Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Luke Evans Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 9th September 2025 Commons Chamber

[Luke Pollard]

I said I would take one intervention from each side of the House. I have done that, so I will make some progress, but I am certain that Members will get another chance in a moment.

This treaty is indispensable to keeping Britain secure at home and strong abroad. It is an expression of our unbreakable defence and intelligence bonds with the United States. It strengthens and extends our power to respond to terrorists and hostile states, wherever they may be. It protects some of the world’s busiest trade routes, on which British businesses and consumers rely. It is a long-term investment in our core national interests, and it will benefit British people for generations to come.

[Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)]

Will the Minister give way?

[Luke Pollard]

I am going to make some progress, but I will be happy to give way in a moment.

Before I start getting into the detail, I want to recognise up front the Chagossians affected by decisions taken by Britain many years ago. We recognise in the preamble to the universal deep regret over what happened. It is acknowledged on the face of the treaty, and I know there is cross-party support for the Chagossians, although there is a range of views on the deal within the Chagossian community. I want to place that on the record right at the start of the debate—[Interruption.] I will return to the Chagossians in a moment.

Both Houses have now had the opportunity to scrutinise the treaty under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty), who is sitting next to me, gave evidence to three parliamentary Committees during the scrutiny period, allowing Members of this House and the other place to fully interrogate the details of the treaty. The International Agreements Committee concluded that if the treaty were not ratified, the future of the base on Diego Garcia would be at greater risk. The purpose of this Bill is to make the necessary changes to domestic law to implement the treaty, so that it can be ratified and brought into force.

Let me remind the House why we needed to secure this treaty. The Diego Garcia base is central to our national security—I know that all Members of this House will recognise that very simple fact.

[Dr Evans]

Will the Minister give way on that point?

[Luke Pollard]

I am going to make a wee bit more progress, but I always like giving way to a Luke, and I will do so in a bit—do not worry—but not quite yet.

I pay tribute to all Members of the House who have taken the time to scrutinise the treaty in detail.

Allow me to set out why it is so vital. The importance of the base cannot be overstated. The joint UK-US base on Diego Garcia has played a vital role in defending the UK and its allies for over 50 years. The base plays a key role in operations that support UK forces and our allies across the middle east, east Africa and south Asia. Its deepwater port, airfield, and advanced communications and surveillance capabilities, give the UK and our allies crucial strategic capabilities, which have played a key role in missions to disrupt high-value terrorists, including Islamic State threats to the United Kingdom.

But the base on Diego Garcia was under threat. Had we not signed the treaty, we could have faced further legal rulings against us within weeks, because the negotiations begun by the Conservatives had been stayed. Further legal rulings might have included arbitrary proceedings against the UK under annex 7 of the UN convention on the law of the sea, known as UNCLOS.

[Dr Evans]

Will the Minister give way?

[Luke Pollard]

In a moment. I will come to the hon. Gentleman—he should not worry.

A judgment from such a tribunal would be legally binding on the UK. It would impact on our ability to protect the electromagnetic spectrum from interference, and impair our ability to ensure access to the base by air and sea, to patrol the maritime area around the base and to support the base’s critical national security functions.

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[Luke Pollard]

I did say that I would give way to a Luke.

[Dr Luke Evans]

The Minister has made it absolutely apparent that this is about the long-term security of the base, so could he explain why, under article 13, if after 99 years the Mauritians decide not to negotiate, the base will just stop. We will get first refusal, but we can easily see that the Chinese would outbid us because we in this country decide that that is not affordable. We are a hostage to fortune, and that base will crumble. He has not secured the base, he has just deferred the issue by four generations, and this House will then have to decide what to do.

[Luke Pollard]

It is good that the hon. Member has read the detail of the treaty. As he will know that, at the end of the initial 99-year lease, a first refusal will be offered to the United Kingdom. That is the right place to be, and that offer will mean—as he describes it, in four generations’ time—there is a decision for this House to take about what it wants to do based on the circumstances at the time. This gives us first refusal, so we can conceivably see that full control of the UK-US base on Diego Garcia could extend well beyond the 99 years I have mentioned.

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[Luke Pollard]

I am grateful to the Father of the House for helping me to get back on track with my speech, because that is the topic of my next section. I will answer the right hon. Gentleman’s question in my remarks, but if a bit is missing, he may ask to intervene on me again.

We have heard some outrageous claims artificially boosting the costs of this deal. It will cost an average of £101 million per year in today’s money. That is an investment in today’s money of £3.4 billion over 99 years. That has been rigorously calculated, based on net present value, the methodology endorsed by the Government Actuary’s Department and the Office for Budget Responsibility. All the associated costings have been laid previously before the House and were explained in full at the time of signature.

Crucially, the exaggerated numbers that have been cited ignore inflation, the OBR deflation mechanisms and the Green Book. The Government have secured a strong deal. I remind those who criticise it that the previous Government knew full well that the status quo was dangerous and unsustainable—that is why they entered into negotiations in the first place, why they held 11 rounds of negotiations under successive Prime Ministers, Foreign Secretaries and Attorneys General, and why the Conservatives have never been able to provide serious alternatives to this deal.

[Dr Luke Evans]

rose—

[Mr Calvin Bailey]

rose—

[Luke Pollard]

I am happy to give way to the hon. Gentleman and then to my hon. Friend.

[Dr Luke Evans]

Can the Minister point to any other country in the world that has used NPV to give away sovereignty? As far as I am aware, there is none, so why are we pioneering that way forward?

[Luke Pollard]

This deal secures the base. The calculated value of the deal uses the Green Book. Other countries look at overseas bases that they rent and make the calculation based on their national accounting standards. We base it on the Green Book. Indeed, the Green Book was updated by the previous Government and has been used for such decisions for the past 20 years.

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[Priti Patel]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. It speaks volumes about the priorities that this Labour Government—socialist to the core in how they like to spend public money—are focused on. Come November, when the Chancellor has her Budget, there will be no point crowing about the past and blaming other people, other countries and international forces and factors. This is a fiscal mess made by this Labour Government with this utterly scandalous, appalling and reckless financial giveaway.

[Dr Luke Evans]

The Minister challenged the Opposition and the shadow Chancellor about our position on net present value, but the reason is that the use of NPV is unprecedented. It is used for commercial deals that the Government make and is standardised for that alone, not for international agreements on sovereignty. Does my right hon. Friend agree that we will not change on net present value, which has its place in commercial deals but not in giving away sovereignty?

[Priti Patel]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right; it is absolutely shameful. I come back to the fundamental principle that this House will have to consider: at a time when hard-pressed British taxpayers are struggling, with significant tax rises and the share of the tax burden on the public going up, the Government will have to have a good, hard look at themselves and justify this appalling cost to their own constituents.

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[Priti Patel]

I will not. I know that the hon. Gentleman will speak later.

I turn to the British Chagossians. As well as undermining our security and defence interests and ripping off British taxpayers, Labour has betrayed the British Chagossians. Members on both sides of the House have recognised and acknowledged that the Chagossian community has faced injustice and hardship. Their removal from the Chagos islands is a source of great and profound regret. I pay tribute to the Chagossian community in Britain for their campaigning, and to Henry Smith, our former colleague as Member of Parliament for Crawley, who kept pursuing and raising the issue, and who fought in the House for their rights. As a result, we gave the community new rights in the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, which Labour voted against. I hope that the Minister can give assurances that those rights will not be undermined by the citizenship measures in clause 4 of the Bill. Because of that past, it is so important that any decisions made about the future of the Chagos islands are made with the community in mind, and that their needs are fully respected.

Ten years ago, when the Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty), was the Opposition’s spokesman, he said:

“The people of Chagos must be at the heart of decisions about their future…the UK Government have a fundamental moral responsibility towards the islanders that will not go away.”—[Official Report, 28 October 2015; Vol. 601, c. 192WH.]

But this treaty fails them. I have met the community many times and heard their concerns and frustrations; I think everyone in the House will acknowledge their frustrations. They feel that they have been ignored throughout the process, and that the treaty has no guarantees for them. There is a £40 million Chagossian trust fund that UK taxpayers will capitalise, but the UK and the British Chagossians will have no control or say over how it will be used or controlled by the Government of Mauritius. I highlight that point because the Chagossians feel strongly—they fundamentally know—that they cannot trust the Government of Mauritius. The Bill and the treaty make no provision for the British Chagossians to benefit from the trust fund, or be involved in its governance; nor are they guaranteed any right to visit the Chagos islands. Those decisions will be controlled by Mauritius once sovereignty is surrendered.

Hon. Members across the House who have spoken up for British Chagossians know of their fears. It is right that I amplify those fears, or at least raise them in the House, because their voices have not been heard. Now is the time for them to be counted, for their voices to be heard, and, importantly, for their rights to be defended.

Another damning indictment of the Bill and the treaty is the way in which they fail to safeguard the 640,000 sq km marine protected area. Its unique biodiversity enables important marine research to be conducted. In just the last few weeks, a study that included researchers from Exeter and Heriot-Watt universities and the Zoological Society of London was published. It noted:

“Our results provide clear evidence for the value of the Chagos Archipelago VLMPA for protecting a diverse range of large and mobile marine species.”

Yet all we have heard thus far from the Government is warm words about intentions to continue with an MPA. No details have been published.

[Dr Luke Evans]

On the conservation point, is it not that the case has already been tested in UNCLOS between 2010 and 2015, when it was said that we could not go ahead with a marine protection area for this British territory because we had not consulted properly with Mauritius? At that point, it was also determined that UNCLOS could not rule on sovereignty as that was not its basis. So we found out not only about the sovereignty side, but that we cannot protect the islands on the environmental part. What guarantees does my right hon. Friend see in the treaty that we will have ecological protections in the area, given those findings?

[Priti Patel]

My hon. Friend is absolutely correct about UNCLOS and in highlighting the insecurities and serious challenges. It may be forthcoming, but at this stage we do not know what levels of protection will be provided or will continue. We do not know what level of resource Mauritius will put into the MPA or what the UK will contribute.

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[Mr Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi (Slough) (Lab)]

I rise to speak on the Bill and proposed agreement, with particular focus on its defence implications. Given substantial other ongoing work and the fact that other Committees have looked into it, this is not an issue that our Defence Committee has investigated thus far. Let us not be under any illusion, however: this is a matter of strategic importance, financial prudence and moral responsibility.

The British Indian Ocean Territory and in particular the Diego Garcia military base have long served as a cornerstone of our defence and security capabilities, not just for the UK but for our allies in the US and across the Five Eyes community. That is why having their stated support for this deal, in addition to that of India and others, is so vital. The base’s role in disrupting threats to the UK, supporting counter-terror operations against ISIS and protecting us against hostile states must continue. Including the management of the electromagnetic spectrum satellite used for communications and the prevention of other powers operating on the outer islands without permission is vital for countering hostile interference. It is not just a diplomatic formality; it is a strategic firewall against encroachment by hostile states.

Maintaining US and UK autonomy on the base cannot be overstated. I note the Government position is that Mauritius will be expeditiously informed of activities. However, I look for reassurance that we do not need to provide Mauritius with advance warning about our operations. I would therefore welcome clarification on that point from the Minister to guarantee that all current and future operations can continue unimpeded.

[Dr Evans]

Given the importance of the Chagos islands to our defence, has the hon. Gentleman’s Committee thought about even doing a review into the Chagos islands and what this would look like? That way, such questions could be addressed directly in a decent period of time—we only have four or five hours tonight—and he could spend several weeks looking into the matter. Is that something he and his Committee would consider?

[Mr Dhesi]

As I mentioned in my introductory remarks, given that various other Committees have been looking into this and that it has been extensively debated on the Floor of the House, and considering the other work that the Committee is undertaking, including an inquiry launched this week into the Afghan data breach, that is why we have not looked into this matter. However, I will give way to the Minister, who I hope will give me some sort of reassurance.

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[Peter Lamb (Crawley) (Lab)]

I congratulate the Minister on his appointment, and thank Ministers for the time they have given me to raise with them matters in relation to this Bill and for the responses they have provided to my questions.

I can see no logical reason why the Government would go through the painful process of bringing this Bill to the Floor of the House today if they were not 100% convinced that it was in the UK’s national security interests. However, I am afraid that I must vote against the Government today because I do not believe that their concerns, no matter how important they might be, give us the right to override the Chagossian people’s right to self-determination. We cannot vote to give away these islands, because they are not our islands to give away in the first place.

I know that many Members have taken an interest in the plight of the Chagossian people over the years, and that in the last year, hopefully, many more have learned more about their history and their circumstances, so I will recount the key points briefly. The first recorded contact with the islands was from those in the Maldives, but its modern history begins with France, which bound the islands together in a colonial administration with Mauritius. This is the only basis on which the modern state of Mauritius makes any claim on the islands.

In the late 18th century, the UK claimed the colonies from the French and planted coconut plantations on the islands. We used slave labour to do that, and it was among those slaves that the unique island culture began to develop. In 1965, the UK divided that colonial entity, granting the modern state of Mauritius independence and at the same time, in return for financial compensation, agreeing to give up any future claim on the islands. However, we had already come to the determination at that point that this would be a convenient location for a military base, jointly run with the United States. I believe that in that initial deal we got a discount on Polaris for providing the site.

In order to facilitate the base, the decision was taken to forcibly remove the islanders from the archipelago—something that began under a Labour Government but concluded under a Conservative Government. Official documentation from the time stated that the base was too important to the UK for “Tarzans” and “Man Fridays” to get in the way, and made it clear that the islanders must be referred to only as Mauritians or Seychellois, recognising the opposition that they would face—even in the 1960s—if it was known that the displacement of an entire people was taking place in the interests of national security.

The islanders were deposited on Mauritius and the Seychelles—islands of a different culture—without a penny to their name, and for decades were abandoned by the British Government, left in poverty and facing discrimination on the basis of their ethnicity. For years, they have fought for their rights, and they have won some concessions in that time, including the right to UK citizenship, with most British Chagossians choosing to set up their home in Crawley. That move came with enormous challenges—a point to which I will circle back in due course.

I have known and worked alongside members of the British Chagossian community for almost two decades. As council leader, I promised them that as a part of Crawley’s community, it was my job to be their voice to Government, not the other way around. It is that promise that leads me to vote against this deal today.

It is true to say that there are Chagossians who enthusiastically support the deal, just as there are those who desperately oppose it—that is the same with any community on absolutely any issue—but what is not disputed is that the islands belong to the Chagossians, and that it is for that people and that people alone to decide the future of their homeland. We have not given them that chance to decide their future. Until every Chagossian has had the chance to have their say, I cannot support this deal.

[Dr Evans]

The hon. Member is making a powerful point. We heard an impassioned defence not to bring the Falkland Islands or other British overseas territories into this, but Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands have self-determination, voted for by their people. Is it his thesis that that will apply for the Chagossians, and therefore they would make the determination whether to be British or, indeed, go to the Mauritians on that basis?

[Peter Lamb]

It is incredibly unfortunate that the Chagossians have not been given that opportunity—that is my view. Had we given them that opportunity, whatever the outcome, I would have had no problem honouring that because we are talking about their land; it is not our land.

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[Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)]

It is a privilege to follow the hon. Member for Crawley (Peter Lamb). I admire his principles and his persistence in his advocacy for his Chagossian constituents, and I know that he would recognise that his predecessor did the same.

There is no dispute that Diego Garcia is crucial to the UK’s security and that of its allies; that is not something we are arguing about. I do not think—although I will be corrected if I am wrong—that it is the Government’s position that, in terms of the day-to-day practicalities of operating the Diego Garcia base, this new arrangement whereby we no longer have sovereignty over Diego Garcia but will continue to administer it, at least for 99 years, is better than what we have now. Rather, it is a more secure arrangement because of what has been described as the legal uncertainty surrounding our sovereignty over it. I see the Minister nodding, and I am grateful for that.

[Dr Evans]

I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend for giving way and using his legal background. It is more secure legally for those 99 years but, more definitively, at that 99-year point, if the Mauritians decide not to have a base there, categorically that is their decision. Therefore, by proxy, it is actually more unsafe, just in 100 years’ time.

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

I understand the point that my hon. Friend makes, and it is reinforced by the point made by our hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Sir Bernard Jenkin) in reading from the agreement as to how any disputes are resolved. But I want to focus on the position now and the legal justification that the Government have already deployed for the arrangement that they seek to make. My hon. Friend is right that there will be further problems down the road, but there are problems already.

It seems to me that if the position the Government take is as I have set it out and as the Minister accepts that it is, that must be right because it would surely be difficult to argue that, were it not for that legal uncertainty, renting Diego Garcia back from someone else would be better than owning it from a security point of view. So for the Government to persuade us in this House, and indeed the country as a whole, that this is a good deal for Britain, everything turns on the question of legal uncertainty, which Ministers have often referred to as the reason why the treaty, and therefore the Bill, are necessary.

Having spent four years as Attorney General, I am quite familiar with legal uncertainty—there is a lot of it about in Government. It is, I am afraid, invariably the case that whenever a decision is made in Government, someone disagrees with it, and some of those who disagree will be prepared to go to a court and challenge the validity of that decision. Until the court—sometimes until the Supreme Court—has resolved the matter, there can fairly be said to be legal uncertainty about it. Legal uncertainty hangs around Government like the clouds, and it cannot be allowed to paralyse a Government. Nor should that sort of atmospheric legal uncertainty be the only cause of a decision as significant as that which this Government are now making to give up sovereignty over a vital military facility.

There must be something more substantive—more tangible—to the legal uncertainty to which Ministers have referred. Many of us have tried to find out what exactly that is, but with very limited success. Given that, as far as I can tell, the legal uncertainty that is being talked about constitutes the entirety of the burning platform on which the Government rely to justify the Bill and the treaty, surely this House, before we approve either, must be given a proper and clear explanation of precisely what legal jeopardy the Government are acting in response to. In pursuit of that, it is worth having a look at the explanations that Ministers have given so far.

Let us start with the former Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy), who of course is now the Deputy Prime Minister. He made a statement on the British Indian Ocean Territory negotiations on 7 October last year. He told the House that the issue of contested sovereignty over Diego Garcia was becoming more acute, and that

“A binding judgment against the UK seemed inevitable”.—[Official Report, 7 October 2024; Vol. 754, c. 45.]

Many of us have been asking where that binding judgment might come from. The only court that had by then been mentioned was the International Court of Justice, which had issued an advisory opinion on sovereignty over the Chagos Islands and Diego Garcia. Indeed, on this subject it could only have been an advisory decision, because the UK accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ by declarations dated 22 February 2017—I was Attorney General at the time. Those declarations made it clear that the UK did not, however, accept that compulsory jurisdiction in relation to

“any dispute with a Government of any other country which is or has been a Member of the Commonwealth”.

That involves and includes Mauritius, so any dispute with Mauritius before the ICJ could not result in a binding judgment against the United Kingdom. That point has been put to Ministers and, as far as I know, they have not dissented from that analysis.

If the ICJ could not make the binding judgment that the former Foreign Secretary told us was inevitable, which other court might? On that, again, I am afraid that we have not had clarity. On 13 November last year, the Minister of State at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty)—who I see has the misfortune of having to defend this position once again today—answered an urgent question on the Chagos Islands. He said:

“International courts were reaching judgments on the basis that Mauritius had sovereignty over the Chagos archipelago.”—[Official Report, 13 November 2024; Vol. 756, c. 793.]

The Minister did not at that point say which courts, but I have done some digging, and I think I am supported in my assumption by what the Minister of State, the hon. Member for Plymouth Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard), said in opening this debate. I think that he may have been referring to a determination made in January 2021 by the special chamber of the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea when considering a dispute between Mauritius and the Maldives. Tragically, I do not have time to go into the fascinating detail of that case, but in essence it was a dispute about the delimitation of maritime territory between those two states. The Maldives argued that the special chamber could not determine the case in question because there was an ongoing dispute about the sovereignty of the Chagos Islands between Mauritius and the UK. The special chamber decided, however, that it could treat Mauritius as the coastal state in the dispute before it, because of the ICJ’s advisory opinion on the matter, which it said had legal effect.

If that ITLOS case is what the Government are relying on, I think there are a few problems: first, the UK was not a party to that case; and secondly, the ITLOS chamber was seemingly basing its decision on that of the ICJ, which, as I have already indicated, could not make a binding ruling on the matter. I am not expecting the House, much less the Government, to accept my opinion on this, but it seems to me that, at the very least, the UK would have the basis of a decent legal argument here. It does not seem to be that this ITLOS decision demonstrates that there was no further hope for UK claims of sovereignty over Diego Garcia.

After a bit more prodding, the Government’s argument moves on and introduces the issue of access to the electromagnetic spectrum. On 5 February this year, the Minister of State at the Foreign Office answered yet another urgent question on the subject.

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[Graeme Downie (Dunfermline and Dollar) (Lab)]

We have heard from Members on the Opposition Benches a slew of political opportunism, scaremongering, some cliché bingo and some derogatory terms—something that belongs more in a tabloid than in this House—about the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

Back when these negotiations started, the Conservative party knew that a deal was needed—it may have been somewhere on its list of priorities when it still had some lingering credibility about the good of the nation. The Conservative party knew that a deal was in the best interests of the United Kingdom and our allies. It knew that without a deal, Mauritius could very well have pursued a sovereignty claim and allowed Russia and China into the waters around Diego Garcia. People do not sit through 11 rounds of negotiations if they do not think something is important; they walk away. To give the previous Government credit, they did not do that. They understood the importance of a deal.

[Dr Evans]

On that basis, there were 17 rounds of formal negotiations for the Falkland Islands between ’65 and ’82. What would the outcome be under the hon. Gentleman’s way forward?

[Graeme Downie]

That point was covered before. We have already seen scaremongering from the Opposition about the other British overseas territories, including the Falkland Islands and Gibraltar. I hope that the Conservative party will reflect on and apologise for that.

None the less, the previous Government knew that a deal would keep Britain safe. They knew that without a deal, international courts could effectively make the base inoperable, and they knew that that could plant China right on our doorstep. Now, they cannot even say why it was important. They cannot say why they even started the negotiations; several Government Members have raised that point, and not once have the Conservatives been able to say why, other than hiding behind the fact that they are being entirely politically opportunist. They knew all that, and they now pretend that none of it matters. They are playing politics with Britain’s safety.

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[Tim Roca (Macclesfield) (Lab)]

It has been a long afternoon, but I should say from the start that I genuinely believe that the motivation of all of us is the national interest of the United Kingdom. Whatever differences of opinion there might be, I think it is important that we try to avoid hyperbole in this matter and think coolly and calmly about what is in the UK national interest.

There are tests we need to apply to what we are discussing: first, does it protect UK national security; secondly, do our allies and the professional military and security establishment support it; and thirdly, are the costs and obligations reasonable and proportionate? We also need to have a weather eye to our responsibility to the Chagossians, and I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Crawley (Peter Lamb) for speaking passionately on behalf of his constituents. I believe the answer to those three tests is yes, and I will address them in turn.

Diego Garcia is not just another overseas facility; it is fundamental to our security. It is where our forces and US forces have launched operations against high-value terrorist groups. It is a communications and logistics hub, and it is where we monitor hostile states and safeguard global trade routes that underpin our economy. Without this treaty, all that is at risk.

Ministers have outlined that international rulings could make the base inoperable. I spoke earlier to Dr Marco Longobardo, a specialist in international law, and it is clear that even the non-binding ICJ judgment is nevertheless a matter of international law and potentially gives hostile countries the opening that they need to contemplate interference in the islands—in the same way that Chinese claims in the South China sea are not recognised by many countries. That is all at risk. Our ability to berth submarines, patrol waters or launch operations would be compromised, and a vacuum would be created.

[Dr Evans]

Will the hon. Member give way?

[Tim Roca]

I believe that the hon. Member has had quite a lot of turns today, and I have been waiting a long time without intervening, so I will proceed. If we allowed a vacuum to be created, it would be filled by China or others in a region that is vital to our security. I will come back to China in a moment, because what China thinks about this treaty is important as well.

Turning to the first test, the treaty secures 99 years of guaranteed access, with the option to extend it by a further 40 years; 99 years was good enough for Lord Salisbury, so it is good enough for me. It gives us full operational control over installations, logistics, communications and the electromagnetic spectrum. It establishes a 24-nautical-mile buffer zone and bans any foreign military presence on the outer islands. We have talked about how it protects a unique maritime environment and provides tangible support through the trust fund for Chagossian communities. On the first test I am satisfied.

On the second test—whether the agreement commands the backing of allies and experts—other colleagues have spoken powerfully about this, but Lord Goldsmith, a former Attorney General, said it was

“consistent with our national security interests and with our respect for international law”.

The international support is equally strong. Australia’s Kevin Rudd called it a

“good outcome for Mauritius, for Australia, for the UK and for our collective security interests”.

Canada’s foreign ministry said that it ensures

“the long-term, secure and effective operation”

of the joint base, strengthening a free and open Indo-Pacific.

In the United States, where there is not much that gets bipartisan support, it is a bipartisan matter. Antony Blinken said that America “strongly supported” the negotiations. Secretary of State Marco Rubio commended the “leadership and vision” shown. The Democratic former Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin said that the agreement will

“safeguard strategic security interests into the next century.”

I believe an hon. Member has already quoted President Trump, who described it as an amazing deal, a beautiful deal or whatever kind of deal—but a good deal, that is the main point.

The international consensus is clear. Our allies, partners and experts back the deal. I was very taken by the comments of Professor Benjamin Sacks of the RAND school of public policy in the United States. He said:

“I contend that Beijing privately views the agreement, even if modified to ameliorate some Chagossians’ outstanding demands, somewhat as a setback. In practical terms, it gains little if any advantage from it.”

He added:

“The Chagos issue constituted a perennial problem for British foreign policy; one that China could simultaneously exploit to demonstrate its supposed adherence to existing RBOs”—

rule-based orders—

“and undermine the UK’s traditionally important role in maintaining it.”

He also said that the deal deters Port Louis—Mauritius—from becoming an effective client state of Beijing. On the point of whether our allies support it, I believe that the treaty meets the test.

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[Dr Luke Evans]

Will the hon. Member give way?

[Phil Brickell]

I will make some progress, if I may. I wanted to intervene on Opposition Members earlier, but was not allowed to.

It was the Conservatives who rightly described the situation in 2022 as unsustainable, and it was they who held 11 rounds of talks on sovereignty. In 2023, when he was Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Richmond and Northallerton (Rishi Sunak) said that he wanted to conclude a deal soon. At the time, when they were in government, Conservative Members recognised that the base’s legal status was under serious threat, and that an interminable sovereignty dispute risked paralysing operations.

Let me make a quick point about international law. In reflecting on the ICJ advisory opinion, the right hon. Member for Witham (Priti Patel) said that it is an international court that few have heard of. Those kinds of reckless throwaway remarks undermine the United Nations’ highest judicial organ. She mentioned that we are a permanent member of the UN Security Council. There are judges sitting in the ICJ who are elected by members of the General Assembly, and through the Security Council. Although we have had judges sitting in that international court since its inception, we have not since 2018, which is a source of much shame for the country at large. I hope that she will take back those remarks denigrating the international system of law that underpins our international work. Let us not forget, after all, that in the 1940s, the United Kingdom was the first country to submit a case for arbitration by the ICJ. [Interruption.] I ask those Opposition Members who are chuntering: where were you when those 11 rounds of negotiations took place? I know that two years is a long time in politics, but have you already forgotten—

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[Alex Ballinger (Halesowen) (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for his speech earlier, although he is no longer in this place. We have heard clearly from those on the Opposition Benches that they are opposed to this deal, so it is first worth outlining what sort of deal they are opposed to. They are opposed to a deal that secures our vital national interest on probably the most important base in the country’s history in the Indian ocean. They are opposed to a deal that is supported by every one of our Five Eyes closest security partners. As we have heard from many of them, they are opposed to a deal that they spent 11 rounds negotiating over two years, and we have not quite heard from them why they started negotiating that deal in the first place. They spent 11 rounds negotiating it, but they have not yet told us—the shadow Minister or otherwise—why they felt it was necessary and why they think this Government might have come to the same conclusion as they did at that time. I believe, as many of us do on the Government Benches, that that dangerous rhetoric puts the security of our base in Diego Garcia at risk. It is playing politics with our national security.

I want to take us back in history for one moment to look at a similar situation. During the second world war, the UK established another airfield in the Indian ocean known as RAF Gan. RAF Gan was the southernmost island in the Maldives, and it was secured in 1942 by the Royal Navy, and then taken over by the Air Force, to secure our operations all across the Indian ocean into the far east, combating the Japanese threat we were facing there. It was such a successful base that the Japanese did not even discover its existence until close to the end of the war, once their expansion plans had ended. Later, in the cold war, it became a vital staging post for the UK and our allies to get our forces across to Singapore and other bases in the far east. In fact, my father served there in 1974, and it was a great shame that two years later we closed that base and handed it over to the Maldivian Government at the same time that we secured our base in Diego Garcia.

I mention that case in particular because it was a vital strategic secure base of ours in a similar situation to Diego Garcia. As soon as the Maldivian Government took possession of that base, the Russians began to exert influence to try to take it over. They were attempting to take over the base that we occupied—that we spent decades developing—and turn it into a secure base for the Soviet Union. They are doing exactly the same thing again on Diego Garcia. They are trying to influence the Mauritian Government to claim the base for their own use.

[Dr Evans]

Is this not the point that we have heard time and again from Government Members? This deal runs out in 99 years, and at that point Mauritius can simply close the base or hand it on to the biggest offer. We get first rights on it, but if the Chinese decide to invest hundreds of billions, we may not be able to match that. We are over a barrel. In 100 years’ time, people will be in this place having this exact debate saying, “How do we solve this problem?” Is the hon. Member as concerned about that as I am?

[Alex Ballinger]

I go back to the example of RAF Gan. The Maldivians refused the Soviet Union back in 1976, because the UK had a good reputation with them. We honoured our agreements and respected international law, and they felt that it was inappropriate for them to be seen to be supporting a country that had not done the same.

In the case of Diego Garcia, this is a situation that has been negotiated for many years. The Conservatives recognised that there was a threat to our sovereignty, because they started the negotiations. As we have heard from my hon. Friends, if we are unable to conclude a deal soon, there is a serious risk that our operations at the base would be thwarted. It would not be in 99 or 140 years after the deal; it would be in weeks or months.

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[Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)]

May I say how much of an honour it is to follow the right hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn)? Although we do not necessarily agree on a lot of policy, I am always struck by the fact that he puts people at the heart of his speeches. That has never been the case more than during his long campaign on this issue, on which he spoke eloquently. He is putting Chagossians right at the heart of any decision making. He deserves a lot of acclaim for that. He is right to call out some of the rhetoric in this debate, because, at the end of the day, those people really matter. I thank him for putting his points on the record.

There are three broad areas that I would like to cover: sovereignty, costs and some of the scariest parts of the Bill. I listened to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright), and I must admit that I am not nearly as learned or experienced as him; I bow to his legal analysis. I am a mere doctor, so I look for an evidence base when trying to understand the process. To that end, I thought it would be useful to write to the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, which I duly did. I received a letter on 28 July 2025 from the Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth (Stephen Doughty), who I see will kindly respond, and is sat in his place. Much to my surprise and pleasure, a lot of what is in the letter was in the Minister’s speech. This debate allows me to walk through some of the letter and pose the questions that hit me as I looked into this case.

I must admit that when I stepped into this House in 2019, this was not a topic that I knew a huge deal about—I think many Members on both sides would say the same—but it very quickly became a topic that I realised we should look into understanding, especially as it deals with security.

The letter states:

“We had to act now because the base was under threat.”

That implies urgency, but the letter is loose on who was under threat, where and how. There is legal uncertainty but, as we have heard, we do not know which court is involved or why. It goes on to say:

“The courts have already made decisions which undermine our position.”

Courts, plural. We know that the ICJ is involved, but as has been stated, its opinion was non-binding, and there is a carve-out relating to the Commonwealth.

The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence, the hon. Member for Plymouth Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard), said, after being pushed to speak on the matter multiple times, that the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea was the area of concern, but he will know that back in 2015, under annex VII, the tribunal agreed with the UK that sovereignty could not be determined by UNCLOS. This was a marine protection issue. Britons were trying to protect the area, and Mauritius wanted to open it up to farm it, and we were found against, under that treaty, in that court. This raises an important side issue: what protections are there in the Bill for the environment? They seem scant, or just not there.

The letter goes further, stating that

“in 2021…a Special Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea…ruled that Mauritius’ sovereignty was inferred from ICJ”.

So the Government themselves point that out. The letter goes on to say:

“The UK was not party to this case”.

Well, obviously, it would not be, but that means that we have not had our day in court to explain why we do not think that the judgment should apply. Mauritius’ sovereignty was inferred from that non-binding, political judgment.

The letter goes on:

“If Mauritius were to take us to court again, the UK’s longstanding legal view is that we would not have a realistic prospect of successfully defending its legal position on sovereignty in such litigation.”

Well, which court? If this advice is so long-standing, why do we not know about it? How have we got this far, going for year upon year with no agreement, without any urgency? It seems sensible and appropriate to release the advice on this. At the start of that quote, the letter said “If Mauritius”. It states later that it is

“highly likely that further wide-ranging litigation would be brought quickly by Mauritius against the UK.”

What evidence do the Government have to back that up? What is it that they say Mauritius will act so quickly on? We certainly have not seen it, if it was from 2021. The dates 2023 and 2024 have been mentioned, and we are now in 2025. I would be interested to see the Government release the evidence base for their claim about how quickly litigation would come forward, because as they rightly point out, there have been 11 rounds of negotiations, so there has clearly been time to sort things out.

Before someone jumps in and says, “Well, you opened the negotiations”, I would point out that we did that for the Falkland Islands as well. I find it amazing that we have trade unionists who built their whole careers on negotiating suddenly chastising the Conservatives for listening to the other side of a disagreement. That seems bizarre to me, because we want to respect each other and exchange ideas, but not have an agreement. It is rightly pointed out by Conservative Members that the agreement was not there; we did not take it. On the cost of the deal, there is no cost, because we did not have a deal to sign off.

The very next sentence in the letter says:

“This might, for example, include further arbitral proceedings against the UK under Annex VII of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. A judgment from such a tribunal would be legally binding on the UK.”

[Sir Iain Duncan Smith]

It is not.

[Dr Evans]

It is. It is true about the legally binding aspect within the area that the tribunal covers, but that does not cover sovereignty, as we learned in 2015 when the tribunal sided with the British Government. Here we have the farcical situation of a House of policy and law shining light on one side and another, but never on the truth. This is where my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam is exactly right. If the Government were to come forward and say exactly which court, where and why, they might get more sympathy from Opposition, but we have been through an entire five-hour debate and we still do not have answers to those questions.

Another court that is often cited is the International Telecommunication Union covering spectre, radio and radar. Article 48.1 states

“Member States retain their entire freedom with regard to military radio installations,”

and the Government know that. Even the written answer from the Minister—it has been hinted at before—states:

“Individual countries have the sovereign right to manage and use the radio spectrum, within their borders, the way they wish, subject to not causing interference with other countries. This right is recognised in the Radio Regulations. The Radio Regulations are the international framework for the use of spectrum by radiocommunication services, defined and managed by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). Individual countries, not the ITU, make their own sovereign spectrum assignments in accordance with the Radio Regulations. The ITU has no legal authority over these assignments regardless of the country’s civilian or military classification of spectrum. The ITU cannot challenge the UK’s use of civilian or military spectrum.”

It is clear here—the Government know it in their own answers—that the ITU has no role in sovereignty. It all boils down to where one believes British overseas territories stand.

Now we must talk about the cost, which has been much debated. There have been three figures in the debate: £3.4 billion, £10 billion and £34 billion. The £3.4 billion is the net present value using social time preference rate. The £10 billion is inflation adjusted, and the £34 billion is the nominal value by the Government Actuary’s Department. The question is, why use net present value? I put it earlier in the debate that there is no other precedent in the world for NPV being used in sovereignty matters. The Minister at the time asked whether the Conservatives want to do away with using NPV—of course not.

[Luke Pollard]

It is in the Green Book.

[Dr Evans]

Absolutely, the Minister says it is within the Green Book. Absolutely not, because it has a perfect place in domestic use for commercial practicalities, not for international sovereignty issues. No other country has looked, or would look, at this because it does not make sense.

The House of Commons Library said when asked that

“this methodology is regularly used in government accounting, but its main use is for cost-benefit analyses. It is unusual to see it used in this situation like this, where only the cost is being assessed and it is not being compared to any benefit”.

On that basis, and listening to the House of Commons Library, what cost-benefit analysis has actually been done in this case, and would it be put in front of the House so we might be able to see it?

At the end of the day, NPV is highly political because it assumes a discount rate, and what is the discount rate that one should choose? In the details, it talks about 3.5%, but the US will use 3.5% or 7%, which would vastly differentiate the figures. It goes on further, for the social time preference rate is 3.5%, but for 30 years. This deal is for 99 years, so how can the Government respond in a written parliamentary question that this

“represents good value for UK taxpayers”?

On what basis are they comparing that if there is no international comparison? We are talking only about domestic uses and for an accounting point.

As I come to my conclusions, possibly the scariest thing to me—I have tried to highlight it throughout the debate—which does seem to be falling on deaf ears, is article 13. I believe this treaty is legally bomb-proof. It looks sensible, and I am no legal expert as I have attested to, but it seems to stand the test of time. That means when article 13 says explicitly that in 99 years Mauritius can say no and just take control, that is a big worry. We have heard from many Government MPs how it secures the long-term aspirations of this country for a period of 99 years. When I mentioned that, several Government MPs scoffed. But is it not the duty of this House to provide not only for the next generation, but the rest of time for our country, in the best interests of our country? After listening to all the arguments that have been made about how essential the base is, the very fact that Mauritius could pull the base is a very scary prospect. There is, of course, a caveat: the right of first refusal. But if China decides to do a deal with Mauritius at exorbitant cost, we are over a barrel and the British taxpayer must fork out yet again to guarantee our security. Mauritius has been given a golden ticket, and it knows it.

Beyond the sovereignty and cost, my biggest concern is that we are outsourcing decision -making for our children and our children’s children. That is the modus operandi of this Government—we need only look at the borrowing in the Budget to see how they borrow on the backs of future children. Pushing this decision out for 99 years is not security for now; it will help, but it creates a far bigger problem in 100 years’ time. If the Government want to give away our islands, they should be open and transparent about how and why.

The biggest thing is that we have not even had our day in court. That is what most troubles the British public. I think that the British public would be reasonable if a court found against us—they would happily say, “We follow the rule of law”—but the Government will not even try that. They say that there is a risk. As has been said, this has been going on for years, and still we are looking at a treaty to sign it off.

That inevitably poses final questions about what happens with Gibraltar, the Falklands and Cyprus. The Minister is correct to point out that there are differences, but the biggest fundamental problem that the Government have in arguing to the British people and the people of the Falklands is about understanding. If this House cannot understand the legal concepts of the places where we are likely to fight these causes, how can we expect the public to do so? When it comes to delivering comms to the UK public, that is what they need to understand.

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Luke Evans Excerpts

Committee of the whole House
Monday 20th October 2025 Commons Chamber

[Wendy Morton]

The point, though, is where is this money coming from? This House has not had a vote. Where is the transparency? Where is the democracy ?

Turning to new clause 2 and amendment 2, as we have already discussed, the duration of the agreement is a matter of serious national security concern. There are too many unanswered questions about what could happen to the base. We need to understand the basis on which the Government have settled that, especially as the then Foreign Secretary told this House on 7 October 2024 that the Government would have a right to extend the lease, which we do not, and the Mauritian Government claim the UK gave up a unilateral right of extension at their request. If that is true, it would be a scandal. No wonder we never get straight answers from Ministers. But then, it was also a scandal for Labour to sign the agreement with a previous Mauritian Government just before that country went into an election, only for there to be a change of Government who then wanted to change the deal and extract more money. Extending the agreement is essential, because we simply cannot lose the base. The House deserves to see the advice that the Government are relying on when they ask us to sign this £35 billion blank cheque.

[Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that under the Bill, if there is no agreement, although we can be first offer, Mauritius can decide simply to close and fold the base, leaving it completely void, so there is no protection against that?

[Wendy Morton]

My hon. Friend is 100% right. This goes to the heart of the Bill. There are so many unanswered questions, which Conservative Members have been raising time and again. For example, how likely are we to be able to extend the base? What will the structure of the negotiations be? What conditions could Mauritius impose, given that it will have our negotiators over a proverbial barrel? How watertight is the first right of refusal?

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[Wendy Morton]

I have to disagree with the right hon. Gentleman on many of those matters. We have raised questions about this issue time and again, and we have simply not received the answers from Ministers.

[Dr Luke Evans]

This issue has been disputed. Is it not the point that the United Nations convention on the law of the sea cannot pass judgment on sovereignty because of the ruling that was made between Mauritius and the UK on marine protection back in 2015? That was under annexe VII, which was tried and tested. Britain was found wanting on that, because we had not properly talked through what should happen with the Mauritians. What the Mauritians actually wanted to do was to open it for fishing. How can we assure the protection for this area? That is why we need to amend the Bill.

[Wendy Morton]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. That is exactly why we have continued and will continue to probe the Government on the MPA. We have not had answers to our questions; we have not had the transparency that I think this House deserves.

It is very possible—in fact, it is very likely—that Labour has committed Britain to helping Mauritius dismantle an MPA that we ourselves established. There are no assurances that we will not be committing British resources to actively harm our own interests and undo our work. Mauritius does not have the capability to manage, monitor or enforce an MPA. It does not have the infrastructure at sea or any such experience. It would leave the stocks in those waters exposed to real risk of pillaging, including by Chinese vessels. It is not likely to have the will to do so either, as we know the economic potential of the waters is of interest to Mauritius.

Despite the Government’s ludicrous and insulting claim that those who oppose this deal side with Russia and its friends, Mauritius has been developing closer ties with Russia on marine matters, announcing as recently as May 2025 that the two countries are strengthening their ties on marine innovation, including marine research, while Mauritius’s close relationship with China—a strategic partnership, no less—opens up the possibility of Chinese fishing trawlers in these waters. It is therefore absolutely right that this House gets a say over the fate of the MPA, and the CRaG-equivalent process set out in our new clause would provide for an appropriate level of scrutiny.

New clause 4 would require regular reporting on the ecological status of the Chagos MPA, which is necessary for the same reason as new clause 3. The Government have bound us to support Mauritius to manage the MPA, so there must be scrutiny of what the Government are doing and the ecological consequences. There are widespread concerns across the House on the future of the MPA, and Ministers have so far failed to give any answers or any assurances; when asked, they have said that they do not know about the future and cannot tell us what resources and costs will be incurred to meet these obligations. Given our role in managing the MPA, the UK should be able to access the data required for this report. This new clause reaffirms our commitment to the MPA.

We recognise the sensitive nature of the military arrangements on Diego Garcia, but oversight of the agreement is none the less essential. New clause 5 would allow for appropriate parliamentary scrutiny while respecting the need to protect critical information. The new clause covers the key areas of security consideration and will act as a catalyst for the Government to maintain their own monitoring of each area. We believe that that is critical as there are holes in the provisions. There must, for example, be agreement on upgrading infrastructure in the buffer zone, such as sensors—but what if there is no agreement? Likewise, the treaty stipulates that Mauritius and Britain must jointly decide on the management and use of the electromagnetic spectrum.

Of particular importance in new clause 5 are paragraphs (d) and (e). On (d), we must ensure that only vessels that should be in the area are in the area, and that Russian and potentially even Chinese vessels are deterred from entering—I have already mentioned the closer ties and partnerships between Mauritius and those countries, which should concern all of us.

With reference to paragraph (e), the treaty states that the United Kingdom agrees

“to expeditiously inform Mauritius of any armed attack on a third state directly emanating from the base on Diego Garcia”.

Given the huge range of security threats in the Indo-Pacific and the middle east, it is far from impossible that in future this mechanism may need to be used. It is important that the notifications are presented to the Intelligence and Security Committee, as once again it would force the Government to log and monitor the mechanism, including any operational impacts it might have. We know that there are genuine concerns that third countries—potentially even China—might try to establish themselves in the archipelago, and the arrangements in the treaty must be monitored to ensure that they are sufficiently robust to stop that happening.

New clause 6 probes the Government’s argument that a legally binding ruling under UNCLOS would have an impact on our ability to operate the electromagnetic spectrum, and impede air and sea access as well as the ability to patrol the area around the base. We take issue with that assertion, not least because there is an argument that provisions under article 298 of UNCLOS allow for exemptions relevant to disputes concerning military activities. The Government have not addressed this issue when we have probed, including on Second Reading, so we have had no choice but to table this new clause to test the Government’s assertion.

I turn finally to new clause 7. The British Chagossian community have been treated appallingly by this Labour Government. Twice the deal has ended up in the courts because of the way Labour has ridden roughshod over their concerns. This Bill sells them short, too. The resettlement programme for the Chagos islands under this treaty is entirely in the hands of Mauritius—a country to which, I should add, Chagossians feel little affinity. Indeed, we have seen many Chagossians arriving in the UK from Mauritius in recent weeks. I hope the Minister will respond to that from the Dispatch Box, because it is clearly concerning that they have been moved to take this action.

The Bill also stops British overseas territories citizenship being awarded on the basis of descent from a person born on the Chagos archipelago. Sadly, we cannot amend the treaty through the Bill; it just is not within the parliamentary rules. However, new clause 7 would require the Government to consult the Chagossian community on the implementation of the treaty—including on the establishment of the trust fund, which we capitalise and Mauritius distributes—and on areas of dispute arising between the UK and Mauritian Governments prior to their being discussed at the joint committee created by the treaty. It also requires the Foreign Secretary to present a report to Parliament within six months of the Act becoming law, and in every subsequent year, on how Chagossian rights are being upheld under this agreement. We have a national obligation and responsibility to the Chagossian community, and the Conservatives will always stand up for their rights.

To conclude, taken together, our amendments and new clauses will hold the Government to account. Let us be clear: the Conservatives oppose this surrender Bill, its colossal costs and the adverse impact on our defence and security. Accepting these amendments and new clauses will simply strengthen accountability and transparency.

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[Danny Kruger]

The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. The key demand that this House is making is for greater transparency about what is going on behind the scenes with this deal. I implore the House to insist that, before Parliament accepts any new arrangements for the sovereignty of the Chagos islands, Ministers explain what is going on. Specifically, is the Minister aware of any effect on our nuclear posture? Is there any relationship between the deal that is being done today and implications for our deterrent? The base is vital to our national interest, and I would be grateful to understand whether any discussions have been had with reference to the deals that were done many years ago about the relationship with the nuclear deterrent.

[Dr Luke Evans]

I will speak to the amendments, starting with amendments 1 and 7, and take a canter through my position, as my constituents will have an interest in that.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Beverley and Holderness (Graham Stuart) asked the important question why. Amendments 1 and 7 try to address the most important issue: context. As my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis) pointed out, our signing this deal does not make sense. The Government have been weak in presenting the evidence for why they think we should sign the deal. I wrote to the Government to ask them to explain, and I was able to pull their response apart on Second Reading, one step at a time, explaining why their reasons do not fit.

Context is really important. I thought that the deal did not make sense, but factoring in the collapsed spy trial, the billion pounds provided to the steel factories, the pending decision on the embassy—yes, maybe no—and the change in the language used around the subject of China, we need to get to the heart of what is going on. The amendments are an attempt to do that in the name of transparency, which is hugely important.

[Blake Stephenson]

Does my hon. Friend agree that the Government are treating China like it is our friend, rather than the threat that it is?

[Dr Evans]

I would be interested to hear an answer to that, as we have tried several times to get the Government to quantify whether China is a threat, a friend, an ally or a foe.

Amendment 7 tries to look at

“an analysis of the status of UK’s sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory under international law;”.

From talking about this previously, we know that UNCLOS, which is often used as the example of why we have to secede the territory, cannot preside over sovereignty, as was said in 2015 when dealing with the marine protected area. We have also heard the Government stress the importance of the International Telecommunications Union, saying that the issue is to do with spectre and spies. However, we know that there is a carve-out, because we heard about that on Second Reading.

That leaves us with the International Court of Justice, which is often held up as the key point. On Second Reading, I was taken by the fact that it is alleged that we have an opt-out under the Commonwealth, so I went away to have a quick look. On the ICJ website, as hon. Members can see, the “Declarations recognising the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory—United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland” were published on 22 February 2017. I quote:

“1. The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland accepts as compulsory ipso facto and without special convention, on condition of reciprocity, the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, ln conformity with paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court, until such time as notice may be given to terminate the acceptance, over all disputes arising after 1 January 1987, with regard to situations or facts subsequent to the same date, other than:”—

these are critical points—

“(i) any dispute which the United Kingdom has agreed with the other Party or Parties thereto to settle by some other method of peaceful settlement; (ii) any dispute with the government of any other country which is or has been a Member of the Commonwealth;”.

That is there in black and white.

However, the Government have yet to mention that in any of debates or letters about their legal position. We need amendments 1 and 7 to be able to understand why the Government do not see that as a strong enough argument to hold up. This nonsense about whether or not there are negotiations is answered there too, because those declarations say:

“any method of peaceful settlement”.

Any good Government would try to resolve the dispute in a peaceful manner.

I am surprised at that from a Labour party whose Members pride themselves on being trade unionists, who make a living from negotiating and trying to come to a solution without the matter going to a court. That is exactly what they should be doing, but the Conservatives are being chastised for trying to have a conversation to resolve the situation. The fact was that we did not come up with a deal because the deal was not good enough.

The Labour Opposition moved into power and have now put forward this horrendous Bill that gives away power, but at what cost? They are not even going to try in court or use some of the simple arguments which I, as a doctor, have found after spending time researching. I am sure that in this great country we have many legal buffs that could put forward that argument, but if the government do not feel that it stands, they should come to this House and tell us why—put it in evidence, write it out and tell us all, and we will go quietly. However, we are not hearing or seeing that from this Government, which is why we need amendments 1 and 7.

Turning to amendments 3, 4 and 6, as has been rightly pointed out by my right hon. Friend the Member for Beverley and Holderness it is clear that the Bill gives carte blanche to this Government, or any other, to do whatever they want. We may as well not even bother having a debate about the Bill—it is not worth the paper it is written on—because the Henry VIII powers mean that Ministers can do what they will, when they will without coming to Parliament. At least these amendments try to ensure some accountability of the Executive to this House, because this House should be making these decisions, especially given their magnitude. We have heard from the Government that it is a priceless base and we have heard from the Conservative Benches about its geopolitical and security importance. Should the House not be making decisions about what that looks like?

New clause 1 talks about the payments. On Second Reading, I asked the Minister whether he could give me any example, from any part of the world, of when we have dealt with sovereignty using net present value. He said it was in the Green Book, but that is for domestic sites and used by the Treasury to look at civil development. I hope the Minister has gone away and done some research, because I think he will find that there is not a precedent, as net present value is not the correct measure and is open to political interference. For example, we use 3.5% and America uses 7%. We can fudge the numbers to fit the narrative that we would like to set.

There is one other problem. The explanatory notes stipulate only 30 years. Unless I have misquoted, this deal goes for 99 years, so what happens in the remaining 70 years? That is why new clause 1 would bring in a robust check to ensure that when the finances are paid out, we know exactly why we are paying, who we are paying and what we are paying for. Most importantly, we would know the mechanism of how the finances were calculated, because the Government still have not come to this place and set that out exactly.

Let me turn to new clause 2. What happens at the end? I raised that as my final point when I spoke on Second Reading. We have heard about long-term security, but in this place we think only on a five-year cycle; this is a 99-year cycle. My biggest fear is that my children’s children’s children, if they are ever elected to this Parliament, will be having a debate in 99 years with the same issues about what happens. It is a dereliction of duty on our behalf in this House not to think things through.

[Sir Julian Lewis]

My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech. I am surprised that nobody has referred to Hong Kong. When the decision was taken and the agreement was reached in 1984 for the handover in 1997, China agreed that it would be “one country, two systems” for at least 50 years. Within less than half that time, Britain came to the conclusion that all those safeguards were being deliberately violated.

[Dr Evans]

As ever, my learned right hon. Friend has pipped me to the punch. That is exactly a good example of the kind of sites we are worried about. What has that meant? We have taken on British nationals overseas and invited them in to give them security, because they feared for political interference and, worse still, for the safety of themselves and their families.

We are not doing our duties if we are not thinking about these things, because, as we have already seen, it is hard enough to predict things in two or three years’ time, let alone 100 years. At that point, as it is written, we will get the best offer, but it will be only offered to us. We could be outstripped by China, Russia or a BRIC country in the future—we do not know; it is 100 years away—and there is no mechanism to solve that. Worse still, Mauritius could simply say, “We do not want a base here at all,” and there is nothing in this Bill that would stop that. The Government repeatedly have been asked those questions, and they cannot set that out. That is why new clause 2 asks for those impacts to be considered and looked at.

New clause 3 would move the marine protected area. I will return to a point I made earlier. The fact is that when Britain and the United Kingdom were taken under UNCLOS in 2010 by Mauritius under annex VII, we wanted to implement protections in the area. Mauritius felt that that impeded on its ability to make its own decisions, which the court found in favour of, and it also wanted to fish in the area. Hang on a second! We are putting weaknesses into this Bill when we know that Mauritius has set its intent. I hope it has moved on, as the debate on climate has, but this new clause would be a guarantee to ensure that that has been thought about.

Let me turn to new clause 5. I appreciate the Minister stepping up, because there has already been debate about the Peros Banhos islands, and he has said there are no concerns that they will be leased to China. Let us be real: this Bill has only just come out—the ink is barely dry—and we already hear stories. Many journalists have already talked about this issue. Maybe I am wrong, but that shows the examples of what could and will come without paying attention to the security and the geopolitical and strategic advantage that these islands have, which my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for South Shropshire (Stuart Anderson) talked about. All new clause 5 asks us to do is ensure that that is reported on and looked at. Again, there is a dereliction of duty by not having that reported.

I could go on, because there are many more amendments, but the salient points in this debate have been made. All the amendments tabled in the names of Conservatives— and, to be fair, in the names of Members of many other Opposition parties—ask for one simple thing: transparency and explanation. They ask for a simple way of seeing what the legal advice does and where the financial outcome comes.

[Stephen Doughty]

indicated assent.

[Dr Evans]

The Minister is nodding along, but there must be something wrong if the public and Opposition Members cannot simply understand the arguments for what is being put in place. We cannot see the wood for the trees. It is a Government’s duty to show those arguments, and I look forward to the Minister doing that in his response and putting these arguments to bed once and for all. Otherwise, the British public will not forgive him.

[Jim Allister (North Antrim) (TUV)]

I will primarily focus on new clause 8, which is in my name and the names of colleagues. First and foremost, this Bill is about perfecting the decolonisation of the British Indian Ocean Territory—that is self-evident in clause 2—but it does that in a way that ignores a primary component of decolonisation. We subscribe to United Nations resolution 1514. That resolution talks about respecting not only the integrity of territory, but self-determination. The British Indian Ocean Territory has existed, de facto and de jure, for over 50 years, yet the Government’s approach in justifying this completion of decolonisation is to focus solely on territorial integrity by claiming that the Chagos islands are, in fact, part of Mauritius.

Resolution 1514 contains a number of components. Its first point is that

“The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights”.

Its second point is that

“All peoples have the right to self-determination”.

The question for this House is surely this: are the Chagossians a people? I certainly think that they are. They are distinct from the Mauritians by their ethnic background, by their religion and by geography. Mauritius and the Chagos islands are over 1,300 miles apart, approximately as far as it is from this House to north Africa, so after 50 years of the existence of the BIOT, it really is a stretch to say that the sole defining issue is that of territorial integrity. To say that is to ignore the right to self-determination.

This nation has dealt with decolonisation before, and we did not approach it on the basis that it is only about territorial integrity. Take the example of India. We decolonised in India, but we allowed it to be subject to self-determination—that is why we have India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. It is quite clear that this is not a situation in which territorial integrity trumps everything else. It does not trump self-determination. An experience of decolonisation such as India’s shows that territorial integrity is secondary to self-determination, yet the right of the people who claim the Chagos islands as their homeland to any measure of self-determination is the one thing that has been utterly ignored in this process. We have in our history the shameful episode of their forceful removal from the Chagos islands, and now under this treaty, we are going to compound that shame by legitimising that removal. Saying that this is only about territorial integrity is to legitimise their forceful removal from the Chagos islands—that is how we get around the question of self-determination. That is wrong. The people of the Chagos islands are a people. They are a people with a homeland; therefore, under international law, they are a people with a right to self-determination, so why do this treaty and this Bill trash that right? That is the fundamental haunting question when it comes to the humanity and international legal requirements of the situation that prevails.

The Government are obviously holding to the line, “It is only about territorial integrity,” but they are hoisted by their own petard, because they have recognised the Chagossians as a people by setting aside some millions of pounds for them. They cannot say it is only about territorial integrity, and there is no people to whom to give the right to self-determination, and then say, “For those people to whom we deny the right to self-determination, here is some conscience money.” They cannot do that, yet that is what the treaty does.

The BIOT recognised the separateness of the people of the Chagos islands, and even the much-vaunted advisory judgment of the International Court of Justice gives respect and acknowledgment—to an extent—to the question of self-determination. At one point, the judgment states:

“It follows that any detachment by the administering Power of part of a non-self-governing territory, unless based on the freely expressed and genuine will of the people of the territory concerned, is contrary to the right to self-determination.”

Even that advisory judgment recognised the exception of the freely expressed and genuine will of the people, but that is what we have not had on this issue. This Government have gone out of their way to deny the free and genuine expression of opinion by the people whose homeland is the Chagos islands. That shameful indictment compounds what we did to those people at the end of the 1960s. The Government now totally dehumanise their human rights by saying, “You have no rights whatever when it comes to self-determination.” That is fundamentally wrong.

If the splitting of that wider colony in 1965 was illegitimate because there was no self-determination, according to the advisory judgment of the Court, then equally the Chagos islands rejoining Mauritius without self-determination is illegitimate. The Government cannot have it both ways, but that is what this Bill is seeking to do. The Government say that because it was illegitimate to split the Chagos islands off from Mauritius in 1965 because there was no self-determination, the Bill is about territorial integrity only, but if the basis of rejoining the Chagos islands to Mauritius is without self-determination, then that equally is illegitimate. Those are some of the points that this Government have not faced, and if they have faced them, they have not answered them. This House is legitimately asking those questions tonight, and waiting for answers. If those answers do not come, it will illustrate how this is the tawdry, unacceptable and unenforceable Bill that it will ultimately be seen to be.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jerome Mayhew]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right to ask those questions—questions that have been asked of the Government time and again throughout this legislative process, but to which we simply have not had an answer.

The Government seem to be blind to the risk of the craven withdrawal of influence from the Indo-Pacific region. This is more Jonathan Powell. He was, of course, the Prime Minister’s envoy, and the architect of the negotiation and the deal. The more I learn of Jonathan Powell, the more I realise that he seems to have a long-term instinct to downplay the threat from China—a threat in the Indian Ocean through this negotiated deal. Let us not forget that this is the same Jonathan Powell who now wears a different hat. He is now the National Security Adviser, and that, very unusually, was a political appointment. There is the question of his involvement—or perhaps it is not his involvement— in the collapse of the Chinese spying case. We are asked to believe that he was not involved in it, and that seems baffling as well.

[Dr Evans]

Was my hon. Friend as surprised as I was to find out that the National Security Adviser does not speak to his deputy? [Interruption.]

[The Chairman of Ways and Means (Ms Nusrat Ghani)]

Order. I do not think we need this chuntering from the Front Bench. Can we ensure that the speech remains within the legislation that we are debating and voting on tonight?

--- Later in debate ---

[Sammy Wilson]

Of course there are many who take a totally different point of view and whose wishes are not reflected in this Bill. The amendments that have been tabled to seek to remedy that situation are being ignored and opposed by the Government.

The second issue is the economy. On a regular basis, we hear how difficult the fiscal position is for this country—black holes we have to fill by taking money off pensioners, reducing benefits, cutting here and cutting there, and taxing people to the hilt. Yet when amendments are tabled that simply request transparency and the opportunity to look at the expenditure involved in this treaty, we hear no support from the Government. Either we are concerned about the fiscal position of this country or we are not. I would suggest that £35 billion—and rising—is a significant figure that we should be looking at.

[Dr Luke Evans]

The right hon. Member is making a powerful point. Is not part of the problem that we do not even know which budget the money is coming out of? That is the kind of simple question that the man or woman on the street would expect us to be able answer.

[Sammy Wilson]

We may not know which budget it is coming from, but we know whose pockets it is coming from: the pockets of taxpayers. To a certain extent it does not really matter, because all our constituents will pay for this deal. The Minister said that the Chagos islands were priceless, yet we are giving them away and giving away taxpayers’ money for them—and we do not even know how much we will be giving in the long run. I would have thought that some Government Members have concerns, if not about human rights then about the financial implications of the deal.

Especially at this time, national security is an important issue for every Member of the House, yet amendments that seek to ensure that there is scrutiny over what happens to these islands, who has influence in them and whether the treaty that has been entered into guarantees that our security will not be jeopardised are being refused. The Government are not even attacking the amendments or explaining their opposition.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Doughty]

I thank all hon. and right hon. Members for their contributions. I will attempt to respond to the specifics of the amendments and new clauses in due course, but I want to come back to some of the fundamental points that have been raised during the debate first, and I also want to respond to some of the specific questions that were raised.

With the exception of some genuine questions in relation to the Chagossians, the MPA and the environmental protections, and the implementation of this treaty, it was a shame to see the rehash of the same arguments that were made on Second Reading. There were some outrageous and nonsensical arguments and claims, particularly relating to the costs and to other matters, which I will come to.

I was shocked by some of the anti-American, conspiracy-fuelled nonsense that we heard at various points during the debate. The base is critical to the United Kingdom, the United States, our allies and our national security, and the Bill and the treaty protect the functioning of that base. It does not surrender it; it secures it into the future. This is a Government who inherited a mess from the former Ministers on the Opposition Benches. We are getting stuff done. We are a patriotic Government; our first duty is to protect the national security of this country, and that is why we have got this deal done. It is why it is backed by the United States. It is why it is backed by our Five Eyes partners. It is absolutely crucial to protect the British people and our allies.

We have been very transparent about the reasons for it, and they are the exact opposite of what has been suggested. I come back, as I always have done, to the fundamental question: if there were not a problem and a risk to the operations of this crucial base, why did the previous Government start the negotiations, why did they continue them through 11 rounds of negotiations, and why did they continue them right up until the general election? Those are the facts.

[Dr Evans]

Will the Minister give way?

[Stephen Doughty]

I will happily take interventions, but first I want to respond to the points that have been made. This agreement has been backed by our key allies and international partners, including the US and our Five Eyes allies. India, Japan and South Korea have also made clear their strong support.

Many questions were asked about the robust security provisions that we have in place to protect the UK and the base for decades to come. The treaty and the Bill secure full operational control of Diego Garcia, a strict ban on foreign security forces across the archipelago and an effective veto on any activity that threatens the base on Diego Garcia. It has been welcomed by the International Agreements Committee and the International Relations and Development Committee in the other place, which said that they

“were assured that the Agreement preserves the UK’s and the US’s freedom of action.”

The legal rationale has been referred to many times, but legally binding provisional measures from the courts could have come within weeks, for example, affecting our ability to patrol the waters around Diego Garcia, and even if we did not comply, international organisations and other countries would. We have set out the legal rationale on a number of occasions. We have been very clear. We also published documents around it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Evans]

Could the Minister give any example worldwide where NPV has been used for sovereignty purposes?

[Stephen Doughty]

I have been clear throughout. We have set and published the methodology. It has been backed by the Office for Budget Responsibility, the statistics regulator and others, and I am happy to set that all out again in writing for the hon. Member if that would be helpful.

I was quite surprised to hear some of the unfortunate remarks made by some Members about the United States and its commitment to this base. The United States pays for the operating costs. We have a crucial national security relationship, which keeps us, the United States and our allies safe. This is a joint base on Diego Garcia. It is absolutely right that those arrangements are in place. As I said, the value from the capability of the base is priceless. This is absolutely the right investment to make.

I was appalled by some of the comments being made. I remind the Committee that President Trump, Secretary of War Hegseth and Secretary Rubio have publicly supported the treaty, as have Five Eyes partners and others.