Nationality and Borders Bill

Stuart C McDonald Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 19th July 2021 Commons Chamber

[Priti Patel]

I will shortly, but I am going to make a bit of progress. It is important to reflect on the fact that when it comes to reforming the immigration system and tackling many of these complex issues, there is no one-size-fits-all approach. I think it is important for all right hon. and hon. Members to recognise that we would be kidding ourselves if we thought there was a silver bullet and said, “There is one thing that could be done.” There are a range of cumulative issues that this legislation seeks to address.

When we launched our new plan for immigration, Labour effectively spoke out about many of the measures in the Bill and in the new plan for immigration. I think it is fair to say that the Opposition seem to think that the British people have the wrong priorities when it comes to tackling issues of migration and illegal entry.

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

rose—

[Priti Patel]

I will give way shortly, but I want to make progress first. The Opposition argue that it is wrong to deport murderers, rapists and dangerous criminals—[Interruption.] It is a fact. They think that border controls are wrong. They think that ending free movement is wrong. Well, Labour Members can sigh and shake their heads, but the fact of the matter is that over the last 12 months, when it has come to ending free movement and having discussions about reforming immigration and our points-based system, they seem to think that open borders are the answer. They obviously do not support our new plan for immigration. They do not like the people’s priorities when it comes to these issues, yet they have no plan.

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[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

rose—

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Will the Secretary of State give way?

[Priti Patel]

No, I will not.

For years, people have risked their lives to enter our country, such as those crossing the channel in dangerous boats to claim asylum. [Interruption.] I have been generous in giving way and I will give way again shortly, but I would like to make progress.

If there were simple and straightforward solutions to many of these challenges—my right hon. Friend the Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May) has touched on this—issues such as illegal migration to the UK would have been resolved by now, but illegal entry to the UK and the subsequent claims of asylum have become complex because of the nature of cases that arise. But I am absolutely clear that no one should seek to put their life, or the lives of their family, in the hands of criminals to enter the UK illegally, and I would like to think that that is an important point that this House can unite on.

The Bill will finally address the issues that over a long period of time, cumulatively, have resulted in the broken system that we have now. It is a system that is being abused, allowing criminals to put the lives of the vulnerable at risk, and it is right that we do everything possible and find measures to fix this and ensure that a fair asylum system provides a safe haven to those fleeing persecution, oppression and tyranny.

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[Priti Patel]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his question. I will shortly address some of these wider issues, but obviously, along with our work on safe and legal routes, we have to provide the right pathways and a secure environment for children to rebuild their lives. That is at the heart of our work in being humane, compassionate and fair.

Our system is overwhelmed, and it is a strong point of reflection that, because of the trends we have been seeing in organised immigration crime and gangs that are effectively exploiting vulnerable individuals, we now need to be able to provide support and to understand where those needs are coming from. Genuine people are being elbowed aside by those who are paying traffickers to come to our country.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

rose—

[Priti Patel]

I will not give way.

As a nation, we have always stepped up to support refugees in need, and rightly so. This is a great source of national pride for our country, and of course that will never change.

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[Priti Patel]

My hon. Friend is right, and that is where the system becomes conflated and there is no separation between the two. He is absolutely right to make that point.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

rose—

[Priti Patel]

I will not give way. [Interruption.] I have been very generous in taking interventions, and I would like to make some progress.

It is important to reflect on the fact that, when it comes to anyone claiming asylum in the UK—this is established in long-standing legislation—we have a statutory duty in relation to accommodation, subsistence, cash and transportation. The system, as I have already mentioned to the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark (Neil Coyle), is currently costing the taxpayer more than £1 billion a year. It is right that we look to reform the system, and not just to make it efficient but to ensure that we do the right thing. The very principle of seeking refuge has clearly been undermined by those who are paying to travel through safe countries and then claiming asylum in the UK. As my hon. Friend the Member for North East Bedfordshire (Richard Fuller) said, many of those are economic migrants and not just those fleeing persecution. People should be claiming asylum in the first safe country that they reach and not using the UK as a destination of choice. That is why our intention is to work—

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[Priti Patel]

No, I will not.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Will the Home Secretary give way?

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[Nick Thomas-Symonds (Torfaen) (Lab)]

I beg to move,

That this House declines to give a Second Reading to the Nationality and Borders Bill, notwithstanding the need to address the increasing number of dangerous boat crossings in the English Channel, because the Bill breaches the 1951 Refugee Convention, does not address the Government’s failure since 2010 to competently process asylum applications which has resulted in a backlog of cases and increased costs to the taxpayer, fails to deal with the serious and organised crime groups who are profiteering from human trafficking and modern slavery, does not address the failure to replace the Dublin III regulations to return refugees to safe countries, fails to re-establish safe routes and help unaccompanied child refugees, and fails to deliver a workable agreement with France to address the issue of boat crossings.

We on these Benches will be opposing this Bill. It is a Bill that is wrong and will make the dangerous situation in the English channel worse. We on these Benches do not want to see people risking their lives making a sea crossing in some of the busiest shipping lanes in the world, often in boats that are unfit for purpose, but the measures proposed will not address that.

By judging claims on the type of journey people make, Ministers will create

“a discriminatory two-tiered approach to asylum”.

Those are not my words but the words of the United Nations Refugee Agency. That must be our starting point today. Any proposals—I will come to some in a moment—to address this profoundly serious issue must be compliant with the 1951 convention relating to the status of refugees.

We should in this House remember the circumstances in which that convention was created. Drafting began in 1946, after the end of the second world war, as the full horrors perpetrated in that conflict had been brought into public view. It was a noble ideal for nations to work together to prevent such awful things from happening again. Countries came together to ensure that, across the world, we would offer a new protection to those who suffered persecution. Countries would not look the other way when there was systematic persecution in other parts of the world. We all bore a responsibility in our common humanity to help others.

The convention was signed under the post-war Labour Government in July 1951, but the document became one of the foundation stones upon which all post-war British Governments stood—a matter of pride to our country and a sign of the values we stand for around the world. It sent a clear signal that Britain was a force for good and was setting a strong moral example that gave it the authority to argue that other countries take responsibility as well. It is to this Government’s shame that they stand outside that fine British tradition. Seventy years after the 1951 convention was signed, this Government have decided to renege on its commitments. [Interruption.] I hear what the hon. Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), the Minister for immigration compliance, says, but do not take my word for it. This is what the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees says about the proposals:

“The international refugee protection system, underpinned by the 1951 Convention, has withstood the test of time and it remains a collective responsibility to uphold and safeguard it. If States, like the UK, that receive a comparatively small fraction of the world’s asylum-seekers and refugees appear poised to renege on their commitments, the system is weakened globally and the role and influence of the UK would be severely impacted. UNHCR is concerned that the Plan, if implemented as it stands, will undermine the 1951 Convention and international protection system, not just in the UK, but globally.”

If the Minister doubts that, this is what the United Nations Refugee Agency had to say ahead of this Second Reading debate:

“Plans to create a new lower class of refugees are discriminatory, breach commitments in the Refugee Convention and should be dropped”.

They are breaching commitments in the refugee convention that a past British Government who truly believed in a global Britain had signed.

In fact, the UN Refugee Agency said the two-tier approach is:

“a recipe for human suffering, social problems, inefficiency and greater cost to the taxpayer.”

Frankly, it is a dangerous and ill-thought-out proposal with profound consequences.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Given that there seems to be unanimity that the Bill should be interpreted in the light of the refugee convention and apparently the Government intention is to follow the refugee convention, surely there could be no possible objection to an interpretation clause in the Bill. We can all work together to put that in there to ensure that all the provisions follow refugee case law and the refugee convention as it is.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. In reality, this is a Bill based on an immigration plan that is harmful. Just listen to the story of Waheed Arian, now an NHS doctor who escaped the Taliban in Afghanistan as a child. These are his words:

“When I arrived alone in London, a bewildered 15-year-old with nothing to my name but $100 and my hopes and dreams, I had no idea I’d end up two decades later working as an NHS doctor fighting Covid-19 on the frontline in A&E. As a former child refugee from Afghanistan, under the UK government’s so-called New Plan for Immigration, it is doubtful I would be here at all.”

I repeat:

“It is doubtful I would be here at all.”

We also know the serious concerns that have been raised by campaigners across the LGBT+ community about the Bill. The way it is so badly drafted risks us turning our back on people fleeing persecution. This is particularly chilling when we know the scale of the dangers faced by so many LGBT+ people across the world, including state-sanctioned persecution. The plan is wrong and it is wrong-headed.

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[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

I am afraid that I regard this as a dreadful Bill, and the Refugee Council was absolutely right to characterise it as the “anti-refugee” Bill. There are eight welcome clauses on nationality, but thereafter what we see risks trampling international convention after international convention, and vulnerable children, stateless children and victims of trafficking will all pay a penalty. Nowhere is the retreat from international law, international co-operation and basic human decency more apparent than in the absolute trashing of the refugee convention as it approaches its 70th birthday. A convention that has saved and protected countless millions of people is being undermined by one of its first champion countries.

Refugees and asylum seekers—we have skirted over this so far—will be criminalised, stripped of their rights and offshored. That is true whether they are Uyghurs fleeing atrocities in China, Syrians fleeing war crimes or persecuted Christians seeking refuge here. The Bill does absolutely nothing to stop them getting in boats in France; what it does is punish them when they get here. That is morally reprehensible.

It is not just the Bill’s awful ends that justifies the Scottish National party refusing it a Second Reading and stopping it in its tracks but the means by which it seeks to pursue those ends. We are talking about a unilateral rewriting or reinterpretation of our obligations under international law. That is, once more, a hugely dangerous precedent to set. It will make our international partners query whether this country gives two hoots about international law and keeping its word.

Secondly, to put it directly, what we have here is a deliberate policy decision to inflict harm on people seeking sanctuary by criminalising them, splitting them from their family, forcing them into destitution, putting them in legal limbo and offshoring them. That is not just ineffective and dangerous, but morally outrageous.

Not only is the Bill the opposite of the right solution, but it wrongly identifies the problem that needs solving. The problem in the asylum system is simply down to the incompetent management of it by this Home Office and this Government. We live in a world in which 80 million people have been forcibly displaced, and 30 million of them are outside their country of origin and are therefore refugees. Four million of them are asylum seekers pursuing recognition as refugees. Some 86% of them are hosted in developing countries, 73% in neighbouring countries.

What we are asking of wealthy western countries barely scratches the surface of their share of responsibility. In European terms, what has been asked of the UK is very little at all. I applaud and support everything that has been achieved through the Syrian vulnerable persons resettlement scheme and other resettlement programmes, but none of it justifies what the Government propose today.

The Government regularly trot out that they have resettled more Syrian refugees than other European countries. In absolute terms that is true but, per head of population, neighbours such as Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Finland and Ireland have all resettled more. Yes, although the UK resettled a few thousand more Syrians than Germany and France, those two countries have offered sanctuary to more Syrians through their asylum systems by massive margins.

In 2019, the UK received around five applications for asylum per 10,000 people, compared with the European average of 14, putting the UK 17th in the table of member states, just behind Italy, Finland and Ireland. Similarly, the UK granted roughly two applications per 10,000 people, compared with the European average of 13, putting it 16th in the table. Yes, although by international standards the UK has a decent history of offering protection, let us not pretend that it has been bearing an unbearable burden that entitles it to rip up the refugee convention and start trying to pass refugees back up the chain to those that already do much more.

The real problem, as we have heard, is that the Home Office’s handling of asylum cases is abysmal. We have heard the extraordinary figures on how long it is taking, and it is not just the length of time it takes to make a decision but the number of decisions that it gets wrong. We are at record levels of successful appeals—it is almost 50:50.

It is not just statistics that cause grave concern but the regular stories of life inside the Home Office: impossible targets, a culture of fear, ill-treatment of staff, high staff turnover, a shortage of skilled asylum caseworkers and administrative chaos. Asylum decision making is a matter of life and death, and it seems clear to me that it should no longer be entrusted to the Home Office, a Department that has again shown itself to be unfit for that purpose. Such decisions should be removed from political interference and entrusted to an independent body, as they are in Canada. That would be a sensible approach.

[Chris Philp]

What about democratic oversight?

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Absolutely, as there is in Canada.

Members from all parties in this House, sitting on the Front Benches and the Back Benches, regularly speak up for some of the most oppressed people on the planet. We have seen brave interventions on Uyghurs fleeing atrocities in China. The plight of Syrians fleeing a decade-long conflict has been championed, and Christians around the world, including Christian converts, have numerous ambassadors in this Chamber, but we have hardly come to terms with what this Bill means for them.

This Bill prompts a question: why speak up against persecution abroad only to say, when they come knocking at our door seeking shelter, “You are not our responsibility. Go somewhere else”? France seems to be the popular answer among Conservative Members. What if France and the rest of Europe say the same thing? We would end up with the system of international protection of refugees breaking down, as the UNHCR points out.

If the Bill passes, that is exactly what it means. Prior to the Bill, we would have sheltered people fleeing persecution. The Bill expressly seeks to discourage them from coming here by making life miserable for those who do. Today, if a Uyghur, Syrian or persecuted Christian convert arrives in the UK to seek asylum, life will be far from plain sailing, precisely because of the outrageous waiting times, the dreadful asylum accommodation, the prohibition on work and the dreadful levels of financial support. They get here and, thanks to our amazing non-governmental organisations and charities, they slowly start to rebuild their lives.

But next year, if this Bill passes, for many of those Uyghurs, Syrians or persecuted Christian converts claiming asylum here, things will be infinitely bleaker, and that will be a deliberate policy choice of this Parliament. Arriving next year, the Uyghur, Syrian or persecuted Christian will be much more likely to be criminalised, regardless of arguments about whether they had come here directly or not.

Section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971 already punishes illegal entry by those without leave to enter. Sensibly, however, those who claim asylum on arrival are granted immigration bail, which does not count officially as entry. Clause 37 of the Bill changes all that. It would essentially criminalise the very act of arriving to claim asylum, because, as the explanatory notes acknowledge, the majority of asylum seekers will not have the ability to secure entry clearance. Despite the Home Secretary’s protestations last week, as the right hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May) said, this criminal offence will apply to Uyghurs, Syrians, persecuted Christian converts and anybody else, and the penalty is up to four years in prison.

The next problem for the Uyghur, Syrian or persecuted Christian convert is that although they are absolutely obviously in need of international protection, this Government, in their wisdom, are not even going to consider their claim for protection for six months. The Government are trying to pretend that that is some sort of replication of the Dublin regulations that the UK was party to prior to Brexit, but of course it is not, because, as we have heard, there are no returns agreements with any remotely relevant country and little indication at this stage that there will be any time soon. Any such returns agreement would have to be carefully circumscribed so as to be consistent with the convention and to have carefully considered the circumstances of the individual, including any ties to the UK, such as family members here.

By contrast, the powers in the Bill will allow the Home Secretary to remove a Uyghur, persecuted Christian or Syrian to any country at all, even if there is no connection, and with very little by way of restriction. Today, the Uyghur, Syrian or persecuted Christian faces outrageous delays in asylum protection systems, and the Bill simply adds another six months.

Where will the Uyghur, Syrian or persecuted Christian be during that time—during that limbo—while the Home Office goes through the futile motions of seeking to remove them? Just now, for those who seek asylum we have a struggling, privatised, over-concentrated system of dispersed asylum accommodation. Numerous Committees have told the Home Office how it could be improved, only to be ignored. Under this Bill and this plan, that is not where the Home Secretary envisages the Syrian, the Uyghur or the persecuted Christian going. Instead, the grim future for these refugees appears under this Bill and this plan to be the disgraceful, disreputable open prison-like conditions that we have already witnessed at Napier or Penally.

Even worse, as we have heard, they may face being removed to an offshore centre to have their claim resolved. Here is the real asylum shopping: the British Government grubbing around to find a country to palm off their responsibilities on to. Let us think of the outrages and the lack of accountability we have seen in relation to immigration detention and the Napier open prison—the abuses that have been meted out there and the harm done. As we know from the Australian experiment, that will be as nothing compared to the hell that is likely to await at an offshore asylum facility. How on earth have we gone from having a Parliament where there was widespread support for time-limiting and restricting the use of detention, to imposing a form of it that is infinitely worse?

Having endured their limbo period, these three groups of refugees will finally have their case assessed by the Home Office. But instead of working to improve asylum decision making, the Bill seeks to make it harder for them to prove their case. It seeks to alter the long-established test set out in the refugee convention that the standard of proof required is a lower, but far from negligible, standard of real risk. That standard is clearly justified by the possible consequences of getting decisions wrong and the huge challenges of proving circumstances that happened thousands of miles away in a country the person has fled.

The Bill seeks to muddy the waters by applying a higher legal threshold. The claimant now has to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that they do belong to one of the protected convention groups and that they fear persecution based on that characteristic. That not only undermines the cautious approach in the convention, justified by the dangers that exist for asylum seekers, but pays no regard to just how difficult it is to prove events that happened in faraway countries.

In addition, by having two different standards of evidence in the same proceedings, it makes life harder for already struggling caseworkers. The judge or decision maker may be certain that the proselytising Christian convert will face the death penalty or torture on return, but now the “real possibility” that the claimant is such a proselytising Christian convert is not enough. If the judge is only 49% satisfied that the person is a proselytising Christian convert, the claim is going to be rejected, even though the risk of torture or death is absolutely certain if the decision maker has got that assessment wrong. I find that deeply troubling, and it is clearly inconsistent with the refugee convention.

Let us imagine that the persecuted Christian, the Syrian and the Uyghur have survived their limbo period and made it through the asylum system, and the Home Office refusal of their application has been overturned on appeal. Unbelievably, the harms inflicted on them by the Bill have barely started. On the contrary, the repugnant programme of disincentives is ramped up further, even after they navigate that system. Because they have stopped temporarily in a European country, they are to be treated as a second-class refugee. Regardless of what any Minister says, that is absolutely contrary to the refugee convention and, more importantly, it is simply disgraceful. It is not just nasty, but sickening—

[Angela Crawley (Lanark and Hamilton East) (SNP)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that on many occasions, particularly for those seeking asylum on the basis of their sexuality, those in the LGBT+ community are the most likely to be adversely impacted by this new legislation? Does he agree that more should be done to protect them and ensure that they can come here as a safe haven?

[Stuart C. McDonald]

My hon. Friend makes a good point. There are all sorts of problems with provisions in the Bill that penalise late disclosure of information, which can very often be the case in modern slavery or LGBT cases, or even religious conversion cases.

Having established that these people are refugees—and the Government have had to recognise that—the system should allow them to rebuild their lives after the trauma of their persecution, their journeys and their asylum claim, but instead this Government still want to turn the screw. Instead of the stability and permanent residence refugees were once provided with, today they are given five years’ leave, with a review that is fairly light-touch, before settlement. But this Bill and the Government’s plan propose endless 30-month cycles of review and ongoing attempts to remove. Nobody can rebuild their lives in those circumstances—and I do not know how on earth the Home Office is going to cope with having to revisit every single asylum case every 30 months.

These refugees will not be entitled to public funds unless they are destitute. So if, say, the Christian convert finds some part-time, low-paid work—a big ask, given the language and cultural barriers, the enforced years out of work, and the trauma—there will be no universal credit to cover housing or income shortfalls, and if he or she was able to bring a child, there will be no support for that child. Their refugee family reunion rights will be diminished, according to the plan, meaning that they cannot be joined by a spouse or perhaps a child. The detail is not in the Bill, but that is what the plan suggests and the Bill enables.

That inevitably gives the Christian convert a choice: does the family stay apart or do other family members—often the women and children that the Home Secretary professes to be protecting—then have to follow and make their own dangerous journeys? Without the family, without state support and without stability, the Uyghur, the Syrian and the persecuted Christian convert have no hope of rebuilding their lives. That amounts not to a place of sanctuary, but to a place of punishment—and the Home Office has the audacity to claim that it is in their best interests. This is, in short, an outrageous way to treat refugees, and it is why the Bill is rightly being called the anti-refugee Bill.

There is so much that could be said about the undermining of efforts to support trafficking victims, the total absence from the Bill of protection for children, and the undermining of rights of stateless children. We need to know what the placeholder clauses will give rise to. We do not even have the chance to debate them here on Second Reading, and there are six or seven of them. The whole of the dentistry profession is up in arms at the suggestion that the discredited and unethical dental X-rays system could return as an inaccurate method of assessing age.

[Chris Philp]

Just like in any other European country.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Well, the dentistry profession and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees say that it is not accurate and it is entirely unethical.

The Home Secretary is also making it harder to identify victims of modern slavery and cutting their recovery period to the minimum allowed in international law.

There is so much that should be in the Bill that is not. I mention just one thing: the failure to end the disgracefully painful 10-year route to settlement that many essentially British kids face and the outrageous fees that others are charged for registering their entitlement to British citizenship. When will that finally be done? This is an abysmal and, indeed, shameful Bill. It does not remotely deserve a Second Reading.

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[Sir John Hayes]

Absolutely, it does not, nor is it just to pillory the public and those who speak for them when they argue that we should enforce the law and that migration should be controlled. As a number of hon. Members have said, legal migration has been out of control for some time, and illegal migration, by its very nature, is both unjust and unfair because it breaks the law. It breaches that principle that people who arrive here and pursue legal routes are doing the right thing and that those who do not are simply doing the wrong thing and should be deported. That is what the public think, and that is what we should say very clearly.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Is no one on the Conservative Benches remotely concerned that the Bill would see a Uyghur fleeing persecution in China, a Syrian fleeing disastrous war crimes in that country or a persecuted Christian seeking sanctuary on this shore criminalised with an offence that could see them in prison for up to four years, stripped of their family reunion rights, offshored and whatever else? Does nobody on those Benches have any qualms about that whatsoever?

[Sir John Hayes]

Surely the hon. Gentleman must realise that while the principle of granting asylum—of giving sanctuary to people in desperate need—is a noble one, it is being gamed, day after day and month after month, with people travelling through many safe countries before claiming asylum, repeated claims on a whole range of different grounds, and even modern slavery, which we all deplore, being used as a justification to stay here when it is invented. That is to insult—to besmirch—those who are really suffering persecution and who come here in genuine need. It is being gamed, frankly, by a combination of unscrupulous civil rights and human rights activists, and people-traffickers. Although they do not work together in an organised fashion, the combination of the two is damaging public faith in our ability to control our borders. If “take back control” means anything, surely it means taking back control of our sovereign borders.

When the average Briton sees the asylum system being played, it leaves them bewildered, frustrated and angry that we should be taken for such fools. British people do not want to pull up the drawbridge to the world’s needy. What they want is a consistent system that helps the right people in the right way: one that will remove those with no right to stay in Britain just as it protects those we ought to be protecting, not one that grants favour to those who manage to successfully break our laws when they first arrive here.

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[Jack Brereton]

Glasgow is the only official asylum dispersal area in Scotland. Other authorities have the opportunity to come forward as dispersal areas, but SNP-controlled authorities in Scotland have failed to do so. All the pressure has fallen on the minority of authorities that are dispersal areas, while numerous authorities have failed to resettle a single asylum seeker.

The west midlands is currently accommodating 12.26%, an increase on 2019, but all of this is falling on only half of the authorities in the region. In Stoke-on-Trent it is having a significant impact on our overstretched local services.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Perhaps the hon. Gentleman can join our delegation tomorrow, because what we seek and what the cross-party Home Affairs Committee has advised is that the Home Office properly fund the dispersal system. Every single local authority in Scotland got involved in the refugee resettlement scheme because it was properly funded. I am more than happy to join him in seeking more money for dispersal areas, and we will all then happily sign up to do the job properly.

[Jack Brereton]

What the hon. Gentleman is actually saying is, “We are happy for authorities like Stoke-on-Trent to continue to pull their weight, and we in Scotland will just sit here, not pull our weight and continue not to support asylum seekers in this country.”

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[Richard Fuller]

My right hon. Friend speaks very wise words.

Let me just say to Opposition Members that there is no monopoly on compassion, and that it does not mean saying that the system must apply to everyone in a particular process. Compassion applies to an individual claim. The importance of our system is that we get to that individual and do not lose sight of him or her. In a previous life as a Member of Parliament, I spoke in a debate on another immigration Bill and bemoaned the lack of compassion in our immigration system. It was encouraging to hear the Home Secretary use the word “compassion” so often, and to hear stories of compassion from other Conservative Members, whether they were about how a council looks after the people who are claiming asylum or about people’s feelings about the system. So there is no monopoly on compassion here, and I look forward to working with Opposition Members in finding ways in which we can make it work more deeply in the Bill.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I have a lot of respect for the hon. Member, particularly for his stance on immigration detention and his campaigning for time limits on it. The Home Secretary talks about compassion, but at the end of the day—I have said this a few times, but people do not seem even to acknowledge it—the Bill would criminalise people it recognises as refugees, strip them of their family reunion rights, strip them of recourse to public funds, limit the amount of leave that they are allowed here and never let them even apply for settlement. That is not remotely compassionate. We are talking about refugees.

[Richard Fuller]

I look forward to the hon. Gentleman talking about specifics, because again there was a bit of broad generalisation there. However, one thing that I will say for SNP Members is that at least they have some ideas, whereas 10 minutes into the shadow Home Secretary’s speech he said, “Let me tell you what the Labour party will do”—and in the rest of his speech he came up with one idea, which was to set a legal target for how quickly asylum claims get processed. Is that it? Is that all the Labour party has to offer? I see that it is, so let us work with the SNP.

Let me tell the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East where I think we can work together. Let us have some compassion for victims of slavery; there is plenty of support on the Conservative Benches for that. Let us have some compassion in how we treat children in the Bill; there is lots of support on both sides of the House for that. Let us have some compassion for how the particular issues of women will be affected by the separation of regular from irregular routes. And let us have some compassion, Minister, by ending indefinite detention once and for all.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Stuart C McDonald Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 20th July 2021 Commons Chamber

[Rob Roberts (Delyn) (Ind)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Airdrie and Shotts (Anum Qaisar-Javed). It will come as no surprise that I do not agree with a great number of things that she said, but she may get some comfort from one of the proposals that I will make later to improve the Bill.

I welcome any Bill that aims to address historical anomalies and areas of unfairness in British nationality law, and to make the current system of applying for asylum fairer and more efficient. This Bill will ensure that those who are in genuine need can be supported, and, at the same time, deter illegal entry into the UK. This is a timely and important topic and an area of law that we have needed to address for some time.

In recent years, we have sadly been haunted by terrible scenes and tragic reports of migrants losing their lives while attempting to enter the UK. That is why I welcome the changes proposed in this Bill. The Bill aims to save and protect lives by ensuring that only safe and legal routes into the UK remain, and proposes harsher punishments for human smugglers and traffickers, who are responsible for so much suffering. The introduction of life sentences for human smuggling, by way of which so many lives have been endangered, will attempt to combat and condemn the exploitation of migrants. Tougher criminal sentences for those attempting to enter the UK illegally will also steer those seeking asylum towards safe and legal routes, and ultimately protect their lives.

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

What the hon. Member is advocating and what the Government have in this Bill is a criminal offence punishable by up to four years in prison that would apply to a Uyghur fleeing ethnic cleansing in China, to a Syrian fleeing war crimes there, or to a persecuted Christian fleeing for their life. How can any Government or any party justify locking up these people for four years?

[Rob Roberts]

I recall serving with the hon. Gentleman on the Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill Committee, so I am very much aware of the experience and expertise that he brings to this debate. The short answer is that this Bill does an awful lot to end human trafficking and the nasty, awful environment that is being fostered by the criminal gangs who are putting lives at risk. I appreciate everything that the hon. Gentleman says and the expertise that he brings to the debate, but I do not necessarily see it in the same way as he does.

The UK has a proud history of supporting the most vulnerable people worldwide, having resettled more refugees than any other country in Europe. The Bill ensures that the Government stand by their moral and legal obligations to help people fleeing cruelty around the world, while condemning those who break the law.

Let me turn briefly to another element of the Bill. Attention needs to be given to the costly and arduous routes to citizenship that are bureaucratic and expensive for those who are already settled and working in the UK. I declare an interest, as my partner is an overseas NHS worker. This is a perfect example of what I mean: many of our NHS workers who have worked day in, day out to provide the best possible care to patients throughout the pandemic have come from other countries. Often these individuals have travelled great distances and put their own lives at risk to help and save our lives, regardless of their or our citizenship; their duty to care and contribute to the wellbeing of their patients is what comes first and I commend their hard work.

However, with fees for indefinite leave to remain at almost £2,400 and citizenship applications another £1,330, the process of becoming a citizen for many of our NHS workers is a costly and challenging one. As the hon. Member for Edinburgh West (Christine Jardine) said last week during an intervention in the Health and Care Bill debate, if we offered indefinite leave to remain to all of our NHS workers who are here on renewable visas, I feel confident that the gap in the NHS workforce would almost certainly close and, simultaneously, we would be recognising their hard work and sacrifices. The over 160,000 NHS staff from over 200 different countries who stated that they were of non-British nationality account for nearly 15% of all NHS staff for whom a nationality is known. It is undeniable that we would be in dire straits without them. Should we not therefore consider changing our current citizenship process to one that does not deter NHS workers through high costs and time-consuming processes, one that does not leave them in debt and in poverty but instead rewards their commitment to their communities?

I welcome the many steps that the Bill takes to improve the UK’s asylum and immigration system to make it one that is based on needs, and I welcome the new NHS visa that has been announced by the Home Office. Given that the Government themselves have already recognised the importance of creating a bespoke route for incoming NHS workers, I feel it is also our duty to focus on those who have already given so much to our country, by creating a new route to citizenship for existing NHS workers.

One of the objections to this could be that once indefinite leave to remain or citizenship had been conferred, the NHS worker would be free to go to the private sector or to a different role altogether, having benefited from the fee abolition. That could be easily resolved. Companies do this all the time, paying fees for qualifications for individuals that would become repayable if that individual then left the company’s service. There does not seem to be any reasonable reason why a similar scheme could not be put in place to make this workable.

As I have said before, in this place and in Westminster Hall, it is time to abolish the fees for indefinite leave to remain and for citizenship for those who work in our NHS, so that those who spend time helping and treating us can finally feel like they belong and are welcomed in our country with open arms.

--- Later in debate ---

[James Sunderland (Bracknell) (Con)]

Since I was elected to Parliament, one of the issues that I have been left in no doubt about whatsoever by many of my constituents is that the UK must take back control of its borders and deal with the tide of illegal immigration. We have all seen the sad and appalling scenes—images of asylum seekers making the perilous journey across the channel in small boats, on dangerous tides. Frankly, it is suicide, and it needs to stop, for all the reasons that have been debated today. The UK has shown itself over many years to be more than generous and hospitable, but there cannot be an indefinite blank cheque for those who come here illegally.

The Bill, as we know, has three main objectives. The first is to increase the fairness of the system—I emphasise the phrase “fairness of the system”—to better protect and support those in need of asylum. The Bill deters illegal entry into the United Kingdom, thereby breaking the business model of people-smuggling networks and protecting the lives of those they wilfully endanger. The Bill also enables those with no right to be in the UK to be removed more easily. The UK’s legal immigration system is being reformed by the ending of free movement and the introduction of a new points-based immigration system. In my view, this Bill is intended to tackle illegal migration and asylum seekers and to control the UK borders, and it fulfils the manifesto promise that was made in 2019.

Let me set out some of the facts. The number of asylum seeker cases is growing. We must assess the current system and innovate to create a fairer and more efficient, modern system. There were 29,500 asylum applications in 2020 alone, and many more continue to arrive. Contrary to popular perception, the UK will continue to resettle genuine refugees directly from regions of conflict and instability. That has protected over 25,000 people in the last six years, more than any other European country.

The proposals in the Bill will rightly create a differentiated approach. How someone arrives in the UK will impact the type of status they are granted in the UK if their asylum claim is successful. Ministers rightly argue that that approach will discourage irregular entry into the UK, such as entry across the channel via small boats, as we have discussed, which, again, increased significantly in 2020.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Even on its own terms, that will not work. There is not a shred of evidence in the world that tinkering with the asylum system discourages people from coming to claim asylum. In fact, parts of the Bill are already in force, including the six-month palming off of complaints, and of course we already have Napier and Penally barracks, yet still the number of crossings continues to rise. It just will not work. People will still come. They will not be put off coming to Britain; they will just be put off claiming asylum because of how bloody awful this Government are making the system.

[James Sunderland]

I am pretty clear that the Bill is designed to do exactly what I said it is designed to do. What we have to do is disincentivise the ongoing passage across the channel. We have to break the cycle. If asylum seekers know that entering the UK illegally via that method is not going to result in a successful claim for asylum, then it may stop. That will also discourage those gangs from wilfully imposing their own selfishness on these vulnerable people.

Let me move on to immigration enforcement. The Australian experience has shown what can be done legally and fairly with state intervention. The Bill will provide our border force with additional powers to search unaccompanied containers located in ports for the presence of illegal migrants. It will seize and dispose of vessels intercepted and encountered, including disposal through donation to charity if appropriate, and it will stop and divert vessels suspected of carrying illegal migrants to the UK, and, subject to the agreement of the relevant country, such as France, return them to where their sea journey to the UK began. Almost all these migrants have passed through many other countries, which should by rights have offered them asylum, to get to the UK, which, clearly, people perceive to be a soft touch, and that has to end.

Currently, there are more than 109,000 asylum cases in the system, 52,000 of which were awaiting an initial decision at the end of 2020. Around 5,500 have an asylum appeal outstanding and approximately 41,000 cases are subject to removal action. These figures are completely outrageous and point not to any failure by the Home Office, but to the sheer numbers of people who continue to seek the UK as a soft touch. Doing nothing is no longer an option. I therefore welcome the measures outlined in the Bill, and I am clear that our current asylum system is unequivocally in need of reform.

In conclusion, this is not a moral or an emotional judgment, but a pragmatic one. Although I urge the Government to ensure that implementation is as humane, kind and hospitable as possible, as we have seen for many years, it is time for change and I shall be voting this Bill through tonight.

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[Richard Burgon]

It appears that there is a twitching of a conscience one Bench back from the Tory Front Bench. If the hon. Gentleman has a conscience on these matters, if he cares about the people he purports to care about from Syria or from anywhere else, I would urge him to vote against the Bill, because this reactionary Bill should be killed off today.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

To bring things a little more up to date, if we are looking at the statistics about who is in these boats crossing the channel, the nationalities are Iranian, Iraqi, Syrian, Eritrean and Sudanese. People from almost all those countries have success rates when they claim asylum of about 60% or 80%. The vast majority of people crossing the channel are refugees. Instead of locking them up, let us look at their applications.

[Richard Burgon]

The hon. Gentleman makes an important point and brings some reality to this debate. This reactionary Bill should be killed off today.

--- Later in debate ---

[Shaun Bailey]

My hon. Friend makes a very good point. I have a lot of respect for the hon. Members for Enfield, Southgate (Bambos Charalambous) and for Newport East (Jessica Morden), but, as I say, where are the rest of them? Where are they? We could all ask that question, and my hon. Friend has articulated it in his unique way. [Laughter.] I assure him that that was a compliment.

I sat here last night and listened intently to the contributions on both sides of the House. I was pretty aghast, to be honest, by some of the stuff I heard—particularly the parallels that people tried to draw between the Kindertransport and this Bill. That was abhorrent. There is no way that any conscionable Government would illegalise the saving of people from a regime such as the Nazis. For Opposition Members to use that parallel in a debate shows, quite frankly, that when they have lost the argument, they just throw mud. That is exactly what that analogy—

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Shaun Bailey]

Not at this point. I will give way to the hon. Gentleman, but I will just make a bit more progress.

I thought that was a disgraceful analogy to make. I also want to draw on a point on the 1951 convention that was articulated very well last night. I agree that we make international agreements and we should abide by those international agreements, but it was interesting to hear in the contributions last night that one of the debates that has had to happen is around how the international community defines “migrant” and “refugee”. We have seen the debate that has been going on, and we heard from my right hon. Friend the Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May) about the conversations she had had with the UN about really drilling down into what that definition meant. By getting the definition right, and through this Bill, we can ensure that we protect those most vulnerable.

Let us just remind ourselves of one thing. We are not trying to turn away refugees and people that need our help. I am sure that my hon. and right hon. Friends who have been lambasted today and yesterday by some of the most disgraceful slurs I could possibly have heard would agree that we uphold our place in the international community to protect the most vulnerable.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The most important thing is to have a sense of perspective. Everyone supports safe, legal routes, but even in a good year, pre-covid—I think the figure was about 25,000 last year—the total number of resettlements globally from UN-mandated camps was in the region of 50,000. We are talking about 25 million or 30 million refugees. We would be here for centuries before resettlement provided a complete solution. We will have resettlement but we must also have an asylum system alongside that. All we are asking is for the United Kingdom to offer a relatively small, by European standards, number of asylum seekers a place of sanctuary.

[Anne McLaughlin]

I completely agree, as I always do, with everything that my hon. Friend says.

I ask Conservative Members: just imagine it was you. I talked about a Belarusian MP, but imagine it was you. Imagine that for some reason—lucky us; we do not have to—you ended up in that situation where you had to flee. Is there anything Conservative Members would not do to keep their families safe? If there is anything they would not do to keep their families safe, maybe they should be thinking about their moral code.

Ireland has been through attempts to reform the system. It argued at the time, as Conservative Members do, that its system was a deterrent. Those at the Ministry of Justice in Ireland wanted to build misery into the accommodation system. It was not a train of thought imagined by critics; it was their actual policy. But they realised it was wrong and there is now cross-party consensus that it must stop. They reached that consensus not just because it did not work, but because they have recognised the inhumanity of that system.

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[Bambos Charalambous]

The hon. Member misunderstands me. It is the process of the Bill getting here that has been rushed, not the debate we have had today.

There is also no impact assessment accompanying the Bill. We have no idea how much it will cost or what the overall impact will be.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The Bill has seven placeholder clauses—something I have never seen before—so the House will not see what the Government are up to until the Committee stage where most Members will not take part.

[Bambos Charalambous]

The hon. Member makes an excellent point.

Less than a week ago, we had hon. Members rightly berating the Minister for Care, screaming blue murder at her failure to produce an impact assessment for the health and social care regulations. Where are those howls today? Not a word. I dare not ask about the legal advice that was sought to formulate this Bill, but if there was an Olympic event for legal gymnastics, it would definitely win a gold medal.

The Bill is riddled with holes. It is fatally flawed and it will not work. It will not work because of the glaring omission of the lack of bilateral agreements with France and other EU countries. Conservative Members can huff and puff all they like, but it should begin to dawn on them that without any such agreements the Bill will not work and it will not stop any channel crossings.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Chris Philp)]

I thank all Members who have spoken in this extremely thorough two-day debate.

The public expect this House to protect our borders, they expect us to combat the dinghies crossing the English channel and they expect us to remove those with no right to be here. This Bill will deliver those people’s priorities. The Labour MPs who say those priorities are somehow racist are not only wrong, but they are insulting our fellow citizens who rightly want proper border control. The Bill is fair but firm: fair to those in genuine need, but firm towards those seeking to abuse the system. Let me reiterate the Government’s commitment to supporting those in genuine need. Of course, we cannot help all 80 million displaced people around the world who may wish to come here, but we will play our part.

First, we are continuing our world-leading resettlement programme. We are working with the UNHCR. We resettle the world’s most vulnerable. We have resettled 25,000 people in the last six years—more than any other European country—half of them children. We will be strengthening that arrangement by immediately granting indefinite leave to remain to those entering via the resettlement programme. I am concerned about the poor integration outcomes in the resettlement scheme—fewer than 5% are in work after a year—so we are going to do more on integration. We are also going to draw in a wider range of persecuted people, recognising, for example, that the most persecuted group globally are persecuted Christians, whom we should make an effort to look after as well.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The Minister talks of what the public expect, but one thing I do not think they would expect is for this Government to create a criminal offence that would see a Uyghur fleeing genocide in China, a Syrian fleeing war crimes or indeed a persecuted Christian who gets here without a visa subject, potentially, to a four-year prison sentence under this Bill.

[Chris Philp]

The hon. Gentleman mentions Syrians fleeing war crimes. Our resettlement programme has principally focused on Syrians fleeing war crimes, who, via the UNHCR working in the region, have been able, safely and legally, to come to this country in greater numbers than are seen in any other European resettlement programme. That is quicker, safer and easier than illegally crossing the channel in a dinghy. We are not just running Europe’s resettlement programme; as we speak, we are bringing locally engaged staff from Afghanistan to the UK, and we have opened up a route for British nationals overseas from Hong Kong to come here, escaping the oppressive regime of the Chinese Communist party. In addition, 29,000 people have come in the past six years as part of refugees family reunions. So when the Opposition claim that we are not offering safe and legal routes, that is simply not true.

The Scottish nationalists have been saying that Scotland would like to do more. I am very disappointed, as I said in my intervention, when I was able to get in, that out of the 32 local authorities in Scotland only one, Glasgow, takes dispersed asylum seekers. If Scotland wants to do more, they have the opportunity to do so. Moreover, when it comes to taking unaccompanied asylum seeking children under the national transfer scheme, Scotland took only a very small handful of the 600 or so who were transferred last year. Scottish National party Members cannot talk about money, because those children have more than £50,000 a year of funding going with them. There are children right now in Dover who need to be looked after, so I call on the Scottish Government to put action behind their words and take some of those children on—tonight. They do not need independence to do that; they can do it now.

Let me be clear: we will always play our part for those in genuine need, but we should choose who deserves our help. Illegal immigration undermines that choice. Instead of the UK being able to choose the children and families most in need, illegal immigration instead allows those who pay people smugglers or who are strong to push their way to the front of the queue.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Philp]

I thank my right hon. Friend for his very timely intervention and I agree with what he says. This Bill contains provisions such that people arriving by small boat and other illegal means will be liable to prosecution and a four-year jail term, and people smugglers will face a life sentence. This Bill also gives Border Force the powers it needs to make interceptions at sea. Let me be clear: nothing in this Bill would have made the Kindertransport from the 1930s illegal. That was an authorised and organised programme that would be perfectly legal. Indeed it is rather analogous to the safe and legal route we are at this very moment offering locally engaged staff from Afghanistan. Let me also reassure the House, and in particular my hon. Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Damian Collins), that there is no intention in this Bill to criminalise bona fide, genuine rescue operations by the RNLI.

Let me also be clear that nothing in this Bill infringes our international obligations. Opposition Members should study article 31 of the refugee convention, which makes it clear that it is permitted to impose penalties where someone has not come “directly” from a place of danger and where they did not have a reasonable opportunity to claim asylum somewhere else.[Official Report, 22 July 2021, Vol. 699, c. 10MC.] The people coming from France are not coming directly from a place of danger, as required by article 31, and they did have a reasonable chance to claim asylum in France. These measures are wholly consistent with our international obligations.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

rose—

[Chris Philp]

I must finish soon. I apologise.

My right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes) asked about the legal system, which also needs reform as it is open to abuse. People make repeated human rights claims to asylum and modern slavery claims, which are often strung out over many years in an effort to avoid removal. Very often those claims are later found to be without merit. For example, in 2017, 83% of the last-minute claims that were raised in detention to frustrate removal were later found to be without merit. I have seen terrible examples of murderers and rapists making last-minute claims, without merit, to avoid deportation. It is not just me saying that. Let me quote what the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Burnett of Maldon, said in a judgment last October:

“Late claims raised shortly before…removal have been endemic, many fanciful or entirely false…It is a matter of regret that a minority of lawyers have lent their professional…support to vexatious representations and abusive late legal challenges.”

In those remarks, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales is saying that change is needed.

The Bill also contains measures on age assessment. We are the only European country not to use scientific age assessment. Recent evaluations in Kent concerning 92 people claiming to be children later found that half were not. There are obvious and serious safeguarding issues if men who are 23 years old, for example, successfully pretend to be under 18 and get housed or educated with 16-year-old girls. We cannot tolerate that.

Nationality and Borders Bill (Second sitting)

Stuart C McDonald Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st September 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I call Stuart McDonald.

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

Q Thank you for your evidence so far. Earlier we heard from Jon Featonby of the Red Cross that there was only one clause in the Bill that would directly impact smugglers themselves, by increasing possible sentences. You have gone further, saying that, on the whole, those gangs would celebrate the Bill passing through Parliament. Why do you go that far?

Zoe Gardner: There is considerable evidence that every time we spend more money on trying to close down a route that is regularly used by smugglers to bring people through irregular means to the UK—indeed, this is the case in any other country—the people who are desperate to take that route do not simply disappear. In fact, the routes are simply redirected, often to more dangerous paths. It does not stop the journeys, but it does allow the smugglers to charge more, for yet more dangerous journeys and yet more complicated ways of making it through these barriers. There is always going to be more flexibility on the side of the smugglers than on the side of the state. Until we provide people with a regulated alternative means of travel to the UK, every round of security spending that we throw at this and every attempt at this failed model of deterrence and pushbacks will be celebrated by the smugglers, because it simply lines their pockets.

The increased sentences proposed by the Bill are all very well, and would be perfectly reasonable if in reality they were aimed at smuggling gangs. However, what we have seen in the last 12 months is that the Home Office has used legislation that was intended to be used against smuggling gangs and members of international criminal gangs to unjustly prosecute asylum seekers themselves. Several asylum seekers have served jail time on the basis that they were facilitating the entry of other asylum seekers on the same boat.

That practice was being undertaken until, in August this year, the Crown Prosecution Service published some clarified guidance confirming that it is not a crime to enter the UK, even on a small boat or through other irregular means, if your purpose is to present yourself to the authorities and seek asylum. That is the case for almost all, if not all—I think the official figure is 98% —of the people on these boats. It has been confirmed that those people are not committing a crime or an immigration offence.

The danger of the increased sentences is that they will be targeted at the wrong people and that they will be used to punish people who are exercising their right to claim asylum rather than being targeted at the people at whom it should be targeted: the organised criminal gangs. That should be done on the basis of credible intelligence and international co-operation, and not on the basis of picking people up off the beach in Kent when they clearly intend to make an asylum claim.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q You have said that you think the policy of trying to disincentivise people from making these crossings is not going to work and that, on the other hand, some of the measures used to pursue that disincentive effect, such as the notices of intent, will have a pretty awful impact on those affected by them. Can you say more about some of the other disincentives? You have mentioned the notices of intent, but obviously there is criminalisation and measures around no recourse to public funds and family reunion. How will those impact on individuals and the local authorities that are trying to support them?

Zoe Gardner: This refers to the differential treatment for people who, once they have arrived and been served with their notice of intent, have to wait six months in this unnecessary and harmful limbo situation in the asylum system. If the Government do not find somewhere else to send them—another country willing to take on our responsibilities for them—as is likely to happen in most cases, they will have their asylum claim assessed in the usual system. Given that the nationalities are overwhelmingly those recognised as refugees in this country—people from countries such as Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Sudan and Syria, which have a high recognition rate—they will be recognised as refugees in need of protection from persecution.

The Government then propose, with this Bill, to offer them only temporary protection status, which is not the same as the refugee protection status that we have provided them with until now. That would mean people having an unstable status that would need to be consistently renewed, potentially once every 30 months, and with no guarantee of obtaining permanent settlement.

That is completely harmful to the mental health and integration prospects of refugees. It runs counter to obligations under the UN refugee convention, which requires that recognised refugees are assisted to naturalise and integrate. It also simply does not work from a practical perspective. We have an example of a JCWI client who is a gay man from Iran. He has been granted a temporary protection status for six months, due to complicated factors of his case. The Home Office proposes to reassess whether this gay man from Iran will be at risk again in six months, and again in six months, and again in six months. If it was every 30 months, I am sure that members of the Committee can see the lack of logic being applied there.

People who obtain refugee protection almost always need long-term, stable protection status. They come from countries where it is very unlikely that it will be safe to remove them again within 30 months. That puts a huge additional bureaucratic burden on a Home Office that is already failing to get through its case load at a reasonable speed and will very seriously hamper those people’s integration prospects.

Furthermore, as Lucy Moreton mentioned, those people may be denied the right to family reunification. That means that the largely female or child contingent of refugees who are currently able to get protection through a safe route of family reunion would then be denied that protection. That might mean that, in desperation to join their loved one who has come to the UK, they may then embark on those dangerous irregular journeys, so this may in fact provoke more irregular journeys and, again, enrich and empower the smugglers yet more.

Finally, the proposals also suggest that refugees granted this secondary status of protection would not be granted access to public funds. Aside from being cruel and harmful to refugees, that follows the same pattern of being illogical and impractical. The reality is that if these refugees are destitute, they will be able to apply to have the “no recourse to public funds” conditions lifted. Given that they will have waited for at least six months and then gone into the standard asylum procedure, which at the moment takes well over six months in many cases, and during that time will not have been allowed to work, plus being people who are recovering from trauma, the likelihood that they can go into a job and start earning straightaway is extremely low. The likelihood that they will be destitute under those circumstances is extremely high.

This just adds a huge additional bureaucratic burden where there will be application after application for these “no recourse to public funds” conditions to be lifted. In the meantime, there is the risk that people will fall into destitution. From the perspective of fairness and compassion, this plan does not work. From the perspective of having a functioning asylum system and a Home Office that produces efficient and tolerable procedures that work on a reasonable time frame, again, it completely fails.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q Lucy Moreton, do you want to pick up on the issue of additional work that this will create for the Home Office, in terms of having to revisit asylum applications every 30 months, even though someone has been recognised as a refugee, and dealing with applications to lift no recourse to public funds conditions and so on? Also, on another subject: do you think pushbacks at sea are more about headline grabbing than worthwhile legislation?

Lucy Moreton: My colleague’s point on the administrative burden of constantly having to reassess and read asylum claims was absolutely right. It feeds back into the point I made about resourcing: you cannot make this work if you do not put the resources in. If you want civil servants to reconsider applications every six or 30 months, you are going to have to put enough civil servants in there to do it.

On the issue of pushbacks, as things stand at the moment, given the instructions that we work under to ensure the safety of life at sea and the legality of it, it seems to us—the trade union, and the members who advise us—extremely unlikely to happen in practice. The restrictions are, quite rightly, very tight. No one wants to see a fatality from what is a very dangerous manoeuvre. It was not expected to be announced as it was. It had been in discussion in various iterations for a couple of years, but for it to be announced suddenly in the press came as a surprise.

It had the unfortunate impact of endangering both border officers and migrants because suddenly migrants feared that they were going to be pushed back, even though they are in circumstances where they never would be—they are vulnerable, the vessel is vulnerable, it has vulnerable people in it and it is not in the right bit of the channel. Because they are frightened of being approached by border officers, they are less willing to be rescued in circumstances where they deeply need rescuing. That was most unfortunate.

I recognise the risk in saying this, but I will personally be very surprised if this ever actually happens and is completed. I would be amazed. We do not see migrant vessels that are not vulnerable in one way or another.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Thank you.

[Paul Howell (Sedgefield) (Con)]

Q I want to turn to your last point before I come to the one that I was going to make. You say that the people in the boats would be scared of Border Force because of what has been said. We were told by the Red Cross earlier that the people getting into boats were not informed about what was going on or what sort of law applied. How would they have a perception that the law had changed and that they were going to be pushed back, given that, as the Red Cross said earlier, they would not have any perception of what laws applied to them?

Lucy Moreton: There are communications channels between migrants who make it and those who are waiting. Also, the spin put on it by the smuggling gangs is absolutely phenomenal. For example, we were seeing a lot of migrants being told that the small vessel route over the English channel would become illegal once the UK had left the EU. It was illegal before and it was going to be illegal after: nothing changed. But the gangs used that to pressure more people into taking the route—“Go now, before they stop it!”—and to charge more money for that route. Different vessels have different amounts of information, but this has been reported quite widely in the press.

Migrant groupings in France, I understand, are now aware that this is a risk. We know that they resist approaches by the French; they put themselves at risk in order to prevent the French intercepting and returning them while they remain within French waters. We get reports from our members on the cutters, particularly the smaller ribs, that migrants make absolutely sure that they have got a British vessel. They are far more likely to trust the RNLI or the coastguard, who they recognise because they are on telly and have different uniforms, than to trust us. The last thing we need is someone standing up and going overboard. If they are trying to avoid being intercepted, either by the French, by us or anyone they do not recognise, that is the risk.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

Q I noted the broad support for the national age assessment board approach that we are proposing to try to deal with some of this, but what impact do you believe the current judicial review-based processes for settling disputes of age assessments have on your organisation? I am conscious, as a former councillor, that it is not always just financial; it is also around officer time in particular, and the impact on services more generally. What would you say about that?

Councillor Rachael Robathan: Anything that moves towards a uniform process will greatly help. At the moment, involving the local authorities and putting the responsibility on them is very difficult for what are very often stretched institutions. Having a uniform, joined-up process would be very welcome.

Councillor Roger Gough: Already when you see changes in, for instance, what the courts have found about what is a reasonable basis on which a challenge can be presented by Border Force, as we have seen recently, that has made a huge difference. The proportion of young people coming to us age disputed is significantly lower than it was before that.

When you get changes in the process, it can make a material difference. Authorities like ours are at least experienced in this area, even if we are in the eye of the storm. As dispersal happens, or when, as I mentioned earlier, those who have been placed as adults launch a challenge within their own authority, issues may arise for an authority that is not nearly as well set up to deal with them as we are.

To pick up on the point that Councillor Robathan made, it is worth emphasising what a difference going into the children’s system or the adult system makes. As we have both said, first there are children in care and then there is the care leaver process, all of which, quite properly in their own way, have particular requirements for children’s services departments in authorities. The process around adult dispersal clearly still makes demands on council services, but in the first instance it is a housing-related issue, from which a number of other things follow. It is not quite the same as building in what can be a seven, eight or 10 year process of somebody being part of the children’s services operations of the council.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q I thank the witnesses for their evidence so far. I have a couple of follow-up questions on age assessments. You have spoken about the safeguarding issues that arise if somebody who is an adult finds themselves in a space for children, but of course the opposite can also happen; there are huge safeguarding issues if somebody aged 15 or 16 ends up being put in a hotel with adults or dispersed to some other part of the United Kingdom with limited supervision. It is in all our interests to get that absolutely right. Would it make any difference, for example, if we took the pressure off these decisions—I am thinking slightly off the top of my head—by continuing UASC leave to a higher age, say 20 or 21?

Councillor Roger Gough: Sorry, could you just run your last point by me again?

[Stuart C. McDonald]

It just strikes me that a lot of the pressure around these decisions, and perhaps even a degree of cynicism about where a number of age claims fall, arises from the fact that UASC leave, as I understand it, takes young people up to 17 and a half. If UASC leave carried on until 19, 20 or 21 there would be much less pressure, or motivation—if you are cynical about it—to make a claim that you were 15, 16 or 17 than there is now. Would that be a different way to try to go about fixing this?

Councillor Roger Gough: I need to think about this one, but I suspect my answer will probably be that where the pressure arises is not so much on the immigration side of things as in respect of the children’s services obligations. As long as a young person is identified as being of a particular age that, under the current rules, makes them a child in care for the council, that is where the issues for councils arise. As has been mentioned, that takes those involved through to the age of 25 as care leavers. The answer almost certainly is that it is Children Act responsibilities that matter in this case. As you say, there is normally UAS leave to remain, which will then usually transfer over into a five-year leave to remain. In a sense, the age issues tie into Children Act responsibilities.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Okay, I will give that some further thought.

Councillor Roger Gough: And so will I.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q Safeguarding obviously does work both ways. Ultimately it is just imperative that we get this right. I think other local authorities have expressed some concern about this national body possibly taking their decision-making power away from them. Nobody would object to anything that drives up standards and helps to make sure we get these decisions right, but do you have any sympathy with local authorities that say, “Ultimately, it is our social workers who will implement this decision. It should be them who make the decision in the first place”?

Councillor Roger Gough: I am certainly more supportive of something that is there to support local authorities and provide more of a framework and a structure, rather than completely taking the process over—I do not think that that is necessarily what would be envisaged. In short, going back to the two points you have posited, you are quite right that safeguarding arguments would cut both ways. What all of us are asking is simply, how do we find a process that is as robust as it can be and that does not have a hugely distorting effect on local authority children’s services departments in terms of their time, their resources and their officers’ commitment?

In terms of the function that this body could have, there is a suggestion that it could support, and take decisions with, authorities who wish it. But the key thing in many ways is that it provides more of a framework within what, at present, is a relatively hazy area of activity. To the degree that you can do that, I think you would make local authorities’ lives easier and better, and they would hopefully provide better services in this area than would otherwise be the case.

Councillor Rachael Robathan: I would largely agree. In terms of your first point, about moving the age higher, I would be wary of introducing a hurdle or age bar that was different from that for other young people in our care. I would be quite wary about introducing a parallel process that has different criteria. I suspect that you might just push the problem forward a few years; then you would have a 19-year-old, but are they really 19 or actually a 22-year-old who is presenting as a 19-year-old? That might move the issue around, rather than addressing it.

I agree with what Councillor Gough said: having a national process that helps local authorities in determining age would be a support. It is not determining the shape of the services that local authorities then deliver; it is basically saying, “This young person qualifies on this age basis to access your services.”

[Stuart C. McDonald]

We will have to see what the placeholder clauses in the Bill are replaced with, but thank you both very much.

[The Chair]

If there are no more questions, I thank the witnesses for their evidence. We will move on to the next panel.

Examination of Witness

Tony Smith gave evidence.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Howell]

Q Thank you, Chair. This question is similar to one that I asked a previous witness. Mr Smith, what aspects of the Bill would you particularly welcome, and what do you feel needs to be more robust, or indeed less? Could you cover that at the same time?

Tony Smith: I particularly welcome the distinction between those people who are entering the country from safe third countries, with the new interpretation of article 31 where we can actually test whether they face an immediate fear of persecution in the circumstances under which we find them, and those who are genuinely fleeing persecution coming through refugee resettlement routes. I think that is the part that I favour the most.

The other thing we will have to consider is whether we will have to establish proper arrangements for the reception of people coming via this route. The facilities in Tug Haven—I do not know whether the Committee has been there—are appalling. We have a marquee there and we have Border Force officers changing nappies and ordering pizzas because we simply do not have the infrastructure to cope with these numbers. Other countries at least provide sensible, safe accommodation. You are going to hear lots of evidence about the circumstances at Napier Barracks. There is a real problem in the Home Office right now about being able to manage the proper reception of these people, whether or not we allow them to stay.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q Thank you, Mr Smith. As ever, it is very interesting to hear from you. I have two quick questions. I am slightly confused because on one hand, you speak about the necessity of deterrence, but the way you want to go about deterring people from making the crossings is through removals to France. That is exactly what we have lost because of Brexit and the end of the Dublin regulations at the start of the year, and this Bill does not bring us any closer to removals to France. On the other hand, you think that criminalisation is not the right way to go, but that is what is in the Bill; it criminalises people who make those crossings. Although I understand your logic, I do not understand how that takes you to supporting this Bill.

[The Chair]

Sorry, Stuart, but I am going to break in here so that we can get an answer. Mr Smith, you have 30 seconds.

Tony Smith: The Dublin convention never worked. It certainly did not work with France even when we were in the EU. In fact, we were in the EU when some of the boats started coming. They still would not take anybody back because it relied on a flawed policy framework. I stand by what I say about the criminal justice system, because we have tried this many times before and people do not fear prison. What they fear is not achieving their ultimate ambition, which is to get settlement in the UK. That is where we need to focus our minds.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

Q Presumably trying to focus our approach on safe and legal routes is also very helpful from a national security perspective.

Rob Jones: Absolutely, with the normalisation of clandestine entry, where people are allowed to hide in a crowd. When this problem began, a big day was 100. We are now looking at a big day as being over 700. Within that, you get an increased risk that people will enter the country in a truly clandestine fashion. The more that you can do to offer safe and legal routes, and to disincentivise the business model through deterrents and a range of provisions, the more effective we can be at tackling the organised crime element, because we can then concentrate on the worst groups, which pose the highest risk and will potentially be moving people with a criminal history, whom we are most concerned about.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q Thank you for your evidence, Mr Jones. I do not think that anyone would beg to differ on the need to deter and disrupt the smuggling gangs and to support safe legal routes; the issue is much more about where we draw the line in trying to deter people who use those gangs, whether it is appropriate to criminalise them, and so on. May I ask you about another challenge on which I think you have given evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee: the use of social media companies and encryption to try to organise these sailings, and so on? Back then, I think you indicated that there was a lack of co-operation from a lot of the social media companies, which was posing a lot of challenges. Has there been any progress in that regard?

Rob Jones: There has been some progress. We have been working constantly with the social media companies to get a better response, and to ensure that their platforms are not being used to promote dangerous crossings, and there is progress. We are working in a voluntary environment. We are, in some ways, short of regulation, particularly in relation to this element, but we continue to work with those companies on a day-to-day basis to take material down. That response has improved. It is still not as good as I would like it to be, and we are working to an action plan where we have a common agreement of standards in terms of takedown and our aspiration to prevent adverse outcomes in the English channel, which is ultimately what this is all about. It has got better. It is not as good as it could be. Your point on encryption and some of the closed spaces that we cannot see that are being used to promote these crossings remains an issue for us.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q Are both these things that you continue to pursue solutions to through agreement, or has the time come for there to be regulation, perhaps through the Online Safety Bill or something else?

Rob Jones: Obviously, we welcome the Online Safety Bill and its passage. It is a complex area, and only some of this can be dealt with in the Bill. We still require platforms and technology companies to be responsible, because however far regulation takes us, we still need the platforms to understand who is using them and to ensure that they are not being abused by organised crime figures, who are making money out of desperate people.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q Finally, are there any other barriers that you would highlight, in terms of how we go about trying to tackle the smuggling gangs? Is it resources? Is it co-operation? Over the last four, five or six years that I have been in this place, a number of Ministers have said, “We’re doing a, b and c, and this will solve the issue, or at least drive it down,” yet here we are, and records continue to be set.

Rob Jones: This is a shared endeavour. I say that the centre of gravity for the organised crime element of this is in France—that is really important—so building on the partnership with France in order to deal with the issue is really important, and we continue to do that. We are also working with partners across Europe and developing those relationships. The factors that surround this, many of which are touched on in the Bill—safe and legal routes, the deterrents effect and so forth—are all important, because there is no silver bullet here. Because of the pull factors, the incentive for organised crime remains, and that is what we are trying to deal with by tackling the problem upstream. It is a range of all those factors, which need concurrent effort, and you cannot underestimate the need for the French to prevent departures in order to allow space for other measures, such as the organised crime element being tackled, to actually kick in and make a difference.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q Sure. I would challenge very little of that. The issue we have on this side of the fence is that a lot of the evidence is that some of the deterrents in the Bill, which are aimed not at smugglers but at people using them, will not work and are, in themselves, objectionable from the point of view that if you put someone in prison, they could be an Afghan interpreter who is fleeing because of what happened yesterday. We draw the line there.

Rob Jones: I understand the point you make, but in relation to illegal entry, you do need an offence and you do need to be able to deal with it. None of that should create the issues that you describe, if the legislation is applied judicially and proportionately, and with properly trained people. I say that because we still have a position at the moment whereby, in relation to illegal entry, there is a difference between entry and arrival. In a maritime scenario, that is really unhelpful. It is not helpful for the safety of the migrants who could be on a smuggler’s boat, and it is not helpful for law enforcement.

One of the things that the proposal suggests is tidying up the position around arrival and entry for illegal entry, which is quite important. I recognise what you describe, but the NCA would never be involved in uniformed border control, where the mass criminalisation that you describe as a risk is something that would be the net impact of what we do. We are intelligence-led and deal with organised crime. Looking at it from that angle, I can see the benefit of those measures.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Sure, but our concern is that that is exactly what the Bill does, and obviously we will hear evidence from UNHCR and various others who have that concern as well. Thank you for your evidence.

[Paul Blomfield]

Q Clearly, we are all concerned and admire your commitment to stopping these dangerous crossings and the risks at which they put people. Our issue as a Committee is to determine whether the measures in the Bill are the best way to achieve that objective.

You talked about the factors that had led smuggling gangs and others to move from lorry and train crossings to boat crossings. We heard from witnesses earlier that we blocked off the opportunity to board lorries through the fortifications around terminals, which was one of the factors that pushed people to the more desperate route of boats. The Home Office’s own impact assessment of the Bill says that there is a serious risk that these measures could encourage people to attempt even riskier routes. Do you think that is a factor we should bear in mind?

Rob Jones: Displacement, in terms of protecting security measures, is always a potential second-order consequence. Organised crime is flexible, and we will respond to that. In terms of where we are at now with the general maritime threat, this does need dealing with. We are trying to second guess where people will go next. We had a terrible mass casualty event in Purfleet, where people were locked into a fridge box. We have had fatalities in the channel already, so we know just how ruthless some of the individuals involved are. We are trying to second guess where they may go next. We already know that bigger vessels have been used, and some of these tactics we have spoken about are important in dealing with bigger vessels.

I think we have pretty much got to the point now where a lot of the tactics and trade craft used in the eastern Mediterranean and other areas of the world are now being deployed in high-risk clandestine entry to the UK. That risk has already manifested itself. We need to live with it, confront it and deal with it, because it is happening now. With the numbers that we see and some of the vessels that are in the channel, we do need to do something different. It has grown to the point where you now have 50 or 60 people in vessels that are not licensed and that are taped together with plywood floors. That is, unfortunately, going to end one way unless it is disrupted, so it does need a second look.

On the displacement point, yes, it is a risk, but where is it? We are now living with a range of tactical options from smugglers that pretty much covers all of the modes. The riskiest one right now is, unfortunately, the English channel and small boats.

Nationality and Borders Bill (First sitting)

Stuart C McDonald Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st September 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

That is not strictly a matter for the Chair; it is a matter for the usual channels. That should be discussed between the Government and Opposition Whips. I had better ask for the relevant parties to do that privately, and to have a conversation with you. It is not something, I am afraid, that I can adjudicate, but you have made your point. The opportunity to discuss it was at the Programming Sub-Committee yesterday, where it should properly have been raised. It was not raised on that occasion.

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

Further to that point of order, Sir Roger. I may have raised it had the Programming Sub-Committee started at the time it was supposed to start. I arrived yesterday a minute before the start time, and the sub-committee had finished its work. I was going to make the point that Government witnesses had disappeared. We have now lost a couple of hours, and the opportunity for other witnesses to give evidence. I wanted to put it on the record that I was disappointed not to be able to make that point yesterday.

[The Chair]

The sub-committee was quorate when it started yesterday. Members are expected to be there in a timely fashion. I think that I am right in saying that we started on the nose of the time at which we were supposed to start. I take your point, but again it is a matter for the usual channels, not the Chair.

Resolved,

That, subject to the discretion of the Chair, any written evidence received by the Committee shall be reported to the House for publication.—(Tom Pursglove.)

Resolved,

That, at this and any subsequent meeting at which oral evidence is to be heard, the Committee shall sit in private until the witnesses are admitted.—(Tom Pursglove.)

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

I must offer other Members the opportunity to ask questions. I will come back to you if there is time, Mr Charalambous.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q How many clauses in this Bill do you think will have a direct impact on people smugglers?

Jon Featonby: There are 71 clauses and four schedules in this Bill. As far as we can see, from our reading of the Bill, there is one clause that directly targets people smugglers themselves. That is the clause extending the criminal sentence for somebody convicted of that to a life sentence. We absolutely welcome that tightening of people smuggling. We absolutely believe that one approach that the Government should continue to take is in targeting those people smugglers who take advantage of people trying to seek safety.

Our concern is about the other aspects of the Bill, which seem to be more about trying to deter people from making those dangerous journeys. As I said earlier, we do not believe that those clauses will have that impact.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q You have said, essentially, that you do not think disincentives work. I want to look at one of the Government’s attempts to disincentivise people from using people smugglers: this new scheme of notices of intent. It is in the Bill, but it is also already in the immigration rules as of the start of this year. What impact have those notices had?

Jon Featonby: It is not clear that they have had any impact. I suppose that you could rightly say that one of the things the Bill does through clause 14 is move the current inadmissibility rules, which are in the immigration rules, into primary legislation. Those have been in force since 1 January, replacing what was the Dublin system, which the UK was part of when it was a member of the European Union.

Since those rules were introduced, 4,500 notices of intent have been issued to individuals. When somebody first arrives in the UK’s asylum process, they are interviewed by a member of the Home Office at the initial stage. Then, if, for whatever reason—there are five potential reasons—the Home Office believes that that person’s asylum claim may be inadmissible in the UK’s asylum system, a notice of intent is issued to that person at that instance. At that point, the person’s asylum claim is still live, but it does not go any further. There are no interviews and it is not substantively considered by the Home Office. The guidance that was introduced by the change in rules then gives the Home Office six months to try to get a return agreement in place, or to look further at that person’s claim to try to work out whether that claim is inadmissible.

What we have not seen since the beginning of this year is a decrease in the number of people making dangerous journeys. It is not apparent to us that it has deterred people. However, because of that in-built six-month delay, it has further increased the delays that people already face while waiting for a decision on their asylum claims.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q So basically, people are waiting another six months. What impact does that and the other measures in the Bill have on local authorities that are involved in asylum work?

Jon Featonby: We pay tribute to the local authorities that are part of the dispersal scheme. We work very closely alongside them, and the ones that we work with are very proud of the roles that they play. However, we also recognise that the local authorities that support people are under quite a lot of pressure. There are not enough local authorities currently taking part in the dispersal system, and we encourage more to do so and believe that that should be a priority for the Home Office.

One of the problems with the increased delay, whether it is caused by the inadmissibility rules or by wider decision-making delays, is that people are left in limbo in the asylum system longer, unable to work and reliant on the Home Office for support. There is then a negative impact on people who do go on to get refugee status, on their ability to integrate and to stand on their own feet; they are more likely to have to rely on local authority support for a longer period.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q What does that mean for the cost of the system?

Jon Featonby: It is well known, and it was mentioned in the equality impact assessment published at the beginning of the week, that the cost of the asylum system has increased significantly over the last year. While we are not aware of a breakdown of the drivers of that cost, it is likely that a lot of it has been driven by the increased pressure on asylum accommodation, and in particular the increased use of hotels over the last year or so. One of the quickest ways to reduce that cost would be to get people moving through the system much faster again—making those decisions and reducing the pressures on the accommodation system.

Because the Bill will not deter people or reduce the number of people entering the asylum system—if anything, it is just going to increase some of the delays in the system—there is a danger that it will increase the overall cost. It is unknown at the moment what the cost of the accommodation centres might be. A contract notice was issued in August saying that they will potentially accommodate up to 8,000 people, but there is very little known about the cost of that.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I know colleagues will have other questions on provisions relating to the asylum system. Does the Red Cross want to speak about the provisions relating to modern slavery or statelessness?

Jon Featonby: One of the roles of the Red Cross in the UK is that we work alongside police forces when they undertake anti-trafficking raids to disrupt situations of exploitation; we are there to work alongside police forces and local authorities to support people at those points. We also support people who have gone through the national referral mechanism and been found to be survivors of modern slavery in terms of what happens next—to support them with their onward journeys.

The Modern Slavery Act 2015 was definitely a landmark change. It has very much changed the way the UK has responded—it has improved it. We know from our work with other Red Cross national societies around the world that the UK is now seen as an international leader through that legislation. We are concerned, though, that this is an immigration Bill that contains a large modern slavery element; there is a danger that part 4 moves away from protection as a first port of call in cases of modern slavery. In particular, when we set up reception centres at anti-trafficking raids, we found that the vast majority of people who are taken out of situations of exploitation do not enter the national referral mechanism. When we monitored 10 reception centres, 170 people were taken out of those situations and only four consented to go into the NRM. Some of the changes to the NRM contained in part 4 of the Bill may raise those barriers.

However, there is also an opportunity in the Bill to improve the treatment of people who come out of the national referral mechanism with a positive conclusive grounds decision. We welcome the commitment in the Bill to offer immigration status to some of the people with positive conclusive grounds decisions. When people get a positive conclusive grounds decision and the support that they received while they were in the NRM ends, one of the challenges that they face is that, if they do not have a secure immigration status, it is very difficult for them to get on with their lives—to make decisions about what happens next. It potentially also means that, if they are unable to work and access local authority support or welfare support, they are at risk of being re-exploited. We have made recommendations in the past that people should get that status.

We feel that those provisions can be strengthened to make it clearer that more people will be able to access that immigration leave. At the moment, if the Home Office believes that somebody would be able to receive protection in their country of nationality, they are not eligible for that grant of leave. Having seen the need in people who have gone through the NRM, we believe that it should pretty much be a universal offer of leave at that point. We would like to see the Bill strengthened in that way. I pay tribute to the work of Lord McColl and Sir Iain Duncan Smith in particular for their campaign around this in recent years.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q Anything on statelessness, or do you want to leave that to other witnesses?

[The Chair]

There are other Members who wish to ask questions, Mr McDonald. If there is time, I am happy to bring you back in. At present I have Jonathon Gullis, Paul Blomfield and Anne McLaughlin who are waiting to speak. Minister, would you like to come in now or wait?

Nationality and Borders Bill (Third sitting)

Stuart C McDonald Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 23rd September 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Bambos Charalambous]

Q Do you have any figures on the cost of offshoring?

George Brandis: I do not have those figures in front of me. Under the regional processing agreements that Australia entered into with Nauru and New Guinea, the establishment of those centres, which required capital works and so on, was contributed to by Australia.

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

Q Thank you for giving up your time this morning, Mr Brandis. On the capacity of the offshore centres, am I right to say that it would be in the region of around 3,000 offshore places in total?

George Brandis: There were always more in Nauru than in New Guinea. Whether at the maximum point they reached as many as 3,000, I am not sure, but I would not be surprised if it was roughly that figure.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q Is it fair to say that there was a challenge within a few months that these places were essentially taken up pretty quickly and capacity was reached?

George Brandis: What happened, as I indicated in the timeline I outlined at the start of my evidence, is that from the introduction of the policy, beginning in September 2013, there was a period during which the effectiveness of the policy was tested by people smugglers. The numbers of people seeking to enter Australia in an irregular fashion continued and then dwindled to nothing by July 2014. Again, I do not have the figures in front of me, but I think it is generally true to say that in the early days of the policy the numbers were greater, obviously, than in subsequent years when the efficacy of the policy was established.

I wonder, Mr McDonald, whether I may make a broader point about this, because I know that this country is seeking to address a problem that has some resemblances but also important differences. The people who put these individuals, groups and families on boats were criminal gangs. People smuggling and people trafficking is a variety of organised crime. Organised crime is a business and, like every other business, it depends upon cash flow. The most important thing that Australia was able to do was drive the people smugglers out of business by depriving them of a product to sell and destroying their cash flow.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q We all want to see that happen, but we have different views about how we can do it and the other implications of various policies. Madeline Gleeson, for example, and others suggest that the offshoring itself achieved very little for the first year or two after it was introduced. Numbers did not decline at all; in fact, they soared for a while. What actually achieved the reduction in the number of boats arriving in Australia was the pushback policy. Would it be fair to say that it was this that delivered success, rather than the offshoring?

George Brandis: I respectfully disagree with you, Sir, and I say that having been both a member of the National Security Committee of Cabinet throughout that time and, in fact, the Attorney General who wrote the legal advice on the basis of which the policy was founded. With respect, it was not the Australian experience, and it would be artificial and wrong, to isolate one of those three elements—disruption and deterrence activities, pushbacks and offshore processing—as being more effective than the others. Rather, it is the case that they were a suite of policies that, operating together, had the effect of driving the people smugglers out of business.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q But when was the last time anyone was sent to an offshore processing centre? Is it not years ago?

George Brandis: Let me get that information for you—I cannot give you a date. It is certainly the case that, from the early days, the need for offshore processing significantly dwindled because of the efficacy of the policy.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q But is that not more because it costs billions of dollars and subjects people to what many regard to be cruel and inhuman treatment?

George Brandis: Sir, I am not going to engage in rhetoric. The fact is that most Australians took the view, as did the Government and the Opposition, that the inhumanity was in letting thousands of people drown.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q Nobody wants to see thousands of people drown. What we are challenging is whether or not the policy of offshoring people in particular conditions had anything to do with that, as opposed to the boat pushbacks. In relation to the pushbacks—

George Brandis: Sorry to interrupt, but if I have not made this clear already, it is absolutely not the case that one element of this policy was the effective element, and another element was not effective. The policy was a policy suite in which all three elements mattered.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

You have given your analysis of that. Obviously others disagree.

[The Chair]

Mr McDonald, this will have to be your last question.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q You have mentioned that a certain number of boats could not be turned back, because it would not have been safe to push them back. One of several issues with the pushback policy here is that we are talking about small dinghies, and that lives would be put at risk by attempting to push them back. There is nothing in the Australian policy that would have seen Australian vessels putting lives in danger by attempting to push back small dinghies, for example.

George Brandis: No, but because the distances involved are so different. Embarkations from the southern shores of Indonesia, across the Timor sea, were not in dinghies; they were largely in dilapidated wooden fishing boats.

[Mr Robert Goodwill (Scarborough and Whitby) (Con)]

Q Welcome, Your Excellency. You said that in 2014 your policies had successfully stemmed the flow of illegal migrants. In September 2015 you announced that you would take 12,000 Syrians and Iraqis into Australia. Do you feel that you would have been in a position to do that, and had the capacity to do that, had you not stemmed the flow of illegal migrants into your country?

George Brandis: I remember that decision very well; it was an NSC decision and I remember the debate as if it were yesterday. I am very proud that Australia did that. Sir, let me answer your question in this way. What we have found in Australia—this is both the view of those who have studied the issue and empirically verified by many public opinion surveys—is that there is a very direct correlation between the public’s willingness to accept a big immigration programme, with a big humanitarian and refugee element, and public confidence that the Government are in control of the borders. When the public have that confidence, they back a big immigration programme. When that confidence is eroded, they are less enthusiastic about it.

That sentiment was captured by former Prime Minister Howard in words that became almost a mantra in Australian politics of the day. He said in 2004, “We will always fulfil our humanitarian obligations, but we will decide who comes into this country and the circumstances in which they come.” Australia is a big immigration nation. To give some figures, in the year in which the Syrian refugee programme was at its most ambitious, 2016-17, Australia accepted 21,968 refugees under our various humanitarian programmes. We also accepted, under our other immigration programmes—skilled migration; family reunions—183,608 people. More than 200,000 people came that year, of whom about 10% came under humanitarian and refugee programmes.

The numbers have gone up and down a bit. That was the biggest year because of the Syrian element, which was an additional element to the normal humanitarian and refugee programme. In the most recent year, 2019-20, we accepted 140,366 people—13,171 people under our humanitarian and refugee programme. The numbers over the last several years have fluctuated between more than 13,000 and almost 22,000 per year under our humanitarian and refugee programme. In most of those years that is per capita the most generous humanitarian and refugee programme in the world, second only to Canada.

Nationality and Borders Bill (Fourth sitting)

Stuart C McDonald Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 23rd September 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Paul Blomfield]

Q I wondered if I could follow up on clause 48—a clause you did not mention—and the proposals in the Bill that would, effectively, increase the threshold for initial identification for a reasonable grounds decision through the national referral mechanism. Do you think the threshold is currently set too low? Are there risks associated with setting it higher in the way the Bill does?

Dame Sara Thornton: There are two schools of thought on this. Many in the sector will argue that the current, very low bar is appropriate, but I know colleagues in law enforcement think it is too high. The Bill is suggesting that we use the wording in the European convention against trafficking, or reasonable grounds to believe that an individual is a victim of modern slavery and human trafficking. On balance, I think that is appropriate.

Reasonable grounds is a pretty low threshold that people understand. It is more than a hunch or a suspicion, but it is not as much as a balance of probabilities. There needs to be some sort of objective information to base that reasonable grounds decision on. The obvious thing to say is that the guidance given to staff in the competent authority will be key, but it is not an unreasonable proposal—not least because the current legislation in Scotland and Northern Ireland uses the word “is” and, as far as I understand, the competent authority uses the same test across the United Kingdom. I do not think it will make that much difference, and to be consistent with the European convention is a reasonable proposal.

Siobhán Mullally: A concern here would be the possible impact of changing the threshold in terms of potential victims of trafficking accessing support and assistance and in processes of identification. Is it likely to have a negative impact? Is it likely to increase difficulties in identifying victims and referring them in a timely way for assistance and protection? That would be a concern if it is a regressive measure from where we are now; in terms of human rights law, you want to ensure non-regression in the protection of human rights of victims of trafficking.

I have concerns about the impact of that and whether it will increase the difficulty of timely and early identification of victims, because early identification is critical to ensuring effective access to protection. There is a question about how it will be implemented in practice and what the fallout will be in its implementation.

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

Q I thank the witnesses for their evidence so far. If I may start with Dame Sara, in answer to Holly Lynch’s questions earlier about clause 51 you expressed concern about the range of offences that might end up excluding people from access to the NRM. Are there concerns that some of the offences created by the Bill might also have that effect?

Dame Sara Thornton: That links to a comment I made in my correspondence with the Home Secretary. If the penalty for illegally entering the country is increased to four years, we could have a situation where, as a matter of course, if somebody had been prosecuted for that they would not be able to access the NRM. It is a risk that probably exists more on paper than in reality, because most of the time immigration enforcement does not use the law to prosecute; it tends to use administrative processes.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q Something to be aware of, then. On disclosure, you have both expressed concern about the traffic information notices, particularly in relation to children. More generally, how awkward is it to have that sort of system and deadline in place when you are talking about victims of trafficking and their ability to disclose information about their experiences in a timely manner?

Siobhán Mullally: As I said, clauses 46 and 47 pose serious difficulties with regard to both adults and children in terms of the state’s compliance with international human rights law on the protection of victims, because of the particular difficulties a victim of trafficking may have not only in disclosing information, but even in identifying as a victim of trafficking. It is not the obligation of the victim to self-identify, but we know that where the context is new, where there may be a distrust or lack of familiarity with officials within a state, where there may be language barriers or delays in accessing legal assistance, or where there may be fears of reprisals for the victims or their families, that can lead to delays.

The European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly addressed that in terms of not properly taking account of the delays that can occur, the inconsistencies that may arise and the trauma that is endured by victims. That is not appropriate in terms of ensuring the fullest protection of the rights of victims of trafficking.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q Dame Sara, have you anything to add?

Dame Sara Thornton: Briefly. Siobhán has explained the issue of trauma, what we know about its impact on the brain, the way it affects memory and the way people recall with inconsistencies. We know that in practice that is very often the case with victims, and until they form trusting relationships you do not get a narrative that starts at the beginning and ends at the end; it is very piecemeal. As people trust and become more open, they might disclose more. That is a really big consideration. If we are not careful, these two clauses disregard that. Secondly, I have come across cases where victims are more able to disclose labour exploitation, for example, but it might take several years for them to disclose the most awful sexual exploitation because they may be embarrassed or ashamed about it. That is a concern. Also, of course, we know that some victims just do not identify as victims. They do not see that the awful things that they have endured mean that they are, in fact, victims.

I have been thinking about whether any amendments could acknowledge this issue about trauma. We have slavery and trafficking care standards, which are all about trauma-informed care. Is there a potential amendment that says that when you are doing this process it has to be done with those sorts of standards and principles in mind?

Similarly, the Bill does not talk at all about how long people might be given to respond to a trafficking information notice. Again, I would be really worried if that were just a matter of a few days. Colleagues have looked at arrangements in some asylum cases. It may be 20 days. I think this might be more complex, so you might think about 30 days. Is it worth thinking about putting in the Bill what sort of time period might be appropriate?

Lastly, colleagues have suggested that you might even want to define in the Bill what might be a good reason for disclosure, because at the moment it is left very much open. It could be open to guidance, but one aspect would be to list—whether it is trauma, mistrust of authority, or a threat from traffickers—all the sorts of reasons that could cause late disclosure, and perhaps, as I say, have them in legislation rather than just relying on guidance.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q Thank you. In your correspondence with the Home Secretary you query the idea behind the Bill that deterrence is an effective strategy. You also express concern that differential treatment of refugees based on the nature of their arrival may serve only to exacerbate vulnerability. Can you say a little about those two points?

Dame Sara Thornton: I will start with the second first. The earlier witnesses gave evidence about the two-tier approach. The concern would be that that creates vulnerability for people who are in this country in that situation because they have fewer protections, and no recourse to public funds unless they are destitute. I know from my work that people in that situation are driven by desperation to take exploitative work. It is a real concern that it could create vulnerability, which criminals and traffickers would exploit.

On the second point, I referred to material that was in a House of Commons Library report that suggested that when you look at the reasons why people choose or choose not to come to a country, there are many other factors that they consider. There is better evidence that they consider other factors than the nature of the law and the situation when they get there—the policy and practice of the country. My concern would be that you risk making more people vulnerable, because they live lives of precarity anyway, with a hope that this will deter. I completely understand the Government’s position that this is a very dangerous way for people to come to this country and we need to stop it, but I am concerned about the extent to which there is evidence that suggests that it might be effective, given that I think it could increase vulnerability.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q A final question: what are your thoughts and views on the proposals in the Bill to reduce the recovery period?

Siobhán Mullally: Again, it is disappointing to see that reduction in the recovery period. It is a regressive measure in terms of current standards and protections, so I would have concerns that it is moving backwards the human rights protections of victims of trafficking. There have been previous examples of regressive measures, in terms of attempts to reduce assistance levels to victims of trafficking. Again, it breaches the principle of non-regression in human rights protections, so I would have concerns around that and the longer-term impact, in terms of ensuring effective protection of victims of trafficking and trying to break the cycle of re-trafficking and vulnerability to exploitation.

Dame Sara Thornton: I really welcome the fact that it is going to be in statute, because it was not in statute in the Modern Slavery Act 2015. I acknowledge that the current guidance is 45 days and that this is only 30 days, but 30 days is what is set out in the European convention. The other thing that is worth saying—I do not know whether Members are aware of this—is that the wait from reasonable grounds to conclusive grounds is very, very long. In 2020, the average was 465 days. We have a big debate about 45 days versus 30, but the reality is that when I meet victims and survivors, most of them have a sense of waiting a very, very long time. They are being provided with support, but they feel that their lives are on hold.

I have a couple of other thoughts about the time period. Of course, if people are being supported for a long time, there is some benefit to that, but there is also a disadvantage, particularly when cases are related to criminal proceedings, the courts are waiting for decisions and the system is grinding very slowly. One particular issue might seem very tactical and technical, which maybe it is, but it is important. One of the weaknesses of the current national referral mechanism is that, historically, all the decisions have been taken by the Home Office—the competent authority. I think a lot of the decisions about whether somebody has been trafficked are best taken locally by local safeguarding partners, and I am really pleased to say that the Home Office established a pilot early this year in 10 local authority areas, whereby local safeguarding boards are making those decisions. You have the right people around the table, and they have a much fuller picture of what has been going on.

Those pilots are going very well. One of the things they are able to do is that, when they meet to discuss what has happened to a child, they are able to take both the reasonable grounds and conclusive grounds decisions at the same meeting—you might imagine how that speeds things up. I would not want anything in the legislation to undermine the really good best practice that is currently being developed, which means that decisions about children’s trafficking are being made locally by the people who are best qualified to do them, and it is happening so much more speedily. I would hope that the Bill does not undermine that good practice.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q Thank you. To push you a little, imagine that we lived in a country where things moved a bit more efficiently, there was not a 400-odd day wait and, generally speaking, these decisions were made timeously. Would you have concerns if the recovery period had been reduced from 45 days to 30 days, if that was the reality?

Dame Sara Thornton: If it was the case that that meant that people were getting just 30 days’ support, it would have a negative impact. If you think about providing people with counselling and helping with their medical support and legal advice—a whole range of things— 30 days is not very long. I am just saying the reality in the UK at the moment is that it is taking so much longer that the difference between 45 and 30 is less significant.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

One more question, Ms McDonagh?

[The Chair]

I have not seen anybody indicate, so yes.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q Dame Sara, another thing that you mentioned is the consultation process. You had some concern that there had not been enough involvement with survivors or people with lived experience of trafficking. Can you say a bit more about that?

Dame Sara Thornton: The period between the new plan for immigration in March and the publication of the Bill in July was very short. We are aware that groups involved in asylum were much more involved in the consultation process than some of the groups that support victims of slavery and trafficking. It is too late now, but it would have been good to see more involvement of survivor groups particularly, so that people could give their views about what this would mean on a personal level, from that survivor perspective.

--- Later in debate ---

[Holly Lynch]

Q We are still waiting to probe some of the information around these trafficking information notices, perhaps in Committee, but do you have a sense that it would be appropriate to receive legal aid and legal advice at the point at which you receive a trafficking information notice, as well?

Adrian Berry: Yes, of course. As you know, there is a whole series of notices, including in relation to trafficking, which increasingly assimilate it to the asylum process where you get punished for producing evidence or material after an arbitrary cut-off date. There is no safeguard in the Bill for when that cut-off date is—it could be too soon, before you have had an opportunity to recover, to produce the information and receive support. Legal aid is one way of enabling people to properly frame their case at the earliest possible opportunity. The use of notices throughout the Bill, whether trafficking, asylum or priority removal notices, is a subject of serious concern in terms of procedural fairness and ensuring convention compliance, whether that is the trafficking convention or the refugee convention.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q I will address this question to Patricia Cabral and the European Network on Statelessness. Could you just explain what the implications of this Bill are for children who face statelessness, and how this might impact on them?

Patricia Cabral: Thank you for the question. Clause 9 proposes to amend and restrict a vital safeguard in British nationality law that was initially introduced with the aim of preventing and reducing childhood statelessness. It is important to note that the UK has international obligations in this area, so the existing safeguard implements those international obligations by enabling a child who was born in the UK and has always been stateless to acquire British citizenship after five years of residing here. We are concerned that the amendment proposed by clause 9 restricts children’s ability to access that safeguard and acquire British citizenship. It is not in line with the UK’s international obligations, and it clearly risks leaving even more children in the UK stateless and in limbo throughout their childhood.

In the last year, we developed a project to understand the issue of childhood statelessness specifically in the UK, so we have gathered some evidence about the barriers these children are facing and who the stateless children in the UK are. Perhaps it would be useful for us to share some of our findings in this area. I will just note that the stateless children in the UK are mainly children who are currently affected by statelessness because their parents belong to a recognised stateless community—for example, the Kuwaiti Bidoon, Rohingya, Palestinian or Kurdish populations—but many of them are also children in care, especially where they have a migrant background. There may be issues with acquiring parental consent if it is required for the child to access nationality, because the documentation may be missing. Children in care are at particular risk of statelessness, because there is a general lack of awareness from local authorities about nationality issues. There may also be children of Roma families or children affected by domestic abuse, trafficking or other forms of exploitation. We are generally talking about children who are already vulnerable and marginalised, and who are also stateless.

We should also bear in mind that clause 9 would amend the provision that applies only to children who were born in the UK and who have lived here for at least five years. We are talking about children who were born here, who grew up here and who really feel that they belong in the UK. They do not know any other country, they feel British and they wonder where else they belong, if not in the UK. We have received some statements from children who grew up in the UK without British nationality, and it really has an impact on them. They describe feelings of alienation, a loss of self-confidence and the challenges to their identity. We have heard from a child who told us that she could not join her class on a trip to France, and she felt that the situation was really insecure and that it was not safe for her to make close friendships. We can only imagine the emotional burdens of this.

We can see how children feel the impact of being stateless, but they really do not understand why they are stateless, and they feel disempowered to change this. That is because the power to change this is really with the UK authorities—for them to grant nationality and a sense of belonging to the UK. Therefore, that starts with simply not amending the existing safeguards that are in line with international law, so clause 9 of the Bill should simply be dropped.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q Adrian Berry, you wanted to come in on that question. At the same time, can you say whether the Home Office has explained why it wants to make it more difficult for already vulnerable children not to have access to recognition of statelessness?

Adrian Berry: There are two things to say. First, there is a real problem with the efficacy of this provision. At the moment, you can apply for registration under this route only when you reach the age of five. But at the age of 10, any child, regardless of whether they have a nationality, can apply for registration as a British citizen under a different provision—section 1 of the British Nationality Act 1981. This is a provision on the face of the Bill that is designed to capture children between the ages of five and 10, because you have another route once you reach the age of 10. The question needs to be asked: what is the point of doing that? You have to have some compelling advice about the cohort aged between five and 10 in order to do it, and there is no evidence at all that that particular cohort of people are the subject of concern. There is no data adduced to show that there is any abuse of the current provision in schedule 2 to the British Nationality Act 1981, which deals with stateless children. There is no reason why you would just leave a child stateless between the ages of five and 10, knowing that there is another provision in law once they reach the age of 10. There is no gain by using this provision. On the question of—[Inaudible.]—simply that the provisions become more available.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q On a slightly different question, perhaps one area where we can all be fairly positive is clauses 1 to 8. This is about correcting historical unfairness in the nationality system—is that right? Are we right to welcome these provisions but with the caveat that we have to see how effective the provisions become, how accessible they are, what fees are charged and so on?

Adrian Berry: Yes. Clauses 1 to 8 are good stuff, as far as they go. They correct—[Inaudible.]—on the grounds of sex discrimination, discrimination on the grounds of illegitimacy, and historical unfairness in relation to people who might have been prejudicially treated in the Windrush scandal. There is not much not to like about that. There are some omissions. They cure prejudices against people who would be British citizens and overseas territory citizens today, but they ignore the people who would be British overseas citizens today. You will know that their concern is directly because they have no ability to come to the UK, but they still have British nationality. So there is more work to do, but so far, so good, and there are some welcome developments in clauses 1 to 8.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q Can I ask about the scope of the criminal offence created by the Bill for coming into the United Kingdom irregularly? The Government’s focus is on boats, but does that catch other people who arrive here and claim asylum? For example, if I arrived here on a visit visa and then sought to claim asylum, and clearly I had applied for the visit visa only for the purposes of coming to claim asylum, would that be a criminal offence? Is it clear from the Bill?

Adrian Berry: If you apply for a visit visa, you are making a representation that you intend to return to your country of origin. At some point, unless you claim on arrival when you land, you may be declared an illegal entrant under existing provisions. The problem with clauses 37 and 38 is that they criminalise arrival and assisting arrival in the UK. So it is the crime of arrival or assisting arrival, if you want to think about it like that. What that does is that applies to asylum seekers. So you say, “Of course, we are not impeding the efficacy of the refugee convention”. In the explanatory notes the Home Office says that, but in practice it is. If you criminalise arrival, that is precisely what you are doing. You cannot see those provisions separately from clause 12, which prohibits you from claiming asylum in UK territorial waters.

When you fit them all together, you have the criminal offence of arrival: you do not have to have entered the UK, you are still on a vessel. You are in UK territorial waters because you are on your way to the UK and you cannot claim asylum there. However, the maritime enforcement powers, which the Home Office gives itself under schedule 3, allow it not only to board your vessel and not take your asylum claim, but require you to go back to the port from which you came and require you to leave UK territorial waters. If you look at the package—criminal offence, not being able to claim asylum, and power to board your vessel and require you to leave—not only might that put you at risk in your insecure vessel, but it just shuts you out from the refugee convention. It is a full-scale assault on being able to claim territorial asylum in the UK.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q In essence, the only part of the asylum system that would be left would be people who happened to be in this country and there was a dramatic change of circumstances in their home country—refugee sur place. It is not so much an objection to shutting down unsafe routes; it is an objection to shutting down the UK asylum system, pretty much.

Adrian Berry: Yes. The whole point of the refugee convention is not about resettlement; it is about people making it to the territory and processing and determining their claims. That is why you have the prohibition on penalties in article 31. It is all about coming to the UK to claim asylum and being a refugee on an irregular route. If you shut that out, all that is left is sur place claims, as they are called, where you are on the territory, as you suggest.

[Paul Howell]

Q I have a question for Patricia Durr, more focused on children. One of the things we hear about is people claiming to be children when they are not, and where the boundary is in that. There are questions about what the boundary of assessment is. Do you have an opinion on that, because I do not think we have heard anything so far on that? Where do you feel that sits? Obviously, it is very important that we keep adults separate from children in any holding pattern.

Patricia Durr: We are waiting for more information about the age assessment, given the placeholder clauses in the Bill. I guess our biggest concern is about children being treated as adults. I know that the Committee has expressed some concern about adults being treated as children, but we need to consider that the greater risk is that children are being pushed into adult systems through inappropriate age assessments. Obviously, it is a concern all round, but that is the greatest concern, I think, because the consequences of the adultification of children who are then also criminalised are huge. In any provision for children and young people in this country, we should have in place very strong, robust safeguarding measures that provide better protection for children and young people there than would be provided for a child in adult provision. That is the way I would consider that.

We are concerned that age assessment should remain within a safeguarding framework and remain with professionals who are skilled in children’s development and care. I think the British Medical Association has given written evidence to the Committee to disavow the idea that there is a scientific method or approach to age assessment. It is obviously about professional judgment by skilled professionals—in this case, social workers—who have a better understanding of child development.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Are there any other questions? Mr McDonald, I stopped you on a question. Would you like to carry on?

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q Thank you, Ms McDonagh. I have just a couple more questions. Mr Charalambous was very comprehensive in his own questioning. Can I go back to the change to the standard of proof? How problematic is it having this balance of probabilities test in there alongside the refugee convention definition of a refugee, which talks of real risk?

Adrian Berry: It is extremely problematic, and not just because it is deprecated in other jurisdictions, but because it makes the judge’s task so much harder—they have to have a split personality. They have to weigh some of the evidence—including the question of whether the person has a refugee convention reason, such as a political opinion or membership of a particular social group—on the balance of probability standard, and then they have to assess the question of what happened in the past on that standard. Then they have to evaluate future risk, which is intimately bound up with how you have been treated in the past, on the lower civil standard of reasonable degree of likelihood.

It is a charter for errors of law creeping into decision making and for onward appeals. It will almost certainly lead to more onward appeals, which will lengthen the process. It will add to costs and uncertainty, and ultimately it will leave people without protection, when there is a commonly understood threshold test, with the reasonable degree of likelihood across the piece, whether it is past facts or future risk, that has applied in this country and other common law jurisdictions and is endorsed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Q Thank you. Finally, can I ask Patricia Cabral about statelessness? You have indicated what is wrong with the Bill and how it makes access to recognition of statelessness for children more difficult. What would you like to see in the Bill? Is it fair to say that the system for applying to be recognised as stateless in the United Kingdom is fairly good by international standards, but there are still hurdles and problems that need to be improved? What could be put in the Bill to improve the system for recognising statelessness in the UK?

Patricia Cabral: Yes, there are a number of issues with statelessness in the UK anyway, but with this Bill we want to focus on clause 9, in particular. Our research shows that children who are brought up stateless in the UK already face a number of significant issues in acquiring British citizenship. There is a lack of legal advice and quality legal support. Legal aid is not always available. There are a number of challenges in evidencing and proving statelessness. There are already all these barriers for children trying to acquire British nationality, which might be the only nationality available to them.

What we are really aiming for today is just to make sure we do not create even more barriers for these children, and that we remove clause 9 to ensure that we do not amend any of the existing safeguards. Paragraph 3 of schedule 2 to the British Nationality Act 1981 is in compliance with international law—the 1961 convention on the rejection of statelessness and the convention on the rights of the child. We simply do not need to touch those safeguards or make this amendment.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Thank you very much.

[Holly Lynch]

Q I have a question for Every Child Protected Against Trafficking. Patricia, in your written submission you were very critical of the lack of due process. Could you take me through just how dissatisfied you were with the consultation process and why?

Patricia Durr: We have talked about how children’s rights are exercised by the provisions in the Bill. A children’s rights impact statement would really have assisted consideration of some of the measures, by setting out which children’s rights are invoked and how they are impacted. It is something the Committee on the Rights of the Child has asked the UK Government to do systematically. It is safe to say that the length of the consultation period was not sufficient.

We were quite surprised that the part 4 provisions are being included in this asylum and immigration Bill, particularly given that there is currently a review of the modern slavery strategy. On the lack of consultation, certainly from our perspective, what implications might there be for child victims of trafficking? Their experience of waiting in limbo, and the lack of provision for leave to remain as recognised child victims of trafficking, rather than through asylum provisions within the immigration rules are certainly a huge concern for the young people we work with, and that would come through very strongly from them. It was that combination: why these provisions in this Bill, and the lack of engagement with children and young people—from our perspective—but also, survivors of trafficking and exploitation more broadly.

Nationality and Borders Bill (Fifth sitting)

Stuart C McDonald Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 19th October 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

We have declared interests during the evidence sessions, and personally I regard that as a declaration of interest. If a Member is in doubt and wants to do a belt-and-braces job on this, they should feel free to declare an interest and cover themselves. That is their responsibility. As far as the Chair is concerned, that job has been done already. If a Member has not declared an interest but wishes to do so, the appropriate moment for it is when they stand to speak.

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Roger. I am grateful for your refresher course. We are all rusty and I ask for your forgiveness for the mistakes that I shall undoubtedly make in the days ahead.

I support amendments 29 and 84 and much of what the shadow Minister just said. I welcome the Minister to his new role. I wish him all the best—apart from with large parts of the Bill, unfortunately. He has been thrown in at the deep end, and I dare say his recess was particularly busy. However, I congratulate him on finding time to record an excellent time in the London marathon a couple of weeks ago.

This complex and technical Bill raises profoundly important issues. We are all aware of the huge concerns that have been expressed about large parts of the Bill. I would also like to thank the various organisations that have given evidence in writing, orally or in private briefings or that have drafted the overwhelming majority of the amendments that we have tabled. I thank the Clerks for their help in what is not always a straightforward process in tabling amendments at a time that has been hugely difficult for them as well as for all hon. Members. We do, however, start our line-by-line consideration on a positive note. Even though we have fundamental disagreements with many aspects of the Bill, that is not the case for part 1 where for eight ninths of the time we can have hearty agreement. We just suggest a little probing and tweaking on one or two issues.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Robert Goodwill (Scarborough and Whitby) (Con)]

I understand some of what the hon. Gentleman is saying but, by way of clarification, may I point out that there is never any doubt as to who the mother of a child is, but there are occasionally questions over the paternity? Does the wording of the amendment make it easier to define who the father is? Sometimes someone’s parent may not be the biological father. Is the difference between a father, and someone who is married to the mother who may have thought he was the father when the child was born?

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for the intervention but I am not sure that I followed every aspect of it. All I can say is that the definition of father in the amendment is exactly the same as the definition that the Government have used. It is not changing that at all. I will explain exactly what the amendment does in a moment.

We are talking about getting rid of the unacceptable discrimination against women and children. A correction, albeit an imperfect one, to the laws of British citizenship that does exactly the same thing has already happened. In clause 5, there is a provision that actually fixes that. However, that correction was not made to British overseas territories citizenship. The Government have already fixed it for British citizenship; the amendment is now trying to fix it for British overseas territories citizenship. In a nutshell, the question we are asking the Government is, “Why are they using slightly different wording this time round compared with last time?” That is the crux of the debate and I will come back to that point.

My amendment would allow people who have suffered injustice to register as British overseas territories citizens. That is good, but two issues arise. The first is cost and we will come to that when we consider the next group of amendments. The second is about the language used and whether it really makes sense. Amendment 29 would challenge the Government on the use of the language to correct the injustice. Slightly surprisingly, the Government have not just copied, or used copy and paste, from the fix used for British citizenship that is found in section 4C of the British Nationality Act 1981. Section 4C allows for the correction of injustices by registration if someone missed out on citizenship because citizenship by descent was not provided for mothers “in the same terms” as for fathers or if someone missed out because it could not be acquired because it could not be obtained “in the same terms” for mothers as for fathers.

The Bill, in doing the same job for British overseas territories citizens, uses the terminology

“had P’s parents been treated equally”.

The key questions for the Minister have been pointed out by Amnesty International and the Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens in their written submissions. Why are the Government not using the same language as they used to fix the problem for British citizenship? If there is a good reason for not using that language—if there is some sort of problem with the language that was used in the case of British citizenship and the fix used for that—do we not need to go back and fix that fix, as it were? Even assuming that there is a problem and the language used has to be different, why have the Government chosen to use this language, which seems rather clunky and problematic?

Speaking about hypothetical circumstances when parents are treated equally does not make it clear, unlike the section 4C version, whether we are, to coin a phrase, “levelling up” rather than levelling down. P’s parents could be treated equally badly, as well as equally well, so the drafting leaves a lack of clarity about the fact that we want mothers to be treated the same as fathers and not the other way round. The Government like to talk about “levelling up”, so here is a chance for the Minister to do some of that and make what appears on the face of the Bill absolutely clear.

Amendment 29 provides the best wording and addresses all the points in amendment 84. It flags up another place where the issue arises and if we wound back the clock a few days, I would probably copy amendment 29 that the shadow Minister has tabled. I believe it is the best version. I will therefore not press amendment 84 to a Division, but I fully support amendment 29. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

[The Chair]

Ordinarily, I would take speakers from both sides of the Committee, but if no Government Member wishes to speak at this stage, I will call the hon. Member for Glasgow North East.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

I will of course be delighted to receive any such examples. I genuinely think that, as with so many cases of immigration law, the underpinning guidance plays an important role in making it clear, in plain English that people can understand, precisely what various aspects of the law entail. I am satisfied with the current wording of the clause.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I understand what the Minister says about the wording doing a job in statute, but will he say whether he thinks that the wording used has any implications for British citizenship as opposed to British overseas territories citizenship? Was a problem with the wording recognised and is that the reason why it was not copied across? Or is this Bill a wee bit different and therefore uses different wording?

[Tom Pursglove]

The short answer, based on my understanding, is no. The connected provision in the Act talks about parents and not the mother and the father, so that is why we think this is the appropriate route to take for BOTCs. I am satisfied that the current wording does what is required so I ask hon. Members not to press their amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

Ordinarily, Mr McDonald, I will not ask this question, because I will assume that if you, or any other Member who wishes to move an amendment that has been debated but not yet called, have not notified the Chair, you do not want it to be called. However, because this is the first time, do you wish to press amendment 84 to a Division?

[Stuart C. McDonald]

No.

[The Chair]

In that case, we move on to the next grouping.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move amendment 8, in clause 1, page 2, line 46, at end insert—

“(7) The Secretary of State must not charge a fee for the processing of applications under this section.”

This amendment would prevent the Secretary of State from charging a fee when remedying the historical inability of mothers to transmit British overseas territories citizenship.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 9, in clause 2, page 7, line 30, at end insert—

“(6) The Secretary of State must not charge a fee for the processing of applications under sections 17C, 17D, 17E or 17F.”

This amendment would prevent the Secretary of State from charging a fee when remedying the historical inability of unmarried fathers to transmit British overseas territories citizenship.

Amendment 10, in clause 3, page 8, line 18, at end insert—

“(4) The Secretary of State must not charge a fee for the processing of applications under this section.”

This amendment would prevent the Secretary of State from charging a fee for British citizenship applications by certain British overseas territories citizens.

Amendment 11, in clause 7, page 10, line 25, at end insert—

“(5) The Secretary of State must not charge a fee for the processing of applications under this section.”

This amendment would prevent the Secretary of State from charging a fee on applications for British citizenship by people who have previously been denied the opportunity to acquire it on account of historical legislative unfairness, an act or omission of a public authority, or exceptional circumstances.

Amendment 12, in clause 7, page 11, line 8, at end insert—

“(5) The Secretary of State must not charge a fee for the processing of applications under this section.”

This amendment would prevent the Secretary of State from charging a fee on applications for British overseas territories citizenship by people who have previously been denied the opportunity to acquire it on account of historical legislative unfairness, an act or omission of a public authority, or exceptional circumstances.

New clause 16—Registration as a British citizen or British overseas territories citizen: Fees—

“(1) No person may be charged a fee to be registered as a British citizen or British overseas territories citizen that is higher than the cost to the Secretary of State of exercising the function of registration.

(2) No child may be charged a fee to be registered as a British citizen or British overseas territories citizen if that child is being looked after by a local authority.

(3) No child may be charged a fee to be registered as a British citizen or British overseas territories citizen that the child or the child’s parent, guardian or carer is unable to afford.

(4) The Secretary of State must take steps to raise awareness of rights under the British Nationality Act 1981 to be registered as a British citizen or British overseas territories citizen among people possessing those rights.”

This new clause would ensure that fees for registering as a British citizen or British overseas territories citizen do not exceed cost price. It would also ensure that children being looked after by a local authority are not liable for such fees, and that no child is charged an unaffordable fee. Lastly, it would require the Government to raise awareness of rights to registration.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

In short, the amendments say to the Government, “Having recognised an injustice and provided people with a right to have it fixed, which is very welcome, you must also ensure that that remedy is accessible to those who have been wronged.” It is about the cost of applications, and about other parts of the procedures that have been put in place. If we acknowledge that these people should have been British citizens automatically, we should not ask them to jump through other hoops. They should not have to pay any fee for an application or for biometrics, or travel hundreds of miles for a citizenship ceremony unless they want to, if that would not have been required of them had the injustice not been done.

It is all about putting the person, so far as is possible, in the position in which they would have been had the injustice not occurred. It is also about making people aware and giving them support, if they need it, to make these new rights a reality, so that we are not just passing laws but making sure they are effective. That can be vital—we know that from the Windrush scandal and the deliberately low-key efforts by the Home Office in the 1980s to advertise registration rights, to avoid a deluge of applications.

Amendment 8 provides that there should be no fee for registration applications under clause 1. As we discussed, that remedies injustices in relation to British overseas territories citizenship for women and their children. Amendments 9 to 12 would do similar in relation to three other clauses that seek to remedy other injustices: clause 2, which corrects injustices whereby people lost out on British overseas territories citizenship because of rules that prevented unmarried fathers from passing on that citizenship; clause 3, which corrects the double injustice faced by some who, having lost out on British overseas territories citizenship, then lost out on entitlement to British citizenship provided for by the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002; finally, clause 7, which provides for more general power to remedy injustices by registration as British overseas territories citizens or British citizens.

The Bill recognises that had our laws not been unjust, the people impacted would have been BOTCs or British citizens with no fee and no procedure. It seems only just to rectify that injustice free of charge. In relation to clauses 1 and 2, there are no fees charged for the equivalent fixes to British citizenship law, so it should be the same for British overseas territories citizenship. I was pleased to learn at the weekend, having already tabled the amendments, that back in July the Home Office had apparently written to various nationality experts to confirm that the intention was not to charge for those applications and that the same approach would be taken for applications under clause 3. That is welcome, but it would be useful for the Minister to confirm that is accurate, so that we can hold the Government to account in future, if the Treasury ever tries to force a change of approach.

I still say that Parliament’s intention should be in the Bill, because it is clear from debates around the British Nationality Act 1981 that registration fees for children were never intended to be set at anything more than the cost of processing for the Home Office. Yet a quarter of a century later, the Home Office started ramping up prices relentlessly and now makes massive profits on them. Let us all agree today that the applications should be free and ensure that our successors are aware of that by putting it into law.

Notwithstanding the welcome Home Office letter, that still leaves applications under clause 7, which is the broad discretionary clause. It would be good to have an indication of the Government’s thinking. Let us remember what that clause provides for: it is a general fix for persons who missed out on British citizenship or British overseas territories citizenship because of laws that discriminated between men and women or against children of unmarried couples, or because of acts or omission by public authorities or something exceptional. If a person has been deprived of citizenship because of discriminatory laws or a mistake by a public authority, it is hard to see why they should be charged a fee for fixing that. That is certainly true where citizenship would have been automatic, hence this amendment.

As the Project for the Registration of Children as British Citizens and Amnesty International argued in their written submissions, fees for registration are undermining access to those procedures. The sum of £1,112 for a child and £1,206 for an adult is a long way beyond the cost—something like £372—to the Home Office of the registration process. It is particularly dangerous to ramp up the fees for applications where success is not guaranteed or certain. Under clause 7, it is not the case that someone simply has to show a date of birth and nationality of a parent and it is easy to know whether the applicant will be successful. In many cases, people will be unsure whether the Secretary of State will regard their circumstances as exceptional. Even if the circumstances are exceptional, as the clause stands, the Secretary of State still has the discretion to say, “no”, because the clause says she “may” register them in those circumstances, rather than “must”.

The lack of certainty of success, coupled with the high fee, risks causing low uptake of the new rights. We are all delighted that the new rights have been put into law, but if someone is not certain that they will be successful and they are putting at risk a huge fee, they will simply not apply and injustices will be left uncorrected.

New clause 16 would enshrine a broader principle that registration for citizenship should not be a profit-making exercise. It is vital to keep in mind the fundamental distinction between naturalisation and registration. It is possible that the root of such problems is the fact that the Home Office has come to treat those things as pretty much the same—they are not; they are very different.

People who naturalise as British citizens, and their families, have made a conscious choice to come to the UK, settle and make this their home country, and seek its citizenship. In contrast, those who register as British citizens—in the overwhelming majority of cases, they are children—did not make those choices. Often, they are British-born kids who are not automatically British at birth. They are allowed to register as British if they lived in the UK for the first 10 years of their lives; if either parent settles and becomes British before the kid turns 18; or if they were stateless at birth and live here for five continuous years. Although the Home Secretary has no discretion over that, the 1981 Act quite rightly retained a discretionary power for the Home Secretary to allow other children to register, including those who came here at an early age and who are, to all intents and purposes, British.

In 1981, Parliament repealed automatic citizenship by birth alone on the basis that birth here did not necessarily mean that someone’s connection to the country was strong enough that this should be their country of citizenship. However, Parliament was careful to put in place protections for children born here to non-British parents, for whom this clearly was or became home, hence their right to register as British citizens. Far from being equivalent to naturalisation as a British citizen—those people have picked the UK to be their home—citizenship through registration should be seen as equivalent to the British citizenship that most people in this room will have automatically enjoyed simply by being born here to British parents.

To make a massive profit from that is as outrageous as demanding that anyone in this room pay for the privilege of being British. Parliament took the view that Britain was the home country for those kids in the same way that it is for everyone in this room. Now, the Home Office is putting that citizenship way beyond the means of many. When he was Home Secretary, the now Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, the right hon. Member for Bromsgrove (Sajid Javid), accepted that that fee was a huge sum of money. The Home Office is undermining Parliament’s intentions: thousands of children cannot access the citizenship that should be theirs because the Home Office now charges that huge sum. When the fees for registration came into force, they were set at something like £30—around £100 in today’s money—simply to cover the cost of administration, and it remained like that for a quarter of a century. Since 2007, however, the Home Office has rapidly ramped up the fee, which now stands at more than £1,000. The application processing cost stands at around £360, so almost £700 of the fee is pure profit for the Home Office.

The impact on kids whose families cannot afford to register them is absolutely profound. Many will grow up unaware that they are not British citizens like their pals. That penny will perhaps not drop until they cannot join a school trip abroad or apply for college, university or a job. Without British citizenship, those children are made subject to immigration control and could feel the full implications of the hostile or compliant environment, meaning that they even run the risk of being refused access to child healthcare, employment and education, social assistance and housing, and of being detained, removed and excluded from their own country altogether. It is important to say that that affects tens of thousands of British-born children, and is surely contrary both to the Government’s duty to safeguard and promote the welfare of children and to the requirement that children’s best interests be a primary consideration in all actions that affect them.

Over the years, the Home Office has made various arguments, a number of which do not stand up to scrutiny, and I will address three of them. First, the Home Office often asserts in such debates, of which we have had several since I turned up in 2015, that the fee reflects the benefits received by the child in being able to register. That is a completely inappropriate argument. On that basis, we all should be charged a fee for our British citizenship, but as it is our right, we are not, and it should be exactly the same for those kids.

Secondly, in what I regard as an even more dreadful argument, the Home Office states that citizenship is not actually necessary for those kids, and that they can instead just apply for leave to remain. Frankly, that is an astonishing argument. If the Home Office said to anyone on the Committee, “We are going to deny you your British citizenship, but don’t worry, you can apply for leave to remain—we might even give you a fee waiver if you’re struggling to afford it”, would any of us be content with that? Absolutely not, particularly given that the leave-to-remain route is the horrendous ten-year route to settlement. To suggest that immigration leave is any sort of equivalent to being recognised as a national is quite simply insulting to those kids.

Thirdly, the Home Office makes the case that people using the immigration and nationality system can fairly be asked to pay a contribution towards its broader costs, so that British taxpayers do not have to. In some circumstances, I accept that that is true. I do not have a problem if the Home Office makes a profit on work visas, perhaps, to subsidise other work that it does, but it is totally unfair to apply that principle to people for whom the UK is home, and who are simply trying to access their right to nationality. These are not migrants choosing to come here to work, study or whatever else; they are, to all intents and purposes, British kids, and it is time that the Home Office supported them in exercising their rights to the British citizenship that reflects that, and stops trying to profit from them and put them off. Let us end this injustice now.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Goodwill]

As I was saying, I would always scrutinise the officials and say, “Does it actually cost this much to apply?” They gave me evidence that this was indeed an expensive operation. As I said, often fake documents are presented, and forensic work needs to be done to ensure that the identity of the person is as stated, and that the documents provided in evidence are correct.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The figures that I gave in terms of the cost to the Home Office came from, I think, freedom of information requests, so they have been carefully calculated. It is beyond doubt—I do not think the Home Office disputes this—that it makes something like £700 profit on an application that costs just over £1,000. We are talking about kids, so it is, as the former Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Bromsgrove (Sajid Javid), said, a huge sum of money.

[Mr Goodwill]

As I said, I hope that the Minister will reassure us of the principle that was certainly in effect when I was in the Home Office: that this is not an opportunity to make a profit out of these people, but merely to recover the cost.

I believe that the amendments will place a greater burden on taxpayers as a whole for a service that is being provided to these applicants. I am also a little concerned about new clause 16(3), which talks about whether a person can afford the fee. I am not clear whether that means that it should be set at a level that anyone can afford, which in effect would have to be zero, or whether the proposal is for some sort of means testing, which of course would add the cost of getting financial information from the applicant. The cost of the process could end up being greater overall, although if the new clause were accepted the costs for some would be lower than for others.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The fundamental point is that a kid’s British citizenship is not a service; it is a right. I am happy to have a discussion about the wording of the new clause, but I understand that the language has been borrowed from elsewhere. The Home Office has fee waiver schemes, for example in the long route to settlement, as the right hon. Member will well know, so it is not something that the Home Office will not understand. It will be able to put in place a scheme that allows people who are generally unable to pay the fee because of their impoverished circumstances not to have to pay it. I am happy to discuss the wording if he accepts the principle.

[Mr Goodwill]

I hear what the hon. Gentleman says, but I maintain my view that the Government have it right on this occasion: the fees should reflect the cost of delivering those services, and should not fall more widely on taxpayers as a whole. Of course I have a right to a British passport, but that does not mean that I should not pay the fee to ensure that the passport is applied to me, not to somebody who is pretending to be me or trying to impersonate another citizen.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

To echo the point made by the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark, no big profits are made on passports. Of course, people still have British citizenship even without a passport. A passport is a useful thing to have to prove citizenship in many circumstances. In a way, that could almost be described as a service. I think it is a pretty important one, and it is right that the Home Office does not make a huge profit on it, but the right hon. Member was not charged a fee for his British citizenship. None of us were. It is not a service that has been provided to us; it is a right, and it is a right for these kids as well.

We have had lots of support on these arguments from Conservative MPs over the years. It is very strange that it is a Scottish National party MP who tends to stand up and champion British citizenship. I thought that this would be made for Conservative MPs. Even if folk will not support us today, I encourage them to please go away and think about this, and speak to their colleagues. I think many hon. Members would have sympathy for this cause if they just looked closely.

[Mr Goodwill]

I completely understand the hon. Gentleman’s point, but I maintain my position that although it is a right for these people to apply for citizenship, the cost of their doing so, and indeed the cost of ensuring that people who may be fraudulently trying to avail themselves of citizenship, should not fall disproportionately on taxpayers as a whole but on the applicants. As long as the Minister can reassure us that the fees reflect the cost, and that any high fees can be justified by the man hours spent and the time needed to check those applications, the Government should be supported on the wording in the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

I will gladly take away the Committee’s feedback on fees. As I have said, fees are kept under constant review and are subject to parliamentary scrutiny. I have no doubt that members of the Committee, and indeed Members across the House, will want to scrutinise any fees orders and fees regulations that are brought forward, express views on them and, as they see fit, either support them or take issue with them.

To return to the focus of the amendments and the clause, removing these fees during the passage of the Bill would undermine the existing legal framework without proper consideration of sustainability and fairness for the UK taxpayer. It would also reduce clarity in the fees structure by creating an alternative mechanism for controlling fees.

Beginning with amendments 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12, the aim of which is to limit the Secretary of State’s power to charge a fee for applying for British overseas territories citizenship, I can reassure the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East that I am sympathetic to the view that a fee should not be charged in cases where a person missed out on becoming a British citizen automatically due to historical anomalies. The provisions in the Bill are about righting historical wrongs, and I can give the Committee my assurance that we will look carefully at where fees should be waived via the fees regulations. However, as I have outlined, that is not a matter for this Bill and it should be remedied through secondary legislation, in line with other changes to immigration and nationality fees.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

My understanding, from the briefing I was given at the weekend, is that in July the Home Office sent a letter to nationality experts stating that the intention was not to charge a fee, but the Minister seems to be saying something different; that there will be fee waivers, rather than no fees at all. We are talking about historical injustices here, so can he be a little more clear? Is the intention not to charge a fee for the applications to which amendments 8 to 11 refer?

[Tom Pursglove]

The hon. Member is always on point in asking pertinent questions. I reiterate the point that the Home Office tends not to charge fees in instances where unfairness or injustice have occurred, and it remains our intention to continue to adopt that approach in relation to the provisions that we are enacting through the Bill. I hope that gives him the reassurance he is seeking.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

The hon. Member would be surprised if we did not want to review the situation and take into account fully the judgment of the Supreme Court in due course. I think that it is entirely proper that we take a view on this and that the situation should be reviewed in the light of any judicial ruling handed down. This exchange has been very useful, as it has allowed me to address many of the points that I would have picked up at the end of my remarks.

I turn now to subsection (1) of new clause 16, the aim of which is to limit the Secretary of State’s power to charge a fee for applying for British citizenship and British overseas territories citizenship to the cost to the Secretary of State of processing the application. As I have already outlined, imposing such a requirement would cut across the funding and coherence of the whole system and is not a matter for the Bill.

Subsection (2) would prevent the Secretary of State from charging a fee to register as a British citizen or British overseas territories citizen if the child is being looked after by a local authority. It is important to remember that any child, irrespective of nationality, who is looked after by their local authority can apply for both limited and indefinite leave to remain without being required to pay application fees.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The Minister is being generous with his time, but I regret that the Home Office appears to have dusted down the same old briefing and he is making the same points that have been made before. He cannot possibly argue that limited leave is some sort of alternative to British citizenship. None of us would accept that; why should these kids?

[Tom Pursglove]

We would argue that the provision ensures no child in local authority care is unable to access leave. We remain of the view that citizenship is not necessary for any individual to work, live, study or access services within the UK. Subsection (3) would prevent the Secretary of State from charging a fee to be registered as a British citizen or British overseas territories citizen that the child or the child’s parent, guardian or carer is unable to afford. That raises similar points to subsection (1) in that imposing such a requirement would cut across the funding and coherence of the whole system and is not a matter for the Bill. Subsection (4) would require the Secretary of State to take steps to raise awareness of rights under the British Nationality Act 1981.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I have a quick question on the fee waiver. Why is registration for citizenship just about the only thing where there is no fee waiver scheme at all? There is a fee waiver sometimes for the 10-year route to settlement—as ludicrous a system as that is. Why is there no fee waiver system at all even for folk who cannot remotely afford that?

[Tom Pursglove]

I am conscious that I want to get through my remarks on this. I will write to the hon. Member on that point.

[Tom Pursglove]

Again, I do not have the figure to hand, but I will happily take that away and see if I can provide him with a written answer on that point. Information about becoming a British citizen is made available in published guidance on gov.uk and we are committed to ensuring information of this nature is fully accessible for all. I am conscious that we have had quite an extensive debate around fees in general, but I hope what I have said around the provisions in the Bill and the Government’s intentions for handling fees in relation to the nationality measures we are seeking to enact gives comfort to the Committee, and that the hon. Members will feel able to withdraw their amendments.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am grateful to all Members for taking part and the Minister for his response. There have been two separate issues. First, on the new registration provision in the Bill, he has provided some assurance that because it is correcting historic injustices the broad intention will be hopefully to avoid a fee. We will hold the Government to that and watch very carefully.

I hear what the Minister says about the fact there is a system of statutory instruments being laid—we all come here and say our piece and then the Government sets a fee pretty much regardless. In theory, that is fine. However, the lesson we learned about the citizenship registration of kids is that in 1981 the then Government and Parliament as a whole made it absolutely clear that profits should not be made on that registration, and that was fine for 20 or 25 years. But then along came successive Governments that decided to ramp it up.

On a principle as fundamental as this, I still think there is a strong case for putting it in the Bill. If a new Government want to change the approach in the future, they can do so, but they will first have to introduce primary legislation to do that. I do insist on amendment 8. I will insist even more strongly on new clause 16.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am grateful, but that is an argument that the Home Office makes every time we have this debate. We have had Westminster Hall debates and so forth, and it is an awful point. This is the point that I have just been making. Imagine if I were to say to the Minister that we are taking British citizenship away from him and that he could get indefinite leave to remain or apply for five years’ leave to remain or two and a half years’ leave to remain. The long route to settlement involves two and a half years, two and a half years, two and a half years and two and a half years. After 10 years, thousands of pounds and all sorts of uncertainty, he would get settlement, but even that is not citizenship. We would laugh at anyone’s suggestion that we would swap our British citizenship for that. That is not a remotely reasonable justification for not having a fee waiver.

It is the Home Office’s official position that British citizenship is somehow equivalent to the long route to settlement. The long route to settlement is a disgrace, but that is another issue. For goodness’ sake, we are talking about something that I would think Conservative and Unionist politicians would think fundamental. A kid’s citizenship is not a commodity or a service. Leave to remain is not an alternative, so that is not an excuse for not having a fee waiver or for having a fee for kids who are in care.

The right hon. Member for Scarborough and Whitby made plenty of points about the importance of being able to subsidise other parts of the system, and I get that for other reasons, but not for this. The figures show that the Home Office is making a huge profit. Making that profit on visa applications means that tens of thousands of kids who should be British citizens are out there struggling to secure leave to remain, with thousands of pounds of fees. They are being denied access and their rights, stability and security. I ask the Minister to take the issue away and think about it again. I also ask Government Members to think about this issue, because it is not party political. As say, I have had lots of support from Conservative MPs in the past. Let us do justice by these kids. In effect, they are British citizens. Let us make them legally British citizens as well.

As I say, new clause 16 is modest. It is not asking for no fees at all; it is asking for no more than cost price. It is asking for a fee waiver, and it is asking to ensure that people have all these rights. I will definitely press amendment 8, and new clause 16, when we reach it, to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Nationality and Borders Bill (Sixth sitting)

Stuart C McDonald Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 19th October 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Bambos Charalambous]

It is the view of the Opposition that British nationality law is out of kilter with adoption law in England and Wales and needs to be rectified. In those countries where an adoption order has been made by a court, it may be made where a child has reached the age of 18 but has not yet reached the age of 19; yet such an adoption order confers British citizenship automatically only where the person adopted is under 18 on the day the order is made. It seems evident to the Opposition that that is a slip that results in unnecessary unfairness.

The adoption law as it stands was enacted some 20 years after the relevant nationality law, and apparently the inconsistency that it created was overlooked. It has never been suggested that the adoption law and British nationality law should be out of step where a court in England and Wales authorises a person to be adopted by a British citizen parent. It is important for every member of the Committee to know that the stated problem is not merely a theoretical one; it generates victims in real life, including a university graduate who was 18 but not yet 19 when she was adopted by her aunt after her mother died of cancer, and who will have no basis on which to enjoy family life in the UK with her new adopted mother once her student status has ended.

We therefore believe that the position needs correcting. The Bill is the right vehicle to make that correction, which is not controversial and which we do not believe should divide Committee members on party lines. The amendment, which should command cross-party support, would bring British nationality law in line with adoption law, so that where our courts make an adoption order in respect of a person who is 18 but not yet 19, and the adoptive parent was a British citizen, British citizenship is conferred automatically on the person adopted. No adoption order may be made in respect of a person who has reached the age of 19, so the proposed amendment affects only those who are 18 but not yet 19 when the adoption order is made.

It is also important to point out that it is no answer to the problem to say that an 18-year-old adopted by a British citizen will be able to apply for registration by an adult as a British citizen at the Secretary of State’s discretion under proposed new section 4L of the British Nationality Act 1981, provided for in clause 7. The problem relates to those persons who should be treated as British citizens automatically from the date of their adoption by a British citizen. Where the only solution is a subsequent application for British citizenship at the Secretary of State’s discretion, there is the risk that such an application may be overlooked, or refused on another basis, such that the intention of Parliament to confer British citizenship on a person adopted by a British citizen will be frustrated. We therefore believe that the sole solution is to make this simple amendment to align British nationality law with adoption law.

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms McDonagh. I will speak in support of amendments 13, 14, 30 and 31. I also support amendments 34 and 35. Amendment 35 in particular seems to make perfect sense—although it relates exclusively to England and Wales. I confess that I have not managed to ascertain whether a similar issue arises in relation to either Northern Ireland or Scotland and, depending on what the Minister says in response, that is perhaps something we can all do our homework on before Report stage.

On the other amendments, this brings us back to the point I made when making the case for no fees for introducing applications, or at least restricted fees. These fees put people off from accessing their rights, especially when there is discretion or subjective criteria are used that mean people can have only a limited idea about whether paying a fee and making an application will result in anything positive happening. If they can afford it and if they know that they meet the criteria, people will pay a fee, but this would not necessarily make it easier to see in advance whether they would be able to show historical injustice or exceptional circumstances, or that the fault lay with the public authority.

We have already debated the fee aspect and made the case for lower fees to ensure that people are not put off from seeking to fix injustices that they have suffered. These amendments taken together address the other side of the coin: what can be done to make the criteria more transparent so that people can feel confident with their applications?

Amendments 30 and 31 seek to ensure that both officials and the victims of injustice are aware of how the provisions brought about by clause 7 are being implemented. If a new type of injustice in UK nationality law is discovered, or circumstances are deemed so exceptional that the Secretary of State decides that registration is merited and she grants such an application, she will first need to ensure that policy and guidance are updated so that those processing other similar applications are aware of that fact and people applying in the same circumstances are successful. More than that, she will also be required to take steps to try and ensure that people who might be entitled to register in the same circumstances know that they can do so.

Again, as I said earlier, we know from Windrush how important taking such action to make people aware of their rights can be. In short, people will have a greater understanding of whether their application will be successful and those who meet the criteria set out in policy will apply. Those who are making decisions will be aware that in previous cases similar applications have been granted and those applications will therefore be successful.

Amendments 13 and 14 challenge a Minister to explain why the provisions introduced by clause 7 are expressed entirely as “may” rather than “must”. If a person proves they are a victim of an injustice, which is carefully defined in the clause, then why should the Home Secretary still have a totally unlimited power to refuse registration in any event? Similarly, if a person shows they were denied citizenship because of an act of omission by a public authority or by exceptional circumstances, why should the Home Secretary have a totally unfettered power to say no?

The big fear is that the Secretary of State has the broadest discretion possible regardless of whether a person meets other criteria. Who will make an application, particularly if there is a fee involved? I can see possible flaws in going completely the other way to a situation where it is a requirement and a must, but that would be better than the totally unlimited discretion that is in the Bill right now. I simply challenge a Minister to come up with a better form of this.

[Bambos Charalambous]

On amendment 30, we want to make sure that the Secretary of State is required to take all reasonable and necessary steps to ensure that the right to registration under clause 7 is made accessible to all its intended beneficiaries. We also want to ensure that historical legislative unfairness is corrected. We do not believe that it is sufficient to rely on that being done ad hoc, subject to the discretion of any particular Secretary of State.

As has been obvious from discussions on previous clauses, several injustices have been identified in British nationality law in our policy and practice over the years. Important provisions in the Bill are necessary to correct some of that, including changes to previous amendments to the British Nationality Act 1981, which only partially corrected a particular injustice.

The Opposition understand and accept that the broad purpose of clause 7 is to provide the means to correct further injustices, and we broadly support its aims. We are concerned, however, about the implementation of the clause, and the amendment serves to address that.

Hon. Members will be aware that clause 7 introduces a new discretion to register adults as British citizens or British overseas territories citizens where that is immediately necessary or appropriate in view of some historical injustice, an act or omission by a public authority, or other exceptional circumstances. As it stands, that provision is welcome and reflects the underlying purpose of all rights of registration under the British Nationality Act 1981 to ensure that citizenship is the right of all persons connected to the UK or the British overseas territories.

However, given that clause 7 relates to historical legislative unfairness, it raises a concern that it may be relied on by Ministers to avoid making necessary future amendments to the 1981 Act, required specifically to correct such injustice. We are deeply concerned, because when such an injustice is identified, Ministers must take the appropriate action to correct it in the Act. It is not enough to rely on the opinion of any particular Minister or group of Ministers. For that reason, we want to insert the following in clause 7:

“Where a person (P) is registered as a British citizen under subsection 4L(1), the Secretary of State must—

(a) ensure that other persons applying to be registered are so registered where the same unfairness, act or omission or circumstances apply unless there are material factors relevant to their applications that were not relevant to P’s application;

(b) amend or make policy or guidance in line with the registration of P;

(c) make that new or amended policy or guidance publicly available; and

(d) take such other steps as may be reasonably necessary to draw attention to that new or amended policy or guidance among other people affected by that same unfairness, act or omission or circumstances.”

Clause 7 must genuinely be given real practical effect—it must not become a mere token statutory provision. Registration requires someone to make a formal application, so the clause will be ineffective if uncertainty over the result of an application, coupled with any cost or other impediment to do so, deters people from making applications. In such circumstances, clause 7 could stand redundant on the statute book because no one to whom it ought to apply knows about it or is sufficiently encouraged or enabled to apply for the discretion to be exercised.

For those reasons, the following matters must, at a minimum, be addressed. It is generally inappropriate, as with registration more generally, for the Secretary of State to charge prohibitive and above-cost fees to prevent people from exercising their rights to British citizenship. The fees are made even more prohibitive if it is not possible to assess in advance that an application will be successful because there are no fixed criteria by which the right to be registered will be assessed.

Ministers should also be pressed to give an assurance that when an individual application is successful, there will be positive action to ensure that other potential applicants are made aware of their equal or similar right to register at their discretion. Under amendment 30, if an unfairness, act or omission by a public authority or exceptional circumstances are identified that make it necessary to exercise discretion, appropriate publicity must be given to it, and there should be a formal updating of public-facing policy. It must be made clear that others in the same circumstances will succeed with their applications to register, if they make them; otherwise, people will continue to be excluded from citizenship in circumstances where it is clearly intended that they should not be.

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[Tom Pursglove]

I will deal with each of the amendments proposed, and then I will of course pick up on a number of the points, questions and challenges that have been raised throughout the course of this debate.

I thank the hon. Members for Enfield, Southgate and for Halifax for having tabled amendment 35, which would allow a person to become a British citizen automatically following their adoption in the UK if the order was made after the age of 18 but before the age of 19, but the adoption proceedings started before their 18th birthday. I have noted the unusual situation, highlighted by hon. Members, in which newly adopted young people can find themselves as a result of differences between the Adoption and Children Act 2002 and the British Nationality Act 1981. An adopted person can automatically acquire British citizenship, provided they are under 18 on the date the adoption order is made. However, under the 2002 Act, it is possible for an adoption order to be made where someone is already 18 years old but has not yet turned 19.

I am aware of cases in which individuals are affected by those nationality provisions, and I have some sympathy for them. However, I am also conscious that a person aged 18 will normally be capable of making their own life choices. At 18, someone can purchase alcohol, accrue debt, join the Army, or vote in an election. From a legal standpoint, at 18, an individual is fully fledged and can theoretically live independently of other family members. It is therefore consistent that a person aged 18 or over who is seeking to acquire British citizenship should normally do so only on the basis of their personal connections with this country, not those of their new family.

I must consider the wider position of adopted children, and I am satisfied that to extend the nationality rules to cover persons who have attained the majority would move nationality out of step with immigration routes. For example, young people over the age of 18 must meet the requirements of the immigration category they are applying in, and are unable to rely on other family members for a claim to residence. I have sympathy for those young adults who feel that they have lost out, but other routes are available that would allow them to choose whether they wish to naturalise or register as British citizens.

Turning to amendment 13, again I thank hon. Members for tabling the amendment and for drawing attention to clause 7, which we believe is a positive move that will allow the Home Secretary to grant British citizenship to those who have missed out on acquiring it, potentially due to reasons beyond their control. Clause 7 will apply to anyone who

“would have been, or would have been able to become, a British citizen but for—

(a) historical legislative unfairness,

(b) an act or omission of a public authority,”

or their exceptional circumstances. This means that the clause covers not just those who would have become citizens automatically, but those who might have had an entitlement to registration or could have registered or naturalised at the Home Secretary’s discretion. As such, we think it right that the provision remains discretionary, to allow the Home Secretary to take into account the criteria that she might have taken into account at the time.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I will have to give some further thought to what the Minister has just said. I take the point about people who would have had to register—therefore, there is still an element of discretion. However, will he look again at the case of those who would have automatically had that citizenship and whether there really should be such broad discretion in cases where people have missed out on citizenship because of historical injustice or exceptional circumstances?

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[Tom Pursglove]

We will no doubt debate this in great detail in due course. As I say, we are putting in place an improved access to justice offer more generally through the Bill.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

There is an absolutely fundamental distinction between naturalisation and registration. We are talking about people who would have had an automatic right to citizenship, which is completely different from naturalisation altogether. Again, I am still struggling to understand why there has to be such broad discretion. People have lost their automatic right because of historical injustice, and the danger that has been highlighted by Members is that that will put folk off applying. Will the Minister not even think about some restrictions on the degree of discretion that the Home Secretary has, or at least provide detailed guidance on when she will exercise that in people’s favour?

[Tom Pursglove]

I want to pick up the points that have been raised by the hon. Members for Bermondsey and for Old Southwark and for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East. Clearly, the guidance is a very important element of the immigration system, so that people can understand very clearly what is required and precisely how cases will be handled. I am always in favour of trying to make such matters more transparent and to improve guidance wherever we can, and that is always ongoing work. I take on board the point that has been raised, and I will certainly reflect on it.

As I say, Members will be aware that the Home Office publishes caseworker guidance, which sets out the sorts of circumstances where discretion would normally be exercised. This works, and we intend that published guidance will also be available for the new adult registration route. The fact that the Home Secretary is not obliged to naturalise a person does not therefore impact practically on most applicants. However, we want to maintain the ability to refuse applications from people who might meet the requirements, but are nevertheless unsuitable to become British citizens.

Where registration is set out in legislation as an entitlement, it needs to be more tightly set out so that there is no doubt as to who does and does not benefit. Because of the historical nature of citizenship and the fact that issues can crop up that we might not have been aware of, we need the flexibility to be able to consider someone’s circumstances without being overly prescriptive. Equally, we recognise that people can be affected by a number of circumstances, which may be difficult to set out in detail. We are not making this a discretionary provision in order to refuse deserving people, but to allow us to respond to situations that cannot reasonably be foreseen.

I understand that hon. Members may wish to seek assurance that people who have missed out in the past will be granted citizenship, but we think that this can be achieved through a discretionary route, which will allow us to take into account all the circumstances of a case. That is why we are introducing the various provisions in the Bill in the first place: to right those historical wrongs. We want this to work.

On amendment 30, again, I thank the hon. Members for tabling the amendment. The new adult discretionary registration provision will allow the Home Secretary to grant British citizenship to anyone who would have been, or would have been able to become, a British citizen, but for historical legislative unfairness, an act or omission of a public authority, or the exceptional circumstances in play. I understand hon. Members’ concerns that that power should be used fairly and consistently, which is right.

Each case will be considered on its own merits, taking into account the particular circumstances of that person, including the reasons they were unable to become a British citizen automatically, through registration or through naturalisation. On that basis it would be unnecessary to have a legislative clause that effectively causes us to treat like cases in a similar way, because applications will be decided in line with the legislation and guidance.

I have already mentioned that we intend to publish caseworker guidance setting out when we expect that this power might be used and the sort of circumstances we will take into account. Of course, that is done very transparently and can be seen by hon. Members and by people out there seeking access to those routes. As I think is my colleagues’ intended purpose in proposing the amendment, that will help to maintain consistency in decision making.

However, I am not convinced that that would be helped by a statutory requirement to produce or amend guidance every time a person with different circumstances is registered. There may be concerns about reflecting an individual’s circumstances in published guidance, even if anonymised. We will reflect the overarching principles in guidance and amend as appropriate. Guidance will continue to be published on the gov.UK website. I can also assure hon. Members that work is done within UK Visas and Immigration to ensure consistency of decision making, particularly when a new route is introduced, and I think that that is right and proper.

I do not think we can commit in statute to publicise any grants of citizenship to people in a similar position. As I have said, we will publish guidance setting out the approach we will take and make it available to potential applicants, but it would not be right to impose a statutory requirement to do so. Indeed, some of those registered will be in unique positions and it would not be possible to identify others who might qualify on the same basis.

The reporting obligation set out in the amendment would require the Home Secretary each year to report any historical legislative unfairness that had been identified in registering a person under clause 7 and say how she intends to correct it. Perhaps it would help to clarify that the thinking behind clause 7 is that it can be used to rectify individual situations that may have been created by historical unfairness, rather than having to create specific provisions to cover each scenario.

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[Bambos Charalambous]

The clause seeks to enable the Secretary of State to waive requirements for naturalisation as a British citizen under section 6, naturalisation as a British overseas territories citizen under section 18, or registration as a British citizen under section 4 of the British Nationality Act 1981. At present, there is no power to waive the requirement to have been present in the UK at the start of the qualifying period except in relation to applications for naturalisation as British citizens from current or former members of the armed forces, which presents a barrier in otherwise deserving cases.

The immediate necessity for the clause arises from the circumstances of people of the Windrush generation, many of whom were deprived of their rights to register their British citizenship by the Home Office’s failure to ensure that people were aware both of their rights and of the need to exercise them. It has since become necessary to use naturalisation without a fee as a means to put people in the position they should have been in all along as British citizens. However, since some people were wrongly exiled from the UK, the remedy has been inadequate for some people who were only recently able to return.

The main barrier stems from the requirement for naturalisation that a person must be present in the UK at a fixed point five or three years before the date of their application to naturalise. The clause therefore seeks to amend the 1981 Act to allow the Secretary of State to waive the requirement that the individual must have been present in the UK or relevant territory at the start of the qualifying period in the special circumstances of a particular case. The waiver will be introduced in relation to the requirements to naturalise a British citizen under section 6 of the 1981 Act, to naturalise as a British overseas territories citizen under section 18 or to register as a British citizen under section 4.

The clause would not have been necessary had the Windrush scandal not happened in the first place, and we wish to place on the record our concerns that it happened because of the hostile environment that was created by the Home Office. Although we welcome clause 8 and will support it, we wish that it had never been necessary because of the injustice of what happened to all those people.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I want to pick up on one thing the shadow Minister mentioned in his speech. He is right that the most profound implications of the clause relate to the correction of wrongs that were done to the Windrush generation, but I slightly disagree with him when he says that it would not have been necessary but for that.

Certain nationality applications always have caused some awkwardness. In the dim and distant past, when I was one of these wicked immigration lawyers, I would have people come to me who were applying to register, and the requirement that they had been in the country five years ago at the start of the residency period would sometimes cause problems. I do not know what I was doing five years ago today, and sometimes it would require a hell of a lot of checking to work it out.

There were the odd occasions where the Home Office kindly returned the applications, because it was going to have to refuse them as the person had perhaps gone abroad for a couple of weeks five years ago. If the Home Office had not done that, it could have just banked the fees and refused the application. The most profound implication is in relation to Windrush, but I think overall that this is a good thing to do anyway and a slightly broader discretion is welcome.

[Anne McLaughlin]

I want to acknowledge the people who were caught up in the Windrush scandal and their tenacity in hanging on in there and sticking it out. I also want to recognise all the different campaign groups, activists and supporters, friends and families of those who suffered so much because of the scandal. I want to take every chance I get to put that on the record.

I regularly talk about feeling frustrated in this place when I passionately argue the case for something or someone but almost never get anywhere—sitting here today, it is of course always going to be nine Members on the Government side and seven on the Opposition side—but I underestimated the importance that people place on MPs speaking up for them and acknowledging their injustice, and I never will again. I did not think it would make such a difference, but it really does make a huge difference to people. That is why, as the SNP’s immigration spokesperson, I take any opportunity to say that what happened to the people who came here as part of the Windrush generation was utterly wrong. Even the solutions went wrong, and there were delays and complications. This clause, today, is good, but that is only right.

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[Tom Pursglove]

The clause amends the provision for registering a child as a British citizen or British overseas territories citizen when the child was born in the UK or a territory and has been stateless since birth. Although it applies to both British citizenship and BOTC, it addresses an issue specific to the UK, so I am going to talk about British citizenship. However, parallel changes will be made in relation to BOTC.

It may help if I put the issue in the context of all children born in the United Kingdom. Since 1983, a child born in the UK will be a British citizen automatically only if one of their parents is a British citizen, is settled in the United Kingdom or, from 13 January 2010, is a member of the armed forces.

“Settled” is defined in the British Nationality Act 1981 as being ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom and not subject to an immigration time restriction on their stay. That effectively excludes those whose parents only have limited leave to remain or are here illegally. Those exempt from immigration control because of diplomatic service or as members of visiting forces are also not regarded as settled. Any child born in the United Kingdom after 1 January 1983 who was not a British citizen at birth has an entitlement to register as a British citizen if the parent becomes a British citizen or settled in the UK, if the parent joins the armed forces, or if the child lives here for the first 10 years of their life.

In addition, there is provision for children born in the UK who would otherwise be stateless to acquire citizenship. If a child is born in the UK to a parent who is a British overseas territories citizen, British overseas citizen or British subject and would otherwise be stateless, they will acquire the same nationality as the parent. Alternatively, if a child is born in the UK and is, and has always been, stateless, they can apply to be registered as a British citizen before their 22nd birthday based on a period of five years’ residence. Those provisions enable us to meet our obligations under the convention on the reduction of statelessness. That means that if a child is stateless and has had no other citizenship or nationality from birth, they can effectively be registered on reaching the age of five—rather than after the age of 10, like other children born in the UK.

The UK, like many other countries, allows for citizenship to be acquired by descent by a child born abroad to a parent who holds that status by birth. Under most countries’ citizenship laws that happens automatically, but some countries require the parents to register a child’s birth for the child to access citizenship. That is the case for India and Sri Lanka, where a child’s birth needs to be registered at a high commission if they are to be recognised as a citizen.

We are aware that increasing numbers of non-settled parents in the UK are actively deciding not to register their child’s birth at the embassy or high commission, and thus failing to secure their child’s entitlement to their parents’ nationality by descent.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The explanatory note just says that there have been cases. This is a very serious change. Can the Minister give us examples of analysis that has been done and the types of circumstances in which such decisions are taking place? Tell us about the scale. I see no evidence of a significant problem, whereas I do see that the clause could cause significant harm.

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I and Opposition colleagues believe that the clause, if adopted, will exacerbate existing challenges leading to the further exclusion, alienation and marginalisation of children and young people in the UK. In short, it is an affront to domestic and international law concerning children’s rights and statelessness. It is also more basically an affront to children. It will impose the most profound of exclusions on children—denial of any citizenship, particularly that of the place where they were born and live, and the only place that they know. The exclusion and alienation inflicted on children through their formative years will be highly damaging to their personal development and any feelings of security and belonging. That is why the Opposition will vote against the clause.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I wish to echo everything the shadow Minister said in outlining why we passionately oppose the clause. As I said in earlier speeches, and has been illustrated by many hon. Members, citizenship is fundamental to a person’s identity. It provides a status and security that no visa or immigration leave can ever match. When talking about statelessness, we may sometimes be talking about people who have neither citizenship nor any immigration status. Organisations that work with stateless kids have provided myriad case studies and examples of the dreadful impact that it can have on them. In essence, they are one of the groups most deserving of our protection and consideration—those without any citizenship at all. Without citizenship, a whole host of other rights become almost impossible, leaving that person with a huge gap in their identity, security and sense of belonging.

We talk often about children who belong to recognised stateless populations, such as Kuwaiti Bidoon, Kurds, Rohingya or Palestinians. Also, there are children who suffer from discrimination under the nationality laws of other countries—the same type of discrimination that has existed and that we have been trying to correct in British nationality law. They could be children in state care, for example, particularly if one of the parents is not available or not co-operative in proving links or nationality.

As matters stand, stateless children and young adults under 22 can register as British if they were born here, have always been stateless and meet the five-year residency requirement. Even now, it is not always a straightforward process, as has been explained by the European Network on Statelessness. Lots of hurdles remain: we have touched on registration fees, as well as lack of knowledge and awareness of the rights of stateless children and challenges in providing proof. I would be keen to rectify that, but instead, for some reason, the Home Office is taking it upon itself to erect further hurdles, making it more difficult, not easier, for children under 18 to be registered as British. Clause 9 restricts access to registration of stateless kids, and is worded in such a way that it gives a broad discretion to the Secretary of State to decline applications, which we believe is in breach of international law.

We have not heard at all from the Government today what assessment they have made of the impact that will have on statelessness. There is no doubt in my mind that it will increase statelessness among children, but that does not appear to have been weighed up in the Government’s reckoning. That is absolutely contrary to the intention of the 1981 Act, which rightly set out to reduce statelessness.

There are three key points: first, the case has simply not been made. There is a bland assertion in the explanatory notes that there have been cases where parents have made that choice. But today, despite pressing for some sort of analysis of the scale of the issue, essentially what we have been given is one extreme case, as the shadow Minister said. I am utterly unconvinced that there are lots of parents going underground and running away from the Home Office all for the sake of trying to secure statelessness in this manner. That case has simply not been made today. That is a wholly inadequate explanation. It actually reflects where Home Office policy making sometimes goes wrong: isolated examples where the rules have arguably been used for purposes slightly beyond how the Home Office would like them to be used are identified, and then an utterly disproportionate response is forthcoming, which may be able to stop those isolated cases but also stops a lot of absolutely deserving cases, and impacts on totally innocent individuals. To put it succinctly, the baby is thrown out with the bath water.

We have called for greater detail: how many cases? We need more examples than one extreme case. What, ultimately, is the problem? There was a lot of talk about queue jumping, but it does not impact on others who perhaps have to wait 10 years for registration. Their rights are not impacted at all. At the end of the day, in one extreme case, a child who has done nothing wrong may end up registered as British five years before they otherwise might be.

Secondly, on international laws, the shadow Minister says that in our view this is in breach of the 1961 UN convention on the reduction of statelessness. The Minister made the case that the UNHCR guidelines on statelessness allow a small discretion for the state to withhold conferring citizenship where the nationality of a parent was available to the child immediately, without any legal or administrative hurdles, and could not be refused by the other state concerned. However, the wording of clause 9 goes significantly beyond what is allowed in the guidance. The clause will insert new paragraph 3A into the British Nationality Act 1981, with subsections 1(d) and 2(c) both going beyond what is permissible. The former appears to allow the Secretary of State some evaluative leeway about what is and what is not possible in terms of accessing another nationality. The question is: why not leave that as a pure question of fact? The latter subsection also introduces leeway where neither the convention nor guidance allows for it. Instead, the very limited exception that is allowed is where the other nationality is available to the child immediately, without any administrative impediments, hurdles, fees or similar obstacles, so I fear that the Home Office will end up in court again.

My final and most important point is that this will cause so much more harm than good. There has been no indication at all that the Home Office has undertaken any sort of balancing exercise. Whatever problem the Home Office is trying to fix—essentially, we have had an anecdote—the damage that will be done goes way beyond it. Families will not risk a huge fee if they have all sorts of doubts about what the Secretary of State will do with her discretion. We fear that many more people risk being unreasonably refused registration, prolonging their statelessness. Where is the assessment of the best interests of the children involved? Where is the assessment of the number of stateless kids who may be impacted by the Bill? There really has been a wholly inadequate justification for it.

I have a final plea to the Minister. Even if he will not revisit the need for some sort of response to the type of case that he has identified and spoken about today, will he at least revisit how far the clause is going? As I say, it is our strong view that it might have prevented that anecdotal case from happening, but it will cause all sorts of damage way beyond that. We also think that the wording is inconsistent with the UN guidelines that the Minister has cited. If he still feels compelled to do something, he should at least revisit how the clause has been worded. Otherwise, I think he will very much regret that the outcome will simply be thousands more stateless kids in the United Kingdom.

[Anne McLaughlin]

The UK is bound by the 1961 UN convention on the reduction of statelessness, as we have heard. That focuses on protecting the stateless child and preventing childhood statelessness. It requires only that the applicant is stateless, and not that they cannot reasonably acquire another nationality, as it says in the Bill. The UK Government say there is a problem that needs addressing through clause 9 and that would justify departing from the safeguards established by the convention, yet no evidence is offered.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East has just said, he intervened on the Minister to ask for the evidence. The Minister said he had a long speech and would come to that, but he did not do so. He gave one piece of anecdotal evidence. I know that much of the Bill will have been drafted prior to his recently coming into the role, and I appreciate that this must be a baptism of fire for him, but I ask him to look more closely at the Bill. Why introduce it, if there is no evidence that there is an increase in abuse? There is no evidence. If there is no evidence, there is no problem, and if there is no problem, there is no need for clause 9. The UK Government really must not legislate to enable breaches of the commitment in the 1961 convention and the principle of the best interests of the child in UK domestic law.

Nationality and Borders Bill (Seventh sitting)

Stuart C McDonald Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 21st October 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

I beg to move amendment 88, in clause 10, page 13, line 13, leave out paragraph (a).

This amendment would remove a provision allowing the Government to treat refugees differently depending on whether they are Group 1 refugees or Group 2 refugees.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 89, in clause 10, page 13, line 15, leave out paragraph (b).

This amendment would remove a provision allowing the Government to treat refugees differently depending on whether they are Group 1 refugees or Group 2 refugees.

Amendment 90, in clause 10, page 13, line 17, leave out paragraph (c).

This amendment would remove a provision allowing the Government to treat refugees differently depending on whether they are Group 1 refugees or Group 2 refugees.

Amendment 91, in clause 10, page 13, line 19, leave out paragraph (d).

This amendment would remove a provision allowing the Government to treat refugees differently depending on whether they are Group 1 refugees or Group 2 refugees.

Amendment 92, in clause 10, page 13, line 25, leave out paragraph (a).

This amendment would remove a provision allowing the Government to treat refugees’ family members differently depending on whether the refugee is a Group 1 refugee or a Group 2 refugee.

Amendment 93, in clause 10, page 13, line 26, leave out paragraph (b).

This amendment would remove a provision allowing the Government to treat refugees’ family members differently depending on whether the refugee is a Group 1 refugee or a Group 2 refugee.

Amendment 94, in clause 10, page 13, line 28, leave out paragraph (c).

This amendment would remove a provision allowing the Government to treat refugees’ family members differently depending on whether the refugee is a Group 1 refugee or a Group 2 refugee.

Amendment 95, in clause 10, page 13, line 30, leave out paragraph (d).

This amendment would remove a provision allowing the Government to treat refugees’ family members differently depending on whether the refugee is a Group 1 refugee or a Group 2 refugee.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair again, Ms McDonagh. I will also speak to the other amendments in the group.

We have now come to one of the most fundamental clauses of one of the most fundamental parts of the Bill. As my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow North East and I set out on Second Reading, we regard both as totally outrageous. In essence, the avowed policy aim is to give the Secretary of State powers to treat certain refugees dreadfully in order to deter others from coming to this country. I find it extraordinary just to be saying that.

Over the course of this debate and the three to follow, we will ask lots of questions in the hope that the Minister will explain a little more what the Government intend to do with these extraordinary powers. We will also challenge the legal policy and, indeed, the ethical basis. We will make the case that in fact the clause will make the asylum system worse, not better. To all intents and purposes, the measure is an attempt to close the asylum system down to a large degree.

There are all sorts of problems with the asylum system: 70,000 asylum applicants were waiting for a decision as of June 2021, more than three quarters of them outstanding for longer than six months. Work has to be done to fix the system, but this measure is not what is required. In fact, as I said, the clause will make it worse.

Most of the broad discussion will take place in the stand part debate; the amendments are designed more to get the Government to flesh out exactly what they want to do with the powers. In doing so, as on Second Reading, I will speak about the implications for a Uyghur asylum seeker, a Syrian asylum seeker and a persecuted Christian seeking asylum, because I want to ensure that the Home Office is tested on its assertion now, and later on Windrush, that it is looking at the face behind the case—it is important to keep in mind who we are talking about. The clause will be particularly disastrous, allowing the Secretary of State almost to punish the individual, to make an example of them, as a form of deterrence.

Of the amendments in the group, amendments 88 and 93 would remove the power to grant so-called group 2 refugees and their families shorter periods of leave to enter or remain. Currently, refugees receive five years’ leave before becoming eligible for settlement. Nothing in the Bill or the explanatory notes tells us what the Government intend to do with the powers. The new plan talks vaguely of no longer than 30 months, with continual assessments thereafter of potential return to a country of origin or of removal to another safe country. My first question is, what is the Government’s proposal? Is it 30 months or, as dreadful as that prospect is, is it worse? Will it be a shorter period?

That is my first question, but the key point is that reducing leave to 30 months or less will have dreadful consequences for our three refugees. Having fled serious persecution, having endured a dreadful journey and having survived six months or more of going through the tortuous inadmissibility procedure—perhaps even an asylum claim—within an accommodation centre, our refugees require stability, a sense of home and the possibility of putting down roots, finding work and rebuilding their lives. All that is being taken away if the powers in the Bill are used as proposed in the new plan.

[Mr Robert Goodwill (Scarborough and Whitby) (Con)]

Would the hon. Gentleman describe a person who has come directly to the UK from France as a person escaping persecution? If so, will he describe the sort of persecution that that person might have experienced in France?

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[Stuart C. McDonald]

That point was made repeatedly on Second Reading, but the big problem with the right hon. Gentleman’s question is that the language of the Bill itself recognises that such people are refugees. The Uyghur is clearly fleeing persecution, the Syrian is fleeing persecution by the Assad regime and the persecuted Christian is fleeing persecution. A refugee does not cease to be a refugee because he has gone on to a different country. We will come to a different debate under clause 14 on the circumstances in which it might sometimes be legitimate for a state to say, “Actually, you are in France and it would be appropriate for France to assess your asylum claim.” I am not saying that is never permissible—far from it—but we will have that debate on clause 14.

The people we are talking about here, however, have been through all that. The Home Office has attempted to move them to France or another country, it has not had any success in doing so and they have been recognised as refugees, so the question is how we treat those three people.

[Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)]

Does the hon. Gentleman share my concern that those who purport to demand that France take more asylum seekers need to be mindful of the fact that France already takes three times as many asylum seekers as the UK, and that we need to meet our international obligations rather than seeking to demand that others take more of a share than we are taking?

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I agree with the hon. Gentleman. That is exactly why the Government are embarking on a dangerous slippery slope. If the case is that the UK cannot cope with the number of asylum claims that have been made here, which I do not think can remotely be the case, because it is not a remarkable number in the grand scheme of things over the past 25 or 30 years, and therefore we need to take all these steps, then clearly France and Germany and Italy will all be perfectly entitled by that same logic to do the same thing. When that chain of dominoes finishes up and we get to Lebanon and Pakistan, the countries neighbouring the countries where these people have been persecuted, the whole system of international protection falls apart.

Returning to the point I was making about how reducing the period of leave will be fundamentally detrimental to people’s ability to put down roots, to integrate and to feel part of UK society, I wanted to finish by saying that the VOICES Network, people who know the asylum system first-hand, in their response to the new plan consultation remarked that the proposal would

“perpetuate the insecurity and uncertainty of the lives of these people with damaging implications for their mental health.”

I think they are absolutely right.

I have a number of questions for the Minister. How many people does the Home Office anticipate will fall into this group in the first years of the policy? What impact does he believe the policy will have on the mental health, employment prospects and levels of integration for refugees such as a Uyghur, Syrian or persecuted Christian? It seems apparent to me that the measures will undermine all that. What will happen to children? What will the cost implications be for the local authorities and health services that are supporting them?

Similar moves in Australia have had exactly the impact I am talking about. As the Australian Human Rights Commission reported in 2019:

“Uncertainty about their future, the inability to make long-term plans and the stress associated with having to reapply for protection (including the anticipatory distress of potentially being returned to the country from which they had fled) caused significant distress and anxiety amongst TPV holders, hampered their capacity to recover from past trauma and resulted in poorer settlement outcomes.”

The Australian Red Cross said that

“temporary protection institutionalises uncertainty, and often poverty, amplifying pre-existing trauma and suspending the process of settling into a new country.”

I have no reason to think that that will not be the fate of the Uyghur, the Syrian or the persecuted Christian if these provisions are enforced for them. That, unfortunately, appears to be exactly what the Government want to achieve, and that is the shame of the whole policy.

On the other side of the coin, given the record delays and problems in processing asylum claims that the Home Office already faces, why on earth do we want to require the Home Office to process the same cases and applicants over and over again over a 10-year period, adding exponentially to caseworker workloads? Can the Minister confirm what exactly the review process will entail? What will be the targeting for these decisions? What happens to refugees whose 30 months or less have expired while they were waiting? How many additional decisions does the Home Office anticipate it will have to make from the third year onwards, and how many extra staff will that require? This is not only disastrous for asylum seekers, but pretty bad news for Home Office caseworkers.

Amendments 89 and 94 would remove the Secretary of State’s right to punish a Uyghur, Syrian or persecuted Christian by denying them indefinite leave to remain on the same basis as other refugees. That settlement provides the ultimate safety and security and is currently available after five years. Again, the Bill does not say what the Government’s intentions are with this power, but it is understood that they propose 10 years of short-term visas before settlement would become available. Can the Minister confirm precisely how the Secretary of State intends to use these powers? What else will be required of a refugee at the 10-year stage? Will there be a fee? What tests will we require to be met? These arguments are similar to those I made for amendments 88 and 93, so I will not repeat them. The key point is the same: instead of offering security, integration and the opportunity to rebuild their lives, the Syrian, the Uyghur and the persecuted Christian have been faced with uncertainty, re-traumatisation, stress and anxiety.

Amendments 90 and 95 are designed to remove the Secretary of State’s power to impoverish these three asylum seeker groups. The power would see universal credit, child benefit and local authority homelessness assistance among the crucial safety nets torn away from them. The explanatory notes say that the power will not be applied in cases of destitution. Minister, if the power must be kept, why not put that in the Bill? Fundamentally, how will it work, and how will it be assessed? Especially after months and years of being excluded from work, refugees will be destitute from the point that they are recognised. Will it happen automatically? How will the Secretary of State review that? How much more work will that entail for Home Office staff?

[Mr Goodwill]

Does the hon. Gentleman not agree that these amendments play into the business model of the people smugglers in that they would discourage people from claiming asylum in the first safe country they reach, tempting them to make the hazardous journey in a non-seaworthy craft across the channel, feeding into the organised criminals who prey on those poor vulnerable people?

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I have absolutely no problem with measures that go after the people smugglers. We all share the goal of disrupting their model. We draw the line at punishing the victims and going after them in an attempt to disrupt and undermine people smuggling. First, I find that morally indefensible. Secondly, as I will come to later, there is no evidence that it will work.

[Neil Coyle]

Does the hon. Gentleman share my concern, which is twofold? First, the best way to tackle the people smugglers is to provide safe routes, because then they are denied the chance to smuggle people to begin with. Secondly, a Xinjiang Muslim who faces forced sterilisation and forced labour is not going to be aware of UK law and what status they enter under. It is complete nonsense to think that refugees and asylum seekers fleeing persecution and torture are going to be aware of UK law, whatever goes into the Bill.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I absolutely agree. The hon. Gentleman makes two points. Yes, safe legal routes can and will make an impact. If people have safe legal routes, they do not need to turn to people smugglers. The Government acknowledge this when they speak about the safe legal routes they support.

There are various other measures we have to take. Our intelligence and police and security forces need to do everything they can to interrupt these networks. It is about international co-operation, including with France, as the Minister alluded to at Home Office questions on Monday. We support those measures, but we do not support deliberately impoverishing the Syrian, the Uyghur and the persecuted Christian and denying them universal credit, homelessness assistance or the child benefit that other citizens in this country get if they need it. I will come back to that in the clause stand part debate.

The Home Office knows this. It did research 20 years ago. If it has done any more since, it is not published. There is no evidence to show that people sit down with a nice table comparing family reunion rights and asylum procedures in all the different countries and then say, “Let’s go for that one.” They come here for a whole host of reasons. Many go to other countries for a whole host of reasons—language, family links, the influence of people smugglers, or they may have a friend or colleague here. Perhaps they just identify with the culture. There are myriad reasons why people end up in France or the United Kingdom, but it is not for these reasons. That is why these provisions will not work.

[Mr Goodwill]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that one of the other reasons people come to the UK is that the payment to the people smugglers is only the deposit and the main payment is through modern slavery, forced labour or other ways in which those people are being exploited when they get here? Often, for example, Vietnamese people coming here are put into prostitution or nail bars and that type of work. That is why they want to get here, because that is the business deal. They come here to work in the black economy.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The right hon. Gentleman fairly describes the circumstances that many find themselves in and it is another policy route that I would be fully behind. In this country, we are way behind where we need to be. We have statutes on the book and we will come to modern slavery later, but some of the measures in part 4 of the Bill will undermine the Home Office’s good work on modern slavery from just a few years ago, which the right hon. Gentleman was part of. Even with those statutes on the book, the system for inspection and finding where this is happening is just not up to scratch. The national referral mechanism takes forever to make decisions. The way it has been implemented is not effective at all; in fact, it is a boon to people traffickers and people who undertake exploitation. So yes, I am happy to support any work that addresses those concerns.

Amendments 91 and 92 would remove the Secretary of State’s power to strip the Syrian, Uyghur or persecuted Christian of their right to family reunion—the right of the Secretary of State to keep their families split apart. Under current law, having been recognised as a refugee, they could apply for reunion with their spouse or partner and with children under 18. For years, parliamentarians across the House have been pushing for broader family reunion rights and it is only a few years since Parliament voted in favour of the private Member’s Bill that my hon. Friend the Member for Na h-Eileanan an Iar (Angus Brendan MacNeil) promoted on the subject. It is another crucial building block in allowing refugees to rebuild their lives, as that Bill recognised.

The Government say it is all about safe legal routes, but this is pretty much the only place where the Bill says anything about them, and now it seems the Government intend to reduce family reunion rights. The crucial question for the Government is simply: is that correct? How will they use the power? Will they prevent spouses and partners from being reunited? Are they going to prevent children from reuniting with a parent? Family reunion is probably the most pivotal safe legal route there is to safety in the UK and it is all the more imperative because without the safe legal route, it seems obvious that the most likely people to try to come here via unsafe routes are those who have family members here.

With around 6,000 family reunion visas issued every year over the past five years, let us also be clear that around 90% are issued to women and children. The real danger is that any restrictions will ultimately mean that many more women and children end up on the boats in the channel or taking other unsafe routes. The danger here is that the Government do the opposite of what they say they intend, and drive people into the arms of the smugglers the Bill is designed to foil.

Again, that is what the Australian experience tends to show us. The Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law notes that after temporary protection visas were introduced,

“there was an increase in the number of women and children who arrived in Australia by boat. According to personal accounts, this was because the TPV regime precluded family reunion. The ineffectiveness of TPVs is the very reason that they were abolished by the Rudd Government.”

Instead, we should do what my hon. Friend’s Bill would have done: expand rules to allow adult children and siblings up to 25 and make other changes. That would reduce the numbers in boats.

In conclusion, all the examples of discrimination in the Bill are just that: examples. The Bill is drafted so as to leave the Secretary of State’s power to discriminate completely and utterly unconstrained. That is pretty shocking. While the amendments test the Government on their intentions in relation to those particular subjects, it is also important to know that the Secretary of State could plan all sorts of other forms of discrimination. Can the Minister clarify what other methods of discrimination the Secretary of State is contemplating?

[Anne McLaughlin (Glasgow North East) (SNP)]

Thank you, Chair, and good morning, everybody. The Government say they are introducing this Bill because they want people who need our protection to use safe and legal routes, but where are those routes? Where in the world and where in the Bill are they? On several occasions, the Minister has made it sound as if this Bill is all about those safe and legal routes, but it is not, because there is no provision for them and they are barely even mentioned.

I have heard those of us who oppose what the Bill does characterised as wanting people to make those dangerous journeys. Of course we do not want that. Our solution is the safe and legal routes that we keep hearing about but not have. They need to be set up and promoted, and people need to be able to use them. One of the safer legal routes that does exist, and is the most likely to be used, is the family reunion route, but this Bill takes that away from people who do not arrive by the mode of transport or in the way that the Government want them to.

Turning to amendment 91, I want to use the example of somebody from Afghanistan, which will also speak to amendment 15. I am using the examples of people, or their family members or friends, who I represent—I know that we were all inundated with requests from people in our constituencies who needed help for people in Afghanistan.

Mr L worked for a British charity in a programme funded by the UK Government around preventing violence against women. He has made an application for relocation, but he has heard absolutely nothing and I cannot get him any information. He and his wife had to go into hiding because his family was being targeted. The Taliban have already made threats against his wife, who, like him, is just 22 years old. The Taliban got messages to her that she will be raped multiple times if they can find her. His father has already been kidnapped by the Taliban and has been tortured by them. Who knows what will become of him?

Mr L’s wife has had such a severe mental breakdown that he had to make the decision to send her to what he hopes is a safe house in Afghanistan, as he thinks he has more chance of securing relocation for him and his wife if at least one of them can get out of Afghanistan. He is now paying illegal traffickers to get him out because he is so desperate to get this situation resolved and is hearing nothing, and weeks and months have gone by. Of course the traffickers are wrong, but is he wrong? Is he wrong to pay them? If he is wrong, what should he do instead? What options have we given him? I do not want him to do this. As an MP, I am not in a position to give him any kind of legal advice, and I know this is not safe for him to do. Does the Minister want me to go back to him and say that, despite all the promises we made to the people of Afghanistan, I do not have options to offer him?

I want to quote a couple of things that were said by Conservative MPs in August, when everything escalated in Afghanistan. The right hon. Member for South West Surrey (Jeremy Hunt) said:

“There is something we can do right now: cut through bureaucracy and ensure that we look after every single Afghani who took risks for themselves and their families because they believed in a better future and trusted us to deliver it.”—[Official Report, 18 August 2021; Vol. 699, c. 1307.]

I am sure we all agreed with that at the time. The right hon. Member for Esher and Walton (Dominic Raab) said:

“Like the Home Secretary, let me just say that, as the son of a refugee, I am deeply proud that this Government are continuing the big-hearted tradition of the British people in offering safe haven to those fleeing persecution.”—[Official Report, 18 August 2021; Vol. 699, c. 1370.]

The right hon. Member for Scarborough and Whitby gave a welcome from the Scarborough community and talked about

“refugees who had left, in many cases with nothing more than the shirts on their backs. They will have gone through a very traumatic process to even get to the airport and now they have arrived in Scarborough. For many people, the consequences of not getting out of the country would be certain death.”

So, I know he completely understands the trauma that people are going through and their desperation.

That was in August and we are now in October. The people I am talking about are no less desperate—they are more desperate—and I do not know what to say to them. I will have to tell Mr L that if he somehow manages to have his wife looked after, while she tries to recover her mental health, and he manages to get here, he could be offshored, sent away or jailed. He may never see his wife again because we will take away the right to family reunion. That cannot be right.

The people of Afghanistan are desperate—I have read out only a few of the quotes, but I know that all members of the Committee understand that. Time is just not on their side, so we must remove the provision—I would remove all of it. I ask the Committee to support amendment 15, at least to remove those consequences for the people coming from Afghanistan, to whom we absolutely owe safe refuge.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Tom Pursglove)]

I thank the hon. Members for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East and for Glasgow North East for all their hard work in this area, and for their engaging speeches. I do not doubt for a moment the sincerity of their contributions. Nobody should be in any doubt about the sincerity of the deeply felt views expressed by all Members of this House, who I genuinely believe want to see appropriate action to tackle dangerous channel crossings. I wanted to make that point at the outset, because it is important to remember that in the context of today’s debate.

As hon. Members will know, the clauses that they seek to amend are crucial to the Government’s intention to uphold the first safe country of asylum principle. In that respect, the clauses are designed to deter dangerous journeys across Europe by no longer treating migrants who come directly to the UK and claim without delay in the same way as those who do not. I am sure that hon. Members will agree that we must do everything in our power to stop people putting their lives in the hands of smugglers and making extremely perilous journeys across the channel.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I echo what the Minister says: everybody present wants to see an end to such crossings. He used the word “migrants” a couple of times, but as the Bill reflects we are talking about people who have gone through the refugee process. They are refugees, and it is very important that in this debate we speak about the fact that this is happening to refugees—hence the term “group 2 refugee”.

[Tom Pursglove]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his intervention.

I will take amendments 88 to 95 in one go, as they individually seek to remove key constituent parts of clause 10 in order to prevent the exercise of the powers to differentiate. That is not the effect of the amendments as drafted, but I shall none the less assume that the intent is as I just set out. Hon. Members are no doubt familiar by now with the way in which the policy is proposed to operate. For the avoidance of doubt, though, clause 10 provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of where differential treatment may be applied to group 2 refugees—in other words, those who do not meet the requirements set out in clause 10, which are based on criteria set out in article 31 of the refugee convention. That includes in relation to the length of leave issued, requirements to achieve settlement, recourse to public funds and family reunion rights.

As mentioned, the clause is extremely important because it acts on our commitment to do everything that we can to deter people from making dangerous journeys to the UK at the hands of smugglers, when they could claim asylum in a safe third country. I will pick up on a number of important points that were made, as it is right to provide clarification on them.

First, the question was raised of how the Secretary of State intends to use these powers. As we talked about in relation to the earlier provisions in the Bill, this will be set out in the normal way in the immigration rules and guidance in due course.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

The hon. Gentleman will appreciate some of the genuine difficulties for people in trying to leave Afghanistan—[Interruption]—and doing so in the safest way possible—[Interruption.] He keeps interrupting from a sedentary position. Will he let me finish the point that I am trying to make?

The bottom line is that we are firmly committed to that resettlement scheme. We will announce details of it as quickly as possible, having taken proper account of the very real difficulties that exist in getting people safely, as far as that is possible, out of Afghanistan. Ministers and officials are working tirelessly to work that up in an appropriate manner.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

rose—

[Tom Pursglove]

I will give way to the hon. Gentleman as well, because I want to be generous and to hear what he has to say.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The Minister is being generous. I want to push things back to some of the questions—

[Tom Pursglove]

I have some answers on those to come.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Great, because the purpose of the amendments is to probe exactly how these very broad powers will be used. It will be useful if he could talk about some of what the Government intend.

[Tom Pursglove]

I am keen to do just that. I have made the point about safe and legal routes. There are many examples in the past and that are still active.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am slightly frustrated—actually, pretty frustrated—that we have not managed to tease out more about what the Government intend. We will no doubt come back to the point about article 31 justifying the provision.

We are being asked to hand hugely significant and broad powers to the Home Secretary, and we are being told, “Well, everything will be set out in immigration rules and guidance,” when we all know that scrutiny and opportunities to amend such provisions are incredibly limited. Let me ask the Minister this: what more do I know now about the Government’s intentions than I knew before half-past 11 this morning? Not very much. I am not sure I even understand the answer in relation to no recourse to public funds. I do not see how a person who is a refugee would still be on section 95 support; having been recognised as a refugee, such a person would obviously move on. At least I get the sense that there would be some sort of automatic decision not to put an NRPF condition on them, but I am none the wiser about how some of the other powers will be used.

[Tom Pursglove]

As I have said previously, I am very keen to be helpful to the Committee, so if I may, I will study Hansard to look back at the questions that the hon. Gentleman posed on this matter. I will gladly write to him to clarify the position and try to provide further detail.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

It would be hugely helpful for Members of this House, ahead of Report, and for Members of the other place, who will be wanting to scrutinise the Government’s intentions, to be told more about that support and about precisely how the clauses on family reunion can be consistent with article 8, and the answers to my questions about leave. That was the purpose of tabling the amendments, so if the Minister undertakes to do that, there is no reason to put anything to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move amendment 15, in clause 10, page 13, line 34, at end insert—

“(7A) An Afghan national who is a refugee because they face a risk of persecution by the Taliban is not to be treated as a Group 2 refugee and in particular—

(a) must not face a restriction on their leave to enter compared to group 1 refugees;

(b) must have access to indefinite leave to remain on the same basis as group 1 refugees;

(c) must not have no recourse to public funds conditions attached to any leave to enter or remain given to them; and

(d) must have access to family reunion on the same basis as group 1 refugees.”

This amendment would prevent the Secretary of State from treating Afghan refugees at risk of persecution by the Taliban as Group 2 refugees.

I can be brief, because a lot of the territory in relation to Afghanistan was covered in the previous debate. Again, Members across this House have been forceful, powerful advocates. Whatever our views on the manner of the withdrawal, its timing and so on, I do not doubt for a minute that every Member of the House intended to ensure the UK did what could be done to assist the people of Afghanistan. The problem with this Bill, as far as I can see, is that that generosity of spirit, that determination to help, seems to come to a shuddering halt should a person from Afghanistan end up claiming asylum in this country.

The amendment confronts hon. Members with, to use a Home Office expression, a face behind the case. We are talking about creating an exemption where the Home Office has assessed a person’s case and accepted that they are at risk of persecution from the Taliban in Afghanistan, such that it will not be permissible for the Secretary of State to discriminate against them—to make them subject to no recourse to public funds, to deny them family reunion, to refuse to give them settlement after five years and to perpetrate all the other discriminations that the clause allows. In a sense, it would be nonsensical to create an exception only for such people, but the amendment is designed simply to confront hon. Members with the fact that that is who we are talking about. Those discriminations will apply to these people, whom we have all been championing, just as they would to any other asylum seeker. I do not need to say any more than that, but I will press the amendment to a Division.

[Tom Pursglove]

I do not think it would be appropriate for clause 10 to include an exemption from group 2 refugee conditions for Afghan national refugees. Although I have great sympathy for the plight of Afghan citizens who are fleeing the brutal reign of the Taliban, a blanket exemption for Afghan citizens who are recognised as refugees would be inappropriate for two reasons.

First, we cannot exempt any particular nationality, because situations of conflict and repression are fluid. There may come a time when that country is no longer unsafe and those from it who claim asylum are no longer genuinely in need of protection; I am sure that is something that we all wish to see. If there were still an exemption for them in primary legislation, it would serve as a huge pull factor to the UK for migrants seeking to claim asylum in order to work or otherwise make a new life in the UK.

Secondly, any blanket exemption would inevitably lead to people posing as Afghans in an attempt to benefit from the hon. Gentleman’s very principled generosity. That would, perversely, prevent us from protecting Afghans who were genuinely in need. I am sure hon. Members agree that that would be in no one’s interest.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

I am very happy to reflect the sentiment in my conversations with my ministerial colleague. As I was about to say before I took the intervention from the shadow spokesperson, I urge SNP Members to withdraw their amendment.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

For the reasons given by the hon. Member for Sheffield Central in particular, I do not accept the argument about creating incentives. All we are asking is for Afghan asylum seekers to be treated in a few months’ time precisely in the same way as they are treated now, to be given a fair hearing, and, once they are recognised as refugees, to be treated in the same way as other refugees.

I have a second quick point before I conclude. Towards the end of his speech, the Minister referred a couple of times to things being looked at on a case-by-case basis. It is very important that, when we get to the clause stand part debate, he expands on what exactly he means by that. From what I heard from the Home Secretary, my understanding was that clause 10 would apply to Afghans in precisely the same way as it would to everybody else. The Minister’s reference to a case-by-case basis seems to suggest some sort of discretion, whether between nationalities or between individual cases. He has opened up a whole series of questions about how exactly the scheme is going to operate. Perhaps we can revisit that during the clause stand part debate.

I agree with the Minister that it does not make sense for legislation to carve out a particular nationality. However, what makes even less sense, as I said at the outset, is for all of us to be champions of Afghans so long as they are—

[Tom Pursglove]

I am keen to clarify that point. The point that I was making was exactly as I alluded to earlier: that, for example, we would not return someone to a country that is fundamentally unsafe.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am grateful for that clarification. I had thought that the Minister was saying that the powers in clause 10 would be applied on a case-by-case basis depending on individual circumstances, rather than what seems to be suggested by the clause: depending on their mode of arrival. He has clarified that what the Home Secretary said was correct: it will apply to Afghans, Uyghurs and everybody else in the same way.

Amendment 15 is not the most perfect or wonderful amendment, but even less perfect are the provisions in the Bill that would see Afghan asylum seekers stripped of public funds, stripped of family reunion rights and treated, frankly, abysmally. I would therefore like to put amendment 15 to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move amendment 96, in clause 10, page 13, line 36, at end insert—

“(8A) Immigration rules made under the power in subsection (8) may not apply to any individual who has submitted a claim for protection prior to those rules coming into force.”

This amendment would prevent the differential treatment described in subsections (5) and (6) from applying to anyone who submitted a protection claim prior to the relevant immigration rules coming into force.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 97, in clause 10, page 13, line 36, at end insert—

“(8A) Notwithstanding section 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971, any regulations made under the power in subsection (8) shall be subject to the draft affirmative procedure.”

This amendment would mean that any regulations made under the power in subsection (8) could not enter into force until they had been approved by Parliament.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I will take the amendments in reverse order. To go back to part of Tuesday’s debate about Parliament, rather than the Executive, taking back control, nobody—regardless of whether they were for or against anything else I have said this morning— could deny that these are sweeping powers, with next to no limits or constraints on how they may be used. In theory, the Secretary of State could put everyone up in palaces or prisons, expand or restrict family reunion rights, and give 50 years’ leave or 50 days’ leave. Because it can all be done by changes to the immigration rules, there might as well be no oversight at all.

The process is even weaker than the negative procedure that we use for some statutory instruments. Not since 2008 has a statement of changes to the rules been properly debated by MPs. Although the other place has a better record of holding debates, 87 changes to the immigration rules have been made since 2008 without the procedure being fully invoked. Even if either House disapproves the changes within 40 days, all that means is that the Home Secretary has to lay further rules, making any changes that she thinks appropriate. In short, these are massive powers that could fundamentally change the asylum system in the UK. More important, they will have a profound impact on hundreds of thousands of people. The powers need proper oversight, which is essentially what amendment 97 supplies.

Amendment 96 is designed to retrieve a sliver of hope from an otherwise horrendous clause. Even if the Government are hellbent on proceeding down this road, by their own logic they surely cannot apply these changes and disincentives retrospectively to somebody who has already claimed asylum. The Minister says that the Bill is about disincentives to stop people crossing, or coming by other dangerous routes. I do not think that that will work, or that it is right, appropriate or ethical to do that. Although the Government take the opposite view, they cannot possible argue that we can disincentivise someone who is already here.

There are 70,000 people in the asylum system, many of whom claimed for refugee status many months ago. It is a source of stress and anxiety, according to organisations that work with refugees, such as the British Red Cross, that the threat of being put into limbo, and of family separation and destitution—all the things that we have just spoken about—will hang over them if the provisions of the Bill apply to them.

[Tom Pursglove]

I hope that I can give the hon. Gentleman the reassurance he seeks in relation to amendment 96. It has never been our intention to apply differentiation retrospectively.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

That is a hugely welcome assurance, which many people will be very pleased to hear. The Minister can say in his response why he objects to that going in the Bill, but, as I say, it will make a profound difference to 70,000 lives, and to family members further afield.

[Tom Pursglove]

I reassure the Committee that amendment 96, which seeks to ensure that only asylum claims made after commencement are considered under clause 10, is not needed. For many good reasons, not least for purposes of practicality, we have always intended to apply clause 10 only to asylum claims made after commencement. The position is similar in respect of amendment 97, which seeks to ensure that any regulations required to implement the policy should be subject to the affirmative procedure in Parliament. Clause 10(8) is not a regulation-making power; rather, it is a power to make immigration rules. In any event, the amendment is not needed since the rules are subject to their own parliamentary procedure, set out in section 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971. Parliamentarians may pray against them within a 40-day period. I therefore urge the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East to withdraw his amendment.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am grateful to the Minister for his response. After a day and a half of debate, I feel I have achieved one small positive, which is reassurance in relation to retrospective application of clause 10. That is welcome. I have moved millions of amendments to Bills over the years in relation to scrutiny and oversight of immigration legislation, and they have all been rejected, so I am not going to press this to a vote. However, I make the point that if we parliamentarians are serious about scrutinising legislation and profound changes that have an impact on people’s lives, we have to come up with better ways of scrutinising what goes on in the immigration system. I shall leave that debate for another day. Having made my point, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move amendment 87, in clause 10, page 13, line 40, at end insert—

“(10) Before this section comes into force, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a report on the implications of this section for local authorities, the Scottish Government, the Welsh Government and the Northern Ireland Executive, and the report must be approved by a substantive vote in both Houses.

(11) A report under subsection (10) must include the following information—

(a) an assessment of the financial implications for the bodies listed in subsection (10);

(b) an assessment of the functions and powers of those bodies that will be affected by this section;

(c) details of any consultation and engagement with those bodies, and the outcome of such engagement and consultation;

(d) the Secretary of State’s findings, conclusions and proposed actions.”

This amendment would require the Government to report on the implications of clause 10 for local authorities and the devolved administrations, and to obtain Parliamentary approval for such a report, before the clause enters into force.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 161, in clause 10, page 13, line 40, at end insert—

“(10) Nothing within the Act or this section authorises any treatment or action which is inconsistent with the UK’s obligations under the Refugee Convention.”

This amendment seeks to ensure consistency of clause 10 with the UK’s obligations under the Refugee Convention.

Clause stand part.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

You will be sick of the sound of my voice pretty soon, Ms McDonagh—[Hon. Members: “Never!”] I am reassured by hon. Members. I will speak in opposition to what I regard to be a dreadful clause in the Bill.

Amendment 87 makes an important point in seeking to test how the Government have engaged with other tiers of government for which the clause will have significant implications. It is clear from everything that has been said that there will be implications for health services, housing and welfare services, devolved social security, and the legal aid and justice systems. How have the Government engaged with all the devolved Governments and local authorities on the implications of the Bill? What joint ministerial meetings have there been? What is the outcome of the suggested assessments about the impact on them? Of course, asylum is reserved, but what has been proposed here will have significant implications for all sorts of devolved functions and for the functions of local authorities. Far too often, experience shows us that the Home Office is happy to pursue policies that leave local authorities, in particular, to pick up the pieces with destitute families.

The Minister may say that there was a consultation on the new plan for immigration but, significantly, that consultation period ran, almost to the day, for the entire period of purdah for the recent Scottish and Welsh elections, and for some local government elections. That made it virtually impossible for civil servants and some local authority officials to engage in any work on the matter because it was politically contentious. It is fair to say that the timing of that consultation was, at best, rather thoughtless and it makes it all the more imperative that engagement with other tiers of government happens before the Bill is passed.

Fundamental questions are raised by amendment 161 and clause 10 more broadly. Indeed, amendment 161 takes us to the question of the Bill’s consistency with the refugee convention. What I regard to be inconsistency with the convention is a key reason why I do not believe the clause should stand part of the Bill. The Minister has already answered my intended question about whether he maintains that there is consistency with the refugee convention. The issue was not spoken about at the Dispatch Box on Second Reading, but if that is the Government’s position, presumably amendment 161 or an alternative along those lines is entirely unproblematic. All it does is call for everything in the Bill to be construed in accordance with the refugee convention, so if there is no problem with the consistency, presumably the Government do not have any problem with that amendment either.

Some may not be particularly vexed about whether the Bill complies with the requirements of the refugee convention, but we believe that is a fundamentally vital question. It is vital because the 70-year-old convention is crucial, simply as it ensures that some of the most vulnerable people in the world, at risk of persecution in their own countries, have a safe place to go to and appropriate rights.

The convention is crucial to ensuring that responsibility is at least to a degree not entirely dumped on neighbouring countries—we heard on Second Reading about how the overwhelming majority of refugees are situated in developing countries. If one country is able to rip up the refugee convention—in particular, one that was instrumental in drafting the convention, as the UK was—then absolutely nothing stops others following suit.

I said earlier that the UK Government have been saying that too many people are making claims in this country, but if we make that argument, the Governments to follow will be France, Germany and Italy. Everything would fall back on Lebanon, Jordan, Pakistan, Kenya and other countries that have to take significant populations from neighbouring countries.

That matters, too, for the reputation and influence of the United Kingdom. I do not want to repeat all the arguments we have had in recent months about the importance of abiding by international law and not breaking it, even in a “specific and limited way”. The Minister also referred to that being important. The problem, however, is that when a Foreign Secretary is busy telling Pakistan—already home to several million Afghan refugees—to keep borders open and take people in, or the Taliban to abide by international norms, at some point, if the widely accepted view is that the UK is itself busy ignoring or totally contradicting advice from the UNHCR and riding roughshod over the spirit and letter of the convention, that will come home to roost. How can we tell other countries to comply with international obligations if we are, as we are with the Bill, ripping up not only the refugee convention, but the statelessness convention, the trafficking convention, international maritime law and probably the European convention on human rights?

Let us be in no doubt, the UNHCR has said over and over again that the attempt to create two different classes of recognised refugees is inconsistent with the refugee convention and

“has no basis in international law.”

Regardless of what the Minister said earlier, that view requires significant deference and respect. I appreciate that Governments do not like publishing legal advice, but I can find no respected refugee lawyer who disagrees with what the UNHCR said. The Minister has his work cut out to explain how the Government believe the UNHCR to be wrong. The convention contains only one definition of a refugee, and only one set of rights to go with it. For someone to be outside their country of origin because of a risk of persecution for reason of one of the characteristics set out in that convention is all that is required.

Turning to the specific provisions and how they breach the refugee convention, the Minister must explain in particular how he reconciles the clause with article 23 of the refugee convention:

“The Contracting States shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory the same treatment with respect to public relief and assistance as is accorded to their nationals.”

In contrast, the clause expressly authorises one group of refugees to be deprived of recourse to public funds that UK nationals would have. The human rights memorandum to the Bill seems to acknowledge a problem, noting the apparent contradiction, but then blithely states that

“the Department will ensure that the powers in clause 10 are implemented in a way which is compatible with Articles 23 and 24.”

The huge question is, how? I do not accept—neither does the UNHCR—that there is a way in which that can happen. It is completely insufficient as a justification or an explanation. It is a promise to do the impossible. Any reasonable person looking at the clause and at article 23 will see that they are completely and utterly incompatible.

Other articles are also contradicted. For reasons I set out earlier, the provisions of the Bill will significantly undermine any possibility of refugees’ integration into society, in contravention of the requirement to facilitate integration and naturalisation under article 34. Going further, the proposals in the Bill and policy documents make it clear that the short periods of leave and the constant reviews are designed to lead to the expulsion of those refugees, regardless of the question of whether they are still refugees and in need of international protection. That is in contravention of article 32 of the convention, which prohibits expulsion except on the grounds of national security or public order.

The principle of family reunion is not in the body of the refugee convention itself, but the conference of plenipotentiaries at which the convention was adopted affirmed that

“the unity of the family, the natural and fundamental group unit of society, is an essential right of the refugee”.

Furthermore, as we heard, article 8 of the European convention on human rights enshrines the right to respect of family life. Given the insurmountable obstacles that those recognised refugees will face—they cannot enjoy that family life in their home country—and that, if they have got to this stage, clearly no other country will accept them, then it is impossible to see how the UK will not be breaching the convention routinely if it does not allow for family reunion.

As the Minister alluded to earlier, the clause is drafted to circumvent such clear breaches by cutting and pasting certain words and expressions from article 31 of the refugee convention into a completely different context. That article was meant to apply to refugees who are lawfully settled in another country, who have found protection there and who have then moved onwards irregularly for reasons unconnected to their need for international protection. In those restricted circumstances, administrative penalties for unlawful entry or presence are permissible. The article is clear that one condition for its applicability is that the person has an unauthorised presence in the country. This measure in the Bill includes no such restriction so, again, it is not compliant with the article.

Article 31 is also clear that, even when it is available to a state, the penalties that are permissible to put in place cannot breach other parts of the refugee convention, which is what the clause does. It also breaches international human rights law on family unity. The clause breaches the convention by applying unlawful penalties to an unlawful range of people. In coming days, we will address further breaches by new offences under clause 37, which will criminalise refugees, and clause 34, which will limit certain defences.

In short, for all the reasons I have given in the earlier debates, the clause will not work. It will not achieve what the Government want it to achieve. It is morally repugnant—it is completely unethical to treatment victims like this—and illegal, so the whole idea should be ditched and clause 10 should not stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Craig Whittaker.)

Nationality and Borders Bill (Eighth sitting)

Stuart C McDonald Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 21st October 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Bambos Charalambous]

Since Dublin 3 ended, there are very few resettlement routes available. That is one of the problems. Unless there are safe resettlement routes, we are just fuelling dangerous journeys.

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

It is repeatedly asserted that the UK has an exceptional record in terms of resettlement. It has a decent one; it is about mid-ranking in the European Union, in terms of the number it has taken per head of population over the years. Similarly, it is mid-ranking in terms of the number of asylum cases it assesses. It is good, but it is not exceptional and it is not a justification for the measures in this Bill.

[Bambos Charalambous]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. Unless safe routes are developed, all that will happen is that there will be an increase in dangerous crossings, because that will be the only way in which people can reach the UK.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for intervening again. I will come on to his point substantively when I speak to clause stand part. Meanwhile, I invite the Opposition Members to withdraw the amendments.

I do not intend to give a long stand part speech, because we have had a wide-ranging and substantive debate on the clause. It is fair to say that many views have been expressed. I do not remotely doubt their sincerity, but I hope that that acknowledgement of sincerity is extended to all Members, regardless of their views on the matter. When Members come to this House, at the forefront of their minds is wanting to do what they believe to be right. Members on the Government side have equally strongly and sincerely held views on the matters that we are debating, and we believe that the approach we are advocating is the right one.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am quite happy to say that all Members are doing what we think is right, though of course we might think each other misguided. I am concerned that the Minister is not going to go into detail about the issues—

[Tom Pursglove]

I am.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I thought the Minister was suggesting that the debate would no longer go on.

[Tom Pursglove]

That is precisely the point that I wanted to focus on before concluding deliberation of the clause. Views have been expressed about differentiation in the way that we are proposing and about its compatibility with our international obligations. I do not agree with the assessment expressed by various Opposition Members: I argue that the differentiation policy is in line with our international obligations, including the refugee convention and the European convention on human rights. Of course, it is for Parliament to determine precisely what is meant by our international obligations, subject only to the principles of treaty interpretation in the Vienna convention. That is precisely what we are doing in the Bill.

I want to say something briefly about people seeking asylum in the first safe country that they reach, the importance of that principle and its relevance in the international context, because there has been a lot of debate on the issue. It is self-evident that those in need of protection should claim in the first safe country that they reach. That is without question the fastest route to safety. The first-safe-country principle is widely recognised internationally, and has been for many years, as my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley South alluded to in his intervention on the shadow Minister, who slightly surprised me by being so willing to condemn the approach taken by the last Labour Government on that principle. It is a long-established principle, which successive Governments have had at the forefront of their minds when looking at and legislating on such matters.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Where does the Minister find this principle and what is it derived from? The overwhelming majority of refugees do claim asylum in the first safe country that they come to. Where exactly is he deriving the principle from?

[Tom Pursglove]

One thing that occurred to me throughout the debate was why any Member of this House would feel that it was necessary for anyone to get into a small boat on the French coastline in order to come to the United Kingdom. France is without doubt a safe country, and I like to think that we could recognise that across the House. Those journeys are completely unnecessary against that backdrop. I am staggered that that point is not recognised more widely. Based on some of the remarks we have heard, one might think that that was not the case. In my mind and those of my colleagues, there is absolutely no need for anyone to get into a small boat to try and cross the English channel or to take irregular journeys.

On the point about what this relates to, the principle is fundamental in the common European asylum system. Without enforcement of it, we simply encourage criminal gangs and smugglers to continue to exploit vulnerable people, and I make no apology for my determination, and that of the Home Secretary and the Government as a whole, to bring these evil criminal gangs to justice and to stop the dangerous channel crossings. We have to stop them, for the reasons that my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent North alluded to. We have a moral obligation to do that, and that is what the measures in the Bill, and the wider package of measures that we talk about very often in the House, are seeking to achieve.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I would like to respond briefly to the debate, which has been wide-ranging. I have to express some frustration, because the Minister said he would address in detail the reasons he thought the provision is in compliance with the refugee convention. I do not think he said anything at all about that. I appreciate that he has already undertaken to write several letters. Could he write another that explains how article 23 of the refugee convention, which requires equal treatment with nationals in access to social security, can possibly be consistent with a clause allowing the Secretary of State to treat people unequally? All the points we have made about the lawfulness of the Bill have not been addressed. I would be grateful if the Minister would do so.

During the debate we lost sight a couple of times of what we are talking about, which is people who are refugees. Sometimes people refer to genuine refugees, and we are talking about genuine refugees, who, by definition, have been assessed by the Home Office as such. The clause enables the Secretary of State to essentially treat them like trash—to withdraw access to public funds, to leave them in limbo and keep them separate from their families. While we support all reasonable measures to stop the crossings, we draw the line at treating the victims of these people smugglers like trash.

In actual fact, the British public are with us. Public opinion polling shows that people are sympathetic to refugees, and I think they will be upset when they find out that this is how refugees will be treated. I ask the Minister to engage with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees on the legality of the measures. These are hugely important concerns for a number of reasons, so I hope he will engage with him.

[Tom Pursglove]

I have a meeting coming up with him in which I fully suspect we will talk about these measures.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I have no doubt about it. That is appreciated. On the effectiveness of these measures, reference has been made to how this would disincentivise crossings. Again, there is no Home Office analysis to show that that would be the case. In fact, Home Office analysis is to the contrary. Where is the analysis to show that disincentives will work? We need to see analysis of what the Home Office think the incentives that make people do this are. As we have said, it is things like family, a history with the United Kingdom or speaking the language. None of those will be changed by the Bill. The Secretary of State will not change the incentives that bring people here in the first place.

The numbers are challenging, but in the grand scheme of things the number of asylum seekers in the United Kingdom is tiny. Most folk do not claim asylum here. That is not the issue. Yes, we want to stop them making dangerous journeys, because none of us want to see lives put at risk, but what has been proposed here goes way beyond what is acceptable.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

Accommodation For Asylum-Seekers Etc

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move amendment 98, in clause 11, page 14, line 26, at end insert—

“(3A) In section 16 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (Establishment of centres), at end insert—

‘(4) For the purposes of this Part, references to ‘persons’ do not include—

(a) children;

(b) women;

(c) individuals with a disability;

(d) individuals who have been referred to the National Referral Mechanism;

(e) survivors of torture;

(f) individuals who identify as LGBTQ+.;

(g) family members of any persons in the groups listed in paragraphs (a) to (f).

(5) For the purposes of subsection (4), ‘family members’ includes—

(a) dependent children;

(b) partners/spouses;

(c) in relation to children—

(i) their siblings;

(ii) any other individual who is the relevant child’s guardian.’”

This amendment would restrict the use of accommodation centres for accommodating people seeking asylum so that the state groups, and their family members, cannot be accommodated in them.

[The Chair]

With this, it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment 99, in clause 11, page 14, line 26, at end insert—

“(3A) In section 16 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (Establishment of centres), at end insert—

‘(2A) Accommodation provided under this section must—

(a) have a capacity of no more than 100 residents, and

(b) provide any unrelated residents at the centre with an individual room for sleeping.’”

This amendment would prevent accommodation centres from accommodating more than 100 people, and would ensure that residents were not required to share sleeping quarters with residents to whom they are not related.

Amendment 100, in clause 11, page 14, line 30, at end insert—

“(4A) After section 17 of that Act, insert—

‘17A  Right of appeal for support under section 17

(none) If the Secretary of State decides not to provide support to a person under section 17, or not to continue to provide support to him or her under that section, the person may appeal to the First-tier Tribunal.’”

This amendment would ensure there is a right of appeal against a decision by the Secretary of State to refuse or end support provided under section 17 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

Amendment 104, in clause 11, page 14, line 41, at end insert—

“(22B) Accommodation Centres, whether for supported asylum seekers or failed asylum seekers shall not allow for limitations upon a supported person’s right—

(a) to enter or to leave at any time;

(b) to receive visitors of their choice at any time; or

(c) to use communications equipment such as telephones, computers or video equipment.

(22C) Accommodation Centres shall provide supported persons with access to a complaints procedure and procedures for appealing any decisions that may restrict a supported person’s claim to freedoms not limited by their conditions of bail.

(22D) Persons supported in Accommodation Centres shall be informed of the conditions of their bail in writing, and shall be provided with means of identifying themselves are their place of residence.”

This amendment aims to distinguish Accommodation Centres from places of detention by introducing rights to persons supported at these Centres, and to require persons in Accommodation Centres to be informed of their bail conditions and provided with means of identifying themselves.

Amendment 130, in clause 11, page 15, line 1, leave out from “subsection” to end of line 2 and insert—

“(1) for ‘six months’ substitute ‘90 days’.”

Clause 11(8) currently amends the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 to allow the Secretary of State to increase the maximum length of time someone can be accommodated in an accommodation centre from the existing limit of six months. This amendment would remove that power and instead reduce the maximum stay to ninety days.

Amendment 16, in clause 11, page 15, line 1, leave out subsection (8).

This amendment would prevent asylum seekers from being housed in accommodation centres for longer than nine months.

Amendment 17, in clause 11, page 15, line 2, at end insert—

“(8A) The Secretary of State must lay a report before Parliament each year setting out—

(a) the numbers of asylum seekers in different types of accommodation; and

(b) the steps the Government is taking to maximise the number of asylum seekers in dispersed community accommodation, including provision of financial support to local authorities.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to produce an annual report on the accommodation provided to asylum seekers.

Amendment 101, in clause 11, page 15, line 2, at end insert—

“(8A) In section 25 of that Act (length of stay in accommodation centre), in subsection (1), for ‘six months’ substitute ‘90 days’.”

This amendment would reduce the maximum length of time someone can be accommodated in an accommodation centre to 90 days in most cases.

Amendment 102, in clause 11, page 15, line 4, at end insert—

“(10) In section 38 of that Act (Local authority), after subsection (2) insert—

‘(2A) The Secretary of State may not make arrangements under section 16 for the provision of premises within the boundary of a local authority unless consent has been given by that local authority.’”

This would amend section 38 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 to prevent the Government from opening an accommodation centre within a particular local authority without the prior consent of that local authority.

Amendment 103, in clause 11, page 15, line 4, at end insert—

“(10) Leave out section 36 of that Act (Education: general).”

Section 36 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 prevents most children accommodated in accommodation centres from attending state schools. This amendment would remove that restriction.

Amendment 160, in clause 11, page 15, line 4, at end insert—

“(10) Before this section comes into force, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a report on the implications of this section for local authorities, the Scottish Government, the Welsh Government and the Northern Ireland Executive, and the report must be approved by a substantive vote in both Houses.

(11) A report under subsection (10) must include the following information—

(a) an assessment of the financial implications for the bodies listed in subsection (10);

(b) an assessment of the functions and powers of those bodies that will be affected by this section;

(c) details of any consultation and engagement with those bodies, and the outcome of such engagement and consultation;

(d) the Secretary of State’s findings, conclusions and proposed actions.”

This amendment would require the Government to report on the implications of clause 11 for local authorities and the devolved administrations, and to obtain Parliamentary approval for such a report, before the clause enters into force.

Clause stand part.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

It is good to see you in the Chair again, Sir Roger. I rise to speak in support of amendment 98 and the other amendments in this group, but against the clause standing part of the Bill.

Clause 11 brings us to the question of how we accommodate asylum seekers, including, of course, the Uyghur, the persecuted Christian and the Syrian I keep referring to. Precisely how they are accommodated can have a profound impact on them. When I had the pleasure to be co-opted on to the Public Accounts Committee for a day back in October 2020 for an evidence session with the permanent secretary of the Home Office, I asked him whether there was a commitment at the Home Office to return to a reliance on community dispersal and a target to end hotel use by a certain date, and to end the use of military barracks as detention centres. He responded:

“There is not a target date, but we are obviously keen to do those things as soon as possible. Both those measures—the use of hotels and the use of other assets owned by the Government, including by the Ministry of Defence—are temporary, to take account of the surge in demand.”

He went on to outline various measures through which that would happen, including faster decisions and fairer distribution models. When he came before the Home Affairs Committee recently, he maintained that that was still the Department’s intention.

It would be reassuring to hear from the Minister today that he and the Secretary of State intend to commit to that model and that goal. Community dispersal is definitely the best system, although I accept that its current operation is far from ideal, as reports from the Home Affairs Committee have made clear. The system gives local authorities immense responsibilities, but few powers and even less by way of resources with which to fulfil those responsibilities. At the same time, significant problems with inappropriate and poor-quality accommodation have been identified.

We need a Bill that addresses those challenges. If this Bill did so, it would undoubtedly expand the capacity in dispersed accommodation. If it did that, the Bill would have our support and I would stop defending councils that did not participate in dispersal. To that end, amendment 17 calls for the Secretary of State to report each year on the types of institution in which asylum seekers are being housed and the steps that are being taken towards realising the goal of maximising the use of dispersal accommodation, including the financial support being offered to councils. Surely the Minister cannot find anything objectionable in that, if maximising the use of dispersal accommodation is genuinely the Government’s goal.

The problem is that the Bill tends to suggest, as does a lot of other evidence, that the Government are not pursuing that goal and are more interested in taking a different route. The Minister has to explain why this clause exists if the Government want to opt for dispersal accommodation as their central goal. The available evidence tells us that large-scale institutional accommodation centres are, by a distance, a disastrous alternative. That is putting it far too nicely when it comes to what happened at Napier Barracks, and yet correspondence from the Home Secretary to the chair of the Home Affairs Committee, and the explanatory memorandum to the special development order that extended Napier’s use, expressly suggests that Napier is supposed to be treated as a model or a pilot for the accommodation centres that feature in the Bill.

That is a truly terrifying path to go down, as the totally inappropriate nature of Napier Barracks is well documented in numerous reports and the High Court judgment, which was described as finding that

“the arrangements and conditions in which asylum seekers were held, posed significant risks that their physical and mental health would be harmed.”

According to the findings, Napier Barracks was overcrowded and felt like a prison. For residents, the environment was reminiscent of previous experiences of detention in places where they were tortured. Dormitory accommodation meant there was no privacy or quiet, and sleep was interrupted repeatedly. Cleaning was poor, and the inadequate shower facilities were frequently broken, unusable, dirty or unsanitary. They were also communal, which was particularly difficult for those with visible scarring from torture.

The all-party parliamentary group on immigration detention has highlighted extensive testimony that backs up the judgment of the High Court. The group has identified problems with poor Home Office identification and safeguarding of vulnerable people, and repeated instances of self-harm and attempted suicide on site —in short,

“profoundly negative impacts…on the mental health of residents, many of whom were already vulnerable.”

That all shows precisely why we should not go down this route, and why this clause should not stand part of the Bill.

Most of the remaining amendments in this group challenge the Minister to outline more about what the Home Office has in mind on how these centres will look and operate. Amendment 98 poses a question to the Minister. Can he tell us who will be placed in these accommodation centres? Will it be women and children? Will it be people with physical disabilities? Will it be individuals who are suspected to be survivors of modern slavery or trafficking? Will it be survivors of torture? Will it be LGBT people?

A Home Office policy document suggests that such groups should not be accommodated at Napier, so I hope it will not be difficult for the Government to agree to such an amendment. However, there is a challenge; as I alluded to earlier, there have been multiple examples of where that policy does not appear to have been appropriately adhered to, and we require reassurance that that will be done properly.

[Tom Pursglove]

I hope I can provide the hon. Gentleman with some clarification at this early juncture. We have no intention to accommodate children in accommodation centres. More broadly, decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis, as set out in policy, in relation to other individuals. I hope that gives him the assurance he seeks.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

It gives me reassurance that children will not be housed in such accommodation, and I think all hon. Members will welcome that. However, we are again being asked, essentially, to legislate blind. As parliamentarians, we are repeatedly told that all sorts of important information will be set out in guidance and in immigration rules, but before we give the Government the power to go ahead, we must least be told what they intend to put in that guidance and those immigration rules.

All sorts of other questions that I have asked—about people with physical or mental health problems, and survivors of modern slavery and trafficking—have yet to be answered. How soon do the Government want to put these people in such accommodation? I want to hear the answers before the Committee is asked to vote on whether the Bill should contain the protection that we propose.

Amendment 103—it is probably redundant in light of the Minister’s welcome reassurance—enables us to ask how, if there were to be children in accommodation centres, those children would be educated. Section 36 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 means that most children in such centres cannot attend state schools. This amendment would remove that restriction, but I am pleased to hear that that question will not arise.

[Neil Coyle]

The Minister said that it was not the Government’s intention, which does not necessarily mean it will not happen. It was not the Government’s intention to put people in unsafe accommodation, as happened with Napier, or to put people at risk in accommodation in my constituency, where there was an inevitable covid outbreak. Perhaps the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East is generous and I am cynical, but I would like something clearer than an intention from the guidance.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

I would like to confirm that that is not relevant, as we are not proposing to accommodate anyone under section 17.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am grateful, because that clarifies the issue. Amendment 104 is in the name of our Labour colleagues, but it has our full support. It makes the point that it is essential that accommodation centres are not de facto detention centres or prisons, in the way that Napier has been, with basic liberties and freedoms more theoretical than real. It raises a crucial question about how we can ensure that such places have accountability and oversight.

The Government will be using sections of the 2002 Act that are not yet in force to implement many of their policy goals, but there is still dubiety about precisely which ones. Section 33 of the Act would have created advisory groups for each accommodation centre, with powers to hear complaints from residents and report to the Home Office. Is that section to be commenced? If not, what alternatives do the Government propose to ensure that such centres are subject to appropriate oversight? I will leave it to the shadow Minister to flesh out that point.

Amendments 102 and 160 take us back to how the Home Office engages—or, rather, does not engage—with other tiers of Government. The Minister was perhaps asleep at the wheel earlier, because his answer was short on detail about engagement with local authorities, and in particular, the devolved Administrations. I accept that asylum is reserved, but these institutions touch on all sorts of powers and services that are the remit of devolved Governments and Parliaments or local authorities, including planning policy and the provision of health, social or other welfare services and education services. In particular, consistent with our championing of local government autonomy and the idea that local government should be seen as a partner rather than an assistant of the Home Office, amendment 102 demands that these centres not be built in a local authority’s territory without consent from that local authority.

The way in which local councils were treated in relation to both Napier and Penally was disgraceful. The Home Office did not even consult Folkestone & Hythe District Council and Kent County Council about the extension of planning permission at Napier because, it said, of urgency, and yet as the House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee notes, it must have known for at least 12 months that planning permission would have expired. It had 12 months in which to carry out consultation, but that was still the excuse.

As I said at the outset, we pose all these questions with a view to ascertaining what precisely the Government intend and why there are not greater constraints in the Bill, but ultimately we believe that this is not the right direction of travel. We support community dispersal—improving that system, making it work better, and involving more councils. We hope that the Government come back to that view and make that system work instead.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I will speak to the three amendments that are in my name and the names of others, but I will start by speaking to amendment 104.

No one on this Committee can fail to have seen the extremely worrying track record of the Government when it comes to accommodation for asylum seekers. The appalling headlines in connection with Napier Barracks cannot have failed to reach anyone who takes any sort of interest in the news. We are deeply concerned, therefore, that in clause 11 there are provisions for creating asylum accommodation centres. The clause suggests a possible wide-scale replication of the type of accommodation seen at Napier Barracks. That is because clause 11 gives the Government powers to house different groups of asylum seekers in undefined accommodation centres. It seems that these centres will involve congregated living in hostel-type accommodation, which has been shown to be unsuitable to house people in the asylum system for long periods. Such a move away from housing in the community is likely to impede integration prospects and will make access to needed support and services more difficult.

Clause 11 also creates new powers to provide different types of housing—namely, accommodation centres—for those at different stages of their asylum claim, including those with “inadmissible” asylum claims. The rationale given in the explanatory notes to the Bill is that that will

“increase efficiencies within the system and increase compliance”,

although again no evidence is given to support that claim.

The term “accommodation centre” is not clearly defined, although the implication is that it will mean that more people seeking asylum will be living in large-scale congregated settings. It is important to state clearly that this represents a wholescale move away from the current dispersal system, whereby people live in homes in the community across the country.

There is therefore a clear indication that the Government are seeking to replicate the kind of inhumane accommodation that we have seen at Napier. As I will set out, this prison-like, isolated and dystopian accommodation provides an extremely poor environment for engaging with asylum claims. There is strong evidence that such accommodation is likely to retraumatise extremely vulnerable people and hinder future integration.

The Government may seek to deny that a punitive approach is part of their agenda, but such a denial would not tally with the actions of the Home Secretary in August, when she visited the notorious reception centre on the Greek island of Samos; campaigners have described it as “prison-like” and “inhumane”. It is shocking that, having visited the Greek reception centres in the summer, the Home Secretary appears to wish to emulate the system whereby more than 7,500 refugees, including 1,700 children, are being detained in refugee camps in unsanitary and inhumane conditions.

However, the evidence that that is indeed the intention seems clear, because in August the Home Secretary also published a prior information notice for the procurement of new accommodation centres, with initial submissions invited by the end of September 2021. The details of the tender are subject to commercial confidentiality and therefore the details are known only to potential contractors who have signed non-disclosure agreements. What is public is that the contract is to be delivered in accordance with part 2 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, and it is stated that it is for housing up to 8,000 people for periods of up to six months. The tender raises serious concerns about how that approach will interact with provisions set out in clause 11, given that contracts will be awarded before the Bill receives Royal Assent. There are also clear concerns about how accountability and standards can be maintained in asylum accommodation when there is no public access to these contracts.

It is also worth stating for the record that since April 2020, the Home Office has been using two large-scale accommodation centres for asylum-seeking men who have arrived in the UK by boat—Napier barracks in Kent, and the Penally camp in Wales, which is now closed. A report by the all-party parliamentary group on immigration detention noted that, although legally speaking, those are not detention centres, they none the less replicate

“many of the features found in detained settings—including visible security measures, shared living quarters, reduced levels of privacy, and isolation from the wider community”.

Our amendment would take away the detention element of those accommodation centres, as we feel that those de facto detention conditions are completely cruel and wholly inappropriate, and will hinder future integration.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

We have had an extensive and wide-ranging debate covering a host of areas. I thank hon. Members for their contributions. I turn to amendments 16, 17, 98 to 104, 130 and 160.

Amendment 16 seeks to disapply a key part of the clause. As I set out, one of the clause’s aims is to enable wider flexibility so that individuals are supported in accommodation centres for as long as that form of housing and other on-site support and arrangements are appropriate for their individual circumstances. We need flexibility to increase the period of residence in a centre—the current maximum allowed by legislation is nine months—if experience shows it to be too short a period to provide consistent streamlined support. The amendment would prevent that. The Government take seriously our responsibilities to asylum seekers, and I reassure hon. Members that those accommodated in the centres will receive the necessary support to meet their essential living needs.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Will the Government not at least consider a maximum time limit on the duration of stay?

[Tom Pursglove]

There have been references during the debate to detention. As I set out in an intervention previously, the accommodation centres are not detention. It is very important to establish that again. I want to make the point clear: anyone in one of those accommodation centres is able to leave at any time. It is important to re-establish that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

The hon. Gentleman will be pleased to know that the people who organise my diary have confirmed that I am set to visit Napier in the not-too-distant future. I have been able to be responsive to that point pretty quickly. I will make some progress on his other point, and I hope to be able to visit it very shortly to provide him with the clarification he requires before concluding my remarks. That is my undertaking to him: I will, for the Committee’s benefit, establish the mechanism that will enact our commitment.

Contrary to what amendment 17 seems to imply, it is not the Government’s intention to maximise the number of supported asylum seekers accommodated in flats and houses in the community. I understand that SNP Members take a different view on the matter, so I appreciate that that will come as a disappointment to them. However, it may be more suitable to house certain cohorts of asylum seekers in accommodation centres, and that is why we are setting them up. Where, for example, their protection claims are likely to be found inadmissible and they can quickly be removed to the appropriate third country, it is likely to be much more efficient to place them in an accommodation centre so that the practical arrangements for facilitating their departure, such as dealing with the necessary travel documentation, can take place at the site. That efficiency benefits the individuals as well as the overall asylum system.

One point that has been overlooked during the debate is that the Government’s whole intention around the policy we are seeking to establish is to deal with cases in a much quicker, speedier and—I would argue—more humane way. I think being able to give people certainty sooner is a good thing, and I would like to think that, whatever the outcome of individual cases, spending less time in any form of temporary accommodation can only be a good thing. It is important to recognise that the whole intention of the policy we are trying to develop is to get on with adjudicating on cases sooner.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

It is not the type of accommodation that has led waiting times to spiral out of control. Only three years ago, there was a regular six-month target time—that was all within the dispersal system as well. Putting folk in the accommodation centres has no real impact on decision times. On the contrary, the Minister will know that since January, when the inadmissibility procedures came into place, virtually nobody has ended up being removed. It has just added six months to the waiting time; it has not accelerated anything. It is just a six-month block—that is it—so I do not understand where he is coming from.

[Tom Pursglove]

In the context of the Bill and in the course of our debates, we will revisit the various challenges in our asylum system many times. My hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent North made the point earlier that the system is broken, and there is a wide acceptance of that. Undoubtedly, that means that people are left in a state of uncertainty around their circumstances for longer than any of us in this House wish to see.

I can provide clarity to the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark on his point about the duty to appoint the group. The answer is that section 33 of the 2002 Act requires the Secretary of State to establish advisory groups for accommodation centres. Napier has not been deemed an accommodation centre at the moment. It is contingency accommodation to manage the high demand for housing that we are undoubtably seeing as a result of the pressures in the system that are a direct consequence of the channel crossings. However, he has that certainty on that particular mechanism.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

I dispute that interpretation of the situation at Napier, because Napier does not have the same wrap-around services that we envisage for accommodation centres. For example, the accommodation centres that we will seek to deliver will have significant caseworking functions built within them. That is a marked difference to Napier. Again, I am visiting Napier in a few weeks’ time and I will be interested to hear from the people there and to talk to the officials managing the accommodation to listen to their experiences. As I have said, and I think this is an important point, there is always a need to reflect on the appropriateness of the provisions in place and on whether governance and oversight arrangements remain adequate. That is something that we keep under constant review. I note with interest the suggestions that have been alluded to, and I will happily feed them back more broadly at the Home Office.

I want to make some progress, because I am conscious that time is marching on. The numbers of asylum seekers in different types of accommodation—if that is of interest to parliamentarians—can be obtained through existing channels, such as correspondence or parliamentary questions, so an annual report setting this information out is unnecessary. Amendment 98 is also unnecessary because there are no plans to place those with children in accommodation centres, and all other cases will only be placed in a centre following an individual assessment that the centre is suitable for them and that they will be safe.

Whether or not groups with the characteristics listed in the amendment are suitable to be supported at a particular accommodation centre will depend on a number of factors. These include their personal circumstances and vulnerabilities, and the facilities available at the particular site or in the particular area. It is not sensible to rule out large cohorts of cases from ever being placed in an accommodated centre in any circumstance, especially if their asylum case is more likely to be resolved quickly in a centre, which of course is in their best interests. I re-emphasise that our intention remains to get to a place where cases are processed quicker than they are at the moment, and that is something that we all should welcome.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Where is the evidence that doing this in accommodation centres speeds things up? We have had dispersal systems for years and on some recent occasions the waiting times have been absolutely outrageous, but a few years back they were perfectly acceptable. We can have fast decision making and we all support that, but that does not require these terrible accommodation centres to be set up.

[Tom Pursglove]

The hon. Member and I fundamentally disagree on this point. I think that there is value in having accommodation centres that provide accommodation but also ensure that caseworking facilities are available alongside. That aids in the processing of cases more quickly. That is a sensible step forward, and something that I endorse. I think it is the right thing to do in these circumstances.

Amendment 99 would also undermine a key objective that we are trying to achieve through setting up accommodation centres, which is to resolve asylum cases more quickly by putting casework and other services on site. This speaks to the point that I have been making; there is therefore no rationale for restricting the number of people who will benefit from these improvements to 100 individuals per site.

Additionally, there is no reason why unrelated asylum seekers cannot share sleeping quarters, provided that they are the same sex. This is already allowed for in the asylum accommodation system. Those in flats or houses, for example, may be required to share bedrooms. Some asylum seekers might require their own room—for example, the current policy provides that those receiving treatment from the Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture should generally not share sleeping quarters with strangers—but that is because of their individual circumstances. I re-emphasise that appropriate decisions must be made on a case-by-case basis and, where circumstances require, appropriate arrangements should be made.

Amendment 100 seems to be based on a misunder-standing—I intervened on the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East on this point earlier. We are not proposing to accommodate anyone in the centres under the powers in section 17 of the 2002 Act. Asylum seekers will be accommodated in the centres under section 95 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, or section 98 of the 1999 Act, pending consideration of an application for section 95 support. If the application is refused, there will be a right of appeal in the normal way.

Amendments 101 and 130 are both similar in theme to amendment 16. I disagree that the normal period of residence in an accommodation centre should be no more than three months. It may be that a three month period is appropriate in some cases, either because of the individual circumstances of the asylum seeker or the nature of the facilities at the site. However, as I have explained, we need the flexibility to increase the period of residence in a centre if experience shows this period is too short to provide consistent, streamlined support.

Amendment 102 would effectively give local authorities a veto on any proposals to set up accommodation centres in their areas. That is not appropriate. It is right, of course, that local authorities are fully consulted about such proposals and their views about local impacts and other matters given considerable weight.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

I am afraid that I do not have those figures to hand, but I will take that request away—very gladly—and I will share that information with the Committee when I have it.

Clause 11 amends section 25 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, so that these periods of time may be changed, by order, to allow for longer or shorter periods. The clause will also provide the flexibility to ensure that individuals remain in accommodation centres for as long as that form of housing and the other support and arrangements on site are appropriate to their circumstances. I encourage the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East to withdraw his amendment.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

On this occasion, I certainly cannot complain that I have not had answers; I may absolutely despair about what those answers were, but the Minister has certainly provided the information.

I am genuinely sad that covid and the stress that it has put on the dispersal system means that the Home Office now appears to be abandoning that system altogether when it has not been justified that that is the correct option. I very much fear that in a few years’ time this will come back to cause the Government problems; more importantly, it will be devastating for lots of people who will be placed in this accommodation.

However, I have the answers, so I do not need to press the amendment to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: 104, in clause 11, page 14, line 41, at end insert—

“(22B) Accommodation Centres, whether for supported asylum seekers or failed asylum seekers shall not allow for limitations upon a supported person’s right—

(a) to enter or to leave at any time;

(b) to receive visitors of their choice at any time; or

(c) to use communications equipment such as telephones, computers or video equipment.

(22C) Accommodation Centres shall provide supported persons with access to a complaints procedure and procedures for appealing any decisions that may restrict a supported person’s claim to freedoms not limited by their conditions of bail.

(22D) Persons supported in Accommodation Centres shall be informed of the conditions of their bail in writing, and shall be provided with means of identifying themselves are their place of residence.”—(Bambos Charalambous.)

This amendment aims to distinguish Accommodation Centres from places of detention by introducing rights to persons supported at these Centres, and to require persons in Accommodation Centres to be informed of their bail conditions and provided with means of identifying themselves.

Nationality and Borders Bill (Ninth sitting)

Stuart C McDonald Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 26th October 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Before we start, I ask Members to ensure that their electronic devices are either switched off or on silent. Members are encouraged to wear masks at all times, except when speaking, but I entirely accept that it is a matter of personal choice, and of necessity in some cases. I understand from the usual channels that we might sit past 5 o’clock. I put that on the record so that Members can adjust their diaries accordingly should that be necessary, although it may not be. The reason, as some Members might not understand, is that come 4 November at 5 o’clock, the guillotine comes down, which means that anything undebated in the Bill remains undebated in Committee, so it is necessary to pace the pitch backwards. We hope to get through all the work in a timely fashion, but we are putting down a marker. If Ms McDonagh is not available to take the Chair this evening, I shall. Hansard and the Doorkeepers have been informed as well.

Clause 14

Asylum claims by persons with connection to safe third State: inadmissibility

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

I beg to move amendment 56, in clause 14, page 17, line 31, at end insert—

“(d) there are in law and practice—

(i) appropriate reception arrangements for asylum seekers;

(ii) sufficient protection against serious harm and violations of fundamental rights;

(iii) protection against refoulement;

(iv) access to fair and efficient state asylum procedures, or to a previously afforded refugee status or other protective status that is inclusive of the rights and obligations set out at Articles 2-34 of the 1951 Convention;

(v) the legal right to remain during the state asylum procedure;

(vi) a grant of refugee status that is inclusive of the rights and obligations set out at Articles 2-34 of the 1951 Convention for those found to be in need of international protection;

(e) it is safe for the particular claimant, taking into account their individual circumstances.”

This amendment modifies the definition of a “safe third State”.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 18, in clause 14, page 17, line 33, leave out “5” and insert “3”.

This amendment is consequential on a later amendment about the definition of “connection”.

Amendment 19, in clause 14, page 17, leave out lines 35 to 38.

This amendment removes subsection (6), which states that a claimant whose asylum claim has been denied by virtue of their connection to a particular safe third State may be removed to any other safe third State.

Amendment 20, in clause 14, page 17, line 40, leave out “may” and insert “must”.

In cases where it is unlikely to be possible to remove the claimant to a safe third State, or in other exceptional circumstances, this amendment would require otherwise inadmissible claims to be considered under the immigration rules.

Amendment 21, in clause 14, page 17, line 41, leave out line 41 to line 2 on page 18 and insert—

“(a) in the absence of a formal, legally binding and public readmission agreement between the United Kingdom and the State to which the person has a connection;

(b) as soon as the proposed State of readmission refuses to accept the person’s return or if the person’s readmission has not been agreed within three months of the registration of their asylum claim, whichever is sooner;

(c) if, taking into account the claimant’s personal circumstances, including the best interests of any children affected by the decision, it is more appropriate that the claim be considered in the United Kingdom;

(d) in such other cases as may be provided for in the immigration rules”.

This amendment broadens the circumstances in which the Secretary of State must consider an asylum application, despite a declaration of inadmissibility.

Amendment 22, in clause 14, page 18, line 13, leave out line 13 and insert—

“(a) has been granted refugee status or another protective status in the safe third state that is inclusive of the rights and obligations set out at Articles 2 to 34 of the 1951 Convention”.

This amendment would strengthen the safeguards in place before a “connection” can be relied on for the purposes of inadmissibility.

Amendment 23, in clause 14, page 18, leave out lines 16 to 24.

This amendment changes the definition of a “connection” to a safe third State.

Amendment 24, in clause 14, page 18, leave out lines 35 to 37.

This amendment changes the definition of a “connection” to a safe third State.

Amendment 25, in clause 14, page 18, leave out lines 38 to 43 and insert—

“(6) For the purposes of this section, a “relevant claim” to a safe third State is a claim for refugee status or other protective status that is inclusive of the rights and obligations set out at Articles 2 to 34 of the 1951 Convention.”

This amendment changes the definition of a “relevant claim” to a safe third State.

Amendment 26, in clause 14, page 18, line 46, at end insert—

“80D Conditions for implementation of section 80B

(1) The Secretary of State may not make a declaration under section 80B(1) in relation to any State unless there are in place reciprocal arrangements with that State by which—

(a) that State has agreed to receive from the United Kingdom a person with a connection to it; and

(b) the United Kingdom has agreed to receive from that State a person who has made an asylum claim in that State who has a connection to the United Kingdom.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), any reciprocal arrangements must provide for the period within which a State is to receive a person from the United Kingdom; and any declaration made under section 80B(1) shall cease to apply if that period has passed and the person remains in the United Kingdom.

(3) The period to which subsection (2) refers must not be longer than 6 months from the date the asylum claim to which it relates is first made.

(4) Notwithstanding subsection (3), the passing of the period shall not prevent the transfer of a person from the United Kingdom to another State in which the person has a family member and to which the person wishes to be transferred.

(5) The Secretary of State may not make a declaration under section 80B(1) in relation to any person who—

(a) has a family member in the United Kingdom;

(b) has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom;

(c) has worked for or with any United Kingdom Government body or other body carrying out work for or sponsored by the United Kingdom Government; or

(d) has a family member who has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom or worked with or for such a body.

(6) In this section—

“a family member” means a child, grandchild, parent, grandparent, brother, sister, uncle, aunt, nephew or niece.”

This amendment would prevent the Secretary of State from rejecting asylum claims on the grounds that the claimant has a connection to a safe third State unless the UK has reciprocal arrangements with that State.

Clause stand part.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Sir Roger. I will speak to amendment 56 and the other amendments in the group, and against the clause, as currently drafted, standing part of the Bill. The clause allows the Secretary of State to declare asylum claims inadmissible on the grounds that she considers the person has a connection to a safe third state. That brings us to another provision in the Bill in relation to which we allege profound inconsistencies with the refugee convention—no doubt those will have been discussed when the Minister met with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees last week.

That inconsistency is one of the reasons why we believe the clause should not stand part of the Bill. Another reason is that we already know it does not work, because a version of this scheme has been in place in the immigration rules since the start of the year. It is incumbent on the Minister to provide the evidence that the provision has achieved anything remotely along the lines of what was intended. From the information that I have seen, it has achieved nothing of the sort.

Those immigration rules were put in place because, with the end of the transition period, the applicability of the EU’s Dublin rules came to an end. That created a significant problem for the Government as they had no replacement agreement in place with the EU under which individuals who would more appropriately have their asylum claim processed elsewhere could have their case transferred there. The clause is not a replacement for Dublin, but a dreadful, one-sided, pale imitation of it, and it is incompatible with the refugee convention.

The Dublin regulations were far from perfect but, first, they included important safeguards that are totally absent from the Government’s scheme, and they contained some restrictions on the grounds for transfer, whereas here the connection can be flimsy indeed, including mere transmit. Secondly, the Dublin rules are two-way. People could be transferred here from the EU or could remain here if they had connections to the UK, such as family, that made it appropriate for asylum claims to be considered in this country. Under the rules that the Government are offering, it is one-way only. The absence of such provision means that, unlike Dublin, this is not about responsibility sharing; it is about responsibility offloading.

The UK is failing to live up to its international obligations and hoping that somebody else will pick up the slack. More often than not, that will be a country that already supports larger numbers of refugees and processes far more asylum claims, including France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and Greece—all highlighted by the Home Secretary at Second Reading.

Thirdly, the Dublin rules represented an agreed framework between member nations. Other countries had actually agreed in principle to take people back. In contract, the scheme set out in the immigration rules and in this Bill, as it stands, is a Home Office pipe dream. There are no agreements with our neighbours to take back those whose claims have been deemed inadmissible. In essence, the Home Office is suspending consideration of asylum claims for six months, even with no realistic prospect of removing more than an handful of people to have their claims considered by other countries. It simply adds another six months of limbo to these people’s lives, at a time when there is already a massive waiting time.

The latest figures I have read showed that something like 4,500 asylum seekers had been subject to the inadmissibility procedures since they came into effect in January. I think seven had ultimately been found inadmissible, and nobody had been removed. Those figures will have changed since then, and I look forward to receiving the updated figures, but what a disaster that represents. Freedom of information requests have confirmed that thousands of cases, including hundreds of Eritreans, Syrians and Afghans, have been served with inadmissibility notices, even though the Home Office knows that, for all intents and purposes, it will not be possible to remove them to so-called connected safe third states.

This is a waste of officials’ time, adds six months to the backlog and adds to, rather than resolves, the problems with the UK asylum system. I would ask the Minister, in responding, if he has calculated how much money the Home Office has spent supporting and accommodating people declared inadmissible only for the Home Office then to start assessing their claims six months down the line. As it stands, clause 14 should not form part of the Bill.

The amendments in this group prompt the Government to think about safeguards that could enable the clause to be consistent with the refugee convention, including restrictions and reciprocity. Amendment 26 tries to do that in a comprehensive but succinct way, while the other amendments probe more deeply into certain aspects of the clause as drafted.

Amendment 26 would basically add a new clause into the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, alongside the Home Office clauses, to fix the failures highlighted. Subsections (1) to (3) would require that an arrangement is in place with the third country, so there is no mass service of inadmissibility notices on people who there is no prospect of removing. Subsection (1) would also address the absence of reciprocity by ensuring that the agreement is a reciprocal one, so the Home Secretary can operate an inadmissibility regime only in relation to countries that are able to send people here or transfer claims here as well. Thus, for example, people with a family connection to the UK are able to have their claims considered in this country, and other examples are given in the amendment. As it stands, people’s connections, such as with family—even their closest family members—as well as language, previous residence in the UK or working for UK entities, including the British Army, are all totally overlooked by the Government’s scheme.

The remaining amendments in this group probe in more detail how the Government will ensure various other vital protections are in place. They take into account the published legal opinion of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on the concept of inadmissibility and some of the criticisms raised there. Amendment 56 seeks to ensure that the rights of asylum seekers will be fully protected in the country to which the Government are seeking to transfer the claim.

As it stands, the definition of a safe third state is really pretty pathetic. So long as your life and liberty are not at risk for a refugee convention reason and that some sort of asylum process is in existence, off you go. There could be an almost certain risk of human rights breaches, albeit falling short of a threat to life or liberty, and that would not matter. There could be a threat to life, but for a non-convention reason, and again it seems that it does not matter, and the country is still deemed safe.

The wording of the safe third state definition is troubling from all sorts of angles. For example, the clause states that a country is safe if “a person” can apply for refugee status and “a person” will not be removed in contravention of the convention, without specifically asking the question, “Will this individual that we want to declare inadmissible be at such a risk?” It is not robust enough either in what it requires for access to asylum and refugee procedures. It simply says that a person may apply and receive protection in accordance with unspecified principles of the convention.

As I read clause 14 just now, if I was at risk in a proposed country I had a connection to because of new autocratic rules or a ruler who decided they wanted capital punishment for people with red hair, it would still very likely meet the definition of a safe country, because my life would not be threatened for a convention reason—arguably, it could be a particular social group, but it is not clear—and if I had previously made a claim there and it had been refused, apparently I am connected enough to be required to go back there. If I am wrong about that, I look forward to the explanation of how that would apply in these particular circumstances.

Amendment 56 therefore surely sets out totally unobjectionable safeguards about which we can all agree, so that—not just on paper, but in practice—fundamental rights are going to be respected, there are appropriate reception arrangements for asylum seekers, there is access to fair and appropriate asylum procedures, and the full convention of refugees must be available if accepted as a refugee.

Amendment 19 again seeks information from Ministers about their intentions in relation to a new provision that allows them to deny an asylum claim on the basis of a connection to country A, but instead remove that person to country B, even when, it seems, there is no connection. I guess that is a foretaste of the debate we will have on clause 26, but this is an extraordinarily wide provision and it is not constrained by any assessment of the appropriateness or otherwise of the transfer in the circumstances of the individual person.

[Mr Robert Goodwill (Scarborough and Whitby) (Con)]

Does the hon. Gentleman accept that any country that meets the Copenhagen criteria, by virtue of being either a member of the European Union or an accession country, would be, by definition, a safe country?

[Stuart C. McDonald]

It almost certainly would, and it would meet the criteria in the Bill. However, that is not really the issue, because, as drafted, the definition of “safe country” goes way beyond who would meet those criteria in the EU. That is what I am driving at. Again, we struggle to see how clause 14 can be justified and how it can possibly be said to be appropriate or consistent with the convention. As the UNHCR put it:

“This would be a significant break from…international practice”.

Amendment 20 would simply mean that if there is no reasonable likelihood of removal to a third country in a reasonable period or there are exceptional circumstances that mean that the Home Secretary should consider the claim, then she “must” do so. As it stands, she “may” do so, but she also may not. Surely it is odd to want to give the Secretary of State the power not to consider a claim when she has decided that

“the claim should be considered”.

The amendment should probably also have taken out the reference to “exceptional circumstances”. After all, if the unexceptional circumstances suggest that the claim should be decided here, where is the logic in not doing that?

Amendment 21 sets out circumstances in which claims should, on any reasonable view, be processed here rather than attempts made to move them elsewhere. In short, if there is not an agreement with a third country that will allow for the transfer of cases, the Home Office should just get on with considering it. If the third country refuses the transfer or does not reply in three months, the Home Office should, again, just get on with considering the case. And if in the circumstances, including the best interests of any children affected, it is better for the claim to be decided here, the Home Office should get on and do it.

Amendments 18 and 22 to 24 take us to the current definition of “connection” to be introduced into law by clause 14. Amendments 23 and 24 remove from the Bill two circumstances in which it is currently said that a connection is sufficient for the purpose of the inadmissibility regime. Amendment 24 would remove what is termed “condition 5”, which is so vague as to be almost incomprehensible and allows the Secretary of State to decide that a connection has been established in an almost unlimited number of scenarios. There is reference to “the claimant’s particular circumstances” but no explanation of what is meant by that.

Amendment 23 takes out “condition 2”, so that a connection can be provided only by proper and full-blown refugee status in accordance with the convention, and not a substandard or pale imitation of it. Amendment 22 puts the full-blown refugee status as a possible connection in the clause.

Amendment 25 is similarly motivated. In short, if the making of an asylum claim in another country is to establish the connection necessary for an inadmissibility declaration, it must be the case that the protection status offered in that other country to a refugee is fully compatible with the 1951 UN refugee convention. Again, it is absolutely not enough for a substandard asylum regime to be in place, and it would be outrageous for the UK Government to say otherwise and to be seen to be tolerating the watering down of refugee rights across the globe.

All these amendments provide ways to fix the flaws in the scheme. We could also have tabled other amendments to fix the inability of anyone to challenge inadmissibility decisions on any grounds. The Government say that this is all about deterring onward movements from France and other neighbours, but the clause is drafted in a way to allow removal to any old regime, regardless of how they treat asylum seekers and refugees. That is not remotely good enough, so the Minister must accept the flaws in the drafting and engage with the UNHCR on changing them.

[Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)]

I speak in support of the Scottish National party amendments and against clause 14 standing part. Once again, we are faced with a draconian, punitive clause that we the Opposition believe risks putting vulnerable people in danger and depriving them of the protection that they deserve under international law. I will begin by setting out what clause 14 does. Again, I thank the many sector organisations that have helped us to analyse the likely impacts of the clause.

Clause 14 puts in the Bill an existing immigration law on inadmissibility that makes any asylum claim inadmissible in a number of circumstances, including if the claimant has passed through a safe country or if they have a connection to a safe third country. The result of a finding of inadmissibility is that, unless the Secretary of State decides that there are exceptional circumstances, the claimant will be denied access to the United Kingdom’s asylum system for a “reasonable period”—currently defined as six months by Home Office policy—while the UK seeks to transfer them to “any other safe country”.

Before getting to the extremely problematic moral and legal aspects of clause 14, I want to draw hon. Members’ attention to the unworkable practical aspects of it. Members know that the current regime is unworkable even as it stands because the UK Government do not have returns agreements with European Union member states, namely the “safe third countries” that refugees are most likely to have passed through. With the huge backlog and delays currently in the system, it is truly impossible to understand how adding another six months to the asylum process will help an already dysfunctional system.

Any Member who is familiar with dealing with asylum cases will be only too familiar with cases that have dragged on for years and seemingly been lost in the system, and the many refusal cases that are overturned on appeal. The current system is not working and by adding extra time to it before a case can even begin suggests a huge increase in the processing backlog. As an ex-lawyer, I know that justice delayed is justice denied, and therefore I have grave reservations about the time stipulations in the clause.

To put the Government’s actions so far into greater context, it is worth noting that in the first six months after implementation of the inadmissibility provisions of the immigration rules—they are echoed in the statutory provisions we are currently considering—the asylum claims of more than 4,500 people were put on hold by the issuance of notices of potential inadmissibility. Incredibly, the UK sought to transfer only seven of those cases—seven out of 4,500. Surely that demonstrates that the concept of inadmissibility is deeply flawed, and that attempts to enforce it by statute, as currently envisaged in clause 14, are equally flawed.

To make matters even worse, the inadmissibility rules set out in clause 14 have a far broader reach than anything that has gone before. First, let us consider the clause’s reference to a “safe third country”. The clause creates a disturbingly low standard for when a state would be considered safe for a particular claimant. The criteria are that their

“life and liberty are not threatened there by reason of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”

That state must be one from which “a person” will not be removed in breach of a non-refoulement obligation under the refugee convention or the European convention on human rights, and that “a person” may apply for refugee status there and, if recognised, receive protection in accordance with the refugee convention. According to clause 14, therefore, a country could still be considered safe even if the applicant had been, or perhaps continues to be, at real risk of being subjected to human rights violations in that country which either fall short of threats to life or liberty, or to which they were not exposed for reasons of a refugee convention ground.

Equally worrying is that, according to clause 14, although that safe state must be one in which in general a person “may” apply for refugee status and receive protection

“in accordance with the Refugee Convention” ,

it is not clear from the terms of the Bill that that possibility needs to be available to the particular applicant. Given the reference in the Bill to “a person”, it appears that it may be sufficient that, in general, there is the “possibility” of applying for refugee status in that state. That is hardly reassuring. In fact, it means that the supposed “safe” third country might not be at all safe for any particular individual. That surely makes a mockery of the term “safe” as commonly understood.

In addition, in order to be found to have a connection to a safe third state, the particular applicant need not have had a reasonable opportunity to access refugee status there. It is worth examining that in more detail. The terms of the clause imply that although the state would have to be one in which, in general, the possibility existed for a person to apply for refugee status, an individual claimant could be found to be inadmissible because they had received nothing more than protection against removal, in violation of the refugee convention or article 3 of the ECHR, or had made or had a reasonable opportunity to make a “relevant claim” for such protection in that state.

Furthermore, we need to look at the use of the term “connection” in clause 14. The clause makes it clear that the mere presence in a safe state where it would have been reasonable to expect the applicant to make a “relevant claim” would be sufficient to establish a “connection”. That in turn would be enough to trigger inadmissibility. Overall, the use of the term “connection” is nothing short of Orwellian. The framing of that term suggests that it could be an otherwise unelaborated connection—in other words, in the claimant’s particular circumstances, it would have been hypothetically reasonable for them to have gone to a given state to make such a claim, even if they had never been there.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

It is fair to say that the Committee had an extensive debate about this issue last week in relation to earlier clauses. I would refer the hon. Member to the comments read out in the Committee from a previous Bill Committee under the last Labour Government, where the principles we are talking about here were very firmly established and endorsed. They have underpinned the approach that has been taken on these matters under successive Governments in this country, and we continue to believe that they are applicable.

I wholeheartedly agree with the importance of the UK continuing to meet its obligations under the refugee convention, including through the rights that we provide to refugees in the UK. I understand the spirit of amendment 56 in defining a safe third state in a way that ensures that an individual removed to that country is provided with adequate protection and their individual rights as a recognised refugee under the refugee convention. However, the definition of a safe third state as set out in clause 14 already ensures that the principles of the refugee convention should be met if we are to remove an individual to that country.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The term “the principles of the refugee convention” is vague. What do the Government mean by that?

[Tom Pursglove]

As we have repeatedly made very clear during the passage of the clauses we have already debated, our obligations are being properly upheld through the provisions of this Bill. We believe that the Bill is fully compliant, and I maintain that that remains the case. The approach is not new; it has been part of our previous legislation on safe countries. We will only ever return inadmissible claimants to countries that are safe, so I do not agree that the amendment is necessary.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

The hon. Gentleman says from a sedentary position that it is not a convincing argument. The bottom line is that we are not removing people to Afghanistan based on the current circumstances. I think that is the right approach.

The ability to return an individual declared inadmissible to any safe country, and not just the safe third country they have a connection to, has formed a part of our inadmissibility process since the changes to our immigration rules in December 2020. In seeking to remove that ability, amendment 19 would remove a provision that Parliament has already been provided an opportunity to scrutinise.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

We all know that there is no scrutiny with these things in any real sense, but that is not a justification for the change. On what possible grounds can a connection with a country A justify removal to country B? What is the point?

[Tom Pursglove]

Again, we have had extensive debates in Committee about the approach that the Government are seeking to take on these matters. We have to stop these dangerous, unacceptable crossings of the channel. We believe that the deterrent effect is very important.

Amendments 18 and 22 to 25, taken together, seek to narrow the meaning of whether we consider an individual to have a connection to a safe third country, and therefore whether it is appropriate to consider them inadmissible. If individuals have travelled via or have connections to safe countries where it is reasonable to expect them to have claimed asylum, they should do so, rather than making dangerous and unnecessary onward journeys to the UK.

We already have in place a well-established process, should it become clear that an individual cannot be returned to a safe country or if after a reasonable period no return agreement has been possible. Where that is the case, the individual’s asylum claim will be considered in the UK. The Bill provisions will not change that. Therefore, I do not agree that amendments 20 and 21 are required.

Agreements by a safe third country to accept an asylum seeker may not always be via a reciprocal arrangement. I believe it is right to also seek returns on a case-by-case basis where appropriate.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

The simple reality is that we will not return people to countries where to do so would put them in danger, or where their rights would not be respected and upheld. That is a perfectly correct approach to take, and entirely in line with what people would expect.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

rose—

[Tom Pursglove]

I will give way, but I am very conscious that I want to make some progress.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I absolutely accept that that is the Minister’s intention. He is not going to remove people; he is going to do all he can not to remove people to unsafe countries. The problem is: what about the next Minister responsible for immigration? As drafted, this definition of safe third state allows his successor to remove somebody to a place where they are at risk of serious human rights abuses, albeit falling short of a threat to life and liberty—it could be torture or whatever else, just as long as it is not a convention ground. I accept that the Minister is going to do the right thing, but we need a Bill that has proper constraints on the next Minister to come along, and that is not clear.

[Tom Pursglove]

The provisions, as drafted, define safe countries as states where people would not be at risk of persecution or a breach of their article 3 ECHR rights. The provisions are considered and consistent with our obligations under the refugee convention. An individual will have an opportunity to raise specific ECHR claims against removal under schedule 3 provisions.

I am confident that the measures in place are appropriate and sufficiently robust. We know it may not always be appropriate to apply inadmissibility to all claimants. Any oral or written representations from a claimant about why inadmissibility processes should not be applied in their case, including any connections they may have to the UK, will be considered ahead of any removal to a safe third country. However, if an individual has family in the UK, there are family reunion routes available. These amendments should not be used to circumnavigate those provisions. For those reasons, I do not support the suggested addition of proposed new section 80D in the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, under amendment 26, and I invite hon. Members not to press it to a Division.

Turning to the clause overall, an increasing number of people are risking their lives to get to the UK, using unseaworthy vessels, putting at risk not only their lives but those of the UK Border Force and rescue services. Those routes are often facilitated by criminal gangs, seeking to arrange those dangerous journeys for profit. We are determined to make the use of small boats to cross the channel an unviable option for reaching the UK. We are determined to send a clear signal that it is unacceptable for individuals to travel through multiple safe countries to then claim asylum in the UK.

To stop people risking their lives on those dangerous crossings, reduce the unsustainable pressure on the asylum system and protect those most in need, we must be clear that many of those coming to the UK by irregular means will not be admitted into our asylum system. Inadmissibility is a long-standing process, designed to prevent secondary movements across Europe, and these measures are being introduced to support that. People should claim asylum in the first safe country they reach, rather than make dangerous journeys to the UK to claim asylum here.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

Again, I refer back to the point that has been raised, which is that we will not return individuals to countries where they would be unsafe as a consequence. Of course we would look at cases on an individual basis and at the concerns that have been raised. If there are concerns, it is important that they are properly taken into account. I am confident that the approach we are taking addresses that issue.

We know, however, that it may not always be appropriate to apply inadmissibility to all claimants. For example, we will not apply those procedures to unaccompanied asylum-seeking children. The introduction of the clauses on inadmissibility aims to strengthen our position on inadmissibility, further disincentivise people from making those dangerous journeys, and encourage them to claim asylum in the first safe country they reach. Those who fear persecution should claim asylum in the first safe country they reach. Parliament has already had an opportunity to scrutinise the measures when they were placed in the immigration rules in December 2020.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I just do not think that the significant legal questions that have been asked have been answered appropriately, and there are all sorts of questions about the safeguards around the description of a safe third state, so I want to press amendment 56 to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

In his opening remarks the hon. Gentleman referred in some depth to clause 16 in addition to speaking to the amendment. I have no problem with that whatever, but I remind the Committee that you cannot have two bites of the cherry. In the light of the line that has been taken, I suggest that we treat this as a stand part debate as well. If anyone has anything to say, now is the chance.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

May I confirm, Sir Roger, that there are two groups of amendments to this clause?

[The Chair]

Absolutely.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Thank you, Sir Roger. In relation to the first group, we fully support the shadow Minister and amendments 36 and 37, which would limit the range of applicants who might face those notices, including children survivors of trafficking and those who need protection because of gender-based violence or sexual orientation. Amendment 153 simply excludes a number of additional groups of people, including those suffering from mental ill health. The shadow Minister explained exactly why it can be very difficult to demand disclosure by certain deadlines from certain applicants. The same arguments apply in relation to our amendments. If we go down this route, there must be a recognition that disclosure of evidence for some can be an incredibly difficult process. How will that be taken into account?

[Paul Blomfield]

Taking account of your suggestion, Sir Roger, I wanted to make a few comments, although my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate made a substantial contribution. We need to pay close attention to this clause and those that follow it, because they cut across a basic principle of English and Scottish law: the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. Underlying the clauses is an assumption of disbelief—everybody is playing the system. Of course, there are people who do, but we do not design our justice system on that assumption, nor should we design the asylum system on that basis.

Instead, we should look at the practical application, because as I said when I spoke to clause 10, we need to understand the journeys taken by those seeking refuge in our country as they flee persecution and conflict, and understand the trauma that led them to uproot themselves from their homes and the trauma that they experience on their journeys. That should give the Government serious pause for thought.

Clauses 16, 17 and 23 prejudice the system against survivors of violence, including sexual and gender-based violence, and reduce access to refugee protection. Clause 16 permits the Home Secretary to serve an evidence notice on a person who has made a protection of human rights claim, forcing them to provide evidence before a specified date. That needs to be looked at in terms of the consequences set out in clause 23 diminishing the weight of their evidence. We are returning to a theme here, because this is in conflict with the Home Office’s own asylum policy, which recognises that there are many good reasons why women who have survived sexual and other gender-based violence would be late in applying for asylum or in submitting evidence.

Let me quote the Home Office’s policy:

“There may be a number of reasons why a claimant, or dependant, may be reluctant to disclose information, for example feelings of guilt, shame, and concerns about family ‘honour’, or fear of family members or traffickers, or having been conditioned or threatened by them…Those who have been sexually assaulted and or who have been victims of trafficking may suffer trauma that can impact on memory and the ability to recall information. The symptoms of this include persistent fear, a loss of self-confidence and self-esteem, difficulty in concentration, an attitude of self-blame, shame, a pervasive loss of control and memory loss or distortion.”

That policy—the policy of the Home Office—states that

“disclosure of gender-based violence at a later stage in the asylum process should not automatically count against their credibility.”

Yet that is precisely what the Government are trying to do in these clauses, in conflict with their own policy.

The Women for Refugee Women charity, which does extraordinary work supporting those fleeing gender-based violence, says:

“because there are so many legitimate reasons for why a woman who has survived gender-based violence may submit evidence late, we do not think there is a way in which these evidence notices can be implemented fairly in respect to these highly vulnerable individuals.”

Let me return to the Home Office’s own assessment of the proposals, which found that the Bill’s

“policies could indirectly disadvantage protected groups”,

such as

“children, disabled people and people who are vulnerable for reasons linked to other protected characteristics—including but not limited to gender reassignment, pregnancy and maternity, sexual orientation and sex.”

That disadvantage, which the Home Office has identified, to vulnerable people and victims of huge trauma and violence will be hardwired into our law by these clauses, so I urge the Government to withdraw them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

I will develop my remarks a little further. I will come back to some of the points raised in the debate, but to start with I want to get through the rationale behind our thinking on the various amendments before the Committee.

Amendment 37 also fails to fully understand the remit of clause 16. The evidence notice applies solely to evidence in support of protection and human rights claims. The new slavery and trafficking information notice, covered in clause 46, will require a person to provide any information relevant to their status as a victim of modern slavery or trafficking.

On amendment 153, the Government take their responsibility towards those seeking international protection seriously. We recognise that particularly vulnerable claimants and survivors of modern slavery need to be treated with care, dignity and sensitivity. Individuals may be particularly vulnerable as a result of their age, their health, the experiences they have lived through or a range of other factors. It is because these factors can be so wide ranging that I am resisting this amendment.

Clause 16 and the new evidence notice will require those who make a protection or human rights claim to provide evidence in support of their claim before the date specified in the evidence notice. This clause works in parallel with clauses 17 and 23. Where evidence is provided late, claimants will be required to provide reasons for that. Where there are no good reasons for the late provision of evidence, this should result in damage to the claimant’s credibility, and decision makers must have regard to the principle that little weight should be given to that evidence.

By introducing a statutory requirement to provide evidence before a specified date, clause 16 will contribute to the swift resolution of protection and human rights claims, enabling decision makers to consider all the evidence up front and, where appropriate, grant leave. However, we recognise that it may be harder for some people to engage in the process. That may be as a result of trauma they have experienced, a lack of trust in the authorities, or because of the sensitive and personal nature of their claim. That is why clause 16, together with clauses 17 and 23, allows for good reasons why evidence might be provided late. As I say, what constitutes good reasons has not been defined in the Bill. It would be impractical to legislate for every case type where someone may have good reasons for not previously disclosing evidence in relation to their protection claim.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Nobody is arguing for an exhaustive list, but if we are all agreed that these are examples of good reasons, why not include them as a non-exhaustive list, just to make sure that these people are protected?

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

I have had no notification that amendment 153 is going to be pressed to a vote, but, in the spirit of the Committee’s operation, if the hon. Gentleman wishes to move it perhaps he would like to say so now.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I thank you for your indulgence, Sir Roger.

Amendment proposed: 153, in clause 16, page 20, line 8, at end insert—

“(1A) The Secretary of State must not serve an evidence notice on a person—

(a) who has made a protection claim or a human rights claim on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics;

(b) who was under 18 years of age at the time of their arrival in the United Kingdom;

(c) who has made a protection or human rights claim on the basis of gender-based violence;

(d) who has experienced sexual violence;

(e) who is a victim of modern slavery or trafficking;

(f) who is suffering from a mental health condition or impairment;

(g) who has been a victim of torture;

(h) who is suffering from a serious physical disability;

(i) who is suffering from other serious physical health conditions or illnesses.”—(Stuart C. McDonald.)

This amendment would prevent the Secretary of State from serving an evidence notice on certain categories of people.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Division 15

Ayes: 7

---

Labour: 5
Scottish National Party: 2

Noes: 9

---

Conservative: 9

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I rise to speak to amendment 27, in clause 16, page 20, line 9, leave out “requiring” and insert “requesting”.

Under this amendment, evidence notices would “request” (rather than “requiring”) the provision of supporting information for a protection or human rights claim.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 28, in clause 16, page 20, line 14, leave out “must” and insert “may”.

This amendment would remove the obligation for applicants to provide supporting information for a protection or human rights claim.

Amendment 40, in clause 18, page 22, line 4, leave out “requiring” and insert “requesting”.

Under this amendment, priority removal notices would “request” rather than “require” the recipient to provide information.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

We have had an extensive debate on these clauses, so I can be brief. Amendment 27 would cast the evidence notices that we have just debated in the form of a request, rather than a requirement. Amendment 28 would mean that an explanation for late evidence could be provided, rather than it being mandatory, so that we were explaining these rights and responsibilities instead of imposing inappropriate penalties. Amendment 40 would provide for similar changes to the priority removal notices instituted by clause 18.

The previous debate was essentially about whether those notices should extend to various groups of people, but in this group of amendments we are attempting to challenge the principles behind them.

Like other hon. Members, we agree that this is just a rehash of the one-stop process, which will achieve little and risk harm to claimants who need refugee protection. It is a distraction from the real issues that the Home Office needs to get a grip of. People who are at risk of persecution are generally desperate to provide evidence if they can, and if they are aware of and understand the processes that they are involved in. There is no advantage to them in providing evidence late, but there are often very good reasons why that happens. On the other hand, if evidence is provided late, it is still ultimately going to have to be looked at; if it proves someone is a refugee, it will have to be recognised, so it is time for the Home Office to get on with fixing the real problem in the asylum system, which is the appalling delays and backlogs in that system. That is why we have tabled these amendments. However, rather than putting them to a vote, I beg your leave to withdraw them, Sir Roger. I will vote against the clause standing part instead.

[The Chair]

That is unusual. The amendment cannot be withdrawn, because it has not been moved.

Question put, That clause 16 stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

Asylum or human rights claim: damage to claimant’s credibility

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move amendment 39, in clause 17, page 20, line 22, at end insert—

‘(1A) For subsection (1) substitute—

In determining whether to believe a statement made by or on behalf of a person who makes an asylum claim or human rights claim, a deciding authority shall take into account any behaviour to which this section applies.”

This amendment would mean that – whilst attempts to conceal information, mislead, or delay the processing of a claim would still be taken into account – it will be for the deciding authority to assess what impact this has on the claimant’s credibility.

Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration 2004 is hugely controversial, both on a point of principle and in its practical effect. It tells decision makers, whether at the Home Office or an independent judge, that if an applicant behaves in a certain way that must be taken as damaging their credibility. Clause 17 adds to the list of behaviours.

Amendment 39 would take us back to the point of principle by saying it is not for Parliament to tell decision makers, judges of fact, what to think about evidence that they have seen and we have not. Are the Government saying that they do not trust them to do their job properly? If we take a step back, the clause would represent the Home Office using legislation to tell decision makers what to think about evidence, in a dispute that it is party to itself. In that light, it is an outrageous principle.

The amendment would mean that those decision makers are asked to take into account the behaviour, rather than being told what to think about it. It is up to them to decide what they should read into late provision of evidence. What if the late provision of evidence is not the claimant’s fault? What if the lawyer made the mistake? What if a medical expert took too long to finalise a report? Ultimately, decision makers have to decide whether the person is at real risk of persecution. If late evidence provides compelling proof of that, they need to be recognised as refugees. Again, get on with fixing decision-making times and quality. From the point of view of principle, we should leave decision makers to weigh up the evidence themselves, without direction from legislators. It is as simple as that.

[The Chair]

I remind the Committee that this will also be considered a clause stand part debate.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

Thank you, Sir Roger. I want to pick up on a couple of other points that were raised in responding to amendment 39. I should clarify that clauses 17 and 23 do not apply to consideration of modern slavery referrals. Claims are considered holistically, and credibility is not by itself determinative of a claim. It is important to emphasise that point. The hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate raised the case of Gloria. Obviously, I am mindful of talking about individual cases because of the difficulties associated with that, as I am sure that he will appreciate, but clauses 17 and 23 do not prevent someone from providing late evidence. Late evidence will still be considered in full. Where there are good reason for lateness, a person’s credibility will not be damaged and clause 23 will not apply. I wanted to provide clarity on that point. With that, I ask that the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East withdraw amendment 39, and that the Committee agree that clause 17 stand part of the Bill.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

As a point of principle, I object to Parliament telling decision makers what to think, but having made my point I am happy to leave it there for now, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question put, That clause 17 stand part of the Bill.

Nationality and Borders Bill (Tenth sitting)

Stuart C McDonald Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 26th October 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Paul Blomfield]

There is an exception to every rule, so I am prepared to accept that not all the problems are down to the Home Office. We discussed that issue earlier. The fact that some people may seek to abuse the system does not mean that the system should be changed to focus on those cases. We should operate on the basis that everybody has a right to access and utilise the judicial processes that are available.

As I was saying, the backlog has risen at a time when the number of asylum applications for the year ending June 2021 fell. We know that is reflected across the system; it is not just a problem with asylum. In the relatively straightforward area of EU settled status, recent data from the Home Office in response to a freedom of information request showed that, in June, more than 26,000 EU citizens had been waiting for more than a year for a decision; more than 216,000 had been waiting for more than six months; and more than 680,000 had been waiting for more than three months.

The problem of delays is endemic in the Home Office, and there were no JRs involved in those numbers. In the asylum process, delay is not only seriously detrimental to the individuals, but—we have returned to this point a number of times, and will again—hugely costly to the taxpayer, so any measure that will exacerbate rather than correct the issue is unconscionable.

The assumption behind the measures in clause 20 and related causes is that those trapped in the system are to blame, as was echoed in the exchange we just had. Blaming others is a common approach of the Government on a wide range of issues such as covid, where GPs are the lightning rod for discontent, and Brexit, where we blame everybody going other than those who negotiated the deal. That ignores the reality that those trapped in the system want decisions to be expedited as soon as they can. They want to move on with their lives. Those who are successful want to take the opportunity to work and contribute to our society.

We need more resources from the Home Office to tackle the backlog. It is welcome that there has been some acknowledgement of that. I saw that the permanent secretary said at the Home Affairs Committee last month that the Home Office is planning to almost double the number of caseworkers, which is extremely positive. It is delayed recognition of where the problem might lie, but they should not be seeking to undermine applicants, which subsection (3) of clause 20 does by specifying that the Secretary of State or the competent authority must consider evidence being brought late as damaging to a claimant’s credibility unless there are good reasons why it was brought late. We come again to this issue, which we debated in relation to an earlier clause, of good reasons.

As there is no explanation before us, either in the legislation or in the explanatory notes, of what might constitute good reasons, amendment 139 seeks to help the Government, in a collegial spirit, by inviting the Secretary of State to publish a framework that allows the consideration of the effect of post-traumatic stress and potential endangerment on the provision of evidence. I do not think that any of us could object to the idea that post-traumatic stress and potential endangerment would be good reasons, so I will be interested to hear the Minister explain, if in fact he does not embrace the amendment, why that is the case, because we go on to suggest that he might also publish the other factors that would be seen to be good reasons.

The clause serves to shift from a presumption of guilty until proven innocent, again echoing an earlier discussion, back to our legal system’s norm of innocent until proven guilty. As it stands, unamended, it is not in the spirit of the law or of British values, and it should not be in the Bill.

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship again, Ms McDonagh. As the hon. Member for Sheffield Central said, clause 20 instructs decision makers to take into account

“as damaging the PRN recipient’s credibility…the late provision”

of information and evidence. I absolutely support the hon. Gentleman’s amendment to explore “good reasons” for evidence, including post-traumatic stress. Our amendment 154 provides other examples, such as mental health issues or where a person has been a victim of torture or other crimes that can impact on their ability to provide information. That is similar to debates we have already had.

Amendment 41 revisits earlier arguments about taking into account all the evidence, including lateness in providing it, when assessing a case. It is not appropriate to tell decision makers what conclusions to draw. We say decision makers will often find people to have credibility if lots of new information is provided with respect to that explanation. That is a matter that should be left to them. It is not for parliamentarians to tell decision makers how to analyse claimants.

[Bambos Charalambous]

Clause 20 introduces the concept of a priority removal notice and, under subsection (3), specifies that the Secretary of State or the competent authority must consider evidence being brought late as damaging to a claimant’s credibility, unless there are good reasons why it was brought late.

As we have made clear during the course of the Bill’s passage, the Government are trying to make it harder for refugees and asylum seekers to gain protection here in the UK. That is undeniable. The priority removal notices regime is part of a package of measures and provisions to achieve that end, both in deterring refugees from seeking protection and in making it more difficult for refugees admitted to the UK to be recognised as such.

One of those measures is directing decision makers, including judges, to doubt an applicant’s credibility if they fail to provide evidence under the strict conditions described in clauses 18 and 19. It is worth noting that the Home Office and the courts have always been able to consider the timing of a claim as a factor in determining credibility, and that might determine an appeal. None the less, clause 20 seeks to reduce the weight that is given to any evidence that is submitted after the cut-off period stipulated by the PRN.

According to the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association:

“Rather than allowing decision-makers to sensibly consider whether the late provision of evidence is a reason to doubt its credibility, weighing all the evidence on the whole, the government proposes to strait-jacket decision-makers with a series of presumptions. The caveat that decision-makers will be allowed to use their own judgment if there is a ‘good reason’ why evidence was provided late does not mitigate these concerns.”

Indeed, there are many so-called bad reasons that evidence might be provided late that do not indicate dishonesty, and many more reasons that it may not be possible for someone to present all relevant information in support of their claim at the earliest opportunity. We have already heard in detail the problems felt by certain groups and individuals with this approach, such as LGBTQ asylum seekers and victims of torture, sexual or gender-based violence, or trafficking.

One long-standing concern for the sector, which we have yet to cover in detail, is failings within the asylum process itself, particularly poor-quality, shortened or inadequate interviews. The consequences of poor interviews conducted with an individual can be devastating in the moment and potentially have grave long-term effects, including the risk of being returned to persecution because the Home Office did not have the information it needed to make a fair and informed decision.

For the Home Office, asylum appeals have been rising steadily over the last decade, which points to the importance of protecting asylum appeals as a vital safeguard for the most vulnerable and to the fact that the Home Office often gets decisions wrong first time. More widely, a system that relies on the appeal process to correct its errors is inefficient, costly and inhumane. For that reason, we can describe the asylum system in the UK as broken, and we can point to the last 11 years of Conservative government as a reason for us having that broken system.

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Priority Removal Notices: Expediated Appeals

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move amendment 155, in clause 21, page 24, line 21, at end insert—

“(2A) The Secretary of State must accept that there are good reasons for P making the claim on or after the cut-off date where—

(a) the PRN recipient’s protection or human rights claim is based on sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics;

(b) the PRN recipient is suffering from a mental health condition or impairment;

(c) the PRN recipient has been a victim of torture;

(d) the PRN recipient has been a victim of sexual or gender based violence;

(e) the PRN recipient has been a victim of human trafficking or modern slavery;

(f) the PRN recipient is suffering from a serious physical disability;

(g) the PRN recipient is suffering from other serious physical health conditions or illnesses.”

This amendment defines ”good reasons” for the purposes of section 82A(2) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (as inserted by this Bill).

If someone makes a protection claim after the PRN cut-off, then unless the Secretary of State is satisfied there are good reasons, she must certify the appeal right and it will be subjected to an expedited appeal straight to the upper tribunal. Tribunal procedure rules, then, must make provision for this. If it is in the interests of justice for an appeal not to be expedited, the tribunal may order that it is no longer subject to that process. This, too, prevents any onward appeal.

In the next debate I will set out our opposition to the clause as a whole, but amendment 155 sets out a situation where the Secretary of State must accept there has been a reasonable excuse, similar to before. It would surely be wrong to subject survivors of human trafficking, or gender-based violence or torture—to use but three examples—to an accelerated appeal, simply on the grounds that they were late making a claim in response to a PRN. We have heard very powerful reasons already today, including in Home Office guidance, why that can be an incredibly difficult process.

I suspect the Minister will again reject this amendment on the same grounds as before, but it is at least useful for him to state on record that these are the types of claimant that he envisages should not be pushed through any accelerated appeal process. I will listen carefully to what he has to say in that regard.

[Tom Pursglove]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for tabling amendment 155, which seeks to define good reasons for the purposes of proposed new section 82A(2) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. I appreciate the concerns this amendment is attempting to address but the Government must oppose it. The amendment would result in all individuals who meet any of the descriptors listed being exempt from the expedited appeal process, even where their reason for lateness may be completely unrelated and make redundant any need to submit a claim by the date specified in the PRN.

I acknowledge that the experiences and circumstances listed in the amendment can inform why a person has made an application late. However, the duty on the Secretary of State will see all and any reasons for lateness being considered. Guidance for decision makers will be published and made available when these measures come into force. For that reason, I invite the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

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[Bambos Charalambous]

There is such welcome generosity from Conservative Members. The measures will do no such thing; all they will do is clog up the upper tribunal system, which I will address later.

The Bill’s system of penalisation includes curtailing appeal rights, as set out in clause 21. The clause creates an expedited appeal route for those who have been served with a priority removal notice and who have provided evidence or a claim after the PRN cut-off date. Most importantly, the right of the appeal will be limited to the upper tribunal.

According to the Law Society, the proposals would essentially result in single-tier appeals with increased pressure on judges and more appeals to the Court of Appeal, as well as undermining access to justice, which is crucial in asylum cases. The Government’s proposals on priority removal notices and expedited appeals risk impinging on people’s rights and access to justice. In many instances, asylum seekers are highly vulnerable and may experience difficulties when it comes to the legal intricacies of the asylum process—studying legal determinations, gathering evidence and preparing submissions for appeals, for instance.

It is also worth clarifying that when unfounded or repeat claims are made, accelerated procedures as part of the asylum process are necessary and important safeguards. The difficulty is that more complex cases—where there are legitimate reasons for evidence being provided at a later date, for example—may be included in those accelerated processes, with devastating consequences. The Committee has heard some of examples of that today.

The Committee heard from Adrian Berry of the Immigration Law Practitioners Association about clause 21 during our evidence session. It is worth revisiting his evidence and the severe concerns that he raised on 23 September. First, he spoke about the expedited appeal, which begins in the upper tribunal. Therefore those who introduce a claim for asylum and provide evidence after the cut-off date in a priority removal notice receive an expedited appeal and lose their right of appeal and a hearing in the first-tier tribunal. Secondly, he raised concerns that the upper tribunal hearing is final. There is no onward appeal to the Court of Appeal. That is wrong for a number of reasons.

Mistakes, unfortunately, do happen in asylum claims, but under the current provision, individuals would be left, in the words of Adrian Berry, “one shot” to appeal and correct the mistakes. The fact that the first instance tribunal decisions cannot be reviewed has serious implications for the rule of law. It also creates a wider time-pressured, accelerated decision-making process operating on the tribunal system, which is likely to have a negative effect on the quality of decisions made. That is well documented and an issue that we have touched on previously, but it is worth repeating for the benefit of the Committee.

Appeals have been rising for many years. Between 2016 and 2018, 57% of first-tier tribunal asylum appeals were dismissed. It was only 52% in 2019-20. The right of appeal is fundamental in protecting individuals’ rights and preventing potential miscarriages of justice.

I should like to cite an example to illustrate that point and wider concerns about the priority removal notices regime introduced in part 2. I will call my example AT, a Gambian national who unsuccessfully sought asylum in the UK. He was married to a Gambian woman who had been granted indefinite leave to remain in July 2016 as she was unable to return to Gambia. His wife was heavily pregnant with their child but their relationship had not been raised or considered by the Home Office as part of his asylum claim. He was given a “notice of liability to removal” and was detained after the notice period had ended. Before his detention, he was unsuccessful in securing an appointment with his solicitors.

During AT’s detention, his wife gave birth to their son—a British citizen. The Home Office refused AT’s human rights claim based on his family life, focusing on the late stage at which he raised it. He was removed from the UK before he could access legal advice and challenge that decision. His subsequent judicial review proceedings were successful and he was allowed to return to the UK to exercise his right of appeal to the first-tier tribunal against that decision. The Home Office subsequently conceded his article 8 family life claim, and granted him leave to stay in the UK with his wife and son. If the priority removal notice provisions of the Bill had been in force in this case, AT’s right of appeal, even after he had succeeded in a judicial review, would have been severely circumscribed. He would only have been able to appeal directly to the upper tribunal. The appeal would have been decided on an expedited basis and the tribunal would have been required to treat AT’s claim to a family life as lacking credibility. If the upper tribunal had found against him, he would have had no right of appeal to the Court of Appeal.

That case highlights some of the severe consequences of clause 21. Are Committee members, on all sides of the debate, happy to put speed over justice? That is what the Bill’s attempts to expedite appeals seeks to do, and without acknowledging the harm that that will cause. It risks people having their human rights violated as a result of a truncated appeals process for asylum claims.

Clause 21 has serious consequences for the rule of law, procedural fairness and the rights of individuals. It will inevitably lead to the wrong being decisions made that will then go unchallenged. Closing off avenues for appeals risks closing off access to justice. An incorrect decision can cost an individual their safety, security and livelihood. Therefore the clause presents an unacceptable risk of breaching the UK’s non-refoulement obligations under the refugee convention and the European convention on human rights. As such, the Opposition will oppose that clause 21 stand part of the Bill.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I agree with everything the shadow Minister said. I want to speak in support of amendment 42, which would preserve onward rights of appeal in certain circumstances.

The overall danger of clause 21 is that it risks expediting appeal processes so that mistakes are made and people are denied justice. Given the dangers that are posed by speeding up such processes, it is all the more important that there is access to the supervisory jurisdiction of the higher courts in case errors are made. We are not talking about minor issues; these are matters of life and death. Assessments have been made about a risk of persecution. Errors will have catastrophic consequences for individuals concerned.

All tribunals make mistakes, so in such circumstances, it seems reckless not to have any right of appeal. I absolutely accept that there can be restrictions and that the grounds for such an appeal can be phrased in a way to try to prevent abuse, but to exclude it altogether goes way beyond what can be justified. Expedited appeals without any possibility of onward appeals creates a double danger of getting those decisions wrong. The fact that claims are made late does not remotely mean that they are necessarily without merit, nor does it mean that they can be decided any quicker than another claim and it should not automatically lead to accelerated appeals processes.

Again, I think that all this is missing the point. The tribunal was actually functioning pretty well. It is the Home Office that has to focus on getting its house in order, and the whole clause is completely misconceived.

Amendment 67 agreed to.

Amendments made: 68, in clause 21, page 24, line 28, after “be” insert “brought and”.

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 67.

Amendment 69, in clause 21, page 24, line 32, leave out from “is” to end of line 33 and insert

“to be continued as an appeal to the First-tier Tribunal and accordingly is to be transferred to that Tribunal”.—(Tom Pursglove.)

This amendment is a drafting amendment to clarify that where the Upper Tribunal is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to do so it has power to order that an expedited appeal is instead to be heard subject to the usual procedure by the First-tier Tribunal.

Amendment proposed: 42, in clause 21, page 24, line 37, leave out subsection (2). —(Stuart C. McDonald.)

This amendment would protect the right to an onward appeal from an expedited appeal decision by the Upper Tribunal in certain cases.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[Tom Pursglove]

The hon. Member is seeking to extend the provision we are proposing in the Bill. We are very clear that the clause makes the legal advice available to those who have been served with priority removal notices. We do not propose to extend the offer beyond that. However, I will make sure that his concerns are flagged with ministerial colleagues in the Ministry of Justice.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 22 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 23

Late provision of evidence in asylum or human rights claim: weight

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move amendment 43, in clause 23, page 26, line 38, leave out subsection (2) and insert—

“(2) Where subsection (1) applies, the deciding authority must have regard to the fact of the evidence being provided late and any reasons why it was provided late in considering it and determining the claim or appeal.”

This amendment would remove the provision which states that “minimal weight” should be given to any evidence provided late.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 38, in clause 23, page 26, line 40, at end insert—

“(2A) Subsection (2) does not apply where—

(a) the claimant’s claim is based on their sexual orientation or gender identity; or

(b) the claimant was under 18 years of age at the time of their arrival in the United Kingdom.”.

This amendment would remove the direction to the deciding authority to give minimal weight to evidence provided late in cases where an asylum claim or human rights claim is based on issues of sexual orientation or gender identity; or where the claimant was under 18 when they arrived in the UK.

Amendment 131, in clause 23, page 26, after line 40, insert—

“(2A) The deciding authority must accept that there are good reasons why the evidence was provided late where—

(a) the claimant’s claim is based on sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics;

(b) the claimant was under 18 years of age at the time of their arrival in the United Kingdom;

(c) the claimant’s claim is based on gender-based violence;

(d) the claimant has experienced sexual violence;

(e) the claimant is a victim of modern slavery or trafficking;

(f) the claimant is suffering from a mental health condition or impairment;

(g) the claimant has been a victim of torture;

(h) the claimant is suffering from a serious physical disability;

(i) the claimant is suffering from other serious physical health conditions or illnesses.”

This amendment sets out the circumstances where the deciding authority must accept that there were good reasons for providing evidence late.

Amendment 44, in clause 23, page 27, line 13, at end insert—

“(6B) This section does not apply where the evidence provided proves that a claimant is at risk of persecution by the Taliban.”

This amendment would disapply Clause 23 (under which minimal weight is given to any evidence provided late) in respect of claimants who are at risk of persecution by the Taliban.

Clause stand part.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The clause is similar in nature to clauses we have debated already, and most of the amendments address similar issues. It is about penalties for providing evidence after a specified cut-off date. Amendment 43 makes the point, again, that we regard it as legitimate to ask a decision maker to take account of the fact that evidence was provided late and the reasons for that, but it should not tell a decision maker what to conclude. We have also added our names in support of amendment 131, which seeks to ensure an acknowledgement of how difficult the process of the provision of evidence can be for certain categories of claimant, and the inappropriateness of fixing hard and fast deadlines.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

I thank hon. Members for raising these important issues. We all recognise that young or particularly vulnerable claimants, sufferers of trauma such as sexual violence or ill-treatment on account of their sexual orientation or gender identity, and survivors of modern slavery or trafficking need to be treated with care, dignity and sensitivity. It is important that they are able to participate fully in the asylum process so that, in the case of a genuine applicant, their claim for protection can be recognised and their status settled at the earliest opportunity. That is in the best interests of the claimant and the overall functioning of the asylum system.

At the same time, we recognise that it may be harder for some people to engage in the process. That may be because of their past experiences, because of a lack of trust in the authorities or because of the sensitive and personal nature of their claim. That is why clause 16, together with clauses 17 and 23, provides for good reasons why evidence might be provided late. What constitutes “good reasons” has not been defined in the Bill, because to do so would limit the discretion and flexibility of decision makers to take factors into account on a case-by-case basis. It would be impractical to legislate for every case type where someone may have good reasons for not previously disclosing evidence in relation to their protection claim.

Good reasons may include objective factors such as practical difficulties in obtaining evidence—that may be where the evidence was not previously available, or where an expert report is not available. Good reasons may also include subjective factors, such as a claimant’s particular vulnerabilities relating to their age, sexual orientation, gender identity or mental health. Decision makers, including the judiciary, will be better placed to identify and assess those factors on an individual and case-by-case basis.

Amendment 43 would effectively remove the minimal weight principle; it would disapply the requirement for a decision maker to have regard to the principle that minimal weight should be given to late evidence for two categories of people. The amendments fail to take into account the fact that decision makers will have discretion in how they apply the principle that minimal weight should be given to late evidence, and that they may choose not to apply the principle in any given case. Clause 23 does not create a provision whereby decision makers are required to give late evidence minimal weight; they are required only to have regard to the principle, which they can choose to disregard.

Amendment 131 would place a statutory obligation on decision makers to accept that there are good reasons for late evidence where an individual’s claim is based on certain factors, or the individual falls into a particular category. That would apply to Home Office decision makers as well as the judiciary. Compelling a judge to accept good reasons for late evidence based solely on the grounds of the person’s claim raises significant issues and interferes with their fact-finding role. It also ignores the possibility that a claim may fall within a particular category or a person may identify as one of the listed categories, but their evidence may be late for unrelated reasons. The amendment would therefore create a blanket acceptance of late evidence in specific prescribed circumstances, and yet a vulnerable individual who did not fall within the specified groups might have late evidence and face a different test for whether or not they have good reasons. We feel that is unfair.

On amendment 44, this country has a proud history of welcoming with open arms those who require its protection. That includes circumstances where, as in Afghanistan, a significant change in circumstances means a sudden shift in a country’s security situation. Where evidence is brought late on account of such a change, that is clearly capable of falling within the “good reasons” consideration, so there is no need to make specific provision in relation to a fear of the Taliban.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

But what would happen in the hypothetical example I gave, where there was not good reason? The guy was a bit stubborn and did not think he should have to go through this process; he thought he should have had some automatic leave. I am still at a loss to understand what it means for the decision maker to have regard to the principle that minimal weight should be given to the evidence. I do not understand the expression. How does that work in the context of the hypothetical example I gave?

[Tom Pursglove]

I will come back to that point and try to give the hon. Gentleman some further clarity, which I hope will be helpful. I will make the point again that, in the current circumstances that we find ourselves in regarding Afghanistan, people are not being removed there.

Of course, all the relevant information is taken into consideration when reaching decisions on individual cases. For example, if there is an assessment that a particular country is safe but for a particular individual there are grounds whereby it is not safe for them in their circumstances, that is reflected in the decisions that are taken.

To finish the point about amendment 44, it would create a system where those with a fear of the Taliban were treated differently from all other asylum seekers, no matter the risks they faced or the vulnerabilities of the individuals involved, simply on the basis of where they were from. That is discriminatory and cannot be right.

On the point about how decision makers can be told that they must apply minimal weight to evidence, clause 23 does not create a requirement for Home Office decision makers or the judiciary to give late evidence, following the receipt of an evidence notice or a priority removal notice, minimal weight. In protection and human rights claims, decision makers must have regard to the principle that minimal weight will be given to any late evidence, but they can consider the principle and determine that it should not be applied in a particular case.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

I am not familiar with the review to which he refers, but the hon. Gentleman will appreciate that I have been in this role only for the past four weeks. However, I will go away and look into that.

I can only repeat the point that we will set out in guidance the relevant factors that will be taken into consideration when cases are determined. I would expect there to be sympathetic consideration of people’s individual circumstances. I have also made that point at the Dispatch Box when we have talked about the operationalisation of the policy. Of course, it is right that that information is established in full. With that, I encourage the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East to withdraw his amendment.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am grateful to the Minister for his answer. At points, he did sound almost reassuring, but the problem is that he sounds reassuring when he says, essentially, “This clause will not have any effect,” suggesting that decision makers will be able just to have regard to all the circumstances on a case-by-case basis. That is what decision makers do anyway without the need for this myriad of statute provisions telling them what to think about a, b, c and the weight to be applied to evidence here, there and everywhere. While I take at face value his intention—I think we probably intend the same thing—that my Afghan example would not end up with conclusive evidence being disregarded because the man was stubborn or behaved in a stupid way because he was at risk, I still find the wording in the clause troubling. I hope the Home Office will think again.

In the meantime, we have pressed similar amendments to a vote, so I do not need to do so again. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: 131, in clause 23, page 26, after line 40, insert—

“(2A) The deciding authority must accept that there are good reasons why the evidence was provided late where—

(a) the claimant’s claim is based on sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics;

(b) the claimant was under 18 years of age at the time of their arrival in the United Kingdom;

(c) the claimant’s claim is based on gender-based violence;

(d) the claimant has experienced sexual violence;

(e) the claimant is a victim of modern slavery or trafficking;

(f) the claimant is suffering from a mental health condition or impairment;

(g) the claimant has been a victim of torture;

(h) the claimant is suffering from a serious physical disability;

save-line2(i) the claimant is suffering from other serious physical health conditions or illnesses.”—(Bambos Charalambous.)

This amendment sets out the circumstances where the deciding authority must accept that there were good reasons for providing evidence late.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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Accelerated detained appeals

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move amendment 45, in clause 24, page 28, leave out lines 9 to 11.

This amendment would remove the requirement for detainees to give their notice of appeal within 5 working days.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 46, in clause 24, page 28, line 22, leave out “may” and insert “must”.

This amendment would require (rather than merely empower) the Tribunal or the Upper Tribunal to cease to treat cases as accelerated detained appeals where it is in the interests of justice to do so.

Clause stand part.

Government new clause 7—Accelerated detained appeals.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Clause 24 establishes a system of fast-track appeals for those in detention. The explanatory notes state that in 2019-20 it took almost 12 weeks on average for detained immigration appeals to progress from receipt in the first tier tribunal through to disposal, and the aim is for faster decisions in certain cases

“to allow appellants to be released or removed more quickly”.

That sounds almost benign, and who does not want appeals to take place as quickly as possible? But the key issue is whether they can be decided fairly within the timeframe set down in the clause. We are talking not about trying to take three or four weeks off the average time, but about reducing it by almost three quarters. Clearly, the Government believe that the tribunal is wasting a lot of time but I do not see any evidence for that, and I do not see any analysis of why that 12-week average exists.

Five days is an incredibly short timeframe in which to launch an appeal, particularly when a person is detained in an immigration detention facility, often in the middle of nowhere, and where the chances of securing proper legal advice and consultation in that time are incredibly slim. Amendment 45 would delete that requirement.

Amendment 46 would also mean that the tribunal would be required to stop treating an appeal as an accelerated appeal if it was in the interests of justice to do so. Again it is not clear to us why the tribunal should be empowered to continue an accelerated appeal when that is not in the interests of justice. More generally, the clause gives rise to the question of why the Secretary of State should have any say in which appeals can be disposed of expeditiously. Why is she not required just to assess the fairness of a case or give consideration to how complex a case is? Why not leave the tribunal to make those determinations? It would be far better placed to make that assessment.

As Members will know, in 2015 the Court of Appeal found similar rules to be unlawful and held that they created a system in which asylum and human rights appeals were disposed of too quickly to be fair. The Court said that the timetable was

“so tight that it is inevitable that a significant number of appellants will be denied a fair opportunity to present their cases”.

It also said that the policy did not appreciate the problems faced by legal representation obtaining instructions in such cases or the complexity or difficulty of many asylum appeals, and the gravity of the issues raised by them. I have absolutely no reason to think that the proposed policy is any better than that one.

The Government now intend to replace the entire clause with new clause 7, principally it seems to expand the categories of appeal that could be subject to the proposed procedure. My party opposes that expansion and opposes the clause.

[Bambos Charalambous]

We oppose the clause. It seeks the return of the detained fast-track system and to recreate it in primary legislation. The clause imposes a duty on the tribunal procedure rules committee to make rules for an accelerated timeframe for certain appeals made from detention that are considered suitable for consideration within that timeframe.

In the explanatory notes, an accelerated detained appeal is defined as being

“an appeal brought by an appellant who…received a refusal of their asylum claim while in detention…remains in detention under a relevant detention provision…is appealing a decision which was certified by the Secretary of State as suitable for an accelerated detained appeal”.

That system previously existed but was found to be illegal by the High Court in a landmark case brought by Detention Action. The system was found to be unfair as asylum and human rights appeals were disposed of too quickly to be fair. The Court of Appeal described the timetable for such appeals as

“so tight that it is inevitable that a significant number of appellants will be denied a fair opportunity to present their cases”.

It also emphasised, perhaps instructively for this Committee, that speed and efficiency must not trump justice and fairness—something of a feature of part 2 of the Bill. Indeed, hundreds if not thousands of cases have had to be reconsidered by the Home Office or the tribunal because they were unfairly rushed through the process that the Government now seek to recreate. Those cases include survivors of trafficking and torture and other individuals who, on the basis of a rushed and unfair procedure, will have been removed to places where they fear persecution or are separated from their families. There was no adequate system for ensuring that such people were removed from the fast track and given a fair opportunity to present their claims.

Despite that background, the Bill aims to create this unjust and ineffective procedure by reintroducing the detained fast-track process through this clause. It will put that same system, which was deemed unlawful in 2015, on a statutory footing, which will insulate it against future legal challenges.

The clause provides for the Secretary of State to certify a decision if she considers that an appeal would be disposed of expeditiously. It requires the tribunal procedure committee to introduce the following time limits: a notice of appeal must be lodged no later than five working days after the decision was received; the tribunal must make a decision no later than 25 days after the appeal date; and an application for permission to appeal to the upper tribunal must be determined by the first-tier tribunal not later than 20 working days after the applicant was given notice of the tribunal’s decision.

The clause would deny access to justice. First, five days is insufficient to prepare an appeal against a negative decision, particularly where the individual is detained and where their access to legal advice is poor and an individual’s wellbeing may be affected by their detention. For those detained in prison, the situation is even worse. For example, in a case in February of this year, the High Court declared the lack of legal aid immigration advice for people held under immigration powers to be unlawful. More widely, Home Office decision making is frequently incorrect or unlawful. As we know, half of all appeals against immigration decisions were successful in the year leading up to June 2019. It is therefore vital that people are able to effectively challenge decisions through the courts.

The detained fast track is unjust. It is also unnecessary. As the Public Law Project and Justice have pointed out, the tribunal has adequate case management powers to deal with appeals expeditiously in appropriate cases and already prioritises detained cases. The Home Secretary should not be trying to force the hand of the independent tribunal procedures committee to stack the cards in her favour in appeals against her decisions. The Bill does not learn the lessons of the past and seeks to resurrect an unworkable system of accelerated detained appeals. The clause proposes that the appeals process be fast-tracked. I am very worried that provisions in part 2 of the Bill will therefore disadvantage the most vulnerable.

By allowing the Home Secretary to accelerate appeals when she thinks they would be disposed of expeditiously, the clause is clearly unjust. Once again, it also seems to violate the refugee convention. As my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western) said on Second Reading:

“It is more than regrettable that the convention appears now to be held in such little regard by this Government.”—[Official Report, 19 July 2021; Vol. 699, c. 769.]

For those reasons, we will oppose that the clause stand part.

[Tom Pursglove]

I understand the motivation behind amendment 45. However, the Government oppose the amendment, as it is contrary to our policy intention and would undermine the effective working of the accelerated detained appeals process.

The period of five working days strikes the right balance, achieving both speed and fairness. The detained fast-track rules put in place in 2003 and 2005 allowed only two days to appeal. The 2014 rules set the same time limit. The current procedure rules allow a non-detained migrant 14 days to lodge their appeal against a refusal decision.

On amendment 46, I can assure hon. Members that it is not necessary, as the Bill already achieves the objective sought. The Government’s aim is to ensure that cases only remain in the ADA where it is in the interests of justice for them to do so. The consideration of what is in the interests of justice is a matter of judicial discretion. Where a judge decides that it is not in the interests of justice to keep a case in the ADA process, we would expect that they would use their discretion to remove the case. The current wording of the Bill—“may” rather than “must”—is consistent with the drafting of the rules that govern all appeals considered in the immigration and asylum chamber.

For these reasons, I invite the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate to withdraw the amendments. On the detained fast track and wider points about the Government’s intentions, although the courts upheld the principle of an accelerated process for appeals made in detention, we have considered the legal challenges to the detained fast track carefully. We are confident that the new accelerated detained appeals route will ensure fairness as well as improving speed. All Home Office decisions to detain are made in accordance with the adults at risk in detention policy and reviewed by the independent detention gatekeeper. Changes made to the screening process, drawing on lessons learned, will enable us to identify appellants who are unsuitable for the accelerated detained appeals route at the earliest opportunity. Suitability will be reviewed on an ongoing basis and the tribunal will have the power to transfer a case out of the accelerated route if it considers that that is in the interests of justice to do so.

The timescales proposed for the accelerated route are longer than under the previous detained fast track. Appellants will have more time to seek legal advice and prepare their case. We are confident that the new route will provide sufficient opportunity to access legal advice. I am also conscious that Members are interested in what happens in the eventuality that a migrant misses the deadline to appeal a refusal decision. Provided that there are no other barriers to return, removal will be arranged. It is open to a migrant and/or their legal representatives to submit an appeal after the deadline and ask a judge to extend the time and admit the appeal late.

On new clause 7, the Government are committed to making the asylum appeals system faster, while maintaining fairness, ensuring access to justice and upholding the rule of law. In particular, it is right that appeals made from detention should be dealt with quickly, so that people are not deprived of their liberty for longer than is necessary. New clause 7 sets out a duty on the tribunal procedure committee to make rules for the provision of an accelerated detained appeals route. That will establish a fixed maximum timeframe for determining specific appeals brought while an individual is detained.

Currently, all immigration and asylum appeals are subject to the same procedure rules. Appeals involving detained appellants are prioritised by Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service but there are no set timeframes. It often takes months for detained appeals to be determined, resulting in people being released from detention before their appeals are concluded.

Changes to procedure rules are subject to the tribunal procedure committee’s statutory consultation requirements and procedures. However, the Government’s intent is to ensure that straightforward appeals from detention are determined more quickly. Under a detained accelerated process all appellants will benefit from a quicker final determination of their immigration status, spending less time in limbo, and getting the certainty they need to move forward with their lives sooner.

Those whose appeals are successful will have their leave to remain confirmed earlier than if the standard procedure rules had been followed. Meanwhile those with no right to remain will be removed more quickly, as they can be detained throughout the process, which reduces the risk of absconding.

The courts have been clear in upholding the principle that an accelerated process for asylum seekers while detained, operated within certain safeguards, is entirely legal. I made that point earlier. We have considered the legal challenges to the previous detained fast track carefully and we are confident that the new accelerated detained appeals route will ensure fairness as well as improving speed. We will ensure, through regulations and guidance, that only suitable cases will be allocated to the accelerated route. Cases will be assessed for whether they are likely to be able to be decided fairly within the shorter timeframe, and individuals will be screened for vulnerability and other factors that may impact their ability to engage fairly with an accelerated process.

As an additional safeguard, the clause makes it clear that the tribunal can decide to remove cases from the accelerated route if it considers it is in the interests of justice to do so. The new accelerated detained appeals route will contribute significantly to the timeliness with which appeals are decided for those in immigration detention. It will allow us to swiftly remove from the country people found not to need protection, while those with valid claims can be released from detention more quickly.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am grateful to the Minister for his response. I still have serious concerns about the provisions in the clause, particularly the short timeframe of five days to launch an appeal, and particularly when it could be the Secretary of State who has decided somebody has to go through that process. If she gets that decision wrong, by the time there is any ability to apply to the tribunal to move away from the fast-track process, it could be too late. In that case, a removal attempt will have been made, and a vulnerable person who was unable to contact a solicitor in time is completely without any chance of rectifying what the Secretary of State has done.

I maintain my opposition to what is proposed. I think that the safeguards fall way short, but I do not see any point in putting my amendment to a vote, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[The Chair]

I will now put the question that clause 24 stand part. I understand that the Government will vote no.

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[Tom Pursglove]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for his intervention. It is fair to say that I am very mindful of the enormous risks that we are finding people taking in trying to cross the channel at the moment. We have debated the matter extensively in this Committee up to this point, and no doubt that debate will continue. I am very concerned to hear about the situation that he has described. I have asked to be updated, and to be kept updated as to the progress of the operation to try to find the individuals who, it would seem, have been lost at sea. Of course, we send our thoughts and best wishes to those who are caught up in that terrible tragedy, and we hope for the best for them. This absolutely and without question underlines the gravity of the risks that people are taking by getting into small boats and trying to cross the English channel to get to the United Kingdom.

The Bill contains a suite of measures designed to protect those in genuine need while breaking the business model of criminal gangs who profit from people trafficking and exploit vulnerable people for their own gain. Our aim is to disincentivise people from seeking to enter the UK by dangerous means, facilitated by those criminal smugglers, with a clear message that those who arrive via an irregular route may be eligible to be transferred to and processed in another safe country not of their choosing.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Is schedule 3 confined to applicants who arrive via irregular and dangerous routes, or could it be applied, in theory, to pretty much anyone who is claiming asylum?

[Tom Pursglove]

If I may, I will set out the detail that underpins schedule 3 in the course of my remarks.

Clause 26 is designed to be part of a whole-system deterrent effect to prevent illegal migration. Access to the UK’s asylum system should be based on need, and not driven by the actions of criminal enterprise. Under current policy, it is too easy for removals of individuals with no right to remain in the UK to be delayed as a result of speculative and, in some cases, unfounded article 3 human rights claims.

Consequently, schedule 3 will also introduce a presumption that specified countries are safe, because of their compliance with obligations under article 3 of the European convention of human rights.

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[Stuart C. McDonald]

The Minister has scuttled over the idea that the Government are keen to abide by their international obligations. The UNHCR is absolutely clear that the clause rides a coach and horses—I paraphrase slightly—through the convention. Can he say a little bit more about how he possibly believes that this is consistent with what the refugee convention provides?

[Tom Pursglove]

I am actually meeting the UNHCR tomorrow, and I am obviously looking forward to that meeting. No doubt we will cover a range of topics during that discussion and engagement, which I most certainly value. I repeat to the hon. Gentleman the point that I have now made several times in relation to the provisions in the Bill: we believe that they are compliant with our international obligations. I have made that point previously and will continue to make it.

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[Stuart C. McDonald]

The Minister keeps referring to safeguards in the Bill and consideration of individual applicants’ safety, but none of that is in schedule 3, which does not require a finding of inadmissibility or a connection with the state. There is no consideration of the reasonableness of the transfer. The country might not even be a signatory to the refugee convention or offer refugee protection or the chance to secure the full rights that refugees are entitled to. Will he talk us through the safeguards?

[Tom Pursglove]

I would argue that I have already set out those safeguards.

The Government are clear that we must consider all options to break the business model of people smugglers and prevent people from putting their lives at risk by making perilous journeys from safe countries. Changes in schedule 3 are a key component of the wholescale system reform that we are committed to undertaking to prevent irregular migration. For those reasons, I ask hon. Members not to press amendment 159.

On schedule 3, the Government have been clear that the fastest route to safety is to claim asylum in the first safe country reached. We must dissuade all those considering making dangerous journeys to the UK to claim asylum. We are working closely with international partners to fix our broken asylum system and are discussing how we could work together in the future.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

No, I am going to make some progress because I am conscious that we have still got some way to go.

Schedule 3 aims to reduce the draw of the UK by working to make it easier to remove someone to a safe country where their claim will be processed. It amends existing legal frameworks to support our future objective to transfer some asylum claims to a safe third country for processing. The Bill contains a suite of measures designed to protect those in genuine need while breaking the business model of criminal gangs who profit from people trafficking and exploit vulnerable people for their own gain. We aim to disincentivise people from seeking to enter the UK by dangerous means facilitated by these criminal smugglers with a clear message that those arriving via an irregular route may be eligible to be transferred to another safe country not of their choosing to be processed.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I just do not understand why the Minister tries to suggest that the provision will apply only to people who are not in genuine need. The Government do not know that because they are not looking at the cases before removing them to a third country. How is he circumscribing those who will be subject to this procedure, which we utterly oppose? How can he keep on saying that it will apply only to those who do not have genuine need?

[Tom Pursglove]

Schedule 3 is designed to be part of a whole system deterrent effect to prevent illegal migration. Access to the UK’s asylum system should be based on need, and not driven by the actions of criminal enterprise. Under current policy, it is too easy for removals of individuals with no right to remain in the UK to be delayed as a result of speculative, and in some cases unfounded, article 3 human rights claims. Consequently, schedule 3 will also introduce a presumption that specified countries are safe, due to them being compliant with their obligations under article 3 of the ECHR. Claimants will be required to present strong evidence to overturn that presumption to prevent removal. This will support the aim to swiftly remove individuals who have no basis to remain in the UK by preventing unnecessary delays where speculative article 3 claims are made prior to removal to safe countries.

Schedule 3 will also provide the Secretary of State with a power to add countries to the safe list—that is in addition to the already held removal power. This will ensure that the list of safe countries remains accurate. The schedule also ensures that rights of appeal are not afforded to asylum seekers on the basis of removal to safe countries nor to clearly unfounded human rights claims, thus preventing unnecessary appeals for unsubstantiated claims.

We are committed to upholding our international obligations, including under the 1951 refugee convention. That will not change. While people are endangering lives making perilous journeys, we must fix the system to prevent abuse of the asylum system and the criminality associated with it. Our aim is that the suite of measures contained within this Bill, including those within schedule 3, will disincentivise people from making dangerous journeys across Europe to the UK and encourage people to claim asylum in the first safe country they reach.

I thank the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East for proposing new clause 18, which introduces new schedule 2. I agree wholeheartedly with the importance of ensuring the safety of those who are removed from the UK to third countries. However, we cannot support the proposals, which seek to limit our ability to remove individuals to a safe country. This Government have made our position clear throughout today’s debate: people should claim asylum in the first safe country that they reach. That is the fastest route to safety. I would like the Committee to consider each of the conditions in new schedule 2 in turn.

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This is an absolutist policy, but there are loopholes. For a policy to work effectively, there must be no exceptions. There is also no end point. Where do the Government plan to end their deterrent policy? As there is no end point, we may get so far down the policy of offshoring that we cannot unwind it, creating a deeply unfair and inefficient system. If there is any chink in its armour, the whole thing will collapse. If it collapses, it will be a political embarrassment for the Government and the legislation will not achieve its aims and objectives. For those reasons, we oppose clause 26.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I will speak briefly in support of amendment 159, new clause 18 and new schedule 2.

I echo everything the shadow Minister said. This is a terrible clause. I echo in particular all that he said about Australia. I take a tiny crumb of comfort from the fact that the Minister, despite the Home Office’s having adduced evidence in relation to the Australian example, did not mention it during his speech. Perhaps the Home Office is learning that it should run a million miles from the Australian offshoring scheme, because it was awful.

I did not recognise the clause from what the Minister said. He kept referring to safeguards and asserting that it was absolutely consistent with our international obligations. My reading of schedule 3 and clause 26 is the polar opposite. Schedule 3 drives a coach and horses through the principle that people cannot be removed while they have a claim outstanding. It allows removal to anywhere if some very basic safeguards are met. The person might have no link to the country to which they are removed—they might have been nowhere near it. It is clearly nothing to do with responsibility sharing between states. Like clause 14, it is just about offloading responsibility.

We are not saying that no one can ever be removed to have a decision made on their claim elsewhere. While not perfect, the Dublin scheme allowed for the transfer of a claim and the removal of a claimant in appropriate circumstances and with appropriate safeguards. We have set out the criteria that would put in place similar safeguards in new clause 18 and new schedule 2. They include a formal, legally binding and public readmission agreement with the state; a requirement that the person has a connection with the country in question; that it is reasonable in the circumstances for the person’s case to be considered there; and that all the requirements and safeguards that we said should have been in place around clause 14 are present, such as the proper implementation of the full refugee convention, protection against harm, access to fair and efficient asylum processes, and so on.

Again, all those protections are informed by the UNHCR’s public commentary on and critique of the Bill. I appreciate that the Minister expressed sympathy for what we are trying to achieve, but I suspect that when he has his discussions with the UNHCR, it will urge him to go further and to adopt some of these safeguards.

There are huge differences between what we propose in new schedule 2 and what appears in schedule 3. The absence of so many crucial safeguards in the latter shows why the clause should not form part of the Bill. Schedule 3 does not even require a finding of inadmissibility or a connection with the state. There is no consideration of the reasonableness of the transfer. The country might not even be a signatory to the refugee convention, offer refugee protection, or offer the chance to secure the full rights to which refugees are entitled under the convention.

To use the UNHCR’s own words:

“Transferring asylum-seekers or recognised refugees to territories with which they have no prior connection and without an individualised consideration of safety, access to fair and efficient asylum procedures and to international protection, or reasonableness is at odds with international practice and risks denying them the right to seek and enjoy asylum, exposing them to human rights abuses and other harm, delaying durable solutions to forced displacement, and encouraging onward movement. To transfer asylum-seekers and refugees to countries that are not parties to the Refugee Convention, and without any expectation, let alone commitment, that they will provide a fair asylum procedure and treatment in line with the Refugee Convention would be an abdication of the United Kingdom’s responsibilities under international law towards refugees and asylum-seekers under its jurisdiction.”

That is the UNHCR’s commentary on schedule 3. That is why we have tabled our new schedule, new clause and amendment, and I hope that the Minister will—not today, obviously—give that further thought.

We know that this is essentially about offshoring. We oppose the clause and the schedule because we are completely and utterly opposed to that concept. It is unlawful, unethical and, as the experience in Australia shows, it does not work. As the shadow Minister highlighted, it did not discourage arrivals by boat. The Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law went into great detail on that in its submission to the Committee, which is absolutely spot on. It highlighted the humongous cost and, more than anything else, the humanitarian disgrace that those camps represent. Doctors Without Borders has talked about

“some of the worst mental health suffering we have ever encountered in our 50 years of existence, including in projects that provide care for torture survivors.”

Finally, on amendment 159, it is good that the Minister has said that children would not be subject to that procedure. However, as the shadow Minister said, there are still various categories of vulnerable people who must be removed from the scope of the clause and schedule. If the Home Office insists on taking that terrible step, surely to goodness it will not subject pregnant women, disabled or sick people, torture victims, victims of trafficking or gender-based violence, LGBT people or the young and old to that procedure. Perhaps the Minister could accept that amendment, just to give us a tiny crumb of comfort.

[Tom Pursglove]

I will briefly pick up on a few points that have been raised during the debate on clause 26. The Government argue that the suite of measures are intended to have a deterrent effect. The measures under the clause are just one part of system-wide reforms that make clear our position that individuals must claim asylum in the first safe country they reach. I recognise that there are fundamental differences of opinion in the Committee about some matters, but we argue that that is the fastest route to safety.

I want to clarify the situation. Although we are, of course, working with our international partners to meet our joint challenges, I assure Committee members that we are not working with Denmark to open an offshore detention centre. It is important to be clear on that point.

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Article 1(A)(2):well-founded fear

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move amendment 152, in clause 29, page 30, leave out subsection (2) and insert—

“(2) The decision-maker must first determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that—

(a) the asylum seeker has a characteristic which could cause them to fear persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion (or has such a characteristic attributed to them by an actor of persecution), and

(b) if the asylum seeker were returned to their country of nationality (or in a case where they do not have a nationality, the country of their former habitual residence)—

(i) they would be persecuted for reason of the characteristic mentioned in subsection (a), and

(ii) they would not be protected as mentioned in section 31.”

This amendment would remove the “balance of probabilities” phrase from the Bill and would maintain the status quo.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 48, in clause 29, page 30, line 45, leave out subsections (2) and (3).

This amendment would remove the requirement for the decision-maker to assess, on the balance of probabilities, whether a claimant’s fear of persecution is well-founded.

Amendment 132, in clause 29, page 30, line 45, leave out

“, on the balance of probabilities”

and insert

“whether there is a reasonable likelihood that”.

Amendment 133, in clause 29, page 31, line 1, leave out “whether”.

Amendment 134, in clause 29, page 31, line 5, leave out paragraph (b) and insert—

“(b) if the asylum seeker were returned to their country of nationality (or in a case where they do not have a nationality, the country of their former habitual residence)—

(i) they would be persecuted for reason of the characteristic mentioned in subsection (a), and

(ii) they would not be protected as mentioned in section 31.”

The amendment would maintain the status quo and bring the bill back in line with UNHCR standards and UK jurisprudence.

Clause stand part.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The clause makes fundamental changes to important aspects of what it means to be a refugee under the convention. It seeks to require that important elements of the claim are to be established on the balance of probabilities before the decision maker goes on to make an overall assessment of real risk. Previously an overall assessment of the reasonable degree of likelihood of persecution was applied.

We regard this as a hugely dangerous and possibly very confusing clause. It fails to take into account the challenge of evidence and facts that arise many thousands of miles away, or facts to which only the claimant’s testimony can speak to. If, for example, a claim is made on the grounds that a person is LGBT, it can be hugely challenging to prove that to the standard of the balance of probabilities. As the UNHCR has explained:

“Some claimants, because of the shame they feel over what has happened to them, or due to trauma, may be reluctant to identify the true extent of the persecution suffered or feared.”

Similar issues will arise with many other groups that we have already spoken about this morning.

What is proposed is really dangerous. If a decision maker is certain, for example, that LGBT people in general are at risk of persecution on return to a particular country, and even if that decision maker thinks that there is a reasonable likelihood that this particular applicant is LGBT, that would no longer be enough to justify an award of refugee status.

[Mr Goodwill]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right that it is very difficult to prove some of these things. It is also difficult to disprove them. Is he aware that asylum seekers from places such as Uganda may well claim to be gay when they are not because they see that as the route to getting a good result quickly?

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am not aware of the evidence of that, so I cannot comment. At the end of the day we are talking about people who are at risk. We are not talking about a road traffic case, a minor bump or the small claims court. We are talking about people whose lives are at risk, or they are at risk of serious harm and persecution. That is why we have to be very, very careful about requiring evidence beyond the standard that is internationally accepted.

Let us say that a decision maker is certain that LGBT people in general are at risk of persecution on return to a particular country. Even though the decision maker thinks there is a reasonable likelihood that a particular applicant is LGBT, that will not be enough to secure refugee status. The decision maker could be 49% certain that the applicant is LGBT and 100% certain that an LGBT person returned to a particular country will be tortured and killed, but that 1%—that tiny little bit of doubt—means that the balance of probabilities threshold will not be met, and that case will be rejected. The implications are huge.

Amendment 152 seeks to maintain the status quo. Let us not mess with a long-established principle, and let us be very, very careful that we are not denying refugee status to people who we know should be awarded it.

[Tom Pursglove]

I thank hon. Members for tabling the amendments. I agree about the importance of the UK carefully assessing whether asylum seekers have a well-founded fear of persecution, as required under article 1A(2) of the refugee convention. However, we do not agree with the amendments, which, when considered together, will leave decision makers with a lack of clarity on how to consider whether a claimant has a well-founded fear of persecution.

Clause 29 is currently drafted to introduce a clear, step-by-step process for decision makers considering whether an asylum seeker has a well-founded fear of persecution. Currently, there is no clearly outlined test as such. While there is case law, policy and guidance, the current approach leads to a number of different elements being considered as part of one overall decision. The reforms that the Government want to introduce create distinct stages that a decision maker must go through, with clearly articulated standards of proof for each. I am confident that hon. Members will agree that that will lead to clearer and more consistent decisions. That is desirable for all involved.

The amendments include what is already in subsection (4) of clause 29, and it is unclear how they are proposed to fit with subsections (3) and (5). That therefore creates a lack of clarity and defeats the clarificatory purpose of the clause. As identified by hon. Members, clause 29 also raises the standard of proof for one element of the test to the balance of probabilities. Whether an asylum seeker has a characteristic that causes them to fear persecution, also referred to as a convention reason, will be tested to the balance of probabilities.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

There is one further issue that I did not raise earlier. The Minister has spoken about whether an appellant has a convention characteristic. How does the clause deal with imputed characteristics—that is, when a person is not LGBT but is perceived to be, or a person who does not have a political opinion but is treated and thought of as having such an opinion? That is quite an important concept and it seems to be absent.

[Tom Pursglove]

Obviously, we are clear that our proposal is entirely consistent with our obligations under the convention. However, I will happily write to the hon. Member with further detail on that point. It is important to give clarity, and I am keen to do so.

At the clause’s core, we are asking claimants to establish that they are who they say they are and fear what they say they fear, to a balance of probabilities standard. That is the ordinary civil standard of proof for establishing facts—namely, more likely than not. Surelyit is reasonable that claimants who are asking the UK for protection are able to answer those questions.

We have looked carefully at the difficult situations from which many claimants come and the impact on the kinds of tangible evidence they may be able to provide as a result of that. We consider that our holistic approach to making decisions, which includes a detailed and sensitive approach to interviewing as well as referring to expert country guidance, allows all genuine claimants an opportunity to explain their story and satisfy the test. The raising of the standard of proof for this distinct element of the test is appropriate to ensure that only those who qualify for protection under the refugee convention are afforded protection in the United Kingdom.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

On the hypothetical example that I gave, if a decision maker is 49% certain that somebody is LGBT or that their membership of a political party meant that they would definitely be persecuted on return, is the Minister not uncomfortable that that small shortfall from 50% would mean that their whole claim would be rejected, given the consequences?

[Tom Pursglove]

On the concerns around LGBTQ+ individuals, we have acknowledged that it may be more difficult to prove such claims compared with individuals making applications based on other convention reasons. We already have specific asylum policy instruction on considering such claims, which sets out in detail how caseworkers should fully investigate the key issues through a focused, professional and sensitive approach to questioning. As part of the operationalisation of the programme, we will seek to update the training and guidance provided to decision makers. That will concentrate on interviews, to ensure that they are sufficiently detailed to enable claimants to meet the standard. I hope that gives the hon. Member some reassurance. I will of course write to him on his earlier point.

The second element of the test—whether the claimant would be persecuted if returned to their country of origin or their country of former habitual residence—remains at the reasonable degree of likelihood standard of proof. The subjective element—the future fear—is naturally harder for the claimant to demonstrate. Consequently, a lower standard of proof is appropriate.

Responses to the public consultation as well as recent reports from non-governmental organisations have warned of the effects that the clause will have on those with certain protected characteristics, including those with LGBT+ claims. The Committee should be assured that we have considered that carefully, and there are several ways in which we will ensure that such individuals are not disadvantaged by the change. It is worth reflecting on the points I made and the explanation I set out in response to the hon. Member’s intervention. In the light of those points, I hope he will agree to withdraw the amendment.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am grateful for the offer of a letter, but I am not remotely reassured about the new higher standard, which will lead to marginal cases being sent away to persecution, torture and all sorts of terrible consequences. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

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article 1(a)(2): reasons for persecution

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move amendment 49, in clause 30, page 31, line 47, leave out “both” and insert “either”.

This amendment would mean that – in order to be defined as a particular social group for the purposes of the Refugee Convention – a group would only have to meet one (not both) of the conditions set out in subsections 3 and 4.

I have a short but important point to make. The clause concerns the definition of a particular social group, which is an important concept in refugee law and has been crucial to its ongoing relevance across many decades. The clause is controversial because it makes an important change to how a particular social group is defined. In the House of Lords case of the Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Fornah, a long-standing argument about whether the tests in subsection (3) of the clause should be cumulative or alternative was addressed and it was decided that there was no need to meet both of those conditions; one or the other would suffice. However, in the Bill, the Government have decided to change that approach. It now demands that both conditions are met, and that seems to contradict established case law in this country. I simply ask the Government to explain why they have taken a more restrictive approach.

[Tom Pursglove]

Clause 30 aims to clarify an area where there has been a degree of contradiction and confusion. There is a clear mismatch between how the concept of “particular social group” is set out in current legislation, Government policy and in some tribunal judgments, against the interpretation taken in some case law. That is unhelpful for all those working in and engaging with the asylum system, and who most of all want clarity and consistency. Defining how key elements of the convention should be interpreted and applied is vital in creating a robust system that can generate consistency and certainty, which ultimately will drive efficiency. I trust that members of the Committee will agree with that principle. The historical confusion demonstrates perfectly why what we are doing in this clause is so important and is a desirable law reform.

I cannot agree to the change proposed by the hon. Gentleman. First, it is important to state that the conditions set out in the clause reflect current Government policy; it is not a change. The amendment would mean that a group need only meet one of the conditions to be considered as a particular social group. That significantly broadens the scope of who may be covered by the convention. It would erode the concept that people deserve and need protection based on fundamental characteristics that go to the core of who they are, such as their faith or sexuality. It proposes instead to broaden the definition to cover potentially transient factors that can perhaps be changed, but that fundamentally misunderstands the very basis of what it means to be a refugee, as envisaged by the refugee convention, and why we have a system to offer protection. I hope my explanation has reassured colleagues across the Committee, and I urge the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

The hon. Gentleman has mentioned established case law on the correct definition of “particular social group”, so I will say something briefly about that. As with many of the key concepts of the refugee convention, case law has developed over the years on how to apply the term “particular social group” for the purpose of considering whether a claimant has a convention reason. Despite significant judicial interest in the interpretation of “particular social group” in case law, there is no established case law on the point. There is, however, conflicting tribunal-level case law and obiter comments by the House of Lords in the case of Fornah. Consequently, the clause seeks to provide clarity on the UK’s interpretation of a particular social group, to ensure that it is applied consistently among decision makers.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I agree with the Minister that we need clarity, but there are two different ways of providing clarity: we can either combine the requirements or use them as alternatives. I say that we should provide clarity by using them as alternatives. That is how the House of Lords interpreted the convention in the case of Fornah, and that is what the tribunal did recently as well, so I wish to press the amendment to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move amendment 157, in clause 34, page 33, line 20, at end insert—

“(1A) Subsection (1) shall not apply to any refugee—

(a) whose claim for asylum is on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics;

(b) whose claim for asylum is on the basis of gender-based violence;

(c) who has experienced sexual violence;

(d) who is a victim of modern slavery or trafficking;

(e) who is suffering from a mental health condition or impairment;

(f) who has been a victim of torture;

(g) who is suffering from a serious physical disability;

(h) who is suffering from other serious physical health conditions or illnesses.”

This amendment would exempt certain groups from subsection (1).

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider amendment 158, in page 33, line 34, at end insert—

“(2A) Subsection (2) shall not apply to any refugee—

(a) whose claim for asylum is on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression or sex characteristics;

(b) whose claim for asylum is on the basis of gender-based violence;

(c) who has experienced sexual violence;

(d) who is a victim of modern slavery or trafficking;

(e) who is suffering from a mental health condition or impairment;

(f) who has been a victim of torture;

(g) who is suffering from a serious physical disability;

(h) who is suffering from other serious physical health conditions or illnesses.”

This amendment would exempt certain groups from subsection (2).

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The clause relates to article 31 of the convention, which provides refugees with immunity from certain penalties. It is an important protection that the Government are seeking to limit by, in my view, reinterpreting and undermining article 31, and setting out expectations of where and when individuals should claim that go beyond the letter and spirit of the convention.

The amendments take us back to this morning’s discussion about why it was especially inappropriate to place these requirements and expectations on particular groups, including victims of trafficking, sexual violence and torture. They are designed to pose a question to the Minister: why is he seeking to strip such groups of their immunity from penalties that the refugee convention provides?

[Tom Pursglove]

Again, I thank the hon. Members for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East and for Glasgow North East for all their hard work in this area and in producing these amendments. As they will know, the provisions they are seeking to amend are crucial to the Government’s intention to uphold the first safe country of asylum principle. In this respect, these clauses are designed to deter dangerous journeys across Europe by no longer treating migrants who come directly to the UK and claim without delay in the same way as those who do not. I am sure they will agree that we must do everything in our power to stop people putting their lives in the hands of smugglers and making extremely perilous journeys across the channel.

Amendments 157 and 158 would apply to clause 34, which is closely related to clause 10 in that it sets out the UK’s interpretation of certain criteria within article 31(1) of the refugee convention. The criteria in article 31 provide the basis for the legal framework we are using to differentiate within clause 10. The intention of the amendments is to seek statutory carve-outs from differentiation for a wide range of cohorts.

I absolutely understand where this is coming from. I would like to reassure hon. Members that the powers in clause 10 do not compel the Secretary of State to act in a certain way, and leave discretion to impose or not impose conditions as appropriate, depending on the individual circumstances. We will of course set out our policy in immigration rules and guidance in due course. The policy will be exercised with full respect to our international obligations and will most certainly be sensitive to certain types, some of which are referenced in the amendment, such as having been trafficked.

I would note that blanket carve-outs are an attractive option to ensure protection of the most vulnerable, but ultimately I do not believe it would appropriate to do this in the way amendments 157 and 158 seek. In reality, blanket carve-outs would simply encourage people coming by small boat to claim they belonged to an exempted cohort. Most importantly, this would of course prevent us from protecting those people who do genuinely have those characteristics. By creating this perverse incentive, it would also undercut the entire purpose of the policy to serve as a deterrent. Indeed, people could then simply continue to make dangerous journeys to the UK and not claim in the first safe country because they know they can avoid group 2 refugee status simply by saying that they are LGBT+ or have a mental health condition.

For all these reasons, I invite the hon. Members for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East and for Glasgow North East not to press their amendments.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Obviously, we maintain a fundamental opposition to the whole scheme proposed by this clause and clause 10. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move amendment 50, in clause 34, page 34, line 1, leave out paragraph (b) and insert—

“(b) in subsection (3), after (b), insert—

“(ba) entry in breach of a deportation order, entry without leave, remaining in the United Kingdom without leave, or arriving in the United Kingdom without entry clearance under section 24 of the 1971 Act”;

(c) in subsection (4), after (c), insert—

“(ca) entry in breach of a deportation order, entry without leave, remaining in the United Kingdom without leave, or arriving in the United Kingdom without entry clearance under section 24 of the 1971 Act””.

This amendment would mean that individuals who committed these offences (and the other offences set out in section 31 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999) would be able to use the defence set out in section 31 of that Act, even if the offence was committed in the course of an attempt to leave the UK.

Again, I want to prompt the Government—perhaps optimistically—for their thinking on the compatibility of these provisions with the convention. The amendment would mean that individuals charged with certain offences could still rely on defences provided by the convention, even if the offence was committed in the course of an attempt to leave the UK. It is important that the Government explain clearly why they think that removing that possibility is consistent with the convention. To be honest, I am struggling to understand the Government’s reasoning.

[Tom Pursglove]

Amendment 50 is extensive. I thank the hon. Member for the considerable thought he has put into the amendment, which would list the illegal entry, arrival without clearance and remaining in the UK without leave offences as subject to the statutory defence against prosecution. However, the express statutory defence under section 31 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 has never applied to the existing offences referred to in amendment 50. We do not consider the new arrivals without entry clearance offence needs to be referred to expressly for the same reason. Where relevant in a particular case, the Crown Prosecution Service will take into account the UK’s obligations under article 31 of the refugee convention.

Another effect of amendment 50 would be to reverse our clause 34(4) and reintroduce a defence from prosecution for those transiting through the UK having entered illegally and intending to go and claim asylum elsewhere, such as Canada or the USA. I disagree that the statutory defence should extend to those who have tried to exit the UK without first seeking asylum, but I reassure hon. Members that that does not mean that every asylum seeker who tries to exit the UK will be prosecuted. We are targeting for prosecution those migrants where there are aggravating factors involved—for example, causing danger to themselves or others, including rescuers; causing severe disruption to services such as shipping routes or closure of the channel tunnel; or where they are persons who have previously been removed from the UK as failed asylum seekers.

We have of course been very clear that people seeking protection must claim in the first safe country they reach. That is the fastest route to safety. In the same way that we will not tolerate smugglers exploiting vulnerable people to come to the UK when a claim could easily be made in another safe country, we will also not tolerate those migrants who transit through the UK, having previously travelled through European countries, to reach other places. They must claim in the first safe country they reach. For those reasons, I invite the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

It is useful to have that on the record. I will go away and give it some further thought. We maintain our fundamental opposition to the whole scheme, but, in the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 34 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 35

Article 33(2): particularly serious crime

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move amendment 51, in clause 35, page 34, line 1, leave out sub-paragraph (i).

Under this amendment, persons receiving certain prison sentences in the UK shall be presumed (as at present) but not automatically deemed (as proposed in the Bill) to have committed a particularly serious crime.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 53, in clause 35, page 34, line 21, leave out “12 months” and insert “four years”.

Under this amendment, persons shall be deemed to have committed a “particularly serious crime” if they receive a prison sentence of more than four years in the UK (as opposed to two years at present, or 12 months as proposed in the Bill).

Amendment 52, in clause 35, page 34, line 24, leave out sub-paragraph (i).

Under this amendment, persons receiving certain prison sentence outside the UK, or persons who could have received such a sentence had they been convicted in the UK, shall be presumed (as at present) but not automatically deemed (as proposed in the Bill) to have committed a particularly serious crime.

Amendment 54, in clause 35, page 34, line 27, leave out paragraphs (b) and (c) and insert—

“(b) in paragraph (b), for “two years” substitute “four years”;

“(c) in paragraph (c), for “two years” substitute “four years””.

Under this amendment, persons shall be deemed to have committed a “particularly serious crime” if they receive a prison sentence of more than four years outside the UK (as opposed to two years at present, or 12 months as proposed in the Bill), or if they could have received such a sentence had they been convicted in the UK.

Clause stand part.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The amendment is a probing one. The basic point is that if someone is at risk of persecution, we must be incredibly careful when creating gaps, loopholes and exceptions that would still see that person subject to removal to the very place where they would be at risk. The convention creates and recognises very specific exceptions to the fundamental principle of non-refoulement.

If someone is a danger to security here or has committed a particularly serious crime, they constitute a danger to the community. The amendment challenges the attempts in the clause to broaden the scope of the exceptions so that persons are automatically deemed and not just presumed to have committed a serious offence if they are sentenced to one year in prison, rather than two years. We have particular concerns about the circumstances where the crime has been committed overseas. How do the Government intend to be sure about the safety and appropriateness of prosecution, conviction and sentence?

Nobody is saying that refugees should not face appropriate punishment for their crimes, but the danger is that those sentenced to one year or more face an additional punishment that puts them at risk of persecution, torture and death. That is way beyond what is merited by the crime. The withdrawal of refugee rights should not be done in anything other than the most serious circumstances. We fear that the clause goes beyond what the convention envisages.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I just wish to add to the points made by the SNP spokesperson. The whole UK criminal justice system is based on having magistrates courts that deal with the less serious offences, which have a maximum sentence of up to 12 months, and we then have the Crown court, which deals with the more serious offences, with a sentence above 12 months. Defining something as serious with 12 months’ imprisonment seems to be contrary to other aspects of our judicial system.

Labour also has concerns about people who have been trafficked who may have been forced to commit offences. They may have been convicted of a criminal offence as a result of their trafficking, whether that is because of drugs, prostitution or another such offence that might attract a penalty above 12 months. We have some concerns about the redefinition and I wonder whether the Minister can clarify what might happen to someone who has been trafficked, has committed an offence and has received a sentence of 12 months. Would the clause apply to them, because that does raise concerns about it? I do not know whether he will be able to assist in that regard.

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[Tom Pursglove]

My right hon. Friend puts the matter in a way that only he can. To raise the definition to a level that captures only crimes that have resulted in a sentence of four years or more imprisonment would be reckless, and would undermine the aims of the new plan for immigration to build a fair but firm immigration system. It would clearly send the wrong, and dangerous, message that the UK welcomes and rewards serious offenders. I do not believe that the people of the UK want that. The amendments would mean that individuals who commit some of the most serious crimes would continue to receive the generous benefits of refugee status in the United Kingdom. Their continued presence in the UK could also lead to avoidable reoffending. The Government would not be upholding their responsibility to protect the public of the United Kingdom by supporting the amendments.

The hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate queried the process for a person who has been trafficked. I can confirm that such a person will be tested under the second limb for whether they amount to a danger to the community. With regard to offences committed overseas, section 72(3)(c) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 contains a provision to ensure that any convictions abroad would result in a sentence of 12 months or above in the UK for a similar offence.

In the light of those points, I hope that the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East will withdraw the amendment, and that the Committee agree that the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

It is useful to have that on the record. I do not think that all the points were addressed, but I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 35 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 36

Interpretation of Part 2

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move amendment 55, in clause 36, page 35, line 14, at end insert—

“‘protection in accordance with the Refugee Convention’ means a legal status that is inclusive of the rights and obligations set out at Articles 2-34 of the 1951 Convention”.

This amendment would define – for the purposes of Part 2 of the Bill – what constitutes protection in accordance with the Refugee Convention.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 135, in clause 36, page 35, line 27, at end insert—

“‘protection in accordance with the Refugee Convention’ means a legal status that is inclusive of the rights and obligations set out at Articles 2-34 of the 1951 Convention.”

This amendment would clarify the meaning of “protection in accordance with the Refugee Convention” and ensure that it includes the positive rights and obligations necessary to ensure durable and humane solutions, and not merely protection against refoulement.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Certain very important provisions in the Bill refer to a state providing protection in accordance with the convention. In particular, it is incredibly important to the inadmissibility provisions in justifying removal to so-called safer countries. We need to define it, and we would do so through amendment 55 by referencing all the rights set out in the refugee convention. We thereby seek to ensure that the standards of that convention have been fully upheld. The amendment poses the question to the Government of whether they are a champion of the full range of rights in the convention, or are requiring people to claim asylum in countries where little more than lip service is paid to it, and nothing more than a protection against refoulement is provided. That is the issue at stake, in a nutshell.

[Bambos Charalambous]

In order to save time—I know that we have had a very long day—I will bear in mind that the wording of amendment 135 is almost identical to that of the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East. He did it justice when speaking to it, and we will support it.

[Tom Pursglove]

I thank hon. Members for tabling the amendments. I have listened carefully to the arguments that they have put forward. I agree about the importance of the United Kingdom continuing to meet its obligations under the refugee convention, including through the rights that we provide to refugees. The amendments to clause 36 relate to the inadmissibility provisions set out in clause 14. I understand the spirit of the amendments in wishing to define protection in accordance with the refugee convention where we may seek to remove an individual to a safe country. However, clause 14 as drafted ensures that the principles of the refugee convention should be met if we are to remove an individual to that country.

If individuals have travelled via, or have connections to, safe countries where it is reasonable to expect them to have claimed asylum, they should do so. They should not make unnecessary and often dangerous onward journeys to the UK; however, if they do, we will seek to remove them to a safe country. We will only ever return inadmissible claimants to countries that are safe and where the principles of the refugee convention are met. For those reasons, I cannot support the amendments, and I ask that the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East withdraw amendment 55.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Again, it is useful to have that on the record. The Minister defends the clause as it is by referencing the protection that clause 14 provides on the principles of the refugee convention, but when I asked him what that meant earlier I was not remotely satisfied by the answer. It is another clause that is completely undefined, so I wish to press amendment 55 to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

Nationality and Borders Bill (Eleventh sitting)

Stuart C McDonald Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 28th October 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Tom Pursglove]

Amendment 110 will add to the other offences in the clause the additional offence of knowingly arriving in the UK without an electronic travel authorisation where that is required. The current offence of knowingly entering the UK in breach of a deportation order or without leave dates back to the Immigration Act 1971, and is no longer considered entirely apt, given the changes in ways that people seek to come to the UK through irregular routes, and in particular the use of small boats.

Many of the individuals involved are intercepted in UK territorial seas and brought to the UK. They arrive in, but may not technically enter, the UK. However, we need to deter migrants from risking their lives and those of their families by taking such dangerous routes to the UK, and to take back control of our borders. We are committed to strengthening our border security by ensuring that everyone wishing to travel to the UK, except British and Irish citizens, seeks permission to do so before travelling.

The clause introduces new arrival offences to deal with the issue. I reassure the Committee that we do not seek to criminalise genuine refugees who come to the UK to seek asylum, but safe and legal routes can be used for that purpose, without risking lives.

Government amendments 111 to 117 and 125 are consequential amendments; they ensure that where the clause and schedule 5 cross-reference to the offence of arrival in the UK without the required entry clearance, they also refer to the new offence.

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

The Minister has slightly skirted over the most fundamental point in all this, which is that lots of refugees who come to seek asylum in this country will be criminalised by the provision—a good 60% or 70%, even according to the Home Office’s explanatory memorandum. How can he possibly feel comfortable about criminalising them through an offence that could see them imprisoned for up to four years?

[Tom Pursglove]

Clearly, any such cases would be referred to the Crown Prosecution Service or the relevant prosecuting authorities. They must make a judgment as to whether it is in the public interest to pursue such a prosecution. I will say more about that in due course, but it is important to highlight that point.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

As I said—I will come on to this in more detail—it is for the prosecuting authorities to decide whether it is in the public interest to pursue a particular case.

On amendment 188, I reassure the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East that consideration of the issues he has listed is already taking place. I fully recognise that, while immigration offences are a reserved matter, the devolved Administrations in Scotland and Northern Ireland have responsibility for their criminal justice systems, and decisions on prosecutions are independently taken by the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service in Scotland and the Public Prosecution Service in Northern Ireland.

My officials have been in contact with the Scottish Government criminal justice division, the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service and the Department of Justice Northern Ireland, and have shared information about potential impacts and costings. The amendment would add an extra and unnecessary layer of parliamentary scrutiny to a process that is under way at official level. It would also have a critical impact on the commencement of the clause; it would add delay, but we need the measures in place to respond to the expected surge in dangerous small boat crossings when the weather improves in spring next year. I urge the hon. Member not to press his amendment.

On clause 37, the UK is experiencing a very serious problem of small boat arrivals; illegal migrants are crossing from the continent in small craft that are often equipped with only an outboard motor. They are unseaworthy and wholly unsuitable for a crossing of a minimum of 21 miles across some of the busiest sea lanes in the world. Many of the vessels break down and are intercepted by UK personnel on the grounds of safety of life at sea. The rescued migrants, including pregnant women and children, are generally brought to Dover.

The maximum sentence of six months does not reflect the seriousness of the offence of entering in breach of a deportation order. Increasing the maximum sentence to five years will disrupt the activities of foreign national offenders involved in criminal networks, including organised immigration crime.

The current offence of knowingly entering the UK without leave is ineffective and does not provide a sufficient deterrent to those wishing to enter the UK illegally by small boat. We accordingly propose increasing the maximum sentence from six months’ to four years’ imprisonment.

We also intend to create a new offence of arriving in the UK without an entry clearance where that is required. While some migrants seek to evade immigration control, for example by landing on a deserted beach, many more now arrive in the UK after being rescued at sea. It would not be right, and would be perverse, to have to let migrants take the risk of completing their journey without assistance, and of landing at a small beach, rather than rescuing them at sea, just because under current legislation, the act of intercepting them and bringing them to the UK could cast doubt on whether the migrants entered unlawfully.

It is worth repeating that we are not seeking to criminalise those who come to the UK genuinely to seek asylum, and who use safe and legal routes to do so. We will be targeting for prosecution those migrants in cases where there are aggravating factors—where they caused danger to themselves or others, including rescuers; where they caused severe disruption to services such as shipping routes, or the closure of the channel tunnel; or where they are criminals who have previously been deported from the UK or persons who have been repeatedly removed as failed asylum seekers. The increased prison penalty will allow appropriate sentences to be given to reflect the seriousness of this behaviour.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The Minister is at his most reassuring when he tells us, basically, “Don’t worry; we are not really going to apply the full provisions of the clause.” The key point is that none of this is in the Bill. I want to remove these measures altogether, but could we at least put some of the restrictions in the Bill? Otherwise, we are putting in statute a law that criminalises the overwhelming majority of asylum seekers coming into the United Kingdom.

[Tom Pursglove]

I hope I will be able to provide the hon. Member with further reassurance by going on to say that, of course, the decision on whether prosecution is in the public interest rests with the Crown Prosecution Service in England and Wales, the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service in Scotland and the Public Prosecution Service in Northern Ireland. In many cases, we will continue to seek the illegal migrant’s removal, rather than their prosecution.

The amended and new offences will apply to all types of unlawful entry and arrival, rather than being limited to entry via small boats. We should not limit our response to the evasion of proper immigration procedures and controls depending on the method of entry employed. Doing that would risk causing displacement to another, potentially equally dangerous, route. The offences will therefore also apply equally to other means of evasion, such as concealment in a lorry.

We are also amending the offence of assisting unlawful immigration to the UK in breach of immigration law, known as facilitation, to include arrival in the UK. That will ensure that the offence of facilitation also applies to those assisting the new offence of arriving without a valid entry clearance.

Clause 60 is one of the six clauses drafted as marker clauses at introduction. As indicated in the explanatory notes and memorandum for the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, it was drafted as such in the interest of transparency—to make clear our intention of bringing forward substantive provisions on electronic travel authorisations. New clauses 21 and 22 are intended to replace clause 60.

Amendment 120 ensures the provisions in new clauses 21 and 22 can be extended to the Crown dependencies by Order in Council, should they wish to introduce their own electronic travel authorisation scheme by amending the Bill’s extent provisions in clause 69. As I noted earlier, the Government are committed to strengthening the security of our border by ensuring that everyone who wishes to travel to the UK—except British and Irish citizens—has permission to do so before they travel. The Government will introduce an electronic travel authorisation scheme—the ETA scheme—to close the current gap in advance permissions, and to enhance our ability to prevent the travel of those who pose a threat to the UK.

At present, non-visa nationals coming to the UK for up to six months as visitors, and in limited other categories, can travel to the UK solely on the basis of their nationality, evidenced by their passport or other travel document. That information is sent to the Government by the majority of carriers as advance passenger information shortly before the individual embarks on their journey. The ETA scheme will allow security checks to be conducted and more informed decisions to be taken at an earlier stage in advance of travel. The introduction of an ETA scheme is in line with the approach that many of our international partners have taken to border security, including the United States, Canada, New Zealand and Australia.

New clause 21 would insert proposed new section 11C into part 1 of the Immigration Act 1971, which will allow the Secretary of State to make immigration rules to administer an ETA scheme. Those rules will include, but are not limited to, who must apply for an ETA, what that application must contain, how long an ETA will be valid for, and when an ETA should be granted, refused, varied or cancelled.

Additionally, new clause 21 also inserts proposed new section 11D into part 1 of the 1971 Act, allowing the Secretary of State to administer an electronic travel authorisation scheme on behalf of a Crown dependency, if requested to do so, in the event that a Crown dependency chooses to operate its own ETA scheme. It also enables the Secretary of State to make regulations to recognise an electronic travel authorisation issued by a Crown dependency as valid for travel to the UK, in line with the UK’s commitment to maintaining the integrity and security of the common travel area.

To enforce the ETA scheme, new clause 22 builds on the existing carriers’ liability scheme by incentivising carriers to check prior to boarding that a traveller holds an ETA—or another form of permission, such as a visa in electronic form—or risk a civil penalty. Such checks are necessary to enforce our requirement for everyone, except British and Irish nationals, to get permission to come to the UK before they travel.

At present, carriers are incentivised to check for the presence of a valid immigration document that satisfactorily establishes identity and nationality or citizenship, and any visa required. New clause 22 incentivises carriers to check that all passengers have the appropriate permission— including by checking with the Home Office, if that permission may be held only in digital form—or risk a penalty. The new clause also provides a statutory excuse against the imposition of a penalty, to cater for circumstances where it has not been possible for the carrier to check for the presence of an ETA, or another form of permission, through no fault of their own.

[The Chair]

I will call Mr McDonald first, because he has tabled an amendment that is in this group.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Thank you very much indeed, Sir Roger.

I will speak in support of amendment 188 and against the clause. To respond to what the Minister said, and to build on one of my interventions, the Committee has to debate the clause as it appears before us, not as the Minister envisages it being implemented. As it stands, the clause is one of the Bill’s low points, as it places in an already bleak Bill an extraordinarily broad criminal offence that will criminalise pretty much everyone who seeks asylum—many of whom are refugees—as well as survivors of trafficking. That will help to strengthen the control that traffickers have over their victims, rather than helping those victims.

It is unbelievable that should a Syrian, a Uyghur, a persecuted Christian convert, an Afghan interpreter, or a victim of the horrific crime of trafficking arrive seeking our protection, instead of being championed, they would be prosecuted and imprisoned by the regime put in place by the clause. Taken alongside the removal of the protections in the convention for asylum seekers in clause 34, this is a hugely retrograde step. It is also, again, utterly against the spirit and the letter of the refugee convention and the convention on trafficking, an issue that the Minister did not touch on.

[Tom Pursglove]

Notwithstanding what I have already said about the prosecution services taking a case-by-case approach, the hon. Member inquired about aggravating factors not being added to the Bill. The factors for prosecution when someone comes to the UK may change depending on the circumstances. We need to be able to react flexibly, so putting the factors in primary legislation would be too restrictive. I return to the point that I would expect prosecution services to look carefully at individual cases and to take all factors into account, so I would not accept his depiction.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I take a small crumb of comfort from the fact that the Minister does seem to be evidencing some discomfort about how the clause is drafted. He is trying to reassure us by saying it will not be implemented as it is set out now, but that is not satisfactory. We parliamentarians are concerned with what is in the Bill. It is fine for the Minister to say that; I do not know how long he will be in office—hopefully many years—but there will be other Immigration Ministers to come, and they may take a completely different approach.

It may be challenging to put restrictions or a statutory defence in the Bill, but the Minister has to try. He must try much harder. We cannot leave such a broad criminal offence in the Bill simply on the basis of reassurances. I am absolutely of the view that the measures should be removed—for the reasons relating to the refugee convention, and that is even before we get to the ethical considerations and the impact the measures will have on asylum seekers and trafficking victims.

What the clause actually says will make it infinitely harder for refugees or trafficking survivors who eventually make it all the way through the horrendous new system to integrate, put down roots and rebuild their lives. There are questions about how the measures would operate in practice; they raise the spectre of families being separated on arrival if one member is accused of committing this criminal offence. How much harder will it be for somebody to get a job in due course if they have this criminal conviction and spend years in prison? UK citizenship will essentially be near impossible for them.

As we have heard repeatedly, particularly from the hon. Member for Sheffield Central, all of this will achieve absolutely nothing. As Tony Smith, the borders expert, told us in the Committee’s evidence sessions, use of the criminal justice system just has not worked. For smugglers and traffickers, it absolutely has, but not for their victims.

I have a question on scope. Will the Minister clarify whether someone who arrives with an entry clearance that is invalidated because it turns out that it was applied for on a false basis—for example, somebody who has secured a visit visa, when they are arriving to claim asylum—will have committed a criminal offence under the clause, because the leave to enter was obtained fraudulently? From the wording, I guess that they will, but it would be useful to hear the Minister’s clarification.

On amendment 110, we broadly support the ETA regime and encouraging carriers to ensure that the conditions are met, but we are still not absolutely convinced of the need for yet another criminal offence. Why can the remedy for turning up without an ETA not simply be to require that person to leave, or to send them back again? What group of people are being targeted here who are not already impacted by one of the other offences?

Even the wording on the state of knowledge of the person committing the offence raises questions. It says the person must “knowingly” arrive here without the ETA or entry clearance. The required knowledge seems to relate only to knowledge of arrival without the ETA or entry clearance, and not knowledge of whether he required that ETA or entry clearance. If we put that together with the fact that the measure will apply to people arriving in the UK rather than entering it, there is a danger that this will cover people who rock up in ignorance at airport border security, rather than anyone who is trying to do anything sinister. Simple ignorance and a mistake could lead to years in prison. I might be wrong about that; it would be useful to have clarity. Why is a criminal offence necessary?

Our amendment 188 was tabled to prompt discussion about consultation with the devolved criminal justice systems and the personnel in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Again, it gives me some comfort that the Minister has had some of these discussions—at least, the Home Office has—and there has been the important recognition that decisions about public interest will be for devolved prosecutors. It is important to acknowledge that, and it is welcome.

In short, as clause 37 stands, it sets out a framework for arresting, prosecuting and imprisoning several thousand asylum seekers, refugees and trafficking victims every year. Is there an estimate of what the cost will be, regardless of how it is implemented in practice? What will that do the backlogs in courts struggling to recover from covid, and what would be the impact on prison capacity? Putting all that to one side, the fundamental issue is the impact on asylum seekers, refugees and trafficking victims. The clause, as drafted, will compound the already slow and needlessly painful process of securing protection and add a criminal sanction. It is going to achieve absolutely nothing except more human misery.

[Jonathan Gullis (Stoke-on-Trent North) (Con)]

It will not be a shock to hon. Members that I fully support clause 37, which has absolutely the right intention. Ultimately, as we have discussed—we have heard the evidence from His Excellency the Australian high commissioner—if we are to deter people from making this dangerous journey, we should be making sure that the deterrents are strong enough.

We have part of that already: if somebody enters this country illegally, that obviously counts against their asylum claim. Now we are saying that the right thing is that if someone chooses to enter this country illegally, that could lead to a criminal prosecution with a strong prison sentence. That is exactly what the people of Stoke-on-Trent North, Kidsgrove and Talke want to hear at the end of the day, because 73% voted to leave and wanted to make sure that we took back control of our borders. We are a part of the asylum dispersal scheme already, with over 1,000 currently within the city region. We are happy to welcome them, but we want to see a change.

For example, we would love other parts of Scotland, not just Glasgow, to take on asylum seekers as part of the asylum dispersal scheme. Obviously, Glasgow is fully supportive, but other places voluntarily choose not to take part. We would like Labour-run Islington Borough Council to participate: by the end of 2020, it had not taken a single refugee.

The city of Stoke-on-Trent is expected to bear the burden of a large load and is taken advantage of, because ultimately we are an area that has been forgotten. The Labour party is still checking its Ordnance Survey map to find where the city of Stoke-on-Trent actually is—Captain Hindsight sent out a search party, and it got stuck in North Islington having chai latte and avocado on toast. Meanwhile, Conservative Members are more interested in delivering on the people’s priorities. We are delivering on that in making sure that this provision is strong.

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[Tom Pursglove]

I will pick up on a few points in concluding our deliberations on the clause.

The hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East spoke about costs. We are working with the various UK criminal justice systems and we have shared estimates of costs at official level as part of operationalising the plan. He sought further clarity about that and I hope that has provided reassurance. He also asked about entry clearance invalidation. If the leave is valid on arrival and is subsequently cancelled, no offence would have been committed, but if it is invalidated prior to arrival and the person knows that, the offence would have been committed.

Finally, I reiterate the point about the application of offences in this area. It bears repeating that we are targeting for prosecution those migrants for whom aggravating factors are involved—for example, those causing danger to themselves or others, including rescuers; those causing severe disruption to services such as shipping routes or closure of the channel tunnel; or those who have previously been removed from the UK as failed asylum seekers. The increased prison penalty will allow appropriate sentences to be given to reflect the seriousness of this behaviour.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Has the Minister done an analysis of whether there are already criminal offences that cover the scenarios he has just outlined?

[Tom Pursglove]

We believe that this measure is required so that we can take appropriate action to deal with the sorts of circumstances I have just set out. I have made that clear on several occasions, and Members will have heard what I have said. I fully expect that that will continue to be the case, and that will be made clear at every opportunity.

I go back to the point that prosecuting services must judge cases on a case-by-case basis. They must of course take all the factors relevant to the individual case into account in deciding whether to proceed with it. They must also decide whether that is in the public interest. That is a very clear and established position, and will continue to be the case.

I am comfortable that the proposed approach is the right one to take in addressing the issues I have set out, which are particularly egregious and concerning and which require further action.

Amendment 110 agreed to.

Amendments made: 111, in clause 37, page 36, line 5, leave out “or (C1)” and insert “, (C1) or (C1A)”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 110.

Amendment 112, in clause 37, page 36, line 19, leave out “or (C1)” and insert “, (C1) or (C1A)”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 110.

Amendment 113, in clause 37, page 36, line 29, after “(C1)” insert “, (C1A)”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 110.

Amendment 114, in clause 37, page 37, line 2, after “(C1)” insert “, (C1A)”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 110.

Amendment 115, in clause 37, page 37, line 4, after “(C1)” insert “, (C1A)”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 110.

Amendment 116, in clause 37, page 37, line 12, after “(C1)” insert “, (C1A)”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 110.

Amendment 117, in clause 37, page 37, line 15, after “(C1)” insert “, (C1A)”. —(Tom Pursglove.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 110.

Question put, That clause 37, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

The Opposition are worried that, if measures in clauses 37 and 38 are enforced, the Government will let vulnerable people with a genuine need for protection be punished, rather than the traffickers, people-smugglers and organised criminal gangs who push them into these dangerous crossings. Targeting them takes international co-operation, not washing our hands of our international obligations under international human rights and maritime law.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I wish briefly to associate myself with everything the shadow Minister just said; he covered pretty much all the ground that I would have covered. This ridiculous clause tramples all over our international obligations. I suspect what will happen today, as happened on Second Reading, is that we will be reassured that the clause will be used in a certain way so that the RNLI and others will not be targeted. Maybe I am wrong, which would be good, but the scope of the clause is extraordinary.

If the defence, as it was on Second Reading, is, “We’re not going to go after these people,” that is not good enough. You have to put that on the face of the Bill. We cannot create criminal offences and ask folk to go about breaching those laws and committing crimes in the hope that the Government keep their promise that they will not be prosecuted. It is a fundamental rule of legal principle—[Interruption.] The Minister is shaking his head: if that is not the defence, I look forward to hearing what is.

[Tom Pursglove]

I am grateful to the hon. Members for Enfield, Southgate and for Halifax for providing the opportunity to explain the difficulties involved in securing convictions for an odious crime that targets and exploits vulnerable people and allows organised criminals to thrive.

Gain can be obtained in many ways, but cannot always be proved to the evidential standard required for a successful prosecution: for example, money transfers made by other family members abroad or made cash in hand, promises of servitude by the asylum seeker or others, or the provision of assistance in the facilitation act, such as by avoiding paying a fee by agreeing to steer a small boat. It is right that all available evidence should be considered and all relevant behaviour taken into account in investigating a serious offence. We are, at present, limited by what is an unrealistic evidential requirement that does not take account of the reality of how international organised crime operates.

In amending the offence, we are mindful of the excellent work of those acting from humanitarian motives both now and in the past. I understand fully hon. Members’ concerns that the wrong people will be drawn into the investigative and judicial process. We are therefore retaining the defence available to organisations whose aim is to assist asylum seekers and who do not charge for their services. I also recognise the bravery of volunteers working for the RNLI and lifeboat crews who undertake vital work in protecting lives at sea.

I will set out my intention to amend this clause on Report to ensure that organisations such as the RNLI, those directed by Her Majesty’s Coastguard, and individuals who fulfil their obligations in rescuing those in distress at sea may continue as they do now. We also intend to ensure that this provision does not prevent those responsible for vessels from complying with their obligations if they discover stowaways on board as they journey to the UK. I understand that some members of the Committee would prefer to have those amendments ready to debate now, but the issues are complex and we must ensure that we do not inadvertently provide loopholes to be exploited by criminal gangs who will look for any means to avoid prosecution.

The effect of amendment 33 is that, by retaining the constraint and having to prove the offence was committed again, we will only rarely be able to respond to and deter those committing the offence and will continue to place an unrealistic burden on our law enforcement officers and prosecutors. I therefore ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment, although I hope he will be reassured that I intend to table on Report an amendment to address the crux of the issues that he raised. I hope that hon. Members across the House will feel able to support the amendment that I intend to table.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

In response to numbers of migrants using dangerous maritime routes to enter the UK illegally, this Government are committed to providing Border Force with the tools and legislation they need to combat this illegal migration threat more effectively. We need to strengthen and broaden our current powers not only to improve the effectiveness and capability of Border Force’s current maritime interception tactics, but to better equip them for future operational developments, which may be enhanced through agreements with our near border partners.

The clause and schedule will also provide new powers allowing Border Force to return vessels and those on board, when appropriate, to non-UK locations. Finally, the Government will use this clause to provide bespoke seizure and disposal powers intended for Border Force use against the small boats threat specifically. It will provide far more flexible options for the seizure and disposal of the vast majority of unflagged, ownerless vessels that are being used to transport illegal migrants.

I turn to Government amendments 82 and 83. We are seeing an unacceptable rise in dangerous and unnecessary small boat crossings. Our primary focus is on preventing people from embarking on dangerous channel crossings to enter the UK illegally, tackling the criminal gangs responsible and protecting lives. We must send a powerful message that people should not leave the safety of countries such as France or Belgium to enter the UK illegally in an unseaworthy boat, and if they do, they could be taken back.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

On the question of legality, Government amendment 82 is pretty extraordinary, because it seems to remove a restriction on the power of the Secretary of State so that she is unconstrained by the United Nations convention on the law of the sea; I am just looking at the explanatory note. Is that amendment designed to allow the Secretary of State to break the international law of the sea?

[Tom Pursglove]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for raising that point, and I will come on to it imminently. To finish the point I was making, the Government amendments will remove text from the Bill that is now considered not to be essential to achieving the aim that I have set out.

The UK has ratified, and is therefore fully committed to upholding, the United Nations convention on the law of the sea. The Government are committed to utilising their maritime enforcement tactics in full compliance with international law. The re-statement of that in the clause is therefore unnecessary. It is also unnecessary to state in legislation, where it is already beyond doubt, that Border Force would seek permission from a foreign country before taking a migrant boat back to that country. That statement adds nothing to the powers being created in this part of the Bill.

We want to make it explicit that operating these maritime enforcement powers in UK waters or international waters to simply divert a migrant vessel from UK territorial seas does not require the permission of a foreign state where that vessel may then enter their waters. These amendments will not result in the UK failing to abide by its international obligations, whether that be in the context of the safety of lives at sea or when seeking permission if intending to return migrants to another country, such as France.

I thank the hon. Member for Sheffield Central for what he will no doubt say about amendments 144 to 149. I will start by addressing amendment 144, which proposes to add an additional requirement to the maritime powers where the options available to officers intercepting a vessel at sea are spelled out. In order for the tactics intended for use in the exercise of these powers to be safe and legal, officers will have to carry out risk assessments before and during any exercise of the powers. That requirement will be laid out in operating procedures to ensure we meet our international obligations on safety of life at sea.

As any deployment of the tactics under the powers will be carried out in full accordance with those obligations, the welfare and safety of those on board vessels will be the priority throughout. With international obligations in this context not being a matter for UK legislation, we do not consider it necessary to add the amendment. I also note that any deployment of maritime tactics will be carried out in full compliance with obligations under the European convention on human rights and the Human Rights Act.

I turn now to amendment 145. The schedule that it would amend deals with new powers allowing Border Force and others to require vessels to be taken to a non-UK port if necessary. There are a number of reasons why we may wish to have the capability to do this, and they are not all related to the return or removal of asylum seekers. For example, any potential future agreement with partners to patrol waters jointly may require rescued or intercepted migrants to be taken back to the country from which they embarked on their maritime journey. As such, we do not consider that the amendment is needed or appropriate in schedule 5, and we are not prepared to commit to providing a running commentary to update on the progress of sometimes sensitive international negotiations.

I understand that the intention of amendments 146 to 148 is to emphasise the need to ensure that account be taken of human rights obligations by appropriately trained officers exercising these maritime powers. However, the amendments are unnecessary and would have no practical impact on the operation of the powers by Border Force officers and others. All operational officers within Border Force receive, and must have passed, appropriate training in order to exercise their duties. In order to be appointed as an immigration officer, an official must successfully complete and pass a foundation course that includes understanding the European convention on human rights as it relates to the Human Rights Act 1998, and their resulting obligations in the context of exercising powers.

Nationality and Borders Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Stuart C McDonald Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 28th October 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Bambos Charalambous]

Clause 43 refers to no-notice removals and presents another problem of access to justice in the Bill. The clause aims to provide a statutory minimum period to enable individuals to access justice prior to removal and makes provisions for removing individuals following a failed departure without the need for a further notice period. It also includes the provision of written notices of intention to remove and departure details. It makes clear in statute the duty of the Home Office to give people a maximum of five working days’ notice when they are going to be removed from the UK.

For more than 10 years, the courts have recognised that that duty to give notice of removal is essential to accessing justice and the rule of law. As the Committee will acknowledge from our discussions on the Bill so far, it is vital that, when officials decide people should be removed, those people can access the courts to challenge that decision if they have a legitimate case.

However, while this clause sets out to provide access to justice, its effectiveness in doing so is very unclear. If the purpose of the notice period is, as stated, to enable those facing removal to access legal advice and the courts, it is essential that people served with a notice are able in practice to access that advice.

For example, the clause does not explain how the Government will ensure that access to legal advice will be provided. Asylum seekers can be highly vulnerable and may experience difficulties in effectively accessing legal advice and in understanding the legal intricacies of the asylum process, such as studying legal determinations or preparing submissions. As we know from our earlier scrutiny, clause 22 in part 2 provides for up to but no more than seven hours of legal aid for those served with a priority removal notice to receive advice on their immigration status and removal. We do not believe that provision goes far enough, but this clause is worse still. Unlike the provisions for priority removal notices, there is no specific provision in part 3 for ensuring that those who are served with notice of intention to remove can access legal advice within the notice period. The scheme therefore depends on existing legal aid provision, which has of course been decimated by the Conservatives for more than a decade. There are serious limitations in the availability of this provision for those both in detention and in the community.

Subsection (8) inserts new section 10A in the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. It sets out potential scenarios where a further notice period is not required, which includes, for example, where the person was not removed on the date specified in the first notice due to matters reasonably beyond the control of the Secretary of State, such as adverse weather conditions, technical faults or transport delays, or disruption by the person to be removed.

Disruption is very broad of course, and can be interpreted on a very broad basis. It could be applied to a person refusing to leave their room in detention because they want to speak to their lawyer. The fine print also states that a new notice of intention to remove and a further notice period are also not required where the person was not removed on the date specified in the first notice as a result of “ongoing judicial review proceedings”.

That point is even more problematic. It applies where a planned removal does not proceed because of judicial review proceedings. If those proceedings are resolved in a way that means removal can proceed, the Home Office does not have to give any notice of removal if it is carried out within 21 days of the court’s decision.

As the Public Law Project and JUSTICE have pointed out, that decision could come weeks, months, or even years after the first notice of removal. Over time, the person’s circumstances could have changed fundamentally, important new evidence could have come to light or the situation in their own country might have changed dramatically. Such changes can happen virtually overnight, as recently witnessed in Afghanistan. Yet once the previous judicial review proceedings, which were potentially based on completely different facts and circumstances, are decided, a person can be removed without any notice or opportunity to raise these new circumstances with the Home Office or to access the court. If implemented, that could give rise to significant injustices.

I have one example to highlight this point—I thank the Public Law Project and JUSTICE for sharing this example. MLF is a Sri Lankan national whose asylum claim had been dismissed. During judicial review proceedings, in which he was unrepresented, he submitted further representations to the Home Office based on new evidence of the killing of three male relatives. That new evidence could not be considered in the judicial review proceedings because it post-dated the decision being challenged. The Home Office’s barrister informed him that the material would be forwarded to the relevant part of the Home Office for consideration.

MLF was subsequently served with a decision that refused to consider his fresh representations. He was subsequently removed to Sri Lanka on the same day without any notice or opportunity to access the court. In hiding in Sri Lanka, MLF applied for judicial review of his removal without notice. The Home Office conceded that he had been unlawfully removed and arranged for MLF to return to the UK. He has since been granted refugee status on the basis of evidence that post-dated his original appeal, including that which he had submitted during his judicial review proceedings.

If clause 43 was implemented in that case, it would have authorised the removal of MLF without notice. To avoid situations where people are wrongly removed and evidence is not considered properly, amendment 137 seeks to delete subsections (3) to (5) of new section 10A of the 1999 Act. That change would ensure that people are required to be given notice of removal directions and an opportunity to ask the court to issue an injunction preventing their removal while additional elements of their case are considered or in order to present fresh evidence to challenge an initial decision.

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

The shadow Minister has raised lots of sensible questions. I have one other brief question for the Minister, on new clause 28. He may not be able to answer it today, but I would like it clarified, if possible.

Proposed new section 10E to the 1999 Act that the new clause would add is supposed to apply when a person has applied for judicial review and the court has made a decision authorising the removal. To be clear, does that decision relate to the judicial review, or could it relate to any prior decision? That point will not affect lots of people, but it will be important. I appreciate that the Minister may not be able to answer immediately, but I hope we will get clarity on that in due course.

[Tom Pursglove]

It may be easier if I explain that the power in amendment 137 already exists—albeit for 10 days—in published policy that is available on gov.uk. The purpose of putting the policy into statute is not to introduce a new power, as it already exists. Rather, we want to place it on a statutory basis to enable parliamentary scrutiny.

We can currently rearrange a migrant’s removal on another flight within 10 days of a failed removal without the need to give the migrant a fresh notice period. Clause 43 will increase the period to 21 days. Our recent experience during the pandemic has shown us that organising flights and complying with travel restrictions is difficult—dealing with self-isolation and rebooking escorts, for example. It is therefore entirely reasonable and sensible to allow the flexibility of 21 days to remove the migrant if the removal fails for reasons that are reasonably beyond the Secretary of State’s control.

It may be helpful to provide some examples to illustrate that point. A migrant has already had time to access justice and is due to be removed, but the flight is cancelled because of bad weather. The removal fails, but we manage to book a flight for the next day. We do not want to be in the position of having to wait another five working days before we can remove that migrant. As a second example, if a removal fails because the migrant is deliberately disruptive, that person should not be rewarded with another five working days in which they can try to defer their removal further. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate to withdraw his amendment.

To pick up on the point about access to legal aid during the notice period, migrants who are detained in immigration removal centres during the notice period will have access to the free legal advice surgery.

New clause 28 replaces clause 43 in its entirety. Our expert drafters have advised that it is better to do it that way because the text flows better and it is easier to navigate.

Unfortunately, migrants subject to enforced removal often wait until the last minute to challenge their removal from the UK. Consequently, flights are cancelled and removals are inevitably delayed at great cost to the taxpayer. We think it right that migrants subject to enforced removal must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to access justice. The sole purpose of the notice period is to give migrants time to seek legal advice. That is the rationale underpinning the clause.

Our current policy is complicated. Some migrants are given a minimum notice period of 72 hours, while others are given five working days. Calculating when the 72 hours start and end is confusing. They must include at least two working days, and the last 24 hours must include a working day. Evidently, there is scope for simplifying the process and making it consistent across the board. New clause 28 will do just that by placing in statute a single statutory minimum notice period of five working days for migrants. The new clause requires us to serve a written notice of intention to remove, setting out the notice period. Before the migrant can be removed, we must serve a written notice of departure details containing the date of removal.

A limited exception to the single statutory notice period relates to port cases. Migrants who are refused entry at the border can be removed within seven days without receiving a notice period. It is unlikely that they would have developed ties to the UK within that week.

The clause will create more clarity for Home Office staff, legal representatives and migrants. Migrants will know how long they have to access justice—in fact, some will have more time to access justice—and will therefore have fewer excuses to frustrate removal.

To be clear, we are not reintroducing removal windows, which were found to be unlawful by the Court of Appeal. Under the new clause, the migrant cannot be removed during the notice period. If the removal is cancelled or deferred because the migrant raises a fresh or further claim, a fresh notice period must be given before removal can proceed. Individuals will also be given a fresh notice period if there is a change to the previously notified destination or route, unless the place of transit is in a safe country.

The new clause provides that migrants can be removed within 21 days of a failed removal that was caused by their disruption. In such circumstances, a further notice period is not required because the migrant has already had sufficient opportunity to access justice, which is entirely reasonable when there are no significant changes to the migrant’s circumstances. That is in our current published policy but with a timescale of 10 days. Extending the time from 10 to 21 days will give us more time to rearrange removal.

The pandemic has highlighted the fact that organising escorts and rebooking flights cannot always be turned around quickly. Migrants frequently challenge their removal by way of judicial review, and of course that is their right. As per the clause, once a court decides that the migrant can be removed, we can remove them within 21 days without a fresh notice period. The migrant has already had time to access justice, and the removal decision has been subject to judicial scrutiny. There is no justification for further time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

For too long, individuals with no right to remain in the UK, including foreign criminals, have been gaming the system in order to get released from detention and frustrate their removal. We have seen individuals making asylum claims while in detention, but then delaying the resolution of that claim through their own deliberate actions, such as refusing to be interviewed. The current system incentivises non-compliant behaviour. By creating obstacles, bail is more likely to be granted due to the time it will take to resolve the claim and any subsequent appeals. It is not right that a person’s non-compliance enables their release.

Similarly, an individual may refuse to provide fingerprints for a travel document or may lie about their true nationality, thereby obstructing the returns documentation process. This again makes the prospect of removal more remote and increases the likelihood that bail may be granted. From an operational perspective, non-compliance is difficult to tackle and becomes much harder to counter once individuals are released from detention into the community, where they have the ability to abscond or continue with non-compliance. Therefore, eliminating the risk and impact of non-compliance is a key benefit that arises from the use of immigration detention if appropriate in the individual case.

We must have an immigration system that encourages compliance. The purpose of clause 45 is to ensure that, so far as possible, appropriate weight is given to evidence that a person has not been co-operative with the immigration or returns processes without reasonable excuse when making immigration bail decisions. This is currently not explicitly referenced as one of the specific mandatory criteria for considering whether to grant immigration bail.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The Minister did seem to accept that all those factors can be taken into account already if they are relevant to the question of whether the person is going to be removed in a reasonable time or whether they will abscond. Surely those are the only two questions. This is not necessary at all and seeks to use immigration detention as a form of punishment.

[Tom Pursglove]

I do not accept that depiction. We are requiring decision makers to take into account co-operation with removal proceedings and immigration processes when considering applications for immigration bail. We are mindful that non-compliance may already be considered, and that the tribunal takes such behaviour into account when deciding whether to grant bail. However, the intention behind the provision is that there be the same focus on evidence of non-compliant behaviour as there is on those factors already particularised and considered in every case. As we have always made clear, we do not detain indefinitely, and the clause will not mean that people will be detained solely due to non-compliance, as there must always be a realistic prospect of removal within a reasonable timescale.

[Bambos Charalambous]

We will oppose the clause. It makes it more difficult for individuals to get bail and leaves them stranded in immigration detention indefinitely.

The clause would require decision makers to consider previous failure “to cooperate with” certain immigration processes when considering whether to grant immigration bail. That is extremely vague and broad language. There is a risk of it being misconstrued and used to penalise those who use their legal rights to resist or appeal against immigration decisions made against them.

The Public Law Project has stated that if detainees are given the impression that any resistance to a decision of the Home Office may be held against them, it would increase unfairness and have a significant chilling effect on those bringing legitimate legal challenge. There is already an uneven playing field; the clause risks tipping things still further in the Home Office’s favour. The Home Office is expanding its powers of detention, while preventing independent judicial oversight of its decisions to detain.

Immigration detention is a harsh measure. It has no time limit and little judicial oversight, and should be used only when necessary and for the shortest time possible. The Government hold vulnerable people in prison-like immigration detention centres for periods ranging from days to several years. That includes people who have lived in the UK since childhood, people fleeing war and persecution, torture survivors and victims of human trafficking. Such vulnerabilities cannot be managed in detention and will no doubt be worsened by the prospect of bail being denied.

Since 2000, 49 people have died in immigration detention centres, and incidents of self-harm are now recorded at more than one a day. The Home Office’s immigration detention facilities are not fit for purpose, and narrowing the availability of immigration bail will only make the situation worse.

The uncertainty of indefinite detention is cruel not only for the detainee, but for family members waiting for them at home. Research by Bail for Immigration Detainees, which helps 3,500 detainees to apply for bail every year, shows that children of detainees are often British citizens, and suffer a range of physical and mental effects due to separation from their parent. Those are compounded by further, unexpected separation. For those children, cutting off the prospect of bail will lead to further mental ill health and suffering.

The majority of people in detention do not need to be there. More than 60% of people taken into detention are eventually released, their detention having served no purpose, at a cost of £76 million a year, according to Matrix Evidence research. BID has said that the Home Office repeatedly breaks the law and detains people unlawfully. In the past two years, the Home Office has paid out £15.1 million to 584 people whom it had detained unlawfully.

The clause will make it tougher for people to get bail and leave them trapped in detention for longer. The Government have committed to reducing detention, but this measure is counter to their own rhetoric. It means less justice for detainees, more harm for vulnerable refugees and more wasted costs for the taxpayer. That is why Labour opposes the clause.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

As I said in my intervention on the Minister, the decision has to be based on whether there is a reasonable prospect of imminent removal, and included in that is the question of the likelihood of the person absconding if bail is granted. If any historical non-compliance has any sort of relation to that question—if it is relevant—the tribunal will obviously already be able to take it into account. Today, the Minister is asking us to tell the decision makers to take into account historical non-compliance even where it has absolutely no bearing, in the decision maker’s view, on the fundamental question of whether someone should be interned. That is moving from weighing up those considerations in the question about removal to using detention almost as a form of punishment. It is completely unjustified, and I echo what the shadow Minister has said.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

Provision of information relating to being a victim of slavery or human trafficking

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move amendment 170, in clause 46, page 41, line 41, leave out “, before the specified date,”.

This amendment would remove the hard deadline for compliance for persons who have made protection claims or human rights claims to comply with a slavery or trafficking information notice.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 169, in clause 46, page 42, line 4, leave out subsections (4) and (5) and insert—

“(4) Subsection (5) applies if the recipient of a slavery or trafficking information notice does not provide the Secretary of State or competent authority with relevant status information within a reasonable period of time.

(5) The Secretary of State must provide recipients with an ongoing opportunity to explain why they did not provide the relevant status information within a reasonable period of time (and see section 47).”

This amendment would remove the hard deadline for compliance for persons who have made protection claims or human rights claims to comply with a slavery or trafficking information notice.

Amendment 171, in clause 46, page 42, leave out lines 13 and 14.

This is a consequential amendment.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Clause 46 brings us on to part 4 of the Bill, which relates to modern slavery. I will make a few general points in this debate, which will save me from having to repeat them in later debates. They are relevant to the clause and the amendment, and to other ones as well.

My first point is: why is modern slavery in a Bill that relates to immigration and border enforcement? The fact that it is included betrays the Government’s motivation. It is not about protecting survivors or addressing the huge difficulties victims face in accessing protection and support. Rather, this has to do with border enforcement functions and is based on unevidenced assertions of abuse. It is important to remember that people cannot refer themselves to the national referral mechanism as a potential victim of slavery; they have to be referred into it. The majority of referrals come from the Home Office and the police. In the overwhelming majority of cases— nine in 10—the NRM results in positive and conclusive decisions. None of this is evidence of any sort of abuse.

This part of the Bill also pre-empts the review of the modern slavery strategy that is supposed to be happening. The proposals are all largely absent from the new plan that was published earlier this year, and they have not been consulted on—certainly not with trafficking survivors. Efforts to tackle the traffickers will suffer as a result of the lack of consultation and engagement. When we debate these clauses, let us also remember that a huge number of survivors are British citizens.

The real problem that we face with trafficking is encouraging people to come forward. That is partly because of the power that traffickers have over their victims, partly because of the trauma that victims have suffered, and partly because we are not doing enough to enable them to feel sure that they will have protection. Too often the experience of the NRM process is that people are re-traumatised and left in limbo waiting for a decision, often for years and without any right to work. Even when they are recognised as trafficking or slavery survivors, as the vast majority are, they are given no leave to remain and are subject to removal. It is little wonder that while some expert groups reckon that there could 100,000 or more modern slavery victims in the UK, we conclusively identify around just 3,000 or so each year. Instead of fixing that, the clause and others in this part of the Bill will make things worse.

[The Chair]

I am sorry to interrupt the hon. Gentleman, but there will be a clause stand part debate later. If he could concentrate on the amendments in this group, that would be good.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am happy to do that, Ms McDonagh.

I will not repeat the arguments that I have already made about why it is wrong for Parliament to tell decision makers how to assess evidence that they see, but that we never will—I have done that already in relation to other notices. I simply make the point that putting in place deadlines for disclosure and punishments for missing them is especially dangerous and counterproductive for victims of trafficking.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

Before turning to part 4, which deals with modern slavery, I would like to make a declaration of interest. In October, prior to my appointment as Minister, I ran the London marathon and raised funds for the Mintridge Foundation, which encourages young people to get into sport, and Justice and Care, a charity that works to tackle modern slavery. I make the declaration in the interests of complete transparency and for the information of the Committee.

I thank the hon. Members for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East, and for Glasgow North East for the amendment. The hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East raised important questions about the purpose of the slavery and risk trafficking notice.

The clause forms part of our approach to expanding the one-stop process to include modern slavery through the establishment of a new slavery and trafficking information notice. We have already debated the one-stop process, so I will not repeat that discussion, but the aim of the process is to identify possible victims as early as possible and ensure they receive the support they need. To best achieve that, we also need to discourage misuse of the system by stating our expectations and stipulating the consequences of non-compliance with the process.

That being said, let me reassure hon. Members that the clause has safeguards built in, and decision makers will consider each case on its grounds. To seek to remove the deadline stipulated by the slavery or trafficking information notice, as suggested by amendment 170, would go against the approach I have outlined. Without a deadline, the Government would be unable to seek the information up front that supports speedier decision making. Equally, changing a “specified” time to

“a reasonable period of time”

would provide less certainty to victims and decision makers on what is required. That would be detrimental to the victim identification process and goes against what we are trying to achieve in the Bill.

The ability to identify victims at the earliest opportunity is fundamental to our ability to support them. The clause is part of a wider process of much-needed change to the system to enable quicker decision making and reduce opportunities for misuse of the system, which takes valuable resources from victims. To deliver on that aim, it is right that we specify the time period in which information should be given, so that there is a connection to the consequences of late provision. As I have already set out, that does not mean that late claims will not be considered; any individual who brings a late claim for a good reason will be treated as if the claim were made in time. That will enable us to strike the right balance between preventing misuse and focusing resources on victims. For the reasons I have outlined, I respectfully invite the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

We share the same goal, which is identifying victims. Unfortunately, every single trafficking organisation that has got in touch with us has said that putting these hard and fast deadlines in the Bill will make that harder, rather than easier. We will probably end up voting against this clause, but in the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move amendment 172, in clause 46, page 41, line 42, at end insert—

“(2A) The requirement in subsection (2) does not apply in relation to anything that the slavery or trafficking information notice recipient has previously provided to the Secretary of State or any other competent authority.”

This amendment would ensure a recipient of a slavery or trafficking information notice does not need to provide information that has already been submitted to the Secretary of State or any other competent authority.

This amendment makes a short and simple, but important, point. Requesting the same information that has already been disclosed could be needlessly re-traumatising for a victim of modern slavery or trafficking, so the simple question is whether the Minister can assure us that that will not be made necessary under clause 46. The clause seems to envisage that trafficking information notices could be served on someone who has already had a positive reasonable grounds decision. Can the Minister confirm whether that is right, and if so, why that would be necessary? As it stands, the clause calls for “any” information that might be relevant for the purposes of making a decision on reasonable or conclusive grounds. Surely there will be no penalty if information already provided is not once again provided in response to the notice being served.

[Tom Pursglove]

Again, I thank the hon. Gentleman for tabling the amendment. I reassure Members that the clause already has safeguards built in, and it is clear that decision makers will consider each case on its grounds. I appreciate the consideration given to the provision of information, and the recommendation that the clause should stipulate that information provided previously to the competent authority should not be included. However, the amendment is not needed. Decision makers in the competent authority will consider all information provided to them. Credibility considerations connected to lateness will, by implication, apply only where information has not been provided within a specified time period and without good reasons, which will be made clear in guidance. For that reason, I respectfully invite the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am grateful to the Minister for his response, which I will go away and consider. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Holly Lynch (Halifax) (Lab)]

I beg to move amendment 184, in clause 46, page 42, line 3, at end insert—

“(3A) Any slavery or trafficking information notice must be accompanied by information regarding the Secretary of State’s obligations to identify and support potential victims of modern slavery and trafficking.”

This amendment would ensure that potential victims are given information regarding their rights at the same time the notice is served.

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Ms McDonagh. I commend the Minister on having run the London marathon for Justice and Care, which does invaluable work.

We are supportive of the previous Scottish National party amendments to clause 46, which were outlined by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East. If we achieve nothing else this afternoon, I did promise the SNP spokesperson that I would work on being able to pronounce his constituency in time for our debates on the Bill, having managed to avoid doing so entirely during the passage of last year’s Immigration Act. I hope he will recognise those efforts.

With your permission, Chair, I will come back to clause 46 more broadly during the stand part debate. Our amendment follows a damning letter sent by 60 charities from across the human trafficking and modern slavery sector. They seeks to mitigate the effects of a Bill that they claim

“will have a disastrous impact on the UK’s response to modern slavery.”

In the light of the series of recommendations in that letter, amendment 184 would require any slavery or trafficking information notice to be

“accompanied by information regarding the Secretary of State’s obligations to identify and support potential victims of modern slavery and trafficking.”

We have serious concerns about both clauses 46 and 47, but these trafficking information notices are a new initiative, and should be accompanied by a full explanation of why the questions are being asked and what rights and support a potential victim of trafficking should be entitled to. The Government have placed significant emphasis on the need to reduce the time taken for victims to be identified, and on ensuring they receive the correct support package at the earliest opportunity. We strongly share that objective, so the requirement for information to be provided at the same time as the notice is served seeks to address any uncertainty and anxieties a potential victim may have.

Furthermore, it is critical that a trafficking notice is served with an assessment and awareness of risks and victims’ needs, as they can be incredibly wide-ranging, and that assessment and awareness can be essential for safeguarding purposes. Some victims will not have English as their first language, and some may have limited literacy skills. They will need access to the correct translator and there should be recognition of any special educational needs. That reinforces the need for each case to be evaluated sensitively.

We seek to ensure that the basic entitlement to information is met. It is important to recognise that in cases of modern slavery, many first responders and expert witnesses have found that victims interviewed often have so little knowledge of the national referral mechanism that they do not know if they are, or have been, in the NRM. Victims being unable to self-identify and limited awareness of how to navigate the NRM are consistent issues, and we will return to them under other clauses in part 4. Amendment 184 seeks to mitigate potential restrictions to the NRM, and is a sensible suggestion, and I hope that the Minister sees its merit.

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The introduction of trafficking information notices is an example of immigration controls creeping into modern slavery protections, where they are simply inappropriate and do not belong. It is a regressive measure, particularly for those who have struggled to secure legal representation. I have indicated our support for SNP amendments that strip away the hard deadlines and establish a more trauma-informed approach. I hope the Minister will recognise those merits. I have received assurances about amendment 184, but ultimately the clause in its current form should not stand part of the Bill.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I will be brief, given what I said in support of the amendment. All the anti-trafficking organisations that got in touch with us—60 or so—said that this clause could cause huge problems. I am not clear at all what issue the Government think it will resolve. What is the problem they are striving to tackle? It has not been outlined at all. All hon. Members agree that we need to identify more victims, but as the hon. Member for Halifax said, this will do the opposite and make it harder, not easier.

[Tom Pursglove]

It might assist the Committee if I say a little more. I am not concerned about covering ground that we may have already covered if it helps to clarify matters further and to put beyond any doubt the Government’s undertaking.

The purpose of clause 46 is to ensure that genuine victims of modern slavery are identified at the earliest possible opportunity, so that they can get the support they need to recover from their exploitation. The clause is part of the measures that seek to expand the current one-stop process to include modern slavery through the establishment of the new slavery and trafficking information notice, which can be issued alongside the new evidence notice introduced by clause 16.

Asylum and human rights claimants will need to provide relevant information relating to being a victim of modern slavery or trafficking within a specified period and, if providing information outside that period, set out a statement of their reasons for doing so. The slavery and trafficking notice aims to help identify possible victims at the earliest opportunity, to ensure that they receive appropriate support. It also aims to ensure that those who are not genuine victims are identified at the earliest possible stage.

The clause is underpinned by access to legal advice to help individuals understand whether they are a potential victim of modern slavery or human trafficking, and to support a referral into the national referral mechanism if that is the case. The clause works in tandem with clause 47, which sets out the impact of not providing information in good time without a good reason, such as the effects of trauma. Individuals will also be made aware from the start that if they fail to disclose information, save for good reason, their credibility may be damaged. We will set out our approach in guidance, giving decision makers the tools to recognise the impact of exploitation and trauma, and ensuring any changes to processes resulting from those measures are designed to take full account of the impact of trauma on victims of modern slavery. We intend to work with the sector to develop the guidance around that. I hope that will give Members confidence that the views and experiences of those groups will be taken into account when developing the guidance.

[Tom Pursglove]

I think the hon. Gentleman may have misunderstood my point. I was not saying there was any intention to impose a requirement on the sector to work with Government to develop the guidance, but undoubtedly we would welcome the input of the sector, which has a lot of experience and knowledge. We think there is a genuine issue that we need to address. The point I have made several times is that we want people to access the help they need when they need it as quickly as possible.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The sector would have preferred to have been consulted on the clause. The key problem it has is what happens if someone has gone past that deadline. This scheme puts real pressure on that person not to disclose at all, because they will fear that the regime will lead to their being disbelieved. That is a fundamental problem. Consulting after the clause is already on the statute book will not fix that.

[Tom Pursglove]

I disagree with the hon. Gentleman’s broader interpretation of the situation. We want to identify and help genuine victims as quickly as possible. I would expect cases to be looked at appropriately and individually to ensure that is exactly what happens. There was also a question of whether victims will receive a slavery and trafficking information notice before getting a reasonable grounds decision? Yes, we want to identify victims as soon as possible.

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Division 42

Ayes: 5

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Labour: 3
Scottish National Party: 2

Noes: 7

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Conservative: 7

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move amendment 173, in clause 47, page 42, line 21, leave out—

“or a conclusive grounds decision”

This amendment would disapply this section when a conclusive grounds decision is being made (i.e. when a reasonable grounds decision will already have been made).

The amendment is designed to allow us to question how the new process will interplay with the NRM process, and to establish how long the notice period in the new process will be, so it is another short but important point. The amendment would disapply the section on credibility if a reasonable grounds decision is made. It is even less clear what sensible case can be made for the use of a trafficking information notice if sufficient information has already been provided to justify such a reasonable grounds decision.

Depending on how the system operates, and given the huge delays in making conclusive grounds decisions, the following scenario could play out. A person receives a reasonable grounds decision and is referred to the NRM process. That person makes a claim for protection, and the Secretary of State then serves them with a trafficking information notice. Full disclosure takes time because of their circumstances. The person is better placed to disclose much more information after the deadline for the trafficking information notice has passed but before a conclusive grounds decision is reached. It would surely be very strange, then, for the conclusive grounds decision to take account of late provision of information, but the clause appears to envisage that that could happen. Has that all been appropriately thought through? It would be useful to hear an explanation of how those two processes will interact.

[Tom Pursglove]

I thank the hon. Members for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East and for Glasgow North East for their amendments. I am pleased to see from the amendments that they acknowledge the benefits of a system that brings forward at the earliest opportunity all information related to modern slavery, enabling us to provide support and protection quickly to those who need it.

To that end, clause 47 covers information raised at the reasonable grounds and conclusive grounds stages, which are the two crucial decision-making stages in the national referral mechanism, and which both confer different rights on possible and confirmed victims. Although there are different standards of proof at those two stages, it is critical that the decision maker at both points can review all information to take decisions. Those decisions should include consideration of whether information has been provided late and whether there are good reasons for that. By removing that consideration at the conclusive grounds stage, amendment 173 would remove the consequence of providing late information when the decision-making threshold is higher. That could perversely incentivise misuse of the system at the later stage.

We are clear that that approach should be taken across both decision points to ensure that we meet the clause’s aim of identifying victims as early as possible and reducing opportunities for misuse.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am confused. I cannot see the benefit of late disclosure if the conclusive grounds process is ongoing. What does the amendment incentivise?

[Tom Pursglove]

Again, I simply make the point that decisions are made case by case. We maintain that we need all the information at both decision points to reach the right decisions in individual cases. For those reasons, I respectfully invite the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

We will go away and study what the Minister has said. I am still confused about the interaction between the two processes. The amendment was designed to seek an explanation, and I suspect that we will not be satisfied with it, but in the meantime I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move amendment 174, in clause 47, page 42, line 23, leave out “or on behalf of”.

This amendment would exclude statements made on behalf of a slavery or trafficking information notice recipient (as opposed to statements made directly by them) from this subsection.

This is a very short point, but another important one. The amendment is designed to try to get further information from the Minister. I am sorry to have to test him on all the detail of the clause, but it is important. What we are asking here is why statements made on behalf of a trafficking information notice recipient should be impacted by the clause because of late provision of evidence. What does this cover? Is a medical report, for example, to be impacted by the clause so that its credibility is doubted because the recipient gave information late? Is analysis of the truth of what a social worker or a counsellor has said on behalf of the trafficking survivor to be impacted by the clause as well? We are really just asking this. What does it mean? What is the scope of the fact that this scheme applies to statements made on behalf of the trafficking information notice recipient and not just by the recipient himself or herself?

[Tom Pursglove]

Again, I am grateful to the hon. Member for setting out his case for the amendment. We know that, given the nature of modern slavery and human trafficking, many individuals often struggle to provide information relating to their abuse. That is why these measures are supported by the provision of legal aid to support possible victims in understanding the process and the national referral mechanism. It is also for that reason that the clause is specifically drafted to capture information provided by the victim or on their behalf.

All relevant information should be considered, whoever provides it, when decision makers are taking into account the provision of late information. Not to do so would create an artificial divide between different cohorts of individuals, depending on who provides the information for consideration. That could inadvertently encourage misuse of the system by leaving it open for individuals to seek to use others to provide all information late, knowing that its late disclosure will not be part of the consideration of credibility, when they could provide it themselves. That could delay disclosure and therefore our ability to identify and support individuals at the earliest opportunity as well as reducing opportunities for misuse. To give a practical example, I am confident that if someone else failed to press “Send”, the individual affected would not be impacted negatively by that.

For the reasons that I have outlined, I respectfully encourage the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Again, I am grateful to the Minister for his answer and we will consider it. I am still not absolutely clear on precisely what the scope of the provision is and whether, for example,

“a statement…on behalf of the person”

would include a medical statement—a medical report—so that its credibility would be damaged just because the person who underwent the medical report disclosed information late. We will go away and think about that. I think the Home Office may need to give it some consideration as well, but in the meantime I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Anne McLaughlin]

I beg to move amendment 175, in clause 47, page 42, line 24, leave out from “account” to the end of the subsection and insert

“of all the factors that may have led to the person providing the information late.”

This amendment would remove the presumption that delayed disclosure in relation to slavery or trafficking will be deemed damaging to a person’s credibility.

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[Tom Pursglove]

I thank hon. Members for their genuine interest in these matters and for bringing forward their amendments. By introducing a statutory requirement to provide information before a specified date, victims of modern slavery will be identified at the earliest opportunity, ensuring that those who need protection are afforded it quickly. This measure is supported by the provision of legal aid to ensure that possible victims feel able to share information in a safe and supported manner.

It is important to state that the requirement to bring forward information related to being a victim of modern slavery does not mean that referrals brought late will not be considered; all claims of modern slavery will be considered, irrespective of when they are raised. We have purposefully not defined “good reasons” in the Bill, and the detail on how to apply “good reasons” will be set out in guidance for decision makers. That is the appropriate place, giving the Government the flexibility to respond to our ever-increasing understanding of modern slavery victims.

We will of course work carefully with stakeholders as we operationalise guidance to ensure that decision makers have the tools to recognise the effect that traumatic events can have on people’s ability to accurately recall, share, or recognise such events in some instances, while not seeking to prejudge their decision making by placing this detail in legislation. However, as has been recognised, we cannot legislate for every instance where someone may have “good reasons” for providing late information. To attempt to do so would be impractical. It would also limit the discretion and flexibility of decision makers, who are best placed to consider all factors on a case-by-case basis.

Amendment 163 would have the perverse impact of individuals facing different requirements simply because their situation is excluded from the amendment. It also ignores the possibility that a person may identify as one of the listed categories, but their information may be late for unrelated reasons. It would therefore create a blanket acceptance for late information in specific prescribed circumstances, while a vulnerable individual who did not fall within the specified categories would face a different test on whether they had good reason for providing late information. That would be unfair.

As I have set out, it is important that we are clear on the consequence of late disclosure of information in order to provide clarity for decision makers and victims, and to deter possible misuse of the system. Removing the reference to impacting credibility, as amendment 175 seeks to do, would remove our ability to require the provision of information up front. A duty to provide information requires a consequence and I think we are all agreed that seeking information on modern slavery issues up front is of benefit to all. The clause already includes mitigations to the possible consequence of damaged credibility, providing clear safeguards while still addressing the issue of potential misuse. The solution is not to stifle the clause of any robustness.

As I stated, more detail on good reasons and the credibility considerations will be set out in guidance. We will work to ensure that this takes account of vulnerabilities related to an individual’s exploitation. However, as I have outlined, we believe that removing the consideration of credibility as damaging would impede the ability to reduce potential misuse and reduce the impetus to identify victims as early as possible. As a result, that would perpetuate the issues that these clauses are designed to address, to the detriment of victims.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am still not sure that the Minister has addressed a fundamental point here. The worry is that if somebody genuinely is a victim of trafficking—I hate even having to describe people in that way—and misses that deadline, the fact that there are possible consequences of that, even if they might have a good reason, means that all they know is that they have missed the deadline. It is a huge disincentive for them to then come forward with other information. That is the whole point, and I still do not think that has been addressed by the Government.

[Tom Pursglove]

I recognise the sincerity of the hon. Gentleman’s concern about this. What I would say to him, as I have now said many times, is that I expect appropriate decisions to be taken on a case-by-case basis, taking proper account of all the circumstances, mitigations and issues that people bring forward in relation to good reasons. I am confident that that process can be properly developed and delivered in a way that is responsive to those sorts of issues. That is why—to address the point made by the hon. Member for Halifax—it is difficult to put a precise time on when that guidance will be put in place, for the simple reason that we want to engage properly with the sector in the way that I have outlined. I want that to be a thorough process and for the guidance to be put in place in an appropriate manner that is as exhaustive as possible, but does not lack common sense and means that proper consideration is given to the many varied reasons that people may have for providing information late, for example.

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[Tom Pursglove]

Clause 47 sets out the consequence if an individual who has been served with a slavery or trafficking information notice as discussed under clause 46 provides information relating to being a victim of modern slavery after the specified time period. The clause aims to ensure that possible victims are identified as early as possible to receive appropriate support and to reduce potential misuse of the national referral mechanism system from referrals intended to delay removal action. Under clause 47, the decision maker must decide whether information provided through the one-stop process is outside the specified time limit and therefore is late. This consideration will take into account whether there was a good reason for the late information, such as the impact of trauma, but where there are no good reasons, an individual’s credibility is damaged due to the provision of late information.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The Minister referred to abusing the process but he has not said much about what evidence there is for this problem. What is the scale of it? Much like statelessness, perhaps he could write to us with the evidence of what it is that the Government are trying to get at here. The big problem is the three-year delay for making decisions. Is not that the problem rather than anything that the Minister has referred to?

[Tom Pursglove]

I recognise the invitation to write with more detail around this and I am happy to do that. That would be advantageous to the Committee. Given that time is getting on and we want to continue to make progress, I am very happy to take that request back to the Department. I will provide that information.

The Government will ensure that any changes to processes as a result of these measures are designed in a way that accounts for the impact of trauma. This includes ensuring that individuals working in the system are aware of the factors that can affect the task of obtaining information such as the effects traumatic events can have on people’s ability to accurately recall such events. This assessment will be set out in guidance for decision makers and we will engage stakeholders as we develop it. We will continue to consider all referrals on a case-by-case basis to ensure that support is tailored to the needs of genuine victims.

Nationality and Borders Bill (Thirteenth sitting)

Stuart C McDonald Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 2nd November 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Holly Lynch]

I have heard some of the Minister’s attempts at reassurance. I have real concerns about some of the changes to the reasonable grounds decision. We heard in earlier discussions on the Bill about the introduction of trafficking information notices, which I am concerned will affect the need to take the reasonable grounds decision quickly. The amendment could have been a step towards improved confidence in, and scrutiny of, those early decisions, so I continue to implore the Government to consider introducing those panels in the guidance. It may not need to be in primary legislation, but I hope that the Minister has heard the case for that approach. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

I beg to move amendment 176, in clause 48, page 43, line 17, leave out subsection (7).

Under this amendment and the corresponding amendment to clause 57, the Secretary of State would no longer be able to change the definition of slavery and human trafficking by regulations. Instead, any changes to the definition of slavery would require primary legislation.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 177, in clause 57, page 51, leave out lines 42 and 43.

Under this amendment and the corresponding amendment to clause 48, the Secretary of State would no longer be able to change the definition of slavery and human trafficking by regulations. Instead, any changes to the definition of slavery would require primary legislation.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Sir Roger. Last week, I was speculating about how long the Immigration Minister might be in post, but I was still shocked. Seriously, we all pass on our best wishes to him for a speedy recovery. I congratulate the Lord Commissioner of Her Majesty’s Treasury, the hon. Member for Calder Valley, on his temporary promotion.

On the whole, we have stayed out of debates on the clause, despite having lots of sympathy for what the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Halifax, has been saying. The clause largely applies only to England and Wales—distinct legislation is in place in Scotland and Northern Ireland. However, one part of the clause amends the “Interpretation” section of the 2015 Act and that does extend to Scotland and Northern Ireland. With the amendment, we are just posing some questions for the Minister. I appreciate that it is not easy for him to answer in these circumstances, so anything in writing afterwards would be more than acceptable.

Under the 2015 Act “victim of slavery” and “victim of human trafficking” are defined as applying to people who are victims of those respective crimes in the first couple of sections of that part of the legislation. That seemed a logical, straightforward and consistent way of doing things—define the criminal offences and then set out support regimes for victims of those offences. I have heard no complaint that that definition causes problems, but clauses 48 and 57 of the Bill—to which my amendments relate—will use a different definition of modern slavery.

The new definitions do not totally supplant the existing definitions of victims of modern slavery or trafficking in the 2015 Act, but they add a new and potentially different definition for the purposes of identification and support of the victims. The question therefore arises as to why we should have one definition of a victim for some purposes, but another for the purposes of identifying those to be supported? If there is to be a different definition, why is it not on the face of the Bill? Why is it, somewhat bizarrely, left to the Secretary of State to define in regulations what must be two of the most fundamental concepts for the purposes of this part of the Bill?

We do not know how the Secretary of State will use the powers, so that is another question for the Minister: what is the intention? It could be that she wants to be generous and to adopt a wider definition for the purposes of identifying and supporting victims and survivors. In line with other provisions of the Bill, however, it could be that she wants to be more restrictive and to confine the category of people who can get support to a much narrower group. If Parliament really wants to be back in control, it should not be allowing the Government to pass legislation such as this. I simply ask the Minister for an explanation as to why it has been done in this way.

[Craig Whittaker]

I thank the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East for his questions. Basically, he asked whether we are amending the definition of modern slavery, and the straightforward answer is no.

To underpin the measures in the Bill, we are creating a power to make regulations to define the meaning of “victim” in accordance with our ECAT obligations. The definition of a victim of slavery or trafficking for the purposes of the Bill will be set out in regulations made under the affirmative procedure.

The hon. Gentleman also asked why we are raising thresholds as such. As I said before, the proposed measure in this Bill will amend the wording of the reasonable grounds threshold in the Modern Slavery Act so that it mirrors some of our ECAT obligations. Alongside this, we are reviewing the reasonable grounds test and the corresponding guidance for decision makers to ensure they are best able to identify genuine victims and reduce the potential for non-genuine victims to misuse the system.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I thank the Minister for his answer. I have made the point I need to make, which is that it is not appropriate to leave it to regulations to define these two fundamental concepts. I am sure this is something that will be pursued in the House of Lords. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

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[The Chair]

In the light of the hon. Lady’s comments, we will also consider clause 49 stand part.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I will be brief, because I fully endorse what the shadow Minister has said. I absolutely welcome the fact that the measure will be in statute, but I share her concern and astonishment that the Government have decided, for no apparent reason, to reduce the prescribed recovery period to 30 days. Yes, that is consistent with the trafficking convention, but equally so is 45 days. There is nothing in the convention to say that it cannot be done and, for all the reasons she outlined, that was a welcome additional safeguard in the UK’s approach.

What is the Home Office driving at here? What signal does it send by making this change? As the shadow Minister pointed out, it is completely artificial, given where we are with average decision times. In one sense, this is just about sending signals. What a signal it sends—that we want to reduce the support given to folk who are suspected of being victims and survivors of trafficking. I support the amendment and endorse everything that the shadow Minister said.

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[Stuart C. McDonald]

I support the amendment and join the calls for the clause not to stand part of the Bill. I very much echo the comments of the shadow Minister. Like her, and as on previous occasions, I find myself not at all clear why the clause is necessary, and what problem it is driving at. Again, I find myself asking for evidence. I have not seen or heard about an issue with abusive additional trafficking claims sparking extra NRM recovery periods. I recognise that that could absolutely happen in theory, but we need much more by way of evidence before we enact such a clause.

Even though someone might be describing earlier events of trafficking, disclosure of that additional information and trafficking or slavery histories could have all sorts of significant implications for that survivor. It could, for example, mean a break from a controlling partner. It could give rise to other dangers for them or to new trauma. Furthermore, as the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner has noted, survivors can feel more able to disclose their trafficking experiences relating to one particular form of exploitation than another, so forced labour can sometimes be disclosed earlier than sexual exploitation, due to feelings of shame or mistrust.

The fact that if the competent authority considers it appropriate in the circumstances of a particular case another recovery period can be granted is better than nothing, and it is good that that provision is in the clause, but that protection needs to be considerably strengthened to ensure that those who need it will have it. As matters stand, we have no idea how that analysis is going to be undertaken. What if the disclosure of this new information leads to new dangers or new trauma? Surely we would all agree that that should require a new decision and a new recovery period, but there is nothing in the Bill to say that that would definitely happen.

Perhaps the clause should be reversed—the Home Office might want to consider turning the presumption around, so that we assume instead that a new recovery period would be needed unless we are satisfied with a very restricted route for a very restricted range of reasons, and the reasonable grounds decision should not occur. The Home Office needs to explain its thinking here.

Finally, on the issue of trafficking, the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner and the Rights Lab at the University of Nottingham are conducting research on that subject at this very moment in time. I urge the Home Office to wait to see the evidence, rather than jumping in with two feet.

[Craig Whittaker]

I would first like to clarify that the clause does not prevent individuals who have been re-trafficked from receiving a further recovery period. Rather, the clause introduces a presumption against multiple recovery periods where an individual has already benefitted from a recovery period and the further reported exploitation happened prior to the previous referral into the national referral mechanism and period of support. This is not a blanket disqualification from multiple recovery periods; it is focused on removing the presumption for multiple recovery periods where the period of exploitation happened before the original recovery period was provided.

The clause will provide further recovery periods where required—for example, where an individual has a second referral for an incident that happened before the first incident for which they were referred and have already received a recovery period. It may not be appropriate or necessary to provide the further recovery period. A discretionary element is included, underpinned by guidance, so that cases are considered on an individual basis.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I put to the hon. Gentleman the suggestion I made towards the end of my contribution: that he reverses the situation so that the presumption is that somebody does need an additional recovery period unless there are specific circumstances that mean it is not appropriate. Is that something he could pass on to his ministerial colleague, for when he takes the Bill forward?

[Craig Whittaker]

As I have said, there is already a provision for the decision makers to amend the care and support package needed on a case-by-case basis. That is the case for recovery periods as well. On the matter of children, I recognise the complexity of children’s vulnerabilities, as well as those of other modern slavey victims. As a result, this clause has scope to consider an individual’s circumstances, even where the new referral for exploitation occurred prior to the previous recovery period. That is why, under this clause, individuals will be considered for more than one recovery period on a case-by-case basis, taking into account their specific needs and vulnerability. Safeguarding and ensuring the welfare of children will, of course, be taken into account as part of any decision to withhold a recovery period.

Further details of how to apply this discretionary element will be outlined in guidance for decision makers. This will ensure that victims of modern slavery who genuinely need multiple periods of protection and support actually receive it. It would not be appropriate to have a blanket approach to children, but our proposed approach ensures that their vulnerabilities are considered. I hope that, in the light of that explanation, the hon. Member for Halifax will be content to withdraw her amendment.

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The clause will drive more people underground and make it significantly harder for the police and the authorities to investigate the perpetrators of human trafficking. It also sends a clear message to those perpetrators that they are free to exploit someone with a criminal record, knowing that they will be exempt from protection. We agree with the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner that securing prosecutions against those who commit those heinous crimes will become harder if the clause stands part, which we do not believe it should.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I rise to support the amendment and to make the case for the removal of the clause. The amendment is absolutely right, and excluding any survivors, especially children, from the scope of the clause will alleviate its worst impacts. The whole clause is bad.

Unlike with previous measures, it is absolutely apparent what the Government are driving at this time, but there is already a perfectly good procedure for dealing with this issue. Guidance implementing the European convention on action against trafficking says that where there is an improper claim of victim status, or there are public order grounds for doing so, the state can make a negative conclusive grounds decision and decide not to observe the reflection and recovery period. That remedy is available right now. How many times has that remedy been used in the United Kingdom? I hope the Minister can answer that, now or later.

The Home Office wants to go much further and help itself to a different remedy. Despite Home Office claims, nothing in the convention justifies simply failing altogether to make a conclusive grounds decision. On the contrary, article 10 of the convention requires states to identify victims, and that position is recognised in the Home Office’s guidance. That is why the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner has expressed, as we have heard, serious concern about the compatibility of the clause with ECAT—they just are not compatible. The measures will not only breach international obligations, but they will be counterproductive in the fight against trafficking and slavery.

We have already heard one or two of the case studies provided by the commissioner. I will add one more, from the Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit. It relates to the case of Z, who was trafficked to the UK after being used for prostitution in Europe for a number of years. Her child had been removed from her by the traffickers. She managed to escape from the traffickers in the UK, and used a false document that she grabbed during her escape, as she wanted to go back to Europe to find her child. She was arrested and prosecuted for a document offence and given a sentence of more than 12 months after being advised to plead guilty. Trafficking was never explored as part of the criminal process. Later, Z was referred to the NRM and claimed asylum. The Home Office agreed that she was a victim of trafficking, and she was then given leave to remain on that basis. It also agreed not to pursue deportation because of her trafficked status.

After Z was referred to the NRM, a decision still had to be made about whether she was a victim of trafficking. The Home Office ultimately decided to grant her leave to remain and halt deportation, having been required to make that decision. Had the clause been in force, Z would never have been identified as a victim of trafficking; she would have been deported. That would have been absolutely dreadful for Z, who would have lost out on support and help that she clearly needs for her recovery, but it is also dreadful for many others, because it will clearly make it infinitely more difficult to track down Z’s traffickers. They will not be apprehended, and other people will fall victim to the very same crime, as is shown by the other case studies provided by the Anti Trafficking and Labour Exploitation Unit, and by the commissioner in her letter to the Home Secretary.

In short, people who need support will be denied it, and the perpetrators of the crimes against them will not be caught and punished. As we have heard, the clause will simply encourage traffickers to target those who have criminal convictions and who are sentenced to more than two at once, and even compel them into criminal activity precisely so that the exclusions will apply to them if the trafficker threatens to disclose their crimes. We have heard from the commissioner that that is already the traffickers’ modus operandi—excuse me; my Latin is terrible. The reason is that traffickers know that the absence of support and removal from the country will make it easier for the trafficker and their colleagues to avoid justice. The clause is, in essence, a gift for people traffickers, and it totally undermines the work of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.

I will briefly mention some other problems. The commissioner has rightly expressed concern about the huge breadth of offences that would be caught by the provision, particularly as it includes sentences imposed outside the UK that might not reflect sentencing guidelines in the UK; that could mean that minor offences are brought within scope. Will the Minister confirm that trafficking victims who enter the UK in breach of clause 37 of the Bill would end up in prison, possibly for even three or four years, and would therefore be excluded from support? A huge proportion of survivors will be left with the threat of exclusion from support hanging over them, putting them in even more vulnerable position.

Why is the expression “bad faith” used in the clause, rather than the convention’s wording or the wording of the guidance that the Home Office has put in place, which relate to “improper purpose”? The use of a different form of words needs to be explained. Why is it that in some cases, suspicion of certain offences, rather than an actual conviction, is enough for exclusion? The key point is that if we do not identify victims, neither do we identify traffickers. In breach of the convention, the clause expressly provides for that, so it should be amended.

[Craig Whittaker]

Let me see whether I can answer some of those questions. The hon. Member for Halifax asked whether the clause is incompatible with the statutory safeguarding responsibilities. The answer to that question is no, it is not incompatible at all with the statutory safeguarding responsibilities. Section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 is a criminal defence, but clause 51 of the Bill is a very separate system. Section 45 is separate from the public order disqualification. A section 45 defence is not applicable to the serious crimes set out in schedule 4 of the Bill. The Government will of course continue to work with local authorities to safeguard children and take their particular vulnerabilities into account on a case-by-case basis.

I will just highlight one or two points that piggyback on the back of what the Government are doing in this field. The hon. Member for Halifax mentioned county lines, and we have invested in specialist support for the under-25s and their families who are affected by county lines exploitation in London, the west midlands and Merseyside. We also fund a missing persons safe call service—a national, confidential helpline for young people, families and carers who are concerned about county lines exploitation—and the Home Office is funding the Children’s Society’s prevention programme, which works to tackle and prevent child criminal exploitation, child sexual abuse and exploitation, and modern-day slavery and human trafficking on a regional and national basis. There is also a public awareness campaign that started in September, which is called Look Closer. What I would say to the hon. Member for Halifax is that the public order grounds for disqualification are set out in ECAT, in which it is envisaged that the recovery and reflection periods will be withheld—

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[Stuart C. McDonald]

That wording is absolutely right. It is possible for the recovery period to be withheld, but the convention absolutely does not allow for a decision to be made on public order grounds. It is absolutely contrary to article 10 of the convention. Does the Minister have anything that can help him with that point?

[Craig Whittaker]

As I have already explained, such decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis. Regardless of whether they are children or vulnerable people, it is important that all aspects of the individual’s case are taken into account, such as whether they have been exploited and to what extent.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I do not want to make life difficult for the Minister, because I know he is in a very difficult situation, but the point is that it will not happen on a case-by-case basis, because decisions will not be made at all. As a result of the clause, people will just be excluded altogether from having a decision made about them. The point is that there is no case-by-case basis. It is an absolute blanket, and huge swathes of people will just not have a decision made about them, with no assessment made of whether they might be a victim of trafficking.

[Craig Whittaker]

I thank the hon. Member for his further intervention. I will take some advice on the technicalities in what he says, but that is not my understanding of what the clause says. I have already said that the decision to withhold recovery periods on public order grounds will be made on a case-by-case basis. That will balance the need to safeguard exploited individuals against public protection concerns and allow the Secretary of State to withhold the protections of the national referral mechanism, where the particular circumstances of an individual mean it is appropriate to do so.

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[Holly Lynch]

Amendments 7, 5 and 6 concern the provisions to provide leave to remain for survivors of trafficking. Similar to our amendments to clause 52, amendment 5 seeks to bring the provisions in line with article 14 of ECAT by changing the criterion for providing leave to remain from “recovery” to “personal situation”. The reference to “personal situation” recognises that leave is necessary for a range of reasons. The explanatory report to ECAT states:

“The personal situation requirement takes in a range of situations, depending on whether it is the victim’s safety, state of health, family situation or some other factor which has to be taken into account.”

Amendment 6 would remove the criterion for not granting leave to remain if assistance could be provided in another country or compensation sought in another country. It is not clear why the Government introduced that criterion, and I would be grateful if the Minister could outline in his response how he could possibly envisage that working in practice.

Amendment 7 provides a clear minimum timeframe for granting leave to remain, thereby creating more certainty for victims. Under the Home Office’s current guidance on assessing discretionary leave for survivors of modern slavery, leave to remain is granted for a mixture of different time periods—sometimes as little as six months. Those timeframes are short, and the inconsistency can set back recovery.

In 2017, the UK Government issued figures on grants of leave to confirmed modern slavery victims. Some 21% of confirmed victims who were neither UK nor EU nationals were granted asylum in 2015. A group of more than 13 frontline charities that are expert practitioners in providing support to victims of slavery highlighted the problem, stating that:

“The support currently provided to survivors of human trafficking and modern slavery is not meeting recovery needs. Government funded support ends abruptly and too early and there is little information or data as to what happens to survivors in the longer term. The current situation leaves survivors with little realistic opportunity to rebuild their lives, with some ending up destitute, vulnerable to further harm or even being re-exploited.”

The Government may argue that they are already providing support for confirmed victims in England and Wales through the recovery needs assessment. However, under the RNA, victims are not guaranteed long-term support. Victims will receive a minimum of 45 days of move-on support, with the RNA determining how much—if any—extra support is required under the modern slavery victim care contract; that extra support will be for a maximum of six months at time, and may be only a few days or weeks.

Furthermore, Labour believes that victims’ needs are not fully addressed in the RNA. In the 2020 annual report on modern slavery, the support recommended by victim support workers was agreed to in full by the Home Office in only 53% of cases, which raises questions as to whether the process genuinely responds to victims’ needs or is, instead, focused on moving victims out of the service. In summary, amendments 7, 5 and 6 are necessary to address the fundamental challenge facing victims and provide them with far greater certainty.

Amendment 189 is necessary because all child victims must be granted immigration leave in line with their best interests as standard, as stated in international law and UK guidance. The amendment seeks to incorporate the entitlement to immigration leave for child victims as per article 14 of ECAT into primary legislation. It will specify that if the person is aged 17 or younger at the point of referral into the national referral mechanism, the Secretary of State must give the person leave to remain in the United Kingdom if that is in the person’s best interests, giving due consideration to a victim’s need for support and care and a sustainable arrangement.

The Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner has echoed concerns on the lack of clarity around what the clause would mean in practice for children, with this having been acknowledged in the Government’s response to the new plan for immigration consultation. Dame Sara Thornton states

“it is disappointing that this detail was not included as part of the Bill”,

and we share that frustration. There is no consistent public data available on the outcomes for potential child victims of trafficking, but evidence shows that our current policies are not being implemented adequately.

Every Child Protected Against Trafficking requested data through the Freedom of Information Act on the immigration outcomes for those exploited as children, the response to which showed alarming results in the data. It found that only about 5% of child-related considerations resulted in a positive decision for discretionary leave. The data indicates that discretionary leave is not being granted to children as victims of trafficking, and that in the small number of cases where it is, the average length of grant is short, suggesting that decisions are not being taken with their best interests as a primary consideration, providing minimal stability.

How many child victims of trafficking were subsequently granted indefinite leave to remain under the policy is unknown but, based on those figures, we can estimate that they are few. That is despite the explicit current policy that states the need to consider the length of leave, including a grant of indefinite leave to remain in line with the child’s best interests. That requirement is set out to fulfil the Secretary of State’s statutory obligation under section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 to safeguard and promote the wellbeing of children. All child victims of trafficking must be granted immigration leave in line with their best interests as only standard, as stated in international law and UK guidance.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I want to say a few words in support of the amendments, which have the SNP’s full support. Currently, while someone might be in limbo for a long time, they are more secure the day after their referral into the NRM than they are the day after they receive a positive conclusive grounds decision, and that is not right. If they have been accepted as a survivor of trafficking, it makes them less secure. We should move towards a period of automatic leave to remain. The provision of leave is often an absolute prerequisite for meaningful recovery. With some security of status, the ability to seek employment or education and participate in the community builds confidence and stability, and the amendments broaden the number who will achieve that stability.

We also absolutely agree that there are problems regarding consistency between article 14 of the trafficking convention and current Home Office guidance. That is what amendment 5 would fix, so we support it. The convention speaks of allowing leave where necessary, given a survivor’s personal situation, and the explanatory report to the convention refers to issues around safety, their state of health, and the family situation or similar. The Home Office guidance calls for a much broader, individualised human rights and children’s safeguarding legislation-based approach, which seeks to protect and assist a victim and safeguard their human rights. Decision makers are to assess whether a grant of leave is necessary to meet the UK’s objectives under the trafficking convention and to provide protection and assistance to that victim owing to their personal situation. The current guidance is therefore closer to the convention than what is in this Bill.

The clause considerably reduces the scope of article 14 and the idea of a personal situation by adopting wording from the totally different article 12 and not offering any justification for that. The purpose and aim of leave to remain is recovery first in the host state if a survivor seeks that before any further upheaval is forced on them. That helps a survivor, and it helps us with law enforcement. It is also the only realistic way that they will be able to seek redress through compensation from those who exploited them. Pursuing such compensation from abroad just does not happen in practice.

Putting emphasis on the possibility that protection might be offered in the survivor’s home state, as the clause does, risks undermining a proper analysis of the personal circumstances as a whole and risks putting survivors back to square one and at risk of re-trafficking. Crucially, watering down the current position will mean fewer survivors remaining here or being in the best position to work with law enforcement authorities to bring the perpetrators of these awful crimes to justice. Again, that is dreadful news for survivors, but dreadful news for all of us as the perpetrators will escape punishment and other people will become the next victims. We support these amendments and call on the Government to explain why they do not just adopt the wording of article 14 of the European convention.

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[Craig Whittaker]

As I clearly stated in my previous answer, each individual case will be treated on the merits of that case, so it will be the decision makers’ decision as to what action, care or support will be needed for the individual.

Let me go back to what I was saying about amendment 7. To specify the length of time up front is not required in legislation, as that can be better met through provision in guidance and flexibility for the decision makers to determine it.

With regard to amendment 5, I think we agree that the primary aim here is to provide clarity to victims on the circumstances in which they are eligible for a grant of temporary leave to remain. To support clarity of decision making, we have sought to define the circumstances in which victims are eligible for a grant of modern slavery-specific leave. By contrast, amendment 5 would reduce clarity by providing that leave should be granted where necessary to assist the individual in their “personal situation”, without actually defining the term “personal situation”. This is why we have chosen to define what we mean by “personal situation” in this clause, for domestic purposes, and have set out that temporary leave to remain will be provided where it is necessary to assist an individual

“in their recovery from any harm arising from the relevant exploitation to their physical and mental health and their social well-being”.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

But the point is that “personal situation” is the wording in the convention and it is also the wording in the Home Office’s own guidance, and I do not understand it to have created problems for the Home Office up to this point. The problem is that this Bill is narrowing the scope of the circumstances that will be taken into account when considering this.

[Craig Whittaker]

The clause defines what personal circumstances mean. Amendment 5 does not do that and, in doing so, reduces clarity for victims. That is completely against the aim of the clause, which is to give clarity to victims.

Nationality and Borders Bill (Fourteenth sitting)

Stuart C McDonald Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 2nd November 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

The Public Gallery is becoming a little crowded. I encourage everyone sitting there to spread out as much as possible, to ensure social distancing.

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

I would like to speak to clause stand part, and I support everything that the hon. Member for Sheffield Central has already said. We all recognise how important it is to get age assessments right, while acknowledging that it will always be an imperfect process. As he said, what precisely is the nature and scale of the problem that the Government are driving at here? Of course, it is important to ensure as far as possible that adults are not placed in child settings, but the overall tenor of the evidence that we have received is that placing children in adult settings is an even greater risk. If a young adult is placed in a setting designed for older children, there will at least be child-specific safeguarding and other age-appropriate support. If a child is wrongly placed in adult reception and immigration processes, there are no such protections, and such a decision can have profound impacts on and consequences for a child.

First and foremost, we should continue to think about age assessments as a function of the child protection and safeguarding system, not of the immigration system. The responsibility should remain with social workers, whose expertise and experience make them by far the best people to undertake such assessments where support is required. We should preserve the current position, which does not place an evidential burden on a child or young adult but leaves the decision makers to weigh up all the evidence to a reasonable degree of likelihood. The Home Office has quite simply offered no sound reasons for undermining that arrangement and for imposing a higher standard of proof.

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[Mr Goodwill]

I have just had a look at the NHS website and it says that having an X-ray is equivalent to one or two days of background radiation. If someone takes a short-haul flight, the amount of radiation they are likely to be exposed to is probably more than an X-ray, particularly if it is on a limb and not on the main body.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I do not have access to that webpage, but the right hon. Gentleman has access to the extensive evidence submitted to the Committee by the BDA. It is a two-sided issue. First, it is not appropriate to subject people to radiation, and in this case there is no informed consent. The evidence is clear. The Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health is clear that an assessment can be no more accurate than two years either side. The British Society for Paediatric Endocrinology and Diabetes is clear that we cannot assess a child’s age just physically or by analysing bones.

In short, if a decision maker says that somebody is 18 years old, the person is just as likely to be 16 or 20. These new clauses leave the Secretary of State with powers that are far too broad. She should at least be required to have consent and approval from professional bodies, whether medical, dental or scientific. The insistence that so-called scientific methods can be used anyway if the decision maker considers it appropriate—as enabled by new clause 32(9)—totally undermines the other safeguards. It must be removed.

[Mr Goodwill]

The hon. Member is very generous in giving way. Is he saying, in effect, that in every case we should take the person’s word for how old they are and treat them as children, even if there is scientific evidence that they may be many years older than 18?

[Stuart C. McDonald]

No, I am not saying that. What I am advocating is the position at present—that the decision maker looks at all the evidence that is available in the round. If somebody is 50, I cannot imagine them needing an invasive scientific procedure to establish that they are over 18. I am not by any stretch of the imagination saying that we just take somebody’s word for it. I am advocating for the status quo. By all means the Government can introduce some sort of advisory board, but that should not supplant and take over the functions of local authorities—but that, unfortunately, is how I see these new clauses working.

The new clauses suggest that there will be implications for a person’s credibility if they choose not to undergo the medical procedures. I object, as a point of principle, to Parliament telling decision makers what to think about someone’s credibility when it is those decision makers—not us—who know the circumstances of the decision that they have to make. It is particularly objectionable given that professional medical bodies thoroughly object to these so-called scientific procedures. Despite the fact that professional bodies have said that these tests are inappropriate, the Government are telling decision makers that, if a young person says, “Well, the medical professionals say this is inappropriate, so I won’t undergo this,” they must find that young person lacking in credibility.

I repeat the point I made in relation to earlier clauses about the impugning of the credibility of those making statements on someone’s behalf. It is especially bizarre that a medical report by a multi-disciplinary panel of experts could have its credibility maligned simple because a child or young adult refuses to undergo one of these so-called scientific methods of testing introduced through regulations by the Secretary of State. Not only is it bizarre; it also undermines the fundamental idea that people should be able to give free consent to medical procedures and examinations, and not be pressured into them. Similarly, it undermines the principle that such a procedure should happen only if it delivers a scientific benefit for that person.

What consultation has there been? We have not been able properly to scrutinise or ask questions of relevant witnesses in relation to these specific provisions. Is consent to be sought from devolved Governments on the basis that large tracts of these new clauses relate to how local authorities should exercise functions related to devolved legislation? In the absence of assurances on any of those fronts—the evidence of problems, proper consultation and devolved consent—the case for change is absolutely not made. On the contrary, there are all sorts of dangers in these clauses that could have serious consequences for children.

[Anne McLaughlin (Glasgow North East) (SNP)]

I will be brief, as I have just a couple of questions. Ethics aside, as is the want of this Government—if that is not the case, why are they running away from the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Sheffield Central?—I want to look at the issue of estimating the maturity of a child’s skeletal system by comparing images with databases of children of the same age and gender. Do children in Ethiopia develop at a comparable rate to children in the UK, because I understand that that is who they are going to be compared to? Do children in Eritrea and Sudan develop at the same rate? The British Medical Association seems pretty certain that they do not. If that is the case, how long will it take to build databases of comparable images for each country or region, and has that work started?

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[Jonathan Gullis (Stoke-on-Trent North) (Con)]

It will probably not shock Committee members that I support what the Government are doing on age assessments. Ultimately, it is about ensuring that we protect our young people in our United Kingdom. When people say that they are children and will be in a classroom surrounded by people of a similar age, we need to make sure that they are indeed children.

As a former teacher, I understand the importance of this. As a former head of year who had responsibility for safeguarding, covering welfare, attendance and the behaviour of young people, it makes no sense to me why anyone would oppose a measure to make sure that people who claim to be young people are indeed young people. An individual who has nothing to hide should have nothing to fear in this regard. It is absolutely essential that age assessments take place to make sure that people claiming to be of school age are indeed of that ilk, because ultimately other young people could be put in a very vulnerable situation.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

We want age assessments to be as accurate as they can be at the moment, not just through the work of social work groups but with input from outside. Does the hon. Gentleman have any concerns about the impact on children who end up being wrongly placed in adult facilities?

[Jonathan Gullis]

Of course—absolutely. Young people should not be placed in a situation like that, for safety reasons. As a former teacher, I would not want a 14 or 15-year-old to be somewhere they felt unsafe. The problem is that we have a broken asylum system that needs fixing. Age assessments can be avoided if people do not try to enter the country illegally, but come by safe and legal routes, where we can have documentation.

There are other ways to prove someone’s identity, age and application, as we have done in Afghanistan and Syria, which will ultimately be a much better system than having illegal economic migrants crossing the English channel from Calais and entering this country illegally. They are putting a huge strain on the public services of our country and on the people of Stoke-on-Trent North, Kidsgrove and Talke, whose area is the fifth largest contributor to the asylum dispersal scheme.

Age assessment is absolutely essential. It is another way of reminding people that if they make an illegal entry into this country they will face a number of procedures to verify the credibility of their asylum claim, their identity and their age, in order to ensure we protect our country’s young and vulnerable people. It is the right and proper thing to, and I fully applaud the Minister on pushing this essential clause.

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Reflecting on the safeguards in the Bill and the pre-existing processes to ensure safe and ethical applications for the various technologies—before I finish, I will give way.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The Minister is outlining what he sees as safeguards. I am unconvinced. New clause 32(9) seems to say that nothing prevents the use of a scientific method, even if it is not specified in regulations and so on, if the decision maker considers it appropriate and, where necessary, consent is given. Given that there are implications if consent is not provided, that surely rides roughshod over all the other protections that the Minister just outlined.

[Craig Whittaker]

I will come on to that when I discuss further measures in new clause 32, but our opinion is that the amendment is not necessary and I ask the hon. Member for Sheffield Central to withdraw it. On the new clauses, clause 58 is one of the six clauses drafted as placeholder clauses of introduction, as indicated in the explanatory notes and memorandum for the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. It was drafted as such in the interests of transparency to make clear our intention to bring forward substantive provision on age assessment. New clauses 29 to 37 are intended to replace clause 58 entirely.

Before I touch on the other clauses, regarding new clause 32, we have already said that determining a young person’s age is an inherently difficult task. One of the questions posed earlier was how we do that as a comparator between other young people growing up in less well-developed countries. Under current arrangements where an individual’s age is disputed, local authorities must already undertake an age assessment. That typically involves two appropriately qualified social workers undertaking a series of interviews with the young person and taking into account any other information that is relevant to their age. However, even where those assessments are conducted thoroughly and reach reasoned conclusions, they are fraught with difficulty, as one would imagine. Such assessments can have a wide margin of error. We are aware of cases where a Merton-compliant age assessment, as they are called, has been conducted on the same individual by different social workers and has come to very different conclusions about the person’s age. Given that context, the use of scientific age assessments represents an additional and important source of evidence to help decision makers in a difficult task, allowing them to better come to accurate judgments. At the end of the day, that is our aim.

Various scientific methods of age assessment are already in use across most European countries, and have been for several years. In Finland and Norway, which I mentioned earlier, radiographs are taken to examine development of the teeth and the fusion of bones in the wrist. Two certified experts perform the age assessment and must jointly agree on the person’s age. In France, X-rays are taken to examine the fusion of the collarbone, alongside dental and wrist X-rays. In Greece, dental X-rays are used alongside social worker assessments.

[Craig Whittaker]

I suspect that the answer to the hon. Lady’s question is that how that is assessed will be down to the individual scientific advice given on the individual case at the time. I cannot see a like-for-like comparator for a child from Ethiopia or Sudan, which was mentioned earlier, being a child in this country. That is why the scientific evidence is a much more accurate way of assessing. It can be a great tool in the arsenal of assessing a child when compared with our existing system, which is the Merton assessment by two individual social workers. Given the challenges of assessing an individual’s age, we see no good reason why such technologies should not also be used. In all good faith, this is one of several tools in the arsenal. To further enhance my answer to the question asked by the hon. Lady, the precise scientific method of assessment will be specified in regulation, following scientific advice.

We are also making it clear within new clause 32 that a decision maker will be able to draw a negative credibility inference if an individual refuses to undergo a scientific age assessment without reasonable grounds. The introduction of any scientific method would be entirely undermined if someone who was asked to undergo such an assessment could simply refuse to co-operate. By legislating to develop our own scientific age assessment capability, we hope to emulate best practice across Europe and to ensure that unaccompanied asylum-seeking children are provided with the care they are entitled to in a safe environment.

Let me turn to the rest of the amendments in the group before I answer some of the questions. Amendment 168 is consequential on new clauses 32 and 33. It provides that the regulation-making powers in the clauses are commenced automatically two months after Royal Assent.

The purpose of new clause 29 is to define an “age-disputed person” and to set the parameters to whom the age-assessment clauses apply. It clarifies the meaning of a number of terms, including “age-disputed person”, “immigration functions”, “immigration officer” and the respective definitions of “local authority” in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. The clause also defines the meaning of “relevant children’s legislation” across the four nations of the United Kingdom.

New clause 30 relates to the establishment of a decision-making function in the Home Office, referred to as the national age assessment board, or the NAAB, as I think the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate referred to it. The NAAB will have responsibility for conducting age assessments of age-disputed persons on referral from the local authority or another public authority specified in regulation. Where an age-disputed person is referred to the NAAB by a local authority, the NAAB assessment will be binding on both the Home Office, in relation to immigration functions, and the local authority when determining access to children’s services. Alongside new clause 30, new clause 31 relates to the establishment of the NAAB. While most NAAB age assessments will be conducted on referral from a local authority, the new clause stipulates that the NAAB may, in certain situations, conduct age assessments on age-disputed persons for the sole purpose of deciding whether or how the Secretary of State should exercise any immigration functions.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Will the Minister say a little bit more about the NAAB? Who will be appointed to it, how will it generally undertake assessments and how will its independence from the Home Office be ensured?

[Craig Whittaker]

I assure the hon. Gentleman that I will answer him before I finish answering the other questions, if indeed I can find the answer in my book.

I have covered new clause 32 quite extensively. New clause 33 provides the Secretary of State with the power to make regulations about the way in which age assessments are to be conducted under the provisions in new clauses 30 and 31. It will provide the Secretary of State with the power to provide more clarity on what a comprehensive age assessment should entail, including, where appropriate, existing elements of age assessment case law. It will be mandatory for local authorities and the Secretary of State to follow these requirements when conducting age assessments. New clause 34 provides for a right of appeal to the first-tier tribunal for an age-disputed person who has been subject to age assessment. In considering an appeal, the tribunal will be able to consider any evidence it deems relevant. It will determine the age of the age-disputed individual and assign them a date of birth.

New clause 35 provides clarity in a number of areas related to the appeal of an age assessment decision. First, a person who brings such an appeal must do so while they are here in the United Kingdom. If they leave the United Kingdom before the appeal is finally determined, the appeal is discontinued. Secondly, the clause provides for the appellant to apply to the tribunal for an order. Pending the outcome of the appeal, the local authority must exercise its function under children’s legislation as if the person is the age they claim to be. Where an age assessment has been made and the individual has not brought an appeal, or has concluded the appeal process, new clause 36 provides a mechanism for them to make further representations to a decision maker where they have new evidence to submit in support of their claimed age. That covers all the specific parts of the new clauses.

The hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate asked me about hotel accommodation. In cases involving a child, local authorities obviously will have obligations to look after them. For adults, hotels are not detention centres, and adults are not held their against their will. There is a duty of care on the local authority when someone is placed there; it is required to give wraparound care for that individual, particularly for children. I cannot really see children being placed there by themselves, but I understand what the hon. Gentleman is saying about where there is an issue around age. Somebody could slip through the net, but the local authority would be required to give wraparound care.

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[Stuart C. McDonald]

I echo what the shadow Minister said. This is all really political theatre—a move to get immigration lawyers. As a former immigration lawyer, I cannot let these clauses pass without comment. In my experience, immigration lawyers are a group of people who do an invaluable job, and not one that there is a queue of folk desperate to do. It is a difficult job. Most clients have no resources; legal aid budgets are far from easy; many clients can be communicated with only through interpreters, who are often hard to find; and these lawyers are dealing with facts, circumstances, documents and other evidence from jurisdictions thousands of miles away. The pressures can be enormous. These lawyers are acutely aware that in some cases, if they get things wrong, the client’s life, liberty or human rights are at serious risk.

This group have been egregiously maligned by the Home Secretary and the Home Office. Here, they are singled out again. It is wrong, reckless and counter- productive. It is wrong because, not for the first time, we are being asked to make law on the basis of anecdote, rather than detailed evidence. As has been said, the immigration tribunals have all the powers that they need in their case management, cost and referral powers. They do not need these new, distinct and very controversial powers. Given the difficult job that we recognise these lawyers do, and the significant pressures that they face, the very last thing we should do is create a threat of their having to pay money for taking on a case. As the shadow Minister said, the measures create the risk of a conflict of interest, because solicitors could find that doing the right thing for their client, or following their client’s instructions, puts them at risk of having to pay a financial penalty.

The measures are also wrong because immigration lawyers have been singled out. I would have thought alarm bells would be ringing in the Home Office at the idea of putting in place a procedure that will apply only to lawyers operating on behalf of non-nationals. I suspect this would see the Home Office in court again. I could go along to the immigration tribunal and do something that I might do without facing consequences in the social security tribunal, employment tribunal, tax tribunal or any other tribunal; but I would find that in the immigration tribunal, there were special provisions in place for me to pay some sort of financial penalty. That seems odd.

Speaking of the tax tribunal, the provisions are essentially a tax. We do not know how much the tax will be, because we are not given any indication at all of the nature of the penalties involved, but it is a tax, because it is not compensation to the other party for wasted costs—we already have provision for that. The money goes straight to the Exchequer. On the other side of the coin, if the Government representative is guilty of this misconduct, the Government pay themselves. They hand over money to the Exchequer. There is not equality of arms, by any stretch of the imagination.

As the shadow Minister said, the measure is also counterproductive, because when the conduct described in the new procedure rules occurs, we will end up with endless hearings, and solicitors will be repeatedly made to come to hearings, just to explain why the situation happened. That is a waste of time, and in absolutely nobody’s interests. I have no idea what the Home Office is playing at here, other than performing political theatre and again having a go at immigration lawyers. If hon. Members want an example of vexatious, unreasonable conduct, they should read these two clauses, because that is exactly what they are.

[Craig Whittaker]

I have already spoken on clause 62; let me comment on clause 63. I apologise, Ms McDonagh, but I did not realise we were taking them together.

Representatives and relevant participants in the legal process on both sides have a role in ensuring that appeals run smoothly so that justice can be served. However, there has been clear judicial concern about the behaviours of some legal representatives in immigration and asylum cases, and we are seeking to strengthen the tribunal’s ability to tackle such conduct. As has been mentioned, judges can already issue a wasted costs order when a legal representative acts in a negligent, improper or unreasonable way that causes legal costs to be wasted. The tribunal can also award costs if a party to the appeal has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting proceedings, which is called an unreasonable costs order.

Costs orders are rarely made and are generally considered only at the request of the other party. To encourage more use of those existing powers, clause 63 provides a duty on the tribunal procedure committee to introduce tribunal procedure rules in the immigration and asylum chamber, which will lead judges to more regularly consider making a wasted costs order or an unreasonable costs order, or the new tribunal costs order introduced by clause 62. That will ensure that circumstances and behaviours that have warranted the making of costs orders previously will more often give rise to judicial attention. Existing case law identifies the types of circumstances and behaviours that have led to costs orders being made or considered, and the principles applied by the courts. Those have included showing a complete disregard for procedural rules, for example through abusing court processes in relation to evidence or the timing of applications.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill

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[Craig Whittaker]

I can assure the hon. Gentleman that clause 65 was taken from the “Windrush Lessons Learned Review”, which is why it is in the Bill.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

What is taken from that review is perhaps the need for consolidation of immigration legislation, nationality legislation and so on, which I would absolutely support. The challenge with the clause as drafted is that it proposes pretty huge and wide-ranging powers. The Secretary of State can amend pretty much any old Act of Parliament if, in her opinion, it facilitates what is otherwise desirable in connection with the consolidation. It could rewrite citizenship laws, for example, or the entire immigration system. There is a check on it in the sense that the regulations will not come into force until a consolidation Act is passed. There is a broader question about how often Governments tend to help themselves to massive Henry VIII powers when they rewrite all sorts of stuff. I have made that point a million times and nobody listens, so I will leave it at that.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 65 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 66 to 68 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 69

Extent

Amendment made: 120, in clause 69, page 58, line 28, at end insert—

‘(4) A power under any provision listed in subsection (5) may be exercised so as to extend, with or without modifications, to any of the Channel Islands or the Isle of Man any amendment made by any of the following provisions to legislation to which the power relates—

(a) section 37 (illegal entry and similar offences), insofar as it relates to the insertion of subsection (C1A) into section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971;

(b) section(Electronic travel authorisations)(electronic travel authorisations);

(c) section(Liability of carriers)(liability of carriers).

(5) Those provisions are—

(a) section 36 of the Immigration Act 1971;

(b) section 170(7) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999;

(c) section 163(4) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.”—(Craig Whittaker.)

This amendment amends clause 69 (extent) to provide that the amendments made by the provisions listed in new subsection (4) may be extended to the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man under the Order in Council provisions listed in new subsection (5).

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move amendment 186, in clause 69, page 58, line 28, at end insert—

‘(4) Part 4 (modern slavery) only extends to Scotland to the extent that a motion has been approved by the Scottish Parliament, bringing it into force in Scotland.

(5) Part 4 (modern slavery) only extends to Northern Ireland to the extent that a motion has been approved by the Northern Ireland Assembly, bringing it into force in Northern Ireland.”

Under this amendment, Part 4 of the Bill would not enter into force in Scotland or Northern Ireland until the relevant devolved legislatures had given their consent.

I am sorry to have to take the Committee back to part 4 and modern slavery and trafficking. The amendment relates to a similar issue that I raised in connection with age assessments, because I tend to believe that certain provisions in part 4 encroach on devolved competences in relation to Scotland and Northern Ireland. Given the way that the part 4 is drafted, the Government have recognised that modern slavery and trafficking is a matter that is devolved to both those jurisdictions. That is why certain clauses do not impact on them. However, in this amendment, we are suggesting simply that the Government should go further. For example, in my view, the recovery period is clearly within the competency of the Scottish Government and I think, also, the Northern Ireland Assembly. However, clause 49 interferes with the start and end points of that period. Clauses 46 and 47 trample all over the idea that identification of victims of slavery and trafficking are devolved matters. So too does clause 51. For those reasons, I am prompting the Minister on what engagement there has been and is ongoing and whether a legislative consent motion should be requested from the Scottish Parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly before the Bill is passed.

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[Craig Whittaker]

It is very kind of the hon. Gentleman to interject before I had finished my sentence. Some provisions will apply only to England and Wales. Those provisions are about matters that are devolved in Scotland and Northern Ireland, but are reserved to the UK Parliament in England and Wales. They are civil legal aid, support for victims of modern slavery offences and the early release scheme.

Turning to the extent outside the UK, part 1— nationality provisions—will also extend to the Crown dependencies of Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man, and also the British overseas territories. That follows discussions between the UK Government, the devolved Administrations, the Crown dependencies and the British overseas territories. I want to clarify that we intend to table a further amendment to add a permissive extent clause on Report. That will enable the Crown dependencies to adopt other parts of the Bill that are relevant to them.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am grateful to the Minister for his response and for his assurances that engagement has been taking place and is ongoing. I accept that the amendment is not practicable, because it impinges on reserved matters. The other side of the coin is also true and this was about provoking a discussion about which parts of the Bill the Home Office has identified as relating to devolved matters. The Minister has listed some, which is helpful, but I do not think he has completely listed all that would apply and should be described as devolved. For example, age assessments quite clearly relate in some circumstances to devolved functions regarding children. More relevant to this amendment debate is modern slavery, as I said—for example, the length of the recovery and reflection period and various other matters in relation to identification of victims are, absolutely and definitely, devolved. That is why we have separate modern slavery and trafficking legislation in Northern Ireland and Scotland.

I have done what I needed to do, which is to suggest that the Home Office has a look at whether a legislative consent memorandum is required, but I will leave it there. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 69, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 70

Commencement

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

I beg to move amendment 107, in clause 70, page 58, line 30, leave out “and (4)” and insert “to (5)”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 109.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 108, in clause 70, page 58, line 42, leave out paragraphs (d) and (e).

This amendment is consequential on an Amendment 109.

Amendment 109, in clause 70, page 59, line 9, at end insert—

“(5) Sections 27 to 35 may not be commenced before—

(a) the Secretary of State has consulted with such parties as the Secretary of State considers appropriate on—

(i) the compatibility of each section with the Refugee Convention; and

(ii) the domestic and international implications of the UK adopting each section;

(b) the Secretary of State has laid before Parliament a report on the outcome of that consultation stating which parties were consulted, and stating in respect of each section—

(i) the views of the parties consulted on its compatibility and implications;

(ii) the differences between the interpretation of the Convention provided by the section and any interpretations provided by the higher courts before the passing of this Act;

(iii) the reasons why the Secretary of State concludes that the section should be commenced; and

(c) both Houses of Parliament have considered that report and approved the commencement of each of the sections that is to be commenced.

(6) For the purposes of subsection (5)—

“interpretation provided by the higher courts” means an interpretation provided by any judgement of the High Court or Court of Appeal in England and Wales, of the Court of Session in Scotland, of the High Court or Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland or of the United Kingdom Supreme Court that has not been superseded.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to hold consultations on the compatibility of Clauses 27 to 35 with the Refugee Convention, and to report to Parliament on such consultations, before the relevant Clauses enter into force.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

God loves a tryer, and I do try. The amendments are another attempt to encourage the Government to set out their legal thinking on the compatibility of the clauses cited in amendment 109 with the refugee convention. How do the Government think that the provisions in clauses 27 to 35 can be consistent with the refugee convention?

There is significant concern among some Members from all parties on this issue. So far, we have been told repeatedly by a Minister that the Government are committed to living up to their international obligations, and we have had a lot of assertions that the Bill is consistent with those obligations. However, as I have said, I am not aware of any lawyer with expertise in the area who supports that conclusion.

On the contrary, we have a detailed published opinion from Matrix Chambers that the Bill is absolutely not compliant with the refugee convention. Alongside that, organisations such as the Immigration Law Practitioners Association and various others have come to the same conclusion. Crucially, the ultimate authority on the convention, the UNHCR, published detailed reasoning for its view that certain clauses do not comply with the convention.

In the circumstances, I might be asking a little too much to expect a detailed legal treatise from the Minister today. However, he must at least accept that this state of affairs is not good enough. On the one side, we have extensive published arguments that the Bill breaches the refugee convention and, on the other side, we just have assurances that everything is in accordance with our international obligations. If MPs are to make a properly informed judgment on this on Report and Third Reading, it is incumbent on the Government to provide their legal arguments in more detail.

[Craig Whittaker]

We have listened carefully to the arguments in favour of amendments 107 to 109, which I will speak to collectively. I thank hon. Members for moving and tabling them, and I agree that it is important that the United Kingdom continues to meet its obligations under the refugee convention and other international conventions and treaties.

I am taking amendments 107 to 109 together because they all seek to achieve the same goal. We do not support them. They seek to delay the commencement of clauses 27 to 35 until their compatibility with the refugee convention has been consulted on and reported to Parliament. As the Committee knows, the UK has a proud history of providing protection to those who need it, in accordance with our international obligations under the convention. I assure hon. Members that every clause in the Bill, including clauses 27 to 35, adheres to our obligations under the refugee convention.

There is no uniform international interpretation of many of the key concepts in the refugee convention. That is an inevitable result of the very nature of international conventions. They are designed to be applied to a range of systems and scenarios across the globe, and to achieve consensus between many signatory states. Each signatory therefore needs to interpret the convention based on a range of sources and information to determine its meaning in good faith. That is not a black-and-white exercise, but one that the Government considered carefully before bringing the Bill to the House and one that we have now entrusted to Parliament in its consideration and considerable scrutiny of the Bill.

The legislative process, in which we are all so engaged today, is in itself a transparent and fully consultative process, as demonstrated by the several reports that the Committee has received on the compatibility of several clauses of the Bill with the refugee convention and other international obligations—including from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Clauses 27 to 35 are drafted to create clarity on what the key concepts of the refugee convention mean, driving improved consistency among Home Office decision makers and the courts, with the ultimate aim of making accurate, well-reasoned decisions quicker. That can only be beneficial for all who are involved with asylum seekers.

In the light of the points that I have made, I hope that hon. Members will agree not to press these amendments going forward.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I have not succeeded in what I wanted to do, which was to move beyond assertion that there is compliance with the refugee convention and to hear a little more about why the Government think that that is the case. I accept the point that different countries have slightly different interpretations of certain provisions; that is legitimate. But there are clear arguments that what the Government are doing in relation to the evidential threshold, their definition of “particular social group” and, in particular, their total rewriting of article 31 on immunity from penalties is inexcusable and way beyond any margin of appreciation that Governments enjoy. I tried. I failed. I will accept that. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Craig Whittaker]

I beg to move amendment 76, in clause 70, page 58, line 34, after “Part” insert “and the following provisions”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 77.

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It is important that deprivation orders made before this Bill comes into force remain valid, otherwise individuals who the Home Secretary has already decided should be deprived of their British citizenship because it is conducive to the public good would have their citizenship effectively reinstated and could therefore freely travel in and out of the UK. This could have detrimental consequences for national security. We need amendment 121 so that the relevant provisions of the new clause are enacted at the earliest opportunity.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I will not say too much, because I need to give new clause 19 further consideration and to speak with stakeholders about it. Circumstances in which service is difficult because a person is out of contact happen pretty regularly in legal disputes that go through the courts. Rather than just shortcutting by having no procedure at all, what happens is that an alternative method is proposed, such as displaying a notice in newspapers. That was back in the old days; I assume that things have moved online since the dim and distant past when I was a practising solicitor. I wonder if there is a better way that does not result in someone being deprived of citizenship—which, as the Minister said, is a very serious matter—without any procedure having been followed at all.

It is controversial to retrospectively decide that decisions to deprive people of nationality are fine, even though they may not have complied with the laws that were in force at that time. Although provisions of this sort are necessary, I still have concerns that the circumstances in which no service would be required are drawn too broadly and that there may be other ways of doing this that do not undermine the clauses, without depriving people of having notice altogether. I leave it at that just now.

Amendment 121 agreed to.

Amendments made: 122, in clause 70, page 58, line 36, at end insert—

“(za) section (Notice of decision to deprive a person of citizenship)(2) to (4) (modifications of duty to give notice of decision to deprive a person of citizenship);”.

This amendment brings subsections (2) to (4) of NC19 (modifying the duty to give notice of a decision to deprive a person of citizenship) into force two months after the Bill receives Royal Assent.

Amendment 123, in clause 70, page 58, line 37, leave out paragraph (a).

This amendment will secure that clauses 16, 17 and 23 of the Bill (evidence in asylum or human rights claims) will be brought into force by regulations rather than coming into force automatically two months after Royal Assent to the Bill.

Amendment 124, in clause 70, page 59, line 2, at end insert—

“(fa) section (Working in United Kingdom waters: arrival and entry), for the purposes of making regulations;”.

This amendment brings NC20 into force, for the purposes of making regulations (under the new section 11B for the Immigration Act 1971), two months after Royal Assent to the Bill. The rest of the clause will be brought into force by regulations.

Amendment 191, in clause 70, page 59, line 4, leave out paragraph (h).

This amendment is consequential on the amendment removing clause 42 from the Bill.

Amendment 78, in clause 70, page 59, line 5, leave out paragraph (i).—(Craig Whittaker.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 77.

[Craig Whittaker]

I beg to move amendment 79, in clause 70, page 59, line 6, at end insert—

“(ia) section (Counter-terrorism questioning of detained entrants away from place of arrival) (counter-terrorism questioning of detained entrants away from place of arrival);”.

This amendment provides for NC12 to come into force two months after Royal Assent to the Bill.

[Craig Whittaker]

Under schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000, counter-terrorism police have the power to stop, question and if necessary, detain and search individuals travelling through UK port and border areas for the purposes of determining whether a person is or has been involved in terrorism. Currently, officers may exercise schedule 7 powers only when an individual is located within a port or border area and their presence in such an area is as a result of them entering or leaving the UK.

The rise in numbers of those attempting to cross the channel illegally, particularly via small boats, means it is impractical to keep large numbers of people, some of whom are minors or in need of medical assistance, at a port or piece of coastline without adequate facilities. Transporting these individuals to locations once they have been detained or arrested under the immigration Acts often means that examining them under schedule 7 is not possible as they are no longer within a port.

New clause 12 seeks to extend the scope of schedule 7 so that individuals who are in detention under immigration provisions are eligible for examination at the location they are taken to following their initial apprehension under immigration powers. Individuals at these locations will be eligible for examination, provided the officer believes they arrived by sea, were apprehended under the immigration Acts within 24 hours of their arrival and it has been no more than five days since they were apprehended. The full suite of powers and safeguards under schedule 7 will apply, including access to legal advice for those detained over an hour. In line with amendment 79, the new clause will come into force two months after the Bill receives Royal Assent.

The new clause will add a further layer to protect our national security by ensuring those who arrive in the UK illegally by sea can be examined for the purpose of determining their involvement in terrorist activity under the same power as if they had passed through conventional border controls.

Amendment 79 agreed to.

Amendments made: 167, in clause 70, page 59, line 7, leave out paragraph (j)

This amendment is consequential on the amendments removing Clauses 58 to 61 of the Bill.

Amendment 168, in clause 70, page 59, line 7, at end insert—

“(ja) section (Interpretation of Part etc) (1) to (4) (interpretation of Part 3A);

(jb) section (Use of scientific methods in age assessments)(1) to (3) and (8) (regulations about use of scientific methods in age assessments);

(jc) section (Regulations about age assessments) (regulations about age assessments);”

This amendment means that amendment NC33 (regulations about age assessments), and the regulation-making power in amendment NC32, will be commenced automatically, two months after Royal Assent, as will the clause that defines certain terms used in the regulation-making power.

Amendment 80, in clause 70, page 59, line 7, at end insert—

“(ja) sections (Removals from the UK: visa penalties for uncooperative countries) and (Visa penalties: review and revocation) (visa penalties);”

This amendment provides for NC9 and NC10 to come into force two months after Royal Assent to the Bill.

Amendment 81, in clause 70, page 59, line 8, leave out paragraph (k) .—(Craig Whittaker.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 75.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move amendment 179, in clause 70, page 59, line 9, at end insert—

‘(5) Sections [Time limit on immigration detention], [Initial detention: criteria and duration] and [Bail hearings] come into force six months after the day on which this Act is passed.“

This amendment would bring NC38, NC39 and NC40 into force six months after the day on which the Bill is passed.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 38—Time limit on immigration detention—

“(1) This section applies to any person (“P”) who is liable to detention under a relevant detention power.

(2) P may not be detained under a relevant detention power for a period of more than 28 days from the relevant time.

(3) If P remains detained under a relevant detention power at the expiry of the period of 28 days then—

(a) P shall be released forthwith; and

(b) P may not be detained under a relevant detention power thereafter, unless the Secretary of State or an immigration officer, as the case may be, is satisfied that there has been a material change of circumstances since P’s release and that the criteria in section [Initial detention: criteria and duration](1) are met.

(4) In this section, “relevant detention power” means a power to detain under—

(a) paragraph 16(2) of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971 (detention of persons liable to examination or removal);

(b) paragraph 2(1), (2) or (3) of Schedule 3 to that Act (detention pending deportation);

(c) section 62 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (detention of persons liable to examination or removal); or

(d) section 36(1) of the UK Borders Act 2007 (detention pending deportation).

(5) In this section, “relevant time” means the time at which P is first detained under a relevant detention power.

(6) This section does not apply to a person in respect of whom the Secretary of State has certified that the decision to detain is or was taken in the interests of national security.”

This new clause would prevent people who are liable to detention under a relevant power from being detained for longer than 28 days.

New clause 39—Initial detention: criteria and duration—

“(1) A person (“P”) to whom section [Time limit on immigration detention] applies may not be detained under a relevant detention power other than for the purposes of examination, unless the Secretary of State or an immigration officer, as the case may be, is satisfied that—

(a) P can be shortly removed from the United Kingdom;

(b) detention is strictly necessary to effect P’s deportation or removal from the United Kingdom; and

(c) the detention of P is in all the circumstances proportionate.

(2) P may not be detained under a relevant detention power for a period of more than 96 hours from the relevant time, unless—

(a) P has been refused bail at an initial bail hearing in accordance with subsection (5)(b) of section [Bail hearings]; or

(b) the Secretary of State has arranged a reference to the Tribunal for consideration of whether to grant immigration bail to P in accordance with subsection (2)(c) of section [Bail hearings] and that hearing has not yet taken place.

(3) Nothing in subsections (1) or (2) authorises the Secretary of State to detain P under a relevant detention power if such detention would, apart from this section, be unlawful.

(4) In this section, “Tribunal” means the First-Tier Tribunal.

(5) In this section, “relevant detention power” and “relevant time” have the meanings given in section [Time limit on immigration detention].”

This new clause sets out the circumstances in which a person to whom NC38 applies may be held in initial detention, and the maximum duration of such detention.

New clause 40—Bail hearings—

“(1) This section applies to any person (“P”) to whom section [Time limit on immigration detention] applies and who is detained under a relevant detention power.

(2) Before the expiry of a period of 96 hours from the relevant time, the Secretary of State must—

(a) release P;

(b) grant immigration bail to P under paragraph 1 of Schedule 10 to the Immigration Act 2016; or

(c) arrange a reference to the Tribunal for consideration of whether to grant immigration bail to P.

(3) Subject to subsection (4), when the Secretary of State arranges a reference to the Tribunal under subsection (2)(c), the Tribunal must hold an oral hearing (“an initial bail hearing”) which must commence within 24 hours of the time at which the reference is made.

(4) If the period of 24 hours in subsection (3) ends on a Saturday, Sunday or Bank holiday, the Tribunal must hold an initial bail hearing on the next working day.

(5) At the initial bail hearing, the Tribunal must—

(a) grant immigration bail to P under paragraph 1 of Schedule 10 to the Immigration Act 2016; or

(b) refuse to grant immigration bail to P.

(6) Subject to subsection (7), the Tribunal must grant immigration bail to P at a bail hearing unless it is satisfied that the Secretary of State has established that the criteria in subsection 1 of section [Initial detention: criteria and duration] are met and that, in addition—

(a) directions have been given for P’s removal from the United Kingdom and such removal is to take place within 14 days;

(b) a travel document is available for the purposes of P’s removal or deportation; and

(c) there are no outstanding legal barriers to removal.

(7) Subsection (6) does not apply if the Tribunal is satisfied that the Secretary of State has established that the criteria in subsection 1 of section [Initial detention: criteria and duration] above are met and that there are very exceptional circumstances which justify maintaining detention.

(8) In subsection (6), “a bail hearing” includes—

(a) an initial bail hearing under subsection (2); and

(b) the hearing of an application for immigration bail under paragraph 1(3) of Schedule 10 of the Immigration Act 2016.

(9) In this section, “Tribunal” means the First-Tier Tribunal.

(10) The Secretary of State shall provide to P or to P’s legal representative, not more than 24 hours after the relevant time, copies of all documents in the Secretary of State’s possession which are relevant to the decision to detain.

(11) At the initial bail hearing, the Tribunal shall not consider any documents relied upon by the Secretary of State which were not provided to P or to P’s legal representative in accordance with subsection (10), unless—

(a) P consents to the documents being considered; or

(b) in the opinion of the Tribunal there is a good reason why the documents were not provided to P or to P’s legal representative in accordance with subsection (10).

(12) The Immigration Act 2016 is amended as follows—

(a) After paragraph 12(4) of schedule 10 insert—

“(4A) Sub-paragraph (2) above does not apply if the refusal of bail by the First tier Tribunal took place at an initial bail hearing within the meaning of section [Bail hearings] of the Sovereign Borders Act 2021.”.”

In respect of people to whom NC38 applies, this new clause would require the Secretary of State to either release them, grant immigration bail or arrange a reference to the Tribunal within 96 hours.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

This group of amendments and new clauses is not new. It was proposed in similar words in the most recent immigration Bill by, I think, the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis), but I may be wrong. No Bill passes through this Parliament on immigration and nationality law that does not include amendments and debate about immigration detention. Perhaps, after the last couple of years, Members are more than ever acutely aware that the deprivation of people’s freedoms is keenly felt and should not occur without evidence as to its necessity.

We are talking here about the deprivation of liberty not because people have committed a crime but, essentially, for the convenience of the Home Office. The new clauses contain measures to end what is indefinite detention in the UK, whatever the Home Office says to the contrary, and to implement a workable system that ensures detention is used only as a last resort to effect lawful removals from the UK. That is what the situation should be. The existing power to detain without prior judicial authority would be retained but there would be important safeguards: a 28-day time limit, judicial oversight by way of bail hearings after 96 hours with clear criteria for continued detention and re-detention only when there is a material change in status or circumstances.

Immigration detention has declined over the last several years, which is very welcome. Nevertheless, there is no release date for immigration detainees, which is incredibly severe, particularly in terms of mental ill health. Although numbers have been falling, the length of time that people are detained has not fallen. The fact of falling numbers does not reduce the need for a time limit. We are talking about several thousand individuals leaving detention every year who have been detained for longer than 28 days and hundreds who have been detained for more than six months. In a minority of cases, detention lasts for years rather than months.

Why 28 days? It is not a number that has been pulled from thin air. It is already in Home Office guidance, which requires caseworkers to consider whether removal is imminent and goes on to define imminence in the following terms:

“Removal could be said to be imminent where a travel document exists, removal directions are set there are no outstanding legal barriers and removal is likely to take place in the next four weeks.”

This is a recommendation that has been made by many organisations with expertise in the area, including the Joint Committee on Human Rights, the Home Affairs Committee, the Bar Council and the all-party parliamentary groups on refugees and on migration.

[Paul Blomfield]

As vice-chair of the inquiry to which the hon. Gentleman referred, may I ask whether he will add the House of Commons to the list of those bodies that have endorsed this? When our recommendation was considered on a votable motion in a Backbench Business debate, it was approved by the House.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman and the other hon. Members involved for their work on that report, which was incredibly thorough. We then had a Backbench Business debate and the Government did not oppose it, because there was clearly a majority in the House of Commons at that time for such a time limit.

Finally, I want to say why 28 days should be the limit. There is a body of evidence that the effect of indefinite detention on mental health in general is very negative, but that after a month the deterioration is particularly significant. We recognise that there will be a minority of cases where people will try to play the system and use the time limit to frustrate lawful removal, but the amendment allows for re-detention if there is a material change in status or circumstances. Other sanctions are also open to the Government in such circumstances.

If none of that appeals to the Government, I will briefly mention the argument that consistently over half those detained are then released into the community, so it is a completely inefficient system that costs an absolute fortune. There are alternatives that are not only better for the individuals concerned, but easier on the taxpayer. I hope the Government will give serious thought to the amendments. The issue has been championed by Members of all parties for a considerable period. It is now time to see a step change in the Government’s approach to the use of immigration detention.

[Craig Whittaker]

I want to be clear from the outset that this Government’s position is that a time limit on detention simply will not work and will not be effective in ensuring that those with no right to be here in the UK leave.

[Craig Whittaker]

Our immigration system must encourage compliance with immigration rules and protect the public. Those who have no right to be in the UK should leave voluntarily, but where the opportunities to do so are not taken, we have to operate a system to enable us to enforce removal and deport foreign national offenders who would otherwise remain in the UK.

I also want to be clear that we do not and cannot detain people indefinitely. It is not lawfully possible to do so.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The Home Office repeatedly asserts that it is not indefinite detention, but can the Minister tell me what is the definite time limit on a person’s detention?

[Craig Whittaker]

I think what the hon. Member has asked me to do is put a time limit on this, and I have already said clearly that just does not work. We have a duty to those in the immigration system, but we have a duty to protect the public too. The introduction of a 28-day detention time limit would severely limit our ability to remove those who refuse to leave voluntarily, and would encourage and reward abuse, to answer the question raised by the hon. Member for Sheffield Central, in some cases from individuals who present a genuine threat to the public, which is not the effect I consider the hon. Members intend with new clause 38.

[Craig Whittaker]

The hon. Lady is absolutely right, but we are talking about those who are a threat to the public. We have to have a duty of care. In fact, the first role of the Government is to protect their own citizens.

New clause 38 would allow those who wish to frustrate the removal process to run down the clock, in answer to the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East, until the time limit is reached and release is guaranteed. It would encourage late and opportunistic claims to be made simply to push them over the 28-day limit.

New clauses 38 to 40 are at total odds with the main objectives of the Bill, which will streamline the asylum process, ensuring that outstanding claims and appeals are dealt with much more effectively, with access to legal advice, while enabling us to remove more easily those with no lawful right to remain in the UK. In summary, it is the firm view of this Government that the introduction of a time limit would significantly impair the UK’s ability to proportionately and efficiently remove individuals who have no right to be here and who, in some cases, represent a significant danger to the public. I therefore respectfully ask the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I do not know where to start with that response, although it is very similar to those we have had in previous debates. The bogey card is always that foreign national offenders are a serious risk, yet the Government have the power to deport folk straight from prison. That is the power they should use in those situations.

What we are talking about, very often, is people who have committed no crime, or represent absolutely no risk to the public. They are detained for extraordinary periods of time, and face extraordinary hardship. Anyone reading the report by Stephen Shaw, commissioned by the former Home Secretary and former Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May), will see what it does to people. There is also the APPG report, which has already been referred to.

The idea that these amendments somehow undermine the Government’s ability to enforce immigration rules is completely at odds with the evidence from around Europe. Other countries have at least as much success—and often far greater success—in enforcing immigration rules and getting people to leave the country if they have no leave, without having to resort to endless and routine immigration detention. For all those reasons, I very much regret what we have heard from the Minister. However, I will not put the amendment to a vote today; we shall keep that for another time. I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 70, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 71 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Paul Holmes.)

Nationality and Borders Bill (Fifteenth sitting)

Stuart C McDonald Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 4th November 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Tom Pursglove)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause would be inserted after clause 21. It forms part of a package of measures that will enable the swift removal of those who have no right to be in the UK. It complements clause 21 by ensuring that individuals cannot utilise the appeals system as a tool to delay their removal from the UK.

Frequently, those facing removal or deportation from the UK utilise delay tactics, such as late claims and repeated appeals, to thwart removal action. That leads to unnecessary costs to the taxpayer and an increased burden on the court and tribunals system. Clause 21 addresses that issue by creating a new expedited appeal for late human rights or protection claims brought by recipients of a priority removal notice, as provided by clause 18. Expedited appeals will be determined quickly, and the decisions of the upper tribunal will be final. Therefore, clause 21 removes the incentive for bringing claims late and protects the appeal system from abuse.

However, there may be additional appeal rights generated by other claims that individuals may seek to exercise in parallel with an expedited appeal. Such additional appeals would usually be heard in the first tier tribunal. Consequently, an expedited appeal may conclude while an individual has an outstanding appeal in the first tier tribunal, which would prevent their removal from the UK.

New clause 6 enables other appeals in the first tier tribunal brought by a person with an expedited appeal to be heard and determined by the upper tribunal alongside the expedited appeal. That will ensure that, following the conclusion of the expedited process, final determination will have been made on the appellant’s right to remain in the UK and, where the upper tribunal decides that they have no right to remain, removal action can take place.

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

I welcome the Minister back to his place. I do not follow the logic of the new clause at all. If somebody is trying to play the system—and I do not like talking in those terms—surely all they need to do is not make a late claim in terms of the PRN notice; then, their existing appeal would proceed normally, with onward rights of appeal and so on. This proposal just does not make sense, even if we accept the Government’s logic, which I do not.

[Tom Pursglove]

The point is exactly as I have set out: in the immigration system, we see repeated appeals deliberately designed to frustrate the system, and the new clause is an appropriate way, with appropriate safeguards, to ensure that the tribunal process can handle those appeals appropriately. It makes sense for appeals to be considered together so that attempts to frustrate the removal process cannot happen and cases are determined as quickly as possible. As I say, there are appropriate judicial safeguards in place in the tribunal process to ensure that appeals are heard appropriately and are directed through the appropriate tribunal. I commend the new clause to the Committee.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Briefly, there are two reasons why I do not think this new clause makes any sense at all. First, there is the point that I just alluded to. The danger is that if someone who has a PRN served on them is contemplating disclosing further information or making a claim and the deadline passes, and they are acting in the way that the Minister wants to get at here and trying to “play the system”, they will simply not make that disclosure. Their existing claims will proceed to appeal through the normal channels, to a first tier tribunal with onward appeal rights. So the proposals do not make sense, even by the Government’s own logic. Can the Minister address that?

Secondly, we object to the new clause from a point of principle. The rare occasions when I would accept that an expedited appeals process can be justified are where the justifications relate solely to manifestly unfounded or repeat claims, but that is not what this is about; this is about expediting appeals and rights to appeal, but not because of the substance of the appeal—it has absolutely nothing to do with the merits of the claim or the related appeal at all. So the proposals make no sense from the point of view of principle, as well as being rather illogical.

[Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)]

Again, briefly, I agree with everything the Scottish National party spokesperson, the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East, has just said. We do not know at what stage the other appeal will be; it may not be ready to be heard. One problem we have in this country is the delay in the appeals processes because of severe underfunding in our court and tribunal systems, so it seems that the new clause will not work.

The new clause will also cause more problems than it solves. I am not sure that there is a huge problem with multiple outstanding appeals in any event, but the new clause could actually make things worse. If the intention in the Bill is to provide fairness, the new clause will not achieve that, because speeding up an appeal could cause unfairness. So for the reasons outlined by the SNP spokesperson we will not support the new clause.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I have said a lot about asylum accommodation in previous years and months. I agree that there are huge problems with the asylum accommodation system, such as over-concentration, too often poor-quality accommodation, a lack of funding for the local authorities that actually step up to the plate and volunteer to undertake the task, and a lack of control and power for those local authorities. Too often they play second fiddle to the companies and organisations contracted to the Government.

I support broadening dispersal, but I am not on board at this stage with mandating it. Repeatedly, local authorities, whether in the west midlands, Glasgow or elsewhere, and other organisations such as the Home Affairs Committee, on which I sit—we have had a couple of reports on this issue—have listed all the things that the Home Office could engage with and undertake to improve the system. I know from speaking to authorities that if the Home Office did those things and increased the powers and financing of local authorities, more would come on board. If the Home Office did that, I do not think that mandation would be required.

If the Home Office fixes its end of the bargain and local authorities are still not getting on board, at that stage I would have no choice but to support mandation, but I do not think that we are at that stage yet. I, too, will quote Abi Brown, who was very measured in her comments when local authorities from the west midlands were writing to the Home Office. She said:

“This is about trying to open up a discussion about how the asylum dispersal system works. So far it’s been very frustrating trying to get the Home Office to engage with us on this issue. We want them to talk to us about how the system can be improved, and we’ve made a number of suggestions in the letter.”

She went on to say:

“This isn’t about party politics, it’s about parity.”

I absolutely agree with that. There is a growing consensus that the Home Office has to up its game on how the dispersal system works. That is what we have to look at, rather than mandating local authorities.

[Tom Pursglove]

I agree with some of the intention behind new clause 2. It is right that all parts of the UK make a reasonable contribution to ensuring that adequate accommodation is available for asylum seekers who would otherwise be destitute, but it is important to recognise that not every area of the UK has appropriate services or affordable accommodation to appropriately support them. Additionally, some local authorities have very few asylum seekers accommodated by the Home Office in their areas but support large numbers of other migrants. For example, the Home Office does not accommodate many adult asylum seekers and their children in Kent or Croydon, but both local authorities support large numbers of unaccompanied asylum-seeking children.

It is also important to note that not all asylum seekers are accommodated by the Home Office. The proportion varies over time, but historically around 50% find accommodation with friends or family. That group often live in areas where there are few supported asylum seekers, but they still require access to the same health and education services. It is not therefore sensible to have a rigid set of rules that require destitute asylum seekers to be accommodated in areas in direct proportion to the population of those places. The other factors that I have described must be taken into consideration.

Since the introduction of part 6 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, successive Governments have employed a policy of seeking the agreement of local authorities prior to placing asylum seekers within an area. However, the legislation does not provide local authorities with a veto on the placement of asylum seekers in their areas. If a local authority objects to proposals by our providers to use accommodation not previously used to house asylum seekers, the Home Office can consider and adjudicate on the matter.

A lot of work has none the less been done on increasing local authority participation in asylum dispersal since 2015. Prior to 2015, there were around only 100 local authorities participating. There are now around 140. We have established the local government chief executive group to bring together senior representatives from local authorities, with the aim of expanding the dispersal system and improving the process for the people who use it. We are planning a wider review of the dispersal process and will be consulting local authorities and others.

The local government chief executive group is working collaboratively to evidence any additional costs to local authorities by the dispersal proposal and to identify the appropriate funding mechanism. In light of what I have said, I hope that the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate will withdraw the motion.

--- Later in debate ---

We have some sympathy for EEA nationals who claim they did not realise that they needed to have CSI to live lawfully in the UK, which is why we introduced guidance for naturalisation caseworkers to explain that discretion can be exercised over the lawful residence requirements if a person did not meet an additional or implicit condition of stay—as opposed to an explicit condition such as illegal entry or overstaying—under EEA free movement regulations. I am not aware of any application for British citizenship being declined purely because of the CSI requirement under EEA free movement regulations.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

It is useful that guidance exists, but does the Minister appreciate that if somebody is considering spending more than £1,000 to make an application and there is no clarity—nothing stronger—they almost certainly will not take the risk? Is it not possible to put something firmer into the guidance for caseworkers to say that, in the overwhelming majority of cases, the lack of CSI should be ignored?

[Tom Pursglove]

The hon. Gentleman will appreciate that this matter falls within the portfolio of the Minister for Future Borders and Immigration, so if the hon. Gentleman does not mind, I shall take away that suggestion and ask the Minister to consider it. If the hon. Gentleman wants to follow up in writing with the Minister, I am sure my hon. Friend would consider that and come back to him. I will certainly make sure that he is aware of the suggestion the hon. Gentleman raises.

The new clause would amend the naturalisation requirements for EEA nationals who did not have CSI and so had not been in the UK lawfully before they acquired settled status. We cannot accept that, as all applicants are required to meet the same requirements for naturalisation in terms of lawful residence and it would not be right to treat certain nationalities differently.

The third part of the new clause would amend the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 such that a person is treated as having had CSI if they had access to the NHS in practice or held a CSI policy. However, there is no mention of CSI in the rest of that Act, nor is there any mention of CSI in residence scheme immigration rules. The EU settlement scheme does not test for CSI and there is no need to have held it in the past, or to hold it now, in order for EEA nationals to obtain settled or pre-settled status. As such, that part of the new clause would have no practical effect. I therefore ask the hon. Members to withdraw their new clause.

--- Later in debate ---

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 15—Acquisition by registration: Descendants of those born on British Indian Ocean Territory—

“(1) The British Nationality Act 1981 is amended as follows.

(2) After section 17H (as inserted by section 7), insert—

‘17I Acquisition by registration: Descendants of those born on British Indian Ocean Territory

(1) A person is entitled to be registered as a British Overseas Territories citizen on an application made under this section if they are a direct descendant of a person (“P”) who was a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies by virtue of P’s birth in the British Indian Ocean Territory or, prior to 8 November 1965, in those islands designated as the British Indian Ocean Territory on that date.

(2) A person who is being registered as a British Overseas Territories citizen under this section is also entitled to be registered as a British citizen.

(3) No charge or fee shall be imposed for registration under this section.’”

This new clause would allow anyone who is descended from a person born before 1983 on the British Indian Ocean Territory to register as a British Overseas Territories citizen. They may also register as a British citizen at the same time. Both applications would be free of charge.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I thank the Chagossians who spoke to the shadow Minister and myself, and Fragomen solicitors for facilitating that discussion and drafting the new clauses. As Members, and particularly Conservative Members, will know, the hon. Member for Crawley (Henry Smith), in whose constituency we find the UK’s largest Chagossian diaspora, has championed Chagossians for many years. On Second Reading I asked the Government to consider introducing a clause to rectify some of the injustices that Chagossians have faced for more than half a century. I understand that they will bring in an amendment on Report to do that, but today we seek to probe their initial thinking.

We could speak all day about how outrageously the Chagossians were treated by the UK and the US. They were removed from their islands simply to make way for an airbase, dumped in Mauritius and elsewhere and basically forgotten about. There are myriad injustices that are still to be put right. The new clauses do not fix everything, but they would fix significant injustices in relation to nationality—exactly what part 1 of this Bill was supposed to do—and family. Some Chagossians would benefit from provisions in part 1 of this Bill, which is welcome, but the Bill needs to go much further if they are to have access to the citizenship that is rightly theirs and that has been denied them only by the outrageous events of the late 1960s and the early 1970s.

As we touched on during debates on part 1, citizenship by descent in British and British overseas territories’ nationality law usually stretches to only one generation. If someone moves abroad, the children they have there will be British by descent, but if those children remain abroad and later have kids they would not be able to pass on that British citizenship. That reflects the idea that the family have made a voluntary decision to loosen their links to the UK and to build a new life elsewhere. Therefore, citizenship of the country where they now live is probably more appropriate.

Exceptions are made—for example, if the only reason the person was abroad was Crown service or if the parent who could not pass on citizenship has actually lived in the UK for three years previously or goes on to do so. All of that illustrates the point that reflecting the idea of a voluntary link to the UK justifies continued transmission of UK citizenship.

None of that can apply to the Chagossians; the situation there is obviously manifestly different. The only reason why Chagossians cannot pass on their British overseas territory citizenship is that they were forcibly removed from their islands. Nobody chose to make a new life in Mauritius or anywhere else—far from it. Nobody can say that they have voluntarily chosen to take on a new identity elsewhere. Any undermining or breaking of the link was completely forced on them in quite the most outrageous circumstances; that in itself should be enough to justify new clause 15.

The knock-on effect is that when the law was changed in 2002, while some Chagossians became British citizens as well as British overseas territory citizens, others missed out. They are now in the horrible situation where some have the right to rekindle their British identity and return here, but others do not. If I was a Chagossian whose parent was born just before being forcibly removed from the islands, and was therefore BOTC by birth, I am likely to be in a far better position than, for example, my cousin whose parents were born just days after being forced from the islands, and therefore cannot transmit their BOTC or British citizenship. When introducing the Bill, the Home Secretary said that it would mean children unfairly denied British overseas territory citizenship will finally be able to acquire citizenship, as well as British citizenship. What happened to the Chagossians, and what they still face today, is an absolute scandal. The least that we can do is ensure that all of them can access the nationality that the UK and US action deprived them of.

New clause 4 would fix another unfairness. I absolutely detest the restrictive rules that the Home Office has put in place on family visas, which say that someone must be earning certain sums of money before they can bring their non-national spouse or children here. Putting that to one side for the moment, even accepting the Government’s own logic, these provisions should not apply to the spouses and family members of Chagossians. Essentially, the Government logic is that if people choose to build a family life elsewhere and then come back to the UK, they should have certain financial means to support themselves and knowledge of the UK. However, again, Chagossians did not choose to make their family life outside British overseas territories—that was forced on them. It would now be totally unfair to restrict the right to come to the UK by imposing those rules on the families as if this was a choice they made.

It was a step in the right direction to provide British citizenship to some in 2002, but it is cruel to deny effective access to these routes by denying family members the right to come here. It is particularly cruel, given that the reason many will not be able to meet the financial threshold is the horrendous way they have been treated for decades and the extraordinary deprivation they have had to endure. I hope the Home Office will look to fix two of the many injustices that have been visited on the Chagossians.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I will speak to new clause 15, which is grouped with new clause 4. I fully endorse what the spokesperson for the SNP said.

New clause 15 seeks to rectify a long-standing issue in British nationality law that affects a relatively small number of people—the Chagossian people, descendants of the Chagos islanders, who were forcibly removed from the British Indian Ocean Territory in the 1960s. Between 1968 and 1974, the UK forcibly removed thousands of Chagossians from their homelands on the Chagos islands. The removal was done to make way for a US military base on Diego Garcia. The Chagossians were a settled population on the islands. Their origins trace back to 1793. They were removed and deported to Mauritius and the Seychelles, more than 1,600 km away from the Chagos islands, and have faced extreme poverty and discrimination in those places.

Because of the removal, many descendants of the Chagos islanders, despite being the grandchildren of people who were British subjects in the British Indian Ocean Territory, have been denied rights to British citizenship. The British Overseas Territories Act 2002 granted British citizenship to resettled Chagossians born between 1969 and 1982—the children of those born on the British Indian Ocean Territory. However, many Chagossians have still been denied citizenship, including second-generation Chagossians born outside those dates.

The grandchildren of those born on the British Indian Ocean Territory, third-generation Chagossians, do not have rights to British citizenship, as citizenship has not automatically passed to them, even if in some cases they migrated to the UK with their British parents at a very young age. That group therefore often become an undocumented presence in the UK once they reach the age of 18, and are denied access to jobs, housing and healthcare, despite having lived in the UK since a very young age.

The Chagossian community is divided between Mauritius, the Seychelles and the UK. Broken and divided families are therefore a direct consequence of this injustice in British nationality law. For 60 years, the Chagossian people have faced dispersal, poverty and separation. That has severely limited their life chances and damaged the health and wellbeing of generations of people.

The Bill in its current state does not cover the British citizenship and immigration issues that the Chagossian community faces. That is why the Opposition are introducing this new clause and why we wish to raise the issue today. It is worth exploring this unfairness in more detail, and the reasons why legislation has failed to rectify it to date.

Under British nationality law, citizenship is normally passed only to one generation born abroad. However, the situation of the Chagossians is fundamentally different from that of other inhabited British overseas territories, and applying that restriction to the Chagossians is unacceptable. As we know, their parents and grandparents were forcibly removed from their homeland and deported to Mauritius and the Seychelles. Since then, the Chagossian people have been born outside the Chagos archipelago and receive citizenship from Mauritius or the Seychelles, with no recognition of their long-standing ties to British nationality.

It is not possible for the descendants of the Chagos islanders to be born on the islands of the British Indian Ocean Territory due to the Order in Council since 2004, which bans any Chagossian from living on their native land. That is deeply unfair. They have not severed links with their British citizenship voluntarily; they have been excluded by the UK Government. At this point I would like to share the personal experiences of those affected by that injustice. Like many in Committee, I have been contacted by members of the community, and I pay tribute to their campaigning efforts in incredibly distressing and difficult circumstances, including groups such as Chagossian Voices. Pascal Francois is one of those affected. He resides in Mauritius and is Chagossian. He says:

“For years we have suffered from the separation of our families, through no fault of our own. We are as British as you and the next person. We wish to be known as British, we belong to the UK & her territories. The Chagossian people in exile no longer want to live in the shadows of others. We want to belong and be British by descent.”

The battle for Chagossians’ rights has been raging for decades, and this group of people have been badly let down by the UK. Most Chagossian families, already financially impacted by their enforced exile, are paying—and have paid for many years—huge and increasing visa, immigration and citizenship fees, health surcharges and legal expenses for spouses and children with pending or rejected applications. This process has significantly damaged their health, wellbeing and livelihoods. It has caused immense stress. There is understandable frustration at the lack of support from the Home Office.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I would just gently say that the response is slightly tone deaf. First, the Migration Advisory Committee has asked the Government to revisit the financial thresholds the Minister mentions. Secondly, we are talking about Chagossians who were forcibly removed from their islands. Consistency is fine, but these are truly exceptional circumstances. Surely most taxpayers would perfectly understand that different rules have to apply in these outrageous circumstances.

[Tom Pursglove]

In fairness, the hon. Gentleman has intervened early in my remarks on the new clauses. Let me continue, but I hear the point he raises, and I of course take it on board, in the way I take all comments from hon. Members on the Committee on board.

We expect those coming to the UK on a family visa with only basic English to become more fluent over time, as a means of encouraging better integration into our society, to make it easier for families to access vital public services and to enable parents to support their children’s education.

New clause 4 would undermine the sound basis on which family migration to this country has been placed in recent years. It would circumvent the need for family migration to be on a basis whereby families are financially independent and able to contribute to the UK. It would also remove the English language requirement, which is fundamental to a migrant’s successful integration into British society. There is no justifiable reason to give preferential treatment to family members based solely on their sponsor’s nationality. Without a clear justification for doing so, that would also likely constitute unlawful discrimination.

The immigration rules on family migration, which new clause 4 would undermine, are designed to prevent burdens on the taxpayer, promote integration and tackle abuse, and thereby ensure that family migration to the UK is on a properly sustainable basis that is fair to migrants and the wider community. The rules are helping to ensure public confidence in the immigration system and, well intended as the new clause may be, it has the potential to reverse that.

In the same way, the introduction of a dual family migration system as required by the new clause would not be seen in a uniformly positive way by British citizens and persons settled here. It would lead to an undesirable two-tier system of family migration in which a group of family members whose sponsor is a British citizen with a connection to the British Indian Ocean Territory would be given preferential treatment over other sponsors. Furthermore, the Government have the power under the Immigration Act 1971 to set out the requirements for entry into and stay in the UK in immigration rules, which are laid before Parliament. The rules allow flexibility to amend policy as appropriate, and the Government continue to review them regularly to ensure that they are fair and effective. Work is ongoing on simplification of the rules following the Law Commission’s recommendations. The new clause would have the effect of undermining that process and prescribing the rules in primary legislation for one particular cohort.

I turn to new clause 15. We are already making changes through the Bill to address historic unfairness so that all those born on the British Indian Ocean Territory and their children are either automatically British citizens or have the right to acquire British nationality. The new clause, tabled by the hon. Members for Enfield, Southgate and for Halifax, seeks to go much further and would address what is seen as the consequences of historic unfairness. Although I am sympathetic with the aim, I am concerned that that is not the correct approach. The new clause would offer British citizenship in perpetuity to those born outside the UK and overseas territories regardless of their connection to the UK as long as they are descendants of someone born on the islands making up the British Indian Ocean Territory.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am not entirely surprised that the Minister’s first point is about the lack of any limit. Would the new clause be more amenable to him if there was a limit on the degree of relationship there had to be with a Chagossian?

[Tom Pursglove]

If the hon. Gentleman lets me conclude my remarks, I hope that that will give him a little comfort on that point. The approach proposed by the new clause cannot be right and would undermine the long-standing principle of British nationality law that nationality or entitlements to nationality are not passed on to the second and subsequent generations born and settled outside the UK and territories.

I recognise, however, that the Chagossians present a unique case. My hon. Friend the Member for Crawley, who has long campaigned on behalf of the Chagossian communities both in his constituency and throughout the UK as vice chair of the Chagos islands (British Indian Ocean Territory) all-party parliamentary group, has indicated his intention to table an amendment on this issue on Report. I would like to reflect further on the complex issues faced by Chagossian communities in the UK and those in Mauritius and the Seychelles that have been raised by hon. Members on both sides of the Committee—I am mindful of the cross-party view—before making any significant changes to nationality law.

Hon. Members from different parties have expressed views, and I have taken on board the points raised. I say to the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East that there is a willingness to look closely at the Chagossian issue. With that, I hope that hon. Members will be willing not to move their new clauses.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

As the Minister said, we will consider what has been said before we revisit this issue on Report. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 5

Former British-Hong Kong service personnel: right of abode

‘(1) The Immigration Act 1971 is amended as follows.

(2) At the end of section 2(1) insert—

“(c) that person is a former member of the Hong Kong Military Service Corps or the Hong Kong Royal Naval service, or

(d) that person is the spouse or dependent of a former member of the Hong Kong Military Service Corps or the Hong Kong Royal Naval service.’—(Stuart C. McDonald.)

This new clause would mean that all former British-Hong Kong service personnel, plus their spouses and dependents, would have right of abode in the UK.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move, that the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause is on a cause championed by the hon. Member for Romford (Andrew Rosindell) for many years: the 300 or so Hong Kong servicemen who seek UK citizenship in recognition of their service in the UK-Hong Kong Army before the handover of Hong Kong to China in 1997. With family included, we are talking of about 1,000 people.

Hongkongers served in our armed forces from 1857 right up to 1997 through world wars and numerous other conflicts. Hong Kong servicemen are recognised by the Ministry of Defence as veterans. In the early 1990s, the British nationality selection scheme allowed certain British nationals—rather than citizens—who were permanent residents of Hong Kong with a right of abode and who met a number of other eligibility criteria to apply for full UK citizenship. Of 654 British-Hong Kong servicemen who applied, only 159 were granted citizenship. Until now, the Home Office has resisted the campaign, but surely recent developments mean that it is now irresistible and that the Home Office must think again.

The Home Office previously refused to budge on the grounds that veterans are deemed to have Chinese citizenship and that some were locally recruited staff, who could not have reasonably expected the right to British citizenship. However, those recent developments, which we understand and know only too well, have seen the Home Office introduce the really welcome scheme for British nationals overseas. It could have refused to establish any BNO scheme for precisely the same reason they have refused the campaign of the hon. Member for Romford. However, it rightly put those arguments aside. It should also put them aside in relation to these veterans, 97 of whom qualify for the BNO scheme. Let us build on that excellent work through a new clause such as this, which would ensure that all British-Hong Kong service personnel, plus their spouses and dependents, would have the right of abode in the UK. In the circumstances, surely it is the right thing to do.

[The Chair]

Before we adjourn the Committee, may I thank hon. Members for the courtesy with which they have conducted proceedings? These are contentious issues, and the Committee’s conduct has been commendable. I am grateful. I also offer my thanks on the Committee’s behalf to the staff and Officers of the House.

Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Craig Whittaker.)

Nationality and Borders Bill (Sixteenth sitting)

Stuart C McDonald Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 4th November 2021 Public Bill Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Tom Pursglove)]

I thank the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East for tabling new clause 5, which provides the Committee with the opportunity to consider granting the right of abode in the United Kingdom to former British-Hong Kong service personnel, their spouses and dependants.

The Government remain extremely grateful to former British-Hong Kong service personnel. Under the British nationality selection scheme, a limited number of personnel who were settled in Hong Kong could apply to register as British citizens. All veterans would have been eligible to acquire British national overseas status between 1986 and 1997. Therefore, many should hold BNO status. Those who hold BNO status may be eligible for the BNO visa that was launched in January this year and which provides a route to settlement in the UK, meaning that many former British-Hong Kong service personnel, their spouses and dependants will already have, or be on the path to having, settlement and subsequently British citizenship, which would confer on them a right of abode in the UK.

We must consider the impact on public services both of increased usage generated by the right of access granted by expanded citizenship, and of the additional costs in granting such rights, such as casework resource and resettlement resulting in lost income that is not budgeted for and is therefore not affordable. Additionally, although I recognise the significant contribution made by this group, it may be difficult to justify why this specific cohort should be granted the right of abode when others from former colonial garrisons are not. For these reasons, I ask the hon. Member to withdraw the new clause.

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

I am grateful to the Minister for his response. I do think there are very specific reasons why this cohort should indeed be granted what this new clause is looking for, and I suspect we will be looking at this again on Report. In the meantime, however, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 13

Reporting to Parliament in relation to the prevention of death

“(1) The Secretary of State must within 12 months of the commencement of this section, and thereafter within each successive 12 months’ period, lay before Parliament a report concerning the deaths of people subject to asylum and immigration powers.

(2) A report required by this section must state the number of people subject to asylum and immigration powers who have died since—

(a) state the number of people subject to asylum and immigration powers who have died since—

(i) the commencement of this section (in the case of the first report laid under this section); or

(ii) the previous report laid under this section (in all other cases); and

(b) set out the support arrangements that the Secretary of State has implemented in that year to assist those directly affected by the deaths, and what changes in these arrangements are planned for the next year.

(3) Subject to subsection (5), the report required by this section must—

(a) in relation to each death to which subsection (2) refers, identify—

(i) whether the deceased was at the time of death detained under immigration powers,

(ii) whether the deceased had an asylum claim outstanding,

(iii) whether the deceased was in receipt of accommodation or support from the Secretary of State,

(iv) whether the deceased was a relevant child or young person,

(v) whether the deceased was under the control of any person acting under the authority of the Secretary of State,

(vi) the age, nationality and gender of the deceased,

(vii) any protected characteristic of the deceased,

(viii) the steps taken by the Secretary of State to support any family member of, or other person directly affected, by the death,

(ix) such further information as the Secretary of State shall consider relevant; and

(b) include a statement by the Secretary of State in relation to each such death concerning the impact, if any, of any relevant function, power, decision or discretion upon the circumstances causally connected to that death; and

(c) set out any changes to legislation, policy or practice that the Secretary of State proposes or has made to prevent the occurrence or continuation of circumstances creating a risk of death or to eliminate or reduce that risk in those circumstances; and

(d) describe the Secretary of State’s policy and practice in providing assistance to or receiving assistance from statutory bodies with responsibilities relating to the investigation or prevention of death.

(4) In making any statement to which subsection (3)(b) refers, the Secretary of State shall take into consideration both acts and omissions in relation to the exercise of any function, power or discretion and the making of any decision (including any omission to make a decision).

(5) Where the Secretary of State is unable to fulfil the requirements of subsection (3) in relation to any particular death by reason of there being insufficient time to compile and consider the relevant circumstances relating to the person who has died, the Secretary of State shall state this in the report and shall fulfil those requirements in the next report required by this section.

(6) In this section—

a person is “subject to asylum or immigration powers” if that person—

(a) is detained under immigration powers;

(b) has made an asylum claim that remains outstanding (including where it is being treated as inadmissible but the person remains in the UK);

(c) is in receipt of accommodation or support provided or arranged by the Secretary of State;

(d) is a relevant child or young person; or

(e) is under the control of any person acting under the authority of the Secretary of State in pursuance of asylum or immigration functions;

“relevant function, power, decision or discretion” refers to functions, powers, decisions or discretion in relation to asylum or immigration functions that are exercised or may be exercised by the Secretary of State, an immigration officer or a person to whom the Secretary of State has delegated that exercise;

“protected characteristic” has the same meaning as in the Equality Act 2010;

a “relevant child or young person” means a person who is subject to immigration control and—

(a) is in the care of a local authority; or

(b) is receiving support from a local authority as a result of having been in such care;

a person (P) is “under the control” of another person (A) where—

(a) P is being escorted by A within or from the UK,

(b) P in the custody of A,

(c) P is reporting (including remotely) to a designated place (including remotely) in compliance with a requirement imposed by A, or

(d) P is residing at a designated place in compliance with a requirement imposed by A;

“young person” means a person below the age of 25 years.” —(Stuart C. McDonald.)

This new clause would seek to ensure there was transparency and accountability about the deaths of people subject to certain asylum and immigration powers, and policies designed to prevent them.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Everyone in this Committee has expressed concern at the loss of life in the channel when people make dangerous journeys to seek asylum here. This new clause brings us to loss of life among people already in the immigration and asylum systems. It asks: what do we know about such deaths, what do we do in response to prevent other deaths from happening, and what do we do to ensure dignity in death? I am grateful to Amnesty International, Migrant Voice, Bail for Immigration Detainees, the Scottish Refugee Council and Liberty Investigates for all their work on this.

I particularly want to mention the Da’aro Youth Project, which was established in 2018 by members of the Eritrean community in London in response to the suicides of several unaccompanied teenage Eritreans who came to the UK to seek asylum, and supports the wellbeing of young people in the UK asylum system from countries in the horn of Africa. Its research found that at least 12 teenagers who arrived in the UK as unaccompanied children seeking asylum have died by suicide in the past five years, most of them Eritrean, including several in recent months. All had either been children in the care of local authorities or care leavers, while one was subject to an age dispute, one had been denied family reunion, and several had been waiting for significant periods for an asylum decision or had in fact been refused asylum.

More recently, Scottish Refugee Council freedom of information requests initially identified 51 deaths in asylum accommodation between April 2016 and June 2021. A slightly different set of FOIs from Liberty Investigates received a different number from the Home Office: 95 in the period to August 2021. Alarmingly, 69 of those deaths—about three quarters—were in the period from 2020, so there has been a significant increase. By August this year, nearly as many people had died in the asylum system as in the whole of last year.

The first issue is why it is only through the work of Da’aro Youth Project, the Scottish Refugee Council and Liberty Investigates that we know this. Surely the Home Office should be reporting regularly on the deaths of those in its system. Can lessons be learned from these deaths, what could be done to prevent further deaths, and do the deaths have implications for broader policy? For example, there has been a significant increase in deaths over the past couple of years, suggesting that moving to institutional accommodation is a dangerous policy, but are there other reasons? What about new policies, including those in this Bill? What impact might they have on deaths in the asylum and immigration system? We cannot do very much of that analysis because it does not seem that the Home Office gathers information never mind publishes it. Which other Government Department would get away with it if deaths of those in its care and caught up in its processes were not being thoroughly investigated and responded to? It should be absolutely no different here.

The second issue is: what happens in response to every individual death? I am not even sure whether there is in existence a proper Home Office policy on this. Is any effort made to find and contact family members, or even to return the body to the family? What is done to support friends and family here in the UK, particularly those who are in the asylum system or local authority care?

Since Windrush, we have been told repeatedly that the Home Office is undergoing a culture change to see “the face behind the case”. I suggest that a vital starting place could be taking much greater interest in those who have lost their life while within the Home Office’s own asylum and immigration systems and being transparent and accountable about what has happened. The new clause simply asks for what really should have been happening for years. It is a simple matter of human decency and proper accountability.

[Tom Pursglove]

I thank the hon. Member for tabling the new clause. I note his concerns around transparency and accountability in relation to deaths of people subject to immigration powers. I can assure him that transparency and accountability remain a key priority for the Department. We currently publish data every year on the number of deaths of people under our care in immigration detention. I recognise the importance of transparency in these circumstances to ensure that there is accountability and that we can develop effective policies and processes to prevent such instances from occurring in future. One death of a person in our care in one death too many. We must do everything in our power to ensure that these do not occur. Thankfully, deaths in detention are rare. There were no deaths in detention in 2020 and just one in 2019, where the individual died of natural causes.

We regularly review the statistics that we publish as a Department and, where it is clearly in the public interest to do so, it is our duty to consider the feasibility of publishing new statistics. We must weigh that up against other considerations. While we have a duty of care to all of those in our remit, there are many people in the asylum and immigration system who are either not required to, or choose not to, maintain regular contact with us. Some may even leave the UK without informing us while they have an open immigration claim. That means that there may be instances where we are not informed of the person’s death or we do not have all the relevant facts.

Additionally, it can take months and even years for inquests to reach conclusions. It is important that we know the facts before we publish the information. This highlights the kind of practical and deliverability challenges that we face and which affect the scope and accuracy of any information in this space. However, I acknowledge the importance of transparency. We regularly review the information that is published by the Department on the context of transparency, but also in line with the changes that the Bill will bring about. I note the interest of the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East in this particular area and will ensure that it is considered in line with the wider and ongoing review of statistics published by the Department. I trust that that addresses his concerns and I encourage him to withdraw the new clause.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I appreciate the Minister’s answer and the sentiments that he expresses. I am concerned that what he says does not always necessarily reflect exactly how things are operating on the ground. On the gathering and publishing of information, that is something that we will watch very closely. What he has not done is set out anything in relation to how the Home Office responds and whether there is a policy in relation to individual deaths—for example, those issues around returning the body, trying to approach family and friends, and the duty of care that we have to those individuals as well. That is something I will need to return to and raise with him again. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 14

Immigration health surcharge: exemption for international volunteers

‘(1) The Immigration Act 2014 is amended as follows.

(2) After section 38, insert—

“38A Immigration health surcharge: exemption for international volunteers

(1) A charge under section 38 may not be imposed on persons who have leave to enter, or to remain in, the United Kingdom through a visa to work voluntarily for a period of no more than 12 months, or for such period as may be prescribed by regulations, for a registered UK charity advancing the charity’s primary purpose.

(2) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section must not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament”.’ . —(Stuart C. McDonald.)

This new clause would ensure that international volunteers, including those working in health and social care, will be exempt from paying the immigration health surcharge.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move that the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause would introduce an immigration health surcharge exemption for international volunteers. On this occasion, I am particularly indebted to Camphill Scotland, which does fantastic work to support around 600 people with learning disabilities and other support needs, ranging from children to older people. It has built a formidable alliance of almost 50 organisations across the UK that support this new clause, including the National Council for Voluntary Organisations, the Scottish Council for Voluntary Organisations, the Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action, the Wales Council for Voluntary Action and many, many more which, unfortunately, I do not have time to mention. All members of the Committee will have received briefings and representations directly on this issue, and I urge them to consider it carefully.

My party objects to the immigration health surcharge altogether, but that debate is for another day. What we do welcome, as do the organisations behind this new clause, is the Government’s decision to exempt health and social care workers from other countries from paying it. The new clause seeks to ensure that those who want to come to work as volunteers in the charitable sector, including in health and social care, are also exempt. We believe that charging this surcharge to volunteers working in health and social care in charitable settings is unfair, inequitable and counterproductive. Volunteers from the EU and beyond make a significant contribution to the work of charities across the UK; Camphill Scotland currently has about 215 international volunteers, helping it to support people with learning disabilities and other support needs.

These young people have chosen to stay in the UK to provide social care to UK citizens during a national health emergency, displaying considerable dedication to and compassion for the people they support. It would be an injustice if the immigration health surcharge exemption was not extended to international volunteers working in the charitable sector. It is all the more essential that this change is made post Brexit, with volunteers from the EU and Switzerland now being caught by visa fees and other expenses. If we cannot continue to attract volunteers, the people who will suffer will be those who benefit from their care, including those with learning disabilities and support needs in the care of Camphill Scotland. The logic of the Government’s immigration health surcharge is that everyone should contribute but, just like the health and social care workforce, the volunteers are already doing just that, so surely the same logic applies. Given that such volunteers cannot have a salary here and will receive a subsistence allowance at most, there is even more reason to exempt them altogether. They are already facing considerable costs to take up these posts. It cannot be right that we also charge them a surcharge to support the very system that they are currently voluntarily supporting. I therefore ask the Minister to consider the representations made by the almost 50 organisations that have contacted him, to consider meeting them and to look carefully at these proposals.

[Tom Pursglove]

The Government recognise the important contribution that international volunteers make to our communities, and are committed to attracting people from overseas who wish to gain experience of our voluntary sector. The temporary work-charity worker visa is available to those who wish to undertake unpaid voluntary fieldwork for up to 12 months, where the work contributes directly to the achievement or advancement of the sponsor’s charitable purpose. The route offers volunteers the chance to experience life in the UK while making a valuable contribution to the aims of their chosen charity. At the same time, the involvement and contribution of these individuals has benefits for the UK charity sector and the wider community, and the UK Government welcome this involvement.

This is not an economic route and it should not be used to fill gaps in the labour market. Volunteers using the charity worker visa must not receive any payment beyond being reimbursed for expenses incurred during their duties. It is therefore not unreasonable to expect costs to be considered and planned for before they apply for a visa. As this is a temporary work category, the cost of a visa is already significantly less than any other work and study routes, at a rate of £244, and sponsors pay a lower licence fee, which reflects their own charity status. The immigration health charge, which applies to this route, ensures that temporary migrants who come to the UK for more than six months make a direct contribution to the comprehensive range of NHS services available to them during their stay. Income from the charge is shared between the health administrations in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, using the formula devised by Lord Barnett. The charge is an essential part of income for the NHS and has raised almost £2 billion in much-needed income since it was introduced in 2015.

Those who make an application to come to the UK for six months or less do not pay the charge, and we know that a sizeable number of volunteers come for less than the 12 months the route allows. If they opt to stay longer than six months, however, it is right that they pay the charge, as is consistent with others who base themselves in the UK for extended periods. I understand that there are concerns about the financial impact of the charge on volunteer workers, alongside visa fees and other payments that a person may make when they choose to come to the UK. However, the Government are clear that the charge is great value, considering the wide range of NHS services, free at the point of use, for charge payers. From the moment they arrive in the UK, charge payers can use the NHS in broadly the same manner as a permanent resident, without having made any prior tax or national insurance contributions. They may access health services as often as they need, including treatment for pre-existing health conditions, and do not need to worry about unexpected health charges or obtaining appropriate health insurance.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The Minister knows that I do not support the idea of an additional surcharge but, even if we accept his logic, the Government have exempted health and social care workers from the surcharge because they contribute to the healthcare system. Should that same logic not apply even more so to volunteers who are working in the health and social care system?

[Tom Pursglove]

In relation to the approach taken for health and social workers, the view widely felt across the House, which was subsequently reflected in policy, was that, given the enormous contribution made by those working directly in this sector during the pandemic, it was appropriate to try and put in place a form of recognition of that work, as well as other measures we have talked about, for example the pay rises that have quite rightly been afforded to NHS workers. It was seen as one means of recognising the enormous contribution that some of those who had come from overseas to work in our health and social care settings had made and rewarding them for that. There were particular circumstances that meant that it was felt that that was appropriate.

Charge payers pay only those charges a UK resident would pay, such as prescription charges in England. They may, however, be charged for assisted conception services in England, should they wish to use them. We welcome talented individuals to the UK and are immensely grateful to them for the important contributions they make, but if a person chooses to come to the UK as a worker, student, family member or volunteer, it is fair and reasonable to expect them to contribute to the high-quality NHS services available to them.

It is vital, particularly given the challenges posed by the pandemic, for the NHS to continue to be properly funded. The immigration health charge directly benefits the NHS and plays an important role in supporting its long-term sustainability. The Government are confident that the charity worker visa provides an attractive offer to voluntary workers. Individuals on some other routes can also volunteer their time to help others, and, depending on the route, they either pay the immigration health charge or may be charged by the NHS for their healthcare.

The youth mobility scheme, for example, is subject to the charge. Those on this route are free to take up work in any sector, paid or unpaid. The standard visitor visa allows people to volunteer for up to 30 days with a registered charity. The visit rules allow visitors to stay for a maximum of six months, which means that they are not subject to the immigration health charge but may instead be charged for NHS care, in line with the rules set by the relevant, devolved health administration.

The Government believe that it is right for the health charge to apply to the charity worker visa. Many nations expect newly arrived individuals to contribute, in some form, to the cost of healthcare. It is right we do the same. For the reasons I have set out, I ask the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East to withdraw the new clause, but I take on board the passion with which he made his case in relation to this issue and the various representations he referred to that have been made to me as Minister with responsibility for this Bill. I will certainly ensure that they are shared with the Minister with responsibility for this area of policy in the Department as part of their consideration of these matters.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am grateful to the Minister for his response and those assurances. He is quite right about the reasons for the recognition that was given to health and social care staff. We are just calling for the same recognition for volunteers as well. I would be interested to know more. I get the impression that this would be a tiny hit for the Treasury, but it could have real benefit for charities. Before we think about that and make the case again before we reach Report stage, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 17

Duty regarding rights to British citizenship or British overseas territories citizenship

“(1) It is the duty of the Secretary of State to encourage, promote and facilitate awareness and exercise of rights to British citizenship or British overseas territories citizenship among persons possessing these rights.

(2) In fulfilment of that duty, the Secretary of State—

(a) must take all reasonable steps to ensure that all persons with rights to British citizenship or British overseas territories citizenship are able to exercise those rights;

(b) must make arrangements, including with local authorities, to ensure that all children in a local authority area are aware of their rights to British citizenship or British overseas territories citizenship and of the means by which to exercise those rights;

(c) must, when considering any application for confirmation or registration of British citizenship or British overseas territories citizenship, have regard to information held by or available to the Secretary of State that would demonstrate the applicant to be a British citizen or British overseas territories citizen or entitled to that citizenship; and

(d) shall have, and where reasonably necessary to ensure that all persons are able to exercise those rights shall exercise, the power to waive any requirement to attend a ceremony or in connection with biometric information.

(3) For the purposes of this section—

“rights to British citizenship” means rights of acquisition of British citizenship by birth, adoption, commencement or registration under the British Nationality Act 1981;

“rights to British overseas territories citizenship” means rights of acquisition of British overseas territories citizenship by birth, adoption, commencement or registration under the British Nationality Act 1981; and

“to exercise those rights” means to be registered as a British citizen or British overseas territories citizen on the making of an application under the British Nationality Act 1981 or to obtain documentation from the Secretary of State confirming British citizenship or British overseas territories citizenship (including by receipt of a passport) on the making of an application to the Secretary of State.”—(Stuart C. McDonald.)

This new Clause would require the Government to encourage, promote and facilitate awareness and exercise of rights to British citizenship or British overseas territories citizenship.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. The new clause would place on the Government an obligation and a duty to undertake promotion of British citizenship rights and British overseas territories citizenship rights.

If there is one thing that members of the Committee can all agree on, it is that nationality law is complicated, and British nationality law is particularly complicated. As I have said, nationality law is also absolutely fundamental to people’s identity, and their ability to fulfil their potential and to exercise so many other rights. That is why it is enshrined in the UN convention itself. It is much superior to any form of immigration leave, which is no form of substitute for holding nationality. The very need for the Bill indicates, however, that lots of people miss out on their entitlements. That is terrible for them as individuals, and it is terrible for the country as a whole—bad for social cohesion—if people are missing out on rights of citizenship that they could have and that are set out in law.

An example is looked-after children. During the registration process for the EU settlement scheme, it was clear that a number of local authorities might have been signing children up for EU settled status when in actual fact they were probably entitled to register as British citizens. The new clause therefore simply calls for the Government to take a more proactive approach and to work with organisations such as local authorities and others to ensure that as many people as possible are aware of and know about their right to register or to access citizenship in other ways, so empowering them to do so.

One welcome thing about the EU settlement scheme was that the Home Office caseworkers did not say, “This or that is missing, so I am going to refuse the application.” There was a concerted attempt to work with people to ensure that all the necessary evidence was found. A lot of the time, the Government took it on themselves—by liaising between Departments—to track down the necessary evidence to allow that person to achieve the status to which they were entitled. We call for the same approach on the more fundamental right to nationality.

That is the reasoning behind the new clause. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Tom Pursglove]

I thank the hon. Members for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East and for Glasgow North East for their new clause. I understand their thinking behind it: people who are entitled to citizenship should be able to find the information that they need and that the process should be simple and straightforward. That is a sentiment I would echo.

The measures the new clause proposes represent best practice, much of which already exists in the nationality and passport processes. For example, both UK Visas and Immigration and Her Majesty’s Passport Office publish information and guidance on gov.uk, and use information that is already available on their systems when processing applications. As part of considering Windrush applications in particular, UKVI caseworkers have demonstrated a proactive approach, helping people to locate the information needed and consulting internal sources.

The existing legislation already contains discretion to excuse or exempt a person from attending a citizenship ceremony or to enrol their biometrics. The Home Secretary can disapply the requirement to attend a ceremony in the special circumstances of a case and, if it would be too difficult for an applicant to enrol their biometrics in the form of a facial image and fingerprints, an authorised person such as an official acting on behalf of the Secretary of State can defer or waive the requirement to enrol some or all of the biometrics. I am happy to listen to the thoughts of the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East about the areas where we could do more.

I do not think that we can accept the new clause, however. It would impose a statutory requirement that I am not sure is measurable. For example, while we could take steps to ensure that local authorities have information about citizenship and are encouraged to pass on that information to children in their area, I do not see that we could fulfil a statutory requirement to ensure an awareness for every child—that would be outside our control.

Similarly, the new clause is not specific about the steps that the Home Secretary would be expected to take—the lengths she would be expected to go to, for example, to obtain “available” information when considering an application, without being in breach of such a statutory duty. I take on board the sentiment of what the hon. Gentleman is trying to achieve, but I ask him to withdraw his new clause.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am grateful to the Minister for his reply and for his constructive approach to the issue. Perhaps we may continue the conversation in the weeks and months ahead. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 23

Safe and legal routes

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 30 days of the date of Royal Assent to this Act and annually thereafter, publish a report on—

(a) all current safe and legal asylum routes to the United Kingdom,

(b) the eligibility criteria for legal entry into the United Kingdom, and

(c) details of the application process.

(2) The Secretary of State must publish a report on its resettlement target of refugees per year, and report on this every year.”— (Paul Blomfield.)

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to publish a summary of safe and legal routes to refuge in the UK each year, alongside their eligibility criteria and application process. It would also commit the UK and Secretary of State to publishing its resettlement targets, and reporting on this annually.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Paul Blomfield (Sheffield Central) (Lab)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause raises an issue central to the Bill and tests the Government’s commitment. Ministers here and elsewhere have consistently argued that their objective for this legislation is to break the business model for the people smugglers, to stop dangerous journeys across the channel and instead to offer those fleeing war and persecution safe and legal routes to refuge in the UK. As the Opposition side have said many times, we endorse those objectives. What we have been doing over the past few weeks is looking at how the Bill achieves them.

We know that the Government’s own assessment of their proposals suggests that they will probably fail; the impact assessment they conducted went so far as to point out that they would probably be counterproductive. Obviously, the Government have brushed that evidence aside, but there is a real concern that there is a fundamental deceit at the core of the Bill, which is that the Government are not serious about offering the safe and legal alternatives.

The new clause is not particularly radical or ambitious; it simply requires the Home Secretary to publish a report on all current safe and legal routes, who is eligible and how people can apply. It would provide transparency and help the Home Office, because it would be able to point to a credible alternative to the dangerous journeys that we all want to discourage. Currently, however, that is not the case: the schemes that the UK has open—the UKRS and the Afghan citizen resettlement scheme—have little detail in the public domain and little guidance on the eligibility criteria or the process for application. I remind the Committee of the point I made earlier: in the first half of this year, only 310 people were resettled under the UK resettlement scheme. The recently published details of the Afghan scheme frankly offer little hope for those to whom the Prime Minister made grand promises about “every effort” and “open arms” back in August.

I remind the Minister that, while the Government promote the generosity of the UK and, as we have touched on previously, we should welcome every effort that has been made to support those fleeing war and persecution, in 2019, Germany resettled more than three times as many refugees as the UK; 1.5% of Germany’s population are refugees, in comparison with 0.65% in France, 0.45% in the Netherlands and 0.19% in the UK, according to the World Bank. We are not middle ranking, as I think the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East said at one stage; we have traditionally been middle ranking, but under this Government we have been falling behind.

By accepting the new clause and publishing information about resettlement routes, the Home Office can at least be honest about the resettlement it is prepared to offer, and to whom. We as a Committee have read the evidence shared from Safe Passage International, which included some examples of people such as Jabir and Ahmed. Jabir is an unaccompanied child in northern France who is desperate to rejoin his family in the UK. He is willing to risk the channel to be reunited with his loved ones. His family have already lost a young family member to the treacherous crossing, so they are desperate to find a way for Jabir to be reunited with them, but it does not exist. While he would have had a clear case under Dublin III, there is no clear route for him now.

Meanwhile, 15-year-old Ahmed is stranded alone in France after fleeing Afghanistan. He desperately wants to be reunited with his brother, who was granted asylum in the UK and is now a young business owner. Under the UK’s current rules, the brothers would find it extremely difficult to reunite. If Ahmed’s parents were in the UK, the process would be straightforward, but tragically his brother is his only remaining family member. Ahmed is in an extremely vulnerable situation; he suffers from trauma and struggles enormously with the loss of his family. Being reunited with his brother is his only option to feel safe and to build a better future. I hope that in responding to these comments, the Minister will outline specifically what options for safe passage are, or are planned to be, available for those two boys.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

On the issue of safe routes for children, unaccompanied asylum-seeking children in Europe with family members in the UK are able to apply to join eligible sponsors, such as those with refugee leave or British settled status. The immigration rules make provision for children to be reunited with their parents. Paragraphs 319 and 297 of the immigration rules are extremely flexible and allow for children to apply to join adult family members if requirements are met, and if there are serious or compelling reasons that make the exclusion of a child undesirable and suitable arrangements are needed for a child’s care. Again, these matters are considered on a case-by-case basis, taking proper account of all the circumstances at play.

Let me finish the point that I was making before I took the interventions. Under the family reunion policy, we have granted reunion to over 37,000 partners and children of those granted protection in the UK since 2015; that is more than 5,000 a year. Our policy makes it clear that there is discretion to grant visas outside the immigration rules that caters for extended family members in exceptional and compassionate circumstances—for example, young adult sons or daughters who are dependent on family here and who are living in dangerous situations. Refugees can also sponsor adult dependent relatives living overseas to join them, when, due to age, illness or disability, that person requires long-term personal care that can only be provided by relatives in the UK.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I suggest the Minister goes away and does some investigations into just how frequently these types of application are granted. My recollection is that some of the thresholds are so high—exceptional and compassionate circumstances, and so on—that in reality, it is almost impossible for some of these applications to be successful. I do not think it is an answer at all to what the hon. Member for Sheffield Central is advocating.

--- Later in debate ---

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. 

I appreciate that the issue of safe routes has been explored fairly extensively already today, but I just want to make a couple more points. I think pretty much everyone on the Committee has agreed that we want to stop people from making dangerous journeys. Members would agree that part of that work involves tackling gangs through police work and so on. Fundamentally, where we have different points of view is over the role that disincentives have.

The Bill is all about disincentivising people from making journeys by putting them in the criminal justice system—breaching their human rights, breaching the refugee convention and using all manner of methods that would be regarded as completely and utterly inappropriate. Indeed, in the last debate we heard about the right to work, which exemplified that approach. The answer from the Minister, with all due respect, was totally devoid of any sort of evidence and reasoning. It is hugely frustrating. The so-called review is still ongoing three years on.

The final way to tackle these journeys is through safe alternatives. Again, I think that across the Committee there is a degree of agreement that safe routes do have a role to play. It is important that we have safe legal routes. In a sense, there is an element of justice about it, which is that we have to play our part in supporting those who suffer persecution; we cannot just leave it all to neighbouring countries, notwithstanding the fact that 80% or 90% of refugees are often in neighbouring countries—developing countries and so on.

I still do not get whether the Government totally appreciate the important role that such safe routes have in reducing unsafe journeys. To me, it is obviously significant. That is why EU countries, previously including the UK, have in place the Dublin rules. Those are far from perfect, but they recognise that if a person seeking asylum has family members or links in another member state, that is an appropriate place for the asylum case to be heard. Almost certainly, if there is no official route for an individual to use to come to the UK, whatever their ties are, an unofficial journey on an unofficial route will follow. That is why we find that many people in France who do consider, and do make, these dangerous journeys actually have relatives here in the UK. The immigration rules as they stand—I raised this in my intervention on the Minister earlier—are not fit for purpose. They include hugely demanding tests. Grants outside the rules are few and far between. I welcome the fact that the Government have indicated that they will take a look at that.

The end of the Dublin rules has almost certainly—definitely, in my view—exacerbated what is going on across the channel. Of course, the fact that there are no safe legal routes across the channel does not mean that there are not people attempting these dangerous journeys: other reasons and other ties exist that motivate people to do that. There is no doubt that providing some form of visa for those who require it would result in some reduction in those dangerous crossings.

As the situation stands, the Government are trying to secure agreements with other countries, but so far as we can see those are entirely one-sided and one-way agreements seeking only to secure the right to remove people from here. To secure deals, to encourage countries to get on board and to ensure a reduction in unsafe journeys, we also need to negotiate safe routes to here. That is why the Dubs scheme was so successful and important. It is important that we put in place something similar for the future, which is what the new clause is all about.

[Tom Pursglove]

I agree with the hon. Gentleman that it is imperative that we think carefully about the issue. Expanding our family reunion policy as proposed by the new clause would significantly increase the number of people who would qualify to come here and to seek protection. Indeed, the new clause is global in scope, meaning that any asylum seeker in the world with extended family in the UK could qualify to claim asylum. That could easily run to the hundreds of thousands.

To give just one example of how that could have challenging consequences, foreign nationals already illegally present in the UK could potentially be incentivised to claim asylum to circumvent immigration rules in order to bring their family over. We need to ensure that our limited resources are focused on helping refugees who are in the UK to reunite and integrate with immediate pre-flight family. We have a proud record of helping those facing persecution, oppression and tyranny, and we stand by our moral and legal obligations to help innocent civilians fleeing cruelty from around the world, but we cannot help all the people displaced worldwide and who want to come to the UK.

Allowing extended family members to come to the UK for the purpose of claiming protection under new clause 47 might simply create further incentives for more adults and children to be encouraged—even forced—to leave their family and risk hazardous journeys to the UK in order to later sponsor qualifying extended family. That plays into the hands of criminal gangs who exploit vulnerable people and goes against the main intention of the Bill. We must do everything in our power to stop that dangerous trend. The new clause would also result in chain migration, where granting entry to each family member has the potential to bring in even greater numbers of their family members to claim protection under the rules. That is simply not sustainable.

We recognise, however, that families can become fragmented because of the nature of conflict and persecution, as well as the speed and manner in which those seeking protection are often forced to flee their own country. That is why the Government strongly support the principle of family unity. We already have a comprehensive framework for families to be reunited here safely. I will add, because this will be of interest to both Government and Opposition Members, that we are committed to reviewing the family refugee reunion rules, as we set out in the new plan for immigration. At all times, as the Committee would expect, we will be fully compliant with our international obligations.

Given that and the issues raised in Committee, everything will be taken into account when looking at the policy.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

First, that was not a fair interpretation of the new clause: it was certainly not advocating for an unlimited number of people to have access to that route. Nevertheless, it is surprising that we are expected to be encouraged about family reunion at a time when this very Bill is proposing to strip the overwhelming majority of asylum seekers and refugees of those family reunion rights. At the end of the day, the issue is one we will have to revisit on Report. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 48

Six month time limit for determining asylum applications

“(1) The Secretary of State must make regulations providing for—

(a) a six month time limit for determining applications for asylum; and

(b) an officer of Director level or above to be required to write to the Home Secretary a letter of explanation on a quarterly basis in the event of any failure to meet the six month time limit.

(2) The Secretary of State must report to Parliament any failure to meet the six month time limit.”—(Bambos Charalambous.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

This new clause could be a silver bullet to solve a lot of the ills in the immigration and asylum system. We believe that, were it to be adopted, it would have many beneficial social and financial effects. It would obviate the need for some of the other clauses we have proposed, such as lifting the ban on working. The new clause would undo a host of negative consequences that arise because of the current endemic delays in the asylum system, which are creating huge social and financial costs.

During the course of this Committee, we have heard testimony from people trapped inside the system for years. We have heard about the toll on mental health and the re-traumatising of people who have fled abuse and torture. We have heard about the way in which being trapped in limbo prevents integration and how being banned from working enforces poverty. None of these negative effects would exist if our six-month time limit for processing cases were adopted. Furthermore, costs to the taxpayer, such as those currently spent on long-term accommodation and subsistence benefits, would all be hugely reduced.

Let us not be under any illusion: the current asylum system is broken. According to the House of Commons Library, as of June 2021 the total “work in progress” asylum case load consisted of 125,000 cases—57,000 of those were awaiting an initial decision at the end of 2020.

--- Later in debate ---

[Bambos Charalambous]

I will not press new clause 52 to a vote, but I do hope that the Government will keep monitoring the system and provide the protection for young Hongkongers that I outlined. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 53

Electronic monitoring: conditions and use of data

“(1) Schedule 10 to the Immigration Act 2016 is amended as follows.

(2) In paragraph 2, in sub-paragraph (3)(a), leave out ‘must’ and insert ‘may’.

(3) In paragraph 2, in sub-paragraph (3)(b), leave out ‘by virtue of sub-paragraph (5) or (7)’.

(4) In paragraph 2, after sub-paragraph (3) insert—

‘(3A) If immigration bail is granted to a person subject to an electronic monitoring condition, the electronic monitoring condition shall cease to apply on the day six months after the day on which immigration bail was granted to the person, unless sub-paragraph (3B) applies.

(3B) This sub-paragraph applies if the Secretary of State or the First-tier Tribunal (as the case may be), when granting immigration bail to the person, has directed that the electronic monitoring condition shall not cease to apply in accordance with sub-paragraph (3A).

(3C) But the Secretary of State or the First-tier Tribunal (as the case may be) shall not make a direction under sub-paragraph (3B) unless the Secretary of State or the First-tier Tribunal (as the case may be) is satisfied that there are very exceptional circumstances which make the continued application of the electronic monitoring condition necessary in the interests of—

(a) public protection; or

(b) national security.’

(5) In paragraph 2, after sub-paragraph (7) insert—

‘(7A) Sub-paragraph (3)(a) does not apply to a person who is granted immigration bail by the First-tier Tribunal if the Tribunal considers that to impose an electronic monitoring condition on the person would be—

(a) impractical, or

(b) contrary to the person’s Convention rights.

(7B) Where sub-paragraph (7) or (7A) applies, the First-tier Tribunal must not grant immigration bail to the person subject to an electronic monitoring condition.’

(6) In paragraph 4, after sub-paragraph (2) insert—

‘(2A) The Secretary of State must not process any data collected by a device within the meaning of sub-paragraph (2) which relates to the matters in sub-paragraph (1)(a) to (c) except for the purpose of, and to the minimum extent reasonably necessary for, determining whether P has breached a condition of his bail.

(2B) In sub-paragraph (2A), “processing” has the same meaning as in section 3(4) of the Data Protection Act 2018.’”.—(Stuart C. McDonald.)

This new clause would place certain safeguards and restrictions on use of electronic monitoring.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 53 is really just to probe the Government on a new issue that has started to arise this year: the significant increase in the use of the GPS monitoring of certain people on bail for immigration purposes, largely foreign national offenders awaiting deportation. I am not for a moment suggesting that such monitoring does not have its role. It absolutely does; indeed, there would be occasions on which I would be upset with the Home Office if it did not use it. There is a genuine concern, however, about the lack of safeguards and limits on its use, and on how data from GPS tracking is being used. Indeed, even compared to the criminal justice system, it seems that the safeguards and limits are somewhat light touch. Cases have arisen where it seems that use was totally inappropriate.

New clause 53 suggests putting in place some appropriate safeguards and restrictions. It is designed to prompt the Minister, if not today then in due course, to answer certain questions. First and foremost, how will data be used in practice and in what circumstances will it be used in relation to somebody’s article 8 claim? That is an area of controversy, in that the use of tracking goes way beyond the original intention in previous relevant legislation, which was to prevent people from absconding.

Secondly, the criminal justice system imposes strict limits and safeguards on how long electronic monitoring is used for and in what circumstances, with limits on collection, processing, storage and use of data. Why, therefore, are those electronic monitoring safeguards absent in the immigration system?

Thirdly, why have the Government not made the data protection and equality impact assessment for such an intrusive scheme available to the public? Fourthly, what guarantee can the Government give that they will not expand their use of this technology and use it on people who have come to the United Kingdom to seek asylum? Can the Minister give us assurances on that today?

Finally, the Government’s own data suggests that absconding rates are exceptionally low. A recent FOI response found that of people granted bail between February 2020 and March 2021, there were 43 cases of absconding out of 7,000, so what evidence does the Home Office have that this intrusive measure is really necessary on anything other than a very limited scale?

[Tom Pursglove]

Our immigration system must encourage compliance with immigration rules and protect the public. Electronic monitoring of foreign national offenders using satellite tracking devices was a Government manifesto commitment, which the public voted for, and the measure which enacts it was passed into primary legislation under the Immigration Act 2016. It has already been subject to parliamentary scrutiny and debate during the passage of the 2016 Act.

Electronic monitoring is a condition of immigration bail. During the debate on the Immigration Act 2016, it was open to Parliament to set a limit on how long a person can be made subject to electronic monitoring, but it chose not to do so. However, I want to be clear that a person’s electronic monitoring conditions are already automatically reviewed on a quarterly basis as a minimum. Compliance with bail conditions, including electronic monitoring, will be a major factor in deciding whether it will remain a condition of that person’s bail. Any representations regarding the person’s electronic monitoring conditions or a breach of those conditions will also generate a review.

Prior to being placed on electronic monitoring when released, a person is given an opportunity to advise the Department as to why electronic monitoring may not be appropriate for them. That includes where there is strong evidence to suggest that an electronic monitoring condition would cause serious harm to the person’s health. A person can also make representations at any point while wearing a tag and those representations will be considered promptly.

Currently, there is a duty on the Secretary of State to consider electronic monitoring for those who are subject to a deportation order or deportation proceedings, known as “the duty”. The proposed clause makes the consideration of imposing an electronic monitoring condition discretionary. However, there is already a caveat within current legislation that electronic monitoring will not be applied to a person who is subject to the duty where its imposition would be impractical or contrary to the person’s convention rights. The proposal to remove the compulsory consideration of electronic monitoring for all those subject to the duty could lead to a scenario where serious offenders who should be electronically monitored are not considered for electronic monitoring and are granted bail without that condition.

I turn to the new clause’s reference to the use of data. Any data that is gathered from the devices will be processed automatically and will not be routinely monitored by the Department. We have undertaken a data protection impact assessment in relation to the introduction of GPS tagging, which sets out the specific permitted circumstances where data can be accessed, and any access outside those circumstances is considered a data breach. Those who are subject to electronic monitoring are made aware of the circumstances as to when their data can be accessed during the induction process.

Restricting the data in the way the new clause sets out will impact on the ability to use data to try to locate a person after it has been identified that they have breached their immigration bail conditions and are viewed as an absconder. The inability to share data with other law enforcement agencies where a lawful request had been made would be out of alignment with the agreement on sharing data for the purposes of preventing or solving crime. In the broadest terms, only knowing that a person had breached their bail conditions and not being able to use the data for any other purpose would greatly limit the efficacy of electronic monitoring.

I do not consider that the new clause would have the effect that hon. Members intend. Rather, it would impair our ability to monitor and deport those who had committed crimes and were not entitled to remain in the UK. Foreign criminals should be in no doubt of our determination to deport them. We make no apology for keeping the public safe and clamping down on those who have no right to be in the UK.

In summary, the restriction of the use of electronic monitoring as proposed in new clause 53 would significantly impair our ability efficiently to remove foreign national offenders who have no right to be here. I am conscious that the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East raised a number of questions at the outset. I have covered quite a lot of ground, but if there are any matters that he feels I have not addressed and he would like to follow up, I of course invite him to please do so.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am grateful to the Minister for that response. I will have a look through everything that has been said and consider whether any follow-up is necessary. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 54

Instructions to the Migration Advisory Committee

“Within two months of this Act coming into force, the Secretary of State must instruct the Migration Advisory Committee to undertake the following work—

(a) a review of the minimum income requirements for leave to enter and remain as a family member of persons who are British citizens or settled in the United Kingdom;

(b) a report making detailed recommendations on the design of a work visa for remote areas.”—(Stuart C. McDonald.)

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to seek further advice in order to take forward certain recommendations made by the Migration Advisory Committee in recent reports.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

This is the final new clause. On that note, I should start by thanking all the organisations that have been incredibly helpful in providing briefings, draft amendments and so on; thanking the staff of the House for their incredible patience in dealing with millions of amendments and new clauses; and thanking you, Ms McDonagh, and Sir Roger for the way you have chaired the Committee.

This new clause asks the Government to commission from the Migration Advisory Committee two incredibly important pieces of work. One relates to family visas, and the other to a possible remote areas pilot scheme. The first issue, which we touched on earlier in relation to the Chagos islanders and the family visa rules, gives me the opportunity to reiterate our passionate view that currently the UK family visa rules are absolutely atrocious and indefensible. In the grand scheme of things, the UK is an absolute outlier in this regard and has been for about a decade. The rules are incredibly restrictive on families. When the then Children’s Commissioner for England did a report on the matter back in, I think, 2015, she wrote in considerable detail about the dreadful impact that this has on children in particular, but also on spouses—British citizens and British settled people—who end up separated from their other halves or from their kids, and all for absolutely unevidenced policy reasons on the part of the Government.

Research shows that in large parts of the country—Northern Ireland in particular, but elsewhere as well—close to and above 50% of the population would not be able to meet the requirements to allow their spouse to come and join them in this country. That is absolutely extraordinary. Even on the Government’s own terms—the Minister spoke earlier about the policy goal being to make sure that folk can stand on their own two feet without having to rely on public funds—all of this is contested.

There is academic research that suggests that, in fact, the way the rules operate means that some families have to place more reliance on public funds. For example, a person who is here with a child and is not able to bring their spouse in ends up having to work fewer hours or not at all, because of childcare. Some institutions have calculated that this actually costs the taxpayer money rather than saving the taxpayer money. In any event, it is totally unjustified and a deeply horrible intrusion into people’s family lives.

In its last annual report, the Migration Advisory Committee said:

“We also think now would be an opportune time to reconsider the minimum income requirements associated with this route. The MAC are concerned that previous analysis may have given too much weight to the fiscal contribution of such migrants and insufficient attention to the benefits that accrue, to both the family and society, from the route. In addition, it is a considerable time since the current income requirements were introduced, so more evidence should now be available to review the impact of these requirements.”

I absolutely endorse that. We must now revisit these anti-family rules. Even if the Minister is not prepared to look again at the financial thresholds, he should look at the rule that means that the Home Office almost never takes into account the earning capacity of the spouse applying for a visa to come in. It seems absolutely absurd that we could have somebody who could earn £20,000, £30,000 or £40,000, yet that is not taken into account in the application process. I just gently ask the Home Office to look again at this.

The second bit of work that this final new clause would ask of the MAC is to look in a little more detail at the possibilities of a remote areas pilot scheme. When the MAC prepared its report to the Government on salary thresholds for the new points-based system, it expressed a sympathetic view about the problems faced by more remote parts of the UK, and recommended that the Government consider a remote areas pilot scheme. In the Government’s response to the review, they noted that the pilot was an idea that they were intending to pursue. Indeed, the words of the current Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, who was then Home Secretary, were that this was “an idea worth pursuing”. The MAC is quite clear that it hopes that the Government will still carry through with the pilot, and that it should involve all devolved Administrations. Part of the scheme could involve a lower salary threshold for those areas.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for the way in which he has gone about his work during the course of proceedings, and for pursuing a number of angles with great tenacity and vigour.

The Migration Advisory Committee is an independent, non-statutory, non-time limited, non-departmental public body that advises the Government on migration issues. The minimum income requirement was implemented in July 2012, following advice from the MAC and has not changed since its introduction. We will consider whether to commission the MAC to review the minimum income requirement within the next three months.

In addition, the MAC considered the issue of work visas for remote areas in is January 2020 report, “A Points-Based System and Salary Thresholds for Immigration”. The MAC recommended a pilot for remote visas, but the Government did not accept this. The UK has a single, flexible immigration system that works for the entirety of the UK. Applying different immigration rules to different parts of the UK would overly complicate the immigration system and would cause significant difficulties for employers who need the flexibility to deploy their staff across the UK. As the MAC itself has said, when considering sustaining remote communities we need to consider why people leave these areas. This is more important than bolstering local communities with migration. I therefore do not consider re-reviewing this issue to be a good use of the MAC’s time or public money.

It is not appropriate to put an amendment such as new clause 54 into primary legislation, as the commissioning of the MAC is done on a priority basis. The Secretary of State retains the power to change the topics, which the MAC reviews at short notice, if a more pressing matter becomes a priority. The Secretary of State should be able to respond flexibly to any new priorities. For those reasons, I encourage the hon. Member to withdraw his new clause.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am grateful to the Minister for his answers. He is certainly candid, as he has been throughout Committee proceedings. I am bitterly disappointed about the answer in relation to the remote areas pilot scheme. Those areas are really suffering, not just in terms of labour shortages and the accompanying economic challenges, but even with depopulation.

I will hang on and finish on an optimistic note in that there is a possibility that the Government will commission a review of the salary threshold for family visas. I very much hope that that does happen and they look at how that route operates all together. I cling to that little bit of silver lining. With that, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Schedule 1

Prisoners returning to the UK: Modifications of Criminal Justice Act 2003

‘This is the Schedule to be inserted after Schedule 19A to the Criminal Justice Act 2003—

“Schedule 19B

Prisoners returning to the UK: Modifications of Chapter 6 of Part 12

Modification of dates for referral to the Board

1 Paragraph 2 applies where section 244ZC(2), 244A(2) or 246A(4) (when read with section 260(4A)) would require the Secretary of State to refer a person’s case to the Board on a day falling before the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the day on which the person is returned to custody.

2 The applicable provision is to be read as requiring the Secretary of State to refer the person’s case to the Board at any time up to the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the day on which the person is returned to custody.

3 For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2, a person returns to custody when the person, having returned to the United Kingdom, is detained (whether or not in prison) in pursuance of their sentence.

Person removed after Board had directed release but before being released

4 Paragraphs 5 and 6 apply where, before a person’s removal from the United Kingdom—

(a) the Board had directed their release under section 244ZC, 244A or 246A, but

(b) they had not been released on licence.

5 The direction of the Board is to be treated as having no effect.

6 The person is to be treated as if—

(a) they had been recalled under section 254 on the day on which they returned to the United Kingdom, and

(b) they were not suitable for automatic release (see section 255A).

Person removed after referral to the Board but before disposal of the reference

7 Paragraph 8 applies where—

(a) before a person’s removal from prison their case had been referred to the Board under section 244ZB(3), 244ZC(2), 244A(2) or 246A(4), and

(b) the reference lapsed under section 260(4B) because the person was removed from the United Kingdom before the Board had disposed of the reference.

8 Section 244ZC(2), 244A(2) or 246A(4) (as applicable) is to be read as requiring the Secretary of State to refer the person’s case to the Board before the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the day on which the person is returned to custody.

9 For the purposes of paragraph 8, a person returns to custody when the person, having returned to the United Kingdom, is detained (whether or not in prison) in pursuance of their sentence.

Person removed after having been recalled to prison

10 Paragraphs 11 and 12 apply where, at the time of a person’s removal from prison under section 260, the person was in prison following recall under section 254.

11 Any direction of the Board made in relation to the person under section 255C or 256A before their return to the United Kingdom is to be treated as having no effect.

12 The person is to be treated as if—

(a) they had been recalled under section 254 on the day on which they returned to the United Kingdom, and

(b) they were not suitable for automatic release (see section 255A).”’—(Tom Pursglove.)

This new schedule inserts a new Schedule 19B into the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to make modifications of that Act in relation to prisoners who have returned to the UK after their removal from prison. It is introduced by section 261 of that Act, which is amended by NC12.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Schedule 3

Working in United Kingdom waters: consequential and related amendments

‘Immigration Act 1971

1 The Immigration Act 1971 is amended as follows.

2 In section 8 (exceptions for seamen etc), after subsection (1) insert—

“(1A) Subsection (1) does not apply in relation to a member of the crew of a ship who is an offshore worker within the meaning of section 11A.”

3 In section 11 (references to entry etc), after subsection (1) insert—

“(1ZA) See also section 11A (additional means by which persons arriving in United Kingdom waters for work can enter the UK).”

4 In section 28 (proceedings for offences)—

(a) before subsection (1) insert—

“(A1) Proceedings for an offence under this Part that is committed in the territorial sea adjacent to the United Kingdom may be taken, and the offence may for all incidental purposes be treated as having been committed, in any place in the United Kingdom.”;

(b) in subsection (2A), for “section 25 or 25A” substitute “this Part”.

5 In section 28L (interpretation of Part 3) —

(a) in subsection (1), at the beginning insert “Subject to subsection (1A)”;

(b) after subsection (1) insert—

“(1A) In this Part ‘premises’ also includes any artificial island, installation or structure (including one in the territorial sea adjacent to the United Kingdom).”

6 In section 28M (enforcement powers in relation to ships: England and Wales), in subsection (2)(a)—

(a) for “section” substitute—

“(i) section 24B,”;

(b) for “, and” substitute “, or

(ii) section 21 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, and”.

7 In section 28N (enforcement powers in relation to ships: Scotland), in subsection (2)(a)—

(a) for “section” substitute—

“(i) section 24B,”;

(b) for “, and” substitute “, or

(ii) section 21 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, and”.

8 In section 28O (enforcement powers in relation to ships: Northern Ireland), in subsection (2)(a)—

(a) for “section” substitute—

“(i) section 24B,”;

(b) for “, and” substitute “, or

(ii) section 21 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006, and”.

9 (1) Schedule 2 (administrative provision as to control on entry etc) is amended as follows.

(2) In paragraph 2—

(a) in sub-paragraph (1), for the words from “who have” to “United Kingdom)” substitute “within sub-paragraph (1A)”;

(b) after sub-paragraph (1) insert—

“(1A) The persons are—

(a) any person who has arrived in the United Kingdom by ship or aircraft (including transit passengers, members of the crew and others not seeking to enter the United Kingdom);

(b) any person who has arrived in United Kingdom waters by ship or aircraft who the immigration officer has reason to believe is an offshore worker.

(1B) In sub-paragraph (1A), ‘offshore worker’ and ‘United Kingdom waters’ have the same meaning as in section 11A.”

(3) In paragraph 27—

(a) after sub-paragraph (1) insert—

“(1A) Sub-paragraph (1) also applies to the captain of a ship or aircraft arriving in United Kingdom waters if—

(a) there are offshore workers on board, or

(b) an immigration officer has informed the captain that they wish to examine any person on board in the exercise of the power under paragraph 2.

(1B) In sub-paragraph (1A), ‘offshore worker’ and ‘United Kingdom waters’ have the same meaning as in section 11A.”

(4) In paragraph 27B—

(a) after sub-paragraph (1) insert—

“(1A) This paragraph also applies to ships or aircraft—

(a) which have offshore workers on board, and

(b) which—

(i) have arrived, or are expected to arrive, in United Kingdom waters, or

(ii) have left, or are expected to leave, United Kingdom waters.”;

(b) after sub-paragraph (9A) insert—

“(9B) ‘Offshore worker’ and ‘United Kingdom waters’ have the same meaning in this paragraph as in section 11A.”

(5) In paragraph 27BA—

(a) after sub-paragraph (1) insert—

“(1A) The Secretary of State may also make regulations requiring responsible persons in respect of ships or aircraft—

(a) which have offshore workers on board, and

(b) which—

(i) have arrived, or are expected to arrive, in United Kingdom waters, or

(ii) have left, or are expected to leave, United Kingdom waters,

to supply information to the Secretary of State or an immigration officer.”;

(b) in sub-paragraph (2), after (1) insert “or (1A)”;

(c) after sub-paragraph (5) insert—

“(5A) For the purposes of this paragraph, ‘offshore workers’ and ‘United Kingdom waters’ have the same meaning as in section 11A.”

10 (1) Schedule 4A (maritime enforcement powers) is amended as follows.

(2) In paragraph 1(2), after the opening words insert—

“‘the 2006 Act’ means the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006;”.

(3) In paragraph (2)(1)(a), for “25 or 25A” substitute “24B, 25 or 25A of this Act or section 21 of the 2006 Act”.

(4) In paragraph (3)(1)(a), for “25, 25A and 25B” substitute “24B, 25, 25A or 25B of this Act or section 21 of the 2006 Act”.

(5) In paragraph 4(1), for “25, 25A or 25B” substitute “24B, 25, 25A or 25B of this Act or section 21 of the 2006 Act”.

(6) In paragraph 12(2), after the opening words insert—

“‘the 2006 Act’ means the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006;”.

(7) In paragraph 13(1)(a), for “25 or 25A” substitute “24B, 25 or 25A of this Act or section 21 of the 2006 Act”.

(8) In paragraph 14(1)(a), for “25 or 25A” substitute “24B, 25 or 25A of this Act or section 21 of the 2006 Act”.

(9) In paragraph 15(1), for “25 or 25A” substitute “24B, 25 or 25A of this Act or section 21 of the 2006 Act”.

(10) In paragraph 23(2), after the opening words insert—

“‘the 2006 Act’ means the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006;”.

(11) In paragraph 24(1)(a), for “25 or 25A” substitute “24B, 25 or 25A of this Act or section 21 of the 2006 Act”.

(12) In paragraph 25(1)(a), for “25 or 25A” substitute “24B, 25 or 25A of this Act or section 21 of the 2006 Act”.

(13) In paragraph 26(1), for “25 or 25A” substitute “24B, 25 or 25A of this Act or section 21 of the 2006 Act”.

Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006

11 In section 21 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 (offence of employing a person who is disqualified from employment by their immigration status), after subsection (3) insert—

“(3A) Proceedings for an offence under this section that is committed in the territorial sea adjacent to the United Kingdom may be taken, and the offence may for all incidental purposes be treated as having been committed, in any place in the United Kingdom.

(3B) Section 3 of the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act 1878 (consent of Secretary of State for certain prosecutions) does not apply to proceedings for an offence under this section.”’—(Tom Pursglove.)

This new schedule makes consequential and related amendments in NC20.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

Question proposed, That the Chair do report the Bill, as amended, to the House.

[Bambos Charalambous]

I want to put on the record my thanks to the Clerks, in particular Sarah Thatcher and Rob Page, for their amazing work in getting our new clauses and amendments into some form of legible parliamentary-type wording. I also thank the other staff, those in the room in particular, the Doorkeepers and those keeping a record of our sometimes very long speeches. I also thank you, Ms McDonagh, and Sir Roger, for the excellent way in which you chaired proceedings of the Committee.

I thank the members of the Committee—the Minister and all members, but in particular my friends and colleagues in the Opposition for their support and for helping us get to where we are today. I put on the record my thanks to my fellow shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax, and my hon. Friends the Members for Bermondsey and Old Southwark, for Sheffield Central and for Coventry North West, and to the hon. Members for Glasgow North East and for—I will attempt to say the name—Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East.

Finally, I thank my staff, Katherine Chibah, Giulia Monasterio, Cian Fox, Charlotte Butterick and Tashi Tahir, for all their hard work on the research and the speeches, and for their general support. It has been a challenging Bill Committee and I am pleased that we have got to the end of it in one piece.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Stuart C McDonald Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 7th December 2021 Commons Chamber

[Johnny Mercer (Plymouth, Moor View) (Con)]

I will not take too long in my remarks, Madam Deputy Speaker, but I wish to make a couple of clear points about foreign and Commonwealth service personnel who serve in our armed forces and then have to pay to live in this country afterwards, and to use public services. There has been wide, broad, and deep support for action on this issue over the past few days, including from people who really do not like to get involved in politics. Whether it is the Royal British Legion, Help for Heroes and the veteran community or beyond, in our communities up and down the country, people recognise the morality behind the issue of charging those who serve to live in this country.

I speak to all sorts of people in the veterans community. Last night, I had a conversation with Prince Harry about this. He has contributed hugely to the veterans debate and I wanted his view. He said to me, “It’s not only morally right but would mean so much to those who have given so much.” That is not a political intervention; it demonstrates the moral purpose of this measure. It is an almost “effortless change”, as he said, for this Government to make, for us to finally see through what we have said to these people for so long. We owe it to them. They are our brothers and sisters. They have served with us over many years. I recognise that there are things going around today saying how we should not be doing this in primary legislation, for lots of reasons. I will come to that in a minute, but this has been going on for 20 years for these people, and at some point we have to grasp the nettle and make sure that we look after them.

The money is meaningless. I will address the figures that have been put out by the Government and others. On Monday, I was told that the Government could not do this because it would cost £160 million. That is garbage. Do not take my word for it; look at the Royal British Legion, which has campaigned on this issue for many years. I pay tribute to Members across the House, including those on the Conservative side, who have been Defence Ministers and have tried to deal with this problem but have hit the same issues we are hitting at the moment.

On that £160 million, the Royal British Legion has studied the figures. If someone who served in the military in this country applies for a visa, all their dependants use a special code. Someone can only use that code if they have served or they are a dependant, so we can pull the data between 2016 and 2020. It has never cost more than £1 million a year, so the majority of those fees are profit—a charge on our service personnel to stay here.

Let me address the consultation issue and the 12-year period. I do not want to air dirty linen in public, but I was there when that 12-year figure was decided on. It was done on a visit. It was plucked out of the air. There is no evidence whatsoever to back it up. There is evidence in the Department that someone from a foreign or Commonwealth country who serves in the military is likely to serve between six and seven years. Twelve years is well outside that. It is well beyond what our peer nations do, it is well beyond what our allies do, and it is incredibly unkind to these individuals who have worked and served for so long.

I have given the moral case and the financial case, but ultimately this decision comes down to Conservative Members. The whole country is aligned on this issue, and it has been for a very long time. All the political parties will support new clause 52 except the Conservatives, and we are the ones who made a promise that we would do something about this. That is unconscionable. Colleagues can of course take the calls from the Defence Secretary and others, with these figures that I have demonstrated are not true, or they can think about what they are here to do.

I am here to represent the Fijian family in Plymouth who left the military after nine years having fought in Afghanistan and Iraq; they may have been members of the United Kingdom Special Forces group—a relentless operational tempo. Finally they leave, their kids go to school and they save up for a house, but they have to pay a £10,000 bill to stay in this country that they fought for over so many years. Can colleagues really look that family in the eye and say, “No, you have to pay; we have to make a profit out of you for you to stay in this country, despite the fact that you were prepared to commit so much to the privileges and the freedoms we enjoy”?

Finally, I say to colleagues that the tide changes very quickly in politics. This issue has been around for 20 years now, and the tide changes. I know what it is like when people put the screws on and ask you to vote a certain way, but the tide changes. All we can do is what we think is right on the day. The moral and financial case for this measure has never been clearer, and I urge colleagues to consider it carefully before they cast their vote.

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

Rather than fixing the broken asylum system, the provisions in this part of the Bill risk breaking it all together, endangering, criminalising, delaying, warehousing, offshoring and depriving of their rights those who simply seek our protection. The Uyghur, the Syrian and the persecuted Christian I spoke about on Second Reading, as well as the Afghans who are now in danger because of events subsequent to that debate, all face those bleak impacts despite our best efforts in Committee.

Contrary to the claims that the Bill is about safe routes, it actually does not add a single one, while threatening to restrict vital family reunion rights, pushing more people towards smugglers and dangerous crossings.

[Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)]

I thank my hon. Friend for his forensic work on the Bill in Committee. He correctly says that the Bill does not propose any new safe legal routes, but there is one provision that does—new clause 10, in the name of the hon. Member for Bermondsey and Old Southwark (Neil Coyle), of which I am a co-sponsor. It proposes having a humanitarian visa that people could apply for in France so that they could start the process of coming to the United Kingdom there. Can my hon. Friend confirm that SNP MPs will support new clauses 10 and 11?

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am grateful to my hon. and learned Friend for her intervention, and I am happy to confirm that the SNP will support them. Indeed, there are a range of new clauses from both sides of the House, from Back Benchers in particular, that seek to add safe routes, and they all have our support. For our part, we have tabled new clause 35, which would expand refugee family reunion in a way that this House supported in 2018 in the private Member’s Bill introduced by my hon. Friend the Member for Na h-Eileanan an Iar (Angus Brendan MacNeil).

Our other proposals try once more to limit some of the harm that the Bill will do at every stage in the asylum process. However, let me first welcome the amendments from the Joint Committee on Human Rights and others regarding the appalling maritime pushback clauses and the criminalisation of rescuers—provisions that risk serious harm even before an asylum seeker is able to enter the asylum process.

For those seeking asylum in the UK who do get here, is it not outrageous that they will be criminalised under an offence in clause 39 punishable by up to four years in prison? That is why our amendment 116 states clearly and simply that if Afghans, Syrians, Uyghurs, Christian converts or others are at risk of persecution in their countries of nationality, their mere entry or arrival for the purposes of seeking asylum is not a crime. Is it not extraordinary that that very idea has to be debated?

Clause 11 means that, having faced the criminal justice system, our Afghan and his colleagues will be stuck in one of the Government’s asylum warehouses. We say that we should not go down that path—a path that the Irish have just rejected as utterly failed and that brought shocking results at Napier Barracks—and that we should make community dispersal work. Our new clause 36 would ensure that dispersal authorities get the funding they need to undertake their vital role.

Clause 15 means that, stuck in that warehouse, the Syrian and his colleagues will have to wait for months on end before their asylum cases are looked at, because their claims will be deemed inadmissible under a ludicrously broad range of criteria that will allow the Home Secretary to say that another country should take responsibility—even if there is not the remotest chance of that actually happening, there is no real reason why it should happen or there are strong reasons, such as family ties, why the claim should actually be considered here. The Home Secretary could even insist that a human rights-abusing country that pays no more than lip service to the refugee convention should take charge, even when our Syrian or Afghan has absolutely no connection to that country whatever.

Amendments 132 to 142, drafted with advice from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, seek to put the necessary safeguards and restrictions in place. We are not saying that it is never appropriate for other countries to be asked to take over responsibility, but crucial safeguards must exist, and they are absolutely nowhere in this Bill. Already this year, 7,000 or so people have had their claims put on hold through inadmissibility procedures. Just 10 were removed. The remaining 6,990 are either still waiting or have been moved into the asylum process. They have been waiting for absolutely no good reason at all and almost certainly at a cost of tens of millions of pounds to the taxpayer. The whole set-up is absolutely ludicrous.

Having toughed out the additional delays, the Uyghur and his colleagues will find that it is the Home Office that finally considers their asylum claims, but we ask why. Time and again the Home Office has shown itself as not fit for purpose, which is why new clause 37 asks us to look to the Canadian model of an independent asylum decision-making body, to ensure that protection claims no longer suffer from political interference and politically motivated targets. Sadly, far from supporting independent decision making, a whole series of pernicious clauses in the Bill would see this Parliament telling decision makers what inferences to draw about evidence provided as part of a claim. We say, “Leave assessments of evidence to the decision makers who actually see it. We don’t get to see it.” That is why amendments 118 to 120 seek to remove clauses 18, 21 and 25.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anne McLaughlin]

Will my hon. Friend take an intervention?

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Very briefly.

[Anne McLaughlin]

I have been told to be very brief, Madam Deputy Speaker. Is my hon. Friend aware of Dr Nick Martin, a medical doctor who had been in the British Navy for a number of years and worked on Manus Island, one of the offshoring projects in Australia? He describes himself as “right of centre” and not a natural refugee supporter until he saw the vile way people were treated—[Interruption.] Well, we are modelling this on the Australian system. Does my hon. Friend agree we should listen to the voices of the people who have lived through this, rather than the people who tell us it will be all roses?

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The evidence about how disgraceful the Australian system was is overwhelming. My hon. Friend adds helpfully to that.

Despite all that, our Syrian, Afghan and Uyghur will almost certainly be recognised as refugees, but let us say that the persecuted Christian convert is refused because the judge is only 49% that he will be murdered on removal. Of those who challenge refusals, around 40% have been successful on appeal in recent years, but in this Bill appeal rights are restricted yet again, and certain appeal processes are accelerated.

Our amendment 121 would delete the Government’s attempt to reinstate the detained fast-track process, which was previously ruled unlawful. Amendment 145 removes another expedited appeal process. It is the Home Office that needs to address delays, not our tribunals. The SNP is also fully behind cross-party attempts to place time limits on the use of detention.

Even if our persecuted Christian, after appeal, joins the others in being recognised as a refugee, the misery this Bill will inflict on them is far from complete. The group will now face all the discriminatory measures heaped on by clause 11, which empowers the Home Secretary to punish recognised refugees through the insecurity of temporary residence, through no recourse to public funds, through limited family reunion and any other form of discrimination or punishment she thinks fit. It is a truly astonishing and outrageous provision. Amendment 114 specifically exempts Afghans, Syrians, Uyghurs, Christian converts and other refugees from such disgraceful treatment, and we fully support amendment 8 to remove the clause altogether.

If our Afghan or any of the others happens to be a young person whose age is challenged, the Bill risks making life especially difficult for them, thanks to the provisions of part 4, rammed into the Bill in Committee against the advice of numerous organisations and experts. The clauses will ramp up the use of age assessments by altering established guidance on when assessments are required, requiring them even when there is no reason to doubt a child’s age. They will allow the Home Office to meddle in an area that should be a matter for child protection and safeguarding teams, and to introduce new, unsupported, inaccurate and unethical scientific methods of assessment. Our amendments 122 to 126 seek to undo the damage of those provisions and leave those with expertise, not an anti-refugee agenda, in charge.

Finally, our new clause 32 simply requires the Bill to be interpreted so far as possible in line with the refugee convention. If the Government maintain there is nothing contrary to the convention in the Bill, surely they will have no problem with that new clause? The reality is, as numerous published legal opinions show, that these provisions are a blatant assault on the refugee convention, and the most vulnerable in the world will suffer. Our amendments seek to ameliorate some of the most outrageous aspects of the Bill, but the truth is that the whole thing needs to be canned.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Stuart C McDonald Excerpts

Report stage & 3rd reading
Wednesday 8th December 2021 Commons Chamber

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

It is a pleasure to take part in this debate and to follow the hon. Member for North East Bedfordshire (Richard Fuller).

Yesterday we badly damaged the UK’s reputation for upholding the refugee convention and the rights of refugees, and today’s clauses risk undermining the protection offered to victims of trafficking and modern slavery. That is particularly frustrating because a lot of good work has been undertaken in Stormont, Westminster and Holyrood to put in place legislative frameworks for tackling trafficking and modern slavery.

Just as yesterday’s clauses failed to address the real failings in the asylum system, the clauses we are debating today do not address the real and significant problems we all face in our efforts to tackle trafficking. They will not lay a glove on traffickers and, in some cases, they will give traffickers extra power and ammunition over their victims and will discourage victims from reaching out for support and assisting prosecutions.

The problems we all face include: the fact we almost certainly identify only a small fraction of trafficking victims and prosecute only a small number of traffickers; the massive delays in the national referral mechanism that see victims sitting in limbo for months and years as they wait for a decision; and the failure to give so many people the stability of the decent period of leave to remain that they need to recover. None of that is addressed in part 5. Instead, it reinforces the impression that efforts to protect victims of trafficking play second fiddle to immigration enforcement, just as decent treatment of asylum seekers and refugees played second fiddle yesterday.

On that note, although I absolutely agree that what we are debating today is distinct and separate from what we debated yesterday—in fact, they should be in separate Bills—it is important that we recognise there is an overlap. Importantly, some of the provisions this House approved yesterday will apply to certain victims of trafficking, including the new criminal offences in relation to arrival in the UK and the discriminatory two-tier asylum system that many trafficking victims will now enter. If I correctly recall our debates in Committee, the offence we put into law yesterday of entering or arriving without permission could result in trafficking victims being excluded from protection.

In particular, I spoke yesterday about this place’s awful habit of passing legislation that tells decision makers how to assess the evidence that they will obviously have in front of them but which we do not have in front of us and that we will never know anything about. Instructing decision makers to make adverse credibility findings in relation to trafficking victims because the evidence or information was provided late is especially pernicious and dangerous. As Members on both sides of the House have pointed out, both today and on Second Reading, it takes time for many victims of modern slavery to identify themselves as a victim, let alone to present the evidence required to establish that fact. As we have heard, there are numerous reasons for that: fear of reprisals, shame, instructions or coaching from traffickers, the impact of trauma and mental health issues, as the right hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Dame Diana Johnson) set out earlier. All the clauses that we debated yesterday requiring negative credibility findings to be made will impact on trafficking survivors who enter the asylum system, and clauses 57 and 58, which we are debating today, will impact on all who seek support as trafficking survivors.

As we argued in Committee, such a trafficking notice might serve a useful purpose if it was just that—a notice that information should be provided. Speaking from personal experience, it could focus the mind of solicitors who might be reasonably well practised in making claims on behalf of clients in relation to the refugee convention, or for immigration status, but who might have had significantly less experience of identifying and taking forward trafficking cases. I am sure lots of colleagues in the legal profession would identify with that.

In Committee, we argued to keep the notices but ditch the threat of sanctions. That approach was rejected by the Government, so we have tabled amendments 127 and 128, which would ditch the scheme altogether. In short, we cannot support a statutory scheme that threatens to punish trafficking victims for late provision of information. Most fundamentally, there can be no doubt that with such a scheme, there is a risk that survivors of trafficking who miss a mandatory deadline will simply withdraw from the whole process. The Bill requires that their credibility be treated as damaged, and all the talk of good reasons as an excuse will make a limited difference. In fact, the whole process risks becoming a vicious circle. I could provide evidence that was late because of the trauma of trafficking, but I would not be able to establish that I had been trafficked because my credibility would be damaged by providing that information late. That is a mess of a provision.

Going further, the scope of the provision is also bizarre, covering as it does not just statements made by the trafficking victim but statements made on their behalf. That could include evidence from their doctor, a counsellor or a social worker. Such reports should be considered on their own merits, not automatically discredited by utterly misguided provisions such as those we are discussing. A victim of trafficking could be in a position of needing to submit more evidence to strengthen their case, but by providing that evidence after a deadline set by the Home Office, they risk having their credibility damaged. They can be disbelieved either for providing not enough evidence, or for providing evidence late. What a Hobson’s choice that is for incredibly vulnerable people. The shadow Minister posed practical questions about the timing. We say, “Let’s take out the punishment through amendment 128,” or, at the very least, support the shadow Minister’s bid to disapply these dangerous provisions to children.

Our third amendment is 148, which probes the Government on the vague and broad provisions in clause 67 to disapply retained EU law deriving from the trafficking directive. In their modern slavery strategy of 2014, the then Conservative Government said that opting into that directive

“demonstrated our commitment to working with other countries in Europe to drive up standards across the continent in tackling trafficking”

and showed

“the UK’s commitment to tackling human trafficking and providing support to victims.”

The Government said that the directive

“paves the way for further engagement with EU-wide organisations and governments to share our prosecution and investigation expertise.”

Clause 67 disapplies that directive, in so far as it would be incompatible with the Bill and any subordinate legislation made under it. Given that the directive is so crucial to prevention, victim identification, protection and support, this proposal is concerning. We should be fully implementing the directive, not moving away from it.

Nothing is said about that provision in the equality impact assessment or the human rights memorandum, so we have no information about which parts of the directive the Home Office considers to be incompatible with this Bill, or which parts would cease to apply. How are anti-trafficking organisations and those who provide support and advice to survivors supposed to know what the law is? Can the Minister spell some of that out today? What other provisions of the directive might the Government want to ditch through subordinate legislation?

Before I address our last amendment, let me express support for amendment 3, which was tabled by the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael), to remove the disqualification provisions of clause 62. As all Opposition Members argued in Committee, those provisions are far too wide. For the same reasons, we support the alternative new clause 39, in the name of the hon. Member for North East Bedfordshire, to secure compliance with the trafficking convention and protect children from disqualification. Rather than fixing the clause, the Government seem intent on making it worse through amendment 71, meaning that survivors who are identified as needing leave to remain to seek compensation, or to co-operate with investigations and prosecutions, will not get it.

We give our support to new clause 47, tabled by the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith), and in particular to the provisions requiring a grant of leave for 12 months, or longer if required because of personal circumstances.

[Tommy Sheppard (Edinburgh East) (SNP)]

My hon. Friend is making an excellent humanitarian case against aspects of the Bill. Does he agree that when the Government reject that argument, it will fuel the case for Scotland to become a politically independent country so that it can build a different immigration system on the basis of fairness and international solidarity, rather than prejudice and paranoia?

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I fully endorse what my hon. Friend says. We will continue to make the case against this Bill, although we all know that that case will be rejected. People who are watching will see our alternative proposals, and they are a strong argument for independence indeed.

In addition to saying yes to new clause 47, we support new clause 3 from the right hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North. I mentioned at the start of my speech that Stormont, Westminster and Holyrood had all passed important legislation in this area, and that brings me to the key point that we have just touched on. Large parts of this issue are a devolved matter, and that is only partially recognised in the Bill. The same is true of the age assessment provisions in part 4. There are very good arguments for saying that legislative consent motions should be required from the Scottish Parliament for various provisions in parts 4 and 5, and that is why we have tabled amendment 129.

The whole disreputable scheme of trafficking notices, plus most law in relation to the recovery period, is surely within devolved competence, but clause 49 also sees the Secretary of State interfering in how local authorities go about discharging their duties in relation to devolved children’s legislation. I would be happy to share with the Minister a legal opinion by Christine O’Neill QC that has been published by the Scottish Refugee Council and JustRight Scotland, and that makes similar points. I am sure that devolved Administrations in Northern Ireland and Wales will also want to look closely at these points.

Our view is that this is a disaster of a Bill and, as the shadow Minister said, the whole legislative process leading up to it has been a disaster as well. The consequences for many vulnerable people will also be disastrous. That is as true of the provisions in relation to trafficking survivors as it is for asylum seekers and refugees. Although we have tried to ameliorate the worst aspects of the Bill, the whole rotten lot of it needs to be canned.

[Mr Bone]

It is a great pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East (Stuart C. McDonald). He supports new clause 74, which is the main thrust of what I want to talk about today.

Across the House, we have seen support for measures to fight modern-day slavery and human trafficking, but I think we should start at the beginning. Only a few years ago, this House did not even recognise human trafficking. I can remember when I came into the House and Tony Blair was Prime Minister, the great Anthony Steen tried every week from the Opposition Benches to persuade the Government that human trafficking existed. The Council of Europe brought forward proposals about human trafficking, and, to the great credit of former Prime Ministers David Cameron and my right hon. Friend the Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May), we produced Europe’s leading anti-slavery legislation.

We should start by congratulating the Government on doing that, but we are here today to see how we can improve on that legislation. I will briefly mention my dissatisfaction with the way child victims of human trafficking are dealt with. As I have said on many occasions, we should follow the methods that we use for adults; we should not just put children into the care of local government, where they are routinely re-trafficked. That is not particularly to do with the clauses that we are debating today, but it is something that we need to look at.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) made the very fair point that we are not talking about asylum, and we are not talking about economic migrants. With economic migrants—people coming here who should not be—the victim is this country. Human trafficking victims are people who have been tricked or coerced into coming to this country, mainly with the thought that they will get a job or a career.

Let me give an example. Somebody from Hungary came into this country thinking they were going to get a job in Belfast. Instead, they were locked up in a terraced house in Belfast. The locks were on the outside of the bedroom and that girl was repeatedly raped. She was rescued by the police and looked after. That is human trafficking, and it is completely different from people coming across the channel in small boats.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Rachel Maclean)]

We have had an excellent debate. Despite some of the comments I have just heard from the previous speaker, the hon. Member for Glasgow North East (Anne McLaughlin), there is more agreement across the House on the seriousness of these crimes and our determination to tackle them than there is disagreement.

The aims of the modern slavery elements of the Bill are twofold: to provide clarity on victims’ rights and entitlements, supporting effective recovery from this awful crime, and to increase prosecutions of perpetrators of the despicable crime of modern slavery. That is why we make clear for the first time in legislation that where a public authority, such as the police, is pursuing an investigation or criminal proceeding, confirmed victims who are co-operating and need to remain in the UK to do so will be granted temporary leave to remain. Our core principle is that the entitlements provided to victims are based on their needs, delivering a firm but fair approach. The Nationality and Borders Bill will go further than ever before in putting modern slavery victims’ rights into law. At the same time, we will put in place safeguards to ensure that these important protections are provided to those who most need them.

I will begin by addressing the Government amendments. I will attempt to come on to the Opposition amendments, but I do not have very much time. Government amendments 64, 71 and 73 to 75, which will make changes to clauses 60 to 63, are technical amendments that seek to provide greater clarity on the protections provided to possible victims through the recovery period and on when those rights can be withheld, and to ensure that we have flexibility in decision making. Specifically, they enable the conclusive grounds decision to be made in the recovery period, while still providing for a minimum recovery period of 30 days, which is effectively 45 days in guidance. The second part makes clear our position that, in specific circumstances, as set out in clauses 61 and 62, we can withhold the recovery period and the protection from removal that it provides. Those changes allow us to respond to modern slavery as an evolving crime.

On Government amendments 72 and 76 to 83, which all relate to modern slavery specific temporary leave to remain for confirmed victims of modern slavery, the aim is to clarify our international obligations with regard to the provision of temporary leave to remain for confirmed victims. Government amendments 78 and 81 to 83 are minor technical drafting amendments that provide consistency with similar provisions on the statute book. Similarly, Government amendment 79 updates the wording of the clause to reflect amendment 56, which we considered yesterday.

Government amendments 76 and 77 remove the wording “social well-being” from subsection (2)(a) of clause 64 on the temporary leave to remain. That phrase was an over-broad concept that lacked clarity and left the eligibility criteria for a grant of leave under the clause unclear for victims and decision makers, which undermined the aim of the clause.

I reassure hon. Members that we remain in line with our international obligations. We will continue to support, via a grant of temporary leave to remain, those who have a need to be in the UK to recover from physical and psychological harm caused by their exploitation. In the same vein, Government amendment 72 amends the wording in clause 63 from “social well-being” to “social harm”. I reassure hon. Members that the clause will be underpinned by the immigration rules, which will provide more guidance on the issue for decision makers.

Government amendment 80 extends the current policy in the Bill that temporary leave will be provided where needs cannot be met in another country of which the individual is a national or citizen, another Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings signatory country, or any country with which we have an appropriate bilateral agreement. Decision makers will assess potential returns on a case-by-case basis following an individualised assessment in line with guidance and available country information.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Will the Minister give way?

[Rachel Maclean]

If the hon. Gentleman will forgive me, I have a huge amount to put on the record. I may take interventions later in my speech, but I have a number of things that I need to address.

I commend the Government amendments to the House and turn to the non-Government amendments. I will attempt to address the points of the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East (Stuart C. McDonald). As I have said, the Government are committed to tackling the heinous crime of modern slavery. I will first turn to some of the points made by the hon. Member for Halifax (Holly Lynch) and the right hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Dame Diana Johnson).

I thank the right hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North and the organisations that she works with for meeting me. I commend her for her extensive work on this important point. I say again that we are committed to tackling all forms of modern slavery. We recognise the specific and horrific circumstances that victims of sexual exploitation have gone through. We believe that we have the right tools and a compassionate approach to those traumatised victims. Our people are fully trained to take a trauma-informed approach to advocate for them with compassion to help them to rebuild their lives and to reintegrate in their communities.

The hon. Member for Halifax referenced the issue of child victims of modern slavery. I repeat to her and other hon. Members who raised the issue that safeguards are built into the measures and that decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis with appropriate levels of care. It is the clear duty of the Government to safeguard and protect child victims of that appalling exploitation.

The people who are dealing with those victims are professionals who will use their discretion and, again, a trauma-informed approach. They fully understand and appreciate the experience of those children—those vulnerable victims—and will ensure that they get the right support and approach to rebuild their lives. I have much more to say about all the work that we are doing with regard to that, victim navigators and independent child trafficking guardians, and some of the other work that we are doing across police forces, but I am afraid that time will not allow me to expand on those issues.

New clause 47, which was tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) and signed by several other hon. Members, including my hon. Friend the Member for Wellingborough (Mr Bone), relates to support and leave to remain for confirmed victims. It is clear that we share common aims of bringing the perpetrators of that horrendous crime to justice and of supporting victims to rebuild their lives.

I put on record my appreciation of my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green, my hon. Friend the Member for Wellingborough and many other hon. Members who have advocated for many years to ensure that we support the victims of that awful crime. A number of organisations, such as the Centre for Social Justice, have been instrumental in that; I want to continue to work with them. We are absolutely committed to ensuring that those victims of modern slavery have the support that they need to assist their recovery and the support that they need when they are engaging with the police and through the criminal justice process.

It is a priority to increase prosecutions of perpetrators of modern slavery. My hon. Friend the Member for Wellingborough is absolutely right that we do not want to see any victims in the system, which is why we are making it clear for the first time that, where a public authority such as the police is pursuing an investigation, those victims who are co-operating and need to remain will be granted temporary leave to remain. Our legislation also makes it clear that leave will be granted where it is necessary to assist an individual in their recovery from any physical or psychological harm arising from the relevant exploitation or where it is necessary to seek compensation from their perpetrators. It is right that leave is granted to those who need it—that is firm but fair.

That is but one element of our work to strengthen the criminal justice response to modern slavery. Since 2016, we have invested £15 million to support the police’s response to modern slavery, led by the modern slavery and organised immigration crime programme. Through that programme, the Home Office has provided funding for specialist training for police victim liaison officers, who build trust with victims to facilitate engagement with the process using a victim-centred approach.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green spoke about the critical role that victim navigators play to help those traumatised individuals to engage with the system to ensure that we bring those despicable criminals to justice. To reflect the need for that specialist expertise, the Home Office funding provides a bespoke modern slavery intelligence hub with regional analysts, operational co-ordinators and improved training to support police forces and increase prosecutions. We are constantly ramping up that work so that we can best get to the source of those awful crimes.

I assure my right hon. Friend that all those who receive a positive conclusive grounds decision and are in need of tailored support will receive appropriate individualised support for a minimum of 12 months. We will set out further details in relevant guidance.

I add a note of appreciation for the hon. Member for Glasgow East (David Linden), who raised the issue of us all being aware of where modern slavery may be happening under our noses. I fully agree with those words and bring them to the attention of everybody in the House.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Stuart C McDonald Excerpts

Consideration of Lords amendments
Tuesday 22nd March 2022 Commons Chamber

[Tom Pursglove]

My hon. Friend puts it better than I could. He has stated with crystal clarity the nature of the change, which I believe is enhanced and improved by accepting the sensible and pragmatic amendments tabled by Lord Anderson. It is also worth saying for the benefit of the House that taking out of the equation the issue of citizenship being obtained by fraud, the provision relates to 19 cases a year on average, and the changes we are making through the Bill do not alter the qualification, so no additional individuals will be brought into scope. The changes relate purely to the matter of notification.

On a procedural note, I should say that although Lord Anderson’s amendments were agreed in the other place, they were deleted when peers agreed to remove the substantive deprivation of citizenship clause from the Bill. The Government are therefore retabling the substantive clause, as amended by peers to include Lord Anderson’s amendments. I hope that meets with the favour of the House. It acts on and reflects the desire expressed for greater safeguards and greater clarity on these measures.

Amendment 5 inserts a clause specifying that nothing in the part of the Bill to which it applies authorises any policies or decisions that are incompatible with the 1951 refugee convention or the 1967 protocol relating to the status of refugees. It is the clear position of this Government that everything we are doing is compatible with all our obligations under international law. We do not think it is necessary to set that out on the face of the Bill. The Government therefore do not agree to the amendment.

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

The Minister will be aware that there is a massive range of legal opinion and that the opinion of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is that that is not the case at all when a lot of what is going on in part two of the Bill is in flagrant breach of the refugee convention. If the Minister is so certain that the powers do not breach the refugee convention, what is the harm to him of accepting the amendment?

[Tom Pursglove]

We do not see a need to augment the Bill in the way that the hon. Gentleman suggests. A plethora of opinions are expressed in the House and more generally when we debate the nature of what is proposed and whether people think it is the right thing to do. We are clear as a Government that we think that the package of measures we are introducing through the Bill is a proportionate response to the issues we face and will fix the broken asylum system in particular. We are also clear—and I have been clear on many occasions in this House and through the various iterations of the Bill—that we will at all times live up to our international obligations.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. He talked about unaccompanied asylum-seeking children, but that means he is not ruling out other children being placed in awful offshore detention facilities. Will he publish an economic impact assessment on how many billions of pounds this will cost the taxpayer? It has been promised for months.

[Tom Pursglove]

I am not going to get drawn into listing all other possible exemptions to removal in that way, but I set out on Report that, for example, family groups would not be separated, because that would clearly not be in accordance with our international obligations. Clearly, much will depend on the particular circumstances of the countries we are working with. We always work in the asylum system and in the immigration space on a case-by-case basis, but I want to assure hon. Members that we will continue to uphold our international obligations and ensure that any removal is compliant with our obligations under the refugee convention and article 3 of the European convention on human rights, which protects against torture and inhuman and degrading treatment.

I am aware that there has been speculation recently about the potential costs of, and possible locations for, overseas asylum claim processing. I cannot give a running commentary on negotiations, nor share information that could tie the hands of the negotiators. I only say again that the provisions are an essential part of the suite of measures that we are introducing to deliver our objective of discouraging unwanted behaviours, such as making unnecessary and dangerous journeys, and we therefore cannot agree to the amendments.

Amendment 10 creates a more generous approach on family reunion for those who are already in Europe, which we do not consider fair. There is already generous provision in our rules for family reunion, under which more than 40,000 people have been reunited with family members in the UK since 2015. This is a single global approach to family reunion, which does not encourage what are often dangerous journeys into Europe, facilitated by smugglers and traffickers. We therefore cannot support the amendment. Similarly, amendment 11 would commit the UK to resettling at least 10,000 refugees each year.

Our view has long been that the number of refugees and people in need of protection that we resettle each year must be based on our capacity, our assessment of the international situation and our ability to care for people properly when they come to the UK. I understand that hon. Members are seeking assurances that our doors will remain open to those in need, but I respectfully suggest that what is really needed to deliver refugee resettlement is not a number but an approach—an approach that is compassionate and flexible. That is exactly what the Government are delivering through our new plan for immigration.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tom Pursglove]

Let me be very clear: there is absolutely no reason why any Ukrainian should pay an evil people smuggler to come to be safe in the United Kingdom. I have set out the detail of our two generous schemes, which are uncapped and wide in capturing people’s many and varied circumstances. I would not want anybody—this applies to any group—to put their life in the hands of evil criminal gangs who have only one regard, which is to turn a profit, putting those individuals in great danger. We have had many debates about the nature and construction of the Ukrainian scheme and I am confident that there is no reason why people should resort to that means of travelling to the United Kingdom. Nobody should encourage Ukrainians, or anybody else for that matter, to make those perilous journeys.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Will the Minister give way?

[Tom Pursglove]

I have given way to the hon. Gentleman a few times and I want to conclude my remarks.

--- Later in debate ---

We have all heard people say often, “Britain has a proud tradition of accepting refugees”, and indeed the Minister did not fail in this duty in his opening remarks. We all use that phrase a lot and it is largely true, if we perhaps look at history at bit sporadically. Let us take this opportunity to put ourselves in that proud tradition and show that this House can live up to the generosity of spirit that the British people are showing to Ukrainian refugees today. In that spirit, I ask the House to support Lords amendment 11.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Ashford (Damian Green), with whom I agree entirely. Let me start by echoing the comments of both the Minister and shadow Minister on PC Keith Palmer, whose incredibly bravery we should never forget.

It is appropriate to recognise that one or two slivers of progress have been made, for example, on BNO visas and Chagossians, but the fundamental problem is that the core idea at the heart of this Bill, which was appalling from its outset last July, remains at its heart: the idea that we should punish and dehumanise certain refugees so as to disincentivise others from coming here, all on the basis that they should stay in the first country they come to. I thought that that was a horrible idea at the time, but the subsequent events in Afghanistan and the further invasion of Ukraine highlight as never before how utterly misconceived and nonsensical the Government’s thinking was, because although most refugees do seek protection in the first country they enter, some will not, for a host of perfectly understandable reasons. The Government have recognised that, rightly, in their family scheme for Ukrainians. Of course it makes sense for Ukrainians to come to join a brother, aunt or grandparent here in the UK and not to stop in Poland or France, but this Bill will criminalise and undermine recognised refugees from Afghanistan or anywhere else who seek protection here motivated by precisely the same reasons. The Bill represents nothing less than this Government resiling from the refugee convention. The Tories are ripping up a 70-year-old convention exactly when we see that it is as crucial as ever; the Bill’s incompatibility, to lawyers out there and most people in here, is as clear as day. The Government know it as well, which is why they cannot even accept Lords amendment 5, a simple amendment that would require powers in part 2 to be exercised in accordance with the refugee convention. If the Minister is right and everything is absolutely consistent with the convention, no harm is done and there is absolutely no reason for the Government to oppose that amendment.

The House of Lords has done its best to make this Bill barely tolerable, but the Government are seeking to reverse almost every one of its eminently sensible proposals. The Government are not listening, whether to parliamentarians, international authorities or the public. Through their motions to disagree, the Government want to take us back to a Bill and a system that will see refugees criminalised with an offence punishable with up to four years in prison, conceivably with people who rescued them next to them in the dock. It is a system that would see people subject to offshoring while their claim is heard and processed. There is the ludicrous inadmissibility procedure that means nothing can happen while the Government pretend they are going to remove a person to a country they have passed through, despite having no returns agreement in place with it. Even once recognised as a refugee, an Afghan, Syrian or persecuted Christian convert, or whoever else, is going to be treated as a sub-class of refugee, with limits on recourse to public funds, no prospect of settlement and limited family reunion rights. In short, they will be unable to rebuild their life here at all, which is exactly the purpose of the Bill: deliberately making the asylum process awful. Those are just some of the most appalling aspects of the Bill that the Lords have sought to fix.

Let us consider this proposition: up to four years in prison for an Afghan or anyone else who takes an unauthorised route to get here. It is outrageous, so Lords amendment 13 and all the consequential ones should remain in place. What about this: penalising those who charitably seek to assist refugees? That is absolutely absurd, so we support Lords amendments 20 and 54 , which ensure that push-back powers are not exercised in a manner that endangers life. It is incredible that these things are even up for debate. We should not be ripping up the convention by making the unauthorised Afghan or Ukrainian arrivals second-tier citizens, deliberately destroying their prospects of rebuilding their lives. So Lords amendment 6, which deletes clause 11, must be left in place. It is hard to overstate how significant this is. As former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said, the provisions of clause 11 would

“threaten the integrity of the global asylum system”.

This is about denying recognised refugees their rights under the refugee convention and it is totally unacceptable.

Where is the Government’s draft guidance about how they will use these sweeping powers? Apparently it exists, but, like so much else in relation to this Bill, they have kept it to themselves. How will decision makers decide when to use powers to strip recognised refugees of many of their rights? Who will face the burden of proof as to whether the provisions should apply? What will the standard of proof be? Will decisions take into account the individual circumstances of the refugee, in the context of the particular countries they passed through? How much discretion will decision makers have not to treat recognised refugees in this frankly disgusting manner? Any exercise of these powers will be abhorrent, but we have little idea about how these sweeping powers will be used. That is another reason we should not be providing them to the Home Secretary.

The utterly obscene idea of offshoring asylum claims must be kicked into touch. All sorts of myths have been perpetuated about how this was successful—it was not; it has been abandoned by the Australians. It did not stop—it did not exceed 300 people— because message got out that it was not worth trying to get to Australia; it stopped because the whole process was at capacity within weeks of its being launched. So we support Lords amendments 9, 52 and 53. Frankly, if Members are still thinking of resisting these amendments, they are either not interested or are utterly indifferent to the grotesque suffering it has caused those caught up in the Australian scheme. We are talking about children self-harming; suicides and suicide attempts; a mental health catastrophe; and sexual assaults. If that is not enough, perhaps Members should consider the billions of pounds such a system will cost, while achieving nothing. Yet the Home Secretary, who is now paying salaries to people responsible for the Australian disgrace, will not even publish her assessment of the costs. We have been promised the economic impact assessment repeatedly. The Home Affairs Committee was told it was to be published shortly, and that was last autumn. Here we are at ping-pong and it has been kept hidden. There must be a reason for that.

[Tom Hunt]

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that when this was introduced in Australia the number of individuals who lost their lives at sea dramatically decreased, to almost zero? Surely that ought to be taken into account when assessing its effectiveness.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I take into account all the evidence we heard on this matter in the Bill Committee—all the written submissions and the oral evidence we heard. Any assessment by anyone independent of the Government behind that scheme says that none of that was attributable to the offshoring and it was actually attributable to something else I do not like, which was push-backs, but push-backs in a completely different context to those—

[Jonathan Gullis]

We both served on the Bill Committee but we seem to have a very different recollection. George Brandis, the Australian high commissioner, talked about a three-part effect, with push-back, offshoring and deterring by having tougher sanctions for those who enter illegally all having worked in tandem with one another to deter people from making the journey. That is unlike what the hon. Gentleman is trying to portray, which is that one silver bullet was the magic answer—it simply was not. It is just a shame that only two local authorities in the entirety of Scotland take part in the asylum dispersal scheme, unlike Stoke-on-Trent, which is the fifth largest contributor.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Conservative Members can continue to try to upset local authorities in Scotland and achieve absolutely nothing in doing so, but on the more substantive—

[Jonathan Gullis]

It is fact—[Interruption.]

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The hon. Gentleman has made his intervention, so I am going to try to—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

Order. Members should not make interventions when they are sitting down—end of story.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. Let me answer the intervention the hon. Gentleman made while he was standing up. As I said in response to the original intervention, other than what we heard from the politician who gave evidence to us, all the impartial expert evidence was that offshoring achieved absolutely nothing; it was not anything to do with a decline in the number of drownings. The second point to make, in relation to Scottish local authorities, is exactly the same point as has been made by the Conservative party leader of Stoke-on-Trent City Council: the Home Office does not step up to its responsibilities because it does not fund local authorities to undertake this work.

[Jonathan Gullis]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way after mentioning Stoke-on-Trent. The leader of Stoke-on-Trent City Council is annoyed about the asylum dispersal scheme because only a third of local authorities are currently part of it. The council is asking for other areas—such as the 30-plus local authority areas in Scotland—to step up and do their bit because our city of Stoke-on-Trent is now at the one in 200 threshold in terms of refugee versus local citizen. Instead of attacking Stoke-on-Trent City Council with some vague quote, let us get into the facts of the matter. If Scotland stepped up to the plate and did its bit, Stoke-on-Trent would not have to carry the burden for the rest of the country.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Stoke-on-Trent City Council is among a group of councils that has taken the Home Office to court, and it protests about how the Home Office handles the scheme. In fairness to the Home Secretary, she agrees with the point I am making, which is that it is outrageous that local authorities have been left without proper funding to do their job. As I have said a million times in the House, once that funding is in place the hon. Gentleman will see other Scottish local authorities step up to the plate, just as every single Scottish local authority did in respect of the Syrian resettlement scheme.

Let us get back to offshoring, because none of what we were just talking about has anything to do with the fact that what offshoring achieved in Australia was self-harm, disastrous mental health consequences and all sorts of appalling torture and degrading treatment for the people there. Offshoring is going to cost billions of pounds, there is no sensible argument in favour of it and we need to get rid of it as soon as we can.

We also support Lords amendment 8, which means the Government cannot delay the consideration of asylum claims in order to attempt removal when in reality there is no prospect of removal happening. In itself, the amendment goes nowhere near far enough in the provision of safeguards against the inappropriate use of inadmissibility procedures, but it is better than nothing at all.

All the Lords amendments I have gone through are designed to prevent the Government from taking the broken asylum system and smashing it to pieces, but there are Lords amendments that also seek to improve the current broken system, which sees people having to wait months even to register their claim, and years to get a decision. Lords amendment 7 is a simple but powerful example. It allows asylum seekers to work after six months. The arguments have been repeated ad infinitum in this place and seem to us to be overwhelming. Nobody can fail to understand the significance of work to tackling poverty, the improvement of mental health and wellbeing and the aiding of integration. If people are left out of work for years—which is how long asylum claims take these days—how can they rebuild their lives?

The Government bang on about pull factors, but that argument is not only morally repugnant—in essence, “Let asylum seekers suffer to disincentivise others from coming”—but empty. The Migration Advisory Committee itself says that there is no evidence to back up what the Government say. Frankly, there is no evidence to back up virtually anything the Government say, which is why very little is ever published. We therefore pay tribute to all the campaigners behind Lords amendment 7.

Lords amendments 10, 11 and 12 represent three different forms of safe route that would enhance our protection system. Lords amendment 10, tabled by Lord Dubs, puts in place a form of family reunion for those in Europe, thereby repairing some of the damage caused by the end of our participation in the Dublin system. The Government recognised that family rules were far too constrained for Ukrainians; Lords amendment 10 is built on the same principle, with a particular benefit for unaccompanied children. With the demise of our participation in Dublin, we see more and more children getting into dinghies to join siblings or other relatives here, and the amendment would help to stop that. The Dublin system was not perfect but it was a lot better than our restrictive family reunion rules, which involve massive fees and impossible legal tests. Lords amendment 10 improves on all that.

Similarly, we support Lords amendment 12, which opens a safe route for people fleeing genocide—I hope my hon. Friend the Member for Argyll and Bute (Brendan O’Hara) will say more on that later—and we fully support Lords amendment 11, which ensures the regular resettlement of 10,000 refugees per year. For too long, the extent to which we have sought to meet our obligations to resettle refugees has been left to the whim of the Home Office. The Syrian scheme was a success, but the infrastructure that made it successful has been left to wither and—to put it politely—the Afghan scheme has barely started, despite the huge responsibility we have for those people. We get lots of rhetoric from the Government on this issue, but little delivery. We need a stable and predictable annual goal with a degree of flexibility, which is exactly what Lords amendment 11 delivers.

Finally, I turn to the one part of the Bill that is largely welcome: part 1. We warmly welcome the progress on the recognition of Chagos islanders as British overseas territory citizens, but questions arise in relation to the amendment in lieu, because unlike the original Lords amendment it does not include an entitlement for Chagos islanders to register as a British citizen at the same time. Were it not for historic injustices, that would have been made an automatic entitlement in May 2002. The Government’s proposals mean there will be only a discretionary route. What is the rationale for that? Will the Minister confirm that that discretion will be used in all cases of this type? Will he ensure that only a restricted fee is charged, as in other cases of historic injustice?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Kevin Foster)]

Just to help and to keep this short, I can tell the hon. Gentleman that our intention is to operate in the spirit of the Lords amendment—that is, there will not be a fee for registration—but I am more than happy to outline in some detail at another time exactly how the process will work.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

It is useful to hear that said from the Dispatch Box, so I thank the Minister.

Lastly, the provisions on stripping people of citizenship without notice were introduced at short notice in the Public Bill Committee, without any chance to hear or receive evidence on them. The provisions were frightening, and their lordships have exposed them for the utterly unfit provisions they were. Indeed, the whole episode has cast light on how unfit for purpose nationality laws have become, and in particular the ever-increasing powers of Ministers to strip people of their citizenship.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stuart C. McDonald]

It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith), with whom I agree. I also agreed with pretty much everything said by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Halifax (Holly Lynch), so I can be fairly brief.

The hon. Member for Halifax was right to say at the outset that, again, it is frustrating that the Government do not appear to be listening—not to their Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner, anti-slavery charities, medical professionals, social workers or survivors—and that everything is being seen through the prism of migration enforcement. The Government are undermining not just the refugee convention, but other international obligations including the European convention on action against trafficking in human beings.



The Minister said a lot of good things at the Dispatch Box, as he did in the debate on the previous group, but sometimes what he says bears very little resemblance to the provisions that are actually in the Bill. I have a lot of respect for him as a Minister, but he cannot ask us to legislate—to pass a Bill—based on how he wants it implemented. We have to go by what is in the Bill, which too often simply does not live up to what he is trying to sell us.

The SNP supports what their lordships have done to take out some of the most offensive provisions of the Bill and to improve protections for trafficking survivors. We believe that the Government’s motions to disagree will not only take out the positive reforms that their lordships suggested and restore some really regressive provisions that undermine modern slavery legislation across the UK, but reinstate challenges and hurdles for survivors of trafficking and slavery, especially children. The only beneficiaries will be those who perpetrate those awful crimes.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Stuart C McDonald Excerpts

Consideration of Lords amendments
Wednesday 20th April 2022 Commons Chamber

[Tom Pursglove]

I will make some progress but I will gladly give way later. The Government continue to work with international partners to ensure removals of people with no right to be in our country.

To turn to Lords amendment 4G, although the Government have accepted Lord Anderson of Ipswich’s amendments that introduced further safeguards to the deprivation of citizenship power, a further amendment was tabled by Baroness D’Souza that removed the provisions protecting the validity of deprivation orders made before the Bill’s commencement and alleging that they offered individuals no right of redress. That is simply not the case. These provisions explicitly ensured that anyone affected by the retrospective provision would still have a right of appeal, but removing them from the clause could cast doubt on the validity of deprivation orders already made before the provisions come into effect. That poses an unacceptable threat to the UK’s safety and security, as it could enable dangerous individuals to regain their British citizenship and thus the freedom to come and go as they please in the UK. Our position on that has not changed. I make it absolutely clear that we cannot allow that unnecessary security risk to happen.

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

Will the Minister explain a bit more about why he thinks that that proposal poses such a danger? All the Home Office has to do is make the same decisions again. I think we are talking about 50 or 60 decisions, but this will mean that the proper safeguards are in place.

[Tom Pursglove]

I would argue that the safeguards that we have accepted, which Lord Anderson proposed with real sincerity, a real interest, expertise and experience in these matters, strike the right balance between keeping our people in this country safe from harm—that is, of course, the first duty of any Government and a responsibility that we take incredibly seriously—while making sure that there is judicial oversight of the process and that, as part of the Home Office’s work, we have internal checks to ensure that the powers will be used appropriately.

Lords amendment 5B relates to the compliance of part 2 of the Bill with the refugee convention. The Bill—I insist on this in the strongest terms—is compatible with all of our obligations under international law. Our position has not changed and we do not consider it necessary to put this on the face of this Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

I am grateful to be called to speak so early, and I will be as brief as possible.

I say to my hon. Friend the Minister that we have already had these discussions. In fact, the Government moved on the issue; they did so by putting proposals into guidance. The problem with guidance is that it is guidance—it is not obligatory—so the problem with Lords amendment 26B is that the Bill is incomplete, because until these measures are in the Bill, there is no support for confirmed victims after the national referral mechanism process is completed; it is all by judgment.

The current system is deeply destabilising for confirmed victims. I am talking about confirmed victims, not other people who have come over. These are people who we agree are victims of modern-day slavery, and we should be very generous to them. What else is there to do? They are victims. Confirmed victims currently receive support under the recovery needs assessment, or RNA, process. Under this process, many victims receive support only for short periods of time. There is no 12-month period, and they therefore undergo repeated needs assessments. The Minister should go through the system and see how painful this is for confirmed victims. It is destabilising and can be harmful to victims’ mental health; we know that. It requires victims to constantly provide “evidence” of need, with support available only for “needs arising from exploitation”. They are confirmed victims, and they do not know how long they will need support, which means that they are worried about what will happen if there is no agreement. That can put them back in the hands of the traffickers—the thing that we say we are against.

Justice and Care’s recent victim navigator study showed that when victims were given support for a minimum period, 89% of those supported by Justice and Care’s programme chose to engage with police investigations, and we got more prosecutions. One does not need a bleeding heart to see the sense of this. It will enable us to prosecute the traffickers. That is what I want my Government to do. Right now, the average percentage of victims who engage with investigations is not 89%, but 33%. People who are very worried, destabilised and uncertain about how long they will be supported for will not give evidence. They will not go to the police or engage with them, because they are frightened. If we give them a minimum of 12 months of support, we will get more prosecutions. As a result, we will both save money and provide some serious security for these victims. I genuinely beg the Government to make the change now, because it is decent, reasonable and the right thing to do. Can we please discuss the matter further before it comes up again, and can we do this?

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

Members on both sides of the House might agree that the Lords got it right when they said that the timetabling arrangements for this House left a lot to be desired. We have one hour to debate 12 substantive and important amendments, and we will end up voting on them for three hours. It makes absolutely no sense.

I could be very succinct and just say that the SNP position remains that this is an atrocious and horrendous Bill, and therefore we support everything that the House of Lords has attempted to do to rein it in, but I will not. However, out of deference to some of the very good speakers on both sides of this debate, I will try to stick to points on one or two of the amendments.

First, I turn to Lords amendment 5B, which simply states,

“For the avoidance of doubt,”

part 2 is compliant with the refugee convention

“and must be…given effect as such.”

The Minister has said several times that that is precisely the Government’s objective, so why on earth does he have a problem with putting those words in the Bill? I suspect that there are two answers, the first of which is that in reality, part 2 does not remotely live up to the demands of our international obligations. Former Supreme Court judge Lord Brown said in the other place:

“I truly believe, as do many others, that several of these provisions flagrantly breach our obligations as interpreted by the UNHCR”.—[Official Report, House of Lords, 4 April 2022; Vol. 820, c. 1882.]

We respectfully agree with Lord Brown.

I suspect that the second reason for resisting this amendment is that Ministers are desperate to keep those words out of the Bill to make it more difficult to ask a court to adjudicate on whether the Bill is, in fact, consistent with the refugee convention. As Lord Brown said—he was directly addressing something that the Minister said here at the Bill’s last outing—it was

“quite wrong to suggest that there was no need for this amendment because the courts would anyway deal with the challenge to the legislation based on suggested non-compliance. I repeat: the amendment is vital. The courts otherwise cannot go behind the definitive clauses in the Bill and would have to apply them, compliant or not.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 4 April 2020; Vol. 820, c. 1883.]

We agree; the Bill is fundamental to what we are doing here.

[Patrick Grady (Glasgow North) (SNP)]

My hon. Friend is right that the amount of scrutiny time being afforded to this House is ridiculous. If the Government are not prepared to come to any kind of compromise with the House of Lords, would it not be even better for all these powers to be devolved to the Scottish Parliament, so that the people of Scotland could build the kind of humane immigration and asylum system that hundreds of constituents in Glasgow North have lobbied me to advocate for in this House?

[Stuart C. McDonald]

I agree with everything that my hon. Friend has just said.

I turn to Lords amendments 15 and 13B, which bring us back to the sweeping criminalisation of asylum seekers and others arriving in the UK. We are talking about Afghans, Syrians, persecuted Christians and Uyghurs. Those are causes that many in this House advocate and speak up for all the time, and yet when these people come to our shores, suddenly we are planning to let them down, offshore them, discriminate against them, treat them abysmally and criminalise them under this legislation.

The Minister has said today that the Lords have defined the criminal offence too tightly and he wants to go back to a sweepingly broad offence. He assures us that that does not really matter, because we will not use the provision against the Afghans and Syrians; it will be used only in egregious cases. We cannot pass criminal laws on the basis of wishes and assurances expressed at the Dispatch Box that we will be quite reasonable in how we use them. He has to come up with the tight wording for the criminal offence that he is aiming at. If he does not, I am afraid we cannot support it at all; in fact, we fundamentally oppose it.

We believe that the Bill represents completely the wrong approach, and we continue to support the House of Lords in all it is doing to try to rein in the worst aspects. I hugely regret that we have had such a pitiful amount of time to say what we have to say about the amendments. In deference to other Members, I will sit down now and do my voting later on.

[Mr Mitchell]

I draw the House’s attention to my registered interests.

I want to try to be constructive with the Minister this afternoon. I do not believe the Rwanda scheme will work, but I am full of good will towards the Home Secretary when it comes to trying to stop this ghastly, deathly channel trade. The Minister asks those who think that the scheme is impractical, ineffective and extraordinarily expensive what we would do. He is right to ask that, so let me try to answer.

There are four things we must do. The first, exactly as my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill) said, is to employ more staff. We need to ensure that we process these asylum claims more rapidly. In Rwanda, it takes three months to process an asylum claim. We ought to have a much more streamlined system in this country, and ought to try to do away with all these lawyers, who extend and prolong the process unnecessarily. That is a point the Government should definitely address.

Secondly, we need to put right our dreadful relationship with France, our neighbour just 22 miles away. The relationship is not what it should be. There are plenty of senior officials and people of good will who have a much better relationship with France, and we need to address that point and repair the relationship. Nothing can be achieved in tackling this evil trade without our having a far better understanding with France. We need, if not its active support, then its passive acquiescence at the very least in the measures that need to be taken.

Thirdly, we need safe and legal routes. I asked the Minister to set out what those routes are, and of course he was not able to.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Stuart C McDonald Excerpts

Consideration of Lords message
Tuesday 26th April 2022 Commons Chamber

I congratulate the Home Secretary and the Minister on at last grappling with an asylum system that is simply not fit for purpose. The Opposition would do well, in a measured and considered way, to back the Government in that respect, rather than backing these essentially destructive Lords amendments. They are destructive because they are not in tune with the spirit of the Bill, and they certainly will not assist any Government in reforming our broken asylum system.

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

I will start by recalling that what we are debating this evening is the fate of Syrians, Afghans, Eritreans, persecuted Christians, trafficking victims and others who seek sanctuary in the United Kingdom.

A rather perplexing set of votes in the other place means that we are down to just three Lords amendments. While the remaining amendments may be small in number, however, they are huge in significance. Assuming that this place fails to do its duty by agreeing to them, I hope the other place, unlike the Minister, will do its duty by continuing to insist on them.

With the exception of some welcome provisions on nationality, we continue to believe the whole Bill should be scrapped. However, for as long as it is before us, we support amendments that seek to ensure as far as possible that the Government act in accordance with the refugee convention and allow that compliance to be considered by the courts. That means accepting their lordships’ amendments on interpretation and on restricting the offensive clauses on differentiation.

The Government have totally lost the argument. The overwhelming weight of legal opinion, as well as that of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, is on our side of this argument. No one with an ounce of common sense would just accept this Government’s assurances that everything accords with the refugee convention, nor would they give up the ability to test it in court—and we certainly should not. Today, it seems that the Minister’s argument is basically that it is Parliament’s role just to declare itself in compliance with the refugee convention. Of course that is absolute nonsense.

I reiterate SNP support for the right to work for asylum seekers, and pay tribute to the Lift the Ban coalition members, including in particular the Maryhill Integration Network and many others who have campaigned with passion and integrity on this issue. This policy is the right thing to do for integration, it is right for the public purse and therefore it is right for our citizens and overwhelmingly right for asylum seekers.

The evidence against the policy remains pathetically weak to non-existent, and warm words about deciding cases within six months mean nothing when that prospect appears as remote as ever. The reality is that people are being left in limbo for years, and excluding them from the labour market for years risks effectively excluding them from work forever and undermining integration.

The Home Secretary has repeatedly told us that she is all for safe legal routes. Indeed, last week she told my right hon. Friend the Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Liz Saville Roberts), the leader of the Plaid Cymru group in Parliament, that this Bill

“actually puts safe and legal routes into statute.”—[Official Report, 19 April 2022; Vol. 712, c. 41.]

The Home Secretary has complained on various occasions that I have not read the Bill, but I am beginning to question whether she has read her own Bill, because that is clearly utter baloney. There is not a single sentence in the Bill as it stands that puts a safe legal route into statute. On the contrary, clause 11 empowers the Secretary of State to diminish safe routes for family members. Their Lordships’ amendments give just a little bit of protection for those rights.

The final argument I want to make relates, believe it or not, to the 2019 Conservative party election manifesto. In advance of this debate, I forced myself to look at that document; indeed, I forced an unfortunate member of my staff to look at it as well. As far as we can see, the words “asylum” and “refugee” feature in that manifesto only once, and in the following terms:

“We will continue to grant asylum and support to refugees fleeing persecution, with the ultimate aim of helping them to return home if it is safe to do so.”

The manifesto also said:

“We will ensure no matter where in the world you or your family come from, your rights will be respected and you will be treated with fairness and dignity.”

This Bill not only breaches the refugee convention, but is utterly contrary to the 2019 Government manifesto. There is nothing in that manifesto about driving a coach and horses through the refugee convention. There is nothing about criminalising—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

Order. I stopped the shadow Minister, so I have to give the same advice to the spokesman for the SNP. We are not here to talk about manifestos and general matters this evening; we are here to talk about Government motions to disagree to amendments 5D, 6D, 6E, 6F, 7F and 7G, and only that. This Bill has been properly heard in general terms. We will stick to the exact points in front of us now.

[Stuart C. McDonald]

The point I am trying to make, Madam Deputy Speaker, if I would be allowed, is that these amendments would bring the Government much closer to fulfilling their 2019 manifesto commitments than anything in the Bill today. The Bill rides roughshod not only over the refugee convention but over the Government’s own manifesto commitments. That is the point I am trying to make. It is an important point for this House, for the Conservative party and for this Government. It is also an important point for Members in the other place, because, yes, this is a Bill that breaches international law in egregious ways, and totally undermines the refugee convention and treats asylum seekers appallingly, but it is also, as I said, contrary to the Conservative manifesto. For that reason, if this is not the sort of Bill that the House of Lords should be using its modest powers to delay, then I really do not know what is.