Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill Debate

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Department: Home Office

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Jim Cunningham Excerpts
Tuesday 2nd December 2014

(10 years ago)

Commons Chamber
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Baroness May of Maidenhead Portrait Mrs May
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We looked carefully at the proposals made by David Anderson and I believe he suggested that there should be a geographical limit for the relocation.

Part 3 seeks to amend the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 to help us identify who in the real world is using an internet protocol, or IP, address at a given point in time. Changes in how service providers build their networks, made to enable them to cope with the increased demand for their services, mean that these identifiers are often shared between a great number of users. Companies generally have no business purpose for keeping a log of who used each address at a given point in time, which means that it is often not possible for law enforcement agencies to identify who sent or received a message. The provisions will allow us to require the key UK companies to retain the necessary information to enable them to identify the users of their services. That will provide vital additional capability to law enforcement in investigating a broad range of serious crime, including terrorism.

The Bill deals only with limited fields of data relating to a specific technical problem. Without the full package of data types included in the draft Communications Data Bill, published in 2012, there will still be gaps in law enforcement and intelligence agencies’ capabilities. For example, the child exploitation and online protection command in the NCA might still struggle to identify those who have been accessing servers hosting illegal images of child sex abuse. That is an issue to which Parliament will need to return after the general election, subject to the outcome of David Anderson’s statutory review of investigatory powers.

Part 4 contains measures on aviation, shipping and rail security. They will help us to stop terrorists and those involved or suspected of being involved in terrorism-related activity from travelling to and from the UK, and will mitigate the threat of an attack on those transport services. The proposals cover three main areas. First, they will require carriers to be able to receive instructions not to carry a specific passenger in a way that is compatible with our border systems. Secondly, they will establish a new framework for authority to carry schemes, commonly known as our no-fly arrangements, that will extend to new categories of British nationals and apply to outbound travel. Finally, they will enhance our ability to require carriers operating to the UK to undertake specified security measures, including the screening of passengers. Carriers that will not comply with security requirements will not be allowed to operate into the UK.

Jim Cunningham Portrait Mr Jim Cunningham (Coventry South) (Lab)
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I am puzzled that the Home Secretary has just said that carriers will be required to provide some sort of security screening. How will they do that? Would that not involve additional cost?

Baroness May of Maidenhead Portrait Mrs May
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Obviously, carriers in most parts of the world are already required to carry out some security screening. From time to time, we say that if someone is going to fly into the United Kingdom we wish them to adopt additional methods of security screening. At the moment, this is done on a voluntary basis, but the Bill takes that and puts it into statute, which will enable us to stop someone from flying into the UK if they do not adopt the security procedures.

Part 5 addresses the issue of those at serious risk of succumbing to radicalisation and terrorism. We propose a new statutory duty on certain bodies, including local authorities, the police, prisons, probation services, schools, colleges and universities, including in the private sector, to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. That will ensure that Prevent strategy activity is consistent across the country and in all those bodies whose staff work on the front line with those at risk from radicalisation. The detail of how the duty should be fulfilled will be set out in statutory guidance, which we will publish shortly.

I hope that the House will find it helpful if I take the opportunity to clarify one specific issue that the guidance will address, which is the need to create an appropriate and sensible balance between the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and the existing duty on universities to promote freedom of speech. I believe that our universities, with their commitment to free speech and the advancement of knowledge, represent one of our most important safeguards against extremist views and ideologies. There is no contradiction between promoting freedom of speech and taking account of the interests and well-being of students, staff and the wider community. That is already subject to guidance issued by both Universities UK and the National Union of Students. We must ensure that poisonous, divisive ideologies are not allowed to promulgate.

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Yvette Cooper Portrait Yvette Cooper
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In which case perhaps the hon. and learned Member should stop intervening and let me get on and speak about the amendments.

Jim Cunningham Portrait Mr Jim Cunningham
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One thing that has bedevilled these debates is that neither the Home Secretary nor anyone else has made it clear which countries are prepared to co-operate, particularly with Turkey which sends different signals.

Yvette Cooper Portrait Yvette Cooper
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My hon. Friend makes an important point, and by the time the Bill gets to Committee, the House needs to know whether there have been discussions with other countries, how those countries will respond, and what the level of co-operation will be.

My second question concerns what happens if the Home Secretary wants someone to return and be required to co-operate with the Channel programme, but does not want to delay their return. At the moment it appears that the order must be served and a permit applied for, and then the Home Secretary has to issue a permit, potentially introducing delays during which someone might abscond again. Is there any way to place requirements on someone once they return, without having to go through that further bureaucratic process at the airport? It appears from the Bill as though the Home Secretary cannot compel people to go to appointments at the police station or to comply with the Channel programme unless she also introduces bureaucratic delays with the application for a permit at the foreign airport. It would be helpful to know whether she has the power to allow someone to swiftly board the plane and also to introduce those powers.

Thirdly, what are the safeguards to prevent abuse? At the moment, temporary exclusion orders can be imposed by the Home Secretary on the basis of reasonable suspicion. That could include ongoing requirements for someone to attend regular appointments, or perhaps even to report daily to the police for two years after their return. There is no ability to appeal when someone returns—for instance, if they have been involved in humanitarian work in the region—and if the orders are breached, the penalty is the same as for breaching a TPIM. I think the Home Secretary should consider that further, because for TPIMs a judicial process rightly has to be satisfied. For a temporary exclusion order there is no judicial oversight, yet penalties for breach are the same. We believe that the powers need to be debated in detail in Committee to ensure they are effective, cannot be abused, and involve appropriate oversight. In response to the question from my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall North (Mr Winnick), we will be tabling amendments on judicial oversight.

Finally, I wish to raise an issue familiar to the House which was included in the original Communications Data Bill. That Bill was far too widely drawn, but there was wide consensus on the need for action on IP addresses, which had the support of the Joint Committee that considered the Bill. IP addresses are created and assigned automatically. Some companies retain those data, but some do not or routinely allocate multiple IP addresses to lots of people. That means that if an abusive image of a child has been sent from a particular IP address, agencies can struggle to discover who that address belongs to or where the child may be being abused. The Opposition support the principle behind that change, although I am sure it will need detailed scrutiny to ensure that the legislation does what is intended. We must be clear that simply having the technical and legal capability to do things is not sufficient as long as, for example, there are huge delays in the National Crime Agency investigating child abuse cases and passing them on to local forces.