(2 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, what we have here is a very serious issue. We already know that, since 2014, debtors have been incorrectly charged VAT when it has been ruled that this should instead be charged to the creditor. Although the Ministry of Justice clarified in its March 2020 and November 2021 guidance that if the creditor is VAT-registered, debtors should not be charged VAT, it did not clarify the actions it would take to look into giving the money back. For this reason alone, I am supportive of the Motion in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, to regret the taking control of goods statutory instrument.
Also, to put it simply, time is running out. Some noble Lords may be aware, but many will not, that there is only a six-year window in which debtors can rightfully claim for this money to be repaid. This means that many debtors, many of whom will not even be aware that this money belongs to them, have unjustly missed out on their opportunity to reclaim VAT. Therefore, the time for action is now. With every passing day of delay, more and more debtors will continue to miss out.
We have come out of a busy Christmas period, the time when many families’ budgets become overly stretched and more financially challenging. The truth is that it is expensive to be poor in this country at the moment. For the average poor family, the poverty premium—a horrible expression—means £490 extra to pay because of meters, being unable to buy in bulk and paying individually for things that other people could pay for in excess. For one in 10 people, that poverty premium is £780 a year. Will the Government ensure that the debt enforcement sector notifies all debtors who may have overpaid VAT? Will they conduct an impact assessment to understand exactly how much has been overpaid? Finally, will they ensure that the debt enforcement sector sets up a scheme to refund this money?
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate, in particular the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, whose Motion gave rise to it. The Motion highlights concern about whether debtors have been overcharged in respect of the VAT that attaches to the fees charged by High Court enforcement officers.
The statutory instrument before the House sets out how the VAT that attaches to enforcement agent fees should be collected. The burden of the noble Baroness’s Motion is to criticise the Government for not going further by applying that retrospectively. A number of noble Lords asked what we propose to do to provide compensation to debtors who were charged VAT wrongly prior to the date on which the instrument took effect. I will seek to explain why the use of “wrongly” is itself subject to question.
Let me set out the purpose of the SI and why we have decided that it is necessary to provide clarity and explain why it would not be possible or fair to legislate retrospectively in this area. We decided that it was necessary to legislate because in the summer of 2019—I accept that the issue was floating around earlier—we were made aware that there were dramatically diverging views and practices within the High Court enforcement industry about who the VAT on its fees should be collected from. We initially sought to provide clarity by working with HMRC to draft guidance about the correct approach.
With apologies to the House, I would point out gently to the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, that we must be careful when we talk about collecting VAT. There are two different issues here. The first is who is responsible for paying the VAT. The second is can you, as the creditor, recover through the enforcement agent a sum equivalent to the VAT. When the debtor pays that sum, the debtor is are not paying VAT; the debtor is paying a sum equivalent to VAT. That sounds like a legal technicality, but it is not; it is a fundamental distinction that it at the heart of this issue.
An important point to make is that neither the guidance nor the SI seeks to change underlying VAT law. In all circumstances, the creditor is liable for the VAT. That is because the creditor is the recipient of the service of the High Court enforcement officer. The guidance and the SI set out the circumstances in which a sum equivalent to the VAT charged to the creditor can be recovered from the judgment debtor as an enforcement cost. We designed that guidance to ensure careful and fair operation of the law so that creditors would not be out of pocket as a result of enforcement costs, while also ensuring that an amount equivalent to VAT was collected from debtors only in cases where the VAT represented a real cost to the creditor. In other words, an amount equivalent to VAT would be collected from the debtor only in cases where the creditor was not able to recover the VAT from HMRC as an input tax. If the creditor was able to recover the VAT from HMRC, the VAT would not be a real cost to the creditor and therefore a sum equivalent to the VAT should not be collected from the debtor.
In March 2020, we consulted interested parties about the draft guidance. Views remained mixed about whether VAT should ever be recovered from the debtor because the debtor was not the recipient of the service. We considered then, as we do now, that it is fair for the creditor to be able to recover the VAT as an enforcement cost in cases where it will represent a real cost to the creditor. That approach is in keeping with the overarching principle that the debtor is responsible for the costs of enforcement. Some consultees questioned the legal basis for our draft guidance. They noted that the regulations setting out the fees that High Court enforcement agents can recover from debtors do not refer to VAT, so we have accepted that it would be helpful to set out the position in legislation to put the matter beyond doubt. That is what this SI seeks to do.
We have listened to the feedback that we received about the draft guidance and taken on board the dangers that a system that is too complicated or nuanced will make it even more difficult for a debtor to understand whether they were paying the correct enforcement costs and, as a consequence, to know whether to challenge an account of the charges they are presented with. The feedback also highlighted how, in a very complicated system to address this issue, more mistakes are likely to be made.
We do not want that to happen. We want to try to have a simple and comprehensible but fair system. We therefore decided that this SI should allow an amount equivalent to the VAT to be recovered from the judgment debtor only in cases where the creditor is not VAT-registered and cannot therefore recover the VAT from HMRC. We think that approach is simple and properly supportable in principle. We think that it is right to allow creditors in those circumstances, although only those who are not VAT-registered, to recover an amount equivalent to the VAT from debtors as it would represent to them a cost of enforcement. We must remember that the creditors may themselves be suffering from financial vulnerability. For example, the creditor may be an individual who has lost their job, sued their employer and got an award of damages for wages. If we do not have this regulation, it is the creditor who will be out of pocket because they will have to pay the costs of enforcement. So I say with great respect that we cannot approach this matter a little simplistically by assuming that the debtor is always the small person, so to speak, and the creditor is always the grasping outfit. That is not the case.
We must also remember that under this SI an amount equivalent to VAT will not be recovered from the debtor in the vast majority of cases as most creditors will be VAT-registered. I should acknowledge that, as we set out in the Explanatory Memorandum, some VAT-registered creditors may make both taxable and exempt supplies. They will be able to recover only a proportion of the total VAT from HMRC. However, we think that putting them together with VAT-registered creditors is the appropriate policy option. We therefore think that this SI strikes the right balance to ensure that an amount equivalent to VAT is recovered from debtors only where it represents a real cost to the creditor.
I accept that we could have acted faster to clarify this matter. We consulted on draft guidance in March 2020. The work to finalise that guidance was delayed as a result of the department’s response to the pandemic. For example, in this area, we diverted resources and introduced legislative bans on enforcement action by enforcement agents in order to protect public health, so the coronavirus pandemic had an impact on this area as well.
I certainly do not want disagreements about what should have happened in the past to delay any further clarification of future practice, so I am grateful to the noble Baroness for amending the Motion to one of regret.
I understand the concerns expressed about whether in the past debtors have paid more than they should have done. I have great sympathy for the wish, expressed by a number of speakers, to ensure that debtors can have their concerns addressed in legislation. However, limits on retrospective legislation are an important safeguard in a just society as well as being a principle of the rule of law. There must be strong reasons to test those limits even where there is the power to do so. This issue is not one of those exceptional cases.
The issues raised in the Motion are largely matters of private law as between debtors, enforcement agents and creditors, and the interpretation of the legal position between those private parties is a matter for the courts. As we have heard, the issue is currently before the High Court in litigation. It is tempting but slightly inaccurate to say that the Government were taken to court, with all that implies. That case is in fact about a declaration being sought from the court as to what the law is. It is fair to say that there are widely divergent opinions on what the correct legal position prior to this SI in fact was.
To pick up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, the common law position is simply this. My friend in the other place was not saying that the common law imposes VAT but that it is a basic principle of the common law that when you enforce a debt, you can recover the debt and the costs of enforcement of the debt. If VAT is to you a real cost of enforcement, an amount equivalent to that VAT is recoverable from the debtor. That ties in with basic principles of enforcement of debts, whether it is VAT or indeed your solicitor’s costs in bringing the matter to court and enforcement. To pick up another point, if the enforcement agent is not registered for VAT, they cannot charge VAT on their fees, so the point does not arise in the first place.
We do not think it would be appropriate to legislate for the past. I respectfully disagree with the noble Baroness when she assumes that debtors who paid VAT or a sum equivalent to VAT in the past were wrongly overcharged. That is a point of law which is in dispute. However, we think that debtors must pay the costs of enforcement of a judgment debt. At the same time, we want to ensure that debtors are fairly treated, not just in relation to the process of enforcement but to the costs of the process.
I do not want to give the House a history lesson, but if one goes back to the high sheriff and undersheriffs of days gone by, the predecessors of the High Court enforcement officers, there is an interesting analysis of whether VAT would or might have applied to their fees. Were they acting on behalf of the creditor or on behalf of the court? It is not always very easy to analyse.
VAT itself is not an uncomplex system, so it is easy to understand why successive Governments were perhaps less prescriptive than they might have been as to how it would impact on the fee rates. None the less, where VAT imposes an additional sum and that sum cannot be recovered by the creditor as an input tax, it is an enforcement cost and should be recoverable from the debtor. That said, given that the matter is seized by the High Court, obviously we will keep a close eye on that litigation. We will look at any findings of the court extremely carefully and will consider whether any further action in this area is necessary.
Before I sit down, I should pick up an important point made by the noble Lord, Lord Best, about the enforcement conduct authority. We are strongly supportive of the work that is being done by the Centre for Social Justice, in partnership with the enforcement and debt advice sectors, to set up an enforcement conduct authority to provide independent oversight of firms and to consider complaints. We believe that the proposed authority will make a real difference by raising standards in the industry to protect vulnerable debtors while improving the effectiveness of enforcement. We remain committed to reviewing the new body within two years of its operation and then deciding whether it is necessary to put it on a statutory footing.
The noble Lord, Lord McNicol, referred to PPI. With respect, I am not persuaded that this is a like-for-like issue. The point with PPI is that people were paying sums which they should not have paid and which went into the pockets of the insurance companies. What has happened here is that VAT has been paid, but there is no suggestion that the enforcement officers have not been remitting the VAT which they collected to HMRC. We should look at each issue on its own merits.
(2 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am pleased that the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, is able to be with us this afternoon—and in good health, I hope—having been unavoidably detained during the debate in Committee. It is good to have been able to hear from her directly on an issue that is of evident interest to a number of Members of your Lordships’ House. I have listened carefully to the points made by everyone, including the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, the noble Lords, Lord Ramsbotham and Lord Laming, the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, my Front Bench colleagues and others to whom I will come.
I hear and feel the mood of the House and the noble Lords who spoke in support of the amendment. I also heard my noble friends Lord Cormack and Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts ask for some favourable and encouraging comments from me. The truth is that I do not really need any persuading on the importance and use of restorative justice. I agree that, in the right circumstances, it can certainly have far-reaching benefits.
Indeed, since we discussed this in Committee, I have spoken at the Council of Europe Justice Ministers meeting, which was specifically about restorative justice. On the upside, the meeting was held in Venice; on the downside, I had to appear virtually. Despite that, I was pleased to welcome the declaration on restorative justice made by that meeting. I talked about our history in the UK of exploring and embedding the appropriate use of restorative justice across the criminal justice system. The Venice declaration calls for the sharing of knowledge, best practice and scientific research on restorative justice. We are committed to playing our full part in this.
Turning to the amendment, it seems to be intended to address a concern that the Bill does not include provision for restorative justice by requiring the Secretary of State to publish an action plan every five years. As I explained in Committee, restorative justice is not just communication between victim and perpetrator. We consider that the concept of restorative justice extends to other parts of the Bill in the sense that we now have a new system for out-of-court disposals because the conditions attached to those disposals again provide an opportunity for intervention and support for offenders and appropriate input from the victim of the crime.
The new statutory two-tier framework replaces the current adult out-of-court disposal options. There must be conditions attached to both of the new proposed cautions, fulfilling one of three objectives: rehabilitation, reparation or punishment. These provide an opportunity for intervention and support for offenders. A restorative justice referral could also be an appropriate condition of a caution where the victim and offender agree to this.
I agree with my noble friend Lord Cormack that we should divert people from prison where we can; indeed, that is part of the Sentencing Code. I also agree with the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that prison and restorative justice are not necessarily—I emphasise “necessarily”—alternatives. I remind the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, that, so far as the sentencing White Paper is concerned, the Bill provides for the greater use of deferred sentencing; this also provides opportunities for restorative justice in the deferred sentencing process.
Over and above that, we are concerned that victims know about restorative justice. Under the victims’ code, they now have the right to be provided with information about restorative justice and how to access restorative justice services in their local area. We continue to provide funding to PCCs to provide support services for victims of crime, which include restorative justice as well.
On 9 December, we launched a consultation, “Delivering Justice for Victims”, the first step towards what we hope will be a landmark victims’ law—a Bill which will build on the foundations of the victims’ code to substantially improve the victim’s experience of the criminal justice system. We propose to place the key principles of the code in primary legislation and are considering the roles and duties of PCCs in relation to victims. However, to repeat a point that I made in Committee—I think that it was also the point that the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, was reaching for—restorative justice is not always appropriate. For some more serious types of offending, it may not be appropriate. The welfare of the victim must always be paramount. I am thinking of some sexual violence and rape cases. We should not have an exhaustive list—even for those cases it is a case-by-case basis—but there will be cases where restorative justice would be unfair on the victim. The victim must always consent but should never feel forced into a process that they are not 100% comfortable with.
The probation service is also working on a new framework for restorative justice, to ensure a more consistent approach, focusing on the people for whom it will make the biggest difference. Having said that, the broad policy aim is that all victims can, if they wish, take part in restorative justice at a time that is right for them. Again, restorative justice does not have to be immediately at the sentencing date. It could be months or even years in the future. It is not a one-time-only option.
It remains the case that we are working very hard in this area. We share the aims and ambitions of the noble Baroness. The evidence base for restorative justice exists. Services are available. Victims should and will be made aware more clearly of their availability. However, requiring rolling action plans will simply create an unnecessary and overly bureaucratic burden. It will cost a lot more without any concrete benefit.
I support restorative justice in principle. I hope that is crystal clear. I cannot promise my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts that we will see restorative justice, or any other form of justice tempered with mercy, from the Australian cricket team, but that lies well outside my capabilities. So far as the amendment is concerned, with a strong endorsement of the principles of restorative justice, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw it.
My Lords, the Minister seemed to suggest that, in any form of restorative justice, a victim might be compelled or forced to engage in the process. I think that is what he said. Can he reassure me that it was not?
I was saying absolutely the opposite and, if it came out wrong, it came out wrong. The whole point of restorative justice is that the offender and the victim have to consent. That is the point which I was making about crimes of sexual violence. The victim there should not feel under any compulsion or pressure to engage in restorative justice if they do not want to. Victim choice and free-will participation is at the heart of restorative justice. I hope that I have made that very clear.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for the warm and encouraging words that we were asking for. Unfortunately, they do not give us any reassurance that there will be a restoration of some sort of national leadership on this issue. As I explained in my brief comments, this is what is missing and why restorative justice is languishing. He said that victims should have access to restorative justice, which is very difficult when only 5% of them are aware of being told about it. There is a major issue of lack of information, lack of understanding and lack of national leadership. This was a small suggestion to put these things right and I very much regret that the Government will not take it on. Having said that, of course I will withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, we support this amendment and every element of what the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said when he was introducing it. It is about criminal sentencing. My noble friend Lord Bach raised the question of a royal commission on the criminal justice system as a whole, and I will be interested to hear the Minister’s response on that.
The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, correctly identified that in this Bill the Opposition have supported some measures that have led to increased sentences. In a sense, the heart of the problem is that the constant inflation of sentences is leading to the overarching problem we have now with overcrowding and squalor in our prisons and a lack of effectiveness in our out-of-court sentences. I understood that to be the main purpose of the royal commission.
I want to give a very simple example of my role as a magistrate sentencing, as I was yesterday, in a magistrates’ court in London. As a magistrate, I have powers to sentence up to six months’ custody for a single offence. When, on occasion, I do that, I simply do not know how long that person will spend in custody. When I first became a magistrate about 14 years ago, I used to say to the offender, “You will spend half your time in custody and then, at the discretion of the prison governor, you will get out”. I do not say that any more because I do not know whether it is true. Sometimes the offender will get out after one-quarter of their sentence, if there are particular reasons and it is a non-violent offence, and sometimes, if they commit relatively less serious offences while they are in prison, they may serve their whole term, so I simply do not say that any more when I am sentencing.
That is a very particular example; there are many examples within sentencing as a whole where any sentencer, including a magistrate, is asked to use fairly obscure phrases which are not simple to understand for the person being sentenced. There is a role for an overall look at this to try to have consistency in sentencing and the words used while sentencing. The noble Lord’s amendment goes further than that as it is looking at community sentences as well. There really is a strong need for an overarching view of criminal sentencing.
My Lords, this amendment, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, would require the Secretary of State to establish a royal commission to review and report on criminal sentencing. The amendment was tabled in Committee and I am glad to have the opportunity to further clarify the Government’s position on this matter.
First, let me pick up the direct question put to me by the noble Lord, Lord Bach, which I think was echoed by my noble friend Lord Cormack and mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede. The 2019 Conservative manifesto did commit, as noted in Committee, to set up a royal commission on the criminal justice system. Work to set up that royal commission was slowed at the onset of the pandemic to focus on the very practical matter of ensuring that the criminal justice system could continue to operate—as it did, thanks to a lot of hard work by staff up and down the country—in a Covid-safe environment. As work on the commission was paused, officials were redeployed to other work and other roles in government.
Significant new programmes of work have now been stood up to support recovery and build back a better criminal justice system. That means that many of the areas the royal commission was due to look at are now being progressed more quickly, for example on efficiency and effectiveness of the system. That includes ensuring that all component parts of the extremely complex system—which we call the criminal justice system but is an amalgam of all sorts of systems—work together to deliver swifter justice for victims. As I said on the last group, on 9 December we announced our consultation on a new victims’ Bill to improve the level of service victims can expect from the criminal justice system. We remain committed to delivering our manifesto commitments. However, we think it is right to continue to pause the work on the royal commission on the criminal justice system while we focus on delivering these priorities over the coming months. We will then revisit what further role there is for the royal commission.
At the same time, let me clarify a point of confusion, which may have been behind the noble Lord’s question— I do not know. To be very clear, the amendment, as drafted, calls for a royal commission on criminal sentencing, not a royal commission on the criminal justice system. For the record and to make it very clear, when my noble and learned friend Lord Stewart of Dirleton previously responded and assured the Committee that a royal commission of this nature was unnecessary, it was the royal commission on criminal sentencing in the amendment that he was referring to. I see the noble Lord nodding and I am grateful; I did not want there to be any confusion on the point.
The sentencing White Paper published last year set out the Government’s proposals for reform to the sentencing and release framework. Work is under way on the non-legislative commitments made there; the legislative measures are being delivered by the Bill. I can assure the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, that we want to adopt a strategic approach here. We believe that the White Paper delivers that, but I am sure that the conversations on these points will continue. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Beith, that the taxpayer’s pound is an important factor here. We want value for money in this and other areas of government. The rationale of the White Paper is to deliver a smarter, more targeted approach to sentencing. The most serious violent and sexual offenders should serve sentences that reflect the severity of their offending behaviour.
I say to the House in general, responding in particular to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, that it is crucial that the Government listen when there are issues on which the public feels strongly, and there are some offences that society finds particularly concerning and, indeed, offensive. At the same time, for lower-level crimes, we are making community sentences more effective, so they can offer an appropriate level of punishment and address the underlying drivers of offending. As part of that—to pick up the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb—we do of course look at the particular issues facing women in prison. We have discussed that on a number of occasions, and I intend no discourtesy by not repeating now what I have said before. We have spoken, and we have focused as a Government, on the needs of women in prison and sentencing women to prison, particularly the primary carers issue, which we have discussed and debated.
My Lords, we support all the amendments in this group. First, I will consider Amendment 104B. As explained by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, this amendment would authorise a special measures direction to enable videorecording of cross-examination of complainants in criminal proceedings for sexual offences or modern slavery offences, in order to enable their evidence to be given remotely.
This is a sensible measure for the protection of witnesses not only from alleged perpetrators but from the trauma of giving evidence in these difficult and painful cases. We have heard many times in debates on this Bill and on the Domestic Abuse Act how painful an ordeal giving evidence is likely to be. In the absence of a special measures direction, complainants who are witnesses have to give evidence before strangers, often in the presence of their assailants or exploiters and often under hostile questioning, to relive some of the most painful experiences of their lives. Nor should we forget how, in these cases, recording the evidence of complainants might well be the very best way of securing truthful and accurate evidence so that courts might be better placed to do justice than if they had to rely on the live oral evidence of very frightened and intimidated witnesses.
We also support Amendment 104C in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, because we have heard that Section 41 applications, if granted, permit the most intrusive and personal questioning of complainants about their previous sexual history. Such questioning might sometimes legitimately be regarded by a court as necessary in the interests of justice, but even when that is the case it nevertheless involves a gross invasion of the privacy, the sense of decency and the perceived rights of the complainant. The noble Lord and the noble Baroness are entirely right to seek the protections for the complainant that the amendment involves: the right to take part in the application or not at her choice, because it is generally a woman’s choice; to be legally represented; and to have a right of appeal against a direction admitting questioning or evidence of previous sexual conduct.
These Section 41 applications and the fear of the questioning they involve have been a reason for the large numbers of sexual offences going unreported or unprosecuted, as complainants are not prepared to go through the hell of facing such cross-examination and they pull out of cases for fear of it. They should be entitled to significant legal protection, just as if they were parties, when such an important issue for their personal integrity is considered by the courts. The protections proposed in the amendment are fully justified.
Finally, we support Amendment 107C on rape and serious sexual offences units—the so-called RASSO units—for the reasons given by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and by my noble friend Lord Paddick. I will try not to repeat the points he made.
Historically, there has been a problem, which we should not seek to deny, in ensuring that police forces treat rape and serious sexual assault with the importance these offences merit. It might be that the situation has improved, and I have no doubt it has. In most forces, victims are treated sympathetically, with tact and care, and derive support from the officers handling their case. However, the public, and women in particular, still lack confidence in the treatment they are likely to and do receive from the police if they are victims of sexual assault. This is one of the factors again driving the low rate of reporting and prosecutions, and the high rate of the withdrawal of complaints. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, gave us the figures, with which we have become familiar.
Specialist units are likely to concentrate expertise and experience of dealing with rape and serious sexual offences in the hands of those who really know about them. This amendment concentrates on the specialist training of the staff in such units. That is critical. Such units have the potential to improve the evidence-gathering process and ultimately, one would hope, the reporting and the prosecutions of offences and the conviction rates, which, as we know, are appallingly low.
All the amendments in this group identify serious issues and propose practical, worthwhile and achievable solutions. In respect of each of them, I suggest it would be helpful for the Government simply to accept them or to come back with alternatives to similar effect at Third Reading.
My Lords, I recognise that behind all these amendments is a dedication to improving the way in which the criminal justice system handles sexual offences cases and supports victims. On both those points, that dedication is shared by the Government. It is absolutely right that we do as much as we can to support all victims, including those of sexual offences, and help bring to justice those guilty of those very serious crimes. I know that there is no disagreement between us on the need to continue to improve the victims’ experience of the criminal justice system, and of the important role that special measures, such as Section 28, can play in supporting victims and witnesses to provide their best evidence.
My Lords, the effect of Amendment 104D would be to increase the maximum sentence for criminal damage with intent to destroy life-saving equipment from 10 years’ imprisonment to life imprisonment. I listened very carefully to the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman of Darlington, and her harrowing accounts of the vandalising of life-saving equipment and the damage and consequences of that. I also listened to the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and it is very clearly necessary that the Government make it clear how they will respond to the issue of vandalising life-saving equipment.
The behaviour comprising the offence is extremely serious because it carries the risk that life will be endangered by the damage caused. However, if I may adopt a slightly lawyerly approach to the amendment, I question whether it is necessary. The scheme of the Criminal Damage Act, as amended, is that under Section 4 an offence of criminal damage generally carries a maximum sentence of 10 years. However, Section 1(2)(b) of that legislation states that where the offence is arson or, as stated, is committed by a person
“intending by the destruction or damage to endanger the life of another or being reckless as to whether the life of another would be thereby endangered”,
the maximum sentence is increased to life imprisonment. That is the combined effect of that subsection and subsection (4).
I understand that the intention of the noble Baroness in moving the amendment on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, would be to cover criminal damage to life-saving equipment with the intention of endangering life. However, given that by Section 1(2)(b) the offence is committed where a person commits criminal damage recklessly as well as intentionally in relation to endangering life—which means where the offender deliberately takes a risk that the damage he causes may endanger the life of another—I cannot at the moment see that such behaviour does not cover intentionally destroying or damaging life-saving equipment without lawful excuse. Nor can I at the moment see how, in the absence of such an intention or recklessness as to life being endangered, a maximum sentence in excess of 10 years would be justified on normal principles.
Consequently, I await hearing from the Minister with interest. He may or may not accept the slightly lawyerly approach that I put, but I hope that he will give some reassurance about how the Government propose to respond to the problem of vandalising life-saving equipment.
My Lords, this amendment was debated just a few weeks ago when the Government set out why we believed it was unnecessary, given the scope of the Criminal Damage Act 1971. I will come back in a moment to what the noble Lord, Lord Marks, called a lawyerly point.
However, it is right first to remind ourselves, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, did, of the very real consequences of this sort of behaviour. On the death of Sam Haycock in Ulley reservoir, can one begin to imagine what his parents Simon and Gaynor went through and are, no doubt, continuing to go through? One only has to say it to try to grasp to enormity of that. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, used the word “harrowing”. That is spot on. This relates to the appalling behaviour of the people vandalise equipment, which results in the requirement of having to make a telephone call to get hold of a life ring, defibrillator or whatever life-saving equipment it happens to be.
I turn to the legal position, as I am afraid we have to, given that we are considering an amendment to a Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, is correct. I explained that it is already an offence intentionally or recklessly to damage or destroy property, including life-saving equipment. Section 1(2) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 makes a specific provision for an aggravated offence of criminal damage where the defendant intends to endanger life or is reckless about such endangerment. To that extent, it goes beyond the scope of the amendment, which relates only to intention and does not include recklessness. As the noble Lord said, that offence already attracts the possibility of life imprisonment.
Of course, I understand that part of the reason why it is proposed to add a specific offence is to put beyond doubt that the law will punish those who damage and destroy vital life-saving equipment, whether they intend to do so or are reckless as to the risk. The concern was raised in Committee that it is not well known that causing damage to life-saving equipment means that Section 1(2) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 could be in play and therefore carry a potential life sentence. However, if the concern is that that is not well known, I would question whether it would make a real difference if this Bill were amended essentially to repeat that point of law. The ordinary citizen, particularly the people who carry out this appalling behaviour, is still as unlikely to understand or perhaps care about the consequences and penalties associated with the crime. Therefore, I suggest that the ultimate problem here is not a question of a gap in legislation or a lacuna in the criminal law but people knowing what the law is and bringing home to people the likely criminal consequences of their actions.
In response to my noble friend Lord Attlee, as I suggested in Committee, if the law is not enough of a deterrent, we must focus on those responsible for water safety, health and safety, and law enforcement to come together to find out what is not working and identify workable solutions that might include sign- posting more clearly on the equipment the consequences of damaging that equipment. That might be a way forward. However, I share with the noble Baroness, Lady Chapmen, that these are abhorrent acts of criminal damage that should be prosecuted. The sentence must fit the crime. There is a potential maximum sentence of life imprisonment.
The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, put the question: why are the Government making destroying statues a criminal offence if destroying life-saving equipment is not a criminal offence? The problem with that question is that destroying life-saving equipment is a criminal offence. So far as statues are concerned, the next instalment is due on Monday, so I will leave the matter for then.
However, so far as today is concerned, while sharing very much the sympathies behind the amendment, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw it.
I am grateful to the Minister for what he had to say and I do understand that creating a new offence or separate provision may not have the desired effect of reducing these horrendous instances. It is right that we want to stop that happening and I welcome his comments about working together, perhaps with local authorities and police forces, to do more creative things to try to prevent this. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I support my noble friend, who is quite right in everything she has said. Sexual abuse and rape can quite often take decades to come to light. The anomaly, which she has outlined very clearly, is within the power of the Government to put right, and I urge the Minister to do so.
My Lords, before I turn to this amendment, I begin with an apology. I made an incorrect statement in an earlier group. On Amendment 104B, I said that in September 2019, we rolled Section 28 out to a further four courts” and then I identified them. I should have said “September 2021”, not “September 2019”. I have already sent a written note to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, correcting the point, but I take this opportunity to correct the record and apologise to the House for that error.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of Cradley, for tabling the amendment, which is aimed at a narrow but important category of cases that remain subject to a highly unusual time limit—we do not usually have time limits in our criminal law—and I thank her for the very useful discussions that we have been able to have on this topic. The amendment affects offences under Section 6 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 of unlawful but consensual sexual intercourse with a girl aged 13 to 15 that were committed before 1 May 2004, when the Sexual Offences Act 2003 came into force and replaced the 1956 Act. It was a requirement under the earlier statute that a prosecution for this under Section 6 had to be commenced within 12 months of the offence. There is no time limit for the offences under the 2003 Act that have been chargeable since 1 May 2004, but when the offence was committed before that date, the 12-month limit for commencing a prosecution continued to apply. That, of course, has long since expired.
As my noble and learned friend Lord Stewart of Dirleton explained in Committee, Parliament usually acts on the principle of non-retroactivity. Although removing the time limit in circumstances where a prosecution was already time-barred would not have amounted to substantive retroactivity in the sense of criminalising conduct that was not previously unlawful, it still would have exposed a person to criminal liability where there had not been any before.
Clearly, we agree with everything that has been said. Rather than repeat it all, I will just compliment the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, on her amendment. We will listen carefully to what the Minister has to say.
My Lords, having begun my response to the previous group with an apology for getting a date wrong, I then went on to get another date wrong. The case of Antia is, for those noble Lords keen to read it, 2020 and not 2000. The rest of the legal analysis, I hope, remains unchanged. I will seek to avoid any reference to dates in what I am about to say.
This amendment would restrict the Ministry of Justice to appointing in our courts and tribunals only interpreters who are registered on the National Register of Public Service Interpreters and who possess a level 6 diploma in public service interpreting or comply with the national register’s rare language status protocols. I place on record at the outset my thanks to the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Hogan-Howe, and others for their time engaging with me.
This is a very important issue. The noble Lord, Lord Berkeley of Knighton, noted that it goes to compassion, which is correct. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, said, it also goes to the heart of the justice process. Anyone who has done a case with interpreters knows how important their role is. Indeed, I remember one case where, when the witness answered a question of mine, it was interpreted through a language I knew, and I knew that it had been interpreted wrongly. The judge also picked up that the interpretation was wrong and the witness himself criticised the interpretation, thus illustrating that the presence of the interpreter was unnecessary, and they were dispensed with.
We currently commission the service of interpreters for our courts and tribunals through our contracted service providers, thebigword and Clarion interpreting. The contract has a clearly defined list of qualifications, skills, experience and vetting requirements interpreters must meet, which have been designed to meet the particular needs of the justice system. The highest complexity level has qualification criteria comparable to those set by the NRPSI. They are sourced from the MoJ register, which is audited by an independent language service provider, The Language Shop. All interpreters must have 100 hours of experience and complete a justice system-specific training course before they can join the register.
As the noble Baroness said, the overall failure rate of all quality assurance assessments remains low, at 5%. We believe that illustrates the effectiveness of the auditing measures. Complaints about quality are also carefully monitored and independently assessed by The Language Shop. The complaint rate remains low, at less than 1%.
I am confident that there are no systemic quality issues with the current arrangements. None the less, I discussed this in some detail with the noble Baroness and others and we want to improve the quality of the service we provide, if that is possible, right across the justice system. That is why I am commissioning a full independent review of our existing qualifications and standards and the requirements for each type of assignment our contract covers. There are over 1,000 of these—I do not have a list to hand. This will also consider experience levels and rare language requirements. The review will be completed in time to inform the retendering of our contracts in 2023. It will establish a detailed framework of the standards and qualifications required for all assignments covered by the contracts, with clear explanations and justifications for each. The aim is to ensure that our contracts continue to meet the demands of all our court users.
We will continue to consult external stakeholders, including the NRPSI—its input is highly valued. We will learn from other schemes, including the police-approved interpreter and translation scheme, which adopts a level 6 diploma in public service interpreting as a minimum qualification standard, but with safeguards to allow for exceptions as needed to ensure timeliness in progressing a case.
We understand that there are issues about the availability of NRPSI-registered interpreters in some parts of the country—40% of them are based in London. Under our current arrangements, we can control and direct recruitment for our register based on geographical and language needs. This is tied in to the supplier’s obligation to fulfil bookings and ensures that we can dictate recruitment trends to meet our requirements.
I cannot say at this stage whether the police-approved interpreter and translation scheme would be suitable for the Ministry of Justice. We are concerned not to have a one-size-fits-all approach; even within a court setting, interpreting in a criminal court is quite different from interpreting, for example, in the family jurisdiction. It is not only court settings; there is telephone interpreting for court custody officers, and service centres require interpreting assistance to support court users paying fines or responding to general inquiries. However, we will look at the outcome of the review. All the options we consider will need to be fully costed in accordance with government policy for large government procurements to ensure value for money for the taxpayer.
The review will be undertaken. We have already started some work; we want to establish the most appropriate and cost-effective solution, one which meets the current and future needs of the justice system and promotes the continued development and progression of new entrants into the interpreting profession. With renewed thanks to the noble Baroness for her time and the discussions we have had, including on the option of a full independent review, which I hope I have set out clearly, I respectfully urge her to withdraw the amendment.
I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. I especially offer my thanks to the Minister and warmly welcome his decision to commission a full independent inquiry into the qualifications, experience and overall standards of all the different types of interpreters for court work. I look forward to seeing the terms of reference, the timetable and other details of this inquiry. I feel optimistic that professional bodies in the field will also feel encouraged by this development and welcome the decision. With that in mind, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for giving those very good and relevant examples of abuses of trust in dance, music and drama. I remember the points that the Minister made when we had this debate in Committee: he did indeed ask for examples, and I thank the noble Lord for providing them.
Surely, the similarity in everything that we are talking about is the nature of the relationship. It is a trusting relationship where a lot of time may well be spent alone with the young person, and it is open to abuse. The Minister had other arguments about why dance, music and drama should not be included, and I would be interested to hear how he rehearses them, given that there is unanimity in the views expressed in today’s debate. I do not know whether the noble Lord will press his amendment to a vote—I think probably not—nevertheless, I will listen to the Minister’s answer.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Beith, for again raising this matter for debate. I am also grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, who is not in her place but who gave up a lot of time last week to discuss this with me and the noble Lord.
I start by clarifying what we mean by a “position of trust” in this context—there may have been some confusion in Committee. The position of trust offences that we are discussing are set out in Sections 16 to 19 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. They are necessarily narrow in scope and were never intended to apply in all scenarios in which a person might have contact with, authority over or a supervisory role over another person, even those aged under 18. Rather, these offences were created to tackle potentially abusive relationships between those under 18 and adults who were in specific positions of trust.
The existing positions of trust, as set out in Section 21 of the 2003 Act, were so drafted in an attempt to capture situations where the young person had a high level of dependency on the adult involved, often combined with some vulnerability. These included those caring for a young person in a residential care home, hospital, school or educational institution. In these contexts, the power dynamic is such that Parliament considered that any sexual activity should be criminalised.
The law was created, therefore, in recognition of the risk inherent in these types of position and the power the individual could have over the young person, which could impact on and affect the young person’s ability to consent. As such, the offences are committed as soon as the adult in one of these specified positions engages in sexual activity with the young person they are caring for; there is no need to prove any abuse or actual manipulation.
To clarify, is the noble Lord saying that when the department looked into this matter it discovered more evidence in respect of sport and religion than in other fields, or some specific evidence that made it clear that this was much more likely to occur in sport or religion?
As I say, we discussed this with a wide range of people, and it seemed to us from looking at all the material that sport and religion are the particular areas where law at the moment should intervene. I was coming to this point. The noble Lord presented the amendment saying, “Abuse can take place in other relationships too”, and of course he is absolutely right. However, abuse can take place where there is no relationship at all, and I am afraid it can take place in lots of different relationships. The question here is when the law should intervene to prohibit automatically, regardless of the particular 17 or 19 year-old and whether any abuse is taking place, to prevent any sexual contact. For those reasons, we consider that at the moment, we should intervene—I will come to the delegated power—in sport and religion only. Those settings involve high levels of trust, influence, community recognition, power and authority, and these figures are often well-established, trusted and respected in the community.
The report of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse found that religious organisations
“may have a significant or even dominant influence on the lives of millions of children”
and that
“what marks religious organisations out from other institutions is the explicit purpose they have in teaching right from wrong.”
Also, both sport and religion can provide a young person with a strong sense of belonging, whether in a team, a squad, a community or a faith. Such deep feelings held by the young can provide unique opportunities for predators to exploit or manipulate and can make it more difficult for the young person or concerned relatives to report abuse.
With respect to sport specifically, the physical nature of the activities means that coaches often ostensibly have legitimate reason physically to touch the children and young persons they are coaching. A sports coach will often have opportunities for closer and more prolonged physical contact compared with other roles, and this can be manipulated by abusers. That is why, to respond to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, the 18 and a half year-old tennis coach would be prohibited from having a relationship with a 17 and a half year-old tennis student, but the 18 and a half year-old chess coach could have such a relationship —assuming for these purposes that chess is not a sport; I do not need to decide that because it is a physical definition that is in the Act—because there is not that scope, ostensibly, for a physical relationship.
The noble Lord’s amendment addresses dance specifically. Again, let me reassure him that the definition of “sport” in Clause 46 includes types of physical recreation engaged in
“for purposes of competition or display”.
We consider that this includes dance.
On the delegated power for the Secretary of State to amend new Section 22A, we accept that new evidence may emerge that may justify legislating further. Let me reassure the House and put it on record that this power will not be used lightly, but nor will we wait until instances of abuse are brought to our attention. We will proactively monitor data on child sexual abuse to ensure that we have the evidence needed to inform policy and act decisively where required, including evidence relating to the nature of roles and the institutional or organisational context, the level of power and control, other factors which we have seen contribute to abuse including opportunities for extensive unsupervised contact, and any inherent risks posed to young people as well as any data on incidents of concern. We are establishing channels through which partners such as the police, the CPS and local authorities can share emerging evidence and highlight patterns of behaviour.
Some of the behaviour that has been mentioned this evening and in Committee is already covered under other offences within the Sexual Offences Act 2003. Let us be clear: sexual activity with someone under the age of 16 is a crime. Non-consensual sexual activity such as rape is obviously a crime. I certainly heard the word “rape” in at least one example mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. We are not talking about that—that is the point—because rape is already a crime. We are talking about sexual activity which would otherwise be lawful and consensual. I did not quite catch all the examples, but one cited was from a newspaper in Scotland where somebody had done something. How old was the person? If they were under 16, it is already caught. Was there consent? If there was not, it is already caught. One has to be careful when one is talking about evidence. We will be proactive in looking for that evidence and, for the avoidance of any doubt, we will of course re-read the examples that he gave us.
I accept that Clause 46 does not represent everybody’s preferred approach, but we believe that, on the material that we have at the moment, our approach strikes the appropriate balance between the protection of young people and the sexual freedoms and rights otherwise granted to 16 and 17 year-olds, while still allowing for rapid responses to emerging patterns of abuse in the future. For those reasons, I respectfully invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.
Before the Minister sits down, can he clarify two points? First, is he saying that those people who teach drama, music and dance should be allowed to exploit their positions up until the point that they rape or indecently assault somebody, or does he agree with my noble friend that action should be taken to prevent that in the first place? Secondly, what is to stop a teacher of a young person who wants to engage in sexual activity with them distancing themselves from their teaching role to enable that to take place? How on earth does this amendment change the age of consent?
I am struggling with that second point, but let me try to answer the first. On whether I am saying that anybody should be allowed to exploit a young person, the answer is no. Frankly, I do not understand how the noble Lord has reached that conclusion. There is nothing in the provisions about justifying exploitation or abuse up to the point of rape and assault. Maybe this is the confusion that he is under in relation to the second question. At the moment, if someone is caught in a position of trust—let us say, for example, a minister of religion who is 18 and a half—that person is prevented from having any sexual contact with, say, a 17 and a half year-old congregant. Before that person was ordained or appointed to the position as a minister of religion, that person could have had a sexual relationship with a 17 and a half year-old. That is why I am talking about changing the age of consent, because that 17 and a half year-old is able to sleep with an 18 and a half year-old but not if that 18 and a half year-old is, for example, her minister of religion. I hope that answers the noble Lord’s second question, although I confess I did not quite understand it because, if I may say so, it seemed to proceed from a fundamental misapprehension of what we are talking about.
My Lords, one thing I want to say in response to the Minister is that, as I said earlier, there are many thousands of people engaged in the training of young people in many contexts, but particularly in some of these fields very close contact and continuous interchange is involved, including activities in which the contact is physical. That applies not just to sport but to teaching someone how to hold their violin and their violin bow; it applies to all sorts of activities. There are spheres too in which the relationship is affected by the authority of the training person, the desire to please that person and to be successful in the activity. The more the Minister described those activities, the more it seemed that what he described happens not just in sport and religion but in many other areas as well.
It is important that we remind society that vast numbers of people are engaged in this kind of training work entirely selflessly and giving great service to young people. They are people we recognise and support. A very small number of people do everybody else so much damage by the kind of abuse referred to in the course of the debate. Unfortunately, we still have to deal with it, which means we have to talk about it, debate it and devise laws that work for that purpose.
I would much have preferred to see a wider clause that used the concept of a position of trust in a series of places in which it is clearly relevant. The Government have preferred to retain power by statutory instrument to make extensions to the list, and the Minister, in response to my request, tried to give a bit more indication of the sort of circumstances involved. He has said that they are not just waiting for cases; they will look to the views and experience of organisations in the field. That could usefully be done. If organisations in any of the fields I have talked about respond to the Government by saying, “Yes, it would help us in our disciplinary and regulatory arrangements if this power was extended”, then I hope that is the kind of information that might lead Ministers to come before the House to make use of those powers. I certainly do not want them to be waiting for cases. I am serious in my concern that some cases will arise where abuse has taken place that otherwise falls within the definitions in this clause but where the position of trust appellation has not been applied because it is in one of the other groups—it is not sport or religion.
This is a serious problem that undermines the wonderful work that so many people do with young people, and the wonderful achievements of those young people in sport, drama, music and the arts. We have to keep it under continuous review but, at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, in moving government Amendment 107A, I first thank sincerely all those in both Houses who have campaigned on this important issue, particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, and all those who spoke in the debate in Committee in this House. I know that she wanted to be here this evening, but I am afraid the hour has prevented her doing so. It is right to put on record my thanks for the tireless work she has done in this area, and for the time she gave on a number of occasions to discuss this issue with me. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has also been extremely helpful on this point, and I thank them for joining me in putting their names to the amendment.
I made it clear in Committee that the Government supported the aims of the original amendment put down by the noble Baroness but considered that it was too broadly drawn and would capture conduct that ought not to be criminalised. In particular, I explained in a series of to-and-fro discussions with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that the issue of intention needed to be more carefully addressed.
We wholeheartedly welcome this, and we welcome how the Minister can laugh at himself and bring good humour to this. I think it is okay to have a sense of humour about this issue; what matters is that we are finally dealing with it. This really is important. Encouragingly, breastfeeding rates are improving in this country; over 80% of women start to breastfeed their baby when they are born, but the rates fall quite dramatically, with around 25% continuing at six weeks. There are lots of reasons for that, but one of them is about feeling uncomfortable breastfeeding in public. We should be doing everything we can to normalise breastfeeding and make breastfeeding mothers feel welcome and supported, wherever and however they choose to feed their babies.
There are two amendments in this grouping: one is the government amendment, which we completely support, and there is also the issue about needing to show intent for sexual gratification or humiliation. It was thoughtful of the Government to include that word, and I just want assurance that the perception of humiliation that ought to matter is that of the woman breastfeeding and being photographed. That ought to be sufficient to prove that there was an intent to humiliate. I would welcome some clarification from the Minister on that point.
We warmly welcome this measure. Breastfeeding women will be very pleased that the Government have come to a place where they see things in the way that they do.
My Lords, I am very grateful for the warm words from across the House and for the support this amendment has received. I will pick up a couple of the points made. First, I respectfully agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, that we want to normalise and support—to use her verbs—women who are breastfeeding; that is very important. It is a matter for my department in this legislation and for other government departments in other areas. That is certainly our aim.
I will try to answer the question put by my noble friend Lord Blencathra. This amendment is modelled on the upskirting offence in the Voyeurism (Offences) Act 2019. We want—without getting myself on “Have I Got News for You” for a second time—to avoid capturing people within the offence who ought not to be captured. Let me try to give a different example. The point made by my noble friend was about forgetting intention and purpose. The problem there, for example, could be that if you were running CCTV in a children’s play area and a mother was breastfeeding, you would be taking images of her; you would not have her consent, nor any reasonable basis to think that she was consenting to being filmed. Therefore, you could be committing a criminal offence. That is why here, just like the upskirting offence, there has to be a purpose of sexual gratification or humiliating, alarming or distressing the person photographed.
The noble Baroness asked me about “humiliating”. I again thank her for spotting that word, which comes from the other Act. It is a really important word. I will put it this way: the fact that the person subjectively feels humiliated does not necessarily mean that it is done for the purpose of humiliation. There is not a one-for-one correlation. However, any court will have to ask the question: was this for the purpose of humiliation? That is a question for the court to decide. You look at the circumstances objectively. The fact that the person feels very humiliated is a very important part of answering that question. But I cannot go so far as to say that the subjective feeling of humiliation necessarily answers the legal question. I hope that has answered the noble Baroness’s question. This is an issue that arises in other areas of criminal law as well. Without delaying the House, I hope that that is a sufficient answer for this evening. I am very happy to engage with the noble Baroness further on this.
I appreciate that and understand what the Minister is saying. Is he saying that, if it could be reasonably expected that a breastfeeding woman would feel humiliated in the particular circumstances, that would be interpreted as humiliation? On the point about the CCTV, I think most breastfeeding women would not feel humiliated in that circumstance.
The question which has to be asked is: was this done for the purpose of humiliating the woman breastfeeding? To answer that you would look at all the relevant circumstances. I would suspect that, rather like the upskirting offence, in the vast majority of cases the question almost answers itself, given our experience from upskirting.
In this area, as in all areas, if, once the offence has gone into the law, it turns out that there is a problem in prosecuting—for this reason or any other—we will keep it under review, because our intention is to stop the conduct, to make it criminal and thereby punish people who engage in it—but, I hope, to stop it. If there are problems, we will keep it under review, and I am very happy to continue the conversation on that. I will draw my remarks to a close and invite the House to support the amendment.
My Lords, this government amendment meets a commitment to bring forward proposals on Report to address concerns that the time limit for bringing prosecutions for common assault or battery involving domestic abuse is unfairly short. I am very grateful that, joining my name on this amendment are the names of the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and the noble Baroness, Lady Greengross.
In response to the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lady Newlove in Committee, we acknowledged that such cases are disproportionately likely to time out. I am pleased now to present our solution to this problem—in the form of government Amendment 107B —to the House.
My Lords, I was sitting in the City of Westminster magistrates’ court yesterday with our Bench chairman, Jane Smith, who was aware of this government concession. We had a very constructive discussion about how welcome it was. In Westminster magistrates’ court we have a specialist DA court, which is not that common among magistrates’ courts. While the noble Lord, Lord Russell, described the problem cleverly—in the best sense; I mean that as I say it—as being hidden in plain sight, it is a problem that we see regularly in that court. It shows that when the Government listen and move quickly, that does get wider recognition. This was certainly recognised and appreciated by my Bench chairman.
My Lords, I am very grateful for the support that the amendment has received across the House. This ought to be a cross-party issue and I am very pleased that it has been. I repeat my thanks to all those who worked with me and my ministerial colleagues to get this amendment before the House this evening. As it is a cross-party matter, it is quite right for me also to thank Yvette Cooper in the other place, who did a lot of work on this issue. Sometimes parties do not matter; it is about the work that we do. I thank her for getting the ball rolling on this very important issue.
We will keep the matter under review, as we do with all legislation, and certainly for something such as this. Again, I do not want to take the House’s time, although this is an important topic. I instead invite the House to join me in supporting the amendment.
(2 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, as a victim of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill, I have to say that dealing with this Statement at this time on this day is not delivering justice to victims.
Seriously, though, I should declare an interest as a victim of two crimes in recent years. One was a homophobic hate crime that my Norwegian husband was a witness to. He said to me afterwards that he would never again be involved in the British criminal justice system as a result of his experience in court, where he felt that he was on trial. The other was a burglary where the perpetrator was caught on closed-circuit television but the police refused to investigate further. In a subsequent meeting with a police super- intendent, he admitted that many cases that were solvable were not being pursued because of a lack of police resources. Is it any wonder, as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, said, that three in five victims do not report crimes, and that one-third would not report them again having experienced the criminal justice system? It seems that my husband and I are not alone.
The Government say that they have strengthened the victims’ code. What improvements have there been as a result? More money has been invested, according to the Statement, but what impact has this had on victim satisfaction? We should be looking for outcomes, not outputs.
The Statement says that it wants victims to
“properly engage at every step.”
Research shows that restorative justice significantly increases victim engagement and satisfaction. What plans do the Government have to fund more restorative justice programmes?
The Statement says that the victim will be consulted before charging decisions are made
“in certain types of case”.
Can the Minister explain what types of case are being referred to?
The Statement says that the Government
“will increase transparency in respect of the performance of our criminal justice agencies.”
What will the Government do when they discover that the reason for poor performance throughout the whole criminal justice system—from the police to the CPS, legal aid and the courts—is that it is underfunded? It is all very well to
“enshrine the victims’ code in law”,—[Official Report, Commons, 9/12/21; cols. 595-6.]
but if the criminal justice system does not have the resources to fulfil its obligations under the victims’ code, how will making it a statutory responsibility help?
The Statement says that the Government will publish a report on progress against the rape review action plan. Research clearly shows that victim satisfaction is the most important outcome measure in rape cases; being believed and cared for are the most important elements of rape survivor satisfaction. Does the report detail changes in victim satisfaction? If not, why not?
The Government are long on words and short on delivery. Trust and confidence in the criminal justice system have declined in the decade or more that the Conservatives have been in power. I can understand that the Government welcome the fact that the police cannot investigate some crimes, despite overwhelming evidence, when it is the Government who stand accused, but for the rest of us, if we cannot trust the police, the CPS and the courts to protect us when we are victims of crime, we are in serious trouble. You cannot get a quart out of a pint pot, which is what the Government appear to be trying to do with these measures.
Finally, I am reminded of colleagues who, when the Government do something we agree with, then go on to question the Government’s motives. I do not know whether the Minister celebrates Christmas, but I hope he enjoys the break, whatever the motivation for having one.
To pick up on that last point first, I take this opportunity to wish everybody—both those who celebrate Christmas and those who do not—a very happy time and a very successful 2022. I think we are all entitled to celebrate the fact that we have achieved at least three days on the police Bill on Report, and we have more to look forward to next year.
I come back to the matter of victims. Despite the fact that it is the last piece of business for this year, it is a very important topic. I am grateful that the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, broadly welcomed the legislation. I think it is fair to say that this is a matter where there is broad agreement across the House on the aims—although, of course, there will be political differences, perhaps as to the way we go about it. We will have an eight-week consultation on the matter, and we will prioritise work on that and introduce the Bill, as the Deputy Prime Minister said in the other place, as soon as possible. We want to ensure that there is wide engagement both across this House and in the other place as we develop the Bill next year.
So far as victim attrition is concerned—I must say, I do not like using that phrase, although it is the phrase that is used; we all use it but there is a real person, so to speak, behind all these statistics—the quicker we get cases to court, the less attrition there will be. That must be balanced with making sure that cases are investigated properly and that the defendant has a fair trial. In the area of rape, for example, we have introduced measures to speed up the extraction of data from mobile phones and make sure that the phone gets back to the victim. In particular, we have found that support from ISVAs—independent sexual violence advisers, whom we also have in domestic violence cases—really makes a difference. We are providing more than £150 million in this financial year for victim and witness support services, which we will increase to £185 million by 2024-25. The figures show that there is a significant benefit in reducing victim attrition for those victims who have contact with ISVAs.
The backlog in criminal trials is obviously a matter that we have debated on a number of occasions. It is fair to say that the pandemic has had a real impact in this jurisdiction. Although we were one of the first jurisdictions to restore jury trials, there were times when we could not hold them, and then we could not hold jury trials with multiple defendants because of space issues. In the Judicial Review and Courts Bill, which the House will consider next year, Clause 11, I think, provides that more work will be put into magistrates’ courts so that Crown Courts are freed up for more jury trials. However, we want to be transparent about this. As the Deputy Prime Minister has explained, we are publishing our rape scorecards, which will provide a tracking basis so that we can see how the system is doing, particularly in rape cases. I know that that is a particular focus of the Deputy Prime Minister.
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, that the victim must be at the heart of the criminal justice system. Too often, there has been seen to be a dissonance, or an inconsistency, with putting the victim at the heart of the system while ensuring that the defendant has a fair trial. In fact, there is no contradiction. You can do both; indeed, we must do both. That is something we are very focused on.
Turning to some of the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick—as he said, he has personal experience in this area, if I can put it that way—giving evidence is always traumatic. We recognise that it is particularly traumatic in cases that deal with sexual or other violence or coercive control. As the noble Lord will know, we have introduced Section 28 and are rolling it out so that it is more widely available. At the end of the day, judges, not Ministers, run trials so it is a matter for judges to decide whether and how Section 28 is deployed in a particular case, but our aim is to make it available across the criminal justice system for those cases where it is suitable.
I agree with the noble Lord that we must focus on outcomes. I have already mentioned rape scorecards. He also mentioned restorative justice. I am pleased that he did because, as I am sure he knows, there is very good evidence to show that there can be benefits for victims and a reduction in reoffending where restorative justice is used properly. It really is a win-win. The victim wins, society wins and, of course, the offender wins because they do not reoffend. The code makes it clear that victims can ask to take part in restorative justice at a time that is right for them. Both the victim and the offender have to agree, of course. The welfare of the victim is paramount so there will be cases where it is unsuitable, but there are lots of cases where it is very suitable. We are providing grant funding to police and crime commissioners to provide victim support services; that includes restorative justice. In the last financial year, 2020-21, they spent around £3.7 million of the funding on restorative justice services; around 5,500 victims engaged with those services in that year. We will bolster support by increasing funding for support services, as I said earlier.
The noble Lord asked in what types of cases it would be appropriate to consult a victim. That is one of the things we are going to consult on because, as he will recognise, it will not be all cases, but there will be many where it will be appropriate. Finally, on resources put into the criminal justice system, I do not want to have a statistics battle across the Dispatch Box, especially since this is the last business of the year. However, I will say that we are putting in £477 million as part of the spending review into the criminal justice system over the next three years, to help reduce the backlog and to provide swifter access to justice, which victims deserve. I think it is generally recognised that the most recent spending review has significantly increased the budget of the Ministry of Justice, and that this will be to the benefit of the criminal justice system.
I also say, finally, that we have published the CLAR report on criminal legal aid, authored by Sir Christopher Bellamy. We are very much looking forward to engaging with the profession, and indeed all stakeholders, about criminal legal aid, which is itself such an important part of the criminal justice system.
My Lords, like the two Front-Bench questioners, I want to look at the issue of delays in courts and its impact on victims. There are two angles to that. First, some figures I have seen indicate that about a quarter of victims are withdrawing from investigations and prosecutions, a figure that rises to 42% for rape allegations. Does the Minister recognise those figures? Are the Government doing anything specifically to ensure that support is provided for people in that situation? If they have stepped away from the legal process, what support is available to them? As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, indicated, it is clear that the impact is likely to continue for very many years after the court process has been dropped.
Secondly, picking up the Minister’s point about the money from the spending review, I mention the article published this afternoon on the east of England BBC website that quoted Stephen Halloran of Lawtons Solicitors referring specifically to that extra funding. Mr Halloran estimates that, on current figures, the Crown Court backlog will reduce by only about 7,000 cases over the next three years. He indicated that his firm is already seeing cases listed in the Crown Courts well into 2023, and that he expects to see cases listed for 2024 very soon. Does the Minister agree that it is clear that the money and the resources are just not enough to give victims justice? I am sure he does not.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness. This is an area, again, where we share the same aims. I do not recognise the precise statistics she mentioned, although I am not sure I was able to note them down quickly enough. I can say that the percentage of investigations closed because the victim does not support further police action is now at roughly 60%. That is a continuation of a longer-term trend.
The effect of the pandemic, which I am afraid has increased the delay in cases coming to trial, is probably part of the reason why more victims may have been withdrawing from the process. One brighter point in the statistics is that it seems there are more victims coming forward. There has been an increase in the number of recorded adult rape offences since 2019 and, indeed, since the first quarter of this year. The noble Baroness will understand what I am saying: I am not saying it is good that there has been an increase in rapes—of course I am not. The point is that it is good that victims feel able to come forward when there has been a crime. What we are very concerned about is victims suffering a crime who then do not feel able to come forward. So, somewhat counterintuitively, that is actually a brighter spot in the statistics—but there is plainly work to be done, and I hope I have been very candid about that.
On the backlog, in addition to what I said earlier, we have to be a little careful with statistics. For example, there are cases when a trial date will be given some time in the future, maybe even in 2023, because trial B may be a follow-on trial from trial A, and it cannot be listed until trial A has concluded. I am not suggesting that all cases fall into that category—I am saying only that we have to be a little careful with looking at the mere listing of a trial as necessarily an indication that the system could not accommodate that trial earlier. Sometimes that might be the case, but sometimes it will not. There are also issues of counsel availability, and some courts have a practice of giving two dates for a trial: an earlier date, which may not take place, and then a hard later date.
I accept that we certainly want to bring on rape trials, and indeed all trials, more quickly than happens at the moment. However, it is not just the time from first court appearance to trial that is important—we must also look at the time from reporting the offence to charge and then from charge to first appearance in court. The time when a victim feels most vulnerable and lost in the system is when the victim does not even know when there is going to be a charge. Focusing on that initial period from when the victim goes into the police station to when a charge is brought is also a very important element of the system.
I beg to move that the House do now adjourn—and I wish you all a very happy Christmas.
(2 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberForgive me, my Lords, but I understood that it was five minutes for each Front Bench and then 10 minutes for the Minister to respond to our questions. Hopefully, with the leave of the House, we will give the Minister appropriate time to respond despite the Labour Front Bench.
Like the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, we believe that the White Paper is disappointing. The Statement gets off on the wrong foot as far as we on these Benches are concerned. It says:
“Prisons play a vital role in protecting the public by keeping the most prolific and dangerous offenders in custody”—
although, as we see from the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill, even peaceful protesters are going to be subject to custodial sentences—
“and rehabilitating those who deserve a second chance.”
Can the Minister explain which prisoners do not deserve a second chance? On what criteria are the Government going to decide who does and does not deserve one?
The Statement says that the Ministry of Justice has secured enough money in the spending review to build an additional 20,000 prison places by the 2020s. The Nationality and Borders Bill intends to criminalise asylum seekers entering the country through irregular routes, with a maximum penalty of four years’ imprisonment —again, not
“the most prolific and dangerous offenders”,
but on current numbers every one of those 20,000 new prison places is likely to be filled by asylum seekers.
When I was a police commander in charge of Brixton, the governor of Brixton Prison told me that illegal drugs were more freely available inside his prison than they were outside on the streets. I am pleased to see that action is being taken to deal with that, but why has it taken over 10 years for this Government to act?
It is also welcome that the Government are going to treat illegal drugs as a health issue, but the probation service has very little financial leverage to secure support to ensure that drug treatment programmes started in prison continue through the gate when a prisoner is released. It is one thing to live without drugs when you are in prison with regular drug testing, but quite another to release prisoners back into the same environment that they came from on release and expect them to continue. What additional resources are being provided for drug rehabilitation and support outside prison specifically for ex-prisoners? Can the Minister specify how much per prisoner compared with 10 years ago, adjusting for inflation and taking into account the increase in prisoner numbers? I am reminded of shops that double the price of things for 12 weeks and then advertise them at 50% off, except that the Government make drastic cuts, put half back and then claim credit for what is in fact a reduction.
There is an increasing prison population compared with proportionately declining staff numbers. Where is the budget to recruit and retain prison officers and the other staff who will be needed to carry out the numeracy and literacy assessments and to deliver the training? I understand that the increase in prison officers outlined in the Statement is to cope with the expansion plans, but who will deliver these enhanced education and skills plans and who will backfill when staff are being “upskilled”?
What pay rises are factored in for prison officers to ensure retention, set against a record increase in inflation not seen for a decade and an increasingly difficult working environment? Wandsworth Prison today has 68 prison officers looking after 1,300 prisoners. Officers are leaving because of poor pay, and applications from new recruits are down 44% because the Prison Service cannot compete with other sectors. How can rehabilitation be delivered in Wandsworth Prison today in such circumstances?
Any measures to find ex-prisoners employment are to be welcomed, but is the limiting factor not that employers will not take them on? A
“new digital tool to match candidates to jobs”
will not help if there are no jobs to match the ever-increasing number of prisoners to. What incentive or encouragement is being provided to employers to employ former prisoners—or at least those prisoners that the Government deem lucky enough to be given a second chance?
Can the Minister explain the “new community accommodation service”? What additional funding or other incentive will local authorities and housing associations be given to provide accommodation and to what extent does this compensate for the devastating cuts to local authority budgets in recent years?
This White Paper appears to shift the balance further towards retribution and away from rehabilitation, with the only realistic, properly thought-through and funded proposals being to build and staff yet more prison places —plans one would expect from a right-wing, authoritarian Government.
My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions. I will respond to as many of the points as I can in the time I have and will reply in writing on anything I cannot deal with orally.
The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, started off by criticising the fact that we are asking questions, but that is a poor place to start. I do not apologise for asking questions and seeking consultation. We published a prison safety and reform White Paper in 2016 and this White Paper builds on that. We are keen to learn. There are new things and new money in this White Paper, which I will come to, and we make no apologies for asking people for their views.
On staffing, which I agree is of absolute importance, since the end of October 2016, we have recruited a net increase of over 4,000 staff. In 2020, we accepted all bar one of the review body’s recommendations on pay and, as we announced in October this year, we accepted all of the PSPRB’s recommendations relating to the 2021 pay award. To retain staff in the sites hardest to recruit for, prison officers in the 31 hardest to recruit for sites receive an additional payment of between £3,000 and £5,000.
I think everybody around the Chamber understands the importance of education in prison. I acknowledge, as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, did, the work done by the former Lord Chancellor, Robert Buckland, in this area. Throughout the pandemic, we have kept education running. The Prisoners’ Education Trust called for major investment in digital technologies in prison. We are developing the digital infrastructure and have reintroduced classroom teaching in prisons in line with government advice on Covid. We absolutely acknowledge that improvements have to be made in prisoner education. The pandemic has obviously not helped in that regard, but we are focused on this and have put new money into it as well.
On employment, which is absolutely key, there are over 1 million vacancies in the UK at the moment. Employers must look to wider talent pools to fill them and the New Futures Network, which is the Prison Service’s network of employment brokers, now works with over 400 organisations to place prisoners in employment. The Government lead by example: we will hire over 1,000 prison leavers into the Civil Service by the end of 2023 and, as the noble Lord will be aware, in the PCSC Bill, we are focusing on the rehabilitation regime, which is also important for people to obtain employment.
On the specific question about virtual visits, I can confirm that we are committed to continuing to offer secure social video calling beyond the Covid restrictions. We are looking at future options in line with the recommendations of my noble friend Lord Farmer’s review on maintaining family ties, but the current position is that there are no charges for secure social video calls.
We will come back to the issue of potting in the new year—I look behind me to see whether my noble friend Lord Attlee is here—so that is a joy which awaits us early in 2022. If I may, I will deal with that at that time.
Autonomy and flexibility for governors are important and we will discuss with them the appropriate KPIs in this context. However, ultimately, the buck always stops with Ministers.
I turn briefly—I am conscious of the time—to the points from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. He asked, “Who deserves a second chance?” The short answer is everybody, perhaps with the exception of those who have a whole life order, because that means, essentially, that you are there for life. We can have an interesting debate about whether that means you deserve a second chance, but the nature of that sentence is obviously somewhat different. I agree about the importance of education. Some prisoners may deserve to have the book thrown at them, but all prisoners deserve to have books thrown to them. We think that prison education is very important. As to asylum seekers, can we pick that up when we debate the Nationality and Borders Bill next year?
Regarding drugs, I am grateful that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, welcomes our strategy. He asked why it has taken so long. As it is the festive season, could I invite him to concentrate not so much on the ghost of Christmas past but to join us in looking to the ghost of Christmas future? We are putting new money in here. We have a £785 million package for treatment and delivery, and we are now investing £120 million of new money over the next three years for drug treatment in prisons. As far as drug treatment out of prisons is concerned, which the noble Lord rightly focused on as well, we are rolling out £80 million of drug treatment funding with the Department of Health and Social Care to ensure that prison leavers get the support they need. I think I have dealt with his points on prison officer retention and pay.
On the community service accommodation point, the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities announced this scheme on 28 July 2021. It is a pathway for prison leavers to give them a route from prison to their own private rented sector accommodation. Local authorities will be providing monitoring information to that department alongside wider monitoring information on homelessness and rough sleeping. Overall, we have allocated £13 million to 87 schemes across 145 local authorities. If there is anything more that I can say on that, perhaps I can drop the noble Lord a line. I have an eye on the Clock and am conscious that others will want to get in, so I hope the House will forgive me if I pause there.
My Lords, the roots of the issues we are talking about go back a long way and it is fair to accept that they go back to well before the present Government. The prison population has trebled in the last 50 years and it has done so under Governments and the leadership of all parties. Indeed, the Labour Government of which I was a member was not progressive on these issues at all; the prison population rose significantly, prison regimes did not improve notably, and the average length of sentences increased.
If we are standing back from this White Paper, which is now in a line of government policy statements going back to the 1980s, it is fair to ask whether we should be looking at more fundamental reforms and learning from the practice of other countries. What is undeniably true is that, as a proportion of our population, we imprison significantly more—we are a significant outlier—than almost any country in Europe. When I last checked the statistics, I think only Portugal had a higher proportion; I am not sure why it is an outlier. We are well above the average for mainstream European countries, none of which appears to have a bigger problem of disorder and lack of respect for the law than we do. The Minister is obviously constrained in what he can say, but does he not think that the time is coming for us to start looking more seriously and systematically at the experience of countries that have succeeded in dealing with issues of law and order with a much smaller prison population than we have and learn from their example?
The noble Lord is right that I am not going to make government policy standing on my feet. In so far as he says that we should look at other countries, I would always agree with that; one can always look at other countries and learn. In the PCSC Bill which is going through the House at the moment, there is a focus on a number of issues, including the use of non-custodial sentences. The critical thing about those sentences is that they have to be robust and the public have to have confidence in them. Later today, I will be making a Statement on victims’ issues. I would hope that the greater inclusion of victims in the criminal justice process may lead to greater use of non-custodial sentences, because victims will buy into the process more. However, I suspect that this is a topic with which we will continue to engage.
My Lords, I wrote down carefully what the Minister said in response to the question of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, about charges for videocalls for family engagement: that the current position is there are no charges. Does the Minister believe that that will continue for the foreseeable future? On the broader question of the in-cell technology, does he agree that this must have full democratic oversight and control, and be run for public good, not private profit?
My Lords, on the video charges point I hope that I was clear as to what we are committed to doing in future. I also set out clearly the current position. I do not think I can go beyond that at present. On technology, of course it must be appropriate. I do not get hung up, I am afraid, on whether public services are delivered by the public sector or the private sector. My focus is on making sure that public services are properly delivered and of a very high quality.
The Minister indicated that the PCSC Bill included non-custodial sentences. Can he highlight what they are, and would he say that there will be a net increase or decrease in the number of people likely to go to prison as a result of the Government’s measures in that Bill?
I was trying to say that on a number of occasions in debates on the PCSC Bill—I think perhaps the noble Lord was not participating in them—I have explained that under the sentencing guidelines, before somebody can be sent to custody the sentencer has to be satisfied that there is no proper alternative to custody. Even when that threshold is met, the sentencer then has to be satisfied that an immediate custodial sentence must be passed. We have had interesting debates on out-of-court disposals and alternatives to custody. I am happy to continue those conversations. As to the projections, I do not have those to hand but am happy to write to the noble Lord with them.
(2 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have also put my name to these amendments, so ably moved by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester, and I support them. I have to confess that, as she was speaking to each amendment, I was mentally going through the processes I go through as a sentencer. She introduced her comments by talking about probation reports. As I have mentioned, I became a magistrate about 14 years ago, when there were no oral reports, and fast-delivery reports were only just being introduced. Most of the time, we saw standard reports. There has been an evolution over the last 14 years. There are oral reports, fast-delivery reports and standard reports. In the youth court we have far more enhanced reports, which are 10 to 20 pages long, and in the domestic abuse courts we will be more informed of the family situation when sentencing somebody convicted of a domestic abuse-related offence.
I do support these amendments. The reports put in front of magistrates’ courts and Crown Courts need to be appropriate, and, of course, they need to include the family circumstances of the person being sentenced. The great dilemma, in any system, is to get enough information in a timely manner but not so much that it delays things. I remember that when oral reports were first introduced in magistrates’ courts, we very much appreciated that, because we had experienced probation officers who would interview the offender on the day and come to the court and tell us the various pros and cons of the sentencing options. We knew those probation officers and trusted them to give us a balanced view and guidance on the appropriateness of certain sentences.
That is a good example I have just given. There are, of course, less good examples where we may not have been made aware of the family responsibilities of the person we were sentencing, and there is an absolutely consistent dilemma, whenever one is sentencing, over whether one has a whole picture.
As I say, I support these amendments. This is all based on the data. It is about having appropriate data at the time and about recognising the domestic situation and whether there are responsibilities. Everyone here today has mentioned the position of children, but a lot of people I sentenced also had responsibilities for older parents or other caring responsibilities, and that needs to be taken account of as well.
While I support these amendments, I think more can be done. Reports need to be focused in the right way, and the probation service needs to build on its links with appropriate local social services, as it does when I sentence domestic abuse-related incidents. Much more needs to be done, and I will support the right reverend Prelate if she decides to press her amendments to a vote.
My Lords, this group of amendments relates to primary carers in the criminal justice system. We debated it at some length during previous stages, and, as I noted in Committee, the proposed new clauses have their origins in previous work by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Let me just take a moment to echo the tribute paid by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, to those who give evidence to that committee and the other committees of this House. While the Government support the principle behind these amendments and have listened carefully to the arguments in support of them, we are still not persuaded that they are necessary.
I will explain the Government’s reasoning regarding each of these proposed new clauses. Amendment 88 would require the Secretary of State to take reasonable steps to collect data centrally and publish it annually on how many people sentenced have parental responsibility for a child or children under the age of 18 or are pregnant. We have publicly acknowledged the gaps in our current data collection on primary carers in prison and believe that understanding the position in prison is where we should focus our improvement efforts regarding data. This will provide an evidence base to develop policy solutions to offer proper support to primary carers who are imprisoned, and their children.
I am sorry that progress has been so slow, but I am pleased to say that the necessary changes to the basic custody screening tool will be made during the first quarter of the coming year. From that point we will be able to collect data on primary carers in prison and the numbers of their children. An important caveat is that our data collection is necessarily dependent on prisoners declaring the information. Although we do our best to encourage people to provide information, there will always be some people who, for various reasons, do not disclose what the underlying position is. We continue to look at this issue to ensure that our data collection is as good as it can be. I heard the right reverend Prelate say that she would be keen to continue discussions on that point. She knows from previous issues that I am very happy to discuss this with her. I will keep her informed of our progress.
Amendment 88 also refers to collecting data on women who are pregnant when they are sentenced. The Government’s view is that the primary focus should be on those who are pregnant and sentenced to custody. We have already taken steps to acknowledge previous weaknesses in our data collection. We are now collecting and publishing data on the number of pregnant women in prison in the HMPPS annual digest, which contains a weekly average for self-declared pregnancies, and the total number of births to women held in custody over the year, in location categories.
On the closely linked topic of maternity services in prisons, this week I met the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, to discuss the breadth of work already completed and under way to address learning from the appalling “Baby A” case, as per the existing statutory obligations. I am grateful to her for the time that she spent discussing the matter with me. HMPPS has accepted and completed all the PPO recommendations. The PPO’s recommendations for health have either been completed or are in the process of being completed.
This work includes investment by NHS England and NHS Improvement of recurrent funding for an improved maternity service at HMP Bronzefield that will be delivered by Ashford and St Peter’s Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust. All the work that we have completed or are in the process of implementing is set out in a joint action plan that we have submitted to the PPO, and which is available publicly on its website. Nationally, as part of the jointly commissioned women’s estate health and social care review, a perinatal steering group has overseen the development of a pregnancy and post-pregnancy service specification for health and justice commissioners. Publication is anticipated for early next year.
Turning to Amendments 86, 87 and 105, which concern remand and sentencing decisions in cases involving primary carers and pregnant women, I will not repeat the points that I made in Committee, but we consider these amendments unnecessary, since a series of relevant and adequate considerations for courts making such decisions are set out in relevant case law and sentencing guidelines, and, as I dealt with on earlier groups today, ensure that custody is a last resort in all cases.
The case law and the sentencing guidelines, which the courts have to follow, are clear that courts should give full and proper consideration to the fact that someone is either a pregnant woman or a primary carer. However, without wishing to diminish the importance of their consideration, we have to acknowledge that courts have to consider various and often complex circumstances relating to the offence or the offender. Regrettably, there will be cases where the risks posed by the individual or the seriousness of the offending is such that, despite the existence of dependents, custody is deemed necessary.
I listened carefully to the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, and the noble Lord, Lord German, about recall. In the time that I have had to respond specifically to that point, I can tell them that in the three years from June 2018 to June 2021 there was an 18% decrease in the number of women recalled to custody while the comparable decrease for men was 4%. So I acknowledge that there is an issue on recall and I am happy to continue that conversation, but the position has got better.
However, we are clear that delivering public protection and confidence across the system is not just about the better use of custody. As set out in our female offender strategy, we want fewer women serving short sentences in custody and more being managed in the community. As part of that strategy, we have committed to piloting residential women’s centres, which will offer an intensive residential support package in the community for women at risk of short custodial sentences.
I turn to Amendment 85. As I set out in Committee, current legislation already requires the court to obtain a pre-sentence report in all cases unless the court deems it unnecessary on the facts of the case—for example, if the offender had been before the court three weeks earlier and a pre-sentence report was obtained then. This requirement is reflected in the sentencing guidelines, which courts have to follow. When sentencers request pre-sentence reports, guidance introduced in 2019 mandates probation practitioners to request an adjournment to allow time to prepare a comprehensive pre-sentence report in all cases involving primary carers and for those at risk of custody.
I am keen to reassure the right reverend Prelate that a key objective of this Government’s reforms is to improve both the quality and the prevalence of pre-sentence reports in the justice system. We heard first-hand experience from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, about the quality of pre-sentence reports, which can be extremely good. We want to ensure that that quality is consistently good.
I think the point I made is that they are extremely variable.
I am looking at the glass as half full. I acknowledge their variability but we want to improve their standard across the board. It is a little simplistic, if I may respectfully say so, always to assume that a written report is better than an oral report. I know the noble Lord was not making that point but I have heard it elsewhere. He was quite clear from his experience that a good oral report may be better than a written report.
If appropriate, exactly; it all depends. The sentencers have experience of the nature of the reports that are appropriate in each case.
On that point, we acknowledged in our sentencing White Paper that pre-sentence reports have decreased over the last decade. We specify in the White Paper that, although we do not propose to alter current judicial discretion, we want to build the evidence base around pre-sentence reports. We therefore commenced a pilot scheme in 15 magistrates’ courts in May this year, in collaboration with the judiciary and HMCTS. It strategically targets female offenders, and some other cohorts, for fuller written pre-sentence reports. The process evaluation will be published in autumn next year and will give us the evidence base to drive improvements in pre-sentence reports and make future decisions. We want to preserve a balance between the current legislation and sentencing guidelines and the independence of judicial decision-making. We very much hope and expect that that pilot scheme, which takes into account operational considerations in the courts as well, will enable us to improve the position significantly.
I hope that what I have said—I hope not at too great a length—will persuade the right reverend Prelate and noble Lords that the Government share the concerns underpinning these amendments and, importantly, that existing law and practice, together with the action we are already taking, make these amendments unnecessary. I invite the right reverend Prelate to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, it is late, and I have very little to add to this debate, since it has already been extensively outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, and other speakers, save this. I have extensive experience of working with educators from many jurisdictions, including all those mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, and many beyond. Some will have, as I have myself, worked with a small number of 10 year-olds who, for a variety of reasons usually to do with adverse childhood experiences, behave in ways that are exceedingly difficult to manage—and some can, under certain circumstances, become aggressive or violent. But what I know is that educators from all those jurisdictions, in general, understand that 10 is simply too young to be an age of criminal responsibility, and many from the countries mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, and many others are astounded it is 10 in England.
Ten year-olds, as my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti has said, need to be nurtured if they have hitherto had circumstances in their short lives that have damaged them seriously. In my own view, 12 is still too young to be an age of criminal responsibility, and had the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, been able to be in her place tonight, she would certainly, I am sure, have listed all the jurisdictions that have an age significantly above 12, as well as notably, as referenced by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. But it is the case that a move from 10 to 12 would be a move in the right direction, and I hope the Government will consider this seriously.
My Lords, we have two amendments before us in the sense of concept. I will take Amendment 88A first and then Amendments 89 and 90 together—they raise quite discrete issues.
Amendment 88A is twofold. It requires the centralised monitoring of youth remand decisions made by the court and the laying of a report of findings before Parliament on an annual basis. On centralised monitoring, as I made clear in Committee, courts will now be required to provide the reasons for their decision in writing. This will be provided to the child, their legal representative and the youth offending team, and it goes beyond what courts already do at present. The record will therefore provide qualitative information, which is not currently readily available. That will enable us and partners in the criminal justice system to understand and better monitor the reasons given for the use of custodial remand.
However, those decisions are complex. We should not prescribe in law at this time how the information should be collected and processed. I am also mindful not to impose unrealistic burdens on operations. As I have indicated previously, HMCTS is also currently designing a new digital case management system, which will deliver better data capturing and reporting. We will consider the best way to collect, analyse and, if appropriate, publish that information.
On the second point, as I explained in Committee, my department already regularly publishes statistics on remand: youth justice statistics are published annually; youth custodial statistics are published monthly. I hope the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, will agree that our objectives are in fact aligned here, and understand the need for pragmatism at this time. I therefore urge him to withdraw Amendment 88A.
Amendments 89 and 90, spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, would raise the age of criminal responsibility from 10 to 12 years and require a review of the age of criminal responsibility. As I have said before, the primary objective of the youth justice system is to prevent children offending in the first place. Where it occurs, we must provide the police and courts with effective tools to tackle offending. That is why we believe that setting the age of criminal responsibility at 10 is the correct response. It provides flexibility in dealing with children and allows for early intervention with the aim of preventing subsequent offending.
Importantly, having the age of criminal responsibility at 10 does not preclude other types of intervention where they would be a better and more proportionate response. This could include diversion from the criminal justice system in the first place. I can answer with a simple “yes” my noble friend Lord Attlee’s question about whether the age of the child is taken into account by the CPS as part of the public interest test. Diversion from the criminal justice system is happening in practice. There has been a dramatic fall since 2009 in the number of children aged between 10 and 12 years in the youth justice system. We want that downward trend to continue.
As I said in Committee, no 10 or 11 year-old has received a custodial sentence since 2010. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, talked about never seeing a 10 or 11 year-old in court. In response to the specific point about criminal damage or arson, in 2020, 171 children were proceeded against for either criminal damage or arson. Of those, the number aged either 10 or 11 was zero. We discussed the appalling Bulger case in Committee. It is a rare case, but it is important that when awful cases such as that arise, we have the correct mechanisms to deal with them.
The fact is that there are a range of approaches across Europe—and the wider world—to the age of criminal responsibility. Other European countries also have an age of criminal responsibility set at 10. The noble Baroness, Lady Blower, said that she was astounded that we had the age of 10, but so does Switzerland—not a country one normally associates with human rights breaches—and I suggest that neither Switzerland nor the UK is in contravention of our international obligations.
The Minister referred to the diversion of young people who might end up in the criminal justice system but are sent down other paths. Can he tell me, either now or in the future—I understand that he may not have the figures to hand—whether the Government have statistics on the demographic characteristics of which children get diverted and which go into the criminal justice system? I am aware that I recited quite a few figures, but they show that there is a greatly increased percentage of children from certain backgrounds who seem to end up in the criminal justice system, which suggests that diversion is working for some but not for others.
I am happy to respond in writing a little more fully, but I can say—with the caveat that I absolutely share concerns about ethnicity proportions in the youth justice system, and indeed through the criminal justice system generally—that the number of black, Asian and minority ethnic children entering the youth justice system for the first time fell in the decade between 2009 and 2019 by 76%. So there is progress but there is still work to be done. I will look at the Official Report and write with anything further.
(2 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, makes a very good case for his amendments. I hope that my noble friend the Minister can satisfy the House, but I think that he will struggle a bit.
My Lords, that is a very encouraging note on which to rise. I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for bringing back matters that we discussed in Committee.
I say respectfully that Amendment 66B, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, commendably deals with the need for consistency in both the use of, and compliance with, the code of practice that will guide the use of diversionary and community cautions under Part 6 of the Bill. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for making time to discuss this matter with me.
For the record—it may have been in the mêlée that occurred when people were leaving—I thought I heard the noble and learned Lord refer to cautions as part of the sentencing framework. Without wishing to split hairs, we see this as separate from the sentencing framework and as an out-of-court disposal, but if the noble and learned Lord did say that, I understood that he was talking in broad terms. I am keen to reassure him and, indeed, the House that a fundamental aim of reforming the out-of-court disposal options currently in use was to improve consistency by reducing the number of disposals and creating two clear and statutory options.
Some attention was paid in Committee to the lack of data currently recorded and available on the use of cautions, whether conditional or simple, and the types of conditions attached to the former. We are keen to address that and believe that the proposals in Part 6 of the Bill, along with the code of practice that will accompany it, will do so. We are currently engaging with the Home Office regarding the outcomes framework so that police can accurately report the number of cautions given, and we will also explore the practicalities of gathering qualitative data from police on the types of conditions used.
We want to preserve the balance between a national framework for decision-making on the one hand and, on the other, operational decision-making that rests on the facts of the case and can be independently and locally scrutinised. We believe that working to develop more effective and consistent scrutiny panels in forces, thereby ensuring independent representation and transparency of findings, would be the most effective course of action. For that reason, we are currently engaging with stakeholders on precisely this issue, including a range of questions on transparency and scrutiny regarding the use and monitoring of the new cautions. It will only be possible to find the balance we seek once we have that feedback. I can assure the noble and learned Lord and the House that this will subsequently be included in the code of practice accompanying this legislation, which will itself be brought before Parliament for scrutiny in due course.
Amendments 66C and 66D, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, relate to the essence of the reform that the Bill makes to the out-of-court disposals framework. As I noted in Committee, this reform has its roots in the work led by the National Police Chiefs’ Council, whose strategy in 2017 removed the need for the simple caution, penalty notice for disorder, and cannabis and khat warnings. The Government have listened to the NPCC and are now taking steps to ensure national consistency in the framework that it has helped to develop. The current position is that one-third of police forces have already moved to using only conditional cautions and community resolutions, and many more, including the Metropolitan Police, are currently in the process of moving over to this two-tier framework.
With Amendment 66D, the noble Lord seeks to retain penalty notices for disorder. We have already seen a marked decline in their use by police. The most recent CJS statistics show that the use of penalty notices for disorder has fallen 28% from the previous year. These are distinct from the fixed penalty notices, which are unaffected by Part 6 of the Bill.
I should also make reference to an important matter that was raised by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester in Committee, speaking through—if I can put it in these terms—the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham. This was in regard to the intention behind the use of conditional cautions. The point she made was that they should have the aim of rehabilitation or restoration. The purpose of this is both to address the causes of the offending in order to support the offender to desist from reoffending and to put a welcome emphasis on the wishes of the victim, allowing for appropriate restoration to be made, where appropriate. The fact is that simple cautions and penalty notices do not allow for this victim-centred approach that mandates rehabilitative and restorative actions. I therefore do disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that this gives rise to what he called—if I heard him correctly—a bureaucratic nightmare.
Retaining the use of penalty notices and simple cautions would undermine these aims entirely and indeed the reform itself. They are inconsistent with it. I heard the noble Lord say, somewhat in stereo as it was repeated behind me by the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, that I have my work cut out to persuade him not to divide the House. But I hope I have set out the principles that underly the new approach: the conditions support rehabilitation and encourage the offender to desist from reoffending. You simply do not get that with a simple caution or notice. I therefore hope that, having listened to what I have said, both he and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, will not press their amendments.
Before the noble Lord sits down, could he just confirm that these changes—not allowing fixed penalties or simple cautions—are being made on the basis of no evidence whatever of the efficacy of conditional cautions versus simple cautions? He has just admitted from the Dispatch Box that the Government do not retain any data on the number of conditional cautions versus the number of simple cautions, or about the sorts of conditions imposed, but retain data only on the total number of cautions.
My Lords, I think we might now be in double figures for the times I have been asked that question. I have set out in my remarks, fairly I hope, what lies behind it. The work from the National Police Chiefs’ Council lies behind this; a third of police forces have gone there; and many more are considering it. Whether one calls that evidence or not, that is the basis on which these reforms are predicated. I have answered this question before, and I answered it in Committee. I appreciate my answers may not satisfy the noble Lord, but that is the basis on which we think this is a good idea; and quite a number of police forces already think this is a good idea.
My Lords, I thank all who participated in this debate. I will deal very briefly with the two points that have arisen.
First, the system to ensure consistency and compliance with the code will apply to whatever system is brought into effect, including the conditional cautions or fixed penalty notices. I am very grateful to the Minister for his statement, and it seems to me there is now a proper basis for going forward. I think it is fair to say that, when fixed penalty notices and cautions came to be used much more frequently, attempts were made by the judiciary from about 2005 onwards—therefore spanning both Governments—to try and put in place such a system. I am afraid we did not get very far, but it is encouraging to know the Minister is now behind this.
I hope for two things. One is for us to go forwards, as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, has said, with the magistrates doing matters locally, and I hope the MA will positively engage. The other is for a national basis. National consistency is important, because to the man on the Clapham omnibus—or whatever the modern phrase is—whether you get required to do something by the court or by the police, it is still part of the same system and it is still the law that requires it. Therefore, I look forward very much to scrutinising, when this comes back, the proposals put forward by the Government in the code.
As to the second part, I am again grateful to all who have taken part. If I may respectfully say so, I think there is a certain lack of wisdom in getting rid, without an adequate evidence base, of something that has been as useful in the past as a simple caution. However, I beg leave to withdraw the first amendment.
My Lords, these amendments follow a discussion in Committee and an undertaking given on Report in the other place in response to amendments tabled by Tom Tugendhat MP, with cross party-support, which sought to raise the maximum penalties for child cruelty offences. We said at that time that we would bring forward proposals for reform as soon as possible.
I pay tribute to Tom Tugendhat and the family of his young constituent, Tony Hudgell, who have campaigned tirelessly for these changes to the law in his name. As a baby, Tony was abused to such an extent by his birth parents that he is now severely disabled. No child should suffer such appalling abuse, especially from those who should love and care for them most. Therefore, it is right to ensure that, in such cases, the punishment fits the crime. I should add that today saw the sentencing of those involved in the tragic death of Star Hobson. I offer my and the Government’s sincere condolences to Star’s friends and family. The violent death of a child as young as Star really is heart-breaking.
Government Amendments 69 and 70 amend Section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 and Section 5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 respectively to increase the maximum penalties in three circumstances. Those for cruelty to a person under 16 rise from 10 years’ imprisonment to 14 years’ imprisonment; those for causing or allowing the death of a child or vulnerable adult rise from 14 years’ imprisonment to life imprisonment; and, finally, those for causing or allowing a child or vulnerable adult to suffer serious physical harm rise from 10 years’ imprisonment to 14 years’ imprisonment.
Government Amendment 70 also adds the offence of causing or allowing the death of a child or vulnerable adult to Schedule 19 to the Sentencing Act 2020. This is a consequential amendment of Schedule 19 which lists offences where the penalty may be life imprisonment. It means that, if the judge determines that the offender is dangerous and the circumstances of the offence are sufficiently serious, the offender must receive a life sentence. Furthermore, a consequence of increasing the maximum penalty for causing or allowing the death of a child or vulnerable adult to life imprisonment is that offenders sentenced to seven years or more for that offence will now spend two-thirds, rather than half, of the sentence in custody.
I am confident that the House will agree, especially in light of the recent appalling cases, that the courts should, where necessary, have the fullest range of sentencing powers available—I underline that these are new maximum sentences—to deal appropriately with those who abuse children and vulnerable persons. I therefore beg to move Amendment 69.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to rise to support government amendments. There are cases of child abuse and neglect that cannot be adequately punished under the current maximum sentences. It is rare for me to urge more punishment; I always try to focus on rehabilitation, deterrence and restitution, but here I see more punishment as appropriate, simply because protecting a child is our natural human response.
A few years ago, a grave was found in Italy containing a 10,000 year-old skeleton of a tiny baby girl, just a few weeks old. She was buried with what would have been quite precious things: an eagle owl talon, shell pendants and some precious stones. This showed us that, first, 10,000 years ago people cared about their children even when they were of a very young age, and we did not necessarily know that—burials from the Mesolithic period are quite rare—and, secondly, the fact that she was a girl showed that it was an egalitarian society and they did not have our western attitude of women being rather less than men.
There is, however, no deterrent effect required from criminal law because if the only thing stopping someone hurting a child is that it is illegal then there is something deeply wrong with that person. We have an innate reaction to child abusers—a natural hatred towards anyone who would do something so vile. However, that is not to say that every single case of child abuse or neglect is the same, so I am pleased that this is an increase in the maximum sentences and that the Government are not messing around with mandatory minimum sentences.
My Lords, we support the amendments. I read with interest the debate on Report in the Commons, where there was clear support for them across the House. The concern to protect children and vulnerable adults is felt particularly keenly at this point. We have all been deeply shocked and moved by the recent cases, and by the voice of Arthur Labinjo-Hughes—I cannot bear to repeat his words. It is little wonder that the Government feel moved to act on this issue. Our justice system should reflect the public’s disgust and concern at what has happened.
However, I want to say something about the impact of these amendments. As hinted at by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, increasing sentences will not prevent these crimes. These measures are the right thing to do and we support them, but they will not prevent these crimes. The Government have systematically undermined early intervention and prevention services, which have largely been delivered by local government, along with health in schools, which have combined to protect children and vulnerable adults. I ask the Minister to speak to his colleagues about working urgently and strategically to deal with the now well-understood and reported problems of poor communication, lack of curiosity, excessive case loads and inadequate co-ordination of services that put child services under so much strain and children at risk. Addressing those issues would do far more to safeguard children and vulnerable adults. For today, though, we support these changes, insufficient though they are.
My Lords, I am grateful to all those who have contributed to this debate. I will pick up the point just made by the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman of Darlington. There has indeed been cross-party support on this point in your Lordships’ House, as there was in the other place, and I am grateful to her and the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, for that. I therefore will not shatter the mood of consensus by descending into a debate on early intervention, save to say that I too agree that early intervention is important. I will pass her remarks on to my colleagues and I am sure we will continue that debate at another time.
For today, it is important to preserve that consensus. There is a mood across the House that these amendments are important, for the reasons given by all speakers. I was particularly grateful to have the support—perhaps unusually, if I may say so—of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, which shows that this issue is a cross-party, and perhaps even a non-party, issue. With those thanks, I commend the amendments to the House.
My Lords, I will speak first to Amendment 82A, to which I put my name, together with the noble Lord, Lord German. It specifies that short periods in custody should not be an inevitable response to someone with a history of relatively minor offending and that sentencers should be required to state the reasons for giving a prison sentence up to and including six months.
A coalition of views has been expressed in support of the amendment. We have, if she does not mind being described in this way, a campaigning right reverend Prelate who consistently talks about short prison sentences, particularly as they affect women, and my noble friend Lord Bradley with his expertise in this area regarding harmful effects on women in particular but also people with mental health problems. I also include myself in the coalition, because I regularly sentence short sentences.
The point I have made in these debates before is that, while the reoffending rate is indeed as bad as the right reverend Prelate said—there are high reoffending rates—in my experience as a sentencer, I sentence short sentences only when a community sentence has failed. I literally cannot remember a time when I have sentenced a short custodial sentence where there have not been—sometimes multiple—failures of community sentences. When I sentence, I am comparing a 100% failure rate for the community sentences of the people in front of me with the 60% failure rate of those who come out of short custodial sentences and reoffend within a year, so I am making a very unfortunate calculation when I give short custodial sentences.
Nevertheless, the noble Lord, Lord German, made absolutely the right point. We are trying to help the Government realise their own policy. The Government acknowledge what I have just said regarding the inevitability, sometimes, of short custodial sentences. The real answer is to come up with a robust, community-based approach that works and that sentencers have some level of belief in. I look forward to the Minister’s response to Amendment 82A.
I turn to the other amendments in the group. As I said in Committee, the Labour Party will abstain—with reluctance—if the noble Lord, Lord Marks, chooses to move his amendments to a vote. The point made by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, was essentially the point the Minister will make, which is that what we are seeing here is the Government’s response to a particular set of offence types and that it is a policy decision on behalf of the Government, which they are entitled to take and which they see as a response to public demand. Frankly, I am not comfortable with the position I am taking on this, but the view of the Opposition is that we will abstain if the noble Lord, Lord Marks, decides to move his amendments to a vote.
My Lords, this group of amendments broadly covers topics related to custodial sentences. We debated them at some length in Committee. The Government have listened carefully to the arguments put forward by noble Lords in support of these amendments. In particular, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, and others for discussing them with me. However, the Government remain unpersuaded that these amendments are necessary. I will briefly explain the reasons why and will begin with Amendments 71 to 78 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, reminded us, we had a lengthy debate in Committee on Clause 102 and minimum sentences. For the avoidance of any doubt, this clause does not introduce any new minimum sentences or new offences. Rather, it seeks to ensure that courts depart from imposing the minimum sentence only in exceptional circumstances. We are making sure that in these cases, where a minimum sentence applies, the criteria by which the courts can depart from the minimum sentence are consistent and are set out.
The amendments use the term
“contrary to the interests of justice”.
This term is not itself unusual, indeed at Section 59 of the Sentencing Code courts are directed to follow the relevant sentencing guidelines unless
“satisfied that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so”.
However, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, accepts, these amendments would create a new and different test in respect of which a court can depart from imposing a minimum sentence when sentencing for these specific offences. The noble Lord’s amendment could be seen, as I think he tacitly accepted, as creating a lower threshold at which the courts may depart from imposing the minimum sentence, whereas the Government intend to raise and clarify the threshold.
As I explained in Committee, the necessity for this measure is supported by the data. In 2020, approximately half of all adults convicted for a third-time domestic burglary offence received less than the minimum sentence, even after taking account of the early guilty plea. We should not forget that minimum sentences are, in the main, for repeat offences which have a large community impact.
I know that concerns have been raised that Clause 102 may lead the courts to impose the minimum sentence in situations that they regard as unjust, because they cannot find the circumstances to fall within the ambit of “exceptional circumstances”. Concerns have also been raised that what constitutes “exceptional” might be treated as being subjective, leading to inconsistent application.
I can, I hope, reassure the House that courts are well accustomed to determining whether there are exceptional circumstances. There is a body of case law relating to the minimum sentence for certain offences involving firearms which already applies unless there are exceptional circumstances. This provision aligns the minimum sentence provisions with that test. Without wishing to turn Report stage into a seminar, in R v Nancarrow—the reference is 2019, EWCA Crim 470; old habits die hard—the Court of Appeal established a number of relevant principles, including that circumstances are exceptional if the imposition of the minimum sentence would be arbitrary and disproportionate. The court should also take a holistic approach and consider whether the collective impact of all the relevant circumstances makes the case exceptional. Therefore, judicial discretion for the court to consider fully the facts of the case and decide on the appropriate sentence in light of the statutory regime is retained in this measure.
I respectfully disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that this is an attack on judicial discretion. It is not a case of the Government not trusting judges; indeed, we have minimum sentences. The noble Lord is not suggesting that we should not have any minimum sentences, so the issue between us is not whether a judge has full discretion or no discretion—I am not advocating no discretion; the noble Lord is not advocating full discretion—but the ambit of that judicial discretion. I suggest that that is a matter of policy and therefore properly a matter for Parliament.
I hate to disagree with the Minister on this matter of policy, but of course Parliament can do what it likes. The question is whether that is wise.
We must distinguish carefully between whether it is wise, which is a point we can make about any legislation, and whether it is proper. When the point is put against me that this is an attack on judicial discretion and a case of not trusting judges, I hear it as a matter of policy and constitutional propriety first and a matter of wisdom second. So far, I have addressed the point on constitutional propriety. My noble and learned friend is right to say that Parliament can do what it likes; my point is that, here, Parliament is doing what is constitutionally proper as well. As to whether it is wise, I set that out earlier.
In these circumstances, it is proper to endorse the exceptional circumstances test. A system in which 50% of people are not being given the minimum sentence is, I suggest, one in which something is going seriously wrong. Although I pay great respect to anything said my noble and learned friend, the point put briefly but clearly and firmly by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, ought to carry serious weight with the House.
The Minister mentioned a Court of Appeal authority on this matter. Can he confirm whether that authority suggests that, if a judge in an individual case believes it would be contrary to the interests of justice to impose the minimum sentence, that is a strong indication that there are exceptional circumstances?
As we found in Committee, it is very tempting for Ministers to start parsing or glossing the term “exceptional circumstances”, and I hope the noble Lord will forgive me if I do not do so. That phrase has been used in statute and considered at the very highest level by the judiciary. The application of statute is properly a matter for the judiciary. In these circumstances, it is not helpful for a Minister on his feet to start parsing or glossing what has been said by the Court of Appeal. With genuine respect, I will leave that matter there and leave it for the Court of Appeal to explain what “exceptional circumstances” means. However, I repeat that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, said in terms that he found that test not a difficult one to apply—indeed, he found it an easier and more straightforward test to apply than the interests of justice.
Amendment 82A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, with the support of the noble Lord, Lord German, would require a court imposing a custodial sentence of six months or less to state its reasons for being satisfied that neither a fine nor a community sentence could be justified.
The noble Lord, Lord German, reminded us of the Government’s position set out in 2020, which, of course, I stand totally by. There are plainly issues of rehabilitation and reoffending when it comes to short sentences, and that is why, as I explained in Committee, provisions in the Sentencing Code already ensure that custody should be a last resort in all cases, and for the shortest term possible. Even where the custodial threshold is met, courts retain discretion to impose non-custodial sentences after taking into account wider considerations. The code also places a duty on the court to explain its reasons for passing any sentence, and this can include an explanation of the factors the court has taken into account in making its sentencing decision.
This amendment also sets out a series of principles for courts to have regard to when imposing a custodial sentence of six months or less. For the most part, these are included in the independent Sentencing Council’s Imposition of Community and Custodial Sentences guidelines. As courts are already under a statutory duty to follow any sentencing guidelines relevant to the offender’s case, the Government do not consider it necessary to put these principles on a statutory footing.
As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, said, if an alternative sentence to custody can properly be handed down, it should be. While I do not propose again to gloss the sentencing guidelines, I respectfully agree that that is a useful summary of them. Again, as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, said with his own experience, it is often only when community sentences have failed that a custodial sentence is handed down. That, again, is in accordance with the approach set out in the sentencing guidelines.
Of course, I listened very carefully to what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, with whom I have had discussions on this and other issues, and by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester—I was going to say the “campaigning” Bishop of Gloucester, but I will leave out the adjective, although she might like it. I hope that they will each be satisfied with—and certainly understand—what I have said and the reasons for the Government’s position on these amendments. For the reasons that I have set out, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am very grateful for the support that I have had for my Amendments 71 to 78 from Members of the House and for all the contributions to this important debate. I am also grateful to the Minister for his response. However, when one analyses it, what he was saying about discretion cannot survive a proper reading of what is meant by “exceptional circumstances”. Certainly, it is the case that authorities have analysed exceptional circumstances, including the Court of Appeal authority of Nancarrow that he mentioned.
Nevertheless, the nub of it is that “exceptional circumstances” means circumstances that are very unusual, and what the Minister did not address was my point that there are many situations which in general experience are commonplace, and the circumstances are common- place, but where it would nevertheless be unjust—contrary both to the judges and to any normal sense of justice—to impose the minimum sentence. Because the circumstances are not exceptional, the judge would be bound to impose that sentence.
In answer to the points of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, of course it is the case that judges are daily addressed on the basis that they should take an exceptional course of leniency, and it is not surprising that, as a recorder, he has been asked to take that course many times. However, that does not mean that he has been asked to find that circumstances are exceptional. It is interesting that the test for the sentencing guidelines and departing from them is “contrary to the interests of justice”, and not a requirement that there should be exceptional circumstances.
On the matter of policy, I respectfully suggest that the answer to the Minister’s point was comprehensively expressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier. He used the word “wise”. It may be that the Government are entitled to legislate in this way, but is it wise? The Minister said that there was a difference between “wise” and “constitutionally proper”. The point I am making is simply that, although it may be a matter of policy in the sense that the Government can have the policy and can legislate—as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, said, Parliament can do what it likes—the question is: is it bad policy? We say that it is bad policy because it forces judges to do what they would not otherwise do, having regard to the interests of justice.
In respect of the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, of course it is right that it may be easier to apply a test of exceptional circumstances, because the authorities are so clear, but the point about the interests of justice, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, picked up in Committee, is that sentencing decisions are difficult.
My Lords, I shall speak briefly to this group of amendments. First, I turn to the minimum sentence for rape of seven years, subject to an exceptional circumstances disregard or permitted departure. We acknowledge and endorse everything that has been said to the effect that rape is the most appalling crime. The terribly low success rate of prosecutions of which the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman of Darlington, spoke is acknowledged by everyone and has been the subject of a great deal of research by parliamentarians, policymakers and the Government. It needs addressing. The problems that she talked of, of low reporting rates and very high withdrawal of support, along with very low conviction rates, all need addressing. However, I am not convinced that a minimum sentence would address any of those things. Furthermore, for all the reasons, which I shall not repeat, I believe that the use of an exceptional circumstances test for the ability of judges to depart from a minimum sentence is simply wrong.
I also agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, when he pointed out that, as anybody who has dealt with rape cases in criminal courts knows, rapes are so very different, the one from another. He was right to point to the very wide range of sentences endorsed in the sentencing guidelines, which mean that courts treat rape very differently, from the milder cases to the very serious cases that merit life imprisonment. I also have some concern that, in some cases, it would make juries even less likely to convict if they knew that there was a minimum sentence of seven years. I cannot support, and I do not think that we cannot support generally, the proposition that this seven-year minimum sentence should be legislated for.
By contrast, Amendment 78B, which would increase the sentence for publishing the identity of sexual offences complainants, is one that we do support. I suspect that it is not often realised quite how serious an offence this is. Sometimes there is a substantial risk of further harm when the identity of a complainant is published. There is very often significant fear on the part of the complainant if her name—as it is usually, although it may be his name—is published. There is almost always really significant distress caused by an unlawful publication. It is of course open to complainants to waive anonymity if they wish. But if they do not wish their identity to be published, to have the law flouted in the way the offence requires seems to me to justify a sentence of imprisonment in some cases. It is important to hear that these are only maximum sentences that we are dealing with.
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, that there are other cases of unlawful disclosure that should be considered and reviewed but, that being the case in an ideal world—and we all know that these things do not happen as fast as they should—that is no reason for not doing anything at all. So we support Amendment 78B.
For all the reasons given by my noble friend Lady Brinton and, no doubt, to be given by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby—the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, has already spoken to it—we support Amendment 78D on the duty to inform under the unduly lenient sentencing scheme, as well as the extension of the time limit for complaint in respect of unduly lenient sentences. In Committee we went through the reasons for the whole-life order to be taken as a starting point in cases of abduction, sexual assault and murder, and we do support that—again, because it is only a starting point—and this ranks right up there with the other serious offences for which a whole-life order is appropriate.
We support for the reasons given by my noble friend Lady Brinton her amendment on home detention curfews as well.
My Lords, these amendments, introduced by the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, include those aimed at increasing penalties for sexual offences, those focused on enabling victims to challenge a sentence perceived to be unduly lenient, and those aimed at restricting additional offenders from release on home detention curfew. We debated these at some length in Committee, and we listened carefully to the arguments put forward by noble Lords in support. There are obviously some emotive and important issues here, and I welcome the opportunity to set out the Government’s position again this evening. But while the sentiment behind the amendments is fully supported by the Government, we do not consider them to be either necessary or the right course of action.
Let me start with a point on which I think there is common ground, as was set out by the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman. Victims must feel that they are put right at the heart of the criminal justice system. They must be supported so that they can engage properly at every step of what can be an incredibly difficult journey. As the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, set out and referred to, last week we launched a package of measures to help achieve this: a consultation on a new victims’ law; a national rollout of provision of pre-recorded cross-examination for sexual and modern slavery victims; national criminal justice and adult rape scorecards; and a progress report on the end-to-end rape review action plan. We believe that those initiatives, individually and collectively, will raise the voice of victims in our criminal justice system and give them the justice they deserve. That especially includes the victims of often horrendous crimes of sexual violence.
I will address first the amendment regarding minimum sentences for rape. There is no dispute across your Lordships’ House that such crimes should be punished with sentences that match the severity of the offence. But the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, is proposing that a court be required to impose a minimum custodial sentence of seven years for a rape offence committed under Section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003,
“unless … there are exceptional circumstances … which justify it not doing so.”
Rape offenders already receive very significant sentences. The courts can, and do, pass sentences of life imprisonment. In 2020, of those who received a custodial sentence of less than life for a Section 1 rape offence, the average sentence was almost 10 years—117.5 months—an increase of almost 15% over the last decade. More than two-thirds of adult offenders sentenced for a Section 1 rape offence received a custodial sentence of over seven years, which is the minimum proposed by the amendment.
In this Bill, and in legislation introduced last year, the Government are ensuring that serious violent and sexual offenders, including rape offenders, sentenced to over four years now spend two-thirds of their sentence in prison, as opposed to having automatic release at the halfway point. However, the nature of this offence and the wide range of circumstances which the court may need to take into account are complex, as my noble friend Lord Hailsham pointed out. I also agree with the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, although, while I know what he meant, I am not sure I would use the word “mild” for any case of rape. I know he did not mean it in that way. What we are dealing with here is different degrees of seriousness of an offence, and I know he meant that.
May I confirm that? It was the wrong word to use, and I apologise.
I was keen to help the noble Lord out, because I think we all knew what he meant, but it is important in these areas to make sure that the record is really clear. I think we all agree that it is especially important, therefore, because we are dealing with different degrees of seriousness in a complex offence, that we maintain judicial discretion for the courts to consider the full facts of a case before them and decide on the appropriate sentence.
Although the sentence lengths for rape have increased, we have long recognised that the decline in the number of effective trials for rape and serious sexual offences is a cause for significant concern. Let me take a moment to mention some of the wider action we are taking: we have introduced legislation to tackle crimes including stalking, forced marriage, FGM and the those set out in the Domestic Abuse Act; we have committed to more than doubling the number of adult rape cases reaching court; we published the end-to-end rape review on 18 June; and we want to improve the number of rape cases being referred by the police, being charged by the CPS and reaching court. I have already mentioned the victims Bill. In July, we published the tackling violence against women and girls strategy, and we hope that also will help us better target perpetrators and support victims of these crimes, which disproportionately, although not exclusively, affect women and girls.
I turn to Amendment 78B, which would increase the maximum penalty for publishing the identity of sexual assault victims—currently a summary, non-imprisonable offence—to two years in custody. We do not dispute that the current maximum penalty is too low. Our concern, however, is that it would not be right to legislate, as the amendment does, only for the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992.
The naming offence in Section 5 of that Act protects complainants in sexual assault cases and was later extended to cover human trafficking cases as well. The effect of this amendment would be that the penalty for breaching these restrictions would be markedly different from the penalty for other offences also involving the breach of anonymity. Two of these, in relation to female genital mutilation and forced marriage, are modelled on the 1992 Act, and it therefore would be difficult to impossible to justify treating these identical offences differently from the 1992 Act offence.
Having very kindly accepted that the maximum is wrong, the Minister’s only point appears to be that it would put it out of sync with these others. What work is being done in the Ministry of Justice and when can we expect to see legislation bringing them all to a position where there is an appropriate maximum sentence? This matters very considerably to victims of a Section 1 crime.
My Lords, it certainly matters. I am a little concerned that the noble and learned Lord has seen my notes because that was precisely the point to which I was coming when he intervened. I am grateful for the intervention and for the points made by my noble friend Lord Sandhurst and the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, which I endorse. We need consistency and a fair approach in this area. We will begin by drawing up, as my noble friend Lord Sandhurst invited us to, a list of relevant offences, to ensure that we capture this issue fully.
I am sorry to interrupt again, but when that has been done, what is the next stage?
There may be others, but I am coming to the next stage. The noble and learned Lord is very keen.
Also part of the framework is the law of contempt of court, which we must consider if we are to look at this area properly. In some circumstances, it might be an alternative to charging the appropriate breach offence, although conduct is usually dealt with as a contempt only where some harm to the administration of justice was likely. It also does not attract the investigatory powers which these offences attract.
My right honourable friend the Attorney-General has already independently asked the Law Commission to examine the law of contempt in this regard. I could not say this in Committee because at that point I was saying that we would invite the Law Commission to do it. In fact, they have already committed to such a review. We have asked them to add in the breach of anonymity offences, both for Section 5 and related offences.
The noble and learned Lord says “years”. It will take some time, but the alternative is to legislate on a piecemeal basis. I do not want to explain to a victim of FGM who is named why she is being treated less favourably than a victim of any other offence. We want consistency in this area. If we have a Law Commission to ensure that we look at the law holistically in an appropriate way, it will deliver a coherent approach to penalties for all offences involving breach of reporting restrictions.
Moving to Amendments 78C and 78D, the unduly lenient sentence scheme allows anyone—the CPS, victims, witnesses, or members of the public—to ask for certain sentences imposed by the Crown Court to be considered by the law officers, where that sentence is felt to be unduly lenient. I underline that point. Anybody can ask the law officers to consider referring the sentence to the Court of Appeal. I am afraid that a number of my colleagues at the Bar have taken the view that it is somewhat improper for Members of Parliament to invite the Attorney-General so to consider. I underline again that anybody can ask the Attorney-General to consider referring a sentence to the Court of Appeal. That is how the scheme operates. It is then for the law officers to decide whether to refer the case to the Court of Appeal, which may then decide to increase the sentence.
Amendment 78C places a duty on the Secretary of State to nominate a government department to inform victims of the details of the scheme. We recognise the importance of victims being aware of the scheme and being clear on how it operates. However, the duty is not necessary. The revised Code of Practice for Victims of Crime—the victims’ code—which came into force on 1 April, already provides victims with the right to be informed about the existence of the scheme. Furthermore, it includes a requirement for the witness care unit to inform victims about the scheme following sentencing. Therefore, that provision is unnecessary.
Turning to the timing point, an application by the law officers to the Court of Appeal must be made within 28 days of sentencing. The absolute time limit of 28 days reflects the importance of finality in sentencing. That point of finality in litigation is sometimes marked by a Latin tag, which I will not trouble your Lordships with, but it is particularly important when it comes to sentencing. While we will keep the operation of the scheme under consideration, including the time limit, there are no current plans to remove the certainty of an absolute time limit in any circumstances.
Amendment 78E would expand the circumstances where a whole life order would be the starting point to include cases of murder involving the abduction and sexual assault of a single person. I explained in Committee that of course we sympathise enormously with the concerns that underpin this amendment, but we do not agree with its purpose. Our current sentencing framework can and does respond to these horrendous cases. The courts can, and do, impose lengthy sentences that fully reflect the gravity of this type of offending and the appalling harm that it causes to families of victims and the community generally.
All those convicted of murder already receive a mandatory life sentence. The murder of a single victim involving sexual conduct has a starting point, when determining the minimum time to be served in prison—the tariff, as it is sometimes called—of 30 years. This can be increased depending on the circumstances of the individual case and the presence of aggravating factors. Additionally, as was demonstrated by the sentencing of Wayne Couzens for the horrific murder of Sarah Everard, there is an existing discretion to impose a whole life order if the seriousness of the individual case is exceptionally high, which Wayne Couzens received.
Amendment 82B, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, seeks to prevent the release on home detention curfew of any offender who has previously breached a protective order and who has been convicted of offences relating to stalking, harassment, coercive control, or domestic abuse. I set out in Committee the importance that we attach to this area. The noble Baroness was quite right to refer to my comments made in another part of the Palace at an event organised by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester, and I stand by them.
I have asked officials to consider the risks presented by such offenders, to ensure that all appropriate safeguards are in place to protect victims and the public and to ensure that unsuitable offenders are not released on home detention curfew. Once that review is complete, I will update the noble Baroness and the House. Despite the fact that we were not able to arrange a meeting in the last 48 hours, I or the Minister for Prisons will be happy to meet with her. I do not believe that legislating on this matter is proportionate or effective in safeguarding victims. The safeguarding can be achieved via the policy framework, without the need for any change in statute.
We are committed to ensuring that serious sexual and violent offenders serve sentences that reflect the severity of their crimes. For those reasons, I urge noble Lords not to press these amendments.
I am grateful to noble Lords, and particularly to the Minister for his comments in response to the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Ponsonby.
On Amendment 78A, clearly it is right that mitigating factors are taken into account and that remorse, guilty pleas and assistance with prosecution are considered; no one is arguing anything to the contrary. However, I put it gently to noble Lords that it is important that sentencing adapts as attitudes in society evolve. I suggest to those noble Lords who were so outraged that we might want to change the system with regard to rape that attitudes towards that crime have changed. That is a very good thing and we should welcome it. However, public confidence in how rape is handled is in crisis.
All rape is violent, often with life-changing consequences for the victim, and we will continue to press the Government on this. I am pleased that women are speaking up with confidence and demanding this kind of change. Speaking personally—although I know that is not something you can properly do from the Dispatch Box—I find the frequent emphasis in this discussion on the idea that there are different degrees of rape, that “There’s rape and then there’s rape”, troubling. As I say, though, we will return to this in future because the women of this country will demand that of us.
My Lords, I support the amendment. I am conscious that the Bill is on Report. This is a probing amendment, but it raises an important and pressing point. I hope I shall be short. I make four points.
If this offence is taken on its own, I think we would all agree that two years is plainly an insufficient maximum. Let us assume for these purposes that an offender comes before the court, is not a murderer and has not been a party to the death of any victim, but has had access to the bodies and has done what Mr Fuller did. It appears that he committed many offences of sexual penetration of corpses to which he had access by virtue of his employment. It may not be common, but we simply do not know what someone may do in the future. It is an appalling prospect, but we simply cannot exclude the possibility that a non-murderous necrophiliac might offend in a similar way. I suggest that we must do all we can both to deter and to punish in that event. If there is no murder but a large number of offences, is 10 years really too long a maximum sentence for someone such as Mr Fuller?
I talk about punishment because it is impossible to contemplate the horror of a relative who learns that their deceased loved one was defiled in this way. We as society owe it to such a relative, who is truly a victim, to show that we respect the dead and will mark such behaviour in a way that demonstrates that respect.
When I was approached by the noble Baroness to help her on this matter, I asked the Library to do some research. It very helpfully uncovered materials relating to the debate that took place in 2003. There was the Home Office’s consultation paper of July 2000, and section 8.6 addressed this issue. It disclosed that at that time, somewhat to the authors’ surprise, there was no offence that made necrophilia illegal. The consultation disclosed that there was
“no firm evidence of the nature or the extent of the problem”,
but agreed that
“human remains should be shown respect”
and noted that
“relatives and friends would be deeply distressed”.
In section 9.2, that consultation addressed sentences for a range of offences. From my reading of the Government’s response in November 2002—I do not criticise anyone for this—it appears that the authors at that point may have proceeded on the assumption that the offence would follow and be additional to a charge of murder or manslaughter. In other words, it was not looked at on the basis of a stand-alone sexual deviant.
If we are looking for a comparator, brief research has disclosed what happens in Canada, where the offence carries a maximum sentence of five years. I question whether even that is sufficient in the worst case, but I leave it to others to consider.
To conclude, this is a most unpleasant criminal offence. It must be reconsidered as a matter of priority. The current sentence for the stand-alone offence is simply too low. I urge the Government to address this with dispatch and not to delay once the immediate clamour over the Fuller case has died down. It is not difficult. It simply needs a suitably steep maximum sentence to mark its gravity.
My Lords, Amendment 78DA, moved by my noble friend Lady Noakes, is in regard to the maximum penalty for the sexual penetration of a corpse. I first place on record my shock and horror at David Fuller’s horrifying offending; my thoughts are with the victims and their families. I assure the House that the Government are committed to looking in detail at what happened in this appalling circumstance to ensure that it simply never happens again.
As we have heard, just this afternoon Mr Fuller has been sentenced to a whole-life term of imprisonment. An investigation into other aspects of his offending is ongoing. The House will understand why I will not comment on the sentence passed in this case, but I thank all those in the police, the CPS and the wider criminal justice system for bringing him to justice.
The Government have announced an inquiry into the events that occurred in hospitals in Tunbridge Wells. This will help us understand how the offences took place without detection in the trust, identify any areas where early action by the trust was necessary and consider wider national issues, including for the NHS as a whole. The Government have already made good progress in establishing the independent inquiry. I understand from colleagues in the Department of Health and Social Care that the inquiry’s chair, Sir Jonathan Michael, has developed draft terms of reference already and will engage with the families on them in the new year before they are published.
As well as that inquiry, I assure the House that the Ministry of Justice is reviewing the existing penalties available for the offence of sexual penetration of a corpse. The statutory maximum penalty for that offence is, as my noble friend indicated, two years’ imprisonment.
I reassure your Lordships, however, that that is the statutory maximum penalty for one offence. Where the offence is sentenced alongside other offences, each offence will be sentenced individually. The overall sentence passed will therefore reflect the totality of the offending behaviour.
I also pay tribute to my noble friend’s work in supporting the inclusion of this offence when it was debated during the passage of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. It was created primarily to deal with a different circumstance—different circumstances were in mind at the time. The focus was on the situation where a murderer abuses the corpse of their victim after death, and it was therefore perhaps thought likely that those sentenced for this offence would, for the most part, be sentenced at the same time for another offence, such as murder—which of course carries a mandatory penalty of life imprisonment. As we have seen in the Fuller case, that is sometimes the case but may not always be so.
It is therefore right that, in view of this depraved—which is not a word I use often, but I think is appropriate in this context—and horrifying offending where we have seen an individual commit this offence independently of other offending in relation to that victim, we review the current statutory maximum penalty for the Section 70 offence. It may also be that this review, and the public inquiry into the offending in hospitals in Kent, will highlight other issues that need to be considered relating to the existing offences that deal with sexual abuse of corpses.
To be clear, I am not saying—I cannot this afternoon —that the Government will adopt the specific approach taken in this amendment, but neither do I rule out future changes to the maximum penalty. Rather, we are reviewing the maximum penalty in its context, and speaking with DHSC officials to ensure that learning from the inquiry into events in hospitals can be taken into account into our review of the penalty. That is the best way to reach a considered conclusion about how to amend Section 70 appropriately.
As to timing, the inquiry into the events at hospitals in Kent is due to publish interim findings in the new year, with the full report at a later stage. I will write to my noble friend, and place a copy in the Library, with any further information on the inquiry’s timescales as soon as that is available. Our review of the available maximum penalties is likely to follow a similar timescale, to ensure that findings from the inquiry can be taken into account in our conclusions. It is therefore important that we await the findings of the inquiry before amending the current legislation. I listened carefully to how my noble friend opened this short debate, and I therefore ask her formally to withdraw this amendment.
My Lords, this has been a short but important debate, and it will be particularly important for the families of those who died who were abused by that man. Clearly, they have suffered hugely. My noble friend is right to point out that I made clear that this was a probing amendment and therefore have no intention of pressing the amendment. My main purpose was to ensure that the Government are set upon dealing with this issue properly, and I was much reassured by what I heard from my noble friend. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, I just want to associate myself with the comments of my noble friend Lord Beith. I will reserve my comments until after the Minister has spoken.
My Lords, I am extremely grateful to the various Members of the House who have spoken. These amendments relate to offenders serving sentences of imprisonment for public protection, known as IPPs. We had a heartfelt and powerful debate on this issue in Committee; the mood during today’s debate has been equally apparent. I should say that, throughout this time, I have personally received a lot of emails from families affected by IPP sentences. I put on record that I have read all of them, even if I cannot reply to them all individually.
Let me go through the amendments and set out the Government’s position clearly. First, I make it absolutely clear that the Government recognise that more work needs to be done in relation to this group of prisoners. On that basis, the Government intend to bring forward an amendment at Third Reading. I will give details of that amendment in a moment; let me first set out the work done so far.
Before my noble friend sits down, I heard what he said, but if the Justice Select Committee in the other place was to recommend a reduction in the qualifying period from 10 years to five years, would he at least give his personal undertaking to do his very best to ensure that the Government found an opportunity to legislate for that at the earliest possible time?
I am not quite sure of the meaning of a personal undertaking from me to ensure that the Government will find an opportunity. I hope the House will appreciate that I have personally put a lot of time and effort into this matter. When I see the Justice Select Committee’s report, that time and effort will not diminish.
My Lords, I am not sure this is protocol, but it might help progress if I indicate to the House that, in discussions with the Minister, we had come to an understanding that we were taking steps forward in a way that would start to unlock this problem. In what he has just read out, the Minister has fulfilled what he agreed with me, and I trust him. On that basis, I recommend to colleagues that we accept the offer of the Third Reading amendment and the commitments that have been made on both procedure and recall, and we move forward on that basis this evening.
(2 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is my pleasure to open the debate on the Report stage of this Bill. I stand to add the proposed new clause, after Clause 2, as printed on the Marshalled List.
This amendment, known as Harper’s law, will impose mandatory life terms on those who are convicted of unlawful act manslaughter, where the victim is an emergency worker who is acting in the exercise of their functions as such a worker. The amendment will apply to adult offenders, and to 16 and 17 year-olds. As the House will see, it contains a judicial discretion for the court to impose an alternative sentence in exceptional circumstances.
It may assist noble Lords if I provide a brief overview of manslaughter—I do not propose to turn this into a lecture—and the manner in which this amendment will work. The amendment applies to those convicted of manslaughter, but the proposed new Sections 258A(4), 274A(4) and 285A(4) of the Sentencing Code are provisions to explicitly exclude those convicted of gross negligence manslaughter, as well as those convicted of manslaughter following a successful partial defence to a charge of murder—for example, manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility, loss of control or in pursuance of a suicide pact. As a result and by process of statutory elimination, the provisions will apply only to those who have been convicted of manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act, more commonly referred to as “unlawful act manslaughter”.
The Government are making this amendment following the death of PC Andrew Harper in August 2019. I am sure the House is familiar with the horrific facts of that case. PC Harper was responding to reports of the attempted theft of a quad bike. He suffered fatal injuries when he became caught in a strap trailing behind a getaway car and was dragged behind it. At their trial in July 2020, PC Harper’s three killers were acquitted of murder but were all convicted of unlawful act manslaughter.
The jury was therefore satisfied that the unlawful and dangerous actions of the defendants, namely the plan to steal the quad bike and then escape apprehension by whatever means possible, including driving dangerously along winding country roads, amounted to manslaughter. The court did not impose life sentences on any of the defendants. Each received sentences of between 13 and 19 years for the manslaughter of PC Harper, sentences that were subsequently upheld by the Court of Appeal. They will therefore all be incarcerated for a significant period. But the Government believe that, where a person is convicted of unlawful act manslaughter, and the person who has been killed is an emergency worker acting as such, that should be punished with life imprisonment.
The court will be able to impose a different sentence where there are exceptional circumstances. As covered in Committee, that term is already used in law and is deliberately undefined in legislation to allow for interpretation and application by the court. This will ensure that the court can apply a different sentence where justified, such as where there are exceptional circumstances relating either to the offence or the offender.
The successful campaign of PC Harper’s widow Lissie Harper and the Police Federation drew this issue to the Government’s attention, but this was not an isolated incident. While, thankfully, emergency workers are not often killed on duty, they are required to put themselves at particular risk when carrying out their duties and protecting the public. As is often said, they run towards the danger when others run away from it. I therefore beg to move Amendment 1.
I rise to express my grave concerns about this new clause, which I hope will not be enacted, although I am bound to say that I am rather pessimistic about that.
I will begin by saying something about procedure. I regret that this new clause is being brought forward on Report. The formal announcement of it was by way of a press release on 24 November this year. As the Minister has said, the new clause was triggered by the very distressing case of the killing of PC Harper. We need to keep in mind that the relevant trial took place in July 2020, and it came before the Court of Appeal for consideration in December that year. I suggest that it is hard to see why the new clause could not have been introduced in the House of Commons or, if that were not possible, in Committee in this House. In either event, there would have been a greater opportunity for discussion, both inside and outside Parliament.
All of us will have the greatest sympathy for PC Harper’s wife and family. However, we should be very cautious about legislating as a consequence of a single case or even a number of cases, however distressing they may be. I have referred to the trial in 2020 and the decision of the Court of Appeal in December that year. My noble friend referred specifically to them. In both those cases, very serious and detailed consideration was given to the appropriate sentence, and, as my noble friend has said, the Court of Appeal rejected the submission of the Attorney-General that, in the case of the defendant Long—the most culpable of them—the sentence should be increased to a life sentence.
I suggest that anyone who studies the judgments of the courts, together with the guidelines of the Sentencing Council—the relevant ones were published as recently as November 2018—will be satisfied that the existing law makes proper provision for the punishment of offenders convicted of serious offences of manslaughter and gives proper protection to emergency workers.
As your Lordships will know, manslaughter covers a very broad spectrum of culpability, extending from the very serious—the killing of PC Harper is an example of this—to many things that are very much less serious, such as a single blow that fells an individual, who strikes his head on the pavement and dies. In all conscience, that is an act of common assault, although the consequences are dreadful.
In the case of PC Harper, the trial judge stated that, had the defendant Long been a few years older— he was 19 at the time of the trial and 18 at the time of his offence—he would probably have been given a life sentence. So we need to be clear about this. A life sentence is already available for serious cases of manslaughter, where the trial judge, who has heard all the relevant facts, thinks that such a sentence is appropriate. Your Lordships are being asked to approve a mandatory life sentence in circumstances in which the trial judge might otherwise determine that one is not appropriate. I am deeply uncomfortable with that, especially when I consider the broad spectrum of culpability that arises in manslaughter cases.
Consider a police officer who intervenes in a street brawl, in or out of uniform—it might be a plain-clothes officer. The officer is struck by a single blow or trips in the course of a scuffle. He or she falls, hits their head on the pavement and dies. If the deceased person had been a civilian killed in such circumstances, the court would impose a relatively modest determinate sentence, but, in the case of the police officer and subject to the subsection (2) provisos, which I will shortly mention, the court would have to impose a life sentence. I do not believe that that can be right.
I said that I would speak briefly, if your Lordships would allow me, to proposed new subsection (2), which was briefly referred to my noble friend the Minister. Subsection (2) refers to the exceptional circumstances that relate to the offence or the offender and make it just not to impose a life sentence. The question that arises and must be considered is: what does that mean? Does that mean that, if the judge thinks that the offence falls at the lower level of culpability, a modest determinate sentence can properly be imposed? If that is the case, what is the purpose of the new clause? If such a discretion is not available to the trial judge, it is surely inevitable that injustice will happen on occasions.
At that point, we come to a related matter. We are talking here about not “whole life” cases but life-sentence cases in which a trial judge must impose a custodial tariff. Is the trial judge entitled under these provisions to set a modest determinate tariff in order to address a low level of culpability? If that is the case, what is the point of the new clause? If it is not the case and the trial judge may not impose a modest tariff, it is extremely unjust.
I have one final point, and I acknowledge that it is about drafting. Consider the following circumstances, which fall within proposed new subsection (3)—I will not read it out because it is on the Marshalled List and I do not want to detain your Lordships’ House. An off-duty officer in plain clothes, whose identity as a police officer is not apparent, intervenes in a street brawl or seeks to apprehend a fleeing thief. In the scuffle, he or she falls over, hits their head and dies. Is it right that, in those circumstances, such a defendant should automatically face a life sentence, unless the subsection (2) provisos apply?
I am profoundly uncomfortable with this new clause, and I would like to think that it will not pass.
My Lords, I stand on these Benches to support, or at least not to oppose, the Government. But I have to say that I am reluctant to go ahead and make this speech, based on the contributions we have just heard. The amendment inserts provisions into the Sentencing Code that require a court to impose a life sentence on an offender convicted of unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter against an emergency worker. As we know, this is known as Harper’s law, and it has been campaigned for by PC Andrew Harper’s widow after he was killed in the line of duty in 2019.
I listened very carefully to the Minister, and he made much play of the word “exceptional”. My noble friend Lord Carlile made the point about the interpretation of the word being fairly narrow in the Court of Appeal. I have to say, in the more “wild west” approach of magistrates’ courts, we interpret “exceptional” quite liberally at times. Having said that, I acknowledge that the Minister did make the point that this excludes those convicted of gross negligence manslaughter and includes only those convicted of unlawful act manslaughter, which I thought was an important point.
As I say, we on this side will support the Government in their amendments. However, I do recognise that some very serious points have been raised in this debate.
My Lords, I am grateful to all those who have contributed and I can start by reassuring the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, that I always listen. We may not always agree, but I certainly always listen. I can also reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, that this is not law made by press release, nor is it law in the guise of a political policy statement. We have considered this issue very carefully. Indeed, it is because we have taken time to get the policy right as we see it that the amendment is here now and not earlier—to deal with one of the points made by my noble friend Lord Hailsham.
We believe this is the right approach to these circumstances. Of course, I carefully read the judgments in the Harper case, in particular the Court of Appeal judgment. I hope it goes without saying that, standing at this Dispatch Box, I have great respect for that court, as indeed I do for all courts. But that does not mean that Parliament is unable to or should be cautious to legislate in the area of sentencing, or should be prevented or inhibited from doing so. We are entitled to do so, and in this case, we ought to.
I will pick up on a couple of the points made by contributors. First, on exceptional circumstances, I seem to be being criticised both for refusing to define “exceptional circumstances” and for putting it too broadly. I deliberately did not gloss or parse the phrase. “Exceptional circumstances” is a phrase used in other legislation, for example the Sentencing Act 2020 and the Firearms Act 1968. We believe it is best to leave it to the courts to interpret and apply that phrase, and not to parse or gloss it from the Dispatch Box.
The noble Lord, Lord Marks, picked up on the word “totally”, which appears, as he said, in a press release form the Ministry of Justice. That shows the importance of leaving it to the words in the statute and not looking at anything else when the courts interpret those words.
An example was given of an off-duty police officer intervening in a fight in a pub. It is right to say that there is no requirement for the offender to know that the victim is an emergency worker acting as such. We stand by that. That is already the approach in other legislation passed by Parliament—for example, the Assaults on Emergency Workers Act 2018. There is no requirement in that Act, either, for the defendant to know that the victim is an emergency worker, although in most cases that will be apparent to the defendant.
For the unlawful act of manslaughter offence to apply in this case, the defendant must have been committing a criminal offence. If the actions of someone are such that they not only commit a criminal offence, but their actions further result in the death of an emergency worker who may be attempting to relieve that very situation, the Government believe the behaviour warrants a life sentence.
I come now to what we mean by a life sentence. I have already dealt with the “exceptional circumstances” point, so I turn to the point on life sentences raised first by my noble friend Lord Hailsham—regarding tariffs—and then more directly by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. When a person is sentenced to a life term and not a whole life term, the judge will set out what the tariff is. Then it is a matter for the Parole Board to determine release, and the person will be under a life licence thereafter.
These provisions do nothing to circumscribe the ability of the trial judge to impose whatever tariff they think is appropriate in the circumstances. If the trial judge thinks a lower tariff is appropriate—the word “modest” was used by my noble friend—no doubt that is what they will impose. As in the case of murder, we believe the offence warrants a life sentence with a tariff and the consequences therewith.
I hear the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that a life sentence does not normally mean that the person stays in prison for their whole life. That is the case across a swathe of criminal law, and maybe on a future occasion the House can decide whether that is an appropriate way to continue. Given that that is our sentencing structure—which I think is correct—it is also appropriate in this case.
I think the debate comes down to whether one accepts that the example given by my noble friend Lord Hailsham of the off-duty officer in civilian clothes who intervenes in a fight—
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. One point he has not dealt with, as I understand it, is why the Sentencing Council and sentencing guidelines are not seen as an adequate and flexible mechanism for dealing with cases of this kind. We need a reasoned explanation for the rejection of that proposition.
The reasoned explanation is that the Government believe that this is an offence which should be marked by a life sentence—a mandatory life sentence. The amount of time the person serves can be set by the judge in a tariff.
The Minister has just given the game away by his slip of the tongue. He said it is a case which should be marked by “a life sentence”, and then he said, “a mandatory life sentence”. He was right before he made the slip of the tongue. That is exactly what judges can do and exactly what the Sentencing Council can deal with. I am afraid that I do not accept that his explanation so far has been reasoned.
We are now having precisely the opposite debate to the one we had in Committee. In Committee, when someone said to me—I think it was the noble Baroness, Lady Jones—“this is a mandatory sentence” and I said, “but there are exceptions”, it was said to me, “no, it is mandatory”. Now, when I am trying to point out that it is not mandatory, in the sense that it is a mandatory life sentence but it does not mean you serve life in prison, that is said to be a slip of the tongue. I absolutely meant what I said: this provision sets out a mandatory life sentence, because the Government believe that is the right way to mark society’s horror at the killing of emergency workers, in the same way that we do for murder.
However, with murder, and in this case, the trial judge will have the ability to set an appropriate tariff. Also, unlike with murder, the trial judge can, in exceptional circumstances, depart from the sentence entirely, something which society and Parliament does not enable a trial judge to do in any murder case. With great respect to the noble Lord—
I am sorry to interrupt again, but the Minister has said something completely untenable. He said that under “exceptional circumstances”, the judge has the power to depart from the sentence entirely. That is absolutely not the case. If the sentencing guidelines in front of any judge sitting in a criminal court lead to the conclusion that the starting point for the sentencing process is a life sentence, but there are circumstances at which different levels can be set, they will operate on that basis. This provision is unnecessary if we trust the judges. The Government are telling us, on the basis of belief, as the Minister said—which I do not necessarily regard as reasoned—that they do not trust judges to pass appropriate sentences in these cases, on the basis of one or two instances, when there is a perfectly good living instrument for dealing with this.
My Lords, with genuine respect, the noble Lord is wrong if he thinks that that is what I have said. Let me be clear: if there are exceptional circumstances, the judge is entitled to depart from the sentence. In other words, the judge does not have to impose the life sentence. The judge will then decide what sentence to impose. With the greatest respect, I was right to say that if there are exceptional circumstances, the life sentence does not apply. If there are no exceptional circumstances, the life sentence does apply, and the judge will then set a relevant tariff.
But does not all of this imply that we are really not serving any purpose by the new clause, partly because of the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and also the point conceded very fairly by the Minister to the effect that the trial judge can impose in reality a very low tariff? So the question is, what is the point?
My Lords, I have explained that. There is a difference between being given a life sentence with a 10-year tariff and being given a sentence of 10 years. That is a point that we all accept in the case of murder.
That is true, too, but the case of murder arises from the original bargain made with Parliament and the country at the time when capital punishment was abolished. That does not apply as an argument to what we are doing now.
My noble friend is absolutely right to say that that is the origin of the life sentence for murder. It was a deal done, if I can put it in those respectful terms, but we have life sentences elsewhere in our legislation as well. The point that I was seeking to answer—and, with great respect, I think I have answered it—was, as I understood it when it was put against me: what is the difference if the trial judge is going to give a tariff of x years, why not just have a sentence of x years? However, there is a difference, as we all recognise, between a life sentence with a tariff of x years and a sentence of x years. We can have a debate—
My Lords, does the Minister not run the risk of ending up, in the case of the pub brawl, with the offender being sentenced to life but with only a four-year tariff?
I would not use the word “risk” at all. On the one hand, I am being charged with not trusting the judges and, on the other, giving the judges too much discretion. I am entirely happy with a trial judge having the ability to set an appropriate tariff in these cases, as trial judges do in all cases of murder. Whether the tariff given is four, 10, 15, 20 or 30 years is entirely a matter for the judge. I am entirely happy to trust the judge. However, it is absolutely right for Parliament to say that, in these cases, where somebody has committed an unlawful act that has led to the death of an emergency worker who was acting as such, a life sentence ought to be the correct response from the court. Two points arise. First, with great respect to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, if there are exceptional circumstances, that sentence does not apply at all. Secondly, if it applies, the judge can impose a tariff.
Forgive me—and I thank the Minister—but perhaps I might ask him whether it is reasonable that a 16 or 17 year-old should be on lifetime licence when alternatively he might get the time of detention plus another three or four years. A lifetime licence means that he is under the control of probation officers from the age of 16 for the rest of his natural life.
My Lords, we have considered this. We restricted the new sentence to 16 and 17 year-olds to ensure that only older children who are convicted of this serious offence are given a mandatory life sentence, unless there are exceptional circumstances that mean it is not justified. Of course, exceptional circumstances are not just those relating to the offence but those relating to the offender. There is a precedent for this age distinction. The Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 also uses the age of 16 as a threshold to begin applying minimum sentences for knife-crime offences. So we have considered the point made by the noble and learned Baroness.
I am so sorry, but I do not understand why we are arguing about this. We are all dissatisfied with what the Government are doing, yet none of us can stop it. It is all angels dancing on the head of a pin, as far as I can see. I am really distressed at this and wish that I had spoken to more people and perhaps got some others onside. The Government are making a mistake and that is what the Minister should hear from this debate.
I was not going to say anything, but I am, I think, the only former police officer in the Chamber. Is the Minister saying that he would be satisfied if somebody were sent to prison for four years for killing a police officer on duty in these circumstances? That seems to be what the noble and learned Lord is saying. In which case, what is the point?
I know it is bad form, but perhaps I can answer in reverse order. I certainly was not saying that. Indeed, the point that I was trying to make was that I was not going to get into what an appropriate tariff would be in any case; I regard that as absolutely a matter for the trial judge. It is not helpful for trial judges or indeed anybody else for Ministers on their feet to hypothesise as to what they might think an appropriate tariff would be in a particular case. The tariff is entirely a matter for the trial judge, who will decide it in the way in which they decide tariffs in other cases of life sentences as well.
To the noble and gallant Lord—forgive me, I am not sure whether I have that right; he is proud not to be a lawyer, a point with which I sympathise—I say that we brought in this amendment as soon as we had thought about the policy and, we think, got it right. When we were thinking about this issue, there were there were a number of points in the policy that required very careful consideration. That took time and that is why it is happening now. I cannot say any more than that.
I was going to acknowledge another point made, but I think I have already responded.
I apologise for not being here at the outset, but I have listened very carefully to what has been said and it seems to me that it would be wrong simply to steamroller this amendment through now when virtually everyone who has spoken has done so very eloquently against it. Would it be possible to take it away, talk to learned Members of this House and come back at Third Reading with something that might be more acceptable ?
Like the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, I, too, apologise for not being here at the outset when my noble friend Lord Hailsham began. I know that next week we are going to talk about IPPs. That subject carries with it all the problems that this subject will bring with it. We now know that IPPs went wrong and have created injustices, and that there are people who have IPPs but short tariffs well past their expiry date and who are still in prison 10 or 15 years after their sentencing. Could we not learn the lessons from the IPP problem and, in order to help us learn those lessons, postpone a decision on this clause until after we have had the IPP debate, so that together we can draw a united conclusion about how best to move forward with justice?
My Lords, the joys of the IPP debate are ahead of us. That raises very different points. The IPP sentence has different characteristics and the problems that it has given rise to are entirely different. I listened very carefully to the debate in Committee on IPPs, when a number of noble and noble and learned Lords expressed disquiet and tabled various amendments. They will know that I have had conversations with them about it. So I am entirely alive to the IPP issue, but that is completely separate from this issue. We consider that this measure is an appropriate response to this form of offending.
The Minister listened very carefully to the debate in Committee on IPP. Some of us have read that and thought about it a lot since then. The problem is that noble Lords have not had the opportunity to listen very carefully to the debate on this particular amendment: that is the problem, in a way. It is not a straightforward amendment. I learned of it by hearing about it via the media and thought it could not possibly be being brought forward in relation to this Bill; I actually explained to people that they did not understand the way in which legislation was made, and that that was just something that the media said. Then, I realised that it was happening.
The Minister was very good and answered some of my queries and made sure that I did not fight any straw men when I went to him with particular arguments. He was very considerate in answering them. However, I do not think that the House has had the chance to consider this amendment. It is not without parallel to the IPP, inasmuch as it is a controversial sentencing change that has very big implications. We know that, because in the press release and the media reports, it was said that this would change everything. That is how it was announced: it was proclaimed as something that would change everything. Therefore, if it is going to change everything, people in this House should have a chance to debate it more thoroughly than now, so it is reasonable to ask if it could be brought forward later on in the Bill in order for some consideration to be given.
I do not know which of the no-doubt multifarious press releases the noble Baroness read, but it was clear in the ones that I saw that the matter was going to be brought back here. This amendment was, I understand, tabled on 1 December, so the issue has been live. I am very happy to take any further interventions. That was probably not a good idea.
My Lords, I cannot resist the temptation. Would the Minister be prepared to express some uncertainty about the “exceptional” rule? If he expressed that uncertainty, it would mean that a Third Reading amendment to the noble Lord’s amendment would be acceptable.
My Lords, I am not quite sure what I am being asked to accept, but I do not have any uncertainty as to what “exceptional circumstances” is. It is a phrase used in this legislation; it is used in other legislation; it is a phrase that is well known to the courts. It is a phrase that they are perfectly able to deal with.
The relevance of IPP sentences to this debate is that, when IPP sentences were introduced, rather similar speeches were made from the Front Bench to the one that the Minister is making tonight. I know his style his different, but the fact remains that it was a disaster and a scandal. It developed in ways in which all those who introduced it did not anticipate, and now concede was wrong, but they had not fully understood at the time what the consequences were. This has all those hallmarks about it.
As I said, I am very alive to the IPP issues, as the noble Lord knows; but the IPP issue and the IPP sentence was a novel sentence which did things that other sentences did not do. Indeed, that is why it was brought in. The shape of this sentence, however, is not novel. It is the application to this particular offence that is new. With the greatest of respect, therefore, I disagree with the comparison to IPP sentences, which were themselves novel.
I hope that I have set out the government position clearly and fairly—
My Lords, the noble Lord started his contribution to this debate by saying that he was listening. Surely, he has heard from the House that the House is not content to allow this amendment to pass at this stage. Surely, the only reasonable thing to do in these circumstances—because nobody wants to divide on this issue here and now—is for the Minister to say that he will take it away and bring it back at Third Reading once noble Lords have had a chance to discuss the issue with him between now and Third Reading.
As I hope the House knows from this Bill and plenty of other Bills, I am very happy to discuss issues with anyone at any time. However, points of principle have been made, and points of principle have been answered by me as clearly and cogently as I am able to do. I think that the appropriate thing to do—relative newcomer as I am to this House—is that the Question on the amendment should be put. If people want to—
My Lords, I am not convinced that the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, is correct because if we delay the amendment, we would be putting it at the back of the Bill, but it has to be in this position in the Bill. Therefore, I think we should leave it until Third Reading rather than delay it.
My Lords, I am not going to try to adjudicate on that point, which seems to be a point of procedure, better left to those who know more about it than I do. I have listened very carefully to the debate, and points of principle have been raised. With genuine respect, however, I believe that I have set out the Government’s position on those points of principle. Kicking the can down the road—attractive as that can sometimes appear—will not achieve anything substantive.
This is pretty shocking. There is a lot of support for the principle that the amendment could be so much better if it could be debated. I completely understand the noble Lord’s embarrassment. He does not want to go back to the Ministry of Justice and not have the amendment, but if you want good law, recognising that the Government want this, there is so much that could be discussed to make this provision better.
The noble Baroness, Lady Williams, agreed without any pressure on two things in relation to the additional protest measures. First, she agreed that they should come at the end of Committee and secondly, she did not move them in Committee because of the exact problem that has arisen in this case. She indicates the right way forward. We would greatly appreciate in the House if the noble Lord would show us the same courtesy that the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, showed us.
I am very happy to be accused of all sorts of things, but I hope that nobody in this House believes that I act either towards it or towards any of its Members with discourtesy. We may have disagreements, but they are always, I hope, courteous. I am not in the least embarrassed about going back to the Ministry of Justice with or without anything. My task, as I see it, is to set out the Government’s position in this House and then the House has to take a view.
With great respect to the noble and learned Lord, I do not accept that this is a question of tweaking the provision or making it better. The points that have been put to me are really points of principle—people do not agree with this at all, while saying, “Of course we agree.” The matter ought to be presented to the House and dealt with by it today.
Following on from the remarks of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, can the Government agree to the House being adjourned for half an hour or so, so that there can be a discussion between the usual channels and between the groups in the House as to how this should continue? We would be very grateful and it would be seen as a matter of utmost but necessary courtesy.
Any Member of the House can call a vote but, if the Minister is not willing to accede to any of the suggestions that have been made, it is the obligation of the Front Benches to indicate that they are so dissatisfied, in the light of all the debate and the fact that we have only had a week to consider this, that they will divide the House. If they were so to indicate, that might impose a bit more pressure on the Minister.
In the last week, as is my wont, I have had discussions with a number of Members of this House on this matter. Any Member of the House knows that my door is always open to them, metaphorically and often literally. All the discussions that I have had on this amendment have been ones that I have reached out to others to have. Nobody has knocked on my door. In those circumstances, I cannot say that we will adjourn. If I am told differently, that will be for others to decide. At the moment, I will ask the House to vote on my amendment.
My Lords, I hate to intervene on my noble friend but I will formally move that the House be adjourned for one hour.
My Lords, I want to put it on record that in the last week, when this amendment has been tabled, all the engagement I have had on this matter I have facilitated, and I have reached out to. Not a single Member of this House has reached out to me about this amendment. I beg to move the amendment.
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberTo ask Her Majesty’s Government, further to the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman’s Independent investigation into the death of Baby A at HMP Bronzefield on 27 September 2019, published on 22 September, what assessment they have made of (1) their policies, and (2) the sentencing guidelines, for pregnant women offenders.
My Lords, this was an appalling event. In consultation with health partners and contracted providers, we have taken a range of immediate and long-term actions locally and nationally to prevent it happening again, including a new policy on pregnancy in women’s prisons. Remand and sentencing decisions are matters for the independent judiciary. We are taking steps to ensure that courts have relevant information, including on pregnancy where known, and we are investing in alternatives to custody.
I thank the Minister for the positive response the Government have given to the ombudsman’s report on this shocking case, in which a troubled teenager who was on a local authority at-risk register and on remand was left to give birth on her own in a prison cell, where the baby tragically died. Sadly, we learn that this was not an isolated incident, but we do not know the extent. So why does the Prison Service not release comprehensive data on miscarriages, stillbirths and baby deaths?
The ombudsman’s report said:
“We consider that all pregnancies in prison should be treated as high risk by virtue of the fact that the woman is locked behind a door for a significant amount of time.”
In light of this, can the Minister tell me whether the Government will use persuasion and statutory force to ensure that the welfare of unborn babies and children must be a primary consideration for the courts when making bail and sentencing decisions?
I will pick up on that last point first. We are seeking to ensure that courts have all relevant information when making bail and sentencing decisions. The default is that, if there is no reason to keep somebody on remand, they must be given bail unless there is a good reason why they should not have bail. When it comes to sentencing, custody is always the last alternative, and pregnancy is a mitigating factor.
As far as prisons are concerned, we have accepted all the recommendations in the ombudsman’s report. We have put a new policy in place; prisons have six months to implement it.
My Lords, Committee on the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill was grateful to hear the Minister say on 1 November that
“there has been a revolution, a real sea change, in the judiciary. They really ‘get it’ when it comes to female offenders and primary carers.”—[Official Report, 1/11/21; col. 1042.]
Following on from what we have already heard, can the Government provide evidence on the extent to which sentencing guidelines on the mitigating factors associated with pregnancy and primary caring are being followed by sentencers? Also, can the Minister provide information on how many sentencers have completed training on safeguarding children when sentencing primary carers?
The obligation to have regard to whether somebody is a primary carer is part of the sentencing guidelines, which are mandatory and must be followed by all sentencers in all parts of the courts system. On whether this is being carried through, I point out to the right reverend Prelate that the number of women in custody has been falling consistently; we think this indicates that courts are following the guidelines properly.
My Lords, one of the most important recommendations of HM Inspectorate in looking at this tragic case was directed at the National Health Service, because the NHS has clear responsibilities in relation to not just maternity services but other services. Is the Minister satisfied that the NHS is rising to that challenge? What levers does he have if he finds problems with that?
The noble Lord is absolutely right to identify that this is an area where we need my department and the NHS to work together. The important thing is that women in prison must have access to the same standard of service that they would have in the community. We have put together a board, which goes across the MoJ and the Department of Health and Social Care, to do exactly what the noble Lord identifies: namely, make sure that our health partners are as focused on this as we are.
My Lords, I pay tribute to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester—my bishop—for her valuable work with prisoners. Should we not have for offenders more modern facilities that work to educate and rehabilitate? Will the Minister look again at the study Rehabilitation by Design, which shows best practice in other countries and which I have mentioned in this House before?
The noble Lord is absolutely right that the design of prisons is important in this context. We are providing more, newer and better-designed places in the women’s estate. That has been informed by design to include things such as windows without bars, smaller units and bigger association spaces. We are also trying to remove dark, narrow corridors and blind corners, which can trigger responses. We must remember that most women in the prison estate have had very difficult pasts. We are thinking about the way we design prisons to minimise additional trauma for women when they are in prison.
My Lords, inhuman treatment and neglect are not part of any sentence handed down by British courts to anyone, let alone to pregnant women offenders. In view of the Baby A case, the circumstances of which are truly shameful, will the Government establish an independent monitoring service for pregnant prisoners to provide confidence that the standards of care are appropriate? Until that monitoring service is established, can the Minister tell us whether the Government will undertake to implement the ombudsman’s recommendations in full, and that the provision of care for such vulnerable women in our care will be pondered sufficiently?
My Lords, there is rather a lot in that. As far as the ombudsman is concerned, we and the Prison and Probation Service have accepted and completed the implementation of the recommendations. We have set up the board, which I mentioned in response to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath. We have put a lot of money into this area. I am not convinced that setting up another inspection body is needed; we already have a very robust inspection regime for prisons, with a specific focus on prisoners with additional vulnerabilities, including pregnancy.
This is, as everybody who has read the report knows, a horrific case. I want to raise two issues. First, the Minister rightly said that the statutory position at the moment is that the same standard of care should be available in prison as is available in the community. The ombudsman’s report said that the midwife-led community approach is wholly inappropriate for a prison, where everybody should be treated as high-risk. Does the Minister not agree that the time is now right for a statutory duty to be placed on the prison authorities to ensure that the care provided is
“appropriate to a custodial setting”?
Secondly, and separately, eight prison officers came near to Ms A during the course of that horrific night and none of them spotted what was going on. Can the Minister tell us how many prison officers on duty that night had more than two years’ experience, and how many had more than five years’ experience? Our concern is that there is a lack of experience in the Prison Service. I gave the Minister some notice of this question, but not enough, probably.
My Lords, I am afraid that I am not convinced that a new statutory duty is the way to resolve this. I think the statutory framework is sufficient. What we need to ensure is that the duties are actually implemented on the ground in prisons.
So far as the staff on duty are concerned, the noble and learned Lord did give me a little bit of notice for this, as he said, but not very much. I do not have the information to hand, but the ombudsman looked at this incident in great detail and did not raise as an issue either the sufficiency of the staffing levels or the experience of the staff on duty.
My Lords, following on from the previous question, I have a further one on the training of staff in prisons. If there are six months to implement the ombudsman’s recommendations, will this include some training for all staff in women’s prisons on what to do if they suspect that early labour has started?
My Lords, all new prison officers working within the women’s estate will complete a new module on pregnancy, which is starting in January. We are also developing a two-day course for all staff working directly with pregnant women and mothers separated from young children, and that is part of our implementation strategy for our new policy for pregnant women in prison.
I was going to ask about training, but I was glad to hear that answer. On a different topic—and forgive my ignorance here—within the sentencing guidelines, how much weight is given to the cost to society when a woman who is kept on remand for a short sentence then loses her home and her children, and the children have to go into care? She would have no home when she comes out, so she could not take them back. That is a cost to society. How much weight is given within the sentencing guidelines to that sort of issue?
It is very important that the implementation of sentencing guidelines is a matter for independent judges and not government Ministers. What I can say is that judges and sentencers of all sorts have to consider the effect of the sentence not only on the person being sentenced but on people for whom they care. That will particularly apply to young children, and in the case of pregnant women it will also apply to the unborn child.
My Lords, all supplementary questions have been asked. We now move to the next Question.
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberI accept that the age of criminal responsibility should go up. I strongly endorse what everybody is saying about the Government and, in particular, I endorse what the noble Lord, Lord Marks, is saying about the Government showing leadership in this respect. I also endorse what he says about the Government needing to show leadership in standing out against campaigns that seek to criminalise people under 10 or, in the campaign that he was referring to, between 10 and 12. My point, which I keep coming back to, is that this Committee should not underestimate, or treat as simply got-up, campaigns concerning the justice system, which in some ways expands beyond the criminal justice system, in cases such as the Bulger case.
My Lords, these amendments concern youth justice matters. I will address each of them in turn.
Amendment 219B, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, would require the centralised monitoring of youth remand decisions made by the court and the laying of a report of findings before Parliament on an annual basis. I understand that the amendment’s purpose is to improve the scrutiny and monitoring of youth remand trends. However, that is precisely what our measures seek to achieve, as I will explain, while leaving the detail of operational processes to the various operational bodies. We think that this is the better way to do it.
The new measures will require the court to be explicit that they have considered not only the two sets of conditions but the interests and welfare of the child. Furthermore, while at the moment the court only has to explain the reason for remand in open court and specify it in the warrant and in the register, our new subsection (5)(za) requires that the court also gives the reasons in writing to the child, their legal representative and the youth offending team, which will enhance the ability of those justice partners to monitor the reasons for custodial remand.
Turning to the specific question put to me by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, on what arrangements are in place for monitoring courts’ decisions and whether statistics are readily available, as I have said, courts already state in open court their reasons for remanding the child to youth detention accommodation. That information is included on the warrant of commitment and the court register. Pronouncement cards from the Sentencing Council provide guidance to the judiciary on how to do that.
As for statistics, my department already publishes annual statistics on court outcomes on youth remand. The population on remand in the youth custody estate is published monthly. We have new IT systems being developed and, in light of those new systems, we will reconsider the best way to collect, analyse and, so far as is appropriate, publish the information that courts will now be required to provide in writing. However, it is best to leave that granular level of operational process to the entities doing the work on the ground, rather than to prescribe it in statute. Our intentions are certainly aligned. I am sure that the noble and learned Lord will appreciate the need for pragmatism in how best to achieve that.
Amendments 220, 221 and 221ZA seek to raise the age of criminal responsibility from 10 to 12 and to require the Secretary of State to complete a review of the age of criminal responsibility including, as my noble friend Lord Sandhurst explained, an assessment of the protected characteristics of children in detention, under the Equality Act. I listened very carefully to my noble friend and, I think it is fair to say, I set out the position on that in some detail on Monday. With respect, I am not going over that again. I hope I made the Government’s position clear on Monday.
I am grateful to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss for raising Amendment 220. I am aware, as she said, that she has brought this to the attention of the House on a number of previous occasions. As far as open ears are concerned, I assure the noble and learned Baroness that my ears are always open. I listened carefully to her speech and the speeches of the noble and learned Lords, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. I join other noble Lords in wishing the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, who is absent, a speedy and full recovery.
I will set out the Government’s position on this issue. We believe that setting the age of criminal responsibility at 10 provides flexibility in dealing with children, allowing early intervention with the aim of preventing subsequent offending. Our primary objective when it comes to children, as I have made clear on previous groups, is to prevent children offending in the first place. Where there is offending, we need to provide the police and courts with effective tools to tackle it. Critically, having the age of criminal responsibility at 10 does not preclude other types of intervention—for example, diversion from the criminal justice system—where it would be a more suitable and proportionate response. To that extent, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord German, that diversion from the criminal justice system should be at the heart of how we approach children in the vast majority of cases.
When considering the most appropriate and proportionate response to offending by a young person, the maturity and needs of a child, as well as their age—to make the obvious point, a 12 year-old is not a 17 year-old—are always considered. We also consider protected characteristics in our work, as per the public sector equalities duty. This is borne out in practice. Most children aged 10 to 14 are diverted from the formal criminal justice system or receive an out of court disposal. The number of children aged between 10 and 12 years in the youth justice system has fallen dramatically since 2009, and we are keen for that downward trend to continue. Since 2010, which is more than a decade ago, no 10 or 11 year-olds have received a custodial sentence.
It is, however, important—to this extent, I adopt the remarks of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton—to ensure that, when appropriate, serious offences can be prosecuted and the public protected. The horrific Bulger case has been mentioned by a number of noble Lords and I remember it clearly. I grew up in Liverpool and it shocked my native city to the core. Whether we are talking about the Bulger case or any case involving children, even the most serious, there is a distinct and separate sentencing framework for children aged 10 to 17, which recognises that they have their own specific needs that require a different and more tailored approach. That looks at age, so someone aged 13 is treated differently from someone aged 17 and a half. As noted by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, that pervades the approach of the criminal justice system to children. It is not a matter just of clothing, words or wigs; there is a fundamentally different approach tailored to dealing with children.
I appreciate that there is a range of ages across Europe. We are at 10; some are at 12; some are at 14; some are at other ages. I have sought to set out why we believe that 10 is the correct age, given the way that our criminal justice system deals with children. I appreciate that what I have said will not have persuaded the noble and learned Baroness, but it is not simply a question of looking at the age but at how the criminal justice system as a whole responds to very young offenders.
As far as the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child is concerned, Her Majesty’s Government believe that we are in compliance with our international obligations. Indeed, as the noble and learned Baroness will know, that convention was the subject of a recent Supreme Court decision on the different ways in which England—or to be more precise, the UK—and Scotland, which wants to incorporate it into domestic legislation, have applied that convention.
I thank my noble friend the Minister for his response. On the jurisdiction of under-18 year-olds, it does not address the fact that they will not get all the wraparound services and support from the youth court and youth practitioners. Furthermore, if they go to the adult court, they will still not get a referral.
I am grateful to my noble friend for the question, and for taking the time to discuss it with me in the past. Because the offender is 18 at the time of the case and of the sentence, the system has to respond to the fact that they are now adult. It may well be, in some cases, inappropriate to lump that adult in with children. Some sentences and responses that the youth court can give to children would be inappropriate for someone who is now an adult of 18. I suggest that the fact that the court starts with the sentence that would have been appropriate at the time of the offence, and then takes into account all other relevant factors, means that we deal with these cases suitably, bearing in mind the time gap before sentencing during which the offender has reached legal maturity.
My amendment was the monitoring amendment and was not the heat and burden of this debate. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, Amendments 222 and 223, which I move today on behalf of the Government, are technical amendments to Clause 139, which clarifies that 16 to 19 academies can provide secure accommodation and allows for the establishment and running of secure 16 to 19 academies to be treated as a charitable purpose. The amendments, as can be seen from the Marshalled List, are a technical tweak, and will have no practical impact on the children or young people placed in these secure academies, or on how the academies are run. They are simply there to ensure consistency with other education legislation. “Pupil” is defined in the education Acts to refer to those attending a school; 16 to 19 academies are not, in the legal sense, schools, and “student” is the standard term used in the context of such academies.
I am conscious that this group also contains amendments from the noble Lord, Lord German, on the organisations which can establish a secure school, and from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, on local authorities’ secure accommodation provisions. I propose, if the Committee finds it helpful, to pause my remarks now, having introduced my amendments, and allow other noble Lords to speak to those amendments, and then I will respond. I see some nodding heads. If that meets with the Committee’s approval, I will sit down, having formally moved my amendments.
I am going to talk about Amendment 223B onwards; Amendment 223A comes first, but I am happy to start with those.
Amendments 223B to 223F have been suggested by the Mayor of London’s office to place a new duty on relevant local authorities in England to convene a new secure accommodation local partnership board that would assess the need for secure accommodation and develop a strategy for tackling any shortfall in secure accommodation. There is, as everybody knows, a significant lack of secure beds in London for young people who come into contact with the criminal justice system. This results in them being dispersed across the country, far away from their families and the professionals committed to their care and well-being.
While this is a particular concern in London, it is also the case in other parts of the country. There are only 15 secure children’s homes in England and Wales, and none in the London area. The recent decision of the Ministry of Justice to remove all children from a key institution detaining young offenders in the United Kingdom—namely, the Rainsbrook Secure Training Centre—meant that more London children were sent away from where they lived. They are being provided with neither the care nor the welfare that they need as vulnerable young people. The recent critical inspection report on the Oakhill Secure Training Centre, alongside the decision to close Rainsbrook, also raises worrying concerns about the future of this type of facility.
It is crucial that such provision is available for those who might be placed there on welfare grounds and for those within the criminal justice system. Amendments 223B, 223C, 223D, 223E and 223F, in the name of my noble friend Lord Ponsonby, give effect to this proposal.
My Lords, I am very grateful to those who have spoken in this short debate. Clearly this amendment is at the centre of this group of amendments. In summing up what everyone has said, I would say that the direction everyone has travelled in is not that these schools or academies should be provided by local authorities, but that they should be given the right to tender to provide those schools or academies.
The judgment that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, made, was that it does not matter who runs them, providing they get the very best education for these very vulnerable children. The standard of education is what is important, not who runs them. At present, local authorities are excluded simply because there is a view that anything called an “academy” in England cannot be run by a local authority, which seems to create an absolute block to the opportunity for everyone in these institutions to have the best opportunities for life and education.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, these are the most vulnerable of children and young people; their lives and futures are at stake. The noble Baroness, Lady Blower, talked of the qualities of the teachers. These teachers have to be the very best, because they are facing the most difficult of circumstances and it becomes a real challenge. It requires a very special person indeed to devote their life to this sort of education. Where you find the best teachers is in the quality of the tender exercise for these establishments.
Excluding local authorities because they breach the Government’s standard that any academy must not be run by a local authority seems to miss the point. My noble friend Lord Marks talked about the experiment with the rehabilitation companies. A lot of effort went into those. The one thing that was totally absent at the end was the engagement of the charitable and voluntary sector. In other words, because they were driven by having to meet a contract, they were not driven by providing the best service for rehabilitation. Quite rightly, that system has now been overturned.
It drives one to think that, if you have as your goals what is best for the child and what are the best services you can provide, excluding those with the most expertise in this area seems simply crazy. I hope that the Minister will be able to address these matters and take on board the whole point of these amendments, which is not to prescribe local government but to offer it the opportunity where it can compete, providing it can offer the best. What matters is the best for our children, not who should run the service.
My Lords, I first turn to Amendment 223A from the noble Lord, Lord German, which would allow local authorities to “establish and maintain” secure academies and prevent any for-profit corporation doing this.
Dealing with those points in turn, first, we are not aware of any specific legislative barrier to the provision of secure 16 to 19 academies by local authorities. However, it is government policy that academy trusts are not local authority influenced bodies. As a result, no academy in England is operated by a local authority and our position here is to mirror academies’ policies and procedures in secure schools to the greatest extent possible. That said—
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. Has he had regard to Section 6 of the Academies Act, which provides that a local authority must cease to maintain a secure school if it becomes an academy? That seems to have the effect of ruling out local authority involvement, even if it operates in a slightly circuitous way.
It might well be that it operates in a slightly circuitous way. I have not looked at that section myself. Let me look at it after I sit down. If I need to upgrade, so to speak, what I have said, I will write to the noble Lord, because I do not want to understate the position if I have inadvertently done so. I will look at the section later—I hope, today.
The noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, said that it is not so much about the name of the institution as about what goes on within it. On that, I strongly agree, as I do on the importance of education in this context, especially in the example given by the noble Lord, of somebody who it appears had not had the benefit of any education before. That is therefore especially appropriate.
At the same time as what I said earlier about local authorities, it is right to say that local authorities have a statutory duty to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in their local area. We would therefore expect secure school providers to work closely with local authorities in relation to the well-being of children in their care. It is important to note also that secure children’s homes, which can be run by local authorities, remain an important part of the current and future youth custodial estate.
Let me deal particularly with the profit motive, which seemed to lie at the heart of a number of contributions to this debate. As academies, secure 16 to 19 academies will be state funded with the core charitable purpose of providing education for the public benefit. All academies, including 16 to 19 academies, are part of an academy trust, which is a not-for-profit charitable entity and, as such, cannot make a profit—or, to be more precise, any profits which are made have to be ploughed back into the purpose of the trust. Secure schools will always be run by non-profit organisations. I therefore hope, in light of what I have said, that it will be appreciated that the second part of this amendment, proposed new subsection (9), preventing profit corporations establishing or maintaining these academies, is unnecessary.
On Amendments 223B to 223F, presented to the Committee by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, I have assumed that these amendments are intended to apply to children looked after by local authorities, but it is worth noting that secure accommodation is used more widely, including for children who are detained by the police and for children who are sentenced or remanded as part of criminal court proceedings.
Local authorities have a duty under the Children Act 1989 to ensure sufficient appropriate accommodation for all the children they look after. I recognise that some local authorities have found it difficult accessing in practice the most appropriate accommodation, particularly for children with the most complex needs. The lack of available and suitable placements for those most vulnerable children is extremely concerning and is something which I and the Government take seriously. We are taking significant steps to support local authorities to fulfil their statutory duties. A programme of work is starting this year to support local authorities to maintain existing capacity and expand provision in secure children’s homes. That means that children can live closer to their previous home and in provision which best meets their needs.
Let me deal specifically with Rainsbrook, to which the noble and learned Lord referred. The situation there is completely unacceptable. We acted decisively to empty the site. All children have now been removed from Rainsbrook. We transferred them to alternative appropriate accommodation within the youth secure estate. We are working through the contractual options with MTC on the future of that contract. When we have completed that work, we will make a further announcement.
In response to the recent concerns about performance at Oakhill, the former Lord Chancellor commissioned Ofsted to undertake a monitoring visit. That took place on 13 September. The report was published within a month, on 11 October, and noted concerns that inspectors had had. Having subsequently attended the centre for a full annual inspection at the beginning of October, Ofsted, together with the Chief Inspector of Prisons and the Care Quality Commission, invoked the urgent notification process at Oakhill on 14 October; that is, within the last month. On the 11th of this month, a response was published to Ofsted and the accompanying action plan, and we are now considering plans to ensure sufficient accommodation for those children at the site.
The spending review announced another £259 million to continue the programme to maintain capacity, expand provision and support local authorities in this regard. There is also the independently-led care review to support improvements to children’s social care and ensure that good practice is applied to every child. That review is expected to be published in the spring. I do not want to pre-empt it now, but we are alive to the particular needs of the children in this cohort.
I have received a note—I will keep my word to look at this matter again later—which indicates that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, may have erred. It is such an astonishing proposition that I will check it for myself later. I am told that he may have nodded in the sense that Section 6 relates to schools being converted to academies. It has no impact on local authorities entering into funding agreements with the Secretary of State. Whether the noble Lord has misunderstood, or whether the note I have been provided with is somewhat cryptic, I will keep my promise to look at it myself later in the day.
The Minister mentioned £259 million in relation to the secure training programme. I may have not quite heard what he said. Is that new money or is it just maintaining the existing amount of money per annum?
My understanding is that the £259 million was announced in the spending review to continue the programme to maintain and expand capacity in both secure and open residential children’s homes. I am not able to say any more than that; it might be a question for my Treasury colleagues to clarify. However, I am also able to clarify it to the noble and learned Lord. Perhaps I can drop him a line on that specific point.
Before the Minister sits down and before I admit to nodding, the point he made is why I referred to the operation of Section 6 as being possibly circuitous. It seems that in certain circumstances it may well apply, and it may well apply more generally.
The reason why I did not say it in terms that I was certain that the noble Lord had got it wrong was precisely that point. It seems that we might be approaching this point from different ends, but I will look at it myself and, if necessary, I will drop noble Lords a note. It may not be necessary given what has now been said.
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have already spoken once. I speak very briefly to say two things. First, what an impressive debate this has been. I draw attention in particular to the speeches of my noble friends Lord Blunkett, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath and Lord Bradley, the noble Lords, Lord Moylan, Lord Ramsbotham and Lord Hogan-Howe, and the noble Baroness, Lady Burt. I draw attention to them because they are not lawyers; they are people who have had contact in other ways with this system and come to the conclusion that it should end.
Secondly, we on this side of the House support all the amendments. Some are alternative ways of dealing with a particular problem, but we support all the proposals. We are not, in the amendments before the House, going as far as some of the speeches went. We are not suggesting the immediate abolition of the sentence. We are saying: support for those in prison to try to get released; support for those who are released to get proper help; and an easier process of having consideration of the licence being got rid of.
As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, said, the one with the teeth is Amendment 208F. It says you get rid of these licences and release the person if they have served more than the sentence for the offence. If you have been sentenced to five years in prison, and that is the maximum sentence, once the maximum is reached, unless the detaining authority can prove that you are still a risk, you get released. If you are still below the maximum sentence for the offence for which you were convicted, but you have been in for 10 years, the same principle applies. It is an incredibly sensible way of ensuring the sentence goes for those who have got it, but you keep inside those who represent a severe danger, as long as the detaining authority can establish that they remain a danger.
I very much hope that the Minister will be able to give some words of comfort to the effect that these very moderate proposals will be taken up by the Government. If there are amendments to these proposals, of course, everybody in the House will consider them, but it is time for a change. These modest proposals require consideration for this Bill, because the biggest disappointment would be to be told that it is coming at some later stage.
My Lords, Amendments 208A to 208H relate to offenders serving sentences of imprisonment for public protection commonly known as IPPs. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who was very kind about my work as a Minister, invited me to put away the departmental brief. I am not going to do that, not least because it might mean that my work as a Minister here ends somewhat prematurely. But that is not inconsistent, I hope, with making it clear to the Committee that I have listened carefully to the debate and to the points raised around the Chamber. I will reread the debate in the Official Report as well.
Of course, I feel the mood of the Committee—that would be impossible to miss. The speeches have been powerful and sometimes heartfelt. Without wishing to ignore others, may I say the contributions from the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, about their personal part in the genesis of IPPs have been unusual and moving. This politician, may I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti—although I see myself still as a lawyer, not a politician—certainly is trying to get this right. I do not think this is an issue which admits of easy analysis. To use the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, it is something of a puzzle, which requires looking at carefully and solving.
I am grateful to those noble Lords who have met with me and discussed the issue. I am sure we will have further discussions between now and Report. I should say that I read Matthew Parris’s column at the end of July as well.
I will go through the amendments and set out the Government’s position, then I will come back at the end to some more general points. Four of the amendments, Amendments 208A to 208C and 208E, the latter from my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier, would require the Government to conduct a review on matters such as sentence progression, resettlement and supervision of prisoners serving an IPP sentence, and to lay a report before both Houses of Parliament.
The Government recognise that work needs to be done in relation to this group of prisoners. I will set out the work that has been done so far. We have put together what I think has been a successful action plan dedicated to the rehabilitation and risk reduction of IPP offenders. We continue to work to increase opportunities for IPP offenders to progress through their sentences via this plan. A qualified psychologist leads a review of the case of every IPP prisoner who is not making the expected progress. Between July 2016 and September this year, which is about five years, just under 1,700—1,679—reviews were completed; 440 prisoners were subsequently released and a further 474 secured a progressive move to more open conditions.
My noble and learned friend Lord Garnier commented on the availability of courses for IPP prisoners to help them make that progress. It is right that during the pandemic there were fewer places on some group interventions. We asked offender managers to look at other sorts of interventions to draw evidence from them for the parole reports. However, we have now been able to ramp up the provision again. Not all IPP prisoners will require the same interventions, of course, but we try to make sure that each prisoner has a suitable pathway, as it is called, to a future safe and sustainable release. That is the focus of the programme. There is a range of interventions, including places on progression regimes, other accredited programmes and places in open prisons. Where a programme is not available for an offender, the prison offender manager would seek to have the prisoner transferred to a prison where the programme is available, subject to a risk assessment and available places. In the meantime, other work would be identified so that the prisoner could undertake that work.
We believe that the action plan is working. High numbers of IPP prisoners are being released each year and the proportion of positive Parole Board decisions remains high. I do not think anybody mentioned this, but let me put it on the record that the Justice Select Committee in the other place has recently launched an inquiry into IPP sentences. Its stated aim is to examine
“the continued existence of IPP sentences and to identify possible legislative and policy solutions.”
The Select Committee will scrutinise what the Government are doing. I have no doubt that it will provide recommendations, which the Government look forward to hearing. I therefore underline that we are doing work in this area. We do not believe that a separate government-led review is necessary at this time.
I turn to Amendment 208D from my noble friend Lord Moylan. Currently, an IPP offender may apply to the Parole Board to have their licence terminated once 10 years from their first release from custody has elapsed. To do that, the offender must give their permission to the Secretary of State to apply to the Parole Board for licence termination on their behalf. The first part of this amendment would therefore remove the legal requirement for the offender to give their permission. Instead, offenders would be automatically rereferred for consideration each year, were they unsuccessful. The second part would change the time period from 10 to five years.
None of the amendments would mean that there would not necessarily be a consideration by the Parole Board, including Amendment 208G, which is the two-year automatic end unless the Government made an application to the Parole Board, so I am not quite sure what the basis of rejection of that one is.
I am not basing it only on what I have called automatic termination. The scheme set out in Amendment 208G would represent a very different approach to management on licence and, for the reasons I have set out, that is not a form of management which we think provides adequate protection to the public. I may come back to that.
Amendment 208H creates a power for the Secretary of State to release an IPP offender who has been recalled to prison, so long as the Secretary of State is satisfied that it is not necessary for public protection for the offender to remain in prison. The position at the moment is that the Parole Board has a responsibility to assess whether offenders are safe to be released into the community, even after an IPP offender is recalled to prison. They can take a decision to rerelease from only 28 days after the offender is recalled. We believe that the Parole Board’s expertise in determining whether offenders serving indeterminate sentences are safe to be released is, as I said, an essential tool of public protection.
If I may, I come back to where I started, with the words of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. Again, I am grateful for his kind words. I agree that there are certainly problems with the current system; we are looking at it. We believe that our IPP action plan has achieved significant results and we keep it under constant review. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, in what I have learned to be his habit of putting his finger on the point at issue, asked, “Well, what is going to be done?” I hope that I have made it clear that I have listened to the debate very carefully, and that I have no doubt of the mood and the strength of feeling of the Committee. I am also sufficiently acquainted with the ways of this House to anticipate what might or might not be moved on Report as and when we come to it. I can say this afternoon that I will continue to work on this issue—a number of noble Lords know that I have been working on it already—and to listen to the debate, but for the moment, I ask noble Lords who tabled this amendment to withdraw it.
My Lords, there can be no disagreement that this has been a thoughtful and deeply impressive debate—the kind of occasion that does massive good to the reputation of this House. I hope, therefore, that the Minister’s words at the beginning and end of his response will give us some hope for the future. On a lighter note, I have to say that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, gave me so much advice when I was Home Secretary that I have difficulty remembering which bits of it I took and which I did not.
On this occasion, I have said already that we clearly have got it wrong, and we now have the opportunity to put it right. The House of Commons Justice Committee has not yet started its process; even with the length of debate on the Bill and the number of days that will be added, it will not have reported in time for us to be able to use this vehicle, and I see no other vehicle coming down the road. We have a chance and, given the Minister’s opening and closing remarks, we may have the opportunity to get this right. It would be admirable and most sensible if the Government were able to bring forward their own proposals before Report, through amendments, guidance and any further regulation by subsidiary legislation they are prepared to use, but if we do not get some movement in time for Report, I believe there is unanimity across all parts of this House that we will have to take action. When we do, I hope that we will have the kind of unanimity we have had this evening. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment in my name.
My Lords, I support this amendment, and very much hope that the Government will either accept it or explain what they are doing in response to the report of the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman on the case of Miss A and her baby. The noble Baroness, Lady Burt, has explained the facts; it is worth looking at them in a little more detail.
Miss A, as she is called in the report, was remanded in custody on 14 August; she was pregnant. It does not say in the report whether the court knew that she was pregnant, but that is not what this amendment deals with. On 19 August, she was seen by a safeguarding midwife, who said that her estimated delivery date was between 24 September and 14 October. On 26 September, she was put on extended observation, which means she would be seen by a nurse in the morning, at lunchtime, in the evening and twice overnight. On that very day, 26 September, she went into labour. At 8.07 pm, 8.32 pm and 8.45 pm, she called for help and, in particular, called for a nurse. All three calls for help were ignored. At 9.27 pm and 4.19 am that night, she was inspected—I assume through a cell hatch—for a regular roll call, and nothing untoward was spotted. At 8.21 am the next morning, other prisoners reported that there was blood in her cell, and at 9.03 am an officer identified that she had given birth overnight and that the baby had died.
It is an absolutely terrible story, as the ombudsman describes. As the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, said, the ombudsman made specific recommendations, which are reflected in proposed new subsections (1) and (2) of her Amendment 209. It says that the Secretary of State must provide “appropriate midwifery care” within the female prison estate, and then defines “appropriate midwifery care” as meaning
“midwifery care that is appropriate to a custodial setting … maternity services that are suitably resourced to provide … an appropriately qualified midwifery lead in each prison to oversee all aspects of perinatal care … a maternity pathway for prisoners that includes a process for women who decline to engage with services”—
as Miss A may have done—
“access for prisoners to psychological and psychiatric services … training for staff in trauma-informed care … training for staff in neonatal and child resuscitation procedures; and … appropriate emergency equipment for children and neonates.”
A lot of those go beyond what would have made a difference in this particular case, but if those recommendations of the ombudsman had been given effect to, the tragedy almost certainly would not have occurred. This gives the Government the opportunity to respond in this House to those recommendations, all of which seem sensible and will not impose a substantial financial burden on the prison estate, because there are not that many women’s prisons. If the Government are not willing to accept these proposals, what are they going to do about the problem? Can they give a reason why a duty such as this on the Secretary of State should not be expressed in the legislation?
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, for tabling this amendment. As the explanatory statement makes clear, the amendment builds on the recommendations of the recent independent investigatory report by the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman into the death of Baby A—as we are calling the baby—at HMP Bronzefield.
I shall start by repeating what my honourable friend Victoria Atkins MP said when giving oral evidence to the Justice Select Committee’s inquiry into women in prison on 3 November. I quote her because I want to associate myself with this, word for word. We are
“very grateful to the ombudsman for her report. The facts as they unfolded in that report were truly shocking. And the fear that that young woman must have felt and the loss she is dealing with even today, we do not, we cannot contemplate anything of that nature ever again within the prison estate.”
My deepest condolences remain with those affected.
The death of Baby A was a tragic and harrowing event and has rightly been the subject of several investigations and inquiries, including that by the PPO, to try to ensure that all the necessary lessons have been learned to avoid a repetition in future. The Committee may be interested to know that there is a Question on this incident on, I think, Wednesday, which will be another opportunity for the House to look at this terrible event, and I believe I am going to be responding to it.
While I point out that we are not talking about sentencing here, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, was right to say so, it is right to say that when it comes to sentencing, pregnancy is certainly a mitigating factor that is specifically taken into account in the sentencing guidelines. I should also say that it is exceptionally rare now for a woman to give birth in prison. The most recent figures, from July 2020 to March 2021, show that 28 births—90% of the total number of births—took place in hospital and none took place in prison. I understand that in the case of the missing 10%, the baby came out a bit quicker than anticipated and the birth might have taken place in the ambulance, but none took place in prison.
In response to the terrible disaster of what happened to Baby A, the previous Lord Chancellor, the right honourable Robert Buckland MP, commissioned the independent external investigation by the PPO. We have since accepted and acted upon all its recommendations for the Ministry of Justice and the Prison Service. We immediately put in place practical steps across the women’s estate, including providing all women with free phone access to local NHS pregnancy advice services and additional welfare observations for pregnant women in their third trimester. At that time we were already undertaking a fundamental review of national policy on pregnancy, mother and baby units and maternal separation in women’s prisons.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, recognised and said she welcomed, that work led to a new policy framework, published on 20 September, which develops those immediate actions into national requirements for all women’s prisons, delivering on a wide range of reforms. The new framework has an extended policy remit covering requirements on perinatal care and maternal separation, in addition to mother and baby units. I hope that what I have said so far—although I will say something more—reassures the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, that we are serious about our response to this matter. We are determined to take all necessary action to avoid a similar tragic event in the future.
I shall turn to the detail of the amendment and explain why, in the light of the current legislative framework, we are not persuaded that what is proposed is necessary. Currently, NHS England is responsible for commissioning almost all forms of healthcare for prisoners within both the public and private estate in England under Section 3B of the National Health Service Act 2006 as amended by the Health and Social Care Act 2012. That statutory obligation has to be read together with Rule 20(1) of the Prison Rules 1999, which states:
“The governor must work in partnership with local health care providers to secure the provision to prisoners of access to the same quality and range of services as the general public receives from the National Health Service.”
The requirement to commission healthcare services and to secure and ensure prisoners’ access to them therefore already applies to the provision of maternity services in the women’s prison estate, so we do not consider that there is any need to add a further separate obligation in statute as proposed by the amendment. What is important is that we ensure that it actually happens. I certainly do not mean to be flippant, but repeating something in statute is not the way to ensure that it happens. We are focused on ensuring that it happens. We already have the statutory obligation.
In fairness to the PPO, I should note that it did not recommend any change to the statutory framework. Rather, it said at paragraph 14:
“Overall, the healthcare offered to Ms A in Bronzefield was not equivalent to that she could have expected in the community.”
It is that provision that we are focused on—ensuring that expectant mothers in prison get the same care as they would have received in the community. The Government’s position is that we would rather focus on that than duplicate statutory provision.
The amendment would not be duplicating anything because it contains specific provisions that are not referred to in the other statutory obligation, so it would be clear what was required.
What is required is that women in prison have access to the same maternity services as they could expect in the community. My suggestion is that once that is set out, that is a sufficient legislative obligation and the Government need to ensure that it actually happens.
I hope that nothing I have said detracts from what I said right at the start, which is that we are appalled by what happened to Baby A. It must never happen again, and we are going to do all we can to ensure that it does not. However, for the reasons I have set out, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, before the Minister sits down, I would like to ask him about the relationship between his department and NHS England. What express work is now being undertaken to ensure that the NHS discharges the statutory responsibility that he has just referred to?
I know that when it comes to the prison estate, there is a very close relationship between my department, the Prison Service and NHS England. Rather than read something off a screen, may I write to the noble Lord and set out a paragraph or two to assist him on that? I am happy to discuss that further with him—or it might be appropriate for the Minister in the department with particular responsibility for prisons to do so. Anyway, I will write to the noble Lord.
My Lords, I am extremely grateful for the learned contributions that have followed my words today, particularly from the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. I have taken heart, to a degree, from what the Minister has said. I accept what he says about the difference between statute and practice. We cannot just enact laws and expect everyone to suddenly do as they are told—it does not work like that—so I think the intention is extremely important.
I shall take this away and consult the bodies that have advised me—particularly Women in Prison, to which I am very grateful. For the time being, I respectfully request to beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
An incredibly powerful case has been made. We support it and I am grateful to the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, my noble friend Lady Lister and, in her absence, the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell, for tabling these amendments. I completely adopt what my noble friend Lady Lister said about the total inadequacy of the reasons given in the Commons for not supporting this. The first was that it would mean there would be bunching of releases on other days, but if a third are on Friday already that seems a completely hopeless point. Secondly and separately, it was said that it is not used very much in Scotland; if it is not used very much, then the Government would not have much to worry about. Why not do it?
My Lords, I am grateful for the various speeches which have been given on these amendments, which, as we have heard, seek in different ways to avoid the release of prisoners on a Friday. Obviously, I understand the distinction between the two, although it is fair to say that they are both aimed at substantially the same point.
The current position is this. Section 23 of the Criminal Justice Act 1961 provides that prisoners whose release dates fall on a weekend or bank holiday should be released on the working day which immediately precedes that weekend or bank holiday. In most cases, that is a Friday, which is why, to make the obvious point, we have “bunching” on Fridays. If one would expect release dates generally to fall over the week, given the law of large numbers, you have Saturday and Sunday pushed back to Friday, plus the occasional bank holiday. We are very aware of and alive to the challenges that this can create in accessing support and services in the community. We are taking steps to mitigate those difficulties; I will turn to those in a moment.
First, however, the amendments seek to reduce releases on a Friday or non-working weekday by either preventing the court setting a sentence length that is likely to lead to release on those days, or by providing greater flexibility for prison governors to avoid Friday releases by giving the discretion to release earlier in the week. I heard what the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, said about the responses given in the other place: that the Minister there was clutching at straws. I think the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, has set me the challenge to be better than “completely hopeless”. That is a bar I hope to surmount.
I assure the Committee that I am open-minded and have listened very carefully to the debate. While I am sympathetic to the need to tackle this issue, I do not agree that it is necessary to legislate in the way proposed by the amendments, and I will explain why. To do so would either undermine existing sentencing principles by preventing the court passing a sentence which is likely to result in release on a Friday, or it would allow prisoners to be released even earlier from their sentence. Legislation provides that prisoners are released on the working day closest to their statutory release date and we do not believe it is necessary to go further than that.
I will deal with sentencing first. It is not realistic or achievable to require a sentencing court to try to work out on which day of the week an offender would fall to be released and adjust the sentence accordingly to avoid that being a Friday, weekend or bank holiday. I would have thought that that is self-evident. It is obvious because a prisoner’s release date is something of a complex calculation. It is carried out by prison staff and depends on a number of different factors that a sentencing court would not necessarily be able to take into account. These could include: any other concurrent or consecutive sentences the offender might already be serving; the correct amount of remand time to apply on all relevant sentences being served; and any added days imposed for bad behaviour while serving the sentence.
I thank the Minister for giving way; that is very kind. Is he aware of how daft that sounds? We have just explained that the punishing of ex-prisoners is not acceptable. The bunching should not occur; find a way around it.
I am trying to deal with the amendments in what I hope is a logical way. At the moment, I am dealing with the amendment which provides that the sentencing court should have regard to the day of release. I am trying to explain—cogently, I hope, and with great respect—why that is not a sensible or workable proposition.
I have dealt with longer sentences; let me now deal with shorter sentences. It might be said that with a shorter sentence the court could identify the release date. I accept that it would be easier for the court to identify the day of the week on which the release would fall if the sentence is very short—let us say two, three or four weeks—and if no other sentences are involved, but the problem there is that if you bring that release date even earlier, percentage wise, that is a significant additional reduction from the sentence. I therefore suggest that these amendments are not the answer—
The Minister may be about to come to the point I was going to make. The provisions in Amendment 211 are discretionary. If it is possible in Scotland, why is it not possible here?
The Minister said that he was dealing with the amendments logically. He dealt with only Amendment 210 and did not deal with Amendment 211.
I am coming to the point about discretion in Scotland. I will respond to that in a moment, if I may. First, I wanted to identify how we think we can best deal with the problems which bunching can give rise to. I absolutely agree that reducing further crime by those who have been released is critical. We have to cut reoffending and we know that a lack of suitable accommodation or sustainable employment, as well as substance misuse, can lead offenders to return to crime. Therefore, we need to ensure that people leaving prison on all days of the week, Fridays included, have access to services.
I will briefly identify four important things in this regard. In January this year, we announced a £50 million investment to reduce crime and tackle key drivers of reoffending. In July, we launched temporary accommodation for prison leavers at risk of homelessness in five probation regions, because we know that having access to transitional accommodation is very important. We have invested a further £20 million in the Prison Leavers Project, which tests new ways to reduce reoffending by addressing the challenges people face when they leave prison.
I am of course impressed by the list of initiatives being taken by the Government and the roll call of money being spent, but it has not answered the question. We are not asking to spend money; all we are asking for is an administrative change. It may be an administrative change whereby the flexibility has to reflect the length of the sentence. We surely cannot be in a position where we cannot give prison governors a day or two of flexibility to enable them to set up a system of the sort that has been described all around the House. It must be possible.
I am not suggesting it is not possible; I am asking whether it is the best way to deal with the problem. I hear “of course it is”, but I suggest that it is not. Take the example of Scotland, where they have a discretionary power. That is a model of discretion regarding early release, under the Prisoners (Control of Release) (Scotland) Act 2015. Scottish Ministers have the discretion to bring forward the release dates of people in custody by no more than two days for the purposes of benefiting a prisoner’s reintegration into the community.
A freedom of information application was made on 30 March this year to the Scottish Prison Service which showed that only 20 prisoners have been granted discretionary early release under that Act in the five years since its implementation. We are not aware of any problems with implementation. I will ask officials in my department to consult with our colleagues in the Scottish Government to explore that issue further. If I am provided with any useful relevant information as a result, I will write to the noble Baroness to provide further information on that discretionary policy. We think that the best way to deal with this matter is to put money and services in place to ensure that prisoners, whatever day they are released on, have access to the services they need.
I heard the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, about universal credit. She very fairly gave me the opportunity to reply in writing, because that matter is substantially outside my department. I also heard what the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said about that issue; I will therefore respond in writing. At the same time, I will try to pick up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord German, on bank account opening, in so far as it is relevant to the universal credit point.
We are certainly not setting people up to fail; we sincerely want them to succeed and not reoffend.
The Minister has made a slightly better fist of it than the Government did in the Commons, but in a sense he is clutching at the same straws—his presentation is just a bit more articulate than they were in the Commons. Does he not accept that it is better, even if it is just a few people, to help a few rather than none? Is he going to be able to say how he is going to keep services open over the weekend, because that is the issue? We have heard terrible examples of people being put in fields and turning to drugs and so on because the services are simply not there. This wonderful list of all these things the Government are putting money into is great, but I have not heard anything that would explain how the Government will ensure that services are there on a Friday evening, Saturday, Sunday and bank holidays.
I am afraid the Minister has not convinced me and, given the shaking of the head behind him, I do not think he has convinced the mover of the amendment, so I really ask him to look again at this. Although, unlike the first group of amendments, we may not have taken two hours on this group, there is absolute unanimity throughout the House that we can do something practical and it will not cost money. I am sorry, I am making a speech, which I should not be.
I do not want to repeat what I have said. My focus is on ensuring that people have access to services on whatever day they are released, whether it is a Tuesday, a Friday or any other day. It is certainly not the case that, if we just moved people’s release day from a Friday to a Tuesday or a Monday, all our problems would go away. We must have those services in place, and that is what I want to focus on. I have said that I will look in more detail at the Scottish discretionary system, if I can call it that, and I will write to the noble Baroness. I do not want to repeat what I have already said, but I hope that I have addressed the substance of her point. I suspect that the noble Lords who spoke to the amendment have indirectly told me the answer before I sit down, but I none the less invite my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, it is important to remember what is in the amendments and what is not. We are not really debating whether short sentences are or are not a good thing; government policy on that has been stated frequently and I will restate it shortly. I am not proposing to make any sort of turn, whether a U-turn or a Z-turn. Instead, I will keep on the straight and narrow, if I can use that phrase in this context.
It is important to remember what the amendments seek to do. They would prevent the court passing a short custodial sentence unless it is satisfied that no other sentence is appropriate. They would also require the court, if imposing a short custodial sentence, to explain why alternative sentences were not considered appropriate. Let me be clear: I understand absolutely the sentiment behind the amendments and appreciate, as the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, made very clear, that this is not saying that there are no circumstances in which a short custodial sentence could be appropriate—I fully take that on board.
I agree that short custodial sentences can, in many cases, be less effective at tackling reoffending than community sentences. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, was very clear about the importance that magistrates attach to community sentencing and how it is important that they have confidence in the community sentence regime. The words of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester that were read to us also questioned whether short custodial sentences were, to use her phrase, an effective remedy. I think I have dealt with that point. I listened with real care to the testimony I heard at the event she organised and which I was very happy to attend.
The Government cannot support these proposals because they reflect existing law which is sufficiently robust. With respect to the noble Lord, Lord Beith, when it comes to statute, I do not believe that saying something again makes it stronger. If something is already in statute and is not being done, it is critical to investigate why it is not being done, and not simply say the same thing again. I therefore gratefully adopt some of what has already been said to the Committee by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.
Section 230 of the Sentencing Act 2020—let us just see how it works—places important restrictions on the courts imposing discretionary custodial sentences. It starts with a negative:
“The court must not pass a custodial sentence”—
the starting point is that the court cannot pass a custodial sentence; that is the default—and then continues:
“unless it is of the opinion that … the offence, or … the combination of the offence and one or more offences associated with it, was so serious that neither a fine alone nor a community sentence can be justified for the offence.”
Section 77 of the Act goes further and makes clear that even where the threshold for passing a custodial sentence has been met, the court may still pass a community sentence after taking into account any mitigation. Even then, where a court has formed the view that only a custodial sentence can be justified, even in light of any mitigation, it may still suspend that sentence so that it does not become an immediate custodial sentence, taking into account factors such as realistic prospect of rehabilitation, strong personal mitigation, which would obviously include the effect on dependants, as we discussed in earlier groups, and significant harmful impact on others of immediate custody. We suggest that, taken together, this provides a very robust framework which would ensure that short custodial sentences are passed only where there is really no other alternative for the court.
I am very grateful to the Minister for giving way. Does he take my point that none of those provisions focuses on short custodial sentences in particular, as opposed to custodial sentences in the generality?
I accept that they do not refer specifically to short custodial sentences, but when the court is considering a short custodial sentence, the particular factors the court would have to go through before imposing it—and particularly before imposing an immediate short custodial sentence—would be all the starker. It is important that we have a consistent regime. For the reasons I have set out, I do not think it necessary or helpful to have a separate regime for shorter custodial sentences. The position on that, I suggest, is already absolutely clear, as is the requirement for a court to explain its reasons for passing sentence. It is important to recognise that the court has to explain its reasons for passing any sentence, not just a custodial sentence; otherwise, the Court of Appeal will have something to say about it. That is set out in Section 52 of the Sentencing Act.
I hear the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, that when it comes to courts explaining the reasons for their sentences, it is very important that they are bespoke and not off the peg—if I can put it that way. That is very important, not least for the offender to know why that sentence has been passed. I will not say any more about the reasons given by the Supreme Court for refusing permission to appeal, but the noble and learned Lord was certainly right that I was all too familiar with receiving those reasons in my cases.
The amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, goes further because it sets out a list of “principles” the court must take into account. I suggest to the noble Lord, who is very familiar with this area, that those principles are by and large set out very clearly already in the guidelines from the Sentencing Council. I suggest that the principles enshrined in legislation would not take us any further.
As the noble Lord knows, there are five statutory purposes when it comes to sentencing, set out in Section 57 of the Act:
“the punishment of offenders … reduction of crime (including its reduction by deterrence) … reform and rehabilitation … the protection of the public, and … reparation by offenders”.
A sentence can serve one or more of those purposes. The Act also states that, even when the threshold for custody has been passed, that does not mean that a custodial sentence is inevitable—particularly for offenders on the cusp of custody.
Imprisonment should not be imposed where there would be a disproportionate impact on dependants. We touched on that today. We looked at that in a lot more detail in an earlier group, so I hope the Committee will forgive me for not dealing with that in any more detail. I have set out the position in some detail already. It is fair to say that, when this amendment was tabled in the other place, Alex Cunningham MP fairly recognised that the principles are already accepted in the sentencing guidelines, which all courts are required to follow; they are not optional. I suggest that the amendment is unnecessary.
Proposed new subsection (3) of the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, concerns the impact of custody on the children of primary carers or the unborn child of a pregnant woman. I think that is almost identical to an amendment we discussed earlier, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Massey, the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton. Again, I have responded to that in some detail already, so I am not proposing to say any more about that.
I will pick up two other points. First, the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, talked about Scotland. The position in Scotland is different. It has a very different sentencing regime from that of England and Wales. The Sentencing Code here, which I have set out, contains the requirements and protections which I have sought to explain. For those reasons, we do not believe that the amendment is necessary; nor, with respect, do we believe we get much assistance in this regard from looking at the Scottish law because there is a very different system for sentencing.
The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, asked me about the JCHR recommendation. In the time I have had, I have an answer here for her. It is fair to say that it is slightly off-topic. Perhaps she would be happy if I were to write to her on this point, rather than take further time. I will set out the answer in writing; I hope that is acceptable.
For those reasons, we suggest that this is already covered in legislation and in the sentencing guidelines. I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.