Crime and Policing Bill (Eleventh sitting)
Tuesday 29th April 2025
(1 day, 21 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesCrime and Policing Bill 2024-26 View all Crime and Policing Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 29 April 2025 - (29 Apr 2025)
The Chair
We continue line-by-line scrutiny of the Crime and Policing Bill. I have a few preliminary reminders for the Committee. As it is warm today, Members may take their jacket off if they wish—I will probably take mine off. Please switch all your electronic devices to silent. No food or drink is permitted during sittings of the Committee, except for the water provided. Hansard colleagues will be grateful if Members could email their speaking notes to hansardnotes@parliament.uk or, alternatively, pass them to one of the Hansard colleagues in the room. If Members wish to speak, I remind them to bob to catch my eye.
Clause 78
Electronic devices for use in vehicle offences
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)
Good morning, Ms Lewell. It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair on this glorious day.
Clause 78 introduces two new criminal offences in relation to electronic devices used in vehicle-related theft. The first will criminalise the possession of such devices, and the second will criminalise the importing, making, adapting, supplying or offering to supply such devices. Both offences require a reasonable suspicion that the device will be used in connection with the theft of a vehicle, theft of anything in a vehicle, or taking a vehicle without authority.
A significant proportion of vehicle theft is driven by serious and organised crime groups, and it costs millions of pounds in social and economic harm each year. Given the high demand for stolen vehicles and vehicle parts, this is an attractive and lucrative area for criminals to profit from. Criminals find ways to overcome security measures, even in the latest vehicle models, by using electronic devices to exploit vulnerabilities in vehicles and new technologies. The Metropolitan Police Service estimates that electronic devices are used in approximately 60% of vehicle thefts in London.
The clause does not define specific electronic devices, but uses a broad definition to cover any electronic device that could be used in vehicle theft. That ensures that the legislation is future-proof for any new devices that may be developed and used by criminals. The offence will be triable either way and, on conviction on indictment, will carry a maximum sentence of five years’ imprisonment, an unlimited fine or both.
We have also provided a defence for a person charged with this offence to show that they did not intend or suspect that the relevant article would be used in connection with the theft of a vehicle or anything in a vehicle. The clause also outlines that the court may assume that the defendant possessed the relevant article where it is on any premises at the same time as the defendant, or on premises at which the defendant was the occupier or an habitual user otherwise than as a member of the public. The defendant will have a defence where they can show that they did not know of an article’s presence on the premises or had no control over the article. During proceedings, a court can also assume that the articles in question are intended to be used in vehicle theft. That reflects the fact that the specified articles have few legitimate uses.
Clause 79 supports clause 78 by clarifying the evidential burdens for the new offence, while also inserting it into the list of lifestyle offences in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. That means that, if convicted of this offence, a person’s assets will be considered to have potentially derived from crime and may be subject to confiscation. To have a defence, a defendant will be required to establish the facts that are within their knowledge—such as demonstrating that they run a company that supplies legitimate electronic devices.
Signal repeaters, which have been approved for use by Ofcom, are legal to own and use to boost an otherwise weak mobile phone signal, for example. If a defendant can demonstrate that they did not intend, nor reasonably suspect, that the articles were to be used in vehicle theft, the evidential burden falls back on the prosecution. The prosecution will need to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant had reasonable grounds to suspect that the article they were importing, making, modifying, supplying, offering to supply or possessing would be used in vehicle theft.
That reverse evidential burden is appropriate given the few legitimate uses associated with the specified articles. It will ensure that law enforcement agencies are able to target those individuals who keep just enough distance from the serious offences being carried out to avoid consequences under existing legislation.
Serious and organised crime has a devastating effect— I am sure we can all agree on that. Clauses 78 and 79 send a clear message about our commitment to tackling vehicle crime and associated serious and organised criminality, and to making it easier for the police to take action. That means more prosecutions and more criminals off our streets, which will help to restore public confidence.
Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Lewell.
Clause 78 rightly introduces new offences aimed at preventing the misuse of electronic devices such as signal jammers, signal amplifiers and devices used to access vehicle wiring systems for committing vehicle-related crimes. The offences include the possession, importation, manufacturing, adaptation, supply or offer to supply such devices when there is reasonable suspicion that they will be used in connection with crimes such as vehicle theft, stealing items from a vehicle or taking a vehicle without authority.
The subsections provide a defence for individuals who can prove that they did not intend or suspect that the device would be used for a relevant offence, and they allow a court to presume possession of a device if it is found on premises occupied or habitually used by the accused, unless the accused can demonstrate that they were unaware of its presence or had no control over it.
Clause 79 clarifies the evidential burden in cases under clause 78, which deals with electronic devices used in vehicles. It explains that where a defendant seeks to rely on such a defence—for example, that they did not intend the device to be used in a crime—they must provide enough evidence to raise the issue, and the prosecution must then disprove it beyond reasonable doubt.
Clauses 78 and 79 are needed to strengthen the legal response to the growing threat of tech-enabled vehicle theft, which has become increasingly sophisticated with the use of electronic devices such as signal jammers and relay attack tools. Clause 78 creates targeted offences around the possession, manufacture and supply of such devices, recognising the role they play in modern vehicle crime. By focusing on intent and suspicion, the clause allows for earlier intervention and prevention even before a theft occurs.
We support the measures, but what consultation was done with law enforcement, manufacturers and cyber-security experts to develop the provisions? Does the Minister expect this designation to lead to more asset confiscation from organised crime groups involved in vehicle theft?
Luke Taylor (Sutton and Cheam) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Lewell, as always.
The Liberal Democrats very much welcome the measures in clauses 78 and 79 to give the police and courts more powers to reduce vehicle theft. It is disheartening to see so much car theft in our cities, particularly London. In south-west London, a regular complaint of residents is that the police are not able to do anything about it. The police themselves are struggling. The technology has become an arms race, and these clauses are needed to keep up with thefts that are becoming so much more technologically advanced.
It is depressing that a litany of old-fashioned manual theft prevention measures are now necessary again—people are having to use steering locks and wheel clamps—because the police cannot keep up with the technology that thieves employ. We are very supportive of these measures to give the police the tools they need to crack down on this incredibly distressing form of theft.
David Burton-Sampson (Southend West and Leigh) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Lewell.
Signal jammers and other electronic devices are a real problem, and one that many of my residents did not realise exist until they were hit. I will never forget knocking on a door one Saturday morning, when the resident opened and said, “Where’s my car gone?” She said, “I’d locked it. It should be here,” but it turned out, again, that her car had been stolen using such a technique. The immediate inconvenience of a theft is significant, but it is not the only consequence. The victim may have to rearrange plans as they no longer have their car, and there are longer-term issues such as increased insurance premiums because of the theft.
Keyless cars, which once seemed super-convenient, are now seen by many as a significant security flaw. I will never forget watching on CCTV after my neighbour’s car was stolen a few years ago using this exact method. The individual walked up to the car, gained entry and drove off, all in 45 seconds. Essex police has said that its stolen vehicles intelligence unit recovered £13.5 million-worth of stolen vehicles and parts in 2024—this is a real issue. I welcome clauses 78 and 79 and the tough new penalties for those who consider it appropriate to commit this crime, which is so disruptive to people’s lives.
David Taylor (Hemel Hempstead) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to speak under your chairship, Ms Lewell. I rise to speak in favour of clause 78, which tackles the growing scourge of criminals using high-tech devices to steal from hard-working people, because I know how important this is in my community. For 14 years, between 2010 and 2024, crime in my patch doubled. These thieves no longer need a crowbar; they use laptops, signal boosters and hacking tools to rob families of their vehicles, their livelihoods and their sense of safety. Enough is enough. Clause 78 strikes directly at those parasites by making it an offence not just to steal but to possess, import, manufacture or supply the very devices that make these thefts possible—it cuts off the tools of their horrific trade.
I recently heard from a Hemel resident who, back in December 2023, had his truck broken into and all his work tools stolen. Then, in November 2024, his family’s disability car was also stolen. Later, two of their neighbours’ cars were stolen along with hundreds of pounds-worth of equipment, having been parked side by side in a lay-by by their homes.
This clause sends a message: “If you are gearing up to commit a crime, this country will come down on you like a ton of bricks.” Let us be clear that this is not about targeting legitimate businesses or technology users; it is about targeting criminals, gangs and the shadow economy that thrives on stealing from working people and laughing as they do it. Subsection (3) rightly offers a defence for those acting innocently, but it removes the cloak of plausible deniability that too many criminals have hidden behind for too long.
The people of Hemel Hempstead are fed up. They are tired of waking up to find their cars stolen, they are tired of seeing criminals treated as an inevitable part of life, and they are tired of seeing their vans broken into and their tools stolen. They expect and demand that we act, and act we must. We have to stand up for the delivery driver who loses their van, for the care worker who needs her car to get to her patients, and for every family who fear that they will become a victim of crime. It is not enough simply to chase stolen vehicles after they are gone. We must prevent these thefts from happening in the first place, and we must choke off the supply of tools that fuel this criminality. We must make it clear that there are no easy pickings for those who prey on working people.
I am proud that the Bill does not stop with vehicle crime. It invests in neighbourhood policing, strengthens the fight against organised crime and clamps down on new forms of digital exploitation. It rebuilds the idea that security—real, everyday security—is a right, not a privilege. The Bill is a line in the sand; it says to criminals, “Your time is up,” and it says to our communities, “We hear you and we are on your side.” For Hemel Hempstead, for our towns and cities and for the millions of honest people who deserve better, I urge hon. Members to back clause 78 and the Crime and Policing Bill without hesitation.
Dame Diana Johnson
I welcome the support for the two clauses. We all know the devastation that the theft of a motor vehicle and its contents can cause to our constituents. I want specifically to address the questions posed by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton West. As he may recall, vehicle crime was raised in the previous Government’s serious organised crime consultation. After that, conversations with law enforcement, vehicle manufacturers and Ofcom have confirmed that this is a key issue. I know from speaking to car manufacturers that they welcome the legislation.
We are also working closely with the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead for vehicle crime to reduce vehicle crime through the national vehicle crime working group and the recently established, industry-funded national vehicle crime reduction partnership. The vehicle crime action plan was formed through the national vehicle crime working group and in conjunction with the Home Office, and it includes commitments to work with motor industry representatives to consider crime prevention measures that can be taken to prevent thefts.
The hon. Member for Stockton West also asked about the effect of the clauses on offending. As I indicated, designating the new offence as a lifestyle offence under POCA will support the increased confiscation of the proceeds of vehicle crime, which chimes well with sending a clear message to criminals that enough is enough and that we will come after them.
With that, I commend the clauses to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 78 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 79 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 80
Possession of a SIM farm
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to consider the following:
Clauses 81 and 82 stand part.
Schedule 10.
Clauses 83 to 85 stand part.
Dame Diana Johnson
This group relates to SIM farms. We know that criminals abuse telecommunications networks, including texts and calls, to target people and defraud victims at a significant scale. We most likely all know of a friend, family member or constituent who has received such a text, or we have even received one ourselves—I certainly have. Such scams prey on the public, particularly those who are vulnerable. They can have a devastating emotional impact and can inflict serious financial harm on victims.
Scam texts are frequently traced back to SIM farms—electronic devices that can hold sometimes hundreds of physical SIM cards, which can be used to send out thousands of scam texts and calls in seconds. They are currently legal for anyone to buy, and it is easy to find suppliers online, making it easy to commit telecoms fraud on a very large scale. Clauses 80 and 81 therefore provide for new offences that criminalise the possession of SIM farms without good reason, and their supply without undertaking adequate due diligence.
Clauses 83 to 85 will also allow the potential extension of the ban to further technologies that may be exploited by criminals to scam the UK public, with any such extension subject to a high level of scrutiny and checks. The new offences will make it difficult for criminals to access and use these devices for the purpose of fraud. They will give the police the necessary tools to disrupt fraudsters, even before they start using SIM farms to commit fraud.
Clause 80 bans the possession of a SIM farm without good reason. A person can possess a SIM farm if they can prove that they have a good reason or lawful authority to do so. The Government have identified several legitimate uses of SIM farms, such as multi-SIM devices used in broadcast and programme-making to facilitate the production and delivery of live and pre-recorded broadcasts.
SIM farms are also used by transport providers to offer wi-fi—I am sure most hon. Members who have to travel frequently will welcome the availability of wi-fi—not only on trains, but on trams, buses, coaches and ferries, as the devices switch between mobile network operators, depending on which has the best reception where the device is located at any particular moment. We have worked closely with stakeholders to develop a defence that will allow such legitimate use to continue uninterrupted, while stopping criminals using SIM farms for criminal activities.
Clause 80 provides examples of what may be a good reason to possess a SIM farm, including the provision of broadcast services, the operation or maintenance of a public transport service and the operation or maintenance of an electronic communications network. The list of good reasons in subsection (3) is not exhaustive and it would be open to a person under investigation for, or charged with, the offence to argue that they have another good reason for possessing a SIM farm.
Matt Vickers
A SIM farm is a system used to manage and operate a large number of SIM cards simultaneously, often using multiple mobile devices or modems controlled by central software. Farms can contain hundreds or even thousands of SIM cards, and they are typically used to send or receive a high volume of messages, calls or mobile data across networks.
While there can be legitimate uses for SIM farms, such as in telecoms testing or large-scale communication platforms, they are commonly associated with illicit and fraudulent activities. One of their most concerning uses is in the spread of spam and phishing texts, where mass messages with links to scams or malware are sent to unsuspecting individuals. They are also frequently used to bypass verification systems by creating large numbers of fake accounts on social media, messaging apps or online services. In other cases, SIM farms are employed in SIM box fraud, a scheme in which international calls are rerouted and disguised as local calls, depriving telecom providers and Governments of revenue and making the original caller harder to trace.
According to research carried out by Ofcom in August 2022, the scale of nuisance and potentially fraudulent communications across UK mobile networks remains alarmingly high. An overwhelming 75% of mobile users reported receiving suspicious texts or calls in just a three-month period, highlighting the widespread nature of the issue. These figures demonstrate the persistent and pervasive threat posed by scam communications, underlining the urgent need for more robust protections and enforcement mechanisms to safeguard the public.
SIM farms pose serious risks to national security and digital infrastructure. Their use can lead to network congestion, overwhelming mobile networks and disrupting legitimate communications. More critically, they are often exploited by organised crime networks to co-ordinate illegal activity as they are cheap, disposable and difficult to trace. That makes it significantly harder for law enforcement to monitor communications or link messages to specific individuals. The previous Conservative Government committed to banning SIM farms as part of their fraud strategy announced in May 2023. They subsequently launched a consultation on how best to implement the ban, although, interestingly, there were only 50 responses, many from businesses or individuals identifying as legitimate SIM farm users who opposed a ban.
In response to the 2023 Home Office consultation on SIM farms, Mobile UK, the trade body representing the UK’s four major mobile network operators, raised concerns that the proposed ban risked being ineffective due to evolving fraud tactics and technological advancements, including the fact that single-SIM devices, rather than SIM farms, are now the most common tools used to send spam SMS messages, according to data from one mobile operator. Mobile UK further warned that the proposed measures would not eliminate large-scale spam or scam messaging, and urged the Government to broaden the definition of SIM farm to include software-based or e-SIM-enabled methods used to achieve the same fraudulent outcomes.
In the Criminal Justice Bill in the 2023-24 Session, the previous Government included provisions to criminalise the possession or supply of devices capable of holding five or more SIM cards, targeting the infrastructure used in large-scale scams. I welcome the Government’s carrying forward the provisions in the Criminal Justice Bill to amend the definition of SIM farm and prohibit other electronic devices used to commit fraud via secondary legislation.
Clause 80 introduces the new criminal offence of possessing a SIM farm, reflecting growing concerns about their misuse in fraudulent and criminal activity. The clause makes it an offence for an individual to possess such a system unless they can demonstrate that they have a lawful authority or good reason for doing so. That shifts the burden to the defendant to prove the legitimacy of their possession, aiming to deter misuse while protecting legitimate operations.
The clause also provides examples of what may constitute a good reason, including the use of SIM farms for broadcasting services, public transport operations, communications network maintenance or freight tracking. Those carve-outs are designed to safeguard industries with genuine operational needs for such technology, while still targeting the widespread abuse seen in mass-messaging scams, SIM box fraud and illegitimate telecommunications activity. The clause is a key part of the broader effort to close regulatory gaps and strengthen the legal tools available to tackle modern digital fraud.
Clause 81 makes it a criminal offence to supply a SIM farm to another person. Clause 82 offers a meaningful definition of what constitutes a SIM farm for the purposes of clauses 80 and 81, and provides the Secretary of State with the power to amend the definition by regulation. Schedule 10 provides for powers of entry and other investigatory powers relating to offences involving SIM farms. Clauses 83 to 85 create the offence of possessing a “specified article”; criminalise the supply of such articles, with appropriate exemptions; set out the sanctions; and allow for the Secretary of State to amend the definition of a specific article via amendment to keep the legislation in line with technology and changing criminal behaviours.
Will there be a formal review mechanism to assess the effectiveness and proportionality of these offences, particularly regarding the number of prosecutions under clauses 80 to 85? Given Mobile UK’s concerns that fraudsters are increasingly using single-SIM devices, e-SIMs and apps such as WhatsApp to bypass traditional SMS channels, is the Minister confident that the measures in the Bill and the Government’s current definition of SIM farm are sufficiently future-proof to tackle emerging forms of fraud?
Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Lewell. I support the clauses, which outlaw the use of SIM farms and the supply of SIM farms to others.
It is a defence for a person to show that they have “good reason” to use a SIM farm. Examples are given in the Bill, including providing broadcasting services, operating or maintaining a public transport service and tracking freight. I do not suggest that amendments are necessary, but I wonder whether the Minister can help us understand the provisions. What are examples of legitimate use in broadcasting services or tracking freight? These are areas of legitimate commercial activity that lay people are not particularly familiar with. I would be interested to know why a company would want to use multiple SIMs and phone numbers to track freight, for example. It is not meant to be a complex question.
Dame Diana Johnson
I am glad that there is cross-party support for these measures. The clauses were, on the whole, included in the Criminal Justice Bill introduced by the previous Government.
Fighting fraud is a top priority for this Government and tackling it is really important not only for our safer streets mission but for our growth agenda. We want to address the full range of fraud threats that occur. We want to close the systemic enablers that criminals are able to exploit to operate at scale and without detection, such as SIM farms.
The hon. Member for Stockton West is right that such a provision was included in the Criminal Justice Bill, but we have updated the definition of SIM farm to reflect newly emerging use cases. In response to feedback from stakeholders, we are creating an additional offence for the possession and supply of additional technologies, to be specified in the future, with appropriate exceptions to avoid unnecessary restrictions on legitimate businesses and professionals. I hope that goes some way to reassuring the hon. Member about why we are trying to future-proof these clauses. On the issue of review, the provisions will be reviewed two years after commencement.
On the point about legitimate activity, as I said, the list in the Bill is not exhaustive; it gives some indication of legitimate reasons why a business or organisation might have a SIM farm in its possession. Whether a reason is reasonable and stands up to scrutiny will obviously be a matter for the court to decide. The list is not exhaustive, in order to provide flexibility; as I said, this area is changing rapidly. In the coming weeks, months and years there may be new legitimate reasons for businesses to possess a SIM farm to assist them in providing a service or selling something. The clauses are constructed as they are in order to allow that flexibility.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 80 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 81 and 82 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 10 agreed to.
Clauses 83 to 85 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 86
Offence of concealing identity at protests
Jack Rankin (Windsor) (Con)
I beg to move amendment 51, in clause 86, page 98, line 2, at end insert—
“(3) The defence described in subsection (2) is only applicable if a person has given written notice to a police station nearest to the public place that is in a locality designated under section 87(1).
(4) Where it is not reasonably practicable to deliver written notice under subsection (3), a person must inform a constable within the locality designated under section 87(1).”
This amendment requires a person using an item that conceals their identity in a public place within a designated protest area for reasons related to health, religious observance or work to notify the police in writing or orally.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
Clauses 87, 88 and 91 stand part.
New clause 34—Meaning of serious disruption to the life of the community—
“(1) Section 12 of the Public Order Act 1986 (imposing conditions on public processions) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (2A), for the words from ‘, the cases’ to the end substitute—
‘(a) the cases in which a public procession in England and Wales may result in serious disruption to the life of the community include, in particular, where it may, by way of physical obstruction, result in—
(i) the prevention of, or a hindrance that is more than minor to, the carrying out of day-to-day activities (including in particular the making of a journey),
(ii) the prevention of, or a delay that is more than minor to, the delivery of a time-sensitive product to consumers of that product, or
(iii) the prevention of, or a disruption that is more than minor to, access to any essential goods or any essential service,
(b) in considering whether a public procession in England and Wales may result in serious disruption to the life of the community, the senior police officer—
(i) must take into account all relevant disruption, and
(ii) may take into account any relevant cumulative disruption, and
(c) “community”, in relation to a public procession in England and Wales, means any group of persons that may be affected by the procession, whether or not all or any of those persons live or work in the vicinity of the procession.’.
(3) In subsection (2B), for ‘subsection (2A)(a)’ substitute ‘subsection (2A) and this subsection—
“access to any essential goods or any essential service” includes, in particular, access to—
(a) the supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel,
(b) a system of communication,
(c) a place of worship,
(d) a transport facility,
(e) an educational institution, or
(f) a service relating to health;
“area”, in relation to a public procession or public assembly, means such area as the senior police officer considers appropriate, having regard to the nature and extent of the disruption that may result from the procession or assembly;
“relevant cumulative disruption”, in relation to a public procession in England and Wales, means the cumulative disruption to the life of the community resulting from—
(a) the procession,
(b) any other public procession in England and Wales that was held, is being held or is intended to be held in the same area as the area in which the procession mentioned in paragraph (a) is being held or is intended to be held (whether or not directions have been given under subsection (1) in relation to that other procession), and
(c) any public assembly in England and Wales that was held, is being held or is intended to be held in the same area in which the procession mentioned in paragraph (a) is being held or is intended to be held (whether or not directions have been given under section 14(1A) in relation to that assembly), and it does not matter whether or not the procession mentioned in paragraph (a) and any procession or assembly within paragraph (b) or (c) are organised by the same person, are attended by any of the same persons or are held or are intended to be held at the same time;
“relevant disruption”, in relation to a public procession in England and Wales, means all disruption to the life of the community—
(a) that may result from the procession, or
(b) that may occur regardless of whether the procession is held (including in particular normal traffic congestion);’.
(4) Section 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 (imposing conditions on public assemblies) is amended as follows.
(5) In subsection (2A), for the words from ‘, the cases’ to the end substitute ‘—
(a) the cases in which a public assembly in England and Wales may result in serious disruption to the life of the community include, in particular, where it may, by way of physical obstruction, result in—
(i) the prevention of, or a hindrance that is more than minor to, the carrying out of day-to-day activities (including in particular the making of a journey),
(ii) the prevention of, or a delay that is more than minor to, the delivery of a time-sensitive product to consumers of that product, or
(iii) the prevention of, or a disruption that is more than minor to, access to any essential goods or any essential service,
(b) in considering whether a public assembly in England and Wales may result in serious disruption to the life of the community, the senior police officer—
(i) must take into account all relevant disruption, and
(ii) may take into account any relevant cumulative disruption, and
(c) “community”, in relation to a public assembly in England and Wales, means any group of persons that may be affected by the assembly, whether or not all or any of those persons live or work in the vicinity of the assembly.’.
(6) In subsection (2B), for ‘subsection (2A)(a)’ substitute ‘subsection (2A) and this subsection—
“access to any essential goods or any essential service” includes, in particular, access to—
(a) the supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel,
(b) a system of communication,
(c) a place of worship,
(d) a transport facility,
(e) an educational institution, or
(f) a service relating to health;
“area”, in relation to a public assembly or public procession, means such area as the senior police officer considers appropriate, having regard to the nature and extent of the disruption that may result from the assembly or procession;
“relevant cumulative disruption”, in relation to a public assembly in England and Wales, means the cumulative disruption to the life of the community resulting from—
(a) the assembly,
(b) any other public assembly in England and Wales that was held, is being held or is intended to be held in the same area in which the assembly mentioned in paragraph (a) is being held or is intended to be held (whether or not directions have been given under subsection (1A) in relation to that other assembly), and
(c) any public procession in England and Wales that was held, is being held or is intended to be held in the same area as the area in which the assembly mentioned in paragraph (a) is being held or is intended to be held (whether or not directions have been given under section 12(1) in relation to that procession),
and it does not matter whether or not the assembly mentioned in paragraph (a) and any assembly or procession within paragraph (b) or (c) are organised by the same person, are attended by any of the same persons or are held or are intended to be held at the same time;
“relevant disruption”, in relation to a public assembly in England and Wales, means all disruption to the life of the community—
(a) that may result from the assembly, or
(b) that may occur regardless of whether the assembly is held (including in particular normal traffic congestion).’”
This new clause defines “serious disruption to the life of the community” so as to amend the effects of the Zeigler judgement.
New clause 53—Right to protest—
“(1) The Public Order Act 1986 is amended as follows.
(2) In Part II (Processions and Assemblies) before section 11, insert—
‘10A The right to protest
(1) Everyone has the right to engage in peaceful protest, both alone and with others.
(2) Public authorities have a duty to—
(a) respect the right to protest;
(b) protect the right to protest; and
(c) facilitate the right to protest.
(3) A public authority may only interfere with the right to protest, including by placing restrictions upon its exercise, when it is necessary and proportionate to do so to protect national security or public safety, prevent disorder or crime, protect public health or the rights and freedoms of others.
(4) For the purposes of this section “public authority” has the same meaning as in section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.’”
This new clause would introduce an express statutory right to protest, imposing both negative and positive obligations on public authorities whilst recognising that the right to protest may need to be limited to protect other legitimate public interests.
Jack Rankin
Clause 86 will criminalise the act of wearing or otherwise using an item as a face covering that conceals someone’s own identity or that of another person when in an area that the police have designated. A designation can be made only in relation to an area where the police reasonably believe that a protest may take place or is taking place, that the protest is likely to involve or has involved the commission of offences, and that a designation would prevent or control the commission of offences. The offence will carry a maximum penalty of one month’s imprisonment, a £1,000 fine, or both.
Current legislation gives police the power to direct people to remove their face coverings in designated areas, as well as to seize face coverings where they reasonably believe people are wearing them wholly or mainly for the purpose of concealing their identity. However, individuals can follow the direction of an officer to remove their face covering but then move to a new area and put the face covering back on. With growing frequency we have seen protesters using a face covering to conceal their identity, clearly with the aim of avoiding a conviction for criminal activity in a designated area.
Whether I or any individual hon. Member agrees with each protest is beside the point. The right to protest has long been at the heart of British democracy, but there are legitimate ways to protest and illegitimate ways to protest. In particular, since the onset of large-scale pro-Palestinian demonstrations, the Metropolitan police have made hundreds of arrests in connection with the protests. Those arrests encompass a range of offences, including breaches of Public Order Act conditions, public nuisance, assault of emergency workers and support for proscribed organisations. Notably, during the protest on 18 January 2025, over 70 individuals were arrested after attempting to breach the agreed protest conditions. The Metropolitan police described it as
“the highest number of arrests we have seen, in response to the most significant escalation in criminality.”
The cost of policing the protests is reaching enormous levels. The Standard reported in May last year that the cost in London had reached over £40 million, an average of £6 million a month between October 2023 and March 2024—eyewatering sums of money that I am sure most people and most Members of this House would prefer the police were using to crack down on shoplifting, mobile phone theft and violent crime.
The police put themselves in harm’s way to protect our precious right to protest and keep protesters safe as far as possible. The recent farmers’ protests against proposed inheritance tax reforms were an excellent example of public protest; as of April 2025 there have been no publicly reported arrests by the Metropolitan police in connection with them. The demonstrations, which commenced in November 2024, have been largely peaceful and co-ordinated with the authorities. For instance, on 1 March 2025, the Metropolitan police imposed conditions under the Public Order Act to prevent tractors from entering central London during the protest, a measure that was communicated in advance and adhered to by the organisers.
However, it is a sad reality that disruptive climate activist protests, antisemitic hate marches and far-right riots are increasingly accompanied by crime. Increasingly, cowards at those protests use face coverings and balaclavas to get away with crimes. Balaclavas intimidate the public, make law enforcement more difficult and embolden the wearer to commit crimes. In my view, face coverings have no place at protests in the overwhelming majority of cases. I strongly believe that those wishing to express a sincere, genuine view in a democracy—one they clearly feel strongly about—should be prepared to put their face to their opinions.
With crowds of the kind we are now used to seeing, particularly in London, the police increasingly have to rely on delivering justice after the fact using CCTV, iPhone or bodycam footage. Face coverings frustrate that process. A balaclava, a covid mask or any other type of face covering should not give people a free pass to commit crime. That is why I tabled amendment 51, which would require those wishing to wear a face covering within a designated protest area to register it with police before the event.
My concern with clause 86 is that those who wish to cause a problem will cover their face and make spurious claims. It is clear to most people with some common sense that, as it is currently drafted, with the defence of health, religious or work grounds able to be used, the clause will not have sufficient teeth. Amendment 51 in my name aims to shift the emphasis and prevent malicious actors from circumnavigating the well-intended clause.
A 2024 YouGov poll showed that 61% of the public would like to see a ban on Facebook groups where there is a clear intent to intimidate or to prevent police from identifying someone committing a crime. The public know that face coverings at protests are simply the tool of criminals. Let us give the police the real powers they need to tackle the issue. If people have genuine health, religious or work grounds for wearing a face covering, then working with the police and giving written notice will not be an issue for the law-abiding majority.
Luke Taylor
Can the hon. Gentleman give examples of how this will be enacted? Would the person who has permission to wear a face covering be given notice by the police? Would they be given a permission slip that they will wave above their head when they are taking part in a march, or does he imagine this as a tabard that they wear that allows them to cover their face? Can he give some examples of how he imagines this would be implemented in practical terms?
Jack Rankin
I thank the hon. Member for his constructive question. The problem with this defence is that it will obviously be abused. People who are malicious will claim these things after the fact; my amendment is an attempt to change the emphasis slightly. I appreciate that there will be difficulties with enforcement, but the point is that people should have to do this in advance. People who are malicious will not do so, and will not be given permission, so the police can then take action, as opposed to a crime happening, only for the police to go to the CCTV footage of the moment and find that there is nothing to be done.
Mr Alex Barros-Curtis (Cardiff West) (Lab)
I am listening carefully to the hon. Member. I agree with what he started with, but I am curious to know how he thinks this will work in practice. What practicalities do the police have in place, resource-wise and operationally, in order to deal with this? Similarly, how feasible will it be for the police to deliver notice orally, under proposed subsection (4), in the midst of a protest, when they are busy managing the protest and ensuring that it is safe and secure?
Jack Rankin
I appreciate the operational challenges; I would suggest that this would simply be automated online. My aim is to stop whole groups of protesters wearing masks. My view is that police should reject those applications if they are not legitimate, at which point they can treat it collectively as an offence.
I have a broader question for the Minister. I was thinking about when I would consider it legitimate to wear a mask at a protest. The only instance that I could think of—I am not saying that there are not more—is when, outside the Chinese embassy for example, those protesting what is happening in Hong Kong wish to protect themselves from being targeted by the Chinese state. With my amendment, those individuals should be able to declare that to the relevant police forces ahead of the event. I do wonder how we give proper protection to Hong Kong activists such as Tony Chung and Carmen Lau, who have both had threatening letters sent to their neighbours offering 1 million Hong Kong dollars— 100 grand in our currency—for information about them, or for delivering them to the Chinese embassy. Legitimate protest is in the great spirit of democracy and we need to ensure that we defend people exercising that right properly, particularly in this instance, which would be a legitimate use of face coverings.
Luke Taylor
I wish to raise concerns, as I did in my intervention, about the practicalities of the amendment. Although the hon. Member for Windsor did come on to discuss the case of Hong Kong protestors, we have seen an increase in surveillance by the Chinese state and the Hong Kong authorities of overseas protestors, and transnational repression of democracy activists is an increased worry for many of our residents. I worry that the amendment hinders the freedom to protest without worry of identification and family and friends being targeted elsewhere. This is not only about Hong Kong practising transnational repression in our country, but that is a useful example on which to base my objection. Under amendment 51, those seeking to come to a protest and exercise their democratic right would be required to register in advance and have some sort of certificate or permit that would then have to be checked, one by one. I think that puts an additional barrier in the way of exercising our democratic rights. On that basis, I invite the hon. Member to withdraw his amendment.
Matt Vickers
We are all too familiar with those who use protests and the anonymity of face coverings to commit criminal acts and intimidate others. When individuals conceal their identity, whether through masks, scarves or other objects, it becomes much harder for police to identify suspects involved in criminal activity such as violence, vandalism or intimidation. That anonymity can embolden a small number of individuals to commit offences, in the belief that they will not be held accountable. In 2024, masked individuals were reported to have attacked police officers in Rotherham during protests, leading to discussions about banning face coverings at such events. Members might recall that in Birmingham, a group of men wearing balaclavas and waving Palestinian flags stormed a pub, assaulted a patron and caused property damage. That incident was part of wider unrest across the UK, prompting investigations by law enforcement.
My hon. Friend the Member for Windsor has ably set out the purposes and benefits of amendment 51, which seeks to provide a framework requiring those concealing their identity to provide advance notice. We heard during our evidence sessions about the legitimate reasons why people may wish to conceal their identity, and we are also aware of the need to protect the public from those who exploit such concealment to do harm to others. The amendment could provide a great opportunity for law enforcement to assess and monitor situations properly, offering a more flexible and accountable approach to managing exemptions. Does the Minister feel there could be enforcement benefits to having a more flexible power to assess the use of face coverings?
Clause 86 rightly introduces a new offence aimed at individuals concealing their identity while attending public protests in designated areas. It recognises and provides for certain legitimate reasons that a person might have for covering their face, including those related to health, religious observance or occupation. It also rightly sets out obligations on the authorities to ensure public awareness of the rule when it is in effect, as well as the sanctions for those who fail to comply. The clause sends a clear message that protest should be lawful, peaceful and safe. When used appropriately and with the public properly informed, the measure could greatly enhance the safety of both demonstrators and the wider public by discouraging those who intend to use anonymity as a cover for criminal acts.
Clause 87 sets out the powers available to senior police officers to designate a specific locality in England or Wales where the offence of concealing identity at protest will apply. It allows for the designation to be made for up to 24 hours if it is reasonably believed that a protest is happening or is likely to happen in the area, that it may involve criminal activity, and that it is necessary to limit or prevent such offences. The clause further sets out how the designation can be expanded and provides for the British Transport police and Ministry of Defence police to apply similar designations within their jurisdictions. Clause 88 sets out the requirements and procedures around creating such designations.
I would be grateful if the Minister set out what safeguards are in place to ensure that the designation power is not applied disproportionately or used to deter legitimate protests. How will the police ensure that adequate and timely public notice is given to protestors or members of the public who may enter a designated area unknowingly? Will the Minister clarify how long written records of designations and directions would be retained, and whether they would be publicly accessible for scrutiny and accountability? Will there be a requirement for post-event review of designations and use of these powers to assess their proportionality and impact?
Dame Diana Johnson
Clause 86 introduces a new criminal offence for a person
“wearing or otherwise using an item that conceals their identity or another person’s identity”
in a public place that has been designated by the police. It is a defence for a person to prove that they wore or used the item for a purpose related to either the health of the person or others, religious observance or the person’s work. Clause 87 provides that
“A constable whose rank is at least that of inspector may designate a locality in England or Wales that is in their police area for a specified period not exceeding 24 hours if they reasonably believe that—
(a) a public assembly, or public procession, which constitutes a protest may take place or is taking place in the locality,
(b) the protest is likely to involve or has involved the commission of offences, and
(c) it is expedient, in order to prevent or limit the commission of offences, to designate the locality”.
Earlier we heard evidence—the hon. Members for Windsor and for Sutton and Cheam raised this example—about people, perhaps from the Hong Kong community, protesting against the Chinese authorities, and how this provision could affect those who legitimately want to cover their faces because of the reprisals and repercussions that might be threatened against their families back in Hong Kong. I want to be clear: this measure does not create an offence of concealing identity at every protest. The offence applies only to a protest in a locality designated by the police, and they can designate a locality only where they reasonably believe that
“the protest is likely to involve or has involved the commission of offences,”
and that
“it is expedient, in order to prevent or limit the commission of offences, to designate the locality”.
The majority of protests are peaceful and would not be captured by these clauses. The use of these powers and the management of protests is also an operational decision for the police, and we would expect them to consider the nature of the protest, including those who are likely to be present, before deciding to designate an area using this power. I hope that deals with the point raised about protestors from the Hong Kong community, and of course others.
As I have set out, the constable at the rank of inspector who designates a locality must ensure that all reasonable steps are taken to notify the public that the designation has been made, the offences created under clause 86, the locality and the period for which the designation will be enforced. Clause 88 sets out the procedure for designation, including what must be specified. Clause 91 is the interpretation section for part 9 of the Bill.
In recent years, as a number of Members have said, the police have faced significant challenges in policing large-scale protests. While the majority of those attending these protests are exercising their rights peacefully and within the confines of the law, unfortunately we have seen a minority of individuals behave in a criminal manner while hiding their identity. It is vital that the police are able to identify those who commit criminal offences during the course of these protests, because those who commit criminal offences should face justice for their crimes and because preventing criminality at protests ensures that peaceful protestors and the wider community are protected from harm.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Jess Phillips)
The shadow Minister spoke about an incident that happened in my constituency. I want to assure everybody that the people who committed those criminal offences, which were not part of any protest, were held accountable and sent to prison.
Dame Diana Johnson
It is always good to hear when people are held accountable for their criminal actions and punished accordingly, so I am very pleased to hear that.
I want to explain fully how clause 86 will work. At the moment, the police have existing powers to require individuals to remove disguises in designated localities where criminality is likely, but those powers have not always worked in the way that we all want them to, with individuals complying with directions to remove disguises, but then later putting them back on. In a large protest, it is difficult to prevent that from occurring, which is why the new offence makes it a criminal offence to conceal an identity as soon as the locality has been designated.
I want to make it clear that the police have to take all reasonable steps to notify the public that a designation has been made, including the nature of the offence, the locality to which the designation applies and the period during which the designation will be enforced. A designation must be in writing, except for where that is not reasonably practicable, such as in a live and rapidly moving public order situation, in which case the police can make an oral designation instead and record that in writing as soon as reasonably practicable. The maximum penalty for this offence is one month’s imprisonment or a level 3 fine not exceeding £1,000.
Let me turn to the amendments in this group. Amendment 51 seeks to limit the defences in clause 86 to those who have given written notice to the police or, if not reasonably practicable, oral notice. While I understand the motivation behind the amendment, we believe that clause 86 already provides a sufficient and specific statutory defence for individuals who wear or use identity-concealing items for purposes related to health, religious observance or work. Crucially, this defence is subject to a reverse burden of proof, which means that the individual must prove on the balance of probabilities that their use of such an item was for one of these legitimate purposes. This mechanism already ensures that only those with genuine reasons can rely on the defence without placing an undue burden on the prosecution.
Introducing a requirement to notify the police in writing or orally would add an unnecessary and impractical layer of and risk excluding individuals with legitimate defences simply because they did not, or could not, provide prior notice, and could result in the criminalisation of innocent people on procedural grounds. The current legal framework strikes an appropriate balance between public safety and individual rights. Amendment 51 would undermine that balance without offering meaningful enforcement benefits.
New clause 34 seeks to import directly into the Public Order Act 1986 the provisions of the Public Order Act 1986 (Serious Disruption to the Life of the Community) Regulations 2023. The shadow Minister has indicated that the rationale for the new clause is to seek to mitigate the effects of the Supreme Court’s Ziegler judgment in June 2021.
The 2023 regulations amended and clarified the meaning of
“serious disruption to the life of the community”
for the purposes of the police’s powers to imposes conditions on protests under the 1986 Act. They did so by amending the examples of cases that may constitute serious disruption, specifying that the cumulative impact of protests in the same area, and all relevant disruption, may be considered by police, even when it is not protest-related, when they assess the impact of a particular protest for the purpose of imposing conditions. The serious disruption regulations also defined the term “community”. The example of cases that may constitute serious disruption aligned the use of the term with the definition provided in section 34 of the Public Order Act 2023.
The Supreme Court’s judgment in the Ziegler case established that the protection afforded to protesters by articles 10 and 11 of the European convention on human rights extends to circumstances in which the disruption caused by protesters is the intentional obstruction of others. However, the extent of the disruption, and whether it was intentional, are relevant factors in the assessment of proportionality.
Let me take the subjects in turn. First, the shadow Minister will be aware that Liberty successfully challenged the serious disruption regulations in May 2024. This Government disagreed with the High Court’s ruling in that case, particularly in relation to the Court’s finding on consultation. Accordingly, we have appealed the Court’s decision, and await the Court of Appeal’s judgment, which is expected shortly.
Secondly, the provisions in the serious disruption regulations are not discernibly impacted by the Supreme Court’s judgment in the Ziegler case. That judgment relates to the reasonable excuse defence, and more recent case law, such as R v. Hallam and Others, has since made clear the limitations of such a defence.
I recognise the positive intention of new clause 34 to ensure that the changes made by the serious disruption regulations remain available to police forces in their policing of protests, but we consider that we cannot seek to address the issue—should there be one—until the Court of Appeal’s judgment is received. In short, it would be inappropriate to pre-empt the Court of Appeal’s judgment. In the meantime, the regulations remain in force until the judgment is handed down. It remains open to the Court of Appeal to overturn the High Court’s quashing order, should the judges find in favour of the Government. We will consider our response to the Court of Appeal’s judgment once it is available.
New clause 53 seeks to insert a statutory right to peaceful protest into the Public Order Act 1986, by requiring public authorities to respect, protect and facilitate the right to protest. The rights that it outlines are already firmly established in UK law through the Human Rights Act 1998, and public authorities must act in a way that is compatible with a convention right. Introducing a parallel provision risks legal duplication, confusion and inconsistent interpretation, potentially complicating the enforcement of public order. Rather than adding legal clarity, the new clause might create uncertainty without offering any new protections.
I hope that I have been able to persuade Opposition Members that their amendments are not necessary or are premature. I ask that the hon. Member for Windsor withdraws amendment 51.
Jack Rankin
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 86 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 87 and 88 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 89
Possession of pyrotechnic articles at protests
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Dame Diana Johnson
During recent protests, the police have observed that protesters are increasingly using flares and fireworks. Although there is existing legislation that prohibits the use of fireworks in public places and the possession of explosives other than for a lawful purpose, it does not consistently cover the mere possession of flares and fireworks during protests. The clause therefore creates a new criminal offence of possession of a pyrotechnic article for those taking part in a protest.
The misuse of pyrotechnic articles has implications regarding public safety. This new measure will enable the police to take the necessary preventive action against such behaviour during protests. It is a defence for a person to show they had a reasonable excuse for having the pyrotechnic article, such as a flare or firework, in their possession at the material time, or, in particular, to show they had it in their possession for use in connection with work.
The offence applies only to those taking part in a protest. It does not capture a person who is taking part in, for example, a cultural or religious event where pyrotechnic articles are customarily used. The maximum penalty for the offence will be a level 3 fine of £1,000. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Dame Diana Johnson
I am grateful for the hon. Member’s support and hope the Committee will agree to the clause standing part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 89 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 90
War memorials
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Dame Diana Johnson
We all understand and accept that war memorials play a vital role in commemorating those who have made the ultimate sacrifice, including those who have no known grave. They offer a place of reflection and should be protected.
In some recent protests, protesters have climbed on war memorials, causing anger and outrage among the public. The new offence will provide greater clarity for policing. In particular, the measure makes it clear that the act of climbing on specified war memorials is unacceptable. It gives police the powers they need to ensure that justice is delivered to those who engage in such disrespectful conduct.
A war memorial is an object that preserves the memory of a war or conflict and those involved in it. It can take any form and be created by anyone at any time. It can be permanent or temporary; it can be a living thing such as a tree; it can a building or a more traditional plaque, monument or sculpture. The offence is intended to ensure that our most significant war memorials are used for their intended purpose of providing remembrance for those who have died and have no grave to be visited, and are not to be disrespected.
Schedule 11 specifies 25 war memorials, including the Royal Artillery memorial and the Cenotaph in London, the Portsmouth naval war memorial, and the Liverpool Cenotaph. The clause includes a power to amend the list of specified war memorials in schedule 11 by regulations.
The penalty for the offence will be a level 3 fine of up to £1,000 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months. It is a defence for a person charged with the offence to provide that they had good reason for climbing on the specified war memorial, or had the owner or occupier’s consent to climb on it. That will ensure that activities such as maintenance approved by the owner will not be criminalised. If a war memorial has a base or steps that are designed for individuals to climb, individuals will not be criminalised. On that basis, I commend the clause and schedule 11 to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
The clause introduces a new offence targeted at individuals who climb on designated war memorials without lawful justification. It is designed to protect sites of national remembrance and ensure that they are treated with appropriate respect and dignity. The act of climbing on such memorials, often during protests or large gatherings, can be seen as disrespectful, provocative or even intentionally inflammatory, particularly when shared on social media.
For example, at a pro-Palestinian demonstration in London in 2023, a group of protesters climbed on to the Royal Artillery memorial at Hyde Park Corner, which honours the tens of thousands of Royal Artillery soldiers who died in the first world war. The Metropolitan police described the actions as inflammatory, but noted that at the time no specific law prohibited climbing on war memorials, so no arrests were made.
The introduction of the offence reflects growing public unease about the perceived disrespect towards war memorials during certain protests in recent years. It is right that this measure should be put in place to protect the memory and legacy of those who made the ultimate sacrifice.
Dame Diana Johnson
I am pleased with the cross-party support for the measure.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 90 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 11 agreed to.
Clause 91 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 92
Suspension of internet protocol addresses and internet domain names
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Dame Diana Johnson
The clause introduces schedule 12, which provides for a new power for law enforcement and certain investigative agencies, such as the National Crime Agency and His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, to apply to the court for an order to suspend internet protocol addresses and domain names when they are used to facilitate serious crime.
All too often, criminals use IP addresses and domain names to facilitate crimes such as fraud, the distribution of child sexual abuse material, malware and phishing. Currently, law enforcement agencies do not have the legal power to mandate the suspension of IP addresses and domain names, so in some scenarios the UK public continue to be at risk of falling victim to crime.
Law enforcement agencies currently utilise voluntary arrangements with industry to request the suspension of IP addresses and domains. In the majority of domestic cases, voluntary arrangements are successful, and the Government are clear that they should continue to be the first port of call in the United Kingdom. However, most of the organisations responsible for providing the IP address or domain name are situated in foreign jurisdictions and often require a formal request, such as a court order, before they will take action. The measure will provide for such a court order to be obtained. Domestically, the provision will empower law enforcement agencies to compel the small number of organisations that do not co-operate with voluntary arrangements.
The measure will protect the public by giving law enforcement and certain investigative agencies the tools they need to tackle crimes facilitated by IP addresses and domain names, and to prevent individuals from becoming potential victims. It will ensure that the UK cyber-landscape continues to be one of the safest in the world. On that basis, I commend the clause to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
The clause rightly provides a legal framework for suspending IP addresses and domain names linked to serious crime. This is a valuable measure in the fight against cyber-enabled criminal activity, including fraud, child exploitation and unlicensed online gambling.
By allowing appropriate officers to apply to a judge for a suspension order, the clause ensures that access to digital infrastructure used for criminal purposes can be swiftly and lawfully disrupted. It will be particularly effective in cases where traditional enforcement is difficult because of the borderless nature of online platforms. Crucially, safeguards are built in to ensure that the powers are used only when necessary, and proportionately. The involvement of a judge, strict criteria for suspension, and provisions for variation or appeal ensure a fair balance between enforcement and civil liberties.
Dame Diana Johnson
I am grateful for the Opposition’s support.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 92 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 12 agreed to.
Clause 93
Electronically tracked stolen goods: search without warrant
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Dame Diana Johnson
Clause 93 amends the Theft Act 1968 to create a new power for the police to enter premises to search for and seize stolen items that have been electronically tracked to the premises, without requiring a warrant from a court if it is not reasonably practicable to obtain one. Clause 94 makes the same change in respect of the service police.
Under the safer streets mission, the Government are determined to crack down on acquisitive and street crimes, antisocial behaviour, and other crimes that make people feel unsafe on our streets. Crimes such as phone theft and snatch theft are deeply invasive and can have a profound impact on those whose possessions are stolen.
Tackling mobile phone theft is a priority for the Government. According to the crime survey for England and Wales, in the year ending March 2024 an estimated 235,000 people had their mobile phone stolen. Around half of stolen phones are taken through snatch thefts or pickpocketing, known as theft from the person offences.
The latest crime survey estimates show that street crime, which includes theft from the person offences and personal robbery, increased by 43%, driven by a significant rise in snatch theft. Data published by the Metropolitan police shows that theft from the person offences involving a mobile phone increased by 30% in London during the year to January 2025. Those figures are extremely concerning.
In recent years, the ability to track valuable items such as phones, bicycles and vehicles has become vastly more sophisticated. If items fitted with GPS or other trackers are stolen, it is now far easier for victims to know where their stolen property is located. However, victims have raised concerns that when they share that information with the police, they are not always able to act. This is extremely frustrating for victims of crime and for the police.
Those who commit the offences are not just petty criminals and opportunists. There is clear evidence of organised criminality and profitability, with stolen devices often being trafficked internationally, particularly to China and Algeria. That is why, at our mobile phone summit on 6 February, my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary brought together law enforcement agencies and the mobile phone industry, and secured their commitments to working jointly to tackle mobile phone theft and to breaking the business model of the organised criminal networks that drive it.
Collaborative efforts include significantly boosting data and intelligence sharing to better understand this complex problem, increased police-intensification activities, and ensuring that all parties work together to drive joint solutions. To complement these actions, the legislative reforms in the Bill will enable the police to investigate more swiftly those who conduct mobile phone and other forms of theft. Currently, the police have no general power to enter and search premises solely for the purpose of searching for and seizing stolen property without a warrant. We know that when items can be tracked to specific locations, they are quickly moved on or sold, limiting the window in which the police can act.
Matt Vickers
Clause 93 is hugely important and rightly allows the police to search premises for electronically tracked stolen goods without a warrant, offering a fast and efficient way for the police to recover stolen items before they are further distributed or sold, with the clause defining the authorisation procedures and limitations on the powers.
The clause empowers senior officers at the rank of inspector or above to authorise searches based on reasonable grounds and electronic tracking data. This is particularly useful in cases where obtaining a warrant in time could risk losing crucial evidence or missing the opportunity to seize the stolen goods. It is designed to enable law enforcement to act quickly when there is clear electronic tracking evidence that stolen goods are present on the specified premises. It seems like a common-sense measure that will allow law enforcement to act swiftly in recovering electronically tracked stolen goods, making it a highly effective tool in the fight against crime.
When stolen items are equipped with tracking devices, the ability to bypass the often time-consuming process of obtaining a warrant can be crucial in preventing further harm, such as the sale or distribution of the goods. The clause will ensure that officers can quickly respond to real-time data, reducing the window of opportunity for criminals to move or hide stolen goods.
The clause adopts a narrower approach to these powers than that proposed by the Criminal Justice Bill. I have always been of the view that, wherever possible, we should look to further enable our police officers and law enforcement agencies to tackle crime. Will the Minister comment on the rationale for narrowing the scope of the powers being given to our police by this measure?
Luke Taylor
I broadly back the powers in the clause. However, I have been involved in two cases in which an item was tracked but the tracking was not sufficiently accurate to ascertain the address. I was witness to a neighbour banging on the door of another neighbour’s home, demanding that he be let in to retrieve his phone, which he claimed had been tracked to that address. The police had been called, but they were not able to enter. When the resident came home, it was demonstrated that the phone was not at that address; it was actually five doors down. The individual had dropped the phone while walking home, and another resident had picked it up, brought it home and was looking after it until they could take it to a police station.
That individual had been incredibly agitated. Under these measures, if the police were called and the tracking information showed that the phone was at a particular address, the inaccurate data would have allowed the police to enter the property incorrectly. Are there appropriate safeguards in relation to the accuracy of the location information that is used? What measures are in place to compensate people when errors are made?
The second example is that, when my bike was stolen, I followed its tracker and went to the house where it seemed to be located. I called the police, who attended. The bike was not in the house; the tracker was actually in a van that was parked on the street outside. Again, if entry to the property had been obtained under these measures, there would have been damage and an incorrect entry to a resident’s home.
These powers seem like a good idea. The hon. Member for Stockton West called them common sense, but what seems to be common sense usually omits serious thought. Without an additional step of scrutiny, I do not think tracking information is sufficiently accurate to ensure these powers are used appropriately. I therefore invite the Minister to provide a bit more reassurance that thought will be given to accuracy and that mitigations will be in place to compensate residents when the measures are used incorrectly. We must not put residents and citizens at risk of property damage for reasons beyond their control.
David Burton-Sampson
As I look around the room, we all have our mobiles glued to our hands. They do everything for us now: payments, emails, leisure and, occasionally, phone calls. These devices are massively important to us. We all know the feeling of leaving home without a mobile device—many of us would have to turn round because we cannot live without it.
There has been a significant rise in snatch-and-grab crimes throughout the country, and I know many constituents, friends and colleagues in this place who have been impacted. Given that these devices can be tracked, it is madness that the police are not currently able to go in and recover them. I take the point raised by the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam about the accuracy of tracking. I do not think it is as big an issue as he makes out, but perhaps it is something for the Minister to consider.
The biggest thing is that knowing the police can enter to recover these items will act as a deterrent. We need to drive down this crime. The prevalence of snatch-and-grabs in this country is simply unacceptable, so I welcome clause 93.
Dame Diana Johnson
I will deal with the questions that have been raised in this short debate. First, the new measure differs from the previous Government’s proposed reform as it provides the police with specific targeted powers to retrieve electronically tagged stolen items that have been tracked to premises using the geolocation data and intelligence, and it will equip the police with tailored powers to act quickly to retrieve items, bringing offenders to justice and providing a swifter resolution for victims. We are also introducing robust safeguards, including the requirement for an officer of at least inspector rank to authorise the use of the powers, so that they are used proportionately and lawfully.
I take very seriously the issue raised by the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam about the accuracy of data. With these new powers, as I tried to set out in my opening remarks, the police will need to be satisfied that at least one item of property in question has been electronically tracked to the premises, and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that it is stolen and on the premises before entry is authorised. We would expect the police to undertake due diligence and, as far as possible, to use additional information or intelligence to ensure that the location is accurate. As I said, any use of the power has to be authorised by at least an inspector.
Luke Taylor
I thank the Minister for giving way, because I think this is a helpful query: will there be any differentiation between last known locations and live tracking? Obviously, tracking devices can be removed and batteries can run out. Will a last known location be considered sufficient evidence of an item’s current location, or will a live location be needed to prove that the item is currently in that position?
Dame Diana Johnson
The hon. Gentleman raises legitimate questions about how this will work operationally. As I said in my opening remarks, there will be guidance on how this will function.
The hon. Gentleman also asked about the possible redress for householders when things perhaps go wrong. There are existing provisions under which individuals may be able to claim compensation where the police have caused damage to property by, for example, forcing entry. Any compensation will obviously depend on the circumstances of each case and will be for the police force to determine, and it is unlikely to be paid if the damage was caused by the police acting lawfully on the evidence and information available to them.
On that basis, I commend these clauses to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 93 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 94 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 95
Access to driver licensing information
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Dame Diana Johnson
Clause 95 deals with access to driver licensing information. It will facilitate automatic access by the police and other law enforcement officers to Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency driver information, at the point of need, for all policing and law enforcement purposes.
The police and other law enforcement officers are frequently required to deal with unpredictable circumstances, often operating under significant time pressure, as they strive to protect the public, maintain order and investigate complex criminality. The police have provided compelling operational examples of where they could better deal with the threats and harms faced by individuals if direct access to DVLA driving licence data were provided.
Protecting our communities from the threat of sexual violence, stopping drug gangs preying on the vulnerable, safeguarding people from harassment and stalking, and informing relatives of the death or serious injury of a loved one are duties that our police officers frequently undertake. Unfortunately, those are some of the activities for which police officers cannot make effective use of DVLA driving licence information within the current data access regime.
Matt Vickers
Clause 95 updates and expands police and law enforcement access to driver licence data held by the DVLA. It replaces the existing section 71 of the 2000 Act with a revised framework, adding proposed new sections 71A and 71B. The modernised provision allows authorised individuals including the police, service police and other specified law enforcement bodies to access driver licensing information not just for road traffic offences but for a wider range of policing and law enforcement purposes. The Secretary of State is given power to regulate access, impose conditions and consult relevant bodies before issuing new rules or codes of practice. The clause also introduces oversight measures, such as a statutory code of practice and an annual report to Parliament, ensuring transparency and responsible data use. I welcome the Minister’s comments on the role of facial recognition technology and on the safeguards put in place to ensure the power is not used disproportionately or inappropriately.
Dame Diana Johnson
I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 95 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 96
Testing of persons in police detention for presence of controlled drugs
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to consider the following:
Schedule 13.
Clauses 97 to 100 stand part.
Dame Diana Johnson
These clauses relate to drug testing. There are a number of provisions we wish to introduce. Clauses 96 to 100 and schedule 13 amend existing legislation to expand the powers of the police to drug test people aged 18 or over on arrest, or aged 14 or over on charge, where the offence they have been arrested for or charged with is a “trigger offence” or where a police officer of at least the rank of inspector reasonably suspects that their drug use caused or contributed to their offending.
These clauses expand the police’s powers to drug test in three clear ways: first, by expanding the range of drugs that can be tested for, from specified class A drugs only to any specified controlled drug; secondly, by expanding the list of trigger offences which may automatically trigger a drug test; and thirdly, by expanding the power to take an additional sample for drug testing when the first is unsuitable or insufficient, and up to a maximum of two samples. The clauses also expand the regime for subsequent assessments for misuse of controlled drugs following a positive test result.
As we all appreciate, drugs can have wide-ranging and devastating impacts on individuals and society. Addressing the drug use that is linked to crime is key to the Government’s safer streets mission. The purpose of drug testing on arrest is to reduce reoffending by referring those whose offending is believed to be at least in part caused by drug use into assessment for treatment and support services. The intention is not to further criminalise drug users, although refusing to provide a sample or to attend or stay for an assessment is an offence. Nor does it mean that they will receive treatment instead of a sentence. Drug testing on arrest is a discretionary power, subject to the safeguards included in the existing legislation, the PACE codes of practice and other relevant guidance. How it is implemented and funded is a local decision made by the police and crime commissioner and service providers.
Clause 96 amends the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to expand the existing police power to drug test in police detention to include any “specified controlled drug” as opposed to just specified class A drugs. The list of controlled drugs will be specified in secondary legislation, subject to the negative procedure. To be specified, drugs must be controlled drugs within the meaning of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971.
Clause 96 also inserts new schedule 2B into PACE, which provides an updated list of trigger offences for drug testing on arrest. A number of the additions to the list of trigger offences are key to the Government’s safer streets mission, including offences linked to violence against women and girls, knife crime and antisocial behaviour. Some existing trigger offences are removed, such as fraud and vagrancy offences where there is no longer a clear link to drug misuse or those offences are being repealed. The clause also moves the Secretary of State’s power to amend the list of trigger offences in secondary legislation, subject to the draft affirmative procedure, into PACE. Clause 97 amends the Drugs Act 2005 and the Bail Act 1976 to reflect the expansion from class A drugs to “specified controlled drugs” to align with the changes in clause 96.
Clause 98 amends PACE to expand the police’s power to take an additional sample from a person in police detention for the purpose of testing, where the first sample is unsuitable or insufficient, up to a maximum of two samples. It allows the police to take an additional sample where required—for example, where one sample alone is not suitable or sufficient for testing across more than one machine or kit to test for additional, different drugs. Only one additional sample may be taken, and only when the first sample is unsuitable or insufficient. The legislative safeguards that apply to the first sample will continue to apply, such as being reminded that refusal to provide a sample is a criminal offence, having a maximum of two samples taken during the period of detention, and not being tested before having seen a custody officer.
Clause 99 repeals subsections (8A) and (8B) in section 37 of PACE and amends section 38, which currently enable the police to continue to detain an individual for the purpose of taking a sample for drug testing, before or after charge. We have determined that, due to changes in operational procedure and drug testing technology, the power is no longer necessary and so we are removing it.
Finally, clause 100 removes the notification conditions in section 63B of PACE and in the Drugs Act 2005. In 2011, Home Office guidance advised all forces in England and Wales that they did not need to seek additional, individual authorisation from the Secretary of State to conduct drug testing on arrest. These amendments reflect that guidance by removing the notification condition from both PACE and the Drugs Act 2005. They remove an administrative burden on the police, improving efficiency. I commend the clauses to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
Clause 96 and schedule 13 significantly expand the existing powers of the police to conduct drug testing on individuals in detention. Currently, the police can test only for class A drugs under certain conditions. The clause amends sections 63B and 63C of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to enable testing for any specified controlled drug, broadening the scope beyond class A to include class B and C substances. The change allows for testing following arrest for those aged 18 and over, or charge for those aged 14 and over, where the arrest relates to a trigger offence or where a police inspector reasonably suspects that drug misuse contributed to the offence.
The clause also inserts new schedule 2B into PACE to define the list of trigger offences, replacing the outdated schedule 6 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000. The updated schedule retains many existing offences, particularly theft and drug offences, but removes fraud and vagrancy offences. It adds a range of new offences such as common assault, certain violent crime and public order offences. The Secretary of State is given the power to amend the list of drugs and offences through regulations subject to either the draft affirmative or negative resolution procedures, depending on the nature of the change.
Clause 97 makes related changes to the Drugs Act 2005 to align the drug assessment framework with the new expanded testing regime. Sections 9 and 10 of the 2005 Act, which govern the process for initial and follow-up assessments following a positive drugs test, are amended to refer to specific controlled drugs rather than just class A substances.
David Taylor
I rise to support clause 96, a necessary update to the law that reflects the reality facing many of our communities. Drug misuse comes in many forms and continues to drive crime, harm and deep personal suffering. Hemel Hempstead has a long-standing drug issue going back several decades. Indeed, drugs were a significant cause of the deaths of two members of my own family, my aunt and my cousin, so I am particularly motivated to see the clause enacted to help tackle the causes of drug crime. Currently, police can test detainees only for class A drugs. Clause 96 rightly extends that power to all controlled drugs, including class B and C substances such as cannabis or illegally traded prescription drugs. Those are not harmless. They contribute to the cycles of reoffending, antisocial behaviour and exploitation, and too often go unnoticed in the system.
The clause is not about punishment; it is about awareness and intervention. Testing can be the first step forward towards treatment. It allows the police to respond more effectively and open the door to support for those struggling with addiction issues. With proper safeguards and parliamentary oversight, these changes give our officers the tools they need while protecting people’s rights. Communities, from major cities to towns like mine, will benefit from a smarter and fairer approach. This is about being honest about the harms that drugs cause, about how we help users and how we prevent the crime that drugs cause. I urge Members to support the clause.
Dame Diana Johnson
I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Hemel Hempstead for his speech. He talked about his experience within his family, and how devastating drugs can be to families, individuals and communities. That is why extending the testing regime with these clauses is so important to try to assist those people who have got themselves into problems with drugs and are involved in criminality. They are not excusing that at all, but finding a way of testing and offering that support and help if people are ready to access treatment. I commend the clauses to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 96 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 13 agreed to.
Clauses 97 to 100 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 101
Cautions given to persons having limited leave to enter or remain in UK
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Dame Diana Johnson
Clause 101 expands the current criteria for foreign national conditional cautions to encompass foreign nationals with limited leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom. A foreign national conditional caution requires a foreign national to be removed from the UK as an alternative to prosecution. It will also specify that they may not return within a specified period of time.
Presently, foreign nationals may be given a foreign national conditional caution to secure their removal from the UK if they do not have existing leave to enter or remain here. The clause extends that to apply to foreign nationals with limited leave to be here. The clause will extend the pool of persons to whom a foreign national conditional caution may be given with a view to securing the removal from the United Kingdom of more foreign nationals who commit crime. On that basis, I commend the clause to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
The clause expands the definition of a “relevant foreign offender” in both the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, to include individuals who have limited leave to enter or remain in the UK as defined by the Immigration Act 1971. By doing so, it ensures that people with limited immigration status are treated as relevant foreign offenders for the purposes of issuing conditional or diversionary cautions, enabling those cautions to carry immigration-related consequences, such as potential removal from the UK.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 101 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 102
Confiscation
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to consider the following:
Schedules 14 and 15.
Clause 103 stand part.
Dame Diana Johnson
Clause 102 introduces schedules 14 and 15 to the Bill, which make the most significant reforms to the confiscation regime in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, as contained in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 since that Act was passed over 20 years ago. The confiscation regime allows courts to place confiscation orders on defendants to repay the benefit gained from criminality and to make it clear to offenders that crime does not pay.
The Government have been aware that confiscation has been in need of reform for some time. In 2018, the Home Office commissioned the Law Commission of England and Wales to review the confiscation regime and make recommendations for reform. The Law Commission’s final report was published in November 2022 and contains 119 recommendations, which have shaped the measures we are introducing in the Bill. Reform is necessary to improve enforcement of confiscation orders and streamline processes by law enforcement and court services, so that the regime operates as efficiently and effectively as possible.
Reform will be achieved by rationalising court processes, creating streamlined confiscation orders, expediting the enforcement of unpaid orders and returning more funds to victims. In particular, the Bill contains a new measure to return funds to victims following an uplift of the amount that is to be paid towards a confiscation order. If a confiscation order is uplifted, money can be redirected towards existing victims to compensate for their outstanding losses. The Home Office has consulted extensively.
Planning and Infrastructure Bill (Third sitting)
Tuesday 29th April 2025
(1 day, 21 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesPlanning and Infrastructure Bill 2024-26 View all Planning and Infrastructure Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 29 April 2025 - (29 Apr 2025)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 6 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
Before we begin, I have a few preliminary announcements. Members should email their speaking notes to hansardnotes@parliament.uk. Please switch electronic devices to silent. Tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings. However, it is very hot this morning, so if you would like to remove your jackets, you are allowed to do so.
Today we begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection and grouping list for today’s sitting is available in the room. It shows how the clauses and selected amendments have been grouped for debate. Amendments grouped together are generally on the same or a similar issue. Please note that decisions on amendments take place not in the order in which they are debated, but in the order in which they appear on the amendment paper. The selection and grouping list shows the order of debates; decisions on each amendment and on whether each clause should stand part of the Bill are taken when we come to the relevant clause.
The Member who has put their name to the lead amendment in a group is called first. Other Members are then free to catch my eye to speak to all or any of the amendments in that group. A Member may speak more than once in a single debate. At the end of the debate on a group of amendments, I shall again call the Member who moved the lead amendment. Before they sit down, they will need to indicate whether they wish to withdraw it or to seek a decision. If any Member wishes to press any other amendments in a group to a vote, they will need to let me know in advance.
Clause 1
National policy statements: review
Gideon Amos (Taunton and Wellington) (LD)
I beg to move amendment 32, in clause 1, page 1, line 16, at end insert—
“(3A) After subsection (2), insert—
‘(2A) Any review of a national policy statement in relation to a nationally significant infrastructure project must include consideration of whether the project complies with the Land Use Framework.’”
This amendment would require national policy statements to be in accordance with the proposed Land Use Framework.
Gideon Amos
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Mrs Hobhouse. I rise to move amendment 32, which stands in my name.
We are pleased that the Government have kept their manifesto commitment to publish the long-awaited consultation on the land use framework—something the Liberal Democrats had long called for. The consultation states:
“Optimising how we use England’s land will be essential to delivering the Government’s Growth mission and the Clean Energy Superpower mission”.
It rightly recognises that a
“strategic approach to land use strategy and planning”
is needed if we are
“to avoid siloed…decision-making and…unintended consequences or unanticipated costs.”
It says that that will also inform decisions
“to guarantee our long-term food security...support development...achieve our targets on nature and climate…and support economic growth.”
Those are good objectives. However, the Secretary of State has repeatedly emphasised that the land use framework is not about telling anyone how to use land; instead, it is about providing the principles, data and tools to empower decision makers. It is right that the land use framework should not become prescriptive, but there is a real chance that it will become an expensive waste of time if it is not bolted into the planning system. To succeed, we need an efficient legal link to planning and spending decisions; otherwise, the land use framework will likely only sit on a shelf.
Part 1 of the Bill rightly recognises the need for more efficient ways to keep national policy statements up to date. In the past, NPSs have fallen behind Government policy, which has led to delay. For example, as Justice Holgate noted in the Drax development consent order challenge, the energy NPS designated in 2011 left important questions about greenhouse gas emissions unanswered because it did not reflect Parliament’s net zero decisions.
To avoid that kind of disconnect and delay, NPSs should have a direct link to the land use framework, as proposed in the amendment. The amendment would help to ensure that the land use framework has a dynamic link to major infrastructure decisions, without becoming too prescriptive. That would help to protect the environment and agriculture by guiding projects away from the most damaging options early in the process. It would also help development by improving certainty up front, reducing the challenge of judicial review were the relationship between NPSs and the land use framework left to the courts to determine.
The land use framework must be aligned with national policy objectives to inform the policies needed to deliver those objectives. Failing to consider the land use framework when reviewing national policy statements would also perpetuate siloed decision making. It would leave the land use framework as toothless and without the necessary weight, undermining public confidence in land use decisions. The amendment would not bind decision makers or prescribe specific land uses but would meet the Government’s stated objective of better informing decisions and supporting the delivery of a shared vision for English land use that balances the need for housing, energy, infrastructure and food security with our statutory climate and nature targets.
In his remarks when he launched the land use framework, the Environment Secretary said that the framework
“will work hand in hand with”
the Government’s
“housing and energy plans…creating a coherent set of policies that work together, rather than against each other.”
Ensuring that national policy statements in these areas consider the land use framework is therefore essential to realising the Government’s objectives of joined-up decision making.
The House of Lords Land Use in England Committee highlighted the issue in its report, which found that the “overarching theme” from witnesses to the Committee was the “lack of integration” between nationally significant infrastructure projects, both
“with other NSIPs (including other projects within same policy area), and with the wider planning system.”
It recommended:
“Energy and other large-scale infrastructure projects should be incorporated into a land use framework.”
An obvious and effective way to do that would be to ensure that any review of the national policy statement complied with the land use framework. Without that, and without the amendment and the institutional and legal levers to create change on the ground, a land use framework would likely just be another strategy on the shelf.
The Minister for Housing and Planning (Matthew Pennycook)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Hobhouse. Before I speak to clause 1 stand part and respond to the hon. Gentleman’s amendment, I put on the record my thanks to the large number of witnesses who gave up their time last week to give evidence to the Committee and inform our deliberations.
Sustained economic growth is the only route to delivering the improved prosperity that our country needs and the high living standards that working people deserve; that is why it is this Government’s No. 1 mission. The failure to build enough critical infrastructure, from electricity networks and clean energy sources to public transport links and water supplies, has constrained economic growth and undermined our energy security. That is why the Government’s plan for change commits us to fast-tracking 150 planning decisions on major infrastructure projects by the end of this Parliament.
While nationally significant infrastructure project applications are already being processed 50 days quicker on average than in the last Parliament, achieving that milestone will require the planning regime for NSIPs to fire on all cylinders—yet we know that the system as it stands is too slow and that its performance has deteriorated sharply in recent years. The Government are determined to improve it and to deliver a faster and more consenting process for critical infrastructure that will drive down costs for industry, bill payers and taxpayers.
Key to an effective NSIP regime is ensuring that national policy statements are fit for purpose. To be clear, those statements are the primary policy framework within which the examining authority makes its recommendations to Ministers on individual development consent order applications and against which the relevant Secretary of State is required to determine an application. However, as the hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington just noted, despite their importance many national policy statements are outdated, with some having not been refreshed for over a decade.
Clause 1 addresses that problem by establishing, on enactment, a new requirement for every national policy statement to be subjected to a full review and updated at least every five years. NPSs can be reviewed at any point within that five-year timeframe, at the discretion of the Secretary of State. Additionally, any statement that has currently not been updated for over five years must be brought up to date within two years of the clause’s enactment.
Having taken on board the views of consenting Departments, a wide range of industry stakeholders and the recommendations of the National Infrastructure Commission, we believe that a five-year timeframe strikes the right balance between ensuring that statements are kept up to date, while avoiding rapid change and the consequential uncertainty for the infrastructure sectors that would be caused by a more rapid review timeframe.
Paul Holmes (Hamble Valley) (Con)
The Minister may come to this later, but he will also be aware that clause 1 will make provisions for the Secretary of State to update an NPS later than required when there are exceptional circumstances, including laying a statement to Parliament. We will discuss in relation to later clauses our concern about transparency and engagement with the House. Will he outline how the Secretary of State will be able to consult the House, once she has laid that statement, to help to form her view and the Government’s view going forward?
Matthew Pennycook
I thank the shadow Minister for his question, and I look forward to what I know will be constructive debates over the days and weeks to come. He makes a fair point, which I am just coming to, in relation to the clause also providing for the ability to delay a mandatory update when there are exceptional circumstances that the relevant Secretary of State considers make the delay unavoidable.
I stress to the hon. Gentleman that those circumstances must be exceptional. We have in mind an extremely high bar: for example, if Parliament was suspended and could not sit. He will know that in instances where a national policy statement, for example, does not need to undergo a material change, a rapid update can take place on that basis. It does not have to go through consultation or the necessary parliamentary scrutiny requirements. The vision is that this particular part of the clause will be used with an exceptionally high bar, in very limited circumstances. If he wishes, I am happy to provide the Committee with further examples, but I think they will be extremely limited.
In such circumstances, as the shadow Minister said, the Secretary of State must, before the five-year deadline expires, lay a statement before Parliament explaining the reasons for the sought-after extension and when they expect to update the national policy statement, with the delay lasting only as long as the exceptional circumstances exist.
In summary, the changes give Ministers the power to ensure that national policy statements are kept up to date so that they can effectively support the delivery of the critical infrastructure that our country needs and the economic growth that its provision will deliver. I commend the clause to the Committee.
I turn to amendment 32, which, as the hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington set out, seeks to insert a requirement for the land use framework—on which the Government consulted between January and April this year—to be complied with whenever a national policy statement is reviewed. We believe that the amendment is unnecessary because the Secretary of State is already obliged to take into account all relevant material considerations when reviewing national policy statements as a matter of law, under sections 104 and 105 of the Planning Act 2008.
If a future Secretary of State considers the final land use framework to be relevant in the circumstances of the specific national policy statement being reviewed, it must therefore be taken into account. The Secretary of State will, in those circumstances, give the land use framework the weight that they consider appropriate in their planning judgment, but their assessment of relevance cannot and should not be prejudged by writing such a requirement on to the face of the Bill.
The majority of national policy statements are not site or project-specific. For national policy statements that do identify locations as suitable or potentially suitable for a particular development, those locations will already have been the subject of strategic level environmental assessments and appraisals for inclusion in the national policy statement.
When deciding whether to grant development consent for a nationally significant infrastructure project, sections 104 and 105 of the 2008 Act require the Secretary of State to have regard to any matter that they think “both important and relevant” to the decision of whether to grant consent. Once published, the land use framework could be given such weight as the Secretary of State considers appropriate, where they consider it “both important and relevant” to the particular consenting decision that is in front of them.
For those reasons, the Government cannot accept amendment 32, which seeks to introduce an unnecessary layer of regulatory complexity, undermining our ambitions to streamline the NSIP planning system.
David Simmonds (Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner) (Con)
I agree very much with the Minister’s point about not introducing excessive complexity. A key issue, though, that this element of the Bill highlights is where there are complex interactions—with legal obligations that are placed on local authorities, for example. I think of my experience with Heathrow airport, where air quality duties are an absolute obligation on the local authority. Parliament can decide to derogate from that, but that does not remove the possibility of the local authority being judicially reviewed, having failed to oppose the Government’s position on a national planning policy statement.
When there are such obligations on other affected public bodies but the decision has been taken from them and is being made instead by Parliament, how will the Government ensure that those public bodies will not find themselves held liable and find that the whole process is effectively derailed—because although parliamentary decisions cannot be judicially reviewed, the involvement of that public body in decisions can be?
Matthew Pennycook
The hon. Gentleman makes a reasonable point but, if I have understood him, it is a slightly different issue from the one we are considering. I will give him some extra clarity about the land use framework and any other material consideration that would need to be assessed. When looking at a national policy statement, the Secretary of State will have to have regard to such material considerations, be they the land use framework or any others, for the decision to be legally sound.
The reason we cannot accept the amendment in the name of the hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington is that it is not necessary to specifically require that, as it would effectively repeat public law decision-making principles on the face of the Bill that would have to be taken into account anyway. For that reason, we cannot accept the hon. Gentleman’s amendment, so I hope he will withdraw it. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Gideon Amos
I am grateful to the Minister for his response. In our view, the land use framework is a really important document about the sustainability of the development of land in the UK, and simply referring to it as one of a number of documents that must be taken into account does not guarantee that it will be delivered on in the really important national policy statement framework. Our intention is that it should be a requirement that national policy statements are in accordance with the land use framework for those reasons; it should not simply be a background document.
I am bleary-eyed this morning, but I have spotted that there are more Members on the Government side than on the Opposition side, so we will not press the amendment to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 2
National policy statements: parliamentary requirements
Gideon Amos
I beg to move amendment 8, in clause 2, page 3, line 34, leave out paragraph (a).
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to lay before Parliament a response to a resolution made by either House or recommendations made by a committee of either House in relation to amendments to national policy statements. The requirement to do so is otherwise removed by 2(a).
Gideon Amos
The justification for the proposal in clause 2 to remove parliamentary requirements for scrutiny and the approval of amendments to national policy statements is that they reflect legislative changes. In our view, that justification is faulty in three respects.
First, it is claimed that since Parliament will have considered the changes, it does not need to scrutinise the resulting amendments to NPSs. However, it is far from certain that national policy statement amendments will reflect new or amended legislation. Let me give an example. In its 2023 review, the Transport Committee was very critical of the draft national networks national policy statement, and said that new planning policies for major road and rail schemes need clarifying against net zero laws. However, the Department for Transport not only failed to accept any of the MPs’ recommendations but put a climate test from the outdated 2015 policy back into the NPS it designated in 2024. Given that the reason for updating the NPS was to update the climate test, that completely compounded the original justification for carrying out the review. There is therefore no certainty that legal decisions will be reflected if my amendment is not accepted.
Secondly, the explanatory notes say that the change will “preserve parliamentary oversight” for amendments to NPSs, but in fact the purpose of the clause is to take away parliamentary oversight of changes to NPSs. It will mean that the Government are no longer required to respond to recommendations of the Select Committee or other MPs. As the Transport Action Network said,
“If we are serious about front-loading, in other words deciding key policies in advance rather than in individual infrastructure decisions, the Planning Act 2008’s failure to enable effective scrutiny of NPSs requires addressing, rather than being made worse.”
Thirdly, although it is suggested that the removal of parliamentary scrutiny is limited, subsection (3)(d) makes it clear than any change of Government policy can be effected by changing an NPS without the oversight of Parliament. The clause—and particularly subsection (3)(d)—destroys the distinction between national policy that has been debated and voted on in Parliament and the rest of Government policy. There is a clear distinction, which is really important, in the NPS regime.
In the case some time ago of Dinsdale Developments Ltd v. Secretary of State for the Environment in 1986, the court accepted an after-dinner speech from the Secretary of State as Government policy. Although I doubt that the Minister speaking over dinner in his family home would be captured and changed into a national policy statement, there is scope for speeches made by Ministers and Secretaries of State to become Government policy. They can be wafted into the national policy statement with no opportunity for Parliament to scrutinise or vote on it, which would undermine the strength of national policy statements.
The Chair
Before I call the shadow Minister, I remind Committee members to indicate if they want to speak. If you want only to intervene, you must keep your interventions short, so make a decision on whether you want to intervene or make a speech.
Paul Holmes
I will adhere to your guidance and orders on this Committee, Mrs Hobhouse. I intend to speak to clause 2 first, and then I will address amendment 8, tabled by the hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington. We welcome the premise of parliamentary scrutiny of the national policy statements, but we understand that although the usual steps for publishing and consulting on material changes—21 days under the legislation—still apply, the Secretary of State is no longer required to respond to feedback from Parliament or its Committees during that process.
That is a step back on the democratic checks and balances that the House has under current legislation. We are concerned about whether the Secretary of State will have increased power to make decisions without that scrutiny. All Ministers, including the two sitting opposite me, try to make good decisions and do their best by the country, but it is unacceptable that the legislation includes a retrograde step whereby Parliament is unable to feed back on changes proposed by the Secretary of State. We see that as a retrograde step for scrutiny.
We have seen in legislation for other Departments a centralising move into the hands of officials and Ministers. What is the benefit of this provision in the Bill? What is the benefit of taking away a very simple and usual step of Parliament being able to give its views on the Secretary of State’s movements and proposals? It does not make a tangible difference to the process. It just seems to be a power grab—that may be unfair on the Minister—or at least a movement of power away from the ability of Parliament to have traditional checks and balances.
Matthew Pennycook
In the interest of focusing the debate on the actual changes that we are making in the clause, when a national policy statement has been reviewed and is to be updated, and involves material changes, all the assessments and consultation that need to take place, including laying the NPS before the House of Commons, will remain in place. We are talking about a specific set of categories of reflective, small changes that, as I will make clear in my remarks later, have already been debated by Parliament in their own terms.
Paul Holmes
I understand that, but the fact of the matter is that the Secretary of State will no longer be required, under the Bill, to respond to feedback from Parliament. That is what the hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington is trying to sort out with his amendment. We very much support that amendment, because it would require the Secretary of State to provide a response to the House on amendments to national policy statements.
I have no disagreement on the provision of NPSs and what we discussed in the debate on the last clause. What tangible difference does it make to the Bill if Parliament is taken note of by being able to respond, and the Secretary of State is required to respond to that feedback? The Select Committee has a right to issue its views. Why is the Secretary of State no longer required to respond to that feedback from Parliament? To us, it seems slightly undemocratic to remove transparency and the ability of elected Members of this House, of all parties, to be able to scrutinise the movements of the Secretary of State and Ministers in national policy statements. Perhaps the Minister can explain in his comments what tangible difference it makes to his life or that of his Department that the Secretary of State no longer has to respond to feedback from elected Members of this House.
As I said, we agree with the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington. It would encourage greater accountability as part of the process outlined in the Bill and would enhance parliamentary scrutiny over crucial development policies that the Secretary of State has oversight of.
David Simmonds
I rise in support of my hon. Friend the shadow Minister to press the Government on this point. I think the key issue for all of us is what remedy is available where there are concerns about the impact of a decision taken using these new provisions.
In the evidence sessions, there was much mockery of a so-called fish disco at a new nuclear power station. However, the local constituency MP, the local authority or fishing and wildlife organisations would be very concerned about the impact of that development on wildlife, particularly at a location with significant numbers of protected species, some of which are unique in Europe. When the detail of a project emerges and an issue of that nature needs to be addressed, and there is feedback from Parliament, if we have inserted provisions that allow the Secretary of State to say, “I am going to ignore that now,” we lose the opportunity to ensure appropriate remedies and measures to address the impact of that detail, either in planning terms or on the local environment.
I recall a judicial review brought by the local authority where I served as a councillor in respect of a scheme that had been agreed with the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State had written to the local authority and said, “This is what it is going to be. This is the process that is going to be followed.” That Secretary of State was then replaced with another, who said, “I am not going to follow it. Although my predecessor wrote to you last year to tell you this is how it was going to be, I am not going to do it.” The local authority said that was clearly unsatisfactory, because of the impact at community level.
The test that was required to be met for a judicial review to succeed was that we had to be able to demonstrate that the Minister was—what the judge said has always stuck in my mind—“out of her mind” when she told Parliament at the Dispatch Box what she was going to do, on the basis that parliamentary sovereignty was so great. If Parliament had approved the Minister’s actions, regardless of whether they were a flagrant breach of an agreement previously entered into with another part of the public sector, provided they had said that at the Dispatch Box and unless we could prove that the Minister had actually been out of their mind at that point, the decision would stand and would not be subject to judicial review. It could not even be considered, because parliamentary sovereignty has such a high test.
I think the shadow Minister is right to raise the need to get this right. We are all talking about the importance of getting infrastructure and major developments through, and we can understand the desire to drive that forward, but we would not wish to find ourselves in a situation where a key point of detail, which has a significant community impact but which emerges only once some of those detailed elements of a major project are in the public domain, cannot be taken account of and is irrelevant or disregarded in the planning process. It is absolutely critical that we have that level of safeguard to ensure that constituents are assured that the concerns that they might perfectly reasonably have will be properly addressed.
Lewis Cocking (Broxbourne) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Hobhouse. I draw your attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. I concur with my colleagues. I have concerns about removing the response from Ministers to Parliament. We are told that constituents and residents will be kept at the heart of such decisions—they will have some say in the national planning policy framework through consultation on national infrastructure projects when they are in their area. Indeed, I asked the Prime Minister a question on the topic at PMQs. I was not convinced by his answer.
How can the Government, on the one hand, say that we will keep local people at the heart of those decisions and allow local people to have a say on them, while on the other, in this part of the Bill, remove parliamentary scrutiny? That will fill the British people with dread, that they will not have such a say in some of those infrastructure projects in their area.
Matthew Pennycook
May I correct the hon. Gentleman? Local people in any part of the country affected by a development consent order will still be able to have their say on it. Nothing in the clause affects that arrangement.
Lewis Cocking
My point is, if we remove parliamentary scrutiny, the British people out there watching this will think, “Well, hang on a minute, the Government are saying on the one hand that we will still have a say and feed into that process, but on the other they are removing parliamentary scrutiny from the process, so how do we weigh that up?” When the Bill has been through the full process to Third Reading, how can we and the British people trust that they will still have a say over national infrastructure projects in their area if parliamentary scrutiny is being removed? That is taking with one hand and giving with the other, and it could be perceived that people will not have a say; they might not believe the Government saying that they will have a say. I hope that the Minister will comment on that.
Matthew Pennycook
Let me be clear. I appreciate the concerns that hon. Members have expressed. I hope that I can provide some reassurance, but I am more than happy to have further exchanges on this point, which is an important one.
The clause introduces a new streamlined procedure for making material policy amendments to national policy statements, where the proposed amendments fall into four categories of changes to be made since the NPPS was last reviewed: reflecting legislative changes or revocations that have already come into force; relevant court decisions that have already been issued; Government policy that has already been published; and changes to other documents referred to in the NPPS.
A good example is our recent changes to the national planning policy framework—consulted on publicly and subject to a significant amount of scrutiny in the House. If a relevant NPPS had to be updated to reflect some of those policy changes, which have already been subject to consultation and scrutiny on their own terms, as I said, that would be a good example of where this reflective procedure might be useful.
The primary aim of the clause is to expedite the Parliamentary process for updating national policy statements. By doing so, it ensures that amendments that have already undergone public and parliamentary scrutiny can be integrated more swiftly into the relevant NPPS. In enabling reflective amendments to be made, the new procedure will support the Government’s growth mission by ensuring that NPPSs are current and relevant, increasing certainty for developers and investors, and streamlining decision making for nationally significant infrastructure projects.
Hon. Members should be assured that, where applicable, the statutory and regulatory prerequisites of an appraisal of sustainability and habitats regulation assessment will continue to apply to amendments that fall within this definition, as will the existing publication and consultation requirements for material changes to a national policy statement. The clause does, however—this is the point of debate that we have just had—disapply the requirements for the Secretary of State to respond to resolutions made by Parliament or its Committees. We believe that change is necessary to enable reflective changes to be made to NPSs in a more timely and proportionate manner.
Matthew Pennycook
I will give way in one second, if the hon. Member will allow me, because I think this is some useful context for some of the discussions that have taken place over recent months.
The Government are grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Hackney South and Shoreditch (Dame Meg Hillier) and the relevant Select Committee Clerks for engaging with me and my officials on the implications of the new procedure. We have agreed on certain guarantees to ensure that there will still be adequate parliamentary scrutiny when the procedure is used.
As such, I am happy to restate today that, when the Government intend to use the reflective amendment route to update a national policy statement, we will write to the relevant Select Committee at the start of the consultation period. We would hope in all instances that the Select Committee responds in a prompt and timely manner, allowing us to take on board its comments. Ministers will make themselves available to speak at the Committee during that period, in so far as that is practical.
The process retains scope for Parliament to raise matters with the Government in the usual fashion. Should a Select Committee publish a report within the relevant timeframes of the public consultation period—in a sense, that is one of the challenges we are trying to get at here: not all select Committees will respond in the relevant period, therefore elongating the process by which the reflective amendment needs to take place—the Government will obviously take those views into account before the updated statement is laid before the House in the usual manner.
Ellie Chowns
I thank the Minister for reminding us that we are talking about a specific amendment to a specific clause about a specific thing. But the issue that is at stake here was communicated by his complaint that parliamentary process might slow things down. Surely, the whole point of Parliament is to make our laws. I am worried by the implication that Government see Parliament as a hindrance to getting things done, rather than as a crucial part of scrutiny and checks and balances. If the Minister has concerns about timescales, it is perfectly achievable to address those by setting timeframes. But the removal of the clause that requires the Government to pay attention to the views of cross-party Committees scrutinising particular statements is concerning.
Matthew Pennycook
I say gently to the hon. Lady that she has ignored everything I have said. Every one of the changes that will be able to be made through this process will have already been subject to relevant consultation and parliamentary scrutiny. There is the example of changes to the national planning policy framework, which underwent a huge amount of parliamentary scrutiny through a Select Committee and a statement on the Floor of the House. It is not particularly problematic that we should be able to quickly, in a timely manner—with Select Committee input if it is able to respond in the necessary timeframe—make that change to a national policy statement to ensure that it is up to date and effective.
It is worth considering what the current arrangements require. Currently, the consultation, publicity and parliamentary scrutiny appeal that the Government must follow when updating an NPS, even for a minor change of the kind I have spoken about, is exactly the same as designating an entirely new NPS. There is no ability at the moment for timely and often minor reflective updates that will only reflect policy changes that have already been made subject to scrutiny, and court decisions that have been issued—there is not process for that. We think the system would work far better in most cases if there were.
Although it is a matter for the House, we would hope that in nearly every instance the relevant Select Committee would be able to respond in time, and that those views would be taken into account to help the NPS be updated in a more proportionate and effective manner.
Paul Holmes
I apologise for interrupting the Minister mid-flow, but if the utopian vision that he has outlined is the case—if a Select Committee comes to them within the right amount of time they will listen to its views, but the timescales are currently too long—and the Minister genuinely wanted to allow parliamentary scrutiny and responses to be taken into account by his Department, he would have come to the Committee today outlining a number of steps contained in the legislation setting standard response times for Select Committees and the processes of this House, as the hon. Member for North Herefordshire said.
The Minister could have clearly outlined in the legislation an aspiration for the amount of time that he would want the changes to be worked through with Parliament. I understand that there are Standing Orders of the House, but I remind the Minister that the Leader of the House is currently a Minister under his Government, and he could have got a workaround instead of taking out the scrutiny powers of the House of Commons.
Matthew Pennycook
I simply disagree with the hon. Gentleman. It is a matter for the House rather than the Government. On their own terms, we think the changes made through the clause are proportionate and will ensure that the system is more effective. Again, I make it clear that we are talking about reflective amendments to national policy statements in the four specific categories I have given.
Matthew Pennycook
I will give way one last time, and then I will make some progress.
Lewis Cocking
If we are talking about small, minor changes, surely the consultation period does not need to be that long—it will not take Select Committees long to produce a report to feed into the process if these are only minor changes. I do not see the need for change that the Minister is setting out.
Matthew Pennycook
All I would say is that if the hon. Gentleman looked at the history of the response times on some of these matters he would see that in not every instance is there a timely response. It can delay the process quite significantly. We appreciate the concerns, but the procedure cannot and will not be used to bypass due parliamentary scrutiny.
Any court decision change being reflected in the NPS will have been scrutinised by the public and Parliament on its own terms. We are adjusting the parliamentary scrutiny requirements to update an NPS, so that it is more proportionate and enables those documents to be updated more quickly. The process retains scope for Parliament to raise matters with the Government. The Secretary of State is required to lay a statement in Parliament announcing that a review of the NPS is taking place. The Government will write to the relevant Select Committee at the start of the consultation period, and Ministers will make themselves available to speak at the relevant Select Committee during the consultation period, so far as is practical. Finally, the NPS as amended will still be laid in Parliament for 21 days and can be prayed against.
I turn to amendment 8, tabled by the hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington; we have covered many of the issues it raises. In seeking to remove clause 2(3)(a), it is a wrecking amendment, in our view. It would fatally and fundamentally undermine the introduction of a new streamlined procedure for updating national policy statements by requiring the Government to respond to a Select Committee inquiry before being able to lay a national policy statement before Parliament. We will therefore resist it. As I have set out, the new procedure introduced by clause 2 will help to unlock growth in our country by enabling policy to be updated more easily, providing certainty for applicants using the NSIP regime and for decision makers. On that basis, I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment, and I commend clause 2 to the Committee.
Gideon Amos
I thank the hon. Members who have spoken. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner for reminding me of the discussion about Hinkley, which is 13 miles from my home and is where a lot of my constituents work. In the evidence sessions, much was made of the fish disco. If memory serves, it is an AFD—not a political party in Germany, but an acoustic fish deterrent—which would cost a fair amount, but would stop about 3 million fish being killed every year in the 7-metre diameter cooling tunnels that suck seawater into Hinkley. Many of my constituents are concerned about species loss, habitat loss and the effect on the natural environment.
David Simmonds
Sucking fish into a nuclear reactor—what could possibly go wrong? That seems a good example of how, when the details of a project are analysed, there is a requirement for such measures. However, we have also looked at the issue of battery storage in connection with improving grid capacity, and the point has been made that ongoing appraisals of the nature of battery storage ensure that local authorities granting planning consent have fulfilled all their relevant environmental and health and safety duties when doing so.
It seems to me that, if a parliamentary Select Committee had looked at and taken into consideration such projects, it would be valuable for the Secretary of State to be required to respond, rather than being able to set that aside and having to seek to unpick the whole decision later as a result of judicial reviews brought because of the failure of a local authority to carry out its statutory obligations.
Gideon Amos
The hon. Gentleman raises another example of a failing that could have been addressed by parliamentary scrutiny.
Hon. Members may be wondering why I am referring to the acoustic fish deterrent, but the fact is that such concerns do matter to people, and people do care about species loss and habitat loss. A simple change in Government policy—for example, a ministerial speech changing Government guidance—could provide a pretext or a basis for a change to a national policy statement without any parliamentary scrutiny. Therefore, if the NPS changed, EDF would be allowed to get rid of its acoustic fish deterrent, and there would be no further scrutiny on that basis, but that is not a good way to make policy.
John Grady (Glasgow East) (Lab)
Does the hon. Gentleman agree that people are also very concerned about the anaemic economic growth in the United Kingdom over the past 14 years, as well as the housing and energy crises, and that the Bill seeks to strike a balance between all these competing considerations? At the moment, we do not have a balance—the balance is against development—and we desperately need developments such as Hinkley that create brilliant, well-paid jobs, including for many young people in south-west England.
Gideon Amos
The hon. Gentleman is right: many of my constituents appreciate the opportunities that the Hinkley development provides them. Perhaps he is right that the decision should be wafted into a quick policy statement and then whacked into the NPS, so EDF can get rid of its fish deterrent for the sake of economic growth and the jobs that he is talking about—but surely Parliament should have some say on these crucial questions of balance between economic objectives and objectives around the natural environment.
Matthew Pennycook
I am struggling to follow what the hon. Gentleman’s specific concern is. He keeps throwing out the after-dinner speech example; that would not meet the threshold for a reflective amendment through this route. If the Government have made a policy change that has been subject to consultation and scrutiny in this House—
Matthew Pennycook
Well, it would have to have been subject to consultation and scrutiny in this House in order to meet the criteria. We think that it is therefore reasonable to take it through in this manner. The hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington is suggesting that there will be a complete absence of parliamentary scrutiny, and in that way is misleading the Committee regarding the effect of the clause.
Gideon Amos
I am grateful to be able to get back to the clause. Clause 2(3)(d) of the Bill is clear that any published Government policy can be the basis for a change through this expedited route, which does not involve parliamentary scrutiny. As I explained earlier, court cases have held that a speech can be admitted as Government policy. There is another danger with this approach. It may be said that there will be only occasional changes. Were the clause restricted to where there have been legal judgments or thorough parliamentary debate, those of us on this side of the Committee would be more relaxed about the changes, but it is not; it covers all published Government policy.
One of the other dangers, besides quick changes in Government policy that would help particular projects, is a potential cumulative danger. There could be numerous changes to national policy statements through this minor amendments route, and anyone who thinks that that is unrealistic needs only to look at the cavernous website of the national planning practice guidance, which is voluminous, ever expanding and always changing. One of my concerns is that this process, through gradual attrition and minor changes, will degrade the importance of a national policy statement as a single statement that has been voted on in Parliament, rather than a mass of amendments over many years, on an ever expanding website of guidance.
If the Minister suggests that there is a very high test, clause 2(3)(d) says that the only test is that it is “published Government policy”. That is not a very high test for what can go through this expedited process.
David Simmonds
Does the hon. Gentleman agree that there is another risk? Ministers may set out that, in order for a particular project to be expedited, it needs to meet a series of tests. I think again of airport expansion; numerous Ministers have said at the Dispatch Box that a whole set of different tests on air quality and finance would need to be met before it could be approved. If we effectively set aside elements of parliamentary feedback, then Ministers, having announced that such tests would need to be met, could, in effect, retrospectively set aside that requirement in order to enable major infrastructure projects to go ahead, without having satisfied the kind of environmental and community concerns that the hon. Gentleman describes?
Gideon Amos
The hon. Member accurately highlights the point that I was trying to make in relation to the acoustic fish deterrent, where particular changes could be made through this new route to facilitate projects—changes that would not have had proper parliamentary scrutiny. The Minister may say that the provision would apply only to proper Government policy—real Government policy—such as the national planning policy framework, which I fully accept has had parliamentary scrutiny, but look at case law, such as Mead Realisations Ltd v. the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government. In the Court of Appeal last year, Sir Keith Lindblom said that
“the legal status of the government’s planning policies in the NPPF and its guidance in the PPG is basically the same. No legal distinction exists between them...Their status is equivalent in the sense that both of them are statements of national policy”.
Clearly, Ministers and Secretaries of State can make a range of policy changes that could feature in, and become changes to, national policy statements. Through a cumulative process, an NPS could become degraded by a morass of detailed changes, and no longer have the strength and integrity that it requires. Crucially, it will not have benefited from parliamentary scrutiny. We intend to press the amendment to a vote.
Matthew Pennycook
The hon. Gentleman has already made it clear that he will press the amendment, but let me take one last opportunity to reassure Members on this point. We have to be clear what the current requirements entail: they do not require the Government to agree with a Select Committee report, if it is issued in a timely manner; they just require the Secretary of State to respond to resolutions made by Parliament or its Committees. Those resolutions can ultimately be set aside if the Government disagree.
As I said, we are not trying to remove wholesale parliamentary scrutiny or the ability of the public to engage and consult. All the changes that will come down this route, when it is appropriate and necessary to use, will have been scrutinised by Parliament and, in many cases, by public consultation on their own terms. However, we think that the removal of an aspect of parliamentary scrutiny is justified by the nature of changes that can be better reflected in policy within a national policy statement. We have had extensive engagement with the Chair of the Treasury Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Hackney South and Shoreditch (Dame Meg Hillier), and the relevant Select Committee Clerks on what guarantees we can provide, while removing this requirement, to ensure that there is still adequate parliamentary scrutiny when the procedure is used.
Finally, I want to bring home to Members what we think the change will allow. We estimate that, in many cases, the requirement to respond to resolutions, particularly in cases where a Select Committee’s response is not timely, adds at least three to six months to the process of updating a national policy statement. Given that we are talking about minor changes that are already policy and court decisions, we think that this is a necessary and proportionate means of ensuring that policy statements are up to date and that investors have confidence in the policy framework being applied. We therefore think that we can streamline the process, and will resist the amendment.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Matthew Pennycook
The Planning Act 2008 provides a uniform approach to consenting, covering a wide range of sectors and types of development. However, this may not always be proportionate for specific developments. Clause 3 provides a new power for the Secretary of State to issue a direction to disapply the requirement for development consent for specified developments that would otherwise fall under the NSIP regime. The clause contains several conditions governing when a direction may or may not be given by the Secretary of State, such as when a request for direction is needed, who may submit such a request, and what such a request may contain.
The Secretary of State may give a direction only if they consider it appropriate for an alternative consenting regime to apply to a specific development. This would mean that a development consent order is no longer required and that the development in question could instead be considered by an alternative appropriate consenting authority, bringing greater flexibility to the system of planning consent by ensuring that the appropriate regime is used, based on the specific circumstances at hand rather than on strict statutory definitions and thresholds. This will help to reduce burdens on applicants that may otherwise be disproportionate, and to develop a more streamlined and responsive decision-making process.
Let me make it clear to hon. Members what the current arrangements provide for. Section 35 of the Planning Act allows the Secretary of State to bring into the NSIP regime specified developments that do not come within the statutory meaning of a nationally significant infrastructure project. Clause 3 will provide similar flexibility but in the other direction, enabling more proportionate and efficient consenting processes. I can provide several examples of where such flexibility may be beneficial. A railway development may be within the scope of the Planning Act, but its impacts and benefits may be more local, and it may not require the compulsory acquisition of land. It might be more appropriate for such cases to be considered under the Transport and Works Act 1992 regime.
Similarly, other large developments often include multiple elements that need to be considered under different consenting regimes, leading to disproportionate work and costs in preparing multiple applications. For example, an access road that is secondary to the main development may require consent under the NSIP regime, while other elements of the development, such as housing, may fall under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 regime. Clause 3 will allow for a direction to be provided by the Secretary of State to enable the applicant to include the access road in the planning application under the Town and Country Planning Act route.
There have also been cases where it has been argued that a development close to exiting statutory thresholds could be more appropriately considered through other, more proportionate regimes. We have all heard the examples—I have heard them in many debates secured by hon. Members—and they were highlighted again in our planning reform working paper. There are many examples of solar developments that have been deliberately kept just below the Planning Act threshold of 50 MW to avoid coming within the NSIP regime. We committed to increasing the statutory threshold for solar developments to 100 MW in December 2024, but as the technology continues to improve, similar issues may occur in the future, and other examples could emerge in other fields.
The current arrangement has resulted in the clustering of developments just below the NSIP threshold and less energy being generated overall, undermining our work to strengthen this country’s energy security. The clause provides far more flexibility at local level so that, even under the new arrangements, an applicant who wants to bring forward a 120 MW solar application need not be deterred by the nature of the present NSIP system being slow and uncertain, which we are taking steps to address. They will be able to divide their application into, say, four different applications within the TCPA regime if they have a constructive and pro-development council that they feel they can work with. That would be a faster route to getting a decision on their application, as the clause allows them to apply to the Secretary of State to make a redirection into an alternative consenting regime.
David Simmonds
How does the Minister propose that this measure will address boundary issues? It is not uncommon for a significant construction project to be located in one local authority while the access road, as he described, is in another local authority. Particularly where a section 106 benefit is derived from a development that is taking place, the consenting authority will undertake those negotiations, so clearly it will be necessary to have taken that into account. Can he indicate how such an approach will be built in, so that everyone has an assurance that that will be fully dealt with?
Matthew Pennycook
It will be for the Secretary of State to consider applicants’ requests when they are made. They will issue their policy on redirection decisions, and issue guidance for clarity about precisely how the process will operate in certain circumstances. The access road example that I gave the hon. Gentleman is a good one. In that type of scenario, there is a very strong case for an access road application not to go through the full NSIP regime, particularly if the applicant in question is dealing with a local authority that is well skilled and well resourced, and that they feel is able to better deal with the application in a more timely fashion. They can apply to the Secretary of State to make such a redirection, but we will issue guidance on specifically how the power could be used.
David Simmonds
May I press the Minister a little further on that? I am thinking of the Southall gasworks site, a very large housing development on a former gasworks site in London. The only possible access route to facilitate the development involved constructing a bridge from the London borough of Hillingdon, where none of that development took place, into the borough of Ealing.
Clearly, one of the issues there is that the large scale of housing being delivered is of benefit to Ealing, since it goes against its housing target. The section 106 yield also goes to Ealing as it is the consenting planning authority. However, the loss is that an access road has to be driven through a nature reserve and leisure facility in the neighbouring local authority.
I am just keen to understand how the clause will be used. When the decisions sit with two separate local authorities in normal due process, one of which has a lot more at stake and the other a lot more to lose, how will the Secretary of State be able to balance them so that local residents—constituents—can be assured that their concerns are taken into account?
Matthew Pennycook
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that question. I want to be very clear about the circumstances in which this measure can be used. As he will appreciate, I will not comment on a specific application, for reasons he will well understand, but, in such a scenario, I struggle to see how that application could feasibly come within the NSIP regime process at all. It sounds like a straight-down-the-line application that would be made by the applicant, across two local authorities, through the Town and Country Planning Act regime.
What the clause seeks to do is ensure that, in cases where, due to the nature of the development, the only route to go down is the NSIP regime via a development consent order, an applicant can apply to have that application determined in a different consenting order if it will lead to a faster, more proportionate and more effective decision-making process. As I say, it will therefore be for the Secretary of State to consider the unique circumstances and impacts of any specific development so that the consenting of certain developments can be undertaken by whatever body the applicant appealing to the Secretary of State says is the more appropriate route. In most instances, I would assume that that would be the local planning authority, but I gave the example of the Transport and Works Acts regime for roads.
We are trying to get at the type of examples where developments need limited consents or may not need compulsory acquisition—in a sense, when the one-stop-shop nature of the NSIP regime may not be the most proportionate means to take that through. The redirection under the clause will not be appropriate for all developments, and, for a direction to be given, the Secretary of State must consider that it is appropriate for an alternative consenting regime to apply rather than the Planning Act.
Lewis Cocking
I thank the Minister for giving way. Has his Department done any analysis of how many requests the Government are likely to get under the clause, and how many applications will want to change how they are determined?
Matthew Pennycook
I think the thrust of the hon. Member’s question was about a numerical analysis. No, we cannot account for the behavioural change that would come if this clause is enacted. What we do know, from significant engagement with stakeholders in the infrastructure sector, is that lots of applicants would make use of the redirection route and are eager to do so.
The examples I have heard from particular major economic infrastructure providers are where, as I say, they have a constructive and healthy working relationship with a local authority that they are confident is resourced and able to take the decision to approve or reject an application in a timely manner and they do not want to have to take it through the NSIP regime, which is currently their only route.
As I said, section 35 already allows the Secretary of State to pull applications from other regimes into the NSIP regime. This will work the other way, and just provides a necessary flexibility. The point of clause 3, though, is to ensure that any given applicant can make a case to the Secretary of State to go into the regime that they feel is the most appropriate and proportionate for the application in question.
Lewis Cocking
I thank the Minister for giving way again. I just want to press him a little more. He is saying that people can choose to go through the Town and Country Planning Act regime, but we were always told by this Government that that is a long, arduous process that developments take a really long time to go through. Why are they suggesting that they might want to put more development through that process if, as they are saying, it is not working?
Matthew Pennycook
The Government are agnostic on which route a developer will wish to go down. As I say, developers will have to apply to the Secretary of State and make a case that, in the specific circumstances in which they are operating, there should be an alternative consenting route. The hon. Gentleman will know that we are making significant efforts to speed up and streamline the town and country planning regime. From previous debates, I know that he takes issue with some of that, but if he has had a conversion, I would very much welcome it.
Paul Holmes
The Opposition generally support what the Minister said. We want to speed up of these applications and give people a better choice in securing the developments that we require. However, we have some concerns and questions, which I hope the Minister will take in the spirit in which they are intended; I am looking to support the clause, not looking to make hay or create issues for him—would you believe it?
The introduction of the idea that the Secretary of State may disapply the requirement for development consent raises some concerns about the potential diminishing of that planning process and the vesting of too much power in Government Ministers. The Minister will understand that the Opposition are concerned about the wording of the provision with regard to when the Secretary of State can use this power. That probably needs to be strengthened, or at least there needs to be a strengthening of the relevant frameworks and parameters.
Two possible cases in which the powers could be used have been outlined, and the Minister helpfully outlined some examples, as did my hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner. We will not press the clause to a vote, but I would be grateful if the Minister could write to the Committee about whether he and his officials would consider strengthening the parameters relating to where the power could be used. I hope that he does not think that too unreasonable.
Proposed new section 35D provides a power for the Secretary of State to make regulations about the timetable for deciding requests and about the provision of information to the Secretary of State. This may be my naivety or it may be that I have not read the right paragraph—I am perfectly willing to accept that I am not perfect, as many of my colleagues will say—but why are those provisions not on the face of the Bill? As the Committee continues this process over the next few weeks, will the Minister try to bring some clarity on that new section?
We do not disagree with the clause. We have some concerns about transparency, but generally we welcome the Minister’s aspirations to speed up these decisions and speed up the process that he has outlined.
Gideon Amos
Without wanting to shock the Minister too much, I rise to support the clause. The Liberal Democrats want measures that will help to facilitate net zero and other developments, and the clause will provide an opportunity for many decisions to go into the Town and Country Planning Act regime, which is local, is accountable and involves local planning committees. That shows that this does not necessarily need to be a slower process; it could at times be a quicker process with more local involvement. I have been involved in NSIP projects that could have gone through that process but in fact came through the Planning Act 2008 regime. Direction under the proposed new section could be very helpful in ensuring more local processing of planning applications.
Matthew Pennycook
I am slightly taken aback by the supportive comment from the hon. Gentleman, but I very much welcome it.
Before I make my main point, it may be helpful if I give hon. Members another example of the types of alternative consenting routes that may be considered more appropriate. We spoke about the Town and Country Planning Act and the Transport and Works Act regimes. Offshore generating stations are another good example. If they are wholly offshore, responsibility for electricity consent functions under section 36 of the Electricity Act 1989 may be more appropriately transferred to the Marine Management Organisation under section 12 of the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009—again, rather than the NSIP regime. We will provide further detail, through guidance, about all the regimes that it will be considered appropriate to use in relation to this power.
I gave hon. Members assurances on the fact that we will work across Government to prepare and publish policy that will provide clarity about the Secretary of State’s considerations when determining requests for redirection of a project. As I said, we will also issue guidance that makes the process clear. However, I am more than happy, in response to the shadow Minister’s point, to write to the Committee to set out in more detail how we think this process will work. That will include responding to his specific point on proposed new section 35D—
David Simmonds
It would be helpful if, when the Minister produces that response, he could also set out for the Committee how the processes in place will ensure consistency of decision making. As he described, some local authorities may be more pro in a particular area, or less so. There is a need to ensure transparency that a given nature of development and a given scale will be dealt with in a consistent manner.
Can the Minister tell us whether any consideration has been given to any time constraints? I am just mindful of the fact that one issue that certainly occurs in local authorities and potentially in central Government is that if the end of a Parliament, a general election, is coming up, there is a risk of developers thinking, “At this point, I’m more likely to get the Minister to sign things off if I go down this route or that route,” regardless of the merits, on a planning basis, of the individual projects that are being put forward. Can we be assured that that will be properly addressed so that we do not see development being constrained by an imminent election or, indeed, advanced without due process because of an imminent election?
Matthew Pennycook
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that entirely reasonable question. It would certainly be our intention, in preparing and publishing policy, to provide clarity. As I said on the Secretary of State’s considerations when determining requests for redirection of a project, we would hope that guidance absolutely provides certainty and clarity. It will not help the Government’s objectives through the Bill if applicants and investors are not clear about how this process works.
In response to the hon. Gentleman’s other point, about clarification of the timelines for how the process could be used, I recognise the concern, but I again remind him that it will be for the Secretary of State to make a decision only on whether an alternative consenting regime can be used. It will be through the normal processes of whatever consenting regime is used, if such a redirection is allowed, that a decision will be made on the material considerations at play in any given application; it will not be for the Secretary of State to decide. This is merely a power to allow, as I said, an applicant to redirect an application into an alternative consenting regime from the NSIP planning process through the Planning Act 2008. On that basis—
David Simmonds
May I press the Minister a little more on that point? I understand and thank him for the clarity that he has brought. As he set out, one purpose of the change is to ensure greater certainty for investors and applicants about the process. We are all very aware that planning issues can often become quite significant local political issues as well.
How will the regime avoid a situation where, with an election in the not-too-distant future, there is a political trade-off that involves a Government, a Minister or a candidate saying, “If we win the election, we are going to push it down this route” in order to try to produce outcome A, versus “We think we should push it down an alternative route” in order to produce a different outcome through the planning process? How can we make sure that it is sufficiently insulated from that political turmoil to ensure certainty?
The Chair
Order. I remind the Committee that we need to get through quite a lot of stuff. The Minister has already said that he will write to the Committee, so I urge Members to press on. I know that these are very important matters, but the Minister has already said that he is going to write.
Matthew Pennycook
Thank you, Mrs Hobhouse. Those of us on the Government Benches will certainly take that stricture into account and limit the length of our contributions. On the specific point, I must say, in all candour, that I struggle to foresee how the dynamics that the hon. Gentleman has just outlined will operate. It is not for the Government to make a judgment on any particular application that a developer may wish to make. It is not the Government’s position to take a view on which consenting regime would be most appropriate, other than on which will produce the most timely and proportionate determination of an application. It will be for the applicant to decide in writing to the Secretary of State, and to make a request to use an alternative consenting regime.
All the Secretary of State will do is decide whether the circumstances at play are such that there is a good case for an alternative to the NSIP regime to be used in a given scenario. As I say, we will set out in policy and guidance more detail about the regimes to which we think this alternative can apply and how we foresee the redirection power being used. On that basis, I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 4
Applications for development consent: consultation
Matthew Pennycook
I beg to move amendment 57, in clause 4, page 8, line 21, leave out subsection (2).
This amendment is consequential on NC44.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendment 58.
Clause stand part.
Government motion to transfer clause 4.
Clause 5 stand part.
Government amendments 60 to 67.
Clauses 6 and 7 stand part.
Government new clause 44—Applications for development consent: removal of certain pre-application requirements.
Government new clause 45—Applications for development consent: changes related to section (Applications for development consent: removal of certain pre-application requirements).
Matthew Pennycook
As hon. Members will be aware, last week the Government announced that we will reform the pre-application stage for nationally significant infrastructure projects to remove the statutory requirement for applicants to consult. Although the Government are committed to consultation and the value that early and constructive engagement plays in developing high-quality infrastructure schemes, feedback on Second Reading and since the Bill’s introduction has shown that the status quo is not working. Evidence indicates that the statutory requirements, which are unique to the NSIP regime and not found in any other planning consenting regime, are now creating perverse incentives.
Rather than driving better outcomes and improving infrastructure applications, statutory pre-application procedures have become a tick-box exercise that encourages risk aversion and gold plating. The result is that communities suffer from consultation fatigue and confusion, with them having to cope with longer, ever-more technical and less accessible documentation. The arrangement also actively disincentivises improvements to applications, even if they are in the local community’s interests, because applicants worry that any change will require further repeat consultation and added delay to the process.
As the Deputy Prime Minister and I set out on Second Reading, we would not hesitate to act boldly if a compelling case for change was made, to ensure that the NSIP regime is firing on all cylinders to deliver on our ambition for building the homes and infrastructure needed to grow our economy.
Jim Dickson (Dartford) (Lab)
Does the Minister, like me, recall the evidence we heard last week from the chair of the National Infrastructure Commission? A report written by the organisation in 2023 said that one of the reasons for the extravagant delays to nationally significant infrastructure projects was “disproportionate consultation”. My constituents are acutely aware of that issue because they have had to wait more than 15 years for the lower Thames crossing to be consented, partly as a result of the very disproportionate consultation that Sir John Armitt referred to. Does the Minister agree that the clauses and amendments he is proposing will provide a significant change to the speed at which NSIPs take place, which will benefit those who are currently suffering as a result of the lack of infrastructure in their area?
Matthew Pennycook
I thank my hon. Friend for that point, and I completely agree with him. The system was set up with very specific objectives in mind. It was created initially without a role for Ministers. That was addressed by the Localism Act 2011, but the statutory pre-consultation requirements were kept in place on the basis that they were helping to improve applications prior to submission. However, according to lots of the evidence we have received in response to our working paper on the subject, the feedback from external stakeholders and the calls on Second Reading for us to look again at this specific area, the statutory requirements are now driving perverse and often bad outcomes, including for the communities affected by them.
Last week, I made a written ministerial statement explaining the changes that the Government intend to make. We are tabling a clean package of amendments to implement these reforms through the Bill. The amendments fall into three broad categories.
First, new clause 44 will remove the relevant sections of the Planning Act to give this change effect. That includes removing the sections that require applicants to consult local authorities, landowners, statutory consultees and local communities before submitting applications for development consent. It will also remove from the Act definitions for those groups.
Gideon Amos
This set of amendments is, at first sight, very sweeping and broad, as it will remove large sections of the Planning Act 2008. However, we have some sympathy with the Government. Provisions were put into the Act to proscribe dangerous commissioners who might make decisions without proper scrutiny. Given that the decisions reverted to the Secretary of State in 2011, it seems that a number of them may not be needed.
None the less, it is important to ensure that consultation is meaningful and of high quality. In place of the Planning Act provisions, we want a consultation test on the face of the Bill; if the machinery of the Committee so allows, we would like to table an amendment along those lines. If there is no test at all for meaningful consultation in NSIPs, these amendments would simply remove a great number of requirements for consultation without putting anything in their place. We should be moving from a set of sections in the Act that are about the mechanics of consultation to a qualitative test: consultation should be meaningful, and people should have had the opportunity to be consulted.
We would like to see the key principles in the guidance on the face of the Bill. That is the spirit in which we will respond to the amendments. We hope to be able to bring forward proposals for the Committee to consider.
Ellie Chowns
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Hobhouse, as I should have said earlier. There are three reasons why I, too, have concerns about new clauses 44 and 45 and the removal of the requirement for pre-application consultation.
First, pre-application consultation is often a very useful process, as a way of highlighting and addressing issues between developers and other stakeholders before we get to the formal, structured, legalistic processes. There was a case in Suffolk in which engagement between the Wildlife Trust and National Grid resulted in the trust’s concerns being addressed in such a way that they did not have to be raised in a more legalistic way later in the process. Pre-application consultation is useful and productive for all parties. It is not for developers to decide whether pre-application consultation will be useful in a particular case, but there should be a statutory requirement for key stakeholders, such as local authorities, to be consulted in that way.
My second concern is that the replacement guidance requirements set out in new clause 45 do not provide sufficient clarity for developers, communities and other stakeholders, or for the Planning Inspectorate, on what pre-application engagement is required specifically, because the wording is too vague to provide sufficient clarity. “Have regard to” is a relatively weak duty, while
“what the Secretary of State considers to be best practice in terms of the steps they might take”
is very vague language. It would be open to interpretation and potentially to contestation, which could be unhelpful to speeding up the process in the way we seek.
My third concern, notwithstanding individual examples of processes that might have been held up, is that generally speaking pre-application consultation and public engagement is not the main constraint on the rapid processing of such applications. I understand that research conducted by Cavendish in 2024 looked at DCO consent times from 2011 to 2023. It found that for the first 70 projects going through the DCO process up until 2017, the response time was pretty reasonable. What changed in 2017? It was not the pre-application consultation requirements, which remained the same throughout the process.
Political chaos is what caused the change. Cavendish’s report identifies that it was political turmoil and manoeuvring that caused delays to happen once projects reached the Secretary of State’s desk—I see my Conservative colleague, the hon. Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner, nodding. Who was in government at that time? We had the turnover of Prime Ministers, Ministers and so forth. Bearing all that in mind—the fact that pre-application consultation is a very useful way of deconflicting issues of contestation, the fact that the replacement guidance is so vague as to be unhelpful and itself probably subject to test, and the fact that this is the wrong solution to the problem of delays—I am concerned.
John Grady
I am grateful. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Hobhouse.
Is the hon. Member disagreeing with the evidence that we heard from Catherine Howard, one of the most eminent planning lawyers in the United Kingdom? Catherine Howard said:
“We cannot magic up more comms consultants, lawyers, environmental impact assessment consultants and planning consultants in that period, so we desperately need a way to apply those professionals most efficiently in a really focused way across all the projects we need.”
She then went on to talk about the pre-app process, which has gone up from 14 months to 27 months:
“I suspect it is even longer now…The pre-app is always something I feel I have to apologise for and explain, and give the best story about how quick it might be”.––[Official Report, Planning and Infrastructure Public Bill Committee, 24 April 2025; c. 67, Q86.]
She explained that investors welcome this change. The pre-application process, in the mind of investors who want to invest in clean energy projects that lower carbon emissions and other critical infrastructure, is a very material source of delays, according to that witness.
Ellie Chowns
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. I would observe that generally speaking the way oral evidence sessions work is that the Government decide who they want to come and give evidence to support the arguments that they wish to put forward in Committee, so I am not all that surprised that we might have heard that evidence. I am not discounting what the witness said, but I am suggesting that there are other ways to look at it. A blanket removal of the pre-app consultation process with stakeholders who have a huge stake in applications, such as local authorities, is an excessively blanket position to take.
Gideon Amos
Would the hon. Member support a test in the Bill of the quality of the consultation carried out, in place of the mechanistic requirements in the previous Act? They do not actually exist in the Town and Country Planning Act, for example, and normal planning processes.
Ellie Chowns
Indeed, and I noted the hon. Gentleman’s comments about bringing forward a proposal about meaningful consultation. I would very much welcome looking at that. I think that would help to address the concerns being raised here.
Luke Murphy (Basingstoke) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Hobhouse. I note the hon. Member’s comments about how the Government arrange the witness sessions, but surely she would not dispute the point about the increasing delays in the pre-application process from 14 months to 27 months. That is a serious issue. The Fens reservoir spent more than 1,000 days in pre-application. The National Grid’s application for Bramford to Twinstead spent 717 days in pre-application for just an overhead line and underground cables covering less than 30 km. Hinkley Point C spent three years in pre-app. Sizewell C spent seven and a half years in pre-app. The hon. Member cannot possibly be suggesting that pre-application is not an issue.
Ellie Chowns
I addressed those points in my comments. I am not disputing the fact that there are individual cases in which huge amounts of time have been spent. In response to the comments from the hon. Member for Glasgow East, I am not dismissing the evidence from the witness he referred to, but I have offered evidence from a report that looked at the whole spectrum of applications from 2011 onwards, which says that the representation of nature and community in pre-application requirements is not the underlying causal problem.
These issues are really complex. There is always a tendency to pick a particular example where the situation has clearly been problematic. I am not disputing the fact that some change may be needed. My argument is that it seems excessive to bring in a blanket policy and shift the pendulum too far away from the opportunity to use the pre-application consultation process to resolve issues that might clog up the process later on, because the requirement for meaningful consultation has been removed. Planning applications will always be contested, but these measures take it too far and sweep aside the rights of communities and organisations representing nature to have their voices heard, as well as the opportunity to resolve conflicts before they reach a legalistic stage.
Jim Dickson
Is the hon. Member aware that Cavendish, the organisation that produced the report, is a company that undertakes consultations? It might just be in its interest to make the case that consultation is not at fault for the delays. Does she agree that the five separate consultations over 15 years that were required—or not required, in my view—for the lower Thames crossing were excessive?
Ellie Chowns
I am aware that Cavendish is a consultancy company. It is perfectly reasonable to make that observation. Most people—I mean, pretty much anyone—who will ever give evidence or produce a report will have some sort of interest. We are not saying that anyone who works in the planning system in any way cannot have a viewpoint that is objective, evidence-based and so forth. There are clear examples of processes that have got stuck. I am concerned not only about unsticking the planning process, but about the proposal to let the pendulum swing too far away from the opportunity to have meaningful pre-application consultation that could be more effective than waiting until things bang up against each other further on in the process.
Ellie Chowns
I am happy to take as many interventions as hon. Members want to make, but I am concerned about the timing, Mrs Hobhouse.
Ellie Chowns
If Members feel that they have additional things to raise, they should feel free to speak.
Nesil Caliskan
I was rising to make my speech, Mrs Hobhouse, not to intervene; I apologise. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship.
A crucial component of the ability to deliver homes across the country will be to deliver transport and other infrastructure projects. The measures in the Bill go some way towards speeding up the statutory processes of consultation in the delivery of infrastructure projects. As I outlined in my speech on Second Reading, the pre-consultation period for infrastructure projects is a major cause of delay for infrastructure being delivered. To echo the Minister’s remarks, the status quo in this country is simply not working to speed up the process.
As matters stand, applicants operate in what I describe as a hyper-risk-averse context. Delays caused to pre-application contribute not only to the length of time that it takes for infrastructure to be delivered, but to the cost. Other Members rightly identified the lower Thames crossing, which impacts my constituency; 2,000 pages and £800 million spent are figures that have served absolutely no one, and certainly not the taxpayer.
Lewis Cocking
Does the hon. Lady not agree that getting rid of the pre-planning application consultation completely will disenfranchise residents and constituents from engaging with the process? Sometimes that process can solve some of the issues down the line. I understand that it takes too long—I agree with and have strong sympathy for her points—but should we not be able to speed it up while allowing that engagement to take place?
Nesil Caliskan
I thank the hon. Member for his intervention, but I do not think that the change would prevent applicants from continuing to engage with residents and elected Members. All it would do is avoid putting additional onus on a process that is costing the taxpayer a huge amount of money.
I will go further. Having spoken to members of our community, I have heard over and over again that there is consultation fatigue with the endless stream of negotiations. Before we even get to a statutory consultation period, we have had many years of something that has been proposed with no statutory framework. This proposal has the good intention of a material change that will shorten the consultation period.
Paul Holmes
The hon. Lady is being generous in giving way as she makes an interesting and good speech based on her expertise in local government. I pay tribute to her for that. She outlined how there can be delays in pre-application. Does she not accept that that very length of time shows that there are issues to be resolved? Does she understand why some people are concerned that the proposals to remove that pre-application process place the onus on applicants to conduct the consultation, and without any safeguards? Potentially, residents and residents groups, constituents and local organisations, such as wildlife trusts will go without their genuine concerns being met by a system that now puts an onus on the people who want planning applications to go ahead.
Nesil Caliskan
I do not accept that, because the statutory consultation period will still be in place and thresholds will still have to be met. The reality is that, as things stand, the pre-consultation period has become a beast in itself, which I do not believe is serving our communities. Years and years of endless consultations, including pre-consultations and pre-application consultations, is not true engagement with communities. That part of the process has become a period in which the applicants just try to derisk their approach to crucial infrastructure in this country, which will see land unlocked so that homes can be built.
Ellie Chowns
I do not think that anybody wants “years and years” of contest, but is it impossible to retain the requirement for a degree of pre-application consultation—perhaps within a shorter timescale or with a more tightly drawn set of consultees—so that issues can be dealt with informally and in advance, to prevent more problems arising further down the line? To sweep everything away seems excessive.
Nesil Caliskan
Manifestly, we do not want years of delay before the delivery of infrastructure, but the truth is that that is exactly what is happening in this country. There are years and years of delay, in part because of the pre-application consultation period.
There is nothing preventing applicants and local authorities, or communities and organisations, from working pre-application on the sort of engagement that the hon. Member is referring to, but including it in the proposals in this way would heighten the legal risk for applicants, making them very resistant to submitting their application formally before going through every single possible step. As hon. Members have highlighted, there is a very long list of examples where the status quo has created a huge burden, made the processes incredibly long and cost the taxpayer a huge amount of money. I think I recall the Minister saying that the proposed amendment would save up to about 12 months and £1 billion, which could be the difference between an infrastructure project being viable or not being viable. Infrastructure projects being viable will mean the land value will increase, and the potential for land to be unlocked and millions of homes to be built across the country will be realised.
Lee Pitcher (Doncaster East and the Isle of Axholme) (Lab)
I am intervening on a different but still very much related point. What is also really important for me is that we remain attractive as a country to foreign investors and others who are looking to invest here, including in the infrastructure that enables our country to grow and creates jobs. It is important that investors want to come and invest here. The longer the process or the greater the burden, the less likely they are to invest here, and we will lose out to other places across the globe. Does my hon. Friend agree that we need to tackle that issue?
Nesil Caliskan
I am so glad that I gave way to my hon. Friend, because that was precisely the point I was going to make and he has made it incredibly well. If we are serious about building homes across the country and about seeing the growth that investment in infrastructure, not least in transport infrastructure, will deliver, we absolutely have to give industry certainty. We have to be able to say to the public, “This will happen with speed.” The amendment seeks to deliver that and it is absolutely in line with the aspiration to speed up the planning process in this country, which at the moment is holding back investment, and to unlock land for development and infrastructure investment.
David Simmonds
I have a lot of sympathy with the comments made by the hon. Members for Doncaster East and the Isle of Axholme and for North Herefordshire. I appreciate that the clause was tabled quite late, and the evidence that we heard last week was mixed. The National Infrastructure Commission gave us its views on the impact of pre-application consultation, and local authority representatives who are responsible for that section of the planning system’s decision making said that they have quite significant concerns.
The Opposition have sympathy with what the Government are trying to achieve, but it seems to me that, as the hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington outlined, we need to look at alternatives. It may be that a regime of deemed consent is a mechanism we could use to speed up elements of the process, or perhaps altering how we set out the requirements of pre-app consultation.
I know that you have extensive experience in local government, Mrs Hobhouse, and you will be aware that, as a matter of law, Parliament has set numerous obligations on local authorities in respect of the quasi-judicial process that they follow in planning, and numerous other obligations in respect of what they do for their communities. The pre-application process is a means drawing out, before a major application is made, how the impacts may play out.
I can draw a good recent example from personal experience. The Chancellor, at the Dispatch Box, said that Heathrow expansion, and airport expansion more generally, would be enabled because sustainable aviation fuel would reduce emissions. It is true that sustainable aviation fuel mandates reduce the overall lifetime emissions from a given quantity of aviation fuel, but they do not reduce the level of pollution at the tailpipe of the aircraft at all. So when we look at Heathrow airport, it does not matter whether the fuel burned there is sustainable aviation fuel or conventional aviation fuel; emissions within the locality, which are what give rise to the legal obligations on the local authority regarding air quality, remain the same. It is not a solution. When a developer proposes to create a solar farm, a battery storage area or a nuclear power station—or any kind of major infrastructure—the pre-application process gives the local authority an opportunity to begin to understand which of its legal obligations may be engaged by the application.
I am conscious of the experience that the hon. Member for Barking described, illustrating the need to streamline the process as much as possible, but clearly, as several hon. Members have said, the major risk of that is that a developer comes along and sets out an ambition for a development, and residents are consulted and their response is, “In general—in principle—that sounds okay, but what will the impact on us be? Do we understand that from what the developer is putting forward?”
Luke Murphy
It is useful to reflect on what Cavendish Consulting said in responding to these proposals:
“Removing a lot of the tick box requirements of a statutory consultation opens up an opportunity to be a lot more strategic and insight led in the pre-application communications, moving away from the security of ‘this is how we’ve done it before to get accepted’ to ‘what does this project and this community need’.”
The changes being proposed could be much more beneficial in removing the tick-box exercise and focusing on what communities need.
David Simmonds
I understand the point the hon. Member makes, but part of me thinks, “Well, they would say that, wouldn’t they?” For a business whose profits come from expediting the grant of planning consent as much as possible, removing potential obstacles to that is important.
However, as has been outlined in many of the examples that we have debated, there can be crucial points of detail that either would make all the difference to the level of consent and support in the local community for a project, or would engage other legal obligations that Parliament has placed on the local authorities, either to carry out an impact assessment—an evaluation of what that will mean—or, in some cases, to engage with that process to oppose the development taking place, because it contradicts other legal obligations placed on the authority by Parliament in respect of environment, health or whatever it may be. Clearly, we need to ensure that there is a functional process.
Lewis Cocking
Does my hon. Friend agree that removing the pre-planning application consultation entirely places too much trust in developers? Sometimes developers build absolute rubbish. I do not want them to spend too much money on something that does not have some sort of community support, or support from Government agencies. The Bill could jeopardise that, if we remove the consultation completely.
David Simmonds
My hon. Friend puts it probably more bluntly than I have, but he is absolutely spot on. I know he has an enormous amount of experience in local government negotiating around exactly these kinds of points.
Matthew Pennycook
I want to tease out a point here, because one of the reasons the Government are confident that the change will lead to beneficial outcomes is that high-quality engagement and consultation routinely takes place in other planning regimes that do not have statutory pre-application requirements. Why do Opposition Members think that their removal, which will equalise all planning consent regimes so that statutory pre-application requirements are not at play, is damaging in this instance? In the TCPA and the types of residential application they are talking about, bad engagement happens, but high-quality consultation and engagement happen too, and residents and other stakeholders get their say post-submission.
David Simmonds
I think that most of us who have been on a planning committee, as the Minister has, probably recognise that, if anything, to satisfy the concerns of our constituents we should be going further with the consultation on small applications, rather than reducing it in larger ways. We are debating developments that will have an enormous community impact, and there are often important points of detail that influence the level of consent.
We have had multiple debates in this and the previous Parliament about the loss of high-quality agricultural land to solar farms, for example. It is quite likely that a community, if it fully understands exactly how a developer will mitigate that impact, will come around to supporting such a development; but if the community is simply faced with, “Here is the planning application. We have made it already. Take it or leave it,” there is a risk from not allowing the opportunity for the level of consent to be built up. That will in turn encourage, and in the case of local authorities’ statutory obligations, force, the exploration of other legal routes of objection to prevent the application proceeding.
While I understand what the Minister is saying, like the hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington, we will use the opportunity given by the provisions being tabled relatively late in the day to explore alternative methods by which concerns can be addressed. It seems to us fundamental that if a major application is made, those who are affected by it should have the opportunity in advance to learn what it means for them, their community and their home, and should not simply be told that the planning application has been made.
There is a world of difference between a planning application that means, “Your house is going to be demolished in order for something to proceed,” and a planning application that indicates a much less significant impact. It is those kinds of issues that need to be teased out; that is what the pre-application discussions and consultations are there for. We encourage the Government to think about a different, more nuanced way to address fully the concerns that have been expressed cross-party, although in slightly different ways.
Paul Holmes
The Minister will be pleased to know that I will not be making a very long speech. I will briefly comment on some of the clauses before the Committee, and elaborate on some of the genuine points that Members on both sides of the Committee have made. I am grateful that the Minister tabled these new clauses, albeit quite late in the day, to give us some clarity, but they actually do not give any clarity on the proposals for the removal of the consultation, particularly new clauses 44 and 45.
Like my hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner and others, I too have chaired a planning committee. I genuinely believe that pre-applications can be very useful. If a community or organisations in a geographic locality have genuine concerns, the pre-application stage can make the passage of planning applications and planning permissions smoother by unblocking some of those concerns, and deliver a better planning application or infrastructure project. A number of colleagues, including the Minister and the hon. Member for Basingstoke, said that this and the length of time the stage takes is a block. I agree with them, but does not mean that it needs to be removed entirely. It means that we should work to ensure that the pre-application stage is better and more efficient.
I am concerned that, if we go down this road and remove pre-application requirements, we will have worse applications and store up longer term blockages when genuine concerns are not met. The Minister outlined the money and time saved, but we will see both start to creep up again or other issues arise. The hon. Member for Basingstoke gave examples of problems. I understand he is an expert in his field but I say to him strongly that solutions can be found. The solution is not necessarily to eradicate completely a provision that is designed to mitigate overwhelming grassroot concerns.
I apologise to the hon. Member for North Herefordshire for thinking she was a Liberal Democrat Member. She is a Green, which is absolutely fine—I would never wish being a Liberal Democrat on anyone. [Laughter.] No offence to the Liberal Democrats, but it is rare for me to agree with either party. I am grateful for her speech, as she is clearly an expert. It was genuine and heartfelt, and came at the problem with an attitude shared by me and my colleagues.
As I said to the hon. Member for Basingstoke and the Minister, we all accept that the processes are too long, but we do not believe we are in a position where people want to do bad. My concern, shared by the hon. Member for North Herefordshire, is that if we go down the proposed route, applicants and developers will end up having overarching power over local people who want to raise concerns. In my view we are giving developers too much power and the pendulum is swinging too far that way. The Minister’s view is that developers genuinely want to make a difference 100% of the time. There is a difference in approach, so I thank the hon. Member for North Herefordshire for her speech.
I ask the Minister to look again at this matter and produce a guidance regime. [Interruption.] He says from a sedentary position that there will be guidance. We believe that that needs to be strengthened in the Bill. Completely removing the pre-application consultation stages, as the Minster outlined, is a retrograde step; it will put too much power in the hands of developers, and will silence those who are not nimbys but who genuinely want to achieve the best solutions for their local communities. These measures go too far and need to be looked at again. I shall be grateful if the Minister comes back to the Committee and the House having reconsidered them.
Ordered That the debate be now adjourned.— (Gen Kitchen.)
Planning and Infrastructure Bill (Fourth sitting)
Tuesday 29th April 2025
(1 day, 21 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesPlanning and Infrastructure Bill 2024-26 View all Planning and Infrastructure Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 29 April 2025 - (29 Apr 2025)
The Chair
I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
Government amendment 58.
Clause stand part.
Government motion to transfer clause 4.
Clause 5 stand part.
Government amendments 60 to 67.
Clauses 6 and 7 stand part.
Government new clause 44—Applications for development consent: removal of certain pre-application requirements.
Government new clause 45—Applications for development consent: changes related to section (Applications for development consent: removal of certain pre-application requirements).
The Minister for Housing and Planning (Matthew Pennycook)
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Mr Twigg. In the last sitting, we discussed the various clauses and Government amendments in this group, and I thank hon. Members on both sides of the Committee for their considered engagement with them. The proposed changes we are considering are, without question, a significant evolution of the nationally significant infrastructure projects regime, and it is entirely right and proper that they are subject to intensive scrutiny.
As the Committee is aware, I set out the Government’s position on this matter in considerable detail in my written ministerial statement from 23 April. I therefore intend to focus my remarks on providing useful further points of clarification about the rationale for the proposed reforms and how we see the system operating once they have been made.
In her remarks, the hon. Member for North Herefordshire conceded that the NSIP process can take a long time, but she implied that the problem was merely confined to individual applications. The Government disagree. From our perspective, the problem that these and other changes in this chapter are intended to remedy are systemic. The status quo is not working, and all too often it is burdensome to applicants and consultees alike.
We know that the performance of the NSIP regime as a whole has deteriorated sharply over recent years. We know that pre-application periods have, on average, nearly doubled since 2013, increasing from over 14 months to nearly 28 months in 2021. As much as Labour Members welcome any and every reminder of the chaos unleashed under recent Conservative Administrations, I do not believe that the deterioration we are discussing can be attributed to the uncertainty that the post-2016 period engendered.
The evidence clearly points to the fact that inefficiencies in the NSIP system, both structural and cultural, are driving delays and high costs. We heard examples this morning of the fact that the documentation underpinning consents has been getting longer, and in too many instances now runs to tens of thousands of pages. Part of the reason is that the statutory and prescriptive nature of the pre-application requirements—I again remind the Committee that they are absent from other planning regimes, including those used for applications for new housing—are driving perverse outcomes.
It is precisely because the requirements are statutory that applicants fear that falling short of them will see their project rejected further down the line, or leave them exposed to judicial review. As we have discussed, the result is that projects are slowed down as developers undertake ever more rounds of consultation and produce greater amounts of documentation to ensure that the requirements are met. Sensible improvements are deterred because applicants worry that they will require further rounds of consultation to insulate them from challenge.
In short, as I argued in the previous sitting, the dynamics of the system are actively encouraging risk aversion and gold-plating and are compelling applicants to go above and beyond what may be required in law, rather than merely ensuring that an application is acceptable in planning terms. Because the root of the problem is the statutory nature of the requirements, it is worth noting that the same behavioural incentives would be in play if we reinserted into the Bill precise statutory criteria for what constitutes effective consultation, as the hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington suggested we should.
In his contribution, the shadow Minister argued that we should focus on improving rather than removing the statutory requirements in question. However, he overlooked the fact that the NSIP action plan, published by the previous Government in February 2023, contained a range of reforms designed to drive more effective and proportionate approaches to consultation and engagement, including new cost-recoverable pre-application services for applicants at the Planning Inspectorate, and revised and strengthened pre-application guidance.
While those steps were welcome, and this Government are seeking to embed new services and cost-recovery mechanisms, the feedback we have received from a wide range of stakeholders suggests that they will not deliver the necessary step change needed to tackle risk aversion and gold-plating. It is the dynamic that has arisen as a result of the very existence of the statutory pre-application requirements in question that is hampering their nominal purpose of producing better outcomes, and the present arrangements are driving up costs not only for developers, but for the bill payers and taxpayers we all represent.
The Government are in complete agreement with the hon. Member for North Herefordshire that early, meaningful and constructive engagement with those affected, including local authorities, statutory consultees, landowners and local communities, often leads to better schemes, greater local benefits and improved mitigation. We still want and expect the NSIP regime to function on the basis of a front-loaded approach in which development proposals are thoroughly scoped and refined prior to being submitted to the Planning Inspectorate. As part of that process, we still want and expect high-quality, early, meaningful and constructive engagement to take place and for positive changes to be made to applications. However, we want and expect it to take place without the downsides that the current statutory requirements are causing.
Removing the statutory requirements in question does not signify that pre-submission consultation and high-quality engagement is no longer important. Statutory guidance that the Government will be required to produce will encourage such pre-application engagement and consultation, but with applicants given the flexibility to carry it out in the way that they consider best for their proposed development, in accordance with that guidance.
Equally as importantly, the system will still reward high-quality engagement and consultation. The Planning Inspectorate will continue to assess whether applications are suitable to proceed to examination. We expect guidance to emphasise that without adequate engagement and consultation, applications are unlikely to be able to do so. Guidance and advice from the Planning Inspectorate will be aimed at helping applicants demonstrate that they are of a satisfactory standard in terms of meeting that process.
Ultimately, all communities will still be able to have their voices heard, whether that is through objecting outright to applications or providing evidence of adverse impacts through the post-submission examination process, which all applications obviously still need to go through.
Gideon Amos (Taunton and Wellington) (LD)
I do not demur from much of what the Minister says about the provisions. To go back to his remarks about the delays not being caused solely by the chaos under the previous Government, is it not a fact that during the last few years of the Conservative Government, the delays at the decision stage, which is meant to be three months, rocketed?
The regime, which began as one in which every section of it respected the deadlines, became one in which every section respected the deadlines with the exception of the Secretary of State. The intention of those drafting the Planning Act 2008 was that, in such circumstances, a report to Parliament by the Secretary of State when delaying the decision would serve as a disincentive on the Secretary of State for doing so. That clearly has not happened. Will the Minister reflect on whether any other measures could be taken to eliminate the delays caused by Secretaries of State making decisions on NSIPs in future?
Matthew Pennycook
It is certainly the case that it is not only in the pre-submission phase where slippages in timeframes have occurred. The hon. Member makes a valid point about the fact that we have seen a pattern in some Departments of Secretaries of State not making timely decisions. This Government have sought to improve upon the past performance. We are already doing so, but I am open to ideas on how we might tighten the process. The Government are giving further thought to the general matter of how consents are taken through Departments.
To conclude, the changes proposed will make a significant contribution to speeding up and streamlining the consenting process for critical infrastructure, and we are convinced that in many cases they will produce better outcomes than the status quo. I therefore urge the Committee to support them.
Amendment 57 agreed to.
Amendment made: 58, in clause 4, page 8, line 32, leave out subsection (3).—(Matthew Pennycook.)
This amendment is consequential on NC44.
Clause 4, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered,
That clause 4 be transferred to the end of line 32 on page 12. —(Matthew Pennycook.)
Clause 5 disagreed to.
Clause 6
Applications for development consent: acceptance stage
Amendments made: 60, in clause 6, page 10, line 4, leave out “follows” and insert
“set out in subsections (2) to (13)”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 68.
Amendment 61, in clause 6, page 10, line 25, after “Secretary of State” insert “and others”.
This amendment is consequential on subsection (5)(d) of NC45.
Amendment 62, in clause 6, page 11, line 4, leave out from “satisfying” to “and” in line 6 and insert
“section 48 (duty to publicise),”.
This amendment is consequential on NC44.
Amendment 63, in clause 6, page 11, leave out lines 12 to 14.
This amendment is consequential on NC44.
Amendment 64, in clause 6, page 11, line 16, leave out “50” and insert “50(1)”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 63.
Amendment 65, in clause 6, page 11, leave out lines 17 to 20.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 63.
Amendment 66, in clause 6, page 11, line 21, leave out subsection (9) and insert—
“(9) Omit subsection (5).”
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 64.
Amendment 67, in clause 6, page 12, line 32, at end insert—
“(14) In consequence of the amendments in subsections (7)(c) and (10), omit section 137(3) and (4) of the Localism Act 2011.”—(Matthew Pennycook.)
This technical amendment omits provisions of the Localism Act 2011 that are no longer required (because of changes made by clause 6 of the Bill).
Clause 6, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 7 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 8
Planning Act 2008: legal challenges
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Matthew Pennycook
Clause 8 streamlines the judicial review process for nationally significant infrastructure projects. The changes apply to legal challenges against decisions on development consent orders and national policy statements. At the moment, individuals wanting to bring challenges against nationally significant infrastructure projects, such as nuclear plants, railway lines, wind farms and other projects, have up to three attempts to try to obtain permission from the courts. As noted by Lord Banner’s independent review last year into the delays caused by these legal challenges, each attempt extends the duration of a claim by several weeks, and in some cases, by several months.
The clause will remove the paper permission stage, meaning that applications for judicial review will go straight to an oral hearing in the High Court. The clause will also remove the right to appeal for cases that are deemed totally without merit at the oral hearing, which becomes the only attempt for these cases. The Government are committed to maintaining access to justice, which is why the right of appeal will remain for cases that are refused permission at the oral hearing, but that are not deemed totally without merit. The changes are a necessary means of preventing meritless claims from holding up development by exhausting the appeals process and of ensuring that legitimate legal challenges are heard promptly. I commend the clause to the Committee.
David Simmonds (Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair this afternoon, Mr Twigg. We touched on the issue of remedy earlier today. A local authority, for example, may have a statutory obligation placed on it by a piece of legislation, which means that it has an obligation to take an interest in a particular development, including potentially judicially reviewing that application, if the impact runs contrary to its other statutory obligations.
We are well aware of issues relating to air quality, but there are also organisations such as ClientEarth, which many of us will have heard of. Essentially, their stock in trade is to look for opportunities to address broader issues around, for example, climate change and environmental impact by using what, in some cases, are arguably loopholes, but in many cases, are essentially contradictions in legislation.
The Minister talked earlier about a shift from having statutory pre-application processes to having guidance that would need to be followed. Clearly, one of the issues is that guidance can be challenged, and bodies that have a responsibility to follow the guidance can be challenged as to whether they have fulfilled their obligation to the letter.
Opposition Members certainly have concerns about the implications of removing the right to judicial review. We share the view that we need to ensure that those processes—those applications—are not frivolous and that they are not being used simply because the cost of responding to judicial review, and the delay that is involved, is a tool to create delay, impose costs and therefore deter development, which we all agree should take place. Conversely, however, we do not wish to see a situation where a public body or a local resident—a constituent—who has a genuine right to be heard and a genuine concern arising out of law is constrained from bringing the matter forward and seeking a remedy.
We also do not want a situation where, for example, a decision by Government, which is then taken through this process and restricted from judicial review, results in a third party, such as a local authority or NHS body, being judicially reviewed for its failure to stop that from proceeding—for its failure to bring a judicial review under other responsibilities that it has. I would be grateful if the Minister could address that.
Statutory consultees already have many legal obligations and duties relating to issues such as water quality, air quality and nature. They are obliged to go to the utmost of their powers to fulfil those obligations. Clearly, they may well be held in default if a development proceeds by virtue of the fact that they have not had the opportunity to appropriately challenge it in law. It would be helpful if the Minister set out how that will be fully addressed.
Matthew Pennycook
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his reasonable questions. If I have understood him, he makes a separate point about the statutory consultee system. As he will know—I refer him to my relevant written ministerial statement—we are seeking to reform that system in a number of ways.
On clause 8 specifically, the changes will not affect the ability to challenge the lawfulness of Government decisions in court. They are simply designed to reduce delays. We are not preventing anyone from challenging our planning decisions. Obviously, Government do not control how many of those challenges are made. We are tightening up the process so that if a challenge is judged to be meritless by the court—not by Government—it cannot be dragged on for years through numerous further appeals.
Only cases deemed totally without merit in the oral permission hearing in the High Court will be prevented from appealing to the Court of Appeal. Other cases will continue to be able to appeal the refusal of permission to the Court of Appeal. That will ensure that there is no possibility of meritless claims holding up nationally significant infrastructure projects, while maintaining access to justice in line with our domestic and international obligations.
I hope that the hon. Member is reassured that we are not removing wholesale the ability to mount judicial review challenges. Some have called for us to go further, but we think the proposals strike the right balance between addressing the removal of the paper permission stage and dealing with the issue of meritless claims. On that basis, I hope that he is reassured and may even feel inclined to support the measure.
Paul Holmes (Hamble Valley) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg. Notwith-standing the comments from my fellow shadow Minister, who made an excellent contribution, can I press the Minister on one question? My hon. Friend outlined the Opposition’s concern over removing wholesale—we are not saying that the Minister is doing this—the checks and balances relating to somebody being able to challenge a decision that they deem has not been taken in the right way.
However, it would be remiss of us as a party not to acknowledge that there are cases where JR is used vexatiously. To use an example from my constituency, I waited for 12 years to get a 300-foot extension to Southampton airport’s runway. It took three judicial reviews before we finally got that through. There was unmitigated support from the local authority and me as the Member of Parliament at the time, and it was taken to JR for what I would say were very dubious reasons, just to try to delay the project.
I understand why the Minister is bringing in the measures, notwithstanding some of the concerns that my hon. Friend mentioned about the balance. However, I am reassured by what the Minister said about not removing the ability to challenge and tightening the process around what can be accepted as being without merit.
I have one question for the Minister, which he may not be able to answer today—I would not necessarily expect him to—but perhaps he could write to me about it. Following Lord Banner’s work, which was a thoughtful examination of how legal challenges could be streamlined, has the Minister made any assessments, through officials or the Department, of how much time or cost on average the changes to clause 8 might mean for the system overall? I am not expecting him to get his abacus out and look at that now, but I wonder whether he could outline to the Committee, through an impact assessment, the effect of some of the changes.
We will not push this clause to a Division. We understand the principled reason why the Minister is bringing it forward, even if we have some concern about the detail of the measure.
John Grady (Glasgow East) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Twigg. This clause and the other clauses in this chapter are good news for Scotland, because we in Scotland depend on projects in England to proceed. Many projects are cross-border and need consent in both countries. That is important for jobs, particularly jobs for young people.
I have had the misfortune to be involved in infrastructure projects for many years. From time to time judicial reviews without any merit are brought solely to delay and frustrate projects. It is right and proper that the law is changed to make it clear that, once the High Court has made a decision, following argument—because the right to an oral hearing is retained—further appeals are prevented. Such appeals can lead to significant delays, depending on the business of the Court of the Appeal, which has many pressing priorities.
Some mention was made of costs. I will briefly describe the cost to developers, because the Labour party is a pro-business, pro-environment party. If someone has a development that is subject to a judicial review, they have planned their contracting strategy, and what it will cost to build the development, and their financing. If there is an indeterminate delay, and a series of additional delays of unpredictable length—as a lawyer, I could never tell people how long litigation would take—they are then exposed to significant fluctuations in the financial and commodities markets. There are therefore real costs, so I naturally support clause 8. The clause, along with the rest of the package of reforms to the development consent order regime, will create the opportunity for significant additional employment in Scotland, jobs for our young people, and great net zero and housing projects.
Matthew Pennycook
I thank the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Hamble Valley, for his constructive tone on this clause—and others; I do not mean to confine his constructive attitude to just this clause. I welcome his praise for Lord Banner’s review, which I agree was thoughtful and insightful. As part of that review Lord Banner made it clear that although the duration differs between different applications, each attempt to apply for a judicial review currently extends the duration of a claim by, on average, several weeks, and in some cases by several months. In large numbers of cases, time is added by legal challenges that are unsuccessful. The changes made by the Bill aim to strike the right balance between improving efficiency and ensuring access to justice.
To be clear, this clause does remove the paper permission stage, but only makes changes by removing the right to appeal for cases that are deemed “totally without merit”. Other cases will retain that right of appeal if they are deemed to be with merit and able to be considered. We think these changes will make a difference to the time that projects take to work their way through the system, and we will work with the judiciary to advance a number of other changes to the process for NSIP judicial reviews, such as introducing target timescales for cases that we think will have a beneficial impact. On that basis, I commend the clause to the Committee.
Clause 9
Connections to electricity network: licence and other modifications
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero (Michael Shanks)
I beg to move amendment 36, in clause 9, page 14, line 6, after “distribution system” insert
“(and such an improvement may include changing the order in which connections are made)”.
This amendment clarifies that the purpose for which the power under clause 9(1) may be exercised may include the making of changes to the order of the queue for connections to a transmission or distribution system.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 37 to 40.
Clause stand part.
Clauses 10 and 11 stand part.
New clause 19—Increasing grid capacity—
The Secretary of State must, within three months of the passing of this Act, lay before Parliament a plan to—
(a) reduce the cost of, and time taken to make, connections to the transmission or distribution system;
(b) permit local energy grids.
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to produce a plan to reduce the time and financial cost of connections to the electricity grid and to allow local energy grids.
Michael Shanks
It is a pleasure to serve under you, Mr Twigg. We thought a change in the tone of the Committee for a few clauses would be helpful, before we return to the other Minister.
Amendment 36 clarifies that a modification made under clause 9 may include changes to the order of the queue for connections, which works towards the broader aim of improving the management of connections to the transmission and distribution systems. The purpose of all this work is to reorder the connections queue. That is essential to deal with the extreme level of oversubscription in the queue, and enable a move from the “first come, first served” proposition that we have at the moment to a “first ready and needed, first connected” approach. The amendment is essential to fulfil the intent of the clauses, which is to provide the means to implement connections reform should the current Ofgem and industry-led process face delays or be unable to realise its benefits in full.
Amendment 37 clarifies that the power of the Secretary of State to direct Ofgem to modify a licence or agreement may be exercised only for the purpose of improving the management of connections to the transmission or distribution system, which places an additional safeguard on the use of that power. Amendment 38 clarifies that the Secretary of State or Ofgem may modify an agreement under the powers in clause 9 even where the effect of the modification might amount to a repudiation of the agreement, which provides consistency with the existing wording in clause 12. It is also essential to fulfil the intent of the clauses. Finally, amendments 39 and 40, which are purely consequential on amendment 38, move the definition of “qualifying distribution agreement” within clause 9.
I turn to clause 9 more broadly. As many Members will know, the current first come, first served electricity grid connections regime is causing considerable and unacceptable delays. It is blocking clean power projects from connecting to the grid, and blocking demand projects that are critical to our economic growth as a country. The National Energy System Operator—NESO—and Ofgem are reforming the electricity grid connections process to a strategically aligned first ready, first connected system. The reformed process will require projects to meet readiness, technological and locational criteria to progress.
The reform requires complex amendments to codes and licences. Clause 9 therefore enables the Secretary of State or Ofgem to support the existing connections reforms by directly amending electricity licences, and associated documents or agreements, should that prove necessary. It is intended to be used should the existing processes enacting connections reforms face significant delays, including alignment with strategic energy plans. The Government or Ofgem will then be able to expedite a set of changes outside the standard process to ensure that our clean power mission is delivered at pace. The clause is focused on improving the management of connections to the transmission or distribution system, and follows precedent in being time-limited to three years after commencement of the power on Royal Assent. Similar powers have been taken in the past, including in section 84 of the Energy Act 2008, but they were also time-limited and are therefore no longer in force.
Clause 10 details the scope of the power in clause 9, which enables the Secretary of State or Ofgem to make amendments to electricity licences and associated documents or agreements. The clause first defines the power to modify in clause 9, which includes the ability to amend, add to or remove provisions, and to add or release parties from agreements. It will enable the Secretary of State or Ofgem to support Ofgem and NESO’s existing connections reforms by directly amending electricity licences, and associated documents or agreements, should that prove necessary.
The clause further details how the Secretary of State or Ofgem can exercise the power, which includes allowing for general or specific modifications, incidental changes and provisions that do not necessarily relate to the activities authorised by the licence. It ensures that modifications to standard licence conditions are reflected in future licences, and specifies the conditions under which licences can be revoked. Finally, it allows agreements to include conditions that must be met before the taking of specific steps, or provision about the procedure for varying the agreement. Similar scope and procedure have been outlined previously in legislation, including in the Nuclear Energy (Financing) Act 2022.
Clause 11 details the procedure around the provision in clause 9 to enable the Secretary of State or Ofgem to make amendments to electricity licences and associated documents. It aligns with the precedent established in section 8 of the 2022 Act, which detailed the procedure to modify a generation licence of a relevant licensee nuclear company. The clause obligates the Secretary of State or Ofgem—I am not sure how many more times I will say that in this speech—to consult a list of specified persons, such as the holder of any relevant licences, NESO and any other appropriate individuals, before making modifications. Details of those modifications must be made public as soon as reasonably practicable to ensure transparency with wider stakeholders. However, the Secretary of State or Ofgem can exclude from the publication any information that could harm commercial interests.
I will respond on new clause 19 after it has been spoken to.
John Grady
I rise simply to add my support to this provision. There is an extensive requirement to develop the electricity generation industry in Scotland and England, and this will give rise to great long-term jobs and apprenticeships for young people, as well as move us on to cheaper, secure, lower-carbon energy.
Such queues have been a long-standing issue in the electricity industry, as any developer will tell you, and half the time it is absolutely impossible to know when their project will be connected. That is no basis on which to attract the significant investment we need in our industry in this country, because developers can go to other jurisdictions and get much quicker connections.
This reform has been carefully put together by the ministerial team and Ofgem. The Minister for Energy has addressed the issue, and the reform is to be applauded. It may seem a rather arid and dry topic, but ultimately the reform is of significant benefit to industry in the United Kingdom.
Paul Holmes
What I have to say about these clauses will not be arduous, partly because I am not a shadow Energy Minister—as many Members will be pleased to note, including me—and my focus will be on the planning amendments. This is, however, a very important part of the Bill.
The Minister said he keeps mentioning “Ofgem and the Secretary of State”, but if he would like us to helpfully have a word with the Prime Minister to recommend that he becomes the Secretary of State, we are more than happy to do so. The Opposition believe that even he, as the Under-Secretary, could not do as much damage to our energy system networks and future growth as the Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Doncaster North (Ed Miliband). [Interruption.] It is a policy disagreement.
This is a policy disagreement because, looking at the proposals in these clauses, we are very concerned. We obviously agree that the grid needs to be ready to connect to, because of the demands being placed on the system, and that is the policy of this Government and of the last. However, the focus of the current Secretary of State in really going down the route of the net zero agenda at what we would describe as a very fast speed, sometimes cutting off his nose to spite his face such as by cutting back on some of the energy systems we currently have, has put overwhelming demand on the energy grid.
The Government’s proposed decarbonising of the grid by 2030 will add at least £25 billion per year to the cost of the electricity system. The brunt of this increase will be felt by the people out there, who will see their household energy bill shoot up by over £900. Professor Gordon Hughes, the leading energy system expert, has found that these plans will increase power generation costs, grid balancing and capacity levels, thereby passing on those costs to our constituents.
The costs of balancing the grid alone are set to rise by £4 billion. Despite that, the Government have scrapped the full system cost review commissioned by the last Government. The current Administration are steaming ahead without a clear understanding of the impact on the energy bills of hard-working people—the energy bills they promised to freeze—on their families and on the industry’s competitiveness. Decarbonising the grid requires transparency on costs, not just soundbites about renewables, which I believe is what we have seen.
The Government have also watered down the proposed community benefits of new energy infrastructure, which they lauded before the press a couple of weeks ago, to just £750 per person.
Paul Holmes
From a sedentary position, the Minister says, “Just”, under his breath. It was not me who went to the BBC and leaked a report saying that the Government were going to give more money than they are now proposing; that has been reduced by his amendment, so, yes—“just”.
Furthermore, the Government have abandoned a number of reforms, including a review of the presumption in favour of overhead lines, stronger protection for prime agricultural land against large solar developments, and enhanced safety measures for battery storage facilities. Expanding and improving the electricity system is necessary, but it must be done in a way that balances affordability, reliability and community concerns. We are concerned that the clauses in the Bill remove this transparency and add costs, but will not deliver the streamlined or more rapid benefits to the system that the Minister outlined.
Olly Glover (Didcot and Wantage) (LD)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Twigg. I rise to speak to new clause 19. First, the Liberal Democrat members of this Committee support a lot of what the Government are proposing in this part of the Bill. Creating electricity grids of the future is a critical route to decarbonising and has the potential to reduce consumer bills.
It is much to the UK’s credit that we are making good progress in efforts to decarbonise our electricity generation. Wind and solar in particular account for a growing share of our power generation. However, the transition from one-way transmission of electricity from a small number of very large power stations to a more distributed and multi-directional movement of power creates some challenges. We are going to need major upgrades of our electricity grid to accommodate the growing number of solar installations, as an example, more of which my hon. Friends and I would like to see on new and existing buildings. Making further progress will help our national energy security and reduce consumer bills at a time when energy inflation and the cost of living are still significant problems.
There are examples where cost and/or process have acted as barriers to the ability to feed surplus solar energy into the grid, or to the commissioning of new clean and renewable electricity production. Local energy grids have the potential to benefit communities and use the energy much closer to its source of generation. Therefore our proposed new clause would go further than the Government in the current Bill. It requires the Secretary of State to, within three months of the passing of this Bill, lay before Parliament a plan for how the Government will facilitate the creation of local energy grids and deal with the cost and time of grid connections. I hope the Minister and hon. Members on the Government Benches will embrace this amendment as a way to help continue our country’s journey towards becoming a clean, renewable energy superpower.
Michael Shanks
I will first respond to a few points in the debate generally. My hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow East—across the Clyde from my constituency—made the absolutely right point that sums up what this connections reform process is all about: the absence of reforming the queue is driving away investment. Reform is critical for investment in our generation capacity and for how we connect demand projects that will be so important for unlocking economic growth. With more than 750 gigawatts currently in the queue to connect in the UK, the truth is there is no scope for that to happen without some radical reform of the queue. The Conservative party, when in government, recognised that that was a challenge and had already set about some reforms to make that happen.
We think we need to go even further. The shadow Minister, in a ray of honesty, said he was glad he was not the shadow Energy Minister. Based on the script on net zero, I think we are all fortunate that he is not the shadow Energy Minister, frankly, but it is the same script we are hearing from everyone at the moment.
Luke Murphy (Basingstoke) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Twigg. Might it not be that the hon. Member for Hamble Valley is embarrassed by his party on net zero? After all, on 17 January he said:
“I will conclude—many will be pleased to hear—by reaffirming the Conservative party’s strong commitment to the UK’s target of reaching net zero by 2050”—[Official Report, 17 January 2025; Vol. 760, c. 650.]—
only for that to be scrapped by his leader exactly two months later.
Michael Shanks
There is always a quote, as they say, and my hon. Friend is always there with the quotes at his fingertips, which is helpful. The truth is that the only way we are going to bring down bills and deliver energy security is the sprint to clean power. This is a crucial element of that, and of how we unlock investment—predominantly private investment—over the next few years as we build that clean power system. Even if we were not doing that, the grid is essential. It is an essential part of how we deliver electricity to homes, businesses and industry and it is critical that we upgrade it anyway.
Lewis Cocking (Broxbourne) (Con)
The Minister talks about energy security and bringing down bills, and of course we need to have more renewables online to do that, but we also need to issue new oil and gas licences so that we can produce more energy at home. That would help with what he is suggesting.
Michael Shanks
We are straying far from new clause 19, which I am keen to return to, but the hon. Gentleman is simply wrong on that point. Gas traded on the international market is exactly why all our constituents pay more on their energy bills. The answer is to get off gas as the marginal price setter, not to have even more of it.
The hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington made a helpful speech, although I will resist his new clause. We are in agreement about the issue of connection delays and the first come, first served process not working, and it is important that we reform that. We are of the view that our proposals do that, and the National Energy System Operator has worked with Ofgem and is of the view they are sufficient to do that.
The question of local power and local grids is an interesting approach that we are looking at. We take seriously the role of community-owned power—it is in the Great British Energy Bill, recognising our commitment to it—but we do not see it in itself as a barrier to what we are trying to do here. The infrastructure, including for local networks, that incorporates generation and demand is already permitted under the existing system. It can be constructed and operated by distribution network operators, by independent network operators or by a private wire under a statutory licence exemption provision.
We agree about the importance of community energy and are looking at a range of things, in particular at how communities might to sell power locally. They are all important points, and all this is how we will unlock the social and economic benefits of the clean power transition. For the reasons I have outlined, and because we think it is already entirely possible, we will resist new clause 19.
Gideon Amos
People in Taunton and Wellington are four-square behind new clause 19, but it was my hon. Friend the Member for Didcot and Wantage who spoke to it.
Michael Shanks
I betray my lack of English geography. I am sorry, but I assume that the hon. Members for Taunton and Wellington and for Didcot and Wantage are both in complete agreement with new clause 19. In any event, I thank them, but disagree with them both, instead of just one of them. I commend Government amendments 36 to 40 and clauses 9 to 11 to the Committee.
Amendment 36 agreed to.
Amendments made: 37, in clause 9, page 14, line 8, at end insert—
“(3A) The Secretary of State may exercise the power under subsection (3) only for the purpose mentioned in subsection (2).”
The amendment makes it clear that the power of the Secretary of State to direct the GEMA to modify a licence or agreement may only be exercised for the purpose of improving the purpose of managing connections to the transmission or distribution system.
Amendment 38, in clause 9, page 14, line 15, at end insert—
“(5A) A relevant authority may under subsection (1) modify an agreement mentioned in subsection (1)(e) or a qualifying distribution agreement even if the effect of the modification might amount to a repudiation of the agreement.”
This amendment ensures consistency with clause 12(8) in clarifying that modifications made to a particular connection or distribution agreement under clause 9(1) may be made even if the effect of the modification might amount to the repudiation of that agreement.
Amendment 39, in clause 9, page 14, line 16, leave out subsection (6).
This amendment, together with amendment 40 moves the definition of “qualifying distribution agreement” into subsection (7); this change is consequential on amendment 38.
Amendment 40, in clause 9, page 14, line 27, at end insert—
“‘qualifying distribution agreement’ means—
(a) the terms subject to which a connection is made by an electricity distributor in pursuance of section 16(1) of the Electricity Act 1989, or
(b) a special connection agreement as defined by section 22(1) of that Act;”.—(Michael Shanks.)
See the explanatory statement for amendment 39.
Clause 9, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 10 and 11 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 12
Directions to modify connection agreements
Michael Shanks
I beg to move amendment 41, in clause 12, page 16, line 8, leave out subsection (1).
The effect of this amendment is that a relevant authority may give a direction under clause 12 without first having exercised its powers under clause 9(1) to modify an electricity licence or an electricity industry code.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 42 to 47.
Clause stand part.
Michael Shanks
Government amendment 41 will allow the Secretary of State or Ofgem to direct the NESO or a distribution network operator to amend an agreement under the clause without the need to have previously modified licences, codes and associated documents under clause 9. Without the amendment, the Secretary of State would not be able to use the power to direct the National Energy System Operator or a DNO had not the modification powers in clause 9 —to make changes to licences, codes and associated documents—also been exercised. The amendment will mean that the directive power in clause 12 is no longer contingent on the use of the powers in clause 9.
An example of where the amendment would be needed is if an Ofgem and NESO-led process to amend licences and codes under the framework is successful, meaning that the powers in clause 9 do not need to be used, but the NESO or DNO has not accordingly amended its agreements with customers connecting to the electricity network. The directive powers could be used to ensure that the implementation of connections reform is successful.
David Simmonds
I have a couple of questions. As my hon. Friend the Member for Hamble Valley has set out, we are broadly supportive of the direction of travel around energy in the Bill.
One of the things we are all conscious of with the move to renewables being the main source of power in the grid—something that the UK has achieved faster than most other countries, with a bigger drop compared with the 1990 baseline than any other developed economy —is that it makes the grid more complex. Unlike oil, gas and nuclear, which can be delivered in an entirely predictable manner, renewables are generally much less predictable. There are times when the wind does not blow and the sun does not shine, and we cannot therefore put that element into the grid. We need to find alternative methods so we need to be able to shift greater amounts of power around to meet the growing energy needs.
As the Minister has outlined, the regime that is envisaged will, for a limited period of time, give greater powers to the Government to determine who gets connected and in which order. First, will the Minister set out how he and the Government intend to feed back to Parliament what we learn from that process, to inform the future shape of our energy grid?
Secondly, what recourse will there be for those at a certain point in the queue who anticipate that their development, whatever it may be, will be served by a particular project and connected at a particular point, if the Government decide otherwise because the reordering of the queue is, in the Minister’s view, necessary? We all understand why that may happen, but if someone is about to invest in a major new carbon capture and storage facility—the sort of major infrastructure project that the Bill is designed to support—and they expect it to be powered by a wind farm but are then told they have been moved much further down the queue than they expected, that will affect the delivery of that project. It would be helpful to understand the process whereby those affected by the reordering of the queue are able to challenge the decision, if necessary, and certainly to engage with the Government, or with constituency MPs, who may seek to advocate for them, so that the reordering can be revisited if necessary.
Michael Shanks
I thank the hon. Gentleman for those helpful questions. He rightly set out the fact that the grid is already considerably more complex than it was 20 or 30 years ago, and it will become more complex, which is partly why the reform of connections is so important.
The hon. Gentleman is right to say that the process of prioritising projects will mean that some will be deprioritised. We have looked at the projects that already have a connection date, and in many cases they will proceed. Viable generation projects above the capacity ranges outlined in the clean power action plan—the first strategic document that will be used to guide projects—might still be able to connect if there is capacity in that particular bit of the DNO after the prioritised projects have been assessed. If there is no space in the pre-2030 queue, they will be offered dates in the 2031-35 process.
We have been clear throughout that the process has not been arbitrary or theoretical. Ofgem and NESO have gone through individual applications that are currently in the process to make sure not only that they fit with the requirements of the clean power action plan but that projects are not unnecessarily disadvantaged. Some projects will go ahead even though they are not in the strategic plan, because where they already are in the grid will make it possible for them to go ahead.
The question of transparency is really important. I will come back to the Committee with details on how we might make the information public, but throughout the process Ofgem and NESO have made public as much information as possible about how they have gone about things, and there was a full public consultation as well. The point about how individual MPs can see whether projects in their constituency are affected is well made and I will take that away and reflect on it.
The critical fact, as the previous Government rightly recognised, is that 750-plus GW is simply unmanageable. Really good projects are sitting with dates long into the future but cannot connect because of what are often phantom projects that are never going to come to fruition and are holding up spaces in the queue. For all the reasons that the hon. Gentleman outlined in terms of the importance of energy security, and the importance of prioritising the queue, we think that the Government amendments and the clause are essential.
Amendment 41 agreed to.
Amendments made: 42, in clause 12, page 16, line 17, leave out
“as mentioned in subsection (1)(c)”
and insert
“in accordance with the conditions of an electricity licence”.
This amendment is consequential on amendment 41.
Amendment 43, in clause 12, page 16, line 22, after “distribution system” insert
“(and such an improvement may include changing the order in which connections are made)”.
This amendment clarifies that the purpose for which a direction may be given under clause 12 may include the making of changes to the order of the queue for connections to a transmission or distribution system.
Amendment 44, in clause 12, page 16, line 23, leave out subsections (4) and (5) and insert—
“( ) A direction under subsection (2) must describe the kinds of modification to be made by the person to whom it is given.”
This amendment inserts a new subsection which would mean that a direction made by the Secretary of State or the GEMA to the ISOP or an electricity distributor to modify an agreement must describe the kinds of modification required.
Amendment 45, in clause 12, page 16, line 38, at end insert—
“(7A) Before giving a direction under subsection (2), the relevant authority must consult—
(a) the person to whom it proposes to give the direction, and
(b) such other persons as the relevant authority considers appropriate.
(7B) Subsection (7A) may be satisfied by consultation carried out before the passing of this Act (as well as by consultation carried out after that time).
(7C) A relevant authority must publish details of any direction it gives under subsection (2) as soon as reasonably practicable after the direction is given.
(7D) A relevant authority may exclude from publication under subsection (7C) any information the publication of which would be likely to prejudice the commercial interests of any person.”
This amendment requires a relevant authority to carry out consultation before giving a direction under clause 12. It also requires a relevant authority to publish any direction it gives under the clause.
Amendment 46, in clause 12, page 16, line 41, at end insert—
“(8A) The power to give a direction under subsection (2) may not be exercised after the end of the period of three years beginning with the day on which this section comes into force.”
This amendment ensures that the power to give a direction under clause 12 is time-limited in the same way as the power to make modifications to licences and other documents under clause 9.
Amendment 47, in clause 12, page 17, line 10, at end insert—
“(11) In Schedule 6A to the Electricity Act 1989 (provisions imposing obligations enforceable as relevant requirements)—
(a) in paragraph 4A (electricity system operator), after sub-paragraph (c) insert—
‘(d) section 12(8) of the Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025 (duty to comply with direction under section 12 of that Act).’;
(b) in paragraph 5 (distribution licence holders), after sub-paragraph (g) insert—
‘(h) section 12(8) of the Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025 (duty to comply with direction under section 12 of that Act).’”—(Michael Shanks.)
This amendment amends Schedule 6A to the Electricity Act 1989 in order to provide for enforcement of the duty to comply with a direction given under clause 12.
Clause 12, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 13
Managing connections to the network: strategic plans etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Michael Shanks
Clause 13 will require NESO and the DNOs to have regard to strategic plans designated by the Secretary of State when they carry out functions related to connections. The Secretary of State will designate one or more strategic plans, with the current intention that this will include the clean power 2030 action plan in the first instance and the strategic spatial energy plan going forward. There is precedent in imposing a duty on a body to have regard to a strategic document—for example, the designated strategy and policy statement under section 165 of the Energy Act 2023, which outlines the Government’s strategic priorities, policy outcomes, and the roles and responsibilities of those involved in implementing energy policy.
Let me turn to the detail of the objects set out in the clause. It amends part 5 of the Energy Act 2023 to include a duty for NESO to have regard to designated strategic plans. It also amends the Electricity Act 1989 to place a duty on DNOs to have regard to any designated strategic plan, and adds a further exception to the duty on DNOs to connect in cases where it would not be in accordance with the designated strategic plans. The clause will support the implementation of ongoing connections reforms led by NESO and Ofgem, and will provide guidance and support for NESO and DNOs in making decisions on issuing new connection offers. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Paul Holmes
The Minister has been clear in outlining how the clause relates to the previous clauses, and how he wants to overwhelmingly reform the electricity system. I do not see the clause as particularly controversial; it moves on from what he has previously described. Despite my previous speech—I have nothing against the Minister—the Opposition obviously want to be constructive where we possibly can be. The clause is simple and enables the process to carry on, and we will not contest it.
Gideon Amos
I endorse the clause on behalf of the Liberal Democrats, given that it lays out plans rather than an unplanned approach. Provided that interested parties have an opportunity to scrutinise those plans and be involved in them, we also support the clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 14
Consents for generating stations and overhead lines: applications
Paul Holmes
I beg to move amendment 80, in clause 14, page 18, line 36, after “application.” insert—
“(4) Any fees received by the Scottish Ministers under sub-paragraph (2)(d) may only be used to fund—
(a) consumer benefits packages, or
(b) local planning authorities.”
This amendment would ensure that fees collected by Scottish Ministers through applications can only be used for connected purposes, namely for consumer benefits or to support local authority planning departments.
The amendment was tabled in the name of the shadow Scotland Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine (Andrew Bowie). The Opposition absolutely understand the provisions of clause 14, and we broadly agree with it, but we think it could be strengthened to allow added scrutiny and consultation among those who will be most affected by some of the changes in the Bill, including members of the public and interested parties who will be affected by applications that go forward.
I have had a number of interactions with the Minister for Housing and Planning in Delegated Legislation Committees and on the Floor of the House about the Government’s moves towards planning fee reform. I know we are currently scrutinising the Minister from the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, but we support planning fee reform and the Government’s move to ringfence fees within local authorities. Amendment 80 seeks to do something along those lines with regard to the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero and Scottish Ministers.
Michael Shanks
Normally, the hon. Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine is my sparring partner in both the Scotland and energy spaces, so it is nice that he has made an appearance in this debate, but I disagree with his amendment. The main reason is that it concerns a devolved competence. This is a UK Government Bill and it is right, given that the resource of local planning decisions and planning authorities is devolved to Scottish Ministers, that they make the decision on how they resource statutory consultees and local planning authorities.
On the point about community benefits, the Scottish Government already have an established process. The 10-year onshore wind ban in England was not in place in Scotland, and the process of good practice for community benefits for onshore wind, for example, is already quite well developed. Processes are in place. Over the past 12 months, developers have offered more than £30 million in community benefits.
We are, of course, exploring all options and the Bill includes bill discounts for network infrastructure—we will come to that shortly—but we are open to much more on community benefits generally, because we agree that if communities are hosting nationally important infrastructure, they should benefit, as the hon. Member for Hamble Valley rightly said. However, for the reasons I have outlined—this is a devolved competence and not a matter for me as a UK Government Minister—we hope the hon. Gentleman will withdraw the amendment.
Paul Holmes
I completely understand where the Minister is coming from. He does not want to tread on the toes of devolved Administrations. I thought he might be more encouraged to do so, considering that the Scottish Government are run by the Scottish National party, which is not doing a very good job at the moment. However, I also understand that he may not want to give them any more money to screw up the job that they are doing.
Paul Holmes
Good—we have some consensus across the Committee. However, the Minister should not be fearful about giving those Ministers greater powers in this respect. We are trying to enable a greater amount of money to be devolved to the local authorities that are going to be directly responsible for ensuring community benefits from community infrastructure for the people who elect them. The Minister has said throughout our discussions that it is important to be transparent and to be able to resource some of the radical reform he is making. He should not be fearful—
Michael Shanks
I do not disagree with a single thing that the hon. Gentleman has just said, but it is not for me to dictate to the Scottish Government. They are democratically elected, and as much as I may disagree with much of what they do, they are none the less the Government of Scotland, and if they want to ringfence funding for a particular part of the process, they should be able to do so. In particular, diverting any funding away from the more speedy processing of planning applications would not be in the interests of the projects we want taken forwards. It is not that I disagree with him, but this is a devolved competence.
Paul Holmes
I thank the Minister for that, and I agree with him that it is a devolved competence—that is a fact—but he could be giving Scottish Ministers and constituents in Scotland a present by allowing the Government to make those decisions.
It is not just that the Government could be taking money from Scottish Ministers and giving it to local authorities under proposed new subsection (4)(a), but there is scope in the amendment for Scottish Ministers—the devolved Ministers—to be given the power to allocate consumer benefits packages where they think fit. That is strengthening the hand of devolved Ministers, not taking anything away from them. [Interruption.] The Minister says, “It doesn’t stop them.” No, but this would strengthen their hand. I think that giving devolved Ministers the power to give consumer benefits packages to Scottish people who are affected by infrastructure is a good thing.
I am not the intellectual powerhouse of the House of Commons, but even I can calculate that we would not win if we pushed this to a vote, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Paul Holmes
I beg to move amendment 84, in clause 14, page 18, line 36, at end insert—
“Consultation requirements (Scotland)
1B (1) Where an application is made to the Scottish Ministers for consent under section 36 or 37, the Scottish Ministers must provide for the holding of a public consultation.
(2) The Scottish Ministers may by regulations make provision about the holding of consultations.
(3) Regulations may include—
(a) the length of consultation periods in urban and rural areas;
(b) requirements on applicants to publish the projected local economic benefits and other specified information in advance of a consultation;
(c) requirements on applicants to respond to or demonstrate consideration of submissions to consultations.”
The amendment stands in the name of my hon. Friend for—
Paul Holmes
The amendment stands in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Gordon and Buchan (Harriet Cross). Just as the Minister is not an expert on the south coast, I am not an expert on Scottish constituencies, particularly as they all changed their names at the last boundary review.
This simple amendment would introduce additional consultation requirements. It is in a similar vein to amendment 81, which, with your permission, Mr Twigg, I intend to move later. It would enable community and public consultations when an application goes forward. As I said in the last debate, I do not think it is unreasonable that, when an application is put forward, members of the public should have a public consultation to hear about the perceived benefits and to challenge the organisations trying to bring forward infrastructure projects. We must also accept that consultations can take effect in a number of ways, based on whether the infrastructure is being built in rural or urban areas.
This is a simple amendment that seeks to make sure that, when an application goes forward, Scottish Ministers have the powers that the Minister has outlined to ensure there is a public consultation, so that the people on the ground who are genuinely affected by such infrastructure projects have a say and see the transparency that we hope the Bill will put in place.
Michael Shanks
Amendment 84, tabled by the hon. Member for Gordon and Buchan (Harriet Cross), concerns public consultations under sections 36 and 37 of the Electricity Act 1989. It is worth making it clear that the planning systems of Scotland and of England and Wales are very different, and the starting points are very different.
The 1989 Act—which we will come to shortly, in relation to the necessary updates to consents more widely—provides for the process of notification and objection at the application stage. This is very different from aspects of the planning regulations in England and Wales, in that there are already opportunities for consultations, but clause 14 creates a further power to make regulations to set out such matters relating to applications for consent, including a pre-application consultation requirement. That requirement will be set out in regulations rather than in primary legislation, but its purpose is to ensure that the application is proportionate, adaptable and future-proofed.
As much as I politically disagree with the incumbent Scottish Government, we have been working together incredibly effectively, since we came into government, on some key aspects. The reforms of the 1989 Act are a good example. To take the earlier point about the changing energy system, that Act was legislation for a different time, and the planning system in Scotland has not kept pace with the reforms in the rest of the United Kingdom. The reforms that we are proposing give Scottish Ministers a framework to introduce regulations to allow for a pre-application consultation process, and to give both communities and statutory consultees meaningful opportunities to influence applications and have a voice early in the process. For that reason, I see much of amendment 84 as replicating provisions already in the Bills, so I hope the hon. Member for Hamble Valley will withdraw it.
Paul Holmes
I thought the Minister would recommend that I withdraw the amendment. I will put on the record that I am delighted that the Minister believes in pre-application consultation, because in one breath this morning—
Paul Holmes
The Minister has had his say. All I am saying, politely, is that in a different provision of the Bill, the Government have completely removed pre-application consultation for nationally significant projects, yet the Under-Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero believes in them. He does not want to accept our amendment to ensure transparent public consultation because pre-application consultation is strong enough already, and the public will be able to have their concerns looked at. The Minister says that they are different systems, but the principles are exactly the same. Ministers cannot rely on that argument for this amendment but not accept the same argument for amendments considered by the Committee earlier. However, as a realist, I know that this will not go very far. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Paul Holmes
I beg to move amendment 81, in clause 14, page 19, line 9, leave out from “application,” to end of line 12 and insert—
“(b) consider the objection and the reporter’s final report,
(c) hold a public hearing, and
(d) allow a period of one month to elapse
before determining whether to give their consent.”
This amendment would require the Scottish Ministers to hold a public hearing and allow one month to elapse before determining whether to give consent to an application for new generating stations or overhead lines under sections 36 or 37 of the Electricity Act 1989.
The amendment is in the name of the shadow Scottish Secretary and acting shadow Energy Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine, who I know the Minister would be delighted to hear from—[Interruption.] I heard the “boo”. Amendment 81 is similar to amendment 84 but more specific. I suspect that the Minister will come back with the same argument, so I will take only a short time on this. The amendment would require Scottish Ministers to hold a public hearing, and allow one month to elapse before determining whether to give consent to an application for new generating stations or overhead lines under sections 36 or 37 of the Electricity Act 1989.
Put simply, that would allow local residents the right to provide feedback on proposed infrastructure. I am sure that hon. Members from both sides of the House will agree that it is right that people can have their voices listened to by Scottish Ministers and the Scottish Government. The amendment would create one mechanism to ensure fairness in the planning system, by allowing not only the pre-application consultation but people to generally give feedback and a say, as they currently can in the English planning system. If the Minister is not minded to accept the amendment, I would be grateful if he wrote to me and the shadow Scottish Secretary, or acting shadow Energy Secretary.
Paul Holmes
Both—that is the world we are in, unfortunately. I would be grateful if the Minister could see if there is an opportunity for a meeting between himself and that shadow Minister on how we can strengthen the grassroots-level consultation that is important to the system. I look forward to the Minister’s response. If we could secure some unofficial channels on how we can strengthen this clause when we get to further stages, I would be grateful. I will not push the amendment, but I would like the Minister to respond to those concerns.
Michael Shanks
I thank the shadow Minister for the way he is discussing these topics. I appreciate that they are from a planning system alien to the one with which he is, I am sure, very familiar—I am tempted to say that the shadow Energy Secretary could join him on the Bench, but he is not here.
I understand the point that the shadow Minister is making. For hon. Members who are not familiar with the Scottish system, a public inquiry can be triggered with one objection into the planning system. The public inquiry can take years to conclude and often is not reflective of actual community sentiment on a particular project. This system does not exist in any form anywhere else in the UK. The purpose of these consenting reforms is to deliver significant efficiencies in the consenting process, and to make decisions faster—not necessarily to make positive decisions faster, just to make decisions faster. Introducing another element that feels like the element that we are removing takes away from that.
As I have said previously, there are still significant opportunities for communities to participate in the process. One of the key aspects that we are introducing is the right of a reporter, who is an experienced specialist in planning and consenting, to consider representations about whether there should be a public hearing on a particular process. That reporter will then make the decision about whether it should go forward into a hearing session or a public inquiry. That is rather than what we have at the moment, which is an automatic trigger that holds up projects for a significant length of time.
I am always happy to meet with the shadow Scottish Secretary on a range of things. I am happy to engage with him, because I appreciate that his part of Scotland has a significant amount of network infrastructure being built; but for the reasons I have outlined, this amendment goes counter to our objectives, and does not sit with the reforms we are making to the Scottish planning system, as distinct from the planning system in England and Wales.
John Grady
I will make a couple of brief remarks as a resident Scottish MP. The Minister has referenced co-operation between the Scottish and UK Governments. That is to be welcomed; it reflects this Government’s determination to do right by Scotland and to work productively with the SNP Government in Holyrood.
These provisions will help to unlock significant investment in Scotland. We heard last week how SSE’s programme of projects, which these provisions help to unlock, will lead to £22 billion of investment by 2030. That is the biggest investment we have seen in the north of Scotland since the second world war. Just think what we could achieve if we had a Labour Government in Scotland as well as in England.
The Minister is right to have worked closely with the Scottish Government on reforming the provisions, which in many cases predate 1989, because the 1989 Act was a consolidation. He is right to have worked productively with the Scottish Government, putting Scotland first, because that will give rise to significant investment and jobs—jobs for our young people and high-quality jobs—as well as access for the people of Great Britain to greater volumes of fixed-price electricity that is not subject to fluctuations in wholesale markets, as we have seen over the last few years.
Paul Holmes
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause 15 stand part.
New clause 53—Reforms to consenting process for electricity infrastructure in Scotland—
“Where any reforms to the consenting process for electricity infrastructure in Scotland are proposed, the Secretary of State must ensure that such reforms—
(a) do not reduce requirements for community engagement or public consultation;
(b) include measures to address local concerns, environmental impacts, and impacts on all key sectors including but not limited to agriculture and tourism.”
New clause 54—Annual report on consents for electricity infrastructure in Scotland—
“(1) The Secretary of State must annually lay before Parliament a report on applications for consent for electricity infrastructure in Scotland.
(2) A report under this section must include—
(a) the outcomes of each application for consent relating to an energy infrastructure project in Scotland;
(b) evidence of community consultation undertaken in relation to each application and, where applicable, how consultation has influenced the design of the infrastructure to which the application relates; and
(c) estimates of economic benefits to local communities from the relevant project.”
Michael Shanks
I will begin with a brief explanation as to why clause 14 should stand part of the Bill. I return to the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow East made a moment ago, and one that I have made before, which is that these reforms were in the pipeline under the previous Government. They are reforms to a long-standing piece of legislation that is long due for updating.
I thank officials in my Department and in the Scottish Government for working closely and at speed, with a similar set of objectives and an open-book approach to making this work, to draft the measures in a way that works for all of us. It is a reset of the tone of how we work as two Governments.
On enabling the introduction of pre-application requirements, as the hon. Member for Hamble Valley referenced, in the Scottish legislation there are currently no steps to give the public an opportunity to engage as there are in the NSIP regime in England and Wales. This is about improving the quality and readiness of applications at the submission stage. It is important to say that this was driven by the views of Scottish Ministers, who said that they thought it was a useful process, but it will be directed in detail in regulations so that it can be updated and adapted to situations, unlike the process that we have in England and Wales at the moment, which has been held back and has added time and complexity to projects and not delivered what it was intended to do. It will give Scottish Ministers the powers to charge fees for pre-application services, enabling them to better support applicants in developing good-quality applications.
Secondly, the clause establishes a power to set time limits through regulations for key stages of the consenting process, which will support the timely determination of applications and bring down overall processing times. Thirdly, it will establish a proportionate process for responding to objections by relevant planning authorities through a reporter-led examination process. The reporter will choose the most appropriate procedure for gathering any further information they need to provide recommendations in a final report to Scottish Ministers. That may include inquiry sessions, where the reporter considers that that is the best approach to take to address particular issues. Such an approach is similar to the well-established process in which appeals in the town and country planning decisions are currently addressed.
Clause 15 enables regulations to be made that prescribe new processes to vary electricity infrastructure consents in Scotland after they have been granted. The clause addresses the current anomaly that there is no prescribed procedure for holders of overhead line consents to apply to Scottish Ministers for a variation to their consents. The current position forces consent holders to make full consent applications in order to authorise often very modest variations. The clause also allows Scottish Ministers to vary an existing generating station or overhead lines consent due to changes in environmental circumstances or technological changes. Such variations will be made with the agreement of the consent holder. Finally, the clause allows Scottish Ministers to correct any errors or omissions made in consents for generating stations or overhead lines.
I will come back to the new clauses later, but I want first to underline the importance of the consenting process. In Scotland, we generate a significant amount of electricity, and there are further projects in the pipeline, including both floating offshore wind and onshore wind. It is critical that there is an off-taker for that power in the rest of the UK, and that requires us to build significantly more network infrastructure to bring that clean power to where it is required. Although these changes to consenting relate to Scotland, they are of critical importance for the energy security of the whole United Kingdom.
Paul Holmes
I would like to move new clauses 53 and 54, but I would like to hear what the Minister has to say about them first.
Michael Shanks
The shadow Minister wants to hear more! New clause 54 is in the name of the hon. Member for Gordon and Buchan (Harriet Cross)—I want the shadow Minister to say, “Gordon and Buchan”, just so I can hear his pronunciation. The clause would require the Secretary of State to produce an annual report providing detail of electricity infrastructure consenting decisions made in Scotland in previous years.
As hon. Members will be aware, responsibility for the consenting process for electricity infrastructure in Scotland is devolved to Scottish Government Ministers. The Scottish Government are accountable to the Scottish Parliament—not the UK Parliament—for the decisions that they make, for the rationale behind them and for what information they choose to provide on consenting decisions. I am aware that the Scottish Government publish all their decisions, which includes information about what public consultations have taken place and consultations with community councils, for example.
It would be inappropriate and potentially duplicative for the Secretary of State to have such an obligation, but fundamentally, to come back to the point I made earlier, there is a particular concern about putting a statutory obligation on what is a devolved power when there is a democratic link between Scottish Ministers and their democratically accountable Parliament, which is the Scottish Parliament and not this Parliament.
Paul Holmes
Thank you. I must apologise, Mr Twigg; this is the first time I have been a shadow Minister on a Bill Committee and I am a bit rusty, but I am learning very quickly.
I thank the Minister for Energy for being very gentle with me as well when discussing Scottish energy connectivity and Scottish planning. He will understand that beggars cannot be choosers on the number of MPs that we have, but being a Member for what is possibly the most southern part of the south coast that one can get bar the Isle of Wight, I am doing my best to discuss the Scottish planning system. I am grateful for the spirit in which he is responding to our new clauses and amendments. I am also grateful to his officials for their work, too.
I understand what the Minister is saying, and I know his reasons for refusing to accept previous amendments under clause 14, but these new clauses create a parallel system. He is absolutely right that Scottish Ministers are accountable to Scottish people and the Scottish Parliament, but Scottish Members of Parliament here are accountable to their constituents. The Secretary of State also has a role within this Parliament and within this UK Government. On new clause 54, the Minister is quite right to say that the Scottish Parliament already has that reporting mechanism, but I do not think that it is unreasonable that the Secretary of State should be able to do that for Scottish MPs here too; when we have questions to the Secretary of State for Scotland, we discuss UK legislation relating to Scotland.
Paul Holmes
The Minister keeps saying “reserved”. That is fine, but we have a Secretary of State for Scotland, accountable to a UK Parliament, who represents Scottish constituencies. There is a role for this Parliament to report and to scrutinise the successes of the Scottish Executive and the UK Government, with the Secretary of State having an overarching position as Secretary of State representing Scotland. Scottish Members of Parliament are entitled to the same rights and benefits as Scottish MSPs when scrutinising the Scotland Government north of the border. The Minister wanted me to pronounce “Gordon and Buchan”. I think that is right—I am not sure, but I did my best. Honestly, there are worse ones to pronounce.
Clearly, we are going to disagree on our approach to these two new clauses, but the reason for new clause 53 is exactly the same. I am surprised by the Minister’s reticence in allowing his Scottish colleagues to be able to have the same rights of scrutiny as Scottish MSPs. It is not an arduous new clause. It would not be arduous on the Government or the Scotland Office to produce those outcomes or statistics. It would not be arduous on the Scotland Office or the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero to provide evidence of community consultation, particularly when we have just discussed some of the amendments that the Opposition have tabled on community consultation.
It would also not be arduous for the Scotland Office—or whatever Department would be answering—to provide estimates of economic benefits to local communities. That is exactly why many members of this Committee who represent Scottish constituencies are here in this UK Parliament: to develop policy that brings economic benefits to local communities. The Minister needs to think outside the box and allow Scottish MPs from all parties in this House to have those rights to scrutinise, to develop the economic benefits to local communities. He should not feel so constrained by the Scottish devolved Administration; he should branch out, improve and increase the power of the Scotland Office or his Department, and allow Scottish MPs to have their say in this area of legislation.
Michael Shanks
I am in danger of going into British constitutional politics 101, but the hon. Gentleman is introducing the West Lothian question.
The Chair
We have to be very careful given the subject of the amendment. I gave the shadow Minister a bit of leeway.
Michael Shanks
The shadow Minister is introducing the best example I have heard in a long time of the West Lothian question. The fundamental thing is that this is not a political question about the Scottish Government or the UK Government. There are reserved matters for which this Parliament is responsible for holding UK Government Ministers to account, and there are devolved matters that Scottish Ministers have responsibility for delivering and the Scottish Parliament is responsible for holding them to account for.
It would ride roughshod over this Parliament’s fairly consistent support of devolution in the UK for us to now suddenly say that those Scottish Ministers are also accountable to another Parliament. I think that we agree on the nature of devolution in this country, although we may strongly disagree on the actions that devolved Governments take, but we cannot support the new clauses, for the reasons I have outlined. This is not about thinking outside the box; it is about recognising the role that the devolved system plays in our constitution. For those reasons, I will resist the new clauses.
Michael Shanks
Clause 16 amends section 36D of the Electricity Act 1989, which provides for a statutory appeal to be brought by any person who is aggrieved by a decision made by Scottish Ministers—perhaps the shadow Minister. A challenge to an offshore electricity infrastructure consenting decision made under section 36 is by statutory appeal. The clause extends this, so that statutory appeal also applies to onshore electricity infrastructure consenting decisions made under section 36, decisions made under section 37 and all variation decisions.
The clause will create consistency in Scotland by making the challenge process the same for both onshore and offshore consents, and ensuring they are brought in a timely manner. A challenge will have to be brought within six weeks for onshore consents, as is already the case for offshore consents. This will bring the timescale for challenging large electricity infrastructure decisions into alignment right across Great Britain.
Clause 16 also amends the Electricity Act so that the six-week timescale for bringing a challenge commences from the publication of the decision by the Scottish Minister, instead of the date on which the decision was taken. This is a new requirement for both onshore and offshore, and is compliant with the Aarhus convention compliance committee’s recommendations relating to the timescale for challenging planning decisions. There is also a consequential amendment to the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1997 in respect of directions relating to deemed planning permission. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Paul Holmes
My contribution will be very short, because the Opposition agree with what the Minister said. It seems perfectly reasonable to amend section 36D of the Electricity Act 1989, which allows anybody aggrieved by the process to appeal. That is a welcome step that meets some of our challenges in other areas of the Bill—not those for which this Minister is responsible—in relation to people being intimately involved in some of these decisions. If people are not happy with what is happening in their local communities, they should be able to challenge it. I welcome the clause, and we will not press it to a vote.
Gideon Amos
We do not object to the clause either. The date of the judicial review challenge being six weeks from the issue of the decision in writing is consistent with the approach under the Town and Country Planning Act, and therefore does not reduce or change people’s right to judicial review. We are content to support the clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 16 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 17
Applications for necessary wayleaves: fees
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Michael Shanks
Clause 17 will confer a power on Scottish Ministers to make regulations to set and charge fees to electricity network operators for processing necessary wayleave applications that they should make in Scotland. Necessary wayleaves are statutory rights that allow electricity licence holders to install and access their overhead electricity lines and associated infrastructure on land owned by others, and in Scotland they are processed and granted by Scottish Ministers.
The objective of the change is to better resource the processing of necessary wayleave applications by the Scottish Government. It is important to act now.
Lewis Cocking
Will the Minister elaborate on why he did not support amendment 80, which we have just discussed, on planning fees going to local councils to resource planning departments? What is the difference between that and him saying to Scottish Ministers under this clause that they can charge a fee, but that it has to go to the resourcing of dealing with these applications?
Michael Shanks
Perhaps I misunderstood the hon. Gentleman’s point, but I think that amendment 80 was about forcing Scottish Government Ministers to spend funds on community benefits and other things. This clause is saying that the Government will have the power to raise application fees if they choose to do so. Of course, they could choose not to, but under this clause they will have the power to raise them.
Lewis Cocking
It says that the Minister expects that money to be put into the system to make the system better. Why has he done that in this case when he did not support the amendment doing it?
Michael Shanks
As I think I have just outlined, that amendment did not just call for the money to make the system more efficient; it called for it to be spent in communities on community benefits. That is quite different. My argument to the shadow Minister in resisting that amendment was that we did not want to tie the hands of the Scottish Government, because we see that investing that money in making the planning system more efficient is probably the best use for it, but it is not for me to tell them that. This clause is about giving them the power to set and charge fees to electricity network operators. I suggest that the point he is making is a slightly different one, but if I have misunderstood him, perhaps he can explain.
David Simmonds
A general point arises here, which we also debated on the Renters’ Rights Bill Committee. The different systems in Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland and England—most of the legislation we are dealing with here is for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland—give rise to a risk of inconsistency. The shadow Minister spoke of the importance of community benefit. That is designed to secure community support. If there is a view that Ministers in Scotland might choose to spend such revenue on other things to the detriment of community benefit, that may also undermine consent.
I completely agree with what the Minister is saying about creating the necessary power, but will he commit to further discussions with his colleagues in the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government so that we can ensure—not just in this Bill, but in future legislation—that where we expect a community benefit to derive from something that we decide on, it will be a consistent benefit across the UK?
Michael Shanks
In general, I agree and disagree with the hon. Gentleman’s point. I understand the point he is making about consistency, but I take the view that the whole purpose of having different devolved Administrations in England, Wales and Scotland is to make different decisions. Northern Ireland is separate in the energy discussion, because it has a separate grid.
I am not sure that I would say that consistency at all costs is the right approach. We created the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly so that they could make decisions locally that affected them in a different way. We have worked with the Scottish Government on these changes to make sure that there is a package of reforms to the consent arrangements under the Energy Act that relates to the planning system in Scotland as it currently is. It is not the same starting point as the system in England and Wales, so it is important to look at them separately. Nevertheless, I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point.
I return to clause 17. Fees are already charged in England and Wales for processing wayleave applications. I reiterate—this comes back to the point made by the hon. Member for Broxbourne—that the Scottish Government do not have the power in legislation to raise those fees. That power is reserved. The clause will give them that power.
Paul Holmes
Has the Minister identified or outlined any potential total income that will come out of this measure? I know that it is not a certain process and that it is not certain how many will come forward.
Michael Shanks
No, we have not. A series of work will be necessary to come up with that figure, because the fees will be charged on a cost recovery basis. It is not a money-making exercise for the Government. That is in line with approaches in the rest of Great Britain. There will clearly be a significant number of such applications in the coming years—more than in previous years, probably—but the detail will be worked out with the Scottish Government. We do not know in advance exactly how many wayleave applications there might be, so we cannot give an exact figure.
Paul Holmes
I thank the Minister for his answer. He will forgive me for intervening again; it will mean that I speak less later. In outline, has he started any engagement with Scottish Ministers to find out whether the intention of the clause will be borne out in reality? If the costs are being recovered on a cost recovery basis, has he secured the necessary assurances from Ministers that the money collected will be used to process the decisions more rapidly, and that it will not be spent in other devolved Scottish areas?
Michael Shanks
I am sorry to come back to this point, but the Government do not bind the hands of devolved Governments in any spending area. When this Parliament—[Interruption.] No, I did not say that. I said that the Bill gives them the power to do that, which they do not currently have.
Michael Shanks
No, I will carry on answering this point, if that is okay.
We are very enthusiastic about clause 17—who would have thought it? To be clear about this point—I feel as if I am the only Scottish MP on this Committee, but I am not—when this Government increase spending in a particular area, that results in a budget transfer to the Scottish Government, the Welsh Government and the Northern Irish Executive, which they can spend on whatever they see as their local priorities. An increase in NHS spending in England does not lead to the exact same in Scotland. We will not bind the hands of every single decision that is made in this case. This is about conferring a power on Scottish Government Ministers to set and charge fees to electricity network operators for necessary wayleave applications in Scotland.
John Grady
I thank the Minister, although he must feel awfully lonely as the Front-Bench Scotsman. As the Member for Rutherglen just on the other side of the Clyde from me, does he agree that the charging of fees for necessary wayleaves is a rather odd way to relitigate the referendum that took place in 1999, and a rather odd way to relitigate the questions of devolution? I know that the Conservative party has some trouble, from time to time, in accepting the devolution settlement. We seem to have moved from the West Lothian question to the Hamble Valley question. It is remarkably confusing.
Michael Shanks
No, I will respond to that point, if I may. I respect the view of the Conservative party and the argument that Conservative Members are making. I completely understand it, but I am trying to make the point gently that this is not about our directing specific decisions that will be made by Scottish Ministers. It is about how—in this case, as it is across wayleave applications in England and Wales as well—fees will be charged on a cost recovery basis in line with UK and Scottish Government policy on managing public money.
Lewis Cocking
Let me try a third time. According to the explanatory notes laid out by the Government:
“The objective of this change is to better resource the processing of necessary wayleaves applications by the Scottish government.”
The Minister is therefore directing the Scottish Government to spend the money that they get in through this process on that planning process. How is that different from amendment 80 which we discussed earlier and the Government said they will not accept?
Michael Shanks
I am trying to find the exact wording. I will come back to the hon. Gentleman. I think I have outlined to him three times now why it is different. I do not have amendment 80 in front of me at this precise moment, but it had two parts to it, one of which was about community benefits. It was directing the Scottish Government to take funds and direct them to a specific purpose. This Parliament does not do that in any other aspects of devolved policy, because it is devolved to the Scottish Parliament to make those decisions. I think that I have made that point clear, but if not, I will write to the Committee and make it even clearer. [Interruption.] I am grateful. I now have amendment 80 in front of me. It mentions
“consumer benefits packages, or…local planning authorities”.
Neither of those things is in the gift of the UK Government to direct the Scottish Government to do. Consumer benefits packages are ill-defined, if nothing else, but local planning authorities are democratically elected in their own right, and the Scottish Government make budget decisions to local government, separate from any budget decisions that the UK Government make to the Scottish Government. The two are not comparable in any way. In any event, the Committee has already voted down that amendment.
Paul Holmes
I do not intend to speak for long. I am grateful to the Minister for repeatedly taking interventions, but I think he is in a slight pickle on this one. On a number of occasions he has said, quite rightly—I understand that he has deeply held views, and I promise that I am not going to go back to the West Lothian question, or the Hamble Valley question—
Paul Holmes
I will confine myself to clause 17. The Minister has often said that he does not want to direct Scottish Government Ministers on a devolved issue. That is perfectly reasonable. When I last intervened on him, I did not ask him to dictate to Scottish Government Ministers; I asked whether he had sought an assurance from them—
Paul Holmes
It is not the same thing. I asked him, in his role as a UK Government Minister, to seek an assurance from Scottish Government Ministers that the retrospective collection of funds under the new power would be used to increase capacity and improve the processing of this proposal. He was not rude to me, but he said, “That’s not my job as a UK Government Minister. It’s up to them as Scottish Government Ministers.” His own explanatory notes say:
“The objective of this change is to better resource the processing of necessary wayleaves applications by the Scottish government.”
When I asked the Minister whether he had sought an assurance from Scottish Government Ministers, I was not asking him to instruct them. I asked him whether he had any information on the total amount of money that would be brought in, which I accept could vary. I perfectly understood and respected that answer, but in his second answer he said that he could not seek such an assurance because he does not want to direct Scottish Government Ministers or take power away from them. Given the objective set out in the explanatory notes, how can we have confidence—
Michael Shanks
There is no contradiction here at all. We are confusing two different things. My ability to say that the Scottish Government could raise x amount of money and must spend it on y is different from what we have clearly outlined—the hon. Gentleman has just repeated it—which is that at the moment Scottish Government Ministers do not have the power to raise fees for wayleaves, as is the case in England and Wales. Those are two very different things.
I have said clearly, I think six or seven times now, that at the moment Scottish Government Ministers have no power to charge for the processing of wayleave applications. The clause will give them the power to do so. Of course, I would hope that those funds will be spent on the planning system, or whatever it might be, but I am not going to bind their hands and evaluate the success or otherwise of that in this Committee. The two issues are quite separate.
Paul Holmes
We are dancing on the head of a pin here. I know that the Minister has no power to do that and does not want to have such a power, but how can he, as a UK Government Minister, commend a clause whose objective the explanatory notes explicitly say
“is to better resource the processing of necessary wayleaves applications by the Scottish government”
while claiming that he does not have the power to ensure that it happens?
I am not trying to be difficult. The Minister is doing a very good job of outlining the clauses, but he has said several times in response to my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne—not just in relation to amendment 81, which was not accepted, but in relation to the clause—that he does not have the power to direct Scottish Government Ministers. All I am asking is why he set out the objective of the change in his approved explanatory notes if he cannot make it happen.
I am not asking the Minister to strengthen the legislation; I asked whether he has sought reassurances from Scottish Government Ministers that that is what they will do with the extra income from the measures. He answered that he did not want to force them. That was not the question. All I am asking—he is welcome to intervene on me—is whether he has had a conversation with Scottish Government Ministers about whether they will use this income for the purposes that his legislation has set out.
Michael Shanks
I have not had the conversation. I am happy to have it, but the tone will not be, “Here are my expectations of you as a democratically elected Member of the Scottish Parliament accountable to a Parliament I do not sit in.”
I do not know how familiar the shadow Minister is with the devolution legislation in the United Kingdom, but I gently say that this Parliament gives the devolved Administrations power to raise a whole series of taxes, charges, levies, fines and various other things. We give that power to those devolved assemblies; we do not then tell them exactly how to spend every single penny of that money. This is another example of that. It is a perfectly common thing in the devolution settlement.
Paul Holmes
I am not trying to be difficult with the Minister at all—I know it seems that I am, but I am not. He said that he has not had those conversations but he now will, and that is welcome. This clause is procedural and process-driven, but within the grand scheme of the Bill it is stated clearly in black and white that the UK Government have an objective for the extra income to be generated, yet the Minister has not had that conversation with Scottish Ministers. I do not blame him for that, but he will now have those conversations going forward.
I hope that when it comes to other clauses, UK Government documents will be very clear about the aims, ambitions and outcomes of what they will do because what we have seen this afternoon has been questionable. The UK Government are setting an objective, with no way to actually achieve it.
David Simmonds
This is a small “p” political point rather than a party political point, but it undermines confidence in devolution when we hear that a devolved body—a local authority, regional government or whatever it may be—has been given a power and has not used it, or central Government have said, “We have allocated additional funds for potholes,” but the council has spent it on social care, as we have seen recently. It undermines the confidence in those central messages that what is promised will be delivered.
I urge the Minister, on behalf of my hon. Friend, to please come back to the Committee with that assurance. For those listening to this debate who expect that the funds raised will be spent on the purpose that the Minister has told the Committee they are intended for, that assurance needs to be there.
Paul Holmes
I appreciate my hon. Friend’s intervention. I understand that I may not be the Minister’s favourite person, but I am trying to help him—I actually think what he is proposing is very good. We support any measure that allows an income stream to be spent on local people and within devolved Administrations to make processes quicker and more efficient. The other Minister on the Committee, the hon. Member for Greenwich and Woolwich, knows that that is my stance historically. I support the Government reforming planning fees, for example, and ringfencing them to enable processes to be delivered more quickly, but I say again to the Minister that I hope he does what he has committed to in his interventions during the debate on this clause.
We will not push this to a vote because, as I have outlined in a very long-winded and convoluted way, we support the clause, but I hope the Minister will take a firmer line in speaking to Scottish Ministers. Before he says this again, I am not asking him to direct those Ministers; he seems to have a preoccupation with me claiming that I want him to instruct Scottish Ministers to do certain things. I am asking him, within his role and remit as a UK Government Minister legislating to give those Ministers extra powers, to use the art of politics and diplomacy to make sure that the outcomes he wants, as per the explanatory notes of his Bill, are delivered for the people affected by his changes.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 17 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 18
Regulations
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause 19 stand part.
Schedule 1.
Michael Shanks
Clause 18 is technical, amending section 106 of the Electricity Act 1989 to make provision for procedural requirements that apply to the new powers conferred by the provision in clauses 14, 15 and 17. All new regulation-making powers, except for the power to amend primary legislation in clause 14(4), are subject to the negative procedure. Scottish Ministers or the Secretary of State must consult each other before making regulations relating to clauses 14 and 15. The power in clause 17 is to be exercised by Scottish Ministers, and it does not require the Secretary of State to be consulted.
Clause 19 introduces schedule 1, which makes amendments to the Electricity Act 1989 consequential to the amendments made by clauses 14 to 18. It also makes some minor amendments relating to consents for electricity infrastructure in Scotland. These amendments are made to sections 36, 36B, 36C and 37 of and schedule 8 to the 1989 Act. Schedule 1 is needed to ensure the Bill’s consistency and clarity in relation to the 1989 Act. Some changes are needed to ensure that the new Scottish consenting reforms can function as intended. Some of the clarifications are needed because the 1989 Act was originally drafted prior to the Scotland Act 1998, which created the Scottish Parliament. Given the number of changes made to the 1989 Act in relation to Scotland, it is necessary to update outdated references in legislation to ensure that such references are clear and consistent.
The consequential amendments cover three main aspects. First, as clause 14 amends schedule 8 to the 1989 Act to allow the Secretary of State or Scottish Ministers to make regulations about time limits for various parts of the consenting process, the amendments clarify how this relates to Scottish Ministers obtaining advice from the Scottish Environment Protection Agency. Secondly, as clause 14 amends schedule 8 to 1989 Act to allow the Secretary of State or Scottish Ministers to make regulations about applications made to Scottish Ministers, amendments have been made so that proposed new section 1A will apply only to applications made to the Secretary of State, not to those made to Scottish Ministers.
Thirdly, there are clarifications to reflect the new processes for variations of consents and the new procedure following objection by the relevant planning authorities for consents under sections 36 and 37 of the 1989 Act. In addition, the minor amendments include those to reflect previous transfers of functions to Scottish Ministers, and some references to the water environment regulations are updated to refer to the most recent version.
As I have said, this is a very technical clause. I look forward to having slightly less debate on it, unless there are any questions.
Paul Holmes
Clauses 18 and 19 are consequential to the previous clauses, and consist of simple process amendments. The Minister will be delighted that we welcome the fact that clause 19 amends the Electricity Act 1989 to reflect earlier transfers of functions to Scottish Ministers. That is exactly as it should be, and we will not be scrutinising the various words. These amendments should go ahead, and I have no further comments.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 18 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 19 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 1 agreed to.
Clause 20
Environmental impact assessments for electricity works
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Michael Shanks
Clause 20 creates a power for the Secretary of State or Scottish Ministers to make limited procedural amendments to the Electricity Works (Environmental Impact Assessment) (Scotland) Regulations 2017, which for ease of reference I will refer to as the EIA regulations.
As part of the consenting process for electricity infrastructure in Scotland, Scottish Ministers are required to assess the likely significant environmental effects arising from a proposed EIA development. Before the UK left the European Union, Scottish Ministers and UK Government Ministers had concurrent powers, under the European Communities Act 1972, to make regulations for electricity works EIAs. However, although the EIA regulations remained in force as assimilated law after the European Communities Act was repealed, the result is that neither Government have the power to amend them.
David Simmonds
We broadly support the content of clause 20, but I have one question for the Minister. I am mindful of his comments about the process of EU retained law, and it is absolutely right that we are looking to update that. However, a lot of the new powers set out for Scottish Ministers are the kind of thing that, in England, we would expect to be the subject of a pre-application consultation. One might ask the promoter of a project to come in and discuss those exact things with the local authority, the strategic planning authority if there is one, or the mayoral authority or the combined authority, so that the application process can be streamlined as much as possible.
Earlier on, we said that we would amend legislation through the Bill to remove that process in England. Given the intention to effectively introduce a top-quality process for applications to be considered in Scotland, does the Minister agree that there is an element of contradiction in that, in the same piece of legislation, we are seeking to remove many of the equivalent processes in England?
Michael Shanks
I understand the argument, but it appears as a contradiction only if we assume that both planning systems are the same, which they are not. And they are not slightly different—they are fundamentally different. The processes are different. The timescales are different. The opportunities for public consultation are different throughout, so we are starting from a different starting point. Although I understand the hon. Member’s point, I do not think that the two are comparable.
This particular clause is even more narrow than the hon. Member recognised. It is simply about the assimilated regulations. I have been in a number of Delegated Legislation Committees where we have discussed some of the unintended consequences, as we obviously assimilated thousands of different pieces of legislation into UK law. As I say, the result was that neither the UK nor the Scottish Government currently have the power to amend these regulations, which is a ludicrous position for us to be in. This clause is narrow in scope, and I do not think it has quite the reach that the hon. Member is suggesting.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 20 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Gen Kitchen.)
Crime and Policing Bill (Twelfth sitting)
Tuesday 29th April 2025
(1 day, 21 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesCrime and Policing Bill 2024-26 View all Crime and Policing Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 29 April 2025 - (29 Apr 2025)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 3 / Noes: 7 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
Schedules 14 and 15.
Clause 103 stand part.
The Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)
When the Committee adjourned this morning, I had just started to set out that the Home Office had consulted extensively on the reform of confiscation orders in clause 102. Not only did we consult extensively on those new measures, which were recommended by the Law Commission, but we had the benefit of over 20 years of operational insight. The reforms will support the delivery of key objectives endorsed by the Government in the economic crime plan 2 to reduce money laundering and increase asset recovery returns, to ensure that criminals are deprived of their benefits from crime.
The wide-ranging reforms are introduced across 12 parts in schedule 14 in relation to England and Wales. The provisions in schedule 15 largely replicate the reforms for Northern Ireland, with appropriate modifications. I do not propose to go through the whole of schedule 14 part by part because much of it contains necessarily very technical provisions, but I am happy to explain particular provisions if any hon. Member would find that helpful.
Clause 103 introduces cost protections for enforcement authorities in the High Court, and the Court of Session in Scotland, in civil recovery proceedings under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. The Government are concerned that the current rules that govern how costs are awarded in civil recovery cases expose enforcement authorities to the risk of excessive strains on their budgets, particularly in cases against wealthy individuals who use very expensive legal teams. Even if a law enforcement agency applies for a civil recovery order in good faith and in the public interest, losing a case exposes enforcement agencies to paying substantial legal and court fees. Enforcement authorities work to make decisions in the public interest, and it is detrimental to the protection of the public if authorities are deterred from pursuing an investigation for fear that, if any resulting legal action is unsuccessful, they would face adverse costs and expensive litigation.
Clause 103 therefore amends the so-called “loser pays” principle to ensure that the court does not make an order for costs against an enforcement authority unless the authority has acted “unreasonably”, “dishonestly” or “improperly” during the course of proceedings or it would be
“just and reasonable to make such an order”
against them considering all the facts of the case. Cost protections will provide a positive step forward for the UK’s broader goal of recovering criminal assets and disrupting criminal activity, and I commend the clauses to the Committee.
Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)
Clause 102 reforms the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, aiming to clarify and strengthen the confiscation regime for proceeds of crime in England and Wales. Schedule 14 outlines several significant amendments with the primary goal of improving the effectiveness and fairness of confiscation proceedings.
One key change introduced by schedule 14 is the insertion of section 5A into the 2002 Act. The new section provides an overarching principal objective, which has been lacking, for the confiscation powers under part 2. The principal aim as defined in section 5A(2) is
“to deprive the defendant of the defendant’s benefit from criminal conduct, so far as within the defendant’s means.”
That will help to ensure that confiscation powers are used proportionately and in line with the objectives of the law, addressing gaps in case law and providing a clear framework for the court.
Paragraph 2 of schedule 14 now allows the prosecutor to decide whether to pursue a criminal lifestyle assessment rather than automatically applying it. That change allows for more flexibility in the application of these provisions, enabling prosecutors to allocate resources more efficiently and only pursue the criminal lifestyle route where appropriate.
Paragraph 4 introduces a change to the test for determining whether an offence constitutes part of a defendant’s criminal lifestyle. Previously, the law required at least three offences to qualify, but this change reduces that threshold to two offences. That will also apply if the defendant has benefited or intended to benefit from the criminal conduct involved in the offence, making the test easier to meet and broadening the scope of the confiscation regime.
A significant reform is found in paragraph 6, which amends section 7 of POCA to clarify how the value of the recoverable amount should be calculated. Currently, certain categories of property are ignored when calculating the value of a defendant’s benefit from crime, including property that has been forfeited or is subject to a recovery order. The proposed amendment extends that to further categories of property, such as property seized under any rule of law and property returned to victims. That ensures that the confiscation amount reflects only the actual benefit derived from crime and prevents double counting of assets that have already been returned or forfeited.
In the light of the changes introduced in clause 102 and schedule 14 on criminal lifestyle provisions, can the Minister clarify how the new flexibility in prosecutorial discretion will ensure that limited resources are effectively allocated, while safeguarding the fairness of confiscation proceedings for defendants who may not meet the criteria for a criminal lifestyle?
Clause 103(1) inserts new section 288A into part 5 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. This provision aims to protect the enforcement authorities from being ordered to pay costs in civil recovery proceedings conducted in the High Court. The court is prohibited from making such orders unless the enforcement authority acted unreasonably, dishonestly or improperly during the proceedings.
Proposed new section 288A(1)(c) of the 2002 Act introduces a discretionary power for the court to determine if, in unforeseen circumstances, it would be just and reasonable for an enforcement authority to pay costs. This provision acknowledges that civil recovery orders, which result in the permanent deprivation of a person’s property, engage the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions. It ensures that the enforcement process complies with the right to access to a court, as guaranteed by article 6 of the European convention on human rights. I would be grateful if the Minister would tell us what mechanisms would ensure that enforcement authorities could be held accountable if acting unreasonably, dishonestly or improperly during civil recovery proceedings.
Dame Diana Johnson
I thank the shadow Minister; he went into some detail about how schedule 14 operates. I want to refer to the issue of criminal lifestyle offences in schedule 2 to POCA, which is about what the court utilises to determine whether a defendant has a criminal lifestyle. This is about the changes that we are adding. I refer in particular to the two environmental offences:
“depositing…certain waste, otherwise than in accordance with an environmental permit”
and
“operating a regulated facility, or causing or knowingly permitting a water discharge activity or groundwater activity, otherwise than in accordance with an environmental permit.”
The third offence that we are adding is the keeping of a brothel for prostitution. I want to make clear that those offences are being added.
The shadow Minister asked how this would be kept under review and whether unreasonable measures will be introduced. The legislation will set that out, but it is my understanding that the court will still have a role to play in any measures that are deemed to be unreasonable and forming a view about that. This part of the schedule is very technical, so I am happy to put in writing to the shadow Minister any further information that I have not been able to provide, but I think the general view is that it is implementing the recommendations from the Law Commission. As I understand it, it is very similar to what the previous Government were going to support. On that basis, I commend the provisions to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 102 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedules 14 and 15 agreed to.
Clause 103 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 104
Extension of polygraph condition to certain offenders
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Davies-Jones)
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair this afternoon, Ms Lewell. Clause 104 seeks to build on existing polygraph testing powers by making an express provision to enable the Secretary of State to impose mandatory polygraph testing as a licence condition for the most serious offenders who commit historic offences connected to terrorism, or who pose a risk of sexual offending.
Polygraph tests are used to monitor compliance with licence conditions. The information obtained from a test is used by probation practitioners to refine and strengthen risk management plans, thereby providing probation practitioners with additional risk-related information that they otherwise would not have known. Without this clause, these serious offenders would remain excluded from polygraph testing while on licence. Polygraph tests have been successfully used by the Probation Service in the management of sexual offenders since January 2014. Initially, it was as a successful pilot and later, a national programme. More recently, it was extended to terrorist offenders by the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021.
Subsection (3) of the clause extends eligibility for polygraph testing to offenders who have been convicted of murder and are assessed as posing a risk of sexual offending on release. It also extends to those who are serving multiple sentences alongside a sentence for a sex offence, to make sure that they can be polygraph tested for the duration of their licence.A gap in existing powers means that currently, for example, someone can be polygraph tested on licence when they have been convicted of rape, but if they have raped and murdered the victim, they are unlikely to be able to be polygraph tested because the sentence for rape is likely to have ended prior to their release on licence.
Subsections (4) to (8) of the clause extend polygraph testing to a cohort of individuals who committed a non-terrorism offence, such as conspiracy to murder, that would have been considered terrorist connected, but their offence was committed before the relevant legislation came into force enabling the court to make a formal determination of a terrorist connection.We refer to this cohort as historic terrorism-connected offenders. Following the changes introduced, where it is determined by the Secretary of State that an offence was an act of terrorism, took place in the course of an act of terrorism or was committed for the purposes of terrorism, individuals will become eligible to have the polygraph condition applied to their licence, subject to meeting the relevant policy criteria.
The polygraph testing licence condition is a vital tool for probation practitioners who are managing individuals who have been convicted of terrorism offences, yet it cannot currently be applied to historic terrorism-connected offenders. That means that polygraph is not available as a tool to manage the risk posed by this cohort, whereas it is available for an individual who commits the same offence today. The clause will therefore fill the gap in legislation and contribute to the consistent and effective risk management of historic terrorism-connected offenders in the community, seeking to close those small but significant operational gaps. Taken as a whole, clause 104 will ensure that polygraph testing can be used to strengthen the management of those who committed historic terrorism-related offences, and those who pose a risk of sexual offending.
Matt Vickers
Clause 104 broadens the use of polygraph testing for offenders by amending the Offender Management Act 2007. It allows polygraph testing for individuals convicted of murder upon release if they pose a risk of committing a sexual offence, and are 18 or over. It also applies to offenders who have served time for a relevant sexual offence, provided they are 18 or older at release. Additionally, the definition of “relevant offence” is expanded to include terrorism-related offences, including those committed for terrorist purposes. The provision functions as a preventive safeguard.
Polygraph testing can act as a deterrent, encouraging compliance with licence conditions or reminding offenders that their conduct and disclosures will be monitored. That is especially significant where there are concerns about future harmful behaviour, even if the original offence did not relate to sexual offending. The clause provides tools to manage individuals involved in terrorism-related offences, helping authorities gather intelligence and make informed decisions on their supervision. It also promotes consistency and supervision, as polygraph conditions are already used for sexual and terrorist offenders, ensuring a balanced approach to risk management across high-risk groups.
What safeguards ensure that the Secretary of State’s discretion in determining risk is transparent and fair? Given that polygraph evidence is not admissible in trials, why is it being increasingly used as a post-sentence supervision condition? Will there be an independent review of its effectiveness in reducing reoffending among the newly included categories?
Alex Davies-Jones
I thank the shadow Minister for his questions. He asked me about the basis of the Secretary of State’s decision; if a Secretary of State decides that, for the purpose of extending polygraph testing, an offence was an act of terrorism or was committed for the purpose of terrorism, but a court does not reach the same decision, the Secretary of State will review their decision in the light of the court’s findings. That is an important backstop. Guidance will be produced on the process of the Secretary of State designating terrorist connections and for the court for the different management changes in the Bill.
Polygraph testing is one of many tools available to the Probation Service when managing offenders in the community and when they are out on licence. It is not the only tool available in its arsenal to ensure the public are kept safe.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 104 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 105
Duty of offender to notify details
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Alex Davies-Jones
This clause will create a new duty on offenders serving a sentence in the community and supervised by probation or a youth offending team, requiring them to inform the responsible officer if they change their name, use a different name or change their contact information. I thank my very good friend, my hon. Friend the Member for Newport West and Islwyn (Ruth Jones), for her work in the previous Parliament on this issue, and I am delighted to be bringing forward this proposal.
The clause will improve the ability of probation and youth offending teams to monitor offenders in the community and will ensure that the public are protected. A significant number of offenders serve sentences in the community, and responsible officers must have the information that they need to keep tabs on those individuals, including if they change their name and contact information. The provisions in this clause are robust. Contact details can change for any reason, but the offender must report any difference from what is kept on file. The clause captures not just formal legal changes of name by deed poll but, for example, the use of an online alias.
We have a separate youth justice system, but it is equally important that services are able to maintain contact with children and have the right information about them to do their jobs. This policy therefore applies equally to offenders of all ages and will create consistency across offenders on licence and those serving sentences in the community, overseen by probation services or youth offending teams.
Probation and youth offending teams will have discretion about whether an offender is returned to court if they fail to comply with this requirement. It is right that the enforcement provisions for this clause are robust and reflect the seriousness of non-compliance. It is right that probation officers and youth offending teams have the same powers to deal with non-compliance with this duty as they have for any other case of non-compliance with a sentence requirement. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
Clause 105 requires certain offenders, including those under referral orders, youth rehabilitation orders, community orders and suspended sentence orders, to provide up-to-date contact information to relevant authorities. Offenders must notify their responsible officer or panel member of any changes in names, phone numbers or email addresses as soon as reasonably practicable after the relevant order is made or after they begin using new contact details. For youth offenders under referral orders, the clause adds a new section to the sentencing code, mandating them to inform a youth offending team member of any aliases and their current contact details as soon as reasonably practicable.
Similar requirements apply to offenders under future and existing orders. The overarching aim of the clause is to close a monitoring gap by ensuring that responsible authorities are kept fully informed of how to reach the offender. That is particularly important for managing compliance with rehabilitative requirements and preventing individuals from circumventing supervision through undisclosed identities or means of communication. Will the Minister clarify what threshold is intended by the term “reasonably practicable” in this context? Given that it is open to interpretation, will statutory guidance be issued to ensure consistent application by youth offender panels and responsible officers?
Alex Davies-Jones
I thank the shadow Minister for his questions. We will of course ensure that guidance is available for this new measure. We will provide the responsible officers with all the tools they need to protect public safety, and ensure that they have all the relevant information available to manage offenders on licence in the community.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 105 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 106
Accelerated investigation procedure in respect of criminal conduct
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clauses 107 to 109 stand part.
New clause 23—Previous conduct as factor in deciding whether to investigate a complaint—
“(1) The Police Reform Act 2002 is amended as follows.
(2) In Schedule 3, paragraph 1(6B)(d), at end insert ‘or
(e) the complaint is made about a person serving with the police who has previous convictions or has had previous complaints made against them.’”
This new clause would make previous complaints or convictions a factor in determining how to handle a new complaint against a police officer.
New clause 31—Automatic dismissal of officers who fail vetting—
“(1) The Police Act 1996 is amended in accordance with subsection (2).
(2) In section 39A (Codes of practice for chief officers), after subsection (1) insert—
‘(1A) Without prejudice to subsection (1) and subject to subsection (1B), a code of practice may provide for an officer to be dismissed without notice where—
(a) the officer fails vetting, and
(b) it is not reasonable to expect that the officer will be capable of being deployed to full duties within a reasonable timeframe.
(1B) Subsection (1A) does not apply where a chief officer concludes that—
(a) the officer, notwithstanding his vetting failure, is capable of being deployed to a substantial majority of duties appropriate for an officer of his rank; and
(b) it would be disproportionate to the operational effectiveness of the force for the officer to be dismissed without notice.’”
This new clause would ensure police officers who failed their vetting can be dismissed.
Dame Diana Johnson
Part 13 of the Bill pertains to matters relating to the police. Before I talk in detail about clauses 106 to 108, it may assist the Committee if I first provide some context for these provisions. Following the shooting of Chris Kaba, and the subsequent trial and acquittal of Sergeant Martyn Blake in October 2024, the Home Secretary made a series of commitments in response to the issues raised under the previous Government’s accountability review. The measures announced by the Home Secretary will rebuild confidence in police accountability systems for both the public and the police.
As the Home Secretary said when making her announcement, the case happened against a backdrop of wider and long-standing concerns about accountability, standards and confidence in policing. The British model of policing relies on mutual bonds of trust between the public and the police. For our model of policing to work, it is essential that the police have the confidence of the communities they serve, and that officers have the confidence they need to do the vital and often extremely difficult job of keeping us all safe. Too often in recent times, both elements of that confidence have become frayed.
Clauses 106 to 108 give effect to certain findings of the accountability review. Clause 106 will improve timeliness in the system by allowing the Independent Office for Police Conduct to make referrals to the Crown Prosecution Service prior to completing its final report. Clause 107 will amend the threshold for the IOPC to make referrals to the CPS, and clause 108 places the IOPC’s victims’ right to review scheme on a statutory footing, further improving the robustness of the IOPC’s investigative process.
Clause 106 will improve timeliness in the misconduct system. At present, a number of factors cause delay in the misconduct system, one of which relates to the fact that in order for the IOPC to make a referral to the CPS, it is legally required to complete its final report, concluding its investigation, which causes delays in making referrals. The final report has to include misconduct findings and lessons learned for the IOPC. Such elements are not required for referrals to be made to the CPS, so the change that we are making will enable the IOPC to make a referral prior to completing its final report, allowing for an improvement in pace in the accountability system.
Currently, the law states that the IOPC may refer a police officer to the CPS where there is an indication that a criminal offence may have been committed. This is a relatively low bar for making referrals to the CPS. Clause 107 changes this to bring the system in line with the threshold that the police apply when making referrals of members of the public to the CPS, which requires there to be a realistic prospect of conviction. It is right and fair that, as a result of this change, officers and members of the public will be referred to the CPS at the same threshold. The CPS will continue to make charging decisions at the same threshold, which is the full code test. This change will improve overall fairness in the system.
Finally, the IOPC’s victims’ right to review currently allows for victims and their families to challenge the IOPC when it decides not to refer matters to the CPS. This right is currently available to victims and their families through guidance. Clause 108 places this right on the statute book to protect victims and demonstrate our clear commitment to victims’ rights. Taken together, these clauses are a balanced package of measures that will help to speed up IOPC investigations while strengthening the rights of those who may be aggrieved by the outcome of an investigation.
Clause 109 amends the powers of the Secretary of State to make provisions on appeals to the police appeals tribunals. It will enable chief constables to appeal the findings or outcome of police misconduct proceedings, with a similar right for police and crime commissioners to appeal where the officer subject to proceedings is a chief constable. It will also enable a right of appeal to be conferred on the director general of the IOPC where the IOPC has presented the case at the misconduct proceedings.
This Government are committed to restoring public trust and confidence in policing, which is something fundamental to our model of policing by consent. While the majority of our police officers act with bravery and integrity, where things go wrong the public rightly expect that there is a system to robustly hold the police to account.
In the context of recent high-profile cases that have damaged that vital trust and confidence, chief constables must be empowered to drive up standards. While chief constables are themselves rightly held to account for standards in their forces, they are not afforded the same ability to challenge disciplinary decisions as the officers in their force. The only route for chief constables to challenge decisions that they consider to be unreasonable is through judicial review. That is a lengthier and more complex process than the existing specialist police appeals tribunals.
Clause 109 will allow the Secretary of State to make amendments to existing rules. First, it will provide for a right of appeal for chief constables to challenge the findings or outcomes of misconduct proceedings in relation to officers within their force, and an equivalent right of appeal for police and crime commissioners where the officer concerned is a chief constable. This is designed to ensure parity within the system, supporting the wider responsibilities of police and crime commissioners in respect of chief constables.
Furthermore, the clause will provide an equivalent right of appeal for the director general of the IOPC, limited to circumstances in which the IOPC has presented at the misconduct proceedings. This again supports public trust and confidence by ensuring vital independence in the system in the most serious and sensitive cases. Amendments to secondary legislation will be developed in consultation with the sector, including the Police Advisory Board for England and Wales.
I will speak to new clauses 23 and 31, which are also in this group, once we have heard from the shadow Minister.
Matt Vickers
On 5 September 2022, an armed police officer shot and killed Chris Kaba during a vehicle stop in south London. The police referred the case to the IOPC, as required when someone dies or is seriously injured in police custody or contact. The IOPC investigated and referred the case to the Crown Prosecution Service, which authorised a murder charge in September 2023. Concerns over accountability systems led the Home Office to launch a review in September 2023. In March 2024, the officer was identified and the Home Secretary announced three immediate changes to improve accountability: raising the threshold for CPS referrals; relaxing restrictions on criminal proceedings; and formalising victims’ rights under the IOPC’s victims’ right to review policy.
Clauses 106 to 108 implement these proposals, which had previously been tabled as amendments to the Criminal Justice Bill. Clause 106 introduces significant procedural reform to allow certain criminal investigations into police misconduct to be expedited. It is clear that the clause will help to significantly speed up accountability, especially in cases involving clear and serious misconduct by police officers. By allowing criminal proceedings to be brought sooner, it reduces the delay in holding individuals accountable for their actions, ensuring that justice is not unduly postponed.
In situations where there is clear evidence of misconduct, that allows for quicker action. A quicker response can help to reassure the public that, where there are serious allegations, the authority is acting swiftly and decisively. It demonstrates that law enforcement and oversight bodies are committed to transparency and integrity. What safeguards are in place to prevent inappropriate or premature referrals to the Director of Public Prosecutions under this accelerated procedure? How will the IOPC or other appropriate authority be held accountable for determinations made?
Currently, chief officers have no right of appeal against panel decisions and may only challenge outcomes via judicial review. In October 2022, the Government launched a review of the dismissal process, with findings published in September 2023. Recommendations included a presumption of dismissal for gross misconduct; automatic gross misconduct designation for certain convictions; streamlined performance and vetting-based dismissal processes; and a new appeal right for chief officers. Met commissioner Sir Mark Rowley welcomed the reforms, citing the need for greater control to uphold standards. However, the Police Federation criticised the changes, warning they could undermine fair hearings and lead to excessive influence by chief officers, risking biased outcomes.
Dame Diana Johnson
I welcome what the shadow Minister has said. There have been no changes to the clauses that were introduced in the Criminal Justice Bill and that are now in the Crime and Policing Bill, so I think we are on the same page in terms of these being the appropriate measures to take forward. I am grateful that he set out in detail the case for introducing the new clauses, which seek to ensure that the provisions work in policing and are fit for purpose, and that everyone who is in policing is fit to be a police officer. I reassure the Committee that the Government take police integrity very seriously. It is essential, as I said in my earlier remarks, that we have public confidence in policing and that the highest standards are upheld and maintained. I think we all agree that individuals who fall below the standards the public expect should not be police officers.
New clause 23 seeks to ensure that previous complaints or convictions are considered a factor in determining when a complaint against an officer should be handled formally under schedule 3 to the Police Reform Act 2002. I recognise the shadow Minister’s desire to strengthen the legislation to that effect but, in reality, these elements are already established practice. Under existing statutory guidance issued by the IOPC, previous complaints against an officer should be taken into account when considering whether to handle a complaint under schedule 3. All those working in policing must have regard to that statutory guidance. Compelling forces to record complaints under schedule 3, where a historical complaint exists on an officer’s record, would limit their ability to handle those complaints in the most proportionate manner and in the interests of the complainant.
Similarly, information on historical convictions is available to forces on the police national computer and is relevant in determining the most appropriate way to handle a complaint. The Government have committed to ensuring that vetting rules are strengthened with regard to historical convictions. We intend to put mandatory vetting standards into law this year, so that those who have committed certain offences cannot hold vetting clearance and serve as police officers.
New clause 31 would amend the Police Act 1996 to ensure that a code of practice may provide that a police officer who fails their vetting will be dismissed without notice. It may help the Committee to understand that the Government have acted rapidly to develop new regulations in this area, which will enable forces to dismiss officers who cannot maintain vetting clearance. The regulations have taken into account the relevant legal proceedings, such as the Di Maria judicial review, which considered the adequacy of the Metropolitan Police Service’s processes to remove those officers without vetting clearance. The Police (Vetting) Regulations 2025, which were laid just last week on 23 April, introduced a duty on police officers to hold and maintain vetting clearance, and provide a bespoke regulatory mechanism by which they can be dismissed should they fail to do so.
The Government also strongly believe that there should be no circumstances in which an officer who is unable to hold vetting clearance should remain in policing, so I cannot support the qualification in new clause 31, which suggests that an officer may be capable of deployment to other duties despite failing to maintain their vetting clearance. I hope that, having had the opportunity to consider the existing framework for complaints, the new regulations that I just referred to and the ongoing work to strengthen the vetting rules, the shadow Minister will be content not to move his new clauses later in our proceedings.
I want to mention how the IOPC will keep an eye on the changes that are being introduced. It is clear that there will be scrutiny of what happens following the changes. If there are emerging patterns of cases where, for instance, the CPS declines to charge an officer, despite the IOPC referral, I would expect the IOPC to consider whether there are lessons to be learned and a further review to be undertaken.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 106 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 107 to 109 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 110
Power to make youth diversion orders
Dame Diana Johnson
I beg to move amendment 53, in clause 110, page 128, line 31, leave out “an” and insert “a relevant”.
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 54.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 54 and 55.
Clause stand part.
Clause 111 stand part.
Government new clause 61—Notification requirements.
Dame Diana Johnson
Part 14 of the Bill is about counter-terrorism and national security. Protecting the public is the first duty of any Government, which is why national security is a key pillar of the Government’s plan for change. The UK has one of the strongest counter-terrorism frameworks in the world, but we cannot stand by while threats evolve.
As the Home Secretary has set out in her statements to the House, the Security Service, Counter Terrorism Policing and the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation have all consistently raised concerns related to the increasing number of young people being investigated for terrorism offences. While there must always be the potential to pursue prosecutions in the most serious cases, it is important to ensure that there are alternative risk management measures that do not automatically result in a young person receiving a terrorism conviction, which can have a hugely destructive impact on their life prospects. We have listened to operational partners about the need for alternative and earlier interventions, and we are taking the opportunity to build on a recommendation made by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Jonathan Hall KC. Chapter 1 of part 14 therefore introduces new youth diversion orders or YDOs.
YDOs will be a new civil order designed to better manage terrorist risk from young people, while reducing the need for their further involvement in the criminal justice system. They demonstrate this Government’s commitment to ensuring that operational partners have the tools they need to reduce terrorism risk and support rehabilitation.
Clause 110 introduces a new power for the police to apply to a youth or magistrates court for a YDO. To impose a YDO, the court will need to be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the respondent has either committed a terrorism offence, committed a non-terrorism offence with a terrorism connection, or engaged in conduct likely to facilitate the commission of a terrorism offence. The court will also need to consider that it is necessary and proportionate to make the order to protect the public from a risk of terrorism or serious harm, as defined in clause 111. This ensures that the new orders will be imposed only where there is a serious risk to the public.
The technical Government amendments 53 to 55 adjust the definition of “offence with a terrorist connection” to avoid the need to refer to legislation relating to sentencing. Sentencing will not take place in YDO applications, but the judge considering a YDO application will be able to consider whether the individual has committed an offence with a terrorist connection, in the same way as a judge would consider this on sentencing.
Finally, new clause 61 requires individuals to provide their personal details to the police where a YDO includes notification requirements. The relevant details are the respondent’s name, including any aliases, and their home address. This requirement will not be automatic or mandatory for every YDO, but will need to be agreed by the court on a case-by-case basis.
The notification requirement will also include a requirement to provide information about the individual’s school or other educational establishment if relevant. This information would be helpful, for example, in a scenario where someone moved school and there was no other trigger for the local authority to inform the police of the move.
The new clause is supported by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, and operational partners have confirmed that it is necessary to support the effective day-to-day management of YDOs. I commend the Government’s amendments to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
The new youth diversion orders are designed as a counterterrorism risk management tool for individuals under the age of 21. The purpose of the YDOs is to divert young people from engaging in terrorist activities, and to allow police to intervene at an earlier stage.
Clause 110 grants the police the authority to apply to the courts for a YDO. Clause 110 clarifies that a YDO can be applied for by a chief officer of police when the respondent meets certain criteria based on their age and involvement in terrorist-related offences. In England, Wales and Northern Ireland, the respondent must be between the ages of 10 and 21, and in Scotland, between 12 and 21.
The aim of the order is diversion, rather than punishment. The YDO is intended to help prevent further involvement in terrorism or related activities. The order may give rehabilitation, counselling or other interventions designed to steer the individual away from terrorism-related conduct. Clause 111 defines serious harm in the context of YDOs.
New clause 61 introduces notification requirements for a youth diversion order, where the respondent must notify the police within three days of being served with the order. The notification includes personal details such as the respondent’s name, any additional names, home address, and the name and address of any educational establishment the respondent normally attends. It is intended to help ensure the youth’s compliance with the order, as well as assist in tracking their progress or risk of non-compliance.
This approach strengthens the monitoring aspect of YDOs by tying in an educational component. It ensures that authorities have up-to-date information regarding the young person’s school involvement, which can be a crucial element in their rehabilitation. How will the Government ensure that the notification requirements, particularly educational details, do not inadvertently stigmatise the young person, or disrupt their education experience, especially in cases where the individual might already be vulnerable or at risk of exclusion from school?
Dame Diana Johnson
I am grateful for the shadow Minister’s comments. On his point about information on schools and stigmatising children, am I right in thinking he believes that information will be made available to the public? I was not clear.
Matt Vickers
In educational settings, if people are given the details and the contact, might that be reflected?
Dame Diana Johnson
I do not wish to try your patience, Mrs Lewell, but my understanding is that this would not be public information that was shared. It would remain within the youth court or the magistrates court. I am looking to my officials, and they are nodding at me, so this is not information that would be in the public domain. I hope that that deals with the point around any stigmatisation of a young person who was subject to a YDO.
Amendment 53 agreed to.
Amendments made: 54, in clause 110, page 129, leave out lines 8 and 9 and insert—
“‘relevant offence’ means an offence which—
(a) was committed on or after 29 June 2021,
(b) is punishable on indictment with imprisonment for more than 2 years, and
(c) is not specified in—
(i) Schedule 1A to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, or
(ii) Schedule A1 to the Sentencing Code;”.
This amendment, Amendment 53 and Amendment 55 replace the concept of an “offence with a terrorist connection” with the concept of a “relevant offence with a terrorist connection” so as to enable the court dealing with an application for a youth diversion order to makes its own determination as to whether an offence has a terrorist connection.
Amendment 55, in clause 110, page 129, line 14, at end insert—
“(3A) For the purposes of subsection (2)(a)(ii), a relevant offence has a terrorist connection if the offence—
(a) is, or takes place in the course of, an act of terrorism, or
(b) is committed for the purposes of terrorism.” —(Dame Diana Johnson.)
See the explanatory statement for Amendment 54.
Clause 110, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 111 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 112
Content of youth diversion orders
Dame Diana Johnson
I beg to move amendment 56, in clause 112, page 130, line 11, leave out “subsection (2) or (3)” and insert “subsections (2) to (3A)”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 59.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 57 to 59.
Amendment 40, in clause 112, page 130, line 33, leave out subsection (6) and insert—
“(6) A youth diversion order must specify the period for which it has effect, up to a maximum of 12 months.
(7) An assessment must be taken of the respondent before the conclusion of a youth diversion order to determine if they continue to hold extremist views or pose a terror threat.
(8) An assessment must be made by a qualified expert in extremism and counterterrorism.
(9) Assessments taken by the respondent’s youth offending team must be reviewed by an external expert with no pre-existing relationship to the respondent.
(10) If the respondent is assessed as holding extremist views or as a terror threat the youth offending team or a chief officer of police must apply to an appropriate court for the youth offending order to be extended up to a maximum of 12 months.
(11) All provisions, prohibitions and requirements of a youth diversion order remain in effect until the respondent has been assessed as holding no extremist views or posing a terror threat.”
This amendment would give the police the ability to apply for youth diversion orders in cases of youth extremism and terror risks. The diversion orders would conclude automatically after a maximum of twelve months without an assessment as to whether the individual remained a terror risk or extremist.
Government amendment 60.
Clause stand part.
Government new clause 62—Electronic monitoring of compliance with order: England and Wales.
Government new clause 63—Conditions for imposing electronic monitoring requirement: England and Wales.
Government amendment 79.
Dame Diana Johnson
Clause 112 sets out a non-exhaustive list of prohibitions or requirements that may be included in a YDO and the safeguards that the police and courts must consider. The police must have the ability to mitigate risk to the public from young people being drawn into terrorism—a growing problem, as we all appreciate. The YDO will enable the police to impose necessary restrictions on an individual, subject to a court order. These may include limits on accessing certain websites or apps, or restrictions on engaging with specific individuals or groups. For example, this could include engagement with other children who have been assessed to be vulnerable to radicalisation. A YDO may also include positive requirements that the respondent must comply with. These may be rehabilitative in nature, including, for example, mandatory attendance at intervention sessions that seek to support the respondent in moving away from extremist ideologies.
Although it is critical that the police are able to impose necessary risk management and rehabilitative measures, the legislation ensures that there are safeguards to limit the extent of such measures. First, each measure must be necessary and proportionate for the purpose of mitigating a risk of terrorism or serious harm. Secondly, any measure included as part of a YDO must not unnecessarily interfere with a respondent’s educational or work commitments, or their religious beliefs. Thirdly, any measure may not exceed a total duration of two years. The aim is to ensure that YDOs have enough time to make a positive impact on a young person’s life while remaining proportionate to the scale of risk they pose to the public by being drawn into terrorism.
The Government amendments to clause 112 provide further examples of the measures that may be imposed through a YDO. This increases transparency and provides a clear statutory basis for the most intrusive measures that will be available. The expanded list of prohibitions and requirements represents the measures that we expect the police will most commonly apply to the court to include in a YDO.
Amendment 57 allows for potential restrictions on entering a specific area, including travel restrictions inside or outside the UK. Amendment 58 outlines potential requirements for the respondent to answer questions, provide information, or produce documents. Amendment 59 provides that, if included in a YDO, the individual may be required to comply with notification requirements, as detailed in new clause 61, and may be subject to restrictions on the possession of weapons and explosives. Amendments 56 and 60 are consequential on these other amendments.
New clauses 62 and 63 and Government amendment 79 enable a YDO to include an electronic monitoring requirement. This will enable the effective monitoring of and compliance with measures such as curfew requirements and exclusion measures. Operational partners have been explicit that having this capability will maximise the utility and effectiveness of YDOs.
Finally, amendment 40, tabled by the shadow Minister, seeks to give the police the ability to apply for a YDO in cases where a young person exhibits extremist views; it would also prevent an order from expiring unless there is an independent expert assessment that concludes the individual no longer poses a terrorist risk or holds extremist views. YDOs are designed for terrorism-related cases only. A YDO is a tool to be used only when young people pose a public safety risk. There are no plans to use YDOs for cases that do not meet terrorism thresholds, as this would interfere with the rights of young people.
This Government take extremism very seriously, and we are committed to ensuring that we have the tools and powers needed to address this issue. Efforts to counter extremism span a broad range of Government and law enforcement activity, and we must persist in our efforts to challenge extremist narratives, to disrupt the activity of radicalising groups, and to directly tackle the causes of radicalisation. The Home Office leads work on countering extremism, and the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government will lead work with local councils on strengthening community cohesion. It is vital that the two programmes on cohesion and extremism work in parallel.
Clause 116(4), which we will debate in a later group, permits the police to apply for the extension of a YDO. There may be two extension applications, and each will be for a maximum of six months, so the maximum duration of an order is two years in total. I assure the hon. Member for Stockton West that counter-terrorism police will regularly assess the risk posed by the individual while the order is in force. Although decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis, the police may decide to apply to the court to extend an order. Where the police assess that the risk posed by the respondent remains despite the order having been in place, they may consider, in consultation with the relevant prosecutorial authority, whether the relevant test for prosecution for terrorist offending is met. Should the risk posed by the individual persist for longer than 24 months, other tools may be considered.
I hope the shadow Minister will agree not to press amendment 40 given the clear operational need for the Government’s amendments, which I commend to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
Amendment 40 primarily focuses on the duration, assessment and possible extension of YDOs, and it would ensure that the orders are subject to review and that further intervention is applied when necessary. Under the amendment, YDOs must specify a period of up to 12 months in which the young person is monitored and guided through the diversion programme. This would ensure there is a clear time limit with a defined end point for the intervention.
Additionally, before the order concludes, an assessment must be carried out to evaluate whether the individual continues to hold extremist views or poses a terrorism threat. This would add an important safeguard to the process, ensuring that young people who may still be a risk are identified before the order ends. A critical element of the amendment is the requirement that qualified experts carry out the assessment. The evaluation of whether the individual continues to hold extremist views or to present a terrorism risk must be conducted by an expert in extremism and counter-terrorism. This would ensure the assessment is informed by a high level of expertise and understanding of the complexities of radicalisation.
Assessments made by the youth offending team must be reviewed by an external expert who has no pre-existing relationship with the respondent. This independent review would guarantee objectivity and minimise any potential bias in the evaluation process. If the individual was assessed to be still holding extremist views or continuing to pose a terrorism risk, the youth offending team or a chief officer of the police would have the power to apply to the court for an extension of the youth diversion order. This extension could be granted for an additional 12 months, allowing continued intervention and monitoring of the individual. Importantly, the extension would ensure that the order remained in place for as long as the individual was considered to pose a risk to public safety.
Finally, the amendment specifies that all provisions, prohibitions and requirements set by the YDO will remain in effect until the individual has been assessed as holding no extremist views or posing no terrorism threat. This would ensure that the protective measures stipulated in the order were maintained throughout the duration of the individual’s involvement in the diversion programme, offering ongoing protection to the public while allowing continued monitoring of the individual’s risk level. The amendment would ensure that the diversion process is both effective and responsive to the changing nature of extremist behaviour, and that any decision to conclude or extend the order is based on robust and independent expert evaluations, thus improving the overall effectiveness of the youth intervention measures in countering extremism and terrorism.
Clause 112 outlines the content and conditions of a youth diversion order, providing the framework for how the order can be structured and what it can include. How will the Government ensure that YDOs do not interfere with religious or cultural practices of respondents, as the clause provides, especially when it comes to limitations on association or communication?
The Chair
My sincere apologies to the Committee: before I called the shadow Minister, I should have proposed Government amendment 56. I call the Minister.
Dame Diana Johnson
To answer the question that the shadow Minister just posed, I said in my earlier remarks that there would not be restrictions that interfered with educational and work commitments, or with religious observances. I think that deals with his question. On that basis, commend the Government amendment to the Committee.
Amendment 56 agreed to.
Amendments made: 57, in clause 112, page 130, line 18, at end insert—
“(d) the respondent’s presence in, or access to, a specified area or place or an area or place of a specified description;
(e) the respondent's travel (whether within the United Kingdom, between the United Kingdom and other places or otherwise).”
This amendment provides that the prohibitions or requirements a youth diversion order may contain include ones relating to the respondent’s presence in or access to particular areas or places, or to the respondent’s travel.
Amendment 58, in clause 112, page 130, line 22, leave out “provide information” and insert
“answer questions, provide information or produce documents”.
This amendment provides that a youth diversion order may require the respondent to answer questions, provide information or produce documents.
Amendment 59, in clause 112, page 130, line 23, at end insert—
“(d) require the respondent to comply with section (Notification requirements) (notification requirements).
(3A) An order may contain any prohibition that is of a kind that could be imposed by the Secretary of State in relation to an individual by virtue of paragraph 6A of Schedule 1 to the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (weapons and explosives measures).”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This amendment provides that a youth diversion order may require the respondent to comply with notification requirements under NC61 and may contain prohibitions relating to weapons and explosives.
Amendment proposed: 40, in clause 112, page 130, line 33, leave out subsection (6) and insert—
“(6) A youth diversion order must specify the period for which it has effect, up to a maximum of 12 months.
(7) An assessment must be taken of the respondent before the conclusion of a youth diversion order to determine if they continue to hold extremist views or pose a terror threat.
(8) An assessment must be made by a qualified expert in extremism and counterterrorism.
(9) Assessments taken by the respondent’s youth offending team must be reviewed by an external expert with no pre-existing relationship to the respondent.
(10) If the respondent is assessed as holding extremist views or as a terror threat the youth offending team or a chief officer of police must apply to an appropriate court for the youth offending order to be extended up to a maximum of 12 months.
(11) All provisions, prohibitions and requirements of a youth diversion order remain in effect until the respondent has been assessed as holding no extremist views or posing a terror threat.”—(Matt Vickers.)
This amendment would give the police the ability to apply for youth diversion orders in cases of youth extremism and terror risks. The diversion orders would conclude automatically after a maximum of twelve months without an assessment as to whether the individual remained a terror risk or extremist.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Dame Diana Johnson
I beg to move amendment 61, in clause 113, page 131, line 4, leave out from “order” to “consult” in line 5 and insert
“, a chief officer of police must, if the respondent will be under the age of 18 when the application is made,”.
This is a drafting change that ensures consistency between the drafting of subsection (1) of clause 113 and subsection (2) of that clause as amended by Amendment 62.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 62, 64 and 63.
Clause stand part.
Government amendments 65 and 66.
Clause 114 stand part.
Government amendment 67.
Clause 115 stand part.
Dame Diana Johnson
Clauses 113 to 115 set out duties on the police to consult with relevant authorities, provide for applications to be made without notice in urgent circumstances, and provide for interim YDOs to be made.
The Committee will recognise the importance of ensuring that the police take wider factors into consideration—for example, a person’s age, mental health, safeguarding and educational needs—before applying for a YDO. Clause 113 therefore introduces a duty to consult before applying for an order or applying for variation or discharge of an order. In England and Wales, and in Northern Ireland, the police will be required to consult with youth offending teams and the Youth Justice Agency respectively for applications involving individuals under the age of 18. In Scotland, the police will be required to consult with the Lord Advocate for all applications. This is necessary to give effect to the different position in Scotland, where consultation with the Lord Advocate is appropriate for all YDOs, including for 18 to 21-year-olds, and for without-notice YDO applications. That reflects the Lord Advocate’s specific functions in relation to their role as the head of the system for the investigation and prosecution of crime, which includes a specific working relationship with Police Scotland.
Government amendments 62 and 65 make the additional requirement in respect of Scotland that the police consult with the local authority before making an application for a YDO, irrespective of the age of the respondent, and remove the requirement for consultation with the Scottish Children’s Reporter Administration for YDOs for under-18s. Again, the amendments are necessary to give effect to the different position in Scotland, where there is no equivalent to youth offending teams. Government amendments 63, 64 and 66 are consequential on those amendments, while Government amendment 61 ensures consistency of drafting between the subsections of clauses 113, as amended.
Consultation will be an important part of the YDO application process, ensuring that the police have thoroughly considered the necessity and proportionality of a YDO and taken into account the expertise of those who work closely with young people in the community. This statutory duty does not prevent the police from engaging with other authorities, such as the CPS or the Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland, wider social services, or the respondent’s school or college, where appropriate.
While it is likely to be rare in practice, there may be circumstances in which an urgent YDO application is required and providing notice to the respondent may increase risk. Therefore, clause 114 provides a route for police to apply for a YDO without notice to the respondent. The requirement to consult does not apply in such cases, although the police will still be required to consult relevant authorities before the full court hearing for a YDO.
Where an application is made without notice, the court will be able to consider whether to impose an interim order, in line with the approach taken with other preventive orders, such as knife crime prevention orders. Due to the temporary nature of an interim order, clause 115 ensures that the only positive requirements that can be included in such an order are to provide information and to comply with notification requirements. For example, the Bill does not allow the police to impose a requirement to attend intervention sessions similar to Prevent in an interim order, but they will be able to impose risk-management measures where necessary and proportionate, subject to the court’s permission. Amendment 67 clarifies the measures that can and cannot be imposed in an interim YDO.
I commend the amendments and the clauses to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
Clause 113 outlines the duty to consult before making an application for a youth diversion order or the variation or discharge of such an order, particularly when the individual involved is under 18. It ensures that key stakeholders are involved in the decision-making process, so that the young person’s best interests are taken into account, and it ensures that the relevant agencies are informed and consulted before any formal application is made. How do the Government plan to ensure that the agencies that are consulted—in particular the youth offending teams—have the necessary expertise and resources to adequately assess the case before the application for a YDO is made?
Clause 114 outlines the process for making an application for a youth diversion order without notice to the respondent. This provision is significant because it allows for situations in which immediate intervention is necessary and the respondent is not notified before the application is made. How will the Government ensure that respondents’ rights are protected in cases where an application is made without notice? What measures are in place to prevent misuse of this provision?
Clause 115 makes provision for an interim youth diversion order to be made during the adjournment of a hearing for a full YDO. It ensures that even while a decision on the full application is pending, the court can take immediate temporary action to manage the respondent’s risk, particularly in cases involving potential extremism or terrorism. The clause allows the courts to impose interim measures to temporarily manage a respondent’s behaviour, safeguarding public safety, while the full process is ongoing.
Dame Diana Johnson
The shadow Minister raised the issue of consultation with youth offending teams and their equivalent in the devolved nations. My understanding is that we are not talking about a large number of individuals being subject to these provisions. The reason we say that youth offending teams have to be consulted is that they have the expertise and the knowledge of working with young people, and it is likely that the individuals they will be consulted on will already be known to them. It is a good, positive measure to undertake that consultation with youth offending teams and recognise the skills and safeguards that they will bring. Their knowledge of the individual will perhaps include, as I spoke about earlier, issues in their background or safeguarding issues that need to be considered. That is really important.
An interim YDO may be required if there is an immediate risk that has to be managed. That is why provision needs to be made for interim YDOs, but of course they are interim, and a full hearing will take place. Interim YDOs will be used only in urgent circumstances, and of course the court will have to agree; while an application can be made, if the court does not recognise the urgency, it will not be granted. The independent reviewer of terrorism legislation has agreed that the power to make interim measures is necessary in order for YDOs to be effective.
I hope that, on the basis of those answers, the shadow Minister is satisfied that the clause should stand part of the Bill.
Amendment 61 agreed to.
Amendments made: 62, in clause 113, page 131, line 10, leave out from “Scotland” to end of line 15 and insert
“must consult—
(a) the Lord Advocate,
(b) the relevant local authority, and
(c) if the respondent will be under the age of 18 when the application is made, the Principal Reporter.”
This amendment changes who the chief constable of the Police Service of Scotland must consult before making an application for a youth diversion order or for the variation or discharge of such an order.
Amendment 64, in clause 113, page 131, line 21, at end insert—
“‘relevant local authority’ means—
(a) the Scottish local authority in whose area it appears to the chief constable that the respondent lives, or
(b) if it appears to the chief constable that the respondent lives in more than one such area, whichever one or more of the relevant Scottish local authorities that the chief constable considers it appropriate to consult;”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 62.
Amendment 63, in clause 113, page 131, line 21, after “section” insert “—
‘Scottish local authority’ means a council constituted under section 2 of the Local Government etc (Scotland) Act 1994;”.—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 62.
Clause 113, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 114
Applications without notice
Amendments made: 65, in clause 114, page 131, line 27, leave out “Section 113(1) does” and insert
“Subsections (1) and (2)(b) and (c) of section 113 do”.
This amendment disapplies the requirement to consult the relevant local authority and (where the respondent is under 18) the Principal Reporter where an application for a youth diversion order is made without notice in Scotland.
Amendment 66, in clause 114, page 131, line 35, leave out “section 113(1)” and insert
“subsection (1) or (2)(b) and (c) of section 113 (as the case may be)”.—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 65.
Clause 114, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 115
Interim youth diversion orders
Amendment made: 67, in clause 115, page 132, line 8, leave out subsection (3) and substitute—
“(3) The only requirements that may be imposed by an interim youth diversion order on the respondent are—
(a) a requirement of the kind mentioned in section 112(3)(b) (requirements to provide information etc);
(b) a requirement to comply with section (Notification requirements) (notification requirements).”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This amendment enables an interim youth diversion order to require the respondent answer questions, provide information or produce documents, or to comply with notification requirements under NC61.
Clause 115, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 116
Variation and discharge of youth diversion orders
Dame Diana Johnson
I beg to move amendment 68, in clause 116, page 132, line 33, at end insert—
“(4A) The court may make provision of a kind mentioned in subsection (4) only if it considers that the provision is necessary for the purpose of protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism or other serious harm.
(4B) Subsections (5) and (7) of section 112 apply to additional prohibitions or requirements included on a variation of an order.”
This amendment provides that a court may only vary a youth diversion order to include an additional prohibition or requirement or to extend its duration if it considers it necessary; and that certain provision in clause 112 about the content of orders applies equally to such additional prohibitions or requirements.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause stand part.
Government amendments 69 to 71.
Clause 117 stand part.
Dame Diana Johnson
Clause 116 ensures that the police or the subject of a YDO can apply to the relevant court to vary the order once it is in place to, for example, add or remove measures or to change the duration of existing measures. The clause also allows the police or the subject of a YDO to apply to end the order before it is due to expire, allowing the police to withdraw the order if it is no longer considered necessary.
Clause 117 sets out the route for the police or a respondent to appeal against a court decision to impose a YDO, an interim YDO or any change made under clause 116. Appeals will be made to the Crown court in England, Wales and Northern Ireland and the Sheriff Appeal Court in Scotland. The court may then make changes on the basis of that appeal, as required. Government amendments 68 and 71 make changes to clarify and streamline the appeals process for YDOs, as do Government amendments 69 and 70, which provide that a second appeal in relation to a YDO may be made to the Court of Appeal in England and Wales.
The Committee will recognise the importance of the clauses in ensuring that there is a process for varying or revoking the order as well as for both the police and YDO subjects to have a prescribed and proportionate route for appeals.
Amendment 68 agreed to.
Clause 116, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 117
Appeal against youth diversion order etc
Dame Diana Johnson
I beg to move amendment 72, in clause 118, page 133, line 22, at end insert—
“(1A) Where a youth diversion order requires a person to provide information or produce a document, it is an offence for the person, in purported compliance with that requirement, to provide any information or produce any document which the person knows to be false.
(1B) Where a youth diversion order requires a person to comply with section (Notification requirements), it is an offence for the person, in purported compliance with that section, to notify to the police any information which the person knows to be false.”
This amendment makes it an offence for a person to knowingly provide false information, produce a false document or notify false information in purported compliance with notification requirements imposed under a youth diversion order.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 73 to 75.
Clause stand part.
Government amendment 76.
Clauses 119 and 120 stand part.
Government amendments 77 and 78.
Clause 121 stand part.
Government new clause 64—Data from electronic monitoring in England and Wales: code of practice.
Government new clause 65—Reviews of operation of this Chapter.
New clause 42—Report on the organisations responsible for implementing and enforcing youth diversion orders—
“(1) The Secretary of State must, within three months of the passing of this Act, publish a report on the organisations responsible for implementing and enforcing youth diversion orders.
(2) That report must include—
(a) the organisations which will be responsible for implementing and enforcing youth diversion orders;
(b) what level of counterterrorism and de-radicalisation training and expertise they have; and
(c) what additional resources they will require to effectively administer the provisions, prohibitions and requirements of youth diversion orders.
(3) Within one month of the publication of this report, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a plan assessing the—
(a) training,
(b) financing, and
(c) guidance,
available to the organisations identified in the report under subsection (1) to bring their training, expertise and funding to the requisite level identified in that report.
(4) The Secretary of State must commission a report from the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation to assess whether the levels of funding, training and expertise proposed in the plan under subsection (3) are sufficient. This report will be laid before Parliament with the plan under subsection (3).”
This new clause would require the Government to publish a report on the organisations responsible for implementing and enforcing youth diversion orders and a plan and independent report on the funding, training and expertise they need.
Dame Diana Johnson
I wonder whether it might be helpful for the Committee if I respond after the shadow Minister has spoken to his new clause 42.
Matt Vickers
Clauses 118 and 119 outline the offence of breaching a youth diversion order and subsequent processes for issuing and revising guidance on the exercise of functions related to youth diversion orders.
Clause 118(4) provides that if a person is convicted of breaching a youth diversion order, the court cannot issue a conditional discharge requiring a substantive penalty instead. This provision prevents a lenient approach that might fail to deter non-compliance. The clause also establishes varying penalties based on age, with difference consequences for individuals under and over 18. How do these penalties balance deterrence with the goal of rehabilitating young offenders, particularly those under 18?
Clause 119 grants the Secretary of State the authority to issue guidance for local police forces. How does the Minister plan to ensure that that guidance brings consistency in the application of YDOs across different regions? Further clauses outline wider procedures, including for applications for YDOs.
New clause 42 would require the Secretary of State to publish a report within three months of the passage of the Act detailing the organisations responsible for implementing and enforcing youth diversion orders. The report must cover the organisations involved, the counter-terrorism and deradicalisation training they possess and any additional resources required to effectively manage the YDO provisions. Within one month of the report’s publication, the Secretary of State must present a plan to address training, financing and guidance to meet the required standards. Additionally, the Secretary of State must commission an independent assessment by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation to evaluate whether the proposed levels of funding, training and expertise are adequate, with that assessment being laid before Parliament alongside the plan.
The new clause would ensure the effective implementation of youth diversion orders with the necessary expertise. The requirement for a report and plan would ensure that organisations are prepared to handle counter-terrorism and deradicalisation issues. It would set clear expectations for training and funding, holding the Government accountable for providing sufficient resources. The independent assessment by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation would add scrutiny, ensuring that the Government’s plans meet the required standards. Overall, the new clause would introduce a proactive and transparent approach, fostering confidence in the system’s ability to address terrorism and extremism.
What steps are the Government taking to ensure that the organisations involved in implementing YDOs have the necessary counter-terrorism and deradicalisation training and expertise? Are the Government confident that those organisations are sufficiently prepared without the need for an independent assessment? Given the complexity of implementing YDOs, does the Minister agree that additional resources might be required to ensure that the orders are effectively enforced? If not, what plans are in place to guarantee that the organisations responsible are adequately resourced?
Dame Diana Johnson
Clauses 118 to 121 will support the implementation of YDOs. Although the aim of a YDO is to divert a young person away from terrorist offending, it is critical that there is an effective deterrent against breaching the order, and that where a young person breaches the order, the police can take action.
Clause 118 ensures that a separate criminal offence is available for breaching a YDO without a reasonable excuse. In practice, we propose that statutory guidance will set out that the police will be expected to consult youth offending teams where there is a suspected breach, and for less serious breaches the police may consider alternatives to prosecution, such as varying the measures in the order or issuing a formal warning to the individual. Prosecution for this offence will therefore be a last resort.
Government amendment 72 makes it an offence for a person to knowingly provide false information, produce a false document or notify false information in purported compliance with notification requirements imposed under a YDO. Government amendments 73 and 74 make the offences under clause 18 triable either way irrespective of the defendant’s age, with a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment. The amendments ensure that there is a consistent maximum penalty for any breach of a YDO, regardless of the young person’s age, and that the legislation more accurately reflects the potential severity of breaching a YDO. For example, a serious breach may involve a breach of a weapons measure, such as by making plans to purchase knives or encouraging or assisting others to do so. We would expect a prosecution for that offence to be the last resort. Detail on other options to be considered beforehand will be included in the statutory guidance. The change is supported by operational partners and the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. Government amendment 75 enables a copy of a YDO to be admissible as evidence in criminal proceedings for breach of the order.
Clause 119 introduces a new power for the Secretary of State to issue guidance to the police in relation to YDOs. In issuing such guidance, we recognise the importance of proper consultation with relevant authorities, including the police, the prosecution service in England and Wales and in Northern Ireland, and the Lord Advocate in Scotland. That is why clause 119 requires mandatory consultation with certain parties and permits the Secretary of State to consult with other stakeholders, where appropriate. Government amendment 76 expands the list of consultees to include youth justice agencies.
Clause 120 ensures that rules of court can provide for anonymity for individuals going through civil proceedings for a YDO. That is important to ensure that reporting restrictions apply, and it is in line with the general policy aim of ensuring that young people do not feel stigmatised through engagement with the justice system—something that the shadow Minister has spoken about.
Finally, clause 121 makes procedural provision in respect of applications for a YDO. Government amendment 77 disapplies the time limit that would otherwise prevent an application for a YDO from being made in relation to matters arising more than six months prior to the making of the application. Amendment 78 enables proceedings in Scotland for, or in relation to, a YDO to be heard by a summary sheriff.
I turn to the Government new clauses in this group. To safeguard effectively the data that is gathered under electronic monitoring requirements, new clause 64 will require the Secretary of State to issue a code of practice for the processing of such data. The processing of such data will be subject to the requirements in the UK general data protection regulation and the Data Protection Act 2018. New clause 65 will enable the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation to review and report on the use and operationalisation of the youth diversion order. The independent reviewer already has a number of statutory functions, and this new clause aligns his statutory functions, enabling him to report on the YDO. The independent reviewer has been consulted on the clause, and his view is that the power to review the operation of the youth diversion order is important.
New clause 42, tabled by the shadow Minister, would require the Government to publish a report on the organisations that are responsible for implementing and enforcing YDOs, and a plan for delivering the relevant funding, training and guidance available for these organisations. It would also require the Government to commission a report from the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation.
As Matt Jukes, the head of counter-terrorism policing, set out in his written evidence to this Committee, counter-terrorism policing is a collaboration of UK police forces with a network of exceptional investigators. It is the lead law enforcement agency for managing terrorist risk, so it is appropriate that it will lead the implementation and enforcement of YDOs. It will be supported in this role by youth justice partners who have substantial experience of working with young people who are subject to court-imposed orders.
As I have already set out, Government new clause 65 already ensures that YDOs are added to the statutory remit of the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. As part of this role, the independent reviewer is required to review the operation of YDOs in practice and report to Parliament. I hope that the shadow Minister agrees that new clause 42 is therefore unnecessary.
On the other issue that the shadow Minister referred to, regarding the consistent use of YDOs across the UK, one of the key objectives of the statutory guidance under clause 119, which chief officers must have regard to, is to ensure that there is consistency. To go back to the point about the youth offending teams, given the small size of the cohort of children who are likely to be given a YDO, we do not anticipate that the changes will add significant pressures to those youth offending teams. On that basis, I commend the Government’s amendments to the Committee.
Amendment 72 agreed to.
Amendments made: 73, in clause 118, page 133, line 23, leave out subsection (2).
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 74.
Amendment 74, in clause 118, page 133, line 33, leave out “aged 18 or over”.
This amendment makes offences under clause 118 (breach of youth diversion order) triable either way whatever the age of the respondent.
Amendment 75, in clause 118, page 134, line 8, at end insert—
“(5) In proceedings for an offence under this section, a copy of the original youth diversion order, certified by the proper officer of the court that made it, is admissible as evidence of its having been made and of its contents to the same extent that oral evidence of those matters is admissible in those proceedings.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This amendment enables a copy of a youth diversion order to be admissible as evidence in criminal proceedings for breach of the order.
Clause 118, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 119
Guidance
Amendment made: 76, in clause 119, page 134, line 16, at end insert—
“(za) the Youth Justice Board for England and Wales;
(zb) the Scottish Ministers;
(zc) the Youth Justice Agency in Northern Ireland;”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This amendment adds to the list of persons the Secretary of State must consult before issuing or revising guidance to chief officers of police about youth diversion orders.
Clause 119, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 120 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 121
Applications
Amendments made: 77, in clause 121, page 135, line 17, at end insert—
“(2) Section 127 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 (time limit for complaints etc) does not apply to a complaint under this Chapter.”
This amendment disapplies the time limit that would otherwise prevent an application for a youth diversion order being made in relation to matters arising more than six months prior to the making of the application.
Amendment 78, in clause 121, page 135, line 17, at end insert—
“(3) In Schedule 1 to the Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 (asp 17) (civil proceedings etc in which summary sheriff has competence), after paragraph 12 insert—
‘Youth diversion orders
13 Proceedings for or in relation to a youth diversion order under section 110 of the Crime and Policing Act 2025.’” —(Dame Diana Johnson.)
This amendment enables proceedings in Scotland for or in relation to a youth diversion order to be heard by a summary sheriff.
Clause 121, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 122
Prevention of terrorism and state threats: weapons etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Dame Diana Johnson
Clause 122 amends the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 and the National Security Act 2023 to broaden the definition of weapons that are prohibited for individuals who are subject to terrorism prevention and investigation measures or state threat prevention and investigation measures. The clause gives the Secretary of State the power to prohibit individuals who are subject to terrorism prevention and investigation measures, or to state threat prevention and investigation measures, from possessing any items that she reasonably considers could be used to cause injury. The change builds on a recommendation by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Jonathan Hall KC, in his annual report “The Terrorism Acts in 2022”.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 43—Travel abroad to support a proscribed organisation—
“(1) A person commits an offence if they travel outside of the United Kingdom to support a proscribed organisation.
(2) For the purposes of this section, ‘support’ includes—
(a) becoming a member of a proscribed organisation, or an affiliated group of a proscribed organisation;
(b) working for any entity, either voluntarily or for financial gain, run by a proscribed organisation;
(c) attending political, religious or social gatherings in support of a proscribed organisation;
(d) meeting with members of a proscribed organisation;
(e) creating content, both online and offline, to raise support for a proscribed organisation; or
(f) travelling to territory controlled by a proscribed organisation without an exemption.
(3) This section does not apply to—
(a) accredited non-governmental organisations and humanitarian organisations;
(b) accredited media outlets and journalists;
(c) diplomats and other governmental officials travelling in an official capacity; or
(d) independent journalists and content creators reporting on a proscribed organisation, or in a territory with a proscribed organisation present.
(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable—
(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years, to a fine (or both), or
(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment of a term not exceeding 6 months, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both).”
This new clause would make travelling abroad to support a proscribed organisation an offence.
Dame Diana Johnson
Section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000 makes it an offence for a person to wear or display an article in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that they are a member or supporter of a proscribed terrorist organisation. The offence is committed only if the person carries out such conduct in a public place.
Clause 123 makes two key changes to section 13 of the Terrorism Act. The first is to create a new offence where a person carries out the conduct in one of the relevant premises set out in the Bill, including prisons, young offender institutions and immigration removal centres. In 2022, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation undertook a review of terrorism in prisons. That was in the context of the UK suffering four terrorist attacks in 2019 and 2020 committed by serving prisoners or terrorist offenders who had been released on licence. One of the reviewer’s recommendations was for the Government to consider amending section 13 to extend the offence to prison settings. This clause implements and builds on that recommendation. The new offence will act as a deterrent to such harmful conduct in the prison estate, and it will help to prevent exposure to articles that are linked to terrorist organisations. That, in turn, may reduce the risk of individuals being radicalised or otherwise encouraged to support such groups.
The second change concerns the powers of seizure under section 13. In his report “The Terrorism Acts in 2022”, the independent reviewer highlighted that the existing seizure powers would not be available where the police could not connect an article, such as a flag or banner, to specific individuals for the purpose of further criminal investigation. He recommended that that gap should be rectified. The clause will therefore amend section 13 to ensure that the police can seize such articles even when there is no real prospect of prosecuting an individual for a section 13 offence. An article may therefore be seized to prevent its continuing display and to preserve it as evidence.
Both changes to section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000 implement the independent reviewer’s recommendations and are supported by the police. They will ensure that the offence and associated seizure powers can be used to full effect. I am happy to respond to new clause 43 once we have heard from the shadow Minister.
Matt Vickers
Clause 123 amends section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which concerns the offence of wearing or displaying articles in support of a proscribed organisation. The key amendment is the introduction of a new offence:
“A person commits an offence if, on relevant premises, the person…wears…or displays an article, in such a way…as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation.”
What is the rationale for introducing the concept of reasonable suspicion in the offence of wearing or displaying articles, as opposed to requiring more direct evidence of support for a proscribed organisation? I would also be grateful for clarity on how the list of relevant premises is determined. Could that include other locations or contexts beyond those listed?
New clause 43 introduces a criminal offence for individuals who travel outside the United Kingdom to support a proscribed organisation. The offence covers various forms of support, including joining or working for a proscribed organisation or its affiliated groups, attending events in support of such an organisation, meeting with its members, creating content to promote the organisation, or travelling to areas controlled by the organisation without a legal exemption. The new clause provides specific exemptions for accredited non-governmental organisations and humanitarian organisations, media outlets and journalists, and diplomats or Government officials travelling in an official capacity. A person who is found guilty under the provision could face a severe penalty of imprisonment for up to 14 years on conviction on indictment, or up to six months and a fine on summary conviction.
The measure is a proactive step to curb the influence and spread of terrorism. By criminalising travel abroad to support a proscribed organisation, it would help to prevent individuals from engaging in activities that might contribute to terrorism and destabilisation abroad. The inclusion of various forms of support, ranging from membership and financial involvement to attending gatherings or creating content, provides clarity on what constitutes illegal activity. That would ensure that law enforcement could pursue a wide range of actions that support proscribed organisations.
New clause 43 is designed to prevent individuals from becoming embedded with or supporting proscribed organisations. Why would the Government not support a preventive measure that helps to protect the UK from individuals travelling abroad to engage in terrorism-related activities?
Dame Diana Johnson
As the shadow Minister has explained, new clause 43 seeks to introduce a new offence for travelling abroad to support a proscribed organisation. The UK has one of the strongest counter-terrorism frameworks in the world. That includes, under the Terrorism Act 2000, the ability to proscribe an organisation that the Home Secretary reasonably believes is concerned in terrorism. That means that it commits and participates in terrorism, prepares for terrorism, promotes or encourages terrorism, or is otherwise concerned in terrorism. Some 80 terrorist organisations are currently proscribed.
As part of the counter-terrorism framework, there are a wide range of powers and offences that can be used by the Government and operational partners to disrupt travel overseas for terrorist purposes and to prosecute individuals on their return. That includes, for example, an executive power to cancel a British citizen’s passport and the power to temporarily seize a passport when there is a reasonable suspicion that the person is traveling to engage in terrorism-related activity.
There are also a wide range of terrorism offences that could be engaged in relation to an individual who travels to support a proscribed organisation. For example, it is an offence to be a member of a proscribed organisation, to invite support—the invited support can be intangible, and it is not limited to money, property or support that incites violence or encourages terrorism—for a proscribed organisation, to attend a place used for terrorist training or to provide or receive terrorist training, and to undertake preparatory acts with the intention of committing an act of terrorism or assisting another to commit an act of terrorism.
The counter-terrorism framework also includes the designated area offence, which permits the Secretary of State to designate an area if she is satisfied that it is necessary for the purpose of protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism to restrict British nationals and residents from entering or remaining in the area. It is an offence for UK nationals or UK residents to enter or remain in a designated area. I recognise that the power has not been used to date, but the Government’s view is that it remains a useful tool to disrupt terrorist travel in the right circumstances.
As the shadow Minister may be aware, the Government are considering a recommendation made by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Jonathan Hall KC, on the topic raised by his new clause. The Government will not hesitate to address gaps in our toolkit and to ensure that it keeps pace with the modern terrorist threat. We have brought forward measures in the Bill to implement and build on recommendations the reviewer put forward under the last Government. In November 2024, the Home Secretary accepted his recommendation to consider introducing a new terrorist travel offence. Officials are currently considering it with operational partners, as well as the extent to which there is a gap. It is vital that any new offence extends the ability of operational partners and the CPS to disrupt and prosecute those involved in terrorism. In due course, the Government will respond fully to that recommendation on disrupting terrorist travel.
Before I conclude, on the issue of reasonable suspicion and the requirement, this measure simply extends beyond private settings to designated settings. We are not changing the reasonable suspicion test; I hope that that is helpful to the shadow Minister. For the reasons set out, I hope he will be content not to press his new clause 43 when we reach it later in our proceedings.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 123 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 124
Management of terrorist offenders
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Schedule 16.
Government new clause 21—Terrorism offences excepted from defence for slavery or trafficking victims.
Government amendment 23.
Dame Diana Johnson
Clause 124 introduces schedule 16, which amends the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. It gives powers to effectively manage a certain cohort of historical terrorism offenders. That cohort includes individuals who committed non-terrorism offences, such as conspiracy to murder, that would have been considered to have a terrorism connection had they not been committed before the relevant legislation came into effect. This is the same cohort of historical terrorism-connected offenders as captured by clause 104, relating to the polygraph testing of those offenders, which my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Justice spoke to earlier.
The 2008 Act introduced a requirement for courts to consider whether there is a connection to terrorism when sentencing certain specified offences. In circumstances where a court determines that an offence has a terrorism connection, it must aggravate the sentence. Where a terrorist connection is determined, the sentence imposed will reflect the risk profile of the offender. In addition, the offender can be more appropriately managed on their release because certain counter-terrorism risk management tools become available to the police in respect of that offender.
Since the passage of the 2008 Act, several further risk management tools have been introduced via various Acts of Parliament to manage terrorism and terrorist-connected offenders. The Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021 also expanded the scope of the terrorist connection provisions to require a court to aggravate certain non-terrorism offences with a maximum penalty of more than two years.
The clause and the associated schedule will extend the application of existing risk management measures. Those measures include powers of urgent arrest and personal search for those on licence, where it is suspected that they have breached a licence condition, as well as imposing terrorist notification requirements under the 2008 Act for this cohort of historical terrorism-connected offenders.
The independent reviewer of terrorism legislation noted that the schedule will allow the police to apply important counter-terrorism measures to serious offenders involved in terrorist plots backed by proscribed organisations, but who were convicted of non-terrorism offences. The amendments made in schedule 16 will also permit the police or the Secretary of State to apply to the courts for an order imposing the terrorist notification requirements on offenders whose historical offences have a terrorist connection. If such an order is made, the urgent arrest power and the power of personal search will also apply in respect of the offender. That measure is supported by the police and the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, who described it as a “sensible measure”.
Government new clause 21 will add certain existing terrorism-related offences to schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015. Government amendment 23 is consequential on new clause 21. As we have debated, schedule 4 to the 2015 Act contains a list of serious offences to which the section 45 defence of that Act does not apply. The list currently includes some terrorism offences, as well as serious violence and sexual offences. Section 45 provides a statutory defence against prosecution for victims of modern slavery, and is designed to give victims the confidence to come forward without fear of prosecution.
Schedule 4 to the 2015 Act ensures that those who commit the most serious offences specified in the schedule do not have the option to rely on that defence. New clause 21 adds existing terrorism offences to schedule 4, building on a recommendation made by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. Currently, only a limited number of terrorism offences are listed in schedule 4, including those in sections 5 and 6 of the Terrorism Act 2006—preparation of terrorist acts and training for terrorism, respectively. Others, such as the offence in section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000—collection of information useful to terrorists—are in scope of the section 45 defence.
Alex Davies-Jones
The clause will bring the offence of breaching a foreign travel restriction order, under paragraph 15 of schedule 5 to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, within scope of the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020, known as TORER.
TORER was emergency legislation passed in 2020 following the horrific terrorist attacks at Fishmongers’ Hall and in Streatham, committed by terrorist offenders on licence. TORER restricts the eligibility of terrorist prisoners for release on licence. It ended the automatic early release—in other words, release without Parole Board approval—of individuals who have committed a terrorist offence carrying a maximum penalty of more than two years’ imprisonment, and increased their release eligibility date from the halfway point of their sentence to the two-thirds point.
The offence of breaching a foreign travel restriction order is not currently covered by TORER, despite having a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment and being a terrorism-specific offence, and despite offences for breaching other terrorism-related orders being within scope of TORER. The clause will add breaching a foreign travel restriction order to TORER, ensuring greater consistency.
Since the introduction of TORER in 2020, a number of other changes have been made to the counter-terrorism legislative framework to strengthen the risk management of individuals who commit a terrorism offence carrying a maximum penalty of more than two years. We are seeking to apply those changes to this offence too, in order to ensure that consistency remains.
Specifically, we are ensuring that the offence of breaching a foreign travel restriction order is capable of attracting a sentence for offenders of particular concern, and the equivalent sentence in Northern Ireland and Scotland. We are also making the offender eligible for certain specialist management on licence, including eligibility for personal search conditions, which will be UK-wide, and a polygraph condition, which will be for England and Wales only. We will also ensure that the offence is incapable of being found by the court at the point of sentencing to have been committed with a terrorist connection, on the basis that it is in fact a terrorist offence. Given that the offence of breaching a foreign travel restriction order applies UK-wide, the clause also makes the equivalent changes for Scotland and Northern Ireland.
This change will ensure that sentencing and release arrangements are commensurate with the risk that the individual is considered to pose, and that eligibility for terrorism management conditions is consistent with other terrorist offences. I commend clause 125 and schedule 17 to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 125 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 126
Length of terrorism sentence with fixed licence period: Northern Ireland
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Alex Davies-Jones
Clause 126 makes a minor amendment to ensure that sentencing for terrorist offenders in Northern Ireland remains consistent with that in England and Wales. The sentencing and release regime for terrorists who commit offences attracting a maximum penalty of more than two years’ imprisonment is designed to be consistent throughout the United Kingdom.
However, as currently drafted, the relevant legislation in Northern Ireland—the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008, and specifically article 15A—makes it possible for judges to hand down incommensurate sentences. The purpose of the amendment is to ensure consistency, so that where a sentencing court in Northern Ireland hands down such a sentence, known as the terrorism sentence with a fixed licence period, the length of the sentence is commensurate with the seriousness of the offending. That will then be comparable to the equivalent sentence in England and Wales, namely the sentence for offenders of particular concern.
Action is necessary to ensure consistency and fairness across UK jurisdictions. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 126 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedules 16 and 17 agreed to.
Clause 127
Implementation of international law enforcement information-sharing agreements
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Dame Diana Johnson
Clause 127 relates to the implementation of international law enforcement information-sharing agreements, clause 128 sets out the meaning of “appropriate national authority” and clause 129 relates to the consultation with devolved authorities about regulations under clause 127.
International law enforcement information-sharing agreements are a vital tool that provides law enforcement officers with access to new intelligence to fight crime, increase public protection and reduce the threat of societal harm posed by international criminality. Clause 127 will provide the appropriate national authority with the power to make regulations to implement any new legally binding international law enforcement information-sharing agreements. Such regulations may, for example, make provision for the technical and, where appropriate, operational detail needed to facilitate the information sharing provided for in a particular agreement. Clause 127 also stipulates that regulations can be made in connection with implementing an international agreement only in so far as it relates to the sharing of information for law enforcement purposes, and that any data sharing must comply with data protection legislation.
Clause 128 defines the appropriate national authority as the Secretary of State or, where a provision falls within devolved competence, Scottish Ministers, Welsh Ministers or the Northern Ireland Department of Justice. Clause 129 requires the Secretary of State, before making regulations, to consult devolved Governments about any provisions in the regulations that would be within the legislative competence of the relevant devolved legislature.
These measures will enable the swift implementation of new international agreements that are designed to help keep the public safe from the threat posed by international criminality and cross-border crime, and help to protect vulnerable people. I commend them to the Committee.
Matt Vickers
Clause 127 gives the Government the power to make regulations to implement international agreements relating to the sharing of law enforcement information. The agreements may evolve over time, and the clause ensures that UK law can adapt accordingly.
The clause allows regulations to override existing restrictions on information sharing, but with two key safeguards. A data protection safeguard means that regulations cannot require or allow the processing of personal data in a way that would breach UK data protection laws, unless the regulations themselves impose a legal duty or power. Regulations also cannot override the restrictions set out in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, which covers the surveillance and interception of communications.
The clause aims to ensure that the UK can meet its obligations under international law enforcement agreements, while still upholding important privacy and legal protections. Clause 128 defines who the appropriate national authority is for the purposes of making regulations under clause 127.
Clause 129 places a duty on the Secretary of State to consult the devolved Administrations before making any regulations under clause 127 that include provisions falling within the legislative competence of a devolved legislature, as set out in clause 128. That ensures proper engagement with, and respect for, the roles of the Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive when regulations touch on devolved matters. We welcome these measures, but could the Minister briefly comment on what format such consultation would take?
Dame Diana Johnson
I am happy to comment. With matters such as this, the normal procedures are in place around consultation. There has been extensive consultation on getting these provisions into the Bill. That is just the normal way that we consult. I hope that that satisfies the shadow Minister.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 127 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 128 and 129 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 130
Criminal liability of bodies corporate and partnerships where senior manager commits offence
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Dame Diana Johnson
As we know, crimes can be committed by corporate bodies, just as they can be committed by individuals. It is important that corporate bodies are held liable for committing criminality and face justice accordingly. That is achieved through what is called the identification doctrine.
In the 1970s, the Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass case determined that a corporation can be held liable for a crime if it is committed by its “directing mind and will”, but there is a lack of clarity on what that constitutes. As companies have grown in size and complexity, there are often multiple controlling minds within different business functions who can exert control and cause harm through different functions of the business.
Through clause 130 the Government are placing the case law test for attributing crimes to corporate bodies on a statutory footing, and clarifying and extending the circumstances under which a body corporate or partnership is liable for any criminal offence, if that offence has been committed by its senior management.
The previous Government undertook the first stage of this reform in the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023, placing the identification doctrine in legislation for economic crime offences. However, the identification doctrine was never intended as an economic crime-only regime. It has historically applied to any criminal offence in case law, and it is important that statute reflects that.
Clause 130 therefore repeals the relevant sections of the 2023 Act and replaces them with an identification doctrine that applies to all relevant crime, not just economic crime. As a result of the clause, a body corporate or partnership in the UK can be held liable for any criminal offence and fined accordingly where a senior manager who has control over the whole or a substantial part of the business commits an offence while acting in the scope of their actual or apparent authority.
The broadening of the principle to senior managers with control over any substantial part of the body corporate reflects the wide decision-making responsibilities of organisations and mitigates prior concerns that individuals committing crime could escape liability by changing or removing their title. That will ensure that businesses cannot continue to avoid liability where senior management have clearly used the business to facilitate or conduct crime.
Matt Vickers
Clause 130 holds organisations criminally liable when a senior manager commits an offence within their authority, expanding liability beyond economic crimes to all criminal offences. This reform addresses gaps in the previous identification doctrine and applies to both UK and non-UK entities. However, liability will not apply if the offences occur entirely outside the UK, unless it would be criminal at the corporate level in the UK. How will the Government ensure that the broader application of corporate liability strikes the right balance between holding organisations accountable and avoiding unfair penalisation for offences that occur in part outside the UK?
Dame Diana Johnson
I am grateful for the question. It is clear that offences committed outside the UK would not be covered by the clause—I think that that answers the shadow Minster’s question. It is clearly something that we need to keep under review, because other legislation does have extraterritorial application. I am certainly willing to go away and look at that point, and to come back to the shadow Minister.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 130 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered,
That the Order of the Committee of Thursday 27 March be varied by leaving out paragraph 1(g).—(Keir Mather.)
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Keir Mather.)