(1 day, 17 hours ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:
Government amendment 58.
Clause stand part.
Government motion to transfer clause 4.
Clause 5 stand part.
Government amendments 60 to 67.
Clauses 6 and 7 stand part.
Government new clause 44—Applications for development consent: removal of certain pre-application requirements.
Government new clause 45—Applications for development consent: changes related to section (Applications for development consent: removal of certain pre-application requirements).
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Mr Twigg. In the last sitting, we discussed the various clauses and Government amendments in this group, and I thank hon. Members on both sides of the Committee for their considered engagement with them. The proposed changes we are considering are, without question, a significant evolution of the nationally significant infrastructure projects regime, and it is entirely right and proper that they are subject to intensive scrutiny.
As the Committee is aware, I set out the Government’s position on this matter in considerable detail in my written ministerial statement from 23 April. I therefore intend to focus my remarks on providing useful further points of clarification about the rationale for the proposed reforms and how we see the system operating once they have been made.
In her remarks, the hon. Member for North Herefordshire conceded that the NSIP process can take a long time, but she implied that the problem was merely confined to individual applications. The Government disagree. From our perspective, the problem that these and other changes in this chapter are intended to remedy are systemic. The status quo is not working, and all too often it is burdensome to applicants and consultees alike.
We know that the performance of the NSIP regime as a whole has deteriorated sharply over recent years. We know that pre-application periods have, on average, nearly doubled since 2013, increasing from over 14 months to nearly 28 months in 2021. As much as Labour Members welcome any and every reminder of the chaos unleashed under recent Conservative Administrations, I do not believe that the deterioration we are discussing can be attributed to the uncertainty that the post-2016 period engendered.
The evidence clearly points to the fact that inefficiencies in the NSIP system, both structural and cultural, are driving delays and high costs. We heard examples this morning of the fact that the documentation underpinning consents has been getting longer, and in too many instances now runs to tens of thousands of pages. Part of the reason is that the statutory and prescriptive nature of the pre-application requirements—I again remind the Committee that they are absent from other planning regimes, including those used for applications for new housing—are driving perverse outcomes.
It is precisely because the requirements are statutory that applicants fear that falling short of them will see their project rejected further down the line, or leave them exposed to judicial review. As we have discussed, the result is that projects are slowed down as developers undertake ever more rounds of consultation and produce greater amounts of documentation to ensure that the requirements are met. Sensible improvements are deterred because applicants worry that they will require further rounds of consultation to insulate them from challenge.
In short, as I argued in the previous sitting, the dynamics of the system are actively encouraging risk aversion and gold-plating and are compelling applicants to go above and beyond what may be required in law, rather than merely ensuring that an application is acceptable in planning terms. Because the root of the problem is the statutory nature of the requirements, it is worth noting that the same behavioural incentives would be in play if we reinserted into the Bill precise statutory criteria for what constitutes effective consultation, as the hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington suggested we should.
In his contribution, the shadow Minister argued that we should focus on improving rather than removing the statutory requirements in question. However, he overlooked the fact that the NSIP action plan, published by the previous Government in February 2023, contained a range of reforms designed to drive more effective and proportionate approaches to consultation and engagement, including new cost-recoverable pre-application services for applicants at the Planning Inspectorate, and revised and strengthened pre-application guidance.
While those steps were welcome, and this Government are seeking to embed new services and cost-recovery mechanisms, the feedback we have received from a wide range of stakeholders suggests that they will not deliver the necessary step change needed to tackle risk aversion and gold-plating. It is the dynamic that has arisen as a result of the very existence of the statutory pre-application requirements in question that is hampering their nominal purpose of producing better outcomes, and the present arrangements are driving up costs not only for developers, but for the bill payers and taxpayers we all represent.
The Government are in complete agreement with the hon. Member for North Herefordshire that early, meaningful and constructive engagement with those affected, including local authorities, statutory consultees, landowners and local communities, often leads to better schemes, greater local benefits and improved mitigation. We still want and expect the NSIP regime to function on the basis of a front-loaded approach in which development proposals are thoroughly scoped and refined prior to being submitted to the Planning Inspectorate. As part of that process, we still want and expect high-quality, early, meaningful and constructive engagement to take place and for positive changes to be made to applications. However, we want and expect it to take place without the downsides that the current statutory requirements are causing.
Removing the statutory requirements in question does not signify that pre-submission consultation and high-quality engagement is no longer important. Statutory guidance that the Government will be required to produce will encourage such pre-application engagement and consultation, but with applicants given the flexibility to carry it out in the way that they consider best for their proposed development, in accordance with that guidance.
Equally as importantly, the system will still reward high-quality engagement and consultation. The Planning Inspectorate will continue to assess whether applications are suitable to proceed to examination. We expect guidance to emphasise that without adequate engagement and consultation, applications are unlikely to be able to do so. Guidance and advice from the Planning Inspectorate will be aimed at helping applicants demonstrate that they are of a satisfactory standard in terms of meeting that process.
Ultimately, all communities will still be able to have their voices heard, whether that is through objecting outright to applications or providing evidence of adverse impacts through the post-submission examination process, which all applications obviously still need to go through.
I do not demur from much of what the Minister says about the provisions. To go back to his remarks about the delays not being caused solely by the chaos under the previous Government, is it not a fact that during the last few years of the Conservative Government, the delays at the decision stage, which is meant to be three months, rocketed?
The regime, which began as one in which every section of it respected the deadlines, became one in which every section respected the deadlines with the exception of the Secretary of State. The intention of those drafting the Planning Act 2008 was that, in such circumstances, a report to Parliament by the Secretary of State when delaying the decision would serve as a disincentive on the Secretary of State for doing so. That clearly has not happened. Will the Minister reflect on whether any other measures could be taken to eliminate the delays caused by Secretaries of State making decisions on NSIPs in future?
It is certainly the case that it is not only in the pre-submission phase where slippages in timeframes have occurred. The hon. Member makes a valid point about the fact that we have seen a pattern in some Departments of Secretaries of State not making timely decisions. This Government have sought to improve upon the past performance. We are already doing so, but I am open to ideas on how we might tighten the process. The Government are giving further thought to the general matter of how consents are taken through Departments.
To conclude, the changes proposed will make a significant contribution to speeding up and streamlining the consenting process for critical infrastructure, and we are convinced that in many cases they will produce better outcomes than the status quo. I therefore urge the Committee to support them.
Amendment 57 agreed to.
Amendment made: 58, in clause 4, page 8, line 32, leave out subsection (3).—(Matthew Pennycook.)
This amendment is consequential on NC44.
Clause 4, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered,
That clause 4 be transferred to the end of line 32 on page 12. —(Matthew Pennycook.)
Clause 5 disagreed to.
Clause 6
Applications for development consent: acceptance stage
Amendments made: 60, in clause 6, page 10, line 4, leave out “follows” and insert
“set out in subsections (2) to (13)”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 68.
Amendment 61, in clause 6, page 10, line 25, after “Secretary of State” insert “and others”.
This amendment is consequential on subsection (5)(d) of NC45.
Amendment 62, in clause 6, page 11, line 4, leave out from “satisfying” to “and” in line 6 and insert
“section 48 (duty to publicise),”.
This amendment is consequential on NC44.
Amendment 63, in clause 6, page 11, leave out lines 12 to 14.
This amendment is consequential on NC44.
Amendment 64, in clause 6, page 11, line 16, leave out “50” and insert “50(1)”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 63.
Amendment 65, in clause 6, page 11, leave out lines 17 to 20.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 63.
Amendment 66, in clause 6, page 11, line 21, leave out subsection (9) and insert—
“(9) Omit subsection (5).”
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 64.
Amendment 67, in clause 6, page 12, line 32, at end insert—
“(14) In consequence of the amendments in subsections (7)(c) and (10), omit section 137(3) and (4) of the Localism Act 2011.”—(Matthew Pennycook.)
This technical amendment omits provisions of the Localism Act 2011 that are no longer required (because of changes made by clause 6 of the Bill).
Clause 6, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 7 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 8
Planning Act 2008: legal challenges
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 8 streamlines the judicial review process for nationally significant infrastructure projects. The changes apply to legal challenges against decisions on development consent orders and national policy statements. At the moment, individuals wanting to bring challenges against nationally significant infrastructure projects, such as nuclear plants, railway lines, wind farms and other projects, have up to three attempts to try to obtain permission from the courts. As noted by Lord Banner’s independent review last year into the delays caused by these legal challenges, each attempt extends the duration of a claim by several weeks, and in some cases, by several months.
The clause will remove the paper permission stage, meaning that applications for judicial review will go straight to an oral hearing in the High Court. The clause will also remove the right to appeal for cases that are deemed totally without merit at the oral hearing, which becomes the only attempt for these cases. The Government are committed to maintaining access to justice, which is why the right of appeal will remain for cases that are refused permission at the oral hearing, but that are not deemed totally without merit. The changes are a necessary means of preventing meritless claims from holding up development by exhausting the appeals process and of ensuring that legitimate legal challenges are heard promptly. I commend the clause to the Committee.
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair this afternoon, Mr Twigg. We touched on the issue of remedy earlier today. A local authority, for example, may have a statutory obligation placed on it by a piece of legislation, which means that it has an obligation to take an interest in a particular development, including potentially judicially reviewing that application, if the impact runs contrary to its other statutory obligations.
We are well aware of issues relating to air quality, but there are also organisations such as ClientEarth, which many of us will have heard of. Essentially, their stock in trade is to look for opportunities to address broader issues around, for example, climate change and environmental impact by using what, in some cases, are arguably loopholes, but in many cases, are essentially contradictions in legislation.
The Minister talked earlier about a shift from having statutory pre-application processes to having guidance that would need to be followed. Clearly, one of the issues is that guidance can be challenged, and bodies that have a responsibility to follow the guidance can be challenged as to whether they have fulfilled their obligation to the letter.
Opposition Members certainly have concerns about the implications of removing the right to judicial review. We share the view that we need to ensure that those processes—those applications—are not frivolous and that they are not being used simply because the cost of responding to judicial review, and the delay that is involved, is a tool to create delay, impose costs and therefore deter development, which we all agree should take place. Conversely, however, we do not wish to see a situation where a public body or a local resident—a constituent—who has a genuine right to be heard and a genuine concern arising out of law is constrained from bringing the matter forward and seeking a remedy.
We also do not want a situation where, for example, a decision by Government, which is then taken through this process and restricted from judicial review, results in a third party, such as a local authority or NHS body, being judicially reviewed for its failure to stop that from proceeding—for its failure to bring a judicial review under other responsibilities that it has. I would be grateful if the Minister could address that.
Statutory consultees already have many legal obligations and duties relating to issues such as water quality, air quality and nature. They are obliged to go to the utmost of their powers to fulfil those obligations. Clearly, they may well be held in default if a development proceeds by virtue of the fact that they have not had the opportunity to appropriately challenge it in law. It would be helpful if the Minister set out how that will be fully addressed.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his reasonable questions. If I have understood him, he makes a separate point about the statutory consultee system. As he will know—I refer him to my relevant written ministerial statement—we are seeking to reform that system in a number of ways.
On clause 8 specifically, the changes will not affect the ability to challenge the lawfulness of Government decisions in court. They are simply designed to reduce delays. We are not preventing anyone from challenging our planning decisions. Obviously, Government do not control how many of those challenges are made. We are tightening up the process so that if a challenge is judged to be meritless by the court—not by Government—it cannot be dragged on for years through numerous further appeals.
Only cases deemed totally without merit in the oral permission hearing in the High Court will be prevented from appealing to the Court of Appeal. Other cases will continue to be able to appeal the refusal of permission to the Court of Appeal. That will ensure that there is no possibility of meritless claims holding up nationally significant infrastructure projects, while maintaining access to justice in line with our domestic and international obligations.
I hope that the hon. Member is reassured that we are not removing wholesale the ability to mount judicial review challenges. Some have called for us to go further, but we think the proposals strike the right balance between addressing the removal of the paper permission stage and dealing with the issue of meritless claims. On that basis, I hope that he is reassured and may even feel inclined to support the measure.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg. Notwith-standing the comments from my fellow shadow Minister, who made an excellent contribution, can I press the Minister on one question? My hon. Friend outlined the Opposition’s concern over removing wholesale—we are not saying that the Minister is doing this—the checks and balances relating to somebody being able to challenge a decision that they deem has not been taken in the right way.
However, it would be remiss of us as a party not to acknowledge that there are cases where JR is used vexatiously. To use an example from my constituency, I waited for 12 years to get a 300-foot extension to Southampton airport’s runway. It took three judicial reviews before we finally got that through. There was unmitigated support from the local authority and me as the Member of Parliament at the time, and it was taken to JR for what I would say were very dubious reasons, just to try to delay the project.
I understand why the Minister is bringing in the measures, notwithstanding some of the concerns that my hon. Friend mentioned about the balance. However, I am reassured by what the Minister said about not removing the ability to challenge and tightening the process around what can be accepted as being without merit.
I have one question for the Minister, which he may not be able to answer today—I would not necessarily expect him to—but perhaps he could write to me about it. Following Lord Banner’s work, which was a thoughtful examination of how legal challenges could be streamlined, has the Minister made any assessments, through officials or the Department, of how much time or cost on average the changes to clause 8 might mean for the system overall? I am not expecting him to get his abacus out and look at that now, but I wonder whether he could outline to the Committee, through an impact assessment, the effect of some of the changes.
We will not push this clause to a Division. We understand the principled reason why the Minister is bringing it forward, even if we have some concern about the detail of the measure.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Twigg. This clause and the other clauses in this chapter are good news for Scotland, because we in Scotland depend on projects in England to proceed. Many projects are cross-border and need consent in both countries. That is important for jobs, particularly jobs for young people.
I have had the misfortune to be involved in infrastructure projects for many years. From time to time judicial reviews without any merit are brought solely to delay and frustrate projects. It is right and proper that the law is changed to make it clear that, once the High Court has made a decision, following argument—because the right to an oral hearing is retained—further appeals are prevented. Such appeals can lead to significant delays, depending on the business of the Court of the Appeal, which has many pressing priorities.
Some mention was made of costs. I will briefly describe the cost to developers, because the Labour party is a pro-business, pro-environment party. If someone has a development that is subject to a judicial review, they have planned their contracting strategy, and what it will cost to build the development, and their financing. If there is an indeterminate delay, and a series of additional delays of unpredictable length—as a lawyer, I could never tell people how long litigation would take—they are then exposed to significant fluctuations in the financial and commodities markets. There are therefore real costs, so I naturally support clause 8. The clause, along with the rest of the package of reforms to the development consent order regime, will create the opportunity for significant additional employment in Scotland, jobs for our young people, and great net zero and housing projects.
I thank the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Hamble Valley, for his constructive tone on this clause—and others; I do not mean to confine his constructive attitude to just this clause. I welcome his praise for Lord Banner’s review, which I agree was thoughtful and insightful. As part of that review Lord Banner made it clear that although the duration differs between different applications, each attempt to apply for a judicial review currently extends the duration of a claim by, on average, several weeks, and in some cases by several months. In large numbers of cases, time is added by legal challenges that are unsuccessful. The changes made by the Bill aim to strike the right balance between improving efficiency and ensuring access to justice.
To be clear, this clause does remove the paper permission stage, but only makes changes by removing the right to appeal for cases that are deemed “totally without merit”. Other cases will retain that right of appeal if they are deemed to be with merit and able to be considered. We think these changes will make a difference to the time that projects take to work their way through the system, and we will work with the judiciary to advance a number of other changes to the process for NSIP judicial reviews, such as introducing target timescales for cases that we think will have a beneficial impact. On that basis, I commend the clause to the Committee.
Clause 9
Connections to electricity network: licence and other modifications
I beg to move amendment 36, in clause 9, page 14, line 6, after “distribution system” insert
“(and such an improvement may include changing the order in which connections are made)”.
This amendment clarifies that the purpose for which the power under clause 9(1) may be exercised may include the making of changes to the order of the queue for connections to a transmission or distribution system.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 37 to 40.
Clause stand part.
Clauses 10 and 11 stand part.
New clause 19—Increasing grid capacity—
The Secretary of State must, within three months of the passing of this Act, lay before Parliament a plan to—
(a) reduce the cost of, and time taken to make, connections to the transmission or distribution system;
(b) permit local energy grids.
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to produce a plan to reduce the time and financial cost of connections to the electricity grid and to allow local energy grids.
It is a pleasure to serve under you, Mr Twigg. We thought a change in the tone of the Committee for a few clauses would be helpful, before we return to the other Minister.
Amendment 36 clarifies that a modification made under clause 9 may include changes to the order of the queue for connections, which works towards the broader aim of improving the management of connections to the transmission and distribution systems. The purpose of all this work is to reorder the connections queue. That is essential to deal with the extreme level of oversubscription in the queue, and enable a move from the “first come, first served” proposition that we have at the moment to a “first ready and needed, first connected” approach. The amendment is essential to fulfil the intent of the clauses, which is to provide the means to implement connections reform should the current Ofgem and industry-led process face delays or be unable to realise its benefits in full.
Amendment 37 clarifies that the power of the Secretary of State to direct Ofgem to modify a licence or agreement may be exercised only for the purpose of improving the management of connections to the transmission or distribution system, which places an additional safeguard on the use of that power. Amendment 38 clarifies that the Secretary of State or Ofgem may modify an agreement under the powers in clause 9 even where the effect of the modification might amount to a repudiation of the agreement, which provides consistency with the existing wording in clause 12. It is also essential to fulfil the intent of the clauses. Finally, amendments 39 and 40, which are purely consequential on amendment 38, move the definition of “qualifying distribution agreement” within clause 9.
I turn to clause 9 more broadly. As many Members will know, the current first come, first served electricity grid connections regime is causing considerable and unacceptable delays. It is blocking clean power projects from connecting to the grid, and blocking demand projects that are critical to our economic growth as a country. The National Energy System Operator—NESO—and Ofgem are reforming the electricity grid connections process to a strategically aligned first ready, first connected system. The reformed process will require projects to meet readiness, technological and locational criteria to progress.
The reform requires complex amendments to codes and licences. Clause 9 therefore enables the Secretary of State or Ofgem to support the existing connections reforms by directly amending electricity licences, and associated documents or agreements, should that prove necessary. It is intended to be used should the existing processes enacting connections reforms face significant delays, including alignment with strategic energy plans. The Government or Ofgem will then be able to expedite a set of changes outside the standard process to ensure that our clean power mission is delivered at pace. The clause is focused on improving the management of connections to the transmission or distribution system, and follows precedent in being time-limited to three years after commencement of the power on Royal Assent. Similar powers have been taken in the past, including in section 84 of the Energy Act 2008, but they were also time-limited and are therefore no longer in force.
Clause 10 details the scope of the power in clause 9, which enables the Secretary of State or Ofgem to make amendments to electricity licences and associated documents or agreements. The clause first defines the power to modify in clause 9, which includes the ability to amend, add to or remove provisions, and to add or release parties from agreements. It will enable the Secretary of State or Ofgem to support Ofgem and NESO’s existing connections reforms by directly amending electricity licences, and associated documents or agreements, should that prove necessary.
The clause further details how the Secretary of State or Ofgem can exercise the power, which includes allowing for general or specific modifications, incidental changes and provisions that do not necessarily relate to the activities authorised by the licence. It ensures that modifications to standard licence conditions are reflected in future licences, and specifies the conditions under which licences can be revoked. Finally, it allows agreements to include conditions that must be met before the taking of specific steps, or provision about the procedure for varying the agreement. Similar scope and procedure have been outlined previously in legislation, including in the Nuclear Energy (Financing) Act 2022.
Clause 11 details the procedure around the provision in clause 9 to enable the Secretary of State or Ofgem to make amendments to electricity licences and associated documents. It aligns with the precedent established in section 8 of the 2022 Act, which detailed the procedure to modify a generation licence of a relevant licensee nuclear company. The clause obligates the Secretary of State or Ofgem—I am not sure how many more times I will say that in this speech—to consult a list of specified persons, such as the holder of any relevant licences, NESO and any other appropriate individuals, before making modifications. Details of those modifications must be made public as soon as reasonably practicable to ensure transparency with wider stakeholders. However, the Secretary of State or Ofgem can exclude from the publication any information that could harm commercial interests.
I will respond on new clause 19 after it has been spoken to.
What I have to say about these clauses will not be arduous, partly because I am not a shadow Energy Minister—as many Members will be pleased to note, including me—and my focus will be on the planning amendments. This is, however, a very important part of the Bill.
The Minister said he keeps mentioning “Ofgem and the Secretary of State”, but if he would like us to helpfully have a word with the Prime Minister to recommend that he becomes the Secretary of State, we are more than happy to do so. The Opposition believe that even he, as the Under-Secretary, could not do as much damage to our energy system networks and future growth as the Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Doncaster North (Ed Miliband). [Interruption.] It is a policy disagreement.
This is a policy disagreement because, looking at the proposals in these clauses, we are very concerned. We obviously agree that the grid needs to be ready to connect to, because of the demands being placed on the system, and that is the policy of this Government and of the last. However, the focus of the current Secretary of State in really going down the route of the net zero agenda at what we would describe as a very fast speed, sometimes cutting off his nose to spite his face such as by cutting back on some of the energy systems we currently have, has put overwhelming demand on the energy grid.
The Government’s proposed decarbonising of the grid by 2030 will add at least £25 billion per year to the cost of the electricity system. The brunt of this increase will be felt by the people out there, who will see their household energy bill shoot up by over £900. Professor Gordon Hughes, the leading energy system expert, has found that these plans will increase power generation costs, grid balancing and capacity levels, thereby passing on those costs to our constituents.
The costs of balancing the grid alone are set to rise by £4 billion. Despite that, the Government have scrapped the full system cost review commissioned by the last Government. The current Administration are steaming ahead without a clear understanding of the impact on the energy bills of hard-working people—the energy bills they promised to freeze—on their families and on the industry’s competitiveness. Decarbonising the grid requires transparency on costs, not just soundbites about renewables, which I believe is what we have seen.
The Government have also watered down the proposed community benefits of new energy infrastructure, which they lauded before the press a couple of weeks ago, to just £750 per person.
From a sedentary position, the Minister says, “Just”, under his breath. It was not me who went to the BBC and leaked a report saying that the Government were going to give more money than they are now proposing; that has been reduced by his amendment, so, yes—“just”.
Furthermore, the Government have abandoned a number of reforms, including a review of the presumption in favour of overhead lines, stronger protection for prime agricultural land against large solar developments, and enhanced safety measures for battery storage facilities. Expanding and improving the electricity system is necessary, but it must be done in a way that balances affordability, reliability and community concerns. We are concerned that the clauses in the Bill remove this transparency and add costs, but will not deliver the streamlined or more rapid benefits to the system that the Minister outlined.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Twigg. I rise to speak to new clause 19. First, the Liberal Democrat members of this Committee support a lot of what the Government are proposing in this part of the Bill. Creating electricity grids of the future is a critical route to decarbonising and has the potential to reduce consumer bills.
It is much to the UK’s credit that we are making good progress in efforts to decarbonise our electricity generation. Wind and solar in particular account for a growing share of our power generation. However, the transition from one-way transmission of electricity from a small number of very large power stations to a more distributed and multi-directional movement of power creates some challenges. We are going to need major upgrades of our electricity grid to accommodate the growing number of solar installations, as an example, more of which my hon. Friends and I would like to see on new and existing buildings. Making further progress will help our national energy security and reduce consumer bills at a time when energy inflation and the cost of living are still significant problems.
There are examples where cost and/or process have acted as barriers to the ability to feed surplus solar energy into the grid, or to the commissioning of new clean and renewable electricity production. Local energy grids have the potential to benefit communities and use the energy much closer to its source of generation. Therefore our proposed new clause would go further than the Government in the current Bill. It requires the Secretary of State to, within three months of the passing of this Bill, lay before Parliament a plan for how the Government will facilitate the creation of local energy grids and deal with the cost and time of grid connections. I hope the Minister and hon. Members on the Government Benches will embrace this amendment as a way to help continue our country’s journey towards becoming a clean, renewable energy superpower.
I will first respond to a few points in the debate generally. My hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow East—across the Clyde from my constituency—made the absolutely right point that sums up what this connections reform process is all about: the absence of reforming the queue is driving away investment. Reform is critical for investment in our generation capacity and for how we connect demand projects that will be so important for unlocking economic growth. With more than 750 gigawatts currently in the queue to connect in the UK, the truth is there is no scope for that to happen without some radical reform of the queue. The Conservative party, when in government, recognised that that was a challenge and had already set about some reforms to make that happen.
We think we need to go even further. The shadow Minister, in a ray of honesty, said he was glad he was not the shadow Energy Minister. Based on the script on net zero, I think we are all fortunate that he is not the shadow Energy Minister, frankly, but it is the same script we are hearing from everyone at the moment.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Twigg. Might it not be that the hon. Member for Hamble Valley is embarrassed by his party on net zero? After all, on 17 January he said:
“I will conclude—many will be pleased to hear—by reaffirming the Conservative party’s strong commitment to the UK’s target of reaching net zero by 2050”—[Official Report, 17 January 2025; Vol. 760, c. 650.]—
only for that to be scrapped by his leader exactly two months later.
There is always a quote, as they say, and my hon. Friend is always there with the quotes at his fingertips, which is helpful. The truth is that the only way we are going to bring down bills and deliver energy security is the sprint to clean power. This is a crucial element of that, and of how we unlock investment—predominantly private investment—over the next few years as we build that clean power system. Even if we were not doing that, the grid is essential. It is an essential part of how we deliver electricity to homes, businesses and industry and it is critical that we upgrade it anyway.
The Minister talks about energy security and bringing down bills, and of course we need to have more renewables online to do that, but we also need to issue new oil and gas licences so that we can produce more energy at home. That would help with what he is suggesting.
We are straying far from new clause 19, which I am keen to return to, but the hon. Gentleman is simply wrong on that point. Gas traded on the international market is exactly why all our constituents pay more on their energy bills. The answer is to get off gas as the marginal price setter, not to have even more of it.
The hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington made a helpful speech, although I will resist his new clause. We are in agreement about the issue of connection delays and the first come, first served process not working, and it is important that we reform that. We are of the view that our proposals do that, and the National Energy System Operator has worked with Ofgem and is of the view they are sufficient to do that.
The question of local power and local grids is an interesting approach that we are looking at. We take seriously the role of community-owned power—it is in the Great British Energy Bill, recognising our commitment to it—but we do not see it in itself as a barrier to what we are trying to do here. The infrastructure, including for local networks, that incorporates generation and demand is already permitted under the existing system. It can be constructed and operated by distribution network operators, by independent network operators or by a private wire under a statutory licence exemption provision.
We agree about the importance of community energy and are looking at a range of things, in particular at how communities might to sell power locally. They are all important points, and all this is how we will unlock the social and economic benefits of the clean power transition. For the reasons I have outlined, and because we think it is already entirely possible, we will resist new clause 19.
People in Taunton and Wellington are four-square behind new clause 19, but it was my hon. Friend the Member for Didcot and Wantage who spoke to it.
I betray my lack of English geography. I am sorry, but I assume that the hon. Members for Taunton and Wellington and for Didcot and Wantage are both in complete agreement with new clause 19. In any event, I thank them, but disagree with them both, instead of just one of them. I commend Government amendments 36 to 40 and clauses 9 to 11 to the Committee.
Amendment 36 agreed to.
Amendments made: 37, in clause 9, page 14, line 8, at end insert—
“(3A) The Secretary of State may exercise the power under subsection (3) only for the purpose mentioned in subsection (2).”
The amendment makes it clear that the power of the Secretary of State to direct the GEMA to modify a licence or agreement may only be exercised for the purpose of improving the purpose of managing connections to the transmission or distribution system.
Amendment 38, in clause 9, page 14, line 15, at end insert—
“(5A) A relevant authority may under subsection (1) modify an agreement mentioned in subsection (1)(e) or a qualifying distribution agreement even if the effect of the modification might amount to a repudiation of the agreement.”
This amendment ensures consistency with clause 12(8) in clarifying that modifications made to a particular connection or distribution agreement under clause 9(1) may be made even if the effect of the modification might amount to the repudiation of that agreement.
Amendment 39, in clause 9, page 14, line 16, leave out subsection (6).
This amendment, together with amendment 40 moves the definition of “qualifying distribution agreement” into subsection (7); this change is consequential on amendment 38.
Amendment 40, in clause 9, page 14, line 27, at end insert—
“‘qualifying distribution agreement’ means—
(a) the terms subject to which a connection is made by an electricity distributor in pursuance of section 16(1) of the Electricity Act 1989, or
(b) a special connection agreement as defined by section 22(1) of that Act;”.—(Michael Shanks.)
See the explanatory statement for amendment 39.
Clause 9, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 10 and 11 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 12
Directions to modify connection agreements
I beg to move amendment 41, in clause 12, page 16, line 8, leave out subsection (1).
The effect of this amendment is that a relevant authority may give a direction under clause 12 without first having exercised its powers under clause 9(1) to modify an electricity licence or an electricity industry code.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 42 to 47.
Clause stand part.
Government amendment 41 will allow the Secretary of State or Ofgem to direct the NESO or a distribution network operator to amend an agreement under the clause without the need to have previously modified licences, codes and associated documents under clause 9. Without the amendment, the Secretary of State would not be able to use the power to direct the National Energy System Operator or a DNO had not the modification powers in clause 9 —to make changes to licences, codes and associated documents—also been exercised. The amendment will mean that the directive power in clause 12 is no longer contingent on the use of the powers in clause 9.
An example of where the amendment would be needed is if an Ofgem and NESO-led process to amend licences and codes under the framework is successful, meaning that the powers in clause 9 do not need to be used, but the NESO or DNO has not accordingly amended its agreements with customers connecting to the electricity network. The directive powers could be used to ensure that the implementation of connections reform is successful.
I have a couple of questions. As my hon. Friend the Member for Hamble Valley has set out, we are broadly supportive of the direction of travel around energy in the Bill.
One of the things we are all conscious of with the move to renewables being the main source of power in the grid—something that the UK has achieved faster than most other countries, with a bigger drop compared with the 1990 baseline than any other developed economy —is that it makes the grid more complex. Unlike oil, gas and nuclear, which can be delivered in an entirely predictable manner, renewables are generally much less predictable. There are times when the wind does not blow and the sun does not shine, and we cannot therefore put that element into the grid. We need to find alternative methods so we need to be able to shift greater amounts of power around to meet the growing energy needs.
As the Minister has outlined, the regime that is envisaged will, for a limited period of time, give greater powers to the Government to determine who gets connected and in which order. First, will the Minister set out how he and the Government intend to feed back to Parliament what we learn from that process, to inform the future shape of our energy grid?
Secondly, what recourse will there be for those at a certain point in the queue who anticipate that their development, whatever it may be, will be served by a particular project and connected at a particular point, if the Government decide otherwise because the reordering of the queue is, in the Minister’s view, necessary? We all understand why that may happen, but if someone is about to invest in a major new carbon capture and storage facility—the sort of major infrastructure project that the Bill is designed to support—and they expect it to be powered by a wind farm but are then told they have been moved much further down the queue than they expected, that will affect the delivery of that project. It would be helpful to understand the process whereby those affected by the reordering of the queue are able to challenge the decision, if necessary, and certainly to engage with the Government, or with constituency MPs, who may seek to advocate for them, so that the reordering can be revisited if necessary.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for those helpful questions. He rightly set out the fact that the grid is already considerably more complex than it was 20 or 30 years ago, and it will become more complex, which is partly why the reform of connections is so important.
The hon. Gentleman is right to say that the process of prioritising projects will mean that some will be deprioritised. We have looked at the projects that already have a connection date, and in many cases they will proceed. Viable generation projects above the capacity ranges outlined in the clean power action plan—the first strategic document that will be used to guide projects—might still be able to connect if there is capacity in that particular bit of the DNO after the prioritised projects have been assessed. If there is no space in the pre-2030 queue, they will be offered dates in the 2031-35 process.
We have been clear throughout that the process has not been arbitrary or theoretical. Ofgem and NESO have gone through individual applications that are currently in the process to make sure not only that they fit with the requirements of the clean power action plan but that projects are not unnecessarily disadvantaged. Some projects will go ahead even though they are not in the strategic plan, because where they already are in the grid will make it possible for them to go ahead.
The question of transparency is really important. I will come back to the Committee with details on how we might make the information public, but throughout the process Ofgem and NESO have made public as much information as possible about how they have gone about things, and there was a full public consultation as well. The point about how individual MPs can see whether projects in their constituency are affected is well made and I will take that away and reflect on it.
The critical fact, as the previous Government rightly recognised, is that 750-plus GW is simply unmanageable. Really good projects are sitting with dates long into the future but cannot connect because of what are often phantom projects that are never going to come to fruition and are holding up spaces in the queue. For all the reasons that the hon. Gentleman outlined in terms of the importance of energy security, and the importance of prioritising the queue, we think that the Government amendments and the clause are essential.
Amendment 41 agreed to.
Amendments made: 42, in clause 12, page 16, line 17, leave out
“as mentioned in subsection (1)(c)”
and insert
“in accordance with the conditions of an electricity licence”.
This amendment is consequential on amendment 41.
Amendment 43, in clause 12, page 16, line 22, after “distribution system” insert
“(and such an improvement may include changing the order in which connections are made)”.
This amendment clarifies that the purpose for which a direction may be given under clause 12 may include the making of changes to the order of the queue for connections to a transmission or distribution system.
Amendment 44, in clause 12, page 16, line 23, leave out subsections (4) and (5) and insert—
“( ) A direction under subsection (2) must describe the kinds of modification to be made by the person to whom it is given.”
This amendment inserts a new subsection which would mean that a direction made by the Secretary of State or the GEMA to the ISOP or an electricity distributor to modify an agreement must describe the kinds of modification required.
Amendment 45, in clause 12, page 16, line 38, at end insert—
“(7A) Before giving a direction under subsection (2), the relevant authority must consult—
(a) the person to whom it proposes to give the direction, and
(b) such other persons as the relevant authority considers appropriate.
(7B) Subsection (7A) may be satisfied by consultation carried out before the passing of this Act (as well as by consultation carried out after that time).
(7C) A relevant authority must publish details of any direction it gives under subsection (2) as soon as reasonably practicable after the direction is given.
(7D) A relevant authority may exclude from publication under subsection (7C) any information the publication of which would be likely to prejudice the commercial interests of any person.”
This amendment requires a relevant authority to carry out consultation before giving a direction under clause 12. It also requires a relevant authority to publish any direction it gives under the clause.
Amendment 46, in clause 12, page 16, line 41, at end insert—
“(8A) The power to give a direction under subsection (2) may not be exercised after the end of the period of three years beginning with the day on which this section comes into force.”
This amendment ensures that the power to give a direction under clause 12 is time-limited in the same way as the power to make modifications to licences and other documents under clause 9.
Amendment 47, in clause 12, page 17, line 10, at end insert—
“(11) In Schedule 6A to the Electricity Act 1989 (provisions imposing obligations enforceable as relevant requirements)—
(a) in paragraph 4A (electricity system operator), after sub-paragraph (c) insert—
‘(d) section 12(8) of the Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025 (duty to comply with direction under section 12 of that Act).’;
(b) in paragraph 5 (distribution licence holders), after sub-paragraph (g) insert—
‘(h) section 12(8) of the Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025 (duty to comply with direction under section 12 of that Act).’”—(Michael Shanks.)
This amendment amends Schedule 6A to the Electricity Act 1989 in order to provide for enforcement of the duty to comply with a direction given under clause 12.
Clause 12, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 13
Managing connections to the network: strategic plans etc
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 13 will require NESO and the DNOs to have regard to strategic plans designated by the Secretary of State when they carry out functions related to connections. The Secretary of State will designate one or more strategic plans, with the current intention that this will include the clean power 2030 action plan in the first instance and the strategic spatial energy plan going forward. There is precedent in imposing a duty on a body to have regard to a strategic document—for example, the designated strategy and policy statement under section 165 of the Energy Act 2023, which outlines the Government’s strategic priorities, policy outcomes, and the roles and responsibilities of those involved in implementing energy policy.
Let me turn to the detail of the objects set out in the clause. It amends part 5 of the Energy Act 2023 to include a duty for NESO to have regard to designated strategic plans. It also amends the Electricity Act 1989 to place a duty on DNOs to have regard to any designated strategic plan, and adds a further exception to the duty on DNOs to connect in cases where it would not be in accordance with the designated strategic plans. The clause will support the implementation of ongoing connections reforms led by NESO and Ofgem, and will provide guidance and support for NESO and DNOs in making decisions on issuing new connection offers. I commend the clause to the Committee.
The Minister has been clear in outlining how the clause relates to the previous clauses, and how he wants to overwhelmingly reform the electricity system. I do not see the clause as particularly controversial; it moves on from what he has previously described. Despite my previous speech—I have nothing against the Minister—the Opposition obviously want to be constructive where we possibly can be. The clause is simple and enables the process to carry on, and we will not contest it.
Normally, the hon. Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine is my sparring partner in both the Scotland and energy spaces, so it is nice that he has made an appearance in this debate, but I disagree with his amendment. The main reason is that it concerns a devolved competence. This is a UK Government Bill and it is right, given that the resource of local planning decisions and planning authorities is devolved to Scottish Ministers, that they make the decision on how they resource statutory consultees and local planning authorities.
On the point about community benefits, the Scottish Government already have an established process. The 10-year onshore wind ban in England was not in place in Scotland, and the process of good practice for community benefits for onshore wind, for example, is already quite well developed. Processes are in place. Over the past 12 months, developers have offered more than £30 million in community benefits.
We are, of course, exploring all options and the Bill includes bill discounts for network infrastructure—we will come to that shortly—but we are open to much more on community benefits generally, because we agree that if communities are hosting nationally important infrastructure, they should benefit, as the hon. Member for Hamble Valley rightly said. However, for the reasons I have outlined—this is a devolved competence and not a matter for me as a UK Government Minister—we hope the hon. Gentleman will withdraw the amendment.
I completely understand where the Minister is coming from. He does not want to tread on the toes of devolved Administrations. I thought he might be more encouraged to do so, considering that the Scottish Government are run by the Scottish National party, which is not doing a very good job at the moment. However, I also understand that he may not want to give them any more money to screw up the job that they are doing.
Good—we have some consensus across the Committee. However, the Minister should not be fearful about giving those Ministers greater powers in this respect. We are trying to enable a greater amount of money to be devolved to the local authorities that are going to be directly responsible for ensuring community benefits from community infrastructure for the people who elect them. The Minister has said throughout our discussions that it is important to be transparent and to be able to resource some of the radical reform he is making. He should not be fearful—
I do not disagree with a single thing that the hon. Gentleman has just said, but it is not for me to dictate to the Scottish Government. They are democratically elected, and as much as I may disagree with much of what they do, they are none the less the Government of Scotland, and if they want to ringfence funding for a particular part of the process, they should be able to do so. In particular, diverting any funding away from the more speedy processing of planning applications would not be in the interests of the projects we want taken forwards. It is not that I disagree with him, but this is a devolved competence.
I thank the Minister for that, and I agree with him that it is a devolved competence—that is a fact—but he could be giving Scottish Ministers and constituents in Scotland a present by allowing the Government to make those decisions.
It is not just that the Government could be taking money from Scottish Ministers and giving it to local authorities under proposed new subsection (4)(a), but there is scope in the amendment for Scottish Ministers—the devolved Ministers—to be given the power to allocate consumer benefits packages where they think fit. That is strengthening the hand of devolved Ministers, not taking anything away from them. [Interruption.] The Minister says, “It doesn’t stop them.” No, but this would strengthen their hand. I think that giving devolved Ministers the power to give consumer benefits packages to Scottish people who are affected by infrastructure is a good thing.
I am not the intellectual powerhouse of the House of Commons, but even I can calculate that we would not win if we pushed this to a vote, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I beg to move amendment 84, in clause 14, page 18, line 36, at end insert—
“Consultation requirements (Scotland)
1B (1) Where an application is made to the Scottish Ministers for consent under section 36 or 37, the Scottish Ministers must provide for the holding of a public consultation.
(2) The Scottish Ministers may by regulations make provision about the holding of consultations.
(3) Regulations may include—
(a) the length of consultation periods in urban and rural areas;
(b) requirements on applicants to publish the projected local economic benefits and other specified information in advance of a consultation;
(c) requirements on applicants to respond to or demonstrate consideration of submissions to consultations.”
The amendment stands in the name of my hon. Friend for—
The amendment stands in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Gordon and Buchan (Harriet Cross). Just as the Minister is not an expert on the south coast, I am not an expert on Scottish constituencies, particularly as they all changed their names at the last boundary review.
This simple amendment would introduce additional consultation requirements. It is in a similar vein to amendment 81, which, with your permission, Mr Twigg, I intend to move later. It would enable community and public consultations when an application goes forward. As I said in the last debate, I do not think it is unreasonable that, when an application is put forward, members of the public should have a public consultation to hear about the perceived benefits and to challenge the organisations trying to bring forward infrastructure projects. We must also accept that consultations can take effect in a number of ways, based on whether the infrastructure is being built in rural or urban areas.
This is a simple amendment that seeks to make sure that, when an application goes forward, Scottish Ministers have the powers that the Minister has outlined to ensure there is a public consultation, so that the people on the ground who are genuinely affected by such infrastructure projects have a say and see the transparency that we hope the Bill will put in place.
Amendment 84, tabled by the hon. Member for Gordon and Buchan (Harriet Cross), concerns public consultations under sections 36 and 37 of the Electricity Act 1989. It is worth making it clear that the planning systems of Scotland and of England and Wales are very different, and the starting points are very different.
The 1989 Act—which we will come to shortly, in relation to the necessary updates to consents more widely—provides for the process of notification and objection at the application stage. This is very different from aspects of the planning regulations in England and Wales, in that there are already opportunities for consultations, but clause 14 creates a further power to make regulations to set out such matters relating to applications for consent, including a pre-application consultation requirement. That requirement will be set out in regulations rather than in primary legislation, but its purpose is to ensure that the application is proportionate, adaptable and future-proofed.
As much as I politically disagree with the incumbent Scottish Government, we have been working together incredibly effectively, since we came into government, on some key aspects. The reforms of the 1989 Act are a good example. To take the earlier point about the changing energy system, that Act was legislation for a different time, and the planning system in Scotland has not kept pace with the reforms in the rest of the United Kingdom. The reforms that we are proposing give Scottish Ministers a framework to introduce regulations to allow for a pre-application consultation process, and to give both communities and statutory consultees meaningful opportunities to influence applications and have a voice early in the process. For that reason, I see much of amendment 84 as replicating provisions already in the Bills, so I hope the hon. Member for Hamble Valley will withdraw it.
I thought the Minister would recommend that I withdraw the amendment. I will put on the record that I am delighted that the Minister believes in pre-application consultation, because in one breath this morning—
The Minister has had his say. All I am saying, politely, is that in a different provision of the Bill, the Government have completely removed pre-application consultation for nationally significant projects, yet the Under-Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero believes in them. He does not want to accept our amendment to ensure transparent public consultation because pre-application consultation is strong enough already, and the public will be able to have their concerns looked at. The Minister says that they are different systems, but the principles are exactly the same. Ministers cannot rely on that argument for this amendment but not accept the same argument for amendments considered by the Committee earlier. However, as a realist, I know that this will not go very far. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I beg to move amendment 81, in clause 14, page 19, line 9, leave out from “application,” to end of line 12 and insert—
“(b) consider the objection and the reporter’s final report,
(c) hold a public hearing, and
(d) allow a period of one month to elapse
before determining whether to give their consent.”
This amendment would require the Scottish Ministers to hold a public hearing and allow one month to elapse before determining whether to give consent to an application for new generating stations or overhead lines under sections 36 or 37 of the Electricity Act 1989.
The amendment is in the name of the shadow Scottish Secretary and acting shadow Energy Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine, who I know the Minister would be delighted to hear from—[Interruption.] I heard the “boo”. Amendment 81 is similar to amendment 84 but more specific. I suspect that the Minister will come back with the same argument, so I will take only a short time on this. The amendment would require Scottish Ministers to hold a public hearing, and allow one month to elapse before determining whether to give consent to an application for new generating stations or overhead lines under sections 36 or 37 of the Electricity Act 1989.
Put simply, that would allow local residents the right to provide feedback on proposed infrastructure. I am sure that hon. Members from both sides of the House will agree that it is right that people can have their voices listened to by Scottish Ministers and the Scottish Government. The amendment would create one mechanism to ensure fairness in the planning system, by allowing not only the pre-application consultation but people to generally give feedback and a say, as they currently can in the English planning system. If the Minister is not minded to accept the amendment, I would be grateful if he wrote to me and the shadow Scottish Secretary, or acting shadow Energy Secretary.
Both—that is the world we are in, unfortunately. I would be grateful if the Minister could see if there is an opportunity for a meeting between himself and that shadow Minister on how we can strengthen the grassroots-level consultation that is important to the system. I look forward to the Minister’s response. If we could secure some unofficial channels on how we can strengthen this clause when we get to further stages, I would be grateful. I will not push the amendment, but I would like the Minister to respond to those concerns.
I thank the shadow Minister for the way he is discussing these topics. I appreciate that they are from a planning system alien to the one with which he is, I am sure, very familiar—I am tempted to say that the shadow Energy Secretary could join him on the Bench, but he is not here.
I understand the point that the shadow Minister is making. For hon. Members who are not familiar with the Scottish system, a public inquiry can be triggered with one objection into the planning system. The public inquiry can take years to conclude and often is not reflective of actual community sentiment on a particular project. This system does not exist in any form anywhere else in the UK. The purpose of these consenting reforms is to deliver significant efficiencies in the consenting process, and to make decisions faster—not necessarily to make positive decisions faster, just to make decisions faster. Introducing another element that feels like the element that we are removing takes away from that.
As I have said previously, there are still significant opportunities for communities to participate in the process. One of the key aspects that we are introducing is the right of a reporter, who is an experienced specialist in planning and consenting, to consider representations about whether there should be a public hearing on a particular process. That reporter will then make the decision about whether it should go forward into a hearing session or a public inquiry. That is rather than what we have at the moment, which is an automatic trigger that holds up projects for a significant length of time.
I am always happy to meet with the shadow Scottish Secretary on a range of things. I am happy to engage with him, because I appreciate that his part of Scotland has a significant amount of network infrastructure being built; but for the reasons I have outlined, this amendment goes counter to our objectives, and does not sit with the reforms we are making to the Scottish planning system, as distinct from the planning system in England and Wales.
I will make a couple of brief remarks as a resident Scottish MP. The Minister has referenced co-operation between the Scottish and UK Governments. That is to be welcomed; it reflects this Government’s determination to do right by Scotland and to work productively with the SNP Government in Holyrood.
These provisions will help to unlock significant investment in Scotland. We heard last week how SSE’s programme of projects, which these provisions help to unlock, will lead to £22 billion of investment by 2030. That is the biggest investment we have seen in the north of Scotland since the second world war. Just think what we could achieve if we had a Labour Government in Scotland as well as in England.
The Minister is right to have worked closely with the Scottish Government on reforming the provisions, which in many cases predate 1989, because the 1989 Act was a consolidation. He is right to have worked productively with the Scottish Government, putting Scotland first, because that will give rise to significant investment and jobs—jobs for our young people and high-quality jobs—as well as access for the people of Great Britain to greater volumes of fixed-price electricity that is not subject to fluctuations in wholesale markets, as we have seen over the last few years.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause 15 stand part.
New clause 53—Reforms to consenting process for electricity infrastructure in Scotland—
“Where any reforms to the consenting process for electricity infrastructure in Scotland are proposed, the Secretary of State must ensure that such reforms—
(a) do not reduce requirements for community engagement or public consultation;
(b) include measures to address local concerns, environmental impacts, and impacts on all key sectors including but not limited to agriculture and tourism.”
New clause 54—Annual report on consents for electricity infrastructure in Scotland—
“(1) The Secretary of State must annually lay before Parliament a report on applications for consent for electricity infrastructure in Scotland.
(2) A report under this section must include—
(a) the outcomes of each application for consent relating to an energy infrastructure project in Scotland;
(b) evidence of community consultation undertaken in relation to each application and, where applicable, how consultation has influenced the design of the infrastructure to which the application relates; and
(c) estimates of economic benefits to local communities from the relevant project.”
I will begin with a brief explanation as to why clause 14 should stand part of the Bill. I return to the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow East made a moment ago, and one that I have made before, which is that these reforms were in the pipeline under the previous Government. They are reforms to a long-standing piece of legislation that is long due for updating.
I thank officials in my Department and in the Scottish Government for working closely and at speed, with a similar set of objectives and an open-book approach to making this work, to draft the measures in a way that works for all of us. It is a reset of the tone of how we work as two Governments.
On enabling the introduction of pre-application requirements, as the hon. Member for Hamble Valley referenced, in the Scottish legislation there are currently no steps to give the public an opportunity to engage as there are in the NSIP regime in England and Wales. This is about improving the quality and readiness of applications at the submission stage. It is important to say that this was driven by the views of Scottish Ministers, who said that they thought it was a useful process, but it will be directed in detail in regulations so that it can be updated and adapted to situations, unlike the process that we have in England and Wales at the moment, which has been held back and has added time and complexity to projects and not delivered what it was intended to do. It will give Scottish Ministers the powers to charge fees for pre-application services, enabling them to better support applicants in developing good-quality applications.
Secondly, the clause establishes a power to set time limits through regulations for key stages of the consenting process, which will support the timely determination of applications and bring down overall processing times. Thirdly, it will establish a proportionate process for responding to objections by relevant planning authorities through a reporter-led examination process. The reporter will choose the most appropriate procedure for gathering any further information they need to provide recommendations in a final report to Scottish Ministers. That may include inquiry sessions, where the reporter considers that that is the best approach to take to address particular issues. Such an approach is similar to the well-established process in which appeals in the town and country planning decisions are currently addressed.
Clause 15 enables regulations to be made that prescribe new processes to vary electricity infrastructure consents in Scotland after they have been granted. The clause addresses the current anomaly that there is no prescribed procedure for holders of overhead line consents to apply to Scottish Ministers for a variation to their consents. The current position forces consent holders to make full consent applications in order to authorise often very modest variations. The clause also allows Scottish Ministers to vary an existing generating station or overhead lines consent due to changes in environmental circumstances or technological changes. Such variations will be made with the agreement of the consent holder. Finally, the clause allows Scottish Ministers to correct any errors or omissions made in consents for generating stations or overhead lines.
I will come back to the new clauses later, but I want first to underline the importance of the consenting process. In Scotland, we generate a significant amount of electricity, and there are further projects in the pipeline, including both floating offshore wind and onshore wind. It is critical that there is an off-taker for that power in the rest of the UK, and that requires us to build significantly more network infrastructure to bring that clean power to where it is required. Although these changes to consenting relate to Scotland, they are of critical importance for the energy security of the whole United Kingdom.
I would like to move new clauses 53 and 54, but I would like to hear what the Minister has to say about them first.
The shadow Minister wants to hear more! New clause 54 is in the name of the hon. Member for Gordon and Buchan (Harriet Cross)—I want the shadow Minister to say, “Gordon and Buchan”, just so I can hear his pronunciation. The clause would require the Secretary of State to produce an annual report providing detail of electricity infrastructure consenting decisions made in Scotland in previous years.
As hon. Members will be aware, responsibility for the consenting process for electricity infrastructure in Scotland is devolved to Scottish Government Ministers. The Scottish Government are accountable to the Scottish Parliament—not the UK Parliament—for the decisions that they make, for the rationale behind them and for what information they choose to provide on consenting decisions. I am aware that the Scottish Government publish all their decisions, which includes information about what public consultations have taken place and consultations with community councils, for example.
It would be inappropriate and potentially duplicative for the Secretary of State to have such an obligation, but fundamentally, to come back to the point I made earlier, there is a particular concern about putting a statutory obligation on what is a devolved power when there is a democratic link between Scottish Ministers and their democratically accountable Parliament, which is the Scottish Parliament and not this Parliament.
Thank you. I must apologise, Mr Twigg; this is the first time I have been a shadow Minister on a Bill Committee and I am a bit rusty, but I am learning very quickly.
I thank the Minister for Energy for being very gentle with me as well when discussing Scottish energy connectivity and Scottish planning. He will understand that beggars cannot be choosers on the number of MPs that we have, but being a Member for what is possibly the most southern part of the south coast that one can get bar the Isle of Wight, I am doing my best to discuss the Scottish planning system. I am grateful for the spirit in which he is responding to our new clauses and amendments. I am also grateful to his officials for their work, too.
I understand what the Minister is saying, and I know his reasons for refusing to accept previous amendments under clause 14, but these new clauses create a parallel system. He is absolutely right that Scottish Ministers are accountable to Scottish people and the Scottish Parliament, but Scottish Members of Parliament here are accountable to their constituents. The Secretary of State also has a role within this Parliament and within this UK Government. On new clause 54, the Minister is quite right to say that the Scottish Parliament already has that reporting mechanism, but I do not think that it is unreasonable that the Secretary of State should be able to do that for Scottish MPs here too; when we have questions to the Secretary of State for Scotland, we discuss UK legislation relating to Scotland.
The Minister keeps saying “reserved”. That is fine, but we have a Secretary of State for Scotland, accountable to a UK Parliament, who represents Scottish constituencies. There is a role for this Parliament to report and to scrutinise the successes of the Scottish Executive and the UK Government, with the Secretary of State having an overarching position as Secretary of State representing Scotland. Scottish Members of Parliament are entitled to the same rights and benefits as Scottish MSPs when scrutinising the Scotland Government north of the border. The Minister wanted me to pronounce “Gordon and Buchan”. I think that is right—I am not sure, but I did my best. Honestly, there are worse ones to pronounce.
Clearly, we are going to disagree on our approach to these two new clauses, but the reason for new clause 53 is exactly the same. I am surprised by the Minister’s reticence in allowing his Scottish colleagues to be able to have the same rights of scrutiny as Scottish MSPs. It is not an arduous new clause. It would not be arduous on the Government or the Scotland Office to produce those outcomes or statistics. It would not be arduous on the Scotland Office or the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero to provide evidence of community consultation, particularly when we have just discussed some of the amendments that the Opposition have tabled on community consultation.
It would also not be arduous for the Scotland Office—or whatever Department would be answering—to provide estimates of economic benefits to local communities. That is exactly why many members of this Committee who represent Scottish constituencies are here in this UK Parliament: to develop policy that brings economic benefits to local communities. The Minister needs to think outside the box and allow Scottish MPs from all parties in this House to have those rights to scrutinise, to develop the economic benefits to local communities. He should not feel so constrained by the Scottish devolved Administration; he should branch out, improve and increase the power of the Scotland Office or his Department, and allow Scottish MPs to have their say in this area of legislation.
I am in danger of going into British constitutional politics 101, but the hon. Gentleman is introducing the West Lothian question.
We have to be very careful given the subject of the amendment. I gave the shadow Minister a bit of leeway.
The shadow Minister is introducing the best example I have heard in a long time of the West Lothian question. The fundamental thing is that this is not a political question about the Scottish Government or the UK Government. There are reserved matters for which this Parliament is responsible for holding UK Government Ministers to account, and there are devolved matters that Scottish Ministers have responsibility for delivering and the Scottish Parliament is responsible for holding them to account for.
It would ride roughshod over this Parliament’s fairly consistent support of devolution in the UK for us to now suddenly say that those Scottish Ministers are also accountable to another Parliament. I think that we agree on the nature of devolution in this country, although we may strongly disagree on the actions that devolved Governments take, but we cannot support the new clauses, for the reasons I have outlined. This is not about thinking outside the box; it is about recognising the role that the devolved system plays in our constitution. For those reasons, I will resist the new clauses.
Clause 16 amends section 36D of the Electricity Act 1989, which provides for a statutory appeal to be brought by any person who is aggrieved by a decision made by Scottish Ministers—perhaps the shadow Minister. A challenge to an offshore electricity infrastructure consenting decision made under section 36 is by statutory appeal. The clause extends this, so that statutory appeal also applies to onshore electricity infrastructure consenting decisions made under section 36, decisions made under section 37 and all variation decisions.
The clause will create consistency in Scotland by making the challenge process the same for both onshore and offshore consents, and ensuring they are brought in a timely manner. A challenge will have to be brought within six weeks for onshore consents, as is already the case for offshore consents. This will bring the timescale for challenging large electricity infrastructure decisions into alignment right across Great Britain.
Clause 16 also amends the Electricity Act so that the six-week timescale for bringing a challenge commences from the publication of the decision by the Scottish Minister, instead of the date on which the decision was taken. This is a new requirement for both onshore and offshore, and is compliant with the Aarhus convention compliance committee’s recommendations relating to the timescale for challenging planning decisions. There is also a consequential amendment to the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1997 in respect of directions relating to deemed planning permission. I commend the clause to the Committee.
My contribution will be very short, because the Opposition agree with what the Minister said. It seems perfectly reasonable to amend section 36D of the Electricity Act 1989, which allows anybody aggrieved by the process to appeal. That is a welcome step that meets some of our challenges in other areas of the Bill—not those for which this Minister is responsible—in relation to people being intimately involved in some of these decisions. If people are not happy with what is happening in their local communities, they should be able to challenge it. I welcome the clause, and we will not press it to a vote.
We do not object to the clause either. The date of the judicial review challenge being six weeks from the issue of the decision in writing is consistent with the approach under the Town and Country Planning Act, and therefore does not reduce or change people’s right to judicial review. We are content to support the clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 16 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 17
Applications for necessary wayleaves: fees
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 17 will confer a power on Scottish Ministers to make regulations to set and charge fees to electricity network operators for processing necessary wayleave applications that they should make in Scotland. Necessary wayleaves are statutory rights that allow electricity licence holders to install and access their overhead electricity lines and associated infrastructure on land owned by others, and in Scotland they are processed and granted by Scottish Ministers.
The objective of the change is to better resource the processing of necessary wayleave applications by the Scottish Government. It is important to act now.
Will the Minister elaborate on why he did not support amendment 80, which we have just discussed, on planning fees going to local councils to resource planning departments? What is the difference between that and him saying to Scottish Ministers under this clause that they can charge a fee, but that it has to go to the resourcing of dealing with these applications?
Perhaps I misunderstood the hon. Gentleman’s point, but I think that amendment 80 was about forcing Scottish Government Ministers to spend funds on community benefits and other things. This clause is saying that the Government will have the power to raise application fees if they choose to do so. Of course, they could choose not to, but under this clause they will have the power to raise them.
It says that the Minister expects that money to be put into the system to make the system better. Why has he done that in this case when he did not support the amendment doing it?
As I think I have just outlined, that amendment did not just call for the money to make the system more efficient; it called for it to be spent in communities on community benefits. That is quite different. My argument to the shadow Minister in resisting that amendment was that we did not want to tie the hands of the Scottish Government, because we see that investing that money in making the planning system more efficient is probably the best use for it, but it is not for me to tell them that. This clause is about giving them the power to set and charge fees to electricity network operators. I suggest that the point he is making is a slightly different one, but if I have misunderstood him, perhaps he can explain.
A general point arises here, which we also debated on the Renters’ Rights Bill Committee. The different systems in Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland and England—most of the legislation we are dealing with here is for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland—give rise to a risk of inconsistency. The shadow Minister spoke of the importance of community benefit. That is designed to secure community support. If there is a view that Ministers in Scotland might choose to spend such revenue on other things to the detriment of community benefit, that may also undermine consent.
I completely agree with what the Minister is saying about creating the necessary power, but will he commit to further discussions with his colleagues in the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government so that we can ensure—not just in this Bill, but in future legislation—that where we expect a community benefit to derive from something that we decide on, it will be a consistent benefit across the UK?
In general, I agree and disagree with the hon. Gentleman’s point. I understand the point he is making about consistency, but I take the view that the whole purpose of having different devolved Administrations in England, Wales and Scotland is to make different decisions. Northern Ireland is separate in the energy discussion, because it has a separate grid.
I am not sure that I would say that consistency at all costs is the right approach. We created the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly so that they could make decisions locally that affected them in a different way. We have worked with the Scottish Government on these changes to make sure that there is a package of reforms to the consent arrangements under the Energy Act that relates to the planning system in Scotland as it currently is. It is not the same starting point as the system in England and Wales, so it is important to look at them separately. Nevertheless, I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point.
I return to clause 17. Fees are already charged in England and Wales for processing wayleave applications. I reiterate—this comes back to the point made by the hon. Member for Broxbourne—that the Scottish Government do not have the power in legislation to raise those fees. That power is reserved. The clause will give them that power.
Has the Minister identified or outlined any potential total income that will come out of this measure? I know that it is not a certain process and that it is not certain how many will come forward.
No, we have not. A series of work will be necessary to come up with that figure, because the fees will be charged on a cost recovery basis. It is not a money-making exercise for the Government. That is in line with approaches in the rest of Great Britain. There will clearly be a significant number of such applications in the coming years—more than in previous years, probably—but the detail will be worked out with the Scottish Government. We do not know in advance exactly how many wayleave applications there might be, so we cannot give an exact figure.
I thank the Minister for his answer. He will forgive me for intervening again; it will mean that I speak less later. In outline, has he started any engagement with Scottish Ministers to find out whether the intention of the clause will be borne out in reality? If the costs are being recovered on a cost recovery basis, has he secured the necessary assurances from Ministers that the money collected will be used to process the decisions more rapidly, and that it will not be spent in other devolved Scottish areas?
I am sorry to come back to this point, but the Government do not bind the hands of devolved Governments in any spending area. When this Parliament—[Interruption.] No, I did not say that. I said that the Bill gives them the power to do that, which they do not currently have.
No, I will carry on answering this point, if that is okay.
We are very enthusiastic about clause 17—who would have thought it? To be clear about this point—I feel as if I am the only Scottish MP on this Committee, but I am not—when this Government increase spending in a particular area, that results in a budget transfer to the Scottish Government, the Welsh Government and the Northern Irish Executive, which they can spend on whatever they see as their local priorities. An increase in NHS spending in England does not lead to the exact same in Scotland. We will not bind the hands of every single decision that is made in this case. This is about conferring a power on Scottish Government Ministers to set and charge fees to electricity network operators for necessary wayleave applications in Scotland.
I thank the Minister, although he must feel awfully lonely as the Front-Bench Scotsman. As the Member for Rutherglen just on the other side of the Clyde from me, does he agree that the charging of fees for necessary wayleaves is a rather odd way to relitigate the referendum that took place in 1999, and a rather odd way to relitigate the questions of devolution? I know that the Conservative party has some trouble, from time to time, in accepting the devolution settlement. We seem to have moved from the West Lothian question to the Hamble Valley question. It is remarkably confusing.
No, I will respond to that point, if I may. I respect the view of the Conservative party and the argument that Conservative Members are making. I completely understand it, but I am trying to make the point gently that this is not about our directing specific decisions that will be made by Scottish Ministers. It is about how—in this case, as it is across wayleave applications in England and Wales as well—fees will be charged on a cost recovery basis in line with UK and Scottish Government policy on managing public money.
Let me try a third time. According to the explanatory notes laid out by the Government:
“The objective of this change is to better resource the processing of necessary wayleaves applications by the Scottish government.”
The Minister is therefore directing the Scottish Government to spend the money that they get in through this process on that planning process. How is that different from amendment 80 which we discussed earlier and the Government said they will not accept?
I am trying to find the exact wording. I will come back to the hon. Gentleman. I think I have outlined to him three times now why it is different. I do not have amendment 80 in front of me at this precise moment, but it had two parts to it, one of which was about community benefits. It was directing the Scottish Government to take funds and direct them to a specific purpose. This Parliament does not do that in any other aspects of devolved policy, because it is devolved to the Scottish Parliament to make those decisions. I think that I have made that point clear, but if not, I will write to the Committee and make it even clearer. [Interruption.] I am grateful. I now have amendment 80 in front of me. It mentions
“consumer benefits packages, or…local planning authorities”.
Neither of those things is in the gift of the UK Government to direct the Scottish Government to do. Consumer benefits packages are ill-defined, if nothing else, but local planning authorities are democratically elected in their own right, and the Scottish Government make budget decisions to local government, separate from any budget decisions that the UK Government make to the Scottish Government. The two are not comparable in any way. In any event, the Committee has already voted down that amendment.
I will confine myself to clause 17. The Minister has often said that he does not want to direct Scottish Government Ministers on a devolved issue. That is perfectly reasonable. When I last intervened on him, I did not ask him to dictate to Scottish Government Ministers; I asked whether he had sought an assurance from them—
It is not the same thing. I asked him, in his role as a UK Government Minister, to seek an assurance from Scottish Government Ministers that the retrospective collection of funds under the new power would be used to increase capacity and improve the processing of this proposal. He was not rude to me, but he said, “That’s not my job as a UK Government Minister. It’s up to them as Scottish Government Ministers.” His own explanatory notes say:
“The objective of this change is to better resource the processing of necessary wayleaves applications by the Scottish government.”
When I asked the Minister whether he had sought an assurance from Scottish Government Ministers, I was not asking him to instruct them. I asked him whether he had any information on the total amount of money that would be brought in, which I accept could vary. I perfectly understood and respected that answer, but in his second answer he said that he could not seek such an assurance because he does not want to direct Scottish Government Ministers or take power away from them. Given the objective set out in the explanatory notes, how can we have confidence—
There is no contradiction here at all. We are confusing two different things. My ability to say that the Scottish Government could raise x amount of money and must spend it on y is different from what we have clearly outlined—the hon. Gentleman has just repeated it—which is that at the moment Scottish Government Ministers do not have the power to raise fees for wayleaves, as is the case in England and Wales. Those are two very different things.
I have said clearly, I think six or seven times now, that at the moment Scottish Government Ministers have no power to charge for the processing of wayleave applications. The clause will give them the power to do so. Of course, I would hope that those funds will be spent on the planning system, or whatever it might be, but I am not going to bind their hands and evaluate the success or otherwise of that in this Committee. The two issues are quite separate.
We are dancing on the head of a pin here. I know that the Minister has no power to do that and does not want to have such a power, but how can he, as a UK Government Minister, commend a clause whose objective the explanatory notes explicitly say
“is to better resource the processing of necessary wayleaves applications by the Scottish government”
while claiming that he does not have the power to ensure that it happens?
I am not trying to be difficult. The Minister is doing a very good job of outlining the clauses, but he has said several times in response to my hon. Friend the Member for Broxbourne—not just in relation to amendment 81, which was not accepted, but in relation to the clause—that he does not have the power to direct Scottish Government Ministers. All I am asking is why he set out the objective of the change in his approved explanatory notes if he cannot make it happen.
I am not asking the Minister to strengthen the legislation; I asked whether he has sought reassurances from Scottish Government Ministers that that is what they will do with the extra income from the measures. He answered that he did not want to force them. That was not the question. All I am asking—he is welcome to intervene on me—is whether he has had a conversation with Scottish Government Ministers about whether they will use this income for the purposes that his legislation has set out.
I have not had the conversation. I am happy to have it, but the tone will not be, “Here are my expectations of you as a democratically elected Member of the Scottish Parliament accountable to a Parliament I do not sit in.”
I do not know how familiar the shadow Minister is with the devolution legislation in the United Kingdom, but I gently say that this Parliament gives the devolved Administrations power to raise a whole series of taxes, charges, levies, fines and various other things. We give that power to those devolved assemblies; we do not then tell them exactly how to spend every single penny of that money. This is another example of that. It is a perfectly common thing in the devolution settlement.
I am not trying to be difficult with the Minister at all—I know it seems that I am, but I am not. He said that he has not had those conversations but he now will, and that is welcome. This clause is procedural and process-driven, but within the grand scheme of the Bill it is stated clearly in black and white that the UK Government have an objective for the extra income to be generated, yet the Minister has not had that conversation with Scottish Ministers. I do not blame him for that, but he will now have those conversations going forward.
I hope that when it comes to other clauses, UK Government documents will be very clear about the aims, ambitions and outcomes of what they will do because what we have seen this afternoon has been questionable. The UK Government are setting an objective, with no way to actually achieve it.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause 19 stand part.
Schedule 1.
Clause 18 is technical, amending section 106 of the Electricity Act 1989 to make provision for procedural requirements that apply to the new powers conferred by the provision in clauses 14, 15 and 17. All new regulation-making powers, except for the power to amend primary legislation in clause 14(4), are subject to the negative procedure. Scottish Ministers or the Secretary of State must consult each other before making regulations relating to clauses 14 and 15. The power in clause 17 is to be exercised by Scottish Ministers, and it does not require the Secretary of State to be consulted.
Clause 19 introduces schedule 1, which makes amendments to the Electricity Act 1989 consequential to the amendments made by clauses 14 to 18. It also makes some minor amendments relating to consents for electricity infrastructure in Scotland. These amendments are made to sections 36, 36B, 36C and 37 of and schedule 8 to the 1989 Act. Schedule 1 is needed to ensure the Bill’s consistency and clarity in relation to the 1989 Act. Some changes are needed to ensure that the new Scottish consenting reforms can function as intended. Some of the clarifications are needed because the 1989 Act was originally drafted prior to the Scotland Act 1998, which created the Scottish Parliament. Given the number of changes made to the 1989 Act in relation to Scotland, it is necessary to update outdated references in legislation to ensure that such references are clear and consistent.
The consequential amendments cover three main aspects. First, as clause 14 amends schedule 8 to the 1989 Act to allow the Secretary of State or Scottish Ministers to make regulations about time limits for various parts of the consenting process, the amendments clarify how this relates to Scottish Ministers obtaining advice from the Scottish Environment Protection Agency. Secondly, as clause 14 amends schedule 8 to 1989 Act to allow the Secretary of State or Scottish Ministers to make regulations about applications made to Scottish Ministers, amendments have been made so that proposed new section 1A will apply only to applications made to the Secretary of State, not to those made to Scottish Ministers.
Thirdly, there are clarifications to reflect the new processes for variations of consents and the new procedure following objection by the relevant planning authorities for consents under sections 36 and 37 of the 1989 Act. In addition, the minor amendments include those to reflect previous transfers of functions to Scottish Ministers, and some references to the water environment regulations are updated to refer to the most recent version.
As I have said, this is a very technical clause. I look forward to having slightly less debate on it, unless there are any questions.
Clauses 18 and 19 are consequential to the previous clauses, and consist of simple process amendments. The Minister will be delighted that we welcome the fact that clause 19 amends the Electricity Act 1989 to reflect earlier transfers of functions to Scottish Ministers. That is exactly as it should be, and we will not be scrutinising the various words. These amendments should go ahead, and I have no further comments.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 18 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 19 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 1 agreed to.
Clause 20
Environmental impact assessments for electricity works
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Clause 20 creates a power for the Secretary of State or Scottish Ministers to make limited procedural amendments to the Electricity Works (Environmental Impact Assessment) (Scotland) Regulations 2017, which for ease of reference I will refer to as the EIA regulations.
As part of the consenting process for electricity infrastructure in Scotland, Scottish Ministers are required to assess the likely significant environmental effects arising from a proposed EIA development. Before the UK left the European Union, Scottish Ministers and UK Government Ministers had concurrent powers, under the European Communities Act 1972, to make regulations for electricity works EIAs. However, although the EIA regulations remained in force as assimilated law after the European Communities Act was repealed, the result is that neither Government have the power to amend them.
We broadly support the content of clause 20, but I have one question for the Minister. I am mindful of his comments about the process of EU retained law, and it is absolutely right that we are looking to update that. However, a lot of the new powers set out for Scottish Ministers are the kind of thing that, in England, we would expect to be the subject of a pre-application consultation. One might ask the promoter of a project to come in and discuss those exact things with the local authority, the strategic planning authority if there is one, or the mayoral authority or the combined authority, so that the application process can be streamlined as much as possible.
Earlier on, we said that we would amend legislation through the Bill to remove that process in England. Given the intention to effectively introduce a top-quality process for applications to be considered in Scotland, does the Minister agree that there is an element of contradiction in that, in the same piece of legislation, we are seeking to remove many of the equivalent processes in England?
I understand the argument, but it appears as a contradiction only if we assume that both planning systems are the same, which they are not. And they are not slightly different—they are fundamentally different. The processes are different. The timescales are different. The opportunities for public consultation are different throughout, so we are starting from a different starting point. Although I understand the hon. Member’s point, I do not think that the two are comparable.
This particular clause is even more narrow than the hon. Member recognised. It is simply about the assimilated regulations. I have been in a number of Delegated Legislation Committees where we have discussed some of the unintended consequences, as we obviously assimilated thousands of different pieces of legislation into UK law. As I say, the result was that neither the UK nor the Scottish Government currently have the power to amend these regulations, which is a ludicrous position for us to be in. This clause is narrow in scope, and I do not think it has quite the reach that the hon. Member is suggesting.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 20 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Gen Kitchen.)