(1 day, 13 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI have a few preliminary reminders. Please switch electronic devices to silent. No food or drink, except the water provided, is permitted during the sittings of this Committee. Hansard would be grateful if Members could email their speaking notes or pass them on to the Hansard colleague in the room. Members are reminded to bob and catch my eye if they wish to speak in any debate.
New Clause 1
Reporting: racial disparities relating to community treatment orders
“(1) Within a period of 12 months following the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must undertake a review of racial disparities which relate to the use and administering of community treatment orders.
(2) The review under subsection (1) must include, but is not limited to—
(a) an assessment of whether certain racial or ethnic groups are disproportionately represented among individuals subject to community treatment orders compared to their representation in the general population;
(b) a review of the outcomes and effectiveness of community treatment orders across different racial groups, including health outcomes, and patient experiences.
(3) The Secretary of State must lay a report of the findings of the review before Parliament within 18 months of the day on which this Act is passed.”—(Zöe Franklin.)
This new clause seeks to gauge the Government’s view on prevalent racial disparities as they relate to the use of community treatment orders under the Act.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 3—Addressing and reporting on racial disparities and other inequalities in the use of the Mental Health Act 1983—
“After section 120D of the Mental Health Act 1983, insert—
‘120E Mental health units and services to have a responsible person
(1) A relevant health organisation that operates a mental health unit or community mental health service for qualifying patients must appoint a responsible person for that unit or service for the purposes of addressing racial disparities and other disparities based on protected characteristics related to functions discharged under the Mental Health Act 1983.
(2) The responsible person must—
(a) be employed by the relevant health organisation, and
(b) be of an appropriate level of seniority.
(3) Where a relevant health organisation operates more than one mental health unit or service, that organisation must appoint a single responsible person in relation to all of the mental health units or services operated by that organisation.
(4) A patient is a qualifying patient if they are—
(a) liable to be detained under this Act, otherwise than by virtue of section 4 or 5(2) or (4) or section 135 or 136;
(b) subject to guardianship under this Act;
(c) a community patient.
120F Policy on racial disparities and other disparities based on protected characteristics
(1) The responsible person must publish a policy on how the unit plans to reduce racial disparities and other disparities based on protected characteristics in that unit or service.
(2) The policy published under subsection (1) must cover the following topics—
(a) the application of the guiding principles to all aspects of operation of this Act;
(b) staff knowledge and competence in connection with promoting equality and anti-discriminatory practice in relation to this Act;
(c) workforce demographics, recruitment, retention and progression;
(d) implementation of the patient and carer race equality framework (England only) and any other requirements of relevant national policies;
(e) care planning and decision-making in the use of this Act including section 56A (making treatment decisions);
(f) the availability of alternatives to detention and involuntary treatment;
(g) take-up of independent mental health advocacy;
(h) the cultural appropriateness of independent mental health advocacy;
(i) access to and use of advance choice documents;
(j) what steps will be taken to reduce racial disparities and other disparities based on protected characteristics in that unit or service.
(3) Where a responsible person is appointed in relation to all of the mental health units operated by a relevant health organisation, the responsible person must publish a single policy under subsection (1) in relation to those units or services.
(4) Before publishing a policy under subsection (1), the responsible person must—
(a) consult any persons that the responsible person considers appropriate;
(b) have regard to the following matters—
(i) the views, wishes and feelings of people from ethnic minority communities who have been detained;
(ii) the views, wishes and feelings of people with other protected characteristics who have been detained.
(5) The responsible person must keep under review any policy published under this section.
(6) The responsible person may from time to time revise any policy published under this section and, if this is done, must publish the policy as revised.
(7) If the responsible person considers that any revisions would amount to a substantial change in the policy, the responsible person must consult any persons that the responsible person considers appropriate before publishing the revised policy.
120G Training in racial disparities and other disparities based on protected characteristics
(1) The responsible person for each mental health unit or service must provide training for staff that relates to addressing racial disparities and other disparities based on protected characteristics in that unit or service.
(2) The training provided under subsection (1) must include training on the topics covered in section 120F(2).
(3) Subject to subsection (4), training must be provided—
(a) in the case of a person who is a member of staff when this section comes into force, as soon as reasonably practicable after this section comes into force, or
(b) in the case of a person who becomes a member of staff after this section comes into force, as soon as reasonably practicable after they become a member of staff.
(4) Subsection (3) does not apply if the responsible person considers that any training provided to the person before this section came into force or before the person became a member of staff—
(a) was given sufficiently recently, and
(b) is of an equivalent standard to the training provided under this section.
(5) Refresher training must be provided at regular intervals whilst a person is a member of staff.
(6) In subsection (5) “refresher training” means training that updates or supplements the training provided under subsection (1).
120H Annual report by the Secretary of State
(1) As soon as reasonably practicable after the end of each calendar year, the Secretary of State must conduct a review in consultation with relevant bodies with commissioning functions on the use of treatment and detention measures contained in the Mental Health Act 1983 broken down by race and other demographic information.
(2) Having conducted a review under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must publish a report on the progress made in reducing inequalities in treatment outcomes and the use of detention measures in the use of this Act on people who have protected characteristics under the Equality Act 2010.’”
This new clause requires mental health units and services to appoint a responsible person tasked with addressing racial disparities related to functions discharged under the Mental Health Act 1983.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Vickers. New clause 1 seeks to ensure that racial disparities in the use of community treatment orders are properly understood, monitored and addressed. We have known for many years that black individuals are disproportionately subjected to coercive powers under the Mental Health Act 1983, including detention, restraint and community treatment orders, yet progress has been painfully slow.
The new clause would require the Secretary of State to undertake a review within 12 months of the Bill passing and to publish the findings within 18 months. It would look specifically at whether certain racial or ethnic groups are over-represented among those who are subject to community treatment orders, and whether there are disparities in outcomes—including treatment effectiveness and patient experience—across racial groups. The aim is not just to collect data, but for meaningful scrutiny of how coercive community powers are applied and whether they are serving all groups equally.
The 2018 independent review of the Mental Health Act found that black individuals were more than eight times more likely to be placed under a CTO than white individuals. That is not a minor discrepancy, but a structural injustice. The review also raised concerns that CTOs were not necessarily used because they are clinically effective, but because they are seen as a way to manage risk, particularly where racialised assumptions come into play. We must ask, are CTOs truly supporting recovery, or are they disproportionately used to control and surveil? Are they fostering trust or fear in mental health services?
The new clause would give Parliament the information we need to answer those questions. It would set a timeline for transparency and create a foundation for future policy reform that is rooted in fairness and equality. In the absence of this new clause, we risk continuing a system where racial injustice is baked into mental health practice, without sufficient oversight or accountability. If this Government are serious about tackling racial inequality in mental health, they will have no objection to this basic measure of review and reporting.
We have discussed specific disparities in previous clauses, but new clause 3 aims to ensure that systematic and sustained action is embedded in the way that mental health services are run. The disproportionate detention and coercive treatment of black and minority ethnic people under the Mental Health Act has been evidenced for decades, yet progress on addressing these inequalities has been too slow and too inconsistent across the country.
New clause 3 takes a structural approach. It would require each mental health provider to appoint a dedicated senior lead to take responsibility for reducing inequalities within their services—not in name only, but through published plans covering staff diversity, culturally appropriate advocacy care planning and the use of advance choice documents. It would also ensure that frontline staff receive ongoing training that equips them to recognise and respond to disparities and uphold anti-discriminatory practice, with regular refreshes to ensure that this learning stays live. Importantly, it would place a duty on the Secretary of State to publish an annual report breaking down how the Bill is used across racial and other demographic groups, and what progress is being made to close those gaps.
This is not about creating more paperwork; it is about requiring leadership, transparency and accountability at every level, from clinical teams through to Government. If this Bill is to earn the title of a reform, it must act decisively on the most pertinent inequalities in the system. I urge the Committee to support the new clauses.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Vickers. Sadly, there are clear racial inequalities within the mental health system, as in other areas of health, and this must change. People from ethnic minority communities are more likely to experience a mental health problem, are less likely to receive support, and have poorer outcomes from services. It is very concerning that black and ethnic minority people are over-represented in detentions in our mental health system, and there are well-documented worries over disparities in the quality of care that they receive.
Decades of evidence and lived experience testimony point to systemic injustice. Black British people suffer a 6% higher rate of common mental health problems than white British people, and black adults are twice as likely to show symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder—at 8%, compared with 4% of the white British population. Black men are over 10 times more likely to be placed under community treatment orders, and black women are more likely than any other group of women to experience common mental health problems. Studies have shown that experiences of racism link to depression, psychosis and post-traumatic stress. When people are assaulted—not just physically, but emotionally and psychologically—by the structures around them, it leaves a lasting impact.
I have witnessed at first hand the racial disparities at a visit to my local in-patient mental health care at Rochford community hospital, where I could see a visibly disproportionate number of black men on the ward, compared with the percentage of black men I know live in my community. People from ethnic minority communities are more likely to come into contact with mental health services through crisis pathways, the police, accident and emergency, and detention. They are more likely to be restrained, isolated and subjected to coercive treatment. We must listen to what these communities are telling us.
Research by Mind identified nine key barriers to accessing care, from stigma and discrimination to Eurocentric models of treatment, language and cultural barriers. People feel othered by a system that was not built with them in mind. We need to rebuild trust and recognise that mental health cannot be separated from the broader social and political context. Austerity, Brexit, the Windrush scandal and covid-19 have all disproportionately affected the black, Asian and minority ethnic community. That has led to a decrease in trust towards the establishment, and that bleeds into general distrust of organisations and officials working in healthcare settings and mental health.
People from BAME communities have shared many examples of direct and indirect discrimination they have experienced within mental health services. Those negative lived experiences further erode trust in the system and often deter people from seeking help. Racial disparities in mental health are a pressing issue that requires immediate and sustained action.
New clauses 1 and 3, tabled by the hon. Member for Winchester and outlined by the hon. Member for Guildford, have good intentions, but we need to reflect on whether they fit in the Bill. I would suggest not. The drivers of disparity here are much deeper than the scope of the Bill, and it would be wrong to attempt to wrap up the solution to this issue within it. That does not mean that action should not be taken.
I am hopeful that this Government are doing wider work to drive down racial inequalities, including with the challenge we can see here with mental health. Perhaps the Minister will outline more about the Government’s work, and therefore why the new clauses are not needed. I support the intent of the hon. Member for Winchester, but I cannot support the new clauses as an addition to the Bill. I would be happy to meet the Minister and others to discuss further ongoing overall inequalities for the BAME community.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship this morning, Mr Vickers.
New clause 1, tabled by the hon. Member for Winchester, would require the Secretary of State to undertake a review of racial disparities in the use of community treatment orders. It is our view that the evidence base is already strong, and further reviews are not necessary. There are significant racial disparities in the use of community treatment orders. In 2023-24, black or black British people were issued with CTOs at seven times the rate of white or white British people. The use of community treatment orders as a proportion of overall detention numbers is higher for all minority ethnic groups compared with the white British population.
We are committed to reducing these disparities through our reforms and through the patient and carer race equality framework, which was a recommendation of the independent review. This includes a greater focus on prevention and early intervention, in part by promoting the use of advance choice documents, rather than an approach that simply makes it harder to impose CTOs. We are developing and monitoring an evaluation strategy, and we will continue to monitor and report on ethnic disparities via the published Mental Health Act statistics and our annual implementation report to Parliament.
New clause 3 would create the new “responsible person” role. They would have a duty to report on racial disparities and other inequalities in the use of the Mental Health Act. However, as drafted, the remit is significantly broader than that, to the extent that it would not be practical to combine all the stated functions into one role. We agree that there is a need to strengthen organisational leadership, improve data collection and change cultures across the mental health system. We also agree that it is important to have more targeted responsibilities to monitor and address racial disparities at board level in trusts, and that is already an explicit requirement of the PCREF.
The PCREF is a contractual requirement of mental health providers under the NHS standard contract. It builds on the statutory duties that apply already under the Equality Act 2010. These existing requirements cover the key responsibilities needed to monitor and address racial disparities. The PCREF can be updated more regularly than primary legislation, allowing us to take an iterative approach throughout implementation to ensure that we are capturing reporting and acting on the right data from frontline services. Ultimately, we feel that the PCREF will be more effective at reducing racial inequalities than the very broad remit outlined in this new clause, and that the addition of a responsible person in legislation is duplicative and unnecessary.
My hon. Friend the Member for Southend West and Leigh asked about implementation. The PCREF is the key instrument that we will use, but we are seeking to improve and strengthen decision making in three important ways: first, by requiring that an individual must be at risk of serious harm to be made subject to a CTO; secondly, by requiring the community clinician to be involved in all community treatment order decisions; and thirdly, by increasing the frequency of automatic reviews of patient cases by the tribunal, so that CTOs can be removed as soon as it is safe and appropriate to do so. I hope that that gives my hon. Friend some reassurance around the work that we are doing, but of course I would be happy to discuss these matters with him.
For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Guildford to withdraw new clause 1, on behalf of the hon. Member for Winchester.
I thank the Minister for outlining the PCREF and the focus that it will have in addressing these issues. I was particularly interested in the explanation of the iterative approach that it will allow. I also thank the hon. Member for Southend West and Leigh for his insights into the issue. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 2
Mental Health Crisis Breathing Space
“(1) Any person detained under sections 3, 37, 41 or 47 of the Mental Health Act 1983 must be offered support from the mental health crisis breathing space debt respite scheme.”—(Dr Chambers.)
This new clause ensures that MHCBS, a debt respite scheme, is offered and available to patients detained under sections 3, 37, 41 and 47 of the Mental Health Act 1983.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause relates to the mental health crisis breathing space debt respite scheme, and would allow it to be
“offered and available to patients detained under sections 3, 37, 41 and 47 of the Mental Health Act 1983.”
The mental health crisis breathing space mechanism is another vital tool that can protect people in a mental health crisis from the impacts of problem debt, by pausing enforcement action, contacting creditors and freezing interest and charges on any debts.
However, the number of people benefitting from an MHCBS are significantly below its potential, largely because both patients and healthcare professionals do not know about it. Ensuring that everyone detained under the longer provisions of the Act would automatically be offered access to the scheme would ensure that many more people could benefit from it. We have discussed in previous sittings the impact of debt on mental health, and the work of Winchester Citizens Advice. I am really pleased to say that this week, I presented them with a huge award for best social enterprise at the Hampshire business awards, so my congratulations go to them.
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Winchester for bringing this issue before the Committee. The Government’s breathing space programme plays an important role in protecting people experiencing problem debt. We recognise that that can be particularly critical for people whose mental illness is worsened or even triggered by financial problems.
Let me reassure the hon. Gentleman that people under the sections identified by his new clause are already eligible for breathing space. In fact, eligibility covers all individuals detained in hospital for assessment or treatment under the Mental Health Act, as well as those receiving crisis treatment in a community setting from a specialist mental health service. Furthermore, NHS England guidance already sets out that financial support, including referral to breathing space, should be offered to patients receiving acute in-patient mental health care, whether detained or voluntary patients. We will make explicit the need for staff to offer proactively that support in the Mental Health Act code of practice. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Winchester to withdraw his new clause.
I thank the Minister for his comments. I am concerned about the lack of knowledge among patients and healthcare professionals. We cannot see any downside to making this an automatic right, so we will press new clause 2 to a vote.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause would require local authorities and commissioning bodies to promote and report annually on mental health wellbeing in regard to any guidance published by the Secretary of State.
I thank the hon. Lady for giving way so early in her speech. I mentioned my concern about this provision on Second Reading: a rough road is not the same as a broken bridge. We are dealing here with the most severe mental health issues. The new clause talks about wellbeing, which affects everyone. Trying to report that and fit it into this criteria risks diluting the very aim of the Bill in trying to deal with the most severe mental health issues. I would be grateful for clarification on the difference between mental wellbeing, which affects everyone, and mental health issues, which not everyone has.
When it comes to enabling the Mental Health Act to function, having an understanding on the ground of the picture across our communities regarding mental health wellbeing is very important. That is why we tabled the new clause, which would allow us to get community care right. That would then feed into the crisis care that we are discussing in this Committee.
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Winchester for tabling the new clause. Like him, we are committed to preventing mental ill health and promoting good mental health. Achieving our vision for mental health requires a spectrum of interventions across the whole of society and across the life course, from prevention and early intervention through to treatment and specialised care for those with a severe mental illness in community and in-patient settings. We are committed to the shifts from treatment to prevention, hospital to community and analogue to digital, and our forthcoming NHS 10-year health plan will affirm those commitments.
With our commitment to neighbourhood health, we are encouraging stronger partnership working between local government, mental health services and the voluntary and community sector. As part of our shift to community, we have already launched six pilot neighbourhood mental health centres to deliver a 24/7 service, with open access to anyone who requires mental health support. Through the shift to prevention, we are putting more emphasis on early intervention and recovery to support people to live well and thrive, ensuring that we improve the conditions for creating good mental health.
Alongside that, I remind the Committee of the existing prevention concordat for better mental health: a voluntary agreement signed by local authorities and integrated care boards. Signing the concordat involves a commitment to take evidence-based, preventive and promotional action to support the mental health and wellbeing of their populations. The new clause would be duplicative of that existing programme, and could introduce an unnecessary resource burden on local authorities and commissioning bodies.
We are committed to moving to a meaningful partnership between central and local government, and to letting local leaders lead within their communities. For those reasons, I hope that the hon. Member for Guildford feels able to withdraw the motion.
I thank the Minister for his comments. In particular, I was interested to hear about the mental health centre pilot schemes. I look forward to their further roll-out. They will be crucial in addressing the issues that we sought to address in the new clause. I was also very pleased to hear about the focus on a meaningful partnership between local government, national Government and mental health providers. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 7
Funding and reporting
“(1) For each financial year until all sections of this Act have come into force, of the total health service expenditure by the bodies (taken together) in subsection (2), the proportion which relates to mental health spending—
(a) under the Mental Health Act 1983, and
(b) under this Act or which, in future, would be made under provision inserted into the Mental Health Act 1983 by this Act, (taken together) must not decrease.
(2) The bodies are the Department of Health and Social Care, NHS England and integrated care boards.”—(Dr Chambers.)
This new clause would require that mental health spending as a proportion of health service expenditure must not decrease in the implementation period of the Act.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
We are aware from the Darzi report that mental health cases account for about 20% of the NHS burden, and currently receive about 10% of the funding. Our mental health services urgently need investment. Children at risk of self-harm, anorexia and suicide often wait months to be seen. I keep thinking about a few people I spoke to in Winchester who have teenage daughters with anorexia. They have been told that their daughters have to reach a lower BMI before they hit the threshold for treatment. That is horrific for the individuals, and we know that their anorexia will be more difficult to treat, will require more intensive, longer treatment, and will cost the NHS more in resources and finances.
Many people cannot access the care in the community that they need. In a context in which suicide and mental ill health is on the rise, it is therefore disappointing to us that the Government have removed key NHS targets on mental health, such as physical health checks for those with mental disorders. Supporting those with mental health conditions is a fundamental pillar of the Government’s welfare reforms and economic agenda, but we know there were about 1 million people waiting in 2024 for mental health services. That is why we need to ensure that the spend on mental health care does not decrease and that, if anything, it increases.
As a member of the Public Accounts Committee, I carefully scrutinise the annual accounts of the Department of Health and Social Care. We have been urging that exactly how the breakdown of expenditure relates to issues is made more transparent within those accounts, such as how much is spent on mental health. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that there are other ways in which we can scrutinise and hold the Department to account for its spend on mental health?
I thank the hon. Member for Winchester for his new clause. This was raised in the other place and there are several issues with it that have not yet been fully addressed.
First, the new clause would apply only to spend under the Mental Health Act. The mental health system, and its accounting, is not structured based on the legal framework that patients are subject to. A single ward may contain a mix of patients under the Mental Health Act and informal patients who would not usually be considered to be under the Act. Community services will support some patients on community treatment orders, who are therefore subject to the Mental Health Act, but also many who are not and have never been subject to the Act. It would not be feasible or desirable to try to restructure accounting and reporting based on which patients are subject to the Act and which are not.
Secondly, the Government believe in prevention. We want to see better mental health outcomes, with more people cared for in the community so that the need for use of the Act is reduced. Over time, we want to see a shift in spend into preventive community services, which should in turn lead to a fall in the need for the use of the Mental Health Act. Few would disagree with that general aim, but the new clause would prevent that. By requiring share of spend under the Act to increase or remain the same, we are necessarily limiting the share of spend that could instead go towards preventing people from needing to use the Act in the first place.
We will need to invest to deliver these reforms, as the impact assessment makes clear; however, the new clause is flawed and not the right mechanism to achieve the necessary investment. Parliament already has the power to scrutinise departmental spend via the estimates process. We are required to report on the share of spend on mental health under the National Health Service Act 2006. This is sufficient to hold the Government to account. I therefore hope that the hon. Member for Winchester feels able to withdraw the motion.
I thank the Minister for his comments. If there is a duty to report the spend on mental health as a share of the whole budget, then I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 8
Mental Health Commissioner
“After section 142B of the Mental Health Act 1983, insert—
‘Mental Health Commissioner
142C Independent Mental Health Commissioner: establishment
(1) There is to be an office known as the Office of the Mental Health Commissioner.
(2) The Office in subsection (1) must be established by the Secretary of State three months after the day on which the Mental Health Act 2025 is passed.
(3) The Office of the Mental Health Commissioner will be led by an individual appointed by the Secretary of State titled the “Independent Mental Health Commissioner”.
(4) The role in subsection (3) is referred to as the “Mental Health Commissioner”.
(5) The Mental Health Commissioner may appoint staff to the Office of the Mental Health Commissioner they consider necessary for assisting in the exercise of their functions in section 142D.
142D Functions of the Commissioner
(1) The Mental Health Commissioner is responsible for overseeing the implementation and operability of functions discharged by relevant bodies and persons under the provisions of this Act, the Mental Health Act 1983, and the Mental Capacity Act 2025 particularly regarding the provision of treatment, care, and detention of people with a mental disorder.
(2) The Mental Health Commissioner must publish an annual report on the use of functions discharged under this Act, which must assess—
(a) the quality of mental health care treatment provided by relevant services;
(b) the accessibility of mental health care treatment services;
(c) the relationship between mental health and the criminal justice system;
(d) inequalities of mental health care provision regarding protected characteristics under the Equality Act 2010;
(e) the use and effectiveness of detention measures under this Act, including but not limited to Community Treatment Orders, for the purposes of therapeutic benefit outlined in section 1(2B);
(f) challenges surrounding stigma of mental health conditions;
(g) the accessibility of advice and support to mental health service users, their families and carers on their legal rights;
(h) other issues deemed appropriate by the Mental Health Commissioner.
(3) In fulfilling their duties under subsection (1), the Mental Health Commissioner may review, and monitor the operation of, arrangements falling within subsection (1), (2) and (3) for the purpose of ascertaining whether, and to what extent, the arrangements are effective in promoting the principles in section 118(2B) of this Act.
(4) Subject to any directions from the Secretary of State, the Commissioner may take action necessary or expedient in connection for the purposes of their functions.
(5) This may include—
(a) collaborating with health services, public authorities, charitable organisations, and other relevant entities, including NHS bodies, the Care Quality Commission, and the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman;
(b) ensuring enforcement authorities and public bodies under the Mental Health Act 1983 have the necessary capacity and resources to adequately discharge duties under the Mental Health Act 1983 and this Act.
142E Appointment, Tenure, and Remuneration of the Mental Health Commissioner
(1) The Secretary of State may by regulation make provision for the appointment, tenure, removal, and general terms of appointment of the Mental Health Commissioner.
(2) The Secretary of State may also by regulation determine the Commissioner’s remuneration, allowances, and pension entitlements.
142F Examination of cases
(1) The Secretary of State may, by regulations, make provision for the examination by the Mental Health Commissioner of the cases of those who are detained under this Act receiving treatment by authorised mental health care providers.
(2) The Secretary of State may, by regulations, provide for the Office of the Mental Health Commissioner to access and examine relevant data on mental health treatment provision held by NHS England and any other authorities the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
142G Regulations
A statutory instrument containing regulations under sections 142E and 142F may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.’”—(Dr Chambers.)
This new clause establishes the office of the Mental Health Commissioner and makes provisions for relevant duties and responsibilities.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 8 would establish the office of a mental health commissioner and makes provision for relevant duties and responsibilities. The commissioner would have a strategic, cross-government focus, working to promote mental health and tackle inequalities, and would be a powerful advocate for the rights and wellbeing of those living with mental health problems, who would finally have a voice at the top table. The commissioner would also play a vital role in the public sphere, tackling stigma and discrimination, and championing policies that support good mental health across society. The commissioner would have an independence to comment on the implementation of the reform of the Mental Health Act and any subsequent changes or issues that arise. International evidence highlights the impact that such a role can have in improving communities.
I keep coming back to a conversation I had in my office in Winchester with a psychiatrist whose wife also worked in the medical profession. He said that they were struggling to navigate the mental health system to get the healthcare that their child desperately needed. He made a really good point: if they, with their knowledge, expertise and experience, could not navigate the mental health system, what hope does anyone else have? That is why it is important to have someone with an overview who can advocate for patients, and the patient journey in general, to ensure that the process is streamlined and that people have the information they need to access the care they are entitled to.
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Winchester for bringing this issue, which was also debated extensively in the other place, before the Committee. Our view has not changed: the functions of the proposed commissioner clearly duplicate existing responsibilities of other organisations, most notably the Care Quality Commission. The Children’s Commissioner has expressed concerns that introducing a new mental health commissioner risks interfering with her own role in relation to children and young people’s mental health.
We recognise that the patient quality and oversight landscape is not working effectively, but I strongly doubt that inserting another body whose role overlaps with those already in place would help to address that issue. The landscape is already cluttered and fragmented. That is why last year we asked Dr Penny Dash to assess whether the current range and combination of organisations deliver effective leadership, listening and regulation for the health and care systems in relation to patient and user safety, or whether a new delivery model is needed. We will shortly see the results of her much-anticipated review.
We appreciate that our argument that the proposed mental health commissioner’s role would be duplicative of the CQC has previously been met with concerns about the effectiveness of that organisation. I reiterate that two major independent reviews into the wider role of the Care Quality Commission have reported under this Government, the recommendations from which the CQC has accepted in full. While we are confident in the progress that the CQC is making, we recognise that those reviews did not closely inspect the CQC’s statutory role and responsibilities in relation to monitoring the use of the Mental Health Act.
Therefore, in response to an amendment tabled in the other House, we committed to report on the CQC’s monitoring functions under the Act in the first of the Government’s annual reports on the implementation of the Bill. That will include reflections from the new chief inspector of mental health, Dr Arun Chopra, on the CQC’s statutory functions and its role as a key partner in delivering the reforms. I am looking forward to meeting Dr Arun Chopra very shortly in his new role.
Lastly, creating a mental health commissioner with a supporting office would require significant resources that we simply cannot justify. The original Mental Health Act commission was brought within the CQC to reduce Government spending and realise the benefits of aligning the CQC’s functions under the Mental Health Act with its functions under the Health and Social Care Act 2012, and to give it new powers to monitor via potential enforcement. Bearing in mind the radical reforms that we are making to the national health system to rid it of duplication, inefficiency and waste, we believe that now is not the time to reverse course on these matters.
I commend the work that the Minister and Penny Dash are doing to look at patient safety and the changes going on at the CQC. Could he reassure us that, within scope, he is also looking at the role of the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman? There seems to be some confusion about whether complaints under the Act fall to the CQC or the PHSO.
The Dash review is looking at the landscape regarding all the different institutions and organisations, including the PHSO and the CQC, to map out how they interact with each other. Our view is that there is a lot of confusion and a lack of clarity, but we await the outcome of the review. I can confirm, however, that Penny Dash is looking at those matters. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Winchester to withdraw the motion.
I thank the Minister for his reassurances. The issue is that the ability of the CQC to oversee implementation is limited, and it does not have a policy advisory function, which is something that a commissioner could do. Although we understand the Minister’s concerns about the office of a commissioner, the issue is important enough that we put it in our manifesto. We stood on a manifesto commitment to improve mental health access and streamline services via a commissioner. For that reason, we will press new clause 8 to a vote.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause would introduce a dedicated veterans’ mental health oversight officer, recognising that those who serve or have served in the UK or Commonwealth armed forces face distinct mental health challenges that are not always adequately met by the current system. Far too many veterans experience post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, anxiety or substance misuse that, sadly, is linked to their service. Yet they are often treated within a system that does not fully take account of those experiences, and they are sometimes detained under the Mental Health Act without the benefit of trauma-informed, veteran-specific pathways of care.
New clause 9 seeks to change that. It would create an independent officer, tasked with monitoring the use of the Mental Health Act in relation to veterans, advocating for tailored assessment and care linked to veterans’ service history, promoting alternatives to detention where appropriate, particularly through veteran-specific services, and reporting annually to Parliament on outcomes including rates of detention, recidivism and systemic barriers. It is not just about oversight; it is about respect and responsibility.
I am very sympathetic to the hon. Member’s concerns, but how does she see the new clause fitting in with the already established armed forces covenant, which protects and promotes healthcare for veterans across the country?
I see them as absolutely sympathetic to each other and working in concert. We want to ensure that veterans have specific, tailored mental health care, as is outlined in the Bill. That is why the new clause would ensure that veterans’ unique needs are not just recognised but actively addressed. It is a practical and overdue step to improve care, safeguard rights and deliver the joined-up service that veterans deserve. After all, they give so much to our nation through their service.
I hope that the Minister will support the new clause, but if he does not, I hope that he will outline for the Committee how the Government will ensure that the aims of the new clause will be addressed through the Bill and its accompanying documents as they stand.
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Guildford for bringing the issue before the Committee. While most veterans lead healthy and successful lives following their service in the armed forces, we know that some may need mental health support. This Government are proud of the courage and dedication of our armed forces, and we are committed to ensuring that those who serve and served in the armed forces receive the best possible care.
All service personnel have access to mental health support throughout their career. The Defence Medical Services provide a responsive, flexible, accessible and comprehensive treatment service and, for leavers from the armed forces, NHS mental health services are available that are specially designed to support the unique needs of veterans. That includes veterans in mental health in-patient settings under the Mental Health Act and those within the criminal justice system. In England, these services are Op Courage and Op Nova, and in Wales there is Veterans NHS Wales. These bespoke services link with wider NHS mental health services to advocate for and support veterans to receive care tailored to their needs.
We are committed to giving veterans and armed forces personnel fair access to mental health care services and special consideration where appropriate. That is reflected in the core principles of the armed forces covenant, to which public bodies such as the NHS are legally bound to give regard. It is our firm view that a wealth of measures are already in place that respond to the unique needs and experiences of those who serve and have served in our armed forces. For that reason, I ask the hon. Member for Guildford to withdraw new clause 9.
I thank the Minister for his comments—particularly about Op Courage, Op Nova and the armed forces covenant—and for his commitment to the veterans who have served this country and their courage, even when they face challenges with their mental health. The Liberal Democrats are willing to withdraw the amendment, but we will observe the passage of the Bill closely to ensure that it serves our veterans well across the UK. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 11
Costed plan to ensure community provision for individuals with learning disabilities and autism who are at risk of detention
“(1) Within 18 months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must publish a fully costed plan for how Integrated Care Boards and local authorities will ensure provision of adequate community services for individuals with learning disabilities and autistic people who are at risk of detention under Part 2 of the Mental Health Act 1983.
(2) As part of the development of that plan, a formal consultation process must take place to determine how the decision to enact the relevant parts of this Act will be made.
(3) The consultation must include input from relevant stakeholders, including—
(a) individuals with learning disabilities and autistic people;
(b) carers for people with learning disabilities and autistic people;
(c) healthcare professionals; and
(d) advocacy groups.”—(Dr Evans.)
This new clause requires a costed plan to ensure that ICBs and local authorities are able to provide adequate community services for individuals with learning disabilities and autistic people at risk of detention under Part 2 of the 1983 Act, informed by a consultation with a range of stakeholders.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I rise to speak in support of the new clause, which was tabled by the Conservative party. It would place a duty on the Secretary of State to review the effectiveness of the regulatory authority’s role under the Mental Health Act 1983 within one year of the Act’s passage.
Allow me to provide the current legal and regulatory context. Under the framework in the Mental Health Act 1983, the Care Quality Commission, which is the regulatory authority in England, is tasked with monitoring and regulating providers of mental health services. We have debated some of this, and there are issues still to be addressed.
The CQC inspects hospitals, community mental health teams, and other relevant services to ensure compliance with statutory safeguards and standards. It publishes reports on providers and issues recommendations where it identifies failings. Additionally, there is an existing reporting framework under the Act whereby the Secretary of State is expected to oversee and ensure the Act’s proper implementation, with periodic ministerial reports to Parliament and CQC inspection outcomes made publicly available. However, there is currently no statutory requirement to review the CQC’s own role and effectiveness in carrying out these specific mental health functions. The gap means that although providers are scrutinised, the regulator itself escapes similar structured accountability and review.
This question was debated in the other place and I welcome the comments from the Minister in the Lords, Baroness Merron, who, in a letter, rightly highlights existing transparency measures. She states that,
“findings from CQC’s monitoring activity are reported annually in their Monitoring the Mental Health Act report, which is laid before Parliament and published publicly.”
That is true. She also notes the annual quality account reports produced by NHS healthcare providers under the Health Act 2009, which cover patient safety, treatment effectiveness, and patient feedback. True. Those are indeed important components of the current oversight framework, and we support the continuation and strengthening of those transparency mechanisms.
My hon. Friend makes a powerful point about transparency, but it is not just about that. Does he agree that it is also about having an evidence base that allows reform and improvement of the regulator?
I do, and to expand the point, this is about understanding the performance of CQC as well. We know from the Dash report and from Mike Richards that there are, and have been, concerns about CQC performance. That is at the heart of this new clause—to try to make sure we actually look at the performance and regulation of the regulator. Those reports focus on the performance of mental health services and providers, but they do not amount to a dedicated statutory review of the regulator itself—specifically, the CQC’s role, effectiveness, and capacity under the Mental Health Act.
Annual reports primarily reflect the CQC’s monitoring outcomes rather than a comprehensive, independent evaluation of whether its regulatory functions are being discharged optimally, or whether it is adequately equipped to meet the new challenges posed by the legislation. In other words, reporting on what the regulator monitors is not the same as reviewing how well the regulator performs its duties.
The new clause would address that distinct gap by mandating a focused review with a parliamentary report and a Government response, thereby strengthening accountability at the regulatory level. The new clause aims to establish an additional layer of scrutiny, not duplicative reporting. It would require the Government, within 12 months of the Bill becoming law, to conduct a formal review of the CQC’s effectiveness, specifically in regulating mental health services under the 1983 Act. It mandates an assessment of whether the CQC is adequately fulfilling its duties, including monitoring, inspection, and enforcement responsibilities, as well as whether it will be capable of carrying out its duties under the new legislation. Given the well-documented problems in mental health, it seems entirely appropriate to address the key point: is the regulator regulating effectively?
My hon. Friend makes a strong point about having a review to ensure that the regulator is operating effectively. Does he share some of my concerns that a one-off review may not demonstrate ongoing oversight and scrutiny of the performance of the regulator?
We do not want to introduce too much bureaucracy, but ensuring an accountable statutory mechanism to ensure adequate oversight is incredibly important. Much of the debate about the Bill has been about whether we put things in primary legislation or in policy, or whether we allow policy and legislation to be done at a secondary level—or even leave them for the organisation to deal with. My concern with the CQC is that we have not seen the organisation step up in the way that it should do. That does not mean that it is not making progress, but we need to see further progress.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Vickers. I rise to speak in strong support of new clause 13, tabled by the shadow Minister. The new clause would place a duty on the Secretary of State to review the functions and effectiveness of the regulatory authority, which is currently the Care Quality Commission, within one year of the passage of the Bill. The new clause is a timely, necessary and constructive addition to the Bill.
As colleagues will know, the Care Quality Commission plays a dual role in relation to the Mental Health Act. First, as the regulator of services, it ensures that providers meet fundamental standards of care and safety. Secondly, through its specific responsibilities in visiting and speaking to those detained under the Act, it ensures that people’s rights are protected and that the law is used appropriately and humanely. That is no small task. It is a balance that requires the CQC to be not only reactive but proactive, and not only independent but responsive to the lived experiences of patients—especially to the voices of the most vulnerable. That is why the new clause matters. As we bring forward significant reforms to the Mental Health Act through the Bill, and rightly modernise and improve safeguards and place greater emphasis on autonomy, dignity and therapeutic benefit, we must also ensure that our system of oversight and regulation is fit for purpose.
I welcome the direction that the Bill sets. Its four core principles are rightly placed at the heart of the legislation: choice and autonomy, least restriction, therapeutic benefit, and seeing the person as an individual. Those principles must shape the way that care is delivered on the ground. That means they must also shape the way that care is monitored, inspected and held to account. A review of the regulator’s role is not about criticism for its own sake; it is about ensuring that the regulatory framework supports and reinforces the ambitions of the Bill and that it can respond to emerging challenges, shine a light where services are falling short and, crucially, act to protect patient rights.
My hon. Friend is being slightly charitable to the CQC. Given Penny Dash’s review, we all know that the CQC has significant problems, otherwise we would not be reviewing it. Does my hon. Friend agree that the new clause is absolutely vital because of the failures of the CQC up to this point, and our lack of faith in it being able to meet the challenges that this legislation will bring to the mental health sector? Does she also share our concern about the CQC’s ability to regulate and scrutinise properly?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. We have seen examples where regulators have not intervened quickly or robustly enough, and where systemic issues went unnoticed or unaddressed for far too long. We need to strengthen the remit and ensure that the CQC is properly equipped and held to the high standards that we expect of it.
I am an economist by background, so evaluation is something I think about a great deal. Reform, however well intentioned, must be followed by evidence, scrutiny and a willingness to learn and improve. The new clause ensures that we do not just set change in motion, but that we stop to ask whether it is working, whether the right things are being done, and if not, how we can improve.
The review required by the new clause would look not only backwards at whether the regulator has effectively carried out its existing duties under the Act, but, crucially, forwards, assessing whether it is ready to meet the responsibilities placed on it by the new reforms. I particularly welcome the requirement for the review to be published and laid before Parliament. Transparency is essential. It would allow Parliament to scrutinise but also gives patients, families, professionals and the public confidence that those questions are being asked seriously and answered publicly.
Ultimately, the new clause is about improving outcomes. When regulation works well it safeguards dignity, prevents harm, identifies and spreads good practice, develops trust and helps us build a system where the principles of this Bill—choice, autonomy, less restriction and greater therapeutic benefit—are not just written in statute, but visible in practice. That is especially important in mental health care, where so often the people subject to the Act are among the most vulnerable. Those in in-patient settings, particularly those who are detained, are often not in a position to advocate for themselves. They rely on a system that is vigilant, takes its safeguarding responsibilities seriously and puts patients’ rights first.
I hope that all members of this Committee will support the new clause. It is collaborative in its intent, constructive in its purpose and essential to delivering the meaningful reform that we all want to see. It reinforces the importance of accountability, transparency and listening to those most affected by this legislation. We owe it to those individuals and their families to make sure that we not only change the law, but also the culture and oversight that surrounds it. This review would help us do exactly that.
I am grateful to the Opposition spokesman, the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, for bringing this issue forward.
Two major independent reviews into the Care Quality Commission have reported under this Government: one by Dr Penny Dash, on the CQC’s operational effectiveness as a regulator of all health and social care providers including those in mental health, the other by Professor Sir Mike Richards on its single assessment framework. The CQC has accepted those recommendations in full, and although we are confident in the progress that the CQC is making, we recognise that the reviews did not closely inspect its statutory role in relation to monitoring the use of the Mental Health Act.
Those powers and duties are entirely distinct from those that the CQC uses to regulate the health and social care sector under the Health and Social Care Act 2008. In recognition of that gap, as the Opposition spokesman pointed out, we committed in the other place to report on that specific aspect of the CQC’s role in the first of the Government’s annual reports on the implementation of the Bill, which will be laid before Parliament one year after Royal Assent.
The Minister mentioned the Government’s annual reports, but at other times he has said that they will issue written ministerial statements. Will he clarify which it will be? There is a big difference between a couple of paragraphs in a written ministerial statement laid before the House, and a full report. When debating the other clauses, new clauses and amendments, the Government’s answer has been that they will report back to Parliament in a year’s time. I am grateful for that, but clarity would be helpful, because a full and comprehensive report would give more weight to the Opposition in terms of understanding and transparency.
I can confirm that the information will be in a section of the written ministerial statement that will be tabled within 12 months of Royal Assent. We think that requirement makes the Bill more robust and effective, because it is an integral part of the entire ecosystem that we are looking at in terms of implementing this legislation and making sure we have the institutional capacity and capability. We think it helps to have the information as an integral part of the written ministerial statement, but the hon. Gentleman is right to point out that we should be clear in the definitions and language we use.
The written ministerial statement will be an overall implementation report. It will contain a number of sections, one of which will be on the role of the CQC and the inspection function. It will include reflections from the new chief inspector of mental health, Dr Arun Chopra, on the CQC’s statutory functions under the Mental Health Act, as well as its role as a key partner in the delivery of the reforms. The written ministerial statement—the report—will be laid before both Houses of Parliament within 12 months of Royal Assent. I hope the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth therefore feels able to withdraw his new clause.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause would require a review of the quality of accommodation for people detained or admitted to hospital under the Mental Health Act, and require the Secretary of State to publish a strategy to implement the recommendations of that review.
Lord Darzi found that many people are being treated in Victorian-era asylums. Many mental health hospitals are crumbling and the wards are not fit for purpose. Both the Care Quality Commission and the independent review of the Mental Health Act confirmed that many mental health wards are unsafe for staff and patients, and provide poor-quality care in unsuitable buildings. One CQC inspection report found that the seclusion rooms had low ceilings that contained electrical wires overhead, creating a safety hazard, and that staff could not see people clearly through the window panels because they were cloudy.
Is the Minister confident that the mental health estate is adequate to fulfil the Bill’s objectives? In particular, is the Minister satisfied that the mental health estate is sufficiently safe, in structural terms, and designed appropriately for those using it? For example, is it free of ligature points, and does it have sufficient in-patient capacity for children and young people?
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Winchester for bringing this issue before us. We are committed to closely monitoring the quality of in-patient care and driving continuous improvement in services. Indeed, we are already in the process of doing that, and a further review is not necessary to drive the changes forward.
The CQC’s role is to monitor the quality of in-patient services. Its annual “Monitoring the Mental Health Act” report specifically discusses the in-patient environment, and considers the quality of accommodation under the 1983 Act. The independent review in particular made a recommendation to replace dormitory provision with private rooms. To date, the NHS has invested £575 million in doing that, and we are committed to completing our programme of investment.
I draw attention to Lynfield Mount hospital in my constituency, which provides mental health in-patient care. It has a fantastic plan for upgrading its facilities, but at the moment it has secured only a proportion of the capital funding. Will the Minister meet me and local NHS leaders to see whether we can close the gap in the capital funding for that facility?
I congratulate Lynfield Mount on the important work it is doing—and I congratulate my hon. Friend on that extremely strategic intervention. Yes, I would of course be more than happy to meet her, and we will make sure to get that in the diary.
The Government have allocated £750 million for estates safety in 2025-26, to address high-priority estate issues across the NHS systems, including in the mental health estate. The CQC will continue to monitor the impact of the reforms through its existing monitoring and reporting duties. A further statutory review is therefore not required, so I ask the hon. Member for Winchester to withdraw his new clause.
I thank the Minister for his reassurances, especially on the ongoing reviews. I will withdraw the new clause, but I make the obvious point that this is about not only the health and safety of the staff and patients, but the public perception of mental health, and the stigma surrounding it if we are treating people in Victorian-era asylums. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 15
Review of impact of this Act on detention
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within a period of 12 months following the day on which this Act is passed, commission an independent review into the impact of relevant provisions on reducing the number of people detained under Part 2 of the Mental Health Act 1983.
(2) In subsection (1), ‘relevant provisions’ include—
(a) sections 4, 5 and 6,
(b) section 8,
(c) section 21, and
(d) sections 46 and 47.
(3) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the publication of the review in subsection (1), publish a strategy to implement the recommendations of that review.”—(Zöe Franklin.)
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to commission a review into the impact of relevant provisions in the Act in reducing the number of people detained, in particular the provisions relating to people with autism or a learning disability, on grounds for detention and for community treatment orders, medical treatment, care and treatment plans, and on after-care, and to implement any recommendations within 12 months of the publication of the review.
Brought up, and read the First time.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 18—Report on the impact of this Act on patients with eating disorders—
“(1) Within a period of 12 months following the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must publish a report on the impact of relevant provisions in this Act on patients with eating disorders.
(2) In subsection (1), ‘relevant provisions’ include—
(a) section 5 (Grounds for detention),
(b) section 11 (Making treatment decisions),
(c) section 17 (Urgent treatment to alleviate serious suffering),
(d) section 21 (Care and treatment plans), and
(e) section 47 (After-care services).”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to report on the impact of this Bill on patients with eating disorders within 12 months of the passage of this Bill.
New clause 23—Impact assessment: children and young people in temporary foster care—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 18 months of the passing of this Act, publish and lay before Parliament an impact assessment on the impact of this Act on children and young people who are in temporary foster care.
(2) The impact assessment under this section must consider—
(a) whether the ordinary residence provisions result in delays or inequities in accessing treatment or after-care under this Act;
(b) the effect of transitions between placements on continuity of treatment under this Act; and
(c) any unintended consequences for children and young people in temporary foster care arising from the application of subsections (3) to (5) of section 125G of the Mental Health Act 1983.”
This new clause would require the Government to publish an impact assessment on the impact of this Act on children and young people in temporary foster care.
New clause 15 calls for an independent review of whether the legislation achieves one of its core aims: reducing unnecessary detention under the Mental Health Act. People with learning disabilities and autistic people are still far too often detained in hospital settings, sometimes for months or years, despite clear evidence that community-based support would be more effective and humane. The Bill’s provisions—including those on grounds for detention, care and treatment planning and aftercare—are supposed to address that, but if we do not review their impact, there is a risk that they remain warm words without real change.
The new clause would ensure that the Government must review how well the new law is working, in particular for those most vulnerable to inappropriate detention, and then act on that evidence within a year. If we are serious about reform, which I believe the Government are given the content of the Bill, then the new clause would ensure serious scrutiny and accountability.
I turn to new clause 18. Eating disorders are complex, often misunderstood and frequently mismanaged in the mental health system. Too many patients face delayed interventions, inappropriate detention or a lack of tailored care, particularly when their condition does not fit into a narrow clinical threshold. The Bill introduces reforms to detention criteria, treatment decisions and care planning, but we must ensure that the changes actually work for people with eating disorders.
The new clause would require the Secretary of State to publish a report within 12 months that assesses the Bill’s impact on patients with eating disorders, including whether it is has improved access to appropriate treatment, safeguarded against unnecessary detention and strengthened aftercare. This is a matter not just of policy but of real people’s lives. We owe it to this vulnerable group to ensure that the reforms deliver real change, and that they are not left behind in a system that is still too often shaped by other conditions.
Finally, on new clause 23, children and young people in temporary foster care are some of the most vulnerable in our system. They often face multiple disruptions in care, placement and support, all of which can significantly impact their mental health. The new clause asks for a focused impact assessment on how the changes in the legislation will affect them. In particular, the new clause looks at whether the ordinary residence rules delay or block access to mental health treatment, whether placement changes disrupt continuity of care, and whether the provisions in section 125G of the Mental Health Act unintentionally harm this group.
Foster children should not fall through the cracks of bureaucracy. If we are serious about improving mental health services for all, we must understand and address the unique risks that face those who are moved frequently, often with little warning or support. An impact assessment is a necessary first step to ensure that their needs are not overlooked.
I commend all the new clauses to the Committee and look forward to hearing from the Minister.
On new clause 15, we want more people cared for in the community and fewer people reaching a point of crisis and detention, but we do not think it is right to use the legislation to drive down the numbers in an arbitrary way that could interfere with clinical decision making and create a risk that people do not receive the help that they need. An evaluation of the relevant clauses should therefore focus not purely on the reduction in detentions, but on the overall improvement of experience and outcomes. Such improvement is predicated on the independent review principles of choice and control, therapeutic benefit, and the person as an individual, as well as the principle of least restriction.
The timescales suggested in new clause 15 are not feasible. Following Royal Assent, our priority will be to update the code and for staff to be trained on the new legislation and code, before commencing the first phase of the reforms. The first phase of significant reforms cannot take effect until the work on the code and the training of staff are completed. Few, if any, of the sections mentioned in new clause 15 could therefore be commenced within 12 months, and it would be premature to commission a review of their effect on detention rates within that time period.
We plan to commission an independent evaluation of the reforms, subject to funding and fundable research applications. This will be a long-term, staged exercise, given the long period over which different reforms are expected to be sequentially commenced following the initial primary legislation. We will monitor the impact of the reforms on the number of detentions and disparities in detention rates, all of which are already published under the monthly Mental Health Act statistics. We have also committed to providing Parliament with an annual update on the implementation of the reforms. As we already plan to commission an independent evaluation of the Bill, and as the timescale set out in new clause 15 would not be feasible, I ask the hon. Member for Guildford to withdraw the new clause.
On new clauses 18 and 23, we have already published an impact assessment alongside the Bill, which was scrutinised by the Regulatory Policy Committee and rated fit for purpose. We have also committed to laying an annual report on the Bill’s implementation, through the written ministerial statement. We are committed to monitoring and evaluating the reforms to understand their impact on different groups affected by the legislation.
On new clause 18, we recognise the devastating impact that an eating disorder can have on someone’s life. The earlier treatment is provided, the greater the chance of recovery. The implementation and evaluation of the reforms will be a long-term, staged exercise. It would not be possible to assess the impact of the reforms on people with eating disorders within 12 months, as not all reforms will have been implemented. We will continue to work closely with NHS England to improve access to appropriate and timely care and treatment for people with an eating disorder.
On new clause 23, we recognise that there are inequalities in mental health prevalence and outcomes for children and young people in care. We are committed to ensuring that all children are able to access the care and treatment they need. We plan to develop bespoke guidance in the revised code on the care and treatment of children and young people, to account for the specific needs of that cohort. I hope that hon. Members will not press their new clauses.
I thank the Minister for his comments; it was really helpful to hear about how he sees the timings in our new clause fitting with the ongoing work to implement the Mental Health Act and the commissioning of the independent review. I am concerned about his comment that the work will be dependent on funding. I hope that the funding for the important independent review will be ensured. However, on the basis of the Minister’s comments, I am happy not to press any of the new clauses. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 16
Transfer of patients: out of area placements
“(1) The Mental Health Act 1983 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 19 (transfer of patients), insert—
‘19A Transfer of patients: out of area placements
(1) The Secretary of State must reduce to zero, within five years of the passage of the Mental Health Act 2025, the number of patients transferred to a hospital outside of the area in which the patient is ordinarily resident.
(2) The Secretary of State must publish, within six months of the passage of the Mental Health Act 2025, a report to outline how the duty under this section will be met, including how provision for treatment under this Act will be increased.’”—(Dr Chambers.)
This new clause would require the transfer of patients to hospitals outside of their area to be reduced to zero within 5 years, and for the Secretary of State to produce a report on how this will be achieved.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause would require the number of patients transferred to hospitals outside their area to be reduced to zero within five years, and the Secretary of State would have to produce a report on how this would be achieved. We should not underestimate the harm and distress caused to patients and their families when they are allocated an out-of-area mental health placement. At the end of March 2024, there were 900 active out-of-area placements in England, of which 89% were deemed inappropriate.
Patients must be treated in a centre close to their home and family, and that can be achieved by increasing capacity and co-ordination between services. The new clause calls on the Secretary of State to publish guidance within six months of the Bill’s passage, setting out what processes and funding will be available for that purpose. Vulnerable people deserve to be treated near to their families and home, and the new clause would ensure that happens.
The new clause is underpinned by noble intentions, but does the hon. Gentleman believe that patients would be better served if such a process were in guidelines rather than in the Bill? That would ensure that it is deliverable.
I welcome the hon. Gentleman’s comments. That is a sensible and insightful point, and I will take on board the Minister’s response too.
We believe that everyone should receive treatment for mental illness as close to home as possible, but there are circumstances in which placement on a ward outside the area where a person usually resides is clinically necessary. Some specialised services—for example, treatment for an eating disorder—may require a person to be transferred to a placement away from home, and we wish to retain that option.
However, we know that too many patients are placed outside their local area, which is why we have set aside £75 million in capital funding for local systems to invest in reducing such placements for all patients. We are also trialling new models of care, including six pilots of 24/7 neighbourhood mental health centres, with the aim of treating more people in their local communities. Similar international models have achieved significant reductions in hospitalisation.
NHS England is developing a new model for specialised children’s and young people’s mental health services that aims to ensure that children and young people are treated in the least restrictive environment close to their family and home. I hope that that satisfies the hon. Gentleman and that he will withdraw the new clause.
I thank the Minister for his comments. He recognises the issue and is taking steps to address it, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 19
Report and Guidance: Improving Outcomes for LGBT Patients
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the day on which this Act is passed, prepare and lay before Parliament a report on the mental health outcomes of patients who are treated under the Mental Health Act 1983 and who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender (LGBT).
(2) The report under subsection (1) must include an assessment of—
(a) any differences between non-LGBT patients and LGBT patients in—
(i) the extent of the use of detention measures under the Mental Health Act 1983; and
(ii) treatment outcomes following detention, and
(b) the availability and accessibility of ‘culturally competent’ mental health treatment under the 1983 Act for LGBT patients.
(3) Following publication of the report under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must publish guidance for responsible bodies and individuals working with patients under the Mental Health Act 1983, including but not limited to those working in—
(a) mental health hospitals;
(b) places of safety;
(c) crisis accommodation; and
(d) relevant community mental health services.
(4) The guidance under subsection (3) must include—
(a) provisions about updated training standards for staff regarding the specific mental health needs and experiences of LGBT individuals, including training on non-discriminatory practice and inclusive communication approaches;
(b) steps to improve safety for LGBT patients in relevant mental health settings, with particular regard to addressing discrimination and harassment; and
(c) a definition of ‘cultural competent mental health treatment’ for the purposes of subsection (2).
(5) Responsible bodies and individuals working with patients under the Mental Health Act 1983 must have regard to guidance published under subsection (3).
(6) In preparing the report under subsection (1) and the guidance under subsection (3), the Secretary of State must consult—
(a) patients with a mental disorder who identify as LGBT;
(b) the families or carers of patients with a mental disorder who identify as LGBT;
(c) relevant professional bodies;
(d) integrated care boards;
(e) local authorities;
(f) providers of mental health treatment; and
(g) such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
(7) The Secretary of State must update the guidance under subsection (3) at regular intervals, and no less frequently than every three years.”—(Zöe Franklin.)
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to report on mental health outcomes and disparities for LGBT patients in treatment under the Mental Health Act 1983 and publish guidance covering training and safety for this specific group.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 19 would require the Secretary of State to report on mental health outcomes for LGBT patients detained or treated under the Mental Health Act 1983, and to publish clear guidance to improve staff training, patient safety and inclusive care for that group. We all deserve appropriate support when experiencing poor mental health, and that support must be fair and respectful, no matter whether the patient identifies as lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender. Members of the LGBT community should have confidence that they will be treated with dignity and should not face unequal or inappropriate treatment because of who they are. Unfortunately, we know that that is not always the reality.
Stonewall’s “LGBT in Britain—Health” report revealed deeply concerning findings: almost one in four LGBT individuals had heard discriminatory or negative remarks about them from healthcare staff, one in eight had experienced unequal treatment, one in 10 had been outed without their consent in healthcare settings, and one in seven had avoided treatment altogether for fear of discrimination. That is unacceptable anywhere in our health system, but it is especially alarming in mental health settings, where patients are already in distress and often detained, and may not be in a position to advocate for themselves.
I am grateful to the hon. Member for bringing this issue before the Committee. This Government are committed to tackling health inequalities. The NHS continues to pursue its advancing mental health equalities strategy, which sets out plans to address inequalities in access, experience and outcomes in mental health care, including for LGBTQ+ people. However, we do not think that a review within 12 months of the passage of this Bill is the right approach. First, there are known data quality issues with the recording of sexual orientation in the mental health services dataset, which, combined with small numbers, limits our ability to monitor outcomes accurately and reliably.
Secondly, we do not need a review before acting to improve patient experience under the Act. We will update the code of practice following the passage of this Bill, including the statutory guidance to the Mental Health Act, and will work with patient groups to consider what further guidance is needed to reduce disparities in use of the Act. That consideration will cover issues based on sexuality, gender, race and other protected characteristics. We are also committed to monitoring and evaluating the reforms, which will include an assessment of whether new safeguards and support mechanisms are being equitably accessed through different groups. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member to withdraw the new clause.
I thank the Minister for his comments, for the recognition that individuals in the LGBT community clearly have concerns about the way that mental health care is provided, and for the commitment to addressing those. I hope that at some point he will be able to advise on the timeline for looking to resolve the issue of the unreliability of data; it is crucial that we have accurate data in order to ensure good outcomes and improvements in mental health care. However, in the light of the Minister’s comments and commitment on the issue, we will not press the new clause, although I look forward to observing closely, as this Bill continues through the House, how it will address the current inequalities for the LGBT+ community. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 22
National strategy on mental health units
“(1) The Mental Health Act 1983 is amended as follows.
(2) In Part VIII (Miscellaneous Functions of Local Authorities and the Secretary of State), after section 118, insert—
‘118A National strategy on mental health units
(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the passing of the Mental Health Act 2025, publish a national strategy to set out how the Government will ensure that all relevant mental health units meet or exceed ‘good’ safety standards as assessed by the Care Quality Commission (CQC).
(2) A strategy issued under this section must address the following matters—
(a) recruitment, retention and training of mental health staff,
(b) patient-to-staff ratios, and
(c) safe staffing levels during crises and night shifts.
(3) Following publication of the strategy, a report on implementation progress must be laid before Parliament annually.
(4) For the purposes of this section, a ‘relevant mental health unit’ is a facility used for treatment under this Act.”—(Dr Chambers.)
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to publish a strategy, followed by an annual progress report, on how the Government will ensure that all mental health units used for treatment under the Mental Health Act 1983 are rated “good” or above by the CQC.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 22 is quite similar to new clause 14, on the state of in-patient facilities. It would require the Secretary of State to publish a national strategy to ensure that all mental health units meet or exceed a good rating for safety, as assessed by the Care Quality Commission. It would also mandate annual progress reports to Parliament. We all know that far too many mental health settings fall below acceptable standards. The CQC has repeatedly flagged serious failings in in-patient mental health services, including unsafe staffing levels, poor physical conditions and risks of harm to patients. These are not isolated issues but persistent and systemic problems.
The new clause calls for a proper, co-ordinated response. It would require the Government to set out how they will address staffing shortages, improve recruitment and retention, and ensure safe staffing levels, particularly at night and during crisis periods, when the risk is often highest. It is not enough to rely on reactive inspections or piecemeal initiatives; we need a national strategy backed by data, accountability and regular reporting to the House. Too many vulnerable people are currently treated in mental health units that are overstretched, understaffed and, in some cases, unsafe. The new clause would begin to change that by setting clear expectations on monitoring progress and holding the Government to account. I commend the new clause to the Committee.
We all agree that patient safety is paramount. Anyone who receives treatment in an in-patient mental health facility deserves safe and high-quality care. There have been too many incidents of poor-quality and unsafe care resulting in trauma and sometimes tragedy.
Although we agree with the principle of the new clause, the overriding objective duplicates NHS England’s in-patient quality transformation programme, a national initiative aimed at improving the quality and safety of care in in-patient mental health, learning disability and autism services. The programme has been developed with service users, families and staff, and sets out a long-term vision for improving in-patient services.
The new clause focuses specifically on staffing arrangements. Although we of course agree that the workforce is an important consideration in ensuring safe in-patient care, it is not the only factor. By comparison, NHS England’s in-patient quality transformation programme takes a more comprehensive view of the factors that contribute to safe and effective in-patient care. For example, it includes support for the cultural changes required to create and sustain an in-patient environment in which patients and staff can flourish. The programme’s progress will be measured using a range of data and evidence, for example on patient and staff experience.
We know that more needs to be done to support the providers of mental health care to improve the quality of their services in a sustainable way, which is why we are putting in place a robust package of reforms to help to improve performance. There will be no more rewards for failing; instead, ICBs and providers that do well will be rewarded with greater freedoms, while the most challenged will receive focused intervention. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the new clause.
I thank the Minister for his comments and reassurances. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 24
Application in respect of patient already on hospital grounds
“(1) The Mental Health Act 1983 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 5(1) (Application in respect of a patient already in hospital), after ‘or,’ insert ‘that the patient has attended a hospital or been brought to a hospital to seek help or admission as a patient or,’”.—(Dr Shastri-Hurst.)
This new clause would allow people who have attended or been brought to a hospital to seek help or admission as a patient to pursue an application for admission under the Mental Health Act.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause seeks to ensure that if a patient dies while in detention under the Mental Health Act, an independent inquiry into their death will be required. Unlike deaths in prison or police-related deaths, deaths while a person is detained under the Mental Health Act are not automatically investigated independently. Currently, if a person dies while detained under the Act, the trust responsible for their care should carry out an internal investigation into their death to find out what happened and whether lessons can be learned. Those investigations, known as serious incident investigations or root cause analysis, do not have any independent oversight and can vary a lot from trust to trust.
Inquest, the only charity in England and Wales providing expertise on state-related deaths and their investigation, has found that the current system for investigating such deaths is not fit for purpose. In its statement to the Lampard inquiry, it outlined an anonymised case from 2010 in which there was a stark contrast between the findings of the NHS trust that investigated the death of a patient detained under its care and the inquest that took place two years later. The trust found very few failings in care, whereas the jury at the later inquest were critical of the patient’s treatment, which directly led to their death. The question we must ask ourselves is why we would allow deaths while in detention under the Mental Health Act to be investigated by those in charge of custody, when deaths in any other setting would not be. We do not allow the police to judge their own actions if a death occurs in custody, so why should it be any different for those detained under the Mental Health Act?
My hon. Friend is making a fantastic speech. In the really dire circumstances of a death in detention, we are dealing with the most difficult and, for family members and loved ones, the most devastating circumstances. Given that, does she agree that it is important to make sure that the circumstances are reviewed thoroughly and independently?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. This is about transparency and providing answers for the families of patients when the very worst happens.
Independence has allowed investigations into deaths in places of custody to improve significantly. As outlined by the independent advisory panel on deaths in custody, patients detained under the Mental Health Act now have the highest mortality rate across all places of custody. Indeed, the rate is three times higher than in prisons, when taking into account estimates of time in custody and the number of people in each setting. Behind each of these tragedies are families who have unanswered questions and who have had to fight to find out what happened to their loved ones, and vulnerable people who should have received better care.
In my constituency, there is the story of Catherine Horton, who died in 2017 while in the care of the South London and Maudsley NHS trust. The inquest into her death found that the risk assessment was not properly updated, with no formal risk assessment conducted, and no care plan on her arrival or while at the facility. There is also the story of Tia Wilson, who died in 2021 in the care of the same trust. The inquest into her death found that there were multiple failures in managing her risk, which contributed to her death. Then there is the story of the brother of one of my constituents, who absconded from his care, went missing, and was later found dead in a wooded area a stone’s throw from her home.
For each of those cases, we know that internal reviews will have taken place and assurances of improvements will have been made, and yet issues with risk assessments remain and families are left pushing for answers. This is not unique to south London; the internal review process is failing to deliver the necessary improvements across the country. Without embedding independence into the process, we risk undoing a lot of the good work that the Bill seeks to achieve. Adding independence into the investigation of these incidents where the very worst things happen gives trusts a genuine space to learn the lessons. It would improve patient safety and provide families with the transparency they need.
Although we must all acknowledge the incredible work that trusts do across our country to provide care for people at their most vulnerable, we must also provide a proper framework for challenge and improvement. The new clause is an opportunity to treat the deaths of people detained under the Mental Health Act with the same seriousness and care as deaths in other custody settings, to embed transparency, and to make the meaningful improvements that all patients deserve.
I am very grateful to my hon. Friend for bringing this issue to the Committee. I thank her for her powerful speech, which drew on specific experiences of people who have been through very terrible and tragic processes. I have discussed some work on the broader issue of quality of care, but this is a vital issue, and I reiterate how grateful I am to her for enabling us to discuss it on the public record. We recognise that there have been too many incidents of poor-quality and unsafe care, which sometimes result in tragedy. I hope my hon. Friend is reassured by the measures we are taking to support providers of mental health care to improve the quality of their services. We have carefully considered her new clause, and I am afraid that we do not think this needs to be addressed through the Bill.
I thank the Minister for his comments. The cluttered and chaotic way in which we investigate these things is part of the problem, so I am glad to hear that there is a wider review of how we streamline the process better for patients, because we are seeing mistakes repeated over and over again. I am content to withdraw the new clause, but I would be grateful if the Minister would meet me to discuss the wider plans in this area and how I can support that work and take it forward.
I would be more than happy to meet my hon. Friend. It is also worth mentioning the independent advisory panel on deaths in custody report, which she mentioned. We are considering that carefully, so we should include it in our discussions.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 26
Use of restraint and restrictive intervention
“(1) The Mental Health Act 1983 is amended as follows.
(2) In Part II (Compulsory Admission to Hospital and Guardianship), after section 7, insert—
‘7A Use of force in connection with admission for assessment or treatment
(1) A relevant organisation that operates a hospital must appoint a responsible person for the purposes of this section.
(2) The responsible person must—
(a) be employed by the relevant health organisation, and
(b) be of an appropriate level of seniority.
(3) The responsible person must keep a record of any use of force by staff who work in that hospital against a person (“P”) who—
(a) has been admitted for assessment or treatment under sections 2 to 5 of this Act; or
(b) is on the hospital premises and is at risk of detention under this Act.
(4) The Secretary of State must by regulations provide for the risk factors to be considered under subsection (3)(b).
(5) A record kept under this section must include—
(a) the reason for the use of force
(b) the place, date and duration of the use of force
(c) whether the type or types of force used on the patient formed part of the patient's care plan;
(d) the name of the patient on whom force was used;
(e) a description of how force was used;
(f) the patient's consistent identifier;
(g) the name and job title of any member of staff who used force on the patient;
(h) the reason any person who was not a member of staff in the hospital was involved in the use of force on the patient;
(i) the patient's mental disorder (if known);
(j) the relevant characteristics of the patient (if known);
(k) whether the patient has a learning disability or autistic spectrum disorders;
(l) a description of the outcome of the use of force;
(m) whether the patient died or suffered any serious injury as a result of the use of force;
(n) any efforts made to avoid the need to use force on the patient; and
(o) whether a notification regarding the use of force was sent to the person or persons (if any) to be notified under the patient's care plan.
(6) The responsible person must keep the record for three years from the date on which it was made.
(7) The Secretary of State must ensure that, at the end of each year, statistics are published regarding the use of force by staff who work in hospitals under the conditions set out in this section.’”—(Jen Craft.)
This new clause would require hospitals to record information on all incidents in which force is used against patients with mental disorders, in line with the reporting currently required in mental health units, including force against those at risk of detention for assessment or treatment. It would also require the Government to publish annual figures on the same topic.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I will speak briefly to the new clause, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Hallam (Olivia Blake). Its aim is to close a loophole in the current framework by which use of restraint is recorded. Currently, the use of restraint is governed by the Mental Health Units (Use of Force) Act 2018, which mandates that where force or restraint is used in a mental health unit, that must be recorded and reported. There are, however, a number of patients who are treated outside mental health units and therefore do not fall within the scope of the Act. My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Hallam has spoken about the issue, to which her attention was particularly drawn in the context of the treatment of patients with eating disorders. This happens quite often, either where there is a shortage of beds in a mental health unit or where the patient in question has co-occurring physical health conditions that require treatment outside such a unit.
Restraint is used regularly and often on patients with eating disorders, by which I mean restraining them to force them to eat, but there is currently no mechanism by which its use must be recorded. If a patient, particularly a young person, who is in hospital but is not in a mental health unit is subject to this restraint, which may be deemed necessary to preserve life and in their best interests, there is currently no mechanism by which that is recorded.
We touched earlier on the safeguards around electroconvulsive therapy. Does my hon. Friend agree that when someone with an eating disorder is restrained, particularly in circumstances that involve the administration of nasogastric tube feeding, such safeguards are really important because of the invasive nature of the treatment and the potential restraint used in delivering it?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The crucial purpose of the new clause is to ensure that the use of restraint is recorded at all times, as well as highlighting that quite often the restraint may be carried out not by a member of the medical staff, but by hospital security, for example. I think we can only imagine the real horror and force involved in that.
I thank my hon. Friend for drawing attention to this gap in the current law. Would she acknowledge that there is now evidence that the use of restraint and restrictive interventions can have serious long-term effects on a patient’s health and wellbeing? Indeed, there can also be an impact on those staff members who are required to carry it out, often with poor training.
I completely agree. The long-term implications and impacts of restraint on health and wellbeing have been widely documented and acknowledged. It is vital, if a patient is subjected to these measures, that their use is recorded and the patient, in turn, can understand why.
The Committee has spent significant time talking about the importance of patient inclusion in their treatment plans. Earlier clauses, which I will not revisit at length, deal with the importance of enabling patients to select how and where they are treated, as well as advance choice documents. They are vital to the patient experience, because they involve and include them in how they are treated. We acknowledge that such involvement has a massive impact on the patient’s ability to heal, get better, recover from their mental illness and, in some cases, get well enough to go home. It is vital, if people are subject to restraint and the use of force, that it is recorded in an appropriate manner.
This new clause seeks to mandate the recording of its use by staff, as well as information such as the member of staff who applied the force, whether they are medical, and, vitally, demographic data. My hon. Friend the Member for Southend East and Leigh—I hope I have that right—
My apologies; they are both lovely places. My hon. Friend spoke earlier about the impact that mental health treatment can have on people in regard to race and ethnicity, and the importance of including demographic data. We know that black people are disproportionately subject to use of force and restraint, which is why recording this data in a mental health unit is acknowledged as important. However, if a patient is subject to restraint outside a mental health unit, there is currently no mechanism to record that.
The new clause would also require the Secretary of State to publish annual statistics on how restraint has been used outside a mental health unit. I believe that the Minister’s predecessor agreed to look at closing this loophole. To date, however, action has not necessarily been forthcoming. People continue to be subject to the use of force or restraint, and we have no means of knowing how often it has occurred, to whom it has occurred or whether it has taken place inappropriately. I encourage the Minister and other members of the Committee to consider how we can ensure that the use of restraint and force is appropriately recorded in all medical settings, not just in mental health units.
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Hallam for tabling this important new clause, and I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock for moving it on her behalf.
The new clause seeks to recreate some of the duties from the Mental Health Units (Use of Force) Act 2018, but apply them to patients detained under sections 2, 3, 4 or 5 of the Mental Health Act or those at risk of detention under that Act. This would cover patients receiving mental health treatment who are not in specialist mental health beds, such as young people with eating disorders who are detained in general paediatric wards.
There are practical reasons why we do not support the new clause as it is drafted. For the vast majority of mental health patients, this duty would duplicate duties that already exist under the 2018 Act. Although the new clause would go further in requiring the recording of use of force outside mental health units, it does not require any further use of that data to develop policies or train staff, which is a key element of the 2018 Act. As drafted, the new clause would introduce new duties to record and report data, without there being any clear further use of that data.
I accept, however, that we need to do more to reduce the use of restraint for all patients detained or at risk of detention under the Mental Health Act. NHS England has an ongoing programme of work, overseen by the reducing restrictive practice oversight group, to address this issue for people experiencing acute distress and mental health difficulties. My officials have also written to the CQC to commission it to develop a viable and proportionate mechanism for reporting use of restraint to the CQC, drawing on the views of NHS Providers and NHS England. Any potential changes can be made in regulations and would not require primary legislation, so we can continue this work in parallel with the passage of the Bill, delivering on our commitment to reduce the use of force for mental health patients. For those reasons, I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock will withdraw the new clause.
I thank the Minister for his comments. I am reassured, as I am sure my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Hallam will be, to hear that he accepts the need to do more about the use of restraint, regardless of the setting in which it occurs. I am also pleased to hear about the measures by which he is seeking to do so in parallel with the passage of the Bill. I am content with what the Minister said, and I imagine my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Hallam will be, too. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 55
Power of Secretary of State to make consequential provision
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
With this it will be convenient to consider the following:
Clauses 56 to 58 stand part.
Government amendment 39.
Clause 59 stand part.
I should say to Members that we have 10 minutes left. If they want to conclude the Committee’s business this morning, they should bear that in mind.
Clauses 55 to 59 are the general provisions of the Bill. They include the powers to make provision that is consequential on the Bill by regulations. The clauses also set out the territorial extent of the measures, and the commencement and short title of the Bill.
Clause 55 will allow the Secretary of State to make regulations that make provisions that are consequential on the Bill. The power may be used to
“amend, repeal or revoke provision made by or under primary legislation passed—
(a) before this Act, or
(b) later in the same session of Parliament as this Act.”
Clause 56 will provide an equivalent power for Welsh Ministers to make consequential provision in areas of their devolved legislative competence. Regulations that make consequential provision will be subject to the affirmative scrutiny procedure where they amend or repeal primary legislation, and to the negative procedure where they amend or revoke secondary legislation.
Clause 57 sets out the extent of the Bill. The majority of the Bill will extend to England and Wales, but the general provisions in clauses 55 to 59 will apply UK-wide. We have tabled two amendments, Government amendments 37 and 38, that will modify section 6(3)(b) of the Human Rights Act 1998, extending its protection to cover private care providers when providing certain services arranged or paid for by public authorities. That change, if accepted, will extend UK-wide; we tabled the amendments to clause 57 to reflect that position.
I will be brief. On this clause, I will be grateful if the Government can ensure good co-operation between the devolved powers, and if the Minister can set out how he will engage with the Welsh Government before exercising the power.
On clause 57, what consideration has been given to cross-border issues to ensure that there are no unintended consequences between the likes of England and Wales or Scotland and England? Clause 58 covers commencement; will there be a clear published timetable for that over the next 10 years? Will Government allow Parliament sight of the transitional provisions? We have talked about the annual written ministerial statement, which we have clarified, but will there be further tracking reports that we can look at?
Clause 59 states that the Bill will not impose new public spending or taxation, and yet the impact assessment lists £1.9 billion for the NHS in England, £396 million for local authorities, £2.5 billion for supporting housing and social care, and £287 million for legal costs and tribunals. Clearly, costs are associated with the Bill’s implementation over the next 10 years, so a money resolution is rightly required. When I raised those issues on our first and second days in Committee, the Minister rightly could not answer, because we had not had the Government’s settlement. We have now had that settlement, so I will be grateful to understand how the funding is to be applied to mental health on the community side and with regards to the Bill. Finally, given that we are dealing with Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, what are the Barnett consequentials of the Bill in ensuring the support implied in the clauses?
I am grateful to the Committee, the Clerks, the Chairs, everyone here and everyone who has helped me prepare. Committee stage has been a joy, but also a long trial to get through. I am glad to be present as the Bill proceeds, because it is the right thing for the country.
I thank the shadow Minister for his question about devolved powers. We have worked closely with the Welsh Government on the Bill. The Senedd has yet to vote, but the Welsh Government in their legislative consent memorandum recommended that it grants consent to the Bill. We also seek a legislative consent motion from the Northern Ireland Executive for extending—in Government amendments 37 and 38—the remit of the Human Rights Act 1998 to cover private care providers when providing certain services arranged for or paid by local by public authorities. I will look into the cross-border issues and, if something is there, I will certainly write to update the shadow Minister.
On the published timetable, the written ministerial statement will absolutely be a report on progress over the 12 months and will have a forward plan in it. I cannot say at this moment whether it will be a forward plan all the way through the proposed 10-year commencement period, because some of that will go beyond the spending review period, for example, but I assure the hon. Member that a timetable will at least cover the period of the initial spending review. I do not know whether there will be tracking reports—I will check that point with officials—but my sense is that the written ministerial statement will be the main hook to hang this on.
The shadow Minister asked about the money resolution. We have the overall financial envelope for the DHSC. There is now—how should I describe this?—intense dialogue going on between departments within the DHSC and across portfolios, so I think it will take a couple of weeks before we get the carve-up of the envelope across the different portfolios.
I note the shadow Minister’s point about the Barnett consequentials. I will look into it and come back to him.
It remains for me to thank you, Mr Vickers; everyone in Committee, for their very hard work; and all the staff and officials, to whom we are hugely grateful. I commend the Bill to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 55 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 56 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 57
Extent
Amendments made: 37, in clause 57, page 68, line 3, at end insert “subject to subsection (2).”
This is consequential on amendment 38.
Amendment 38, in clause 57, page 68, line 4, leave out “This section, section 55” and insert—
“Section (Human Rights Act 1998: extension to certain private care providers), section 55, this section”.—(Stephen Kinnock.)
This ensures that NC10 extends to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.
Clause 57, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 58 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 59
Short title
Amendment made: 39, in clause 59, page 68, line 25, leave out subsection (2).—(Stephen Kinnock.)
This removes the privilege amendment inserted in the Lords.
Clause 59, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Bill, as amended, to be reported.
(1 day, 13 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesBefore we begin, I have a few preliminary announcements. Will Members please be kind enough to send their speaking notes by email, if possible, to hansardnotes@parliament.uk? Please switch all electronic devices off or to silent. Please also remember that tea and coffee are not allowed in the room during sittings.
We will consider first the programme motion as on the amendment paper and then the motion on the reporting of written evidence for publication. In view of the time available, I hope that we can take those formally, but they are open to debate if anyone wishes to debate them. The Minister will move the programme motion standing in his name, which was discussed yesterday by the Programming Sub-Committee for the Bill.
Ordered,
That—
1. the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 9.25 am on Tuesday 24 June) meet—
(a) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 26 June;
(b) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 1 July;
(c) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 3 July;
(d) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 8 July;
2. the proceedings shall be taken in the following order: Clauses 1 to 12; Schedule; Clauses 13 to 40; new Clauses; new Schedules; Clauses 41 to 44; remaining proceedings on the Bill;
3. the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 5.00 pm on Tuesday 8 July.—(Simon Lightwood.)
Resolved,
That, subject to the discretion of the Chair, any written evidence received by the Committee
shall be reported to the House for publication.—(Simon Lightwood.)
It is cooler today, but if hon. Members are robust enough and wish to remove their jackets, they may do so.
We now come to line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection and grouping list is available in the room. It shows how the clauses and selected amendments—there are amendments that have not been selected—have been grouped together for debate. Amendments grouped together are ordinarily on the same or a similar issue. I appreciate that I may be teaching granny to suck eggs, but some Members may not have served on a Bill Committee before.
Decisions on amendments do not take place in the order that they are debated; they take place in the order that they appear on the amendment paper. The selection and grouping list shows the order of debates. Decisions on each amendment, and on whether each clause should stand part of the Bill, are taken when we come to consider the relevant clause.
Let me explain that: you will find that things are debated and then not voted on, and you might think, “Oh gosh, we have missed something.” We have not. We will vote on them when we reach the stage in the Bill at which they appear, even though they have been grouped earlier, because they are on a similar subject to something else. I hope that is clear. If you have any questions, feel free to ask me or the Clerk—I may not know the answer, but the Clerk certainly will.
A Member who has put their name to the lead amendment in a group is called to speak first. Other Members are then free to catch my eye to speak on all or any of the amendments within that group. Members can speak more than once in a debate, but please indicate that—I do not have second sight. I do not like feeling that someone has been left out because I did not call them, so make sure that you catch my eye, or that of whoever is in the Chair, if you want to speak.
At the end of the debate on a group of amendments, I will call the Member who moved the lead amendment to speak again only if they wish to do so. Before the Member sits down, they need to indicate whether they wish to withdraw the amendment or press it to a vote. If any Member wishes to press any other amendment to a vote, please let me know in advance. Before we start, do any Members need to make declarations of interest?
I am a serving councillor on Norfolk county council.
I am a serving Isle of Wight councillor.
We will now begin our consideration of the Bill.
Clause 1
Purpose: improvement of bus passenger services
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 22—Duty to promote bus services—
“(1) It is the general duty of any relevant authorities overseeing bus operations to promote bus services in their jurisdiction.
(2) In fulfilling this duty, authorities may consider—
(a) the potential benefits of making bus services economically competitive with other transport options;
(b) measures to enhance the environmental sustainability of bus services, including but not limited to reducing emissions and supporting greener transport alternatives;
(c) the broader social, economic, and environmental benefits of increasing bus patronage;
(d) the need to reduce road congestion and improve urban mobility;
(e) opportunities to contribute to lower air pollution and reduced greenhouse gas emissions;
(f) the provision of affordable and accessible transport that promotes social inclusion;
(g) the need to improve access to employment, education, health, and other essential services.
(3) A relevant authority must publish a report every two years which outlines steps taken to fulfil this duty, including—
(a) progress in making bus services economically competitive and environmentally sustainable;
(b) the effectiveness of policies and measures aimed at increasing bus patronage;
(c) challenges faced in promoting bus services and proposing or implementing solutions; and
(d) plans for future improvements in bus services.
(4) Relevant authorities may consult with any relevant stakeholders, including transport operators, local businesses, and members of the public, which they deem to be expedient for the purpose of fulfilling the duty outlined in this section.”
This new clause would place a duty on authorities to promote bus services in their areas.
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Sir Roger. I think I speak for the majority of Committee members in saying that, as this is my first Bill Committee, I will be guided by your experience and that of the Clerks.
This clause places a duty on the Secretary of State to have regard to the purpose of the Bill, namely the improved performance, quality and accessibility of bus passenger services in Great Britain. The clause was inserted into the Bill via a non-Government amendment in the other place. I will take this opportunity to outline the Government’s objectives for buses, which extend well beyond the Bill and explain why the clause is not necessary.
The Government know that for far too long, buses have not been delivering for passengers. Long-term service decline has undermined confidence and contributed to falling patronage. Efforts to buck that trend have not gone far enough. The Government’s vision is for better bus services across the country. We seek to grow passenger numbers and drive opportunity to underserved regions. That means enabling local areas to shape services that connect people to the places where they need to go; that can be counted on as a reliable, affordable, inclusive and better integrated part of the transport network; and that offer bus passengers, in particular women and girls, safety throughout their journeys. Passengers should also be able to access accurate, accessible and timely information about when and where buses will run.
The Bill is an important part of delivering that vision. Local leaders will be given powers to decide how best to design bus services in their areas, whether that is through bus franchising or strengthened enhanced partnerships. The Government are taking steps to ensure that essential services, including those in rural areas, are protected, that safety is improved, and that services are more accessible.
Legislative change alone, however, is not enough. In addition, the Government have published updated franchising guidance. Reforms to how bus services are funded are also being implemented, with the bus service improvement plan and the bus service operators grant funding being combined into a single bus grant. Furthermore, at the spending review, the Government committed £900 million each year to maintain and improve vital bus services; extended the £3 fare cap until March 2027; and announced franchising pilots in York and North Yorkshire, and Cheshire West and Chester.
The clause, therefore, does not account for the full scope of the Government’s ambition. It cannot do so, because our ambitious reform package extends beyond the structural changes that the Bill makes. The clause would also amend the Bill to limit its outcomes to specific aims, which would not take into account the other outcomes that the Government seek to achieve, such as improved safety. I hope that my comments demonstrate to Members the Government’s objectives for buses. For those reasons, the Government will oppose the clause remaining part of the Bill.
I thank the hon. Members for Wimbledon and for North Norfolk for tabling new clause 22. I have explained that the Bill is about empowering local leaders across the country to shape better bus services for their communities. Beyond the Bill, the Department for Transport allocated more than £700 million of bus grant funding to local transport authorities in 2025-26. That included additional funding for local transport authorities to boost their capability, so that they can make the most of the opportunities that the Bill gives them. I have already spoken about the announcements at the recent spending review, including the extension of the £3 bus fare cap to March ’27. Work is already under way to ensure that the Government provide active support to local transport authorities, such as those interested in franchising.
The Bill is about giving local areas choice, and with that comes trust. That is consistent with what the Government seek to achieve through devolution. My view is that authorities and operators want to promote bus services in their local areas, which will help their communities to thrive and create growth. New clause 22, however, would place additional requirements and reporting burdens on local authorities and local transport authorities. That would lead to additional pressures on authorities already under resource constraints. That is not the Government’s intention. We want authorities to be focused on delivering better buses and, as I said, we want to give them the tools to get on and do precisely that. The new clause has the potential to compel authorities to divert funding from essential services to other activities. For those reasons, the Government cannot support it and I ask that the new clause not be moved.
I will give another word of explanation at this point. Ordinarily, I would call the shadow Minister first and then other Members, but because Mr Kohler tabled the new clause, I shall call him first and then the shadow Minister. The first four debates on the selection and grouping list are on clause stand part, which means, literally, that the clause being considered shall stand—remain—part of the Bill. If the clause is amended, the Question will be whether the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
When we come to a group with a lead amendment, as we will in our fifth debate, I have the authority to decide whether to subsequently permit a clause stand part debate. We will debate the amendments in the group, and then I will put the Question that the clause stand part of the Bill—but that can be debated. Different Chairmen take different views. My view is that you can have your cake, but you cannot eat it twice. You can have a big debate, which sometimes facilitates a general discussion—that is fine by me—but it almost invariably means that you then do not get a second bite of the cherry with a stand part debate at the end.
If you have any questions, ask. It is a slightly complex and arcane process, but we will get there in the end.
What you have just described is in the event that the amendment is agreed to. Is that right?
No, not necessarily. A lead amendment will be moved when we come to a group of amendments, as will happen in our fifth debate. Only the lead amendment will be moved, and it may or may not be agreed to. I will then decide, on the basis of the debate on the grouped amendments, whether everything in the clause has been sufficiently debated and we need hear no more about it, thank you very much. If there are things missing, I will say, “Actually, this still warrants a clause stand part debate.” Other Chairmen may take a different view. I have found, generally, that Members like to take a slightly broader view in debates, which is fine, but you cannot do it twice. What we cannot have is repetitive debates.
Because new clause 22 is grouped with clause 1, I call Paul Kohler to speak to his new clause.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Roger. The Lib Dems support the Bill and applaud the Government’s ambitions. This is an excellent move forward, and we support the purpose set out in clause 1. The stated aim to
“improve the performance, accessibility and quality of bus passenger services”
in the UK is vital. However, buses have for too long been a poor relation in public transport, which is why we are pushing the Government to give local authorities a general duty to promote the use of bus services.
The bus is the most popular form of public transport, but it has long been neglected and, to some extent, looked down on. New clause 22 would ensure that local authorities have a duty to encourage the use of buses and promote their benefits and services, but it is only a general duty. Subsection (2) would not be mandatory; it simply suggests the things that a local authority might consider.
Although the Government’s ambitions are wonderful and to be commended, we want local authorities to start saying to people, “Yes, buses are important, and we have a role in providing them.” That is why we are pushing the Government on that.
It is very reassuring to have you in the Chair, Sir Roger. I already feel calmer, and I am sure the Minister does as well.
I will tell you at the end of the day.
The Opposition welcome the Bill in principle, which is why we did not divide the House on Second Reading. We welcome it because franchising was an innovation that the previous Government introduced in 2017. At that stage, it was limited to mayoral combined authorities, although any local authority could apply to the Secretary of State for agreement that franchising could be brought in.
We are concerned, however, that the Bill does not deliver the goals of value for money and improvement of passenger services as it is currently drafted. It is therefore important that we use this opportunity to carefully consider the many amendments from the Government, official Opposition, the Liberal Democrats and the Greens; each of them has their various merits, and there are many good ideas to improve what every party agrees is currently an imperfect Bill.
That brings me to clause 1—the purpose clause—which was proposed by the Earl of Effingham in the other place, and received substantial support. It ensures that the overarching aim of the Bill is to improve bus services, and that that remains at the heart of all decisions undertaken in its provisions. By explicitly requiring the Secretary of State to have regard to that purpose, the clause embeds into the legislation a commitment to improve bus services. That is not merely a formality; it is about setting a clear duty on the Secretary of State to put the improvement of bus services at the core of any decisions he or she makes under the legislation.
The clause gives the Bill a necessary focus; it is the framework on which all the baubles of other clauses and requirements are hung. That is important when there is a change to structures, as the Bill anticipates, because it is easy for process to take over from the clear objectives of the Bill. In a purely commercial construct, where there is an operator driven by the profit motive—they need to drive fare box and have customers to get a return on their investment—it is obvious that the natural incentives focus on the customer. When we move to a franchise and the primacy of commercial incentives are removed, the risk is that the customer gets overlooked.
In what is commonly described as full-fat franchising—rather like the Manchester example of the Bee Network, which I believe we will refer to quite frequently in Committee—the local authority takes full assumption of commercial risk within its remit and the operator is contracted merely to provide a service. That brings the temptation to mould services in favour of the supplier—particularly if the supplier is a municipal bus company, such as an in-house provider—as opposed to the passenger.
With external providers, there are a couple of checks on that: first, the direct relationship between fare box and profitability, which I have already mentioned; and secondly, the local authority’s overseeing position to challenge operators and hold them to account, particularly when partnerships are the enhanced partnerships that we have in many local authorities around the country. That combination enforces the interests of the passenger, even when they are not directly consistent with commercial performance. Under wider franchising, there is a risk—albeit a manageable one—that that check will disappear, because local authorities may become both the judge and the jury.
That makes the purpose clause even more important to ensure that the Secretary of State focuses on passengers in every decision. It makes it clear that the accountability for achieving that result lies firmly with the Secretary of State, and it is useful, as in any complex consideration, to have organisational clarity. Nothing in the Bill, other than here in clause 1, puts passengers front and centre—that is a notable omission from the Bill as currently drafted; all the rest deals with procedure. Placing an explicit duty on the Secretary of State provides a valuable guiding principle throughout the Bill’s implementation period, and ensures that every step taken under the Bill will be aligned with the objective of improving bus services for all those who rely on them.
The Minister in his opening remarks said that the clause was not necessary, because it does not encompass
“the full scope of the Government’s ambition.”
Yet the clause says that the Bill will
“improve the performance, accessibility and quality”.
Surely “quality” encompasses safety, which was the Minister’s example as to why the clause was inadequate to describe the full scope of the Government’s ambitions. I push back on that, because quality does encompass safety in the ordinary sense of that word.
Paragraph 1 of the Government’s explanatory notes for the Bill says:
“The Bus Services (No. 2) Bill brings forward primary legislative measures intended to support the government’s commitment to deliver better buses.”
Clause 1 honours that Government commitment to deliver better buses and should remain part of the Bill.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Roger. This is not my first Public Bill Committee, but I will certainly benefit from your guidance on the particulars of the proceedings.
In general, I am a big fan of the Bill. I am a bus person at heart. Wherever I go in the country, I make a point of taking the buses—I take notes and sometimes write to local councillors. That is how passionately I feel about this. The good measures in the Bill need to be backed up by clause 1, which was added to the Bill in the other place. The Bill has come from the other place in very good shape, and the clause is part of that.
I worry about what the move from the Government to strike out the clause portends for the rest of the Committee proceedings. Is it the sign of real commitment that the bus services deserve? Is it a sign that we will see high-quality, reliable, frequent, high-performance, accessible bus services for the whole country? The Government should explain more why they want to remove this very good clause.
I support new clause 22, tabled by my Lib Dem colleagues the hon. Members for Wimbledon and for North Norfolk. It would extend a stronger duty, including an accountability, to local transport authorities. Empowering local authorities is great, but those who need buses—those who struggle with car dependency and cannot reach essential services—need the good measures in the Bill to be backed up by both those duties and real funding as soon as possible.
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Sir Roger.
I rise to endorse the comments made by the shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland and Fakenham, and to draw further attention to an issue with new clause 22: placing duties on local authorities without money coming in. Central Government are very good, and have been for decades, at requiring things of local government, which naturally leads to increased costs on councils to deliver the relevant duties and comply with the law, but councils do not automatically—in fact, very rarely—get money to go towards complying.
The duties set out in the new clause seem obvious. Subsection (1) says:
“It is the general duty of any relevant authorities overseeing bus operations to promote bus services in their jurisdiction.”
Subsection (2) has paragraphs (a) to (g). I will not read them all out, but paragraph (a) says that authorities may consider
“the potential benefits of making bus services economically competitive with other transport options”.
There is also a requirement to report every two years. That looks laudable. One would hope it would lead to better bus services, but it would place a cost burden on local government without money coming to every local authority. That is my concern: placing duties without accompanying finance in all cases. That is why I have difficulty with new clause 22, although I appreciate the intention and sentiment behind it.
As I said in my opening remarks, clause 1 does not account for the full scope of the Government’s ambition. The shadow Minister talked about incentives; I think the incentives for local authorities are really clear, if not the clearest. They know what is best for their local areas. They are driven by the desire to tackle the social and economic challenges within their areas, and I do not agree that the clause would add anything to that.
The shadow Minister’s reading of “quality” to include safety is subjective. I do not think it is as clear as he made out. The franchising guidance states that an LTA must
“explain how far it will deliver improvements”
if it franchises. The guidance also has a chapter to ensure that an LTA articulates how it is putting people at the heart of franchising assessments. Although it is not in the legislation, the guidance is clear about driving improvements.
New clause 22 would create an additional reporting burden on local authorities and local transport authorities, which are already operating under resource constraints, while potentially undermining their devolved powers to determine transport priorities in line with their local transport plans. I am not able to support it.
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 14—Franchising statement—
“(1) The Transport Act 2000 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 123A, after subsection (1) insert—
‘(1A) The power in subsection (1) cannot be exercised until the franchising authority, or two or more franchising authorities acting jointly, has published a statement, subject to the requirement in subsection (1B), stating—
(a) their objectives in making the franchising scheme, and
(b) their reasons and evidence for believing that the making of such a scheme is the best option for achieving those objectives.
(1B) It is a requirement that a statement in subsection (1A) must be published before the franchising authority complies with the requirements in sections 123B to 123G.’”
This new clause seeks to ensure that before initiating the formal franchising process undersections 123B to 123G of the Transport Act 2000, franchising authorities must first publish a statement outlining their objectives, reasons, and supporting evidence for believing that franchising is the best option to achieve their aims.
New clause 18—Cost of franchising schemes—
“(1) Where a local authority owned bus company is providing franchised bus services, the authority or authorities must publish annually—
(a) The anticipated cost of the franchise for that year
(b) The actual cost of the franchise for that year.
(2) Where an authority (or authorities) have transferred the franchise from a privately owned bus company to a local authority owned bus company, the authority (or authorities) must publish—
(a) the costs incurred by the franchising authority in transferring the service, including the transfer of undertakings (protection of employment costs); and
(b) a breakdown of how those costs are being incurred.
(3) The reports required by subsections (1) and (2) must be published in a format that is easily accessible on the website of the relevant authority or authorities.
(4) Each local authority which runs a bus company delivering franchised bus services must ensure that time is made available for the reports required by subsections (1) and (2) to be debated at a public meeting of the full council.”
This new clause would require transparency about the costs of franchising local authority owned bus services.
New clause 30—Guidance on the development of franchising schemes—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, issue guidance for local transport authorities on the development of a franchising scheme.
(2) Any guidance produced under this section must include specific information or guidance for local transport authorities in—
(a) rural areas;
(b) coastal communities; and
(c) suburban areas.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to produce guidance for local transport authorities on the development of franchising schemes.
New clause 38—Franchising authorities: joint forum—
“(1) When operating a franchise scheme, the franchising authority must establish a joint forum with operators and trades unions.
(2) The purpose of the joint forum is to address bus service staffing and employment issues in the area covered by that franchising authority.”
Clause 2 removes the requirement for local transport authorities that are not mayoral combined authorities or mayoral combined county authorities to gain the Secretary of State’s consent to start the franchising process. The measure puts all local transport authorities on a level playing field. It also removes from the process an administrative step that does not provide an effective check on local transport authorities’ plans, given that it occurs before a franchising assessment is produced. I am confident that the measure will make franchising more attractive to local transport authorities by speeding up the overall process.
New clause 14, tabled by the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham, would require authorities to publish a statement that outlines their objectives, reasons and supporting evidence for deciding whether franchising is the best option to achieve their aims, before they initiate the formal process. The Department for Transport has established franchising guidance; to require local authorities to provide an up-front statement during an exploratory stage would be premature. The franchising scheme assessment also provides a robust way to present the evidence and rationale behind a decision to franchise.
Although local authorities might choose to develop a feasibility assessment to investigate the right bus model for their area, this should remain optional to allow them the flexibility to adopt the approach that best suits their needs. The new clause would also make the franchising process slower and undermine the Government’s ambition to streamline franchising, making it faster and more cost-effective.
New clause 18 would require local authorities to publish the costs associated with franchised bus services operated by local authority-owned bus companies. Authorities are already subject to statutory requirements to publish detailed information on their spending and financial performance. Under the 2015 local government transparency code, they must regularly publish data on all expenditure over £500, and are required to produce and make publicly available their annual statements of accounts, which are subject to external audit and public scrutiny. The framework ensures a high level of financial transparency and public accountability, making such an additional burden on authorities unnecessary.
New clause 30 would require the Secretary of State to produce guidance for local transport authorities on the development of franchising schemes that includes specific information on rural and suburban areas and coastal communities. The Department for Transport has published franchising guidance, including on the consideration of neighbouring authorities and on the requirement to consult affected areas. The Department continuously refines the franchising guidance, and plans to undertake comprehensive updates after the Bill receives Royal Assent. The introduction of piecemeal additions without considering the guidance in its entirety would risk reducing its effectiveness.
In addition to the guidance, the Department supports LTAs through the franchising and bus reform pilot. The ambition is to explore alternative models that may suit a local area and help to provide evidence for the decision. Lessons learned, tools, templates and best practice will be shared throughout the pilot programme.
New clause 38, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough and Thornaby East (Andy McDonald), would require franchising authorities to establish a forum of stakeholders to address staffing and employment issues in the franchising area. It seeks to increase accountability in areas that choose to adopt franchising. I am sympathetic to the new clause’s aims, but it is not the role of central Government to prescribe how local transport authorities run their services. Franchising guidance that covers driver welfare already exists, giving the franchising authority scope to decide what forums it wants to put in place to support the delivery of its bus services. The new clause is therefore unnecessary and I hope it will be withdrawn.
Clause 2 amends the Transport Act 2000 in relation to the availability of franchising schemes. It is essentially a facilitating clause to allow for one of the really important changes in the Bill, which is to remove the requirement for the Secretary of State to consent to any local authority other than mayoral combined authorities when deciding whether to embark on a franchising scheme.
The concern raised by many stakeholders about this Bill is not about its contents. We all agree with its contents, but the money and expertise are lacking. Local councils do not have either. As I said on Second Reading, although this Bill
“hands councils a set of keys to a new bus network, it does not ensure that there is fuel in the tank.”—[Official Report, 2 June 2025; Vol. 768, c. 97.]
We have great sympathy with Conservative new clauses 14 and 18. It is important that we ask local authorities to list the objectives and evidence. It is also be important to go through the costs. Those constraints and disciplines are crucial and will avoid ideological decisions. We have seen that already with rail nationalisation, where a Transport for London model, which the industry and many Labour Members supported at one point, would have been a better approach than concession contracts. New clauses 14 and 18 are a useful brake on letting ideology, rather than pragmatism, take control. They are not impediments; they are things that surely should be done and are good practice. We will support new clauses 14 and 18.
On new clause 30, we want to make it easier for local transport authorities that do not have the expertise. Having a number of off-the-shelf approaches to franchising is surely a good thing. There are specific issues in rural areas and villages, which my hon. Friend the Member for North Norfolk will speak to, but in urban areas we have real issues with bus routes that do not keep to local authority boundaries, but cross them. There are problems of co-ordination when bus routes cross boundaries, and an absence of buses because of those problems. Having a number of off-the-shelf ways to help authorities would surely be a good thing. I will leave it to my hon. Friend to take on that matter.
All the comments I was going to make have already been made by the shadow Minister. He was so complete and comprehensive that he leaves no space for any additional comment. However, I will briefly give my slant on some of the points. When I rose at the beginning of this sitting, it was to talk about the costs that would be put on to local authorities by the general duties in new clause 22. That has been dealt with. This clause will put much more significant costs on to local authorities that choose to go down the franchising route—after all, franchising is a choice available to a transport authority. Those are costs incurred by transferring a risk from commercial operators to local authorities and the taxpayer if the business does not go in the way of the business plan.
The shadow Minister has already spoken about the huge cost subsidy, effectively, to the services operated in London and Manchester, where there are huge economy of scale advantages. My view is that the franchising model, if it works at all, works for high population densities—cities, large local authorities and those that can swallow bad years—and offers nothing at all for smaller authorities other than the option to take a step into the unknown for no obvious benefit. I think of my local authority on the Isle of Wight—it is fanciful to think that that unitary authority could in any way take a step towards franchising. Even if we end up with a combined mayoral authority with Hampshire county council, which has a big budget deficit, it seems highly unattractive to Hampshire, Portsmouth, Southampton and the Isle of Wight to go down the franchising route and take on all those risks.
I have no direct experience of the Manchester model, but if Manchester really is the shining beacon, it is one that has cost a huge amount of money. However, that is a huge amount of money that the taxpayer in Manchester may be able to swallow. For a transport authority with a significant chunk of rurality—Hampshire and the Isle of Wight is an exception only in that it has an island attached to it, not in terms of how rural it is—I cannot see the figures adding up because no money goes with franchising.
The Government may talk about money being available for bus services and the £3 fare cap. Those are welcome things, but they are not sums of money that naturally flow with an option to go down the franchising route. Although that does not go against having franchising as an option, I feel that it is going to be attractive only to a fairly small proportion of England—areas with high-density populations and those with metropolitan authorities. In this country, franchising is for the few; it is not a mass model that all local authorities will find attractive. It could lead to a more uneven quality of bus services across the country, and to a two-tier system.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Roger. I want to challenge the suggestion that franchising is an obligation. It is not; it is a power that is given to authorities to use if they wish. However, in those communities that were so poorly served for the past 14 years under the previous Government, should we not inspire an ambition for better bus services?
I was not suggesting that it is an obligation. Plainly, franchising is an option. My point is that it is an option that is unattractive to smaller local authorities, which cannot benefit from the economies of scale of franchising bus services. It is much more attractive for city areas. Of course I want rural bus services to be improved; my constituency is a rural area and we want better bus services. I see absolutely nothing in the franchising option that will deliver that, because I cannot see a local authority—in my own or other rural areas—looking at it and thinking, “This is helpful.” That is because it does not, as a right, bring money with it.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Roger. I am a Warrington MP, and, as has been mentioned, the town has one of the country’s eight remaining municipal bus companies—the award-winning Warrington’s Own Buses. It is a trailblazer, and it is an example of what a municipal bus company can be and what can be achieved. For example, Warrington still has capped fares, and the bus company can still offer a flat fee of £2 for adults and £1 for under-22s. We have a pioneering all-electric fleet and a brand-new depot. Any profit goes back into the service, and we have free travel for care leavers. With a municipal bus company that understands our communities, we have been able to maintain the essential services that private providers would simply give up on and walk away from.
I agree with much of the hon. Lady’s description of Warrington’s Own Buses. A few weeks ago, I spoke to the company’s managing director and I was impressed, as I said on Second Reading. However, does the hon. Lady agree that that is because Warrington’s Own Buses has 30, 40 or 50 years’ institutional experience in running those kinds of services—experience that other local authorities simply do not have? Does she also agree that exactly the same delivery of services can be achieved through an enhanced partnership, in which the operator works in collaboration with the local authority, and it is up to them to decide what is important for the community?
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his comments. I put it on record that Ben Wakerley, who heads up Warrington’s Own Buses, is fantastic. He has been a real asset for us. Experience is an important factor, but it is also about understanding the community that a company serves, and that does not take 30 or 40 years. It just means taking the time to know and understand the community. Ben has not been there for 30 or 40 years, but he has been leading the way with a lot of the delivery.
Collaboration can be good, but my experience of Warrington’s Own Buses, and of how it has focused on services and delivered in the way that it has, shows how powerful that format can be. I encourage other areas to adopt the same thing, because it has put power back into the hands of the community, not private providers.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Roger. I will speak to the clause and to new clause 30 in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Wimbledon. We have this Bill Committee, Department for Transport estimates day and the forthcoming Transport Committee report on connecting rural communities—we wait for years for the opportunity to talk about buses, and three come along at once.
I strongly welcome the widening of bus franchising opportunities. Rural transport, in particular, needs a proper rethink, and the greater powers that transport authorities can get hold of as a result of the Bill will, I believe, allow local leaders to do just that. People are already welcome the idea of bus franchising. When we visit London, we do not quibble about whether our red bus is run by Transport UK, Arriva, Stagecoach or another franchise holder; we care that it comes at the time we want and takes us where we want to go.
What is lacking in the Bill, however, is leadership relating to how the powers can be used to make a much needed difference to people in rural areas. We have models of urban bus franchising to follow—London has taken the lead and now Manchester is following—but it has never been attempted in a truly rural area. It would be quite reckless of the Government to leave authorities completely rudderless, because some would be guaranteed to go off the rails, and we all know that residents would pay the price in their passenger experience and council tax bills. I gently say to the Minister that this is not about whether guidance is in the pipeline; it is about how far it goes and how robust it is.
Our new clause 30 is the first of our many new clauses and amendments that seek to provide guardrails, guidance and models for those adopting franchising for the first time, in a situation where there may be little evidence to go on. Given the concerns of the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East about how franchising might work in rural areas, there could be some good news for him in our new clause, but we need to adjust our thinking about what good bus services look like in such areas. While we do not want a top-down imposition of things on rural, coastal and suburban areas, I and other hon. Members believe it would be good for those areas to be given a greater degree of support from the Government than there currently is in the Bill. I also think that specifically outlining such areas in the Bill will help to ensure greater consideration of the unique characteristics of those parts of the country.
Even if the Department pledges to produce guidance, it could fail to address the challenges faced in rural communities in particular. Coming from a rural area, I know how much Government policy feels like it was written by someone who has rarely stepped foot outside the SW1 postcode. Our coastal communities remain without a top-table representative in Government, and I struggle to see how residents of rural communities can trust that such guidance will be forthcoming unless it is in the Bill, or that it will represent the challenges and needs of their areas.
I hope that the Minister will give due consideration to what we are trying to achieve with new clause 30. I do not expect him to accept it, although he is welcome to do so, but I hope that he outlines the steps that his Department will take to provide comprehensive and structured support to those authorities embarking into uncharted territory with their franchise schemes, beyond what we have heard already.
I will try not to repeat the comments that I have made already, but I will say to the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham, that yes, the Conservative Government did put franchising in place. They also ensured that it was near impossible to achieve, as there were so many barriers. Instead of playing party politics about Manchester, what the Conservatives should be saying to Andy Burnham is, “Thank you for your vision. Despite all the barriers that we placed before you, you still managed to achieve franchising and improve bus services throughout Greater Manchester.” The shadow Minister also talked about the primacy of passengers—but excuse me if I judge the previous Government on their actions, not just their words, because from 2010 to 2024, 300 million fewer miles were travelled on buses.
There is a lot of to-ing and fro-ing about which system passengers prefer. The way to really judge that is through ridership—how many people take the buses. It is absolutely right that in Greater Manchester, under the Bee Network, there has been a post-pandemic increase in ridership of about 34%, from memory. However, does the Minister not accept that in Norfolk, where there is an enhanced partnership, ridership has increased by more than 40%, and in Essex, another enhanced partnership area, ridership has increased by more than 50%? The point is that it is not the scheme design that is fundamentally important, but the way in which it is approached. Does the Minister accept that we can have outcomes that are just as good—better outcomes, in fact—through enhanced partnerships as we can through franchising?
What the shadow Minister failed to hear in my previous remarks is that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to buses. This could be done through franchising; it could be done through municipal bus companies or local authority-operated bus companies; or it could be done through strengthened enhanced partnerships.
Let me touch on franchising, because the shadow Minister talks about Manchester as the full-fat model. A huge number of alternative franchising arrangements are available, including the Jersey model, which I will go into in a moment. Within franchising assessments, there will be a detailed investigation that is then checked robustly for assurance purposes. Obviously, the process as it stands does not provide an effective check on local transport authority plans, because it happens before a franchising assessment is produced.
On the Secretary of State’s consent, as I have said, it is not effective because it is at the beginning of the franchising process. The assessment must look at the finances of the proposed scheme and then be independently assured. Different areas will also have different circumstances when pursuing franchising; the Secretary of State is not in a position to scrutinise them all.
On funding and LTA support, £1 billion of funding was announced for 2025-26, £700 million of which was for local authorities to improve bus services. That is not for franchising per se; as I said, there is no one-size-fits-all approach. The Government are opening up options to local transport authorities. No LTA is being forced to franchise. No LTA has been forced to franchise through the Greater Manchester model, in fact. The Government are looking at how best to support LTAs, including through franchising pilots, which will include elements of rural communities as well. Funding is provided through the bus allocations for LTAs to decide how to spend. The franchising pilots will look at alternative models, one of which could be a joint venture model like the one in Jersey.
The Minister is right, of course, that all sorts of different franchising schemes and mechanisms are available, and I am looking forward to his description of the Jersey model. However, does he not recognise and accept that, of the authorities that have expressed a direction of travel so far, both Liverpool and West Midlands have also decided to go down what I have described as the full-fat model? It is not just Manchester being an outlier. It is likely that the Bill will ensure—in fact, it is happening already—that full fat is seen as the direction of travel. Does the Minister not think that that is correct?
I concede that, at the moment, it tends to be city regions that are looking at franchising, which is why we are doing the pilots to ensure that we have the template approach. We will learn the lessons from the various different franchising models that could be used. As we announced at the spending review, York and North Yorkshire is one of the areas that would be ideally suited to demonstrate the effectiveness of franchising in a rural setting. There was a comment about coastal communities, so let me just put this on the record: this South Shields-born, not SW1-postcoded MP knows full well the importance of buses to coastal and rural communities. In fact, I am the son of a bus driver as well. [Interruption.] I have ticked all the boxes—he was not a toolmaker, though.
Let me touch on Manchester. The figures quoted on franchising costs in Manchester refer to the level of investment being made to improve Greater Manchester’s bus network, supporting economic growth, greater productivity, access to homes and so on. In 2024-25, the cost of operating the franchised bus network was about £151 million, but it would be misleading to compare that with the £226 million in an attempt to argue that costs have inflated year on year. Greater Manchester was only partway through the three-phase transition to franchising during ’24-25, so the cost was accordingly lower. Transport for Greater Manchester was operating only half of the full network for the majority—nine months—of ’24-25. There is very little additional cost resulting from the adoption of franchising in Greater Manchester, and evidence to date shows that this model is more efficient and effective at delivering value for money.
Bus depots in Greater Manchester were required to ensure a level playing field when procuring franchised operators; otherwise, there would be an inherent advantage, of course, to incumbent operators. Depot acquisition also recognises the importance of investing to bring infrastructure up to modern standards to deliver a quality service and electrification of the fleet.
Turning to local authority bus companies—LABCos or municipal bus companies—there is a level playing field for arm’s length LABCos, which the existing ones in England are, and for private operators. There is existing legislation and regulations around local authority bus companies.
There will be different ways that LTAs can franchise. Rural areas, for example, could look to integrate demand-responsive transport into the network. It is right to recognise the successes that there have been in Jersey. When I visited in April, I saw at first hand the benefits of franchising and what it has delivered for passengers. A small team have successfully introduced franchising in rural areas. Although that offers useful lessons for rural and suburban communities in England, Jersey offers just one model, and there will be particular local transport challenges and opportunities in other places. Far from stipulating the one-size-fits-all Greater Manchester model, we are exploring and working with local transport authorities throughout the country to demonstrate different forms of franchising to make that a success.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 2 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 3
Specification of areas
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 70, in clause 4, page 2, line 10, leave out “or places” and insert
“, places or Rural Bus Hubs”.
This amendment is linked to NC35 and would allow rural bus hubs to be included in the specification for a franchise scheme.
Clause 4 stand part.
Amendment 71, in clause 38, page 41, line 23, after “England” insert—
“(e) the impact, or potential impact, the establishment of Rural Bus Hubs on services to villages.”
This amendment would require a review of bus service provision for villages to include an assessment of the impact of rural bus hubs, if already established, or the impact which establishing them may have on villages.
New clause 35—Rural Bus Hubs—
“(1) Local transport authorities may consider the construction of Rural Bus Hubs in rural areas which are, in the authority’s assessment, not sufficiently well-served by buses.
(2) Any Rural Bus Hub must—
(a) be a facility where bus users can park vehicles for the purposes of transferring to a bus service for the remainder of their journey;
(b) be constructed outside of town or and village centres, and be easily accessible by road, cycle or walking routes and other modes of transport;
(c) be on newly-developed sites or on sites which have been repurposed;
(d) contain car parking, electric vehicle charging, cycle parking and other amenities as the franchising authority sees fit, at a level of adequacy determined by the franchising authority.”
This new clause would allow local transport authorities to create rural bus hubs in areas to create a hub-and-spoke model of bus service delivery.
The clause enhances the flexibility of franchising in terms of the areas that can be brought into such a scheme. The Government understand that there is a lack of clarity about whether a franchising scheme may specify more than one non-contiguous area. The clause therefore clarifies that that is permissible, meaning that franchising authorities may be flexible in the areas that they can bring into a franchising scheme. For example, it will allow rural authorities to focus on franchising in individual towns and villages if they so wish.
I thank the hon. Members for North Norfolk and for Wimbledon for tabling amendment 70 that would allow rural bus hubs to be included in the specification of a franchising scheme. The franchised services that a franchising scheme will provide must be specified or formally set out and published. This ensures that the scheme will deliver in a transparent way. The amendment would make it explicit that franchised services could be specified by reference to the rural bus hubs that they might serve. The amendment is unnecessary because the Bill already allows franchising authorities to specify places that franchised services will serve. Places can include rural bus hubs.
Alongside clause 3, clause 4 also enhances flexibility for franchising authorities by clarifying how franchised services may be specified in the scheme. This ensures that franchising authorities can more easily make minor changes to franchised services. For example, the clause will give a franchising authority scope to specify services by listing specific places to be served, or by specifying places by the purpose they serve. Purposes could include connecting students to school or employees to work.
The clause allows franchising authorities to combine approaches to specifying services. This will allow adaptability and ensure that franchising authorities can develop franchising schemes that meet the needs of different communities, such as those in urban and rural areas. The clause also has transitional provisions for authorities that have started the process of franchising prior to the Bill becoming law.
I wish to speak to new clause 35 and amendments 70 and 71 tabled in my name. The Minister has done a very good job of outlining what those proposals seek to achieve, for which I am grateful. I am seeking to remedy the lack of vision for fixing the public transport problems that we face in rural areas.
As I have said, we cannot just throw new powers at rural areas and hope for the best. We have to create workable models for adoption to support areas to use the new powers in the best way possible. There has been great excitement about how to use them to transform the bus networks in our major cities, but in all the conversations here on this issue, rural communities seem to have been forgotten about.
In rural areas, the local bus service is not just a convenience or a “nice to have”, but a real and genuine lifeline. For many, it is the main way they can get to see friends and family, go to medical appointments, and get to the shops and to leisure activities. Bus services keeps many rural villages going. It is no surprise that when the withdrawal of routes in areas like this are proposed, there is fury locally and major campaigns against it.
I asked some of my rural colleagues about their experiences and, unsurprisingly, I was inundated. My hon. Friend the Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted (Victoria Collins) has been campaigning to save the X5 between Aylesbury and Hemel Hempstead, which was replaced with an unreliable service that is making it hard for residents to get to key medical appointments. My hon. Friends the Members for South Cotswolds (Dr Savage) and for Thornbury and Yate (Claire Young) are trying to bring back the 84/85 route from Yate to Wotton, a vital route to shopping centres, schools and colleges and for those visiting HMP Leyhill. My hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire (Alex Brewer) has been working with campaigners to save school bus services in Ancells Farm, with children facing the prospect of long walks down unsafe roads to get to and from school in Fleet.
There are all these communities and campaigns, but we still have not come up with better ways to serve rural areas and protect their access to services. It is telling that when my Transport Committee colleagues and I, several of whom are represented on both sides of this Committee, wanted to go and see some best practice of rural bus networks for our “Buses connecting communities” inquiry—report forthcoming shortly; I am sure everyone will be reading it as soon as it is published—we had to travel to the Republic in Ireland to find them. We simply do not have good examples of successful rural networks here in the UK.
All of that serves to say that it is time for a bold new approach. A good few years ago, when we were researching the Liberal Democrat manifesto for Norfolk’s 2021 county council elections, we undertook research with a number of key local stakeholders to hear what they thought of the local bus network and what we could do to improve it. I personally interviewed bus companies, council officers and other stakeholders. Most importantly, we surveyed local people, including those who do not currently use buses—an often overlooked audience segment. We concluded that we need to combine two of the most successful features of current public transport models to create a new model for rural public transport. Those two things are park and ride services and demand-responsive transport. Pairing them could create a real network that works for our rural towns and villages without the near-impossible task of running an hourly timetable to every village. That conclusion resulted in the rural bus hub scheme outlined in new clause 35.
Rural bus hubs would allow people to get between key towns and villages that they need to visit directly. People in many rural areas suffer from having to take buses in the opposite direction from where they want to go, going to the nearby town or city just to go straight back out again. That adds hours to people’s journeys, the journey is totally derailed if one link in the complicated chain goes wrong, and it is ultimately an inconvenient way to get about. As a result, it does not improve passenger numbers.
Similar to our park and ride networks, rural bus hubs would have facilities to enable those living nearby to travel to the hub independently, either by car or active travel routes. The hubs would have the amenities to charge electric vehicles, and to lock and store bikes safely, so that people could easily return to them to complete the final few miles of their return journeys. The hubs would also be well served by demand-responsive transport for those who are not independently mobile. That would ensure that the network could reach into all areas, including rural villages and harder-to-access communities that may never have had a regular service, if any service, from an existing bus route.
Such passengers, once at the hub, could catch direct, frequent buses to any part of a proper network, getting them to the hub nearest to where they want to go, and linking up with train connections or even hospitals and employment areas. It is a model that could easily be adopted by transport authorities. It would reach the most people possible without seeking to run a regular bus through every village, and it would connect those in rural areas to a proper public transport network that broadens the range of their destinations, rather than just taking them to the nearest city or large town.
My amendment 70 would permit rural bus hubs to fit into the current model of franchising, allowing for specified services to include those running to and from, or between, the hubs. My amendment 71 would add to the review of service provision to villages an assessment of how service in the villages could be impacted by the establishment of rural bus hubs, or how the establishment of the hubs has affected services for villages at the time of the review. That would ensure that, as we assess how villages are faring following the passing of the Bill, we do not simply grow a list of complaints but assess what could be done differently to make improvements and the impacts that those improvements would have.
I grew up in a rural village with a sketchy bus connection. I now live in another, and my children are growing up with the same sketchy connection that I had. That cycle cannot continue. We have to do better for areas like mine, and conventional thinking is not going to cut it. It is time for a radical rethink of how we deliver public transport in rural areas. We have to challenge the old ideas and be willing to seize on something new.
I am sure that the Government will oppose these ideas, but I would gently say that they have not put forward anything equivalent. It is all very well to say, “You could do anything,” but there is nothing of substance to say, “Of all the things you could do, these are the things you might specifically like to consider.” We could feasibly help households to reduce the number of vehicles they rely on, saving them thousands every year. We could encourage active travel by expanding the number of journeys, and the hubs could be a component of that. By expanding demand-responsive transport, we could even remove car reliance altogether, while connecting the carless to a far better range of travel times and destinations than they currently have.
The same old approach is not working. The situation will not magically fix itself with the new franchising powers alone. We have to try something different, and do something to create networked, accessible public transport that works for people, and gets them where they want to go, when they want to go there. I do not think that is asking the world, and I hope that the Government will pledge to look into this idea further to deliver real change for people in North Norfolk, and rural communities across the country.
Clause 3 is not controversial, so I will not make a long speech. Proposed new subsection (2A) of the Transport Act 2000 simply makes it clear that, where more than one area is specified in a franchising scheme, the specified areas “need not be contiguous.” I say no more about that.
Amendment 70, in the name of the hon. Member for North Norfolk, adds a reference to bus hubs. As he is my constituency neighbour, our constituents share many of the same experiences, and I absolutely support the sentiments that he eloquently expressed: rural areas are often overlooked, bus policy is designed with the major cities and large towns in mind, and policymakers—perhaps because they have limited experience of life in the kind of rural communities that he and I serve—do not consider the very different challenges that we face. I therefore support the sentiment of the amendment, but the challenge is the cost. We keep coming back to the money—or lack of it—in this legislation, because it is disproportionately expensive.
The hon. Member is absolutely right that park and ride is an interesting hub-and-spoke model for rural areas, but there is also the on-demand model, which I have previously described as the Uberfication of rural transport. The tech is obviously already there. Someone books in and says that they want to go from here to there; the algorithm sorts out the route and how many people can be picked up; and then they are delivered from door to door. Because it is door to door, it has the opportunity to provide an improved customer experience.
The challenge is getting the take-up, because it requires a large number of people to buy into such a scheme, and the set-up costs are expensive. There has been a trial in Wymondham, in Norfolk, where the county council put forward a type of on-demand rural service, but the take-up was disappointingly low. Why was that? My working hypothesis is that, if it is a pilot, hardly anyone knows about it, but if there is wide-scale adoption—“This is the future of rural transport”—and it is backed up with public information so that everybody in the community cannot help but know about it, the take-up will be much greater and that then transforms the economics of it.
As a fellow Norfolk MP, I fully support the concept behind the hon. Member’s amendment, but I am afraid that I question whether it is needed, given the specifics of the drafting. As “places” are not defined under the clause as drafted, I am not sure about the requirement to define a specific place—this is my lawyer’s background coming through; it is a nasty rash I am developing—and I wonder whether there is a legal need for that clarification.
I will move on to clause 4. According to the explanatory notes, it inserts proposed new paragraph 123H(2B)(a) into the 2000 Act to clarify that services can be specified by routes or the places intended to be served. I think that is sensible. For example, a franchising authority could specify the services by listing the principal points to be served, so, “The local services to be provided under local service contracts are ones that serve the following principal points,” followed by a list of what they are, such as the hospital, the railway station and the doctor’s surgery.
Another example under this proposed new subsection would be for services to be specified route by route. I will come back to that in a moment, because that is quite an important clarification when we look at the kind of operators that will be in a position to provide these services. Specifically, there is a question about the access of small and medium-sized enterprises to contracts under franchising, which sounds a bit niche but is nevertheless important.
Proposed new paragraph 123H(2B)(b) of the 2000 Act clarifies that services can be specified by describing intended services in general terms. It is broad and gives franchising authorities a wide range of options for specifying services under this proposed new subsection. That, again, is eminently sensible; I will not go into the detail.
Proposed new paragraph 123H(2B)(c) of the 2000 Act clarifies that franchising authorities can combine the approaches under proposed new paragraphs (a) and (b). For example, a franchise authority that covers both urban and rural areas could specify services by reference to the specific routes for the urban areas, in line with proposed new paragraph (a), and then could take a broader approach for the rural areas. Finally, paragraph (d) clarifies the catch-all that franchising authorities can specify services “in such other way”.
I appreciate the warm support from the hon. Gentleman, who is, as he stated, my constituency neighbour. I defer to his lawyering experience on his salient points about the propriety of my amendments given the Bill’s drafting, but I will ask for his reflections on two points.
First, cost is a big unanswered question in the Bill. If the Minister had access to the Treasury, I know that he would be raiding it to fund improved rural bus services. Does the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham agree, however, that at least looking at a hub model makes more sense financially, and for service provision, than trying to establish hourly services in every village?
Secondly, I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s support for amendment 71. Although I intend to withdraw amendment 70, I will push amendment 71 to a vote with his support.
I do not disagree with anything the hon. Member said. I do not have in my head the financial details associated with rural hubs, but it makes more commercial sense as a matter of principle, although it would probably not be profitable, to have a hub-and-spoke approach rather than an hourly service for every village. I do not know whether the hon. Member has counted the villages in North Norfolk, but there are well over 100 in Broadland and Fakenham, so that would be a challenge for any provider.
The Opposition support the concept of new clause 35 if the finances—the missing link—add up, but we question the need for it, because there is nothing in the Bill to prevent local authorities from doing what it sets out.
I am conscious that we are finishing in three minutes, so I will limit my comments to give the Minister some time. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland and Fakenham, I query the premise that public is better than private. The hon. Member for Warrington South mentioned the ability to provide a better service than existing franchise services, but I want to put on record that we can still get £2 fares in South West Devon. There is not necessarily a concrete need for a franchise; it is not necessarily a magic wand. I will fit my other comments in somewhere else, because I am conscious of time.
I thought the Liberal Democrats were the party of devolution, but they have a strange habit of wanting to tell local areas what to do and how to do it. Rural bus hubs are not yet widespread and the available data on their impact is limited. I have already outlined that there is no one-size-fits-all solution to improving buses. Local transport authorities in rural areas better understand the needs of their local communities, so it is right that they are given the opportunity to determine what is right for their areas.
I have already spoken about the different models for bus franchising, such as the Jersey model. The pilots will explore the models that may suit rural areas over metropolitan areas. In a rural setting, bus franchising could provide the opportunity to integrate demand-responsive transport into the network, ensuring that it links rural areas to key locations and access to onward travel options.
The Government are also supporting local transport authorities to improve the viability and sustainability of demand-responsive transport. That may be the most viable option in rural areas. The Government are gathering insights from the rural mobility fund pilots and are developing best practice guidance—a comprehensive resource for setting up and managing DRT schemes.
Beyond that, the Department’s support programme includes a focus on rural-specific challenges, such as the dedicated Bus Centre of Excellence’s conference on quality bus services in July and our plans for franchising pilots. The Department understands that there are barriers to SMEs accessing franchise networks. That is why we are listening to the sector about ways to ensure that disproportionate paperwork requirements do not hinder SMEs bidding for franchising contracts.
(1 day, 13 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesWe continue line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill. Please switch all electronic devices to silent. No food or drink is permitted apart from the water in front of you. Hansard colleagues would be grateful if Members could email their speaking notes to them or pass the relevant notes to the Hansard colleagues in the room. Members are reminded to bob if they wish to speak.
Clause 11
Reviews of sentencing: time limits
I beg to move amendment 9, in clause 11, page 12, line 22, at end insert—
“(aa) in that sub-paragraph omit ‘28’ and insert ‘56’”.
This amendment increases the window for applying to the Unduly Lenient Sentences Scheme from 28 days to 56 days.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 10, in clause 11, page 12, line 23, after “(2)” insert
“unless an application is made by a victim, or their deceased victim’s next of kin, in which case notice of an application shall be given within one year”.
This amendment increases the window for applying to the Unduly Lenient Sentences Scheme to one year for a victim of a crime or a deceased victim’s next of kin.
Amendment 11, in clause 11, page 12, line 29, leave out “28” and insert “56”.
This amendment is contingent on Amendment 8.
Amendment 12, in clause 11, page 12, line 39, at end insert—
“(5) In accordance with the provision under sub-paragraph (1) the Crown Prosecution Service must write to the victim, or a deceased victim’s next of kin, within 10 working days of the sentence being delivered to make them aware of their ability to apply for a review of sentencing.”
This amendment is contingent on Amendment 9. It would require the CPS to write to a victim, or a deceased victim’s next of kin, within 10 working days of a sentence being delivered to make them aware of their ability to apply for a review.
Before any observers start panicking that the shadow Justice Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle, has really let himself go over the weekend, I should say that he sends his apologies to the Committee, although it is not clear whether that is for his absence due to illness or for lumbering Members with me this morning.
I rise to speak in support of Opposition amendments 9 to 12. In the last sitting, we spent considerable time considering the role and involvement of victims and their families in the sentencing process. We spoke about measures aimed at making it as meaningful as possible by both involving them and trying to ensure that offenders are present. Disappointingly, we were unable to secure changes that we believe would strengthen the voice of victims and their families.
Across the criminal justice system, we have seen considerable effort made to improve the experience of victims and their families, including through the introduction of screens, the pre-recording of evidence, the work of organisations such as Victim Support, and the many ways in which the Victims’ Commissioner has expanded the rights of victims and their families and the services available to them. However, there is cross-party agreement on the need to go further. We welcome many of the measures that the Government are introducing, including through clause 11, but victims and their families are not just interested in what the processes of the criminal justice system are like. Although the views of victims and their families are not the only ones we should seek, we really want them to have a fair and reasonable experience of the justice system, and to consider its outcomes to be fair and reasonable.
The unduly lenient sentence scheme provides victims, their families and others with a route to redress when they feel that the outcome does not represent justice. However, it is clear from the evidence we heard last week, and from victims’ family members whom the shadow Minister and I have spoken to, that the current scheme is woefully inadequate. Witnesses who spoke for victims during our evidence sessions, as well as the Victims’ Commissioner and the Domestic Abuse Commissioner, all agreed that the current time window is simply not fair.
As Paula and Glenn from Justice for Victims said, echoing what Katie Brett from the group had originally said, 28 days is the same amount of time people get to return something to a shop. There is an inherent unfairness, because there is an exceptional circumstances clause under which a criminal gets no time limit—none at all. The Bill will amend the unduly lenient sentence scheme, but only for the Government’s Law Officers—not in relation to victims and families. We can see no good reason why we should not act now, with legislation before us, to improve the scheme for victims and families too.
Our amendment 10 would allow victims, or a deceased victim’s next of kin, to request a review up to one year after sentencing. Giving them time to act would show that we understand that this can be a deeply traumatic time for many people. Many of us will have had victims come to our advice surgeries soon after sentencing, but outside the 28-day period in which we are able to offer any help. When we have spoken to victims, it has been clear that, first, they were not aware of that, and secondly, because of their state of mind after the trial and sentencing, they were not focusing on such things immediately. Therefore, it is reasonable to extend that period.
Katie Brett started a petition to change the law, which has gathered more than 14,000 signatures. Katie is doing that in memory of her sister Sasha, who was brutally murdered; she was stabbed more than 100 times, raped, and her body was set on fire. Katie has every reason to believe that her sister’s killer should have received a whole-life order, but will never get the chance to legally test that. Ayse Hussein, also from Justice for Victims, had a similar experience, and the group is campaigning for a change in the law.
I am sure the Minister will say that the Law Commission is looking into unduly lenient sentencing and that we must let it do its work, but anyone reading that review will see that it is primarily about criminal appeals from the viewpoint of offenders. The consultation document makes it clear that the Law Commission does not think there is anything wrong with the way in which the ULS operates at the moment, and it is not clear how it can possibly reach that view. Why does the Minister need the Law Commission to tell her and us that this needs to change? The Government are giving the appearance of being dependent on reviews to make up their mind on quite simple principles, but particularly anything significant in the judicial sphere. Here is an opportunity to be bold, and to apply good instincts, which I know the Minister has and am confident would be similar to ours on this issue. We hope that the Government will accept the amendment.
Amendment 12 addresses the equally important issue of awareness. Of course, a short time window creates a greater risk of someone never being made aware, but either way, we need a more robust mechanism of notification, so that victims know of the possibilities. The amendment would introduce a new duty on the Crown Prosecution Service to inform victims, or a deceased victim’s next of kin, within 10 working days of sentencing that they can apply to the ULS. This is about enforceable rights. A legal right means little if the person entitled to it does not know that it exists. Victims deserve to be told what their options are clearly and promptly. The amendment would ensure that no one missed their opportunity for justice simply because no one had bothered to tell them. Surely we do not need the Law Commission to tell us that this is the right thing to do.
Finally, amendment 9 would make a straightforward but crucial change—to increase the time limit for referring a sentence under the unduly lenient sentence scheme from 28 days to 56 days. This is about achieving simple fairness by extending more broadly the Government’s measure to award more time to their own Law Officers.
We welcome the provisions in clause 11, which relate to extending the time period in which the unduly lenient sentence scheme may be applied for. However, as the official Opposition, we still have concerns that the window of opportunity for victims to raise an appeal remains the same. The scheme can only be referred to for some of the most serious crimes—crimes that are likely to leave victims and their families with a degree of trauma or grief. How can we possibly expect that, within just a month of a sentence being issued, gathering together a clear, strong case for a sentence’s being unduly lenient would be on the minds of victims?
We also know that many victims do not know about the scheme, or the opportunity to appeal. Baroness Newlove said that victims “really do not know” about it. She said:
“Once they leave the courtroom, it can take a long time, but the clock is ticking.”—[Official Report, Victims and Courts Public Bill Committee, 17 June 2025; c. 8, Q15.]
During the oral evidence session, many notable sources raised issues with the current timeframe. Dame Nicole Jacobs, Domestic Abuse Commissioner for England and Wales, described the current system as “disorienting” and said that
“we need to do so much more to put in place solid advice and support for victims. Those 28 days seem to fly in the face of that.”––[Official Report, Victims and Courts Public Bill Committee, 17 June 2025; c. 9, Q15.]
Extending the window of opportunity will also surely allow a greater base of evidence from previous cases to be compiled, to bolster a referral under the scheme. It is only right that we allow victims, and the organisations supporting them, the time and space to make their case as strong as possible, ensuring that everything is laid on the table for the Attorney General to consider. Let us place victims and families at the heart of the unduly lenient sentence scheme, where they should be.
It is a pleasure to serve under you in the Chair, Dr Murrison. I place on the record our well wishes to the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle, and welcome the Opposition Whip, the hon. Member for Kingswinford and South Staffordshire, in his place today.
On amendments 9 and 11, let me start by thanking the Justice for Victims campaign and, in particular, Katie Brett, whom I met again recently and whom I commend for her tireless campaigning for reform of the unduly lenient sentence scheme in honour of her sister Sasha.
As the Opposition Whip mentioned, the Law Commission is undertaking a review of criminal appeals, and it has launched a public consultation inviting views on a range of reforms to the ULS scheme, including extending the time limit. The consultation is open to all and has been extended to 27 June. I urge him and anyone else with an interest to submit their views, if they have not already done so. The Government will review the recommendations by the Law Commission and act if necessary. Parliament intended the ULS scheme to be an exceptional power, and any expansion of the scheme must be carefully considered. Therefore, we will holistically consider the review’s final recommendations following publication of the report.
On amendments 10 and 12, we recognise the exceptionally difficult circumstances for victims and their families in making a referral within 28 days. We heard about the impact that that is having on them directly in our evidence sessions last week. That is why anyone can ask the Attorney General or the Solicitor General to consider referring a sentence to the Court of Appeal. That is open to not just victims or relatives of a victim, but members of the public, the Crown Prosecution Service and parliamentarians—I myself referred cases to the Attorney General and Solicitor General when I was a Back-Bench Opposition MP—thereby taking the burden off victims and their loved ones.
The Court of Appeal is less likely to increase a sentence after more time has passed, because of the double jeopardy risks of sentencing an offender twice. Particularly if enough time has passed that the offender has already completed their sentence, the Court may actually reduce an extra sentence in order to reflect that. That means that an extended time limit would have a more limited impact and, worse, it would create false hope for victims, leading them to delay requests to review and then retraumatising them, with uncertainty hanging over them for up to a year after the trial, when they are trying to move on with their lives. For that reason, it is important that sentences are certain and not subject to change for too long a period.
Let me be clear: it is imperative that we provide better and clearer communication with victims by criminal justice agencies, including in relation to how and when information is given to victims and their families about the unduly lenient sentence scheme after sentencing. We heard loud and clear from victims last week about how the lack of communication and of awareness about the scheme was one of the issues. Under the victims code, the police-run witness care units are required to tell victims about the unduly lenient sentence scheme when they provide a victim or family with information about the sentence. We have already commenced the obligation in the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024 on those who provide victims code services to comply with the code unless there is a good reason not to do so. That ensures that agencies, including the police, are held to account for providing victims and their families with the service that they should expect. Once the new victims code is in force, we will also implement the code awareness duty, placing a legal responsibility on criminal justice agencies, including the police and the CPS, to promote the victims code to the public and victims of crime and ensure that every victim and their family are aware of their rights.
I do not wish to prolong proceedings unnecessarily. We welcome the Opposition’s support for the clause.
Wonderfully brief—thank you.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 11 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 12
Terms of imprisonment for certain offences on summary conviction
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 12 is a technical measure. It would bring the maximum penalty for six triable either way offences, when dealt with summarily in a magistrates court, in line with other triable either way offences. For those six offences, the maximum penalty that a magistrates court can issue is currently specified as six months. The clause specifies that the magistrates court maximum penalty for those offences is
“the general limit in a magistrates’ court”,
which since November has been 12 months for a single either way offence. That will mean that if magistrates courts’ sentencing powers are changed again in the future, the six offences will also be subject to that change. Correcting that inconsistency will ultimately help to avoid confusion and error in sentencing relating to those six offences.
The clause is a sensible measure updating the sentencing provision for certain offences on summary conviction. It will replace the fixed six-month maximum term with the general limit in a magistrates court. The change affects a number of serious offences, including breaches of sexual harm prevention orders, criminal behaviour orders and restraining orders. Those are not technical breaches; they often represent a continuation of harmful, coercive or threatening conduct, and it is right that magistrates should have the greatest possible flexibility to impose sentences that reflect the seriousness and risk involved. The clause brings consistency to how the offences are treated and allows magistrates to use the full extent of the sentencing powers available to them. Although we will be watching closely to ensure that the expanded powers are used proportionately and in ways that genuinely improve public protection and victim confidence in the system, we agree that the clause is a sensible provision, and we will support it.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 12 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
New Clause 4
Court transcripts of sentencing remarks
“(1) All sentencing remarks made in the Crown Court must be published within two sitting days of being delivered.
(2) All publications must be freely available to all members of the public.”—(Mike Wood.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
With this it will be convenient to discuss
New clause 12—Access to free court transcripts for victims—
“(1) Victims of criminal offences shall be entitled to receive, without charge, court transcripts of—
(a) sentencing remarks,
(b) judicial summings-up,
(c) bail decisions and conditions relevant to their case.
(2) The Secretary of State must ensure that such transcripts are provided within 14 days of a request.
(3) The duty under subsection (1) shall apply irrespective of whether the victim gave evidence in the case.”
The new clause seeks to address a critical gap in transparency and accessibility in our criminal justice system: the publication of sentencing remarks from the Crown court. Sentencing remarks are the moment when justice is spoken out loud; when the judge explains not only what sentence is being passed, but why. For victims, families, journalists and the public at large, the remarks are essential for understanding the rationale behind a sentence. They provide clarity, accountability, and allow the public to see that justice is being not only done, but explained. Under the current system, however, the remarks are often buried, available only on request, behind paywalls or subject to lengthy delays, and generally at significant financial cost. That feeds a sense of injustice and confusion, particularly when sentencing decisions are controversial or appear lenient. It also limits public confidence in our courts. People should not have to be legal professionals or pay fees just to access the reasoning behind a judge’s decision.
The new clause would change that. It would require that all sentencing remarks made in the Crown court be published within two sitting days and that those publications be freely accessible to the public. That is not only a matter of open justice; it is a basic democratic civil right. Open justice is not served if court processes and explanations are inaccessible to the very people they affect most directly. Victims deserve to know how their case was resolved. The public deserve to see how justice is applied in their name, and journalists deserve timely access so that the courts can be reported on accurately and fairly.
This is a modest ask with significant democratic weight: two days to publish and no barriers to access. We should expect nothing less from a modern justice system that values openness, trust, and public understanding. It ties into our earlier amendments, because these remarks would help someone understand whether they should consider a referral to the unduly lenient sentence scheme. I hope the Government will support the new clause to deliver the basic right for victims, their families and the general public.
I rise to speak in favour of new clause 12. We agree in principle that victims should have access to the court transcripts—indeed, it has been a long-standing campaign by my hon. Friend the Member for Richmond Park (Sarah Olney). That is very important for victims, especially if they have been subject to coercive control, gaslighting or sexual abuse; victims at the end of the court process may be left questioning, “Was this my fault?” or, “Did this really happen to me?” We have heard from victims that having the transcripts gives them the peace of mind and validation that they need.
We disagree with the Opposition, however, on two fundamental points. The first is the requirement that the court transcripts be provided within two days. We think that is completely impractical, and that two weeks is much more reasonable. Secondly, we do not believe they should be made public. Many people commit crimes who have been coerced into them, or there may be retaliatory crimes; we think making court transcripts public presents an unnecessary public shaming of a criminal, whereas providing them to the victim provides closure and clarity.
I thank the hon. Member for Kingswinford and South Staffordshire for new clause 4, which would require transcripts of Crown court sentencing remarks to be published and made freely available to the public within two sitting days of being delivered. Introducing that provision would place a significant financial burden on the criminal justice system in a challenging fiscal context, diverting valuable resources away from the wider system, potentially including other victims services. The release of any Crown court transcript requires judicial oversight to ensure that the reporting restrictions have been adhered to and that other public interest factors have been considered. For transcripts of all sentencing remarks to be published and made freely available within two sitting days would have significant operational and resource implications.
With respect, it is very different. These are court documents that can be used in a court of appeal. What we say here is clarified. We email our speaking notes to Hansard. Our comments are checked. The resources are far vaster than for a Crown court in England and Wales, sadly. Therefore, it is not a fair comparison.
Those court transcripts need to be as accurate as possible and legally sound, because people’s lives hang on the line—for want of a better phrase—in terms of whether they are free to go or sentenced, and therefore it is important that they are accurate documents. This new clause would overburden a court system that is already in difficulties, thanks to what we inherited from the previous Government.
However, as I will come to in my remarks, we are looking to make progress in this area. We have extended the pilot for transcripts, and we have made that permanent for RASSO—rape and serious sexual offences—victims, because we recognise how important it is for victims to have them. We are looking at a way of doing it, but the timeframe given by this new clause is just not possible or workable under the restrictions that we currently have within our court system.
Similarly, new clause 12 would introduce a statutory entitlement to all victims of crime to request certain specified court transcripts: transcripts of sentencing remarks, judicial summings-up, bail decisions and conditions relevant to the case. As with new clause 4, providing those free of charge within 14 days of making that request would have significant cost implications and place a significant burden on the courts and the judiciary.
However, as I have said, I want to reassure members of the Committee that the Government are working to improve access on court transcripts and ensure that free provision is focused on victims who need it the most. Bereaved families of victims of murder, manslaughter and fatal road offences can request a judge’s sentencing remarks for free, and between May 2024 and 2025 the Ministry of Justice ran a one-year pilot that enabled victims of rape and sexual offences whose cases were heard at the Crown court to request a free transcript of the judge’s sentencing remarks in their case.
Victims of these offences were chosen because of the particular trauma that attending court can cause for them, resulting in a particular benefit in receiving a copy of the remarks—delivered in a sentencing hearing that they might find it difficult to attend for very understandable reasons—given the impact that those remarks can have on their recovery and in helping them to move on with their lives. Following that pilot, we are pleased to announce that victims of those offences will be able to request free transcripts on an ongoing basis. We are also exploring opportunities for the use of artificial intelligence in reducing the future cost of transcripts, and there is no doubt that the Government are taking action on this important issue.
I hope I have reassured hon. Members. I am happy to work with them, as we have with Members across the House, to ensure that we get this right, but it is important that we get this accurate, and get it right, because there is a lot at stake in providing these court transcripts. Therefore, it is important that we do it holistically, rather than just immediately, because of the impact that that could have.
I thank the Minister for her remarks, but it does seem that, particularly with the use of AI, as she has said, releasing an initial transcript need not be overly onerous. Obviously, after having got that initial release, the measure would allow for a definitive recording to be produced at a later time if an appeal was to be based on that. I do think that making these transcripts available is in the public interest, so we would like to press new clause 4 to a vote.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 7 calls for a review of court delays and their impact on victims to be conducted within six months of the Bill becoming law. Clearly, the impact of covid on our Crown courts in particular is still being felt within the system. Prior to covid, the Crown court backlog was actually lower than it had been under parts of the previous Labour Administration.
Due to significant investment in recovery efforts to try to address the backlog since the pandemic, including a provision for Nightingale courts and uncapped sitting days, the previous Lord Chancellor was clear that our last provisionally agreed sitting days were to be seen as a floor, not a cap. We support the calls from the Lady Chief Justice for more sitting days, and regret that the Government have only gone part of the way towards meeting the capacity that the Lady Chief Justice said was available within the court system.
Moving forward, it is important that we keep up the scrutiny to ensure that the court system is operating effectively and in the interests of victims. Delays in the court system are not just administrative; they retraumatise victims, reduce conviction rates and push people out of the justice process altogether. This review is urgent and overdue. If we are truly to put victims first, we must understand and act on the toll that these delays take. The Opposition believe that this review will help to focus efforts on reducing those delays to a minimum.
New clause 7 would require the Secretary of State to assess within six months of Royal Assent the impact of court delays on victims. As the hon. Member will be aware, thanks to his previous Government, this Government inherited a record and rising court backlog. Between 2010 and 2019, the Conservative Government permanently closed more than 260 court buildings as part of a wider estate consolidation. Additionally, historical underfunding has resulted in challenges across the estate, with an estimated £1.3 billion maintenance backlog.
As of December 2024, the Crown court outstanding caseload was over 74,000 cases. Sitting levels have never been higher, but even that is not enough to keep up with the increasing backlog of cases. I recognise the human impact that this can have on victims as they navigate those delays. The recent report by the Victims’ Commissioner truly brought to life the impact of the outstanding Crown court caseload on victims, victims services and the wider criminal justice system. It is clear that more must be done, and that fundamental reform is necessary to address the court backlog.
That is why the Lord Chancellor asked Sir Brian Leveson to propose a once-in-a-generation reform. The review is aimed at achieving a more efficient criminal court system and improved timeliness and swifter justice for victims, witnesses and defendants, without jeopardising the requirement for a fair trial for all involved. The review will also consider the most appropriate and proportionate ways of dealing with cases before the courts, as well as how processes through charge to conviction or acquittal could be improved to maximise efficiency. We expect the review of the report on options for long-term reform in the coming weeks and findings on court efficiency in autumn 2025.
We support the work that Sir Brian is doing, but do not feel that the new clause would contradict or otherwise impede that work. We also do not think that we ought to wait for the conclusions of Sir Brian’s work before acting. For now, we will leave the new clause as a probing amendment, but we may return to it at a future stage. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 8
Victim personal statements
“(1) The Secretary of State shall, within six months of the passing of this Act, issue revised guidance on the content of victim personal statements.
(2) The revised guidance issued under subsection (1) must stipulate that when making a victim personal statement, a victim shall be able to say anything they wish about the defendant, provided it is not contrary to any statutory limitations on free speech, makes allegations of untried criminal conduct or is disorderly language.
(3) The court must disregard any prejudicial comments made during a victim personal statement.”—(Mike Wood.)
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to review how to make victim personal statements less restrictive and clarify what can be included.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause addresses the rules on victim personal statements, about which we heard much in the evidence sessions. There is clearly a desperate need for reform to allow victims to properly and accurately communicate the impact that crimes have had on them. Our new clause introduces a right to be heard for those victims and for families making victim personal statements. We heard appalling stories of traumatised family members, such as Becky and Glenn Youens and Jeremy and Susan Everard, who were told that, no, they could not say what they wanted—they could not say anything derogatory about the guilty offender.
Victim personal statements are not appropriate platforms for gratuitous abuse, but the focus needs to be on allowing the voice of victims, rather than worrying too much about the hurt feelings of the convicted offender. The new clause would ensure that victims can speak freely with the most minimal restrictions possible. We can fairly ask the judge to consider what can and cannot be taken into account for sentencing rather than removing or censoring everything in advance. It is time that we uphold the voices of victims and provide them with the platform and the dignity that they deserve.
I thank the hon. Member for new clause 8, which would require the Secretary of State to issue revised guidance on victim personal statements to change the legal position on what they can include. First, let me say that I recognise that victim personal statements are a powerful tool for victims and their families to have their voices heard, and give them the opportunity to tell the court about the impact that a crime has had on them.
The victim personal statement is also important for the court’s sentencing decision. It provides evidence to assist the court in determining the seriousness of the offending as part of a sentencing process. It is right that victims have the opportunity to be part of that. However, it is also right that that be done fairly, which means that the usual rules of evidence must apply.
The hon. Member should be assured that I have heard from victims and their families on their concerns about their experience of the personal statement process. I have already committed to those families that I will look into the matter further. However, his drive to bolster the victim’s voice risks weakening the role that it can play in a sentencing process.
On a practical point, I do not believe the new clause will achieve the desired effect. The criminal practice directions provide the legal basis for a victim personal statement in the context of sentencing. Criminal practice directions are issued by judges, not Ministers. The legal position is then reflected in publicly available guidance. The Secretary of State for Justice is not responsible for any of that guidance, nor have they previously issued any such guidance.
Changing this guidance or issuing new guidance will not change the legal position as set out in the criminal practice directions. That is why I urge the hon. Member to withdraw the new clause, and to work with me to better understand victims’ experience of victim personal statements and how these issues might actually be addressed in a courtroom, while ensuring that the criminal justice system operates safely and fairly for all.
I thank the Minister for her response. This is an extremely important matter that needs to be dealt with in this legislation. I think she said that she wishes to proceed with something that broadly achieves our aims, but which addresses her concerns about the drafting. If she will undertake to work with the shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Bexhill and Battle, before Report to find a form of drafting that satisfies the new clause’s objectives without what she clearly sees as defects in its proposed wording, we would obviously be happy to work with her and not press the new clause for now. Hopefully, we will have something that we can agree to on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 10
Sentencing guidelines on court fines
“Within 18 months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, the Sentencing Council must revise relevant sentencing guidelines so that the court must award compensation to a victim to the value of items stolen when imposing compensation for the offence of theft, burglary, fraud, or any other crime that has resulted in a financial loss to the victim.”—(Mike Wood.)
This new clause would require the Sentencing Council to revise sentencing guidelines so that a court must impose compensation commensurate to the value of stolen items when issuing fines.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause seeks to correct a long-standing imbalance in the way in which financial justice is delivered to victims of theft, fraud, burglary and similar offences. It does so by requiring the Sentencing Council to revise its guidelines within 18 months of Royal Assent so that courts must impose compensation that reflects the actual financial loss suffered by the victim. Right now, victims of crime are far too often left bearing the financial burden of the offence, while the offender, even when convicted, is handed a compensation order that does not even begin to redress the damage that has been done, either directly or indirectly.
The result is an insult added to injury. Offenders walk away with a light financial consequence, while victims are left out of pocket and out of luck due to the crimes committed by others. The new clause would shift that balance, not punitively but justly. It would make it a duty, not a possibility, for sentencing to account for what was actually taken or lost. This is not an unfamiliar concept. Courts already have the power to impose compensation orders, but the inconsistency and infrequency with which they do so undermines public confidence in the system. Let us be clear: all the ordinary processes remain in place for pursuing outstanding payments, but why should we not recognise what is actually owed? If someone has a change of circumstance, it may well be that they could quite readily pay what they owe.
Most importantly, this is about victims. It is about restoring faith in the idea that when someone suffers a loss through crime, the justice system stands behind them—not just symbolically but materially by seeking, as far as possible, to provide restitution. The new clause proposes the straightforward but meaningful step of revising the sentencing guidelines so that, where there is a proven loss, it must be reflected in compensation. That is not just fair; it is the very least that victims should be able to expect. I urge the Committee to support the new clause.
New clause 10, tabled by the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle, would require the Sentencing Council to revise its sentencing guidelines so that courts must award compensation to victims to the value of the items stolen when imposing compensation for the offences of theft, burglary, fraud or any other crime that has resulted in a loss to the victim. I have considered the proposed new clause, but I do not consider it helpful in view of the current legislative position, which I will briefly explain.
Courts can impose a compensation order to require an offender to make financial reparations to the victim for any personal injury, loss or damage resulting from the offence. This includes any financial loss sustained as a result of items stolen in cases of theft, burglary, fraud or any other crime resulting in financial loss. Compensation may be ordered for such amount as the court considers appropriate, having regard to any evidence and representations made by the offender or prosecutor. There is no limit on the value of the single compensation order handed down to an adult offender.
The court must also consider the financial circumstances of the offender, in so far as they are known, to ensure they have sufficient means to pay. To do otherwise would create a pointless system of chasing down money that people are unable to pay, causing a cycle of unnecessary harm and emotional distress to victims.
The Sentencing Council has already issued explanatory information on compensation, which outlines these matters to aid sentencers when considering or issuing compensation orders. The proposed new clause, tabled by the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle, would limit the flexibility of sentences by mandating through sentencing guidelines that compensation must be awarded to the value of the items stolen. The Government are satisfied that the current process allows courts to strike an appropriate balance between seeking reparation for the harm caused to victims and knowing that it is actually enforceable so that victims are not left waiting for unrealistic debts to be paid to them. I therefore urge the hon. Member for Kingswinford and South Staffordshire to withdraw the proposed new clause.
I thank the Minister for her comments, but there is an imbalance in the system. Whereas convicted offenders may appeal against a sentence, victims do not have a similar ability to appeal against a failure to award full compensation. The new clause ought to be the presumptive starting point for compensation. Full compensation should usually be awarded, so we will press this matter to a vote.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
This new clause seeks to close a loophole in the recovery of unpaid court fines. At present, the Limitation Act 1980 imposes a six-year time limit on recovering debts, including fines handed down by the Crown court. Criminal fines are not ordinary civil debts. They are the product of judicial sanction, often imposed in response to serious offences, and reflect the principle that individuals must be held accountable for their actions through the justice system. The new clause would ensure that Crown court fines do not simply expire with time. It would give the Secretary of State the power to pursue unpaid fines without restriction, sending a clear message that justice delayed must not become justice denied. For victims and communities, the payment of court-ordered fines is about not only financial restitution, but accountability and the credibility of our criminal justice system. The Victims’ Commissioner, Baroness Newlove, has long identified this as an opportunity to secure funding, and we all know the tight constraints on expenditure.
The new clause implies that there is a time limit on the Government’s ability to enforce unpaid fines imposed by the Crown court, and seeks to remove it. I reassure all hon. Members that this is not the case. There is no such limitation on the ability of the criminal courts or His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service to enforce unpaid fines.
We take the recovery and enforcement of fines very seriously, and we are fully committed to ensuring that financial penalties are paid. HMCTS has robust methods in place for doing so, including taking money from a defendant’s benefits and salary, and seizing and selling goods. Courts also have powers to send offenders to prison for non-payment of fines and other monetary orders. The new clause also seeks to empower the Secretary of State to initiate proceedings to recover unpaid fines. However, civil enforcement mechanisms such as charging orders and bankruptcy are already available, and other well-established enforcement options, including deduction from earnings and benefits, are already in place.
Some offenders will do everything in their power to evade payment. They will move home or provide a false address, and there are processes in place to track them down using tracing tools and any legal routes for securing information gathered by other Government Departments and agencies. Bailiffs can be instructed to collect unpaid sums, and we have just launched a consultation on bailiff regulation, including a 5% uplift in fees to support early-stage recovery. We are also investing in the replacement of outdated IT systems to further improve the efficiency of enforcement arrangements.
I support the intention behind the new clause. It is, of course, essential that fines imposed by the Crown court are collected and enforced. There is no time limit on our ability to enforce fines that remain unpaid, and for good reason. Prolific offenders can rack up substantial fines, which they may pay back through deduction orders or other enforcement orders over many months or years. Offenders may be serving time in prison for other offences, which means that any fines that remain payable during that period will not be enforced until they are released.
We carefully monitor performance on the enforcement of fines. In 2023-24, HMCTS collected over £671 million in financial penalties, of which £10 million was for offences committed before 2017. We rigorously pursue money owed, no matter how old the debt. On average, by the time a financial penalty is five years old, 80% of the total imposition will have been collected. The actions we are taking will further improve performance in this area. For those reasons, we urge the hon. Member for Kingswinford and South Staffordshire to withdraw the new clause.
Given the Minister’s comments, we are content not to press the new clause to a Division at this time. Again, we may return to it at a future stage. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 15
Duty to collect and publish data upon sentencing
“(1) At the time of passing a sentence by a judge or magistrate the relevant court must provide to HM Courts and Tribunals Service (‘HMCTS’) the following information regarding the sentence passed—
(a) offence type,
(b) sentence length,
(c) such information about the sentenced individual as the Secretary of State sees fit, which must include—
(i) nationality,
(ii) method of entry to the United Kingdom,
(iii) visa route,
(iv) visa status,
(v) asylum status, and
(vi) country of birth.
(2) HMCTS must collect and collate the information on the basis set out in subsection (1) on sentences passed in the courts.
(3) Once every three months, the Secretary of State must publish statistics based on the information collected by HMCTS under subsection (2).”—(Mike Wood.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause was tabled in the name of the shadow Secretary of State for Justice, my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick). It would introduce a new statutory duty for courts to provide structured data on sentencing outcomes, including key information about individuals’ immigration status.
Transparency on crime is critical not only for building public trust in our justice system but for ensuring that we have the right tools in place to understand and respond to the realities of criminal offending. The new clause would create a clear, accountable framework for collecting and publishing sentencing data that sits at the intersection of the criminal justice and immigration systems. By requiring His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service to gather and publish that data quarterly, we would enable policymakers to detect patterns, assess outcomes and develop evidence-based responses. Crucially, it would also strengthen the ability of immigration enforcement to make fair, informed decisions on removals, deportations or protections—decisions that must balance public safety with legal and humanitarian obligations.
Ultimately, the public have a right to this level of transparency. For too long, assumptions have filled the void left by incomplete data. The new clause would replace speculation with facts, and in doing so it would promote more informed policy, more effective enforcement and greater public confidence. I commend it to the Committee.
I recognise the importance of transparency when publishing data on foreign national offenders. The hon. Member will know that we inherited our current data collection and publication system from the previous Government. It is interesting that the Conservatives are now keen to make changes, after 14 years in office in which they could have done it themselves.
The Lord Chancellor has been clear. This is important to her and we are reviewing what we collect and publish, and should we decide it needs to change, we will of course enact that. More broadly, we are working to strengthen data collection at court, and we are exploring how we can improve the sharing of immigration status data across the criminal justice system.
We are committed to continually developing the data we publish. We already publish data on the number of self-declared foreign nationals in prison and under probation supervision, and we publish detailed ethnicity data of those prosecuted in court. Recording such data for everyone convicted and sentenced in court, including those for lower-level convictions—those that result in a fine, for example—would represent an additional burden on an already stretched system, but it would also inevitably give rise to a substantial data quality risk.
Courts have no mechanism to verify or validate information provided, nor do they have any mechanism to compel such provision in the first place. The new clause would impose an obligation without any consideration of the infrastructure necessary to deliver it. For those reasons, we are unable to accept the new clause, but we will continue to look at what more we can do to improve the accessibility of information relating to foreign national offenders.
Foreign nationals who commit crime should be in no doubt that the law will be enforced, and that we will work with the Home Office to pursue their deportation. It is worth noting that, since 5 July 2024, more foreign offenders have been returned than in the same period 12 months before under the previous Government. For all the Conservatives’ rhetoric, it is this Government who are getting on with the job.
Given the Minister’s disappointing response, we will wish to have a fuller debate on Report. I do not intend to press the new clause to a vote now, but we will almost certainly do so at a later stage. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 13
Power to make consequential provision
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 13 to 16 contain standard provisions that confer powers to make consequential amendments, to set out the Bill’s territorial extent, to make arrangements for commencement of the Bill’s measures, and to set out the Bill’s short title.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 14 to 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Question proposed, That the Chair do report the Bill, as amended, to the House.
It is customary at this stage in proceedings to say a few words to mark the end of our deliberations in Committee. I welcome that the measures in this Bill command a substantial degree of cross-party support, and I am pleased that the Bill has had the benefit of rigorous scrutiny by members on both sides of the Committee.
I thank the Opposition Front-Bench team, including the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle—I wish him well in his recovery—for their careful consideration. I pay tribute to all hon. Members who have served so diligently on the Committee and made such thoughtful, valuable and powerful contributions.
I thank you, Dr Murrison, and your co-Chair, Mr Stringer, for keeping us in very good order. I also thank the Government Whip, my hon. Friend the Member for Chester North and Neston. I thank the Clerks and the MOJ officials, particularly Rachel Bennion, Zara Bernard and Hayley Newell, for all of their work. I thank the Hansard Reporters and the Doorkeepers, and I look forward to the debate on Report, which I am sure we will come to soon.
On behalf of the Opposition, I thank all the Clerks, officials, Doorkeepers and Hansard Reporters. I also thank you, Dr Murrison, and Mr Stringer for your work on this Committee.
There is much that is very positive in this Bill, which is why His Majesty’s official Opposition are pleased to support it. Obviously, there are various points on which we think the Government could and should go further, and we will seek to make the Bill even better on Report. For now, I thank all members of the Committee for their contributions over the past week. I look forward to returning to this debate on Report.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill, as amended, accordingly to be reported.