Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)
Tuesday 10th June 2025
(2 days, 16 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesMental Health Bill [HL] 2024-26 View all Mental Health Bill [HL] 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 10 June 2025 - (10 Jun 2025)
The Chair
We are sitting in public and our proceedings are being broadcast. I remind hon. Members to switch off or silence their electronic devices. Tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings.
Before we move on to line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill, we will first consider the programme motion on the amendment paper, and then a motion to enable the reporting of written evidence for publication. In view of the time available, I hope to take these initial matters formally, without debate. The programme motion was discussed yesterday by the Programming Sub-Committee for the Bill.
Ordered,
That—
1. the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 9.25 am on Tuesday 10 June) meet—
(a) at 2.00 pm on Tuesday 10 June;
(b) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 12 June;
(c) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 17 June;
(d) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 19 June;
(e) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 24 June;
(f) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 26 June;
2. proceedings on consideration of the Bill in Committee shall be taken in the following order: Clauses 1 to 3; Schedule 1; Clauses 4 to 24; Schedule 2; Clauses 25 to 41; Schedule 3; Clauses 42 to 54; new Clauses; new Schedules; Clauses 55 to 59; remaining proceedings on the Bill;
3. the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 5.00 pm on Thursday 26 June. —(Stephen Kinnock.)
Resolved,
That, subject to the discretion of the Chair, any written evidence received by the Committee shall be reported to the House for publication.—(Stephen Kinnock.)
The Chair
Copies of written evidence that the Committee receives will be made available in the Committee Room.
We will now begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room and on the parliamentary website. It shows how the clauses, schedules and selected amendments have been grouped for debate. The purpose of the grouping is to avoid undue repetition in debate.
I remind the Committee that the Member who has put their name to the lead amendment in the group is called first. In a stand part debate, the Minister will be called to speak first. Other Members will then be free to indicate, by bobbing, whether they wish to speak. At the end of a debate on a group of amendments, new clauses or schedules, I shall again call the Member who moved the lead amendment or new clause. Before they sit down, they will need to indicate whether they wish to withdraw the amendment or new clause or to seek a decision.
If any Member wishes to press any other amendment, new clause or schedule to a vote, they will need to let me know. I shall use my discretion to decide whether to allow a separate stand part debate on individual clauses and schedules following the debate on the relevant amendments. I hope that that explanation was helpful.
Clause 1
Principles to inform decisions
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Minister for Care (Stephen Kinnock)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Vickers.
I thank the many hon. Members who spoke on Second Reading. It is clear that in this place, as in the other place, the Bill will proceed in a collaborative and constructive spirit, with the single motivation of getting the reforms right. On Second Reading, we heard numerous powerful accounts from hon. Members arising from their personal experience of supporting family, friends or constituents with a serious mental illness, a learning disability or neurodiversity, or drawing on their own experiences to underscore the importance of the need for reform. I was heartened to hear from so many Members who set out the positive impact of the changes that the Bill will introduce, particularly the vital changes to ensure that patients’ voices are heard and that—as we would expect in any modern mental health service—the patient is at the heart of all decision making.
In our manifesto, we committed to modernising the Mental Health Act 1983 to give patients greater choice, autonomy, enhanced rights and support, and to ensure that everyone is treated with dignity and respect throughout their treatment. I am proud that we included this critical Bill in our first King’s Speech, and I look forward to constructive engagement with the Committee on this important legislation.
I will also take a moment to thank the Liberal Democrat Member, the name of whose constituency escapes me, and other MPs who have shone a light on the experiences of Fiona Laskaris and other families. No one should lose a child in that way. I thank Fiona for meeting me and I commend her tireless campaign efforts. The engagement that my officials and I have had with Fiona and the hon. Member has been incredibly valuable. Unfortunately, the Bill is not the appropriate vehicle to address those concerns, but I have committed to continuing engagement with Fiona and the hon. Member to further explore those issues and how we might tackle them.
Dr Danny Chambers (Winchester) (LD)
I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Dorking and Horley (Chris Coghlan) has been pushing forward on that very emotive and difficult issue of capacity; he brought it up in his maiden speech and has been campaigning tirelessly on it. My hon. Friend said that the Minister was very constructive in his engagement on the issue, which we very much appreciate. Even though we cannot include it in the Bill, we look forward to working on it.
Stephen Kinnock
I thank the hon. Member for that intervention, not least because it gave me the opportunity to remember the constituency of the hon. Member for Dorking and Horley—please pass my apologies to him for forgetting that important point. He has been a tireless campaigner and I believe that we can find a way forward; this Bill is just not the correct vehicle for it.
Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)
I also want to assess the amendment that could potentially have been tabled. The Opposition were struggling to see how it would fit in, and it looks as if there is a crossover with the Mental Capacity Act 2005. Can the Minister set out why he felt that it did not quite fit into this area and how it could be taken forward, so that with cross-party work outside this Committee we can see how we can make it happen?
Stephen Kinnock
There were a number of technical and drafting issues. The Public Bill Office ruled that the amendment, as drafted, was out of scope. One of the key concerns was about the unintended consequences of the relationship between physical disability and mental disorder. The drafting of the amendment could have caused confusion, because it could have started to bring physical disability into the scope of the Bill, which is clearly not what it is about. There were a number of technical and drafting issues, but I do not think that they are insurmountable. We can get to where we need to be, just not through a legislative vehicle.
Gregory Stafford (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)
I support the comments of the Minister and the hon. Member for Winchester on the issue. On a cross-party basis, I know that my right hon. Friend the Member for Godalming and Ash (Sir Jeremy Hunt) has taken a close interest. Could he also be included in those discussions?
Stephen Kinnock
Yes, absolutely. We had a very constructive meeting with the right hon. Member for Godalming and Ash, along with the hon. Member for Dorking and Horley, and we are certainly open to working with that team of people, who are clearly focused on getting the results that we all want to see.
Clause 1 will make it a statutory requirement for the Secretary of State to include, in the statement of principles in the Mental Health Act code of practice, the wording of the four principles identified by the independent review. Those principles are choice and autonomy, least restriction, therapeutic benefit and the person as an individual. This will ensure that the review’s principles underpin the implementation of the Mental Health Act 1983 and are considered when making decisions related to care, support or the treatment provided to patients under the Act.
Embedding the principles in day-to-day practice will help to drive the culture change envisaged by the independent review. We are including the principles in the Act so that they govern the content of the code of practice and can changed only by Parliament. The Government are firmly supportive of the four principles, which were co-designed with service users during the independent review. They have informed every decision made in developing the Bill. We have embedded the principles in measures throughout the Bill, such as via the inclusion of therapeutic benefit in the detention criteria and several measures to improve patient choice and autonomy, including new treatment safeguards, introducing advance choice documents and the right to choose a nominated person.
I turn to clause 2. The code of practice for Wales already includes a statement of principles, although it is not a statutory requirement under section 118 of the Mental Health Act 1983 for Welsh Ministers to do so. Clause 2 will amend section 118 to extend subsection (2A) to Wales, along with the new subsection (2B) inserted by clause 1. To do so, clause 2 will also make amendments elsewhere in section 118 to clarify the application of each subsection, which will be to the Secretary of State in relation to England, to Welsh Ministers in relation to Wales, by virtue of the transfer of devolved functions, or to both.
The extent of the Mental Health Act is England and Wales, and there are separate codes of practice for England and Wales. Both codes of practice currently include a statement of principles, although the principles themselves vary slightly. Clause 2 will place a statutory requirement on Welsh Ministers to include the wording of the four principles identified by the independent review in the statement of principles when preparing the Mental Health Act code of practice for Wales.
As in clause 1, we are putting these principles explicitly in the Act so that they govern the content of the code of practice and so that they cannot be changed except by Parliament, or by the Senedd in respect of Wales. The Welsh code is already required to undergo scrutiny by Senedd Cymru, but clause 2 will also update the position in relation to the Senedd Cymru scrutiny procedure for the Welsh code. I commend clauses 1 and 2 to the Committee.
Dr Evans
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Vickers. I thank the Minister for his collaborative tone on some of the difficult amendments that we have discussed.
I will open where the shadow Secretary of State, my right hon. Friend the Member for Melton and Syston (Edward Argar), left us on Second Reading. As he rightly emphasised, the importance of updating the Mental Health Act cannot be overstated. I fully share his view that it was right to take the necessary time to get this legislation right. The cross-party commitment to reform in this area, spanning both previous and current Governments, reflects a shared recognition of the urgent need to modernise our approach to mental health, particularly for those who are most vulnerable.
I welcome the Bill’s focus on enhancing patients’ voice and autonomy, including through the expansion of independent advocacy and the shift away from using police and prison cells as a place of safety. Those are positive and overdue steps. At the same time, as my right hon. Friend outlined, the Opposition’s role is to engage rigorously and constructively with the details of the Bill. Over the next few weeks, I look forward to working with colleagues on the Committee to ensure that, for example, the principle of patient choice is embedded not only in policy but in practice, such as through the use of advance choice documents.
We will continue to scrutinise the Bill in good faith, proposing improvements where needed, with the aim of delivering the strongest possible protections and outcomes for patients, their families and the community. How we begin a conversation often determines whether it becomes dialogue or dispute, so I hope that the Committee can take a constructive and productive look at what lies ahead of us.
I support clause 1, which will rightly update section 118(2B) of the Mental Health Act 1983 and embed a refreshed code of practice at the very heart of the mental health framework. This is not merely a procedural amendment; it is a statement of values, placing humanity, dignity and recovery at the centre of how we treat some of the most vulnerable people in our society, who are profoundly affected by mental health legislation. It is vital that the framework guiding professionals be clear, principled and rooted in respect for individuals.
Why do we need these changes? For too long, the Mental Health Act has been criticised as outdated and insufficiently centred on patient autonomy and dignity. Concerns raised by successive independent reviews, clinicians and, crucially, by people with lived experience have pointed to inconsistencies in how decisions are made, which can often result in over-restriction, lack of patient involvement and insufficient therapeutic focus.
The independent review of the Mental Health Act, which was published in 2018, made a landmark contribution by recommending the adoption of the four core principles in front of us today: choice and autonomy, least restriction, therapeutic benefit and recognition of the person as an individual. These principles are designed to shift the culture and practice towards one that respects autonomy while safeguarding wellbeing and public safety.
The historical context is that the Mental Health Act has undergone several amendments since its introduction—notably, in 2007, updates were made to some of the detention criteria and safeguards—but it was clear that the Act remained predominantly paternalistic. The 2018 independent review was a comprehensive, evidence-based re-examination of the entire Act, informed by extensive consultation, including with patients, families and clinicians. It concluded that embedding the principles formally into the law and code of practice was essential to modernise and humanise mental health law.
The four key principles—choice and autonomy, least restriction, therapeutic benefit and the person as an individual to be treated with dignity—are not abstract ideals. They are the foundations of compassionate, lawful and effective care. They echo the spirit of the UN convention on the rights of persons with disabilities and signal a move away from paternalism and towards genuine co-production of care plans. Involvement ensures that decisions are not made about patients without them. The principle of choice and autonomy reminds us that the mental illness must not be a justification for blanket restrictions. The principle of least restriction challenges us to find community-based alternatives before defaulting to detention. Therapeutic benefit ensures that care is not custodial, but meaningful healing. These principles are what most of us would hope to see for our own family.
Anna Dixon (Shipley) (Lab)
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his comments. Does he agree that the Wessely independent review setting out these four principles gets right the balance that even though people may need to be detained, they should not lose their personhood and control, and that embedding these principles in this updated Bill will ensure that those rights are enshrined in law?
Dr Evans
The hon. Member is absolutely right. The key part is about trying to change not only the legislative framework, but the culture around clinicians and society as a whole. We saw that impact in 1983, we saw it in 2005 with the update on capacity, and we saw it in 2007. Now is the right time to look again at this, and it is well overdue.
I am glad that it has taken a while to ensure that the Bill has been thoroughly thought out. As we heard in the House of Lords debate, this is exactly the kind of framework that we need to make sure that society moves forward in a collaborative way that puts the patient at the centre, but also protects the wider community. Given some of the high-profile incidents that we have seen, we must also make sure that relatives, the community and the wider public at large are all protected.
As the Minister has rightly highlighted, the core principles must be the default for everyone. Clause 1 therefore represents an important step forward: by requiring the Secretary of State and the Welsh Ministers to include the four principles explicitly in the code of practice and by making it a legal duty for decision makers to have regard to them, the clause will strengthen the ethical foundation of mental health law. However, we must be honest about the challenges. The success of the principles depends on the culture, not just the codification. Training, supervision and leadership across clinical settings will be essential to bringing the values off the page and into practice.
These principles will also require resource backing. We cannot call for the least restrictive or most therapeutic interventions while community mental health services remain as they are. A plan for investment and a timeline for delivery will be imperative, or else we risk embedding principles we cannot fulfil. Members on both sides of the House understand that. I know that the Minister will have to think carefully about setting out a timetable, but it is key.
We must also guard against tokenism. We must guard against lofty principles being left unenforced and becoming rhetorical wallpaper. If we are to legislate for these values, we must look for accountability, with regular auditing, patient feedback mechanisms and a duty on the provider to report on how the principles are being upheld. Those are all areas that His Majesty’s Opposition will scrutinise.
To that end, I wish to raise several important questions for the Government and the Committee to consider. The first is about enforcement and accountability. How will the Government ensure that decision makers truly have regard to the principles in practice, and is there a robust mechanism for monitoring compliance and addressing breaches?
The second question is about balancing conflicts. In some cases, principles may conflict: for example, the imperative to respect patient autonomy may clash with the need to impose restrictions for safety. How does the code intend to guide practitioners to navigate these difficult trade-offs?
The third question is about care and interested parties. Although the clause highlights patient involvement, what explicit protections and roles will be afforded to carers and other interested parties, and how will their sometimes divergent perspectives be balanced?
The fourth question is about training and resources. Embedding the principles requires more than words on paper. What investments are planned to equip practitioners with the skills and understanding necessary to apply these principles sensitively and consistently?
The fifth question is about the timeline and consultation. The explanatory notes mention that the code must be consulted on and presented for scrutiny. What is the proposed timeline for that process, and how will people with lived experience continue to be involved?
Stephen Kinnock
I thank the shadow Minister for his questions. I will answer to the best of my ability, but I may need to write to him on one or two points.
On enforcement and accountability, the code of practice is underpinned by the Bill and is therefore legally binding. Any divergence from the code of practice would need an extremely strong justification. That could well end up being a matter for the courts. I think that we will see a fairly strong line of sight from this primary legislation through to the code of practice and its implementation. Enforcement and accountability will be provided on that basis.
On balancing conflict, we will consult on the code of practice. Consultation will launch as soon as the Bill becomes an Act. That will be an important part of getting to the nub of some of these nuanced issues. It is quite difficult to put all that down in a document—a lot is about the culture, as the shadow Minister said—so we need an approach that has sufficient flexibility, but with clear outcomes and accountability. The consultation process will help us to get that.
Dr Evans
I agree with the Minister. Does the Department have a rough idea of the timetable for putting in place the code of practice? How long will the consultation need to take? When will it be implemented? How many rounds go with it? How wide is it to be—will it consult across England and Wales, or just in England?
Stephen Kinnock
We expect the entire process to take about a year from Royal Assent. My colleague Baroness Merron made a strong commitment from the Dispatch Box in the other place that we will present a written ministerial statement to the House every year. That will be the opportunity for us to report on the progress of all the measures that need to be implemented. A pressing task is to build the community capability required in this shift from hospital to community, which is very much part of the Bill and of our broader strategy for mental health and, indeed, health across the board. We need to report every year on that, but the first year will also be a report on the consultation and its conclusion, including the conclusion of a draft code of practice. We expect that to take approximately 12 months.
That, in some ways, has also answered the shadow Minister’s question about training and resources. A big part of the reason for the 10-year implementation period is the time that it will take to do the training and the training needs analysis, to identify trainers to deliver the training, and to get the system up to speed. That will be a fairly large chunk of the 10-year process.
Dr Evans
The Opposition appreciate the timescale taken to skill-up in this area, but the workforce plan is soon to be announced by the hon. Member’s Government. Has any consideration been made of what the capacity might look like, and of the crossover between having this legislation not quite in place—although likely to happen, upon Royal Assent—and its impact on updating the workforce plan on mental health?
Stephen Kinnock
The shadow Minister is tempting me to reveal the details of the workforce plan. While I have a huge amount of respect for this Committee, I do not think that it is where we will launch it. Absolutely, however, that is built into our thinking about the plan. There is a huge mental health challenge in our country, and those with acute and severe disorders and conditions which the Bill is designed to address are absolutely a part of that. A skilled and compassionate workforce is required, and I pay tribute to the amazing staff, mental health professionals and others who work in this area, often in incredibly challenging circumstances. We recognise and value that. The Bill does need to hook up with the workforce plan, and we are focused on that.
On Wales and the risk of divergence, the shadow Minister makes an interesting point. I guess it is about ensuring that that there is devolution, but not divergence, in the sense that we have a framework here—much of the legal framework is reserved—but the delivery of mental health services is devolved. That balance has to be right, but it is something that the two Governments have been working on since devolution started in 1998. There is a fairly mature and sophisticated culture in the interface between the two Governments. The shadow Minister is right to flag that point, and I am more than happy to seek some assurances from officials and write to him. However, as things stand, I do not see any particular risks.
Dr Evans
The Minister is right that there is shared working. However, part of the problem between devolved nations, such as Scotland and Wales, is that the datasets and definitions of data are often changed. Actually, the comparison of data across the UK can be quite hard to manage. Given that we are talking specifically about mental health, including some of the most at-risk people with the most severe mental health illnesses, will the Government commit to pushing for shared data that is comparable between Scotland and Wales, which we are legislating on in this case, to ensure that there is data transparency, so no one country can hide behind a different comparison or by saying, “We are looking at apples and pears”?
Stephen Kinnock
It is important that we do not see devolution as a wall between the two countries; in fact, we should be sharing information and best practice—nobody has a monopoly on good ideas. The Welsh Government have achieved some things, particularly in mental health, that England could learn from, and vice versa. There is no reason why the data cannot be shared from my own practicable and pragmatic point of view. There may be some issues with data protection, but data protection law really should be implemented in the same way right across the board because it is reserved.
Dr Evans
I entirely agree, and I hope that data is and will be shared. The question is about the definitions and standards, such as those used for waiting times. We often use the A&E waiting time of four hours. When it comes to the most vulnerable patients who will potentially be on waiting lists, or looking at specific data, if it is categorised differently in Wales, Scotland and England, that makes it very hard to see where best practice is so that it can be shared. That is the Opposition’s concern. I know that both sides of the House have shared that concern in my five years in Parliament. Is there a mechanism to address that issue either in the Bill or in the Minister’s wider portfolio?
Stephen Kinnock
I see. I am sorry; I had misunderstood the shadow Minister’s point. I thought it was about sharing data on particular patients, especially those who are crossing borders. The point about waiting lists is a more difficult issue. The Welsh Government have taken a view on how best to define them. For example, I know that ambulance waiting times have been quite controversial because there is a different definition in Wales to England. Many feel that the definition adopted by the Welsh Government sets the bar at a higher standard, which can then sometimes framed, in the hurly-burly of politics, as failing more than they would be if they had used a different metric, but they have chosen to use that metric.
In the context of devolution, it is up to the Welsh Government to decide how best to evaluate the Welsh health service and its performance. I take the shadow Minister’s point on having the best alignment that we can, but when it comes to this UK Government, we will determine how performance is evaluated for England, and the Welsh Government will determine how best to evaluate performance for Wales. I think that the Welsh media, the UK media, this Parliament and the Welsh Parliament will then decide who is failing and who is succeeding.
Aphra Brandreth (Chester South and Eddisbury) (Con)
I represent an English constituency on the border with Wales; on some streets, one side is considered Welsh and the other English. Does the Minister recognise that it matters to people in England and Wales that there is consistency across both parts of our fantastic country, and that it is not sufficient to say that what happens in Wales will affect only Welsh people, or what happens in England will affect only English people?
Stephen Kinnock
I absolutely accept the point that there are deeply integrated communities on that border. A huge number of people live in England and work in Wales, or live in Wales and work in England. However, the fact of the matter is that health is a devolved policy area. It is, therefore, up to the devolved Administrations to determine how they want to measure the performance of their respective systems. It would be a violation of the principles of devolution if one Government in our United Kingdom were to dictate to another how they should evaluate their devolved policy areas—whether that is health, education or any other devolved area. I hope that I have responded to the best of my ability.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 3
Application of the Mental Health Act 1983: autism and learning disability
Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)
I beg to move amendment 56, in clause 3, page 3, line 19, at end insert—
“(4) The Secretary of State may by regulations update the definitions in subsection (2) in response to scientific advancements.
(5) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”
This amendment would allow the definitions for mental disorder, autism, learning disability and psychiatric disorder to be updated by secondary legislation as science evolves.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Vickers. I rise to speak to amendment 56, which is in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Dr Spencer), who has extensive clinical experience. The amendment provides for a narrowly drawn but important power, namely, to update, via regulations and subject to affirmative procedure, the statutory definitions in clause 3, in response to developments in scientific and clinical understanding.
I recognise that any clause that confers powers on the Executive to amend the statutory definitions must be treated with due caution. There could be concerns that changes could be made without broad clinical consensus. However, on this occasion, I believe that my hon. Friend, who brings to the debate the weight of his clinical expertise, has struck the right balance. The proposed power is tightly scoped. It is triggered only by new scientific knowledge. It cannot be exercised on ministerial whim. Crucially, it is subject to the full rigour of parliamentary approval under the affirmative resolution procedure. It is not a case of Executive overreach; it is a recognition that the pace of medical and neuroscientific research is such that legislation risks obsolescence unless we allow for responsible adaptation.
One need only look at the evolution of our understanding of conditions such as autism spectrum disorder and complex post-traumatic stress disorder to appreciate how quickly definitions can move on. Clearly, any change must reflect best practice and take place under broad consultation. However, I argue that we are not opening the back door to arbitrary change; we are safeguarding the front door against stagnation. For that reason, I support the amendment.
Dr Evans
I rise to speak to amendment 56, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge. The amendment proposes to grant the Secretary of State the power to update the definitions of “mental disorder”, “autism”, “learning disability” and “psychiatric disorder” by secondary legislation, subject to affirmative resolution by both Houses of Parliament. Currently, the Bill sets out fixed definitions of those terms in the primary legislation—the Mental Health Act, as amended. Those definitions can be changed only through further primary legislation. That means that any further change, reflecting new scientific knowledge or evolving clinical consensus, would require a full legislative process. Given that the Act was passed in 1983, and we are here more than 40 years later, I think that the problem is clear.
Anna Dixon
Does the hon. Gentleman recognise the work of the World Health Organisation in producing the international classification of diseases and ICD-11, which provides a scientific, evidence-based update, including on psychiatric disorders, autism and other neurodevelopmental disorders? Has he considered whether that is an appropriate reference point for the Bill?
Dr Evans
The hon. Member makes a good point. We have had ICD-10 and DSM-5, which aim to codify those disorders. Part of the problem is that someone with Korsakoff syndrome, which is brain damage from alcohol, or with Rett’s disease would potentially come under the scope of these definitions. That makes it very difficult. What about acquired brain injury? That is an emerging field—the House has looked at it and has put a strategy in place. However, there could be problems in the legislation going forward.
The amendment is asking, I think, how we scientifically proof the Bill so that we do not need to introduce further primary legislation. That is the question that the Government need to grapple with. As a doctor, I have seen the difficulties and practicalities of these definitions, and of trying to put people in a box. For example, where does Asperger’s fit on the autism scale? What does that look like on the spectrum of conditions? Are we trying to codify that? These are the real, pragmatic problems of putting definitions in place. That means it is all the more important to look at definitions, but, as the hon. Member for Shipley has rightly pointed out, the definitions have already moved on while we have been discussing the Bill. Introducing a mechanism that allows the House to update the legislation in keeping with advances in scientific knowledge is really important. The question is whether this is the right amendment to do that.
The amendment would allow the Secretary of State to make updates through regulations—secondary legislation—which would thereby enable a more flexible and responsive approach. Importantly, it requires that any such regulations must be laid before Parliament and approved by both Houses, which maintains parliamentary scrutiny and democratic oversight.
The potential benefits of this approach are clear. It offers the possibility of allowing the law to evolve and stay aligned with scientific evidence and clinical best practice without undue delay. That could prevent outdated or overly rigid definitions from adversely impacting vulnerable people, and better reflects the complexities of mental health conditions. It would allow the law to keep pace with advances in the scientific understanding of autism, learning disability and mental disorders, without the need for primary legislation. It could help ensure that the definitions remain clinically accurate and relevant, improving how the law is applied and reducing the risk of outdated criteria causing harm or confusion.
As the hon. Member for Shipley pointed out, that is part of the problem. As new criteria come up, there is a delay in the uptake of definitions. From my experience in clinical practice, keeping up to date with definitions can sometimes be a challenge. It is part of the personal development plan to make sure there is that understanding, but there is always a drip through as change in practice comes through, along with clinicians being comfortable and happy to use the new definitions. With any new medication, it is important to understand the side effects and the pros and cons of what it is trying to achieve, and to be able to explain that fully so that a patient can consent when taking that medication. The same applies when trying to explain a condition to patients. If there is a change and a new aspect to the way in which a definition is being applied, it is important that we have some flexibility.
The affirmative procedure preserves Parliament’s role, offering safeguards against unchecked ministerial power. However, there are some important considerations and potential drawbacks. Definitions of mental health conditions have profound legal and social implications. Delegating this power, even with parliamentary approval, risks politicisation or inconsistent application if regulations are used too frequently or without adequate consultation.
Secondary legislation typically receives less parliamentary debate and public scrutiny than primary legislation, even with the affirmative procedure, which may not suffice for such significant changes. There is also a risk that the changes could be made in a reactive or piecemeal way rather than with a coherent legislative framework, potentially leading to legal uncertainty or unintended consequences.
Given those points, I have several questions for the Minister. How do the Government propose to keep the legislation updated, given that we are only updating the Mental Health Act now, 40 years on? Do they have a mechanism in mind to ensure that any updates to the definitions are accompanied by robust clinical and expert consultation, while reacting to advances in medical understanding? Would the Government consider a formal review mechanism such as a mandated periodic independent review of the definitions? That could solve the problem of legislation becoming outdated, and put the safeguards in place. If there is a difference in the scientific community, we need to make sure that any changes are broadly in agreement with the direction of travel of scientific knowledge.
Furthermore, in considering the need for balanced, flexible and democratic accountability, the Government could introduce a sunset clause on any regulations, so that any changes would be revisited and renewed by primary legislation within a set period, unless Parliament agrees otherwise.
Crucially, to my knowledge, there are no standing statutory bodies or panels tasked with reviewing or advising the Government on the legal definitions of mental health conditions. There is an argument that without a dedicated expert body to guide the Secretary of State, we cannot be sure that any changes are robustly evidence-based and clinically sound. Currently, we have the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, the royal colleges, the Department of Health and Social Care and the intermittent mental health review bodies, but have the Government considered establishing a formal advisory mechanism to address problems in the future? The Opposition can see the argument both ways, but to govern is to choose, and it would be useful to understand the Minister’s thoughts on this area.
Anna Dixon
The hon. Gentleman seems to be overcomplicating the need for additional scrutiny. Will he acknowledge the work of the World Health Organisation to review the evidence on a global basis and update the definitions of psychiatric disorders?
Dr Evans
The hon. Member is correct about the way in which the world looks at this issue. The problem is that we are sat here debating definitions in legislation that is 40 years old. Will we be here in 40 years debating definitions that have moved on? The amendment suggests that, somehow, we need to try to ensure that legislation is flexible and updated enough, and has the scrutiny and safeguards in place. That relates to not just health, but any part of government that we tend to look at in the House.
I wanted to speak to the amendment to probe the Government on how they will safeguard the legislation. I do not have all the answers, but this is important. I do not want to see my successors—the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth from whatever party—sat here debating this issue in 40 years’ time because the definitions that we happen to set today have become outdated and have unintended consequences.
That is the balance that I am looking for. I do not see a body across the UK, given that this is UK legislation, that fulfils this role. It could be a transitory role or fully established. A psychiatrist could take it on, or it could come under NICE. With the abolition of NHS England, it could be a new role for the Department of Health to take on. All those are viable vehicles that could potentially look into the definitions. I want to ensure that what we pass in Parliament actually translates into the real world for clinicians, patients and the public.
The Opposition can see the argument both ways, as I mentioned. Perhaps it would be useful to have an expert panel, with representatives of clinicians, legal experts and service users to support regulatory updates. I put those questions to the Minister and I look forward to his answers.
Stephen Kinnock
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley for moving the amendment on behalf of the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge, and to the shadow Minister for speaking to it.
As this regulation-making power would amend primary legislation, it would signify a Henry VIII power that the Government consider to be unjustified. We have significant concern that it could change the way in which the Bill applies to people with certain conditions without appropriate consultation or parliamentary scrutiny. The serious matter of detention for compulsory treatment should be considered in primary legislation.
The hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley spoke about the need to stay in touch with our evolving understanding of these terms and conditions. My view is that the Bill does that. We have modified the meaning of mental disorder by including new definitions of autism, learning disability and psychiatric disorder. That acknowledges the advancement in our understanding of learning disabilities and autism, and how the Bill should apply in respect of those conditions. Any future change to the definitions should be a matter for Parliament, informed by strong evidence and consultation with the public.
For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley to withdraw the amendment.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephen Kinnock
Currently, a person with a learning disability can be detained for treatment under section 3 of the Mental Health Act when their learning disability
“is associated with abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct”.
A person can be detained under section 3 on the basis of being autistic, which is classed as a mental disorder under the Act. However, we know that people with a learning disability and autistic people may sometimes be detained because of needs that have arisen due to insufficient community support, rather than for treatment of a mental health condition, and compulsory treatment in hospital settings is rarely likely to be helpful, particularly for autistic people.
Clause 3 and schedule 1 will insert new definitions in the Act and make amendments using those definitions throughout the Act. Those amendments will remove, for the purposes of part 2 of the Act, learning disability and autism from the conditions for which a person can be detained for compulsory treatment. It will be possible to detain someone for treatment under part 2 only if they satisfy the conditions set out in section 3, as amended by the Bill. These include that they have a “psychiatric disorder”, which is a
“mental disorder other than autism or learning disability”.
The changes will not apply to section 2 of the Act, under which a person can be detained for a maximum of 28 days for assessment to understand whether they have a psychiatric disorder that warrants detention under section 3. The revised detention criteria will not apply to part 3, so people in the criminal justice system can continue to be diverted to hospital, where appropriate, to access the specialist support they may need.
We recognise the importance of implementation in ensuring these reforms have their intended effect. For this reason, the proposed changes will be commenced only when there are strong community services in place. I commend the clause and schedule to the Committee.
Dr Evans
It is a pleasure to speak to clause 3, which brings forward the vital and long overdue changes to the way our laws treat autism and learning disabilities under the Mental Health Act. The clause responds to a persistent injustice: the inappropriate detention of autistic people and people with learning disabilities in mental health hospitals, often for years at a time, without meaningful therapeutic benefit. Those individuals are not mentally ill, yet they have too often been detained, medicated and restrained as if they were.
As the law stands, individuals with learning disabilities and autistic people can be detained both for assessment, under section 2 of the Act, and for treatment, under section 3. Notably, people with learning disabilities may be detained under section 3 when their condition
“is associated with abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct”,
whereas that does not currently apply to autistic people. Evidence and reports show that some such detentions can be lengthy and may not always provide therapeutic benefit. That raises concerns about the appropriateness of detention on the basis of disability alone. In my time on the Health and Social Care Committee, we looked specifically at this topic and produced a report, some of which has influenced the Bill.
The clause aims to directly address the issue of lengthy detentions for such individuals. For the first time, the law will clearly define autism and learning disability—something that has not happened for 40 years. As science has moved on, legislation must follow. Autism will now be recognised as a “lifelong developmental condition” that affects perception, communication and interaction, and learning disability will be defined as “significant impairment” of intellectual functioning.
Supported by schedule 1, the clause seeks to clarify and refine that position by introducing formal definitions of “autism”, “learning disability” and “psychiatric disorder”. Crucially, it removes autism and learning disability as stand-alone grounds for compulsory treatment and detention under section 3. Instead, detention for treatment will be permitted only if a person has a co-occurring psychiatric disorder—that is, a mental disorder other than autism or learning disability. Additionally, the change applies to community treatment orders, meaning that they cannot be applied solely on the basis of autism or a learning disability. However, the Act makes it clear that the changes do not apply to people detained under part 3 of the Act who are within the criminal justice system. For that group, autism and learning disabilities with serious behavioural consequences remain grounds for detention and treatment disorders.
The Bill introduces the new term, “psychiatric disorder”, meaning any mental disorder excluding autism or a learning disability. That distinction matters because detention under section 3 of the Act—compulsory admission for treatment—will no longer be permitted solely on the basis of someone being autistic or having a learning disability. From now on, a person may be detained only if they have a co-occurring psychiatric disorder or their learning disability is associated with “serious behavioural consequences”, such as
“abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct”.
That reflects a fundamental shift in the philosophy of the Act from using hospitalisation as a containment tool to ensuring that any detention has a clear clinical and therapeutic purpose.
This reform is rooted in the recommendations of the 2018 review of the Mental Health Act, which was led by Professor Simon Wessely, and has been championed by groups such as the National Autistic Society. It represents a more modern understanding, as we currently see things, so there are many positives—it protects people’s rights, preventing detention simply for being different, it promotes community-based care rather than institutionalisation, it modernises the law in line with current clinical understanding and it seeks to end the harm caused by prolonged non-therapeutic hospital stays, which often involving over-medication and restraint.
However, I also sound a note of caution: the clause alone will not be enough. There is rightly concern about the provision for robust community services. We risk creating legal protections that are admirable on paper but ineffective in practice. I know that the Minister appreciates this dilemma. If people cannot get the right support in the community, they will still end up in crisis, and possibly still be detained—just under a different part of the law.
There are also concerns about ambiguity. The phrase “serious behavioural consequences” may be open to a wide interpretation. Without clear guidance and training, we risk inconsistencies and even potential loopholes that could undermine the intent of this reform. I commend the Government’s intention to protect autistic people and people with learning disabilities from potentially inappropriate detentions, and to ensure that compulsory treatment is targeted to those with mental disorders warranting hospital care.
The emphasis on therapeutic benefit and the principle of least restriction aligns well with the human rights standard and the UN convention on the rights of persons with disabilities. However, I have several questions that I hope the Government will be able to address. How will clinicians reliably distinguish between behaviours arising from autism and learning disabilities and behaviours arising from co-occurring psychiatric disorders, given the complexity of presentations in this population? Is there, or will there be, clear guidance and training to support those assessments? For individuals with severe autism or learning disabilities who display challenging behaviours but do not have a diagnoseable psychiatric disorder, what alternative pathways and supports are envisaged to ensure their safety and wellbeing without resorting to detention?
On the issue of patients under part 3 of the Bill, I know the Government’s rationale for maintaining broader detention definition criteria, but will there be additional safeguards or oversight to ensure those patients are not subject to unnecessarily prolonged or restrictive detention? The removal of “social functioning” from the definition of learning disability is intended to create a clearer distinction from autism, but could the changes create any unintended legal or clinical ambiguities in practice?
The changes could introduce some unintended consequences. Previously, impairments in social function were considered part of the learning disability definition, which helped capture individuals whose social difficulties accompanied intellectual impairments. Without that, there may be legal and clinical uncertainty for people with borderline or overlapping conditions. For example, someone with moderate intellectual impairment and significant social difficulties might no longer clearly fit the learning disability definition. Similarly, autistic individuals with mild intellectual disability who experience social challenges could find their diagnosis and legal status less certain. Those ambiguities risk inconsistent assessments and potential gaps in access to appropriate care unless the Government provide clear guidance to clinicians and tribunals on how to navigate complex presentations. What plans are in place to monitor and evaluate the impact of the changes on detention rates, patient outcomes and the availability of community-based alternatives?
In closing, this is an important clause that moves us closer to a system that respects autonomy, delivers appropriate care and upholds the rights of neurodivergent people. But we must be mindful that passing this legislation must not be seen as the end of the job. As the Minister understands, it is the beginning. If we are to drive reform, the Government will need to set out the funding and workforce pathway for the services that will deliver it. We must train professionals, empower families and support voices of lived experience at every level. Only then will clause 3 deliver on its promise not just to change law, but to change lives.
I turn to schedule 1. Schedules are an important and yet often overlooked part of the legislative process. It is worth reminding the Committee that a schedule is a part of a Bill’s function, like a detailed appendix. It contains the granular, often technical amendments that give practical and legal effect to the broad principles set out in main clauses. In other words, the clause tells us what Parliament intends to do and schedules show us how it will be done: amending existing statutes, updating definitions and ensuring consistency across legal frameworks.
In this Bill, schedule 1 is particularly consequential. It does the heavy lifting of applying the reforms in clause 3 to the existing Mental Health Act 1983, especially with regard to how we treat autism and learning disabilities within the scope of mental health law. Let us be clear that the schedule is not simply technical. It is transformational in what it attempts to do. Where the 1983 Act spoke broadly of mental disorder, schedule 1 now creates a more precise legal category—“relevant disorder”—defined to include psychiatric disorder, autism and learning disability with serious behavioural consequences. That matters enormously. In fact, it is one of the key reasons for the review of this entire piece of legislation. Individuals with autism or learning disabilities have been subject to compulsory powers, including detention, as we have heard, in the absence of any co-occurring mental illness. That is a practice with which the Committee should rightly be uncomfortable.
Schedule 1 amends not only the criteria for compulsory admission under section 3, but those for guardianship, community treatment orders, tribunal discharge and even the treatment provisions in part 4 of the Act. This breadth shows that clause 3 is not merely a rhetorical shift; it is being operationalised throughout the entire Act. With such significant implications, the schedule raises serious and legitimate questions that I am sure will form the backbone of the ongoing discussions in Committee over the next few weeks.
First, what is the threshold for serious behavioural consequences? Will that be clearly defined? Without precision, we risk substituting one vague standard for another. Secondly, do the transitory provisions offer enough clarity for frontline practitioners, in particular approved mental health professionals and tribunal panels who will be making decisions in grey areas between new and old law? Again, what about the cross-border issue between Wales and England? Thirdly, given the change from mental disorder to psychiatric disorders in some sections but not others, what is the Government’s rationale for that linguistic differentiation? Is there a risk of confusion among legal and clinical practitioners? To clarify—I am happy to share this with the Minister—I went through it and there appear to be a few occasions where the definition was changed, but some areas where it was not. Now, that may be my naïve understanding as a mere shadow Minister, but I would welcome the clarification and I am happy to pass them on to the Clerks to ensure that, if we are going to update the Bill, all parts are updated. Finally, and critically, do we have the workforce, training and services in place to support this cultural and clinical shift away from paternalism towards community-based and rights-respecting alternatives?
Schedule 1 shows us that reform is not just about good intentions, but getting the detail right. It is about ensuring the law reflects modern clinical understanding and human dignity. I support the direction of travel, but I gently remind the Minister to ensure that the operational mechanisms of the schedule are tested, clarified and, where necessary, strengthened. We owe that to the individuals and the families for whom we are producing this legislation to improve their lives.
Anna Dixon
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Vickers. I will make a few brief remarks on clause 3. For many of us, the detention and long-term institutionalisation of people with autism and learning disabilities is a shameful part of the NHS’s history. The Bill, and particularly this clause, will finally make it very clear that that is no longer acceptable. It is a further shame that, despite the Winterbourne View report in 2012, so little progress has actually been made on providing for people to be cared for in the community and closer to home.
Stephen Kinnock
The red thread that goes through all those questions, from both my hon. Friend and the Opposition spokesman, is very much about how we are going to build a clear and strong understanding of what good community support looks like, and then build towards it so that we achieve the aims that we set out for ourselves. In many ways, that is a difficult question to answer in this Committee, because an important part of the answer will come from the consultation on the code of practice that will be launched as soon as the Bill gets Royal Assent.
The Government believe passionately in making policy on the basis of evidence, so we need that consultation and input for the code of practice. We need a clear definition based on engagement with those who are at the cutting edge of delivering these services, so that we can define the new reality that we want to work towards, and then implement it step by step.
I apologise to Committee members for the fact that in some ways that is a step beyond what we are doing here in scrutinising the Bill. We will, I hope, pass the Bill, and then it will get Royal Assent. From that day, we will be straining every sinew to get community services to where they need to be.
Jen Craft (Thurrock) (Lab)
I do not want to speak outside the scope of the clause, but I would very much welcome a commitment from the Minister on ensuring that people with learning disabilities and/or autism are part of the process of the consultation to produce guidance on what good community services look like, and that they are engaged with from the start in a very real and meaningful way.
Stephen Kinnock
Absolutely, and I pay tribute to my hon. Friend for her outstanding work in the all-party parliamentary group; I am looking forward to meeting with the APPG as soon as diary time can be organised.
There is absolutely no point in the Government making policy in an ivory tower in Westminster or Whitehall. Policy must be evidence-based and based on the real, lived experience of patients—we are very committed to building a patient-centric national health service—and practitioners. If we try to make policy without involving the voices of those people, the policy will fail; we know that from bitter experience.
David Burton-Sampson (Southend West and Leigh) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Vickers. I, too, have received messages from organisations in my constituency that welcome clause 3 and clause 4, which I will speak to later. On the implementation, however, they have made it very clear that it is really important to hear the voices of the individuals who will be impacted and their families. As we work with the ICBs, local authorities and commissioners to implement these new regulations, I seek an assurance that the voices of the community will be heard.
Stephen Kinnock
My hon. Friend is absolutely right that those voices must be heard. One example is that we must produce a code of practice to ensure that approved mental health professionals are better supported in their decision making, including when assessing whether somebody with a learning disability or an autistic person has a co-occurring mental disorder. At the heart of the process are the assessment and the definition, and the pathway that flows from that. That code of practice can be developed only on the basis of dialogue and engagement with precisely the people he has talked about.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
Building on the Minister’s last point, can he reassure the Committee that any consultation will have a strong focus on ensuring that practitioners have the training and, most importantly, the resources that they need to achieve a seamless transition from one set of regulations to another?
Stephen Kinnock
I can give the hon. Gentleman that assurance. We are moving to a nuanced position that is about defining where there are co-occurring conditions and where there are not. I think everybody recognises that that is, by definition, a complex process, so the training and the code of practice that go around it will be vital.
Sojan Joseph (Ashford) (Lab)
In the past, many people with mental health disorders have been detained in hospitals for months or even years because of a lack of proper social care provision in the community. Will the Minister also ensure that local communities, which will be providing social care for patients who are discharged from hospital, are part of that discussion?
Stephen Kinnock
It is absolutely a team effort. Sadly, when people have severe and acute mental health disorders, a multi-agency effort is often required to support them and to help them to get the treatment they need. The process should not be about trying to isolate people. We are keen to ensure that people stay in mainstream society and remain as integrated as possible, because that is often an important part of supporting their mental health condition.
All of that means that local authorities, mental health professionals, social workers, and often children’s social care professionals or adult social care professionals are important in the process—it requires a team effort. That integrated approach will be really important as we build the community services that we want to see.
Gregory Stafford
On the point made by the hon. Member for Ashford about local authorities, given that the Government are devolving and reorganising local government structures across parts of the country, how will the Minister ensure that the standards around this issue—and other health and social care issues—are maintained? That restructuring means that we will have a whole load of new local authorities that do not necessarily have experience of dealing with this area.
Stephen Kinnock
The devolution Bill and the process of reorganising and restructuring are based on two really strong principles: that it is up to us through legislation to create the outcomes that we need to see delivered across the country and that there are clear standards and targets that we need to see met. But the implementation work needs to be done to deliver those desired outcomes and targets. Local authorities are empowered to do that, which is why we are seeing, for example, a lot of breaking down of ringfencing. The Government are keen to massively reduce the amount of ringfencing, because that has become a straitjacket for local authorities, integrated care boards and others in how they can best manage their portfolio of activities and deliver that devolved power and responsibility.
The answer to the hon. Gentleman’s question is that we want to devolve. We are absolutely committed to decentralising and we believe that is an important part of modern governance. Of course, that has to be done within a framework of set targets and the development of community services that the Bill commits to. All of that will come together to enable those at the coalface, who are best placed to understand them, how to deliver those services to their communities.
Stephen Kinnock
I just need to turn to the question asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley. On strong duties, the code of practice flows from the primary legislation and therefore has a statutory power. There is no stronger power to ensure that people with learning disabilities and autism get the treatment, service and support that they require. The system will have a statutory duty to ensure that that happens within the framework of the legislation.
My hon. Friend is right that the transition from children’s to adult services is a major challenge. I am engaging with colleagues in the Department for Education about that to ensure that conversations about the transition happen upstream. We do not want a situation where an individual is looked after until they are 18 and then handed over without any prior conversations and engagement. We want the handover from one service to the other to be as seamless as possible. Our commitment to dynamic support registers will help in this context. They will be an important tool for understanding the needs of individuals who are at risk of admission and for getting that information into the system across the board prior to any detention.
My hon. Friend also asked about carers who so often pick up the baton in the gaps in community provision. She is absolutely right to flag that. We owe a huge debt of gratitude to the millions of unpaid carers across our country, many of them dealing with extremely challenging family situations. The system would simply collapse without them, so she is right to pay tribute to those people.
Dr Evans
I want to expand a little on the practicalities and respond to the question asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon about local authorities. I declare an interest because Leicestershire is one of the 21 county councils going through a devolution process. About 85% of its budget deals with special educational needs and social care. It is part of an ICB where the mental health team and primary and secondary care come together, but there is oversight from NHS England.
With so many moving parts, including the legislation we are putting in place, the budgetary constraints for ICBs, and the fact that we are getting rid of NHS England, there is a real worry among Opposition Members that things could drop through the gap, or more likely, that because we are moving all these things at the same time, we do not decide which is the fixed point that leads where others follow. If we are trying to cut costs in the ICBs, if NHS England is going over the next two years, and if devolution of responsibilities is also happening over the next couple of years with unitary councils forming, we will create a sticky situation for who is actually leading on this issue. At the heart of it are the clinicians and the patients who could fall through the gap.
What consideration has been given to the top-down strategy for how to incorporate all that? The Minister has talked about a red thread that runs through it all, but is there a running plan? Different Departments, agencies and areas of the country are involved. They are trying to come together to manage their budgets, legislation and policies. It is a complex situation to work through. The imperative part—the legislation—is almost the easier part to get in place; it is the delivery that is all-important. Can the Minister explain further how those three things tessellate?
Stephen Kinnock
I do not know whether I will be able to answer the hon. Gentleman’s question in its entirety, because quite a lot of that is being led by my colleagues in the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government—in the English devolution Bill, for example. On the part of his question relating to the Department of Health and Social Care, we came to the view following the general election last year that NHS England was an unnecessary layer of bureaucracy. We think it is important that there is a clear line of accountability from the Secretary of State to Ministers, to ICBs, to trusts and to the system per se for delivery. That line of accountability was being blurred by NHS England, which is why we have removed it from the equation.
The hon. Gentleman is right that there are a lot of moving parts, but, by definition, a reform agenda creates change and some turbulence. We believe that is the only way we will get the system to where we need it to be so that we can deliver the three big shifts in our 10-year health plan: the shifts from hospital to community, from sickness to prevention and from analogue to digital. Many of the questions he is asking will be answered in the 10-year plan. He does not have long to wait for that to be published; it is coming very soon.
I reiterate that the principle underlying all of this is about empowering, devolving and giving agency to those closest to the communities they serve, because they are best placed to deliver. That all has to fit into the Bill, but the fundamental principle underpinning the Bill is the right one: it is about devolution, and about being patient-centric. The Bill deals with a cohort of people whose needs should drive the services that we design and deliver.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 1 agreed to.
Clause 4
People with autism or learning disability
Dr Chambers
I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 4, page 4, line 41, at end insert—
“(iv) housing.”
This amendment ensures that housing needs are considered as part of care, education and treatment review meetings.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 51, in clause 4, page 4, line 41, at end insert—
“(iv) accommodation and relocation, and”.
This amendment ensures that the impact of accommodation and relocation is considered in care and treatment reviews for patients with autism or learning disabilities.
Amendment 2, in clause 4, page 5, line 23, at end insert—
“(v) the patient,
(vi) the patient’s nominated person, and
(vii) the patient’s independent mental health advocate.”
This amendment would ensure that nominated persons and independent mental health advocates receive copy of a care, education, and treatment review meeting report for children and young people with autism or a learning disability.
Amendment 3, in clause 4, page 5, line 31, for “12” substitute “six”.
This amendment would shorten the length between care and treatment reviews from 12 months to six months.
Amendment 4, in clause 4, page 7, line 6, at end insert—
“(iii) housing, and”.
This amendment ensures that housing needs are considered as part of care and treatment review meetings.
Amendment 5, in clause 4, page 7, line 32, at end insert—
“(v) the patient,
(vi) the patient’s nominated person, and
(vii) the patient’s independent mental health advocate.”
This amendment ensures that nominated persons and independent mental health advocates receive a copy of a care and treatment review meeting report.
Amendment 6, in clause 4, page 7, line 40, for “12” substitute “six”.
This amendment would shorten the length between care and treatment reviews from 12 months to six months.
Amendment 7, in clause 4, page 8, line 12, leave out “must have regard to” and insert
“have a duty to carry out”.
This amendment ensures that integrated care boards and local authorities responsible for a patient's treatment and care have a duty to implement recommendations arising from a care and treatment review.
Dr Chambers
It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Vickers. I will speak to amendments 1, 51 and 4 together, as they all relate to housing. Amendment 1 ensures that housing needs are considered as part of care, education and treatment reviews. Amendment 51 ensures that the impact of accommodation and relocation is considered in care and treatment reviews for patients with autism or learning disabilities. Amendment 4 ensures that housing needs are considered as part of care and treatment reviews.
Appropriate housing is critical for people’s wellbeing and cannot be viewed as separate from effective and safe care. Ensuring that housing or any temporary or crisis accommodation supports the safety and independence of people with a learning disability should be a key part of care, education and treatment reviews. We believe that it is essential for fulfilling the duties of the Bill.
Without that provision, it will be far harder for patients to leave detention and for care to be facilitated in the community. If people with learning disabilities who are detained risk being discharged into insecure or inappropriate housing, their recovery from mental ill health could be jeopardised. Patients should be viewed in their whole context, not just as a collection of conditions or symptoms. Housing is among the most fundamental social needs that should be considered.
Zöe Franklin (Guildford) (LD)
I rise to speak to amendments 2 and 5, which, in summary, would ensure that patients, named persons and independent mental health advocates would receive a copy of a care, education and treatment review meeting report for children and young people with autism or a learning disability.
Patients, along with all those tasked with helping to represent their wishes, should be able to see transparently what has been judged to be safe and appropriate care for them. Being given the opportunity to understand why their care or treatment is changing or remaining the same should be a basic right for patients, yet as it stands they are often frozen out of seeing that final report. Similarly, the nominated person, whether that is a friend, a mother, a sibling, or another parent, often has care of the patient; they know the whole person better than any NHS institution, and will often have a far fuller understanding of the patient’s history.
Gregory Stafford
I have a lot of sympathy with what the hon. Lady is trying to achieve with these amendments. My question is about how she would ensure, within the context of the provisions, that the patient’s confidentiality would be maintained where it needed to be.
Zöe Franklin
The hon. Member raises an interesting and pertinent point. There will always need to be balance when addressing the issues around patient confidentiality. I have seen from my own casework that when families who have been through mental health crises with their loved ones have not been involved in that process, unfortunately the crisis has lasted much longer and been more significant because those around them have been unable to support the individual. I do not have the answer, but we need to work collectively to find a way to strike that balance in order to address the needs of the patient.
Gregory Stafford
Moving on from the confidentiality point, if there is going to be sharing—again, I have a lot of sympathy with the amendments—how would the hon. Lady ensure that disagreements between family members and the patient are safeguarded against?
Zöe Franklin
That presents challenges, but again, I would refer back to my own casework, and I am sure there are Members on the Committee who will have had the same experience. There are examples across the UK where health boards and providers find ways to appropriately share information with families and other carers to get the best outcomes for patients. I simply ask that, when the Minister and colleagues in this space have those examples, they share them. I know that there are some areas where this is already done effectively, particularly in Scotland, and I seek to reference those examples.
My final point on amendments 2 and 5 is that we need to ensure that those around a patient are given the opportunity to raise concern or the alarm when part of the report does not meet the patient’s needs. We need to address the patient’s full needs, and to ensure that they are both reflected in the reports and met.
Aphra Brandreth
Like my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon, I have a lot of sympathy with some of the things that the hon. Lady is trying to achieve through the amendments. If there is to be an additional requirement for six-monthly rather than annual checks, how will the balance be struck to ensure that there is a focus on care rather than on the administrative burden that might be required?
Zöe Franklin
Helpfully, I was about to move on to a point about amendments 3 and 6, which would shorten the length between care and treatment plan reviews from 12 to six months.
We need to reflect on the fact that sometimes we do not get it right when we support an individual. In such circumstances, it is particularly important that we are able to have reviews every six months, rather than 12. It does not have to be a detailed, full-scale review. If all involved in the patient’s care come to the conclusion that the care needs are being met, that review could be incredibly short. If someone’s care is inadequate or inappropriate, it is not right that they should have to suffer unnecessarily for a year without the changes that are needed. Halving the time between the care and treatment reviews ensures that patients are not left languishing and instead have care that truly reflects their individual needs. I would reiterate that a six-month review can be incredibly short, and it also benefits patients by making them aware of where their care is not working for them, so that it can be reviewed.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
I have a certain degree of sympathy for the amendments, but I am sure the hon. Lady will recognise that patients and their families often find the review process overwhelming in and of itself. Bringing it forward to six months, when such reviews would often not be required, can cause a huge amount of stress and place pressure on those family units and patients. Of course, reviews can be brought forward when clinical need requires it. To stipulate that within the legislation puts an enormous burden upon those families and, most importantly, the patients.
Zöe Franklin
I return to my point that a review can be short when clinicians and those involved in a patient’s treatment deem it appropriate. Again, where the system is working for a patient, it is good and proper that we do a short review, and they can then carry on with their treatment. When it is not working, why should the patient struggle on for 12 months alongside their families, who will also be struggling?
Zöe Franklin
No, I will move on to amendment 7, which I also want to cover. This amendment is very important, as it would ensure that the integrated care boards and local authorities responsible for a patient’s treatment and care would have a duty to implement the recommendations arising from a care and treatment review. The legislation states “must have regard to”, but we believe that that is too weak and could see crucial parts of care and treatment reviews left unimplemented.
As it stands, this part of the Bill could be considered to be implemented even if no adequate resourcing was required, with the care and treatment review left as an empty exercise. One of the key parts of this legislation is to ensure that resources are there to implement treatment for patients. Will the Minister reassure us that adequate resources will be provided to ensure that patients’ treatment needs are met, that training for clinicians and others supporting an individual is made available through resourcing, and that we do not again find ourselves in a situation like the current one, in which patients too often struggle because there are not the resources to meet their care needs?
Dr Evans
I rise to speak to Liberal Democrat amendments 1 to 7 and 51 to clause 4. I welcome the intention behind the amendments, which aim to enhance the care and treatment review process for people with autism and learning disabilities, particularly by addressing housing and accommodation needs and ensuring that key advocates receive reports.
There are positive elements of the amendments that are worth highlighting. I understand the good intent of including housing and accommodation considerations explicitly in reviews, as it recognises that a person’s living situation is often central to their wellbeing and recovery. Additionally, ensuring that nominated persons and independent mental health advocates receive reports promptly promotes transparency and patient advocacy. Shortening the review intervals from 12 to six months could lead to more responsive care planning.
However, I have some significant reservations about the statutory implications of blurring housing, for example, so directly with the care and treatment review process. Housing is traditionally managed under separate statutory frameworks from health and social care, so to embed housing as a statutory element within these reviews risks creating confusion about which agency holds responsibility and may expose health bodies or commissioners to legal obligations that they are neither funded nor structured for.
I have a few questions for the Liberal Democrats. In their eyes, how would the Government ensure clarity over the statutory duties applied to housing recommendations arising from the reviews? Would that not risk delaying or complicating discharges if housing issues became a statutory sticking point within health-led care reviews? Moreover, housing provision often depends on local authorities and housing departments that have their own complex eligibility criteria and resourcing constraints. Are we confident that ICBs and responsible commissioners would be able to co-ordinate effectively across these boundaries, especially given the patchwork of funding and powers in play?
Gregory Stafford
To take that point slightly further, given that pretty much every local authority has a different set of criteria by which to determine people’s housing needs, how would, for example, an ICB that potentially crosses multiple local authorities with differing housing needs be able to understand the complexities within the current structure, and ensure that the patient is served best?
Dr Evans
Those are exactly the kind of practical questions that we really need to think about when we definitively put into legislation what that would look like. My constituency now has several boundaries across the borders with Warwickshire and Staffordshire, which causes problems when it comes to deciding who will look after what. On the criteria, my hon. Friend raises another point: will there be a regulatory fight or even infighting between the ICB and the local authorities to determine whose criteria cover what, and who trumps who? To top that off—I raised this matter with the Minister earlier—I would be interested to understand how the Liberal Democrats would deal with that problem, given that the Government are pushing through their devolution agenda. We have already heard about the complexity of everything tessellating together. That makes it very interesting, to put it politely, to consider how it would work in practice.
On the related point of the duty imposed on ICBs and local authorities to have regard to review recommendations, I note that amendment 7 would insert the phrase
“have a duty to carry out”.
I have concerns in this area too, which I will raise in later comments, but let me explain a little further. The aim is to address accountability, but the Liberal Democrats’ solution would change the provision from “must have regard to” to “have a duty to carry out”. There is an important distinction here: a duty to “have regard to” requires that recommendations may be properly considered and responded to but does not legally compel implementation; a duty to carry out, however, would impose a legal obligation to act on every recommendation, regardless of feasibility, availability or agreement.
That raises a crucial question: if the Government intend to hold ICBs to account for meeting those needs, how would they ensure that the necessary resources, powers and accountabilities for the mechanisms are in place? What oversight would the Liberal Democrats establish to guarantee not just consideration but effective delivery, and how would conflicts be resolved where recommendations are impractical, or local capacity is lacking?
Perhaps a more balanced approach would be to strengthen the duty to respond with clear timelines and a requirement for transparency about decisions, while investing in cross-sector co-ordination mechanisms and adequately resourcing local authorities and housing providers. We could provide statutory guidance to clarify roles and responsibilities, and enhanced oversight to monitor outcomes, rather than simply prescribing an inflexible duty to implement.
In essence, a duty to respond means that the responsible body, whether an integrated care body or the local authority, must formally consider and reply to the recommendations arising from the care and treatment review. It does not legally compel it to carry out every single recommendation, but it requires the body to explain what it will and will not implement, and why it cannot implement a recommendation. That promotes transparency and accountability without creating unrealistic legal obligations. For example, an ICB might say, “We will implement recommendations 1, 3 and 5 within six months, but recommendation 2 is not feasible due to current resource constraint.” That kind of structured response is both practical and responsible.
Gregory Stafford
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Vickers. As I have indicated, I have a lot of sympathy with the amendments, but some practical constraints need to be teased out.
Amendment 1 seeks to ensure that housing needs are explicitly considered during a care, education and treatment review meeting. I can see the pros of that. Clearly, a holistic approach recognises that stable housing is fundamental to mental health and recovery, especially for vulnerable individuals. Addressing housing barriers may reduce unnecessary hospital admissions. Likewise, it could lead to improved discharge planning, ensuring that patients are not delayed in hospital due to a lack of suitable accommodation. All Governments, of every colour and political party, want to see collaboration between health, social care and housing services, and the amendment brings those things together.
As I said in an intervention, however, local authorities and NHS bodies such as ICBs may face challenges to co-ordinating housing assessments within the CETRs. As my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth mentioned, his constituency crosses a number of local authority boundaries, while my seat of Farnham and Bordon, with two thirds of it in Surrey and one third in Hampshire, has that same issue. The county councils are wonderful and Conservative run, but Waverley is run by Liberal Democrats.
The hon. Member for Winchester, who moved the amendment, recognised the issue of implementation capacity, but there are also likely to be resource constraints. These days, local authorities spend most of their money on social care, education and the bits of health that sit within their remit, so there may be insufficient housing stock or funding to meet the identified needs that the amendment would bring forward. There are therefore practical implications.
Dr Evans
Thinking that through, how does my hon. Friend feel that existing statutory requirements to provide accommodation will balance out if we provide another statutory requirement on accommodation in these plans? Does he worry, as I do, about creating a risk, for example, of pitting someone with severe learning disabilities against a homeless person if there is resource rationing thanks to the practicalities of how many houses we have? Members throughout the House agree that we need to build more houses, but until that happens, such local authorities have the resources issue.
Gregory Stafford
I agree. Even if the Government build the number of houses that they propose—I have some scepticism—there will always be the potential conflict or disagreement on prioritisation in the housing register and list. As my hon. Friend says, that might well lead to local authorities having to change their criteria, which are not necessarily consistent across local authorities, and, as in his example, potentially pitting a homeless person against someone with mental health needs.
The amendment would also have the potential for scope creep. I have a lot of sympathy with what it is trying to achieve, but expanding CETRs to include housing might dilute their focus and overburden the process. I am interested to hear from the mover and supporters of the amendment how they would ensure that the CETR continues to have that core focus on the health and wellbeing of the individual, rather than potentially be bogged down in the mire of housing issues.
Moving on, amendment 51 would ensure that the care and treatment of individuals with autism or learning disabilities explicitly considered the impact of accommodation and relocation in the planning and decision-making process. Again, I have a lot of sympathy with that. It would promote holistic care planning, reduce trauma and disruption, support continuity of care and, I think, align with the person-centred principles throughout the Bill, which all of us support. Again, however, amendment 51 might complicate discharge planning, if suitable accommodation were limited.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
Does my hon. Friend share my concerns that not resolving housing and accommodation at the point of discharge could lead to a delay in transition? Patients would remain in hospital for longer than might be beneficial to them.
Gregory Stafford
I agree entirely. That could be the unintended consequence of amendment 51: in essence, if the housing provision is not there, discharge will be delayed. From my understanding of the amendments in the group, those who tabled them are trying to speed up and improve discharge. My hon. Friend is absolutely right that we need to think about the practical implications of the Bill.
The amendment would require co-ordination among health, social care and housing services, which may be challenging in under-resourced areas. Frankly, because parts of those organisations are not used to working in the ways that the amendment would require, it might fall over without suitable training, the necessary lead-in time and a practical understanding of how it will work.
Amendment 4 would ensure that housing needs are formally considered during the care and treatment review meetings for adults with autism or a learning disability, without an EHCP. I understand that the aim is to support more effective discharge planning and reduce the risk of unnecessary or prolonged hospital stays. That is entirely in keeping with what we should be trying to do in the Bill. Holistic care planning reduces delays in discharge, improves cross-sector collaboration and supports community-based care, which we all support.
Once again, however, there is potential for complexity in the implementation. New processes may be required to involve the housing authorities. Resources and local housing shortages could limit the amendments’ practical impact. Another layer of complex review processes could add to that administrative burden. If there is inconsistent local capacity, the effectiveness of the amendment will almost certainly vary depending on the local housing infrastructure, which could lead to a postcode lottery, for want of a better phrase, in who receives the adequate care and housing.
Amendment 2 would ensure that children and young people with autism or learning disability, as well as their nominated persons and independent mental health advocates, receive a copy of the care, education and treatment review meeting report. I have a lot of sympathy with that. It potentially increases empowerment and transparency, ensuring that patients and their advocates are fully informed, which could enable better participation in care decisions. It has a legal and ethical alignment with the principles of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the UN convention on the rights of persons with disabilities, both of which emphasise supported decision making. It might also improve advocacy, as independent mental health advocates can more effectively represent a patient’s interest when they have access to the full report.
Aphra Brandreth
My hon. Friend is making valuable points about the benefits of the amendment. For vulnerable individuals, family involvement is often extremely important, but does he agree that that must be balanced with ensuring that potential disagreements do not put at risk what is best for the individual?
Gregory Stafford
My hon. Friend makes a key point that I was about to address. Clearly, where there is a supportive family structure with the best interests of the individual at heart, the amendment will work extraordinarily well. However, we have to be realistic about the practical implications.
Not every patient has a strong family structure around them. Unfortunately, some patients may even have family members who, for financial or other reasons, actively do not have their best interests at heart. There is a potential concern around confidentiality. I ask the hon. Members for Winchester and for Guildford how they would balance that conflict in practical terms, especially when the CETR includes sensitive clinical information that could be used in a way that is not beneficial to the patient by someone who does not have their best interests at heart. As my hon. Friend the Member for Chester South and Eddisbury points out, disputes can happen if patients or families disagree with professional assessments or recommendations.
Finally, although this is probably not the strongest point, we should think about the administrative burden. Given the increased workload that we are putting on all our health and care workers and services, there will clearly be an administrative burden in sharing these reports.
Gregory Stafford
I knew it began with S and was somewhere that is not Surrey or Hampshire—because where else would you want to be, Mr Vickers? The amendment would potentially increase the workload, because more frequent reviews place additional pressure on professionals and services.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
Does my hon. Friend agree that there is a risk that the amendment would not only increase the workload of practitioners, but divert attention from patient care?
Gregory Stafford
My hon. Friend is entirely correct. We operate in a resource-confined area. It does not matter what the resource envelope is; it will always be confined. If we use resource to service the very laudable aims of the amendment, it will take resource and money away from another area.
Dr Evans
Would my hon. Friend speculate on a question that I hope will be answered by the hon. Member for Winchester? It is about the evidence base behind choosing six months instead of 12. GPs would do learning disability reviews every year, for example, and it is an annual thing with asthma and in similar areas. Is the hon. Member for Winchester aware of an evidence base for why it should be six months? There may not be one—often these can be arbitrary, in terms of just giving a clinical judgment—but I wonder whether there is a specific reason for choosing to reduce the period between reviews to six months.
Gregory Stafford
My hon. Friend attributes to me a level of clairvoyance that I do not possess, but I am sure that the hon. Member for Winchester or the hon. Member for Guildford will pick up that point.
The resource implications are not just about the funding. They are about increased workload and the pressure put on the professions and services. As my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley said, the amendment would divert attention away from delivering care, if it is not balanced properly. My hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth is right to ask, “Why six months?” Why not nine months, eight months or any other period? Is there a clinical basis for six months?
Jen Craft
On a small point of clarification, the six-month criteria are based on the current NHS guidance around CETRs. It is loose guidance; it is not statutory. The reason that it is six months as opposed to 12 months is that that would bring us closer in line with the guidance.
Gregory Stafford
I thank the hon. Member for her helpful intervention. If that is correct, I will draw my comments on that point to a close.
Amendment 6 concerns CETR frequency. It seeks to change the timetabling of these reviews. The same issues, both positive and negative, run through it as in amendment 3.
Amendment 7 would strengthen the legal obligation on integrated care boards and local authorities by requiring them to implement recommendations from the care, education and treatment reviews rather than merely considering them. That would ensure that review outcomes lead to concrete action and improved care. I do not think that anyone in the Committee could possibly disagree with that point. It would lead to greater accountability and would ensure that CETR recommendations are not ignored or delayed. That would clearly improve outcomes, because it would increase the likelihood that patients receive timely and appropriate care.
The amendment would also introduce stronger legal clarity. By removing “must have regard to” and replacing it with
“have a duty to carry out”,
it would remove ambiguity around the responsibilities of the ICBs and local authorities, supporting the rights-based care and the principles of transparency and enforceability in service provision that we all support.
I hope that the hon. Members for Winchester and for Guildford will be able to clarify the problem of resource pressures, which applies to all these amendments. Local authorities and ICBs may struggle to implement all the recommendations due to funding or capacity constraints. What would be the legal sanction for ICBs and local authorities if, through no “fault” of their own—although one might argue that they should have the necessary resources in place—they genuinely do not have the resources to implement all the recommendations? I would hope that such a sanction did not put them into further financial difficulty.
The reduction in flexibility concerns me. It may limit professional discretion in cases in which recommendations are impractical or outdated. It may require new systems for monitoring and enforcement, and if recommendations are not implemented it could increase the likelihood of legal challenges.
Anna Dixon
The hon. Member is going into some detail on these amendments. There is a duty where EHCPs are in place. Local authorities have had their funding cut over many years, so they have found it difficult to meet their EHCP obligations for the many children with SEND needs. Is there not a similar risk that the amendments will put duties on local authorities that they will not be able to meet unless they have sufficient resources? There must be some flexibility as well as duty on local authorities and the NHS to balance their duties and responsibilities with resources.
Gregory Stafford
I will do my best, Mr Vickers. The hon. Lady raises some good points. She made a slightly party political point, but I will forgive her because I made one earlier. Maybe that is our party politicking done for the day.
As the vice-chair of the all-party parliamentary group for SEND, I recognise the issues that the hon. Lady has raised. I would be surprised if there were any hon. Member on this Committee who did not recognise her point. Across the piece, there is a significant problem with the process and the funding of EHCPs. I look to the Minister; I know it is not his responsibility, but I understand that the Government are introducing something around EHCPs.
I will draw my comments to a close, but I ask the hon. Members for Winchester and for Guildford to address those concerns.
Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Fifth sitting)
Tuesday 10th June 2025
(2 days, 16 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesFootball Governance Bill [HL] 2024-26 View all Football Governance Bill [HL] 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 10 June 2025 - (10 Jun 2025)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 12 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 12 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 2 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
We are now sitting in public and proceedings are being broadcast. I remind all Members to switch their electronic devices to silent. We now resume line-by-line consideration of the Bill.
Schedule 4
Threshold Requirements
Mr Clive Betts (Sheffield South East) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 14, in schedule 4, page 98, line 20, at end insert—
“(d) the home ground threshold requirement (see paragraph 4A)”
See explanatory statement for Amendment 15.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 15, schedule 4, page 99, line 41, at end insert—
“Home ground
4A (1) The home ground threshold requirement is met, in relation to a club, if the club—
(a) has security of tenure over a home ground for at least the minimum period; and
(b) the home ground is suitable for the club's use for footballing purposes.
(2) In subsection (1)(a), the minimum period is 20 years, or such other period as the IFR may determine in respect of a particular club (where there are compelling reasons why it should be shortened).
(3) In determining whether subsection (1)(b) is satisfied in respect of a club, the IFR shall have regard to the specified competition and league in which a club plays and whether the facilities satisfy the requirements set out by the relevant competition organiser(s), as well as any other factors that it deems relevant.
(4) In this paragraph 5, “home ground” shall have the meaning given to it in section 46(10)(a).”
This amendment specifies what constitutes the home ground threshold requirement.
Mr Betts
It is a pleasure to be back with you in the Chair, Sir Jeremy.
This might be termed the Dejphon Chansiri clause—though there are a number of those as we go through the Bill, and they could also apply to other owners of football clubs who have over the years behaved in ways that we might find unacceptable.
Within the Bill—and credit to my hon. Friend the Minister for this—there are clear requirements for clubs wanting to move grounds to properly consult and demonstrate that there are good footballing reasons to do so. There will occasionally be good reasons, when clubs should move as it is in their commercial and footballing interests to do so.
The problem with the Bill as it stands, however, which I have talked to my hon. Friend about on a number of occasions—she is probably fed up of hearing me on the subject—is where the owner has divested the ground separate from ownership of the club. The ownership of the ground is often therefore in a different place and with a different company. It is often, as in the case of Sheffield Wednesday, owned by the same person as the club, but in a different format, so the club could be sold but could be left with no ground.
There probably would not be many people who would want to buy a club in that situation, but we can see the possibilities for owners who do not have the best intentions to do things that are not acceptable. That has been starkly illustrated in the last two weeks, as supporters at Hillsborough have got angrier and angrier with the chairman and he has now gone on record on social media to say, “If you keep on protesting, I can find better things to do with this ground and make more money by building a supermarket or housing”. He has actually put that in writing and said it, so I think we have to cover off those situations. With Sheffield Wednesday, I think the club has a lease on the ground and he would be legally challenged if he tried to do that, but the fact is that owners will try many things to maximise their personal financial interests.
Coming back to the content and intention of the Bill, it is right we are going to have a licensing system; we will come on to that in more detail in due course. The intention is that to get a licence, the owner has to show that they are a fit and proper person and demonstrate that they can run the club financially. If it is proper that the owner has to show that they have the financial resources to run the club, surely they need to show that they have a ground to play on. This amendment is almost as simple as that.
The English Football League rules as they are partly cover this issue, because the EFL requires clubs to demonstrate they have the 20-year use of a ground as part of their conditions. There is an overlap between what the regulator’s powers are going to be and what the leagues do, but we want to make sure there are no gaps and that we cover off those with bad intentions. I am sure Mr Chansiri has the best of intentions—perhaps for himself and his family, I hasten to add—but nevertheless it is also true of clubs like Derby and Charlton and others, and we have seen in the past the sad case of Wimbledon, having to move halfway across the country because the owners got rid of their ground, Plough Lane.
We saw Brighton wandering homeless around the country for many years when the Goldstone Ground, which I remember going to several times, was sold for a supermarket there. Mr Chansiri is obviously following in those footsteps. That left the club in an awful situation. Let us not go there again; let us anticipate what might go wrong and put measures in place to stop it. That is what I am trying to do with my amendments. Even if the Minister cannot accept the precise wording, I hope that she will, at least, understand and recognise the problems that could exist, which need addressing at this stage.
Mr Louie French (Old Bexley and Sidcup) (Con)
It is a privilege to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Jeremy, and to speak on day three—is it day three? Time flies when you’re having fun!—of this Bill Committee.
The hon. Member for Sheffield South East has explained in quite lengthy detail the aims of the amendment; I will not repeat what he has said, because it is his amendment, but I have great sympathy with his arguments. Examples, as he says, include Derby, Sheffield Wednesday, Coventry, Wimbledon—for us slightly older football fans—and of course my home club, Charlton, where as I understand it the person who owned the club two owners ago retains ownership of both the stadium—The Valley—and the training ground.
That creates a number of challenges for clubs, not only on the playing side, but behind the scenes and on the academy side. It is a real issue in football. The hon. Member highlighted some of the tensions it causes, particularly with fans, and the great uncertainty about the future of the game and the participation of those clubs. It is always extremely disappointing and frustrating when a small number of owners clearly do not have the best long-term intentions for the club or the community that they serve.
I am interested to hear the Minister’s response to the amendment and how it might work if it is agreed to. I would also like to understand how it would work for good owners who look to invest in their communities and grounds, and who ensure that clubs have new stadia, for example. The most obvious example, going into the new season, is Everton’s new stadium. We in the Opposition do not want to restrict clubs from increasing capacity and investing in communities around the country; I am sure that we will see a lot more of that, going forward, as clubs seek to increase their revenues and the capacity of stadia. Nevertheless, I have great sympathy for the arguments made by the hon. Member for Sheffield South East.
Jon Pearce (High Peak) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Jeremy. I would like to make a declaration of interest as a member and former chair of the RamsTrust. The history of Derby County and its football stadia has been raised by both the shadow Minister and my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East. In 2003, three owners bought the club for £1 each and decided to sell it to a company based in Panama. We then had to lease it back for £1 million a year. It took years to bring the club and its stadia back together. More recently, under Mel Morris, the club and its stadia were again separated. It was only this summer that they were brought back under one legal ownership, thanks to the new owner, David Clowes.
As a fan of a club that has moved from the old Baseball Ground to Pride Park, I believe the shadow Minister is entirely right that clubs must be able to move stadium. That is absolutely clear. However, it is also clear that, for many fans, the stadium is part and parcel of the community and the way of life. What I would give to be able to go back to the Baseball Ground and relive my childhood! I cannot overstate how important an emotional attachment to the stadium is. It is impossible, in most fans’ minds, to separate the two.
James Naish (Rushcliffe) (Lab)
Overnight, I had a message about the City Ground, where Nottingham Forest play—England will be playing there tonight against Senegal in their friendly, which I very much welcome. The message said, “Please make sure that Nottingham Forest continue to play at the City Ground.” There have been discussions about moving elsewhere. My hon. Friend is right that the grounds are central to the community, so does he agree that it is essential that fans have a say in where teams play?
Jon Pearce
Absolutely. As a Derby fan, for once I can probably agree with a Notts Forest fan. It is vital that fans have a say. Fans will always want their clubs to do better and to drive forward, and there will be cases where it is right for a club to move; but where there is malign interest, the fans need to have the ability to keep their stadia and clubs together.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stephanie Peacock)
It is a pleasure to once again serve under your chairship, Sir Jeremy. I look forward to day three of Committee. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East for the amendments; I am never fed up of hearing from him and I know he is very passionate about this issue.
The Government recognise the intent behind the amendments to ensure that football continues to be played at a club’s home ground. The Bill already has a number of strong protections to safeguard home grounds against reckless sales or ill-thought-out relocations. I will respond to a couple of points made in the debate and will then outline why we will not be accepting the amendments.
Fan consultation was mentioned. Clubs must consult their fans on any plans to change or move their home ground as per the fan engagement threshold condition. The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup, made an important point about how it will sometimes be necessary for clubs to relocate their home ground, for a number of reasons, such as the ground being too small, facilities no longer working or the ground being sold. We recognise that we need flexibility in that approach, but fans will have a say.
For clubs that do not own their stadium or have already sold the stadium, due to the scope of the Bill and existing property law, it is not always possible for home grounds that are not owned by the club to have the same protections as home grounds that are. This point was recognised in the fan-led review. However, alongside the fan engagement requirements, there are also protections under the national planning policy framework for sports grounds and existing assets of community value, and there is work under this Government, as well as an ongoing Law Commission review of security of tenure that has the scope to address sports grounds. Those powers will all work alongside the soft powers and levers of the regulator to look to protect home grounds, as far as possible.
My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East also referred to the fact that leagues have requirements for tenure, and clubs are prevented from entering the league if they do not meet them. Leagues also have enforceable standards regarding the quality of the grounds. These vary from league to league and can get into the specifics of grass length on matchdays, for example. Given those requirements, we do not feel it is necessary for the regulator to duplicate rules. Instead, it will work alongside the leagues.
It should be noted that clubs may not own their home grounds—I have responded on that point—and therefore they would require the agreement of their landlord to meet the additional licensing requirement we believe that the amendments would lead to. These amendments would place a requirement on clubs to guarantee something that may not be within their control, as well as duplicating pre-existing league requirements for home grounds.
We recognise that the fan-led review recommended that the Government explore the viability of introducing security of tenure property rights for football clubs. I hope I have explained why we do not feel we can do that.
The Law Commission is now in the process of reviewing the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954, including an assessment of security of tenure for all commercial properties, including football clubs. Following the review, the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government will consider the recommendations and publish a full response.
For those reasons, I am not able to accept my hon. Friend’s amendments and would ask that he withdraws them.
Mr Betts
I am still not quite sure why my amendments would cause so many problems. I understand the difficulty where a club does not actually own the ground but leases it, but the amendment is about security of tenure. There does not have to be ownership; it could be a secure lease, as the English Football League requires, for a 20-year period. That is implied by the amendment.
I was not quite sure what the Minister was saying about how the review by the Law Commission and implementation by MHCLG Ministers would secure the position for football clubs, and what else is being looked at in terms of the planning framework. Is she able to say any more on those points to get on the record what further safeguards might be in place?
Stephanie Peacock
On the point in the amendments about 20 years, we appreciate that not all the leagues go that far, but we think that the point is addressed by the league rules. On the consultation by MHCLG, it might be helpful if I ask my counterpart there to write to my hon. Friend and to share that letter with the Committee, because that ongoing work falls in that Department.
Mr Betts
The Minister often completely convinces me—on this occasion, she goes a little way towards being convincing. I want to read what MHCLG is going to say. In the end, it is not how we do it, but what we achieve in terms of the safety and security of grounds for the fans. That is what this is about. If what MHCLG is going to do moves us in that direction, as the Minister indicates it will, I am happy to await that correspondence from it before pushing this further. I hope that we can get a response from MHCLG Ministers before Report—if the Minister could encourage them to write in that time period, it would be helpful.
Stephanie Peacock
It is a disappointment that I am not able to convince my hon. Friend fully. Not all of what he asks is in my gift, but I commit to the Committee that I will do my very best to get a response from the Department before Report, and if possible earlier.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 16—Duty to consult fans on political statements—
“(1) A regulated club may not publish any political statements, political opinions, or issue an items with party political connotations unless it has taken reasonable steps to establish that such statements, opinions or items are supported by the majority of the club’s fans in England and Wales.
(2) A regulated club may not permit any officers or employees, when acting in an official capacity, of the club to engage in political activities or publish political statements or wear any item with political links unless it has taken reasonable steps to establish that such activities, statements, or items are supported by a majority of the club’s fans in England and Wales.”
This new clause would give fans a say on the political positions adopted by regulated football clubs.
Mr French
Amendment 104 would amend schedule 4 to insert
“the club’s political statements and positions”,
to ensure that clubs have to engage their fans on any political statements that the club might adopt. New clause 16 introduces a duty to consult fans on political statements and is an expansion of what that means in practice. As everyone can see the amendment paper, I will move on to my speech.
Schedule 4 sets out the threshold requirements that a club must meet to be granted a licence by this Government’s regulator. In essence, those are the baseline criteria that every club must pass before the Government allow them to play football. Never before has a Government been involved in deciding who can play football. This is a huge moment for English football, its governance and, most importantly, its fans. On the face of it, few would argue against the principle of minimum standards, but as is so often the case with regulation, the devil lies in the detail. In this case, the sheer breadth and flexibility that the Bill hands to the Government’s regulator raise real and pressing concerns.
I start with a central and unarguable point: clubs must be well run. No one disputes that, and thankfully, the vast majority of clubs in the country are. However, we have seen hard-working communities let down by reckless owners and weak governance—from Bury and Derby to the recent struggles at Reading, which the hon. Member for Newbury mentioned. The purpose of this legislation should be to help to protect footballing communities better and to ensure that all clubs are not only sustainable, but rooted, responsible and resilient. However, there is a clear difference between ensuring prudence and exercising control over a club.
My concern, and that of many clubs and fans, is that schedule 4 risks crossing that line. Under paragraphs 2 to 7 of schedule 4, the Government’s regulator is empowered to set requirements for financial resources, suitable governance structures, appropriate corporate plans and the ability to comply with all relevant obligations. On the surface that might seem sensible, but the provisions are broad, vaguely defined and, in practice, leave almost every detail to be filled in by a politically led regulator at a later date via licence conditions.
Let us take paragraph 4, for example, which sets out:
“The fan engagement threshold requirement is met, in relation to a club, if the club has adequate and effective means by which—
(a) the club consults its fans about the relevant matters, and
(b) the club takes the views of its fans into account in making decisions”.
However, it does not tell us what constitutes “adequate” or “effective”. Can the Minister tell us what those terms mean, or when we can expect to be told? Who defines those terms? Is this another instance of the regulator being able to set its own definitions, terms of reference and standards? Paragraph 3(2)(c) states that the Government’s regulator must have regard to a club’s “corporate governance arrangements”. I ask the Minister: what does that actually mean? We are not told, and again it is not clear. Does it mean formal board structures, independent non-executive directors and complying with the UK corporate governance code, or something else entirely? Could the Minister please clarify that for the Committee?
We fear that this schedule hands a blank cheque to the regulator to determine how football clubs, from Premier League giants to National League sides, must structure their affairs, able to coerce them into restructuring their club to fit a narrow regulatory framework that has not been voted for by the fans of any club. This is a serious transfer of power from clubs and their owners to a Government body, and we must ask: is it proportionate? Is it justified?
Max Wilkinson (Cheltenham) (LD)
Would this new clause preclude the owner or chairman, or some other executive officer or member of staff, of a football club from standing for election? I can think of one example: a former chairman of my club Southampton, the hon. Member for Great Yarmouth (Rupert Lowe). He stood for the Referendum party in the Cotswolds in 1997, shortly after he had become the chairman of Southampton football club, and he is rumoured to be joining those on the Conservative Benches soon. I wonder whether the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup would be against that sort of thing.
Mr French
I will try to stick to the footballing part of the question and not stray into the transfer market, which I believe opens today or tomorrow. When we have people camped outside Conservative Campaign Headquarters on deadline day, I will know that the hon. Member for Great Yarmouth has sent them there. In all seriousness, what we are looking to do is to talk about representations made by a club in an official capacity rather than a personal capacity. I think that there is an important distinction with what a person does in their own time. What was the party—the Referendum party? The hon. Member for Cheltenham is showing his age.
Max Wilkinson
Some would regard wearing rainbow laces for Pride as a political statement. In the hon. Member’s ideal world of football governance, would a club have to go to a referendum of its fans to work out whether its players and the club could wear rainbow laces for Pride, for example? Would that not be more pointless bureaucracy?
Mr French
We are not suggesting a referendum. We are saying that fans should be involved in the decision-making process. There is a debate around Pride and other issues, but that is not the point we are trying to make. We are trying to make sure that football clubs, wherever possible, stick to the game and that fans have a say. I have already said that we are not trying to bind clubs and prevent them from addressing initiatives that are often taken by the leagues rather than just individual clubs, but we are trying to ensure that fans have a say.
Amanda Martin (Portsmouth North) (Lab)
Does the hon. Member believe that this would include involving fans in political-financial decisions like that made by West Ham United, who donated to the Conservative party? Should fans be involved in that type of decision, or is it a decision that the board should just be able to make?
Mr French
I appreciate the point that the hon. Lady makes. I am not aware of the financial example that she gives—genuinely I am not—so it would not be appropriate for me to comment, but the crossover between politics and football is one that we have to acknowledge, regardless of party allegiance. The vast majority of fans, when they go to the football at the weekend or midweek, go to watch football and in many ways to switch off from the harsher realities of life. I am personally a big believer in politics staying out of sport, as I have said on a number of occasions.
Amanda Martin
Just for the record on those donations, in 2016 the club contributed £12,500 to the Conservative party, and in 2022, it contributed £9,000.
Mr Betts
This is a serious point, because football is about our communities. It reflects what goes on in our communities and tries to improve it. Football has a very good record of tackling racism in this country, right from the top, with the Football Association and the leagues, through to the clubs. Young kids walk on the pitch and there are “kick racism out of football” banners, and football has done good work on homophobia as well. Is the shadow Minister saying that all those matters should be put to a club’s fans in a referendum, or would we expect a club to do those things as a matter of good practice?
Mr French
I completely appreciate the hon. Member’s point. As he highlighted, clubs have done a lot of this good work themselves, so I do not believe that the Government or their regulator need to dictate on terms where clubs have that good practice already. My new clause tries to draw a line so that fans will have a say on any such issues and, in particular, on contentious ones. I do not personally believe that kicking racism out of football is a contentious issue. The vast majority of fans would absolutely support that, and have supported for many years the work that that campaign has done.
Max Wilkinson
New clause 16 specifically says that the club must establish that there is support from
“a majority of the club’s fans in England and Wales.”
That is really difficult to establish. Committee members will have been in football grounds and heard a number of opinions expressed in vociferous terms from the stands. I challenge anyone to say that it is possible to establish that a majority of fans either support or do not support any kind of political statement that might be made by a club. I just do not think the new clause works.
Mr French
I am not sure what to say about that, but the hon. Member can have his say when the Committee votes on the matter shortly. He has stated his belief.
In recent years, we have seen clubs wade into contentious debates, sometimes with noble intentions, without any formal engagement with their supporter base. Whether we are talking about a statement on a foreign conflict, domestic legislation or ideological campaigns, such interventions can divide opinion and risk alienating the people who pay their money, wear the shirt and keep their club alive. Nobody is arguing that clubs should be barred from speaking on social matters, but they should be expected to act with consent, not presumption. Fans should not wake up to find their club being used as a platform for views that they had no part in shaping. The new clause would not restrict freedom of expression; rather, it would enhance democratic accountability in football.
Mr French
I will make some progress because I am conscious of the Chairman’s time. The new clause would ensure that where a club proposes to adopt a political stance not directly related to football or the club’s commercial interests, it must first engage with its supporters through an appropriate consultation mechanism. This is about strengthening the bond between club and community, not weakening it. New clause 16 would be a simple safeguard to protect the cultural neutrality of our national game, and to ensure that football remains a source of unity, not division.
The cumulative effect of the Bill’s provisions, as they stand, is that they give the Government’s regulator enormous latitude to impose an ever-growing set of compliance obligations on clubs with little oversight or scrutiny from Parliament or fans. It is entirely possible, perhaps even likely, that clubs could find themselves constantly revising governance arrangements, redrafting financial documents and hiring compliance staff simply to keep up with the regulator’s demands—demands that are funded by the clubs. That is a concern for the entire football pyramid, but it is a particular burden for the lower leagues, where administrative budgets are tight and every pound spent on compliance is a pound not spent on the pitch or in the community.
Let us be clear: good regulation is about balance. It is about ensuring standards without stifling initiative, protecting clubs without disempowering them and learning from the past without writing off the future. There are a number of ways in which the Government could help to strike that balance.
First, we ask the Government to publish a clear definition of what each of the threshold requirements entails. It is not good enough to provide for “appropriate” arrangements. The regulator should be guarded by Parliament’s intent, not left to interpret sweeping language.
Secondly, we must ensure transparency and account-ability. If the regulator decides to change the threshold requirements—say, by requiring new climate disclosure standards or mandating support or representation on the board—that is a major policy shift. We believe that, as a sovereign Parliament responsible for passing this legislation, we should be able to scrutinise and, if necessary, prevent the Government’s regulator from making law by regulation. It should come back to the House, not be slipped through in the shadows.
Finally, we must keep a watchful eye on the cost burden. As we argued in previous debates, the Government’s regulator will not be cost-free. It is expected to fund itself through levies and fees imposed on clubs, so every layer of compliance—every extra form, every extra process —has a price tag. That price will ultimately be paid by the very fans we are trying to protect.
Kevin Bonavia
I thank the shadow Minister for giving way, and it is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Jeremy. The shadow Minister is talking about cost, yet here is another proposal that would add more cost and is effectively unworkable. This Bill is in Committee at the moment. If a club saw the changes here and wanted to lobby us to say, “We are not happy with this,” how on earth would it do that if it had to consult its fans? How do we define a political move by a club? It just does not work, does it?
Mr French
I hear the argument that hon. Gentleman is making, and he will be able to vote on the amendment shortly. Again, I appreciate your time, Sir Jeremy.
It is a shame that the Government would not accept our earlier amendment to ensure that fans know the true impact of the regulator on the price of their tickets. Football is not a normal business. It is a great national institution built on history, local pride and community loyalty. However, that does not mean it should be run by quangos. Clubs should be encouraged to improve their governance, not be coerced into uniformity. They should be supported to succeed, not strangled by red tape.
Schedule 4 is one of the most important parts of the Bill, because it defines the gate through which every club must pass before they can be allowed to simply play football. We owe it to those clubs and their fans to ensure that the gateway is firm but fair, principled but practical, and clear, not vague. That is why we will be seeking further assurances from the Minister that the Government’s regulator’s use of these powers will be proportionate, transparent and subject to proper scrutiny. Without that, we risk creating a regime that may prevent future failures, but at the cost of stifling ambition, independence and the very lifeblood of our national game.
The Chair
I should make it clear that it is not my time; it is the Committee’s time, and the Committee can use it in any way it wishes within the confines of the programme order. Secondly, the hon. Gentleman has slid ever so slightly into a debate about schedule 4 more broadly. I have not intervened to stop him, but I know he will not want to repeat all those points when we get to the debate on schedule 4 stand part.
Stephanie Peacock
I will begin with a couple of brief points in response to the shadow Minister. However, as Sir Jeremy has just outlined, some of the shadow Minister’s points relate to schedule 4 more broadly, which falls under group 38, and the points on fan engagement fall under group 48. I will make some quick comments, but I am happy to take some points away and elaborate further when we come to those groups.
The shadow Minister asked a specific question about what constitutes “adequate” and “effective”. The Bill is intentionally designed to allow for each club to have its own approach to fan engagement. That is why a specific form of fan engagement is not mandated in order to meet the benchmark of adequate and effective. Instead, we expect that the regulator will look at a number of factors to assess fan engagement at clubs, and publish guidance for clubs on what will be expected. Across all of that, the regulator will look to uphold proportionality, taking into account the size and make-up of each club and what is appropriate. We will revisit those issues when we move on to groups 38 and 48. Of course, the debate on ticket pricing has been well rehearsed. This Government added an obligation to consult fans on ticket prices, which will strengthen the fan voice on that issue.
Amendment 104 seeks to add a requirement for a club to consult fans on any political statements or positions that it makes or takes, and new clause 16 seeks to mandate fan approval prior to any political statement or political activity being made by the club, its players or staff. It is not the place of a statutory regulator tasked with financial sustainability to limit or add additional approval processes for political speech or action. Clubs and leagues here and abroad take positions on a variety of issues that could be deemed political, and that is their right.
However, it is not appropriate for an independent statutory regulator to take subjective positions, or opine on the positions of others, in the same way—especially not a regulator tasked only with a tight mission of financial sustainability, to which political statements bear no relevance. It may be that clubs wish to consult their fans in this regard as part of their regular fan engagement. We would not expect the regulator to have any issue with that, but it is not something that it will require of clubs.
The Bill is intended to ensure that fans have a voice in key decisions regarding their club, but we must ensure that this is proportionate. That is why we have not listed every possible issue on which clubs should engage their fans in minute detail. We also do not want to inhibit the free speech of players or any representatives of the club. It is also notable that many sporting personalities have used the attention that the sport gets to protest relevant issues that concern them. We do not want to inhibit the free speech of any of those individuals.
Max Wilkinson
Is the Minister concerned about inhibiting the free speech of Members of the House of Lords, for example Baroness Brady, who made significant and very valuable comments in the debate on the Bill in the other place, and then repeatedly made similar statements in the press and other media? She is, of course, a representative of West Ham and the Conservative party, as was noted by the hon. Member for Portsmouth North. Would we seek to retain her freedom of speech and freedom of expression by voting down new clause 16?
Stephanie Peacock
The hon. Gentleman puts his point on the record. We had a full debate in the other place, in which many Members took part.
Ultimately, the amendments have no relevance to the regulator’s purpose and will not help it to deliver its objectives. Rather, they would serve only to stifle freedom of speech. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member to withdraw them.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Mr French
I beg to move amendment 112, in schedule 4, page 99, line 34, leave out “crest” and insert “badge.”
My amendment raises a point that may seem technical, but I believe it is important if the Bill is to respect the history and traditions of our great national game. There is reference in the proposed legislation to the “crest” of a football club, but as any student of heraldry or loyal football supporter will tell us, that term is often misunderstood. In fact, the correct term in almost every case should be the “badge”. A crest is a specific heraldic element part of a full coat of arms traditionally appearing above a shield and regulated under royal prerogative through the College of Arms.
That distinction may seem academic, but it is not. When clubs are challenged on their intellectual property, or when supporters are concerned about the commercialisation or alteration of the symbols that represent generations of loyalty, it matters enormously that we use the correct terminology. We are not just talking about branding. We are talking about something deeply symbolic: an identity that lives on scarves and gravestones, and in the hearts of whole communities. My noble Friend Lord Parkinson raised this point in the Lords with great care and I believe he was right to do so. He proposed that the Bill use the term “badge”, not “crest”, to ensure accuracy and to avoid the legal and cultural confusion that can arise when the wrong term is used.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
Another reason to include the word “badge”, my hon. Friend would presumably agree, is not only that is it technically correct, but it is a word used in football. It is a word that fans use. It is always helpful if legal documents in a Bill can reflect both technical and everyday wording. If the two are the same, that seems like an obvious answer.
Mr French
I thank my hon. Friend for making that point. I must admit, as a long-term football fan, that I have never heard a player say that he kissed the crest of his club when celebrating a goal. The footballing term is as accurate as the legal one, as he highlights.
This may seem a modest amendment, but it speaks to something bigger: the importance of precision, respect for history and an understanding of football not just as a product but as a tradition. If we are going to regulate the game, let us do it properly with the right words and the right respect.
Stephanie Peacock
The hon. Member’s amendment follows the extensive debate regarding heraldic terminology in the other place. I can reassure him that the Government have worked closely with the College of Arms to ensure that the term “crest” is used consistently with heraldic law, and with the FA to ensure accuracy and cohesion with industry norms, as the term “crest” is the key term within its existing heritage rules. The Government amendments made in the other place make sure the legislation remains in step with both the FA and heraldic law, and that is in addition to changes to the explanatory notes, to further clarify the point.
Although the word “crest” is used colloquially in the industry, “crests” have a very specific meaning in heraldic law. Crests can only be granted by the College of Arms and only a select few clubs have been granted one. For that reason, the legislation refers to crests, but also needs to capture other clubs and circumstances. That is why the Bill uses “emblem”.
When making these changes, the Government explored the use of “badge” instead of “emblem”. However, it was felt that “badge” would risk unintentionally only capturing the image on shirts. In examples such as Arsenal or Liverpool, the shirt features only one element of the club’s emblem, such as the cannon or the liver bird. In those instances, “badge” might capture only those elements and thereby not deliver on the policy intent of protecting the heritage associated with the entire emblem. Given those comments, I ask that the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup withdraw the amendment.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Stephanie Peacock
Schedule 4 sets out the three threshold requirements—financial resources, non-financial resources and fan engagement—that clubs will have to meet in order to be granted a full operating licence. As I set out last week, to apply for a licence, a club must submit a business plan and a personnel statement. These are basic requirements that any club should be able to complete. As I have made clear, the regulator will support them with their applications wherever needed.
Before discussing the requirements for a full operating licence, I would like to correct a point I made last week regarding the hypothetical scenario where a club is not granted a provisional licence. I want to clarify that once a provisional licence is in force, a club must have a licence to be able to play in a specified competition.
As I have set out, to receive a provisional licence, a club must submit a business plan and a personnel statement. We think these are basic requirements that any club should be able to complete, and the regulator will support them with their applications where needed.
Lincoln Jopp (Spelthorne) (Con)
The Minister mentioned the two criteria of the business plan and the personnel statement. I thought from our discussions last week that giving the regulator any form of information that the regulator so requested was an additional condition.
Stephanie Peacock
The two I mentioned are the basic points. The regulator has the ability to ask for further information should they want it. I think I gave the example that if the regulator is unsure about the source of funds, or whether there is enough, it could ask for more information. That will be at the discretion of the regulator—we had a well-rehearsed debate on that point last week.
We think that the requirements for a provisional licence are basic requirements that any club should be able to complete. As I was really keen to stress in the debate last week, the regulator will be keen to work with clubs to do everything it can to help them to meet those requirements.
The regulator needs to be satisfied that a club will be able to meet the mandatory licence conditions and duties on clubs once it has been granted a licence. This is a forward-looking “would comply” test. The expectation is that the provision of information and documentation, as well as the engagement with clubs as part of the application process, will be sufficient to satisfy the regulator. It should be straightforward for all clubs to obtain a provisional licence. Once they are in the regulatory system, a club will have time to improve standards up to the necessary requirements for a full licence, with the support of the regulator as needed.
Mr French
One of the points we were slightly unclear about when we had the discussion of provisional licences before was what would happen if a club decided it did not want to apply for a provisional licence. There are several clubs that are very publicly concerned about the regulator. What would happen if they were to form, say, a union and go against the regulator and refuse to apply for a provisional licence? How would that work in practice? Would they be kicked out of the league?
Stephanie Peacock
The Government envisage that licence refusal or the revocation of a licence would be in extreme circumstances, but there will come a point when the regulatory system switches on and a licence will be needed in order to play. That is the point that I am keen to clarify. Yes, ultimately a club can be stopped from playing if it does not apply for a licence, but I stress that, with the provisional licence, it does not have to be meeting it; it has to be willing to meet it.
The regulator will do everything it can to work with clubs, because it is in no one’s interests for a club to be unable to play—that would be completely contrary to the purpose of the Bill. The purpose of the Bill is to improve club sustainability once the regime is in force. There must be a consequence for extreme cases, which is the point that the shadow Minister is making, but the club must be given every opportunity to meet the standards if it has failed to do so. Once a club is licensed, the regulator will have a range of other escalating enforcement tools. We will come on to enforcement, so I will not elaborate on that now—I do not want to test your patience, Sir Jeremy.
I turn now to the threshold requirements in schedule 4. There are three main areas of the regulator’s licensing regime that build on the freestanding duties in the mandatory conditions. Meeting the threshold requirements will mean that the regulator is satisfied that the club can currently operate sustainably in its financial, non-financial and fan-engagement areas and will continue to do so.
Although the threshold requirements are principles set in legislation, what each club must do to meet the threshold will not be the same. For example, what constitutes appropriate financial resources for a Premier League club will be very different to a League One club. A club may already meet the threshold requirements, for example, through naturally good operations or by complying with competition laws. In such cases, the regulator will not need to directly intervene. But if not, the regulator can apply discretionary licence conditions to bring the club up to the required threshold, which was the point that the hon. Member for Spelthorne referred to.
The structure will allow for a proportionate, light-touch system, with requirements tailored to clubs. The threshold requirement for financial resources means that clubs need an appropriate level of financial resources to support their long-term financial sustainability. The regulator will be able to consider any relevant factors to determine whether the club’s financial resources are appropriate relative to its circumstances and the risks it faces. For example, that might include which competition the club competes in, its financial relationship with its owners, and the wider economic context that it operates in. In particular, the regulator should take into account the club’s financial plan, and its contingency plan for dealing with financial shocks.
In essence, a club must have the financial resources to match the business it is operating—and plans to operate. If a club does not have the finances to back up its plans, or does not have plans in place for how it would manage foreseeable risk, it would need to do one of two things: either demonstrate that it has access to the necessary funding, or reconsider its plans and risk appetite. If it does not, then the regulator can impose discretionary licence conditions to bring the club’s finances back in line with its operations and risk level.
For non-financial resources, a similar threshold requirement and process applies. Non-financial resources could include things such as internal control systems and policies, as well as the information and people that a club has available to it. Although not financial in nature, these are important resources for any well-run club and need to be adequate. When assessing whether these resources are appropriate, the regulator might consider the skills and experience of senior managers, its plans, and its corporate governance arrangements.
The financial and non-financial resources of a club both need to be appropriate. For example, a club needs to have the financial means to back up its plans, and on the non-financial side it needs to have a contingency plan and risk-management processes to mitigate potential financial shocks.
Melanie Onn (Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes) (Lab)
Is it the Government’s expectation that financial and non-financial resources will be proportionate to the size of the club?
Stephanie Peacock
My hon. Friend makes an important point; it will be proportionate. I have met with all the leagues a number of times, and this was of particular concern to the National League. It will be proportionate, and the regulator will take that approach when dealing with the different clubs and leagues.
Mr French
I appreciate the Minister’s comments about proportionality; we will look to review that as the Bill goes forward. One question I have is about how the regulator will interact with the existing rules. The most obvious ones that come to mind are the financial fair play rules that are already in existence in the Premier League. What analysis of, and crossover with, the existing league investigations and restrictions to clubs will there be?
Stephanie Peacock
Those will be an issue for the leagues; where the leagues have rules, clubs will continue to comply with them. That is not something that the regulator will be involved with. Where there are league rules, that is for the leagues to enforce. I am happy to write to the hon. Gentleman to outline that further.
Mr French
If the Minister could outline that further, it would be really helpful. At the end of the day, we are keen to ensure that there is no confusion in the regulations for clubs, nor any duplication of purpose for the regulator. We would like to understand how that will work in practice, and I would appreciate that in writing.
Lincoln Jopp
I am sure that the Minister realises that one of the variants in a club’s business plan is whether its matches are selected for being televised. It is an incredibly haphazard process and difficult to predict, because they are decided within season. What guidance will the Minister give, as the appointer of the regulator, as to reasonable assumptions in the business plan regarding expected television revenue in season?
Stephanie Peacock
I think that it is an issue for the leagues, but I will happily write to the hon. Gentleman. I will check that point, but I am pretty confident that it would be left to the leagues. It is similar to what they deal with now. I will write to the hon. Members for Spelthorne and for Old Bexley and Sidcup further to their points, because it is helpful to get clarity in writing. Where there are league rules, they are for the leagues to enforce, but I will add further detail in writing, if that is helpful.
I would like to move on to the final point, about the requirement for clubs to adequately and effectively consult and consider the views of fans when making decisions relating to certain specified matters. Those relevant matters are listed in the Bill and cover key “off pitch” decisions, which the fan-led review highlighted as important to fans across specified leagues. The Government have made it explicit that that will include ticket pricing, as mentioned already, which is an issue of importance for many fans.
The threshold requirement is designed to work in tandem with the fan consultation mandatory licence condition. Through that condition, all clubs must regularly consult with a representative group of supporters to discuss the relevant matters listed in the Bill. That must be in place by the time a club is granted a provisional licence. Appropriate fan engagement will look different at every club and will partly be based on the size and complexity of the club’s fanbase, as I touched on in my earlier contribution.
James Naish
This point is slightly tangential, but it is related to fan engagement. England are playing Senegal in Nottingham later today. With the support of the FA, we have run a competition for primary and secondary school children to design a new England shirt. Would the Minister be happy to congratulate Albie, Dylan, Joshua and Mikey on their contributions?
The Chair
Order. That is not slightly tangential; it is very tangential. Just a brief answer, Minister, and then we must return to the schedule.
Stephanie Peacock
With the indulgence of the Chair, I will speak to the hon. Gentleman after today’s sitting. I would like to write to those who took part in such a wonderful competition.
I would like to complete my remarks by talking briefly about the threshold requirement, which has been designed to allow the regulator to recognise the inherent variation between clubs, while ensuring that standards are raised where necessary. It also allows the regulator to impose discretionary licence conditions on clubs relating to fan consultation.
Fans are the foundation of any club, and putting in place a supporter engagement threshold requirement recognises that they must be consulted on key decisions that affect their club. The Government have also looked to protect fan views, even in the worst-case scenario of a club entering administration. That includes the addition of a requirement to continue taking the views of fans into account when making decisions in insolvency proceedings, as long as the club retains the power to make decisions about the relevant matters.
Mr Betts
On a general point, when we talk about fans and fan groups, who defines who they are and the relevant ones? That is a really important point. Coming back to our club, Sheffield Wednesday, we have more than 20 different fan groups. That is also true of other clubs. Talk to the EFL, because it often struggles to engage or know who actually represents fans, as opposed to two or three people who have got together to name themselves as a group. How are we going to deal with that? As fans become an integral part of the process, who decides who the relevant groups are?
Stephanie Peacock
I appreciate that point. We will come on to discuss that in relation to schedule 5, and I will give a fuller response then.
Question put and agreed to.
Schedule 4 accordingly agreed to.
Clause 19
revocation and cessation of operating licence
Mr French
I beg to move amendment 106, in clause 19, page 13, line 19, at end insert—
“(c) inviting the club to make representations about the proposed revocation, and
(d) specifying the means by which, and the period within which, such representations must be made, which must be a period of not less than one month beginning with the day on which the notice under subsection (3) is given.”
This amendment allows clubs to make representations about the proposed revocation of their operating licence.
Clause 19 concerns the revocation and cessation of an operating licence granted to football clubs. That is understandably a crucial provision that goes to the heart of how the Government’s new regulator will exercise its most serious power, the ability effectively to remove a club from the regulated football pyramid by taking away its licence to operate. Let me clear from the outset that we support an independent regulator that can intervene when standards are seriously breached but, as with all powers of this kind, the devil is in the detail. Our task in this Committee must be to ensure that the regulator’s powers are proportionate, transparent and accountable.
Clause 19 provides that the regulator may revoke a licence if the club in in breach of licence conditions or if there are grounds to believe that the licence should never have been granted. In principle, that is entirely reasonable, but the consequences of revocation, for clubs, fans and communities, are potentially devastating. This is not the revocation of a licence to sell alcohol or to host events late into the night; it is the revocation of a licence to participate in the life of a community—in many cases, the cultural soul of a town or city. That power should not be exercised lightly, so I must raise several matters with the Minister.
First, what thresholds and safeguards are in place to ensure that revocation is used only as a last resort? Will the Government’s regulator be required to consider less draconian alternatives—such as conditional compliance periods, fines or a change in ownership—before resorting to the total revocation of a licence? Secondly, what procedural protections exist for clubs facing this threat? As it stands, there is no right of appeal, which is why I tabled amendment 106, which would allow clubs to make representations about the proposed revocation of their operating licence.
These are serious matters. The Government’s regulator is empowered to act in the interests of the game and to uphold high standards of governance, transparency and financial responsibility. But with such powers must come robust safeguards, and that is where the clause as drafted falls short. As it stands, there is no explicit requirement for the regulator to notify a club of its intention to revoke the licence, or to invite the club to make representations, before such action is taken. In effect, the regulator could move straight to revocation, without a formal process that allows the club to defend itself, explain its actions or offer remedial steps. That is not due process, it is not natural justice, and in any other regulated sector such an approach would be wholly unacceptable.
Melanie Onn
The shadow Minister talks about there not being due process, but the Bill talks about a club’s failure being persistent and says that a failure is persistent if it has occurred
“on a sufficient number of occasions for it to be clear that it represents a pattern of behaviour or practice.”
It is not a one-off that results in revocation.
Mr French
I understand the point that the hon. Lady makes, but we still believe that clubs have a right to representation and to appeal, which is what this amendment seeks to put into the Bill.
My amendment would fix the problem. It would require the Government’s regulator, before making any decision to revoke a licence, to provide the club with written notice of its intention to do so, and not just stating that it will be revoked but setting out the reasons and the evidence relied on. The club would then be entitled to respond—to make representations within a reasonable timeframe, to challenge the basis of the proposed revocation and to outline any mitigating circumstances or corrective measures.
Such a mechanism would not just be fair; we believe that it is necessary. The consequences of revocation of an operating licence are profound. It would prevent a club from competing in the regulated pyramid, as has been highlighted already. That would be likely to trigger financial collapse, job losses and irreparable harm to the club’s standing and its local community. Therefore, the decision to revoke must be taken only after the fullest consideration, and that cannot happen if one side is not allowed to speak.
There is a broader point about public confidence in the Government’s new regulator. For it to earn the trust of clubs, fans and the wider footballing ecosystem, it must be seen to operate fairly and transparently. Due process, consultation and the right to be heard before sanctions are imposed are all basic principles of good governance and the basis of justice. By incorporating my amendment in clause 19, we would be helping to enshrine those values at the heart of the regulator’s enforcement powers.
I urge the Committee to consider the precedent being set. If we allow revocations to occur without a statutory right to respond, we risk creating a regulatory regime that is reactive rather than reflective—one that punishes rather than reforms. That would be to the detriment of the game as a whole, particularly if clubs are chucked out or have their licence removed midway through a season. That would cause a much greater ripple across the league system.
Let me be clear: this amendment does not seek to tie the regulator’s hands. It does not require the regulator to delay action indefinitely or to overlook serious misconduct. What it does do is ensure that any action is taken with the full knowledge of the facts and with the benefit of a fair and balanced process. As we have heard already, clubs, especially those in lower leagues, do not have legions of lawyers or vast compliance departments. Despite best intentions, they may make genuine mistakes or fall foul of complex regulations. We must allow them the chance to explain, to engage and, where appropriate, to put things right, before the ultimate sanction is imposed.
This is a measured, sensible and proportionate amendment. It aligns with principles that Members across the House support, and I hope that the Committee will support it. If we are serious about building a strong, fair and sustainable regulatory regime, we must ensure that justice is not only done but seen to be done. On my broader concerns about the drafting of the clause, I ask the Minister what transparency will apply in such situations.
Lincoln Jopp
Does my hon. Friend agree that his amendment is very much in the spirit of football? We have seen many injury time winners, when all the odds are stacked against a club, but in the dying moments they manage to rescue an almost impossible situation. So it is not only in the spirit of fairness, but in the spirit of football.
Mr French
I thank my hon. Friend for putting it very poetically. He talks about the spirit of football. I am not sure how many last-minute winners Chelsea have scored over the years, but he might have misbehaved on the terraces with joy and jubilation when it has happened. His description was much nicer than calling it the VAR amendment, which would not have been so popular across the House. His point is well made.
Will the regulator be required to publish clear criteria and case-by-case justifications for any licence revocation, so that Parliament, the press and the public can understand why the decision was taken? What consideration will be given to the fanbase—the loyal supporters who may find their club’s future in jeopardy through no fault of their own? How will we be acting in the interest of fans of English football if we do not have transparency?
We must also bear in mind the risk of regulatory overreach. Such a power as this, unless it is tightly constrained, could inadvertently create uncertainty and instability in the football ecosystem. Clubs, owners and investors must know where they stand. A stable regulatory environment, not a reactive or arbitrary one, is essential if the Government’s new regulator is to command respect, not just fear. I hope the Minister provides more clarity on how her new regulator will apply clause 19 in practice and on what guidance will be issued to ensure that the power of revocation is exercised only with great caution and care. When dealing with a matter as serious as extinguishing the operating licence of a football club, we owe it to the game and to the people who love it to think through every safeguard properly.
Stephanie Peacock
As you say, Sir Jeremy, we will speak in detail about the revocation or suspension of an operating licence when we debate clause 19 stand part, so I will save my detailed remarks for then.
To respond directly to the shadow Minister’s questions, there is an appeals process, and clubs can make representations; I will outline how. I thank him for his amendment, but the Bill already provides sufficient opportunity for a club to make representations ahead of its provisional licence being revoked. If a club persistently fails to meet the test for a full licence, clause 18(4) requires the regulator to give it notice inviting it to make representations.
There is a high bar for the revocation of a provisional licence under clause 19. The regulator must be satisfied of three things: first, that the test for a full operating licence is not met; secondly, that the club in question has persistently and without reasonable excuse failed to take reasonable steps to meet the test; and, finally, that there is no reasonable prospect of the club meeting the test within a reasonable period, even if it is given more time. In the unlikely circumstance that that high threshold is met, clause 18 sets out requirements to notify the club and allow it to make its case one last time. Specifically, if the regulator is minded to revoke a club’s provisional licence, it must give the club notice explaining why and invite it to make representations.
Only after that, if the regulator is still convinced that there is no reasonable prospect that the club will obtain its full licence, even given an extension, it can revoke the club’s provisional licence. In every case, the club will have been given adequate opportunity to make formal representations on the issue, in addition to the informal constructive engagement that we expect the regulator to have with the club regularly throughout this period. It is not necessary or proportionate for the club to be given another opportunity to make further representations as the amendment proposes.
If, after all that, the club believes that the regulator has taken the wrong course of action, there is further recourse through the appeals process. The club will be able to request that fresh decision makers at the regulator reevaluate the decision through an internal review. Alternatively, the club may appeal directly to the Competition Appeal Tribunal. If the tribunal decides to hear the appeal, it will do so on the merits of the case, so it will reconsider the evidence and may substitute its own decision for that of the regulator; it may, therefore, reverse the decision to revoke the club’s licence. That is another way that the regulator can be held to account and its decisions can be scrutinised. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.
Mr French
The Minister has outlined the initial process before revocation is determined by the regulator. As I explained in my lengthy speech, which I will not seek to repeat, the amendment would give clubs a say if they believed a decision reached by the regulator was wrong. The Minister was clear about the tribunal approach if a club is not happy with a decision, but as I have outlined previously, my fear is that clubs will end up spending more time in court than they will focusing on the pitch and on the game. The official Opposition believe that an appeal process at that point would be more beneficial than a legal route.
Stephanie Peacock
As I said, clubs can make representations to the regulator and ask the regulator to look again, and beyond that there is the appeals process. As with all aspects of appeals process, the key considerations are the expertise of the judiciary, the tribunal’s experience and familiarity with the policy, speed and cost. We think the Competition Appeal Tribunal is the best option for balance. It is an internationally well-respected tribunal which offers time and cost-efficient options, with flexible case management to expedite urgent cases and bring in appropriate expertise. We believe that that avenue and the internal review process make adequate provision in the Bill and that the hon. Gentleman’s amendment simply is not needed.
Stephanie Peacock
Clause 19 details revocation of a club’s provisional operating licence for failing to progress to a full licence, and a licence ceasing to have effect. For the revocation to occur, the regulator must satisfy itself of three things: first, that the test for a full operating licence is not met; secondly, that the club in question has persistently and without reasonable excuse failed to take reasonable steps to meet the test; and finally, that there is no reasonable prospect of the club meeting the test within a reasonable period, even if given more time. The regulator should engage with the club throughout this period. We expect that, through constructive dialogue, a solution can be found that avoids this drastic step in all but the most serious of cases.
The regulator must notify the club of its decision and provide its reasoning. Revocation must not take place before the end of the current season, to reduce as much as possible the impact on ongoing sporting competitions. A licence automatically ceases to have effect only when a club stops operating a team in specified competitions, the most likely cause being that the club is relegated from the specified competition and is therefore no longer in scope of the regulator.
Mr French
I am trying to get clarity. Again, I will happily accept it in writing if the Minister does not have the answer today. Waiting until the end of the season before revoking a licence is entirely sensible, but what would that mean for relegation and promotion? For example, if a club is mid-table and the regulator decides its licence should be revoked, that will have a direct impact on the competitive nature of the league. Has any thought been put into whether, for example, that may mean only two teams are relegated that season, because one has lost its licence? How might it work in practice?
Stephanie Peacock
Where possible, we want to reduce any impact on ongoing sporting competitions. The hon. Gentleman presents me with a hypothetical scenario. I think it would be best if I respond in writing to him.
Regarding the circumstances when a licence automatically ceases to have effect, it will only happen when the club stops operating a team in specified competition. The most likely cause of that is a club having been relegated and therefore no longer being in scope. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Mr French
I will not rehash the debate we have already had on the amendment. We were seeking greater transparency and a greater say for clubs at risk of losing their licence, which, as I have explained, is the ultimate sanction and would cause enormous damage to clubs and the communities in which they operate through job losses, and impact on the game and on fans. I would appreciate the Minister giving more clarity on how this will work in practice. These situations are hypothetical, but realistic, and would have serious consequences for not just the individual clubs, but the leagues and how they operate.
We believe strongly that promotion and relegation should be based on competition on the pitch. However, in the extreme example of a club breaching the licence so significantly that it is revoked, which might more realistically happen at the lower end of the pyramid, we need to have a greater understanding of what that means for relegation. All clubs deserve transparency in that regard. We have seen much speculation in recent years around change of ownership—I will not mention the clubs involved as some of the legal cases are ongoing—what that might mean for relegation and the significant financial consequences it may have for other clubs. It would be greatly appreciated if the Minister provided guidance on that in writing so that all Members can have a greater understanding of how it will work in practice.
Baggy Shanker (Derby South) (Lab/Co-op)
Will the Minister say whether a good licensing regime and, if necessary, revocation of licences would prevent clubs from going into full administration—as in the example of Derby County that my hon. Friend the Member for High Peak described—and the knock-on effect of that on supporters, suppliers and the local community? A licensing regime should prevent full administration and be able to deal with problem clubs at a much earlier stage.
Stephanie Peacock
My hon. Friend raises an important constituency point. I do not want to comment on particular clubs and predict the action the regulator may or may not take. We hope that the Bill will raise the bar across the board and prevent clubs from getting into difficulty, but I do not want to be drawn on the specifics.
We have been clear that this is not a zero-fail regime. I will endeavour to write to the shadow Minister regarding the complex, but important, hypothetical situation he has proposed.
Mr French
I appreciate the Minister committing to that. The example just mentioned by the hon. Member for Derby South needs fleshing out as well, because clubs get into financial difficulty as a matter of course; points are therefore deducted mid-season, as we have seen, or, in the worst cases, the club goes into administration. The tests for the licence are about financial prudence and sustainability, so the hon. Gentleman makes a fair challenge.
What would happen if a club went into administration? Would the regulator seek to change the owner to allow the operating licence to continue, for example, or would the club, having lost the licence, then reapply via a new owner? The consequences would be dramatic. One would automatically assume that a club that no longer had a licence would have to start at the bottom of the football pyramid and come back up again, as we have seen in the past. Can the Minister add clarification of that important example to her letter?
Stephanie Peacock
Absolutely. We will come on to the owners and directors test later in the Bill Committee; perhaps we can explore this further at that point. The one point I would make to the shadow Minister and to my hon. Friend the Member for Derby South is that the aim of the regulator is always to minimise disruption to ongoing sporting competitions. I will add clarification on that when I write to the shadow Minister about the complex scenario he proposed.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 19 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 20
Mandatory licence conditions
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
The clause requires the regulator to attach full mandatory licence conditions to the provisional and full operating licences for all licensed clubs. These are basic and fundamental requirements of the whole regime and so apply to all licensed clubs, regardless of their individual circumstances.
The mandatory conditions vary in their aims. They are set out in schedule 5, so we will cover them in more detail, but to summarise briefly, the conditions on financial plans and annual declarations are about ensuring that the regulator has the relevant and timely information it needs to regulate effectively. That includes financial risk assessments, plans for managing financial risks, details on income and expenditure, and contingency plans in the event of a shock such as relegation.
The corporate governance condition introduces basic requirements to report against the club corporate governance code of practice published by the regulator. This reporting mechanism will mean that clubs are transparent about board structures, decision making processes and equality, diversity and inclusion.
The fan consultation condition establishes a baseline level of fan engagement that requires clubs to consult fans on specified matters. This will ensure that clubs have a framework in place to regularly meet and consult a representative group of fans on key strategic matters at the club, and on other issues of interest to supporters. This will work in tandem with the freestanding duties, such as those protecting club heritage and other key areas.
The annual declaration condition requires the club to submit a declaration on any matters that should have previously been notified, or to confirm that there are no such matters. I commend clause 20 to the Committee.
Mr French
As outlined by the Minister, clause 20 requires the IFR to attach four mandatory licence conditions to the each club’s operating licence, whether provisional or full. This includes a requirement for the club to submit a financial plan, either annually or at more frequent intervals. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s views on how frequent she believes is reasonable; is that semi-annually, for example?
The club must also submit and publish a corporate governance statement explaining how it is applying the IFR’s corporate governance code, and regularly consult its fans. I think we need some clarity about how that will work in practice. The hon. Member for Sheffield South East raised the example of Sheffield Wednesday and multiple fans’ groups claiming to represent the club. I think that that needs some fleshing out so that the regulator is clear about what that consultation looks like. Obviously, that will be different for each individual club, which should, hopefully, know its fans better than anyone else.
Last, there is a requirement to submit an annual declaration of any material changes in circumstances affecting the club. Again, we would argue that that needs to be very clear to clubs, particularly if there is any—
The Chair
Order. I hesitate to interrupt the hon. Gentleman, but, just so that he is reminded, we will get to the detail of all of this in schedule 5. Clause 20 simply introduces the schedule, so the hon. Gentleman might want to keep some of his powder dry for the schedule 5 debate.
Stephanie Peacock
I appreciate the shadow Minister’s comments. I will address them in detail when we come to the relevant debate.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 20 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 5
Mandatory Licence Conditions
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 8, in schedule 5, page 103, line 16, at end insert—
“Enforcement
11A An enforcement condition is a condition requiring a club to incorporate and maintain within its Articles of Association (or equivalent constitutional document) provisions which—
(a) require any person in respect of whom the Regulator makes an order under section 43 to—
(i) transfer the shares and/or voting rights which are held, directly or indirectly, in the club by that person (or by the trustees or members referred to in paragraph 2(5)(a) of Part 1 of Schedule 1),
(ii) terminate that person's right (or that of the trustees or members referred to in paragraph 2(5)(a) of Part 1 of Schedule 1) to exercise, or cease to exercise, significant influence or control over the activities of the club, and
(iii) terminate that person's right (or that of the trustees or members referred to in paragraph 2(5)(a) of Part 1 of Schedule 1) to appoint or remove an officer of the club, and
(b) empower any director of the club, or any trustee appointed by virtue of an order under section 43, to complete, execute and deliver in the name of, and as agent and attorney on behalf of, the person referred to in paragraph 13(a) (or the trustees or members referred to in paragraph 2(5)(a) of Part 1 of Schedule 1) all documents necessary to fulfil that person's obligations under paragraph 13(a).”
This amendment creates an enforcement provision to better enable the removal of an unsuitable owner. It would require a club to amend its articles of association to include a standing set of compulsory share transfer provisions and restrictions on the usual powers of a majority shareholder.
Mr Betts
This is actually quite an important issue—not that other things are not important—because it seems to me that it is at the heart of what happens when we try to get proper ownership into football clubs. It is a complicated legal issue, so I am not expecting the Minister immediately to agree with every word in my amendment, but I thank Fair Game for having a look at this and trying to come up with a solution.
The amendment relates to the case of Reading, a club that have had real difficulties recently: they had an owner who was not interested—they almost walked away from the club—and the EFL was in a difficult place because it eventually had evidence about behaviours, I think in China, that were not acceptable and meant that the owner was no longer a “fit and proper person”. What happens in that situation?
No one who is not a fit and proper person may run a club, so the club then cannot play in any competition it is currently in. That is the point that Reading almost got to. In the end, a sale was made just a few days before the EFL deadline day, which saved the club and allowed it to continue. But if the owner had been completely capricious, and had just decided, “It’s my club and I’m not selling, so what?” the club would have disappeared, and there is nothing that the EFL or anyone else could have done.
I am not sure the Bill says anything about what happens to a club if the current owner or owners were previously deemed to be fit and proper persons, but are no longer. Such persons cannot have a licence. Without a licence, the club cannot play in the competition. There is nothing that the regulator can do, as it stands, if the owner refuses to sell and give up their ownership. Where does that leave the club?
I am trying to find a way that gives the regulator powers—perhaps of appointing trustees—to enable the club to continue to operate with a licence in the competition they are playing in.
Jim Dickson (Dartford) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Jeremy. We have all seen clubs driven into the ground by irresponsible owners. We have cited Dai Yongge at Reading, Mel Morris at Derby and Steve Dale at Bury, who disastrously led Bury into bankruptcy and eventually it disappeared. The dilemma will clearly be in how and when these powers are invoked and what criteria are used to invoke them. Would my hon. Friend say that this is about having backstop powers to enforce better behaviour by owners who may decide to engage in a course of action that brings a club to the sort of place that Reading, Derby and Bury have found themselves, rather than those powers always being exercised?
Mr Betts
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. No one wants to see the regulator come in and compel clubs to change ownership. That is not the intention. Encouraging owners to behave better so that that intervention is not necessary is of course the ideal outcome, but history would teach us that not every power or potential use of power will compel some owners to behave properly. This is about what happens when they do not.
The whole purpose of these arrangements in the Bill is to stop the Burys happening again, or to stop the situation at Reading getting worse than it did. At this stage, I do not see where the power is for the regulator to do anything other than to say that someone is not a fit and proper person.
Lincoln Jopp
Has the hon. Gentleman considered that, essentially, we are talking about the state seizing someone’s assets and giving them to someone else? If a club falls into administration, the administrator is governed by a very strict set of laws in terms of treating all creditors fairly. Is he not concerned that this power could fly in the face of existing powers for the administration of companies?
Mr Betts
The hon. Member raises a worthwhile point for consideration. It may be that in the situation of Reading, if it had not changed ownership, the club would have gone into administration, because it would have had no income coming in because it could not play in the competition. That is entirely possible. It is possible that the chairman could just walk away and say, “Right, I am dissolving this organisation—I am off.” That would not be acceptable for fans.
That is why I said at the beginning that it is a complicated legal issue, and I am not saying that I have the only solution here. What I am saying is that there is a problem that does not currently appear to have a solution in the Bill. It is a problem. I keep going back to the situation at Sheffield Wednesday. We have a situation where an owner is running out of money. We do not even know where his money comes from. It clearly does not come from his companies, because his companies are loss-making. Is he being supported by his family? Is the Thai Union Group providing the money? Is the family trust providing the money? The regulator will have the power to find the source of funding, which might be quite interesting in some cases. We had a situation at Leeds a few years ago where we did not even know who owned the club.
Getting that information on the record and giving the regulator powers to find out who actually owns the club, what the source of funding is and whether the beneficial owner is the same as the owner who claims to be the owner are important issues, but then we get to the point where the owner is found to be not fit and proper. What actually happens? I do not know the answer. I have read the Bill many times and debated it many times, and still do not know the answer. There has to be an answer.
Lincoln Jopp
My understanding of the Bill is that under those circumstances, they would lose their licence to operate.
Mr Betts
They would, and therefore the club disappears. No one wants to see that. The whole purpose of the Bill is to stop clubs disappearing, to stop what happened to Bury, and so there is a gap in the legislation, because what happens in that situation? It nearly happened at Reading—the club nearly disappeared, but in the end it was a last-minute sale. If the owner had not sold it at the last minute, however, the EFL has no powers to deal with it, and the regulator will not either. The regulator has the power to say: “You shouldn’t be owning the club. You shouldn’t have a licence to operate the club, because of what you have done, you haven’t got the funds, your source of funds is inappropriate”—all those things—but then what happens?
I am saying to the Minister that the whole intention of the Bill is to ensure that the clubs that fans have supported for years, for generations—for communities, it is their club—do not disappear, go out of business or lose their place in the competition they are playing in. Clubs might get relegated, that is fine, but they should not lose their place because they have an owner who is not fit and proper, and does not meet the test. We have to find way of dealing with this, which the Bill does not do as drafted.
Stephanie Peacock
I thank my hon. Friend for moving the amendment and tabling amendment 8. To be the owner of a football club is to be the custodian of a treasured and historic community asset. That should be an honour, but it also comes with great responsibility. We recognise that in the past, however, it has typically been the actions of unsuitable custodians that have put our historic clubs at risk of collapse. It is vital that the regulator has the necessary powers to protect clubs and their fans from such owners. We therefore completely recognise the intent behind the amendments—to ensure that the regulator has the necessary enforcement mechanisms to back up its regime and guarantee protection from unsuitable owners.
I reassure my hon. Friend that the Bill already suitably achieves that. The regulator already has the power to require a club to make constitutional changes if the regulator considers that that is an appropriate way to secure an unsuitable owner’s removal. It has a range of strong powers to enforce against any non-compliance. The powers include the imposition of sanctions, such as financial penalties, all the way up to forcing divestment, which would force an owner to divest their stake in the club at no minimum price, directing them to take no part in the running of the club in the meantime. If necessary, the regulator can appoint an interim officer to assist the club operating effectively in the owner’s absence.
To respond to the point made by the hon. Member for Spelthorne in an intervention—a point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East a number of times—that ability to isolate and remove unsuitable owners and officers should mean that a club never has to have its licence suspended or revoked. A clubs’ fans should therefore not have to suffer the consequences of bad leadership. To be clear, because the licence is separate from the owner, the removal of an owner will not impact the club’s licensed status. We will come on shortly to discuss owners and directors, so I shall reflect on my hon. Friend’s comments ahead of that debate. I hope to provide him with reassurance, but we will not support his amendment.
Stephanie Peacock
I am saying that the regulator may—I am not saying definitely will, because I do not want to get into hypotheticals of what it will do or not—appoint an interim officer to assist a club to operate effectively in the owner’s absence. To be clear, the club’s licence is separate from its owner, so the removal of the owner does not impact the club’s licensed status.
Mr Betts
In further debate, we will come back to the issues of owners and directors, to which the Minister referred. As I said at the beginning, this was an exploratory amendment for discussion of the whole issue, which is important, but with her reassurance. at this point I will not press the amendments to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 17, in schedule 5, page 103, line 16, at end insert—
“Asset of Community Value
11A The Asset of Community Value condition is a condition requiring a club to either—
(a) obtain and maintain Asset of Community Value status for its home ground; or
(b) incorporate into its Articles of Association a restriction which substantially mirrors the restrictions placed on Assets of Community Value under the Localism Act 2011,
and the Secretary of State may create regulations detailing further the implementation of the Asset of Community Value condition.”
The amendment defines the Asset of Community Value condition that clubs are required to obtain for their home ground and is consequential on Amendment 16.
Mr Betts
Assets of community value have been looked at in a number of different ways over time. Some clubs are already in this situation because their fans have moved to do this. That is true at Sheffield Wednesday, where fans moved some time ago to have the ground designated as an asset of community value. It does not provide a complete safeguard against an owner, who wants to cause mischief and upset for fans and the club, transferring the ground for another purpose, but it provides more of a safeguard than simply having it as a ground without any particular protection, as is currently the case.
The Minister referred to what the MHCLG might be doing in this area on the rules around planning. Is she prepared to look at using assets of community value to give further protection and to comfort fans that football grounds hold a different status to other assets that owners, from time to time, might want to change for another purpose?
Stephanie Peacock
I thank my hon. Friend for tabling the amendments. I know we have discussed this issue a number of times; it has always been a pleasure to do so, and I recognise its importance. Home grounds are often the most important asset that a club owns, so that is why I want to thank my hon. Friend for placing a real focus on them.
The significant financial and heritage value that grounds hold is why the Bill has strong protections to prevent home grounds being sold, used as collateral or relocated without the necessary considerations. Asset of community value status is another mechanism that a number of clubs and supporter groups have obtained for their home grounds. We would expect the regulator to welcome any club that wishes to gain community value status for an asset as another way to protect their home ground.
However, we are confident that the legislation will provide the necessary protections to address fan concerns and keep these important assets protected without mandating this status. Additionally, while assets of community value have proven beneficial for many clubs where no other protections have been in place, these amendments may place an unnecessary burden on clubs. As currently drafted, they would require clubs to either go through what can be a lengthy process with the relevant authority or make structural changes to the constitutional document of a club. Given that significant protections are already in place in the Bill that deliver the necessary safeguards, it is difficult to justify any additional measures for all regulated clubs, especially as a mandatory licence condition.
I really want to reassure my hon. Friend, as I know that home ground protections are of particular importance to him, that the Government have already committed to asset of community value reform in our manifesto, and this is something that the recent English devolution White Paper from the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government commits to.
Mr French
I have a lot of sympathy for the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Sheffield South East. The Minister argues that this does not need to be addressed through the regulator, but will guidance be published for those fan groups who are keen to ensure the long-term future of their grounds? What guidance will be published to ensure that any fans in this situation have clear advice from the Government on the best routes to protect their ground?
Stephanie Peacock
I am saying that I am confident the legislation will provide the necessary protections to address fan concerns, but I also draw the Committee’s attention to the work of the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government on the specific issue of assets of community value. Of course, that does not fall into my portfolio, but I am very happy to commit to speaking to my relevant counterpart and adding to the letter that I have earlier committed to writing. This is something that I am sympathetic to, but I do not have the ability to make that commitment today. I believe that the work the Ministry is doing is very interesting and relevant to what we are discussing. For that reason, I am unable to accept my hon. Friend’s amendment, and I ask that he withdraws it.
Mr Betts
I thank the Minister for that reply; it is helpful in moving the discussion in the right direction. I appreciate that she cannot commit on behalf of another Department and other Ministers, but she has indicated that work is going on in this area. Again, it would be helpful if she could encourage her colleagues in the MHCLG to come forward with that further information before we get to Report. If they are going to write to us about the other issue, they could write to us about this as well. It would be extremely helpful if that could be done, but I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 136, in schedule 5, page 102, line 7, leave out sub-paragraph (e).
This amendment removes the requirement for the corporate governance statement to cover what action the club is taking to improve equality, diversity and inclusion.
Mr French
My amendments would remove the requirement for clubs to include in their corporate governance statements an account of the actions they are taking to improve EDI. Although the intentions behind the provision may be well-meaning, we believe it is misplaced within the framework of a Bill that is rightly intended to stabilise the footballing pyramid, preserve our historic clubs and ensure sustainable financial conduct.
Let us be clear about what schedule 5 seeks to achieve. It introduces a requirement for clubs to prepare and publish an annual corporate governance statement setting out how the club is managed, its leadership and board structure, and the internal controls that ensure compliance with financial and operational rules. That is, at heart, a welcome and worthwhile measure that will support transparency and proper stewardship across the game. Those are principles that we have been urging the Government to apply to the regulator throughout the process of the Bill, but we believe in certain areas they have declined to do so. The inclusion, however, of a requirement for clubs to report on their actions to advance EDI veers into territory that is, at best, tangential to the core purpose of the legislation. This is, after all, a Football Governance Bill, not a vehicle for social policy experimentation.
Melanie Onn
We talked about this briefly in a previous session. The requirements in schedule 5 are exactly what would be found in any business’s corporate governance report, alongside ESG expectations. Why should it be different for football, and is it particularly the “E”, the “D” or the “I” that the shadow Minister does not like?
Mr French
In my previous career, I headed up sustainability on ESG, so I understand the hon. Lady’s point. If she will let me continue, I believe my points will answer her question.
This country’s football clubs are not arms of the state. They are private institutions, many of which are more than a century old, with proud identities shaped by the local community’s traditions and values. Their job is not to issue corporate platitudes on diversity but to serve their supporters, compete on the pitch and conduct themselves with financial integrity. Mandating EDI reporting risks turning the regulator into a cultural enforcer rather than a steward of good governance.
Importantly, however, we must also consider the burden it will place on clubs, particularly those in the lower leagues. Our amendments go to the heart of an argument that has served us time and again during the scrutiny of the Bill: the risk of regulatory overreach and overburden. Clubs in League One and League Two, National League outfits and even some Championship sides already struggle with the administrative requirements expected of them, from audit processes to licensing compliance. Adding more politically motivated reporting requirements, particularly in controversial and contested areas such as EDI, risks deepening the strain without any justification related to the Bill’s primary purpose: football. Some may argue that football has a responsibility to lead on matters of social justice, but cultural change should not be imposed by statutory mandate. Real change, where needed, comes from within; from clubs taking action because it is right for them and their supporters, not because a regulator demands it as part of its governance tick-box exercise.
We can see that with Forest Green Rovers, a club that chose, of its own accord, to take a distinctive approach to sustainability, ethics and inclusion not because a regulator told them to, but because it aligned with their leadership values and the identity they wanted to build. Whether or not one agrees with their choices, the point is that they were made voluntarily. That is the right way to foster progress in football—through leadership and initiative, not through regulatory coercion.
As we discuss schedule 5 and the role of corporate governance statements in football clubs reporting, it is important to recognise the significant work already underway in the game on EDI—work that is being driven voluntarily and effectively by the FA, Premier League, EFL and National League without an overzealous and politicised regulator interfering. The Premier League has developed its own EDI standard, known as PLEDIS. It provides clubs with a clear, structured framework to improve inclusion both on and off the pitch. It is not a mere tick-box exercise, as we fear the Government regulator will be. It is a rigorous programme of three levels: preliminary, intermediate and advanced. Clubs must earn all of those levels for evidence-based progress and independent assessment.
Max Wilkinson
The shadow Minister referenced Forest Green Rovers, which is the rival club to my town’s club, Cheltenham Town. I have nothing against Forest Green Rovers. They have vegan catering, and many people view veganism as a political statement. That is, of course, a business choice that Forest Green Rovers made and it has served them well. Based on a previous amendment the shadow Minister tabled, would he suggest that the fans should have been consulted on the move from meat to vegan food being served in the grounds?
Mr French
I am happy to answer that with a simple yes. They should have been consulted.
To date, 27 clubs have engaged with PLEDIS, and 18 have achieved the advanced level. Clubs such as West Ham United have demonstrated genuine leadership by embedding EDI principles deep within their organisation over multiple years without the need for Government involvement.
Beyond PLEDIS, the Premier League’s “No Room for Racism” campaign highlights a range of targeted initiatives, from supporting coaching pathways to enhancing representation among players and officials from diverse backgrounds. Premier League schemes such as the professional player to coach scheme and the coach inclusion and diversity scheme have supported more than 80 coaches into full-time professional roles. Meanwhile, thousands of grassroots participants benefit from programmes aimed at increasing access for under-represented communities in football, including the south Asian action plan.
Meanwhile, the English Football League has also taken proactive steps through its equality code of practice, which encourages clubs to set ambitious, measurable goals and recognise best practice through an awards system, with 10 clubs having attained silver status as of last year. The EFL’s community outreach includes programmes such as the Stronger Communities cup, which promotes social cohesion by bringing together girls from local communities and girls who have been forcibly displaced. The EFL Trust’s talent inclusion programme further demonstrates how clubs are creating pathways for young women from diverse backgrounds, ensuring that football’s future is open and accessible. All that work has taken place without the need for the Government’s regulator to interfere.
These efforts underline a key principle: real progress on equality and inclusion in football comes through leadership, commitment and initiative, not through bureaucratic mandates or additional regulatory burdens. Clubs are already stepping up in a meaningful way. That is why we argue against adding a new statutory reporting requirement on EDI in the Bill. We believe that this would risk distracting from the core purpose of the Bill—ensuring sound governance and financial sustainability within English football—while imposing burdens that may not add tangible value.
I urge hon. Members to recognise the existing achievements of football and to support my amendments, which would remove the unnecessary requirements for clubs to report on EDI action in their corporate governance statements. Fans do not attend matches to receive diversity statements. They go to support their team, share in the highs and lows, and pass on the tradition that means something to them and their community. They do so as part of a footballing community that is focused on the team they support, not the colour of a supporter’s skin, their religion or their sexual preference.
These initiatives reflect concerted efforts by the Premier League, the FA, the EFL and the National League to foster an inclusive environment in football. They demonstrate that meaningful progress on EDI can be achieved through voluntary, club-led actions rather than statutory mandates. What precisely do the Government intend that their regulator do with these EDI statements? Will they be assessed for adequacy and ranked against each other? Will penalties be imposed for perceived failure to meet EDI expectations? The risk is not just regulatory creep, but mission creep—the regulator may become an arbiter of social values rather than a guarantor of financial sustainability and good governance.
Let me be absolutely clear: we support inclusivity and fair treatment in football and beyond. Discrimination has no place in the game. Kick It Out and Show Racism the Red Card do important work, and we will continue to support that work, but not by putting extra burdens on clubs that are, in many cases, already struggling due to Labour’s decision to hammer businesses at every turn and twist.
Melanie Onn
The shadow Minister spoke about initiatives that have already been undertaken in football. Clubs have a wider role of community leadership in local communities, and is that not precisely what these rules and regulations provide for? They will ensure that clubs deliver community leadership on things that are important, particularly around community cohesion.
Mr French
As I have made clear, we believe that some of these issues are important, but we believe that they should be addressed on a voluntary basis, which is what has driven progress in the game. We do not believe that it should be mandated in statute at arm’s length by the Government. I have been clear in making that distinction in my comments.
Requiring clubs to report annually on their EDI action is not a proportionate or effective way to achieve those broader aims. It amounts to moral licensing, encouraging clubs to go through the motions rather than to take meaningful steps to foster a welcoming culture in ways that make sense for them.
My amendments would restore clarity to the regulator’s remit. They would ensure that schedule 5 is focused on what really matters: clear lines of accountability, proper oversight of directors and owners, and a robust governance structure that protects clubs from the kind of catastrophic mismanagement that we have seen in the past. Football has always been about community; it is in the dressing rooms, on the terraces and in the shared heritage of our towns and cities that the game’s values are lived. Let us not fall into the trap of thinking that they can be legislated for by line item in a regulator’s reporting requirements. It is for that reason that I tabled these amendments. I urge the Minister to reflect seriously on whether this part of schedule 5 is truly consistent with the aims of the Bill and the traditions of our national game, which is inclusive by default.
Stephanie Peacock
I thank the hon. Gentleman for the amendments, but I disagree with the attempts to remove the references to EDI from the Bill. I will outline why and then, towards the end of my contribution, I will respond to his specific questions.
The Government believe that equality, diversity and inclusion is a key part of good corporate governance. As my hon. Friend the Member for Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes outlined, it is common practice. Research shows that diversity on boards and in organisations promotes better governance, decision making and transparency, all of which, in turn, contribute to improved financial sustainability. The relationship between diversity and better corporate performance is recognised by the Financial Reporting Council and the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants.
The industry is already taking action in this space, and the shadow Minister shared some examples, which I will not repeat. In November 2024, the FA published its four-year equality, diversity and inclusion strategy, titled “A Game Free from Discrimination”. It set out a long-term commitment to celebrate and promote diversity in English football, as well as an ambition to tackle all forms of discrimination in the game.
At a club level, in May this year, Chelsea’s incredible work in that area was recognised, with the Premier League awarding them the advanced level of its equality, diversity and inclusion standard—the highest level that can be awarded. All clubs in the Premier League, and some that have since been relegated from it, engage with the Premier League equality, diversity and inclusion standard initiative.
The Bill does not put EDI in football—it is already there and it is being celebrated by the industry. It is therefore right that, as a regulator that will be introducing a corporate governance code and requiring clubs to report against that, it covers EDI. The regulator will look to work co-operatively with stakeholders, draw on the expertise of the sector and add industry initiatives.
As with fan engagement, this will be a statutory baseline. Clubs that already champion equality, diversity and inclusion will not have an additional burden placed on them, other than having to periodically report on those things. Under the corporate governance code, clubs will simply be required to explain how they are applying the code and what actions they are taking to improve equality, diversity and inclusion—and nothing more. That is not onerous; it is a very helpful transparency measure, and it speaks to the question that the shadow Minister posed. I want to be very clear: the regulator is not going to prescriptively micromanage each club’s board or set targets and quotas on EDI. That is simply not the role of the regulator and would cause a significant burden to both the regulator and clubs. Ultimately, this is only a reporting requirement that all clubs should be able to meet.
Mr French
I appreciate the clarity provided by the Minister in outlining what she believes the regulator should or should not do. On quotas, can we be absolutely clear that the Government’s intention is not for there to be a mandated quota for clubs to have certain elements and different parts of the community on the board? Is that the clear intention in what the Minister is saying?
Stephanie Peacock
Absolutely. I will repeat the wording I just used in the Committee: to be very clear, the regulator is not going to prescriptively micromanage each club’s board or set targets or quotas on EDI. We will have that in Hansard twice now, so the intention should be very clear. Therefore, I hope that the hon. Member will seek to withdraw his amendment.
Mr French
I appreciate the clarity that the Minister provided on quotas, because that particularly concerns Opposition Members. As I have mentioned—I will not seek to repeat my comments—we are concerned about mission creep and scope creep of the regulator and what the Bill is designed to do. I made it clear earlier that I believe that football is inclusive and that it has done amazing work, when we compare the state of football 20 or 30 years ago with where we are today. We see that on the terraces at most clubs every single week, and we certainly see that with the national team, which most of the country comes together to support, particularly in big tournaments.
Mandating EDI reporting and turning it into a bit of a tick-box exercise—that was highlighted in some of the Minister’s comments—moves away from what we believe to be the valuable part of this work, which is to drive forward inclusivity in clubs and increase the fan base, which is good for clubs, by expanding beyond some of the traditional support of the game. We fear that having this provision in the corporate governance code, in the way it is written, will lead to unintended consequences. It will drive certain agendas, and we fear that clubs will walk into a number of traps accidentally.
We have tabled these amendments because we believe that EDI reporting, especially in certain areas where it is contested, should not be put on clubs in this way. The voluntary scheme in football has worked much more powerfully over the years, and that is proven in the experiences at football grounds around the country.
Mr French
I beg to move amendment 137, in schedule 5, page 102, line 2, at end insert
“including the club’s official charity.”
This amendment would make clear that the activities of a football club’s official charity can be counted towards it meeting the corporate governance code.
It is a pleasure to speak in favour of the amendment. The Bill as drafted does not specify that the activities of these charities—often known as community trusts—count when taking into account actions taken by the club in relation to meeting the corporate governance code, so I start by asking the Minister why the Bill does not contain explicit recognition, in the governance reporting requirements, of the work done by community trusts. I would appreciate it if she could pick that up in her comments.
As both the shadow Minister for sport and the Member of Parliament for Old Bexley and Sidcup, I am in a fortunate position: I get to see week in, week out how sport, and football in particular, can transform lives. I also get to see what that looks like in practice, not just in headlines or strategies, but on the ground—in local parks, youth centres and school halls across my constituency. I know that other Members will have similar experiences in their own.
In my constituency, we are lucky to benefit from the extraordinary work undertaken by Charlton Athletic Community Trust. It is no exaggeration to say that CACT, if we want to call it that—I do not really like that wording—has become one of the most respected and impactful community foundations affiliated with a professional football club anywhere in the country. It often wins awards at national level for that work. Its work extends far beyond the pitch and well beyond the borough of Greenwich, where the training ground and the stadium—the Valley—are located, and deep into my borough of Bexley, the wider south-east London area, and Kent. In fact, Charlton have been delivering services and support in Bexley for well over a decade.
Charlton’s community trust delivers youth services on behalf of Bexley council. It provides safe spaces and structured activities that help young people to develop skills, build confidence and stay on the right path. In today’s world, where young people, as most Members would recognise, face growing pressures and limited opportunity, that kind of work is more vital than ever.
Although Charlton are not a Premier League side just yet, one of the flagship initiatives that it runs is the Premier League Kicks programme, which operates across the borough in areas such as Thamesmead, Slade Green and Erith—places where young people often face the dual challenge of limited opportunities and exposure to risks—as well as in my area of Old Bexley, Sidcup and Welling. The Kicks sessions are free weekly football sessions, but they are about much more than just sport. They take place in safe and welcoming environments and are led by trained staff. Young people aged between eight and 18 can build confidence, learn leadership skills and receive mentoring from positive role models—often young adults who were once participants in the scheme.
What makes the Kicks programme in Bexley particularly valuable is its consistency and partnership working. Sessions are delivered year round in collaboration with the police, youth services and local schools. This is not a one-off scheme or a publicity stunt. It is part of a broader, integrated approach to youth engagement and early intervention that genuinely helps to steer young people away from things such as crime and towards the opportunities that football presents.
Charlton’s work goes far wider than just youth engagement, although I have seen that recently at Hurstmere school in my constituency and when Charlton brought the Premier League trophy to a local park. It was incredible to see the reactions of young football fans to the trophy. Just remember not to touch it—a mistake that I made on the day, and I was rightly told off.
In Bexley, Charlton are a contracted delivery partner for the council’s early help youth services—statutory support that has been delivered to a high professional standard for many years. Importantly, the trust has developed deep and lasting partnerships in Bexley and Greenwich, not only with the local authority, but with the NHS, local schools, the police and the voluntary sector. That joined-up approach is what makes its work sustainable and successful. As I said, I am sure that many other clubs around the country are doing such work.
Jim Dickson
The hon. Gentleman is outlining in great detail the amazing work done by Charlton Athletic through its club charity. Nearby Dartford football club are lower down the football pyramid, but is he aware that, none the less—typically of clubs around the country, be they in League One, the Championship, as Charlton now are, or lower down the pyramid—it does amazing work? Dartford FC educational charity does incredible work in the community. It has partnered up with ellenor hospice to raise money, and it has undertaken great public health work with Kent county council around stopping smoking. I am glad that he has mentioned Charlton’s work and given us an opportunity to raise the work done by our clubs.
The Chair
Before the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup responds, it may be of assistance if I put on record that I am prepared to take it as read that all football clubs do good work. There is no need for Members to explain it in detail.
Mr French
Thank you for your guidance, Sir Jeremy. You will be pleased to know that I am coming on to why my example is relevant to the amendment. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Dartford for raising the example of Dartford football club—a rival of one of my other local clubs, Welling United, which also do great work in the community.
In the light of your words, Sir Jeremy, I will move on to the amendment. Clubs do such amazing work around the country, and the amendment would ensure that that is recognised properly in the Bill. I hope the Minister agrees that work that such community trusts are delivering around the country, particularly in youth engagement, public health and crime prevention, should form part of a club’s social responsibility and how it is reported.
Why does that matter in the context of the Bill? Because we are legislating for a new governance framework for football, and the Government have decided that this Bill must reflect football clubs’ wider social responsibilities and recognise the real value of institutions such as the trusts, which deliver on the responsibilities in practice. As the Bill is drafted, there is a risk that such work will be seen as separate from clubs’ corporate governance responsibility, and there is a risk that a club will have to wind up its charitable organisation—God forbid—and bring it fully in-house to meet the requirements of the Bill. Allowing a club’s charities or community trusts to count towards that will allow the good work to continue growing while trusts benefit from their charitable status.
The Bill is a slight own goal, but I believe the drafting can be corrected. We believe it represents a missed opportunity for communities across the country, and our amendment would correct that by making it clear that clubs can include the work of their associated community trusts as part of how they meet their governance targets. That does not mean giving clubs an easy ride or allowing them to paper over poor performance elsewhere, but it does mean taking a more holistic, grounded approach to what good governance looks like in the real world.
When we are considering how best to shape football regulation, I believe the example set out by the Charlton trust should give us something to aim for across the country and across the football pyramid. It shows what football at its best can do when it is rooted firmly in its community and takes its social obligations seriously. Charlton Athletic may not be in the Premier League at the moment—give them another season—but through the community trust, they are leading the way in community impact. I understand that it is up for another national award this year.
That is why I believe the amendment is not only proportionate and practical, but in keeping with the spirit of the legislation. If we are serious about building a more sustainable and responsible football pyramid, we must also be serious about recognising clubs that take their community obligations very seriously, not through a statement of intent but through long-standing, properly resourced partnerships.
In Bexley, it does not matter whether you are an Addick yourself; you can come along to a Premier League Kicks session and be part of something bigger. The same is true of neighbouring Millwall, who do lots of great work in the Lewisham borough. We want this to be more than a box-ticking exercise.
There is a real risk that clubs will scale back some of that work if it is brought under the scope of the Government’s regulator. I am sure the Minister would agree that that would be an unintended consequence. Does she agree that allowing clubs to include their trusts’ work in their corporate governance statements would incentivise long-term investment in high-quality community programmes, rather than short-term or superficial schemes?
We hope that any new regulatory framework, including the establishment of the Government’s regulator, will recognise and protect the kind of local partnership work that I have described today. Will the Minister therefore tell us whether she believes that when it assesses a club’s performance, the regulator will be equipped to distinguish between high-impact, properly evaluated community work, such as I have described, and less substantive activity? Will she issue guidance that the regulator must have regard to outreach delivered through a club’s trust when assessing corporate governance?
The Chair adjourned the Committee without question put (Standing Order No. 88.)
Mental Health Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting)
Tuesday 10th June 2025
(2 days, 16 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesMental Health Bill [HL] 2024-26 View all Mental Health Bill [HL] 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 10 June 2025 - (10 Jun 2025)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 2 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 2 / Noes: 9 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 4 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
Amendment 51, in clause 4, page 4, line 41, at end insert—
“(iv) accommodation and relocation, and”.
This amendment ensures that the impact of accommodation and relocation is considered in care and treatment reviews for patients with autism or learning disabilities.
Amendment 2, in clause 4, page 5, line 23, at end insert—
“(v) the patient,
(vi) the patient’s nominated person, and
(vii) the patient’s independent mental health advocate.”
This amendment would ensure that nominated persons and independent mental health advocates receive copy of a care, education, and treatment review meeting report for children and young people with autism or a learning disability.
Amendment 3, in clause 4, page 5, line 31, for “12” substitute “six”.
This amendment would shorten the length between care and treatment reviews from 12 months to six months.
Amendment 4, in clause 4, page 7, line 6, at end insert—
“(iii) housing, and”.
This amendment ensures that housing needs are considered as part of care and treatment review meetings.
Amendment 5, in clause 4, page 7, line 32, at end insert—
“(v) the patient,
(vi) the patient’s nominated person, and
(vii) the patient’s independent mental health advocate.”
This amendment ensures that nominated persons and independent mental health advocates receive a copy of a care and treatment review meeting report.
Amendment 6, in clause 4, page 7, line 40, for “12” substitute “six”.
This amendment would shorten the length between care and treatment reviews from 12 months to six months.
Amendment 7, in clause 4, page 8, line 12, leave out “must have regard to” and insert
“have a duty to carry out”.
This amendment ensures that integrated care boards and local authorities responsible for a patient's treatment and care have a duty to implement recommendations arising from a care and treatment review.
The Minister for Care (Stephen Kinnock)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Furniss.
I thank the hon. Members for Winchester and for Guildford for tabling this group of amendments. I will address each in turn, beginning with amendments 1, 4 and 51. We recognise that a lack of appropriate housing can be a barrier to discharge for some patients. That is why we have put the important reviews on a statutory footing. I am pleased to provide an assurance that the Bill already makes provision for any relevant recommendation about a patient’s discharge, including meeting their housing needs.
Statutory guidance will assist the responsible commissioner to determine who to involve in review meetings. That will include guidance on when the involvement of partners such as housing departments and organisations may be appropriate. Placing a specific requirement to consider the housing needs of every patient would mean that housing would have to be considered in every case, even if it is not a relevant issue. Potentially, that could divert focus from factors more relevant to the patient’s care and treatment.
On amendments 2 and 5, the Bill makes it clear that a copy of the review report must be provided to those who have a legal duty to have regard to the review recommendations, so that any recommendations are implemented as appropriate. The patient should receive the report, in line with good practice. However, we are concerned that requiring a longer list of people to receive the report in every case might increase the chance of patients withdrawing their consent for a review to be held, especially if they do not wish for those people to see the report. We recognise that it is often appropriate for the report to be provided to other people, such as those listed in the amendments, but the Bill was amended in the other place to make it clear that a copy of the report may be provided to other persons not listed in the legislation, with the patient’s consent.
Amendments 3 and 6 are unnecessary. The current drafting provides that review meetings take place at least once every 12 months. That is in addition to the requirement that arrangements must be made for an initial review meeting to take place within 14 days of admission for children and for some people aged 18 and over, and within 28 days for other adults. We also know that more frequent reviews may not be appropriate for all patients. For example, for a patient who is unable to be discharged for a long time, reviews that focus on discharge may be rather distressing.
Commissioners should use their judgment to determine whether the individual needs of a patient might mean that a more frequent review is appropriate. NHS England policy makes it clear that patients, their families and advocates can request a review meeting at any point. Statutory guidance will provide commissioners with further information on factors to consider when determining whether more frequent reviews should take place. For example, current practice, in line with NHS England policy, is that children under 18 should have a review meeting at least every three months—that will be made clear in the guidance. We consider it preferable to set out that information in statutory guidance, which can provide detailed case studies and be readily updated in line with emerging best practice, including on frequency and considering particular circumstances.
Dr Luke Evans (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)
The Minister makes a fair point about best practice. However, did the Government consider any mechanism for how best to share best practice across areas? Especially as the Bill also covers Wales, as heard this morning, it might be useful—across the integrated care boards—to understand the Government’s thinking on how to ensure that best practice in exemplar places, where care is really good, can be shared to help places where care might not be so good.
Stephen Kinnock
The shadow Minister is right, and one of the overarching objectives of this Government is to take the best of the NHS to the rest of the NHS. We are very keen to ensure that we identify best practice right across the board in all the services that we provide, and that it is then replicated and scaled up. We also recognise, though, that every community and area of the country is different, so it is not about exporting and importing best practice. It is more about looking at those exemplars and asking, “How could we use some of this, without reinventing the wheel?” That is absolutely the culture of how we want our health service to run—I think it is a cultural point.
Dr Evans
The Minister makes a good point about the differences in the country, one of which is how the Care Quality Commission looks at the standards. Especially as the CQC is under new leadership, will it be taking a role in looking at how best practice is implemented while ensuring standards?
Stephen Kinnock
The CQC has a key inspection role, which is an important check and balance in the system. I would rather see the incremental building of a culture of excellence across the board, including within upstream institutions, ICBs, local authorities, healthcare professionals, mental health professionals and social workers. We need to create a collaborative approach across the board so that best practice is developed within a culture of excellence. One would hope that the CQC, when it does its inspections, is then finding positive results. Of course, it also plays an important role in identifying, investigating and holding to account when things are not going as they should.
Finally, I will address amendment 7. The Bill requires named persons and bodies to have regard to the review recommendations. This is a well-established duty that clinicians, integrated care boards and other public bodies are used to applying and already exists within the Act. Where effective care and treatment is the central aim, we expect careful consideration of all recommendations. Where these bodies decide not to accept a relevant recommendation, we expect them to have a very good reason.
It is inappropriate to place an absolute duty on a body to follow recommendations in every case, as flexibility is required to depart from a recommendation where appropriate, for example if a recommendation is outside the body’s purview or not in the patient’s best interests. As currently drafted, the Bill already requires that certain named persons or bodies carefully consider the recommendations and give them appropriate weight. Where a body does not consider a recommendation appropriately, that may be subject to review by the courts. In the light of all this, I therefore thank the Liberal Democrats—
Dr Evans
The Minister is right about the absolute nature of the Liberal Democrat amendment, but we talked about the duty to respond requiring a body to set out why it has decided to take action or not. The Minister seemed to allude to that, but he then jumped to talking about being challenged in court. Is there a hybrid version within that duty to respond so that it could stipulate the setting out of why the body is accepting the recommendations or not, because that may well help transparency?
Stephen Kinnock
I see where the shadow Minister and the amendments are coming from, but there is a risk of over-embroidering the Bill if we try to load additional duties on to something that we believe is already happening. It is a very well-established duty that clinicians, integrated care boards and other public bodies are used to applying, and this already exists within the Act. I think there is an element here of “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.”
If there is compelling evidence that it is not working, clearly we need to intervene as a system, which is about real leadership at the ICB level. As things stand, we feel that this amendment is surplus to requirements for the reasons I have set out. I thank the hon. Members for Winchester and for Guildford for this exchange of views, and I hope that they are content to withdraw amendment 1.
Dr Danny Chambers (Winchester) (LD)
It is an honour to serve under your chairpersonship, Ms Furniss. I know that the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon will have spent his lunch time anticipating the responses to his long series of questions. The tension is palpable— I hope he is excited to hear our replies.
Dr Chambers
Unfortunately, I was busy meeting Brian May and talking about farming, so I have not had a chance to work up a really good response.
The point of the Liberal Democrat amendments is to recognise that mental ill health requires holistic care and that many non-clinical factors directly influence mental health. Although the Bill’s scope is understandably narrow, very much focusing on people once they are admitted to hospital for treatment, we need to recognise that, if someone is discharged back into the situation from which they were admitted, they are very likely to have a relapse and to need treatment again. Some of those factors are non-clinical. For example, people living in poverty—those in the lowest 20% of income—are more than twice as likely to suffer mental health issues than those on an average income.
We strongly support the Bill, but we need to recognise that, on its own, it will not improve mental health or do anything to prevent people from developing mental health issues. If our amendments are not within scope or are not appropriate for the Bill, we urge the Minister to work with other Departments, such as the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, to ensure that this good piece of legislation, which we support, can be successful.
The hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon made a point this morning about local authorities. He is right that local authority reorganisation is a challenge, especially when it comes to providing accommodation for young people and for people being discharged from mental health care centres. It is also an opportunity, because the current situation is not fit for purpose. Hampshire county council is struggling to provide the care these people need. Housing, which often affects young people’s mental health, is probably the single biggest issue that comes up in my inbox and when I knock on doors.
I thank the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth. As a clinician, his point about the evidence base, especially when it comes to reviews, is really important. We are discussing a Mental Health Bill that may not be changed significantly for another 40 years, so it is important that we use the best evidence. As a long-time trustee of an evidence-based medicine charity, I am passionate about this.
I thank the hon. Member for Thurrock for pointing out that clinical guidelines suggest six-month reviews. Yearly reviews are used for many medical conditions, and I would argue that a year is also an arbitrary period, rather than one based in evidence. Why six months and not a year, or why a year and not six months?
Dr Evans
The hon. Member is correct to establish the evidence base and the guidance. Broadly, we need to balance that with the logistics and the impact on the clinician, the patient and the resources. Move too far one way and it becomes a tick-box exercise or more resource-heavy; move too far the other way and the safeguards that we are trying to implement are lost or watered down.
When I look at the amendments, that is the balance I am trying to understand; if the guidelines are written with that in mind, that makes sense. The job of this House is to scrutinise the numbers and decide whether we agree that they are right, or whether we should push a bit harder—whether we should tighten the safeguards or relax them a little to allow clinicians more freedom of choice.
I guess that is the purpose of the Bill—getting the right boundary between the safety of the individual patient, support for the wider public, and making sure that clinicians have the freedom to make their judgment so that we are not stepping on expert opinion or, worse, creating bureaucratic processes. I hope the hon. Member understands that is why we are probing further on the rationale.
Dr Chambers
I completely agree with everything the hon. Member just said. Atul Gawande did a fantastic piece of work on checklists that emphasised the need for them not to become tick boxes. They are meant to involve active thinking and decision making.
I thank the Minister for reassuring us about housing. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Dr Chambers
I beg to move amendment 8, in clause 4, page 8, line 27, at end insert—
“(ba) the person is under 18 years old and satisfies the conditions in (b)(ii).”
This amendment inserts a new subsection that extends the duty on integrated care boards to establish and maintain a register for those at risk of detention to all children and young people under the age of 18.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 47, in clause 4, page 9, line 20, at end insert—
“(6) The risk factors specified in regulations under subsection (5) must include—
(a) homelessness;
(b) addiction;
(c) domestic abuse;
(d) miscarriage and traumatic birth;
(e) experience of armed conflict; and
(f) bereavement.”
This amendment would specify risk factors for detention for people on the register of people at risk of detention under Clause 4.
Amendment 9, in clause 4, page 9, line 29, at end insert—
“(c) seek to ensure that the needs of children and young people can be met without detaining them under Part 2 of this Act.”
This amendment extends the duty on integrated care boards and local authorities to exercise their marketing functions in a way that seeks to ensure that children and young people’s needs can be met without detaining them.
Dr Chambers
Amendments 8 and 9 would insert a new subsection to extend to all children and young people under the age of 18 the duty on integrated care boards to establish and maintain a register of those at risk of detention. Amendment 9 would extend the duty on integrated care boards and local authorities to exercise their marketing functions in a way that seeks to ensure that children and young people’s needs can be met without detaining them.
Far too many children are unable to access the mental health care they need, leaving them more vulnerable to experiencing a mental health crisis that then requires detention, which all too often ends in tragedy. Child and adolescent mental health services are in a state of near collapse, with many children unable to access the care and treatment they need until their mental ill health has reached the point of crisis. Waiting 15 months in great mental distress is far too long, especially for children. It is a huge disruption not only to their personal development but to their education. Waiting up to two years for treatment is a huge proportion of a 12-year- old’s life.
We are pleased that the Bill, as it currently stands, includes specific provisions to prevent people with learning disabilities from requiring detention under the Act. The Government should take that approach for more people, especially our young people. Early intervention, delivered through regular check-ups and cutting waiting times for treatment by community services, is critical. We should not pretend that acute mental health services and in-patient care exist in a vacuum. The pressures they face are directly impacted by the quality of community services. We need stronger steps to ensure that fewer people require detention in the first place, especially children.
We are pleased that the Government are taking steps towards having mental health support in every school, for which we have long campaigned. We would like them to go further by ensuring a dedicated professional in every school. We are alarmed that the targets for mental health are being dropped, so I press the Government for assurances that the upcoming 10-year plan will ensure that children who are referred can expect swift and efficient support and treatment, with binding duties on health bodies to deliver that.
Alongside this Bill, what requirements and resources will ICBs have for preventing mental health crises? As part of that, will the Department make specific changes to CAMHS?
Dr Evans
The hon. Gentleman makes a pertinent point about the pressure on CAMHS. In Leicestershire, about 45% of CAMHS referrals are for things like autism and ADHD, and the problem is that it takes a lot of services away from those who have eating disorders or depression, or who self-harm. Does he believe there is scope to reorganise services to make sure they are appropriate where there needs to be treatment? A child suffering with severe anxiety and self-harming tendencies should not be on a pathway with someone who has autism, for example. Has he given any thought to how this Bill might be a way of opening that door?
Dr Chambers
On the surface, what the shadow Minister says seems logical and makes sense. I am not a mental health clinician, so I want to be really careful about pushing in one direction. Whether someone has an eating disorder or is waiting for a diagnosis of something like ADHD, the waiting times are too long. We must better structure a system that ensures that everyone gets healthcare when they need it, rather than prioritising what we perceive as most important.
One of the most heartbreaking things that I hear from parents in Winchester, who are worried sick, is that young teenagers with an eating disorder have been told that they have to hit a lower BMI to reach the threshold to qualify for treatment. That is essentially saying that someone has to be sicker for longer. No one would ever say, “We’ll wait until your cancer reaches stage 4 before we start treatment,” but that is happening with eating disorders. The treatment will end up being longer, more complicated, more costly for the taxpayer and maybe less successful.
A question often comes up—the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon alluded to this—about the pressures on local authorities to deliver mental health care. Actually, the question is “How we can afford not to deliver it?” People with mental health disorders are ending up in A&E or prison and costing police time. It costs £52,000 a year to keep someone in prison, yet apparently we cannot afford to give them the community interventions that might stop them going there in the first place.
David Burton-Sampson (Southend West and Leigh) (Lab)
The Labour Government are working on a range of early interventions for young people in the area of mental health and to stop them spiralling into crime, such as the Young Futures hubs and introducing mental health support in every single school. The hon. Gentleman makes a valid point, but it sits outside the Bill, and there is plenty that the Government are doing. Regrettably, there will always be a need, at certain times, for a young person to be under a section 2 notice and to be brought into care for a period of time, for their own safety. That is unavoidable and will be the right thing for that individual, but there is so much work being done outside this Bill to help young people and others with their mental health.
Dr Chambers
We support all efforts to keep young people happy and healthy in their communities. I visited Winchester Youth Counselling recently, where pupils can self-refer to talk through their issues. That does not involve any clinical personnel. It is hugely impactful and cost-effective and is part of the community. We support those community hubs.
Amendment 47 would specify risk factors for detention for people on the register of people at risk of detention under clause 4, including homelessness, addiction, domestic abuse, miscarriage and traumatic birth, experience of armed conflict, and bereavement. For anyone, including people with learning disabilities, life events can have a profound impact on mental ill health and can drive mental disorders. Well over a third of women with mental health problems have been a victim of domestic violence, and 50% of rough sleepers have mental health problems. The disastrous impact that bereavement can have on anxiety and depression, which are key factors in suicide, has been well documented.
It seems obvious, frustratingly, that public services do not currently reflect that key fact. There are no registers of bereaved children to ensure that they get the right support in the community and in school. There are no registers of veterans, despite their far higher risk of mental ill health and suicide. Women who have suffered a miscarriage do not receive an automatic referral, including to mental health services. The Government need to ensure that people can get mental health assessment and support at key points in their life, including the most traumatic moments.
Dr Chambers
I do not know the best place for it to be held. That is an important point. For a lot of the issues that Members are bringing up, we are not expecting there to be answers today. However, we want to ensure that they are all being considered, given that the subject might not return to Parliament for another 40 years.
Jen Craft (Thurrock) (Lab)
I have a question about the list of risk factors that has been provided. Is there not a concern that it might be too prescriptive or restrictive, and that putting it in primary legislation prevents local authorities or ICBs from widening it, from having registers and risk factors that might be appropriate to their areas, and from focusing on what the appropriate level of care is that they are best placed to meet?
Dr Chambers
That is a very insightful point. The list could be longer and is not meant to be exclusive. I am not sure of the answer to the hon. Lady’s question but, taking a step back, we know that the single most common cause of death in women 12 months after giving birth is suicide, and there is no proactive automatic care. If a person is addicted to alcohol, they are admitted to hospital for treatment for their physical symptoms. When they are physically well enough to go home and they are discharged, there is no automatic enrolment or follow-up in mental health care. I would not want to bring in a system, as the hon. Lady says, that ends up being too prescriptive. However, at the moment, we have one that is not prescriptive enough. I could list a handful of demographics of people who desperately need that proactive care.
Sojan Joseph (Ashford) (Lab)
The purpose of this part of the legislation is for ICBs to keep a register of anyone who is diagnosed with autism or a learning disability. Patients who are already under a clinical team already have a risk assessment, which covers all the areas that the hon. Gentleman is specifying. As a result of the amendment, would we not be duplicating information about risks that already exists for most patients with their clinical teams?
Dr Chambers
The point of having an at-risk list is that ideally there is proactive contact with people—perhaps in quite a soft way, and perhaps through community hubs, as we have discussed—before they demonstrate a severe mental health crisis. I assume that the people the hon. Gentleman is talking about have already been admitted to hospital and have received treatment, and that they are being followed up after they have been discharged. That is not a proactive list; it is a reactive register. Am I correct? I apologise if I have misunderstood his question.
Sojan Joseph
Anyone who is under the care of a clinical team for their mental health has a risk assessment. That is basic paperwork, which is completed by the clinicians. That risk assessment covers everything that is specified in the amendment. The purpose of this part of the legislation is for ICBs to have a register. However, ICBs will not be providing direct care; that will be provided by the clinicians. Those patients who are under any clinical team have a risk assessment that covers all the points in the amendment. My point is that the amendment would duplicate some of that paperwork.
Dr Chambers
I will not argue with an esteemed Member who has the hon. Gentleman’s background in mental health. I take his point as it stands.
Gregory Stafford
I have been listening carefully to the hon. Member’s argument. I do not disagree with anything in it; I just fail to see how the amendment fits with the clause that we are discussing, which I think may be the point that the hon. Member for Ashford is making.
As far as I can tell, clause 4 is about producing a register of people who have a learning disability or autism, who are at risk of being detained for a mental health episode and for whom those risk factors are active, for example because they have been sectioned before or have presented at A&E. Those are specific incidences. What the hon. Member for Winchester is talking about is more wide-ranging; it is not about touchpoints in the same sense. I can see how he could potentially say, “Well, domestic abuse has led to a mental health episode and therefore to a presentation at A&E or in the system.” However, if we put in societal factors, for want of a better phrase, we could end up putting most people on the list, because most people will have experienced a bereavement. I get what the hon. Member is trying to do, but I fail to see how the amendment matches the overall purpose of clause 4.
Dr Chambers
I thank the hon. Member for his intervention. In my maiden speech, I focused primarily on mental health and on the fact that there are so many demographics of people who we know are at significantly higher risk of suicide and mental ill health than the general population. Whether the issue is more appropriately addressed in the Bill or outside it, but using the Bill as a mechanism to highlight it and to cause the proactive engagement of other relevant Departments and other pieces of legislation, I am determined that we are not going to discuss the biggest piece of mental health legislation in 40 years and not even have a discussion about how we proactively engage with groups of people who we know are at very high risk of mental health issues.
Dr Chambers
I will carry on, if that is okay.
Our social and health services need to see the whole person, including their social needs and the factors in their environment that threaten their wellbeing. Trying to treat a mental disorder but failing to account for that person’s lack of housing, which drove their anxiety and depression in the first place, is doomed to fail. A lack of support for a child who has lost their parents at a young age could lead to significant harmful consequences further down the line.
There are a huge range of areas that require change, but for now we would like to press the Minister on three specific issues. We understand that some of them may turn out not to be within the scope of this Bill, but it is still important that they be addressed in some capacity.
Will the Government finally implement a register of all bereaved children to ensure that they get the support they need? Will the Government ensure that all women who go through miscarriage, stillbirth or traumatic birth access mental health support quickly and effectively? Will the Government establish a veterans register to ensure that those who have served in the armed forces and who face particular challenges as a result get the tailored mental health support that they need and do not reach the point of requiring detention?
The Chair
I need to remind the hon. Member that issues that are not within the scope of the Bill are not within the scope of the debate—but we have let you get away with it this time.
Dr Evans
I rise to speak to Liberal Democrat amendments 8, 47 and 9 to clause 4, which seek to expand the scope of the at-risk register, define risk factors and protect children and young people from unnecessary detention under the Mental Health Act.
Let me start by acknowledging the intent behind the proposals. There is genuine merit in ensuring that those who are at risk of detention, particularly children, are visible to the system before crisis point. That view is shared on both sides of the House. I also share the concern that we are too often intervening too late, after a child or young person has already reached breaking point; I would add families to that, because they also bear a lot of the brunt, especially when it comes to waiting. By extension, when there are waiting lists, as the hon. Member for Winchester mentioned, the clinicians themselves—often the GP—will struggle to deal with patients and families when they do not have the clinical expertise necessary for the most severe interventions.
Amendment 9, which would include all under-18s at risk of detention on the register, reflects that preventive ambition. Likewise, the proposed list of risk factors, including bereavement, homelessness and domestic abuse, rightly recognises the social determinants of mental ill health, which are all too often overlooked. However, I have some reservations about the proposals in their current form.
First, on the register for all under-18s, expanding the duty so broadly raises serious questions about safeguarding, data protection and deliverability. Children and young people are already subject to multiple overlapping systems, from social care to CAMHS and education, health and care plans. Before laying on a new national register, we should ask what safeguards will be in place, who will manage the data, and how it will integrate with existing responsibilities such as those under the Children Act 1989 and the special educational needs frameworks.
Secondly, although I agree that we must understand the drivers of detention, the list of mandatory risk factors, including miscarriage, bereavement and even armed conflict—all of which are profoundly serious—could widen the scope of the register so far that it loses operational focus, as we have heard. That is why the Opposition have tabled a later amendment to define it as childhood trauma instead, which is a more encompassing way of dealing with it. Also, we risk casting the net too wide without necessarily improving outcomes for targeting the right support or, conversely, missing something. For example, looking at that list, I would argue that gang violence or gang involvement is a key factor that Members on both sides of the House would agree is very pertinent, and yet it is not mentioned. Therein lies a problem.
Thirdly, amendment 9 seeks to prevent the detention of children and young people unless it is absolutely necessary, which is a principle that I wholeheartedly support, but how do the Lib Dems propose that it be enforced? What levers are in place if a service fails to deliver that community-based service? Without resourcing CAMHS, investing in crisis alternatives and reforming commissioning models, the duty risks being symbolic rather than systemic. In essence, the hon. Member for Winchester is trying to make the point that we should have these discussions.
Although I support the goals of the amendments—visibility, prevention and early support—I am not sure that the specific mechanisms in them are the best way to safeguard achieving them. Instead, I wonder whether consideration has been given to piloting regional early intervention panels for under-18s at risk of admission, building on existing safeguards in educational frameworks, rather than creating separate registers. Alternatively, we could include risk indicators in statutory guidance, rather than setting them rigidly in legislation, which I think was the point made by the Government. That would allow some clinical judgment and flexibility. Above all, we must ensure that ICBs are not just given duties, but held to account. How are they are going to deliver them? That means having the right metrics and oversight and a strong role for advocacy and families.
Anna Dixon (Shipley) (Lab)
The shadow Minister is making some useful observations about best practice. One of the real injustices that we are seeing with detention at the moment is the racial disparities in detention rates. One could argue that such a disparity is a potential risk factor, but behind it is something that we should be addressing through dealing with inequalities in the mental health system, particularly the unwarranted variation in practice from clinicians perhaps making discriminatory judgments in these cases. Does the shadow Minister agree that that is another reason why we should not be over-specifying some of these points where we see associations between risk factors and detention rates under the Mental Health Act, and that therefore we should not be including them in the Bill?
Dr Evans
I entirely agree with the hon. Lady’s end point and with the thrust of what she says. Causality is not causation, and we need to be very careful. When we get to the later clauses of the Bill, that will be at the forefront of our discussion.
We cannot deny the reason we are having this legislative debate in the first place: the observation that black men in particular are subject to community treatment orders far more than any other group in the country. However, we must not make a lazy causal analysis and say, “Well, just because that is the case.” For example, black men have a higher risk of prostate cancer, and white people a higher chance of coeliac disease, because of the genetic basis. Is there something in that? Is there systemic bias by clinicians, as she hinted? That all needs to be explored.
The hon. Member for Shipley beat me to the punch when it comes to my closing statement. We owe it to our children and young people not to legislate in haste, so I welcome the spirit of the amendments, and I welcome the debate, but we must be careful to ensure that we are truly legislating for and defining exactly what we know. Otherwise, we risk creating other inequalities and unintended consequences or, worse still, a system that becomes even more flabby and difficult to manoeuvre through. That is the last thing we want for our patients, clinicians and the public.
Gregory Stafford
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Furniss. I have some criticisms of the specifics of the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Winchester, but I entirely support him and congratulate him on the passion with which he spoke about them. As I remember, his maiden speech touched on a number of these issues. Whether they are within the scope of the Bill is for the Clerks and the Committee to decide, but he made several extraordinarily good points that I hope the Government will take away. If the Bill is not the appropriate place for them, there should be another avenue.
The lead amendment is about the ICB register. It would insert a new subsection to extend the duty on integrated care boards to establish and maintain a register for those at risk of detention to cover all children and young people who meet certain risk criteria. As drafted, the duty to maintain a register under clause 4 may not explicitly include all under-18s. Therefore, the amendment would ensure that children and young people are proactively identified and supported before reaching a crisis point that might lead to detention.
Clearly, there are positives. As the hon. Member stated, early intervention might help to prevent unnecessary detention by identifying risk earlier, which is especially important for children. Likewise, there is a strong argument about equity and care to ensure that young people receive the same proactive planning as adults. That would clearly lead to improved safeguarding through better tracking of vulnerable minors in the mental health system. A corollary to that would be better data collection on youth mental health needs, which I think we would all support. We would be able to use that information to support more informed policymaking and resource decisions.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth highlighted, however, and as I highlighted in the debates on other clauses, there would clearly be a resource demand, especially on ICBs, from expanding registers and services. Likewise, there is the complexity of implementation, because defining who qualifies as being “at risk” may be subjective. I therefore ask the hon. Member for Winchester, when he sums up on the amendments, to give us some indication of how “at risk” would be defined, or whether that would simply be down to the mental health professional or some other medical professional. There are also, of course, privacy and consent concerns related to maintaining a register for minors. Again, the hon. Member may have thought about some practical things that could assuage my concerns about that.
There may also be a risk of stigmatisation. We have to be very careful, especially with children and young people, because being labelled or treated differently due to being on the register would not help their mental health. We would have to have some really strict privacy and data-sharing controls to ensure that they were protected within the proposed system.
As I said in my intervention, I entirely support the aims of amendment 47 because it would specify the risk factors for detention for those on the register of people at risk of detention under clause 4. The criteria for identifying such individuals are left to be defined in regulations as the Bill stands. The amendment would mandate in law specific evidence-based risk factors—which I agree are risk factors for the issues that the hon. Member is talking about, particularly those linked to trauma and social disadvantage—rather than leaving them to discretion.
At a general level, the amendment recognises the role of trauma and social determinants in mental health crises—I congratulate the hon. Member on clearly explaining some of the factors. Going back to our debate on the previous group of amendments, that would improve the early identification of individuals at risk, promote preventive care, strengthen equity and provide clarity and consistency. However, like my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, I am concerned about prescribing a relatively small list and therefore limiting the clause’s flexibility—there may be risk factors that are not listed in the amendment or ones that we have not even thought of.
Jen Craft
Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the Bill makes allowances for the Secretary of State to introduce appropriate risk factors via regulation, and that it is more appropriate to list the risk factors that ICBs should take into account in secondary legislation issued by the Secretary of State than in primary legislation, as amendment 47 seeks to do?
Gregory Stafford
I agree with the hon. Lady; that is my understanding, but perhaps the Minister can confirm that when he sums up. The flexibility in the clause is one of its strengths.
Dr Evans
Does my hon. Friend share my opinion that it makes sense to agree with the Government? The impact of social media and the evidence coming out about using mobile phones and about the impact of certain sites have been debated in this House for the last five years—since I have been here—and there have been advances. Legislation has been brought forward, but there is a growing consensus on both sides of the House that it never quite keeps up. Allowing the Secretary of State to add risk factors as they come up, even in policy guidance, might be a shrewder way to future-proof the Bill against those difficulties. In 1983, we were not discussing or even thinking about the likes of Facebook, yet here we are. With the advent of artificial intelligence, who knows where we will be in another 40 years?
Gregory Stafford
I entirely agree with my hon. Friend. To touch on his point about social media, it is a very useful tool, but is deeply pervasive and can cause the bullying, harassment and mental health issues that he describes. As far as I can tell, the risk factors in amendment 47 would not cover something like that unless it was part of something else—for example, part of domestic abuse, armed conflict and so on.
Anna Dixon
This discussion of the list of risk factors throws up a concern for me: one of the risk factors that has been facing families and other constituents of mine in Shipley for some years is the inability to get appropriate support for their children from children’s social care, for example, because there are very long waiting times for child and adolescent mental health services. Even when people have EHCPs, they are often not fulfilled. Does the hon. Gentleman recognise that we need to address special educational needs and disabilities and children’s social care and put those things in place, as the Government are doing? Children with autism and learning disabilities will remain at high risk of much more complex mental health needs if they do not get the support they need at an early stage.
Gregory Stafford
Once again, the hon. Lady tempts me to make a party political point, but I shall resist. On her general point, there are factors, such as the ones she described, that would not necessarily fall within the list in amendment 47. [Interruption.]
Gregory Stafford
Thank you, Ms Furniss. I was coming to my closing remarks on amendment 47. Suffice it to say that some of the concerns that I raised on amendment 8 about the administrative burdens, the data sharing, and the potential safeguarding and privacy concerns transfer through. Again, perhaps the hon. Member for Winchester could give some reassurance on that when summing up.
Amendment 9, as far as I can tell, would extend the duty on integrated care boards and local authorities to exercise their marketing functions in a way that seeks to ensure that children and young people’s needs can be met without detaining them.
Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)
Does my hon. Friend agree that, although the intention behind the amendment may be worthy, there is a lack of clarity in the drafting? In particular, it is unclear what “seek to ensure” means and how that would be legally defined.
Gregory Stafford
My hon. Friend is right; although a number of the Liberal Democrats are entirely worthy, there are some concerns about the drafting, which could give rise to ambiguity, legal loopholes and definitional issues. In that example, I do not think that “seek to ensure” is helpful. When the hon. Member for Winchester is summing up, perhaps he might explain how “seek to ensure” can be robustly defined within the law, or if it cannot be, suggest a different form of wording that he may wish to use in a future amendment if this amendment fails to be agreed.
Part II of the Mental Health Act 1983 covers the powers to detain individuals for assessment and treatment. Detention can clearly be traumatic, especially for children and young people. Amendment 9 reflects a growing consensus that detention should be the last resort— I think hon. Members on both sides of the House agree with that—and that community-based preventive and therapeutic alternatives should be prioritised. Again, I think it would be very hard to disagree with that ambition.
On the positive side, community-based care is clearly better than detention in most cases, and, if we can get to a point where people are assessed earlier, as is the intention of some of the other amendments, clearly—hopefully—that would lead to community-based care and not detention. The amendment would also protect children’s rights and support the trauma-informed approaches to mental health that were raised previously regarding amendment 47.
The amendment could also reduce the long-term harm associated with institutionalisation and potentially coercive treatment. As we have heard from Members on both sides, that would align with best practice in child and adolescent mental health services and it would promote and encourage a system of accountability by making ICBs and local authorities responsible for proactive care planning. All of that is extraordinarily laudable.
On the potential downsides, there is an ambiguity about the enforcement of the amendment, as my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley said, because of the lack of legal force or clarity in some of the phraseology. There would be also resource implications and, if there are resource limitations at the ICB or local authority level, that might hinder their ability to provide adequate, community-based alternatives.
I do not say that as an excuse for not supporting the amendment, but the hon. Member for Winchester has to understand the reality of the world we live in. Although I want local authorities and ICBs in every area to be entirely fully funded and resourced—and frankly, I do not think the Government’s cut of 50%, or indeed more in some ICBs, will do anything to help community-based care—there would be resource challenges. There would also be implementation challenges in areas where mental health services are already underfunded or overstretched that could lead to delays in care.
This is the key question that I ask the hon. Member to respond to in his summing up. Members on both sides of the House want to ensure that all people of all ages get the best, most appropriate mental health care as early as possible. But in an imperfect world, if there are potential delays in care because community services are struggling to find alternatives to detention, the unintended consequence could be that someone may not be treated at all because of the onus on defined community-based care rather than detention. Will the hon. Member explain how that would work?
I draw my remarks to a close by saying I, certainly, and the Opposition, entirely agree with the ambitions of the amendments. However, some practical and legal issues would need to be ironed out before I could wholeheartedly support them.
Stephen Kinnock
Again, I thank the hon. Member for Winchester for his amendments. I understand the intent behind amendments 8 and 9, but the clauses on registers and the associated duties on integrated care boards and local authorities are specifically aimed at people with a learning disability and autistic people, because of the detrimental outcomes that these groups of people may suffer when detained.
We recognise the concern around the treatment of children and young people, which is why we have several provisions in the Bill aimed at improving their care. However, dynamic support registers are particularly tailored to the needs of people with a learning disability and autistic people, and have been established in NHS England’s policy for some time. We do not have evidence that they would be an appropriate mechanism for wider cohorts.
We do recognise that bereavement, miscarriage, the experience of trauma and difficult life transitions can all have a bearing on mental health. However, access to mental health support is based on clinical need, not on the circumstances that might give rise to that need.
Dr Evans
The Minister is right about the registers, but I did notice that the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill introduced the unique identifier number. That came about after the Lord Laming report into Victoria Climbié, who was “lost in the system.” It also builds on the work of the Children’s Commissioner, which found that around 10,000 children are not in school. Is there a role for getting some of the identifiers that we are looking at here in place along with that unique identifier number?
Equally, how does that unique identifier input into the Bill’s provisions on risk registers, now that that piece of legislation has passed Third Reading? There will be an interaction, but the unique identifier is much broader and the dynamic support register is held slightly differently. What work have the Government done to ensure that there is bridging and understanding about what that would look like, not only in the short term but in the long term?
Stephen Kinnock
The dynamic support register is specifically focused on people, both children and adults, who have learning disabilities and people who are autistic. I think it is quite a separate thing. I am not familiar with the detail of that education legislation but, as the hon. Gentleman says, it is a very broad identifier not based at all on the clinical conditions of the persons, as I understand it, whereas this is very focused and specific for people with the conditions that we are debating. I do not think that there would be a connection between the two.
Dr Evans
Let me take the example of a young person with deteriorating or fluctuating problems. They may be in school or out of school. We know that people with autism and learning disabilities are at greater risk of abuse and of being taken advantage of. If the Minister is not aware of it, would he look at how this duality could work, because clearly there is scope?
One benefit that the Government argued for in having this unique number was that it could be shared across these registers. It sounds as if there is work that could be done. The Minister is absolutely right, and I am not suggesting merging the two, but on the risk register, there could be a nice piece of crossover work to pull that all together, so that the information moves across agencies. What we know from people with severe learning disabilities, autism and mental health issues is that they are often in contact with multiple agencies at multiple times—from social services to, potentially, the police, the NHS, dentistry and, of course, educational settings, which might be multiplicitous. Is that a consideration that the Minister will take forward?
Stephen Kinnock
The hon. Member makes an interesting point. I am certainly happy to discuss that with officials, just as long as everybody is clear that there are two very different things going on here, with different types of risk and therefore different agencies. But I am all in favour of joined-up government wherever we can deliver it.
I turn now to amendment 47. It is important that robust measures are in place to support people with a learning disability and autistic people who are at risk of admission. That is why the Bill will, for the first time, put dynamic support registers on a statutory footing and, via regulations, set out the factors that the Secretary of State considers increase the probability of someone being detained. That is the most appropriate approach in order to provide sufficient flexibility for updates in line with emerging best practice, evidence and clinical and commissioner understanding.
As the factors are likely to be updated regularly, returning them to Parliament at every such instance would be disproportionate and unmanageable. Additionally, although putting them in primary legislation would not prevent the Secretary of State from providing and updating a longer list in regulations, having some factors but not others in the Bill could be perceived to give them primacy—for example, having a history of in-patient admissions or presenting in A&E in crisis. That could have unintended consequences and divert support from those most at risk.
We will of course engage with expert stakeholders, who are best placed to advise on what the list of risk factors for detention should be, taking into account the existing NHS England policy on dynamic support registers. I am pleased to provide assurance to the Committee that current NHS England policy provides examples of factors such as those in the amendment—for example, having no fixed address, having drug and alcohol addiction and having had significant life events such as bereavement and abuse. For those reasons, I hope the hon. Member for Winchester will not press his amendments.
Dr Chambers
I know how much the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon enjoys speaking in Bill Committees—we were on the Tobacco and Vapes Bill Committee together a few months ago—and I am really pleased that our amendments have given so much material for discussion. I really appreciate the input from Members on both sides of the Committee; it has been really insightful, useful and constructive.
It has been rightly pointed out that the current state of local authorities—their funding and their capacity—means that they might not be able to deliver the more holistic care we are pushing for in the amendments, but I do not think that the Mental Health Bill should be limited by the current state of local services and funding. If that is the underlying problem, that is what should be addressed, not the measures in the Bill.
Gregory Stafford
I accept that we should aim for the pinnacle and the best. What I was trying to say was that because the amendments restrict us, rather than giving us the space to, hopefully, reach the pinnacle, or to explore other options if we cannot, they could have unintended consequences if we cannot reach that pinnacle.
Anna Dixon
The hon. Gentleman may want to take these points together. We drew attention to proposed new section 125. Subsection (1) relates to integrated care boards, while subsection (2) relates to local authorities. They do exactly what he wants: strengthen the requirements on ICBs and local authorities to better meet the needs of people with autism or learning disabilities in order to avoid detention. The very essence of the Bill therefore provides the duties that the Minister reassured us on in response to my earlier point. The expectation is that commissioners will meet needs as identified in these dynamic registers.
Dr Chambers
I thank both hon. Members for their input and their valid points. We appreciate the Minister addressing these concerns. We will not press amendment 9 or 47, but we would like to vote on amendment 8.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Zöe Franklin (Guildford) (LD)
I beg to move amendment 20, in clause 4, page 9, line 38, at end insert—
“125ZF Registers: duty to maintain crisis accommodation
(1) In exercising its functions under section 125E, an integrated care board must seek to ensure that there is appropriate crisis accommodation for people with autism or a learning disability within its area.
(2) For the purposes of this section, ‘appropriate crisis accommodation’ means accommodation which—
(a) is designed to meet the specific needs of people with autism or learning disability during periods of acute mental health crisis;
(b) is staffed by persons with specialist training in supporting people with autism or a learning disability;
(c) maintains appropriate staffing ratios determined by guidance issued by the Secretary of State; and
(d) provides a safe alternative to detention under section 136 of this Act.
(3) The Secretary of State must issue guidance about the exercise of functions under this section, and integrated care boards must have regard to this guidance.”
This amendment would require integrated care boards to establish and maintain appropriate crisis accommodation specifically designed for people with autism or learning disability as one of its duties in relation to registers of people at risk of detention.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 10, in clause 4, page 10, line 5, at end insert—
“125FA Report: sufficient commissioning services for people with autism or learning disability
(1) Within four months of the day on which the Mental Health Act 2025 is passed, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a plan to allocate sufficient resources for commissioning services regarding the treatment and detention of autistic people and people with learning disabilities to ensure operability of provisions in this Act.
(2) The plan must include—
(a) revised assumptions of the number of autistic people and people with learning disabilities who may require detention under this Act;
(b) the actions that the Secretary of State will take to ensure community services are available to meet demand after the 28-day detention period;
(c) plans for data collection to support commissioning sufficient services;
(d) plans to allocate appropriate resource to ensure operability of services, including, but not limited to, financial resource;
(e) plans to ensure that responsible bodies and individuals receive the necessary training to carry out support, diagnostic, and treatment plans.”
This amendment requires the Secretary of State to present a plan within four months to ensure sufficient services, resources, data, and training are in place to support autistic people and those with learning disabilities under the Act.
Amendment 22, in clause 4, page 10, line 5, at end insert—
“125FA Assessment: provision of services for people with autism or learning disability
(1) Each financial year, an integrated care board must—
(a) conduct an assessment of the availability and adequacy of services within its area for people with autism or a learning disability who have specified risk factors for detention under Part 2 of this Act;
(b) publish the results of the assessment; and
(c) publish an action plan to address any gaps in provision identified.
(2) The assessment under subsection (1) must include consideration of—
(a) the availability of appropriate crisis accommodation;
(b) the availability of appropriate community support services;
(c) the adequacy of training for responsible bodies and individuals to carry out support, diagnostic and treatment plans; and
(d) the experiences of people with autism or a learning disability who have specified risk factors for detention under Part 2 of this Act and their families or carers.
(3) The integrated care board must consult the following in conducting the assessment—
(a) persons with autism or a learning disability who have specified risk factors for detention under Part 2 of this Act and their families or carers;
(b) the relevant local authority or authorities;
(c) providers of relevant services; and
(d) such other persons as the integrated care board considers appropriate.
(4) The Secretary of State must issue guidance about the conduct of assessments under this section, and integrated care boards must have regard to this guidance.”
This amendment would require integrated care boards to conduct and publish annual assessments of the provision available for people with autism or learning disability at risk of detention and to prepare action plans to address any identified gaps.
Amendment 24, in clause 4, page 10, line 5, at end insert—
“125FA Report: services for people with autism or learning disability
(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of this section coming into force and annually thereafter, prepare and lay before Parliament a report on—
(a) the availability of appropriate accommodation for people with autism or learning disability detained under this Act;
(b) the number of instances where appropriate accommodation could not be found within statutory timeframes;
(c) the progress towards implementation of sections 3 and 4 of the Mental Health Act 2025 and the impact of any delays to implementation on people with autism or a learning disability; and
(d) progress made towards meeting the needs of people with autism or a learning disability without detaining them under Part 2 of this Act.
(2) In preparing the report, the Secretary of State must consult—
(a) people with autism or a learning disability who have specified risk factors for detention under Part 2 of this Act and their families or carers;
(b) integrated care boards;
(c) local authorities; and
(d) such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to report annually to Parliament on the availability of appropriate placements for people with autism or learning disabilities and on progress implementing the relevant provisions of the Act.
Amendment 21, in clause 58, page 68, line 15, at end insert—
“(5A) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for sections 3, 4 and 21 to come into force in full no later than two years after the day on which this Act is passed.”
This amendment would establish an accelerated implementation timeline for provisions related to autism and learning disabilities, requiring them to be fully implemented within 2 years.
New clause 11—Costed plan to ensure community provision for individuals with learning disabilities and autism who are at risk of detention—
“(1) Within 18 months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must publish a fully costed plan for how Integrated Care Boards and local authorities will ensure provision of adequate community services for individuals with learning disabilities and autistic people who are at risk of detention under Part 2 of the Mental Health Act 1983.
(2) As part of the development of that plan, a formal consultation process must take place to determine how the decision to enact the relevant parts of this Act will be made.
(3) The consultation must include input from relevant stakeholders, including—
(a) individuals with learning disabilities and autistic people;
(b) carers for people with learning disabilities and autistic people;
(c) healthcare professionals; and
(d) advocacy groups.”
This new clause requires a costed plan to ensure that ICBs and local authorities are able to provide adequate community services for individuals with learning disabilities and autistic people at risk of detention under Part 2 of the 1983 Act, informed by a consultation with a range of stakeholders.
Zöe Franklin
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Furniss. I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for St Neots and Mid Cambridgeshire (Ian Sollom), and I am sure many in this room will remember his passionate speech about his constituent Declan Morrison, who has inspired many of these amendments. I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his help with my notes.
Amendment 20 would require integrated care boards to establish and maintain appropriate crisis accommodation specifically designed for people with autism and learning disability, as one its duties in relation to registers of people at risk of detention. Currently, just over 2,000 people with autism or learning disabilities are detained in mental health hospitals for an average of five years. Over half of delayed discharges are due to a lack of suitable housing or accommodation.
The crisis provision created in Cambridgeshire after my hon. Friend’s constituent Declan passed away was operating at 90% capacity before funding was withdrawn. When we hear Declan’s story, we realise the severe implications behind the amendment and why it is being put forward. We must also recognise that there has been a significant increase in section 136 use over the past 10 years. Many of the suites being used are outdated, unable to keep up with demand and unfit for purpose.
The amendment would therefore make appropriate crisis accommodation a statutory duty, and I hope all Members would agree that there is a desperate need for such accommodation, specifically for autistic people and those with learning disabilities. It would also require there to be specialist training for staff. We have already referenced today how important training is when it comes to protecting those who are in crisis and who need support. Finally, it would provide for safe, alternative detention under section 136, preventing situations such as that experienced by the hon. Friend’s constituent, where a vulnerable person is held in inappropriate emergency settings for extended periods.
Amendments 10 and 22 are both designed to ensure that there are sufficient resources for people with autism or learning disabilities. On amendment 10, it is crucial that community services are properly resourced to meet the needs of people with autism and learning disabilities. Too many of us will have seen how inadequate community services make detention and in-patient care much more likely, which is worse for the person detained, far more costly and unsustainable in the long term. Our amendments place duties on the integrated care board at the local level, and the Secretary of State at the national level, to be transparent about gaps in provision and to take steps to eliminate them.
Amendment 22 would require an integrated care board to conduct an assessment of the availability and adequacy of the relevant services within its area for people with autism or learning disabilities who have specified risk factors for detention, and to set out a plan to respond to those findings. There is currently an absence of suitable placements, with over 100 places that were contacted having no single bed available. We cannot continue with such a situation, given the significant implications when things go wrong.
Through those amendments, we are asking for an assessment, because there is currently no systematic assessment of whether services match demand, which is crucial to ensuring that the Bill is workable in the long term. It is also acknowledged that it may take 10 years to fully implement the Bill and to ensure that additional clinical and judicial staff are trained.
Amendment 21 was also tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for St Neots and Mid Cambridgeshire. It would establish an accelerated implementation timeline for provisions related to autism and learning disabilities, requiring those provisions to be fully implemented within two years. Currently, just over 2,000 autistic people and people with learning disabilities are detained in mental health hospitals who are being let down by the system.
The Government have sadly already missed the targets, and we cannot afford to wait another decade—people’s lives are too important. In fact, the UN Human Rights Committee has called on the UK to end the detention of people with disabilities based solely on their disability. Every day that we wait means more people at risk of tragic outcomes. As I said, the amendment would establish a two-year deadline, and it recognises that these are some of the most urgent reforms in the Bill. I ask the Government to consider them as a priority.
Finally, amendment 24, which was also tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for St Neots and Mid Cambridgeshire, would establish an accelerated implementation timeline of services related to autism and learning disabilities, by again requiring them to be implemented within two years. I reiterate what we heard in the Chamber, which I am sure we will all hear in our inboxes and in conversations with our residents: it is crucial that we implement these changes at pace; otherwise, we risk failing individuals with autism and learning disabilities further.
Dr Evans
I will direct my remarks at new clause 11 and the amendments spoken to by the hon. Member for Guildford. New clause 11 seeks a clear, costed and consultative plan to help ensure that integrated care boards and local authorities are properly equipped to deliver the community-based services that individuals with learning disabilities and autism need and, of course, deserve, so that they are not unnecessarily detained under part 2 of the Mental Health Act.
Let me begin by recognising the good intentions across the House when it comes to reducing inappropriate and prolonged detentions in mental health settings. There is broad consensus that detention should be the last resort. However, good intentions must be matched by a concrete, deliverable plan because, as the evidence has shown, too many people are being held in hospitals or other facilities, not because of clinical need, but because the right community support simply is not there.
Gregory Stafford
My hon. Friend is making an excellent case for new clause 11, which could potentially solve funding issues I have raised. He mentioned the NHS 10-year plan. Will he suggest that the Minister looks at ensuring that, if new clause 11 is not passed today, the details in it are fed through into the plan? When it is published, which the Minister has indicated will be relatively soon, the information and outcomes my hon. Friend is trying to achieve through the new clause could be in it.
Dr Evans
Far be it from me to tell the Minister what to do, but if I were a wise Minister, I might look at where my predecessors had benefitted from further information and where they may have stumbled. The Bill has been looked at for a number of years by many people from outside and inside the House. Many have been involved throughout its progress, including a former Prime Minister, who tabled amendments in the other place. There is definitely the ability to learn from what the last Government found and to use that information in the kinds of plans that we need.
Anna Dixon
The hon. Gentleman elaborates on the great history of the previous Conservative Government. From where I am sitting, the record is less rose-tinted—but perhaps I am wearing different spectacles. Might he return to the substance of new clause 11, which, it seems to me, is about community provision? I return to the points that I raised earlier about proposed new section 125E. I do not see what new clause 11 adds to the Bill in regard to duties relating to the commissioning of services. I encourage him to address the specifics of the amendment.
Dr Evans
I shall be interested to know what the hon. Lady’s rose-tinted spectacles show when we consider Scotland or Wales. One of my biggest frustrations in debates about the NHS is that in each nation health is devolved, each is run by a different political party, and each has challenges. We in this place enjoy the political football, scoring points without seeing what is blindingly obvious: that across the board, across all the countries, health and mental health services are struggling to keep pace and keep our population healthy with the workforce and technology provided.
Dr Evans
Let me address these points, then I will be happy to give way. When we come to clause stand part, I will address the other amendments, but I specifically said that my comments would be on new clause 11. When scrutinising the Bill, it is important that we talk about how we will deliver, as the hon. Member for Shipley rightly pointed out. It is entirely right to try to put together a plan to ensure that the Government are held accountable. We are not saying how the plan should be formulated; we simply stipulate that a plan should be formulated and introduced. That is a very different argument.
My concern about previous Lib Dem amendments was that they were too specific. We have to get the balance right. New clause 11 simply provides that the Government have 18 months to introduce a fully costed plan, so that we can again have a debate in this House. Especially as a spending review will, I believe, be announced tomorrow, we need to consider how we will match budgets in the future. We accept that it is a 10-year project.
Dr Evans
I am still addressing the hon. Lady’s first point. The Conservatives understand that it will take a long time to put in place, but a credible plan is needed. There was a credible plan in place, as I have said, in the 2011 and 2016 strategies, with the funding to match. I use that as an illustration because it is provides an apt evidence base for the new clause. Otherwise, I might well be challenged by someone saying, “What is your evidence base of a delivery network and a delivery ability from a Government?” I hope that by talking through these points, I am giving the Government the chance to learn from the mistakes we made and from the way we took forward mental health. Regardless of political party, I hope hon. Members that the debate has moved on a long way from when we started in 2010 with the work done partly under the coalition Government. I will now take the intervention.
Jen Craft
I thank the hon. Gentleman for reflecting on the fact that mistakes were made by the previous Government—acknowledgment of that is often sorely lacking. I respect the fact that he says that the debate has moved on, but does he accept that while the debate may have moved on, policy to enact actual change for people who are detained under the Mental Health Act, particularly those with learning disabilities and autism, has not kept pace? The number of people in locked units, under detention, has remained solid, without much wavering, for the past 14 years. Despite the acknowledgement that this is a scandal, and we should all hang our head in shame that it continues to this day, not much has been done to get them out of those units.
While we look back on the history of the past 14 years, focusing specifically on the people who are detained under the Mental Health Act, let us remember that Lord Darzi pointed out in his report that some of the facilities are more redolent of the Victorian era than of a modern mental health care service. Perhaps those who were in government in those 14 years should reflect on why that is the case.
Dr Evans
There is quite a lot to unpack in the hon. Lady’s intervention. As I pointed out, reflecting on what the previous Government learned is also important—for example, when considering Wales. Objectively, the data shows that Wales is struggling more than England, and the same is true of Scotland. Wales and Scotland have been run by different parties from England for a long time, so my natural inclination is to attack back and say, “Well, actually, the Conservatives did better,” but my fundamental point is that we all need to do better because we have seen the problems rising. As I mentioned, over the last 10 years the number of people turning up in mental health facilities has increased by a quarter.
On the hon. Lady’s point about people with autism and learning disabilities, I sat on the Health and Social Care Committee that looked specifically at that issue. We looked at some of the best models in the world, including that of Trieste, where community care is in place. When we took evidence, we found that most people were supportive of that model, but fearful people did come forward to say that the community was not the best place for their daughter, son, husband or wife. Managing the nuance is really important. It takes time to get this right. In 2018, when the last Government looked to legislate on this issue, there was pre-legislative scrutiny, which does not always happen in this place. It was done because there was fundamental agreement that we must get the legislation right, because it applies to the most vulnerable people.
The hon. Lady is right that Lord Darzi identified three shifts that will be really important, but when he looked at this issue, he missed a fundamental point. His report starts from 2010, but when I was a junior doctor— I qualified in 2007—we had issues that affect the culture now: for example, how we managed MRSA and C. diff. That was not a brilliant time to be a patient. The medical training application service fiasco affected doctors applying for jobs so much that in 2004 the Government had to apologise and change the system, because so many people who wanted to get into specialist training could not go through that service.
We are still paying for IT infrastructure that the last Labour Government tried to introduce. The last report, in 2018, said that that cost the taxpayer almost £14 billion. We wonder why, when we try to make a shift to introduce more tech, as recommended by Darzi, people in the NHS are reticent, but they have been burnt by IT projects before. They have seen what happened under a Conservative Government, a coalition Government, and a Labour Government. All that has an immediate and impregnable effect on the legislation and the practicalities that we are dealing with today.
I am not trying to talk facetiously about the legislation; the point is to give some pragmatic direction and to actually say something tangible. On that basis, I look forward to the Minister hopefully supporting proposed new clause 11, which would give the Government the flexibility to have a plan that they choose, as is their democratic right, but also the safeguards to know that it will be delivered and we will not have more delay. There is a balance between making legislation in haste and making sure that we avoid inaction. Would the hon. Member for Shipley like to intervene?
Anna Dixon
Yes, briefly. I was trying to get the hon. Gentleman back to the point, which is people with autism and learning disabilities, rather than mental health policy in general. The point of reference I used earlier was the failure to deal with Winterbourne View in 2012. My hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock made the point very well: if we get down to it, we are talking about community provision for people with learning disabilities and autism. Too many people remain institutionalised, too far from their family, friends and community. I was pointing at that failing. I encourage the hon. Member to get back to that point. Would you like to give clarity on what is within scope of the group of amendments that we are currently debating, Ms Furniss?
Dr Evans
You may want to set me straight, Ms Furniss, but as we have agreed, I will directly address those points in the clause 4 stand part discussion. The hon. Member for Shipley rightly talks about community settings, but where does she think primary care staff come from? They come through medical training. When we talk about the Darzi impact, it is important that we fully understand why people choose not to go into mental health or primary care and become a GP. Without establishing that, which is a problem that this Government have to deal with, we will run into real problems when it comes to delivery.
Aphra Brandreth (Chester South and Eddisbury) (Con)
My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech. The new clause is incredibly important. We do not want vulnerable people to slip through the cracks and not receive the right support, and it is really important to ensure that there is consultation with the right stakeholders. I recently met with Down Syndrome Cheshire, and last year I met with the Cheshire West and Chester SEND accountability group. They said that one of the things they value most is being listened to so that they can inform the process. Does my hon. Friend agree that that is a really crucial part of new clause 11?
Dr Evans
My hon. Friend speaks to the heart of what we all know from our constituency day jobs, where many of us here in this place speak to outside organisations and families. On Second Reading, the hon. Member for St Neots and Mid Cambridgeshire talked passionately about the impacts and the sorry stories that we have all heard about. The whole point of this Bill is to make mental health care patient-centred, but also family and advocate-centred. That is a driving thrust of what the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care was asking us for, and it is why we have enshrined the individual in the first clause of the Bill.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right: if we are committed to the principle enshrined on the front of the Bill, we need co-production. That must be more than a tick-box exercise. If the Government believe that the necessary plan is already in place, will the Minister say where that is covered, and would he put that plan in the House of Commons Library? Is it fully costed? Has it been fully consulted on? Will it be published within 18 months and incorporated in the NHS long-term plan? If not, how will the ICBs and local authorities be expected to deliver? How will the changes to NHS England affect plans to deliver the legislation? Having the legal duty to produce a costed plan will provide a focal point and fulcrum to build around, to ensure that the most serious mental health conditions receive the attention they need.
I know the Minister cares deeply and wants to do his best. He wants the legislation to be enacted as swiftly as possible. I also recognise the commitments and priorities facing the country, but this new clause is about turning good intentions into action. I simply aim to strengthen the hand of the Minister when it comes to negotiating with the Chancellor about funding, so that he has the evidence base required to bolster his position. I hope hon. Members across the Committee, especially on the Government Benches, see it as a supportive, sensible, balanced and practical solution to have this debate and then campaign with the Chancellor to get the money needed for the services.
Turning to the Lib Dem amendments, I begin by recognising the genuine intent behind amendments 10, 22, 24 and 21. Addressing the needs of people with autism and learning disabilities, particularly ensuring appropriate crisis accommodation and reducing unnecessary detention, is unquestionably important. That said, I have specific concerns about legislating for service provision in the Bill.
I understand why we do not legislate for the number of intensive care units, hospices or detox centres in the health system. There is an argument that that might be a good idea. Those are critical services, yet their commissioning and capacity are generally managed through policy funding decisions and local planning, rather than through statutory duties. Introducing a statutory duty for crisis accommodation risks unintended consequences. It may limit the flexibility of integrated care boards to respond to local needs, and could impose significant new resource burdens without clear funding commitments. That risks setting a precedent for increasingly prescriptive legislation across health and social care, which we should approach cautiously. We do not want to pit one condition against another.
On the proposed requirement on the Secretary of State to produce a commissioning plan within four months, I acknowledge the desire for a timely response. The choice of a four-month deadline, however, seems arbitrary and may not allow sufficient time for robust consultation and realistic planning. We need to be mindful that rushed plans can undermine long-term success.
On the proposed reporting requirements, although transparency is vital, I highlight that new clause 11, which we are proposing, would provide stronger and more detailed mechanisms to hold the Government to account on implementation and resource allocation, while allowing flexibility. We should focus on supporting those provisions rather than layer on multiple overlapping reporting duties, which risk duplication and confusion. In conclusion, the amendments raise important points and I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Sojan Joseph
I will briefly trot through the proposed amendments and new clause. We all know that the closure of learning disability hospitals was a gradual process. The reason was the institutionalisation of some of those patients, as seen in the Winterbourne View scandal. The aim was to create new community-based housing to look after people with learning disabilities and autism. Amendment 20 seeks to create appropriate fully staffed crisis accommodation. Will the Lib Dems clarify whether they are looking to create more in-patient settings? Are we going back to where we were years ago, or should we work with the new plan to create more community-based accommodation?
Not all patients with a learning disability or autism need detention or community-based accommodation. Many of them are looked after by their family members, so we also need to look into the support we are providing to carers, so that we can keep those people at home with their family member’s support.
I will keep this brief: as a member of the all-party parliamentary group on adult social care, I recently met with many people who have lived experience of this. They want their views to be heard. They are not asking for more hospital settings; they are asking for more support, including for carers. I was pleased to see that the Minister for Care was there to engage with those people.
In the new NHS 10-year plan, the focus is on moving care from the hospitals to the community. Can the Minister clarify how we can make that happen? We have talked about that for many years, but we have never seen it happening. In my own experience practising in a mental health ward, many patients with a learning disability and autism were detained and, as the hon. Member said, kept in hospitals because we could not find a suitable place for them to be discharged to—it was not that they needed the hospital.
I think we are all talking about the same thing, but we need to find a solution. That is why the new NHS 10-year plan and its focus on moving care from the hospitals to the community is important. Again, can the Minister clarify how we will do that? The Government have already started the work, and the new commission, led by Baroness Casey, should also be looking into where we will find the social care support for carers and the community provision for people with learning disability, rather than just creating more crisis accommodations.
Dr Evans
The hon. Member mentioned Baroness Casey, for whom I have the utmost respect, but herein lies the problem: she is still currently undertaking a review for the Home Office that has now been delayed and has not concluded. This is at the same time that she is supposed to be looking at social care. The whole idea of an amendment that asks for a statutory plan is to stop these kind of slippages. Given his point about wanting to see progress, is that something that he would consider if he were voting on this new clause?
Sojan Joseph
I hope that Baroness Casey completes her commission work and gives us her report. It was promised in the Chamber that the initial report would be available within a year. Regardless of whether she is taking up another role, I hope there will not be any delay and that we get that report and a detailed report within three years. I am looking for a solid plan to fix this problem forever. I am not looking for sticking plasters or an immediate fix, but we need a plan, perhaps including a national care service. These are the people who are looking for a long-term solution to these problems.
The hon. Member asked about how I will vote; unfortunately, I will not be supporting new clause 11. The Government have already started some work, which is why I am specifically talking about the NHS 10-year plan to move care from hospitals to the community, along with the social care commission, which is looking into how we can get good progress on that. This is the answer; we need to get a long-term solution to this problem.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Furniss. I rise to speak to Liberal Democrat amendments 20, 10, 22, 24 and 21, and set out why, although I think they are honourable in their intent, I am unable to support them today.
I will start with amendment 20. The purpose of the amendment is to require ICBs to ensure the availability of specialist crisis accommodation for people with autism and learning disabilities. The aim is to provide a safe and therapeutic alternative to detention, which I think we would all agree is a sensible course of action. Section 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983 allows police to remove an individual who is experiencing a mental health crisis from a public place to a place of safety. That can, on unfortunate occasions, lead to detention in inappropriate settings, which may include police cells. That can obviously be deeply harmful, particularly to those with conditions such as autistic spectrum disorder or other learning difficulties.
Jen Craft
I will be reasonably brief, as Members have covered a lot of what I was going to talk about.
The intent behind amendments 10 and 24 and new clause 11 is to address the issue raised by a number of organisations, such as Mencap, the National Autistic Society and the NHS Confederation, around the delay in particular clauses being switched on for people with autism or with a learning disability due to insufficient community services. The concern is that there is not, as yet, an articulation of what sufficient community services look like or how we will know when we have reached that point, so that we can turn on parts of the Act. There is a sufficient community backing in place for that to happen. Therefore, I would welcome the Minister’s thoughts on how we will know that we have reached the point where we can address the issues that clause 3 looks to tackle.
As the Conservative Members mentioned, there are concerns about funding and access to fairly scarce resources, and a concern that rolling out this provision could put undue burdens on people who are unable to deliver certain parts of it.
However, it would definitely be welcome to have an understanding of where we are heading, what “good” looks like and how we are going to get there, and what the Minister might see as a road map for community services to reach the point where clause 3 can be switched on, so that autistic people and people with a learning disability do not need to be detained under the Mental Health Act purely because there is insufficient support for them in the community to enable alternative provision. I would welcome any thoughts from the Minister about how those concerns about the operability of the Bill can be addressed. If they will not be addressed via these amendments, how will they be taken forward?
Aphra Brandreth
I rise to make a few remarks on new clause 11, which would require a costed plan to ensure that ICBs and local authorities are able to provide adequate community services for individuals with learning disabilities and autistic people at risk of detention under part II of the 1983 Act.
We need to ensure that there is a fully cost-effective plan with accountability to support those with learning disabilities. For instance, Cheshire West and Chester council, one of the local authorities in my constituency of Chester South and Eddisbury, has let down parents, families and those with learning difficulties because of its poor management. It has come at the cost of adequate provision, particularly in school places, and therefore puts more people at risk of mental health problems because they are not getting the support they need in the community.
With the measures outlined in new clause 11, we could go a long way to ensuring accountability. I am sure the Minister will agree that we need to ensure that commitments are backed by funding for the good of those who need SEND support. I urge all those on the Committee to reflect on the value of the new clause. Crucially, it would also require the costed plan to be informed by a consultation with a range of stakeholders. That is incredibly important, because we need to listen to the lived experience of those who are often extremely vulnerable to ensure that they receive the right support. In my intervention, I referred to some of the important groups in my constituency. Down Syndrome Cheshire and the Cheshire West and Chester SEND Accountability group are just two examples, but there are so many more. They are clear that they value being listened to, so that they can inform the process.
The new clause would ensure a costed plan, where commitments are not just words, but backed by funding. Crucially, it would mandate a formal consultation process to inform the plan, incorporating the view of a broad range of stakeholders, including those with lived experience such as those I mentioned in my constituency. There are individuals, carers, healthcare providers and advocacy groups whose voices all matter. We need a plan that is costed so it can be delivered, and that, crucially, reflects the needs and rights of those most affected. I fully support the new clause.
Stephen Kinnock
I thank hon. Members for this set of amendments, which draw attention to the important matter of implementation and community support for people with a learning disability and autistic people. I heard this issue raised many times on Second Reading.
I will begin with amendment 20. I am grateful that this important issue has been raised. Although he has not been appointed to the Committee, I know that the hon. Member for St Neots and Mid Cambridgeshire has spoken powerfully and movingly about the tragic circumstances surrounding the death of Declan Morrison, his constituent, and the need to ensure effective and timely community-based support.
Proposed new section 125E of the Mental Health Act, provided within the Bill, already requires integrated care boards and local authorities to seek to ensure that the needs of autistic people and people with a learning disability can be met without detaining them. That should be driven by the specific needs of the local population, informed by the dynamic support register. That requirement already covers any relevant needs for crisis accommodation. We expect, and will set out in statutory guidance on dynamic support registers, that they will cover any relevant needs for crisis accommodation.
In contrast, the amendment seeks to place a prescriptive legal requirement to ensure provision of a specific service in all circumstances, irrespective of what people in the area actually need. That would have the unintended effect of restricting integrated care boards in designing provision and allocating resources in the most effective way to meet people’s needs.
Anna Dixon
I thank the Minister for setting out so clearly the importance of the annual ministerial statement. Does he envisage that the statement will also give an update on the extent of community provision available and the execution of the transition of people with learning disabilities and autism from institutional settings to community settings closer to home? Is that within scope of the statement?
Stephen Kinnock
I think the short answer to my hon. Friend’s question is yes. The written ministerial statement will be an update on the work done over the preceding 12 months, but it absolutely will also be a forward plan, so it will set out the next actions that the Government will take, what the broader, long-term change delivery process will be, the institutions that will need to change and how they will change.
A number of colleagues have also asked the question, “What does good look like?” In many ways, it is absolutely right that we, as a Government, are being held to account on the content of the Bill, but there will be a really important accountability moment 12 months after it gets Royal Assent, which will be that written ministerial statement. I fully expect every colleague in this room to read that in great detail and hold the Government to account, both on what has been achieved over the preceding 12 months and, importantly, on what the forward plan looks like.
I think that covers most of what I wanted to say, although one additional point I would make is that the amendments could have the unintended consequence of requiring Government and local areas to set out unfunded or speculative plans ahead of any funding settlements, which would affect their credibility. It is more effective to set out plans when they are ready, when we have a clear line of sight on funding and deliverability.
We also need time to engage with expert stakeholders to inform implementation planning. We know that sufficient community services cannot be achieved without wider system reforms beyond health, and details contained in any plan must also consider the context of the 10-year health plan and the independent commission into adult social care, chaired by Baroness Casey. For that reason, I thank hon. Members for their contributions and invite them to withdraw amendment 20 and not to press amendments 24, 10, 22, 21 and new clause 11.
Dr Chambers
I thank everyone for all their insights into our amendments; they were very useful and constructive. I will address a couple of them briefly.
First, I thank the hon. Member for Ashford; we totally agree that we want to be moving mental health care—any care, actually, but mental health care specifically—back into the community and have more community care. We are not advocating for more hospital care. There is a specific point to amendment 20: my hon. Friend the Member for St Neots and Mid Cambridgeshire, who is in the Public Gallery, had a tragic case of a constituent, which resulted from there not being enough available safe places for someone in crisis to be cared for.
A lot of our amendments have rightly been criticised for possibly being outside the scope of the Bill, because this Bill is for when people are in a mental health crisis, and a lot of our amendments are about how we can improve community care. To me, amendment 20 appears to be very in scope, because it addresses a failure of someone who was admitted for mental health care.
I thought that the insightful comments on most of our amendments from the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley, given his legal and medical background, were very useful, and we will take those on board. The only one that I would disagree with, and I think he might feel the same, is on amendment 20 specifically. His main criticisms of that were that it might result in variability across the nation, that there are currently staff shortages and that there could be implementation delays. I do not see any of those three reasons to be strong enough to not want to maintain crisis accommodation.
I thank the Minister for his comments and his serious consideration of all our amendments. We will press amendment 20 to a vote, but will not press any of our other amendments.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Zöe Franklin
I beg to move amendment 25, in clause 4, page 10, line 5, at end insert—
“125FA Training standards
(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision about training standards for responsible bodies and individuals working with people with autism or a learning disability in—
(a) mental health hospitals;
(b) places of safety designated under sections 135 or 136 of this Act;
(c) crisis accommodation; and
(d) such other settings as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
(2) Regulations under subsection (1) must—
(a) specify minimum training requirements;
(b) require training to be co-produced with people with autism or learning disability and their families or carers;
(c) require regular refresher training; and
(d) include training on de-escalation techniques and alternatives to restraint.
(3) The Secretary of State must publish guidance about the standards set out in regulations under subsection (1).
(4) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to produce guidance on minimum training standards for staff working with people with autism or learning disabilities in mental health settings and require that training be co-produced with people with lived experience and their families.
Amendment 25 was, again, tabled by my esteemed colleague, my hon. Friend the Member for St Neots and Mid Cambridgeshire. It would require the Secretary of State to produce guidance on minimum training standards for staff working with people with autism or learning disabilities in mental health settings, and would require that the training be co-produced with people with lived experience and their families.
I suggest to all colleagues on the Committee, particularly those who heard my hon. Friend’s passionate speech on Second Reading, that we need to reflect and learn from the tragic story of his constituent Declan, in which insufficient training sadly contributed to Declan’s death. Autistic people in hospitals risk being subject to unnecessary restraint, over-medication and solitary confinement. That raises real concerns about whether there is sufficient training available to staff working with them. I acknowledge that enormous numbers of incredible professionals work with individuals who are in crisis, but when such tragedies happen, we need to reflect on whether training is sufficient.
Across mental health hospitals, places of safety and crisis accommodation, training is crucial to ensuring good outcomes for those in crisis. Some 92% of people with learning disabilities or autism in hospitals are detained under the Mental Health Act, yet many staff lack specialist understanding. Research shows that training is most effective when it is developed with people with lived experience.
The amendment would ensure that all staff working with autistic people and people with learning disabilities receive specialist training. It would require co-production with families and people with lived experience, with which Conservative colleagues have already said that they agree. That would include mandatory training in de-escalation techniques and alternatives to restraint; create consistent national standards, rather than the unfortunate postcode lottery; and address fundamental staff knowledge gaps that contribute to inappropriate treatment. I ask the Minister to accept the amendment, which would enable us to ensure that those providing crucial mental health support to those in crisis have the appropriate training to prevent tragedies like the loss of Declan.
Jen Craft
I rise to share a few brief reflections. I appreciate that the intent behind amendment 25 is to make sure that the relevant training is in place. I assume that the hon. Member for Guildford has in mind something similar to the Oliver McGowan training provided across hospital trusts, which mandates that all healthcare providers spend a certain amount of time training with someone who has lived experience of autism and of learning disabilities, in order to make sure that the very different ways in which people with autism or learning disabilities might present do not overshadow what they are attending hospital to demonstrate. Particularly for mental health, we all know that diagnostic overshadowing can be fairly significant. In a locked setting, someone with a learning disability or autism may be unable to demonstrate behaviours that show they are improving or getting better, which can undermine the care they receive.
I would just question whether primary legislation is the best vehicle by which to provide for this. We have spoken at length about how the NHS workforce plan and the 10-year plan are coming forward. I wonder whether this would be better placed within that wider framework. Training could be taken forward either as part of continual professional development, or for medical professionals at the start of their career.
Natasha Irons (Croydon East) (Lab)
On the point about training in the round for NHS staff, or any staff dealing with someone in crisis, might it be about taking a more contextual safeguarding approach that relates to not just the one setting? I agree with the point about looking at the 10-year plan, and making sure that mental health training is provided for all staff, because we know that people can present in very different ways, in many different contexts across the health system.
Jen Craft
I think there is a concern about having a prescriptive mandate in primary legislation, rather than using a vehicle that could implement real change. Again, I would welcome the Minister’s thoughts on how to ensure that those working in a mental health environment have sufficient training on learning disabilities and autism. We need to make sure that those with a specialism in learning disabilities and/or autism are present and people have access to them, so that things like diagnostic overshadowing do not continue to occur.
Sojan Joseph
I rise briefly to speak about training in our health settings. There is, in fact, too much mandatory training in NHS and care settings; the issue is that we are not complying with it. We also heavily rely on agency staff, whose training often nobody monitors. It is not that we are short of training. As my hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock mentioned, the Oliver McGowan training was rolled out across the NHS.
Gregory Stafford
I want to be clear about what the hon. Gentleman is saying. My understanding of the amendment, for which I have a lot of sympathy, is that the mandatory training will be around appropriate care in the settings listed. I think he is talking about manual handling or data protection stuff. As someone who worked in the NHS for seven years, I entirely agree that there is a lot of “mandatory training” that could be scrapped to make the NHS much more efficient. The amendment is specifically about ensuring that there is appropriate training for those who are working in the settings listed. I hope that he is not saying that he does not think that there should be training for mental health professionals. I am sure he is not saying that, but that is how it is coming across.
Sojan Joseph
Not at all. I am not claiming that there should not be training for people who work in any settings; I am saying that more and more training has been added every time we learn something and yet compliance with the training requirement is not being monitored. That is the point I am making—not that we do not need the training.
I support training, because appropriate training is necessary, but we also need to ensure that the people who work in those settings are compliant with the training. That is the larger point I am making. This is not about the amount of training we might want to add to this legislation; we need to ensure that existing training is completed by the staff working in those areas.
Stephen Kinnock
The Health and Social Care Act 2008, as amended by the Health and Care Act 2022, already requires that all CQC-registered health and adult social care providers ensure that their staff receive specific training, appropriate to their role, on learning disability and autism. The associated code of practice has been consulted on and is expected to be published and laid before Parliament soon.
The code sets out four standards that outline minimum training requirements, including expectations of training content at different levels; that training is co-produced and co-delivered alongside people with a learning disability and autistic people—that addresses the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock about co-production and things not being done in an ivory tower; and that staff complete training at least every three years. To set out separate standards in secondary legislation, as the amendment asks, would cut across that existing legal requirement and the forthcoming code. Inadvertently, that could lead to confusion. I hope that that satisfies the hon. Member for Guildford enough to persuade her to withdraw the amendment.
Zöe Franklin
Having had a conversation with my hon. Friend the Member for Winchester, I can say that we will withdraw the amendment. However, we hope that the Minister will ensure that the provisions addressing the need for training in such situations will come soon, and with a timeline, so that all members of the Committee understand when we will see the statutory guidance. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Dr Evans
It is a shame that the hon. Member for Shipley is not in her place to hear me speak to the rest of the clause 4, having considered the amendments to it first—[Interruption.] Oh, she is here just in time. I am grateful to the Government and the Chair, as the clause stand part debate allows things to be more structured.
I want to discuss proposed new part 8A of the Mental Health Act 1983, which will introduce welcome changes to provisions specific to people in England with autism or learning disabilities who are subject to detention under the Act. At the outset, let me say that the Opposition welcome the Government’s recognition that people with autism or learning disabilities require a tailored and rights-based approach within our health system. We know—the evidence points clearly to the fact—that such individuals have been inappropriately detained in institutional settings, often for years, without the care and support that they truly need. The creation of a statutory care, education and treatment review in legislation was a step in the right direction. It therefore makes sense in this part of our proceedings to discuss such reviews.
The background is really important to understanding what the measure will do. Care, education and treatment reviews were introduced in 2015 as part of the Transforming Care programme, a joint initiative between NHS England and the Department of Health and Social Care under the last Government. The TCP was launched in response to the Winterbourne View scandal, which we have heard mentioned a few times, where serious abuses of people with learning disabilities and autism in private hospitals were exposed.
The purpose of CETRs in the Transforming Care programme was to ensure multi-agency oversight of care plans for people with learning disabilities and/or autism, particularly those with complex needs detained in in-patient or secure settings. They were there to promote person-centred care by involving patients, families and a broad range of professionals; to identify barriers to discharge and support safe, timely moves to community or less restrictive settings; and to improve care quality and reduce inappropriate long-term in-patient stays.
The implementation timetable started in 2015 with CETRs introduced as a mandatory part of the TCP, initially focusing on children and adults with learning disabilities and/or autism in in-patient settings. In 2017 to 2019, CETRs were expanded and refined, with NHS England producing guidance and a framework for conducting reviews consistently. Ongoing, CETRs are now embedded across the health and social care systems, extending beyond learning disabilities to other groups with complex mental health needs, including secure mental health services.
CETRs are multidisciplinary independent reviews designed to improve the care and treatment of people with complex mental health needs, particularly those detained in secure hospitals or secure settings, such as children and young people with learning disabilities, autism or complex mental health needs, or in other in-patient settings where there are concerns about the appropriateness of their care, treatment or placement. The purpose is to ensure that the care, education and treatment plans are appropriate, person-centred and holistic; to identify and address any barriers to overcoming recovery and discharge; to promote co-ordinated working between health, social care, education and other relevant services; and to support the least restrictive care principle, one that we have now enshrined in the Bill—helping people to move to less restrictive settings where possible.
There are, however, some complications. The number of CETRs has increased over recent years, especially with the growing recognition of the need for better oversight of complex needs. Several hundred CETRs take place annually across England and Wales, primarily within secure and specialist mental health services. Exact numbers are quite difficult to pin down and vary by service user populations, health trusts, NHS England monitoring and the reporting of the activity.
What is a CETR made up of? That is really important. A typical CETR involves a multidisciplinary panel including independent clinical reviewers such as a senior psychiatrist or clinician not involved in direct care; representatives from social care services; educational specialists, especially for children and young people; advocates or independent mental health advocates; the patient or service users themselves, where possible, to ensure their voice is central; family members or carers where appropriate and with consent; and commissioners and other relevant professionals involved in the person’s care pathway.
Under the review process, the panel examines the individual care, the treatment, the education and progress. It assesses whether the current placement and treatment plan are meeting the person’s needs and whether there is scope to support transition to less restrictive or more appropriate settings. Recommendations may be made on changes to care, treatment plans, discharge or support arrangements.
CETRs are a very valuable safeguard. They bring together the independent clinicians, the social care professionals, the educators, the advocates and, crucially, the patients and their families to review the care and treatment being provided. The aim is to ensure that the treatment is person-centred, appropriate and geared towards recovery, while also exploring opportunities to move people to less restrictive environments when safe to do so. That said, while CETRs are increasingly used, questions remain about their consistency, effectiveness and impacts on outcomes. On page 12 of the explanatory notes, paragraph 46 states that
“recommendations are not always being acted upon”,
which is contributing to
“the perpetuated detention of people with a learning disability and autistic people, often without therapeutic benefit.”
That is really significant. To that end, how many CETRs are conducted annually and what are the mechanics in place to ensure that the reviews lead to meaningful change in care, rather than becoming a procedural exercise? I must admit that I struggled to find that information. If I, as someone looking into it, am struggling, there is a concern about how wide that information and data is.
Gregory Stafford
Given that we have discussed the proposed new sections in depth, I do not intend to dilate upon this clause for long. Suffice it to say that the Opposition, notwithstanding the questions asked by the shadow Minister, support the clause, which is essential to ensure the safeguards and progress that we are trying to achieve through the Bill.
Clearly, the clause is prevention-focused and helps avoid unnecessary and traumatic hospital admissions. It leads to better planning because it supports tracked admission of services tailored to individual needs. It also has an element of legal accountability, given that it makes it a legal duty for ICBs to monitor and support at-risk individuals. It is also data driven because it encourages the use of real-time data to inform care decisions.
That being said, a number of the concerns that we raised during debate on the amendments apply to the clause itself. In the Minister’s summing up, can he touch once again on the privacy concerns, as well as the resource demands and the risk of stigma? By that, I mean that being placed on a register could be seen as labelling or pathologising. How do we ensure that the register does what it is supposed to without that risk? Can he also touch on some of the vague criteria and definitional phrases, such as “at risk”, and how they might potentially lead to inconsistent application?
Stephen Kinnock
I am conscious that we will be voting imminently, so I will try to rattle through. Going back to my phrase “the red thread”, the thread running through all the shadow Minister’s questions is delivery. The proof of the pudding in all legislation is whether we convert it into action in a way that best delivers for the interests of the British people, and in a way that absorbs the risks, builds resilience in the system and ensures that we are constantly monitoring, evaluating, reviewing and learning from what is happening on the ground and, through a constant process, improving delivery.
The shadow Minister asks some very good questions, but the problem is that so many will relate to the work that we need to do at pace as soon as the Bill receives Royal Assent. This is a sequential process; we first need the legislation and the comprehensive spending review, so that we know our funding package. We then need to start work consulting on the code of practice, getting that feedback and shaping a plan that defines what good community services look like, because we all know that we are a million miles from having good community services at the current time. We are in a state of crisis and the system is on its knees; we are very conscious of all those facts. There is an immense urgency with all this.
The shadow Minister asked about evaluating and updating pathways and CETRs, duty to respond, the information collected, managing the risks, preventing paternalism and ensuring that people do not get labelled. All those things will have to be set out and explained in the project plan. That is something we will all be working very hard on as soon as the Bill gets Royal Assent.
One of the shadow Minister’s factual questions was on how many CETRs have been issued. I cannot give him that number, but I can tell him that, as set out in the impact assessment, 86% of in-patients received a CETR in the last year. If my answer that this is about delivery does not satisfy him and he thinks there are issues that relate directly to the Bill rather than to the implementation plan, I am happy to write to him on that.
Dr Evans
I appreciate what the Minister is saying. The blue threat, or blue and yellow thread, running through the debate is the question of how much needs to be in the primary legislation. The argument from the Conservative side has been that, while some of the Lib Dem amendments are too restrictive, the danger is that the freedom and flexibility at the Government’s end is too loose. I trust the Minister implicitly—but, having seen Ministers on our side come and go, there could be a change within Government or a change of colour of Government, and no Government are bound by the one that went before.
I am trying to get the balance right by asking questions around procedure to assess whether some of these things should be in the legislation. I agree that there has to be a balance. That is why the Opposition chose to say 18 months, as opposed to four months; it was to have accountability and safeguards in place and to urge good delivery, but not to curtail the ICBs or clinicians—the people delivering stuff—and make them simply check boxes.
I appreciate the Minister’s offer to write to me. I would be grateful for that data, because where we find it will be important in future debates and in his future written or oral statements. I hope he understands that these probes are to make sure that we get the balance right between primary legislation, what is going in the code of practice and what is well intentioned, but could be left to blow in the wind.
Stephen Kinnock
That is a valid question, and one that has probably been asked in pretty much every Bill Committee that has ever taken place. It is always a challenge to get the balance right, having the right level of steer to the system in primary legislation without tying the hands of the system. Everything is constantly evolving, particularly in the age of technology in which we live, so it would be foolish to tie our hands too tightly given the changing nature of the landscape we are working in.
My answer to the question—I say this personally and from the point of view of the Government—is that we are satisfied that we have the balance more or less right. That is in the eye of the beholder, and not everybody will agree, but we feel that clause 4 gets that balance right, and sends clear signals to the system through primary legislation. The proof of the pudding will then be in the eating, and that is for the code of practice, the regulations and the programme planning. On that basis, I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 4 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 5
Grounds for detention
Dr Shastri-Hurst
I beg to move amendment 52, in clause 5, page 11, leave out lines 20 to 22 and insert—
“(b) in the case of a patient who lacks capacity or competence to consent to admission for assessment (or for assessment followed by medical treatment), serious harm may be caused to the health or safety of the patient or of another person unless the patient is so detained by a constable or other authorised person, or in the case of a patient who does not lack capacity or competence to consent to admission for assessment (or for assessment followed by medical treatment) serious harm may be caused to the health or safety of another person unless the patient is so detained by a constable or other authorised person; and”
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 53, in clause 5, page 11, leave out lines 27 to 29 and insert—
“(b) in the case of a patient who lacks capacity or competence to consent to admission for medical treatment, serious harm may be caused to the health or safety of the patient or of another person unless the patient receives medical treatment, or in the case of a patient who does not lack capacity or competence to consent to admission for medical treatment, serious harm may be caused to the health or safety of another person unless the patient receives medical treatment,”
This amendment, along with Amendment 52, would add to the grounds for admission to hospital for assessment or treatment that the patient must lack the capacity to consent to that admission, if they would not be detained due to being a risk to others.
New clause 24—Application in respect of patient already on hospital grounds—
“(1) The Mental Health Act 1983 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 5(1) (Application in respect of a patient already in hospital), after ‘or,’ insert ‘that the patient has attended a hospital or been brought to a hospital to seek help or admission as a patient or,’”
This new clause would allow people who have attended or been brought to a hospital to seek help or admission as a patient to pursue an application for admission under the Mental Health Act.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
All the amendments in this group have been tabled in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Dr Spencer). Amendments 52 and 53 deal with grounds for detention and treatment—specifically, with how those grounds differ depending on whether a patient has the capacity or competence to consent.
At the heart of both amendments is the simple but vital proposition that capacity matters, not only ethically, but legally. The ability of an individual to make decisions about their own care must shape the basis on which the state may act against their will.
The revised wording introduces an important distinction between the two scenarios, where a patient lacks capacity and where they retain it. In the first case, where a patient cannot consent because they are unable to understand or weigh up the relevant information, then serious harm either to the patient or to others may justify detention or compulsory treatment. However, in the second case, where capacity is intact, the threshold for overriding a person’s autonomy is rightly higher. In such circumstances, the justification for intervention must rest solely on the risk of serious harm to other people.
This is more than legal tidiness; it is a matter of fundamental rights. The law should not permit the detention or forced treatment of a capacitated individual on the basis of a paternalistic judgment about their own safety—that is not a liberal mental health framework, but an arbitrary power. These amendments achieve something critical: they preserve the protective duty of the state, particularly to those who cannot protect themselves, but they do so without blurring the line between necessary intervention and justified intrusion. They are grounded in legal precedent, echoing the principles found in common law, the Mental Capacity Act and article 5 of the European convention on human rights. They introduce clarity where ambiguity once stood, and they ensure that the Bill reflects both compassion and constitutional restraint. [Interruption.]
The Chair
Order. We are now expecting three Divisions. I will therefore suspend the Committee for twenty-five minutes, until 5.30 pm—[Interruption.] Four Divisions? We have only been informed about three. [Interruption.] Yes—we would like you all back at 5.40 pm.
Chris Bloore (Redditch) (Lab)
On a point of order, Ms Furniss. Could we have some clarity on what adjourning the Committee right now would mean? Several members of the Committee have not returned from the Division, and it would be good to know the implications if we adjourn now.
Aphra Brandreth
The Conservative members of the Committee all came back at 5.40 pm, when we were asked to return.
Stephen Kinnock
My understanding was that we would all come back after the final vote, which was on Third Reading.
The Lord Commissioner of His Majesty’s Treasury (Taiwo Owatemi)
I am the only one who can move the Adjournment.
Gregory Stafford
That is not true. Any member of the Committee can move the Adjournment.
Gregory Stafford
On a point of order, Ms Furniss. I called for a Division on the Adjournment before several members of the Committee who are now in the room came back. What is your ruling on whether members who were not here when the Division was called will be allowed to vote?
Chris Bloore
With the greatest of respect to the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon, I clearly asked my question before the Question was put. We therefore have not divided yet.
The Chair
You wanted to know what adjourning now would mean for the progress of the Bill, and it would mean that we have to restart where we finished, so Thursday could be a longer day.
Dr Evans
Further to that point of order, Ms Furniss. To follow up on what the Government Whip, the hon. Member for Coventry North West, said, when a vote was called—although I appreciate that it was not carried on the voices—a number of members of the Committee who have since returned were not present.
Ms Furniss, could you speak to the Clerk to clarify at what point the Committee divided? There was a very clear point at which the Adjournment was moved. I appreciate it is your call whether the Question was carried on the voices, but you said that it seemed to have been carried, which implies that the Committee should now adjourn. I appreciate that there are some difficulties.
Taiwo Owatemi
Members have 15 minutes to get back when a Division is called in the House. The 15 minutes had not elapsed when the Adjournment was moved. How can the vote be allowed to stand when the rules say that members of the Committee have 15 minutes to get back?
Gregory Stafford
Ms Furniss, your ruling, as I am sure Hansard will show, is that we were required to come back at 20 minutes to 6. Opposition members of the Committee were back at 20 minutes to 6, and few others were here. You did not suspend the Committee again when the House divided on Third Reading because you were not here, and therefore the 15-minute rule cannot apply.
Taiwo Owatemi
When the previous vote was called, I made it very clear to the Committee that we had three votes plus a vote on Third Reading.
Gregory Stafford
The Chair said that we must be back here at 20 minutes to 6, and that the Committee would be suspended until that point. We have not been suspended since then.
The Chair
Arguing about whether we were here or not is not moving us on, is it? We need to know what we are going to do now, so let us stop there. I think the Government Whip will agree that if we adjourn the debate now, the business will resume on Thursday. The Committee has another eight sittings after that, so you should have time to catch up. That is what it would mean.
Question put, That the debate be now adjourned.
The Chair
I call Dr Neil Shastri-Hurst to continue speaking to amendment 52 and the other amendments in that group.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
It seems a lifetime ago since I was last on my feet. I am sure the Minister was waiting in anticipation for the crescendo of my speech. He heard my observations on amendments 52 and 53, and I know he will be mindful of ensuring that the balance between intervention and detention is held in equilibrium. I would be grateful if he addressed the points I raised before the interlude in his response.
New clause 24 would amend section 5(1) of the Mental Health Act 1983 to clarify that a formal application for detention can be made not only for a patient already admitted to hospital, but for individuals who have attended or been brought to a hospital seeking help or admission. It would therefore expand the legal basis for initiating detention procedures under the Act.
The new clause makes an important distinction. While the Act currently allows for the detention of an individual who is already an in-patient, there is ambiguity about whether that applies to individuals who are on hospital grounds—who have attended A&E, for example—but have not yet been formally admitted as a patient. In those cases, the Act fails to capture people who arrive voluntarily or are brought to such an institution during a crisis.
New clause 24 seeks to close that gap by explicitly allowing an application for detention to be made in such circumstances, ensuring that a timely intervention can occur when necessary for safety or treatment. A number of significant benefits would arise from the new clause. It would provide firm legal clarity; remove any ambiguity about when detention procedures can begin; allow timely intervention, enabling quicker responses for an individual in crisis who is already at hospital but has not been admitted; reduce the risk of harm by allowing earlier application of safeguards; and align the legal framework with the reality of hospital procedures. The distinction between those who are in attendance at a hospital and those who have been admitted in a state of crisis is a false one.
Dr Evans
Like me, my hon. Friend has served as a clinician on the frontline. As this point is sometimes lost, can he explain the practicalities of what turning up at a hospital versus actually being admitted means? They are two distinct things. Can he walk us through what the process entails?
Dr Shastri-Hurst
My hon. Friend is right. An individual can attend an emergency department to be assessed and be seen by a doctor before a decision is made on whether that patient should be admitted to that hospital, transferred to a tertiary centre or discharged back into the community. New clause 24 seeks to provide clarity and certainty for practitioners on that grey area and, crucially, it seeks to provide a safeguard for patients who have yet to be formally admitted to an institution—a hospital, community placement or wherever—but need a crucial intervention.
Dr Evans
Amendment 52 would amend clause 5 to introduce an important distinction in the grounds for detention under section 2 of the Mental Health Act, namely on whether a person has the mental capacity or competence to consent to admission. This amendment, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge, raises questions that go to the heart of how we balance liberty and protection, autonomy and risk in our mental health system.
Under the current Mental Health Act, and indeed under the Bill as drafted, an individual can be detained for assessment if they are experiencing a mental disorder and if serious harm could be caused to themselves or others unless they are detained. There is no distinction based on whether they have the capacity to consent to care. In other words, a person who has full understanding and decision-making ability may still be detained against their will to protect them from themselves.
The amendment proposes a change to that approach, so that if someone lacks the capacity to make a decision about admission and treatment, the current protection should apply—they can be detained if they are at risk of harming themselves or others. But if someone has capacity, understands what is happening and what the risks are, and still refuses care, they should be detained only if they pose a risk to others and not just to themselves.
I will give a brief example to try to bring that to life. Imagine a young adult, aged 22 and living with long-standing depression. They have attempted suicide in the past, but they now clearly and repeatedly say that they do not want to be admitted. They understand the risks, are coherent, consistent and judged by clinicians to have capacity. Under the Bill as it stands, that person could still technically be detained, but under this amendment they could not unless they pose a risk to someone else.
Why does this amendment have merit? There is much in it that is compelling. It puts autonomy at the centre of the mental health framework, which the Committee discussed and agreed on earlier. It aligns more closely with the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which already allows people to make unwise decisions so long as they understand what they are doing. It also echoes the principles in the UN convention on the rights of persons with disabilities, which calls for supported decision making over substitute decision making. It could reduce unnecessary or overly paternalistic detentions, especially of people from marginalised groups who are already disproportionally affected by coercive care.
Gregory Stafford
I am interested in the points that my hon. Friend is raising. Could he give any examples of the situations he is talking about? It would help the Committee, and certainly help me, to understand the practical realities of what he is talking about.
Dr Evans
I will try to elucidate a little further. We know that some people have fluid capacity, such as those with dementia or depression. How do we ensure that people have safeguards for themselves and the wider community, while respecting their capacity and allowing them to be masters of their own destiny? The Bill literally says that we want to see individual autonomy, and by definition, there is always a balance to be struck. The Bill shifts more to the paternalistic side, which brings some challenges because it could create gaps in protections, as I will explain.
There are clinical situations in which a person in mental health crisis—for example, in the early stages of a manic episode or a severe personality disorder crisis—may present with superficial capacity but be at grave risk of harm. Are we confident that clinicians can assess capacity accurately in real time, in often pressured and emergency contexts? Might we inadvertently tie the hands of practitioners trying to prevent suicide or serious self-injury? If capacity becomes the gateway to protection, what support and guidance will be provided to ensure that it applies fairly, consistently and safely?
That is important when we talk about detention, because detaining people is one thing; the next thing is how we get them out. To understand that, it is worth focusing on the crucial interaction between the Bill and liberty protection safeguards. It is worth my briefly explaining to the Committee what LPS are, how they evolved and why they matter. Liberty protection safeguards are the new legal framework that replaces the old deprivation of liberty safeguards, or DoLS. DoLS were designed to protect people who lack capacity, but had become widely criticised as complex, slow and limited mainly to hospitals and care homes.
In response, the Conservative Government introduced LPS through the Mental Capacity (Amendment) Act 2019, to simplify the process and extend protections to community settings such as supported living and people’s own homes. Given that we are talking about Darzi’s shift, that is important. With that context, I turn to the key concerns before us today: how the Bill interacts with LPS, especially when individuals move from hospital detention to community care.
To illustrate why this matters, let us consider the case of Mrs A. She is a 55-year-old woman with bipolar disorder and mild dementia. She was detained under the Mental Health Act after a severe manic episode put her at risk. While in hospital, the Act governed her detention and treatment. After several months, Mrs A stabilises enough to be discharged, but because of her dementia, she lacks the capacity to consent to her care arrangements in the community. She requires supported living, with 24/7 care, which means that she will continue to be deprived of her liberty, but now in the community. Because she is no longer detained under the Mental Health Act upon discharge, the liberty protection safeguards must authorise the deprivation of liberty in the community.
This requires careful consideration. An LPS assessment and best intention decisions are required, and formal authorisation must be in place before she leaves hospital. This transition point is critical, because without clear protocols, Mrs A could find herself deprived of liberty without lawful authorisation—a breach of her human rights. Information sharing between hospital staff, community providers and local authorities may be delayed or incomplete. There may be confusion among professionals about who is responsible for co-ordinating the handover. Training gaps might lead to the inconsistent application of safeguards.
The Bill reforms detention in hospitals, but there is some opacity regarding how the handover to LPS in the community will be managed. Will the Bill ensure a seamless transition, with no gaps in safeguards? If it does not, then how will this be provided? Will there be statutory duties to mandate information sharing and co-ordinate reassessments? How will professionals across health and social care be trained to navigate both systems effectively?
The Bill rightly aims to reduce inappropriate detentions and enhance patient autonomy in hospital, but protections under LPS in the community must be equally robust to maintain dignity and rights post discharge. How will the Government guarantee parity of safeguards across settings? The Bill also seeks to address disproportionate detention rates among ethnic minorities. We must be equally vigilant that the reforms and the wider LPS regime do not perpetuate inequalities once individuals leave hospital. We therefore need to ask the questions: what monitoring is done and what safeguards will be in place?
On detention, I gently ask the Minister to clarify the Government’s plan to manage the vital interface between the Mental Health Act and LPS, even as the Bill stands, to embed clear statutory duties, guidance and accountability to protect all individuals like Mrs A throughout her care journey.
What is the Government’s view on distinguishing between those with and without capacity in the context of detention for self-harm risk? Has the Department assessed the clinical and operational implications of requiring real-time capacity judgments before detaining someone at risk to themselves? Will the Government consider a limited override provision in extreme cases where the risk is immediate, catastrophic and the capacity assessment is finely balanced? We will see more of these kinds of cases as we go forward, with more and more people living with the likes of dementia or acquired brain injuries.
If the Government do not support the amendment as drafted, might they consider refining the code of practice to provide clear guidance on how capacity, autonomy and right to self are waived? The amendment presents a thoughtful and principled intervention. It is not perfect in my eyes, but it challenges us, rightly, to consider whether our mental health laws strike the right balance between protection and personal freedom.
Amendment 53, like its partner on section 2, reflects a growing consensus that the law should better respect the autonomy of people with mental health conditions, especially when they have the capacity to make informed decisions. In introducing a necessary distinction, if someone can truly understand the consequences of refusing treatment and they pose no risk to others, should the state override their decision on their own behalf? The amendment would add a capacity-based distinction into section 3, mirroring the earlier amendment on section 2. Specifically, if a patient lacks capacity to consent to a medical treatment, they may be detained if there is risk of serious harm to themselves or others. If a person has capacity, they may be detained only if there is risk to others. In short, if a person is mentally unwell but understands the consequences of refusing treatment in this case and only poses a risk to themselves, they would not be eligible for detention under this amendment.
Imagine a woman with anorexia nervosa who is dangerously underweight, has a good understanding of her condition and the risk, and refuses in-patient treatment. Under the Bill as it stands she can be detained, but under the amendment if she is judged to have capacity and only poses a risk to herself, she could not be detained under section 3. Therefore, there are huge and far-reaching consequences to the amendment. The wider science is moving towards capacity, but it needs to answer some of these questions. Some are even being grappled with now—take the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill. This truly cuts to the heart of humanity and I am sure there are varying views not only across the Committee, but across society. Similar questions will arise when it comes to capacity.
To that end, the question posed is not simple. In some cases, such as severe anorexia or chronic suicidal tendencies, capacity may be technically present but clinically contested. The stakes could not be higher. The amendment challenges us, and therefore the Government—and rightly so—to ask: are we doing enough to balance liberty and care? Do we have the right clinical tools, legal thresholds and ethical safeguards in place?
New clause 24 is on a different but related subject. This Back-Bench amendment relates to the application for admission in respect of patients who are already on hospital grounds but have not yet been formally admitted. This is really important, because it comes down to the ability. As my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley said, when it comes to the mechanism this is the day-to-day reality. Someone, just because they turn up in A&E, is not under the care of A&E per se until they are admitted. That is when the clinicians will take control. If they just give their name, at what point do we have that grey area? That is the matter of contention in day-to-day working.
Currently, under section 5(1) of the Mental Health Act, applications for detention or admission can be made only in relation to patients who are already admitted to hospital—that is the key part. This leaves a grey area for people who come to hospital voluntarily, perhaps by walking into A&E and seeking help or being brought by an ambulance or the police, but have not yet been formally admitted. The amendment would explicitly allow applications for admission to be made as soon as someone attends or is brought into hospital to seek help, even before formal admission.
Gregory Stafford
I rise to speak to amendments 52 and 53, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge and moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley. Clearly, both my hon. Friends have significant clinical experience, and I bow in many ways to their expertise. However, the amendments cause me some concerns.
Amendments 52 and 53
“would add to the grounds for admission to hospital for assessment or treatment that the patient must lack the capacity to consent to that admission, if they would not be detained due to being a risk to others.”
Clearly, both amendments would introduce a capacity-based distinction in the grounds for detaining a person for medical treatment under the Mental Health Act, as my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth mentioned. That would ensure that, for patients who lack capacity or competence, detention is justified if serious harm may be caused to themselves or others unless they receive that treatment. For patients who have capacity or competence, detention is justified only if serious harm may be caused to others unless they received that treatment.
The amendments build on the principle of autonomous individuals, which we have talked about and which, as my hon. Friend said, is in the Bill. People should not be detained solely for their own protection if they are capable of making informed decisions about their care. As my hon. Friend said, that aligns with the Mental Capacity Act and broader human rights principles, aiming to ensure that detention is used proportionately and, most importantly, ethically.
Where the two amendments improve the current legislation is around the strengthening of patient autonomy by limiting the detention of capable individuals to cases where others are at risk. The amendments align the Bill with the human rights principles and the Mental Capacity Act, and clarify a number of legal thresholds for detention, reducing ambiguity in clinical decision making. That will help clinicians to make more sensible and consistent judgments when it comes to who should or should not be detained. Obviously, the amendments promote a proportionality element in the use of coercive powers, and support the person-centred care that we want.
However, I am concerned that the amendments may increase complexity when assessing capacity in applying the correct legal tests. It will absolutely require training and guidance. Government Members have been concerned about mandatory training, and I make no apologies for hoping there would be significant training on this for clinicians when acting in this role, to ensure consistent application of these services. While I accept that the provisions clarify the legal thresholds, I think there is a potential for legal challenges if the distinction is misapplied or misunderstood, hence the need to return to my point about having the correct training. I hope the Minister is able to address some of those concerns, rather than just dismissing the amendments outright.
New clause 24 was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge and moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull and West Shirley—
Gregory Stafford
I am doing my best—I will get it right by week three, I promise.
New clause 24 would allow people who have attended or been brought to hospital to seek help or admission as a patient to pursue an application for admission under the Mental Health Act. As other Members have mentioned, section 5(1) of the Mental Health Act allows for the detention of individuals who are already in-patients. However, there has been ambiguity about whether that applies to individuals who are on hospital grounds but not yet formally admitted; for example, those who arrive voluntarily or are being brought in during a crisis. New clause 24 seeks to close that gap by explicitly allowing applications for detention to be made in such circumstances, ensuring that a timely intervention can occur when necessary for safety or treatment, according to my hon. Friends the Members for Solihull West and Shirley and for Runnymede and Weybridge.
I listened carefully to my hon. Friends on the benefits of the new clause, and I accept some of them. However, I have some concerns about deterring people from turning up to a hospital setting, either for some other treatment or to visit friends or relations. I am worried that people would be concerned that they would be forcibly sectioned or detained without their consent by just turning up. There is a real risk of overreach in new clause 24. If we go back to the point about autonomy, people need to have assurance about when and where they will potentially be detained when they seek voluntary help.
The line between voluntary attendance and involuntary detention is the nub of the new clause. While I accept the arguments that have been made by my two hon. Friends, I am not thus far convinced that the balance in the clause is correct, but I am hopeful that the Minister can give some clarity.
Anna Dixon
I have a great deal of respect for the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge. I have worked with him on some aspects of the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill; he brings great expertise as a psychiatrist, and an understanding of the Mental Capacity Act that is perhaps greater than mine and that of some Members of the Opposition. However, even though I respect the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge, does the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon recognise that we need to ensure compatibility between the Mental Capacity Act and the Bill before us? I hope the Minister will be able to assure us that the legal checks have been done and that the proposals before us are compatible. Given that pre-legislative scrutiny was carried out under the previous Government, I am sure that process fully got to the bottom of these issues, and I therefore hope that we can move on.
Gregory Stafford
Just in case my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge is not following this Bill in Hansard, I will pass on the hon. Lady’s compliments to him. Like her, I have great respect for him; I am not trying to denigrate his great work on the amendments and the new clause. All I am suggesting is that, from a layperson’s perspective, there are some elements that need tightening up, if not changing altogether. I take the hon. Lady’s point about pre-legislative scrutiny, but obviously these amendments and the new clause were not part of that because they have only just been tabled. I therefore think it is entirely appropriate to be debating them now.
Dr Evans
I have spoken to my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge and looked into this issue a bit further. Psychiatry is already looking towards future capacity and trying to bring the two pieces of legislation together. I believe that Scotland has already moved in that direction. We are therefore into the cycle of chasing legislation for something behind us. I appreciate the concerns, but that is why the Government need to be alive to these situations. At the end of the day, the nub of the issue is patients getting caught up between capacity and safety under the Mental Health Act. Does my hon. Friend agree?
Gregory Stafford
I thank my hon. Friend for his extraordinarily helpful intervention. I was not aware of the changes, and I certainly had not heard of fusion before, or about what is going on in Scotland. Of course, if the new clause had already been enacted in another part of the United Kingdom in some form, I would be much more comfortable with it. But, as I said in relation amendments 52 and 53, if the new clause is to pass in its current form in this Bill or in some future form in another Bill, there has to be a focus on proper training and guidance. Because there is potentially such a legal quagmire, we must ensure that people understand the legal framework within which they can do this.
Stephen Kinnock
Once again, I am grateful to the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley for moving the amendments and the new clause on behalf of the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge.
I will first speak to amendments 52 and 53. The new detention criteria explicitly require decision makers to consider the risk of serious harm and the likelihood of harms occurring in order to justify detention. It is right that clinicians have the power to intervene when a patient is at risk of seriously harming themselves, both when they do and when do not have mental capacity.
If we were to accept the amendments and the new clause, we think that patients would be left without the protections that the Mental Health Act provides. For example, let us consider a patient with a serious eating disorder who is assessed as having capacity but is refusing treatment. If there were no longer an option to detain that patient under the Mental Health Act, that could leave clinicians and families without a route for treatment, potentially leading to tragic results.
The pre-legislative scrutiny Committee highlighted concerns about cases where the concept of capacity had been used to justify denying individuals care that they had sought voluntarily, particularly in relation to very ill and potentially suicidal patients. That goes against the spirit of the Mental Health Act and could fall short of professional standards.
Patient choice is, of course, critical, and the changes that we are making recognise that when patients have a say in their treatment, they are more likely to engage. We also think that it is right that when those decisions put people at risk of serious harm, including risk to their own life, there is a duty to intervene.
We recognise that detaining and treating patients with capacity without their consent is a very serious step to take. However, we think that it is right that we intervene when someone is a risk to themselves, not just to other people. That is in line with the Government’s commitment to delivering a cross-sector suicide prevention strategy for England. We should deprive somebody of their liberty and detain them only as a last resort. The threshold of serious harm in the new criteria reflects the gravity of that decision.
Dr Evans
I am grateful to the Minister for how seriously he is taking this issue, and I agree that there is not necessarily a consensus even within the Opposition. Having the debate is therefore really important. It may be useful to collect data on the number of incidents and where these handovers are. Would the Government commit to that? We would be better able to have this debate, and to decide how much of a problem this is and to work out what the solutions are. Again, I struggle to find data that indicates where this is an issue, but I have spoken to clinicians who I know and colleagues who I have worked with when I have seen it. It happens enough that I was aware of it as a bog-standard GP who has worked in A&E, but it is clearly not rampant and we are not seeing it every single day. Would the Government commit to collecting data on it? If so, in what format would it come?
Stephen Kinnock
I ask the hon. Gentleman to clarify his question about data collection. Is he looking for clarity on the number of people who are judged to have mental capacity but who trigger the deprivation of liberty condition because they are seen to be either of severe risk of harm to themselves or to society?
Dr Evans
That would be a very useful piece of data, but I was in fact talking about new clause 24 and the grey area of hospital detentions. That data is probably easier to collect. I specifically ask the Minister to keep in mind the collection of data on those who turn up to A&E but end up having to be taken out of the hospital to be sectioned, for example. That is the nub of the issue and the practicality of what is going on. In a number of incidents, although the law is set in a way that is supposed to be helpful, the interface unfortunately becomes very difficult.
The Minister has rightly pointed out that there are different ways to deal with this. The new clause is one such potentially heavy-handed way of dealing with it. At the same time, it comes from the good place of trying to address what clinicians deal with in A&E day in, day out. However, we need some data and some teeth behind that to understand and appreciate how much of a problem it is and to then come up with a solution. I hope that clarifies my question.
Stephen Kinnock
That does clarify it. I will absolutely discuss that with officials. It is clear that we need a complete picture of the prevalence of people reporting to emergency departments and then having to be extracted from them and put into other facilities. That is an important point. We clearly need to think more about this issue and consult further. Obviously, understanding the data is a very important part of that. I cannot give the hon. Gentleman a nailed-on commitment to do that, but I give him a nailed-on commitment to discuss it with officials. It is possible that the data is already out there. We need to find that out.
We have heard concerns that there is a lack of clarity about what legal powers are available to health professionals to hold someone in emergency departments until they can be assessed. However, it is a complex issue that requires extreme care and caution. We have committed to continue to explore the issue. We will engage with stakeholders to understand how the current legal framework is applied, and identify solutions to the problems raised. We will provide further guidance on the existing legal framework, including the handover process from police to health, in the next revision of the code of practice. We are also taking steps to address current operational pressures. NHS operational and planning guidance for this year tasks local health systems to improve patient flow through mental health crisis pathways and to reduce waits of more than 12 hours in emergency departments.
Anna Dixon
Will the setting up of more health settings—places of healthcare and of safety—help to address the issue?
Stephen Kinnock
Yes, I think that is right. We have a commitment to creating—either building or repurposing—facilities for more acute mental health settings. We have also created the 111 mental health line. We have a commitment to 8,500 more mental health specialists. We are committed to having a mental health-trained person in every school in the country.
I hope that all those wraparound measures will help in the overall role that we play in the community, and identify people with challenges in a way that will help to support them and, one hopes, avoid them getting to the acute stage. My hon. Friend is absolutely right to point to some of the wraparound measures that the Government are pushing forward.
For the reasons that I have outlined, I ask the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley not to press amendments 52 and 53 and new clause 24 to a vote.
Dr Shastri-Hurst
I have listened carefully to the Minister, who has addressed the issue with his usual thoughtfulness. I ask that he looks into sharing that data, particularly around new clause 24, but on the basis of the reassurances that he has provided, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Taiwo Owatemi.)
Football Governance Bill [ Lords ] (Sixth sitting)
Tuesday 10th June 2025
(2 days, 16 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesFootball Governance Bill [HL] 2024-26 View all Football Governance Bill [HL] 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 10 June 2025 - (10 Jun 2025)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 5 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 11 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 2 / Noes: 13 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 2 / Noes: 13 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 2 / Noes: 13 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Stephanie Peacock)
It is a pleasure once again to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Turner. I thank the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup for his amendment. He made some important points in his contribution, including his reference to the Kicks programme. He also pointed out an event in his area where he was able to see the Premier League trophy; that is a fantastic tour involving lots of grassroots and other clubs. I was really pleased to visit one such club in Mr Speaker’s Chorley constituency, and I will take this opportunity to wish Mr Speaker a very happy birthday. I am sure that other Committee members will join me in putting that on the record.
We do not believe, however, that the change in amendment 137 is necessary. I will outline why and respond throughout my speech to some of the hon. Gentleman’s points. As drafted, the Bill gives flexibility to a club to detail what action it is taking to contribute
“to the economic and social well-being of the local community with which it is associated”.
This provision was introduced through a Government amendment made in the other place to allow the regulator to include clubs’ community contributions in its corporate governance code. The regulator will work with the industry to design the code to ensure that it is relevant to clubs, the challenges they face and the unique nature of the responsibilities associated with custodianship of a football club.
If a club details, in its statement, its work with or through its official charity, that would of course be accepted by the regulator. That is the opposite of what the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup said. He referred to scaling back charity work, but that is absolutely not what we will see as a result of the proposals.
Let me detail some of the specifics. If a club is donating to or funding bodies that are not its official charity, that is also a contribution to the community and could be included. We have tried to keep this as broad as possible. To share something from my constituency and town, Barnsley FC Community Trust is a great example of a charity that is closely connected to a club. The community trust held its conference on Monday, and I was pleased to send them a message. One purpose of that conference was to raise the charity’s profile across Barnsley. It helps between 10,000 and 15,000 people each year, who range in age from two to 100 years old. I will not detain the Committee by outlining the work that the trust does, but it ranges from education to health, social inclusion and sports participation, not just in and around the centre connected to Oakwell, but across the whole of Barnsley and my Barnsley South constituency.
Barnsley FC could use their work with the trust to show how they contribute to the economic and social wellbeing of their community, and I put on record that they very much do that in my area. But it is not just Barnsley FC that do such work; many clubs carry out great work in their communities, whether through their official charities or not. Portsmouth FC’s Pompey in the Community and the Sheffield Wednesday FC Community Programme are just two examples; I am sure that hon. Members across the Committee have examples from their communities. It is important to shine a light on those contributions to the local community, and that is why a club’s report on their corporate governance will be published online to allow public scrutiny, so that they can be held accountable for their actions, or inaction. We believe that this will encourage transparency and, as with the approach to corporate governance more widely, encourage greater action in this space.
Above all, that approach will allow flexibility for each club to comply in accordance with their resources and size in a way that is suited to the needs of their local community. Additionally, when the regulator publishes its corporate governance report on clubs, best practice can be shared with the industry. We therefore believe that the Bill, as drafted, sufficiently allows clubs to demonstrate the actions they contribute to their communities. I hope that the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup will withdraw his amendment.
Mr Louie French (Old Bexley and Sidcup) (Con)
It is a privilege to speak again under your chairmanship, Mr Turner. I congratulate you and the city of Hull on the Challenge cup victory at the weekend, which probably does not please Mr Speaker on his birthday, but such is sport.
Moving back to football, before the lunch break, I explained why the Opposition felt the need for amendment 137. It is a technical amendment that would make it very clear that the official charities and trusts of the clubs would count towards the corporate governance structure. I have listened carefully to the Minister’s comments and appreciate the feedback that she has given. However, we would still like to see the amendment made to provide clarity to clubs, so we will press it to a Division.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Mr French
I beg to move amendment 131, in schedule 5, page 103, line 16, at end insert—
“Agents fees
11A (1) An agents fees condition is a condition requiring a club employing an agent to cap their fees.
(2) The agents fee cap will be set by Regulations subject to approval by both Houses.”
My amendment proposes that clubs regulated by the Government’s new regulator should be required to cap the fees paid to agents, because, as many fans know, an ever-increasing amount of money is leaving the football pyramid to agents. The level of the proposed cap would be set through regulations, subject to the approval of both Houses of Parliament, and determined following consultation with clubs and leagues.
Let me set out why we believe the measure is necessary—not as an attack on agents or their role in the game, but as a proportionate, reasonable step towards a more sustainable, transparent and responsible football ecosystem. If we are serious about football reform and safeguarding the long-term financial health of clubs up and down the pyramid, we must be prepared to tackle the excesses and distortions that have taken root in the sport.
Few are more obvious or pressing than the spiralling sums paid to agents. According to the Football Association, in the year from February 2024 to February 2025, Premier League clubs alone paid more than £409 million in agent fees and intermediaries. That is more than the total broadcast revenue of a number of Championship clubs in 2022-23; or more than double the commercial revenue of several clubs for that season; or almost three times the matchday revenue of a number of Championship clubs in the same season.
This is not wages or transfer fees, nor is it investment in the matchday experience for fans—it is money paid out purely for representation costs, often for work done on both sides of a deal. To put that into context, it is more than the entire annual income of many Championship clubs combined, and this is not just a Premier League problem. Although the sums are relatively smaller further down the pyramid, the pressures are arguably even more acute for clubs with less budget.
My amendment seeks to introduce a straightforward principle—that there should be a fair and proportionate limit on the fees that clubs can pay to agents, and that the limit should be set by regulations made by the Secretary of State subject to affirmative procedure. This would help to ensure full parliamentary oversight and allow future Governments to adjust the cap based on changing market conditions, evidence from the Government’s regulator and broader economic factors in football.
There is already a strong precedent for this kind of intervention. For example, FIFA’s agent regulations now attempt to impose limits on the commissions payable to clubs and players alike, but those rules remain subject to legal challenge and uneven enforcement across jurisdictions. In the absence of effective international enforcement, there is an opportunity for this to be included in the scope of the Government’s regulator as a core part of the financial sustainability of English football.
Mr Lee Dillon (Newbury) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Turner. I have sympathy with what the amendment is trying to achieve, but can the shadow Minister reflect on what it could do to transfers coming into the country? An agent working with Ronaldo could sell him either to an English club, where the fees are capped, or to an Italian, French or Spanish club, where the fees are not capped. Is there a concern that this would limit good players coming into the country?
Mr French
I discussed that consideration with a number of people in the game before we tabled the amendment. The hon. Gentleman mentioned the French, who already cap agents’ fees at 10%. With this amendment, we are not seeking to say what the level should be—that should be determined by the game in consultation—but we are looking for the game to help to set the cap at a level that does not have the impact that he talks about. But it is a fair challenge.
We must remember that the Bill is fundamentally about sustainability. Financial discipline is not just a boardroom concern, but a matter of public trust. Football clubs are more than private enterprises, as we have discussed. They are community institutions. They are the social glue in towns such as Bury, Scunthorpe and Southend, all of which have suffered financial distress in recent years. The idea that hundreds of millions of pounds can leave the game each year in opaque payments to third-party agents while clubs struggle to pay wages, maintain facilities or invest in their academies is becoming increasingly indefensible.
Let us be clear: no one is saying that agents do not have a role. Many provide important professional services, such as legal advice, contract negotiation and logistical support, but the current system lacks transparency, consistency and limits. There are countless examples of agents receiving commissions from both buying and selling clubs on the same deal—a structure that would raise red flags in other regulated industries as a clear conflict of interest. Without a cap, there is little to stop the agents’ arms race escalating even further.
Clubs are forced to pay inflated fees just to stay competitive in the transfer market. In some cases, they are backed into a corner by players who will not sign unless their representative is paid what they demand. That imbalance needs to be addressed, not with heavy-handed bans, but with clear, enforceable limits that ensure agent fees are grounded in reality and tied to the financial position of the English football pyramid. My amendment would allow for the cap to adapt over time, either up or down, depending on the financial context of the day.
This debate also has a clear moral dimension. Football fans—the lifeblood of the game—see money flooding out of the system into offshore accounts while ticket prices rise, lower-league clubs fall into administration, as we have heard, and local facilities are left to deteriorate without needed investment. What message are we sending to those communities if we continue to turn a blind eye to this major issue?
The problem is not new. Lord Sugar famously described agents as “ten percenters” during his time as chairman of Tottenham Hotspur. However, in recent years, that 10% has crept up; we now see cases in which agents walk away with fees amounting to 15% or even 20% of a transfer value, and in some instances with fixed payments that are totally unrelated to the value or complexity of the deal. That is not healthy, efficient or sustainable, and it is not a good use of fans’ hard-earned money.
This amendment is about putting the interests of clubs, fans and the wider game first. In fact, we believe that clubs in the lower leagues would stand to benefit the most. Although some clubs in the top flight can absorb these costs through commercial revenues or broadcast income, those further down the pyramid often spend a disproportionate amount of their limited budgets on agents. That creates a vicious cycle: less money for youth development, community outreach and infrastructure, and more dependence on short-term deals brokered by intermediaries. By capping agent fees, we would take a meaningful step towards ending that cycle. We could help clubs plan more prudently, negotiate more confidently and operate on a fairer playing field. In doing so, we would strengthen the whole system, from the grassroots to the elite.
Let us not forget that the purpose of the Government’s regulator is not to micro-manage football, but to restore public confidence and ensure long-term stability. Agent fees are a glaring blind spot in the current model. If we are willing to regulate ownership tests, financial reporting and fan engagement, surely we must also be willing to act on a financial outflow that directly threatens the viability of many clubs.
This is a proportionate, sensible and timely amendment. It allows the Government to tackle one of the most visible and controversial financial issues in football; it helps preserve flexibility; it respects Parliament; and, most importantly, it places the interests of our clubs, fans and communities above those of unregulated market actors. We have an opportunity to help reshape the financial culture of English football for the better. Introducing a cap on agents’ fees is not only a necessary reform, but the right thing to do.
The Chair
Before we move on, there are one or two points I want to raise. First, we are expecting Divisions on the business in the main Chamber. If there is a Division, we will suspend the Committee for 15 minutes for the first Division, and 10 minutes’ injury time thereafter if required. Secondly, it is a bit warm in this room, so Members are welcome to take off their jackets.
Stephanie Peacock
I thank the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup for his amendment 131. Football is a worldwide industry, and the activity of football agents continues to be a significant contributor to the financial pressures on English football, as well as internationally. We recognise that this is a key issue, which is frequently raised by the industry. Agent fees are a significant cost pressure, particularly on clubs in the Premier League and the Championship. The largest fees are often paid in international transfer activity, where regulation is especially difficult without a global framework. There are also concerns about dual representation and conflicts of interest, which can further inflate costs.
However, the regulator cannot be the solution for all of football’s woes. The Bill establishes a club licensing regime with a tightly defined scope, in which agents are not included. The fan-led review recognised that and recommended pursuing an international and game-wide solution to football agents, rather than trying to address the issue in isolation. Acting unilaterally may end up being disadvantageous to English football. It is right that we follow the review’s recommendation not to try and address the issue in isolation, which reflects the unique scale and complexity of English football’s place in the global game.
I want to make it clear that the Government acknowledge the importance of this issue, and will continue to work with the industry on agents and fees. We will work closely with governing bodies to support full compliance once legal proceedings conclude in the courts, and to drive forward our shared ambition for transparency, integrity and best practice across the game. We will keep this issue under review, but for those reasons, I ask the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment.
Mr French
I have listened carefully to the Minister’s comments and acknowledge a number of the points that she made. The purpose behind the amendment was to have the discussion about the impact of fees on the game. I accept some of her points about the international nature of the transfer market. I would like to continue discussing this with her and the regulator once in situ, because I think there is something we can do here, either formally or informally, to move the game along so that it stops losing so much money to agents’ fees. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Stephanie Peacock
I beg to move amendment 64, in schedule 5, page 103, line 18, after “specified” insert
“from time to time by the IFR”.
This amendment clarifies that the IFR may specify certain elements of the mandatory licence conditions from time to time.
The regulator will attach four mandatory licence conditions—the financial plan, the corporate governance statement, a fan consultation and an annual declaration—to the operating licence, both provisional and full, of each club. This means that all licensed clubs will need to comply with those requirements.
While the mandatory conditions are basic requirements that apply to all licensed clubs as standard, elements within them can be varied. For example, the regulator can specify when a club must submit and update a financial plan, or require that a plan contains additional information. As another example, the fan consultation condition can require that clubs consult plans at specified periods, which speaks to a point that my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East raised earlier.
Government amendment 64 simply makes it explicit that the regulator can respecify these elements to the mandatory licence conditions from time to time. The licensing regime is designed to be flexible and proportionate, and the mandatory licence conditions are no different. For instance, a Premier League club’s financial plan is likely to be more detailed than one for a National League club. If a club’s circumstances change—for instance, if it gets promoted or relegated—the regulator should have a chance to respecify the mandatory licence condition to ensure that it remains proportionate.
The regulator also needs to be able to keep pace with developments in the industry and changes in best practice —for example, if there are innovations in financial plans or mechanisms for fan engagement. Government amendment 64 simply makes that explicit in the Bill.
Amendment 64 agreed to.
Question proposed, That the schedule be the Fifth schedule to the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
The schedule outlines the mandatory licence conditions that the regulator will attach to all licences as standard, regardless of the club’s circumstances. Those conditions are related to core areas of financial management, corporate governance, fan engagement, and reporting. They will form the foundations for the overall improved standards and sustainability of a club. Long-term financial sustainability is at the heart of the Bill, and is vital to making clubs more resilient to financial difficulties.
The financial plan condition requires clubs to present a plan that allows the regulator to understand the risk profile of the club and its plans for mitigating risks if necessary. That will include contingency planning and plans to wind a club back to a sustainable state if it faces unexpected financial difficulty. Those are not overly onerous requirements, but basic business planning that most well-run clubs will already be doing. It is anticipated that the regulator will help clubs update their plans if they exhibit unmanaged risk. If the updated plan still exhibits excessive risk, the regulator can place discretionary licence conditions on a club to help them meet the financial resources threshold requirement. That ensures that clubs can be ambitious but, equally, that failing to achieve those ambitions does not put the long-term financial sustainability of the club at risk.
A key tenet of a well-run business is good corporate governance, and the regulator will look to instil that into all licensed football clubs through the mandatory condition. Corporate governance standards in the industry need improving, with many clubs lacking even the most basic of good governance arrangements, such as a proper, functioning board. In consultation with the Football Association and other relevant stakeholders, the regulator will prepare and publish a code of practice about the corporate governance of regulated football clubs. Through that condition, licensed clubs will be required to submit a statement detailing how they are applying the code of practice. That will include what action they are taking to improve equality, diversity and inclusion.
Given the rich variety of clubs and fanbases, good supporter consultation will look different from one club to another. The fan engagement licence condition has been designed to reflect that, empowering the regulator to impose specific requirements on the form and frequency of supporter consultation where necessary. That mandatory licence condition works in tandem with the fan engagement threshold requirement, which is in schedule 4. The mandatory licence condition will be the minimum requirement for all clubs.
Stephanie Peacock
I will address some of my hon. Friend’s points, if he bears with me for a moment. If I do not, I will be very happy to give way.
All clubs must regularly consult a representative group of fans or a group elected by the club’s fans to represent them on the relevant matters listed in the Bill. The regulator can specify that the group is formed via fan elections—an additional measure the Government added to ensure the fan group can be independent from the club. The threshold requirement in schedule 4 then empowers the regulator to go further on fan engagement, if needed. It allows the regulator to impose discretionary licence conditions on clubs relating to fan consultation. There are several types of fan engagement that could be used to meet that requirement. No one way has been specified on the face of the Bill in order to allow for a bespoke approach to be taken at each club. We expect, however, that we would likely look to utilise existing structures where appropriate. Those would likely be organisations such as supporters’ trusts or fan advisory boards, which are often key independent fan bodies.
To address the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East, for the most part, individual clubs will be in the best position to understand the demographics of their fans. The regulator will be able to provide guidance for clubs on how best to consult fans, which will include how to approach consulting across a widespread fan base. It is, however, vital that they engage with a representative group of fans, and therefore, if a section of the fan base has not been engaged with, the regulator has the ability to specify the club should meet with them. That will ensure that clubs have an appropriate framework in place that allows them to meet regularly and consult the group on key strategic matters and supporter interest.
Clubs in the lower leagues will tend to have more a more local fan base, whereas larger clubs will tend to have fans from across the world. That diversity is part of the reason why the English football pyramid is so special. It is also why we want to implement proportional and flexible proposals that work for clubs across the pyramid. The regulator will implement a minimum requirement for fan engagement, which the regular fan consultations will be a significant part of, alongside protections for club heritage. I hope that answers my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East. I am happy to give way if not, or he can contribute to the debate.
Stephanie Peacock
Perfect. The annual declaration condition requires a club to submit an annual declaration to the regulator, which sets out all the notifications that the club has made, or should have made, to the regulator in the preceding 12 months. Broadly speaking, these notifications relate to changes in the circumstances affecting the club that the regulator needs to know about to regulate effectively. That includes any non-compliance related to the club. A club will also have to issue a statement even if there are not any matters to notify the regulator about. That will create a formal touchpoint each year in lieu of any licence renewal; the emphasis will be on clubs to declare all relevant changes in circumstances and compliance against which they can then be held accountable.
Mr Betts
It is a pleasure to have you back in the Chair, Mr Turner. The Minister is doing all she can to deal with situations that will apply to most clubs. The problem is those owners that do not want to engage. They will try to avoid this responsibility because they see it as an infringement of their right to run their club in the way they want.
I have to come back to Sheffield Wednesday because Mr Chansiri has a track record on this. He set up an engagement panel with fans, but he invited the fan groups he wanted to invite. Worse than that, once someone goes into a meeting with him, they have to sign a statement to say that they will not divulge any of the things that happen in that meeting. It is a closed shop.
I sat down with a myriad of different groups including the supporters’ trust, which is the biggest fan group by a long way, and several other groups, including the women’s group and the 1867 group. We formed an umbrella group to try to bring all the fan groups together. The club spoke to the groups and said, “If you get involved in the umbrella group, you will not be allowed on the engagement panel.” It is either/or because that is seen as an attack on the club and the chairman. You could not make it up—well, you can make it up, because we can see how the club is run. That is the problem.
How do we get around that situation? I was told the other day, “The chairman engages with fans. He has actually had two meetings of five hours each with fans.” But he does not answer any questions. When I asked one of the officers at the club why he will not answer questions, they said, “Well, they wanted to know what his business plan was.” It is not a bad question to ask, and that is exactly what the regulator is going to have the powers to do.
I am still not absolutely certain on what happens when the club tries to control the situation. Does the regulator then arbitrate? Does the regulator come in and say what they think good fan engagement looks like? It would be very helpful if the Football Supporters’ Association were to be given some role in that, because it understands fan engagement and fan involvement better than anyone. It knows what happens on the ground, it knows the tricks that the clubs pull and it knows how genuine fan engagement can be developed and implemented. I am not sure a new regulator will necessarily have all that intrinsic knowledge about what happens at clubs. Some role for the FSA in this would be helpful. In particular, it would help when problems arise of the sort that I have just explained.
I am sure Sheffield Wednesday are not the only club where owners do not really want fans around—they just want them to turn up, pay their money and go away. The Chair probably cannot get involved in the debate, but I can see you nodding, Mr Turner, because I am aware that there have been a few problems at Hull in that regard in the past. I ask that the Minister provide a bit more of an explanation and flesh this out further. In particular, sub-paragraph 8(2) reads:
“So far as the condition requires consultation with persons within sub-paragraph (1)(a), the condition may require the club to constitute a group of such persons”.
I know immediately how some clubs will constitute that group, and it will not be proper fan consultation.
Stephanie Peacock
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his contribution. We would obviously expect the regulator to build on relevant expertise internally and via consultation. I have worked with and met representatives of the FSA a number of times. I pay tribute to the work they do, and I am sure that is the sort of group that the regulator will very much draw on.
My hon. Friend will completely understand why I am slightly reluctant to comment on live examples. That does not mean that I am not sympathetic to the points he makes on behalf of his constituents. I draw his attention to my remarks about how, if a section of the fanbase is not being engaged with, the regulator has the ability to require a meeting with the club. Where an owner or a club are not engaging, or not engaging effectively, the regulator will be able to intervene.
Mr Betts
It is helpful of the Minister to have elaborated on that. Would she go a bit further and say whether she anticipates that the regulator will engage with the Football Supporters’ Association when difficulties arise and there needs to be an independent look at fan engagement with a club?
Stephanie Peacock
We have talked about the regulator engaging with a wide range of stakeholders. We anticipate throughout the Bill—in lots of clauses, not just this one—that it will absolutely engage with relevant stakeholders.
If a certain group of fans feel that they are being ignored or excluded, or that the owner is not engaging in good faith or appropriately, the regulator has the ability to step in and specify that they should be engaged with more frequently, and sanctions may be imposed if the owner is not behaving correctly. There are enforcement powers that the regulator can draw on. We are clear that, although the approach is flexible and bespoke for different clubs, the voices of fans should be heard.
Question put and agreed to.
Schedule 5, as amended, accordingly agreed to.
Clause 21
Discretionary licence conditions
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
The clause relates to the discretionary licence conditions. Where needed, the regulator will use discretionary licence conditions to bring a club up to the required level of compliance with the threshold requirements. That will mean that the regulator is satisfied that the club can currently operate sustainably, and will be able to continue to continue to do so, in the financial, non-financial and fan engagement areas. Those conditions will be in addition to the standardised mandatory licence conditions. When applied, they will be tailored to the club’s specific circumstances and identified financial risk.
If a club is already meeting the threshold requirements set by the regulator, there will be no need to attach any discretionary licence conditions to that end. That means that the regulator can be light touch where appropriate, and that it does not need to directly intervene if a desired outcome is already being met.
Discretionary licence conditions could also be used to protect and promote the financial resilience of the football system. They will be used to resolve risks that might not threaten any one club significantly, but whose aggregated, correlated or multiplied effects may pose a significant risk to large parts of the football system or the pyramid as a whole. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Mr French
The clause formally sets out the regulator’s powers to attach, amend or remove discretionary licence conditions, which could bring a club toward meeting a threshold requirement or mitigate financial risks. It raises some concern about mission creep, so I hope the Minister will assure us that the regulator’s powers do not extend beyond those objectives. Should the regulator use the powers to effectively create new burdensome regulatory requirements, that would significantly change the purpose of the regulator.
Will the Minister please clarify what engagement the regulator will have with clubs to ensure they are aware of the discretionary licence conditions? Will there be any consultation or engagement with clubs prior to attaching or amending a discretionary condition? Will clubs have the ability to request a variation or removal of a condition? In what timeframe will that be processed?
If a club feels that a discretionary licence condition has been placed arbitrarily or punitively, how can it appeal or challenge the condition? What will the process look like, and what timescales will be used? Will the timescales be standardised, or will they be at the regulator’s discretion? Although some larger clubs may have the resources and budgets to appeal a condition, what support will be given to smaller clubs? Have the Government considered the potential merit of a tiered application based on the club’s size?
Aside from the concern about mission creep, it is important that these powers are exercised proportionately and based on evidence. Will there be any oversight of their use to ensure that happens? Subsection (4) states:
“The IFR may vary a discretionary licence condition where…the IFR considers that the condition is no longer effective, or…there has been a material change in circumstances”.
However, it fails to define what constitutes a material change in circumstances. The lack of such a definition leaves the door open for the Independent Football Regulator to vary conditions without sufficient reasons or evidence.
We ask those questions now because we are concerned about future legal cases if there is a lack of consistency and transparency surrounding how the conditions are applied. I would appreciate some answers from the Minister.
Stephanie Peacock
I am grateful to the shadow Minister for those questions. Throughout this process, we have been keen to reiterate that discretionary conditions must be proportionate to the club’s size and the league it plays in. We absolutely expect the regulator to engage thoroughly with a club before applying any discretionary licence conditions. Perhaps I could just draw on the conversation that we had in the previous debate in terms of fan engagement: I am hesitant to get into hypothetical scenarios, but it might be that, if a club is not effectively engaging with fans, that could be a discretionary licence condition if there is an obvious gap in what the club is doing. If the club does not believe the regulator has made a correct decision, it does have recourse through the appeals process, which is set out in part 9.
We want this to be a flexible regime so it can be light touch where appropriate. If the regulator does not need to attach extra conditions, it will not, but it will have that ability to make sure that all clubs are meeting the conditions they need to.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 22
Scope of powers to attach or vary discretionary licence conditions
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 108, in clause 22, page 14, line 37, leave out subsection (c).
This amendment prevents the IFR from being able to set licence conditions relating to the overall expenditure of a club.
Amendment 109, in clause 22, page 15, line 12, leave out subsection (5).
This amendment removes the power of the Secretary of State to amend the discretionary licence conditions by regulations.
Mr French
I rise to speak on clause 22 of this important Bill, which provides the Independent Football Regulator with powers to attach, amend and remove discretionary licence conditions for individual football clubs. At face value, this clause offers the regulator flexibility to respond to particular risks or circumstances on a case-by-case basis. However, as with all regulatory discretion, the true implications lie in how such powers may evolve over time, be interpreted, or be expanded.
In this Committee, it is our role to ensure that what begins as a sensible framework for tailored intervention does not become the thin end of a wedge that risks overreach, centralisation and, ultimately, the erosion of club autonomy. I believe strongly that English football does need reform in certain areas, but I also believe in restraint, clarity of purpose and fidelity to the principle that football clubs, however commercial they may have become, are civic institutions first and foremost. They belong to their communities, not to Whitehall, not to arm’s length bodies, and certainly not to ministerial discretion.
Clause 22, as drafted, gives the Independent Football Regulator a wide and open-ended ability to impose additional conditions on individual clubs—conditions that are not part of the baseline threshold requirements in the Bill, but which the regulator may, in its own judgment, decide are appropriate. We should acknowledge that there are circumstances in which such powers might be necessary. For example, where a club has narrowly avoided insolvency, has a particularly opaque ownership structure, or is operating under unusual financial pressures, the regulator may wish to impose temporary conditions to help safeguard the public interest, protect creditors or ensure better transparency.
That flexibility has its place. However, it must be anchored in the principles of proportionality, accountability and predictability. It is for that reason that I want to speak to three amendments that have been tabled in my name, each of which I believe would help materially improve the Bill by preventing mission creep, protecting the distinct role of the leagues, and ensuring that Parliament, not the Executive, retains the ultimate authority over the scope of regulation.
The first amendment would prevent the regulator from imposing discretionary conditions relating to a club’s internal controls—that is, the systems and procedures by which a club governs itself, monitors risks, approves spending and safeguards assets. These are matters properly for the board of directors, who have legal duties under company law, are accountable to shareholders and fans, and must answer to independent auditors.
To allow the regulator to second guess those internal arrangements and dictate how a club structures its finance team or risk-management processes would be a significant intrusion into corporate governance territory. Let us be clear: there is a distinction between requiring that a club has adequate systems and mandating the precise nature of those systems. The former is reasonable; the latter, we believe, is excessive.
We must also be mindful of the danger that the regulator could, perhaps with good intentions, begin to substitute its own preferred model of governance over the perfectly legitimate models that clubs themselves decide to adopt. For example, what works for a large Premier League club with international operations may not be appropriate or affordable for a League Two club or a community-owned side. Discretionary licensing conditions must not become a one-size-fits-all instrument that penalises innovation, tradition or diversity in club structures.
I support this amendment because it would help ringfence those areas of internal decision making that are rightly matters for the club’s board—subject to transparency and good practice but not for centralised prescription.
The second amendment that I have tabled would prevent the regulator from imposing licensing conditions relating to a club’s overall expenditure. Amendment 108 would prevent the regulator from imposing licence conditions relating to a club’s overall expenditure. This is a fundamental issue. English football operates within a competitive ecosystem, as we have discussed. Decisions about how much to invest in players, infrastructure, academies or commercial operations are matters of strategic importance for clubs. They should be driven by ambition, fan demand and commercial opportunity, not by the regulator’s view of what is appropriate spending.
We must not fall into the trap of conflating good financial regulation with financial central planning. The role of the Independent Football Regulator should be to monitor solvency, ensure robust business plans, enforce transparency and intervene when there are clear risks of harm. It is not the regulator’s job, and it should never become its job, to determine how much a club is allowed to spend. There is a world of difference between assessing whether spending is sustainable and attempting to control outright the volume of that spending.
Let us remember that the leagues themselves already impose cost controls. The Premier League has profit and sustainability rules. The English Football League enforces squad salary caps and financial fair play frameworks, and now has the new financial review panel. The regulator is not meant to replace those roles. It is not a shadow competition authority, nor should it seek to override club investment decisions, which often have complex justifications and long-term returns.
Amendment 108 would help to ensure that the regulator cannot use its discretionary power to micromanage investment levels. Such a step would go beyond the spirit and the letter of what the Bill intends to achieve. The goal is to protect clubs from existential risk, not to homogenise them or stifle ambition.
Amendment 109 would remove the Secretary of State’s power to amend the list of discretionary licence conditions by regulation. This is not a technical point; it goes to the constitutional heart of the Bill. The Independent Football Regulator must be just that: independent. Its scope, duties and powers must be defined by Parliament and subject to oversight. We cannot accept a model in which future Secretaries of State, by regulation and with minimal scrutiny, can expand the areas the regulator may interfere with. That would allow a future Government of any colour to alter the regulatory perimeter at will. Today, it might be internal controls; tomorrow, it might be club ticket pricing, political messaging or hiring policies. The clause must be narrowed to ensure that any expansion of discretionary licence conditions comes through primary legislation that is debated and approved by both Houses.
Regulatory stability is vital not only for clubs but for fans, leagues and the broader football economy. Clubs, particularly those in the lower leagues, need to be able to plan over multiple seasons. Uncertainty about what new regulatory burdens might be imposed, or fears that the regime could be altered mid-season by ministerial decree, will have a chilling effect on investment, sponsorship and ambition. Regulation must be predictable and principled, not politicised or ever-shifting. Amendment 109 would safeguard its integrity.
Clause 22 presents a risk of regulatory overreach, however well-intentioned it may be. The amendments would not strip the regulator of useful tools. They would simply place guardrails around its discretion and ensure that decisions of fundamental importance to club governance, financial independence and regulatory scope remain where they belong: with clubs, fans and Parliament.
We need a regulator that enforces minimum standards, upholds transparency and ensures financial resilience. What we do not need is a regulator that micromanages club affairs or displaces the judgment of boards and owners. Football clubs must remain free to compete, to innovate and to fail or succeed on their own merits—within a fair framework, yes, but not under constant intervention.
The amendments reinforce that principle. They are not ideological; they are practical, measured and consistent with the values that underpin the Bill. I urge the Committee to support them and, in doing so, to send a clear signal that we are legislating not to control football but to support it firmly, fairly and with the long-term interests of the game at heart.
Stephanie Peacock
I thank the shadow Minister for tabling the amendments, which I will take in turn in responding to the points that he made.
Broadly, amendments 107 and 108 concern integral powers for a financial regulator. Limiting those powers by reducing the scope of the regulator’s discretionary licence conditions would jeopardise its ability to achieve its objectives. On internal controls, the conditions cover areas such as the completeness and accuracy of reporting and information from a club, and continued compliance with the rules and regulations. If the regulator had no power to intervene to improve those areas where it was deemed necessary, it would not be able to bring a club up to its non-financial threshold requirement, and therefore the club would be unable to obtain a full operating licence.
Similarly, not allowing a financial regulator to require a club to limit its future expenditure to a sustainable amount, for example, would be self-defeating. This is a financial regulator, and it should have the power to intervene in a club’s finances if necessary, but—to respond directly to one of the points made by the shadow Minister —while it can direct the club to reduce expenditure, it cannot specify exactly how that is done, which is for the club to decide.
The regulator may only set licence conditions in such areas if a club is not meeting its threshold requirements. Any condition must be proportionate to the issue identified. The regulator must also have regard to whether the requirement or restriction is necessary and to whether a similar outcome could be achieved by a less burdensome means, as per the principles.
Mr French
I will repeat my arguments, but I listened carefully to the Minister’s response and we remain concerned about various aspects of the clause. That is why we tabled not just one, but three amendments, to try to put some safeguards and guardrails around future powers of the IFR, as I said.
Fundamentally, we believe that the ultimate responsibility for managing clubs should be that of the clubs themselves, while engaging with the fans, and we fear that without some of our amendments, the IFR will be too involved with the day-to-day running of clubs. That is why we tabled the amendments. We listened carefully to the Minister, but I am afraid that we are not fully satisfied, so we will press them to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Stephanie Peacock
Clause 21 outlined the use of discretionary licence conditions, which can be used to bring clubs up to the threshold requirements for a full operating licence, if necessary. They can also be applied to clubs with a full licence if there is a risk that they might drop below the threshold requirements.
Clause 22 sets out the scope of powers that the regulator will have to attach or vary a discretionary licence condition. Under the financial resources threshold requirement, discretionary conditions may address only four areas: debt management, liquidity requirements, restricting a club’s overall expenditure and restricting a club’s ability to receive illicit finance. The fourth area, which enables the regulator to restrict a club’s ability to access funding if it has reasonable grounds to suspect it is connected to serious criminal conduct, is integral. It will empower the regulator to limit illicit finance, which is inherently unsustainable for a club.
Under the non-financial resources threshold requirement, conditions may relate to only one of three areas: internal controls, risk management and financial reporting. As outlined in clause 21, the regulator can also attach discretionary licence conditions to advance its systemic financial resilience objective. That objective is specifically to address systemic risks or structural issues by applying conditions to multiple clubs, or even to all licensed clubs. Clause 22 limits the scope of such conditions to those that relate to debt management or liquidity requirements, and those restricting a club’s overall expenditure.
In order to future-proof the regulator’s regime, the Secretary of State will have the power to amend the areas that discretionary licence conditions may relate to. However, as we have discussed, that can be done only if the regulator makes a request in writing to the Secretary of State, having carried out a consultation first, explaining why an amendment is needed by reference to the purpose of the Act. We have also made it explicit in the legislation that the regulator must consult all regulated clubs and each specified competition organiser before requesting any amendments. That means that the Secretary of State will not be able to amend the regulator’s powers to attach discretionary conditions on their own initiative and against the wishes of the regulator, which, as I said, will limit the risk of unwanted, politically motivated scope creep in the future. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 22 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 23
Procedure for attaching or varying financial discretionary licence conditions
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause 24 stand part.
Schedule 6.
Clause 25 stand part.
Stephanie Peacock
Clause 23 sets out the procedure for attaching or varying financial discretionary licence conditions on clubs, which ensures that clubs and competition organisers are notified and given the appropriate opportunity to engage in advance when the regulator considers that a discretionary licence condition is needed. Where appropriate, the regulator will look to allow the relevant club and league to address identified issues and risks, so that the regulator does not have to formally intervene itself. That will allow the potential for the football industry to respond to issues, reducing regulatory intervention and producing a better regulatory response and outcome. The industry may be best placed to address specific issues within the overall context of a league’s own regulatory framework.
Before any action is taken by the regulator, there will be a period in which leagues and clubs are able to make representations, and the competition organiser will also be able to give a commitment to take action in lieu of the condition being attached or varied as proposed by the regulator. Clause 24 explains in further detail the mechanism for commitments in lieu of discretionary financial licence conditions. It is a final, formal opportunity for competition organisers to offer a self-regulatory solution to a problem identified by the regulator, so that the regulator does not have to step in. It is another important aspect of the regulator’s approach, which emphasises engagement and working with the industry to minimise formal intervention where possible. The regulator will still have powers to step in if the issue is not resolved, but the mechanism will give a competition organiser the chance to present a football industry-led solution to an identified risk.
The regulator can accept a commitment if it concludes that it should achieve the same results as the proposed discretionary licence condition and it does not conflict with the regulator’s objectives. The regulator does not have to accept the commitment, although, if it does not, it must provide reasons why. If a commitment proposed by a league will not achieve the regulator’s desired outcome, the regulator can reject it, and it will retain the power to intervene directly by imposing a discretionary licence condition on a club where any accepted commitment proves ineffective.
Schedule 6 expands on clause 24 by outlining the procedure where a competition organiser gives a commitment that the regulator is minded to accept, or requests a variation to a commitment in force, in lieu of the regulator’s attaching a financial discretionary licence condition to a club. The intention, as I referenced earlier, is for commitments to provide a less burdensome solution for all parties and still address the identified risk. However, for that to be the case, it is important that there is a clear procedure for interaction between clubs, the relevant competition organisers and the regulator, and the schedule sets out that procedure in further detail. Clubs can make representations to the regulator before accepting a commitment from a competition organiser, as well as before a competition organiser is released from a commitment.
Clause 25 sets out the procedure for the regulator to attach or vary a discretionary licence condition relating to the non-financial resources threshold requirement or the fan engagement threshold requirement. The regulator must notify the club and give it a period of no less than 14 days to make representations, but the clause allows the regulator to take more immediate action in situations that are more urgent and serious: if it thinks that giving a club notice and allowing a period for representations will jeopardise or risk jeopardising one of its objectives, it can apply the discretionary licence condition immediately and without prior notice. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Mr French
Clause 23 sets out the process that the Government’s new regulator must follow when it wishes to attach or vary a financial discretionary licence condition, which are by definition additional obligations that the regulator may impose on clubs that go beyond the mandatory licensing framework. In doing so, the clause confers on the regulator considerable further discretion. As with other discretionary powers in the Bill, the risk is not merely that the regulator uses its discretion, but that it does so inconsistently, unpredictably or in a way that strays beyond its core remit. Given that the powers provided by the clause relate directly to the financial obligations of clubs, the implications for competitiveness, investment and long-term planning are significant.
Although it is welcome that the clause does not set out a consultative process for how the financial conditions are imposed or amended, the process must not be a box-ticking exercise. Clubs should be able to challenge unreasonable conditions, and the regulator should be required to justify in clear terms why any new financial burden is necessary to meet the threshold requirements. It cannot become the case that discretionary conditions are routinely imposed as a back-door method of raising standards in areas for which Parliament has not explicitly legislated.
The risk of regulatory mission creep is particularly acute in a sector like football, in which the boundaries between finance, governance and culture are easily blurred. That is why we will be looking closely at whether there are sufficient checks, balances and transparency mechanisms in the clause to protect clubs from arbitrary financial conditions. Will the regulator issue any guidance on financial discretionary licence conditions, and will that guidance be made public? Will the Minister consider requiring an annual report to Parliament detailing how many clubs have had such discretionary financial conditions imposed, varied or removed, and on what grounds those decisions were made?
Without such checks, there is a real risk of an unequal competition taking place without fans and Parliament knowing, until it is too late and UEFA and FIFA have ejected us from their competitions. That is what I most fear may happen by accident. As we have discussed at length, the Bill is already flawed in this respect, and UEFA and FIFA would intervene if the regulator caused any impact on competitiveness. I only have to highlight the example of Crystal Palace, which is currently in the press, to demonstrate that UEFA and FIFA will stick to their rules rigidly, whether we like them or not. As I said when speaking to my amendment 97, any new licensing requirements introduced by the IFR must be meticulously aligned with existing UEFA and international frameworks.
Does the Minister accept that clubs, as entities directly impacted by licensing regulations, must have a voice in the development and implementation of these requirements? As the clause stands, her new regulator will be able to attach or vary financial licence conditions that would that mean one club becomes more competitive than another. She has said that she intends for the regulator to be able to adapt to the circumstances of each club. However, we must be mindful that that would mean changing the level of competitiveness between clubs. That is the key risk. That is not a political point; it is sadly a risk and a fact of which we have to be mindful.
Let me stress-test that with a hypothetical question for the Minister on the Bill’s impact. Brighton & Hove Albion and Aston Villa will both compete in the Premier League next season, both have been in that league for a number of years, and both also compete for European football. If her regulator decided, for whatever reason, that Brighton required stricter or simply more financial licensing conditions than Aston Villa, there would be a competitive imbalance between the teams. Does she accept that fact, which is plainly obvious, and recognise that such club-by-club tailoring of rules and licence conditions is potentially a violation of UEFA and FIFA rules on fair competition? To give her a bit of time, I ask her to respond to that concern after I have spoken about the other provisions in the group.
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
My hon. Friend the shadow Minister sets out his question very well. It sounds as though the situation could get very complicated, especially over time, as the regulator might impose certain conditions on certain clubs and severely distort the market. Does he have any comment on that?
Mr French
That is exactly my concern. In trying to tailor the conditions that we are discussing, there is a risk of inadvertently impacting the ability of clubs to compete on a fair and level playing field. I am concerned that that should not happen inadvertently, as the regulator evolves. That is why I keep pushing for more parliamentary oversight, so that we understand the risks. At the end of the day, fans will not forgive us as Members of this House if this goes wrong. I do not believe in any shape or form that the Government are aiming deliberately to get it wrong—I say that openly—but I fear that there will be unintended consequences, and that is the broader point that we have been trying to make in a number of the Committee’s debates.
Stephanie Peacock
Clause 23 already tightly constrains the regulator’s ability to set discretionary licence conditions, and the shadow Minister’s earlier amendment sought to tighten that further, but it would have left the regulator unable to act as necessary to ensure financially sustainable clubs. It would have been unable to manage unsustainable debt or spiralling spending.
The regulator must act in accordance with its objectives and duties at all times, which include transparency and consistency. It can tailor regulation to clubs that will not breach UEFA statutes. I draw hon. Members’ attentions to page 14 of the Bill, which outlines in detail the scope of the powers to attach or vary licence conditions. Of course, a discretionary licence condition relating to the financial resource threshold requirement may only, as I said earlier,
“relate to debt management…relate to liquidity requirements…restrict the club’s overall expenditure, or…restrict the club’s ability to accept or receive funding which the IFR reasonably suspects to be connected to serious criminal conduct.”
We expect the regulator to work with clubs. If they are acting in good faith, we have said all along that the regulator will work with them. I think that answers the shadow Minister’s points.
In my opening remarks on this clause, I outlined in detail that there is a process available to come to a football-led solution. If the regulator thinks that giving a club notice or allowing for representations would jeopardise or risk jeopardising one of its objectives, it can apply the licence condition immediately, without prior notice. However, there is scope within the Bill and the regulator’s powers to reach football-led solutions in which it works together with clubs.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 23 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 24 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 6 agreed to.
Clause 25 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 26
Part 4: overview and interpretation
Max Wilkinson (Cheltenham) (LD)
I beg to move amendment 75, in clause 26, page 19, line 20, at end insert—
“(c) respects and promotes the protection of human rights and prevents modern slavery (as set out in section [Human rights and modern slavery considerations]).”
This amendment is linked to NC8.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 8—Human rights and modern slavery considerations—
“(1) When considering whether a person (‘A’) satisfies the requirement in section 26(7)(c), the Regulator shall have regard to (among other things)—
(a) whether A has been complicit in any egregious or consistent violation(s) of international human rights law, whether of any international human rights treaty, customary law, or other instrument,
(b) whether A has been convicted, cautioned or reprimanded or complicit in any egregious or consistent violation(s) of domestic human rights legislation, including breaching provisions in the UK Modern Slavery Act 2015 or equivalent national legislation,
(c) whether A has been subject to a Slavery and Trafficking Prevention Order,
(d) whether A has been found liable in a civil claim relating to a human rights violation,
(e) whether A has been convicted of an offence, cautioned or reprimanded for failing to comply with their human rights and modern slavery reporting and due diligence obligations under applicable domestic legislation,
(f) any representations made by A or the club in accordance with the notice.
(2) In subsection (1)—
(a) where A is a body corporate or other non-corporeal entity (including a government or nation state), the Regulator shall consider the actions of anyone who controls that body corporate or entity (and “control” shall have the meaning given in section 255 of the Companies Act 2006). and
(b) the Regulator shall have absolute discretion to determine whether conduct falls within any of the categories in paragraphs (a) to (d).
(3) In respect of subsection (1)(c) and (d), a risk of disrepute shall not be valid grounds for disqualification of any person if such disrepute would, in the reasonable opinion of the Regulator, be unfounded.
(4) In accordance with Schedule 2, Part 2, paragraph 15, the Regulator may establish a committee or committees to discharge its functions under this Clause.”
This new clause would prohibit individuals with a record of human rights abuses from club ownership.
Max Wilkinson
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Turner. The amendment would prohibit individuals with a record of human rights abuses from club ownership. Our national game is a source of huge pride to our country and everyone in this room. It should not be exploited by individuals and regimes that want to launder their reputations using some of our greatest cultural and sporting assets.
Strengthening the proprietary tests for prospective owners and directors, with clear tests about human rights, would enable UK football to promote and protect what we know is special about our game and would promote and protect the liberal and democratic western values that we all hold so dear. It is wrong that we allow football to roll out the red carpet for despots. Let us consider a future in which the owner or potential owner of a football club is also the head of a state or a Minister in the Government of a foreign state that suppresses its own people or is involved in illegal military action, perhaps in a failed state. That owner is also clearly financially linked to activities that involve the plunder of that failed state’s mineral wealth. If that person were to be linked directly to such action, which breaches international human rights laws, would this Government, football and this country accept it? We think that we should not, and that is why we have tabled the amendment and the new clause.
Mr French
I thank the Liberal Democrat spokesperson for explaining the objectives behind the amendment, which is aimed at preventing individuals with a record of human rights abuses from owning a club. My question for the hon. Member is about new clause 8(2)(b), which states that
“the Regulator shall have absolute discretion to determine whether conduct falls within any of the categories in paragraphs (a) to (d).”
In other words, it will have discretion to determine whether such conduct constitutes human rights abuses. Given we are talking about a football regulator, the obvious question to ask is about what qualifications the regulator would need to make such a decision. What information could they rely on? Would we be looking for Government involvement in that, given that that would probably provide the intellectual experience required? Does the hon. Member for Cheltenham think it might improve the new clause to include a route of appeal against such a decision, as a matter of natural justice, so we are seen to give individuals the right of appeal if they believe that they have been wrongly classified?
Joe Robertson
I have sympathy with the aims of the amendments, but I also have a few questions. I wonder whether the wording in the Bill about “requisite honesty and integrity” might cover the issue that the hon. Member for Cheltenham is trying to deal with in new clause 8. I note that amendment 75 would do more that protect against owners with a record of human rights abuses, because it would require them to promote human rights. I obviously have no problem with people promoting human rights, but the amendment would put a duty on an owner to do something positive to show that they are fit and proper. I wonder whether that is really the hon. Member’s intention.
Stephanie Peacock
It is once again a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Turner. I thank the hon. Member for Cheltenham for tabling his amendments. It is absolutely right that clubs should have suitable owners, which is why the new statutory owners and directors test is a key focus of the regulatory regime. Because we have provided the regulator with statutory powers, including information-gathering powers and information-sharing gateways with other government agencies such as His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, the regulator will be better placed to apply all elements of its tests than the relevant leagues. Unlike the tests used by the leagues, the regulator will assess owners’ and officers’ suitability in the round, as well as any relevant mitigating circumstances, leading to a better determination of whether an individual is suitable.
A core part of the owners and directors test is the fitness test, which the hon. Gentleman’s amendments seek to expand. The individual ownership fitness test criteria—honesty and integrity, and financial soundness—have been carefully designed. The relevant matters the regulator must consider are listed in clause 37, which I will speak to in a later sitting. They are based on precedent, and are specifically relevant to whether someone is suitable to be an owner of a football club.
All individuals will be tested against the same criteria. I reassure the hon. Gentleman that much of what his amendments seek to achieve is already delivered by the Bill as drafted. In line with the relevant matters listed in clause 37, if an individual has had legal proceedings brought against them, whether civil or criminal, including in the international courts, the regulator must have regard to that.
The regulator will also look at whether the individual has had regulatory or disciplinary action of any kind brought against them. If that action has a bearing on their honesty or integrity, the regulator must take that into account and could potentially find them unsuitable on that basis. That means that offences under the Modern Slavery Act 2015 or equivalent legislation, whether in the UK or elsewhere, are already captured by the Bill’s owners and directors test, as are any behaviours that have given rise to legal, regulatory or disciplinary action against the owner in any forum, as well as egregious actions committed outside the UK that can be proven and that would have been criminal if done here. In addition, the regulator will consider whether any individual is sanctioned by the UK Government—for example, because of their connection to a foreign state. The regulator will take those things very seriously.
Where the amendments go further than existing drafting, however, we believe they are not appropriate. New clause 8 gives the regulator absolute discretion to determine who is “complicit” in violations, but complicity is not a clear legal test. That would fundamentally undermine the general principle of how the test is applied, and would lead to a subjective decision. The Bill, as drafted, ensures that any negative determination the regulator makes must be evidence-based. It will test every individual against the same criteria. It is crucial that it remains that way. The new clause also states that the regulator can establish a committee to help make decisions about owners. We agree that it is important that the regulator can do that, which is why it is already possible under schedule 2, so there is no need for the amendment.
The shadow Minister also spoke about appeals, which we will come on to when we debate clause 28. For the reasons that I have set out, I ask the hon. Member for Cheltenham to withdraw his amendment and not to move the new clause.
Max Wilkinson
I am reassured by what the Minister has said. The points raised by Conservative Members are all valid and we will take them on board.
On the point about honour and integrity, I suggest that the kind of people who commit these crimes will not admit to them readily. In cases that may arise, it may be obvious that something has happened only after some time, and individuals who we know have been doing something might end up owning football clubs. If that were to occur in the near future, we might reflect on today’s discussion and the powers that the regulator might have had.
We do not intend to press the amendment to a vote—we recognise the numbers in the room—but I am glad that we have put the debate on the record. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
We have seen too many instances of unsuitable custodians mismanaging clubs, taking risks that jeopardise a club’s long-term future, and disregarding the interests of fans and communities. It is evident that the industry’s existing tests have not been effective enough at screening and rooting out bad actors. Existing tests are conducted on a self-declaration basis, as the hon. Member for Cheltenham just mentioned. Consequently, those tests have allowed in owners who have long histories of business bankruptcies, and owners have later been imprisoned for crimes including money laundering.
That is why part 4 of the Bill establishes strong, new statutory owners and directors tests, including by giving the regulator the power to test the suitability of prospective new owners and officers before they can enter regulated clubs, as well as the power to test incumbent owners and officers in certain circumstances. The clause provides an overview of part 4 and signposts to the rest of the clauses in this part of the Bill. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Mr Dillon
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Turner. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (Clive Jones) for tabling new clause 15. It is the result of close co-operation between local parliamentarians and the Supporters Trust at Reading, which I have mentioned previously. I thank it for its constructive approach to the Bill.
The new clause mandates that individuals must notify the IFR if they are aware of any evidence that indicates a change in circumstances that could affect the ability of club owners or key personnel who are essential to the management and survival of football clubs to meet the statutory fitness criteria set forth in clause 26. It is widely recognised that whistleblowing is a vital tool for public scrutiny and accountability of individuals, and that wrongdoing and bad practice need to be called out. It is therefore essential that there are protections to encourage people to speak out. The new clause seeks to flesh out formal whistleblowing routes with regard to football ownership. Although I welcome and recognise the detail already included in the Bill on that, we need to go much further.
We need to expand the list of groups and stakeholders who would be required to report any concerns that they have about the suitability of owners or officers, including the governing body for the relevant league, the football supporters’ trust and the Football Supporters’ Association. It is often the case that those stakeholders have more knowledge about the day-to-day operations inside a club than fans, due to their proximity to the club’s inner workings. As many fans do not have the same connection or influence as such organisations, it is vital to provide a strong and accessible voice for them when issues arise, particularly when evidence concerning the survival of a club comes to light.
It is essential that the individuals listed in new clause 15 have the opportunity and route to escalate their concerns when necessary. If we take as an example my local EFL club, Reading, there may have been some people in the EFL and in the club itself who had suspicions about the deteriorating situation at the club long before those problems came to the surface and to the attention of the fanbase. If this new clause had been in place, it would have given stakeholders a formal route to raise such concerns and ensure that Dai Yongge was scrutinised properly. That could have gone some way to resolving the situation before the club ended up teetering on the brink; it is only recently that it has been sold and been able to recover.
To conclude, new clause 15 would enable accountability and monitoring of owners during their time in charge. Football club owners are temporary custodians of heritage assets that are vital to our communities; at the very least they should face regular scrutiny. It is for those reasons that I hope new clause 15 is accepted.
Joe Robertson
Once again, I have some sympathy with the aims of the new clause and I see where the hon. Member is trying to go with it. However, as it is currently drafted, it has a lot of breadth and contains vagaries that could throw up all sorts of issues. I will just deal with those issues briefly.
By the way, I like the idea of identifying “material change” to the extent that someone who may once have been considered fit and proper is no longer considered fit and proper, because of something that has happened or something that has been identified.
I have a problem with imposing a duty, particularly on some of the groups set out in paragraphs (a) to (f) of subsection (2). For example, there would be a positive duty on “club employees”, which would include some very junior members of staff. In English law, imposing a duty on someone to do something is fairly exceptional. Although I could probably tolerate imposing a duty on “officers and board members”—if people have attained that level within an organisation, they should expect duties to come with it—I could not tolerate imposing a duty on all “club employees”. That is a difficulty I have. Also, that list is not exhaustive. Subsection (1) refers to:
“ Individuals or organisations associated with a regulated club”.
That could capture a lot more people than those listed in subsection (2).
I am also slightly concerned that the duty for notification applies:
“when they”—
that is, the person—
“have evidence or information that a material change in circumstances has occurred”.
I suspect that that could open the floodgates and be misused as a means to try and potentially smear someone, or raise questions about whether they are fit and proper, based on some pretty spurious “evidence”. Such evidence could be pretty much anything—even a trivial matter. I would have hoped that there would be some sort of threshold, such as evidence that points to a strong or compelling case. “Evidence” on its own is a very, very low bar and could encourage all sorts of minor allegations that could make the job of the football regulator far bigger than it is intended to be.
Otherwise, I broadly support what the hon. Gentleman is trying to achieve.
Mr French
I thank the hon. Member for speaking to the new clause on behalf of his colleague, the hon. Member for Wokingham. The point that he made is very interesting and I have great sympathy with fans of Reading football club, who he referred to, and with fans of other clubs around the country that have fallen foul of their owners, who, I think it is fair to say, did not have the club’s long-term interests at heart. I say that as someone who has already referred to Charlton a number of times in this Committee—been there, done it, got the T-shirt. As I say, I have a lot of sympathy with fans of Reading and I hope that the future looks brighter for that club.
Even before the election, I publicly supported strengthening ownership tests. I believe them to be part of one of the most fundamental roles that the regulator should play. We should ensure the consistency of those tests between the leagues, and we should ensure that up and down the country we have the best people in charge of such community assets, and that they have the long-term interests of clubs at heart, as I believe the overwhelming majority of club owners do.
Those examples of where problems came to a head and caused significant damage to communities have proven that there is a difference in some of the tests applied by the leagues historically, with gaps and loopholes that individuals have looked to exploit. Such examples have also highlighted the need for ongoing review by the regulator about how it manages the information that comes to light. An owner might be deemed an appropriate and fit person to run a club in 2025, but changes to their financial circumstances—assuming that they have other business interests—could mean that they become more stretched, and they might be involved in other activity that comes to light, so it would be right for the review to take place as early as possible to minimise the potential damage to clubs.
My hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East posited a number of important legal challenges around this point of duty. I have sympathy with the broader objective of new clause 15, but this issue of duty poses a number of risks for people who are not board-level employees or in significant roles of influence. I think that all Members would seek to avoid a situation where people disengage from a process because they are concerned about that word “duty”, and what that could leave them exposed to legally if they were to come across information, for example, but did not feel confident in passing it on. That might arise in a variety of circumstances, but I am interested to hear the Minister’s comments on new clause 15 in particular and on how we can seek to deliver the broader objective of strengthening ownership tests, without having to go down the rabbit hole of this duty element.
Stephanie Peacock
I thank the hon. Member for Wokingham for tabling new clause 15 and the hon. Member for Newbury for speaking to it, but it is already open to anyone, including all those listed in the new clause, to share relevant information with the regulator. That is in addition to the existing requirements on clubs, owners and officers, which the new clause unnecessarily duplicates.
I assure the Committee that the regulator will take credible reports about unsuitable owners or officers very seriously, whether they come from a whistleblower inside the industry or any other source. We do not need to create a separate obligation in the Bill for individuals to report information to the regulator. In fact, new clause 15 would place regulatory obligations on new individuals and organisations, thereby extending the effect of the regulator’s regime. It would take things a step further and create a duty—beyond the relevant owner, officer or club—for club employees, competition organisers, supporters trusts, the FSA and Fair Game to notify the regulator. As matters stand, anyone including owners, officers, club employees, competition organisers, the Football Supporters’ Association, trusts and supporters can notify the regulator if they have information regarding an individual’s suitability to be an owner or an officer. There is no need for any specific legislative provision to enable that. As the regulator will only regulate clubs, owners, officers and competition organisers, we believe that it would not be appropriate to obligate other persons to report any changes to the regulator. The new clause would extend the scope of the regulator.
The key point is that we do not think that that should be a duty. It is of course open to all those whom I have listed, and indeed any others, to approach the regulator, which as I say will take any reports seriously.
James Naish (Rushcliffe) (Lab)
I thank the Minister for the clarification, which I hope is helpful to the hon. Member for Newbury. In essence, is she saying that it is important for regulators to create an atmosphere of confidence, where individuals who have that type of information can share it with the regulator directly, irrespective of new clause 15?
Stephanie Peacock
Yes, absolutely. We very much want that confidence to be established. We simply do not think that regulating junior employees, supporters trusts or the FSA is appropriate or proportionate. On that basis, I would be grateful if the hon. Member for Newbury did not press the new clause to a vote.
Mr Dillon
Given the assurances of the Minister, I am happy not to move new clause 15. I thank the hon. Member for Rushcliffe for seeking clarification about the atmosphere that will be created.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 26 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 27
Duties to notify IFR of prospective new owner or officer
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
The regulator’s owners and directors test has been designed to prevent unsuitable custodians from running or owning clubs. Therefore, the regulator needs to know who a club’s prospective new owners and officers are before they buy or join a club so that they can be tested.
Clause 27 places duties on a person to notify the regulator when there is a reasonable prospect of them becoming a new owner or officer of a regulated club. This will ensure that the regulator receives advance notice that an application should be coming, and it will help the regulator prepare to act quickly when it receives the application. The clause also places the same duty on regulated clubs themselves, as another means of ensuring that the regulator will be notified.
The regulator needs to know a person’s role at the club so that it can prepare to assess whether they are suitable to be an owner or officer of that club. That is why, where the notification relates to an officer, the notification must state their proposed job title or job description, and any senior management functions they will carry out.
Enforcement measures, such as censure statements or financial penalties, are available to the regulator should it determine that this requirement has not been complied with without reasonable excuse. That will deter those who do not wish to comply with the regime. I commend clause 27 to the Committee.
Mr French
As the Minister just outlined, clause 27 requires regulated clubs to notify about prospective new owners and officers if there is a reasonable prospect of such a change. It also requires an officer’s proposed job title, job description and senior management functions. If the football regulator is not notified before the change, the club must notify as soon as practically possible.
I am slightly concerned that this could be a burdensome requirement on some clubs. Any large organisation, such as a football club, will often cast a wide net when considering such appointments, with people on the radar long in advance. I therefore ask the Minister to enlighten us on what she believes constitutes “a reasonable prospect”. For example, would media speculation that the right hon. Member for Houghton and Sunderland South (Bridget Phillipson) might move to the Minister’s Department be considered “a reasonable prospect”? There are non-political examples of how that might work too, but it would be interesting to hear what the Government believe to be a reasonable prospect.
Stephanie Peacock
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his contribution. As with everything throughout this Bill, we would expect the regulator to act proportionately. Where there is a reasonable prospect, it is obviously very helpful for the regulator to be informed of that, because that will, of course, allow them to move as speedily as possible. We therefore think this is an appropriate provision. The hon. Gentleman tempts me to get into other examples, but I will resist that, if he does not mind.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 27 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 28
Determination of suitability required for new owner
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
As we have heard throughout the passage of the Bill, football clubs hold unique importance to their fans and local communities, and it is these fans who lose out when clubs are exploited or mismanaged by unsuitable owners and officers. Clause 28 prohibits a person from becoming a new owner of a club unless the regulator has determined they are suitable to own that club beforehand. Prospective new owners will be required to provide an application containing information about how they propose to run a club and where club funding will come from. This will better ensure that prospective owners are clear from the outset about how they would deliver their plans for a club.
Once a complete application has been provided, the regulator can only pass the individual owner if the following requirements are met. First, the individual must meet the individual ownership fitness test. This means that they have the requisite honesty and integrity and are financially sound. Secondly, they must have sufficient financial resources. Finally, the regulator must not have grounds to suspect that the individual has any source of wealth that is connected to serious criminal conduct, including crimes such as drug trafficking and fraud. This will better mitigate against illicit finance in the game by requiring new owners to undergo the regulator’s test. Clause 28 will prevent unsuitable custodians from ever becoming owners.
Clause 29 prohibits individuals from becoming a new officer of a regulated club unless the regulator has determined that they are suitable beforehand. Once the prospective officer has provided a complete application to the regulator, it will assess them to ensure they meet individual officer fitness criteria. That means they must possess the requisite honesty, integrity and competence, and be financially sound. If the regulator is satisfied that the individual meets those requirements, it must find them suitable to be an officer of the club; otherwise, it must find them unsuitable. When making this determination, the regulator will take into account the matters listed in clause 37. By requiring new officers to undergo the regulator’s test, this clause will stop unsuitable individuals from becoming officers.
It is possible that someone might take up a position at a club without first having undergone the owners and directors test. That may be a blatant and deliberate breach of the requirement to undergo the test before joining the club. A prospective owner may act in bad faith, hoping that once they are “in”, the regulator would be more hesitant to fail them. However, in some circumstances a person may fall within the definition inadvertently or have some other relatively innocent reason for the breach. This may occur, for example, when a person inherits significant equity in a football club. Alternatively, a person may dispute in good faith whether their actions bring them within the Bill’s definition of an owner.
Therefore, where a person becomes a new owner or officer without the regulator having determined their suitability, clause 30 gives the regulator the power to respond decisively but flexibly. When the regulator becomes aware this has happened, it has two options: to either notify the new owner or officer that they are automatically treated as unsuitable, or require them to submit an application as though they were a prospective applicant. The regime cannot be allowed to be abused; the regulator must have the discretion and the teeth it needs to address harm to the sector. Clause 30 is an important step to achieving this aim.
If the regulator is minded to fail a new or prospective owner officer, clause 31 requires the regulator to give that person and the relevant club the opportunity to make representations. This must take place before the regulator makes its final decision. That will allow a new owner, officer or relevant club an appropriate opportunity to argue their case before the regulator finds them unsuitable. This ensures the regulator has all relevant information available to it, allowing it to make better decisions so that the regime is more effective.
Football is a fast-paced industry where clubs operate within constraints such as league seasons and transfer windows. Timely decisions about the suitability of new owners and officers is important for clubs’ financial sustainability. Without deadlines, we have seen league determinations drag on, unable to reach a decision. The regulator will need to conduct a thorough level of scrutiny of new owners and directors, but it also needs to make decisions in an appropriate timeframe to ensure clubs are not unnecessarily impacted.
That is why the regulator will be subject to a statutory deadline when it tests the suitability of new prospective owners and officers, which clause 32 sets out. When a complete application is provided, the determination period starts. By the end of that period, the regulator must find an applicant suitable or unsuitable. As well as providing certainty to the industry, the deadline will incentivise new owners and officers to provide the necessary information the regulator needs to assess suitability in a timely manner.
If the regulator cannot decide before the initial deadline is met, it can extend the determination period, and this will provide it with the necessary flexibility to gather more information to make well informed but timely decisions. The determination period, including the maximum amount of extra time, will be set by the Secretary of State in secondary legislation. This will ensure the regulator is bound by it—but there is still flexibility for the deadline to be amended in the future. If the regulator cannot make the decision before the period expires, the person is automatically determined to be unsuitable. This means that only owners or officers that the regulator is confident are suitable will be allowed to get involved with clubs.
The measures set out in the group of clauses will form a key part in ensuring our clubs have suitable custodians, which in turn will help to safeguard the financial sustainability of football over the long term. Therefore, I commend the clauses to the Committee.
Mr French
Clause 29 prohibits any person from becoming an owner of a regulated club without first applying to the independent football regulator and being determined suitable for that role. It requires any applicant to provide information on the proposed operation of the club, estimated costs, how those costs will be funded and the source of funding, which is a point that is been raised already in this Committee.
The football regulator must make an affirmative determination regarding the application if the potential owner is considered to have sufficient financial resources and meets the individual ownership fitness criteria. I already spoken about why I believe it is important that these fitness tests are strengthened wherever possible, but there are a couple of questions I would like to ask the Minister on this clause first.
What assurances can the Minister provide that this process will be completed swiftly and will not unnecessarily delay any ownership changes which, as we have already discussed, may need to happen very quickly when a club is under significant financial stress—to ensure wages are paid and to prevent further hardship when seeking a change of ownership?
Clause 30 sets out what should happen in the event that a person has become an owner or an officer of a regulated club without first obtaining the suitability determination from the football regulator. The clause assumes that the football regulator “becomes aware”; is the expectation that there is a disclosure from the club, or will the IFR be probing clubs, looking at news reports, Companies House and so on? It would be helpful for Members to have an insight into how that might look, because this clause does not offer a specific timeframe within which the football regulator must act at once if it becomes aware of an unauthorised appointment at a club.
It also seems that the football regulator can indefinitely extend the deadline for submitting such an application; the clause fails to clarify how many times and under what conditions. I therefore wonder whether the Minister has considered the potential effects on the stability of the club of the football regulator deeming an individual unsuitable: would that open clubs to legal or operational risk, and would there be financial consequences of those risks? It is vital that decisions taken by the regulator are independent and impartial, as already discussed, so what safeguards will there be to ensure that neither media nor political pressure is exerted on the football regulator to deem an owner unsuitable?
Clause 31 states that the football regulator must “have regard to” representations from affected clubs or individuals. What does that constitute in reality—a response, or simply a consideration? Must the football regulator provide written reasoning if it rejects the arguments made in the representation? Does this clause not lack basic safeguards and, without a framework for how representations should be made or evaluated, does it not risk leading to inconsistent decision making? Again, I fear there would be various legal challenges, given the financial implications of such decisions.
There is also no requirement, it appears, for the football regulator to consider other external stakeholders, which could include other directors or supporters’ trusts involved with the running of a club. Should an individual receive a negative determination, the legal and financial resources to make a strong representation within a specified timeframe might be considerable. Does the Minister envisage many applicants seeking legal aid or other advisory support mechanisms in such a scenario?
Clause 32 outlines several points about the football regulator’s determinations after an individual makes an application under clauses 28 and 29. The IFR seems to be able to extend its determination periods several times, but the clause fails to outline for what reason an extension might be justified and how long it should or could be. Can applicants, for example, challenge or appeal those delays, if the reason for them lay with the regulator rather than the individual club? A delay by the regulator would risk unfairly penalising applicants who were not personally at fault for it. Will there be an obligation on the football regulator to inform applicants of approaching deadlines, to ensure that they know when the determination period is nearing its end, and what oversight will there be to ensure that extensions are not routine?
Lastly, will there be monitoring of how often extensions are used and how long determinations typically take, so that clubs can start to plan for such instances where they occur? That would also give greater certainty to the leagues because, as I highlighted earlier, it is not just individuals, but clubs themselves at risk. If we think about not just the financial penalties imposed, but the points that can be deducted, there are major implications for the competitive nature of the league. I look forward to the Minister answering a few of those questions.
Stephanie Peacock
I am grateful to the shadow Minister for those questions. I reiterate, as I said in an earlier intervention, that the licensing is separate from the ownership. On some of his points about the extension, we have talked throughout proceedings about being collaborative and working with owners and clubs; if the regulator needs more information, it has the ability to provide an extension. Of course we would expect it to provide appropriate information of approaching deadlines or expected timelines. I will not repeat what I said in my main contribution on this group, but I did try to set out some examples where a breach is a genuine accident or someone has inherited equity, versus somebody trying to circumvent the regime. The regulator has that flexibility and a regime with teeth so that it can respond to both scenarios.
The shadow Minister posed a number of questions, so I will double-check Hansard and, if I have not answered them all, I will write to him.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 28 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 29 to 32 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Stephanie Peacock
It is important for sustainability that incumbent owners and officers continue to be suitable custodians of their clubs. That is why the Bill gives the regulator the power to test incumbents if it has grounds for concern about their suitability. That will help mitigate the risk of harm from individuals already in the system.
Clause 33 places a duty on incumbent owners and officers, as well as regulated clubs, to notify the regulator where they consider there to have been a relevant material change in circumstance. Notably, this is a change of circumstances that could have an impact on whether the regulator would find the individual suitable to be an owner or officer of the particular club—for example, if an officer became subject to criminal or relevant civil proceedings that the regulator was not previously aware of, or if an owner’s source of wealth had changed in some way that is relevant to whether it is connected to serious criminality.
The notification must explain the material change in circumstances and its relevance to an individual’s suitability. If this information gives the regulator grounds for concern about the incumbent’s suitability, it has the power to test them under clauses 34 or 35. Ensuring that the regulator is aware of relevant material changes will better enable it to ensure that incumbent owners and officers continue to be suitable.
Clause 34 provides the regulator with the necessary powers to test incumbent owners already in place in clubs where there is concern about their suitability. This allows the regulator to tackle any risks to clubs from unsuitable owners already within the industry.
Mr Betts
I just want to be clear about the grounds on which the regulator can investigate or intervene. We talked about the source of wealth being criminal, which has been clearly laid out. However, if the source of wealth is one that has diminished substantially, so the owner cannot now show that they can continue to run the club, is that a reason for the regulator to consider intervening?
Stephanie Peacock
There are different thresholds for new owners and incumbent owners; with new owners, it is grounds for suspecting, but with incumbent owners, it is the balance of probabilities. Of course, the latter is a higher bar, given the existing owner’s property rights. I do not know whether that fully answers my hon. Friend’s question, but I can write to him with some further detail.
Mr Betts
It would be helpful if the Minister could write to me because this is a big question in football. There are owners who promise the world and then find that they cannot deliver it; indeed, they can deliver very little. I come back to Sheffield Wednesday, but there have been other owners, such as Ken Bates at Oldham, who set up a structure that could not then be financially maintained. It is important to understand whether the regulator has power in that circumstance to intervene.
Stephanie Peacock
Absolutely, and I refer back to some of our earlier conversations. If we take the regulatory regime as a whole, at the very basic level, owners need to have a business plan, consult their fans and be fit and proper—those three things work together. As we spoke about earlier, if the business plan does not match the source or amount of funds, the regulator can go back and direct them. Perhaps that provides a little more clarity, but I am very happy to add more detail.
Mr Betts
I think the Minister and I are getting there. Obviously, the business plan and the source of funds come with a new owner and then continue. However, with an owner already in place, does that still apply? Can the regulator say, “Wait a minute. I need to see a business plan and a source of funds to ensure that you are a fit and proper person”?
Stephanie Peacock
In certain circumstances. I am hesitant to use the word “new” information, because the information may not be new. However, if relevant information comes to light for the regulator, which may be new or pre-existing but relevant, the regulator can look at it. I draw my hon. Friend’s attention to the difference in the threshold between new owners and existing owners.
Mr Betts
I will make just one more point—I think it is important that we understand precisely what this means. Clause 33 talks about an owner or club having a responsibility to notify the regulator. Surely that does not mean that nobody else could notify the regulator, if relevant information came to them. Could they then pass it on for the regulator to look at?
Stephanie Peacock
Yes, absolutely. That goes back to the discussion that we had earlier on new clause 15. The regulator will take credible information seriously.
Clause 34 provides the regulator with the necessary powers to test incumbent owners—those already in place—of clubs, where there is a concern about their suitability. It will allow the regulator to tackle any risk to clubs from unsuitable owners within the industry, while recognising that there are suitable owners already in the system who do not need to be tested. We want to ensure that the approach is not overly burdensome for the regulator, and we do not want to deter investment in the game. Incumbent owners can be assessed to ensure that they have the requisite honesty and integrity, and are financially sound enough, to own a club. If the regulator has information that gives it grounds for suspicion, incumbent owners can also be tested on their source of wealth. The regulator will need to establish if wealth is connected to serious criminal conduct, including crimes such as drug trafficking or fraud. The regulator will not remove incumbent owners because of a mere suspicion about their source of wealth. Rather, an incumbent owner must be treated as unsuitable if the regulator is more sure than not that their source of wealth is connected to serious criminal conduct. The clause will ensure that the regulator has the appropriate powers to test incumbent owners where a risk of harm arises.
Clause 35 provides the regulator with the necessary powers to test incumbent officers—those already in place—of clubs, where a risk of harm arises. As with the provisions for owners in clause 34, testing of officers is limited to cases where there is concern about suitability. It allows the regulator to tackle any risks to clubs from unsuitable officers already in the industry. Incumbent officers can be tested to ensure that they have the requisite honesty, integrity, competence, and are financially sound enough, to continue in their role.
The Government are aware that finding an incumbent owner or officer unsuitable would bring about significant consequences for that person, and may cause concern for clubs or fans. That is why, when the regulator is minded to fail an incumbent owner or officer, clause 36 gives the individual and the club concerned an opportunity to make representations before the regulator makes its final decision. That allows an officer or owner an appropriate opportunity to argue their case before the regulator finds them unsuitable. The regulator has the ability to test or re-test incumbent owners and officers, which will prevent unsuitable custodians from harming clubs over the long term, not just at the point of entry. That will help to ensure the sustainability of clubs over the long term, benefiting football now and into the future. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.
Mr French
Clause 33 places a duty on clubs to notify the Government’s new regulator of any change in circumstances relating to the current owner or an officer that could impact their suitability under the regime set out in part 4 of the Bill. On one level, it is an understandable provision. To fulfil its statutory duties, the regulator must be kept informed of material changes, as ensuring the fitness and propriety of owners and officers is a core part of its remit. However, the clause as drafted raises a number of serious and practical concerns about how such a duty will be defined, interpreted and enforced.
The first issue with the clause is its vagueness. What exactly constitutes a “change in circumstances”? The explanatory notes prepared by the Government give a small indication of what such circumstances might include, stating that
“Relevant material changes could include, for example, an officer becoming subject to criminal proceedings or regulatory action”.
That is somewhat clear, but what qualifies as “regulatory action”? Could it be an Ofcom investigation, for example? The explanatory notes add that
“new information coming to light regarding whether an owner’s source of wealth is connected to serious criminality”
also qualifies as a material, relevant change. What qualifies as “new information”? Does it mean a full-blown criminal investigation or spurious claims, potentially made by activist groups against foreign owners? How the provision will work needs to be clarified.
The Government and the new regulator must be up front, open and honest with fans and Parliament as to what those terms actually mean. We fear that the Government are deliberately muddying the waters around what the regulatory environment would look like under the Bill, and around the rules that the regulator will seek to apply. The Minister must answer whether a “change in circumstances” is limited to formal legal developments, such as bankruptcy, a criminal conviction, or something as small as a parking fine. I hope not the latter. Could the definition extend to more subjective matters such as personal, reputational issues, media allegations, or ongoing investigations? If so, I fear that the Government and their regulator would be on very shaky ground, not just because clubs would find themselves in the near-impossible position of having to second-guess what the regulator might later deem to be relevant, even when no formal wrongdoing has occurred, but because it would open up the regulator to spates of judicial reviews. As we see already, the wealthiest clubs would be able to hire the best lawyers, and those clubs that are already struggling would be subject to the personal diktats of the chairman of the Government’s regulator. That is not a sustainable, appropriate or moral way to regulate, and it is totally incompatible with the principle of legal certainty that should underpin any new statutory regime.
Furthermore, clause 33 requires that the Government be notified
“as soon as reasonably practicable”
after a change has occurred. Again, the language is open to wide interpretation. What is “reasonably practicable” for a large Premier League club with extensive legal support may be entirely different for a National League side with minimal back office capacity. We must ensure that smaller clubs are not disproportionately penalised because they lack the administrative infrastructure to track and report such changes with the same immediacy as those international brands that sit atop the English football pyramid. We must also ask whether the sanctions for failing to report, which could be very serious, potentially leading to licence revocation, are proportionate to each breach. Clubs cannot become the regulator’s enforcement arm, expected to carry out continuous due diligence on their own officers and owners, with the threat of regulatory action hanging over them if they get it wrong.
Clause 33 touches on a sensitive area: the relationship between clubs and their owners, and the role of the state in policing suitability. It is right to expect clubs to act responsibly and keep the regulator informed, but the duty must be clear, proportionate and fairly enforced to avoid lower-level staff being put in extremely difficult situations. We do not want to create a culture of regulatory paranoia, where clubs feel compelled to notify the Government’s regulator of every minor development just in case it is later deemed relevant, nor do we want smaller clubs punished for failing to meet standards that are de facto only achievable for the top tier. The Government must ensure that the clause is not a trapdoor for arbitrary enforcement, and that it supports predictability, stability and confidence in the regulatory framework. We understand the underlying principle, but we will continue to press the Minister to ensure the practical operation of the clause does not give rise to legal ambiguity, unjust outcomes or unaccountable discretion.
Before moving on, I have a number of questions on clause 33. Could the Minister clarify what sorts of events would qualify as a “change in circumstances” under clause 33? Will guidance be issued by the football regulator to ensure consistent interpretation? Will the definition be limited to formal, objective legal changes? What level of evidence or certainty will clubs be expected to have before reporting a change? Will clubs be required to report allegations or media speculation? Will the football regulator consider good-faith failures to notify or take a strict liability approach? How will the regulator account for differences in club size, structure and resourcing when judging what is “reasonably practicable”? Will there be any threshold or scaling in terms of compliance expectations for clubs of differing means?
What appeal or review mechanisms will be available to a club if the football regulator finds that it failed to notify as required? Will there be a formal process for representations or challenge before any enforcement action is taken? How does the clause interact with the broader principles of legal privilege and privacy? Will clubs be expected to disclose internal HR issues or ongoing internal investigations, even if there is no conclusion yet? Have the Government assessed whether the clause is compatible with UEFA and FIFA expectations of non-interference in the running of football clubs? I had a written response from the Minister this morning regarding her last meeting with UEFA and FIFA, which was 1 November. A lot of water has gone under the bridge since then, so we are still concerned about the broader point regarding UEFA. I would appreciate a response to that point today.
Moving on to clause 34, it empowers the football regulator to determine whether an incumbent individual owner meets the fitness criteria or has wealth associated with serious criminal conduct, if the regulator has information that raises grounds for concern. It requires the regulator to inform the owner and club before making a determination and then notify them of the outcome. If passed, more than 100 English football clubs will be subject to the regulation. It is not specified in the Bill what level of information would raise grounds for concern regarding incumbent owners. If the bar is set too low, the regulator may be immediately burdened by reviewing multiple existing owners, causing unease in English football. What level of information is required to qualify as grounds for concern? There is also no time limit for the regulator to make its assessment, so how will the regulator ensure that the threat does not needlessly hang over existing owners?
Clause 35 empowers the football regulator to determine whether an incumbent officer meets the fitness criteria if the regulator has information that raises grounds for concern. It requires the regulator to inform the owner and club before making a determination and then notify them of the outcome. As I said regarding the previous clause, more than 100 English football clubs will be regulated if the Bill passes. It is not specified in the Bill what level of information would raise grounds for concern regarding officers, of which there are even more to consider. If the bar is set too low, the regulator may be immediately burdened by the need to review multiple existing officers for each club. I ask the Minister again: what level of information will be required to qualify as grounds for concern? There is also no time limit for the regulator to make its assessment, so how will it ensure that this threat does not needlessly hang over existing officers?
Lastly—you will be pleased to know, Mr Turner—clause 36 requires the football regulator to give advance notification to an incumbent owner or officer if it is minded to find them unsuitable. Before making a final decision, the clause requires the person and club in question to be allowed to make representations, which must then be taken into account. The clause stipulates that the regulator must inform incumbent owners and officers only that it is minded to find them unsuitable, not of the reasons why. Given the vital importance of these representations, should there not be a requirement for the regulator to disclose the reasons to the person and club so that they can fully engage? I would appreciate the Minister picking up the point about the reasons, because it is important.
There is a broader point here about clubs that may be listed on the open market. My understanding of this clause is that, before a final decision is taken, the club would effectively become an insider from a trading perspective. It will be interesting to see how the Government will seek to manage that risk in terms of financial compliance, given that an issue with a particular owner or officer could have significant financial implications for a club and therefore potentially leave individuals inside that loop at risk of being involved with inside information from a dealing perspective. As we all know, if anyone is found to be in breach of inside information, it has very serious consequences. It will be interesting to see how the mechanism in this clause to inform clubs and individuals first will work with the broader notifications in the market where clubs are listed.
Stephanie Peacock
I will begin with the subject of UEFA. Once again, I can reassure the shadow Minister that UEFA is content with the Bill as drafted. He will note that, in answer to his written question, I detailed my last meeting with UEFA, which was after the Bill was published, and said that we continue to engage with officials on a regular basis.
The shadow Minister asked a long list of questions to which I will respond in writing to ensure accuracy, as I did not get a chance to note them down. We have spoken about some of the points he touched on around appeals and enforcement and will come on to debate them in further detail.
I draw the shadow Minister’s attention to the fact that, as I said in answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East, the bar is set differently for existing and new owners. I outlined points on new owners, grounds to suspect, incumbent owners, the balance of probabilities and the higher bar given existing owners’ property rights.
The shadow Minister also asked a number of questions on what information would be relevant. A parking ticket, certainly, would not be relevant, but serious legal issues or an investigation or action by a regulator—things of that nature—would be relevant. The regulator will not immediately test information in every case just because it comes in. It will make its own decision about whether the information reaches a high enough threshold for it to take action.
Information that gives the regulator grounds for concern could come in lots of forms. It does not need to be new information, as I outlined in my response to my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East, but it has to call into question whether the individual is still suitable to be an owner or officer of a club. The information may be relevant if the club gets into difficulty or fails to comply with the regime. Information that is in the public domain or held by external organisations about incumbent owners could be considered grounds for concern to test an individual. It will be up to the regulator to decide whether the information meets the threshold for the incumbent to be tested.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 33 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 34 to 36 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Vicky Foxcroft.)