Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Gary Streeter Excerpts

Monday 15th December 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr David Hanson (Delyn) (Lab)]

I beg to move amendment 29, page 1, line 8, at end insert—

‘(2) This section shall be repealed on 31 December 2016 unless both Houses of Parliament have passed a resolution that it should continue in force until a future date.

(3) The date specified in a resolution of both Houses of Parliament under subsection (2) may be modified by subsequent resolutions of both Houses of Parliament.”

[The Temporary Chair (Mr Gary Streeter)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause 1 stand part.

Amendment 17, in schedule 1, page 30, line 14, at end insert—

“(c) the individual subject whose travel document has been removed may appeal against this decision in the courts over the evidence on which conditions in paragraph 2(1)(a) and (b) of this schedule were met.”

Government amendment 13.

Schedule 1 stand part.

New clause 8—Police bail for terrorism suspects—

‘(1) Section 34 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (1) after “offence” insert “or on suspicion of being a terrorist under section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000”.

(3) In subsection (2)(b) after “Act” insert “or section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000".

(4) After subsection (5) insert—

“(5A) A grant of bail under this section shall last no longer than six months from the date of release.”

As an alternative to the ad hoc passport seizure and retention scheme set out at Clause 1 and Schedule 1 of the Bill this new clause would make police bail, with conditions, available for those suspected of terrorism.

[Mr Hanson]

Mr Streeter, I welcome you to the Chair of the Committee. I rise on behalf of my hon. Friends to speak to amendments 29 and 17.

I hope you will allow me a little leeway, Mr Streeter, before we begin the debate. Although this Bill has nothing to do with what has happened in Sydney, Australia, I think it would be appropriate for the Committee to recognise that there has been a serious incident there and for us to express our condolences in relation to those who have died as a result. It reminds us that terrorism and terrorist activity are never far from our shores and from individuals in our communities as well. That is why it is important that we look at the new clauses and amendments before us in what will be, I hope, a positive discussion and debate.

The Government believe there is a need to legislate on counter-terrorism. There is a terrorism threat in the United Kingdom: on 29 August the independent joint terrorism analysis centre raised the UK national terrorist threat level from substantial to severe. [Interruption.]

[The Temporary Chair (Mr Gary Streeter)]

Order. I am reluctant to interrupt the right hon. Gentleman, but a lot of background conversations are going on in the Chamber and we can hardly hear the most important speech that is being made. Will colleagues please keep the noise down?

[Mr Hanson]

I am grateful to you, Mr Streeter.

It is important that we recognise that terrorist attacks are, sadly, highly likely. According to the Government’s own analysis in the explanatory notes:

“Approximately 500 individuals of interest to the police and security services have travelled from the UK to Syria and the region since the start of the conflict. It is estimated half of these have returned. In the context of this heightened threat to our national security, the provisions of the Bill”

are designed to address those matters.

My hon. Friends the Members for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson) and for Sedgefield (Phil Wilson) and I have tabled amendments 29 and 17 because there needs to be a debate about two particular issues. If the Bill’s measures are agreed by both Houses they will become law, but there will be no end date or review date for the powers. Amendment 29 seeks to ensure that clause 1

“shall be repealed on 31 December 2016 unless both Houses of Parliament have passed a resolution that it should continue in force until a future date.”

It goes on:

“The date specified in a resolution of both Houses of Parliament under subsection (2) may be modified by subsequent resolutions of both Houses of Parliament.”

The amendment is therefore designed to create, in effect, a sunset clause to review the legislation, which is not unusual for terrorism legislation. It would not demand that we revisit the whole clause by seeking to enact new legislation; it would simply require a resolution to allow the provisions to continue. The amendment has merit and I will willingly discuss it with the Minister.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Grieve]

I expressed that concern and it remains a concern, but the interesting point about amendment 17 is that if we were to allow an appeal, as the right hon. Gentleman describes it, how quickly could such an appeal be heard and would it have a significant impact on the shortness of time in which a passport might be capable of being returned, given that we now know that there will be two weeks, or 14 days, for that return to take place? I listened carefully to what he has to say and it seems to me that he is making a good point, but I would also be interested to hear from my hon. Friend the Minister and from the right hon. Gentleman how such a system could be made to work in reality.

[The Temporary Chair (Mr Gary Streeter)]

Order. Before I call the shadow Minister, let me say that interventions should be slightly briefer than that.

[Mr Hanson]

Thank you, Mr Streeter. I take the point made by the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), but we are in opposition, which is a difficult and cold place. We do not have the officials that the Minister has. The principle is that we believe there should be an examination of the right of appeal on any decision that has been taken. The purpose of amendment 17 is to place that argument before the Government so that they can say whether they believe there should be any right of appeal or whether they believe that 14 days or 30 days is sufficient, for the reasons given by the hon. Member for Skipton and Ripon (Julian Smith) and by the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield, and that there is no need for an appeal as it would not resolve the issue. It is inherent in any decision of this seriousness that an individual should be able to challenge a decision on the grounds of mistaken identity or the grounds of loss of service in a court.

--- Later in debate ---

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Temporary Chair (Mr Gary Streeter)]

With this it will be convenient to consider the following:

Clauses 3 to 10 stand part.

Amendment 14, in clause 11, page 7, leave out lines 16 and 17 and insert—

““specified individual” means a person named in a notification and managed return order and in relation to whom Conditions A-D of section [Notification and managed return orders] are met.

“a carrier” has the same meaning as at section 18.”

Amendment 15,  page 7, leave out lines 20 to 24.

Amendment 16,  page 7, leave out line 41.

Clause 11 stand part.

New clause 4— Notification and managed return orders—

‘(1) A “notification and managed return order” is an order requiring a person (“a carrier”) to notify the Home Secretary that—

(a) a specified individual intends to travel to the UK, and

(b) the date, time and location of the specified person‘s scheduled arrival.

(2) The Secretary of State may impose a notification and managed return order if conditions A to D are met.

(3) Condition A is that the Secretary of State reasonably suspects that the specified individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism related activity outside the United Kingdom.

(4) Condition B is that the Secretary of State reasonably considers that it is necessary, for purposes connected with protecting members of the public in the United Kingdom from a risk of terrorism, for a notification and managed return order to be imposed on a carrier in relation to a specified individual.

(5) Condition C is that the Secretary of State reasonably considers that the specified individual is outside the United Kingdom.

(6) Condition D is that the specified individual has the right of abode in the United Kingdom.

(7) During the period that a notification and managed return order is in force, the Secretary of State must keep under review whether condition B is met.”

New clause 5—Notification and managed return orders: supplementary provision—

‘(1) The Secretary of State must give notice of the imposition of a notification and managed return order to the specified individual and the carrier.

(2) Notice of the imposition of a notification and managed return order may include notice that the specified individual may be stopped, questioned and detained on return to the United Kingdom.

(3) A notification and managed return order—

(a) comes into force when notice of its imposition is given; and

(b) is in force for the period of two years (unless revoked or otherwise brought to an end earlier).

(4) The Secretary of State may revoke a notification and managed return order at any time.

(5) The Secretary of State must give notice of the revocation of a notification and managed return order to the specified individual and the carrier.

(6) If a notification and managed return order is revoked, it ceases to be in force when notice of its revocation is given to the specified individual and the carrier.

(7) The validity of a notification and managed return order is not affected by the specified individual—

(a) returning to the United Kingdom, or

(b) departing from the United Kingdom.

(8) The imposition of a notification and managed return order does not prevent a further notification and managed return order from being imposed on a carrier in relation to the same specified individual (including in a case where an order ceases to be in force at the expiry of its two year duration).

(9) The imposition of a notification and managed return order does not prevent a further notification and managed return order from being imposed on another carrier contemporaneously or consecutively in relation to the same specified individual.”

New clause 6—Penalty for breach of notification and managed return order—

‘(1) The Secretary of State may make regulations setting out the penalties to be imposed for breaching a notification and managed return order.

(2) Regulations under subsection (1) must make provision—

(a) about how a penalty is to be calculated;

(b) about the procedure for imposing a penalty;

(c) about the enforcement of penalties;

(d) allowing for an appeal against a decision to impose a penalty;

and the regulations may make different provision for different purposes.

(3) Provision in the regulations about the procedure for imposing a penalty must provide for a carrier to be given an opportunity to object to a proposed penalty in the circumstances set out in the regulations.

(4) Any penalty paid by virtue of this section must be paid into the Consolidated Fund.

(5) Regulations under this section are to be made by statutory instrument; and any such statutory instrument may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before each House of Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House.”

New clause 9—Imposition of terrorism prevention and investigation measures—

‘(1) The Secretary of State may by notice (a “TEO”) impose a “temporary exclusion order” which requires an individual not to return to the United Kingdom on an individual if conditions A to E in section [Conditions A to E] are met.

(2) 1n this Act “temporary exclusion order” means requirements, restrictions and other provision which may be made in relation to an individual by virtue of section [Conditions A to E] “prior permission of the court” and Schedule [“Proceedings relating to temporary exclusion orders”].

(3) An individual subject to a TEO may not return to the UK unless—

(a) the return is in accordance with a permit to return issued by the Secretary of State before the individual began the return, or

(b) the return is the result of the individual’s deportation to the United Kingdom.”

New clause 10—Conditions A to E—

‘(1) Condition A is that the Secretary of State reasonably suspects that the individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity outside the United Kingdom.

(2) Condition B is that the Secretary of State reasonably considers that it is necessary, for purposes connected with protecting members of the public in the United Kingdom from a risk of terrorism, for a temporary exclusion order to be imposed on the individual.

(3) Condition C is that the Secretary of State reasonably considers that the individual is outside the United Kingdom.

(4) Condition D is that the individual has the right of abode in the United Kingdom.

(5) Condition E is that—

(a) the court gives the Secretary of State permission under section 3, or

(b) the Secretary of State reasonably considers that the urgency of the case requires a temporary exclusion order to be imposed without obtaining such permission.

(6) During the period that a temporary exclusion order is in force, the Secretary of State must keep under review whether condition B is met.”

New clause 11—Prior permission of the court—

‘(1) This section applies if the Secretary of State—

(a) makes the relevant decisions in relation to an individual, and

(b) makes an application to the court for permission to impose measures on the individual.

(2) The application must set out a draft of the proposed TEO notice.

(3) The function of the court on the application is—

(a) to determine whether the relevant decisions of the Secretary of State are obviously flawed, and

(b) to determine whether to give permission to impose measures on the individual and (where applicable) whether to exercise the power of direction under subsection (9).

(4) The court may consider the application—

(a) in the absence of the individual;

(b) without the individual having been notified of the application; and

(c) without the individual having been given an opportunity (if the individual was aware of the application) of making any representations to the court.

(5) But that does not limit the matters about which rules of court may be made.

(6) In determining the application, the court must apply the principles applicable on an application for judicial review.

(7) In a case where the court determines that a decision of the Secretary of State that condition A, condition B, or condition C is met is obviously flawed, the court may not give permission under this section.

(8) In any other case, the court may give permission under this section.

(9) If the court determines that the Secretary of State‘s decision that condition D is met is obviously flawed, the court may (in addition to giving permission under subsection (8) give directions to the Secretary of State in relation to the measures to be imposed on the individual.

(10) 1n this section “relevant decisions” means the decisions that the following conditions are met—

(a) condition A;

(b) condition B;

(c) condition C; and

(d) condition D.”

New schedule 1—Proceedings relating to Temporary Exclusion Orders—

Introductory

1 In this Schedule—

“appeal proceedings” means proceedings in the Court of Appeal or the Inner House of the Court of Session on an appeal relating to temporary exclusion order proceedings;

“the relevant court” means—

(a) in relation to TEO proceedings, the court;

(b) in relation to appeal proceedings, the Court of Appeal or the Inner House of the Court of Session;

“rules of court” means rules for regulating the practice and procedure to be followed in the court, the Court of Appeal or the Inner House of the Court of Session.

Rules of court: general provision

2 (1) A person making rules of court relating to TEO proceedings or appeal proceedings must have regard to the need to secure the following—

(a) that the decisions that are the subject of the proceedings are properly reviewed, and

(b) that disclosures of information are not made where they would be contrary to the public interest.

(2) Rules of court relating to TEO proceedings or appeal proceedings may make provision—

(a) about the mode of proof and about evidence in the proceedings;

(b) enabling or requiring the proceedings to be determined without a hearing;

(c) about legal representation in the proceedings;

(d) enabling the proceedings to take place without full particulars of the reasons for the decisions to which the proceedings relate being given to a party to the proceedings (or to any legal representative of that party);

(e) enabling the relevant court to conduct proceedings in the absence of any person, including a party to the proceedings (or any legal representative of that party);

(f) about the functions of a person appointed as a special advocate (see paragraph 10);

(g) enabling the court to give a party to the proceedings a summary of evidence taken in the party’s absence.

(3) In this paragraph—

(a) references to a party to the proceedings do not include the Secretary of State;

(b) references to a party’s legal representative do not include a person appointed as a special advocate.

(4) Nothing in this paragraph is to be read as restricting the power to make rules of court or the matters to be taken into account when doing so.

Rules of court: disclosure

3 (1) Rules of court relating to TEO proceedings or appeal proceedings must secure that the Secretary of State is required to disclose—

(a) material on which the Secretary of State relies,

(b) material which adversely affects the Secretary of State’s case, and

(c) material which supports the case of another party to the proceedings.

(2) This paragraph is subject to paragraph 4.

4 (1) Rules of court relating to TEO proceedings or appeal proceedings must secure—

(a) that the Secretary of State has the opportunity to make an application to the relevant court for permission not to disclose material otherwise than to the relevant court and any person appointed as a special advocate;

(b) that such an application is always considered in the absence of every party to the proceedings (and every party’s legal representative);

(c) that the relevant court is required to give permission for material not to be disclosed if it considers that the disclosure of the material would be contrary to the public interest;

(d) that, if permission is given by the relevant court not to disclose material, it must consider requiring the Secretary of State to provide a summary of the material to every party to the proceedings (and every party’s legal representative);

(e) that the relevant court is required to ensure that such a summary does not contain material the disclosure of which would be contrary to the public interest.

(2) Rules of court relating to TEO proceedings or appeal proceedings must secure that provision to the effect mentioned in sub-paragraph (3) applies in cases where the Secretary of State—

(a) does not receive the permission of the relevant court to withhold material, but elects not to disclose it, or

(b) is required to provide a party to the proceedings with a summary of material that is withheld, but elects not to provide the summary.

(3) The relevant court must be authorised—

(a) if it considers that the material or anything that is required to be summarised might adversely affect the Secretary of State‘s case or support the case of a party to the proceedings, to direct that the Secretary of State—

(i) is not to rely on such points in the Secretary of State‘s case, or

(ii) is to make such concessions or take such other steps as the court may specify, or

(b) in any other case, to ensure that the Secretary of State does not rely on the material or (as the case may be) on that which is required to be summarised.

(4) In this paragraph—

(a) references to a party to the proceedings do not include the Secretary of State;

(b) references to a party’s legal representative do not include a person appointed as a special advocate.

Article 6 rights

5 (1) Nothing in paragraphs 2 to 4, or in rules of court made under any of those paragraphs, is to be read as requiring the relevant court to act in a manner inconsistent with Article 6 of the Human Rights Convention.

(2) The “Human Rights Convention” means the Convention within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998 (see section 21(1) of that Act).

Rules of court: anonymity

6 (1) Rules of court relating to TEO proceedings or appeal proceedings may make provision for—

(a) the making by the Secretary of State or the relevant individual of an application to the court for an order requiring anonymity for that individual, and

(b) the making by the court, on such an application, of an order requiring such anonymity;

and the provision made by the rules may allow the application and the order to be made irrespective of whether any other TEO proceedings have been begun in the court.

(2) Rules of court may provide for the Court of Appeal or the Inner House of the Court of Session to make an order in connection with any appeal proceedings requiring anonymity for the relevant individual.

(3) In sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) the references, in relation to a court, to an order requiring anonymity for the relevant individual are references to an order by that court which imposes such prohibition or restriction as it thinks fit on the disclosure—

(a) by such persons as the court specifies or describes, or

(b) by persons generally,

of the identity of the relevant individual or of any information that would tend to identify the relevant individual.

(4) In this paragraph “relevant individual” means an individual on whom the Secretary of State is proposing to impose, or has imposed, measures.

Initial exercise of rule-making powers by Lord Chancellor

7 (1) The first time after the passing of this Act that rules of court are made in exercise of the powers conferred by this Schedule in relation to proceedings in England and Wales or in Northern Ireland, the rules may be made by the Lord Chancellor instead of by the person who would otherwise make them.

(2) Before making rules of court under sub-paragraph (1), the Lord Chancellor must consult—

(a) in relation to rules applicable to proceedings in England and Wales, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales;

(b) in relation to rules applicable to proceedings in Northern Ireland, the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland.

(3) But the Lord Chancellor is not required to undertake any other consultation before making the rules.

(4) A requirement to consult under sub-paragraph (2) may be satisfied by consultation that took place wholly or partly before the passing of this Act.

(5) Rules of court made by the Lord Chancellor under sub-paragraph (1)—

(a) must be laid before Parliament, and

(b) if not approved by a resolution of each House before the end of 40 days beginning with the day on which they were made, cease to have effect at the end of that period.

(6) In determining that period of 40 days no account is to be taken of any time during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued or during which both Houses are adjourned for more than 4 days.

(7) 1f rules cease to have effect in accordance with sub-paragraph (5)—

(a) that does not affect anything done in previous reliance on the rules, and

(b) sub-paragraph (1) applies again as if the rules had not been made.

(8) The following provisions do not apply to rules of court made by the Lord Chancellor under this paragraph—

(a) section 3(6) of the Civil Procedure Act 1997 (Parliamentary procedure for civil procedure rules);

(b) section 56(1), (2) and (4) of the Judicature (Northern Ireland) Act 1978 (statutory rules procedure).

(9) Until the coming into force of section 85 of the Courts Act 2003, the reference in sub-paragraph (8)(a) to section 3(6) of the Civil Procedure Act 1997 is to be read as a reference to section 3(2) of that Act.

Use of advisers

8 (1) In any TEO proceedings or appeal proceedings the relevant court may if it thinks fit—

(a) call in aid one or more advisers appointed for the purposes of this paragraph by the Lord Chancellor, and

(b) hear and dispose of the proceedings with the assistance of the adviser or advisers.

(2) The Lord Chancellor may appoint advisers for the purposes of this paragraph only with the approval of—

(a) the Lord President of the Court of Session, in relation to an adviser who may be called in aid wholly or mainly in Scotland;

(b) the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland, in relation to an adviser who may be called in aid wholly or mainly in Northern Ireland;

(c) the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, in any other case.

(3) Rules of court may regulate the use of advisers in proceedings who are called in aid under sub-paragraph (1).

(4) The Lord Chancellor may pay such remuneration, expenses and allowances to advisers appointed for the purposes of this paragraph as the Lord Chancellor may determine.

9 (1) The Lord President of the Court of Session may nominate a judge of the Court of Session who is a member of the First or Second Division of the Inner House of that Court to exercise the function under paragraph 8(2)(a).

(2) The Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland may nominate any of the following to exercise the function under paragraph 8(2)(b)—

(a) the holder of one of the offices listed in Schedule 1 to the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002;

(b) a Lord Justice of Appeal (as defined in section 88 of that Act).

(3) The Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales may nominate a judicial office holder (as defined in section 109(4) of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005) to exercise the function under paragraph 8(2)(c).

Appointment of special advocate

10 (1) The appropriate law officer may appoint a person to represent the interests of a party in any TEO proceedings or appeal proceedings from which the party (and any legal representative of the party) is excluded.

(2) A person appointed under sub-paragraph (1) is referred to in this Schedule as appointed as “special advocate”.

(3) The “appropriate law officer” is—

(a) in relation to proceedings in England and Wales, the Attorney General;

(b) in relation to proceedings in Scotland, the Advocate General for Scotland;

(c) in relation to proceedings in Northern Ireland, the Advocate General for Northern Ireland.

(4) A person appointed as a special advocate is not responsible to the party to the proceedings whose interests the person is appointed to represent.

(5) A person may be appointed as a special advocate only if—

(a) in the case of an appointment by the Attorney General, the person has a general qualification the purposes of section 71 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990;

(b) in the case of an appointment by the Advocate General for Scotland, the person is an advocate or a solicitor who has rights of audience in the Court of Session or the High Court of Justiciary by virtue of section 25A of the Solicitors (Scotland) Act 1980;

(c) in the case of an appointment by the Advocate General for Northern Ireland, the person is a member of the Bar of Northern Ireland.”

[The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mrs Theresa May)]

I am very pleased to be able to participate in this part of the debate on an important Bill, and particularly pleased to be able to talk about temporary exclusion orders. Let me begin by explaining the background.

Earlier this year, the joint terrorism analysis centre raised our national terrorist threat level from substantial to severe. That means that a terrorist attack is highly likely. Approximately 500 individuals who are of interest to the police and security services have travelled from the United Kingdom to Syria and the region since the start of the conflict, and it has been estimated that half of them have returned.

In the context of that heightened threat to our national security, we need a power that will allow us to disrupt the travel, and control the return, of British citizens who have travelled abroad to engage in terrorist-related activity, and to manage the threat they pose. The temporary exclusion power will do just that. It will make it an offence for an individual who is subject to an order to return to the UK without first engaging with the UK authorities. It will also allow for the imposition of certain limited requirements on the individual on his or her return.

Let me make it clear that this is a discretionary power, which will be considered for use on a case-by-case basis. Let me also reassure the Committee again that it will not render any individual stateless. British nationals who are made subject to an order will have the right—which their citizenship guarantees—to return to the UK. Clauses 2 to 11 relate to this TEO and set out the way it will operate and issues around the permits to return.