 14, which seek to make provision for “notification and managed return orders”. These would be orders imposed on a carrier such as an airline to notify the Secretary of State that a specified individual intended to travel to the UK and to notify the date, time and location of that individual’s arrival in the UK. Carriers already provide advance passenger information to the Government’s border system. That information enables the current authority-to-carry scheme to operate and, similarly, it will underpin new schemes under clause 18 of the Bill. When an individual intending to travel to the UK is a person who is inadmissible to the UK, the national border targeting centre will contact the carrier to refuse authority to carry the individual to the UK. The Government intend that individuals who are subject to temporary exclusion orders will be a class of passengers in respect of whom authority to carry must be sought by carriers, under a new authority-to-carry scheme.
The proposal that a carrier should be required to tell the Secretary of State that a specified individual intends to travel to the UK implies that every carrier operating to the UK needs to know the details of every individual liable to a managed return. Disclosing to carriers around the world the details of individuals reasonably suspected of involvement in terrorism-related activity outside the UK is unnecessary. The Government hold and maintain those details, and we match them against information provided by carriers. We know from our experience of planning for and operating the current authority-to-carry scheme that carriers much prefer the Government to do the matching. It is for the Government to take the responsibility for getting that right and making the right decisions, which can result in individuals being prevented from travelling to the UK or, under the Bill, being liable to temporary exclusion and a managed return.
Equally, the new clause providing for penalties to be imposed on carriers that fail to notify the Secretary of State when a specified individual is travelling to the UK is unnecessary. Criminal penalties are already in place for carriers that fail to provide passenger and crew information when required to do so, and there is provision in schedule 2 to the Bill to complement those provisions with civil penalties.
Finally, amendments 15 and 16 relate to the interpretation of the temporary exclusion measure. The first of those amendments would impact on our ability to prosecute an individual for breaching a temporary exclusion order. The second would prevent us from correctly implementing a temporary exclusion order, should a host country seek lawfully to expel the individual under powers other than deportation. Both amendments would seriously jeopardise key fundamentals of the policy and, perhaps, would not produce the result intended by the Opposition.
Lady Hermon
The UK authorities will have an obligation to let the Home Office know about the passenger lists in relation to individuals returning to the United Kingdom, but can the Home Secretary reassure the Committee that she will work closely with her Irish counterpart to ensure that the Irish Government keep similar information about those who are suspected of terrorism abroad? We must ensure that there is close co-operation on the two lists, which might contain the details of highly suspicious individuals coming back into Ireland and indirectly back into the UK through Northern Ireland.
Mrs May
The hon. Lady makes an important point, given our relationship with the Republic of Ireland and the operation of the common travel area. I can assure her that we work very closely with the Irish Government on the necessary information exchange between us, to ensure that the common travel area could not be—and, in general, is not—a means by which people can access the UK when we do not wish them to do so.
As I was saying, this is a necessary and proportionate power and, given the circumstances in which we find ourselves, it is entirely appropriate to introduce a power that will enable us to disrupt and mange the return of a number of individuals who have been involved in terrorist-related activity outside the UK.
Mr Hanson
I should like to speak to the amendments and new clauses standing in my name and those of my right hon. and hon. Friends. I am grateful to the Home Secretary for her explanation of the measures in the Bill, which are worthy of discussion today. We have tabled new clauses 4 and 5 to provide a supportive narrative to the one that the Home Secretary has put forward. The new clauses and amendments taken together form some of the options that could support the control of terror suspects who are at our border in the UK rather than at a foreign port. They provide a mechanism for the issuing of a notification and managed return order, which would be similar to the measure proposed by the Home Secretary but with a slightly different emphasis.
It is important that we recognise the threat posed by British citizens travelling abroad to participate in terror camps or to join the fight with ISIS in the middle east. The threat from ISIS is serious, and the Government need to do more to prevent young people from being groomed and radicalised to go and fight, and, using the measure in clause 1, to deal with such people when they try to return, having left the country to take part in such activity.
That threat is still live. On 21 October, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe, was quoted as saying that five Britons were travelling to Iraq and Syria to join ISIS every week. The Government’s own information states that more than 500 Britons have travelled to Syria and that as many as 250 are now seeking to return. Self-evidently, we need a mechanism to protect the British citizen and to deal with those who wish to return. It is also vital that we are able to deal with people we know to be involved in these activities but who are unaware that we know about them. There is a synergy between what we are trying to achieve and what the Government are proposing. We particularly think there may be practical difficulties with the Bill in relation to individuals at foreign ports returning to the UK, and I would welcome the Home Secretary’s view.
The blanket exile proposal—I know the Home Secretary has not used that phrase—was referred to by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, David Anderson QC, as an
“announcement waiting for a policy”
when it was made. He was worried, and still has some worries, about whether it is legally and practically workable. We now have plans before us that, at first sight, appear closer to managed return than exile, but I wonder how they work in practice. If the aim of the policy is to keep dangerous individuals out of the country and then, ultimately, to manage their return, we need to explore real issues about that, not least what happens when individuals do not choose to apply for consent to come back—or indeed when they do choose to do that. The Home Secretary has touched on this, but what happens to individuals in particular countries? Would Turkey be happy to detain, potentially for months on end, a Briton suspected of illegally fighting for a terrorist organisation if he or she turned up at Ankara airport but was banned from departing to the UK? What options are in place for that? It is not clear whether the British Government have negotiated agreements with particular countries and whether they intend to do that on a case-by-case basis. What provision is in place—if it is not detention—to stop an individual who finds themselves faced with an order at the airport taking an alternative course of action, either returning to the host country in a different way, or returning and leaving for another country, not the UK? There is a practical argument as to what happens under the Bill to individuals in whom the Government have an interest.
Our new clause 4 seeks to examine an alternative model, which could work in parallel with the Government’s proposals but gives an opportunity for a managed return. We have tabled new clauses 4, 5 and 6, and the consequential amendments, which we are happy to look at and to reflect on, given what the Home Secretary has said about them. There is an argument to be made that the Government’s measure is too blunt a tool, in that it either prevents people from coming back or allows them to return. A more graduated response would give the security services and the Government much greater choice in how they want to approach each individual. Our notification and managed return orders proposal provides an alternative that gives security to the Government and takes effective action against individuals in whom the Government have an interest, but does so by allowing them to return to the UK and be managed in the UK, as opposed to leaving us facing some practical difficulties elsewhere.
Our approach would require carriers to provide advance notice of travel bookings for certain named individuals in whom the Government have an interest, and that is well and good. It would allow the British authorities to have advance knowledge and notice of suspects’ travel plans so that arrangements could be made for police interview or arrest at the port or border immediately on their return to the UK. If that model were used as well, it would in part transfer the procedure that the Government are trying to achieve in a foreign port to a UK port. At that point, interviews could be undertaken and action could be taken against an individual, and we could also ensure that we had dealt with an individual of interest to the UK Government in the UK That could be an alternative model.
Mrs May
On the face of it, this may not look like a significant point, but it is. There is a very real difference between giving a list of a large number of people to a carrier and saying, “If any of these people travel, please tell us” and looking at the carrier’s information and saying, “This individual shall not be allowed to travel.” The amount of information about individuals that the carrier holds is very different under the Government’s proposal; much more information about individuals would be held by the carriers under the Opposition’s proposal, and that provides less protection for the individuals.
Mr Hanson
Again, these are matters of genuine debate and interest. The point I make to the Home Secretary is that this is entirely in her gift. Under the model we are proposing, her model is not being deleted from the Bill. It is still there to provide the ability to say to carriers, “If Mr X or Miss X turns up at Schiphol airport, we wish you to take action against them and exercise the powers in the Bill.” I could have turned the television on at any time in the past month and seen the names of individuals that we know have travelled abroad—individuals that are publicly travelling abroad and that relatives have said have travelled abroad. It is quite possible for the Home Secretary not to make these two possibilities mutually exclusive. The issue is simply—[Interruption.] If the Minister for Security and Immigration wants to back up his boss and intervene, I am happy to allow him to do so. The debate is about the practical difficulties of the Home Secretary’s proposals, which are to have people sign to say that they will come back under managed return, to have detention or to stop carriers at ports. Are they the sole way to deal with every case that is brought before the Home Secretary’s notice? We are trying to provide at least one alternative for consideration.
Caroline Lucas
I do not think that I am making assertions. I am asking questions about whether it will be possible for people in all circumstances to go through very formal processes at a time when they may well be living in a culture of fear and when, by definition, severe conflict is going on. Such people might already have been fingered as someone who is trying to leave and be at particular risk of attack from others. I am describing a rather more complex situation than someone simply using the postal system, knowing what they have to do next and then marching down to the consulate and doing it. The reality on the ground is likely to be far more complex than the hon. Gentleman suggests.
If someone does complete the process successfully, the Home Secretary will have what is defined as “reasonable time” to let them come home. I am concerned that, as far as I can see, there is no indication of what that time would be. The period of enforced temporary residence in another country could effectively trap British citizens in countries where jihadi groups have a strong presence, such as Sudan, Somalia, Turkey, Syria and Iraq. As the human rights group Liberty states:
“Those who are equivocal are more likely to be pushed towards terrorist factions by the imposition of executive led punishments and enforced periods in close proximity to such groups.”
If the primary purpose of counter-terrorism policy is to make us safer, why would we take steps to alienate individuals by condemning them to exile when some of them—I quite understand that this does not apply to all of them—may simply have made a terrible mistake? They may have been horrified by the bloodshed and barbarism that they have seen and want to find a way to come home.
Mrs May
The hon. Lady has referred a number of times to “exile” for the individuals concerned. We have to be absolutely clear that the provision will not exile an individual or prevent them from having the right to return to the United Kingdom. It will mean that when they return to the United Kingdom, it will be on a managed basis under terms that the Government set.
Caroline Lucas
I thank the Home Secretary, and I accept that she is technically correct, but I am describing a situation in which, because a person has not been able to follow the process that she described, they cannot find a way back and feel as though they were in exile.
If the primary purpose of counter-terrorism policy is to make us safer, it is surely sensible to ensure that individuals who definitely pose a threat are somewhere where it is easier to keep an eye on them, investigate them, arrest them, charge them and prosecute them, should the evidence warrant it. Surely we want suspected terrorists close at hand so that we can take targeted action against them rather than allow them to roam who knows where doing who knows what. As the old adage goes, “Keep your friends close and your enemies even closer”. Moreover, if someone is intent on carrying out a terrorist attack on British soil, does the Home Secretary really believe that having to apply for a permit and attend an interview will act as any kind of deterrent or obstacle?
The Government’s scheme does have one element to recommend it, which is the steps taken to ensure that agencies and the police know of an individual’s location should they need to place him or her under surveillance. That comes from the stipulation that someone return on a specific flight to a specific airport. However, I argue that the same outcomes could be secured by placing a simple notification requirement on carriers, as set out in new clauses 4 to 6. Crucially, as the right hon. Member for Holborn and St Pancras described, that approach would not automatically alert a terror suspect to the fact that they had come to the notice of the authorities and that their return was being monitored. I argue that it would instead facilitate a targeted and intelligence-led response, and that the ability to undertake close surveillance of suspects would be maximised, with a view to arrest and prosecution. The option under existing counter-terrorism powers of interviewing a suspect on their arrival back in the UK would also be retained, and there would be further options as appropriate.
I have some concerns about the human rights aspects of the proposals on TEOs, but I also believe that they could end up being counter-productive from a security perspective. They will not provide the robust level of security that people in Britain have a right to expect.
Jeremy Corbyn
I would want that person to have some kind of treatment, or I would want measures of some kind to be taken, but expressing support for something and doing it are two rather different things.
There are very unpleasant parallels in the British colonial past. I sat through the hearings in the High Court when the Mau Mau people were seeking compensation. The way in which they had been treated by the British Army in Kenya in 1955 was disgusting and disgraceful beyond belief. We are now going through a horrible, vile period in Syria. We must understand where we have come from and how we will get through this period without denying our own civil liberties and encouraging more people to join in this whole ghastly process.
Mrs May
This has been a constructive and well-informed debate. Some Members have raised practical questions and others have raised questions of principle, but it was the right hon. Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Frank Dobson) who brought home to us why we must look at the issue of our terrorism legislation when he explained that his own constituency had been affected by not the theory but the actuality of terrorism, and that people had lost their lives as a result. So this is not an academic discussion; we are talking about a real threat to this country, and we need to do everything we can to combat that.
The hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) talked about the balance between civil liberties and national security. I have always taken the view that without our security we cannot enjoy our civil liberties, but I would simply point out that this Government reviewed counter-terrorism legislation when we came in and took a number of steps such as reducing the period of pre-charge detention from 28 to 14 days, so we have been very conscious throughout of the need always to be aware of the freedoms we hold dear and the desire to ensure we can maintain them.
I am grateful for the constructive tone adopted by most of those who spoke in the debate. There will of course be discussion of the details and consideration of how best to achieve our desired objective, but many of those who spoke recognised the legitimate aim of what the Government are doing. It is perfectly legitimate to try to ensure we can manage the return to this country of those who may pose a threat to the people of the UK.
The right hon. Member for Knowsley (Mr Howarth) talked about the complexity of the situation we are dealing with, particularly in relation to Syria and Iraq. People going out there, sometimes with the best of intentions, may find themselves being radicalised. People may go out to fight or work with one particular group but get caught up in fighting with other, more extreme terrorist organisations. So it is a very complex picture; I understand that.
The right hon. Gentleman raised the question of whether people would be looked at in categories, and described a number of categories. As I have said, individuals will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Whether they meet the criteria set out in the Bill will be considered, and that will include looking at them in much the way he described, and putting in place the appropriate measures in relation to particular individuals. Of course, such considerations will be made in consultation with operational partners, notably the security services and the police, but that this will be done on a case-by-case basis is a very important element that people should remember.
Mr George Howarth
My point in illustrating those categories is that the hope is that the conditions attached to the return would point individuals in the direction of prevention or some form of surveillance, as the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) accepted might be necessary. I was interested in those two things coming together.
Mrs May
I understand the point the right hon. Gentleman was making, and the intention is indeed that that will be done on a case-by-case basis—both the question whether there should be a TEO, and how that individual would be managed on their return to the United Kingdom. For some, it would be appropriate to look at further action when they return to the UK—for example, it could be right to put someone on a TPIM—or it might be appropriate for them to be put in the direction of some form of programme that helps to de-radicalise them. The right hon. Member for Holborn and St Pancras raised the issue of potential prosecution, too, and it may be that there is evidence and it is appropriate to prosecute somebody when they return. So we are talking about this being done on a case-by-case basis. I know that is a well-used phrase, but that is genuinely intended to operate in this instance.
I hope that answers the point the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) made in referring to her two constituents who had died in Syria. Of course we think of the father she quoted, who has seen his sons die in those circumstances. Again, I assure her that we would decide whether to impose a TEO on a case-by-case basis. As I have said, people will go out to Syria for a whole variety of reasons, some of them believing they are going for humanitarian purposes.
The Government have given a clear message to everyone: if you are thinking of going out to Syria for humanitarian purposes, don’t go. There are better ways of helping the people of Syria than going out there and potentially getting caught up in the fighting and losing your life.
I welcome the constructive approach adopted by the right hon. Member for Delyn (Mr Hanson), who led for the official Opposition, and by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve). I want to respond to some of the points that they and others have raised. A number of Members spoke as though the Opposition’s notification and managed return proposals were an alternative to the Government’s proposals, but I think the right hon. Member for Delyn made it clear that they were in addition to our proposals. The hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) asked what would constitute a reasonable excuse. In fact, that would ultimately be for the courts to decide. A reasonable excuse could involve circumstances in which an individual had inadvertently breached the terms of their permit to return to the UK for practical reasons—for example, when their plane had been diverted.
Frank Dobson
If a person who had been made the subject of an order that had been deemed to have been served came to this country without knowing that it had been served, would they have committed an offence?
Mrs May
I was about to come on to the issue of serving the order. It is set out in the Bill that the fact that someone does not know that an order has been served is not necessarily a sufficient excuse, but that is a matter that would be tested in the courts. They would be looking at the action that was to be taken in relation to a breach, and it would be for them to determine what a reasonable excuse would be. An order would be served in person whenever possible, but when that was not possible, we would seek to ensure that an individual was made aware of the order through other mechanisms. We might, for example, seek to serve it at the individual’s last known address or serve the order to file. As I said earlier, similar systems work effectively in other contexts, such as informing foreign nationals about decisions on their immigration status.
Frank Dobson
This reminds me of one of my constituents. He went to Somalia and then went to Djibouti, where he was arrested and handed over to the Americans. When he said he was a British citizen, he was told, “No, you’re not. The Home Secretary has taken your citizenship away.” He was unaware of that fact, but I gather that the order was deemed to have been served on him in Somalia because it had been sent to his mother’s address in Islington.
John McDonnell
Can we be clear on this point? Clause 9(4) states that when a relevant notice
“has not actually been given to an individual, the fact that the relevant notice is deemed to have been given to the individual…does not…prevent the individual from showing that lack of knowledge of the temporary exclusion order…was a reasonable excuse”.
To be frank, that will not be strong enough in many cases.
Mrs May
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his intervention, but as I have just said to the right hon. Member for Holborn and St Pancras, the point is that what is a reasonable excuse will be tested in the courts. I did not quote the exact words but I cited the spirit of the point in clause 9(4). As I say, that matter would be tested by the courts and it would be for them to determine whether or not what the hon. Gentleman describes constituted a reasonable excuse.
Mr Winnick
What makes some of us uneasy about temporary exclusion orders—I was certainly uneasy about them from the very beginning—is that excessive powers are being given without the individual having legal redress. I hope that one does not have to say that one is against terrorism and loathes every form of criminality, when we see what is happening with terrorism and what is happening in Australia. That does not alter the fact that these powers should be subject to some form of legal redress, and it is unfortunate that they will not be.
Mrs May
They are subject to a form of legal redress; it is called judicial review. The debate has not been about whether there is some form of legal redress available to individuals but about whether there should be an automatic court process after a decision has been made by the Secretary of State.
Mr Winnick
The judicial process comes afterwards, and it can be very complex for the individual concerned. What I am saying is that if the Secretary of State is going to take powers such as temporary exclusion orders, those powers should be subject to a court order, and the arguments should be put in court. There may be some obvious restrictions for reasons that have been stated, but at least they are all part of living under the rule of law.
Mrs May
I remind the hon. Gentleman that the power to remove a passport from an individual—the royal prerogative power—is not subject to an automatic court process. This is more akin to that royal prerogative exercise in the removal of a passport than it is to the imposition of the sort of measures that can be within the terrorism prevention and investigation measures.
Jeremy Corbyn
Let us be clear: a judicial review is not an appeal; it is an examination of process. It is no more and no less than that. To call it a judicial oversight is really not correct.
Mrs May
The point is that there is a process in which the courts consider whether the decision by the Secretary of State to exercise the temporary exclusion order was reasonable. Let me come back to the point made by the hon. Member for Walsall North (Mr Winnick). If we look at the difference between a royal prerogative power and the terrorism prevention and investigation measures, the restriction on an individual that can be imposed through a TPIM is far greater than that imposed through the exercise of the royal prerogative power. This power of the temporary exclusion order is more akin to the royal prerogative power, which is why I believe that the proposals in the Bill are appropriate for the sort of measure that we are putting in place.
As the Bill goes through its various stages in this House and the other place, there will be further discussion on the issues that have been raised by hon. Members today. What we are proposing is a new power, but it is both necessary and proportionate. As I have said before, it will not render anyone stateless. It will ensure that those who have been fighting abroad and who want to come back to the United Kingdom do so in a managed way and on our terms, and it is compliant with all our domestic and international legal obligations. I invite all those who have tabled amendments to withdraw them, and the Committee to agree that clauses 2 to 11 should stand part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 2 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 3 to 11 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
To report progress and ask leave to sit again.—(Mel Stride.)
The Deputy Speaker resumed the Chair.
Progress reported; Committee to sit again tomorrow.
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures
Baroness May of Maidenhead Excerpts(10 years ago)
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The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mrs Theresa May)
Section 19(1) of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (the Act) requires the Secretary of State to report to Parliament as soon as reasonably practicable after the end of every relevant three-month period on the exercise of her TPIM powers under the Act during that period.
The level of information provided will always be subject to slight variations based on operational advice.
TPIM notices in force (as of 30 November 2014) | 1 |
TPIM notices in respect of British citizens (as of 30 November 2014) | 0 |
TPIM notices extended (during the reporting period) | 1 |
TPIM notices revoked (during the reporting period) | 0 |
TPIM notices revived (during the reporting period) | 0 |
Variations made to measures specified in TPIM notices (during the reporting period) | 1 |
Applications to vary measures specified in TPIM notices refused (during the reporting period) | 2 |
During the reporting period one TPIM notice has been extended.
The TPIM review group (TRG) keeps every TPIM notice under regular and formal review. The next TRG will take place in December.
Section 16 of the 2011 Act provides rights of appeal in relation to decisions taken by the Secretary of State under the Act. One appeal was lodged under section 16 during the reporting period.
One judgment was handed down by the High Court in relation to an appeal under section 16 of the Act. In DD v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWHC 3820 (Admin), handed down on 20 November 2014, the High Court dismissed a preliminary issue in DD’s appeal against the revival of his TPIM notice. This preliminary issue related to DD’s submission that the revival of the TPIM notice breached article 3 ECHR. The remainder of the appeal will be heard in March 2015. This judgment is available at http://www. bailii.org/
Police and National Crime Agency Remuneration Review Bodies
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The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mrs Theresa May)
I am pleased to announce that I have appointed Anita Bharucha and Paul Leighton as members of the Police and National Crime Agency Remuneration Review Bodies. These appointments will be to 31 August 2017, commencing on 11 December.
Anita Bharucha is currently an independent management consultant and brings a wealth of experience to the role. Anita was a civil servant from 1993 to 2012 and served in a number of Departments including the Home Office, Cabinet Office, Northern Ireland Office, and latterly as a Director in the Ministry of Justice.
Paul Leighton is currently, a non-executive director on the Prison Service management board for Northern Ireland and Chair of its Audit Committee. Among the extensive experience he brings to the role is an understanding of the specific context of policing in Northern Ireland. Paul retired as Deputy Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland in May 2009 and he has previously worked in policing in both Northern Ireland and the north-east of England.
These appointments have been made in accordance with the code of practice issued by the Commissioner for Public Appointments.
Police Integrity
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The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mrs Theresa May)
On 22 July, Official Report, column 1265, I gave a statement to the House on this Government’s ongoing work to ensure the highest standards of integrity in the police. I informed the House that I would undertake a number of reviews, including an end-to-end review of the police complaints system and an independent review of the police disciplinary system, led by Major General (Retd) Chip Chapman. I am pleased to tell the House that these reviews have now concluded and the Government are today launching a public consultation on reforms to improve police complaints and discipline to better hold police officers to account and deal with misconduct appropriately.
I have always been clear that I believe the vast majority of police officers in this country do their job honestly and with integrity. They put themselves in harm’s way to protect the public. They are cutting crime even as we reduce police spending. And the vast majority of officers do their work with a strong sense of fairness and duty. But as I have said before, the good work of the majority threatens to be damaged by a continuing series of events and revelations relating to police conduct.
This Government have carried out a radical programme of reform of the policing landscape. We have given chief constables greater operational independence, by scrapping national targets, while at the same time strengthening local accountability to the public through the creation of directly elected police and crime commissioners (PCCs). We have reformed police pay and conditions, established the College of Policing to improve police standards and beefed up the Independent Police Complaints Commission to take on all serious and sensitive cases. Crime has fallen by a fifth under this Government, according to the crime survey for England and Wales.
The reforms I am consulting on today will build on this programme of reform. The reviews show that the police complaints and disciplinary systems do not meet the standards that both the public and the police rightly expect. Those wishing to lodge a complaint find an opaque and bureaucratic system with insufficient independence. The police see a system designed to punish them, rather than one that provides feedback to help them improve performance.
The Government’s proposed reforms put the public at the heart of the system, replacing bureaucracy and complexity with accountability and transparency. We propose giving Police and Crime Commissioners the powers to handle complaints in a way that makes sense for their local electorates. This includes PCCs taking on responsibility for how complaints appropriate for local resolution are dealt with, making sure that issues are resolved quickly and effectively. We propose giving the IPCC new powers, strengthening its role as an independent oversight body and building on this Government’s commitment to transfer resources to enable the IPCC to investigate all serious and sensitive cases. We suggest the introduction of police super-complaints, a feature of the financial markets regulatory landscape, to allow designated organisations to present evidence of systemic problems to the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC), and give a voice to those who choose not to complain directly.
It is impossible to separate the police complaints and disciplinary systems and the Government’s reforms also address the way in which police performance and misconduct matters are dealt with. I am grateful in this regard for Major General (Retd) Chip Chapman’s thorough investigation and analysis of the police disciplinary system, which is published today alongside the Government’s proposals. On 18 November, Official Report, column 6WS, I announced proposals to hold police disciplinary hearings in public with independent, legally-qualified chairs and the intention to legislate in this Parliament. In addition, the Government are now seeking views on the majority of the remaining Chapman recommendations, which include benchmarking to ensure consistency of sanctions; streamlining and integrating the performance management and misconduct processes; and consulting on merging the disciplinary systems for police officers and police staff.
Finally, the Government have already announced a consultation on protections for police whistleblowers to ensure that concerns can be raised without fear of disciplinary action. Today’s consultation document contains further proposals, including strengthening the independent route for whistleblowing to the IPCC and allowing the IPCC to conduct investigations in a way that protects the identity of the whistleblower.
In addition, I am today announcing the commencement of the first triennial review of the Independent Police Complaints Commission, part of the Government’s commitment to ensuring that public bodies continue to have regular independent challenge. The review will focus on examining whether the IPCC is operating efficiently and whether its control and governance arrangements continue to meet the recognised principles of good corporate governance. I will inform the House of the outcome of the review when it is completed.
These proposals are a key step of the Government’s reform of the policing landscape, ensuring that, where the public have concerns about their contact with the police, these will be dealt with in a transparent, fair and effective way. These reforms are vital for securing confidence in this system and in the work of the police.
We will be consulting on these proposals for eight weeks and will respond to the consultation before the end of the Parliament. The consultation document has been published as a Command Paper (Cm 8976) and copies will be available from the Vote Office. A copy of Major General Chapman’s report will be placed in the Library of the House. Both of these publications can be found at:
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications?departments%5B%5D=home-office&publication_filter_option=consultations
I hope that those with an interest in these very important matters will take the time to respond to the consultation.
Justice and Home Affairs Council
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The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mrs Theresa May)
The Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council was held on 4 and 5 December in Brussels. The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, my right hon. Friend the Member for Epsom and Ewell (Chris Grayling), and I attended on behalf of the United Kingdom. The following items were discussed.
The justice day began with a discussion on the proposed general data protection regulation. The presidency sought a partial general approach on a number of articles intended to provide member states with flexibility to adapt the application of the rules to their public sectors, and on chapter IX, on rules for data processing for research, scientific and journalistic purposes. The Commission encouraged member states to accept the compromise between common standards and a measure of flexibility now available for particular national approaches. A majority of member states, including the UK, agreed the deal.
The discussion of the data protection regulation continued with an orientation debate on the presidency’s proposed structure for a “one stop shop” mechanism, which is intended to reduce burdens for business by enabling all of their operations in different member states to be overseen by the data protection regulator in their home state. While there was support for the principle and most member states accepted the compromise proposed by the presidency, the UK and a number of other member states expressed concerns that, with legally binding powers for the European data protection board (EDPB) to resolve disputes, the model proposed would fail to achieve the stated objectives of legal certainty, quick decisions and proximity for the data subject. The presidency concluded that a majority of member states accepted the basic elements of its proposal, including the proposed European data protection board, but noted that questions remained, and tasked the official-level working group to develop the detail in the light of this steer.
The presidency also provided a separate update on the proposed data protection directive covering the processing of personal data for criminal justice purposes. The file remains under discussion, and the working group has recently focused on the scope of the directive. The UK Government believe that the priority should be on agreeing the text of the general regulation.
The Council adopted a general approach on the proposed directive on the presumption of innocence in criminal proceedings. Commissioner Jourova supported the Council compromise, though regretted that the absolute right to silence and right not to self incriminate had not been fully upheld in the proposed text. The UK has not opted into the directive.
There was a partial general approach on the draft Eurojust regulation, covering all parts except the provisions covering its relationship with the European Public Prosecutor (EPPO) and data protection. However, the Commission stated that they still have a number of issues with the text, including the need for them to be able to participate in administrative decision-making because of their budgetary responsibility, and the proposed compensation mechanism. On the EPPO, Ministers concluded that there was a need to strengthen the prosecutor’s independence within the supervisory regime. They noted the presidency’s suggested drafting but mandated further discussion at expert level on this issue. The UK is not participating in the EPPO and has not opted in to the draft Eurojust regulation.
Political agreement, supported by the UK, was reached on the proposal to amend the EU insolvency regulation 1346/2000. The presidency noted the importance of this file for cross-border insolvency and the considerable work that had gone into finding an acceptable compromise with the European Parliament. The next step is for the text to be finalised by lawyers before adoption under the Latvian presidency.
The Council adopted a general approach on the proposed regulation on small claims, which the Government generally welcome. The Council has agreed a threshold of £3,137 for the maximum value of a claim under the regulation, but expects this to be one of the issues for negotiation during trilogue with the European Parliament, which will start in January.
Next, the Council endorsed, without discussion, orientation guidelines for the negotiation of the draft regulation on simplifying the cross-border acceptance of certain public documents—abolishing the process of “legalisation”. The guidelines will steer discussions at working group level, and narrow the scope of the draft regulation; allow certified translations to be accepted in other member states, and allow for simple translations of original national documents rather than translated stand-alone forms with their own evidentiary value.
In a “state of play” update on the proposed legal aid directive, the presidency noted that there were still divergences of views between member states, some of which advocated more flexibility on the provision of legal aid in the case of minor offences, while others wished to see the directive extended to ordinary legal aid, beyond the provisional legal aid proposed by the Commission. The presidency will provide the incoming Latvian presidency with a document setting out their understanding of the main outstanding points in the negotiations. The UK has not opted into this directive.
The presidency gave a state of play update on the draft directive on the fight against fraud by means of criminal law—the so-called “PIF” directive—noting that a few substantive issues remained. These included whether to include VAT in scope, the definition of fraud, and the definition of serious offences.
The presidency invited Ministers to take note of its latest text of the proposals on the applicable law and jurisdiction in relation to matrimonial and registered partnership property regimes, which it hoped would be an acceptable compromise. It suggested a period of reflection to last no longer than until the end of 2015 to allow member states to consider whether unanimity could be reached. The UK has not opted into these proposals.
Under AOB the presidency invited Council to take stock of the activities undertaken over the course of 2014 by the Special Committee on Organised Crime, Corruption and Money Laundering (CRIM), established by the European Parliament.
The Latvian Justice Minister set out his priorities for their forthcoming presidency. These included reaching a general approach on the data protection regulation at the March Council, continuing work on the “PIF” directive and the EPPO, reaching a general approach on the legal aid directive by March, continuing work on the small claims regulation, reaching agreement on the access to public documents file, and continuing work on the common European sales law.
The interior day began in mixed committee which included a discussion on “managing migratory flows”. This focused on the implementation of the October JHA Council conclusions on this topic. The Commission introduced its “scorecard” on progress, and the incoming Latvian presidency informed the Council of its commitment to continuing this work. There has been progress, including with the launch of the Khartoum process, which focused on people smuggling and human trafficking in the horn of Africa.
With regard to the Mediterranean, member states continue to provide support for Frontex’s Operation Triton, while the presidency confirmed that the Italian search and rescue operation “Mare Nostrum” would be phased out by the end of January.
The Council underlined the importance of implementing the common European asylum system (CEAS) and of all member states providing concrete solidarity to those facing particular pressures. There were calls from some member states for further resettlement activities, including for a “distribution key” guiding allocation among member states, while others made clear their views that resettlement should remain voluntary. The Council agreed that proposals for enhanced regional devolvement and protection programmes would continue to be taken forward.
The UK emphasised the need to focus on upstream activities in countries of origin and transit and to tackle smugglers and traffickers, and joined other Ministers in calling for all member states to fully respect their responsibilities under the CEAS, including the need to fingerprint and register claims.
The Commission presented its latest biannual report on the functioning of the Schengen area, highlighting increased illegal migration at the EU’s external borders and calling for member states to fulfil their commitment to share information on secondary illegal migration movements within the Schengen area. The Government have a strong interest in the effective functioning of the Schengen area and continue to work with European partners to tackle migratory pressures across the EU. The UK emphasised how the openness of the Schengen area and the principle of free movement continue to be exploited, for example by organised gangs and criminals, and how the EU needs to work harder to manage these risks and put the right safeguards in place.
The Council and the Commission noted achievements during 15 years of Schengen evaluation and agreed Council conclusions which authorise the continuation of Schengen evaluation work within the Council under the new Schengen evaluation mechanism.
During the main Council, member states returned to the issue of counter terrorism and in particular foreign fighters, following discussions on this issue at the October Council. Member states, along with the Commission and Europol, discussed how best to tackle the threat posed by those returning from Syria and Iraq, as well as efforts to tackle radicalisation.
Over lunch, the Commission (Avramopoulos) stressed its commitment to achieving an EU passenger name records (PNR) directive, despite the European Parliament’s referral of the EU Canada PNR agreement to the Court of Justice of the European Union. The UK expressed disappointment at the likelihood of significant delay and stressed that in the face of a severe threat it was now essential for member states to press ahead with bilateral arrangements for PNR. There was general agreement among member states that an EU instrument was needed to set common standards and protect privacy and that the directive should still be pursued. The UK agreed, but stated that we would not support a PNR directive which was overly constrained and that in the interim further progress on intergovernmental agreements should be pursued.
Under AOB, the Commission congratulated the presidency for the organisation of recent meetings on the Rabat and Khartoum processes in Rome and said work would continue on greater co-ordination across the board on migration issues. Slovenia informed Council of the outcome of the Salzburg forum ministerial conference in Slovenia on 11-12 November. The conference had discussed the fight against foreign fighters, support for the integrated approach for the western Balkan regions, strengthening regional co-operation and the new regulation for training of law enforcement authorities.
The presidency set out the background to the students and researchers directive and updated Council on the recent progress made, in particular on the scope. It hoped that member states could agree to a compromise package by the end of the year, so as to begin negotiations with the European Parliament early next year. The presidency also said that negotiations continued on the amendments to the Dublin III regulation and aimed to reach agreement on a Council position. The Commission hoped that Council would reach a balanced position and that trilogues could start as soon as possible.
The incoming Latvian presidency explained its priorities for interior business. It would concentrate on implementation of the strategic guidelines for the justice and home affairs area, as agreed at the June European Council, with a particular focus on: countering foreign fighters, renewing the EU internal security strategy and continuing the work on a comprehensive and structured approach to managing migratory flows. It would continue legislative work on the students and researchers directives, amendments to the Dublin regulation, the visa code recast, Europol, the European Police College (CEPOL) and the smart borders package and continue progress with PNR. A special priority for the Latvian presidency would be strengthening co-operation with eastern partners. Latvia would host an Eastern Partnership meeting in the margins of the informal Council on 29-30 January.
On both days, under AOB, Council was informed of the outcome of the EU-US JHA ministerial meeting, on 12-13 November.
Article 10 of protocol 36 to the treaties
Under the arrangements in article 10 of protocol 36 to the treaties, which were negotiated by the last Government, the United Kingdom had the right to opt out of all EU police and judicial co-operation measures adopted before the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty. In July 2013, following votes in both Houses of Parliament endorsing the Government’s decision, the Prime Minister formally exercised the opt-out. This decision took effect on 1 December 2014 and on that date the United Kingdom opted out of more than 100 EU police and criminal justice powers.
The Government have always been clear that we wanted to remain part of a smaller number of measures which give our police and law enforcement agencies vital and practical help to tackle serious crime and keep the public safe. Following consultation with operational partners and the relevant parliamentary Committees, and detailed discussions with the European Commission, the Council and other member states, the Government reached final agreement to rejoin 35 crucial police and criminal justice measures with debates in both houses on 10 and 17 November this year.
On 20 November 2014, following votes in both Houses of Parliament endorsing the Government’s package, the Prime Minister notified the President of the Council of Ministers of the United Kingdom’s wish to rejoin the 35 measures set out in Command Paper 8897: “Decision pursuant to Article 10(5) of Protocol 36 to The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union”. A copy of the Prime Minister’s notification letter has been placed in the Library of the House.
A Council and a Commission decision were required to give effect to the United Kingdom’s application to rejoin the measures. These processes were concluded on 1 December and copies of both decisions were deposited in Parliament on 4 December. Explanatory memoranda for both decisions have now also been deposited in Parliament.
The Government voted, via the written procedure, to approve the adoption of the Schengen Council decision, in order to ensure that it entered into force on 1 December without an operational gap for our law enforcement agencies occurring. This decision required the overriding of the scrutiny reserve resolution, but did no more than approve the UK’s participation in the six Schengen measures that had already been endorsed by both Houses of Parliament. Given unanimity was required for the measure to pass, the Government had to vote to approve this decision to ensure that the package of measures could come into operation as soon as possible, to avoid a legal vacuum which could have arisen, to allow negotiations to conclude, and in order to conclude an advantageous package deal with other member states.
The Commission decision, which contained no more than a short provision approving the UK’s application to rejoin the 29 non-Schengen measures, did not require the formal endorsement of the United Kingdom or other member states prior to its adoption.
Two further decisions relating to this matter were adopted by the Council at the Transport Telecommunications and Energy (TTE) Council on 27 November. The UK did not have a vote on the transitional decision, but voted in favour of the financial consequences decision in order to secure the advantageous deal we had reached with other member states and ensure that the package of measures could come into operation as soon as possible. The European Scrutiny Committee did not clear the draft Council decision on financial consequences from scrutiny ahead of this Council. As a result, this decision required the overriding of the scrutiny reserve resolution to allow negotiations to conclude, and in order to conclude the deal with other member states.
The Government’s undertaking not to override scrutiny save in exceptional circumstances is embodied in scrutiny reserve resolutions of the House of Commons (last updated in 1998) and the House of Lords (in 2010). These resolutions are the cornerstone of the scrutiny procedures and provide assurance to Parliament that Ministers will not agree to measures in the Council of Ministers unless scrutiny has been completed. Ministers are committed to the scrutiny process and do not override them lightly. However, the circumstances were such in this case that it was necessary in order to deliver on a significant and successful negotiation where the measures implemented an outcome endorsed by both Houses of Parliament.
The Government are confident that the deal reached is a good one for all parties and that the smaller package of measures that we have rejoined will give our police and law enforcement agencies vital and practical tools to maintain co-operation with our European partners.
Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill
Baroness May of Maidenhead Excerpts(10 years ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mrs Theresa May)
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
The threat that we face from terrorism is serious, and it is growing. The Security Service believes that since the attacks on 7 July 2005, about 40 terrorist plots have been disrupted. It is thanks to the hard work and dedication of our security and intelligence services, the police, and our allies overseas that almost all those plots have been thwarted, and countless lives have been saved. I am sure that the whole House will want to join me in paying tribute to those men and women, whose work so often goes unreported and unrecognised as they strive to keep us safe.
Today, however, the threat from terrorism is becoming ever-more complex and diverse. Last year we saw the first terrorist-related deaths in Great Britain since 2005: Fusilier Lee Rigby was brutally murdered by Islamist extremists, and Mohammed Saleem, an 82-year-old Muslim from Birmingham, was stabbed to death by a far-right extremist who then tried to bomb mosques in Walsall, Wolverhampton and Tipton.
ISIL and its western fighters represent a clear danger. This summer, partly in response to that threat, the independent joint terrorism analysis centre raised the threat level for international terrorism from “substantial” to “severe”. That means that JTAC considers a terrorist attack to be “highly likely”. We face the very serious prospect that British nationals who have fought with terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq will seek to radicalise others, or carry out attacks here. We have already seen the appalling murder of four civilians outside the Jewish Museum in Brussels, and the recent attack on the Canadian Parliament was a shocking reminder that we are all targets for these terrorist organisations and those whom they inspire.
However, ISIL is not the only threat that we face. There are further threats related to Islamist extremism, and there are threats from far-right and Northern Ireland-related terrorism, among others. Just last week, a report from the Intelligence and Security Committee on the intelligence relating to the murder of Lee Rigby highlighted the real, and potentially very dangerous, capability gaps that exist for the security and intelligence agencies—and when our security and intelligence agencies tell us that the threat that we face is now more dangerous than at any time before or since 9/11, we must act.
We are engaged in a struggle against terrorism which is being fought on many fronts and in many forms, so our response must be comprehensive, coherent and effective. Since April 2010, in Great Britain, more than 800 people have been arrested for terrorism-related offences, more than 210 have been charged, and more than 140 have been successfully prosecuted. Only last week, Mohammed and Hamza Nawaz became the first Britons to be jailed for terrorist training in Syria, and we have outlawed groups linked to terrorist attacks in Syria, Iraq and Egypt.
We have protected the budgets for counter-terrorism policing and for the security and intelligence agencies, and, as the Prime Minister announced last week, we have made an additional £130 million available over the next two years to help us tackle the increasing terrorist threat. We have replaced control orders, which had been whittled down by the courts, with terrorism prevention and investigation measures, or TPIMs. We have strengthened the criteria governing the use of the royal prerogative, which allows the Government to cancel British passports to disrupt the travel of people planning to engage in terrorist-related activity overseas. I have used that enhanced power 29 times since April 2013.
Mr Pat McFadden (Wolverhampton South East) (Lab)
The Home Secretary referred to the Government decision to replace control orders. One of the decisions she made when she did that was to remove the relocation powers within control orders. That was a decision of choice, not one forced on her by the courts. This Bill reverses that judgment to get rid of relocation powers. Will she now admit that it was a grave error to put the public at increased risk as a result of a political deal within the coalition, and that the fact that she is now legislating to reverse those changes shows that it was a grave error of judgment?
Mrs May
I would say two things to the right hon. Gentleman. First, as I have just been outlining, we face today a different threat background from that we faced in recent years. Also, if he looks carefully at the Bill, he will see that we are not simply reintroducing a power of relocation into the TPIMs. We have taken on board the recommendations of the independent reviewer of counter-terrorism legislation, David Anderson QC, who did propose the reintroduction of relocation, but who also proposed a number of other changes to TPIMs, which we are introducing, including the raising of the threshold for the introduction of TPIMs from “reasonable suspicion” to “the balance of probabilities”.
We have worked hard to make it easier to get rid of undesirable foreign nationals, including terrorists and terror suspects. We have changed the law to make it clear to the courts that article 8 of the European convention on human rights, the right to respect for a family life, is qualified and not an absolute right. We have significantly reformed the Prevent pillar of the counter-terrorism strategy so that it is tackles the ideology behind the threat, and we are working with the internet industry to remove terrorist material hosted in the UK or overseas. Since December last year, the counter-terrorism internet referral unit has secured the removal of over 46,000 items that encouraged or glorified acts of terrorism.
The emergency legislation that Parliament approved in the summer ensured that two important capabilities, communications data and interception, were not eroded further. Both of these capabilities are absolutely crucial to the investigation of those involved in terrorist activity.
Derek Twigg (Halton) (Lab)
Is the right hon. Lady satisfied that we now have enough interception powers, or not?
Mrs May
If the hon. Gentleman is referring to the power to issue warrants on companies who offer services in the UK but who are based overseas or the holding of whose data is based overseas, we addressed precisely that issue in the legislation introduced in the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 that this House put through under emergency powers in the summer.
So we are taking action at home, but we must also have a comprehensive strategy to defeat these extremists abroad. This involves using all the resources at our disposal: humanitarian efforts to help those displaced by ISIL’s onslaught—efforts that Britain is already leading—and diplomatic efforts to engage the widest possible coalition of countries in the region as part of this international effort.
Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)
I am glad the Home Secretary just mentioned tackling the terrorists’ narrative. Does she have in mind in that respect not only taking down extremist postings on the internet, for example, but promoting a counter-narrative that exposes the fallacies of the terrorist narrative?
Mrs May
I commend my hon. Friend because he has been resolute in promoting this aspect of dealing with terrorism for some time, and he is absolutely right that it is important to promote that counter-narrative, but I think it is also important to do something else: to take a further step back and look at the whole issue of extremism more generally. That is why we have been very clear, and the work of the Prime Minister’s extremism taskforce is very clear, that we need to introduce an extremism strategy, and the Home Office is currently leading on that. It will be a cross-Government piece of work, but the Home Office is leading on that and the strategy is being developed.
Keith Vaz (Leicester East) (Lab)
The Home Secretary is right to say that progress has been made during the past year, but will she help me on one point? Where a British citizen has been found to be involved in terrorist-related activities in a foreign country, is it right that we will no longer seek their return to this country, and that they will have to be punished and dealt with abroad?
Mrs May
No. Under the temporary exclusion power in the Bill, when someone who has been involved in terrorist-related activities—that will be considered on a case-by-case basis—returns home to the UK, that will happen on what I would describe as our terms. In other words, that return will be managed so that appropriate action can be taken here in the United Kingdom.
Hazel Blears (Salford and Eccles) (Lab)
The Home Secretary has just said that we need a counter-extremism strategy. May I ask her when that might be available? I remind her that the Department for Communities and Local Government was charged with producing just such a strategy three years ago, but it has not done so. My big concern about the Bill is that it appears to have a gaping hole at its centre. We have a lot about action on individuals who are radicalised, but it has little to say about countering the narrative and countering extremism in general.
Mrs May
As I have indicated, the Home Office is leading on the extremism strategy. We will be working on that, but the right hon. Lady should not expect to see anything published before the end of the year. On the wider issue, when we came into power, we made two changes to the way in which Prevent operated, and we did so for a good reason. First, we ensured that Prevent looked not only at violent extremism but at non-violent extremism. Secondly, we saw that in some communities, work being done on community integration under a Prevent heading was being rejected or arousing suspicion. People saw that the work was being done under a counter-terrorism heading and thought that it was about spying on individuals, when it was actually more about community integration. That is why we separated the integration work and gave it to the Department for Communities and Local Government, which has been undertaking that work.
Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)
May I press the Home Secretary about the temporary exclusion orders that she wants to have the power to exact? They would, in effect, result in the exile—albeit short term and temporary—of British citizens, in many cases, to other countries. All history suggests that such action further radicalises people and makes them more dangerous enemies to this country. If we do so without any judicial process, as she advocates in the Bill, is there not a real danger that we will put ourselves in more danger rather than less?
Mrs May
I caution the hon. Gentleman about the terminology that he uses in relation to the power. He has used the term “exile”, but the proposal is not about saying that people cannot return. It is possible for people to return, but they will return on the basis that we have set out in the Bill. Their return will be managed and we will have some control over it.
In response to an earlier intervention, I said that the change that we were making to the threshold for TPIMs was from “reasonable suspicion” to “the balance of probabilities”. The change is actually from “reasonable belief” to “the balance of probabilities”. I apologise to the House for having given the wrong impression about that.
Aside from the diplomatic efforts that we must make and the work we must do with those in the region, I have always been clear that we would keep our terrorism laws and capabilities under review. As the House knows, the first and most important duty of Government is the protection and security of their citizens. As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister made clear to the House on 1 September, we must ensure that our law enforcement and intelligence agencies have the powers that they need to keep us safe. The Bill will strengthen our existing powers so that we can disrupt people’s ability to travel abroad to fight, as well as their ability to return to the country. It will enhance our ability to monitor and control the actions of those in the UK who pose a threat and it will help to combat the underlying ideology that feeds, supports and sanctions terrorism.
Part 1 of the Bill will provide the police and MI5 with two new powers that will significantly enhance their ability to restrict the travel of those suspected of seeking to engage in terrorism-related activity overseas. First, it will provide the police, or a designated Border Force officer under their direction, with the power to seize a passport at ports. That will allow them to disrupt the travel of individuals, and give operational agencies the time to investigate and assess whether long-term disruptive action should be taken, on a case-by-case basis. Such action could be taken through, for example, criminal prosecution; the exercise of the royal prerogative to refuse or cancel a passport; a TPIM; deprivation of citizenship; or deportation. The use of this power will be properly safeguarded through a range of measures, including the need for a senior officer’s approval; an additional check by a more senior officer independent of the investigation after 72 hours; an initial retention period of 14 days for the passport; and a court review of the ongoing need to retain a passport, where a judge can allow more time for the police to continue their investigation—up to 30 days. There will also be a statutory code of practice for officers on how to exercise the power, and we intend to publish this code for consultation shortly.
Secondly, the Bill will create a power to issue temporary exclusion orders, to which I have already referred in response to interventions. These orders can temporarily disrupt the return to the UK of a British citizen suspected of involvement in terrorist activity abroad, ensuring that when individuals do return, it is done in a manner that we control. This power will cancel an individual’s travel documents and add them to watch lists, notifying the UK if they attempt to travel. Depending on the individual case, it may also require the individual to comply with certain activities once they are back in the UK. There has been a lot of interest in the nature of this power, as we have seen already this afternoon, but I want to reassure the House that it will not render an individual stateless. All those concerned will have the right, which their citizenship guarantees, to return to the UK. But when they do, it will be on our terms—quite possibly in the company of a police officer. Once they are back in the UK, the police will interview them, in order to explore their activities abroad, and can make them subject to further requirements. We are discussing this proposal with other Governments, in order to agree how it will work best in practice. So far these discussions have been constructive, and this proposal is consistent with all our existing international legal obligations.
Yvette Cooper (Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford) (Lab)
Will the Home Secretary clarify something so that we can understand the implications of the legislation? What are the circumstances in which she would not grant a permit to return?
Mrs May
These matters will be looked at on a case-by-case basis. The point is to be able to manage the return of individuals who have been involved in terrorist-related activity abroad, and we are discussing how the power would be operated practically with a number of other Governments, as I have said. The point is to ensure that when somebody returns, they do so under control and on our terms.
Sir Menzies Campbell (North East Fife) (LD)
I confess that I am by no means convinced of the legality of what is being suggested under temporary exclusion orders, which will, no doubt, be known in due course as TEOs, given our enthusiasm for acronyms. What is the position of someone who declines to accept conditions of return and who is not subject to deportation by the country in which they temporarily find themselves? Are they not de facto stateless in such circumstances?
Mrs May
They are not de facto stateless. It is open to somebody to return, but the proposal is that they would be returning on our basis, under documents that would be issued by the Government, and therefore we would be aware of their return, be able to manage that return and, as I have indicated, take appropriate action when they return to the UK. So this is not rendering people stateless.
Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)
I understand the system that my right hon. Friend is putting in place of managed return, but what is not clear in the Bill is the system that will be present to enable that managed return requirement to be challenged. I wonder whether she can help the House on that point. It seems to me that there must be a mechanism by which a person who is told that they have to return in a particular way can challenge it on their return to this country, and do so expeditiously, if it is not to be an unwarranted interference with their rights.
Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South East) (Lab)
On a point that was made earlier, if an individual has the right to challenge how they are managed—I think the right hon. Lady said that it would be by means of judicial review—can we ensure that they have legal aid to do that?
Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Con)
The Home Secretary is being very reasonable to a lot of Members who wish to get in. Let us take the position of someone subject to one of these orders who finds themselves in a friendly country such as Turkey or France. If the Governments of Turkey or France request the British Government to take that person back into the United Kingdom without going through the deportation process, is it not a fact that we would really feel under an obligation to take back such a person?
Mrs May
If someone were in a country such as France or Turkey, and the Government of that country requested us to take back the individual, it would be possible in those circumstances for us to act in exactly the way that we are proposing in the Bill. I am talking about managing the return of that individual. For example, they might be accompanied by a police officer who would go out to bring them back into the UK, and various actions might be taken on their return. There might be an interview with the police, the introduction of a TPIM notice or a requirement to go on a Prevent programme. Those sorts of measures could be judged on a case-by-case basis.
Richard Fuller
As someone who wants to protect civil liberties in this country, may I warmly welcome this measure from the Home Secretary? There are many in my constituency who would like to see people in this situation given a one-way ticket and not allowed back into the country, so she has found a balance. Does she not think that one benefit of this piece of legislation is that it empowers mothers and fathers of impressionable teenagers to have a clear conversation with them about the consequences of their mind being warped by people on the internet trying to induce them to acts of terrorism overseas?
Mrs May
My hon. Friend makes an interesting point. That is part of the process of trying to disrupt people from travelling to Syria and Iraq or from being active with terrorist groups. We want to get the message across to young people that if they want to help people in Syria there are better ways of doing it than crossing into the country. They can, for example, assist the humanitarian efforts in the UK to support refugees from Syria, which can be of genuine support to people in Syria. In recent weeks, I have met some very impressive women from Muslim communities around the United Kingdom. They have been working with young people and their families, developing a number of programmes, which relay the message, “Don’t go to Syria.” The #MakingAStand campaign and the work that is being done by the charity FAST are about helping families to ensure that young people get the message that they should not be going over to Syria.
Part 2 of the Bill relates to TPIMs. It gives effect to the recommendations of David Anderson QC, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, in his most recent report on TPIMs. The changes to the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 will provide the police and MI5 with valuable new capabilities. That includes allowing TPIM subjects to be relocated to different parts of the country. We will also be raising the legal test for imposing a TPIM—
Mrs May
Will the right hon. Lady at least allow me to get to the end of the paragraph before I give way?
The changes to the TPIM Act include allowing TPIM subjects to be relocated, but we will also be raising the legal test, as I said earlier in response to an intervention, and narrowing the definition of terrorism-related activity in relation to this power. David Anderson is clear that there is no need to turn the clock back to the previous Government’s control orders regime, and I agree with him.
Hazel Blears
I have a simple inquiry, as I genuinely do not understand why the clause as drafted states that if someone is going to be relocated 190 miles away that can be imposed by the Home Secretary, but if they are going to be relocated 205 miles away it has to be a matter for agreement. I do not understand the logic in that provision at all.
Mrs May
We looked carefully at the proposals made by David Anderson and I believe he suggested that there should be a geographical limit for the relocation.
Part 3 seeks to amend the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 to help us identify who in the real world is using an internet protocol, or IP, address at a given point in time. Changes in how service providers build their networks, made to enable them to cope with the increased demand for their services, mean that these identifiers are often shared between a great number of users. Companies generally have no business purpose for keeping a log of who used each address at a given point in time, which means that it is often not possible for law enforcement agencies to identify who sent or received a message. The provisions will allow us to require the key UK companies to retain the necessary information to enable them to identify the users of their services. That will provide vital additional capability to law enforcement in investigating a broad range of serious crime, including terrorism.
The Bill deals only with limited fields of data relating to a specific technical problem. Without the full package of data types included in the draft Communications Data Bill, published in 2012, there will still be gaps in law enforcement and intelligence agencies’ capabilities. For example, the child exploitation and online protection command in the NCA might still struggle to identify those who have been accessing servers hosting illegal images of child sex abuse. That is an issue to which Parliament will need to return after the general election, subject to the outcome of David Anderson’s statutory review of investigatory powers.
Part 4 contains measures on aviation, shipping and rail security. They will help us to stop terrorists and those involved or suspected of being involved in terrorism-related activity from travelling to and from the UK, and will mitigate the threat of an attack on those transport services. The proposals cover three main areas. First, they will require carriers to be able to receive instructions not to carry a specific passenger in a way that is compatible with our border systems. Secondly, they will establish a new framework for authority to carry schemes, commonly known as our no-fly arrangements, that will extend to new categories of British nationals and apply to outbound travel. Finally, they will enhance our ability to require carriers operating to the UK to undertake specified security measures, including the screening of passengers. Carriers that will not comply with security requirements will not be allowed to operate into the UK.
Mr Jim Cunningham (Coventry South) (Lab)
I am puzzled that the Home Secretary has just said that carriers will be required to provide some sort of security screening. How will they do that? Would that not involve additional cost?
Mrs May
Obviously, carriers in most parts of the world are already required to carry out some security screening. From time to time, we say that if someone is going to fly into the United Kingdom we wish them to adopt additional methods of security screening. At the moment, this is done on a voluntary basis, but the Bill takes that and puts it into statute, which will enable us to stop someone from flying into the UK if they do not adopt the security procedures.
Part 5 addresses the issue of those at serious risk of succumbing to radicalisation and terrorism. We propose a new statutory duty on certain bodies, including local authorities, the police, prisons, probation services, schools, colleges and universities, including in the private sector, to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. That will ensure that Prevent strategy activity is consistent across the country and in all those bodies whose staff work on the front line with those at risk from radicalisation. The detail of how the duty should be fulfilled will be set out in statutory guidance, which we will publish shortly.
I hope that the House will find it helpful if I take the opportunity to clarify one specific issue that the guidance will address, which is the need to create an appropriate and sensible balance between the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and the existing duty on universities to promote freedom of speech. I believe that our universities, with their commitment to free speech and the advancement of knowledge, represent one of our most important safeguards against extremist views and ideologies. There is no contradiction between promoting freedom of speech and taking account of the interests and well-being of students, staff and the wider community. That is already subject to guidance issued by both Universities UK and the National Union of Students. We must ensure that poisonous, divisive ideologies are not allowed to promulgate.
Yasmin Qureshi
The right hon. Lady mentioned universities and other institutions being sent statutory guidelines on Prevent. Why do the guidelines have to be in statutory format? Why cannot they just be sent, knowing that any responsible institution will follow them without their having to have legal force behind them?
Mrs May
The purpose of putting Prevent on a statutory basis is twofold. First, the statutory duty will now relate to a number of front-line institutions, as I have said, such as local authorities and universities. There is already some guidance that Universities UK and the National Union of Students apply to universities, as I have indicated. However, I believe it is important to ensure that there is that statutory duty on bodies such as universities, and the Bill allows the Secretary of State to make a direction to one of the bodies covered by that power if they are failing to exercise their statutory duty.
Yvette Cooper
Will the Home Secretary clarify what she means by that? Could she envisage a Home Secretary making a direction in order to tell a university or institution not to allow somebody to speak?
Mrs May
That is not the intention of the duty; its intention is to ensure that the university or institution has in place a policy on matters relating to extremism. For example, they might have a general policy that they apply in relation to extremist speakers coming to their institution. The purpose of the power to make a direction in the Bill is to ensure that they are doing something like that, taking their statutory duty seriously. It is for those institutions that are failing to comply with the statutory duty that that particular power has been put into the Bill.
Alongside that statutory requirement in relation to Prevent, the Bill will also provide a statutory basis for the existing programmes for those at risk of being drawn into terrorism, known as Channel in England and Wales. That will enshrine existing good practice and help to ensure consistency across all local areas.
Pete Wishart (Perth and North Perthshire) (SNP)
As the Home Secretary knows, the Prevent strategy falls within the competence of Scottish Ministers under the devolved settlement. Scottish Ministers have their own priorities and agenda when it comes to delivering those measures in Scotland. I know that there have been discussions with Home Office Ministers about excluding Scotland from that power, so that we can have the opportunity to consult our public bodies properly. Is she open to that type of approach, so that Scotland could be included in the measures later, when we have had an opportunity to work out what it would actually mean for our public bodies and their responsibilities?
Mrs May
I point out to the hon. Gentleman that counter-terrorism is obviously a reserved matter. He might like to know that his point relates to the very next paragraph I was about to read. It is the Government’s hope and intention that these provisions should also apply to Scotland. We are consulting Ministers in the devolved Administrations about the practical implications of our proposals, and obviously those discussions will continue with the Scottish Government.
Part 6 includes amendments to two provisions in the Terrorism Act 2000. First, it will put it beyond doubt that UK insurance firms cannot reimburse payments made to terrorists in response to ransom demands. To put that in context, the UN estimates that ransom payments raised up to £28 million for ISIL over the past 12 months alone. We need to avoid any uncertainty on that issue.
Secondly, the Bill will clarify our counter-terrorism port and border controls in relation to where goods may be examined and the examination of goods comprising items of post. That is an important part of our counter-terrorism port and border controls and the disruption of those engaged in terrorism. We must ensure that the law is clear and that the police can fulfil their duties.
The powers in the Bill are essential, but they should be used only where it is necessary and proportionate to do so. Their use will be stringently safeguarded, including through suitable legal thresholds and judicial oversight of certain measures. Part 7 of the Bill will also allow for the creation of a privacy and civil liberties board to support the important work of David Anderson QC, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation.
Finally, the Bill includes a provision to ensure that challenges to refusals of applications for British overseas territories citizenship can be heard before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, so that sensitive material can be protected. This simply addresses an anomaly in existing legislation.
I have stressed the urgency and importance of this legislation. This is not a knee-jerk reaction but a considered, targeted approach that ensures that our law enforcement and intelligence agencies have the powers they need to respond to the heightened threat to our national security. Substantial work, in consultation with the police and MI5, has gone into drafting the clauses. Where the measures impact on those in the private sector or civil society, we have consulted the relevant bodies.
I am grateful to the shadow Home Secretary for engaging in constructive discussions on the timetable for the Bill.
Michael Ellis (Northampton North) (Con)
I commend the Home Secretary for the measures in this Bill, which are reasonable measures that accord with our international obligations. Does she agree, though, that there is a gap as regards communications data? I hope that we will be able to include that area in future measures as soon as possible, because although the measures she is announcing go some way towards improving national security and meet our national obligations, we must address that gap.
Mrs May
My hon. Friend is right that we continue to have a gap in relation to communications data. Although the Bill introduces the question of IP address resolution, it will still be the case that data that previously would have been available to our law enforcement agencies and security services will not be available in future. I am very clear that Parliament will have to return to this issue after the general election.
The need to introduce this legislation today is pressing, but I do not propose to rush it through Parliament in a matter of days or weeks. Parliament must have adequate time to consider these measures. Expediting the Bill’s passage over the next couple of months will enable that to take place, while allowing us to seek approval for crucial secondary legislation prior to the election. This will ensure that proper scrutiny can take place, and that the police and agencies are able to use these new capabilities without undue delay.
We are in the midst of a generational struggle against a deadly terrorist ideology. That is why we have brought this legislation forward at the earliest opportunity, and we will seek its swift passage through Parliament. We must ensure that the police and the security and intelligence agencies have all the legal powers and capabilities they need to stop people travelling to fight in Syria and Iraq, to tackle this terrorist threat, and to protect all the law-abiding citizens who believe in keeping the UK an open, free and tolerant nation. That is what this Bill will do, and I commend it to the House.
Yvette Cooper
I agree with the hon. Gentleman that more needs to be done at the national level. The Bill introduces a statutory duty on a series of organisations to do more, and those organisations should certainly work in partnership to prevent people from being drawn into extremism and terrorist activity. Given the points made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears) about some of the gaps, particularly in relation to the Department for Communities and Local Government, there is a question about whether the duty should in fact extend to that Department, rather than simply to local organisations across the country.
In Committee, we will probe the Home Secretary further on what she intends to do with her power of direction. That is still unclear from the Bill, and it is unclear what she envisages putting in guidance. She said that guidance would be published alongside the Bill, but we have not yet seen it. I do not know whether it has already been published.
Mrs May
I have listened very carefully to what the shadow Home Secretary is saying about the Prevent programme. As I said earlier, one of the first things that the Government did when we considered the programme was to decide that it should no longer look simply at violent extremism, but at non-violent extremism as well. Does what she is saying mean that she agrees with the step that we took, and does she therefore accept that the previous Labour Government got it wrong in concentrating the Prevent programme only on violent extremism?
Keith Vaz (Leicester East) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), whose excellent and thoughtful speech leads me to conclude that were he still the Attorney-General, the Bill would not have appeared before the House in the form it has. I hope he makes it to the Committee, because the points he raised are extremely important to ensuring that the Bill is robust before it is passed by the House.
I agree with the Home Secretary, the shadow Home Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), and the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield that these are dangerous times, which is why we require the greatest possible scrutiny of the Bill. I therefore begin by raising the concern of the Home Affairs Committee that we have not had the opportunity to scrutinise the Bill to the extent we would have liked. It was published only last week, and today is its Second Reading. We have not had an opportunity to hold any sessions, and no Minister has come before us. I know that the Home Secretary is extremely busy, but she managed to fit in several other engagements instead of coming before the Committee. It would have been much more appropriate had a Minister come before us before the Bill came to the House.
Mrs May
When we were discussing the Wanless and Whittam report, the right hon. Gentleman challenged me in the Chamber over the fact that I had not appeared before the Committee, when in fact the Committee had withdrawn the invitation. As I understand it—he might have a different understanding—I am due to appear before his Committee in two weeks.
Keith Vaz
The Home Secretary is right that she is due to appear before us in two weeks’ time, but the legislation will probably have passed through the House by then. If a piece of emergency legislation is coming before us, as it is now, Ministers should put themselves before the relevant Select Committee. The right hon. Lady managed to fit in a visit to the British curry awards last night, at which we were of course all delighted to see her, but the point is that the date of 16 December for this emergency legislation to come before the House was fixed many months ago, and Ministers must be prepared to be scrutinised on such legislation. That message clearly applies to all Select Committees. The Home Secretary may nod her head, but that is the position. Our Select Committee is now left to conduct a session on this Bill after its Second Reading, which we will do tomorrow.