Planning and Infrastructure Bill (Fourth sitting)

Matthew Pennycook Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 29th April 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:

Government amendment 58.

Clause stand part.

Government motion to transfer clause 4.

Clause 5 stand part.

Government amendments 60 to 67.

Clauses 6 and 7 stand part.

Government new clause 44—Applications for development consent: removal of certain pre-application requirements.

Government new clause 45—Applications for development consent: changes related to section (Applications for development consent: removal of certain pre-application requirements).

[The Minister for Housing and Planning (Matthew Pennycook)]

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Mr Twigg. In the last sitting, we discussed the various clauses and Government amendments in this group, and I thank hon. Members on both sides of the Committee for their considered engagement with them. The proposed changes we are considering are, without question, a significant evolution of the nationally significant infrastructure projects regime, and it is entirely right and proper that they are subject to intensive scrutiny.

As the Committee is aware, I set out the Government’s position on this matter in considerable detail in my written ministerial statement from 23 April. I therefore intend to focus my remarks on providing useful further points of clarification about the rationale for the proposed reforms and how we see the system operating once they have been made.

In her remarks, the hon. Member for North Herefordshire conceded that the NSIP process can take a long time, but she implied that the problem was merely confined to individual applications. The Government disagree. From our perspective, the problem that these and other changes in this chapter are intended to remedy are systemic. The status quo is not working, and all too often it is burdensome to applicants and consultees alike.

We know that the performance of the NSIP regime as a whole has deteriorated sharply over recent years. We know that pre-application periods have, on average, nearly doubled since 2013, increasing from over 14 months to nearly 28 months in 2021. As much as Labour Members welcome any and every reminder of the chaos unleashed under recent Conservative Administrations, I do not believe that the deterioration we are discussing can be attributed to the uncertainty that the post-2016 period engendered.

The evidence clearly points to the fact that inefficiencies in the NSIP system, both structural and cultural, are driving delays and high costs. We heard examples this morning of the fact that the documentation underpinning consents has been getting longer, and in too many instances now runs to tens of thousands of pages. Part of the reason is that the statutory and prescriptive nature of the pre-application requirements—I again remind the Committee that they are absent from other planning regimes, including those used for applications for new housing—are driving perverse outcomes.

It is precisely because the requirements are statutory that applicants fear that falling short of them will see their project rejected further down the line, or leave them exposed to judicial review. As we have discussed, the result is that projects are slowed down as developers undertake ever more rounds of consultation and produce greater amounts of documentation to ensure that the requirements are met. Sensible improvements are deterred because applicants worry that they will require further rounds of consultation to insulate them from challenge.

In short, as I argued in the previous sitting, the dynamics of the system are actively encouraging risk aversion and gold-plating and are compelling applicants to go above and beyond what may be required in law, rather than merely ensuring that an application is acceptable in planning terms. Because the root of the problem is the statutory nature of the requirements, it is worth noting that the same behavioural incentives would be in play if we reinserted into the Bill precise statutory criteria for what constitutes effective consultation, as the hon. Member for Taunton and Wellington suggested we should.

In his contribution, the shadow Minister argued that we should focus on improving rather than removing the statutory requirements in question. However, he overlooked the fact that the NSIP action plan, published by the previous Government in February 2023, contained a range of reforms designed to drive more effective and proportionate approaches to consultation and engagement, including new cost-recoverable pre-application services for applicants at the Planning Inspectorate, and revised and strengthened pre-application guidance.

While those steps were welcome, and this Government are seeking to embed new services and cost-recovery mechanisms, the feedback we have received from a wide range of stakeholders suggests that they will not deliver the necessary step change needed to tackle risk aversion and gold-plating. It is the dynamic that has arisen as a result of the very existence of the statutory pre-application requirements in question that is hampering their nominal purpose of producing better outcomes, and the present arrangements are driving up costs not only for developers, but for the bill payers and taxpayers we all represent.

The Government are in complete agreement with the hon. Member for North Herefordshire that early, meaningful and constructive engagement with those affected, including local authorities, statutory consultees, landowners and local communities, often leads to better schemes, greater local benefits and improved mitigation. We still want and expect the NSIP regime to function on the basis of a front-loaded approach in which development proposals are thoroughly scoped and refined prior to being submitted to the Planning Inspectorate. As part of that process, we still want and expect high-quality, early, meaningful and constructive engagement to take place and for positive changes to be made to applications. However, we want and expect it to take place without the downsides that the current statutory requirements are causing.

Removing the statutory requirements in question does not signify that pre-submission consultation and high-quality engagement is no longer important. Statutory guidance that the Government will be required to produce will encourage such pre-application engagement and consultation, but with applicants given the flexibility to carry it out in the way that they consider best for their proposed development, in accordance with that guidance.

Equally as importantly, the system will still reward high-quality engagement and consultation. The Planning Inspectorate will continue to assess whether applications are suitable to proceed to examination. We expect guidance to emphasise that without adequate engagement and consultation, applications are unlikely to be able to do so. Guidance and advice from the Planning Inspectorate will be aimed at helping applicants demonstrate that they are of a satisfactory standard in terms of meeting that process.

Ultimately, all communities will still be able to have their voices heard, whether that is through objecting outright to applications or providing evidence of adverse impacts through the post-submission examination process, which all applications obviously still need to go through.

[Gideon Amos (Taunton and Wellington) (LD)]

I do not demur from much of what the Minister says about the provisions. To go back to his remarks about the delays not being caused solely by the chaos under the previous Government, is it not a fact that during the last few years of the Conservative Government, the delays at the decision stage, which is meant to be three months, rocketed?

The regime, which began as one in which every section of it respected the deadlines, became one in which every section respected the deadlines with the exception of the Secretary of State. The intention of those drafting the Planning Act 2008 was that, in such circumstances, a report to Parliament by the Secretary of State when delaying the decision would serve as a disincentive on the Secretary of State for doing so. That clearly has not happened. Will the Minister reflect on whether any other measures could be taken to eliminate the delays caused by Secretaries of State making decisions on NSIPs in future?

[Matthew Pennycook]

It is certainly the case that it is not only in the pre-submission phase where slippages in timeframes have occurred. The hon. Member makes a valid point about the fact that we have seen a pattern in some Departments of Secretaries of State not making timely decisions. This Government have sought to improve upon the past performance. We are already doing so, but I am open to ideas on how we might tighten the process. The Government are giving further thought to the general matter of how consents are taken through Departments.

To conclude, the changes proposed will make a significant contribution to speeding up and streamlining the consenting process for critical infrastructure, and we are convinced that in many cases they will produce better outcomes than the status quo. I therefore urge the Committee to support them.

Amendment 57 agreed to.

Amendment made: 58, in clause 4, page 8, line 32, leave out subsection (3).—(Matthew Pennycook.)

This amendment is consequential on NC44.

Clause 4, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered,

That clause 4 be transferred to the end of line 32 on page 12. —(Matthew Pennycook.)

Clause 5 disagreed to.

Clause 6

Applications for development consent: acceptance stage

Amendments made: 60, in clause 6, page 10, line 4, leave out “follows” and insert

“set out in subsections (2) to (13)”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 68.

Amendment 61, in clause 6, page 10, line 25, after “Secretary of State” insert “and others”.

This amendment is consequential on subsection (5)(d) of NC45.

Amendment 62, in clause 6, page 11, line 4, leave out from “satisfying” to “and” in line 6 and insert

“section 48 (duty to publicise),”.

This amendment is consequential on NC44.

Amendment 63, in clause 6, page 11, leave out lines 12 to 14.

This amendment is consequential on NC44.

Amendment 64, in clause 6, page 11, line 16, leave out “50” and insert “50(1)”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 63.

Amendment 65, in clause 6, page 11, leave out lines 17 to 20.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 63.

Amendment 66, in clause 6, page 11, line 21, leave out subsection (9) and insert—

“(9) Omit subsection (5).”

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 64.

Amendment 67, in clause 6, page 12, line 32, at end insert—

“(14) In consequence of the amendments in subsections (7)(c) and (10), omit section 137(3) and (4) of the Localism Act 2011.”—(Matthew Pennycook.)

This technical amendment omits provisions of the Localism Act 2011 that are no longer required (because of changes made by clause 6 of the Bill).

Clause 6, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 7 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 8

Planning Act 2008: legal challenges

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Matthew Pennycook]

Clause 8 streamlines the judicial review process for nationally significant infrastructure projects. The changes apply to legal challenges against decisions on development consent orders and national policy statements. At the moment, individuals wanting to bring challenges against nationally significant infrastructure projects, such as nuclear plants, railway lines, wind farms and other projects, have up to three attempts to try to obtain permission from the courts. As noted by Lord Banner’s independent review last year into the delays caused by these legal challenges, each attempt extends the duration of a claim by several weeks, and in some cases, by several months.

The clause will remove the paper permission stage, meaning that applications for judicial review will go straight to an oral hearing in the High Court. The clause will also remove the right to appeal for cases that are deemed totally without merit at the oral hearing, which becomes the only attempt for these cases. The Government are committed to maintaining access to justice, which is why the right of appeal will remain for cases that are refused permission at the oral hearing, but that are not deemed totally without merit. The changes are a necessary means of preventing meritless claims from holding up development by exhausting the appeals process and of ensuring that legitimate legal challenges are heard promptly. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[David Simmonds (Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair this afternoon, Mr Twigg. We touched on the issue of remedy earlier today. A local authority, for example, may have a statutory obligation placed on it by a piece of legislation, which means that it has an obligation to take an interest in a particular development, including potentially judicially reviewing that application, if the impact runs contrary to its other statutory obligations.

We are well aware of issues relating to air quality, but there are also organisations such as ClientEarth, which many of us will have heard of. Essentially, their stock in trade is to look for opportunities to address broader issues around, for example, climate change and environmental impact by using what, in some cases, are arguably loopholes, but in many cases, are essentially contradictions in legislation.

The Minister talked earlier about a shift from having statutory pre-application processes to having guidance that would need to be followed. Clearly, one of the issues is that guidance can be challenged, and bodies that have a responsibility to follow the guidance can be challenged as to whether they have fulfilled their obligation to the letter.

Opposition Members certainly have concerns about the implications of removing the right to judicial review. We share the view that we need to ensure that those processes—those applications—are not frivolous and that they are not being used simply because the cost of responding to judicial review, and the delay that is involved, is a tool to create delay, impose costs and therefore deter development, which we all agree should take place. Conversely, however, we do not wish to see a situation where a public body or a local resident—a constituent—who has a genuine right to be heard and a genuine concern arising out of law is constrained from bringing the matter forward and seeking a remedy.

We also do not want a situation where, for example, a decision by Government, which is then taken through this process and restricted from judicial review, results in a third party, such as a local authority or NHS body, being judicially reviewed for its failure to stop that from proceeding—for its failure to bring a judicial review under other responsibilities that it has. I would be grateful if the Minister could address that.

Statutory consultees already have many legal obligations and duties relating to issues such as water quality, air quality and nature. They are obliged to go to the utmost of their powers to fulfil those obligations. Clearly, they may well be held in default if a development proceeds by virtue of the fact that they have not had the opportunity to appropriately challenge it in law. It would be helpful if the Minister set out how that will be fully addressed.

[Matthew Pennycook]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his reasonable questions. If I have understood him, he makes a separate point about the statutory consultee system. As he will know—I refer him to my relevant written ministerial statement—we are seeking to reform that system in a number of ways.

On clause 8 specifically, the changes will not affect the ability to challenge the lawfulness of Government decisions in court. They are simply designed to reduce delays. We are not preventing anyone from challenging our planning decisions. Obviously, Government do not control how many of those challenges are made. We are tightening up the process so that if a challenge is judged to be meritless by the court—not by Government—it cannot be dragged on for years through numerous further appeals.

Only cases deemed totally without merit in the oral permission hearing in the High Court will be prevented from appealing to the Court of Appeal. Other cases will continue to be able to appeal the refusal of permission to the Court of Appeal. That will ensure that there is no possibility of meritless claims holding up nationally significant infrastructure projects, while maintaining access to justice in line with our domestic and international obligations.

I hope that the hon. Member is reassured that we are not removing wholesale the ability to mount judicial review challenges. Some have called for us to go further, but we think the proposals strike the right balance between addressing the removal of the paper permission stage and dealing with the issue of meritless claims. On that basis, I hope that he is reassured and may even feel inclined to support the measure.

[Paul Holmes (Hamble Valley) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg. Notwith-standing the comments from my fellow shadow Minister, who made an excellent contribution, can I press the Minister on one question? My hon. Friend outlined the Opposition’s concern over removing wholesale—we are not saying that the Minister is doing this—the checks and balances relating to somebody being able to challenge a decision that they deem has not been taken in the right way.

However, it would be remiss of us as a party not to acknowledge that there are cases where JR is used vexatiously. To use an example from my constituency, I waited for 12 years to get a 300-foot extension to Southampton airport’s runway. It took three judicial reviews before we finally got that through. There was unmitigated support from the local authority and me as the Member of Parliament at the time, and it was taken to JR for what I would say were very dubious reasons, just to try to delay the project.

I understand why the Minister is bringing in the measures, notwithstanding some of the concerns that my hon. Friend mentioned about the balance. However, I am reassured by what the Minister said about not removing the ability to challenge and tightening the process around what can be accepted as being without merit.

I have one question for the Minister, which he may not be able to answer today—I would not necessarily expect him to—but perhaps he could write to me about it. Following Lord Banner’s work, which was a thoughtful examination of how legal challenges could be streamlined, has the Minister made any assessments, through officials or the Department, of how much time or cost on average the changes to clause 8 might mean for the system overall? I am not expecting him to get his abacus out and look at that now, but I wonder whether he could outline to the Committee, through an impact assessment, the effect of some of the changes.

We will not push this clause to a Division. We understand the principled reason why the Minister is bringing it forward, even if we have some concern about the detail of the measure.

[John Grady (Glasgow East) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Twigg. This clause and the other clauses in this chapter are good news for Scotland, because we in Scotland depend on projects in England to proceed. Many projects are cross-border and need consent in both countries. That is important for jobs, particularly jobs for young people.

I have had the misfortune to be involved in infrastructure projects for many years. From time to time judicial reviews without any merit are brought solely to delay and frustrate projects. It is right and proper that the law is changed to make it clear that, once the High Court has made a decision, following argument—because the right to an oral hearing is retained—further appeals are prevented. Such appeals can lead to significant delays, depending on the business of the Court of the Appeal, which has many pressing priorities.

Some mention was made of costs. I will briefly describe the cost to developers, because the Labour party is a pro-business, pro-environment party. If someone has a development that is subject to a judicial review, they have planned their contracting strategy, and what it will cost to build the development, and their financing. If there is an indeterminate delay, and a series of additional delays of unpredictable length—as a lawyer, I could never tell people how long litigation would take—they are then exposed to significant fluctuations in the financial and commodities markets. There are therefore real costs, so I naturally support clause 8. The clause, along with the rest of the package of reforms to the development consent order regime, will create the opportunity for significant additional employment in Scotland, jobs for our young people, and great net zero and housing projects.

[Matthew Pennycook]

I thank the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Hamble Valley, for his constructive tone on this clause—and others; I do not mean to confine his constructive attitude to just this clause. I welcome his praise for Lord Banner’s review, which I agree was thoughtful and insightful. As part of that review Lord Banner made it clear that although the duration differs between different applications, each attempt to apply for a judicial review currently extends the duration of a claim by, on average, several weeks, and in some cases by several months. In large numbers of cases, time is added by legal challenges that are unsuccessful. The changes made by the Bill aim to strike the right balance between improving efficiency and ensuring access to justice.

To be clear, this clause does remove the paper permission stage, but only makes changes by removing the right to appeal for cases that are deemed “totally without merit”. Other cases will retain that right of appeal if they are deemed to be with merit and able to be considered. We think these changes will make a difference to the time that projects take to work their way through the system, and we will work with the judiciary to advance a number of other changes to the process for NSIP judicial reviews, such as introducing target timescales for cases that we think will have a beneficial impact. On that basis, I commend the clause to the Committee.

Clause 9

Connections to electricity network: licence and other modifications

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero (Michael Shanks)]

I beg to move amendment 36, in clause 9, page 14, line 6, after “distribution system” insert

“(and such an improvement may include changing the order in which connections are made)”.

This amendment clarifies that the purpose for which the power under clause 9(1) may be exercised may include the making of changes to the order of the queue for connections to a transmission or distribution system.