Space Industry Bill [ Lords ] (First sitting)
Tuesday 23rd January 2018
(6 years, 10 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Space Industry Act 2018 View all Space Industry Act 2018 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 23 January 2018 - (23 Jan 2018)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 2 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 7 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 7 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
We are now sitting in public and the proceedings are being broadcast. Before we begin, everyone should ensure that their electronic devices are turned off or switched to silent mode. Tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings because they are hot drinks. I also remind Members that they need to declare any relevant interests publicly. They can do that now, if they wish, or when they first rise to speak. Does anyone wish to declare any interests?
David Morris (Morecambe and Lunesdale) (Con)
I do not know whether it is relevant or not, but I am the chairman of the all-party parliamentary group on space.
The Chair
Thank you.
Today we will consider the programme motion on the amendment paper, then a motion to enable the reporting of written evidence for publication.
Ordered,
That—
(1) the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 9.25 am on Tuesday 23 January) meet—
(a) at 2.00 pm on Tuesday 23 January;
(b) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 25 January;
(c) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 30 January;
(2) proceedings on consideration of the Bill in Committee shall be taken in the following order: Clauses 1 to 12; Schedule 1; Clauses 13 to 17; Schedule 2; Clause 18; Schedule 3; Clauses 19 to 21; Schedule 4; Clause 22; Schedule 5; Clauses 23 to 40; Schedule 6; Clauses 41 and 42; Schedule 7; Clause 43; Schedule 8; Clauses 44 and 45; Schedule 9; Clauses 46 to 59; Schedule 10; Clauses 60 and 61; Schedule 11; Clauses 62 to 66; Schedule 12; Clauses 67 to 71; new Clauses; new Schedules; remaining proceedings on the Bill;
(3) the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 5.00 pm on Tuesday 30 January. —(Joseph Johnson.)
The Chair
Therefore the deadline for amendments to be considered at the first two line-by-line sittings has passed. The deadline for amendments to be considered at the third line-by-line sitting is the rise of the House on Thursday.
Ordered,
That, subject to the discretion of the Chair, any written evidence received by the Committee shall be reported to the House for publication.—(Joseph Johnson.)
The Chair
We now begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. Today’s selection list is available in the room and on the Bill website. It shows how selected amendments have been grouped together for debate. Grouped amendments are generally on the same or a similar issue. A Member who has put their name to the lead amendment is called first. Other Members are free to catch my eye to speak on all or any of the amendments in that group. A Member may speak more than once in a single debate.
At the end of a debate on a group of amendments, I shall call the Member who moved the lead amendment again. Before they sit down, they need to indicate whether they wish to withdraw the amendment or press it to a Division. If a Member wishes to press any other amendments or new clause in a group to a vote, they need to let me know. I shall work on the assumption that the Minister wishes the Committee to reach a decision on all tabled Government amendments.
Please note that decisions on amendments do not take place in the order that they are debated, but in the order that they appear on the amendment paper. In other words, debate occurs according to the selection list, and decisions are taken when we come to the clause that the amendment affects.
I shall use my discretion to decide whether to allow a separate stand part debate on individual clauses and schedules following debates on relevant amendments. I hope that that explanation is helpful.
The Committee has just agreed a programme motion, which will be reproduced on the amendment paper from tomorrow. The motion sets out the order in which we will consider the Bill.
Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 2
Duties and supplementary powers of the regulator
Karl Turner (Kingston upon Hull East) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 13, in clause 2, page 2, line 25, at end insert—
“(ea) the effect on the environment and on local communities of activities connected with the operation of spaceflight activities or the operation of a spaceport as licensed under this Act;”
This amendment adds impact on the environment and local community activities to the list of areas the regulator should take into account when exercising functions under this Act.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss Government new clause 1—Grant of licences: assessments of environmental effects.
Karl Turner
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Bone. The amendment adds impact on the environment and local community activities to the list of areas the regulator should take into account when exercising functions under the Bill.
I am grateful that the Government listened to my colleagues in the other place, tabled new clause 1 and agreed to undertake assessments of environmental effects before the regulator grants certain licenses. I pay tribute to my Front-Bench colleagues in the other place, who did a great deal of work to improve the Bill by persuading the Government to make a number of crucial concessions.
I do not intend to press the amendment to a vote, but I would like to ask the Minister whether he will set out on the record exactly how the proposed operator licensing regime and its regulation powers will work in relation to existing planning laws and processes. Concerns were raised in the other place that the regulator or persons with an operator license will be able to overrule or disregard any existing planning regulations, laws and processes when it comes to potential spaceport or spaceflight operations in the UK.
As I indicated, I am happy to withdraw the amendment if the Minister is prepared to clear up any ambiguity surrounding existing planning procedures and the development the UK’s space industry. I hope he listens not only to the concerns that we raise in Committee but to the expert contributions in the other place.
The Minister of State, Department for Transport (Joseph Johnson)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship on this important Bill, Mr Bone. I echo the hon. Gentleman’s thanks to Members in the other place for the collegiate and helpful way in which they developed the Bill into its current state.
I recognise the hon. Gentleman’s concerns about environmental protection and the impact on local communities of spaceflight activities and the operation of spaceports under the Bill. As he said, similar issues were raised in the other place. Following constructive debates in the other place on environmental issues, the Government reviewed the compatibility of the existing planning and environmental framework with spaceflight activities. During that review, certain situations were identified where the existing framework may not provide the environmental protection that we all wish to be required of spaceflight activities. Discussions have since taken place across Government to address that potential gap, resulting in the tabling of Government new clause 1.
New clause 1 will place a mandatory requirement on an applicant for either a launch or a spaceport licence to submit an assessment of the environmental effects of their proposed activity as a precondition of receiving a licence. That duty will ensure that appropriate assessments of environmental effects are conducted by the operator or spaceport licensee and considered by the regulator prior to the determination of an application for a licence.
As hon. Members are aware, there is already a comprehensive body of environmental and planning legislation with which spaceports and spaceflight operators will need to comply, independently of the requirements in the Bill. As such, the new clause seeks to ensure that appropriate assessments are undertaken without placing a disproportionate burden on applicants. To achieve that, it allows for existing equivalent environmental assessments to be considered where appropriate. That will be the case only where the regulator is satisfied that there has been no material change of circumstance since the previous assessment was prepared.
I hope I have reassured hon. Members of the Government’s intention to ensure that spaceport and operator licences are granted only following a robust assessment of the environmental effects of the activities those licences permit. New clause 1 goes even further than the hon. Gentleman’s amendment 13. It adds to the duty on the regulator in clause 2(2)(e) to take into account any environmental objectives set by the Secretary of State, including those set by the Environment Agency.
We also amended schedule 1 in the other place to include an indicative licence condition that, if included in a licence, would require assessments of the impact of noise and emissions from spaceflight activities. I hope in the light of the Government new clause that the Committee will agree that the Bill contains robust environmental protections, and I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.
Dr Philippa Whitford (Central Ayrshire) (SNP)
I, too, welcome the amendment and the Government’s new clause to strengthen the environmental protections. Those hoping to establish spaceports are still concerned about exactly what is expected of them. It is about trying to get the right balance between protecting the community and allowing spaceports to develop. The sooner the regulations and expectations are clear, the more likely it is that spaceports will go ahead. At the moment, it is hard to expect them to invest if there is still the risk that, at some point, they simply will be ruled out by one of the environmental regulations.
Karl Turner
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 3 to 6 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 7
Provision of range control services
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Dr Whitford
Again, I welcome any clarification, sooner rather than later, about who is envisaged as providing the range control services. It is clearly stated and welcome that the provider should be independent from those operating the spaceport or the flight. Would it be air traffic control? Who exactly is identified? The problem with the Bill is still that there is a lot of vague gaps that have not been filled in, which is causing anxiety.
Joseph Johnson
I thank the hon. Lady for her question on range controls. Clause 7 requires that range control services must be provided either by the Government or by licensed providers. At present, only one part of the Government—the Ministry of Defence—is able to provide range control services. Range safety for existing military ranges is regulated by the Defence Safety Authority, but our intention is that, for spaceflight, those services will be provided on a commercial basis. Indeed, a driving purpose of the Bill is to enable commercial and not state-sponsored or institutional spaceflight. Since range control services are one of the key mechanisms through which we will protect the public during spaceflight activities, any provider must hold a licence. That will help to ensure the regulator that only fit-and-proper persons can act as a range control service provider. I hope that clarifies the situation.
Dr Whitford
Is the Government’s expectation clear to the companies that are already developing? Are they able to have the security to set up what is, in essence, yet another completely new industry to service the space launch industry?
Joseph Johnson
In our Launch UK programme, we have made it clear that range control is one of the opportunities for which we are seeking interest from industry. To that extent, the private sector is aware that this is one of the big opportunities that the Bill will enable.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 7 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 8 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 9
Grant of operator licences: safety
Karl Turner
I beg to move amendment 14, in clause 9, page 7, line 37, leave out “to (4)” and insert “and (3)”.
This amendment changes the requirements the regulator must satisfy in order to grant an operator licence to UK Space Port operators.
The amendment is merely a probing amendment, and I do not intend to speak to it for very long. We would like the Government to ensure that the regulator must not grant an application to a potential operator unless it has carried out a thorough risk assessment and meets the prescribed requirements as laid out in the Bill. I would like to press the Minister and seek further details on how the relationship between the Health and Safety Executive and the Civil Aviation Authority or UK Space Agency will work, and how best practices will be shared.
A lengthy debate in the other place highlighted the concerns. I am grateful to the Minister in the other place, who indicated that he would go away and work with officials. Concerns were raised, mainly by my Front-Bench colleagues in the other place and by me in the Commons on Second Reading, about how the Health and Safety Executive will work with the regulators. The Government stated that there would be a memorandum of understanding, but we are still in the dark when it comes to details.
I seek assurances from the Minister that regulators have the expertise and resources necessary to ensure that the general public are kept safe when it comes to the potential development of our space industry. I also reiterate that, so far, we have little detail on how the UK Space Agency and the CAA are going to share best practice. We would be grateful if the Minister could shed any more light on that.
Joseph Johnson
I will certainly attempt to do so. The hon. Gentleman raises the important issue of the safety requirements that regulators must take into account when deciding applications for a spaceflight operator licence under clause 9. The Bill makes it clear that safety regulation will be at the heart of the regulation of spaceflight, spaceports and associated activities. Clause 2 sets out the core duties of the regulator and establishes that ensuring the health and safety of the public is the primary duty.
Clause 9 imposes very clear requirements on both the applicant for a spaceflight operator licence and the regulator in deciding that application. Clause 9 requires that applicants for a spaceflight operator licence assess the risks to health and safety posed by the spaceflight activity. Clause 9 makes a necessary differentiation between the assessments carried out for those who voluntarily agreed to participate in spaceflight activities, which would include any crew or other spaceflight participant, and others who are not taking part in any prescribed capacity—the general public. For people taking part in spaceflight activities, details of the risk assessment required under subsection (2) will form a critical part of the informed consent form that clause 16 requires the volunteers to sign before they are allowed to participate in those activities.
The other key aspect to the clause is managing risks to the general public. Even after all steps have been taking to reduce risks to as low as is reasonably practicable, subsection (4)(b) means that the regulator will not issue a licence if the residual risk to public health and safety remains unacceptably high. If amendment 14 were passed, that protection for the general public would be removed, although I understand that, as the hon. Gentleman said, it is a probing amendment.
Subsection (5) enables the making of regulations to make provision about the matters that operators must take into account and other requirements to be met in carrying out risk assessments. Paragraphs (b) and (c) address the risk to public safety, the steps to be taken to ensure that risks are as low as reasonably practicable, and how acceptable levels of risk are to be determined. The regulations will also prescribe the factors that must be taken into account in determining acceptable levels of risk. Subsection (6) enables regulations setting out information that applicants must provide so that the regulator may be satisfied that an applicant has done what it is required to do under the licence.
Dr Whitford
This is one of the key areas in the Bill where spaceport and launch operators do not know what is expected of them. I understand that the Government wish to consult, but the sooner that it is clarified the better. Regulations coming forward two years after Royal Assent—that comes from a comment in the Lords, and would mean the summer of 2020, when the Government had hoped to launch—would throw complete planning blight over the industry. It is not possible to borrow money to develop launch vehicles or a spaceport without any idea what standard has to be reached.
On clause 9(9) and thinking about passengers, one of the industries that will develop is space tourism. Clearly, the public must be protected as far as possible. In the past, those involved in launch or space abilities have been incredibly fit and trained people. For those going as tourists, that will not be the case. It will be important that we carefully lay down what level of health expectation or physical training is required, because we do not want the early years of the industry to be marred by deaths in space.
Joseph Johnson
I will respond to two of the points made by hon. Members. On early visibility of licence requirements, to get the industry feeling confident that it has a clear set of rules to work with, we will continue to engage with it as we develop the detailed regulations to ensure that the legislation facilitates and supports development in the sector and provides operators with the confidence to move forward with their plans. In addition, as has been said, regulators will be holding extensive pre-licensing discussions with potential operators in order for them to provide more detailed guidance.
Karl Turner
I thank the Minister for his response and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 9 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 10
Grant of spaceport licence
Karl Turner
I beg to move amendment 15, in clause 10, page 8, line 27, leave out ‘satisfied that’.
This amendment ensures that two defined criteria steps are properly defined for granting an application for a space port licence.
The amendment is intended to make the legislation clearer about the regulator not granting an application for a spaceport licence “unless satisfied that”—this is from the Bill—
“the applicant has taken all reasonable steps to ensure that risks to public safety arising from the operation of the spaceport are as low as reasonably practicable, and…any prescribed criteria or requirements are met.”
Speaking purely as a lawyer, I thought the legislation would be clearer to remove “satisfied that”, but on reflection that is probably just semantical. I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Joseph Johnson
If the amendment has been withdrawn, I would just beg to move that the clause stands part of the Bill.
The Chair
Ah! You are getting a little ahead of yourself, Minister.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 10 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 11
Terms of licences
Karl Turner
I beg to move amendment 16, in clause 11, page 8, line 37, leave out subsection (2).
This amendment removes the specified limit they must pay in damages to an uninvolved third party in the event of an accident in operator licences.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 5, in clause 11, page 8, line 37, leave out “may” and insert “must”.
This amendment places a definite cap on the amount of a licensee’s liability.
Amendment 6, in clause 11, page 9, line 12, at end insert—
“(7) Within 12 months of this Act coming into force the Secretary of State must lay a report before Parliament setting out plans on what an appropriate maximum limit would be on the amount of the licensee’s liability under subsection (2).”.
This amendment would ensure that the Secretary of State decides on what level the mandatory cap for the licensee’s liability is.
Karl Turner
The amendment relates to the terms of spaceport and space operator licences. I propose to remove the specified limit that must be paid in damages to an uninvolved third party in the event of an incident in the operator’s licences. Clause 11 concerns the terms that may or must be included in a licence issued under the Bill authorising spaceflight activities, the operation of a spaceport or the provision of a range control services.
Colleagues in the other place were concerned about the particular wording of this section. We have heard that the amount of liability may be capped. The Minister will correct me if I am wrong, but I think it was mentioned on Second Reading in the Commons that a limit of £20 million had been suggested. I would like the Minister to clarify the issue of the cap, and that is why we have re-tabled the amendment. Although I declare an interest as a lawyer, I did not practise personal injury law and this is not my area of expertise. However, it seems to me that £20 million would cover two very serious non-fatal incidents. It would not be anywhere near enough to cover costs such as living costs and other issues that would arise from serious injury.
I want to know from the Minister, if he is prepared to tell me, whether there is a limit on how much the operator or the Government must pay in damages to an uninvolved third party in the event of an incident. It is also not clear who pays if the losses exceed the proposed cap. Are the Government the insurer of last resort? In the unlikely event of a catastrophic incident, would the Government meet the excess above any cap?
We are certainly not opposed to a cap. We just want some clarity on the issue. Therefore, I would be grateful if the Minister could clear up some of these concerns, which were also raised in the other place, where they were very well put.
The Chair
As we will also debate amendments 5 and 6 now, it seems appropriate to have the stand part debate too.
Dr Whitford
My amendment is completely the opposite of the Labour amendment. As things stand, the Government basically take liability for injury and accident and the operator has to indemnify the Government to cover that risk. What we are looking for is a change in subsection (2) from “may” to “must”. The Outer Space Act 1986 makes that clear. At the moment, the liability limit is €60 million, not £20 million. Without some form of cap on the operator’s liability, it is impossible for operators to get insurance. Therefore, they will simply continue to operate outside the UK under the Outer Space Act, somewhere with a limit of €60 million, rather than in the UK with unlimited liability, for which they simply cannot get insurance.
Amendment 6 deals with the level of cap for the kind of launches that are likely to occur from the UK. Further on in the Bill, we would want to have perhaps a per launch cap rather than per satellite, as it is now. With CubeSats and nanosatellites launched in clusters, the liability cap would be absolutely untenable. Consultation is needed. There may be a later reference to launches that could be defined as green or amber, and it may be that different caps are set for that kind of launch as an overall approach. However, there has to be an ultimate limit and that should not be higher than the current €60 million.
The clause mentions the different aspects of launch, and those are the spaceport, the range control and the launch operator, and later there will be the satellite operator. I have tabled an amendment to a later clause to define the liabilities of those groups, with very clear margins, so that there are no gaps that a victim of an accident could fall between.
Joseph Johnson
Clause 11(2) provides a power for a licensee’s liability to indemnify the Government under clause 35 to be capped in an operator licence. Amendment 16 would remove that vital power. Under both this Bill and the Outer Space Act 1986, operators have a liability to indemnify the Government against claims for damage or loss from foreign states and their nationals. That is to ensure that we meet our obligations under the UN space treaties.
However, satellite operators have previously raised concerns that such a liability is a barrier to operating in the space industry. Operators found that the unlimited liability made it difficult to raise finance or to insure against. The Government have therefore responded to those concerns.
The unlimited liability provisions under the Outer Space Act were amended by the Deregulation Act 2012 and since then licences issued under that Act for the procurement of an overseas launch and the in-orbit operation of a satellite benefit from a cap, which is set out in licence conditions.
The UK Space Agency publishes the usual level of cap in its guidance, which currently sets the cap at €60 million for standard missions. Crucially, however, the level is not set by statute, so the cap can be varied depending on the risk of the activity in question. Some activities currently regulated under the Outer Space Act, notably procuring the launch of a space object and the operation of a satellite in orbit taking place from the UK, will be regulated under this Bill in future, and it is the intention to continue to exercise the discretion to cap the liability to indemnify Government in these licences.
Therefore, following Royal Assent of this Bill, amendment 16 would reverse current Government policy and disadvantage satellite operators in the UK. Conversely, amendment 5 seeks to ensure that all operator licences must cap the liability to indemnify the Government under clause 35. Amendment 6 would then go on to ensure that the level of this cap would be set out in a report to Parliament.
I understand clearly that the intent of these amendments is to support operators in the UK and the Government welcome support for that principle, which is why we have included this power in the Bill. However, these amendments are premature. The cap on the indemnity to the Government under the Outer Space Act was based on many years of licensing the procuring of the launch of space objects and of the operation of satellites in orbit. Indeed, it was not put in place until more than 25 years after that Act gained Royal Assent. The costs and benefits of capping liability for those activities were fully considered and were subject to a full consultation with industry. We intend to take a similar approach to considering capping a launch operator’s liability to Government under this Bill, as launch is a new activity in the UK and poses more risks for the UK as a launching state.
As I said on Second Reading, we intend to announce a call for evidence on all issues relating to insurance and liabilities early this year, following Royal Assent. That will allow us to start to assess the appropriateness of a cap for this new and potentially riskier activity, balancing the economic benefits of such activity with the need to protect the taxpayer.
On that basis, I hope that the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East will withdraw the amendment.
Karl Turner
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Dr Whitford
I wish to press amendment 5, which would change the wording from “may” to “must”. There is still room to consult on the level of the cap, but the industry requires a Government commitment that there will be a liability cap.
Joseph Johnson
We intend to explore that carefully in the consultation, taking into account the fact that launching in the UK is a riskier activity than procuring the launch overseas. It poses a higher level of risk to the UK taxpayer, and we need to consider it very carefully.
Dr Whitford
I assume the Government recognise that other launching states, such as Australia, France and the US, all have liability caps. If there is no cap, that will simply kill the launch industry dead in this country. I will not push to a vote amendment 6, which would set the cap at a particular level, but the Government should accept the principle that there will be a cap. I would be happy if the Government plan to bring forward such a measure before the third day, but simply to leave the wording as “may” leaves too much doubt.
Amendment proposed: 5, in clause 11, page 8, line 37, leave out “may” and insert “must”.—(Dr Whitford.)
This amendment places a definite cap on the amount of a licensee’s liability.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Karl Turner
I beg to move amendment 17, in clause 12, page 9, line 41, at end insert—
“(ea) must consult the Environment Agency or (as appropriate) the Northern Ireland Environment Agency, the Scottish Environment Protection Agency or Natural Resources Wales;
“(eb) must consult any relevant local planning authority;”
This amendment ensures that the devolved Administrations are consulted in regards to respective Environment Agency bodies.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 18, in clause 12, page 10, line 4, at end insert—
‘(9) In subsection (6) a “relevant local planning authority” means a local planning authority with jurisdiction over any location which would be significantly affected by the licence application.”
This amendment defines ‘relevant local planning authorities’.
Karl Turner
I will be brief, Mr Bone. The amendments aim to tighten up some of the ambiguous wording in the Bill. They are intended to ensure that if space activities were to be established under any of the devolved Administrations of Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales, their respective environment agency bodies would be consulted before any decision was made on granting an operator licence in their jurisdictions. Will the Minister assure us that he will ensure that the regulator will properly consult the Northern Ireland Environment Agency, the Scottish Environment Protection Agency or Natural Resources Wales, as well as any relevant local planning authority, before an operator can be granted a UK spaceport licence?
I tabled amendment 18 with the aim of properly defining a “relevant local planning authority”. We believe that the Bill is too vague and have expanded on its wording to ensure that a local planning authority is defined as an
“authority with jurisdiction over any location which would be significantly affected by the licence application”.
I have seen the Minister’s collegiate approach to the Committee and hope that he will note Opposition concerns, and I shall be happy to withdraw the amendment if he addresses the important points I have raised.
Stephen Doughty (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)
It is always a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Bone.
I support the amendments and hope that the Minister can answer some questions. I am speaking with a constituency interest, as Natural Resources Wales is in my constituency. As that constituency borders England, and has a maritime border, issues such as those we are considering are of regular concern to my constituents. A recent example was the building of the new Hinkley Point nuclear power station on the other side of the Bristol channel. Various significant concerns were raised about the granting of licences for the disposal of mud, which is being removed from the Hinkley Point site to the Welsh side of the channel.
I do not want to get into the specifics of that example, but as there is a question of potentially hazardous materials and the potential for cross-border contamination within the UK, I agree that the matters should be the subject of proper consultation with the devolved authorities, given the likely consequences of anything untoward happening.
Dr Whitford
I welcome the amendment. My hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow North West and I certainly support it, because three of the potential sites are in Scotland, and one is in Wales. However, as we have discussed, the industry could grow and while there is not currently a site in Northern Ireland, there could be in future. It is important that the devolved Governments should be respected and consulted.
The Government introduced new clause 1 on environmental impact right at the start, when we considered clause 2, and it is crucial that they should respect the devolved Governments’ environmental agencies and local planning considerations.
Joseph Johnson
I thank hon. Members for raising important issues on consultation with relevant environmental and planning bodies. The regulator will identify what assessments of environmental effects are appropriate, during the pre-application process. In reviewing those assessments and deciding whether conditions should be attached to a licence, the regulator may wish to have an input from various environmental bodies. However, requiring consultation with the relevant environment agency and local planning authority before deciding what conditions to attach to a licence is not necessary, and may end up being disproportionate.
For example, once the industry has developed, multiple launches may occur under a separate but almost identical licence. In such a case it would be disproportionate for the regulator to have to consult the environment agency and local planning authority for each new licence. It is also worth noting that clause 2 requires the regulator to take into account any environmental objectives set by the Government, which would include any issued by the environment agency.
The existing planning, regulatory and environmental framework will continue to apply, and environmental bodies will have a say, in accordance with their statutory remit, at the relevant stages, such as when planning permission is applied for. I hope that in the light of the Government amendment and the provisions already in the Bill, Members will agree that robust assessments of environmental effects will be conducted and considered prior both to the granting of a licence and to the imposition of conditions under the Bill. I would therefore ask the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East to withdraw amendment 17.
Dr Whitford
I wonder whether the Government would consider including consultation with these agencies within the environmental impact assessment in clause 2, as amended by new clause 1. The Minister talks about consulting with the Environment Agency but, obviously, in the devolved administrations there are three other environment agencies and they should have their place.
Joseph Johnson
I would not want the Committee to think that we have not been engaging closely with the devolved Administrations in the development of the Bill, because we have, and over a considerable period. We have worked with Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland at official level to ensure that all the devolved Administrations are content with provisions in the Bill. I have been out in Northern Ireland myself to discuss the opportunities this Bill presents to businesses there.
Karl Turner
While these amendments intend to ensure that the respective environmental bodies would be consulted were space activities to be established in any of the devolved Administrations—Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales—I do not think the Government have gone anywhere near far enough on that. On that basis, I want to push the amendment to a vote.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Dr Whitford
On the matter of informed consent, I highlight the written evidence submitted to us around what will be defined as informed consent and the possible need to explain complex issues and whether there would be potential for exposing technical information, which, under the US’s ITAR—International Traffic in Arms Regulations—agreement, would be a problem. That is not particularly something I want to bring forward, but we have received a written submission on informed consent.
Joseph Johnson
Informed consent is an important part of the Bill. We will be developing detailed regulations on informed consent, including the information that operators must provide to individuals before they sign consent forms.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 17 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 2 agreed to.
Clause 18 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 3 agreed to.
Clauses 19 to 21 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 4 agreed to.
Clause 22
Security regulations
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephen Doughty
I want to ask the Minister a few questions regarding the clause. I apologise if they have been covered already in other parts of the debate.
Clearly, the security of space for our operations is crucial. These activities will be of significant interest to terrorist organisations or others who would wish to cause harm. This is a problem shared not only in this country but across Europe and the world. Currently, we have sensitive information-sharing systems with the Five Eyes countries and our European neighbours. Given the context of Brexit and the absence of guarantees on the existence of a security treaty and so on—these are issues we have covered at great length in the Home Affairs Committee—will the Minister discuss the consideration given to sharing information with our European partners, in particular regarding the safety and security of operations and those who would wish to target them? On the one hand, any new technology or operation could lead us towards a cautious and very secure approach, but there may also be some issues, whether in relation to the cyber or physical aspects of these operations, such as using locations that have not traditionally been used before for civil aviation or other aerospace activities.
We need to take every precaution necessary, particularly with regard to the increasing threat from not only terrorist organisations and non-state actors, but Russia and other countries that would seek to carry out cyber-attacks—North Korea, for example. Many allegations have been made about attacks on other parts of the UK’s infrastructure, including the NHS, and I see no reason why they would not choose to attack such a high-profile area as space activity.
Will the Minister say a little about how we will ensure the most thorough sharing of information? Will he also give us some guarantees? For example, does he believe that a security treaty will be needed with our European neighbours to ensure that data on individuals can be shared adequately enough to deal with those concerns?
Joseph Johnson
National security and the security of spaceports is, indeed, a vital key element of the Bill. The Bill contains measures to secure against unauthorised access to and interference with space craft, spaceports and any associated infrastructure. It also enables the Secretary of State and regulators to take action where necessary in the interests of national security. The hon. Gentleman will be interested to know that the Bill extends existing civil aviation security powers to regulate spaceplanes and spaceports and introduces broadly similar arrangements for operations to launch objects into orbit, but tailors them to the sensitive nature of satellites and reflects the fact that vertical operations will not be manned.
As with aviation security, the Government will work closely with key partners in Europe and around the world to ensure that security remains paramount in the development of the Bill and the industry. We will continue to work with international partners in all appropriate forums to review and, if necessary, to develop and strengthen measures to ensure that transport generally, and in this case the space flight sector, is cyber-secure.
Stephen Doughty
Will the Minister be specific on the importance of having legal agreements in place for the sharing of relevant information on the matter—the importance, for example, of a security treaty of some sort, in particular with our European partners who are not covered by the Five Eyes agreements? Does he agree that that is crucial?
Joseph Johnson
Should we identify a need for additional legislation, the Bill provides us with the power to adopt appropriate regulatory measures and the ability to issue directions, where necessary and proportionate, to specific entities.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 22 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 5 agreed to.
Clause 23
Spaceport byelaws
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephen Doughty
Will the Minister say a bit about the measures the Government plan to put in place to deal with drones and unmanned aerial vehicles, particularly in relation to their operation around spaceports? There are substantial restrictions on their operation around civil aviation activities in the UK, but a wide range of drones can be commercially purchased and many operators are unaware of the consequences of using them, near to not only airspace but other activities. Will he comment on that, given the particularly sensitive nature of space flight activities and the risk that could be caused by, for example, an incursion into the space around a launch or training activities?
The clause crucially mentions road traffic enactments and the parking of vehicles. We know of terrorist organisations that have attempted to park vehicles near UK airports in the past and it is crucial to retain the physical security around those sites. Given the ability to launch and remotely control drones from great distances, what thought has been given to whether any additional restrictions will be needed or whether the existing regulations for the use of drones will apply in byelaws for space flight operation centres?
Joseph Johnson
The clause enables the Secretary of State to make security-related regulations and to provide guidance on how they may be complied with. The hon. Gentleman asked specifically about drones. He might be aware that the Government announced at the end of November that it is their intention to introduce drone legislation in the spring. The Government will be publishing a draft drone Bill, which will look to extend police powers to extend drone misuse and to mandate the use of safety applications in the UK. We will also be looking at an amendment to the air navigation order to introduce legislation and leisure pilot tests. I hope that addresses his concerns.
Stephen Doughty
Is it therefore the Minister’s intention that when that legislation comes forward it will specifically look at, and make it clear that it applies to, operations around spaceports and space activities? Further, will it be made clear that it concerns not only drones, but—although we are not largely talking here about manned space flight—the use of laser pointers and so on, which we know is a regular problem around airports and which might impede the operation of staff working at those sites or perhaps blind technical equipment being used for space launch activities? Will it be clear that the new legislation applies equally to spaceport activities?
Joseph Johnson
The hon. Gentleman will be interested to know that we will be introducing draft legislation. Should he detect any shortcoming in its application and should he continue to have concerns about whether the spaceport and spaceflight activity enabled by the Bill would have risks posed to it by drone activity, there will be plenty of opportunities in the development of that legislation for Members to point that out to Government.
Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)
When will the draft legislation come forward? Given that the police have indicated they do not have the resources to investigate crimes such as shop lifting, bike thefts and mobile phone thefts, will it include resources to ensure that the police can adequately deliver those new responsibilities?
Stephen Doughty
Will the draft legislation also identify new resources to ensure that this responsibility of the police, as well as others, can be adequately enforced?
Joseph Johnson
On the timing, we announced at the end of November that we would introduce the draft legislation in the spring. Spring is slightly movable. We are not quite in spring, I would say, in the middle of January. Later this year—later on this spring—we will bring forward that legislation. The hon. Gentleman will obviously want us to get the legislation right. We are working carefully in the Department to ensure that it is fit for purpose and covers all the situations that he has rightly been bringing to the attention of the Committee.
Stephen Doughty
I want to ask the Minister one further question and would appreciate his indulgence. He refers to the enforcement of the byelaws by a constable. Does he expect, for example, that the responsibilities around any spaceport enforcement of byelaws will be down to the local and geographical police constabulary, or does he expect that the responsibility will be undertaken by one of the non-geographical forces, such as British Transport Police or the MOD police or the Civil Nuclear Constabulary?
The only reason I ask is because, as is often the case and as I have experienced in my own constituency, when there are major national sites of interest—for example, I have the National Assembly and some other major locations of national significance in my area—there is a tendency, given the additional security requirements around those locations, sometimes to divert resources from local policing activities.
Given the existing strains on police forces, community policing and so on, I am a little concerned in that we all want those byelaws to be enforced and security to be absolutely maintained. For example, will consideration be given to additional resources for a police force where a spaceport is located and licensed to ensure that it can cope with those responsibilities and carry them out without being diverted from day to day crime fighting and other police activities?
The Chair
Order. The way in which the Committee is being carried out is completely in order. The Opposition are being very kind to the Minister in not interrupting to him while he is speaking, but his inspiration sometimes takes a little bit longer to come—it might be that interventions are easier for the Minister than the way we are doing it. [Interruption.] I see it is now working perfectly well.
Joseph Johnson
I am quite happy either way, Mr Bone.
Clause 27 enables the Secretary of State to issue directions in relation to the security of spaceflight activities and national security. Clause 24 provides for a licensee to request further specific advice from regulators or the Secretary of State about compliance with security requirements of a particular activity, service, site, facility or other matter. The byelaw powers are modelled on airport byelaws, and they would be locally policed and locally resourced.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 23 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 24 to 27 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 28
Power to give directions: international obligations of the UK
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Stephen Doughty
Significant concern has been expressed about the future participation of the UK in various space industry international obligations, particularly European obligations. Perhaps the Minister could say a little bit about that—I will go on at length here so he can get some inspiration. Perhaps he could also talk about what assessment has been made of the impacts of leaving the European Union on our participation in, for example, Copernicus, Galileo, Egnos, GovSatCom, Iris, and in Space Situational Awareness and Space Surveillance and Tracking.
For those unfamiliar with those, Copernicus deals with earth observation missions, Galileo and Egnos with navigation—the European equivalent to GPS in some respects—GovSatCom deals with communications, and Iris deals with air traffic management, which we discussed along with aspects of air safety regulations in the last debate. Space Situational Awareness and Space Surveillance and Tracking deal with space debris. Those issues to not come up on a day-to-day basis but, given the cross-border nature of operations, it is crucial that we continue co-operating with our European neighbours, in particular on space debris, given the likely trajectories of launches from the UK and the likely descent paths of items falling from launches and so on. Those things are designed and planned in such a way as to avoid the descent of dangerous materials, but given the increasing number of launches and the increasing number of vehicles being launched into space, and with technology going up through space launch methods, getting that stuff right is obviously important.
We do not want to find ourselves getting into a dispute with our European neighbours after something falls off something we have launched. That is why international agreements on space activities are so crucial, particularly with our European neighbours. Will the Minister say something about the assessment that has been made of our existing international obligations and obligations that we could be in the process of entering into if we stay in the European Union, and their implications?
Joseph Johnson
The Government recognise the enormous benefits of European collaboration in space, and indeed in research and innovation generally. We published a science and innovation discussion paper as well as an external security discussion paper in September 2017 that set out the Government’s clear wish to discuss options for future arrangements in the EU space programmes, including Galileo, Copernicus, Agnos and others. The decision that concluded phase 1 of the exit negotiations in December provides certainty that UK businesses can continue to bid for and win contracts to build, operate and help develop the EU space programme, which we have played a huge part in over the years.
The Government continue to invest in the success of the UK space sector. We recently invested more than £100 million in new satellite test facilities at Harwell and manufacture and test facilities for rocket engines at Westcott in Buckinghamshire. As the hon. Gentleman knows, that is in addition to the substantial UK investment in the European Space Agency, which is a non-EU body, of around £300 million per year.
Stephen Doughty
I thank the Minister for his answer on some of those agencies. Again, I have a particular interest in this as declared in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. Airbus Defence and Space is in the next door constituency and a number of my constituents work there. I know they and many other members of UK space bodies have concerns about future participation in these agencies.
I welcome what the Minister said on the principles with respect to the agencies, but he did not mention specifically the more technical space debris agencies and other agencies. Rather than detain him now, could he write to the Committee and outline how he sees our international obligations functioning under all of the agencies I mentioned?
Joseph Johnson
I am happy to provide further details about our common approach to space debris, if that would be helpful, and undertake to do so.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 28 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 29 to 31 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 32
Power to authorise entry etc in emergencies
Karl Turner
I beg to move amendment 19, in clause 32, page 23, line 31, at end insert—
‘(4A) An enforcement authorisation must be referred to a justice of the peace for evaluation within 48 hours, following the 48 hour period under subsection (7) in which the enforcement authorisation remains in force.”
This amendment provides that an urgent enforcement authorisation must be referred to a justice of the peace for evaluation within 48 hours, following the 48-hour period under Clause 32(7) of the Bill, during which the enforcement authorisation remains in force.
The amendment provides that an urgent enforcement authorisation must be referred to a justice of the peace for evaluation within 48 hours following the 48-hour period under subsection (7), during which the enforcement authorisation remains in force. The amendment aims to clear up any ambiguity surrounding clauses 31 and 32, which grant warrants authorising entry or direct action and powers to authorise entry in emergencies.
Clause 32(2) permits a named person to do anything necessary for protecting national security, securing compliance with international obligations or protecting health and safety. My colleagues in the other place raised concerns about emergency warrants and such vague wording. The power conferred by clause 32 is very extensive and broad. It contains no thorough judicial oversight. The Minister is well aware that the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee also expressed concerns about this aspect of the Bill, which was obviously mentioned in detail in the other place.
We welcome the fact that the Government reduced the authorisation period from one month to 48 hours, which limits the Secretary of State’s power to a degree. However, we still have concerns that such significant and wide-ranging powers will be exercisable without anticipatory or rapid post hoc judicial involvement.
Currently, there is not enough in the Bill to check whether the powers granted under clause 32 will be appropriately or proportionately used by the authorised person. The Minister in the other place stated that the amendment would “impose unhelpful bureaucracy”. We believe that judicial oversight of emergency warrants is crucial to ensure that such excessive powers are not abused, and we do not believe that we are asking for anything unreasonable. Having checks in place to ensure that this extensive power is not misused will improve the Bill. It is not, as stated by the Minister in the other place, “unhelpful bureaucracy”. I hope the Minister can give assurances that the Government are listening to those concerns and will take them on board.
Dr Whitford
I rise to support the amendment. Clause 31 refers to the seeking of warrants from justices of the peace, where there is time to do so. Clearly, there will be situations where that is not reasonable and therefore we accept that there is a need to allow emergency entry— 48 hours should be sufficient to allow that warrant to be reviewed by a justice of the peace. We welcome that the Government reduced emergency entry from a month to 48 hours, but it is perfectly reasonable that it should be looked at by a justice of the peace within two days.
Joseph Johnson
I thank the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East and for Central Ayrshire for raising the issue of emergency powers. The clause confers on the Secretary of State the power to grant an enforcement authorisation to carry out any specified action in the most urgent cases, such as a serious risk to national security, compliance with our international obligations or people’s health and safety. The amendment tabled by the hon. Gentleman would seek to require that such an enforcement authorisation be evaluated by a justice of the peace within 48 hours of the 48 hours that the authorisation has been in force.
The Government have listened carefully at all stages of the discussion of the provision and addressed concerns before the Bill was brought to the House. Before the Bill’s introduction, the Science and Technology Committee raised concerns about the length of time for which an enforcement authorisation would remain in place. In response to that helpful intervention, we reduced the time for which an enforcement authorisation can remain in place from one month to 48 hours.
The Opposition in the other place attempted to introduce amendments similar to that tabled by the hon. Gentleman. The amendments are not clear on the purpose that a post hoc evaluation by a justice of the peace would serve—the order would have already been spent and the specified action taken. It is also not clear what is expected to follow from any such evaluation. However, the Government have reflected further on the amendments and the intentions underpinning them. Officials have carried out extensive discussions with colleagues across Whitehall, including in the Ministry of Justice, the chief magistrate’s office and the Home Office, which is responsible for the powers of entry gateway process. None of the discussions resulted in the suggestion that the power should be amended as the amendment proposes. An important reason for that is that there is no known precedent of a justice of the peace conducting an evaluation of an emergency power once it has been exercised.
Let me reassure hon. Members that there are adequate safeguards in the Bill with respect to the exercise of this significant power. Such an authorisation can be granted only to a named person who the Secretary of State is satisfied is suitably qualified to carry out the necessary action. Each time the power is used, the authorisation must be in writing, must specify the action required and will remain in force for only 48 hours from the time it is granted.
In response to concerns previously raised about the exercise of this power without sanction by an independent judicial authority, it is important to note that the decision of the Secretary of State to issue an enforcement authorisation could be challenged by judicial review. I would also point out that this power is more conservative and requires more stringent authorisation than other comparable powers of entry, such as those of nuclear inspectors or health and safety inspectors who are provided with a standing authorisation and may act at their discretion. The power would be used only in the most serious and urgent cases, but it is necessary to ensure that those involved in spaceflight activities and third parties are adequately protected should such situations arise.
Mark Garnier (Wyre Forest) (Con)
The Minister is being very helpful. One of the interesting points that lies behind some of the concerns is about who advises the Secretary of State that the intervention needs to be made in the first place. Will the Minister give a little more flavour of the process whereby advice is given that leads to an intervention order? That may give some comfort to the Opposition.
Joseph Johnson
The enforcement authorisations would be a last resort where the regulatory bodies in question felt that it was absolutely imperative to have one in the interests of our national security, or for the pursuit of our international obligations, or the health and safety of individuals in and around the spaceport or elsewhere in the UK. It is very much a power of last resort. Given the nature of the activities being undertaken at spaceports, everyone should be able to see the need for such provisions.
Karl Turner
I hear what the Minister says, but he seems to be saying that, because there is no precedent for a justice of the peace to review such warrants, it is not necessary. He also said that judicial review is available, but he must appreciate that the threshold to succeed in judicial review is very high and that it is extremely costly to the party bringing the proceeding. Frankly, he has not gone anywhere near far enough, and for that reason I am pressing the amendment to a Division.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Space Industry Bill [ Lords ] (Second sitting)
Tuesday 23rd January 2018
(6 years, 10 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Space Industry Act 2018 View all Space Industry Act 2018 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 23 January 2018 - (23 Jan 2018)
The Committee divided: - Ayes: 2 / Noes: 10 - Question accordingly negatived.
The Chair
We resume line-by-line consideration of the Space Industry Bill. We are sitting in public and the proceedings are being broadcast. Before we begin, will everyone ensure that all electronic devices are turned off or switched to silent mode? Teas and coffees are not allowed during sittings.
Clause 33
Liability of operator for injury or damage etc
Karl Turner (Kingston upon Hull East) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 20, in clause 33, page 24, line 2, leave out subsection (1).
This amendment relates to situations where the operator has no liability in order that those living around the spaceports have adequate powers to protect themselves from noise and nuisance.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Bailey. The amendment relates to situations where the operator has no liability, and seeks to ensure that people living around spaceports have adequate powers to protect themselves from noise nuisance. The Bill originally contained no proper provisions to protect people living close to spaceports or under potential flightpaths from noise. The word “noise” was not even included in the Bill. It now is, but only once. Again, I pay tribute to my colleagues in the other place, particularly my Front-Bench colleagues, who managed to secure that vital concession.
I welcome the Government’s insertion of an assurance that licences can include a condition that an assessment must be done of the noise and emissions that activity will cause, and of the impact on local communities. To say that aircraft noise is rather loud would be an understatement. I can imagine the noise and nuisance if we ended up regularly launching rockets in the UK. Will the Minister therefore give us an assurance that he will look closely at what powers people who live around potential UK spaceports have to protect themselves from such noise nuisance?
The Minister of State, Department for Transport (Joseph Johnson)
I appreciate that there are concerns about the possibility that spaceflight activities may have an adverse effect on local people. Clause 33 is designed to balance the right to quiet enjoyment of land against the right to carry out a commercial activity, to ensure that there is only minimal encroachment of rights where the operator acts in accordance with the law.
Subsection 1 is replicated from section 76(1) of the Civil Aviation Act 1982, which provides a similar protection for aircraft operators. Amendment 20 would remove the protection for spaceflight operators. However, the Government believe that subsection (1) is appropriate to enable spaceflight operators to carry out activities from the UK. Such a provision is necessary to prevent an operator who acts lawfully from being sued by a third party who considers that his or her right to quiet enjoyment of land is being affected.
Where carrier aircraft are used as part of spaceflight activities, local people will continue to have no such claims against aircraft operators because of the protection in section 76 of the Civil Aviation Act, so the amendment would have little practical effect on spaceports that are adapted aerodromes, such as the potential spaceports at Newquay and Prestwick. However, it should be stressed that such a protection does not apply if an operator does not comply substantially with all the requirements imposed on them.
The protection from claims of nuisance and trespass does not prevent anyone who suffers injury or damage arising from spaceflight activities from bringing a claim against an operator under the strict liability course of action provided for in subsection (2). With that assurance, I ask the hon. Gentleman to consider withdrawing his amendment.
Karl Turner
I am grateful to the Minister for those assurances. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Dr Philippa Whitford (Central Ayrshire) (SNP)
I beg to move amendment 7, in clause 33, page 24, line 31, leave out “may” and insert “must”.
This amendment places a definite cap on the amount of a licensee’s liability.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 8, in clause 33, page 24, line 36, at end insert—
“(5A) The limit on the amount of the licensee’s liability as referenced in subsection (5) must not exceed €60 million for each launch.”
Amendment 9, in clause 33, page 24, line 36, at end insert—
“(5A) Regulations under subsection (5) must provide for—
(a) the maximum limit on the amount of a particular licensee’s liability to be based on each launch undertaken by the operator;
(b) the maximum limit on the amount of a licensee’s liability to vary depending on the classification type of each launch.
(5B) The classification type for each launch as in subsection (5A) is defined as the level of risk attached to each launch and will be determined by the regulator in accordance with the regulations.”
This amendment allows for a mandatory cap for the licensee’s liability to be based on each launch rather than per satellite and would ensure the cap on the amount of a licensee’s liability can vary depending on the type of launch depending on its risk classification.
Amendment 10, in clause 33, page 24, line 37, leave out “may” and insert “must”.
This amendment places a definite cap on the amount of a licensee’s liability.
Dr Whitford
This group of amendments comes back to the issue of liability for operators and, in particular, the need to set some form of cap on their liabilities so that they can get insurance.
Amendment 7 would change “may” to “must” in subsection 5. As I said earlier, that is not to set the limit, but to raise the principle of one. Later, as we will see when we come to Government amendments to clause 34, the Government themselves change “may” to “must”, implying that there is a cap that they are paying above. Similarly, in clause 33(6) we would also change “may” to “must”.
It needs to be stated that the maximum limit would not go above the €60 million that satellite launchers currently have to indemnify elsewhere. However, what has been described in the Bill and in the explanatory notes is that the launch activities carried out in the UK may be quite different, as the Minister just talked about with regard to noise nuisance. In horizontal take-off, we are talking about an aeroplane carrying a small rocket that will launch cube satellites and micro-satellites such as Unicorn.
As I said earlier, the current limit of €60 million per satellite, and therefore the launch of micro-satellites, would be untenable. Therefore, we need to consider in the consultation making the amount per launch, or per cluster, as opposed simply to per satellite. The Government need to reassure us that they accept the principle of a limited liability and of a liability cap.
There is also the discussion in the paper of describing launches as having a green or amber risk—obviously, those at red risk would not get a licence. Therefore, it could be done by class as opposed to launch by launch. Horizontal take-off vehicles launching cube satellites and micro-satellites might be given a different classification than a vertical take-off vehicle carrying large satellites, as has been the case elsewhere.
This cluster of amendments simply intends to bring back this basic principle that the industry has raised with me, and I am sure with other Members. It has also submitted in writing again that the failure to commit to setting a liability cap whereby industry indemnifies the Government up to a certain level means that companies will not manage to get insurance and they simply will not launch from the UK.
Carol Monaghan (Glasgow North West) (SNP)
To add to the comments of my hon. Friend, this issue could affect where future developments take place in the space industry. Jurisdictions such as Singapore do not require satellites—Glasgow has strength in satellites—to be built locally. However, other jurisdictions require satellites to be built in the local area or in the country.
If cube satellite businesses do not get a mandatory liability cap within this Bill, there is a danger that future development will be affected, and a danger that, when those businesses are looking to expand or develop satellites for future use, they will do so where they can get one. That would be where they can insure and launch satellites. It is absolutely crucial that we get this issue sorted at this stage.
Joseph Johnson
We discussed an operator’s liability to indemnify the Government against claims from foreign states and their nationals in clause 35. In addition, clause 33 places a strict liability on the operator to compensate third parties in the UK who suffer injury or damage as a result of space flight activity. This is necessary because the Bill allows spaceflight activities to take place from the UK. The intention is to provide easy recourse to compensation for the uninvolved general public in the UK on the same basis as compensation available to foreign nationals.
Clause 33(5) provides a power to make regulations to limit an operator’s liability arising out of spaceflight activities. As we have discussed, the Government intend to issue a call for evidence to consider whether such a cap is appropriate. The amendments seek to require the Government to make regulations that specify a cap on liability in an operator’s licence based on the risk profile of the launch.
The proposal is to set an upper limit on that cap in secondary legislation of €60 million. That figure, as we have discussed, reflects the existing cap on an operator’s liability to indemnify the Government in a licence for a standard mission issued under the Outer Space Act 1986, which was set following considerable experience of satellite licensing. There is no reason to believe that that is also an appropriate level at which to cap a launch vehicle operator’s liability to third parties in the UK, since that activity is likely to be inherently more risky.
Creating inflexibility in legislation is also not helpful. The existing Government indemnity liability cap of €60 million for satellite operators is set by a policy decision and can be varied as appropriate—the figure is not laid down in the Outer Space Act for that reason. The UK Space Agency is considering its approach to risk management of satellite licensing, including the implications for liabilities and insurance requirements. That flexibility is vital if regulation is to keep up with a rapidly changing space sector. The UK Space Agency intends to issue further guidance on that new approach later this year.
As that demonstrates, legislative flexibility is better for both industry and the Government, because it allows the regulator to determine case by case whether to cap liability and the level of any cap. That should encourage operators to design their missions to reduce injury and damage as much as possible, leading to safer launches and reduced costs for them.
Joseph Johnson
Let me turn to some of the hon. Lady’s specific points before she intervenes—I may anticipate what she is about to ask.
A mandatory cap on liability and mandatory Government compensation embedded in primary legislation could potentially breach state aid rules. That could also cause difficulties in respect of future trading rules applying to the UK, although those are of course as yet unknown. For that reason, it is important to retain the flexibility to deal with the issue by way of secondary legislation. In that way, this and future Governments will have a power to introduce and vary a cap to ensure that it is in line with our legal obligations. It can also be varied in the light of changes in the market or in our trading commitments.
The amendment to clause 33(4)(a) means that the Government—the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire commented on this—must compensate a claimant only in the event of a cap. That amendment does not mean that there is a cap on the face of the Bill.
Dr Whitford
As I said in my remarks, it is the principle a cap as opposed to the amount. I totally understand the need for consultation, because the type of space industry being discussed is different from space industries elsewhere, where vertical rockets are launched. I am still not clear why the Government are unwilling to commit to a cap in principle when that is what the industry is crying out for.
Joseph Johnson
I will repeat what I said before. As soon as the Bill receives Royal Assent we will start the process of a call for evidence to determine whether there is a need for a cap and the level at which any such cap might be set.
Dr Whitford
I beg to move amendment 11, in clause 33, page 24, line 39, at end insert—
“(7) Within 6 months of this Act coming into force the Secretary of State must lay a report before Parliament setting out divisions of responsibility and the level of liability for parties’ spaceflight activities, including—
(a) the Spaceport;
(b) the launch operator; and
(c) the satellite operator.”
This amendment places a requirement on the Secretary of State to publish clear guidelines with regards to responsibility and liability for parties involved in spaceflight activities.
This is a probing amendment to highlight the fact that in the past the space industry was very much state-driven, state-paid-for and state-covered, and now we are moving to a commercial situation where a spaceport, a launch company and a satellite company will be totally different entities. Therefore, I seek clarification in the consultation of exactly where the handover of liability is from one to the other and what responsibilities they have. We would not want to see people arguing at the edges and bystanders, other companies or satellite companies ending up not being compensated for a mission that failed.
Joseph Johnson
I thank the hon. Lady for raising the important matter of the respective responsibilities and liabilities that spaceports, launch operators and operators of satellites will have. The full scope of a licensee’s responsibilities will be set out in the Bill, in regulations made under the Bill and in the terms of specific licences granted by the regulator. In broad terms, it is envisaged that the Bill will enable the regulator to license four types of activity initially: operation of a spaceport, spaceflight activities involving launch of a spacecraft, operation of a satellite and provision of range control services.
The Bill sets out certain high-level responsibilities and obligations on licensees. Most obligations are on persons carrying out spaceflight activities. I shall refer to them as spaceflight operators for convenience, although that term is not used in the Bill. Those include persons carrying out launch and operating a satellite. It is considered that activities of the spaceflight operator are the most likely to cause injury or damage to third parties.
In the case of spaceflight operators, clause 9 imposes obligations to assess the risk to health and safety posed by the spaceflight activity, to comply with the risk assessment requirements and to take all reasonable steps to reduce risks to the general public so that they are as low as reasonably practicable.
Under clause 16, the spaceflight operator must not allow individuals to take part in a spaceflight activity unless they meet criteria prescribed in regulations and have signed a consent form signifying that they understand and accept the risks of taking part in the spaceflight activity. Under clause 17, the spaceflight operator must not allow unqualified individuals to take part in or otherwise be engaged with the spaceflight activity.
Clause 33 places a strict liability on a spaceflight operator to provide the uninvolved general public with a straightforward remedy for compensation for injury or damage caused by their spaceflight activities. This strict liability would apply to any injury or damage caused in the UK or its territorial waters, and to an aircraft in flight or persons and property on board such aircraft. It applies to damage that is caused by a craft or space object being used for spaceflight activities.
Spaceflight operators also have an obligation under clause 35 to indemnify the Government for any claims brought against the Government for loss or damage caused by their spaceflight activities. Other bodies that may be carrying out functions on behalf of the Government also benefit from the indemnity.
On the responsibilities and liabilities of spaceport operators, clause 10 requires that applicants for a spaceport licence must take all reasonable steps to ensure that risks to public safety of operating the spaceport are as low as reasonably practicable. In addition, the applicant will need to fulfil any criteria and requirements set out in regulations. In the case of providers of range control services, they will be governed by the provisions of clauses 5, 6 and 7 and regulations made under those clauses.
In addition to the Bill, further detailed obligations and responsibilities for all types of licence holders will be prescribed in regulations: for example, safety requirements under clause 18 and security requirements under clause 21. Those regulations will be supplemented by detailed guidance.
The regulations will set out licensing and ongoing requirements and any oversight of operations to ensure that spaceflight activities and spaceports are operated safety. In addition to general responsibilities and liabilities imposed by the Bill, and regulations made under it, the terms of individual licences will specify the particular activities authorised under that licence and the responsibilities that go with them. Individual licences will also be subject to licence conditions tailored to their application, examples of which are set out in schedule 1.
I hope I have reassured the hon. Lady that the Bill, combined with the regulations to be made under it and the terms of individual licences, will provide the necessary clarity on the responsibilities and liabilities that come with being a licence holder under the Bill. The Government intend to consult publicly an all initial draft statutory instruments and statutory guidance. All draft regulations will be accompanied by a full explanation of their intent. Furthermore, reflecting the importance that the Government place on consultation, we have amended the Bill to impose a statutory duty to carry out public consultation before making any regulations under the affirmative resolution procedure. I therefore ask her to withdraw her amendment.
Stephen Doughty (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)
As ever, it is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Bailey. I want to underline the point that has been made as it applies well to what we are talking about—the wording that relates to liabilities, given their legal implications. It also applies to clause 68.
The Minister will be aware that UKspace, the space trade association, has raised concerns about the terminology used, which in this circumstance and in other parts of the Bill is not necessarily consistent with that used in the industry. To give an example of the confusion, the industry uses “launch systems” or “launch services” to refer to the launching of satellites, whereas the Bill appears to use “spacecraft” for that. The industry uses the word “spacecraft” to refer to man-made objects that are to be delivered into space—also known as “the payload.”
I do not want to get into a big semantic debate but, particularly when we are talking about where liabilities lie—whether with a launch operator or a satellite operator, or with a spacecraft, a launch system or launch services—I want an assurance from the Minister that there will be clear guidance, understood by the industry, the public and the courts when it comes to interpreting the Bill’s provisions.
Joseph Johnson
I am happy to repeat the assurance I gave a second ago. We will consult publicly on all the initial draft statutory instruments and the statutory guidance that will give effect to the provisions. I hope that that process will address any remaining areas of uncertainty about terminology, to which the hon. Gentleman refers.
Dr Whitford
I look forward to seeing the regulations. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 33 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 34
Power of Secretary of State to indemnify
Joseph Johnson
I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 34, page 25, line 15, leave out “may” and insert “must”.
This amendment concerns the case where a person is caused injury or damage by spaceflight activities carried out by a licensee whose liability to that person is capped by regulations under clause 33(5). It converts the Secretary of State’s power to indemnify that person in respect of any shortfall into a duty to do so.
Joseph Johnson
The Bill is designed to ensure that spaceflight activity is as safe as possible, and risks to third parties are minimised as far as possible. However, no activity is entirely without risk and we have to account for that. If injury or damage arise, it is right that affected third parties should have easy recourse to compensation. That policy does not change if an operator has a capped liability.
As we discussed, clause 33(5) provides a power to make regulations that enable a regulator to specify a cap on an operator’s liability for injury or damage arising out of their spaceflight activities to prescribed persons, or in prescribed circumstances. Those persons and circumstances would be set out in regulations, but we envisage that a cap would be on an operator’s liability to the uninvolved general public who suffer injury or damage as a result of spaceflight activities. As that liability can be capped, clause 34(3), as drafted, provides the Secretary of State with a power to indemnify a claimant in situations where injury or damage caused by spaceflight activities exceeds an apparatus capped liability amount.
Having listened carefully to the debate in the other place, the Government agree that it is right to go further, and the amendments turn the power under clause 34(3) into a duty, and ensure that the Government must pay the remaining compensation above that amount. I am sure that that will be welcomed by hon. Members, as it reflects the desire on both sides of the House to ensure that third parties will rightly never miss out.
Amendment 1 agreed to.
Amendments made: 2, in clause 34, page 25, line 22, after first “or” insert “duty under subsection”.
This amendment is consequential on amendment 1.
Amendment 3, in clause 34, page 25, line 26, after “may” insert “or must”.
This amendment is consequential on amendment 1.
Amendment 4, in clause 34, page 25, line 29, after “or” insert “duty under subsection”.—(Joseph Johnson.)
This amendment is consequential on amendment 1.
Clause 34, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 35 to 37 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 38
Powers to obtain rights over land
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Dr Whitford
I really just want to speak to clause 38(4), and the rights created under that. Again, this refers to the devolved nations, which currently have four of the five sites being discussed, although obviously future sites may well be scattered right across the UK. We are looking, again, for some consultation in the event of rights being taken over land that would be with the devolved Government. I have an amendment on that later, but I wanted to refer to it during debate on the clause itself.
Joseph Johnson
I can set out some context for the hon. Lady that might clarify the issue. Some concern was expressed in the other place about the provisions, but I assure the Committee that the Government are taking a responsible and balanced approach. We have sought to address those concerns by amending the Bill.
In clause 38 in particular, we made it clear on the face of the Bill that an order will be made only when the Secretary of State considers it appropriate, rather than when it is expedient, as the Bill said originally. Powers are restricted to what is required and proportionate for securing safe space flight operations. There are no powers in the Bill for a spaceport licence holder, launch operator or range control service provider to purchase land compulsorily.
The clause allows for the creation of orders granting rights over land. Such orders may be necessary to ensure that utilities and other supporting infrastructure can be installed and maintained—for radar or surveillance, for example. Space flight from the UK will be conducted on a commercial basis, so we expect operators to negotiate access in the vast majority of cases. Such an order, therefore, would be created only as a last resort, where a negotiation with the landowner had failed to produce a mutually agreeable outcome. Schedule 6 sets out further provision for such circumstances, including how notice for such orders should be given and how proposed orders can be objected to.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 38 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 39 and 40 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 6 agreed to.
Clause 41 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 42
Challenges to and commencement of orders
Dr Whitford
I beg to move amendment 12, in clause 42, page 31, line 12, at end insert—
‘(4) An order under section 38 or 40 cannot be made in relation to a spaceport or prospective spaceport without the consent of—
(a) the Scottish Ministers, in relation to the use of land in Scotland;
(b) the Welsh Ministers, in relation to the use of land in Wales;
(c) the Northern Ireland devolved authority, in relation to the use of land in Northern Ireland.
(5) In this section, a “Northern Ireland devolved authority” means the First Minister and deputy First Minister acting jointly, a Northern Ireland Minister or a Northern Ireland department.”
This amendment would ensure that consent of devolved administrations is sought prior to the Secretary of State exercising their powers under Clauses 38 and 40.
This is the formal amendment on the point that I made in relation to clause 38 about a requirement to consult on land enforcement orders with the devolved powers in Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland.
Joseph Johnson
I thank the hon. Lady for tabling this amendment, allowing me again to address the subject of land powers, in the specific context of the devolved Administrations. I reassure her and other Committee members that there has been considerable engagement with the devolved Administrations as the provisions have been developed.
Officials have been engaging with the devolved Administrations since early 2014, when they met the Welsh and Scottish Governments to discuss ambitions to create a UK spaceport. Representatives from the devolved Administrations have since been invited to launch UK events across the country, bringing together many of those interested in becoming involved in the operations or supply chains of spaceports or space flight activities.
Alongside this general engagement, we have worked with Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland at official level to ensure that the devolved Administrations are content with all provisions in the Bill. Specifically, on land powers, we have agreed an approach that the devolved Administrations have confirmed they are content with.
Before the introduction of the Bill, we discussed the land provisions with the Scottish Government, the Lands Tribunals for Scotland and Northern Ireland, and Registers of Scotland. We have since consulted the Scottish Civil Justice Council on the practical implications of orders under clauses 38 and 40. These organisations have confirmed that they are content with the implications for their processes and have not requested amendment to the current drafting of the clauses. Orders made on Welsh land would be subject to the same registration process as those in England, and any tribunals that were to be involved would be the same ones as for England.
The previous Minister of State for Transport spoke with the Scottish Government Minister for Transport to update him on the progress of the Bill and the proposed amendments ahead of Report in the other place. In addition, my officials continue to engage with the devolved Administrations of Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland as the Bill makes its progress through the parliamentary process.
Going back to the clauses to which the hon. Lady’s amendment refers, I should say that an opportunity for those in the devolved Administrations to raise any concerns about a specific order is provided in schedule 6. The schedule requires that notice of a proposal to make an order under clause 38 or a land order under clause 40 must be published in local newspapers and served on the local authority. However, we expect that spaceport or launch operators, or range control service providers, will work closely with local landowners and local authorities as they develop their plans for sites and launches.
We also expect that, rather than orders under clauses 38 and 40 being necessary, operators will negotiate with landowners for access to land or for restrictions on the use of land or water near a spaceport site. Representatives of the companies hoping to develop the first spaceports have confirmed that they have indeed been working closely with local landowners and local authorities as they progress their plans.
I should also emphasise that orders that may be made under clauses 38 and 40 are compatible with the existing body of planning legislation and will not restrict the ability of local planning authorities to take planning decisions. Should Ministers in the devolved Administrations wish to call in any planning decision relating to the development of a spaceport site, their right to do so will not be affected by any provision in this Bill.
I hope that the hon. Lady is reassured that the powers in clauses 38 and 40 will not impact on the ability of local planning authorities or Ministers in Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland to take planning decisions as they would usually. I hope she is reassured that the devolved Administrations, as well as any persons served with a notice, will be able to object to the making of orders through the process set out in schedule 6. I therefore ask the hon. Lady to consider withdrawing amendment 12.
Dr Whitford
I thank the Minister for that detailed explanation. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 42 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 7 agreed to.
Clause 43 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 8 agreed to.
Clauses 44 and 45 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 9 agreed to.
Clauses 46 to 59 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 10 agreed to.
Clauses 60 and 61 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 11 agreed to.
Clauses 62 to 66 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 12 agreed to.
Clause 67
Regulations: general
Karl Turner
I beg to move amendment 21, in clause 67, page 43, line 40, leave out subsection (6) and insert—
‘(6) A statutory instrument containing (whether alone or with other provision)—
(a) regulations under section 4(2),
(b) regulations under section 5(2),
(c) regulations under section 7(4),
(d) regulations under section 7(6),
(e) regulations under section 9,
(f) regulations under section 12(7),
(g) regulations under section 18,
(h) regulations under section 22,
(i) regulations under section 34(5),
(j) regulations under section 35(3)(a),
(k) regulations under section 58,
(l) regulations under section 64, or
(m) regulations that create offences,
is subject to the super-affirmative resolution procedure.
(6A) For the purposes of this Act the “super-affirmative procedure” is as follows.
(6B) The Minister must lay before Parliament—
(a) a draft resolution, and
(b) an explanatory document.
(6C) The explanatory document must—
(a) introduce and give reasons for the resolution,
(b) explain under which power or powers in this Act the provision contained in the resolution is made, and
(c) give a detailed explanation of provisions included in the resolution.
(6D) The Minister must have regard to—
(a) any representations,
(b) any resolution of either House of Parliament, and
(c) any recommendations of a committee of either House of Parliament charged with reporting on the draft resolution,
made during the 40-day period with regard to the draft resolution.
(6E) If, after the expiry of the 40-day period, the Minister wishes to make a resolution in the terms of the draft, he must lay before Parliament a statement—
(a) stating whether any representations were made under subsection (6D)(a), and
(b) if any representations were so made, giving details of them.
(6F) The Minister may after the laying of such a statement make a resolution in the terms of the draft if it is approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.
(6G) However, a committee of either House charged with reporting on the draft resolution may, at any time after the laying of a statement under subsection (6E) and before the draft resolution is approved by that House under subsection (6F), recommend under this subsection that no further proceedings be taken in relation to the draft resolution.
(6H) Where a recommendation is made by a committee of either House under subsection (6G) in relation to a draft resolution, no proceedings may be taken in relation to the draft resolution in that House under subsection (6F) unless the recommendation is, in the same Session, rejected by resolution of that House.
(6I) If, after the expiry of the 40-day period, the Minister wishes to make a resolution consisting of a version of the draft resolution with material changes, he must lay before Parliament—
(a) a revised draft resolution, and
(b) a statement giving details of—
(i) any representations made under subsection (6D)(a), and
(ii) the revisions proposed.
(6J) The Minister may after laying a revised draft resolution and statement under subsection (6I) make a resolution in the terms of the revised draft if it is approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.
(6K) However, a committee of either House charged with reporting on the revised draft resolution may, at any time after the revised draft resolution is laid under subsection (6I) and before it is approved by that House under subsection (6J), recommend under this subsection that no further proceedings be taken in relation to the revised draft resolution.
(6L) Where a recommendation is made by a committee of either House under subsection (6K) in relation to a revised draft resolution, no proceedings may be taken in relation to the revised draft resolution in that House under subsection (6J) unless the recommendation is, in the same Session, rejected by resolution of that House.
(6M) In this section the “40-day period” means the period of 40 days beginning with the day on which the draft resolution was laid before Parliament under subsection (6B).”
The amendment provides for the use of the super-affirmative procedure rather than, when applicable, the affirmative procedure for considering regulations and secondary legislation. The super-affirmative procedure provides that a Minister must lay a draft resolution and explanatory document before both Houses and take account of any representations.
The amendment provides for the use of the super-affirmative procedure rather than, when applicable, the affirmative procedure for considering regulations and secondary legislation. As we know, the super-affirmative procedure provides that a Minister must lay a draft order and an explanatory document before both Houses and take account of any representations.
I do not intend to speak for long to the amendment, because it was previously debated at some length in the other place. It is about parliamentary scrutiny. It aims to change the Bill so that a significant statutory instrument arising from the delegated powers consistently go through a super-affirmative procedure, which will mean that it is debated in both Houses, rather than the negative procedure, when it would automatically become law without proper parliamentary debate or scrutiny.
I will set out the case why such statutory instruments should be under the affirmative procedure each and every time they are brought forward. The Opposition have expressed great concern that the Government are attempting to evade proper parliamentary scrutiny on clause 67. Let me be clear that we support the Bill, but it is a skeleton Bill. It is already difficult to scrutinise properly in its current format. My colleagues in the other place raised the point that crucial regulations will not even be consulted on until next year, and will not come before Parliament for nearly two years at the very earliest.
I accept that we must consider rapid technological change and advances in the space industry—those points were made by the Minister in the other place—but how can we make sure that we get the proper legislative framework in place for the space industry, which is constantly developing? The Government and future Governments in years to come still need to be held to account, and Parliament needs to scrutinise legislation properly. I am sure that everyone in this Committee Room wants the United Kingdom’s space industry to grow. However, that should not come at the expense of parliamentary scrutiny. Will the Minister assure us that he will consider the points raised and set out the Government’s position for future statutory instruments under the Bill?
Dr Whitford
The amendment is, as the hon. Gentleman referred to, about the potential delay for the industry from considering regulations. I seek assurances from the Minister that the timescale of two years that seems to be being discussed is erroneous, because otherwise we will not be launching anything in 2020. That timescale seemed to be referred to in the House of Lords—the hon. Gentleman also referred to it—but it would kick the industry into the long grass again. This process started in 2014 and we are in 2018. There had been an aspiration to be ready to launch from the UK in 2020, if the vehicles are ready. There is an urgency and I seek reassurance that we are getting on with it.
Joseph Johnson
Hon. Members may be aware—my noble Friend mentioned this—that a similar amendment was tabled in the other place. The Government reflected on the concerns of noble Lords and amended the Bill to impose a statutory duty to carry out a public consultation before making any regulations under the affirmative resolution procedure. The Bill now includes a requirement for a report by the Secretary of State on the consultation to be laid before Parliament. As my noble Friend the Minister made clear in the other place, a public consultation would invite a response from all interested parties. Subsequent regulations that materially change the substance of the original regulations would also be subject to public consultation.
The amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East goes much further than that by imposing the super-affirmative procedure on affirmative regulations. As I have said, the Government have listened and taken on board the concerns raised in the other place, and the Bill now ensures that there is the enhanced scrutiny of affirmative regulations. The amendment would lead to a duplication of effort.
I assure hon. Members that it is the Government’s intention to continue to build on the open collaboration that has taken place throughout the development of this legislation—from publishing the Bill in draft, to the publication of policy scoping notes, to committing to formally consult on the draft regulations prior to laying them. As the hon. Member for Middlesbrough (Andy McDonald) noted on Second Reading, the Government have taken a very open attitude in developing this legislation and in engaging with hon. Members and noble Lords in the other place to ensure we have a successful Bill. We want that to continue as we go on to the next stages of secondary legislation, consultation on guidance and so forth.
The question from the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire on the timing of the laying of statutory instruments is a novel and complex challenge. I know she appreciates that that requires detailed policy development, building in parallel internal expertise to enable us to deliver an effective regulatory regime. There is a wealth of best practice in the industry and we need to work with stakeholders to identify how we can best design the regulatory framework and the subsequent legislation on the basis of being informed adequately by those discussions. I can confirm that it is the Government’s intention to formally consult as soon as the draft statutory instruments are available.
I hope that that has assured hon. Members that the approach will continue as we develop secondary legislation, and that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw the amendment.
Karl Turner
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 67 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 68 to 71 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
New Clause 1
Grant of licences: assessments of environmental effects
“(1) This section applies to—
(a) a spaceport licence;
(b) an operator licence authorising launches of spacecraft or carrier aircraft.
(2) The regulator may not grant an application for a licence to which this section applies unless the applicant has submitted an assessment of environmental effects.
(3) In this section “assessment of environmental effects”—
(a) in relation to a spaceport licence, means an assessment of the effects that launches of spacecraft or carrier aircraft from the spaceport in question, or from launches of spacecraft from carrier aircraft launched from the spaceport, are expected to have on the environment;
(b) in relation to an operator licence authorising launches of spacecraft or carrier aircraft, means an assessment of the effects that those launches are expected to have on the environment.
(4) If or to the extent that the regulator directs, the requirement imposed by subsection (2) to submit an assessment of environmental effects may be met by submitting—
(a) an equivalent assessment prepared previously in compliance with a requirement imposed by or under another enactment, or
(b) an assessment of environmental effects prepared in connection with a previous application.
The regulator may make a direction under this subsection only if satisfied that there has been no material change of circumstances since the previous assessment was prepared.
(5) The regulator must take into account the assessment of environmental effects (including any assessment submitted as mentioned in subsection (4) in deciding—
(a) whether to grant a licence to which this section applies;
(b) what conditions should be attached to such a licence under section 12.
(6) The regulator must issue guidance about—
(a) the form, contents and level of detail of an assessment of environmental effects;
(b) the time for submitting an assessment of environmental effects;
(c) the circumstances in which the regulator will or may give a direction under subsection (4).
Guidance under paragraph (a) may specify matters that are to be dealt with in an assessment of environmental effects only if the regulator so requires in a particular case.”—(Joseph Johnson.)
This new clause requires assessments of environmental effects to be carried out before the regulator can grant certain licences, and makes further provision about such assessments.
Brought up, read the First and Second time and added to the Bill.
New Clause 2
Potential impact of leaving the European Union on the United Kingdom’s space industry
“(1) The Secretary of State must carry out an assessment of the potential impact that leaving the European Union will have on the United Kingdom’s space industry.
(2) The assessment under subsection (1) must make reference to the following areas—
(a) membership of the European Space Agency;
(b) the impact of the UK’s exit from the EU on research and development and access to funding, including Horizon 2020;
(c) the free movement to the UK from the EU of those who work in the space industry;
(d) the UK’s participation in the Galileo and Copernicus programmes; and
(e) the impact of the UK leaving the Single Market on supply chains within the space industry. (3) The Secretary of State must lay a report of the assessment under subsection (1) before Parliament within one year of this Act passing, and once in each calendar year following.”—(Dr Philippa Whitford.)
This new clause would ensure the Government prepares and publishes an impact assessment of the potential impact on the space industry as a result of the UK leaving the EU.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Dr Whitford
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
In light of the process of leaving the European Union, the clause seeks, as was referred to by hon. Members earlier, to consider the impact. We have looked at the impact assessments, particularly at the aerospace assessment, when we had the opportunity to view what are called the Brexit papers, and what we saw was a description of the aerospace industry and comments from the industry, but not the impact.
Although the European Space Agency is separate to the EU, it receives significant funding from it. With the new clause, therefore, we seek assurances that the UK will still be able to be part of the agency, to be active in it and, as the Minister said earlier, to be able to bid for contracts under Copernicus or Galileo for satellite work, in which the UK is a leading player. The clause simply calls for an assessment of the impact on the developing space industry of leaving the EU, to ensure that, as negotiations go forward, the Government set themselves to achieve the best deal for the space industry.
Joseph Johnson
As the hon. Lady knows, the UK has played a major part in developing the main EU space programmes, Galileo and Copernicus, which have supported the rapid growth of the UK space sector and contributed directly to our prosperity. The UK is recognised for its specialist capability in the area of earth observation, and has been especially involved in the development of the Galileo security modules and encryption, which are integral to a secure and resilient earth observation system. The Government recognise that, which is why the future partnership papers I referred to earlier, which were published in September 2017, set out that, given the unique nature of the space programmes’ applications to security as well as to science and innovation, and the extent of the UK’s involvement, the EU and the UK should discuss all options for future co-operation, including new arrangements subsequent to our departure from the European Union.
Dr Whitford
Does the Minister therefore foresee the UK continuing to pay funds? If so, will they be paid directly to the ESA or via the EU? Obviously, the EU is a significant funder of the ESA.
Joseph Johnson
The European Space Agency delivers a number of programmes for the European Union, but we continue to be a member of the ESA in our own right and, as I said, we are contributing record amounts—more than €1.4 billion in the current budget period.
Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)
For absolute clarity, is the Minister suggesting that payments via the EU could still be possible, in contrast with the Foreign Secretary’s position on that matter?
Joseph Johnson
I am not going to parse comments by others that I have not seen, but I can confirm that we remain a full member of the European Space Agency in our own right, we are contributing record amounts to its budget, and we have every expectation of continuing to be a full member of that organisation long into the future.
On the new clause’s requirement to undertake an assessment, the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union provided the relevant Committees with reports for many sectors, including one for the UK space sector, on 27 November. As the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire said, that report contained a description of the sector, the current EU regulatory regime, existing frameworks for the facilitation of trade between countries in the sector, and sector views.
Vicky Ford (Chelmsford) (Con)
This is my first Bill Committee, so bear with me, Mr Bailey. The new clause suggests that the Secretary of State should have to make an annual assessment of the impact of our leaving the EU on research and development, including Horizon 2020, every year well after 2020, but Horizon 2020 clearly finishes in 2020. Does the Minister agree that it seems illogical to assess something that has already finished?
Joseph Johnson
I obviously note the point about the duration of Horizon 2020, which does indeed end at the end of 2020, but we have committed as a Government to exploring all options for future participation in the next set of framework programmes, which will start after 2020. We have every hope that those discussions will conclude successfully, because those research programmes deliver huge value to our science and research communities and to our universities all over the country, including in Scotland.
On that basis, I ask the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire to consider withdrawing her new clause.
Dr Whitford
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
Bill, as amended, to be reported.
Trade Bill (First sitting)
Tuesday 23rd January 2018
(6 years, 10 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Trade Bill 2017-19 View all Trade Bill 2017-19 Debates Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 23 January 2018 - (23 Jan 2018)
The Chair
Before we begin, I have a few preliminary points to make. Please switch electronic devices to silent. Tea and coffee are not allowed during sittings. We will first consider the programme motion on the amendment paper. We will then consider a motion to enable the reporting of written evidence for publication and a motion to allow us to deliberate in private about our questions before the oral evidence sessions. In view of the limited time available, I hope we can take those matters without too much debate or delay. Date Time Witness Tuesday 23 January Until no later than 10.25 am Global Justice Now; Computer and Communications Industry Association; Christopher Howarth, former Senior Political Analyst, Open Europe Tuesday 23 January Until no later than 11.25 am CBI; International Chambers of Commerce UK; Unite the Union; FSB Tuesday 23 January Until no later than 2.45 pm Dr Lorands Bartels, University of Cambridge; Dr Roiger Hestermeyer, King’s College London; Hansard Society Jude Kirton Darling MEP Tuesday 23 January Until no later than 3.30 pm George Peretz QC, Monckton Chambers; Professor Alan Winters, UK Trade Policy Observatory; Law Society Scotland Tuesday 23 January Until no later than 4.15 pm British Ceramic Confederation; UK Steel Manufacturing Trade Remedies Alliance; British Chambers of Commerce Tuesday 23 January Until no later than 5.00 pm UK Finance; British Retail Consortium Standard Chartered Bank Thursday 25 January Until no later than 12.00 pm Devro plc; Scotch Whisky Association Food Standards Scotland Thursday 25 January Until no later than 1.00 pm Business for Scotland; British Furniture Association Hologic Date Time Witness Tuesday 23 January Until no later than 10.25 am Global Justice Now; Nick Ashton-Hart, Trade Policy Consultant and Associate Fellow, Geneva Centre for Security Policy; Christopher Howarth, former Senior Political Analyst, Open Europe Tuesday 23 January Until no later than 11.25 am CBI; International Chambers of Commerce UK; Unite the Union; FSB Tuesday 23 January Until no later than 2.45 pm Dr Lorands Bartels, University of Cambridge; Dr Roiger Hestermeyer, King’s College London; Hansard Society Jude Kirton Darling MEP Tuesday 23 January Until no later than 3.30 pm George Peretz QC, Monckton Chambers; Professor Alan Winters, UK Trade Policy Observatory; Law Society Scotland Tuesday 23 January Until no later than 4.15 pm British Ceramic Confederation; UK Steel Manufacturing Trade Remedies Alliance; British Chambers of Commerce Tuesday 23 January Until no later than 5.00 pm UK Finance; British Retail Consortium Standard Chartered Bank Thursday 25 January Until no later than 12.00 pm Devro plc; Scotch Whisky Association Food Standards Scotland Thursday 25 January Until no later than 1.00 pm Business for Scotland; British Furniture Association Hologic
I first call the Minister to move the programme motion, which was decided by the Programming Sub-Committee yesterday.
Motion made, and Question proposed,
That—
(1) the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 9.25 am on Tuesday 23 January) meet—
(a) at 2.00 pm on Tuesday 23 January;
(b) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 25 January;
(c) at 9.25 am, 2.00 pm and 5.30 pm on Tuesday 30 January;
(d) at 11.30 am on Thursday 1 February.
(2) the Committee shall hear oral evidence in accordance with the following Table:
(3) proceedings on consideration of the Bill in Committee shall be taken in the following order: Clauses 1 to 3; Schedules 1 to 3; Clauses 4 and 5; Schedule 4; Clauses 6 to 12; new Clauses; new Schedules; remaining proceedings on the Bill;
(4) the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 2.00 pm on Thursday 1 February. —(Greg Hands.)
Manuscript amendment made: In the table on page 2 of the amendment paper, in the first entry for Tuesday 23 January, leave out
“Computer and Communications Industry Association”
and insert
“Nick Ashton-Hart, Trade Policy Consultant and Associate Fellow, Geneva Centre for Security Policy”.—(Greg Hands.)
Main Question, as amended, put and agreed to.
Ordered,
That—
(1) the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 9.25 am on Tuesday 23 January) meet—
(a) at 2.00 pm on Tuesday 23 January;
(b) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 25 January;
(c) at 9.25 am, 2.00 pm and 5.30 pm on Tuesday 30 January;
(d) at 11.30 am on Thursday 1 February.
(2) the Committee shall hear oral evidence in accordance with the following Table:
(3) proceedings on consideration of the Bill in Committee shall be taken in the following order: Clauses 1 to 3; Schedules 1 to 3; Clauses 4 and 5; Schedule 4; Clauses 6 to 12; new Clauses; new Schedules; remaining proceedings on the Bill;
(4) the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 2.00 pm on Thursday 1 February.
Resolved,
That, subject to the discretion of the Chair, any written evidence received by the Committee shall be reported to the House for publication.—(Greg Hands.)
The Chair
Copies of written evidence that the Committee receives will be made available in the Committee Room.
Resolved,
That, at this and any subsequent meeting at which oral evidence is to be heard, the Committee shall sit in private until the witnesses are admitted.—(Greg Hands.)
The Chair
Before we start our formal session, I invite members of the Committee to declare any relevant interests.
Mr Mark Prisk (Hertford and Stortford) (Con)
I am trade envoy to the Nordic and Baltic nations, and to Brazil.
The Chair
Q
Will the witnesses please introduce themselves for the record?
Nick Dearden: I am Nick Dearden, director of Global Justice Now.
Nick Ashton-Hart: I am Nick Ashton-Hart from the Geneva Centre for Security Policy.
Christopher Howarth: I am Christopher Howarth, former senior political analyst at Open Europe, and now senior researcher in the House of Commons.
Barry Gardiner (Brent North) (Lab)
Q
Nick Ashton-Hart: Thank you for inviting me—this is a first for me. To answer the first question, it depends very much on whether it is in the interests of the counterparties to those agreements to roll them over without modification. Since those agreements were created for a number of member states other than just us, those partner countries will go through a process of evaluating the net trade benefit to them of applying those terms to us alone. Where they have an interest in changing the terms to their benefit, they will seek to do so, because that is what Trade Ministries do—they seek economic benefit for their country, and they expect you to seek it for yours. Unless the trade benefits for them are exactly the same for us alone as they are for 28 other countries, they are going to ask for changes in their interests.
If the shoe were on the other foot, I suspect we can all imagine that it would be hard for our Trade Ministry officials to come to you all and say, “Well, we have just copied an agreement with a large trading bloc for one country’s benefit because it is in a hurry.” I suspect we will find that this will take some time—trade agreements always do.
The Chair
Before anyone else answers, may I ask Members and witnesses to speak up so that we get everything on the record? That would be perfect. Sorry—the acoustics in this room are terrible.
Barry Gardiner
Q
Nick Dearden: We are really concerned about the lack of scrutiny and accountability in the Bill. Global Justice Now, and a number of other organisations, worked on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership for a long time. We had some concerns about that agreement—not with the potential tariff areas, but with the non-tariff areas. In modern trade deals, non-tariff aspects make up the bulk of the agreement. That means everything from regulation—we probably all now know more than we would like about chlorinated chickens, but that is just one symbol of the regulatory aspects of trade deals that really concern the public, and I think many parliamentarians, too. Intellectual property, which has a direct correlation to the price of medicines and the price that the NHS may bear for them, through to local government procurement and e-commerce can also be added to that.
Modern trade deals touch on huge areas of public policy, which should be within the scope of Parliament to control. We are concerned that the Bill does not allow for that scope. As Nick said, it is difficult for us to imagine that many of these deals will be a straight cut and paste. That is why the explanatory notes allow for substantial changes to be made to the deals, but without the requisite scrutiny that we believe Members deserve and require if we are to have proper control of our trade policy.
Barry Gardiner
Chair, I know that others on my side wish to come in, but those on the other side may wish to speak.
Bill Esterson (Sefton Central) (Lab)
Q
Nick Dearden: Certainly. We think there should be several stages. First, before the negotiations, Parliament or a parliamentary Committee should give consent to those negotiations and should have some role in setting out the broad framework or objectives. We also think that at that stage the Government should have a responsibility to conduct and publish impact assessments and public consultations. It is set out in great detail how those should be conducted in the European Union and the United States.
As the negotiations are proceeding, Parliament should be able to scrutinise Ministers on what they are negotiating. It should be able to see negotiating texts. We think there should be a presumption that negotiating texts should be transparent to everybody, but even if there are specific reasons why they cannot be, they should certainly be transparent to MPs. If the Government want to change their mandate, they should have to come back to Parliament or to a parliamentary Committee to ask for that.
When negotiations are finalised, there should be a guaranteed debate and, at the least, an up-or-down vote. That would make a huge difference, because at the moment at none of those stages does Parliament have any control: it is not allowed to know what is going on in the negotiations; it has no role in setting the mandate; it is not allowed to see the negotiating texts; it is not guaranteed a debate; and it cannot vote against a trade deal. We think that what I have suggested would bring us into line with other modern democracies.
I will give a very small example. CETA, which still has not had a proper debate in the House, has been discussed in detail for days by the Wallonian Assembly in Belgium. They take seriously the regulatory aspects of trade deals and we think that, post-Brexit, we need to be looking at a similar model.
Bill Esterson
Q
Nick Dearden: We know that post-Brexit we want to be doing a trade deal with the European Union and the United States, so they are good places to start. Both political entities have set out in detail a number of ways in which they negotiate and give Congress or Parliament power over trade deals. In the United States, a 700-strong citizen advisory board is allowed to see all the texts. They have to have very specific public consultations. At the very least, Congress gets an up-or-down vote at the end, and if it does not fast-track trade deals, it gets substantially more power than that.
In the European Union, the Parliament gets to feed into a mandate—the Council gets to set a mandate. Various parliamentary Committees get to look at, scrutinise and give recommendations to the Executive for how a trade deal would affect jobs, the economy, the environment, human rights, or whatever else we may be concerned about. At the end, the Parliament is given a proper debate and an up-or-down vote.
On top of that, as I have already said, many trade deals are required to go back to member Parliaments for them to have a say, too. If you look at how Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands or Finland operate, they already exercise far more scrutiny over external EU trade deals than the UK does.
Mr Prisk
Q
Nick Dearden: There are various ways in which you could do it. One of the ways is to have a Committee set up particularly to scrutinise the Government on this. When the time comes to enter negotiations on a deal, it will discuss with the Government what their priorities are and they will say, “We think this is acceptable and this is not acceptable.” It will be brought in from the very beginning.
I think that is important, because the Secretary of State has said a number of times, “I really want to avoid a TTIP-style situation, where we end up with a deal in discussion that has lost public support and lost a lot of parliamentary support.” To do that, we must have that buy-in from the very beginning, and that must require some degree of parliamentary discussion about what the objectives for this country should be in a trade deal with country X.
Mr Prisk
Q
Nick Dearden: That would probably depend on exactly when proper trade negotiation starts and we are properly discussing a trade deal.
Mr Prisk
Q
Nick Dearden: You can look at how it happens in Denmark, for example, because they do exactly that. They have a parliamentary Committee that sets a mandate at the initiation of trade talks. I understand that obviously the Government are talking to loads of different countries at any one time about possible trade, but within each of the countries they are talking to, they must have objectives. It is for Parliament to scrutinise, set and agree to those objectives.
At the moment, I do not feel that we have that ability. We are talking to a lot of countries; we have 16 trade working groups currently set up between the Secretary of State and other countries. We know, because we have read it in the media, that various negotiations are ongoing with some of those countries, but Parliament, and we as civil society, have no right to know what is being discussed, when it is being discussed and with whom. That is a profound democratic deficit. At the very least, if these are formal working groups involved in trade discussions, we should know what they are talking about, to whom and when.
Mr Prisk
Q
Nick Dearden: I would say at the very least, at this point in time, for each of the trade working groups that has been set up, there should be a mandate set by parliamentary Committees.
Mr Prisk
Q
Nick Dearden: There is something to be said for that if you look at previous trade agreements such as TTIP—how they have worked and how people have felt about them. There is a big populist backlash going on around the world at the moment, part of which is a result of people feeling there is a democratic deficit in the trade agreements being signed.
We have lots of ideas for how we could construct a trade agreement and how we would want to do it, and I should say now that we are absolutely not against trade; even with TTIP, we were not against the tariff aspects of that trade agreement. When it comes to public policy, it is different. Again, I am not against international co-operation, in trade agreements or other agreements, but there has to be a democratic basis for how those things are decided.
Mr Prisk
Q
Nick Dearden: They might be or they might not. It depends how they are done, who they are done with and what the terms are. If you have two very different types of country, in terms of wealth and power, obviously there can be a big problem because some people have a much bigger negotiating hand than others. That is what we have seen with economic partnership agreements, which is why we would prefer, for example, to give tariff-free access to goods coming from those countries rather than do a reciprocal agreement, which also puts what we believe to be unsustainable and unhelpful conditions on the African country concerned.
Mr Prisk
My concern is not with the follow-on scrutiny of events that happened, but more the idea that somehow Parliament should require our existing teams in negotiations to seek approval before they start those conversations. That is my concern, but I will not delay the Committee any longer.
Barry Gardiner
Q
Nick Ashton-Hart: I would also say on the point about when terms of reference are set and whether our ambassadors need permission before they go and talk, I worked with most of our trading partners in Geneva and dozens of other countries. There are a lot of commonalities in how legislatures interact with Trade Ministries. Generally, the Trade Ministry will say, “We want to achieve these objectives over the course of this Parliament or this year,” and that is done in consultation with the relevant parliamentary Committees.
Ambassadors explore ideas with countries all the time; they do not need a mandate to do that. When it becomes clear that there is interest in formalising something, a process goes on in the capital to say, “Okay, what is our net benefit to be achieved?” To do a deal of any configuration with country X, the economics teams in the Ministry would go away and say, “Where is the net trade-generative agreement here? What sectors would we have to include? What likely trade-offs would we have to do with the other side?”
But that process would generally be informed by a consultation with the stakeholders in the industrial sectors that have most to gain or lose, the unions in those sectors and the like, so that before you even get into a negotiation, you know where your benefits lie, you have your stakeholders signed up to what you are trying to achieve and the other side knows that you have those things.
As I pointed out in my comments, the reason why you see so many leaks in trade negotiations is that it is in the interest of one party or another to put pressure on the other in their capital. Leaks do not happen by accident; they are deliberate.
Mr Prisk
I think we are familiar with that!
Nick Ashton-Hart: You are familiar with how that dynamic works. It is no different in trade negotiations.
What I have described is pretty much a common process everywhere in the world, and it is not accidental; it is because the political economy demands that you have the backing, as a negotiator, at home when you are sitting across the table from your counterparties and that they know that you have that. They can watch your processes of consent and agreement and evaluate where your weaknesses are—where there are buttons they can push, but also where you are likely to need support. People know that you have to get to a sustainable deal also, and sometimes you have to do a concession at the right time to solve a problem in a domestic constituency for your counterparty, provided that it is in your interest to do so.
Tom Pursglove (Corby) (Con)
Q
Nick Dearden: I do not have a complete list of all of them, but I do know that we have very serious concerns about the economic partnership agreements with African countries, for example, because of some of the conditions that are placed on those countries. We have particular concerns, because we worked on it, with the CETA agreement with Canada, again related to the so-called non-tariff barriers in that agreement.
One problem is that no matter what we thought about the agreements when they were originally negotiated, they are going to look different when it comes to being translated into or replaced by a UK-Canada or UK-African country agreement; they are just going to be different deals. Given that, I think it only right that there be some degree of scrutiny. It says in the Bill, “Well, we aim for these deals to be as similar as possible.” I understand that, but it may well be that some of the deals will be more similar than others.
For the deals that are more similar, I think it would be right and proper for Parliament to say, “Okay, fine. We will wave that one through. We understand that that is continuity.” But for other deals—what a substantial amendment or change in the deal would look like is not defined—we believe that Parliament should have proper scrutiny and proper ratification powers. That is particularly important for deals that have not even been through the proper ratification process in the European Union—examples involve Singapore, Japan and Vietnam. Those deals may all be replaced by UK deals, but they have not been through the proper process as yet in the European Union, and we do not want to see a situation in which they are taken on just because we are so rushed that we do not have time to really think about the consequences of the deals.
Tom Pursglove
Q
Nick Dearden: As a campaigning organisation, we are likely to pick up only those deals—
Tom Pursglove
Q
Nick Dearden: I would say we are supportive of trade, but it depends on how it is done. Absolutely. For example, I would say that an awful lot of trade that has happened in the European Union over the last 40 years —not all of it, because some of it we would be concerned about—has raised standards. It has raised standards for producers and for consumers, and that is positive. In the European Union, there is at least a balancing of trade and economic interests with social interests and environmental interests and with democratic scrutiny and accountability, so it is possible to do that.
Judith Cummins (Bradford South) (Lab)
Q
Nick Ashton-Hart: There are so many moving parts. Assuming that there is a date, that we know it, and that all counterparties have a few years’ advance warning of it—the date that matters is a date on which existing agreements will no longer be available to us—we would have to look at their approval process and count backwards to find the date by which we would have to conclude our negotiations with them. That is the only way that you would know what your actual hard finishing date was for any of those agreements. I do not know if that analysis has been done by the Department for International Trade—I am hoping that it has done some of it, and I am guessing that it probably has. Say it takes two years, and we have two years. We are not going to finish an agreement tomorrow, so that means that that deal will not be done in time. What percentage of our GDP, and of our exports and imports, is that deal, which will not be available?
That is the first thing that you would have to do is know how much negotiating time you have, and with which parties. You would then have to prioritise deals based on their economic importance to us. I am not sure what the decision tree is within the Ministry—I am sure that there must be one—for what it prioritises. The only way that you all will have a clear picture of the deadlines is to work backwards. I have seen no discussion at all of how long it takes our counterparties to conclude approving an agreement, but it can be a considerable time, depending on the country. I imagine it would be very difficult. The short answer is that it is hard for me to imagine that there are even enough people to negotiate that many deals simultaneously with that many parties, unless you had several years to do it.
Martin Vickers (Cleethorpes) (Con)
Q
Nick Dearden: It probably is, yes, because there may be countries where, for example, the human rights situation is so bad that any trade deal that you do is effectively reinforcing and giving succour to a regime to which we would not want to give succour.
Martin Vickers
Q
Nick Dearden: For example, there are serious human rights abuses in Turkey at the moment. The Prime Minister, as many people know, was the first political leader to visit Donald Trump in the United States after he was elected. After visiting President Trump, she went to President Erdoğan of Turkey, and a trade deal was part of the negotiations there. At that time, she also sold £100 million-worth of weapons to Turkey. That was an inappropriate thing to do, and it was connected with our ability to conduct a trade deal with that country, post Brexit. You may disagree with that, of course, but at the very least, there should be parliamentary control over those kinds of actions and activities. I do not think that just because they are in the international realm, they should be negotiated under royal prerogative; they have an impact on policy here. MPs should be apprised of that and should authorise it.
Martin Vickers
Q
Nick Dearden: That is a really important point. On the public policy aspects of trade deals, traditionally we thought that we did not need to worry about whether we ratified the trade deal, because Parliament would have the power to authorise implementing legislation for the various things that we needed to do to put the trade deal into effect. There is a problem with that: once a trade deal is signed and ratified, it really makes no difference whether Parliament enacts that legislation or not—we are committed to it under international treaty. It is too late to say no. Normally, we do not intend to say no—we have done the deal—but if there was a real dispute, and Parliament said, “We have a problem with that”, we would have real difficulty in stopping it, because we had already agreed to do it.
Various things that impact on public policy are never brought forward for implementation as legislation anyway. One of the things that people were particularly concerned about with TTIP, as you probably know, was the investment protection tribunals that allow overseas companies to sue Governments for various things—for what they regard as unfair treatment, for the indirect expropriation of assets and so on. There is a lot of public concern about those bodies, because people feel that this infringes on democratic sovereignty and accountability, yet those things never need to be signed off by Parliament. They just exist in the trade deal, from day one, so Parliament does not have a say in whether things that have been proved to have tangible impacts on public policy come into effect. That is one example of why it is important for the ratification process to be seen as directly impinging on public policy, and why scrutiny and accountability are necessary.
Faisal Rashid (Warrington South) (Lab)
Q
Nick Ashton-Hart: Several. I think first for the agreements you wish to transition you would look at the net economic benefit of transitioning them. You would then have to look at what likely changes the other party would be asking for—they would be doing the same analysis—and what changes you would ask for. You have to assume the worst. You have to assume the other party is going to ask for changes, and you have to assume that you will need to ask for some also. If you get lucky and you do not have to do any of that, that is great, but you cannot do this on hope. You have to do it on the worst-case scenario.
I think at that point you would have to bring in stakeholders to help you make that analysis. The expertise to do this is not all in government. It never is. It is also in the private sector and in academia. At the point where you had that you would know the basis on which you were transitioning the arrangements. This is not a trivial undertaking. Because of the regulatory impacts that newer deals, especially, have, you would also have to look at the consequences of certain changes to other arrangements.
For example, if there are most-favoured nation clauses in a deal that you wish to transition, as there often are, and if any changes are made to that arrangement when you transition it, it can impact all the other deals that have MFN clauses. This is now being discussed publicly, related to whether the EU could do an expanded services deal with us, and who would automatically get the benefits of it. For example, a Canadian deal would provide that the EU would have to give the benefits they give us to several other parties, Japan and Canada included.
We are in the same situation because there are MFN clauses in these agreements that we wish to transition, so you have to analyse the net economic benefit to you of the deal in question, but also the consequences of any changes to other deals that you want to transition, because you can guarantee that, for any MFN clause in any other deal, the parties that you are going to negotiate with will be looking at what you are giving in these other discussions and of course expecting to receive in them also.
There is a good reason why trade arrangements are slow, and there are not many going at one time. It is because this is an enormous number of moving parts to try to manage at one go—for us but also for the other Trade Ministries, because deals with us are not the only deals that they have going or that they are working on. If I were you, I would be asking the Ministry: “Look, what is your plan for dealing with these different eventualities?”
Faisal Rashid
Q
Nick Ashton-Hart: I think it is essential, aside from the benefits in terms of being a democracy that is looked up to by others as an example, and not wanting to set an example that is far below the minimum level of accountability in any other developed economy, which is what we would be doing—we would be setting a precedent here that should concern everyone.
Secondarily, it is in our interest to do that, because there is going to be a political hue and cry about various provisions in probably all the 40-plus deals. There is going to be something that someone does not like about them. That is the nature of trade agreements. Some sectors win and some lose. Losers complain and winners keep quiet mostly, because they do not want to provoke people who won. The objective is to have a net benefit, but that does not mean that within that there are not winners and losers.
There is going to be controversy associated with these arrangements. Having effective and robust consultation now will help insulate the negotiating process and provide a rationale for all of you, the Members, to go to your constituencies and say, “Look, there is a reason why we are doing it this way. We have had an oversight process. Here is what the country will get out of this.” For those districts or constituencies that will be negatively impacted by a deal, you will be able to go to your constituents and say, “Okay, on this one we may not do so well, but we will do well on this and this and this, and the net benefit to all of us is positive.” The consultation process provides all of you with the ammunition you need to explain why at a real level—the firm level and the sectoral level—transitioning the arrangements in the way that they will be agreed is in your constituents’ interests and the national interest.
Without that dialogue, you do not have that ammunition. Every time you are hit with a news story, you will have to go and ask the Ministry concerned, “How do I counter this?” Being reactive all the time on trade policy has a very unhappy history of negative views of trade in general, and of deals in particular. Criticism does not have to be true to stick, as I am sure we are all familiar. I would say—Nick might disagree—that there was some criticism of TTIP and provisions that were alleged would be in the deal, such as things that affected NHS procurement, which were actually excluded from the negotiating mandate. The fact that those criticisms were levelled did not stop there being a political cost to the negotiation as a whole from the allegation that those provisions would be inbuilt. On a pragmatic basis, there is a very strong argument for a robust consultation process, but the negotiators themselves are going to need information that is in the private sector and in academia as part of their negotiating arguments, and without a robust consultation process they will not have access to those.
The Chair
Can I say, before I go on to the next person, that I have at least six people who still want to ask a question and we have a maximum of 23 minutes, so can people bear that mind?
Mrs Kemi Badenoch (Saffron Walden) (Con)
Q
Christopher Howarth: It is important, getting back to the Trade Bill, that it only gives a power for existing trade agreements. These trade agreements are already in force and companies already rely upon them. When we talk about impact assessments, the biggest impact assessment is that these agreements are already in force or have already gone through a scrutiny process and may come into force, such as CETA. Obviously, in leaving the European Union, we are moving to a different scrutiny system. Before, they could be decided by the Commission, the European Parliament by qualified majority voting or, in the cases of mixed agreements, you would have to get unanimity, occasionally from devolved Administrations as well. We are moving to a new system, but these agreements are already in force.
The relationship with the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill is that we are keeping retained legislation and we are keeping the EU standards, so if there are any amendments to these agreements, they have to be in line with the regulations—the food safety and environmental standards—that are being retained in UK law. The scope for actually changing things is quite narrow. These have been through a scrutiny process. They are in force. This Bill is necessary, in my opinion, so that the people who rely on these agreements can be sure that they will be transferred over in time.
Mrs Badenoch
Q
Christopher Howarth: Trade agreements do traditionally take a very long time. In this case, they are already in force and we already have texts. Small amendments may need to be made around quotas—in some of the agreements we need to agree with the European Union and the counterparty how to split the quotas up—but the texts by and large have been agreed. In the future we may wish to come back to them to improve them or to fit them more to UK interests, but these agreements do exist. Trade agreements traditionally take a long time. I refer you to Parkinson’s law: that trade agreements tend to expand to the amount of time available to negotiate them. If you give trade negotiators 10 years to negotiate an agreement, it will probably take 10 years. In this case we have a fixed deadline, and I assume both sides will want to fit the negotiations and the necessary functions to that.
Barry Gardiner
Q
Christopher Howarth: I think it is true to say that the agreements the European Union made were fitted around European Union interests and that if the UK were starting from scratch, we may have had other interests. The EU interests would protect French farmers and the French audio-visual industry. You would get a price on the other side, say with Canadian agriculture. If the UK was doing it, we might do it differently. That is probably a discussion that would take longer and we would come back to later, and these agreements would probably stay exactly as they are. On the scrutiny side, we had a sort of mirror of this debate in the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill negotiation and discussions in Parliament. There may be some—
Barry Gardiner
Q
Christopher Howarth: There may be some minor changes, potentially around the EU agreements and our relationship with the European Union. If there is an EU-agreed quota in an agreement with a third country—in terms of how we split that up, how we change that or the wording of the agreement—then there may be references that need changing in the agreements. There may be minor changes, but I imagine the substance of the agreements will stay pretty much as they are.
Barry Gardiner
Q
Christopher Howarth: Indeed, it might be an opportunity for the UK to get a better deal, because if we are a more liberal economy and we have more to offer, we may be able to get better access.
Barry Gardiner
Q
Christopher Howarth: Yes, but speed will probably be the overarching thing that dictates that they will remain as they are for the foreseeable future. We may come back to that at a later date.
Iain Stewart (Milton Keynes South) (Con)
Q
Christopher Howarth: The timeframe that we are working on at the moment is that we will leave the European Union on 29 March 2019, so that will be two years, then three years after that. That is a substantial time in which to negotiate. The United States and Australia negotiated a full agreement in roughly two years. Some countries take longer, some less, but that would be a substantial amount of time to revisit and improve agreements.
Iain Stewart
Q
Christopher Howarth: The countries that the European Union has agreements with—South Korea, South Africa, Mexico—are major trading partners. Something that has not been mentioned so far is the plurilateral World Trade Organisation government procurement agreement, which gives British businesses access to over £1 trillion of Government contracts around the world. As a liberal country that tends to accept contracts from other countries, it is important that we get reciprocal rights for British businesses to other countries. Remaining part of that plurilateral agreement, which the Bill allows, would be important for British businesses when seeking Government contracts abroad.
Nick Smith (Blaenau Gwent) (Lab)
Q
Christopher Howarth: I work for a group of mostly Conservative MPs.
Nick Smith
Q
Nick Ashton-Hart: I am not really an expert in how the Australian Government do their consultations, so I cannot describe them in detail. I can describe how the trade officials who I deal with view them. From my conversations with trade officials over the past six or seven years, most of them find the oversight process challenging. The Australians are no exception to that.
For example, in the discussions on the flow of data that have taken place at the WTO and in the trade in services agreement negotiation, of which Australia is a part and which the US and Australia created, a significant portion of all the issues that delayed all the services parts—all the digital elements—of TISA were related to the flow of data and to the Australian negotiators’ view of what they could get their oversight processes to consent to in relation to it. A comprehensive change to their data protection regulation came into force about four years ago, and its structure made it impossible to evaluate how it would work in a plurilateral context because of how it applied liability when private information was given to non-nationals. That meant that they were unable to make an offer or respond to other offers for a considerable period of time—about 18 months, I think—as a result of their oversight process at home. That was in relation to just one part of the plurilateral negotiation.
That example has held true. I have seen it happen with probably half a dozen countries on various issues over time. If there is a political problem in one area, it generally gums up everything else because it is often not convenient for you to say, “I have a problem in Parliament at home, so I cannot talk to you about x and y.” Instead, you would say, “We are still consulting on that.” Meanwhile, you will ask for something impossibly difficult, knowing that the other party will then get stuck. Once your problem goes away, you can withdraw the thing that is causing things to stick over here, because this is the political economy. You do not want to be negotiating on your weaknesses. You want to negotiate on someone else’s, so you have to create them if you have a negotiating bloc.
Alan Brown (Kilmarnock and Loudoun) (SNP)
Q
Christopher Howarth: It is probably a matter of practicalities. There are a number of these around the world and starting negotiations with all of them at the same time is probably impractical. That is not to say that these agreements were not based on EU interests; UK interests are slightly different. There are things we would have prioritised to gain access for British companies and there were some defensive interests that were not relevant to the UK. Taking an example: citrus fruit or things we do not produce in this country. There were things we would have done differently.
These are probably questions to come back to at a later date. At the moment, it is about trying to make sure these agreements still exist when we leave the European Union, so it is the practicalities of getting these agreements moved over into the UK’s name and out of the EU’s name, putting the UK’s signature on them.
Alan Brown
Q
Christopher Howarth: If one of the European Union’s agreements has a quota in it, as the UK leaves, the counterparty might wish to continue to be able to export the same amount into the European Union and the UK. So it would be a three-way negotiation, which would involve splitting the quota up, with different countries taking different views as to what the fair way to do that would be.
Alan Brown
Q
Christopher Howarth: Yes, it would need splitting up. You either do it with the counterparty via the WTO and you would need to discuss it with the European Union as well.
Alan Brown
Q
Nick Ashton-Hart: It depends very much on the nature of the deals in question and how recent they are. All the deals tend to be more focused on tariffs and the like, whereas it is somewhat simpler. Where it involves services, yes, even though these agreements are in force now, as was explained, you still have to accept that what France wanted from that deal when it was negotiated, what Germany wanted, what we wanted: these are not the same as what we and the other party want now. There are things such as protections for certain industries that we do not protect, but the other party will say, “Can we take that out?” and we might say, “Okay, but then we want this over here.”
Human nature is such that, if you are given a chance to negotiate on something and it is of serious monetary value, you are going to ask for a better deal than you got last time. If we buy cars, we do this. We don’t go and buy the car and say, “We will pay full price”—although some people might—or a house or the like. Countries do not do this. So you have to assume that normal human behaviour is not going to be thrown out of the window simply because we are in a hurry to transition our arrangements over to someone else. You have to assume that human nature will still apply and the other country is still going to behave as a rational negotiating partner, which is to seek their advantage from our need for speed.
The only way then to proceed is to say, “Okay, let’s look at these deals as they apply to us now and let’s consider: what is the other side likely to ask for? What is it in their interests to ask for and is it in our interests to agree to it, because it is expeditious, or because it is in our interests, or both?” You have to treat this as a negotiation, not as a replication.
Barry Gardiner
Q
Nick Ashton-Hart: I cannot imagine that the constituencies of this country would see it any other way. This is a substantial portion of our GDP; it is a substantial portion of our export and import. How can you say to people that you passed up an opportunity to make things better, when that was part of the premise under which we are doing this whole exercise in the first place? And our other counterparties certainly will not see our need for speed as anything other than an advantage to them, because it is. We are the ones in a hurry. Japan is 1.8% of our exports or something like that.
The Chair
May I just say that I have at least two, and possibly three people who still want to catch my eye, and we have a maximum of four minutes left? So perhaps a short question and a short answer would help.
Gillian Keegan (Chichester) (Con)
Q
Nick Ashton-Hart: If people are trading with us now under an arrangement, there is an incentive for them to see that it continues. I am not suggesting that that is not true. What I am suggesting is that it is an opportunity for the other parties to ask for things that they wanted last time and did not get, or that the passage of time of those agreements—age—means that it is appropriate to ask now. I am saying that everyone needs to bring home some benefit for something.
Gillian Keegan
Q
Nick Ashton-Hart: I am saying that I have never seen or heard of a Trade Ministry not asking for some improvement when any deal is being renegotiated, because that is how you are seen to be doing your job.
Gillian Keegan
Q
The Chair
May I move on finally to Anna McMorrin, because she has been waiting patiently, for probably the last question?
Anna McMorrin (Cardiff North) (Lab)
Q
Nick Ashton-Hart: It depends on the nature of the agreement. If it is a situation where a quota has to be split, then yes. We see this in Geneva now, where the quotas at WTO level are being split up, or even our closest trading partners are arguing over whether one plus one equals one. In other areas, it is not necessarily the case. It really depends on the way the original agreement was made, and who else might benefit from a change to it through an MFN clause, or the like.
Anna McMorrin
Q
Nick Ashton-Hart: Where there are rules that we are accepting from the EU, then of course we have less flexibility to make a change if it is asked for by the other side; that would conflict, of course.
The Chair
Order. That brings us to the end of the time allocated for the Committee to ask questions. I thank witnesses for their evidence, and I thank Nick Dearden and Nick Ashton-Hart for their written evidence; I am sure that we are all grateful for it.
Examination of Witnesses
James Ashton-Bell, Chris Southworth, Tony Burke and Martin McTague gave evidence.
The Chair
Q
For this sitting, we have until 11.25 am. Would each of the witnesses please introduce themselves for the record?
James Ashton-Bell: I am James Ashton-Bell, head of international trade and investment at the Confederation of British Industry.
Chris Southworth: Chris Southworth, secretary-general of the International Chamber of Commerce here in the UK.
Martin McTague: I am Martin McTague, national policy director for the Federation of Small Businesses.
Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab)
Q
Chris Southworth: There are four key elements within the Bill that are broadly in the right direction of travel around setting up a trade remedies Bill, sharing data and so on, but there are missing elements—I think we agree with a much wider community of non-governmental organisations and unions—where we need a more inclusive approach to dealing with trade, more democratic oversight and more policy connectivity. We are speaking in a context of G20, where there is a very public commitment to developing a free trade model that works for everyone. That is missing in the current Trade Bill.
Matt Western
Q
James Ashton-Bell: I think we start from the place that the Bill does a lot of really important things for business, in terms of providing continuity. Continuity is absolutely key in all business leaders’ minds when it comes to our trade relationship with the EU, but also with third countries and the World Trade Organisation. The Bill goes a long way toward providing assurances with regard to the WTO on things like procurement, ensuring—as you have heard—that trade remedies are available and provisions for replication of free trade agreements that we currently enjoy through the EU.
I think business is looking for more in the longer term, and there is a broader question about whether or not this is the right vehicle to use to create the kinds of structure that they need around consultation. Any major trade country in the world has extensive and formalised ways of engaging with civil society to ensure that they get the maximum amount of input into trade policy that they need. The question of whether or not this is the right legislative vehicle to create such a structure and such a process is one that I will leave to Members, but business is looking for those kinds of structure, and if not now, when?
Matt Western
Q
James Ashton-Bell: Yes.
Matt Western
Q
Martin McTague: Our clear priority is the transition process. It is vitally important that there is no cliff edge at this very early stage. Our members, and the small business community as a whole, see this as an enabling Bill, something that will help a smooth transition, so in principle we welcome it.
Matt Western
Q
Chris Southworth: There is a general recognition across the international community since the EU referendum—of course, that was followed by Trump and further issues across the G7—that the existing models for handling trade need to change. That is because there is a disconnect within society and over wider communities and regions, particularly in the lower-skilled areas, where they have not benefited from the growth of trade.
Everybody is looking for exemplars. Some countries have more structured set-ups, such as the US and New Zealand, where it is much less around the ad hoc consultation and engagement that we have in the UK. That is one key point to make. There are definitely lessons to learn from elsewhere, including the EU, I have to say. The propositions in the Trade Bill are a lesser option than what already exists within the EU. Although the EU itself can improve, there are elements of their structures that would work well for the UK, going forward. That is a key point to make.
The Chair
May I interrupt to welcome Tony Burke, who is the assistant general secretary of Unite the Union? We are very grateful to you.
Tony Burke: Apologies for being delayed. St Pancras and King’s Cross tubes were closed. I have done some fleet footwork to get here.
Matt Western
Q
James Ashton-Bell: I support everything that Chris has just said. For us, we look at the spectrum of different formal ways of engaging civil society. At one extreme you have the United States, which has an incredibly elaborate set of technical committees, numbering several hundred different members of civil society, to provide technical assistance to officials. At the other extreme there are less formalised systems for economies that tend to be a little bit less complex and tend to be significantly smaller than ourselves.
Business would come down somewhere along the lines of being closer to the US model than something less formalised for a less complicated economy that is also quite a bit smaller. Does that mean we need everything that the US model has? No, absolutely. We need a UK-specific bespoke model but it would probably be quite elaborate, to ensure that it takes in every business and wider civil society from across every region of the UK, across every size and shape of organisation and across all the different types of technical expertise, which crosses many different policy issues—everything from intellectual property to issues of data.
Matt Western
Q
James Ashton-Bell: I struggle to understand how any Government, engaging in trade policy, be it at multilateral or bilateral level, would be able to get the best possible outcome for that negotiation unless they were using the full strength of their economy, pooling from the best minds that exist within and outside Government.
Matt Western
Q
Martin McTague: It is difficult to draw parallels with any other country withdrawing from a 40-year relationship. The view that we have taken in the past is that consultation has worked well, inasmuch as the small business community, which we think is a vital part of the economy, has been listened to, and we would hope that that would happen in future. However, there is a temptation, because the bigger corporates sometimes have more access to Government, that small business does not really get listened to. This component, we think, is absolutely vital in the development of the policy.
Mr Prisk
Q
Martin McTague: At the moment our view is that the early stages of development of TRA look encouraging, but we know they are a consultation. We know that they are looking at a variety of different options, and we are willing to wait for the consultation process before we get into a committed decision.
Chris Southworth: The principles are there in terms of setting up a trade role and it is as much to do with the speed around that. I would echo the same thoughts: there needs to be a lot more consultation around them and there needs to be clearer evidence of learning best practice from others. We are not the only country proposing a Trade Remedies Authority. I would start with the idea that having a trade remedies authority and the core concepts that exist in this Bill feel broadly right.
Mr Prisk
Q
Chris Southworth: Yes, I would have thought so. I do not think there should be any opposition to the idea that one may need to evolve in time. The UK has to re-learn how it does trade as an independent country, so we will not get it 100% right in the beginning. It should be able to evolve over time, and if there is a better way of doing it, then do it.
James Ashton-Bell: I take a slightly different view. As to what is in the Bill at present, our internal analysis of the Trade Remedies Authority is that there is a fundamental question, and we are looking for an answer to it: that question is about who makes the ultimate decisions about when to take action and when not to take action.
Having an independent organisation to advise on the data that exists—or does not exist, in many cases—is useful. The EU has found time and again that it does not have access to the kind of data information it needs to draw the kinds of concrete conclusions that it would like to draw. Given that scenario, it is useful to have an independent organisation to make those choices and to be clear about what information is and is not there.
When you have things like the economic interest test that is currently being floated as part of this authority, which in essence allows for the identification of particularly problematic trade behaviour from a third country and for it not to be actioned by the Government or authority, it means that there will be a decision at some point not to take action. If there is not enough information, then that in itself becomes a subjective decision about which parts of the economy are worth protecting using these particular tools, and it is argued that, if a subjective decision is going to be made, then it needs to most certainly be made by a Minister who is accountable for making those choices.
Tony Burke: Right from the get-go, the Manufacturing Trade Remedies Alliance, which consists of three trade unions and a number of trade associations including UK Steel, chemicals industries and ceramics among others, pressed strongly to get a trade remedies clause or a structure in there. We were able to put forward our proposals in advance of the discussions taking place at this level. One of the things that we would say from the trade union point of view is that it is absolutely essential that the TRA has a trade union voice—a worker’s voice—on it, particularly at non-executive level. We should also obviously be subject to International Labour Organisation conventions that protect workers in that remedies arrangement. We are supported by the employers on this. From our point of view, the situation in Unite is that we have many members in manufacturing who have suffered at the hands of dumping: steel, tyres, ceramic, chemicals and pharma. It is a big concern for us. We would see that we need a remedies authority that is transparent, and that has trade union and employer representation. At the end of the day, Parliament has to have consent over any decisions made.
Mr Prisk
Q
Tony Burke: As it stands, but we do not see the transparency that we would like to see, and we also have a view about what appears to be an ability for the Minister to appoint people. We believe that working people and companies should have an opportunity to have a say, and also for trade unions to bring a case. This is important. We have learned from America. We have worked closely with the steelworkers’ union in the United States. They as a trade union in America do bring cases to protect their members in steel, rubber, paper making and industries like that.
Barry Gardiner
Q
James Ashton-Bell: My organisation does not have a defined position on that blank sheet of paper you have just described, but to follow your rationale, and consistent with what I have said so far, bigger organisations do not have a monopoly on understanding how trade impacts the economy. In anything where you are making choices about trade and how it will impact the wider economy, you should have a wide and balanced group of people advising Government, or an independent authority, about how to make those choices. That means, indeed, that small business are very much equal to big business, and workers also, because workers are just as impacted as the businesses themselves.
Chris Southworth: I just want to clarify my point. It is exactly the same: the representation is a critical point. An independent body, yes, but there must be representation within that independent body to represent all the important voices, which includes all those here, but I would also include NGOs and civil society, who have equal interest in the implications of trade. They must be at the table and that has to be in everyone’s interest, including business—big, small and medium.
Martin McTague: Barry, it will not come as a massive surprise to you that, yes, I do agree that small business should be a serious voice on this. It is nice to know that James supports me. That is a welcome change. [Interruption.] It is something that we have clearly got unanimity on.
Mrs Badenoch
Q
Chris Southworth: Ultimately, it is about having a rounded decision made by an independent body. That political oversight is critical—James is completely right. Ultimately, it is going to come down to a political decision whether a decision is made one way or the other. If you operate in an organisation like the World Trade Organisation, then all these voices come into play. It is incredibly important that the decisions prior to any engagement in a global environment are made in a good way that is inclusive. The role of Parliament is critical in that too.
Mrs Badenoch
Q
Chris Southworth: Trade is slow, it is technical, and it is difficult. It involves implications for people’s lives and for businesses of all shapes and sizes in every region. There isn’t a component of public or professional life that is not impacted by trade. It is important that everyone has their say, so that when the negotiations begin, the negotiators and all the stakeholders are confident on what those positions are. It is equally important that, during the negotiation when important points come up that are difficult and tricky, which they always are at that stage, there is also an opportunity to come back and say, “What do you think? Do you agree with this, because we are going to have to make a compromise?” That could mean an implication for Welsh farmers, businesses in the midlands, or local communities in Sheffield. It could mean all of those things.
Mrs Badenoch
Q
Chris Southworth: Again, you need to come down with a political decision at some stage on whether or not it is right in terms of timing. The key point is: has there been proper consultation beforehand and has every stakeholder had the chance to voice their views in a proper structured format, not throughout the consultations, but in a proper structured way? That is the important point. Ultimately, there is always a sensibility around trade remedies, particularly if you are talking about things such as steel dumping. That has huge implications for a lot of people, particularly in geographies that tend to be vulnerable, so there is a difficult decision to be made. It is important that everyone has a chance to have their say about what that decision should be.
Mrs Badenoch
Q
Tony Burke: I think we would agree with everything that was said about the make-up of the board. It has to be wide-ranging and it has to have expertise. On the point you raised: when we put our evidence in from the Manufacturing Trade Remedies Alliance—industry and the unions—we wanted a system that worked. Don’t forget, we have not done this for a long, long time. We needed to make sure that we got it right. There were some folks’ voices saying, “Let’s have a fast-track. Look at America, it takes a long, long time”. We said, “No, if you do fast-track, you could get it wrong”. You need to have a system that works, step by step, but is widely consulted on, as has been said.
We may have problems in a particular industry, where we have to bring expertise in and we need to have people in that discussion at the remedies authority who know exactly what they are talking about and are able to demonstrate it. They can be very complex. When we look at the US system, it takes a very long time and moves very slowly. We do not want to rush it, but we need something that works and is as wide as possible. As I said earlier, I do not think impartiality comes into it, providing there was oversight from Parliament.
Faisal Rashid
Q
Martin McTague: We believe it has been taken into account at this early stage, but a lot more consultation needs to take place. We have a position and we are developing that position on exactly how this will affect smaller businesses. At this stage, it is not a developed position.
Faisal Rashid
Q
Martin McTague: It is only in conversations with officials that we believe that a lot of those consultations have been accepted, or at least understood. We are not at a position now where we are taking a firm line on this issue.
Faisal Rashid
Q
Martin McTague: I can come back to you with concrete examples, but I do not have them at my fingertips.
Chris Southworth: No, I do not think it has been satisfactory at all, certainly for the international community, which is what I represent. When I asked the question of officials, “Who have you actually consulted?” I was told, “The USA and Japan.” That is completely inadequate in terms of the countries that the UK is trading with. Their voice—they also have SMEs, also in supply chains, also funding livelihood—is equally important. This is going to affect other people’s countries and communities. So it was completely inadequate and haphazard. If you happen to name a name, that person will get consulted. If that person happens to be missed, we do not know, and they are completely missed off the consultation. That is not a way to consult on trade. It is slapdash.
Faisal Rashid
Q
Chris Southworth: As I understand it from the explanatory notes and the Secretary of State’s speech on Second Reading, there is no intention of consulting within the Bill—that all comes later, whenever that is. It was not clear in any of the communications whether that would be a further Bill or a paper. It all sounds distinctly like it will be something informal, which I would argue is completely the wrong approach. Bear in mind that the Bill is the first opportunity for Government to tell the world, not just the UK, how they will create a free trade model that works for everyone. This is the moment to set out the stall on what that structure for engagement will be. It is all missing in the Bill. There is nothing in it.
Faisal Rashid
If there is no new Trade Bill, those Henry VIII powers stay.
Chris Southworth: I go back to my point that, if I were living in Scotland, Northern Ireland, Wales, the Yorkshire Dales—where I am from—Sheffield or the north, I would be concerned about where my voice is coming into this process. We are talking about rolling over the terms of 88 countries. That is a lot of countries, and they are not all EU. It is extremely unlikely to happen. I would want to have a say in that process, not to wait.
Tony Burke: When the Manufacturing Trade Remedies Alliance put forward its document, which it had worked considerably hard to produce over a long time, we were surprised at the speed at which the whole thing moved. There were areas that we had gone through in great detail to prepare.
As I have said, there was unanimity on things such as International Labour Organisation conventions, trade union representation and industry representation, and on some of the real technical detail as well, which we could not go into today. We would be happy to revisit that document. I understand that the other folk from the MTRA are giving evidence to a different Committee today, and I think they will say very much the same thing. We have no problem in going through it again and picking out some of the key issues from the point of view not just of trade unions but of industry.
Some trade associations on that body are very concerned about what could happen to their industries. They will be putting forward those points of view today. The speed at which it was done was far too fast. The view seemed to be that that was it, even though people had spent a lot of time putting the arguments together.
Tom Pursglove
Q
Tony Burke: The big danger is that, if we do not have one that works on day one, we could be subject to what we have already seen in the past few years. Steel has been subject to the most horrendous situation for the past two or three years—lots of jobs have been lost. The industry came together to try to make sure that it holds together, but without a trade remedies structure in place, the big fear is that we would be subject to the dumping of steel again, particularly from countries such as China, although I am not singling it out. That is one of the issues.
There are other constituencies where we talk to colleagues—MPs and others—and our members. The tyres industry, for instance, is very concerned about the dumping of cheap tyres on the market, which would undermine our premium brands and well-paid skilled jobs. We need something in place. Of course, as I have said, we have not had anything for 40 years and it will take some time to work through, but it is important to have a wider group of people who can push the arguments for various industries.
My fear, and the fear of our members in steel in Corby and other steel areas, is that, if we do not have trade remedies in place, we could be faced with horrendous dumping on the basis that, in respect of what is happening and what has been said, there is massive over-capacity. Steel in particular is being sold at cheaper rates than it costs to produce.
Tom Pursglove
Q
Tony Burke: You have to have something in place. Certainly, many of our members in the steel industry have followed this and are extremely concerned about what could happen and about market economy status being granted to China. Those are the key issues, and they will expect us to keep pushing the issues wherever we can to get this right. It was said earlier on. We do not want to just harp on steel—there are lots of other industries—but it is one area where we have had a really bad time. Many of our members in the steel industry understand the arguments and would expect us to come back to the issues again whenever we could.
Tom Pursglove
Q
Tony Burke: We have not got to that situation directly in talking to our shop stewards and reps. We have been talking with our parliamentary colleagues who have steel in their constituencies, and our union reps are talking to them, so there would be concern.
Judith Cummins
Q
Tony Burke: No. We have been working with the Manufacturing Trade Remedies Alliance, which includes a number of trade associations—as I have said, steel, chemicals, fertilisers and so on—and I think there has been a coming together. We would have preferred a longer period, obviously, to go through this in detail—a longer period to argue for the things that we put forward in our document, which were generally accepted by everybody. To answer your question, the only way we are going to be able to make sure that the voice of working people is heard is to have representation on that body directly from the trade unions.
Chris Southworth: I would make an additional point. I completely support that point, but if there is one thing we have learned over the last year and a half, it is that we have to accept that there is generally a low understanding of trade, and trade itself has moved on significantly in the last 40 years; the world we live in today is not the same as it was 40 years ago, either. I think that extra diligence in relation to consultation and informing the public, and business for that matter—businesses are in the same position, surprising as that may sound—is a good idea.
Bill Esterson
Q
James Ashton-Bell: Specifically when it comes to trade remedies, I think the most important place to start is: where have mistakes been made and where have processes not delivered outcomes, either in a timely way or in terms of the right kind of outcomes for the wider economy? I know there is a lot that officials have been looking at to learn what not to do from the EU, because everyone agrees that that system is not perfect. Much of that thinking has coloured some of what has gone into this Bill. There are aspects of the US system that do not work. No one has a system that we have found you can hold up as an absolutely perfect system. There are always going to be different balances that have to be made, but the fact that officials working on this have looked at the US, Canadian, EU, Japanese and Swiss systems means that they have certainly made a good effort to try to learn from others’ mistakes, and that is an excellent place to start.
Bill Esterson
Q
James Ashton-Bell: Getting to some very technical areas that, as the Bill stands, would be covered by secondary legislation—so the devil will be in the detail—for me the central question is who ultimately makes decisions about whether to take action, where to take action and what is a proportionate action to take. The reason I say that is because taking action in a case of using trade remedies and defence is a highly political move and a highly economic move. It is never without controversy and, as I mentioned before, never with absolutely perfect information and data to make an objective decision.
Having very clear reporting structures and decision-making structures about who is the ultimate arbiter is key. Having lots of time for everyone to feed in as much information across the wider economy is key. So have as much information as you can at the beginning, but have a very clear process for using that information and have clear decision making to ensure that the outcome is someone’s responsibility and that they will be held accountable for it. It feeds into our wider industrial strategy; it is not just a trade issue.
Bill Esterson
Q
James Ashton-Bell: The mistakes are usually procedural. I am not going to pronounce on individual decisions because, as I said, they are never made without controversy, and for me to pronounce on another country’s individual trade remedy decisions would put me in a very difficult place. In terms of process, some have commented that in the American system, they can be very rushed and not all information or all stakeholders are taken into account. In other instances, such as with the EU, the process can be so long that they do not actually take action early enough to ensure that you can fix the problem when it is a problem. Procedure is absolutely core to most of the problems that occur when designing a system like this.
Chris Southworth: I have a difficult situation, which is a real one: the market status of China. That was very live last year or the year before. You have a classic situation there where we clearly want to be supportive to China as it comes on board as a global leader. China itself knows perfectly well that it wants to wind down steel production and that it is over-producing, but you cannot just wind down the Chinese economy overnight—that will take 10 years to do, as Europe did with its mountains in the past.
Where is the balance? In the meantime, the impact is on steel communities in the UK, across Europe and other parts of the world—we are not on our own—but who decides what that balance is? There is an implication either way on either the political relationship with China and supporting the Chinese economy, or local communities here in the UK. Someone has to come down and say, “Okay, this is where we are going to be.” That may potentially evolve: you may want to take several positions over a period of time so that you get to the end goal that you collectively want, but that must involve the people who will be impacted by those decisions.
Bill Esterson
Q
Chris Southworth: I have already made the point, and broadly speaking I support the comments made here that you have to have something on day one. Do not be afraid to evolve that over time, but you have to have something in place that feels broadly right. Having listened to the conversations here, I would say that the stakeholder representation needs to be looked at, but the basic structure is there to work with—get on with it.
Bill Esterson
Q
Tony Burke: I agree with some of my comrades here. Everybody has got to look around the world at different systems. In Unite, we are focusing on the US system primarily because of our relationship with the United Steelworkers union in the States, which, as I have mentioned before in other areas, almost does this for a living. It has officials on the hill working on this all the time, and at times it is very time consuming and costly. So if there are many mistakes, they can either be rushed in the States, as has been said, or be very slow and very costly. We are looking for a system that works and that can be easily understood. I do not know whether you want to extend the debate into the market economy status for China. I will resist the temptation, but I have to say that that is a major issue for us in our industries.
Martin McTague: The only thing I would add is that in the States there is a temptation—there seems to be plenty of evidence that it happens—for the bigger, more concentrated industries to get dealt with more quickly. What you have got is that the more fragmented industries that are supplied by lots of smaller companies do not get dealt with effectively.
Gillian Keegan
Q
Tony Burke: The EU system was slow. At times, when we had the situation that I mentioned—going back to steel, when we had a crisis—we were quite concerned about the glacial pace of getting the whole thing moving and recognising what was happening. We are looking for the TRA in the UK to be, as I said, one that we can move forward on, and for decisions to be made that will assist companies and industries fairly quickly, without being too rushed—you need to take opportunities to listen to what people have got to say and take the best advice and evidence.
Gillian Keegan
Q
James Ashton-Bell: My only comment would be, based on what is in the Bill, that it feels like there is a good framework to start with, and to work from that to create a better version of what the EU currently has, but much of whether or not that will be successful will be defined in secondary legislation, I believe. Based on what I have seen, we have a good starter for 10; we now need to build on it and ensure that more consultation responses on some of the more controversial issues are taken into account, and then translate that into secondary legislation.
Chris Southworth: I would support those comments. I would not be too quick to dismiss the EU; they are very difficult decisions to make across 27 countries. The decisions themselves are incredibly diverse, as well as the 27 countries being diverse. There are very difficult decisions when you are talking about these kinds of issues around trade remedies.
Gillian Keegan
Q
James Ashton-Bell: Correct.
Chris Southworth: I agree.
Martin McTague: The principle is that we want to get this thing up and running as quickly as possible—efficiently and possibly more efficiently—while taking into account some of the interests of smaller businesses. I think that that is clearly understood, and we support the points that James made earlier, but do we need it? Is it something that essentially has to be there on day one? I do not think there is any doubt.
Barry Gardiner
Q
Chris Southworth: Again, I think it all goes back to consultation and scrutiny. If people have an opportunity to look at the measures or issues properly, you are more likely to head those issues off. I agree that we do not want to become the second best option, or the optimal option for the wrong reasons, if you know what I mean. At the end of the day, these are people’s livelihoods, so it is very important, but it comes back to the same premise throughout this conversation: consultation, proper scrutiny across the stakeholders with Government and then coming to a conclusion as to what is right.
Barry Gardiner
Q
Chris Southworth: If we are going to create a free trade model that works for everyone, the answer is absolutely yes. There must be those considerations and there must be that input from the range of stakeholders. It has to be the right way forward. It is the only way forward, because what we definitely know is that what we have at the moment does not work. The backlash to that model is sufficient to make everybody sit up in their seats and say, “That doesn’t work, let’s try and be better.” The answer to your question is yes.
James Ashton-Bell: I agree with that. We do not have a defined position as an organisation on this, but I would say that we do have a defined position that trade, industrial strategy and your wider domestic agenda are inherently linked and should never be seen as running in parallel or separate. Given those concerns, we would say that you would never take a decision on anything to do with trade defences without taking into account every impact on your wider economy before making that choice.
Tony Burke: I agree. The question of taking the environment into account is important, but so is this question of social impact. When you look at what could happen with the dumping of goods and how that affects particular companies or industries that centre around certain areas, I think it is absolutely essential. As colleagues have said here, you have to take into account an industrial strategy that ensures that all regions and industries—particularly foundation industries—are protected as best as we can possibly do it. We definitely would need to include the environment, but social impact on localities and industries is very important.
Barry Gardiner
Protect Mr Pursglove’s constituents.
Martin McTague: The only thing I can add to that is that I do not see anything in the Bill that prevents you from doing that. This is something that we would support in secondary legislation.
Barry Gardiner
Q
Tony Burke: Are you referring directly to the MTRA’s evidence, Mr Gardiner?
Barry Gardiner
Well—
Tony Burke: Yes. Well, as I said earlier on, one of the issues was that we have done a tremendous amount of work on this and lots of wide consultation. We came up with our proposals and we were quite surprised that almost overnight that was what we were going to do. What was the feeling? The industries represented on there were somewhat taken aback that it was done so quickly, and concerned—as would be expected—about whether their voices would be listened to. From the union’s point of view, that was very much the same. We thought that we had done one hell of a lot and put the arguments there very clearly, and obviously some of the key issues for us, such as ILO standards and employment protections, were not there. Hopefully we can try to revisit them and get them in at some point.
Barry Gardiner
Q
Tony Burke: I believe that was the case, but then I will stand corrected. I remember it all happening.
Barry Gardiner
Q
James Ashton-Bell: The thing I can say is that the optics were not ideal.
Barry Gardiner
You should go into the diplomatic service.
James Ashton-Bell: We start from a position that much of what is in this Bill is a framework. The framework itself can be argued to a greater or lesser extent as non-controversial. The controversy starts arising when you start putting in the detail that is not currently in the Bill as it stands and, from our perspective, more importantly, what is not in the Bill at all and probably should be. Those are bigger questions.
On that basis, we know a number of conversations happened in the run-up to publishing this Bill, particularly around the issue of dumping. The elements that went into the Bill seemed to be the ones that were the least controversial and could be built around with more detail. Presentationally, was it the right thing to do? Maybe not, but I have more confidence that there is opportunity for the House to alter this legislation to fill in on the more controversial element.
Chris Southworth: My overall impression is twofold: too fast, and not enough consultation of the international business community, bearing in mind we are talking trade here. This is not public health in Yorkshire or somewhere. This is trade. We must be talking to our trading partners, who are just as perplexed and confused about what is going on over here as anybody else. I don’t think they were consulted enough, partly because of the speed and partly because there was not enough communication as to what the UK is trying to do. That would be my answer.
Martin McTague: The best way to answer this is that small business as a whole is completely split down the middle. If I speak to the average leave voter, they would say “Why don’t you get on with it?” This isn’t fast enough for them. The average remainer will consider it a recklessly rushed process. We are not reaching a conclusion—it depends on which perspective is looking at this. That is largely the view we are getting from small businesses.
Barry Gardiner
But however quickly you take the process, you would want—
Martin McTague: How quickly you take the process is either perceived as being far too fast or reckless.
The Chair
I have at least three people still seeking to catch my eye and we have a maximum of eight minutes. If we can have short questions and short answers, and if a panellist does not feel they have anything to add to someone else’s answer, perhaps we can skip on, just to try and get as many people’s questions in as possible.
Alan Brown
Q
Chris Southworth: Overall—not just the Trade Remedies Authority—I would be concerned if I were in the devolved Administrations. There is specifically no opportunity for the devolved Administrations—or the regions, I have to say—to feed into decisions on trade. I would be very concerned about that, particularly in the devolved Administrations, where there are vulnerabilities on a whole range of different industries.
Alan Brown
Q
Chris Southworth: My point is back to James. What is missing in the Bill is clear direction on what the Government are going to do to create a new, more inclusive structure to include all the stakeholders. That is the central point to all of the content of the Bill and every other Bill relating to trade, going forward. We must do things differently and it is all missing. There is not even a reference to it. There are references to things that will be very agitating, such as Henry VIII powers—the ability to overrule. That, to the outside world, will look like an aggravating factor, I would have thought, when we need to do the opposite and be more inclusive.
On the world stage, I have to say, the UK Government are exemplary on this. We are pushing out the message very publicly, as the Secretary of State was doing in Argentina just before Christmas time at the World Trade Organisation ministerial conference, around inclusive trade—the need to do trade for everyone and to make it work for everyone. It was exemplary. We were the most vocal Government around it, actually, but back home, when you look at the Bill, you think “That doesn’t make sense.” That was my reaction to it.
Alan Brown
Q
James Ashton-Bell: I agree with that.
Faisal Rashid
Q
Tony Burke: As it stands, no.
Chris Southworth: Look at what you have got today. That is what you get when you do not get proper consultation and involvement in trade. That is what we are dealing with right now: huge social division, division and disparity across the regions, industries vulnerable. You get all of that. That is what we are dealing with. That is what you have if you do not make change. That is why the Bill needs to demonstrate change.
James Ashton-Bell: The reason we have been calling for a very formalised form of consultation is twofold. One, there are many examples in history—many countries have designed very elaborate free trade agreements that businesses do not use because they were not designed with business in mind. That is a waste of everyone’s time and our negotiating effort.
The second reason is that we find in many instances, as we saw when trying to ratify CETA, through Belgium, or with TTIP, if you do not have an inclusive process that is incredibly formalised and elaborate, you actually lose public support. Having the right advocates to push the deal across the line is something that is good for the economy. It needs to be grounded in fact to ensure that it is good, and also something that has consensus and that we can actually stand behind.
Tony Burke: Again, I am in danger of agreeing with a lot of folks in what they are saying at the moment. Regarding what has just been said, if you look at CETA and TTIP, there was massive opposition from across the spectrum. It is important that we get this right, and inclusivity is the key. We had no involvement in discussions with regard to the UK in those trade agreements and I think the same thing could happen again if we are not careful. We cannot just go casting around trying to pick one off the shelf. This is going to be a very complex issue, so everybody needs to be on board.
Martin McTague: We have regarded this as an enabling piece of legislation. It is a framework. I can say that the area where TTIP really came alive for small businesses was when they introduced the small business chapter, which meant the real concerns of small businesses had a basis on which they could discuss those issues and get them properly grounded.
Matt Western
Q
James Ashton-Bell: I do not believe the Bill as a vehicle can deliver a good Brexit in any scenario. There are too many Bills and pieces of legislation that are necessary to deliver a good Brexit. This is one piece of the puzzle. There is a lot of detail that is not in here. Our position is not necessarily that that has to be in here. There are other pieces, like the consultation issue, that we believe need to be formalised in legislation. That could happen at a later date.
Our concern is that to deliver a good Brexit we are going to have so many pieces of legislation in a very truncated period of time. A lot of pressure will be put on Parliament to rush through legislation without properly scrutinising it, or legislation will not make it through. Either way, we get a bad outcome. Our question comes back to the one I started with. If there are essential elements for your trade policy, if they are not in this Bill, why not, because you have it in front of the House anyway?
The Chair
Order. That brings us to the end of our time allotted to the Committee to ask questions. I thank our witnesses on behalf of the Committee for their evidence, in particular Mr Burke, for the tortuous journey he had getting here.
Trade Bill (Second sitting)
Tuesday 23rd January 2018
(6 years, 10 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Trade Bill 2017-19 View all Trade Bill 2017-19 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 23 January 2018 - (23 Jan 2018)
The Chair
For those of you who do not know, I am James Gray. I am a stand-in for Joan Ryan, who unfortunately has, I think, a family problem of one sort or another. I shall be in the Chair for this afternoon’s proceedings. I mentioned earlier on that, contrary to normal practice, I voted on Second Reading in favour of the Bill, but I do not think that that affects my ability to be dispassionate. A Chair who had not voted on the Bill could not be found, so that is why I am in the Chair—I hope that is all right. With that, let us have the witnesses in, please.
Examination of Witnesses
Dr Lorand Bartels, Dr Holger Hestermeyer, Jude Kirton-Darling and Dr Brigid Fowler gave evidence.
The Chair
Q
Dr Fowler: I am Brigid Fowler, from the Hansard Society.
Jude Kirton-Darling: I am Jude Kirton-Darling, a Labour Member of the European Parliament for the north-east of England, and a member of the European Parliament Committee on International Trade.
Dr Hestermeyer: I am Holger Hestermeyer, the Shell reader in international dispute resolution at King’s College London.
Dr Bartels: I am Lorand Bartels, a reader in international law at the University of Cambridge, and senior counsel at Linklaters.
The Chair
I do not know whether you have a thought to do so, or would like to do so, but you would be more than welcome to make a short introductory statement if you wish. If not, we will move straight on to questions, starting with Barry Gardiner.
Barry Gardiner (Brent North) (Lab)
Q
Dr Hestermeyer: The first thing to note—in fact, it is even in the Government’s comments on the Bill—is that the deals will be technically new international agreements, so they will be technically separate. As to their content, first, there are the technical details that will need to be changed—for example, rules of origin, which define when a product benefits from a trade deal. Those are quantities, so they will say, “50% of a car has to be from the EU.” That, of course, no longer fits; it will have to be the UK, and the numbers will have to be changed too, because a UK car is substantially now 44% UK-content. We will not benefit from the deals if we do not change the numbers. Those are technical issues, but they are vital.
There are some deals that are structurally so different that, quite frankly, I wonder whether we really want to reproduce them one-on-one. For example, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein are in the European economic area—as was recently explained, in the sidecar to the single market. Do we really want to reproduce those deals by statutory instrument? It seems peculiar to me that we would want that. Turkey, for example, is in a customs union with the European Union. Do we want a customs union with the European Union? We might say yes or no, but I wonder whether a statutory instrument is really the way to take those decisions. Switzerland has a whole number of agreements, some of them linked by what is called a guillotine clause, free movement. Do we want that? That probably could not be reproduced even if we did want it, so that is also a no.
You might say, “All this is insignificant,” but if you add up the numbers, the EEA is 2% of UK trade, according to the Government’s assessment of the Bill; Turkey is 1.3% and Switzerland is 3.1%. That amounts to roughly half the trade we are talking about, or half the 15% that the Government assessment arrived at for those agreements. I do not think that will be rolled over, because I am not sure we would want it, quite apart from the technical issues that will arise and the question of whether other states and our partners will say, “We also want something.”
Dr Bartels: I would rather focus on the implementation aspects. Obviously, the question of which agreements the Government choose to roll over is a political decision; it depends on negotiations and so on. My reading of the Bill is that it talks about the implementation of those agreements. What is important there is to identify the scope of the agreements that can then be implemented.
One point of interest is that the Bill extends to agreements that have been signed but not ratified as of Brexit day. I think we can safely say that that is likely to be the comprehensive economic and trade agreement with Canada, the agreement with Japan and others as well; and if the EU agreement is provisionally applied at the same time, some might think that they are in force and ratified. In fact, I found the language in some of the documents around this area blurred the point a little bit, but there is a fundamental difference in international law between a signed and provisionally applied agreement and a ratified agreement. The Bill is quite extensive when it comes to signed agreements.
There are other points to do with the definition of the sorts of agreements that are covered here, such as a free trade agreement, which is here defined to include a free trade agreement and a customs union agreement by reference to World Trade Organisation definitions. Then, interestingly, we have in clause 2(2)(b),
“an international agreement that mainly relates to trade, other than a free trade agreement.”
I do not know whether you would like me to say anything about that now. It could be quite broad. I noticed one idea in some of the amendments, which was that it could be further defined as including a strategic partnership agreement, the language used for the framework agreement sitting on top of CETA, and mutual recognition agreements.
I must say that I think the amendment is very comprehensive; for a start, the strategic partnership agreement is not even tangentially about trade, so it could not really be described as an agreement about trade. The point of it is political and human rights conditionality and so on. In that sense, the definition is over-inclusive. It is also under-inclusive, in the sense that mutual recognition agreements are only one type of agreement relating to trade that one might legitimately want to include here. For instance, one would also have customs co-operation agreements as an obvious agreement that should be rolled over and implemented.
The broader point is that, despite what I said about the strategic partnership agreement, it is an outlier in this respect. A lot of agreements have to do with trade. Environmental agreements have trade aspects; the Montreal protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer is all about banning trade in ozone-depleting substances. The convention on international trade in endangered species is all about trade in endangered species.
Therefore, I think the definition is a little bit unclear. One could say, “Well, it’s agreements that just liberalise trade,” but that is a problem too, because FTAs do not just liberalise trade. They have intellectual property provisions, which might arguably in some way promote trade, but more likely investment. Certainly, they are not the first thing that you think about when thinking about a trade liberalising agreement. There are provisions in the FTAs in addition to intellectual property: competition law, labour and environmental protection provisions are in all the modern EU agreements that we have talked about. Essentially, this gives the Government the ability to implement labour standards provisions, which include not exactly sanctions, but obligations that need to be performed. Frankly, these two Bills strike me as very old-fashioned; they do not seem up to date with the reality of modern trade agreements.
Jude Kirton-Darling: I will follow on directly from that last thought, from my experience inside the European Parliament as an MEP, scrutinising trade policy at EU level. Of course, our MEPs have done that job for the last few decades. From our perspective, what really is missing from the Bill is the parliamentary scrutiny dimension. No-one on the panel has mentioned that so far. In terms of process, compared with the parliamentary scrutiny powers that British MEPs have today in the European Parliament, the Bill is an enormous step back in democratic oversight of trade agreements.
To add to what has already been said from a legal perspective about what these trade deals are, any kind of roll-over is likely to come up against the offensive interests of our trading partners. We have already seen that what was supposed to be quite a technical question of the division of tariff-rate quotas going to the World Trade Organisation has turned into an enormous political issue, with countries who supposedly are our friends and allies defending very actively their offensive interests in relation to tariff-rate quotas.
Once we start opening trade deals up to technical tinkering, whether that is a number here or a point there, our trading counterparts will also use that opportunity to try to get a bit more leeway for their interests. It is likely that these deals will be very different at the end of the process from what we have at the beginning. That parliamentary scrutiny—the role of MPs in ensuring that there is democratic oversight—is absolutely crucial but entirely missing from the legislation.
Dr Fowler: If the question is which of these agreements will change significantly, my answer is, we do not know that. Other people who are much more expert than me in the details of trade agreements would have better sight of that, but as someone who looks at what is coming to and through the Westminster Parliament, we simply do not know at the moment. On that basis, I make two points.
First, Parliament needs to be happy that it has procedures in place to deal with agreements that might be changed significantly. Even the Government have indicated that that is a possibility—they use language about substantive change in the Bill documents. Secondly is the point about transparency and possibly some kind of reporting function, which does not have to go into the Bill; it could be done through other means. However, I feel that, given the number of these agreements that have to be dealt with in the amount of time that we are talking about, some kind of regular reporting transparency about exactly what is going on would be useful to Parliament.
The Chair
Thank you; that was very useful. It is not necessary for all four members of the panel to answer all the questions. You may want to target them, because we have half an hour left and we want to make the best use of our time.
Mr Mark Prisk (Hertford and Stortford) (Con)
Q
Dr Bartels: One of the features of the package that you have been presented with is a split between fiscal and non-fiscal measures that can be adopted. I am not entirely convinced that that is a very sensible division of tasks. For instance, because of that division, what seems to be missing is the ability to impose quotas—not tariff-rate quotas but quantity quotas—as safeguard measures, which is permissible under WTO law and is done. Because of the split, nothing on those measures is set out in this agreement, and the other agreement only deals with duties, so you are limited to tariff-rate quotas. That is one overall observation. I could say other things about the treatment of developing countries in the other Bill, which I find under-complex, to use a German term that my colleague is fond of.
More directly to your question—again, this links to what I am saying about the split—the major issue when it comes to the Trade Remedies Authority here is that we do not have it in a context that enables appeals. I know that in the other Bill there is a reference to the possibility of an appeals mechanism. The United States is very big on appeals—it is very elaborate. Of course, one can disagree with the way in which the United States conducts itself—we have all paid some attention to the Bombardier dispute and the United States’ interpretation of its WTO obligations—but at least formally speaking there is a sequence of decision making that includes a court, appeals and so on established there, and we do not have that here. It is very, let us say, basic at this point.
On the rest of it, reading this together with the other Bill, I would say in general terms it looks fairly standard. There are some choices you can make when setting up a Trade Remedies Authority, such as the duties that can be imposed and whether you go for a lesser duty rule or not—we seem to be doing that here. One can make a political choice on that, but in general terms, other than the point on appeals of decisions, and connected with that the relationship between the authority and the Secretary of State, which here is extremely close and in other systems might be a little more arm’s length, I think the detail of what the authority can do is fairly standard.
Mr Prisk
Does anyone want to add to that?
Jude Kirton-Darling: I would add one thing. I heard the evidence this morning in which there was quite a lot of discussion of the EU trade defence instruments and the EU system, and some of it was a little bit out of date. During the steel crisis, quite a number of reforms came in to modernise and speed up trade defence inside the EU, mainly led by the European Parliament. That is one of the key elements missing from the Bills: the role of Parliament in terms of oversight and scrutiny.
If I think about the role of MEPs when it comes to trade defence instrument questions, we have the right to veto proposed duties and to scrutinise all of the Commission’s proposals, we have access to all of the documents in relation to investigations, and we can demand closed-door meetings with Commission officials to really get into the detail of those investigations. It seems to me that lots of that scrutiny is missing from the proposals on the table. That scrutiny gives a quality to the process of ensuring balanced trade defence instruments that are effective.
Mr Prisk
Q
Jude Kirton-Darling: There is a clear role for stronger scrutiny. Inside the legislation, there is no obligation on the Secretary of State or the new Trade Remedies Authority to engage directly with Parliament through, for example, a specific Committee of Parliament. In future, that could be the International Trade Committee—an amendment could be tabled to ensure that link and that scrutiny—but at the moment that is not in the proposals. It is a missing link, if you think about what we already benefit from in the current system, of which we are a member.
I would hate to give the impression that what we have is perfect; that is not what I am trying to say. Today, in the European Parliament’s Committee on International Trade, MEPs have voted on a modernisation package to try to rectify some of the weaknesses in the EU’s regime. If you are thinking about what to improve on, our system is not perfect, but, at the same time, MEPs—your counterparts—have a clear role in the process, which is entirely missing from the proposals tabled.
Anna McMorrin (Cardiff North) (Lab)
Q
Dr Bartels: One can look at what is covered in modern trade agreements according to two poles, and then there is a sort of meeting in the middle. On one side, you have the pure market access issues, where you are reducing duties—you are liberalising trade—in certain economic sectors. Those sectors are going to be affected negatively and are not going to be happy about it, because there is competition that they were not used to. To do that, you need to be able to trade sectors off against one another. There is a reason for confidentiality with that traditional sort of trade negotiation. Not everybody would agree—you might say that someone whose job is at risk should get a right to know what is being negotiated—but there is at least a traditional and strong argument there for confidentiality.
On the other side, you have purely regulatory issues, such as the question of what you think in your system of the precautionary principle for health and safety. That sort of principle would normally be dealt with through the normal democratic process, and I cannot see any reason why that should be changed and negotiators should be given the ability to haggle that away, particularly if they are doing that in secret. In the middle, you have rules that are regulatory but arguably are also protectionist, so the trade negotiators would say, “We should be able to negotiate those away in secrecy.” It is hard to know where to draw the line, but it is certainly useful to conceive of what is in a trade agreement according to those two poles.
None of that means that this should be limited purely to the Executive, even when there is confidentiality on market access. Many other countries have systems where parliamentarians have some rights to see what is being negotiated and to be kept apprised of negotiations as they go. The European Union, for instance, is extremely advanced when it comes to that; there are strict limitations in terms of going into and coming out of the room, no phones are allowed, and so on. The US Congress has similar arrangements. There is a palette of options to enable parliamentary involvement, even within the framework of confidentiality. I am not sure that the Bill is the right place to address that sort of issue, but there is certainly nothing like that in the Bill.
Anna McMorrin
Q
Dr Bartels: It is true, but it is generally more true in certain sectors. It is true, for instance, in sanitary and phytosanitary standards. It is usually not the standards themselves that are protectionist. There are examples of standards, such as the beef hormone standards, that I can say are protectionist because WTO cases have said they are protectionist—I just need to cite Geneva on those—but it is often done by having overly complicated conformity assessment requirements, and so on. There is definitely room for regulations that purport to be there simply to protect the public also to be protectionist. Usually, you have both aspects in the same regulation. But even in that sort of situation, I still think that the regulatory dimension is sufficient for there to be at least some type of domestic scrutiny over haggling that away.
The Chair
Q
Dr Hestermeyer: There are certainly examples of standards being used only for protectionist purposes, but it is far more common for standards that one side sets to be perceived as protectionist by the other. Let us take hormone beef. There is real concern on the part of a lot of European consumers that hormone beef is not healthy. There is no direct scientific evidence to show that that is true, but the concern is nevertheless there. So the standard reflects the democratic choice of the populace—whether we think it is adequate or not. That is important to see. With any standard set, some sides will say, “This is protectionism,” and it is also rhetoric to attack the standard.
Jude Kirton-Darling: I guess the last point missing from that is that if we look at where trade agreements and trade policy have been controversial in recent years, it is when the perception is that standards held very dearly by the public for exactly those reasons are perceived to be negotiated away behind closed doors, with only a certain number of vested interests having access to the process. That is one more reason why having an open process, with parliamentary scrutiny and engagement, gives credibility to any final agreement, which at the end of the day has to have public support, after the negotiations. You build in societal acceptance through the process by engaging Parliament in an active way.
Dr Fowler: I would very much endorse that. If it is the case that some degree of secrecy or privacy is an advantage in one respect, there is probably a trade-off in terms of not being able to have that societal buy-in that might be wanted at the end of the process. There is a trade-off and losses if it is all done in private.
Tom Pursglove (Corby) (Con)
Q
Dr Bartels: I will kick off. Yes, I would agree with that, but I would also say that what is important about the Bill is that it gives the Government the power to change those agreements. They are, legally, new agreements, and that is recognised specifically in the Bill and in the explanatory memorandum, where no bones are made about saying that new obligations might be undertaken, so it would not be the same agreement that is subject to scrutiny. What is important here is to work out whether there are any limits on the Government’s ability to undertake new agreements—or new obligations in what are named as existing agreements—and implement those obligations, and if they do that, whether that is then sufficiently being scrutinised by Parliament.
Dr Hestermeyer: I would like to go back to my first answer and take as an example the Turkey agreement. I do not think that we would want the kind of customs union that Turkey has, but currently the Henry VIII power would allow implementation of any agreement that we then make with Turkey, even if in the end it looked completely different. That is the first problem with this scrutiny process.
The second problem, as Lorand identified at the beginning, is that some agreements have been signed but not ratified, so the scrutiny part of ratification has not yet happened. They have not been fully scrutinised.
The third element is that I do not think that the Ponsonby rule, as qualified, is sufficient because, first, it allows only delay and not a straight up-or-down vote; and secondly, it requires scheduling of an actual debate and vote. With Government control of parliamentary timetables, there is no guarantee that it cannot be indefinitely delayed. Even theoretically, therefore, that is not possible.
Jude Kirton-Darling: I fully agree with previous speakers.
The Chair
In which case, you may just nod.
Dr Fowler: I would agree with that. In terms of existing scrutiny through the European scrutiny system, one point is that it is imperfect. As we know, the European Scrutiny Committee here spends a lot of time trying to get time on the Floor of the House and trying to ensure that it sees documents in time and to arrange things so that it can have a meaningful say. Then there is the problem of the agreements that will not have been fully through the European scrutiny process before they come back again. Then there are the CRAGA problems—it seems that no one quite knows how the CRAGA provisions would work. That may be because no one in either House has ever tried to do anything under them, but it seems to me that part of this process ought to be that agreements are going to come before Parliament that it might want to do something about, and merely as a minimalist position—
The Chair
I am sorry to interrupt. May I just say that there is a gentleman in the gallery who may not take photographs? Please carry on.
Dr Fowler: If you wanted to take a minimalist view, merely as a bit of constitutional housekeeping, it seems to me that there is scope for at least clarifying how the CRAGA provisions would be used, before possibly going into strengthening the powers.
Faisal Rashid (Warrington South) (Lab)
Q
Dr Fowler: As you will know, under the negative procedure, Parliament has the power to pray against an instrument. In order to do that, first, Members need to use the early-day motion procedure, which is obscure and many Members do not even know about. Secondly, and more importantly, there is the issue of trying to get time on the Floor of the House. There have been cases where Members have wished to pray against a negative instrument and time has not been granted on the Floor of the House within the scrutiny period, so it has simply been impossible to annul a negative instrument before it came into force. That is one problem with the current system.
Faisal Rashid
Q
Dr Fowler: Inasmuch as the Trade Bill provides for use of the negative procedure, yes, that would be fair. I am sure there would not necessarily be any wish to do that on the part of any Government, but as the procedures currently stand, Back Benchers cannot be sure that they can get time on the Floor of the House if they want it.
Judith Cummins (Bradford South) (Lab)
Q
Dr Fowler: At the moment that procedure happens through the European scrutiny system because of the EU’s competence to conduct trade policy. The main instrument is the so-called scrutiny reserve, under which the Government deposits relevant documents with the European Scrutiny Committees in both Houses and they scrutinise them. The relevant Minister is not supposed to sign up to things in the EU Council if the relevant documents are still held under scrutiny. That works every time a new set of documents is tabled along the process.
The system can be quite effective but there is a difficulty about timing, and getting time on the Floor of the House. There is a difficulty if something has to move quickly at EU level, and then the Government quite often uses what is called the scrutiny override where it just says, “We had to go ahead with this.” Then there is also the difficulty about trying to schedule appropriate debates in Committee or on the Floor of the House.
Jude Kirton-Darling: My only addition would be that currently, one of our frustrations as MEPs is about what happens when some things that we have scrutinised heavily at European level, pass to the national level. We see the level of scrutiny in the German Parliament, in the Belgian Parliament, in Scandinavian Parliaments, where there are very detailed scrutiny processes—often going on at the same time as we are scrutinising at European level, so we get feedback from those Parliaments during the process—and we do not feel, in many cases, that same process from Westminster. So, regardless of what happens in terms of Brexit, it is one of the ways in which Westminster could do more to scrutinise trade in any case, and that would be a benefit for everybody.
Dr Hestermeyer: Just as a reminder, the scrutiny override was used for CETA. To compare that, under German law, for example, Parliament gets involved very early on. There was a change in the constitution and then an additional statute was passed, so Parliament gets involved very early on and can make binding statements for the Government, which will then be taken into account by the Government also in the Council. That way, there is a large impact of parliamentary statements in governmental positions, because in the end, the Government will have to defend measures in the Council.
Martin Vickers (Cleethorpes) (Con)
Q
Jude Kirton-Darling: Unfortunately, no.
Martin Vickers
I thought you might say that.
Jude Kirton-Darling: Globally, our voice will be very much reduced by Brexit. Currently, we negotiate together with our neighbouring countries and that collective weight is leveraged in negotiations with trading partners, which, unfortunately, we will lose as a result of Brexit. The benefit of that parliamentary engagement from the national level from other countries creates that societal acceptance, in many cases, of European trade deals. We saw that where there is poor parliamentary engagement, societal acceptance is called into question. The biggest example—it may be a very small region of Europe—was the case of Wallonia and the CETA negotiations, where, through the powers they have as a regional Parliament, they were able, even if they were a small region in Europe, to leverage quite significant improvements in the CETA deal to address some of the concerns they had about that deal. That is where the Parliament is working effectively to really ensure they scrutinise trade deals.
After Brexit there will be a case, if there are improved scrutiny powers included in this Bill and in the accompanying measures toward this Bill, that could mean that MPs would be able to be far more effective in terms of trade policy. My basic answer is that we will be weaker post Brexit because we lose our place and we will become, in effect, a rule-taker rather than a rule-maker when it comes to international trade negotiations.
Martin Vickers
Q
Dr Hestermeyer: On a technical-legal point on mixed trade agreements, all trade agreements except for Kosovo, if I am not mistaken, were mixed trade agreements. The Council decides by common accord, which means that the UK alone could prevent agreement.
Martin Vickers
Q
Dr Hestermeyer: There might be political pressures but I am not a politician; I am just a lawyer, so on a legal position. Obviously, that is the past; that is not the future.
Alan Brown (Kilmarnock and Loudoun) (SNP)
Q
Jude Kirton-Darling: In my experience of the European Parliament’s level of scrutiny, what we have at European level legally is quite limited. Inside the treaty we have a right to accept or veto trade deals at the end of the negotiations. That is included in the Bill, but the second element which we have which is not included in the Bill, which we use much more effectively, is that we have the right to be kept informed throughout the negotiations. That is a legal obligation inside the European treaties. That effectively then gives Members of the European Parliament a hook on which is placed the whole of parliamentary scrutiny at a European level.
You could amend the Trade Bill to include a hook in the same way, which would then allow you to develop some kind of working statute which could evolve over time. These processes evolve over time—improve, I hope, over time—with more transparency as trust is built between institutions. However, you need that legal hook at the beginning. Within the European Parliament, as a result of the hook, we have monitoring groups on every single negotiation that the EU is undertaking and established trade agreements. We have monitoring groups which meet behind closed doors on a regular basis with the chief negotiators, in which MEPs can scrutinise and ask any question. We have access to the majority of documents. During the negotiations you will have heard about the TTIP reading room. We had access to all the EU side of the negotiation documents. Crucially, in that reading room, we also had the read-outs from the European negotiating team of the process of each round of negotiations. To put it into context, you had the legal text of the EU negotiating position and, through the read-out, you could see where the room for manoeuvre was with the US side of the negotiations. Those documents give you the capacity then really to question.
The Chair
Thank you. At quarter to three, I will stop you talking, even if you are mid-sentence.
Bill Esterson (Sefton Central) (Lab)
Q
Dr Fowler: First, Parliament needs to be very clear whether it is happy that the Bill only covers the replicated agreement. You might want to decide that you are happier with these agreements and then do something stronger for the completely new agreements that the UK will be negotiating. I believe that is something that the Secretary of State has indicated he would be open to, but I suggest that Parliament might want to get that nailed down in some way at this stage.
As I have mentioned before, the main issues are the weakness of the CRAGA procedure at the moment—
Bill Esterson
Q
Dr Fowler: For example, you might simply want to have an affirmative motion, a motion for resolution, rather than the negative power that is applicable at the moment. That might be one option that the Government need to bring a motion for affirmative resolution. That is one possibility. Even more important is the preceding stage, which is processes around the signature of the new agreements, particularly where they might have been changed significantly from the existing EU ones. Again, there are things that Parliament could do about transparency, possibly having an approval motion, or recreating some kind of scrutiny reserve, possibly through a Committee. There are all sorts of institutional options, but I think the House might want to look at a set of processes around signature that the House might want to look at.
The Chair
We have a few seconds—I take the opportunity to thank our panel. You have been extremely clear and interesting and will greatly add to Members’ understanding of the Bill. Thank you very much for your evidence. Perhaps if you would like to shuffle off in one direction, the next lot will shuffle in.
Examination of Witnesses
Professor Alan Winters, Michael Clancy and George Peretz gave evidence.
The Chair
Q
Michael Clancy: Thank you, Mr Chairman. My name is Michael Clancy. I am the director of law reform at the Law Society of Scotland.
George Peretz: I am George Peretz. I am a QC practising for Monckton Chambers in London on EU and international and all sorts of other bits of law.
Professor Winters: I am Alan Winters, professor of economics at the University of Sussex and director of the UK Trade Policy Observatory.
Barry Gardiner
Q
Professor Winters: In general, they have been a pretty poor piece of policy. As far as the UK is concerned, I would suggest that we might want to consider rolling them over for two or three years, but I would hope that that two or three-year period was then used to try to devise a more satisfactory regime. They encourage distortions in the developing countries. The developing countries are put through the agony of trying to negotiate together, which is very costly and time-absorbing for them, and rather ineffective. What we need to do is to try to find a much simpler way of allowing developing countries access to the British market than the current EPAs.
Barry Gardiner
Q
Professor Winters: By and large, countries find it very difficult to resist the offer of tariff-free access to a market. If they were put in a position where they were told it was the equivalent of the EPA or nothing indefinitely, my guess is that most would shrug and accept the EPA, but given one quarter of a chance, they would want to talk to us about a more reasonable and satisfactory—and in the end more efficient—process of market access.
Mr Prisk
Q
Professor Winters: The Trade Remedies Authority is something we clearly need. Without seeing a lot more details about exactly how it operated, I would not want to say whether it is robust, but I would like to emphasise three things about it. One is, I understand, Government policy; I think the others are not.
The so-called lesser duty rule is important for safeguards and anti-dumping. That is essentially the rule that says the duty you put on goods that are allegedly dumped is the lower of the amount of dumping—the dumping or injury margin—required to make good the British industry. That is a good rule to have.
The two things I am less clear are there at the moment are, first, a very strong degree of transparency. Its operations need to be, with the exception of commercial confidence, pretty much out in the open. The second is that experience through decades in nearly every country suggests that these trade remedies are captured by producer interests. They are complex, they are triggered by the producers complaining that they cannot manage or that they are being cheated, and the whole process essentially favours them.
The really important thing is that, exactly like the House of Commons, you need an opposition. I would urge that we try to supplement the Trade Remedies Authority with an officially sanctioned and resourced group to represent the consumer interest, to do the analysis and actually have the right of audience at the TRA to make the case.
George Peretz: If I may add to that, of course the trade remedies provisions are spread across this Bill and the customs Bill. If one looks at the customs Bill to find out where the appeal mechanism is—as a barrister, my first thoughts go to what the appropriate appeal mechanism is—all you find is a power of the Secretary of State to make appropriate regulations.
It is my personal view that that is somewhat unsatisfactory. There are a number of important questions that arise about appeals, one of which is very important, and that is what the appropriate standard of review is. Is it a merits review, which enables a specialist appeal court to correct the decision maker on questions of fact as well as questions of law, or is it simply a judicial review mechanism, where all the court is doing is saying, “Is this a reasonable decision, whether it is right or wrong?”? It is a very important decision to make and it seems to me that that is one that ought to be made by Parliament in primary legislation and not by the Secretary of State or the Executive in a statutory instrument. That is a decision for you.
The appeals mechanism is important. I said slightly flippantly that it was because I am a barrister, but it is the experience of all regulatory processes that what actually happens at the regulatory stage is often very conditioned and influenced by the form of an appeal. Any sensible regulator will, during the process, have their eye on what the appeal route is, who can appeal and what the level of scrutiny of their decision is going to be.
If you have a very robust form of appeal mechanism, which is open to both parties— the complaining industry but also a range of interest groups whose interests might be affected by the imposition of duty—and if they are allowed routes to appeal that will encourage the regulator, in this case the TRA, to take robust decisions. That is robust in the sense of fully reasoned decisions that will sustain detailed scrutiny, to ensure that all parties are properly heard so that they are fully aware of where the objections to what they are proposing to do are and can properly evaluate them. You get better decision making out of all of that.
I sent the secretary to this Committee a copy of a briefing paper I did for the UK Trade Forum website, which is there if any of you want to read it. It expands a bit on that point but I would emphasise the appeal mechanism. There are other issues about the trade remedies. I have probably spoken for long enough but if people have other questions they could ask about them.
Michael Clancy: I read your blog; it is very good. The other thing that I would say is that the tenure should be made more independent by having term limits. That is quite important in reinforcing independence and impartiality. We have had experience in Scotland of the whole system of judicial appointments being reworked for temporary sheriffs because they did not have a stated term and were subject to the whim of the appointing Ministers. That would be my addition to this discussion.
George Peretz: The provisions for the appointment of members of the Trade Remedies Authority are very similar to the provisions for appointments to the Competition and Markets Authority, which as anyone who has watched the press this morning knows takes very important decisions about the economy. There is a difference with the Trade Remedies Authority, and the argument why you might need a more constraining set of rules governing whom the Secretary of State might appoint. At the moment the Secretary of State appoints the majority and the rest are staff members. There may be an argument for a more constraining set of rules, particularly if the Trade Remedies Authority is—as the customs Bill contemplates—itself given the remit of applying a wide range of economic interest tests as the trade remedies body. That means that even if the TRA accepts that there is a legal basis for opposing a trade remedy, then as a matter of economic interest to the UK it is able to say, “We are not going to do so here because, for example, the consumer interest outweighs the interest of the particular producers affected.”
That seems to me to be a political position: it is balancing the interests of jobs in a particular area of the country against the interests of consumers across the country, to put it crudely. If the TRA is, as the customs Bill contemplates, itself going to be taking that kind of decision, then there is a case for saying that its composition ought to be balanced by statute and that it ought to reflect a variety of different perspectives. In that sense its role is much more political than that of the Competition and Markets Authority.
The Chair
We have half an hour left. Incidentally, Mr Peretz’s evidence is available in written format in the Committee Room.
Anna McMorrin
Q
Professor Winters: Yes, I’m afraid that I do see complications of a technical nature and, in a sense, of a political nature as well. The technical complications concern rules of origin to begin with. Every trade agreement essentially has rules of origin that determine whether a good qualifies for zero-tariff entry. A typical rule of origin says that 50% of the value must be contributed from the country claiming the duty-free access. If we take a good that is exported to Korea that is made in the UK but with a 40% input from the EU and 30% input from the USA, it gets into Korea tariff-free because the UK plus the EU27 contribution is at 70% larger than the rule of origin requires. If we are outside and by ourselves we have only 30% of the content—the value of that good—and we would not get into Korea tariff-free if the Koreans applied the same rule.
Equally, there are cases coming the other way of goods that are exported to the EU where, for instance, Korea could export a good directly into the EU27 because it has a free trade agreement for a good produced in Korea. But if they send it into the UK and we insert it into something that we then seek to send to the EU, then it might not get in because Korean content will not count towards the UK content to meet the EU’s rule of origin.
What do you do about all this? You essentially have to do something called diagonal cumulation. Korea, the UK and the EU essentially have to agree that each of them retreat from its rule of origin the content of the other two as the defining origin. In that specific case, it would restore the status quo. That needs to be negotiated with the Koreans and the EU.
Other places where we have technical problems are in the splitting up of tariff-rate quotas. For instance, there are tariff-rate quotas in the agreement with Canada: that is an agreement to import a particular volume of goods tariff-free. This has to be settled on an EU28 basis, and now it has to be divided between the UK and the EU27. On occasions, there are clauses of these agreements that refer back to a body of law in the parties. In the financial services agreement with Korea, there is a reference to accepting goods into the Korean market that were introduced into the European market without asking any further questions as long as they are consistent with existing law and do not entail a modification of existing law. That existing law—if that clause makes any sense at all—was law when the agreement was signed; it is EU law. If we tried to introduce even an equivalent law, we would have to argue the case that it needs to be treated as such for us to get access to Korea for financial services. Those are the technical reasons why there are serious problems.
Politically, we need a deal. If the transition is handled in any way that is fairly straightforward—although George has a proposal that is complicated but perhaps gets around it—it is possible that the transition will allow Korean goods into the UK tariff-free, but not UK goods into Korea tariff-free. Therefore, we really need a deal, and if you really need a deal, that is not the time to be negotiating.
Anna McMorrin
Q
Michael Clancy: Under the Scotland Act 1998, paragraph 7 of schedule 5, international agreements, including trade agreements, are not within the competence of the Scottish Parliament. In that sense there is no formal role in agreeing international agreements. That being said, one of the things we have sought to promote throughout this process, with the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, this Bill and associated measures, is that there should be some form of whole-of-governance conversation about getting things right. As we know, this Bill will affect the competence of Scottish Ministers and allow orders to be made that may amend, for instance, Acts of the Scottish Parliament, and measures from Wales and Northern Ireland too.
There is clearly an issue about how the Sewel convention or legislative consent convention is interpreted in respect of that. Under devolution guidance note 10, any proposals in UK Parliament legislation that seek to alter the legislative competence of the Parliament or of Scottish Ministers require the consent of the Parliament. That also applies to the National Assembly for Wales and the Northern Ireland Assembly. Therefore, there is an issue. Today in the Scottish Parliament there is a debate about legislative consent in respect of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, and the Finance and Constitution Committee of the Scottish Parliament is currently consulting on the legislative consent memorandum on this Bill, where the Scottish Government have indicated that they would not recommend that the Parliament pass it.
It is a matter of political debate and discussion, and something that I know both the Scottish and UK Governments have in their sights in the concordat they are thinking about. That includes a framework for dealing with trade matters. There is a role, but I do not know it yet, because neither the Scottish nor the UK Government have told us what it is.
Iain Stewart (Milton Keynes South) (Con)
Q
Professor Winters: Information is very important, not least in my trade, for analysing what goes on. The case for collecting reasonable amounts of information, as long as it is cheap to do so, is very strong indeed, subject to the standard confidentiality requirements. I confess, on reading the Bill it did not strike me that there were obvious things that were missing, but I would not want to assert that I read it sufficiently carefully to say that nothing is missing. It is important that the Government have the right to collect information, and that information should be made as widely available as possible. The Government clearly need to make policy, but there needs to be public debate, too; it is not just the Government who need to discuss policy issues. I did not interpret this as being part of the Bill, but in general, information other than private or commercially confidential information really should be made available to a wide community of people to enable them to analyse policy.
Iain Stewart
Q
Professor Winters: I am not sure that I can comment on the practicalities. They certainly want a large amount of information. My general rule would be that that needs to be information that firms collect anyway in the normal course of their business, and that it should be a simple matter to transfer it to HMRC.
Faisal Rashid
Q
Professor Winters: Yes. I gave the example of rules of origin and tariff-rate quotas. Those very clearly have to be negotiated with the EU, because the EU is intimately involved in them, and they have to be negotiated with the partner. We cannot just arrive in Korea and say, “Here it is. We don’t want to talk about it.” They very clearly have trilateral dimensions, which I guess need to be sequenced and taken seriously.
Remember that there is a further wrinkle: these are going to be new trade agreements and we are going to have to notify them to the WTO. Although the WTO procedure for reviewing regional trading arrangements does not require us to ask permission, the WTO secretariat will make a good deal of information available to members, and other members may wish to clarify things to discuss and even, ultimately, to dispute. It is actually somewhat broader than trilateral, but you cannot avoid a tripartite discussion on quite a lot of aspects.
Faisal Rashid
Q
Professor Winters: I would not hold myself up as an authority on exactly what was promised, but it does not deliver a satisfactory framework for negotiating new trade agreements. There are many different models, but experience from around the world suggests that one needs a good deal of consultation, input and legislative oversight of trade agreements. You cannot have a position where Parliament can unpick a trade agreement that has been concluded. If Parliament claimed that right, no one would negotiate with us. That means that Parliament and the devolved Administrations need to have an important role in setting mandates, and there need to be consultation and information during the process. Civil society would certainly claim that it, too, ought to be consulted, and I would advocate that, to the extent that one can generate one, there should be a discussion publicly.
Trade policy comes along in treaties. It is intrusive. It affects people’s livelihoods. It is a very good thing that we are talking about trade policy now in a way that we have not for decades—since before the EU existed, in fact.
George Peretz: I would add as a footnote that one of the best short things I have seen written about this is a piece by Stephen Harper, the former Prime Minister of Canada. He is not generally known as a politician who always wanted to do everything by consensus, but it is simply an explanation of how the Canadian side prepared itself for the CETA negotiations. It very much emphasises the need to consult with everybody in Canada, to bring the provinces together as well as all industry, trade unions, all the political parties and other actors to try to get as much consensus as possible on what Canada was trying to achieve at the outset of the process, before it started. It is a very good piece from somebody whose perspective on it is interesting.
Barry Gardiner
Q
Michael Clancy: That is a very difficult question to answer without getting into uncomfortably hot waters.
Barry Gardiner
You could write to the Committee.
Michael Clancy: Let’s give it a shot, shall we? The important thing is that the UK Government are the negotiator of these international agreements. Parliament is the body that then ratifies agreements made by the sovereign power, exercised by Government. Therefore, in that sense, it is quite difficult to see how the devolved Parliaments would be able to exercise any form of consent reserve in respect of the making of an agreement and the ratification of an agreement.
The issue is that the parliamentary oversight of the agreement is deficient in this place and it is even more restrained when it comes to the devolved legislatures. That is the issue I would like people to focus on. Clearly something needs to be done to enhance oversight here. Earlier, we heard Brigid Fowler explain that the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 provisions are inadequate. Why are they inadequate? Because they have only got this perpetualisation of the 21-day period, and this Bill does not allow for any form of implementation order other than a negative procedure order. Therefore, there is an issue about that.
The read across to the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill and the sifting procedure that the Procedure Committee advanced and had accepted into the Bill—Mr Walker’s amendment last week or the week before—raises issues about what the relationship is between orders under this Bill and those under the EUWB. Why does this Bill amend the EUWB? Why not have amendments brought forward for that Bill, reflecting this Bill? I am sure that parliamentary draftspeople have an amour propre in respect of such things, but an ordinary individual—a rather rustic lawyer like myself—is not going to catch it immediately. These are the issues we ought to look at: parliamentary oversight, extending across these islands, and how we write something that attains the intention of Parliament.
If I might just cross over, I do not think the Bill is meant to implement new agreements; it is meant to transpose existing agreements. That is quite an important facet to dwell on. Although, if one scoots to the explanatory notes, one sees in paragraph 44 that there may be
“technical changes to the agreement”
and in paragraph 53 it says:
“It may also be necessary to substantively amend the text”
of the provisions. The question, therefore, is what is an existing agreement and how far does it have to be changed for it to change from being an existing agreement to a different agreement. That is a question that I do not care to essay on at the moment.
Mrs Kemi Badenoch (Saffron Walden) (Con)
Q
George Peretz: If I might go first, one can see the difficulty. It is a commonplace of the legislation on Brexit generally that there is a lot to do in a very short space of time. There is certainly a case for doing things by statutory instrument that ordinarily one might be very reluctant to see done in that way, simply because of the process of time and the time it takes to get primary legislation through.
We were discussing a few minutes ago general policy in relation to how Parliament should scrutinise future trade negotiations. It is entirely a fair point to say that the Bill is not about that. There may well be a case for the Government to produce a Bill about that, but that is a different question. This Bill is not about that, but about the roll-over.
We have touched on the difficulties. You have a number of difficulties in scope: what an international trade agreement is goes beyond trade and customs agreements. As I think Holger Hestermeyer pointed out, technically the definition includes the EEA agreement and the Turkey customs union agreement. If you think the Government have rather wide powers to implement the EEA agreement—one assumes the Government have no intention of using it that way—it is quite a wide power to give them.
There are questions about scope and about whether negative procedure is right, and there is the question Michael touched on about what is an existing agreement. The cynic in me as a lawyer tends to say from general experience that if you go to the other party to a contract and say, “I need to change this contract,” the normal response of a well-informed and well-advised counterparty is, “Well, yes, but let’s take the opportunity to get some other things in it.” So things are often not that simple. You may have quite wide and important changes being made, but I do not think there is a right legal answer. It is a question for you to think about as to whether this is an appropriate power to give the Government, given the need to do things quickly.
Mrs Badenoch
Q
Michael Clancy: We do not have enough time—there are 430-odd days between now and 29 March 2019. Trying to get through primary legislation, if we were to scrap this and go for another Bill, would be problematic to say the least. The intergovernmental conference in October is really the defining factor that we have to aim at. Then there are all these orders, which are going to be put through. If one waits until this Bill gets the Royal Assent before the orders start to be consulted on, there are difficulties about that. I am afraid that I would be for looking to keep this Bill and to move it along and see what improvements can be made to it to make it a much better and more robust piece of legislation.
Professor Winters: May I comment? In principle—I am not a lawyer and cannot really comment on how one can do this—essentially there is the very short-term, immediate problem of all these things that have to be done, but we do not want that to define the long-term by default. I think we need to have a very clear understanding from the body politic in general. The trade policy is an important instrument for a sovereign country to operate. It can be done well or it can be done badly, and we do need to continue to review it and go back to some of these things, so that even if we have to patch something up in the near future, which as near as dammit is the status quo, that should not say it is therefore closed forever. We need to go with our partners and say, “We need to reopen this.”
Bill Esterson
Q
George Peretz: Not all WTO law is clear, but what is pretty clear is that we could not simply automatically carry over existing trade remedies imposed by the EU and say, “These remedies will apply to the UK now that it is a separate WTO jurisdiction”—if I can use that term loosely. We cannot do that for one very simply reason: it is a condition of all trade remedies that there is a domestic injury. A domestic injury is defined, and the UK is obviously not the same as the EU. It is potentially an issue that applies the other way around, incidentally, but that it a problem for the EU rather than for us.
As far as I understand it, the Department for International Trade is feeling its way to dealing with this problem. As a first step, it is asking industries that benefit from an existing trade remedy to set out why they think it should continue and to explain what the domestic injury is. There is probably also a need for the UK to discuss with the European Commission what the position is. After all, in its investigation of all these remedies, the Commission will have built up a case file that will include quite a lot of information about what the injury is, some of which will be pinned down geographically. It will be able to say that that is evidence of an injury in the UK. Perhaps that could be used to justify carrying on the remedy after we have left the EU, but it would have to be the judgment of the new Trade Remedies Authority whether that evidence was good enough to withstand domestic scrutiny and appeals and, ultimately, a possible WTO challenge. There is a very difficult set of issues there, which will be a challenge for DIT and the TRA.
Craig Whittaker (Calder Valley) (Con)
Q
George Peretz: I do not claim to be a great expert in parliamentary procedure, and I am not sure that I can add very much to what Brigid Fowler said about that—she is an expert on parliamentary procedure.
Plainly, there is an opportunity to challenge a statutory instrument that uses the negative resolution procedure, but clearly it is less likely to be challenged—just look at the statistics—than a piece of primary legislation, because one fundamental point about any statutory instrument is that the vote is simply an all-or-nothing vote on the instrument. There is no ability to have the primary legislation to say, “We agree with most of this clause but we don’t like clause 5, therefore we would like to amend that.” It is take-it-or-leave-it. The problem with a lot of this is that you will be told that the clock is running and you need to decide very quickly what to do.
Professor Winters: There is very little time, so be realistic about what the cost of a challenge would be and the pressures that that would generate.
Michael Clancy: It is the balance between speed and scrutiny—that is the whole point. To get that right is quite difficult with a negative or indeed an affirmative resolution procedure. Although theoretically each of these could be debated, I think it would be very difficult to get each of these debated. There simply is not enough time to do that—we are told that there are between 800 and 1,000 orders in relation to the EUWB. I do not know how many of them might be here—63 existing trade treaties, maybe more, and other things as well. That is the difficulty.
What are the defects? The defects are that we have an alternative procedure of super-affirmative if we need extra time to look at something—that is where the sift comes in. If the sift identifies a particular order as being important, it might then get better scrutiny, and better scrutiny might mean the affirmative resolution procedure on a super-affirmative basis. We do not know that the sift applies to these orders because the sift is not mentioned in this Bill. Will it be? Are you going to propose amendments? Is the Government going to take that forward to this Bill? That is another story for another day perhaps.
Then there is the issue—I think it is in one of the Hansard Society papers—of the difficulty, in fact the incapability, of amending these orders. They have to be taken back by the Minister and re-presented. That induces time and delay, and we are running out time and inducing delay.
Craig Whittaker
Q
Michael Clancy: That is true, but the ultimate test is overturning the order. We saw that the last time an order was overturned in the other place—it resulted in the Strathclyde review because it was such an outrage, so we have to be careful about that, because it may have more political impact than we would imagine.
The Chair
We are having trouble with time and scrutiny as well. We have only two minutes left for Matt Western.
Matt Western (Warwick and Leamington) (Lab)
Q
Professor Winters: Because the roll-over is not straightforward. Maybe you can say that this is an implicit recognition that it is not entirely straightforward and that there will have to be changes. Some might be purely technical, but some are clearly going to be substantive.
It is precisely because it is difficult, contentious and requires negotiations, that the Henry VIII powers are so important, because it is the Minister, their designated authority or delegate who will make those decisions.
Matt Western
Q
Professor Winters: The division of tariff-rate quota on cheese into Canada, or which bit of law financial services access to Korea will refer to. There are, I have no doubt, plenty of others.
Matt Western
Q
George Peretz: I am not sure I have much to add to that very complete answer to the question.
Does it require Henry VIII powers? It probably does require them because you have to amend primary legislation. The questions about the degree of scrutiny and so on, are, I think, questions for you, but the need for a pretty fast procedure to amend our law to deal with what will quite often be technical points that involve changes seems fairly clear.
Alan Brown
Q
Michael Clancy: When I get elected?
The Chair
With that, can I thank all three of our witnesses for their extremely interesting evidence? You have covered a lot of ground in a short space of time. We are most grateful to you all for that.
Examination of Witnesses
Tom Reynolds, Gareth Stace and Cliff Stevenson gave evidence.
The Chair
I have a couple of quick admin points. I understand that there may be a Division in the House at 3.45 pm. If there is, I will suspend the Committee for 15 minutes until 4 o’clock and we will add an extra 15 minutes at the end to make up for it.
Mr Stace, I gather that you have to give evidence to the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Bill Committee and you may therefore have to leave this session early. Is that right?
Gareth Stace: That is correct. If that were possible, I would be grateful.
The Chair
It is possible. Just tip us a wink when you have to go and we will say goodbye.
Gareth Stace: I think one of your Clerks is going to escort me.
The Chair
Perfect. I call Barry Gardiner. [Interruption.] Well, failing that, I call Mark Prisk.
The Chair
No, the Opposition failed, so we will give the Government a try. I call Mark Prisk.
Mr Prisk
Q
Gareth Stace: Let me start with what would need to change in the Bill. We would like to see more detail in the Bill. The Bill sets out powers to create an independent arm’s length authority—the Trade Remedies Authority—to advise the Secretary of State, but there is no detail. There is little detail of the powers that it might have or of the scope of its remit. I am sure that will come in secondary legislation or after that, but as you quite rightly said, industries that are or have been subject to dumping and unfair trade practices are quite nervous about what is going to happen in the UK, and the more detail we have, the better. That is why at this stage we are quite nervous about what might or might not come out down the line.
Mr Prisk
Q
Gareth Stace: Yes, an appeals process—there is no detail in the Bill—is not even set out as: “The appeals process will be this, this and this.” We do not even know what the basis of appeals might be, because we do not know how the TRA will define subsidy, injury and dumping. We do not even have something to base that on.
Tom Reynolds: It is clear that we need a TRA, and it is certainly welcome that the Bill establishes one. I want to rebut a point made by an earlier witness, who said that trade remedies are invariably captured by producer interests. That certainly has not been the experience in the European system. I am sure that Gareth agrees that that was apparent in the steel crisis—the trade remedy system was slow to react to the producer interest.
We have to read the Bill alongside the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Bill. My feeling is that the rules for the TRA, which are set out in that other Bill, tip the balance the other way, against the producer interest. There are areas where that Bill and the way that it works with this Bill can be improved, which I would be happy to explore with the Committee.
Mr Prisk
Q
Tom Reynolds: There are really four points. The public interest test and the economic interest test is of concern because, as Gareth has already pointed out, the lack of detail means it could operate in any number of ways. Our fear is that it might include an over-simplistic cost-benefit analysis that appears very seductive in its indication that the benefit for producers may be outweighed by the damage to the consumers, when it does not show the full story and perhaps the long-term impact to the consumer that removal of a competitive environment for domestic producers creates if the trade remedies are insufficient to keep production here in the UK.
A big concern for ceramics—the country of concern that is dumping into the European Union at the moment is China—is how you calculate the dumping margin in instances where the domestic price cannot be used because it is subject to such state distortion. That detail is crucial to the effectiveness of the trade remedies system.
There are other issues, such as the lesser duty rule—it was touched on earlier. For the proper operation of the lesser duty rule, we would need to see the detail and how you calculate injury. That is crucial. Pushing all of this into the long grass just adds a lot of uncertainty and concern for producers.
Cliff Stevenson: Because the Bill is simply setting up a framework for the TRA and not really having anything more substantive than that, there are only small points that you might look at, but there are some important points. For example, the composition of the members of the TRA is critical because trade remedies is a highly political area of policy where there are very different views. Some see trade remedies as purely protectionist and would abolish them completely, and some see trade remedies as an essential competition policy-type tool to correct multilateral distortions.
I am in the second group. I believe that, in the absence of multilateral competition rules, trade remedies are the only thing we have that allows state distortions and other unfair practices to be addressed. Within the EU, we do not need anti-dumping or anti-subsidies law because we have really good competition and state aid law.
What we want from this legislation—you have to see the two Bills together—is a coherent, robust system that could redress those problems. In terms of this Bill, the composition of the members is very important to look at because, if all the members thought trade remedies were protectionist, we would never get any trade remedies through—or all members might believe that trade remedies were essential. You would want to ensure that there is some balance in there.
There are some other smaller issues that could be significant. For example, regarding the provision that the TRA should report to Parliament annually, I think there could be a little bit more detail on what it might report on, so that, if the TRA was being biased one way or the other, by being obliged to provide certain statistics, such as number of cases opened, measures adopted and so on, it could be assessed.
Barry Gardiner
Q
Cliff Stevenson: Yes, what would definitely be of importance is to have a substantial report submitted to Parliament on an annual basis. In the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Bill, there is a provision on reporting. There is already a proposal for there to be an annual report. The EU anti-dumping regulation is quite specific about what the European Commission must report to the European Parliament in terms of the statistics it must provide. A little more detail ensuring that certain things were provided in this report would be useful.
Tom Reynolds: The question about Parliament’s ongoing role with the Trade Remedies Authority is an interesting one, but so is Parliament’s role in setting up the rules for the system. The point made by Jude Kirton-Darling earlier on about the level of involvement of MEPs in scrutinising and offering amendments on, for instance, the new anti-dumping methodology and the TDI modernisation, which was mentioned, has been integral in improving that legislation from the Commission’s original proposals. I would be more comfortable if there was a more rigorous approach for parliamentarians to get involved in the setting of the rules for the system as well.
Bill Esterson
Q
Gareth Stace: Do you mean the board?
Bill Esterson
Yes.
Gareth Stace: The board needs to represent interests. From my point of view, I would like to see someone from industry and someone from the trade unions on that board to provide that balance, clarity and expertise as well. That could be set out in primary legislation. It is not there now.
Tom Reynolds: One of the most successful acts of Parliament in setting up a non-departmental public body over the years has been the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, which stipulates that the Secretary of State, in making appointments to the commission—now the HSE board—must consult with organisations for three of the members. There could be representatives of the employers, and three of the representatives could be from the trade unions. That sort of model might lend itself well to the establishment of the Trade Remedies Authority and the appointments made to the non-exec board.
Gareth Stace: However, we would not want anything that you would add to it that would then create more work and delay measures in place or delay the investigations that would take place by the authority.
Bill Esterson
Q
Gareth Stace: There is a whole range of “if we don’t get this right”. If we get this very wrong, we become the dumping ground—not just in Europe, but for the rest of the world. Think of the steel sector, which thrives on free, liberalised trade. That is what we are. Over a third of all steel produced travels across borders globally.
Also, something crucial, in particular for the steel sector, is that in 1994 we agreed as a sector with Governments to abolish all customs tariffs for steel for developed countries. There are no tariffs. So when you think about us coming out of the EU, whatever agreement or not is put in place, we as steel will not be subject to customs tariffs. That is not an issue for us—non-tariff barriers are an issue for us, but not tariff barriers. That enabled us to be even more liberalised in terms of trade. What supports that? Trade remedies support that: they are the safety valve that enables free trade to take place. Sometimes the debate turns the other way round, as if trade remedies were there to provide protectionism. We would say that if there were not a strong trade remedies regime in the UK or anywhere else in the world then you would see a rise in protectionism, with weak trade remedies.
There is a whole range of things that could go wrong. When the investigations take place in the end, will they find that there is no injury or dumping for whatever reason, even if there is? If they do find that there has been injury or dumping, what are the tariff levels that are set? Are they high enough to stop the illegal trade in the UK—the dumped steel that is against WTO rules? If the endgame is not that those tariffs are high enough, then we have a problem.
Bill Esterson
Q
Tom Reynolds: We have a very similar experience. We are a sector that thrives on international trade: we export over half a billion pounds’ worth of products each year. We are not protectionist. However, as the Government have rightly pointed out, free trade does not mean trade without rules, and unfortunately some of our trading partners do not play by those rules. Examples from our sector include cases involving tiles and tableware. In the case of tiles, imports rose from a fairly stable level of around £4 million worth of tiles a year from China up to 2004, and rocketed in less than a decade to over £30 million worth of imports from China. If you were to look at volume, it was an even sharper rise.
The European Union introduced anti-dumping measures in 2011, which were not enormous—they are not the 230% tariffs that the United States has looked at. They were between 13% for co-operating companies in China, up to just short of 70% for non-co-operating companies. The introduction of those measures allowed our UK industry to stabilise and invest. As a result, employment has gone up by 40% in the sector, with even further boosts to the supply chain as well. All that could be at risk if we get things wrong.
It is worth noting that in 2011 the UK Government voted against the tiles measures in Council. That was understandable because the UK’s role within the European Union was as a liberal counterweight across the 28 member states. As we forge an independent trade policy we have a different role, but some of the most experienced civil servants and experts are steeped in that heritage of the UK being the liberal counterweight within the European Union. That is why we come back to this point about a non-exec board being a watchdog, ensuring a balanced system in the UK. It is an integral part of getting things right.
Bill Esterson
Q
Tom Reynolds: It is not something that the BCC or the Manufacturing Trade Remedies Alliance has made a submission on; it is something that we would have to consider, and maybe we can write to the Committee.
Faisal Rashid
Q
Cliff Stevenson: Obviously, the wording is not effective at the moment in terms of ensuring that there is a balanced composition of those members. If you look elsewhere and compare, the closest major trade remedy regime to the UK’s proposed system is Australia’s. It has a separate anti-dumping commission that works in a similar way to how the Trade Remedies Authority would work, but there is a big difference in the sense that it is headed up by one person, an anti-dumping commissioner: there is not a committee or a group of members in the way that is proposed for the UK.
One concern I slightly have with this is that it is an extra level of decision making. There is no detail on how the members might make a decision—whether they would vote if they disagreed—and that could hold up investigations, which are always subject to very severe time limits given the amount of work that has to be done.
In the US and Canada, for example, there are examples of independent bodies such as the United States International Trade Commission, which does the injury determination for the cases. It is a completely independent body that has six commissioners who vote at the end of the investigation. If there is a positive finding of injury and three out of six vote in favour, it will be an affirmative determination. In that case, where there is a quasi-judicial system where it is completely separate and not under any political control, there are these commissioners taking a vote on the basis of the technical information.
Gareth Stace: You have to look at what the TRA and the whole system is trying to achieve. Why is it being set up? It is being set up because we are leaving the EU. Is that an opportunity to have a system that is fleet of foot, quite simple and employs fewer people than the European Commission does?
That is why a year ago we, as UK Steel, said that actually what this arm’s-length, independent body could be doing is just looking at the dumping margin, because that is a really simple, straightforward—almost—calculation. It is what they do in the US, which is seen as a champion of free trade, and we want to create strong links with the US going forward. There was that opportunity to do that, and so the make-up of the TRA and the committee would not be as important as if it was then doing the injury calculation—that is much more of a black box. You stick a load of numbers in, and you hope that something will come out. You twiddle some dials as well, and the tariffs come out of that. So you probably do then need some independent committee to look at it, but how much are they going to influence—[Interruption.]
The Chair
Order. There is a Division in the House, so I suspend the Committee until 10 minutes past 4.
The Chair
Welcome back. We are going to change the order of questioning slightly, because Mr Stace has to go and give evidence to our sister Bill Committee.
Barry Gardiner
Q
Gareth Stace: I think it would. You are not going to say to the USA, “Hey look, can we do a really great free trade agreement with you? Look, our trade remedies is really weak and yours is really strong so can you weaken yours and then we will do a great deal?” They will not do that. They will keep their regime and hope that ours is weak, and they will then see more trade coming from them to us.
It is the same when we think about the zero tariff for steel with developed countries. When India exports steel to the UK, it is at zero tariff; when we supply steel to India a tariff is applied. So when we say to India, “Can we do a free trade agreement with you? Hey, you know, we could do zero tariff”, India will say, “We already have zero tariff, so why would we want to do anything else?” What would add something would be having a strong trade remedies regime in place.
If we had a weak regime, what would that mean? We talked about that before. It would mean a loss of jobs, and in the steel sector I do not want to talk about loss of jobs, because we saw a lot of that in 2015-16. But we would also see a rapid rise in imports. In rebar—reinforcing bar that goes into construction—in one year China had zero per cent. of the UK market. It did not import anything, and within four years, because there were no duties in place, China had 43% of the UK market. Then, once duties came in, the percentage went back to zero.
I know I have to go, but I want to make just one point about the lesser duty rule, which I am sure will be raised later. I know it is not in the Bill but it is very important, in that there is talk that if we did not have a lesser duty rule prices would rise and the consumer would be disadvantaged. Let me put that into context. In the hot-rolled flat case we had recently, the injury margin was 17.5% and the dumping margin was 29%. There is a difference there of 11%. If we think of a luxury car priced at €45,000, not applying the lesser duty rule in that case would increase the price of that car by a whopping €16.50. Everyone is saying that if we did not apply it in the UK it would be dreadful—consumer prices would rise and it would be awful—but €16 is all it would increase the price of a €45,000 car by.
The Chair
Mr Stace, thank you very much indeed for doing two Committees in one afternoon. That is very noble work. Thank you for your evidence to us. I think someone is going to escort you off to the other Committee.
Judith Cummins
Q
Cliff Stevenson: In principle, I think it is not necessarily a bad idea—that if you have an organisation full of trade expertise, you might use it for other purposes as well. I mentioned Canada earlier. The Canadian international trade tribunal, the independent entity that makes determinations on injury, can also be given other tasks and produce expert reports. So I do not think it is a bad idea in principle that the TRA may do other things. The concern would be about resourcing.
Trade remedy investigations are highly resource-intensive. They are incredibly detailed. Gareth mentioned earlier about the dumping calculation being easy. In a sense, what he was saying is that it is straightforward, the steps are very clear—but it is a massive calculation with thousands of data entries on a spreadsheet or in a model. To the extent that there would be a concern, it would be to ensure that there was sufficient capacity ring-fenced for the different functions. Principally, it seems to me that the Trade Remedies Authority’s purpose is the administration of the trade remedy regime. That would be the only issue I would raise.
Matt Western
Q
Tom Reynolds: One example I can give you is from MTRA partner sectors, the chemicals fertiliser sector, around the long-term implications for the consumer if adequate trade remedies are not installed. In Ireland, for instance, the domestic manufacturing industry for fertilisers sadly went by the wayside, because the anti-dumping measures were not introduced in time to provide a defence for their industry. As it became a less attractive market because of less competition, the prices started to rise for all the previously dumped exports, so the lack of competitive environment in Ireland ended up costing farmers more for their fertilisers.
Cliff Stevenson: Obviously, it depends on the product, because when you are talking about products used in another industry, such as in the case of steel, even a fairly substantial anti-dumping duty, if you work it through to the final price to the retailer of the downstream product, is going to have a much smaller effect. Obviously, in the case of a consumer product, where the product goes directly to the consumer, the impact of the duty would be exactly at the level of the duty, so that is certainly true.
It is important always to consider what the purpose of trade remedies is. They are about remedying a distortion, an anti-competitive situation or a subsidy. In that way, any time you increase a duty the users, the importers, or the consumers of that product are going to face the negative impact of the increase in duty. What is really important to remember about trade remedies is that they are not about protecting domestic industry, I do not believe. They are about restoring effective competition. That is a key point. Even if a consumer product does increase in price, in the long term the consumer is better off if effective competition is maintained.
The Chair
Are there any questions? No. May I thank you both very much for your very useful evidence? I am sorry that a Division disturbed the middle of your session—these things happen in Parliament. It was very kind of you to come, so thank you very much. If the next witnesses are here, perhaps they would like to take the stand.
Examination of Witnesses
Anastassia Beliakova, Stephen Jones, William Bain and Edward Bowles gave evidence.
The Chair
Q
Edward Bowles: I am Edward Bowles, managing director at Standard Chartered Bank.
Stephen Jones: I am Stephen Jones, chief executive of UK Finance.
Anastassia Beliakova: I am Anastassia Beliakova, head of trade policy at the British Chambers of Commerce.
William Bain: I am William Bain, international trade and Europe policy adviser for the British Retail Consortium.
Barry Gardiner
Perhaps I can kick off with—sorry, is it Mr Jones who is from Standard Chartered?
Barry Gardiner
Mr Bowles is from Standard Chartered and Mr Jones from UK Finance. Is that right?
Edward Bowles: Correct.
Barry Gardiner
Q
The BRC has identified, among others, the agreements involving Norway and Turkey as the most significant of our EU FTAs. Of course, the Government have already indicated that there will be an end to free movement, which rules out simply replicating the Norway model, and that we will leave the customs union, which rules out simply rolling over the Turkish model, so what elements of the agreements—not just those two, but the others—do you consider it most important to replicate on substantially the same terms?
William Bain: The key provisions are those on tariffs, because if the UK leaves the European Union, it is not part of the EU’s common external tariff system, and we could then face higher tariffs on imported goods. A great deal depends on the kind of transitional arrangements that are adopted, but the kind of additional MFN tariffs that would apply would be 12% in relation to clothing from Turkey, 13% in relation to soft fruit from Chile and Peru and 27% on imported processed canned tuna from the Seychelles. Those would, I think, lead retailers and consumers to face considerable price pressures, so the main element that we would want to see is replication of the zero-tariff or low-tariff provisions on imports.
The other key areas that are very difficult in terms of replication and, we believe, may require a degree of assistance from the European Union are in relation to rules of origin. For example, with the Canada trade agreement, there is a complex rule of origin. The same is true in relation to South Korea. I think that diagonal cumulation is involved in the rules of origin in respect of the CARIFORUM trade agreements.
These are areas where it seems that time is running out, the clock is ticking, and a solution needs to be found if British business and British consumers are not to face a large cliff edge in March 2019.
Anastassia Beliakova: Absolutely. Rules of origin are a headache for businesses, and if we consider that there is the likelihood, in the roll-over of existing trade agreements, that they may have to comply with tougher rules of origin or that some of the benefits that they currently get by counting both EU and UK origin as single origin might be lost, that is very concerning. For about one in seven of our members, the existence of a free trade agreement is the determining factor in whether they export to or import from a country. I urge the Government to give stronger assurances for those agreements, as Mr Bain has mentioned, that already provide for, or have clauses mentioning, diagonal cumulation, but also to look at all the EU trade agreements and particularly those that have the greatest economic significance for the UK, and open up those discussions to provide for that as they are rolled over into UK-third country FTAs.
Iain Stewart
Q
Anastassia Beliakova: Not at first glance. However, the wider picture around trade data is that trade data is imperfect. It is particularly lacking when it comes to services, of course, and when it comes to intra-EU trading data. That is where we currently have significant gaps. If, in the future, there can be a more robust collection of data and stronger assessments of UK-third country trade, that would be helpful.
Stephen Jones: I have nothing to add.
Edward Bowles: Obviously, the collection of data is largely in respect of goods that cross borders. It is very difficult to do that for services, so I would have thought that a way of more robustly measuring cross-border flows of services would be quite an important thing to look at, so that you can get a better grip on revenue as much as anything else. Largely, it is more on the goods side than it is on the services side.
Faisal Rashid
Q
Edward Bowles: The great thing about having economists is that they are independent of those of us who do jobs outside of research. Razia is an expert in her own right and would be the best placed person to speak to those issues.
In fact, they are not really trade agreements; they are economic partnership agreements that the EU has with most African, sub-Saharan and, indeed, subcontinent markets. It is certainly true that they have undergone a high degree of revision under the current Commission’s administration. I am not aware, frankly, of any overwhelming dissatisfaction. I attended a recent meeting only two months ago between quite a lot of these markets and Cecilia Malmström, so things do seem to be moving in a good direction. The question is what the UK’s approach would be to that and how much it might be minded to depart, if at all, from the approach. The starting point must be simply to mirror the current arrangements, as was said on Second Reading and in the Government’s response to the consultation on the Trade Bill.
Faisal Rashid
Mr Jones, would you like to add anything?
Stephen Jones: No, I have nothing specific to add in relation to Africa in general.
On a more generic point in relation to the Trade Bill, it is obviously focused on existing trade agreements and economic partnership agreements. From a services perspective, we need to look beyond that and reflect on arrangements that exist beyond that, which are critical to the cross-border flow of trade in services, because there are very few provisions and services agreements in trade treaties that relate to services. There are lots of mutual recognitions and memorandums of understanding that relate to infrastructure, to recognition and co-operation between supervisors, to the flow of data and to the recognition of exchanges, but which do not exist within the context of a trade agreement. They nevertheless facilitate cross-border trade in services that already exists between the EU—including the UK—and other jurisdictions. It is very important that we do not lose sight of those specific provisions, but seek to mirror them so far as the financial services industry is concerned, simply because the existing trade treaty provision is so poor in services.
Bill Esterson
Stephen Jones, you are the UK Finance representative. Sorry, it has been a long day. Can I ask about the written evidence you gave to the Procedure Committee, where you indicated the benefits of a triage or sifting process and stated how you might apply those when looking at new trade agreements? For the purposes of the phrase “new trade agreements”, given some of the evidence we have heard today, can we include anything that changes the agreements that are part of this Bill? Can you explain what you think the merit of such an approach would be, how you might apply it, and the importance of such a sifting process?
Stephen Jones: Given the time available in the context of Brexit, from the perspective of the financial services industry, clearly continuity, speed and the correct process and scrutiny to transpose the existing trade arrangements that the EU has with the rest of the world to the UK are incredibly important for continuity. That does not directly benefit the financial services industry. It benefits mostly the customers of the financial services industry, but in that context it is very important.
To the extent that your question relates to prioritising whether one should seek to amend the agreements in order to ensure more robust coverage of services within the context of those agreements, I think that in the first phase that is unrealistic. There is not enough time. What we need is as much certainty as we can get. Business in general needs as much certainty as it can get in terms of the transposition of the existing EU arrangements.
In terms of the ongoing amendment of those treaties to seek to extend them and prioritise what should be done—the sifting process, if you like, for services—we can develop a modus operandi in terms of markets that are important. However, as I say, there are significant factors beyond trade agreements that influence the ability to conduct cross-border business between the UK and the rest of the world. Those are a susceptibility to inward investment; strong regulatory and supervisory co-operation; aspects of data protection and the willingness to mutually recognise the cross-border sharing of data; and infrastructure, with the recognition on a cross-border basis of critical market infrastructure in each jurisdiction, such that member firms in each place are able to access and utilise the infrastructure in the other country. To the extent that that can be captured within a trade agreement, that is great.
To date, that has failed and our focus very much is on an ambition for the UK with the EU to seek to build an ambitious free trade agreement that has not been attempted in services anywhere else in the world. But we believe it should be attempted in the current context, simply because of the importance of the cross-dependencies that already exist and the fact that we are starting with a fully converged rulebook, which is extremely unusual in a trade negotiation context. So we believe that there is the prospect of an ambitious mutual recognition-based trade agreement in services between the UK and the EU and that potentially should be the first focus, to the extent that we are talking about prioritisation of negotiation of trade agreements.
Bill Esterson
Q
Stephen Jones: I think we are talking about beyond transition. From a transition perspective, the only realistic thing that we believe can be achieved is a prolongation of the acquis, which is a full adoption of the existing rule book lock, stock and barrel. The chances of seeking to amend or renegotiate that in the time that is available are wholly unrealistic, and what is far more important is certainty through the transition period. The only way you can deliver that certainty is simply to take forward the existing rule book.
Bill Esterson
Q
Stephen Jones: In terms of the prolongation of the acquis—that is, the adoption of rules on day one—in a sense those rules are already on for the purposes of transition. Those rules have already been adopted by the UK. I recognise the sovereignty of Parliament and the importance of scrutiny, but to the extent that the rules are not being changed we are simply extending arrangements that continue to exist. The Bill’s provisions relating to Ministers’ 10-year power to use secondary legislation to renegotiate those rules strike me as pretty broad-brush, and they potentially should benefit from greater parliamentary scrutiny than is currently contemplated.
Bill Esterson
Q
Stephen Jones: Broadly, I do not think it is realistic to expect changes. In that context, the secondary legislation ministerial power provisions are broadly acceptable, but beyond that, to the extent that arrangements are adapted to the UK as an independent country with its own trade policy, I would suggest that they merit parliamentary scrutiny.
Bill Esterson
Q
William Bain: The nature of the transition impinges on terms in the Bill, and the retail industry is keen to have a standstill transition in all elements—in terms of the current customs rules, the current tariff rules and the current SPS rules—but it also applies to the trade facilitation that we get from the bilateral trade agreements, which fit into part 1 of the Bill. I cannot stress how important it is to the retail sector, which imports products from countries like Chile, Peru, South Africa and Turkey, that we do not have a discontinuity in our trading arrangements at any stage after 29 March 2019. There are some connections and points of commonality with the kind of transitional deal that is done, but in a sense this is a slightly separate question. It really demands clear attention from the Government in order to get the job done by 29 March next year.
Barry Gardiner
Q
We are talking about 100 separate agreements between the EU and Switzerland alone, some of which include free movement of people. There are going to be some major changes, such as those we talked about with Turkey and the customs union, and with Norway, free movement of people and the four freedoms. Do you not think, given that you have already recommended a sift Committee in one form, that a similar sort of mechanism for trying to distinguish between what is and what is not vital, and what should have parliamentary scrutiny, is a sensible way to proceed?
Stephen Jones: Yes, sorry; forgive me for the lack of clarity. My reference was really to the existing provisions between the UK and the EU in relation to financial services. In my assessment, for the purposes of transition and of business services in financial services, the chances of change, and therefore of the need for sift, are zero. There just is not the time. In the context of other areas, where there is an assessment that change is possible, the sift Committee strikes me as a very sensible mechanism to prioritise and assess those changes and the degree of scrutiny that is required.
Mr Prisk
Q
Anastassia Beliakova: It is absolutely critical. Our members are operating on the assumption that during a transition period there will be continuity in our trading arrangements not just with the EU but with all the other markets with which we have a trade agreement of some sort. The working assumption is that they should not be making any changes currently or planning for significant changes in trading conditions in March 2019. Of course we are still waiting for greater clarity from the EU on this over the coming months, but I cannot stress enough that in the immediate future the continuity in our trading relationship with the EU during transition is critical. Our continuity, looking further ahead, with the other markets, is also something that our members want to count on.
Mr Prisk
Q
Stephen Jones: Continuity is very important, particularly through the transition period and on an ongoing basis. We believe that there is an opportunity for a free trade agreement in services between the UK and the EU that prolongs many of the existing arrangements, which are beneficial on a cross-border basis, particularly in markets for wholesale financial services and markets affecting professional counterparties and market-based counterparties, where cross-border provision, passporting and mutual recognition are important to the efficient working of trade not just in financial services but in goods—not just in the UK but in the EU as well.
The economic case for maintaining much of the existing arrangement is significant, but we are, as you know, working with a negotiation envelope as far as the EU is concerned that appears to require change—to require the UK to have less access than previously, in a visible sense. So we need to be seen, I guess, within the context of that envelope, to prioritise what is important for both sides in financial services. In our assessment it is more of the capital, derivative, centralised clearing and—outside my remit but clearly very important—insurance and reinsurance markets, which are professional-to-professional markets operating on a seamless and cross-border basis across Europe, the disruption of which would be quite significant. In those circumstances maintaining as much as we can of the existing establishment regulatory supervisory arrangements around those business activities will be important for the UK economy, but equally for the continental European economy as well.
Mr Prisk
Mr Bowles, is that your take as well?
Edward Bowles: There are two things I want to say. One is that the lead time involved for change for a regulated industry—and it is not just financial services but, my guess is, pharmaceuticals and manufacturing, among others—is so long that, to give you an idea, to create a subsidiary where you do not have one, even in a market where you may have a branch, is a minimum 18-month project plan timeframe from beginning to end, and in some cases longer depending on the breadth of products you are dealing with and the number of regulatory approvals involved. Therefore, a degree of clarity around the future timeframe and the continuity in that timeframe is critical. Otherwise you end up creating a high degree of uncertainty, not just for the regulated entities but for all their clients—thousands of clients who would be forced, with scrambling and redocumentation, to look to a different legal entity and to price and measure risk in a different way from the way they are used to doing it with the current entity.
Continuity is key, but the working assumption, as Stephen said, is that there will be change. The question is when that change will come, and whether it will be in one step or more than one step. Will we have sufficient clarity that when we deliver the end state it will be the final end state? That is why the transitional period is critical to get us to the point where the framework gives us a high degree of visibility over what the end state might be.
Mr Prisk
Q
Stephen Jones: I defer to Mr Bowles on this—given his experience with TTIP and equivalent regimes.
Edward Bowles: Obviously a high degree of dialogue is done regulator to regulator, so we are a supervised entity not merely in the home state where we may have our domicile and headquarters but in all markets where we have operation. In fact, your first point of call would be the nature of the relationship in terms of supervisory co-operation between those two entities, and what it is that you are permitted to do, and where any disputes may arise about what you are doing in those markets. In fact, the TRA is probably much less relevant to a highly regulated and supervised industry like financial services than to some others, in which there are fewer regulator-to-regulator forums that would determine the methods and modes of operation.
Stephen Jones: I would just add that the concept of dumping in financial services is, therefore, not strictly relevant.
Nick Smith (Blaenau Gwent) (Lab)
Q
Edward Bowles: Thank you for the question. Standard Chartered has been UK-headquartered for the last 155 years, but 85% of our revenues are from Asia, Africa and the middle east. In respect of most of those countries, there are no FTAs, either with the UK or, indeed, with almost any other markets. I was quite involved in my 10 years at Standard Chartered with the negotiations between the EU and Korea, the EU and Singapore and the EU and Vietnam and, most latterly, with those on TTIP, and on India in between times—that has been a slightly less successful product in negotiating terms. The fact is that we have FTAs with some of those markets and some of them are incredibly advanced. Korea and Singapore are incredibly advanced markets. You are dealing with very sophisticated regulators, politicians and others. They completely understand what the UK would be seeking to achieve in any renegotiation post the roll-over of the current FTAs.
There is certainly scope, I think, in some of those FTAs for tweaking, shall we say, and data offshoring would be one of the issues that I am sure the UK would want to look at. The negotiations take a long time. Korea was seven years. Singapore is not yet in force but we have just had a European Court of Justice ruling in relation to one aspect of it that will enable it to come into force soon, but it has been eight years overall. We can cut and paste them, but then the question is, “What are the incentives on each side—which will probably be asymmetric in terms of interests—for tweaking, and what will be the appetite and the timeframe over which you could do it?” My guess is that you would want to do it expeditiously, but the degree of consultation and engagement with other interested industries, politicians, civic sectors and so on, would inevitably build in a longer time.
For other markets that are rather less developed perhaps than Singapore and Korea, it would take longer, because if there is no existing FTA you are looking at a degree of transparency around their regulatory framework and around the concessions they inevitably will be asked to make, and the question is: “What is the quid pro quo for them?” India is a classic example. You have visas, and immigration is one of their core demands. It has always been one of the core issues that has bedevilled the EU-India FTA negotiations and that will be no less the case, I am sure, with the UK than it is with India.
Judith Cummins
Q
William Bain: Indeed. There is a good quantity of imported fish, from Norway and Iceland, that UK consumers buy. In particular, there is South Africa in terms of products like wine and some citrus, Chile and Peru in terms of soft fruits, and Morocco in terms of fruit, vegetables and some clothing. And there is principally Turkey in terms of clothing. There are many members of the BRC that source clothing in Turkey, which can be given to consumers for sale in this country on good terms. One of the fundamental issues is that, at the moment, that is under a customs union: is there going to be a functioning customs union between the UK and Turkey on 30 March 2019? I think that speaks to some of the process issues that come up in part 1 of the Bill. We know that there will be an interaction between the CRAG process of bringing a concluded treaty before this House, then interacting with the processes that have to be gone through in part 1 of the Bill.
Unless we have things like letters of intent ready to be signed at 11.1 pm on 29 March 2019, and unless we have the EU involved—what seems on the face of it to be bilateral is, in many cases, a trilateral negotiation—we will have a gap. That gap will cause uncertainty for business. Ultimately, it could cause gaps on the shelves and a lack of choice and availability. It is a serious issue for investment and for consumers.
Barry Gardiner
Q
At the moment, we may not be in control of that process. We know that we would like it to be very simple, but it may not be. Given that, should the scrutiny not be in place for Parliament either to assist procedure or, using some other mechanism, to say, “Yes, this is important, and we need to make sure that we, as Parliament, deal with it in the appropriate democratic way”?
Edward Bowles: I would say be careful what you wish for, and I do not say that completely comedically. It would very much depend upon the scale of the market that you are interacting with, and the significance of it. The experience that I had of TTIP was one where the lack of initial transparency, of engagement with civic sector societies, and of disclosure of the mandate for the first 15 months of the negotiations very much allowed the debate to be run by outside interests that felt disenfranchised. Effectively, that stymied the political will to take the negotiation further forward even before the new President was elected.
It was absolutely clear that there are lessons to be learned from a negotiation of that scale, ambition and impact for the UK’s economy, to make sure that you have the right level of engagement, transparency, scrutiny and so on in an ongoing manner. For a much smaller market, I dare say that, given the time involved, it may not necessarily warrant a full-scale similar application of scrutiny because, frankly, the relative impact for the UK economy, and therefore for consumers, healthcare and so on, would be much less. Judge each of them on their merits.
Anastassia Beliakova: To follow up on what Mr Bowles said, the TTIP example certainly shows us how critical it is to have appropriate stakeholder engagement mechanisms. At the moment, the Bill is meant to deal just with continuity of existing agreements that have already had the relevant scrutiny from the European Parliament and have passed through the European Scrutiny Committee here. However, if there are very substantial changes or if we are talking about completely new agreements, provisions certainly need to be made for appropriate scrutiny in Parliament, and for stakeholder engagement for business, civil society and non-governmental organisations. It might make sense for that to have some form of statutory underpinning so that there is input that is not contingent on the political environment, which may change. As has been said, negotiations take a long time, sometimes even up to a decade, and during those negotiations you still need to be able to test both the public views and the impacts. I would urge for these kinds of mechanisms to be put in place where new agreements are implemented.
Faisal Rashid
Q
Anastassia Beliakova: Consultation is absolutely critical. If there are changes through these agreements that would alter the benefits that businesses currently see, our members would want to be consulted. At the moment, there is a question as to how the UK will set out on having an independent trade policy. We are conducting a study with the London School of Economics on that topic, which I would be happy to share once it is published.
There is a balance of interests between continuation—ensuring that there is no gap between the current benefits and some new measures that will be implemented—and appropriate scrutiny. That has to be considered on a case-by-case basis when it comes to the existing agreements. For any new negotiations, however, there needs to be a more clearly set out process.
William Bain: There are two important points to make. First, if we look at the guidelines adopted by the European Council on 15 December and the drafts that are circulating in Brussels for the draft directive to be adopted next Monday, it is very doubtful that the EU will permit the UK to vary these agreements at all. It will basically be small changes that will require the UK to still be subject to its current obligations under these agreements. That is all that the EU will be prepared to accept.
Another important point is that if the mechanism for the transition is that the UK is under the common commercial policy and the EU common external tariff, the UK will be applying all the EU’s external tariffs vis-à-vis third countries. That means that Canada and South Korea will get the advantage of relatively low-tariff trade into the UK market, but unless we get the EU on board to help us with the transitioning process, we will not get the advantages of access to the Canadian and South Korean markets. That is the absolute imperative of why this task has to be completed—so that we can have certainty and continuity for business.
The Chair
The imminence of another Division tempts me to think that we ought to finish, unless it is a very short question.
Faisal Rashid
Q
Stephen Jones: It is a rhetorical question, I think.
The Chair
A rhetorical question that Hansard will have noted. I thank our four witnesses very much for your evidence. You were very good value for money considering you were not paid to be here. Thank you for taking time out—it was most useful for the Committee.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Craig Whittaker.)
Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Bill (First sitting)
(6 years, 10 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Chair
Before we begin, will everyone ensure that their phones are switched to silent, including me, and remove all signs of illicit tea and coffee? We have three motions to consider, which we can hopefully do formally. We are considering the programme motion, a motion to enable the reporting and publication of evidence, and a motion to allow us to deliberate in private about questions before the oral evidence session. Date Time Witness Tuesday 23 January Until no later than 10.25 am British Chambers of Commerce; Agency Sector Management; Association of Freight Software Suppliers Tuesday 23 January Until no later than 11.25 am Jeremey White, Barrister; Customs Associates Ltd; Fairtrade; Which? Tuesday 23 January Until no later than 2.45 pm Trades Union Congress; Unite; GMB; Public and Commercial Services Union Tuesday 23 January Until no later than 3.15 pm Hansard Society Tuesday 23 January Until no later than 4.15 pm UK Chamber of Shipping; British International Freight Association; British Ports Association Tuesday 23 January Until no later than 5 pm UK Steel; Chemical Industries Association; British Ceramic Confederation
Ordered,
That—
(1) the Committee shall (in addition to its first meeting at 9.25 am on Tuesday 23 January) meet—
(a) at 2.00 pm on Tuesday 23 January;
(b) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 25 January;
(c) at 9.25 am and 2.00 pm on Tuesday 30 January;
(d) at 11.30 am and 2.00 pm on Thursday 1 February;
(2) the Committee shall hear oral evidence in accordance with the following Table:
(3) proceedings on consideration of the Bill in Committee shall be taken in the following order: Clauses 1 to 3; Schedules 1 and 2; Clauses 4 to 10; Schedule 3; Clauses 11 to 13; Schedules 4 and 5; Clauses 14 to 20; Schedule 6; Clauses 21 to 29; Schedule 7; Clauses 30 to 43; Schedule 8; Clauses 44 to 50; Schedule 9; Clauses 51 to 56; new Clauses; new Schedules; remaining proceedings on the Bill;
(4) the proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 5.00 pm on Thursday 1 February.—(Mel Stride.)
Resolved,
That, subject to the discretion of the Chair, any written evidence received by the Committee shall be reported to the House for publication.—(Mel Stride.)
Resolved,
That, at this and any subsequent meeting at which oral evidence is to be heard, the Committee shall sit in private until the witnesses are admitted.—(Mel Stride.)
The Chair
The deadline for amendments to be considered at the first line-by-line sitting of the Committee was the rise of the House yesterday and the next deadline will be the rise of the House on Thursday for the Committee’s sitting a week today. Copies of written evidence that the Committee receives will be made available in the Committee Room.
The Chair
Good morning, witnesses. Thank you for coming along. We are now resuming our public sitting. We are going to hear evidence from the British Chambers of Commerce, the British Retail Consortium, Agency Sector Management and the Association of Freight Software Suppliers. I remind Members that all questions should be limited to matters within the scope of the Bill and that we have to stick to the timings set out in the programme motion, so we will have to conclude this session by 10.25 am. Will the witnesses start by introducing themselves for the record?
William Bain: Good morning, Ms Buck. I am Willie Bain from the British Retail Consortium. It is very nice to be back.
Anastassia Beliakova: Good morning, Ms Buck. I am Anastassia Beliakova. I am head of trade policy at the British Chambers of Commerce.
Peter MacSwiney: Good morning, I am Peter MacSwiney from Agency Sector Management.
Gordon Tutt: Good morning everyone, I am Gordon Tutt from the Association of Freight Software Suppliers.
Peter Dowd (Bootle) (Lab)
Q
Anastassia Beliakova: An issue that our members have raised—this was something that we heard from members even before the whole Brexit question arose—is staffing capacity and in particular the ability to help businesses with day-to-day questions that they may have. That is particularly important when businesses apply for various trade facilitations, such as inward processing relief, or for various forms of certification, such as to be an authorised economic operator. There used to be a helpline at HMRC that is no longer available. Businesses would find it helpful if that were reintroduced. Another concern they have raised is that there is an evidenced shortage of staff dedicated to goods checks. That has been ongoing for a number of years, and questions are being asked about whether there is sufficient resource and focus allocated to goods checks and support. Those questions will become much more acute with all the coming changes.
Peter MacSwiney: There are always questions raised about the Customs Declaration Service, which is the replacement for the customs handling of import and export freight programme. I have said many times that I still believe that between CDS and CHIEF, the computer system will have sufficient capacity to handle the declarations. To pick up on Anastassia’s point, to enable goods to move freely through the border post-Brexit we will have to rely on advance information and bulk entries done with some form of simplified procedure. As far as I can see, Border Force is not engaging very much with trade. What it wants the processes to be and what data elements it wants are still unclear. Customs seems to be getting bogged down with the authorisation process. All of that could do with being streamlined.
Gordon Tutt: Our association members have customers who cover a wide range of different trade sectors. One of the common problems we have is getting approvals processed quickly. That is particularly worrying. One of the recent changes that has been mooted is that before a trader can have their approval granted, they will have to have their software contracts in place. Most traders would not want to go to the cost and trouble of organising and paying a software contract if they did not know they would get the approval. It puts the cart before the horse. Having said that, we are expecting to have discussions with HMRC through the Joint Customs Consultative Committee sub-group on how we can best streamline the whole approval process.
William Bain: One of the key things that our members have said to us is that the last big change they were asked to adjust to, which was the introduction of the Union customs code, took companies three years to get ready for. There is good engagement with HMRC, but there is concern about the capacity of the new CDS system to handle perhaps 255 million customs declarations a year, depending on the kind of deal that is or is not negotiated in the next few months.
Peter Dowd
Q
Peter MacSwiney: The lines of communication are in place. I do not think there is enough time to have any real meaningful discussions. I think the original view from the trade was that a five-year transitional period would be a minimum. Even if we get two years, it is difficult to see what we could achieve in that timeframe.
Gordon Tutt: From a technical perspective, we always work on a general rule that it takes two years from the time that we have the full technical specifications to the time we can actually implement. That gives you an idea of where we are at the moment. We are working closely with HMRC’s technical teams on the CDS development. It is not an easy task. We are looking at a replacement to a service and a system that both the Government and the trade are highly dependent on. Clearly, we want to make sure that we get that absolutely right. We believe that Customs has taken some very sensible approaches, but we probably need to further mitigate the risk by enabling CHIEF to continue for a longer period, thereby allowing the transition from the current service to CDS over a longer period of time.
Chris Davies (Brecon and Radnorshire) (Con)
Q
Gordon Tutt: First, yes, you are right—it is an enabling Bill. It is very good that much of it is already contained in the Union customs code, so it actually provides a really good basis for future UK legislation. It also avoids an awful lot of new requirements on trade, particularly on our side of the systems, because it adopts much of the concepts of the technology and the data that are already maintained in the UCC legislation.
Anastassia Beliakova: To add to that, yes, of course it is an enabling Bill. We and our members welcome the fact that it aims to replicate the UCC as much as possible because, as has already been mentioned, a lot of effort and time have been put into adhering to the new aspects of the Union customs code. However, what we have noticed is that some elements of the code have not been addressed in the Bill.
For instance on origin, the means of defining origin have been set out. However, origin declaration has not been mentioned. That is just as important, if not more so in some aspects, than rules of origin, when it comes to international trade. There are various means in which businesses now declare origin. Sometimes it is through sub-certification; sometimes it is through certificates of origin. We published a paper last week—there are copies available for the Committee—that shows that businesses are worried about compliance issues after Brexit. They want to know that there will be certainty going forward and support for them with that. We would view it as quite important to have at least one clause in primary legislation ensuring continuity in the means of origin declaration, which is further elaborated in secondary legislation.
Chris Davies
Q
William Bain: It is a very flexible Bill—it has extensive powers to make delegated legislation. It does throw up some other issues that the BRC would like to see resolved during this process. For example, to get as free a flow of goods as possible, we not only need a deal with the EU on customs arrangements, we also need it on things such as transit, security, haulage and particularly VAT.
One of our concerns is that the way the Bill is drafted at the moment throws up some issues about doing business in the future. For example, companies may have to register in every EU member state in which they provide services and in many member states in which they take goods to and from the UK. That is something that we would strongly urge the Committee to look at as the Bill proceeds.
Peter MacSwiney: I will stick to the system issue, if you like. I echo what Anastassia has said. The phrase “free circulation” is still in there. I do not see how that applies. Origins should be the criteria. You said it is a very flexible Bill—it is. Our members have some concerns that it allows HMRC to make it up as it goes along. That is a worry.
I am also concerned about some of the references to electronic systems and to things being delivered by a customs information paper or a public notice. At Heathrow, for instance, public notice 216 applies, which I think was written in the mid ’80s. We have been trying to rewrite it for the last 10 years probably. It suddenly popped up last year having been rewritten with no consultation and did not show any significant changes.
I have a real concern about who will be responsible for determining day-to-day processes such as the presentation of goods, which the Bill mentions—what is that? It cannot be the physical presentation in the post-Brexit world, because there will be too much of it, so the inventory systems have the concept of presentation against an electronic record. Those things really need to be thought out.
Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)
Q
William Bain: Yes, that is a huge concern because companies will have a big cash flow hit. The movement of goods within the European Union has been treated as VAT-free up to now. If the UK is treated as a third country afterwards, companies ostensibly will face an up-front cash payment. There are policies—domestic and in terms of the negotiations—that could mitigate that. The Government could introduce a deferment scheme, as is the case in Spain. They could look at other domestic policies to tackle it. More fundamentally, they could look at a form of self-assessment for VAT, which would obviate the need for up-front payments.
Some international solutions could be looked at. As I pointed out earlier, whatever happens domestically, UK companies will still face the burden of having to register for VAT purposes in each member state where they offer services and in most member states where they provide goods. That requires an international solution such as staying in the EU VAT area—even though that might involve treaty change—the establishment of a new common VAT area, or some other strong VAT co-operation. The domestic element and the negotiation element are both required to sort the problem out in the round.
Anastassia Beliakova: VAT and future potential VAT cash flow issues are a serious concern for our members. To echo the points already made, international measures that are not contingent on negotiations could be adopted. Deferment schemes are one. There are already deferment schemes in the UK, but they could be more generous. For instance, they ask businesses to provide bank guarantees, which is yet another cash flow issue for businesses. Some companies can waive it, but only after they have had a clean record of VAT payments for three years, which not all SMEs, for instance, could provide.
Another potential solution is to consider postponed accounting, which in effect is what we already have as members of the EU VAT area. The Government could consider setting out policy that would introduce postponed VAT accounting for imports from all third countries. That would alleviate future concerns in relation to Brexit and simplify existing procedures quite significantly.
Peter MacSwiney: The Joint Customs Consultative Committee has requested a return to postponed accounting; that is not popular with the Treasury, of course.
Kirsty Blackman
Q
William Bain: We are less concerned with the process than with the outcomes. The reality is that we need an operational statute book on 30 March 2019. As I say, some issues not dealt with in the Bill are very relevant to the process of getting goods in and out of the country and to the customs process in the round. We would appreciate some further treatment of those issues, such as haulage permits or what you do with people driving trucks into the country, who need permission to move from Belgium into the UK. Some issues that we think are important in the customs process could be addressed by the Bill.
Peter MacSwiney: The JCCC was keen that the legislation should reflect how business actually works. That was why we requested some input into the primary legislation, which was refused. The problem you have potentially is the interpretation of the law. You have two options: if the law categorically states, “You can do this”, that is fine—but if the law does not categorically state that you cannot do it, can you still do it? Those may sound like very similar points of view, but actually they are not. It depends very much on the interpretation of the authorities as to how much flexibility they will allow trade. There could be a clearer guide on the facilitative, rather than being prescriptive of the letter of the law.
Kirsty Blackman
Q
Anastassia Beliakova: The Bill, as has already been said, is very facilitative of all possible future options. Because none of them seem to have been narrowed down at the moment, it is very difficult for businesses to prepare. There is the working assumption that imports VAT is something that they will have to deal with once we leave the EU VAT area, but again that has not been fully clarified. Hence, with this kind of situation, businesses are still waiting for further clarity.
Gordon Tutt: On a technical level, when it comes to having the legislation and the systems ready, the time period to take on not only the technical changes but the additional volume and participants that may be required is very challenging. We should learn a lesson from the implementation of the UCC, which was introduced without very much thought about how it could be introduced within the timescale; subsequently, the concept of transitional regulation was introduced to allow trade and the member states—the customs authorities—to have time to adopt the changes. Our legislation in the UK perhaps needs to reflect better the ability to introduce transitional elements, where required, in a controlled manner.
Peter MacSwiney: Our concern, on behalf of our customers—predominantly freight forwarders—is that they are only just beginning to realise the extent of the changes. They are also just beginning to wake up to the fact that they are going to have to talk to their customers. From that point of view, I do not think they are particularly prepared at all.
William Bain: We have good lines of engagement with HMRC. We are having a meeting at the BRC with customs and tax experts from our member companies on Thursday, so we welcome that, but clearly there is only so much you can do when you do not know what the trading conditions will be the day after Brexit. We do not have clarity as yet on the transition. That is critical for business, in terms of the investment decisions being made in the first quarter of this year, and it is also about getting enough staff trained up and the IT systems changed and ready. All of those things take time, and getting the earliest possible clarity on as much of the terms of the transition as possible would be welcome—as early as possible.
The Chair
I would love to call Grahame Morris, but I cannot, because he has lost his voice. Anneliese will ask a question for him.
Anneliese Dodds (Oxford East) (Lab/Co-op)
Thank you, Ms Buck. The question that Mr Morris asked me to ask on his behalf is, if anything, even more pertinent after something that Mr Bain said. In the general area of customs—we are talking not only about duties, charges and processes strictly for customs, but about issues to do with migration, security, veterinary checks and haulage—I wondered, on behalf of Mr Morris, whether members of the panel would expand on what changes might be needed there. Are those being taken sufficiently in the round with matters strictly dealt with in the Bill?
William Bain: It is particularly important for food retailers because we deal with perishable items. I will use the anecdote, which is true, that a retailer can put in an order for orange juice. It comes via Zeebrugge and Dover and is on the shelves the following day. Our companies deal with just-in-time supply contracts and sourcing mechanisms. If you put friction into that process, you can introduce a day’s delay. For example, at Tilbury, I understand that if your crate has not arrived by 3 o’clock, it is processed the next day. You have to refrigerate it overnight. Those things add extra costs. They increase the possibility of food waste. They increase the possibility of having gaps on the shelves and products not being there when consumers want to buy them.
Meat products are a particularly huge issue. If we leave the European Union sanitary and phytosanitary rules system, you have to check meat items as they leave the country they are being exported from—let us say from France—and you also have to check them when they arrive in the UK. That will add huge friction into the process, and that is something that the food retail sector in particular has been very critical of. It also affects non-foods.
There are many furniture stores among our membership that import items—flat-packs—from the rest of the EU. If there are long delays at customs, that affects the ability of those goods to get to consumers as well. So non-food and food are concerned about the possibilities of more friction in the system.
Anastassia Beliakova: There are two considerations here: what businesses need to prepare for and what happens at the border. A lot has been said about CDS, which is a critical part of the picture, but that is just one element. We have been trying to draw attention to the fact that origin declaration, which is separate from customs declaration, also needs to be clarified.
When it comes to getting goods through the border—the just-in-time, the ferry coming in and so on—you need several systems working together. You need the customs declaration in place and already authorised. That needs to happen before the truck arrives and rolls off. There needs already to be an interlink with the relevant agencies—whether for food, plant and so on—who have already approved all this. This needs various means of declaration, and several IT systems need to work together and be integrated with the relevant port systems and make sure that there are no further delays. So we think there are some other elements that have not been covered sufficiently in the debate.
Peter MacSwiney: We have some pretty slick systems in place now for traditional freight. We do not really have any port systems in the ro-ro ports. We do not have any space and any procedures that lend themselves to goods being stopped and looked at this side of the channel. I think absolutely it has to work on advance information on a permission to load basis on the other side. Once you have that, the goods would have to roll freely through the ro-ro ports specifically on the basis that they are eligible to be entered into the UK, and the fiscal processes should take place after that. After they have gone through the border, they are accounted for separately.
Gordon Tutt: In terms of the systems we have currently for undertaking customs procedures, we probably have some of the most advanced systems in the world for doing these transactions. We have a lot of advantages over other countries in that we have got integration with our community systems providers in the ports, who can provide advance information. Customs and the Border Force to some extent use that information now. We have advance notification through the various systems internationally.
Where we seem to fail in this country is not with the revenue and the customs systems; it is actually with the other Government Departments. It might surprise you that within the airline arrivals, some of the notifications are still done on paper. That is not because trade and the port and community systems do not have the systems to provide this information—it is purely that those Departments do not have the ability to accept that information electronically. If we are to avoid delaying goods unnecessarily, where we have known, trusted traders bringing goods which present no risk fiscally or from a security point of view, that information should be passed freely to these other Government Departments, thereby avoiding any unnecessary delays.
Peter MacSwiney: The processes at Heathrow and Gatwick—both are run by the same community system provider—are different, and within the specific airports the transit sheds operate different procedures as well, so it absolutely could do with being streamlined.
Julian Sturdy (York Outer) (Con)
Q
Anastassia Beliakova: There are two considerations. The first is ensuring that businesses know that in future they can continue to rely on what they currently use to declare origin. At the British Chambers of Commerce, we facilitated 650,000 shipments through the use of certificates of origin last year. That is worth £22 billion to the UK economy—it is really critical. In the future, we do not know whether the existing means of declaring origin will continue. It is really important that businesses are told that they can.
It is also important from a strategic perspective for the UK Government, when we perhaps enter into new negotiations. If other countries ask for their means of declaring origin to be written into the agreement, that would cause significant compliance issues and would mean that there were far too many complicated rules for businesses to comply with. If there were provision in the legislation for the existing means of declaring origin, there would be a much stronger basis for the UK in future negotiations to make a case for the existing means to continue.
Julian Sturdy
Q
Anastassia Beliakova: The intention of the Department for International Trade is now to roll over existing EU trade agreements, most of which accept preferential certificates of origin as a means of showing that the goods come from the EU. If in the future those agreements are not rolled over and there is not the same provision for the same means of declaring origin, that means that companies will not be able to get the reduced duty rate when they export to that market—or, indeed, import from it.
Emma Hardy (Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle) (Lab)
Good morning—it is nice to see you all here. Earlier this week, the director general of the CBI said that the UK should seek to negotiate a comprehensive customs union with the EU. Having listened to all the complications that you have just outlined, would you support that proposal?
William Bain: The BRC is less concerned at this stage with the means of delivering frictionless and tariff-free trade with the EU, but what we do see is the overwhelming priority of the Government to focus on securing that. Our biggest market is the European Union, and it is likely to remain so for many decades to come.
To put it into perspective, our members say that 79% of food imports come from the European Union. That shows the sensitivity of sourcing contracts and supply contracts. For example, some retailers offer ready meals with cheddar from the Republic of Ireland in them, so it is used as an ingredient in products. If we do not get a deal that ensures tariff-free trade with the EU, the tariff on Irish cheddar is 44.5%. On beef from Ireland, it is 38.9%. On Dutch tomatoes, it is nearly 29%. That will have a serious impact on consumers, which is why we have said that, above all, by whatever mechanism they achieve it, the Government should aim for frictionless trade and zero-tariff trade with the European Union. Otherwise, consumers will face a big hit to their living standards.
Anastassia Beliakova: The same principle of having as little friction as possible in future trade with the EU is, of course, very critical for our members. On the specific question of the customs union, we are currently surveying our members—literally as we speak, or at least in the next few days—so, as and when those results are available, I will be very happy to share them with the Committee.
Peter MacSwiney: All the efforts over the last few years have been to remove bureaucracy. SITPRO made it its mission in life to try and simplify trade, and now we are introducing an inhibition to trade in the form of a customs entry. Taking what William said, of course duty plays a part, but even if there is a duty-free element you still have to do a customs entry, and it is hard to see where the benefit of that is. So, I would say that some form of customs union would be useful and beneficial.
Gordon Tutt: From a systems point of view—obviously, we are a vested interest here—the more declarations that are done, the more money for our members. That is why we take a very neutral position on this. But clearly, as my colleagues have said, there are a whole range of issues here, particularly in the movement of goods, which traditionally posed no threat. That goes in both directions—both into the UK and leaving the UK. We need to find a mechanism to allow those goods to move freely, without hindrance and without additional cost to trade.
Nic Dakin (Scunthorpe) (Lab)
Q
Gordon Tutt: Having experienced some of the European legislation in recent years, particularly the way the UCC was written, I do not see that the current UK proposal is any more onerous than what we have seen coming out of Brussels—in fact, in some ways it is a lot clearer. And we do have the confidence here in the UK; again, I can only speak on behalf of my members. We have a very good rapport with customs and with other Government agencies, in that we can actually discuss the detail and get clear understanding, and intervention where it is necessary. So, I am not unduly concerned with what is being proposed.
Peter MacSwiney: I think of the point we made earlier. As Gordon has just said, the engagement is good but the timescales are not.
William Bain: The key point, Mr Dakin, is that obviously companies want to know what the impact on them and the wider industry will be. Having legislation with an impact assessment is very helpful, in being able to explore the pinch points—whether on customs, VAT or the staffing implications. The retail industry wants to see this legislation as early as possible, and to engage with Government about it. We know that this legislation is not amendable in this House or in the House of Lords, so it is even more important that industry has a very strong engagement with it at the earliest opportunity.
Nic Dakin
Q
Anastassia Beliakova: We already provide a lot of advice to businesses when it comes to trade. That is due to our role in trade facilitation with certificates of origin, but we also help with any queries that companies have regarding compliance with origin or local regulations in other markets. We also support businesses with any questions regarding taxation.
We hear from our members that they want to know what they should be preparing for. At the moment, the kind of guidance that we can provide is not prescriptive. It is more, “These are the various areas that you could consider”. One of them, of course, is VAT; another is origin declaration; and a third one is various rules of origin and existing trade agreements that the UK has by its membership of the EU. But because businesses don’t know what they don’t know, and we are working between assuming that everything will continue as it is and anticipating further changes, we would like to work even more closely with HMRC and Government more widely to provide support as and when changes become clear.
Peter MacSwiney: The current infrastructure is good. The Joint Customs Consultative Committee and the sub-groups are a decent forum. We are all members of one or more of those groups, and that works pretty well. I would like to see more engagement from the Border Force with the end user. It seems to be more focused on intergovernmental negotiations and discussions, rather than coming out to the wider trade.
Gordon Tutt: Most trade associations attending the JCCC are also, through either their own trade associations or affiliate trade associations, part of the trade contact group that discusses arrangements with TAXUD—the taxation and customs union directorate-general—for customs legislation in the EU. We are working closely with our European trade associations to try to ensure that there is a commonality in approach, to avoid unnecessary disruption to trade both from the UK and from the EU.
William Bain: The practical benefit is the experience across different industries and sectors in dealing with the movement of goods and services and being able to identify the potential difficulties with compliance.
One further point on the movement of goods is that at the moment there are 30 separate Government agencies that deal with this process. We are not expecting the Government to rationalise those or shuffle them in some way, but we would urge that the level of integration and co-operation between them should increase as we move towards Brexit day and, if there is a transitional period, any expiry of it, because dealing with 30 separate agencies is onerous for business.
Anneliese Dodds
Q
Secondly, regarding HMRC capacity, we have obviously seen a big reduction in headcount and changes with all the offices becoming regional hubs. Are there other alterations that you would make to HMRC’s set-up to facilitate the big challenges coming down the road with these new systems?
Gordon Tutt: May I begin by answering the first question? Within the UCC legislation, which is carried over into the new UK legislation, there is a recognition of the role of the authorised economic operator. That is quite important, but it means that there will be potentially hundreds, if not thousands, of UK companies that may wish to become AEOs to gain the benefits once we leave the EU.
The problem is that unless you have a proven record of customs transactions, you cannot apply to become an AEO, so in some ways we are going to disadvantage traders that are probably acting completely in accordance with regulations, are good taxpayers and are honest and trustworthy companies. None of that is taken into consideration. We have had some discussions with HMRC and it is almost as though we might need something like a provisional AEO status so that those companies, which pose no risk, can take on some of the benefits, such as guarantee waivers and being able to operate the self-assessment schemes, where there is no risk either to the Treasury or to the safety and security of the country. That is a key point.
I would add that the provisions of the self-assessment scheme, which are part of the UCC regulations and will be carried over into UK law, can also perhaps provide some answers to some of the problems that we have not successfully been able to find solutions to.
Anastassia Beliakova: On AEO, the issue is actually your second point of HMRC capacity, and the way the process is run in the UK. AEO is an international system. It is recognised by standards at the World Customs Organisation, so there are certain aspects that a country that has this scheme must adhere to.
However, the process of approving companies—just how long that takes, and all those practical aspects—is up to the customs authority of each country to implement. We have heard time and again from our members that that takes far too long. I have an example of a company that had already been approved for AEO but it took 12 months for them to get the reapproval, although they did not have to go through the exact same process again. It should have been much faster.
I have spoken to customs authorities in other countries such as Austria. There, owing to their much more customer-service-focused approach—and, it has to be said, they do have many more customs officers—it takes a company about three months from the start to the very end of the process. Yet they are no less rigorous than we are. We are very stringent in our approach, and if we want to help more companies achieve this status, the practicalities need to be rethought.
William Bain: That is a key issue. AEO status is part of the solution, but it is no silver bullet for the customs issues that companies are likely to face. There are 10 times fewer AEO companies in the UK compared with Germany; penetration among small and medium-sized enterprises is particularly low. There is a lot of work that Government could do to make the process of applying easier but, as was said earlier, there has to be a history of previous customs transactions. I believe it is three years before companies can apply.
The other thing that is necessary in any withdrawal agreement solution is that there should be mutual recognition between the UK and EU AEO systems. The EU has already done that with America, China and some other countries. That is critical.
On HMRC resources, I revert to an earlier point: that Dover and Eurotunnel do not have capacity to conduct SPS—Sanitary and Phytosanitary Certificate—checks. If we end up outside of the EU SPS regime and we have to check fresh meat and plant products coming into the country, there is not the capacity to do that at Dover. You have to find an offsite solution and that will draw further on HMRC resources—to have veterinary staff in position to perform these checks. That will increase the burden on the HMRC budget.
The Chair
Emma Hardy has a quick, mini-supplementary, four people want to ask another question, and we have 14 or 13 minutes—just to give you an idea of how to manage the time.
Emma Hardy
Q
Peter MacSwiney: It is hard to see the transition period being less than five years, in all honesty, based on experience of introducing systems over the past 20 years. Introducing a system is one thing, but educating the trade and getting the processes in place really does take a long time. It is hard to see that being done in much less than that.
Gordon Tutt: I would support Peter on that. We should not make the same mistakes as with the UCC. There are elements of that that cannot be introduced, even within the current transitional arrangements. We need to be mindful that it takes a long time to get the systems in place and, more importantly, to make sure that they have the connectivity to other trade systems around the world that are often providing this information. Five years sounds awful—and that is the worst case scenario. But if you work on a basis of five years, you can introduce elements much quicker, but some elements could take up to five years to introduce.
Jonathan Reynolds (Stalybridge and Hyde) (Lab/Co-op)
Q
Peter MacSwiney: I think it would probably do the job. I have said it before and I will say it again: on this side of the channel, we will get our systems and processes sorted out, because that is what we do. I do not think it will address the issues on the other side of the channel. That is likely to be a bigger problem than what happens in the UK.
William Bain: The key issue for moving goods between the rest of the European Union and the UK is partly customs, but also regulation. The Bill puts in place different eventualities on customs, but it does not answer the questions on the regulatory framework, so that has to be dealt with. Also, these other issues about what happens to the common transit convention, to security agreements and to haulage permits and driver permits all affect the flow of goods. If those are not dealt with in this Bill, we encourage the Committee to explore how they can be dealt with otherwise.
The Chair
Q
Gordon Tutt: There is everything in the Bill that we need in terms of whatever the solution is. There are already provisions within that legislation to allow flexibility, to prevent goods from being detained at the border and to allow them to be moved up into inland examination points under controlled mechanisms. That already exists within that legislation.
Mike Hill (Hartlepool) (Lab)
Q
Anastassia Beliakova: I believe the figure has been cited as being 130,000 businesses who are dealing with customs declarations for the first time—that is, those estimated to be currently trading just with the EU. Of course, there will be businesses of different sizes. If you are a very large business, you will be working directly with the new system’s CDS and then you need time to integrate into that. If you are a smaller business, you are dependent on the provisions that your intermediaries, your freight forwarders, have put in place. A whole host of businesses will be affected that depend on a number of different bodies and Government putting the right measures in place with sufficient notice.
Peter Dowd
Q
Anastassia Beliakova: It would be very difficult to assess, because there are a number of factors. One is just the cost of a customs declaration. That will perhaps be more challenging for a smaller business that is trading ad hoc. If you are a large business trading at big volumes, the cost will be quite marginal for you.
But then there are other considerations. There is the time issue. Are you going to factor in any potential delays? If so, does that mean you have to provide for more warehousing facilities? Does that mean you have to keep an inventory? All those things are very difficult to quantify for a median figure, but they are things we know our members are starting to consider—some quite actively.
William Bain: If you move away from a just-in-time supply and sourcing mechanism, you have to look at stockpiling. That means you have to look at extra warehousing capacity. You have to change IT systems in terms of VAT and customs. All that comes at a cost for businesses, at a time in which we see the pressures in terms of footfall and retail spending.
Peter MacSwiney: As a software supplier, we support about 350 companies in probably 800 locations. We estimate that making the necessary changes, just to roll out our system, is going to cost in excess of £250,000 over the next two years. I do not know whether that is any help to you.
Gordon Tutt: One of the other issues is underwritten by the fact that some of the changes being introduced to the software systems would have been required anyway as part of the requirements to meet the UCC—new data set, new message types, more engagement in terms of electronic transactions. In addition, we are already working on CHIEF replacement, so the costs of that are already borne as part of the decision to replace CHIEF. As high as these costs are for some of the software suppliers and some of the trade sector, some of that cost would have already existed had we decided to remain within the EU.
Kirsty Blackman
Q
Peter MacSwiney: I think there is a structural issue. It is the view, certainly at the airports, that freight is the poor relation where the Border Force is concerned.
Anastassia Beliakova: I would say it is both. It is very difficult to assess within the Border Force how much emphasis is given to goods checks versus checks on people. We have heard from members that it seems as if the focus has definitely shifted over the years. It is therefore an area that would require either a change of focus with more focus to goods, or more people dedicated just on goods checks, from our perspective.
The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mel Stride)
Q
Would you describe HMRC’s engagement with yourselves—your own organisation, in the context of the discussions and the issues we have gone over today—as having been good, average or poor? Starting with Gordon.
Gordon Tutt: Very good.
Peter MacSwiney: I endorse that.
Anastassia Beliakova: Very good.
William Bain: Good, but we need answers on what is going to happen.
Mel Stride
That is more than one word—you can tell who the former politician is. My final question has clearly been identified. Naturally, there are many challenges and uncertainties out there. Some come from the sheer fact that we have decided to leave the EU and the short time frame, for example, for decisions. Many of the issues we have described come out of the negotiations and the uncertainty about where we may land in that respect.
However, what the Bill is doing and the focus of this Committee is to make sure that we are as close as we can be to existing arrangements and, secondly, that we have the flexibility to be nimble enough to move and adjust our configuration to accommodate wherever we land on day one. Very quick answers down the line: in essence, in broad terms, do you think the Bill is about right?
Gordon Tutt: Yes, I do.
Peter MacSwiney: I think it probably is, but it needs to focus on implementation and people must have the attitude that they are using it to facilitate trade and not to inhibit it.
Anastassia Beliakova: Yes, but more clarity on policy is needed, particularly on VAT.
William Bain: We would advise that it also deals with the other issues we have spoken about today which affect the flow of goods in and out of the UK.
The Chair
I also thank the witnesses very much for their attendance. We will now close the session and move on to the next panel.
Examination of Witnesses
Sue Davies, Jeremy White, Barbara Scott and Helen Dennis gave evidence.
The Chair
Q
Helen Dennis: I am Helpen Dennis and I work at the Fairtrade Foundation.
Jeremy White: I am Jeremy White from the Pump Court Tax Chambers. I am here today as the customs duties spokesman of the Chartered Institute of Taxation.
Sue Davies: Hello, I am Sue Davis from Which?
Jonathan Reynolds
Q
Sue Davies: I want to say at the start that from the perspective of Which? we focus on making sure that we get the best outcome for consumers from Brexit. We took a neutral position on the referendum, and that also applies to trade policy. Our interest in the Bill lies in making sure that it is as explicit as possible, within that, on how consumer interests will be taken into account.
In relation to what is in the Bill and what is dealt with by subsequent legislation, we want to make sure that any changes are limited to technical matters, and that anything with wider policy significance—particularly given the sensitivities of trade issues to some extent—is dealt with openly, so that we can see and weigh up its pros and cons. We feel that some aspects of the Bill need to be strengthened to make the consumer interest more explicit. There is recognition in the Bill, for example, of the need to take into account consumer interest when setting import duties. We also strongly support the inclusion of what is called the economic test in relation to trade remedies, because we want to make sure that we have a thorough understanding before we potentially raise consumer prices in order to support particular industries. There are aspects of the Bill that we think are important, but we also think that there could be greater clarity to make sure we see how the consumer impact will be assessed.
Helen Dennis: On the delegated powers issue: across the board we do have some concerns, more so with the Trade Bill and the process for agreeing future trade deals than are necessarily within this legislation. Here, we do have a lot of delegated powers around setting tariffs, establishing rules of origin. We are thinking about it from the perspective of developing countries, where in some instances there is a high dependency on the UK market and where there are products with tight margins, so changes to tariffs could make or break the livelihoods of producers. If you were to ask for a vote on every single tariff change, that would not be workable, so this is about finding the right balance in terms of moving forward.
It is a question to throw back to parliamentarians: to consider the role that parliamentarians feel they should have around parliamentary scrutiny, consideration of different tariff changes and rules of origin—the things we were discussing earlier. The Government have set out quite an ambitious vision about trade for development, for example in their trade White Paper, in which they want to use trade policies to improve access for developing countries. At the moment, however, we do not see those improvements in this legislation, because the focus is on continuity and maintaining the status quo for now, but we do not want to lose sight of future improvements and future discussions. I would say that actually, as things stand at the moment, there should probably be a process whereby Members of Parliament can call things in or request further scrutiny, but that is part of the wider discussion about trade policy going forward, including how the Houses want to be involved in that and how public consultation is built into it. It is something that needs to be thought about in tandem with the ongoing discussions about the Trade Bill, as well.
Jeremy White: I have a problem with the structure of the Bill, the consequence of which is that parliamentary scrutiny will be excessively difficult. I can illustrate that with this visual aid that I have brought in, which is a handbook that I edit. This is the regulatory framework for customs duties in the Union—the Union Customs Code—and its guidance. The UCC and its implementing provisions are about this wide, very finely typed—about 1,300 pages. The rest—this part here—is the necessary European and national guidance on the matter.
Therefore, when we think about the implementing provisions, of which we have maybe 15 or 20 pages of detail in the Bill, which are meant to be implemented by this, we know that the statutory instruments are going to be an enormous burden. The problem is that the Bill is overly ambitious. It fails to distinguish between those provisions that I will call just charges and the machinery—the regulatory framework. This book does not concern the charges, the tariff schedules, the trade instruments or the preferential agreements. They are in another book, of about the same size. I am not concerned about those, and the Bill would deal with them.
The trouble is that it brings into force the repeal of the UCC, in effect, on exit day. That being so—it is hard-wired into the Bill—its commencement provision requires there to be statutory instruments of this magnitude on exit day. The problem is that since the destruction of the Bill is a recast, they will be recast into other, English language. Such an approach might be appropriate for a no-deal arrangement with the EU, but it creates burdens of cost and risk in respect of any trading activity that follows afterwards, particularly if we have any transition period at all or are subject to obligations under the leaving treaty—I will call it the leaving treaty, but whatever it is—to preserve the regulatory framework of the UCC.
To be realistic, we cannot expect the EU to be in favour of or agree to any kind of regulatory framework that is different from the UCC. The UCC is what they have budgeted for. At the moment, it is in an implementation phase; we will probably come to that in other questions, and the problems of the timetable for its implementation now that, yesterday, the Commission has endorsed a report following the revised road map for the implementation of the UCC, which I could cover later.
The primary point then is that if we have a complete recast on exit day, anybody who is involved in trade, particularly if we have obligations to retain the same effects as the UCC, will have to be looking at both the UCC and the English implementation at the same time for every single piece of endeavour—almost every importation. As I said, the scrutiny will not just be on the basis of whether the legislation achieves its objective with respect to any changes from the UCC; it will also have to look at it on the basis of whether it preserves the effect of the UCC that was intended. That is an enormous burden, and I would say that it makes parliamentary scrutiny unnecessarily and excessively difficult.
Kirsty Blackman
Q
Jeremy White: That is an important point. The CIOT’s report brings out some evidence of some members having already amended their supply chains in order to cope with arrangements, because of the uncertainty. Uncertainty is a burden that trade faces at the moment, and it has to make decisions about it, so you are right. The CIOT has noticed that clients—enterprises that are members—are changing their supply chains because of the uncertainty, so anything that the Bill can do to reduce uncertainty would be good. For example, if the Bill can, by its commencement provisions, instead allow the withdrawal Bill to operate—therefore the UCC is automatically incorporated—and then exercise the powers to modify that application, that will reduce a lot of uncertainty and there will be no need to read this book—the UCC—and the English version. This book has to be read anyway, and this, and there will be a very small amount of variation where we want to improve on the UCC for the United Kingdom.
This is about uncertainty and cost, and what enterprises want to do. Everything can be resolved by law and by allocating resources to the issues, but that just increases cost, besides the parliamentary scrutiny being a burden for Parliament and for those who want to assist it—charities such as the CIOT and so on. Businesses themselves will see this as an issue of cost that it is unnecessary for them to incur.
Kirsty Blackman
Q
Helen Dennis: There is certainly that intention in the legislation, and that is good to see. Certainly, bringing forward a UK preference scheme and guaranteeing in law the duty-free, quota-free access for the least developed countries is all very positive. It takes the best bits of current EU policy and brings them over into UK policy. What we are grappling with at the moment is those countries that do not qualify for that access, which are not LDCs but still have developing country status in some way; they may have an economic partnership agreement or a free trade agreement. We do not yet have absolute clarity and guarantees that their market access will be preserved in the same way. There is definitely a stated intention from Government, but not a guarantee.
I would say we have heard more than we have seen. Obviously, the next six months or so are going to be critical. What we have heard were potential discussions about people changing their sourcing—away from Kenya to Ethiopia, for example—in relation to cut flowers, and discussion about trading routes: things that currently come via other EU countries into the UK, whether that is flowers via the Netherlands or tea or coffee that is processed in Germany. There is lots of complexity around every commodity. I would say that at the moment there has been more hearing than seeing action, but I think the next few months will be crucial.
The challenge of one of the points that we have been trying to make with quite a short submission about this is that because we do not have an absolute guarantee at the moment that the transition of the economic partnership agreements and free trade agreements will occur in March 2019, although we know that the Government are working hard on it, we want to ensure that the preference scheme is able to accommodate additional countries that may not be listed in the schedules at the moment, as a kind of fall-back option in case we cannot transition those free trade agreements and so on over in time. Obviously, we want to avoid the cliff edge for developing countries just as we want to avoid the cliff edge for UK business.
The Chair
We welcome Barbara Scott to the panel. Barbara, would you like to introduce yourself?
Barbara Scott: My apologies for the Metropolitan line this morning. I am the director of Customs Associates. I am an independent customs consultant and have been for many years, advising businesses on importing and exporting, currently for trade outside the Union.
Anneliese Dodds
Q
I have an additional question about the distorted economies. We have very little detail about how distorted economies will be dealt with in the Bill. Do you have any comments on that, given that there are severe human rights concerns in many of those economies about certain elements of production, including modern slavery?
Helen Dennis: You are right to say that the three tiers of the EU preference scheme are not cited in the legislation. At the moment, in the Generalised Scheme of Preferences, there is Everything But Arms duty-free and quota-free access for the least developed countries, and there is broad GSP and something called GSP-plus, which countries can access if they have ratified certain human rights agreements and conventions. That highlights that the Bill is being kept incredibly loose. We have had discussions with officials at the Department for International Trade about this, and the stated intention is probably to cut and paste the preference scheme.
At one point, I thought that there would probably be some wider discussions about the shape of the preference scheme: whether we would go for one tier, two tiers or three tiers, whether we wanted to roll over the human rights conditionality, and more. I do not know whether it is to do with the time, resources and everything that needs to be done in the next year, but the preference seems to be, essentially, to cut and paste for now, and to look at those improvements later. You are right to say that that is not in the legislation, so the detail of rules of origin and the different tiers of a preference scheme are just more issues that the Secretary of State would bring forward in regulations. It was implied in the first question whether that is satisfactory. Do members want to have a say in shaping a preference scheme and on whether there should be human rights conditionality? That is an important question that needs considering.
On your second question about distorted economies, there probably are divergent opinions—certainly in civil society and non-governmental organisations—about the use of trade agreements and tools to enforce human rights obligations. Obviously, everyone wants to see that, but trade is quite a blunt tool for doing that. Its application at EU level is still fairly recent, so there probably is not enough evidence yet to see whether the GSP-plus has the desired effect. I am not an expert, but I know that after the Rana Plaza tragedy in Bangladesh, the United States was able to use trade policy to move forward some of those conversations about labour conditions and rights in Bangladesh. There are ways in which trade policy can be used for those discussions, but whether they are applied as conditions in trade agreements is a question for discussion.
Chris Davies
Q
Jeremy White: Good lawyers—and even good editors—work only for their clients, not for themselves. Barbara is a colleague of mine, and you should ask her that question, too. We are interested only in making sure that the Bill is fit for purpose. Our charity is made up of lawyers and consultants, and we all agree that although the Bill is not designed to do something bad, it tries to do too much. We applaud its ambition and, to a point, its flexibility, but let me make a couple of pleas for special items.
On the replacement of VAT on acquisitions being dealt with in a VAT return, we see flexibility in the Bill and in the announcements of HMRC and the Treasury. That can be replaced by postponed accounting of import VAT. That kind of flexibility is good. When we look at the flexibility that we would like to see in respect of some of the special procedures and information systems, we think, “Yes, that will be good.” In particular, guarantee waivers—taking a different view from the EU on guarantees—are a good thing. The Bill would give us that structure, and we applaud that.
Our problem is with the cost that would follow, both in terms of parliamentary scrutiny and for the trade, if we commenced a UK recast. Having to look at both the UK recast and the Community law would create an unnecessary cost. As I said, we are not concerned about parts of the current law such as tariff schedules and trade instruments, which we know will have to be recast. Each paragraph of the Chartered Institute of Taxation report is quite dense—a number of people were fighting to get their arguments in, and some of it is a bit too dense—but one talks about international obligations. We do not want the flexibility of a UK approach that is inconsistent with our international obligations, because that would just lead to more cost. Although we might, in individual cases, obtain a result that we liked based on a simple reading of the English recast, it might be incompatible with either a Community obligation or an international obligation, and we would end up with everything having to be reversed on appeal and the whole enterprise being more expensive.
The problem with an unnecessary recast is that it would produce an amount of uncertainty. It is that, not the flexibility, that we object to. If I put my own hat on, you are right that I would never be able to retire, because, instead of being paid once for reading this version, I would have to be paid twice—once for reading this version and once for reading the English recast—in any case I was involved in.
Chris Davies
Q
Jeremy White: To go right back to the beginning, this is not personal. I am definitely arguing against my personal interest, as you pointed out. You are right.
Peter Dowd
Q
Barbara Scott: Sure. I presume that Jeremey has already mentioned the fact that the new draft Bill moves away from the Union customs code. We had been told that the Union customs code would be the way forward for UK legislation, so we were surprised to see the new draft Bill presented in this way. If it is to be changed—personally, I do not see how we can change something in such a short period, given that the Union customs code took 10 years to put in place—how can we present something new that is a strong and proper piece of legislation? We will not be able to do that in the time available, which is all the more reason for picking up the Union customs code and tweaking it.
If we are going to change things, why produce something that to me looks like going back to the legislation that we had? Perhaps those drafting the Bill started by looking at legislation before the Union customs code, or even the Community customs code, because a lot of the wording is not modern. Perhaps that is the way that this has always been done, but it seems to me that we could at least use plain English that people understand, and present it in a clearer way. The wording of the Union customs code is sometimes a bit odd, but it is written in clear English that most traders and non-lawyers can understand. If we are to change this legislation, it would have been nice to have seen something a lot more fitting for today. A totally new customs regime is coming in, and if it is to be different, this would have been an opportunity to make it a shining star for Britain.
Peter Dowd
Q
“new UK legislation is needed to create a separate UK Customs regime.”
I think everyone acknowledges that.
“However, we believe the Government’s approach, of providing Ministers with exceptional (yet apparently permanent) powers to create a Customs regime from scratch, with minimum parliamentary involvement or scrutiny, in a very short space of time, is unnecessary.”
Why? What is wrong with that? The Financial Secretary is a very reasonable person, and I am sure that nobody would want to pull the wool over anybody’s eyes. What is the problem with that idea?
Jeremy White: Parliamentary scrutiny will be excessively difficult. That is the problem. We are talking about how to get this amount of material recast and properly analysed, with time to debate anomalies, difficulties, or even the uncertainty of it all. There are risks to the Revenue as well, besides business cost. The Revenue might think that it has a proper charge, but the problem with customs machinery as something that is modified or recast is that often the customs debts themselves result from a time when goods were on duty suspension. That is where customs duties are in two parts. First, there is a charge in the thing, in rem, on importation, and then the goods are on duty suspension until there is a charge, in persona, against a person who is then liable for the debt.
In the time between those two events, the goods are subject to all this regulatory machinery. Uncertain or defective provisions that could be subject to litigation will affect the Revenue itself. We will say what we think the legislation is—it will have its explanatory notes and its public notices—but once you have let it go, it is up to the judges to decide what it means, and traders and advisers might come up with a clever, nuanced interpretation of the Bill and statutory instruments that was completely outside your intention. So avoid that uncertainty, that litigation and that cost simply by allowing the withdrawal Bill to incorporate the UCC—as we thought it would—and then enact just the sensible few amendments or modifications that are necessary of the UCC. As I say, I am arguing only for that, not for the whole body of the customs legislation, some of which it is probably best to recast, subject to compliance with EU and international obligations.
Peter Dowd
Q
“The explanatory notes to the Bill state that the new standalone regime will be ‘largely based on EU law’ and that it is intended that the customs regime ‘will continue to operate in much the same way as it does today’.”
I want to tease out a little more on that. Do you think that aspiration will be delivered by the Bill?
Jeremy White: Not with its current commencement provision, no.
Peter Dowd
Q
“We are concerned that taxpayers’ rights in relation to an effective appeals process are retained. This Bill could be”—
you do not say “will be”—
“a backwards step in relation to an effective appeals process, because it affords such wide discretion to HMRC. We wish to see the adoption of clear unambiguous legal requirements for customs matters, which minimise commissioners’ discretion.”
Could you tease that out a bit more? That is in paragraph 6.1 of the Chartered Institute of Taxation’s evidence.
Jeremy White: A thorn in the flesh of the people who contributed to that section was clause 23, and in particular where certain results—particularly approvals—are treated as never having been granted if HMRC considers that approval would not have been granted if a deficiency was known at the time it was granted. That is just one example. There are a number of parts of the Bill where this construction is used whereby one authority—an administrative authority, a parliamentary authority or a Minister—considers that kind of discretion.
Yes, that is a useful construction in English for granting a power to make an instrument, but when it comes to affecting a trader’s relationship and whether they can be in business or not because they have got an authorisation, it should then be subject to the ordinary appeal to the simple, low-cost traders’ tribunal that we have learned to admire. All of the other authorisation-type decisions that HMRC could make are subject to appeal, and they are preserved properly by the Bill. The trouble is the Bill then adds in a few more, using a construction such as “considers” and “discretions”. It is bad enough now that sometimes we have to tell a client, “Sorry, you’re going to have to pay the money to go to the High Court and challenge the Ministers or HMRC on the basis of judicial review,” which is very expensive, discourages litigation and often discourages people from obtaining a remedy for their dispute.
This should not be controversial. It should be, “Yes. That is the right thing to do.” If we were able to add to a shopping list, we would say, “Can we please have all of the current disputes going on in the High Court in customs matters dealt with in a tribunal as well, please?” but that may be asking too much. If the scope of the Bill is wide enough for that and you could amend it to get that in, that would be good. We should not really have customs issues going to the High Court at all. They should all be dealt with in the first-tier tribunal tax chamber.
Mark Menzies (Fylde) (Con)
Q
Helen Dennis: A lot has been said about value addition and its potential post-Brexit. Our view is probably that the tariffs are not the key issue here. We already have duty-free, quota-free access for the least developed countries. If we take a country such as Colombia, or a GSP-plus country such as Bolivia, it is able to access the market with roasted coffee as well, duty free, but as I said before, with the free trade agreements, they may not all transition over necessarily. The biggest issue in terms of trade policy and development continues to be subsidy rather than EU tariffs. There are other issues, such as rules of origin or just getting the investment in roasting and processing facilities, that are more of an obstacle to moving into that kind of value-added activity.
Having said that, there is still scope for improving the tariffs. That goes back to the point about how we and the Government do that. Do we say that the Secretary of State has that power and authority, every three years or so, to revise the preference scheme to extend product coverage and potentially country coverage, and so on? Is that a conversation that happens through regulations under delegated powers, or is it something that a Committee of the House or another grouping, or Parliament in its entirety, would want to discuss, debate and have a vote on? There are lots of issues to unpack. I would certainly agree with the premise of your question, but some of the detail on that particular issue around coffee roasting does not impact as many countries as is sometimes talked about.
Mark Menzies
Q
Helen Dennis: I agree with you on that. There are certain products that we work with, such as bananas and sugar, that are not covered by the GSP. There may be products that we would want to include within a new preference scheme, and we would want to have the opportunity to bring those proposals forward. The Bill certainly does that, by granting the power to the Secretary of State to make those decisions.
The one thing I would want to flag up is that a decision about tariffs affecting one country impacts on other countries. It is important that when those matters are being brought forward, a thorough impact assessment is done of the impact not only directly on that economy but on neighbouring or other competitor countries. If we go back to Colombia for example, it is a big exporter of cut flowers. There is competition between east Africa and some of the Latin American countries. There is no right or wrong answer, but if we are going to make tariff changes, we need to make sure that we have thoroughly considered the potential impacts.
When the Bill lists the things that the Secretary of State or Chancellor must have regard to, at the moment there is nothing that relates to development impact. From our perspective, we would like to see something added there, so that we are thinking about UK interests and consumers, of course, but we are also thinking about development impact when we make changes.
Douglas Chapman (Dunfermline and West Fife) (SNP)
Q
Barbara Scott: I work a lot with SMEs who currently find it very hard to understand the Community legislation on customs and international trade law. It is complex and there are a lot of different strands to it. Trade is complex. Things are different depending on what you are doing, whether coffee from Colombia or bicycle parts from China. The legislation and the effect on business is very different, unlike other laws, such as VAT or corporation tax, which generally impact in the same way on most businesses.
This is a huge step change for SMEs and particularly for those who have only traded within the EU. It will be a tough challenge for HMRC to reach out to those people, get them involved and explain how the new legislation will work. There is clearly going to have to be a lot of propaganda and information out there. It is a huge challenge for the state.
Jeremy White: And there is a cost. The SMEs will have to employ agents, because they will not be able to employ in-house staff. I have been told that SMEs will sell out to someone who does have the assistance. The only frictionless trade known to man is customs union. Anything else is costly and can only be managed—just—with all the simplified procedures of the UCC in operation, plus all the information systems that are there to support them. That is big money.
Barbara Scott: When we talk to customs about this, we are constantly hearing, yes, they are being given more resources and will be employing more staff, but can business afford to do that—suddenly to employ new people and understand these new processes? It is a huge cost. People ask, “What is that cost?” It is very difficult to measure. I do not think anyone has attempted to do so yet. It will be a very difficult time for SMEs in particular.
Sue Davies: I cannot comment on SMEs but I want to make the point that if there are additional costs for businesses, they will feed through and lead to increased prices for consumers. That is why it is really important that we have as efficient a system as possible, which still maintains the right level of protection for consumers.
Mike Hill
Q
Jeremy White: Uncertainty always produces that, doesn’t it? A little bit of background: all my professional life has been using EU-type rules, EU language and structure. Through all its iterations—when I was a Government lawyer working on the implementation of the Community customs code, then when we began to do work on the Union customs code, then I went back to practice—it is still very similar. It is well known that the opportunities for avoidance are few. There have been some, obviously, in terms of customs valuation. There have been customs valuation schemes in the past. Most of them have been dealt with.
This is just an example—we do not know, and it could be handled very well—but in a recast there is always an opportunity of bringing in some uncertainty. Is this exactly the same provision as we had before? Will it prevent a customs valuation scheme? The answer to that is that we do not know because all we have seen in the Bill is a very small, framework principle rule provision, but it still does not adopt exactly the language of the World Trade Organisation customs valuation agreement. That would be beneficial—that is another point in our report. The way it works is this. All the customs authorities in the world are obviously interested in preventing evasion and avoidance. They have their own legislation, they have got together for a world agreement on how customs valuation should be—taxation based on movements of goods—that is adopted generally, and their Supreme Courts have ruled on it for many years now, or at least since everyone adopted the same since 1994. We have all that body of work, help and certainty. If we then have an English law recast that abandons that language, we do not take the benefit of leveraging off of any of the international law or any of the international judgments.
The answer to your question—that was really all background—is that we do not know until we see what the statutory instrument looks like, if we still go down this road. It would be better not to, but if we do still go down the road of the recast for all purposes, we will see what the statutory instrument says. I would have thought that the advice will be that the statutory instrument has to adhere to the WTO customs valuation agreement.
The Chair
We have a little over 10 minutes to go and three people to ask any further questions.
Nic Dakin
Q
Sue Davies: We think it absolutely critical that we have the economic interest test. We completely recognise that there will be cases where we need to consider whether we put remedies in place, but it is really important that when the decision is made to do that, there has also been a full assessment of what the impact would be ultimately on the end consumers. As some of the products or sectors that have involved remedies up to now have often been inputs or intermediaries into other sectors, which will then feed through to consumers, we need to ensure that we are looking at what the short-term impacts could be while also thinking longer term. We were really pleased to see the economic impact test referred to. We think it could be more explicit about the public interest side and the need for a consumer impact assessment, but otherwise we could be going down an unnecessarily protectionist route that could have consequences we are not sure about, because remedies can remain in place for quite a while.
Correspondingly, I appreciate that you are not considering the Trade Bill, but we think that the composition of the Trade Remedies Authority, which will be included in the Trade Bill, and the way that it operates, are also critical, so that we ensure it is transparent and includes consumer interest—for example, consumer representation on its board—so that when it is looking at the need for remedies we all understand exactly how it has traded off those different interests. But we think it would be simplistic and potentially damaging to consumers if we do not have the test in the Bill.
Nic Dakin
Q
Sue Davies: We have the economic significance of affected industries and consumers and the likely impact on affected industries and consumers, which enable a wider public policy consideration. For example, there have been remedies in everything from salmon to solar panels in the past. We have got the likely impact on particular geographical areas, which is about regional aspects, and the likely consequences on the competitive environment. So there is a wider competition check, and that is where it will be important to make sure that the Competition and Markets Authority is consulted.
We think the criteria are right. It is how it is done. At the moment it says, “They can take account of the following so far as relevant,” whereas we think it is really important that there is a transparent impact assessment, so we think the wording there could be clearer about how it is doing that modelling in assessing the impact. We felt that the criteria seemed sensible.
Barbara Scott: What also needs to be in there is perhaps timings. At the moment, when we have trade remedies under the EU legislation, it takes an inordinate amount of time to put them in place. If we can have something in our legislation that is timeframed and more clear, with a shorter timeframe, that will be a big plus.
Kirsty Blackman
Q
Barbara Scott: Currently, we have a bit of a divide between HMRC and Customs and how it operates processes such as economic operators, which Border Force does not come online with. No matter what we do to facilitate authorised economic operators—I detest that term—Border Force will still carry out the same controls whether a trade is authorised or not authorised. That really is something that discourages businesses from actually becoming an AEO.
There is a lot of talk about our not having a high number of AEOs in this country. That is because UK Customs has looked at trade facilitation as far as it can, and was quite facilitative to business before we even had an AEO system. For larger traders, there was a lot of facilitation allowed, whereas perhaps some other EU countries, particularly before the UCC, were not so facilitative and have used that AEO process to be more facilitative, which is why traders in, say, Germany have become authorised and in the UK they have not.
The benefits of AEO currently are very small, which is why I was pleased to see within this Bill that there are opportunities for having different levels of AEO. That could be a particular help to small businesses that cannot get over the extremely high bar that exists at the moment. Something that is smaller—a sort of bronze star for SMEs—might be better than the gold star that a multimillion-pound business can afford to obtain.
Mel Stride
Q
Jeremy White: Technically, I think you would be safe if you amended the commencement provision. At the moment, the way that it operates on exit day is that the repeal in schedule 7 of the taxation Bill automatically repeals the effect of the withdrawal Bill, which would otherwise preserve the UCC as retained EU direct legislation. You would have to effect the taxation commencement provision. That would have to be amended, so that on exit day it no longer immediately repealed the UCC. Then the withdrawal Bill would operate.
Clearly, we would identify some modifications that are required, some deficiencies, and we would have power under regulations, under the withdrawal Bill, to make regulations amending an unnecessary effect or remedying a deficiency. There would also be power under regulations under the taxation Act itself to make regulations. Those regulations would have to be enforced on exit day.
Mel Stride
Q
Jeremy White: At the moment, I think it is schedule 7 of the Bill that itself does the business to repeal the effect of the withdrawal Bill.
Mel Stride
Q
Jeremy White: That is right. If you had a qualified commencement provision, so that schedule 7 did not take effect straightaway but had to have a commencement provision, so instead of Royal Assent you had a commencement provision, you would still have the flexibility, if sadly it became appropriate, in a no-deal situation, immediately to bring this into effect. That would be possible.
Someone is still going to have to do the work. As Barbara outlined, someone in HMRC and the Treasury will have to do the work for all of these scenarios for the regulatory framework. Even if they wanted to have a recast, now is not a good time.
To pick up for a second or two on the preference agreements on replication, everything there that will be done will have to be proved. There will have to be proofs of origin. We have got a serious problem outlined, because of the Commission’s adoption yesterday of the road map to put back the information systems, which could have included common databases, as we have in other free trade agreements, particularly with China and Switzerland, that that computer system would not be available in the EU until 2025. In the earlier session you were told that a transition to 2025 is better, even legally technically for getting what we want by way of free trade agreements being replicated and being frictionless. If they are not replicated and not frictionless, then we have to be back to all of the paper certificates. We know that we will have to on the anti-dumping—we will have to employ our own police force to investigate in other countries; we will need reciprocal agreements. At the moment we benefit from the Community policing. There will be no police force—no OLAF. That is a serious problem we face on implementation in this area.
Mel Stride
Q
Jeremy White: You could allow schedule 7, part 1 to take effect. That would repeal the UCC and you could have an affirmative instrument that applied it; yes. You could use that structure.
Mel Stride
Q
Jeremy White: Except for the fact that the affirmative instrument, the SI, would have to repeal those parts of the Bill that make specific provision already. The trouble is that it is not just repealing the UCC. There are 33 pages of provision in the Bill that would have to be repealed by the affirmative statutory instrument, which will be messy. It could work, but it is better to amend the commencement provision, I would say, so that part 1 and schedule 7 do not commence as they do now.
The Chair
Order. We have now come to the end of the allotted time for the Committee. I thank all four of the witnesses very much for their attendance.
Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Bill (Second sitting)
(6 years, 10 months ago)
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The Chair
Good afternoon. We will now hear oral evidence from the Trades Union Congress, Unite, GMB and the Public and Commercial Services Union. We have until 2.45 pm for questions to these witnesses, whom I welcome. I will give them a few minutes to introduce themselves before they answer Members’ questions.
Kathleen Walker Shaw: Good afternoon, everyone. My name is Kathleen Walker Shaw. I am the European officer for the British trade union GMB.
Alan Runswick: I am Alan Runswick. I am a member of the group executive committee of the Public and Commercial Services Union, which represents 35,000 members who work for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, and I work for HMRC.
Ben Richards: Good afternoon. My name is Ben Richards. I work as an international officer for Unite the union.
Rosa Crawford: Good afternoon. My name is Rosa Crawford. I am policy officer in the international department covering trade at the Trades Union Congress.
The Chair
Thank you very much for that. If the gentlemen—or ladies—are finding this room warm and they would like to remove their jackets, they should feel free to do so. I call Peter Dowd.
Peter Dowd (Bootle) (Lab)
Q
Ben Richards: Our view is that, particularly in the scenario we will move into after Brexit, having an effective trade remedies regime for the UK is vital to protecting our manufacturing industries and the members we represent in those industries.
One of the major problems we have with the Bill is that, because so much of the crucial detail is being put into regulations, it is hard to assess properly at this stage whether it gives adequate protections. Certainly, from reading the Bill as it is now, our view as Unite is that it does not appear to give even the same protections as we currently enjoy in the EU regime, and we want to see a stronger trade remedies regime introduced in the UK in future.
Kathleen Walker Shaw: I work for the GMB, which has a number of members across a number of manufacturing sectors. I have to say that when I read the proposals in the Bill, I was extremely alarmed by how weak the remedies were in terms of anti-dumping cases. This is a complex area of trade law, and we know from the European experience, where there is a very robust system, that you cannot take your eye off the ball when you are pursuing those cases. They are very data, document and resource-heavy cases to bring forward.
I just feel that the provisions in the Bill do not fulfil the promise we were given that British jobs, British industry and the British economy would thrive post-Brexit. I feel that huge risks would be taken with our ability to protect and promote British industry and British jobs if the proposals were not amended.
Rosa Crawford: If I could add some specific concerns that we have, there is a compulsory lesser-duty rule in the Bill, which would mean that anti-dumping measures were not adequate. There is ample evidence that the lesser-duty rule is not efficient. Indeed, at EU level, the rules have been reformed to take away compulsory use of the lesser-duty rule, yet it is in the Bill, which would not provide adequate protection against dumping. There is also an economic interest test and a public interest test in the Bill. Those would allow the Secretary of State to veto recommendations by the trade remedies authority that trade remedies should be applied. We regard that as an overreach of the Secretary of State’s power that will not lead to an effective trade remedies mechanism being established.
Also, building on what Ben from Unite was saying, we are seeing a whole area of trade remedies in the Bill left to secondary legislation. China, a non-market economy, has clearly been one of the worst offenders in the last few years and has affected steel and other sectors in which we have significant numbers of members. There has been a real negative impact on jobs, and there is nothing in the primary legislation about how they will be dealt with. Again, for that we would need to see there being an effective trade remedies mechanism post-Brexit.
Peter Dowd
Q
Ben Richards: One of the things that we have been doing, as Unite, with the GMB, the TUC and our sister union, Community, is working very closely with employer organisations from a number of key sectors, in forming the Manufacturing Trade Remedies Alliance. That is in industries such as paper, steel, chemicals, tyres and in a number of other industries as well.
What is clear in our experience, certainly from Unite members, is that we have just gone through the steel crisis, which immediately threw up a crucial or fundamental issue for the UK’s manufacturing industries, but it feeds into many other areas. Our members in the paper industry are particularly concerned. There are also the rubber tyre and ceramics industries as well as many others, which are represented not only by Unite but by the GMB, Community and many other TUC unions.
Kirsty Blackman (Aberdeen North) (SNP)
Q
Alan Runswick: My specific area of expertise is Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, but I do know a little about Border Force, which has suffered cutbacks in staffing over the period. I am also aware that Border Force is the first line, as it were; if you go through a port or airport, you will see Border Force there. I used to work for HM Customs and Excise, actually, but transferred into that. Certainly there are now huge areas of the coastline that do not have any protection, effectively, by the civil service.
The other major concern for us is that Border Force is the first line of defence but its powers are limited; for many things, it then has to contact HMRC staff, which it calls in to take the next step, as it were. The clock is already ticking under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, once Border Force has made some sort of intervention.
One of the major issues that we are facing now is that HMRC is already under quite considerable pressure because of the staff cuts over the last decade. However, just as Brexit is happening, the Department is planning to shrink back from its current estate into just 13 regional centres and five specialist sites, leaving the majority of the ports and airports very large distances indeed from the nearest HMRC office. The time that it would take to travel—if you are called out, any time of day or night—to assist Border Force in dealing with smuggling, interventions and that kind of thing will clearly be a major issue for delivery of working between HMRC and Border Force.
For example, there will be no HMRC office north of Glasgow and Edinburgh—nothing in Scotland except Glasgow and Edinburgh. There will be no HMRC office in the south-west other than in Bristol, which in fact is hardly the south-west; if any of you know the south-west, you will realise that. There will be no HMRC office along the south coast dealing with this kind of intervention. So HMRC is closing offices in places such as Southampton and so on—indeed it is closing this work on the east coast around the ports of Felixstowe and Harwich, with the closure of the Ipswich office.
So we think that there will be a real struggle to deliver the work that HMRC does with Border Force in that situation. My union believes that HMRC should pause the office closure programme until it is clear what the Government will need HMRC to do in a post-Brexit situation.
Kirsty Blackman
Q
Alan Runswick: First, I need to say that my union does not have a position in principle on whether the country should leave or remain and specifically does not have a position on whether we should remain in the single market or the customs union. We are neutral on those questions. In terms of the impact on jobs, we are concerned about the uncertainty of the position and what the future might hold. Are you talking specifically about jobs in the civil service, or jobs in general across the economy?
Kirsty Blackman
In general.
Alan Runswick: As far as the economy is concerned, I would defer to my colleagues here on that position. The position in the civil service is clearly going to be massively impacted depending on whether Britain remains in the customs union or joins a customs union, or what the terms might be if there is no customs union. That is a huge period of uncertainty as far as we are concerned. The jobs and delivery impact of that from my union’s point of view is that it is impossible to say what would be needed.
At the moment, HMRC are actually making people redundant. As offices close, staff are being laid over and years of experience are being lost, at a time when our chief executive is forecasting that we might need to recruit 3,000 to 5,000 extra people. It is complete madness as far as we are concerned to make experienced staff redundant because they are not in the “right area”, when we might need to recruit people. So there is a jobs impact within HMRC. In terms of the wider economy, I defer to my colleagues from the other trade unions.
Kathleen Walker Shaw: A major concern of a lot of unions involved in manufacturing, as well as the concerns about properly protecting and supporting industries in terms of remedies, is that so many of our industries that export or import components or elements of their production are reliant on just-in-time processes. With many products, the margins are so tight that even the slightest delay or friction in terms of the movement of goods will put us out of competition.
As Alan rightly pointed out, we do not know what the Government’s objectives are in terms of future customs relationships with the EU or beyond. In our conversations with other unions that work on borders or in shipping, we are trying to get a picture of where the lock points are. In terms of policy, we are pushing to guarantee smooth administration and as little friction as we can in terms of the movement of the goods, to preserve the just-in-time production processes that so many industries rely on. That is not just about being competitive—in the food sector for instance, it is about getting food there in a state in which it can be sold. We cannot give fixed numbers because we are dealing with the unknown, but it is important not to underestimate the multi-chain effect of things going wrong and policy not being the right one in terms of border administration.
Some of you may have already seen that some groupings of German and French federations have done assessments of what various types of Brexit might cost. Some of the figures from the German employers federations in terms of the added costs of a not positive Brexit agreement are eye-watering. We wish that we had a little bit more of that investigation going on at Government level as well. We have to know what we are facing. At the moment we are living with the fear of what we know through working at hands-on level with the production structures across a number of industries.
Rosa Crawford: Can I just add a perspective from across the union movement, because obviously the TUC represents a majority of trade unions in the UK? Our position is that any future deal with the EU must protect jobs and must protect rights. We have said that the Government were acting recklessly to take a customs union and single market membership off the table at this early stage in the negotiations. We know that it is important to protect rights and to ensure that UK workers do not fall behind those in the EU. We should have single market membership as an option on the table, because that provides an assurance of rights backed by the European Court of Justice.
Ensuring barrier-free, frictionless trade is a very important part of our position and our statement of intent for any post-Brexit deal. Customs union membership is one way of achieving that, but what we see in the legislation is only the possibility under clause 31 of joining a customs union. The terms are not clear and we would need to see the detail. While we are clear that there are risks in not having a relationship that ensures tariff-free, barrier-free, frictionless trade and great costs associated with adding customs checks, which my colleagues have talked about, we have not seen any detail of what the Government are offering. We need to see that detail to protect jobs and our members’ livelihoods going forward.
The Chair
I am going to call Emma Hardy. I ask witnesses to make their answers a little shorter, because several Members wish to ask questions.
Emma Hardy (Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle) (Lab)
Q
Ben Richards: We represent members in the transport industry. In its current form, it is very hard to know whether the Bill will prevent excessive delays in importing freight, simply because we see so much of the detail being pushed to secondary legislation. That is where we would want to have these sorts of conversations to give evidence and have the discussion. One of our major concerns is that the real crux of the detail of our future system is being left to secondary legislation, where we and you will not have the opportunity to engage in detailed debates about exactly those issues.
Emma Hardy
Q
Ben Richards: It goes back to what Rosa was just talking about with the need to have a frictionless aspect to trade. That may be through a type of customs union arrangement, but in the Bill as it stands it is simply not clear. It is very hard to say whether this is the right or wrong way, but we know that with the automotive industry, in which we have tens of thousands of members, on average each part in a car built in the UK crosses a European border and our border anywhere from five to six times. Even a delay of five or 10 minutes added into the just-in-time production systems could create significant problems for such industries.
Alan Runswick: Briefly, on processing, my union is unable to say whether the new Customs Declarations System will be able to cope with the vast increase in the volume of declarations that would come under one of the scenarios we have, because we do not know that it will be that scenario. Similarly, some scenarios will require a big increase in staffing, as has already been mentioned, and those people have to be trained as well. Nobody knows yet what the rules will be. There is a great uncertainty about that position, and that means we have to be very concerned about whether HMRC could cope with the new situation to assist with frictionless trade.
Mark Menzies (Fylde) (Con)
Q
Rosa Crawford: This is something that the trade remedies alliance, which Ben from Unite mentioned, has been working on with manufacturers associations. We have produced evidence on that and we could supply it to the Committee.
I know there has been specific research on the use of the lesser duty rule in the case of solar panels. We have been in discussion with officials on that. There is an argument that the lesser duty rule applied to the import of solar panels allowed a balance with affordable solar panels. The specific discussion was on social housing and allowing those panels to be provided to social housing, but there was also a measure of action taken against unfair trade practice. Talking to colleagues working in the glass associations and other manufacturer associations, they saw those solar panels as being of a lower quality. I am not speaking from a technical point of view, but they had enough information to judge that those solar panels were of a lower quality.
When we think about the importance of using high-quality materials in social housing—obviously in the shadow of the Grenfell disaster—with solar panels just one aspect of that, that judgment always needs to be made about the low price and the quality of the product. Obviously, there is an implication for support for British industry and what you do to the British industry that could have made a higher-quality panel, and for investment around skills and training to bring in those panels.
Mark Menzies
Q
Rosa Crawford: There will be other examples that I can supply to the Committee. The trade remedies alliance will be happy to provide those.
Ben Richards: On specific cases, that is why we are working collectively with the employers organisations. The trade unions and employers are working together because our interests are combined here. Particularly in relation to the lesser duty rule, it is very interesting that very few other World Trade Organisation members use such a rule as this. Indeed, the European Union in its trade remedies regime is moving towards making the use of the lesser duty rule much more conditional, because it has seen weaknesses in having a mandatory lesser duty rule. In the changes that are taking place at the moment in the EU trade remedies regime, there are some important developments in relation to the lesser duty rule over there.
Kathleen Walker Shaw: May I add a supplementary point on the concern for the lesser duty rule? The problem with that particular form of remedy, because you are creating a sort of cap on the level of remedy, is that it is based on the assessment of injury, which is a difficult thing to do accurately. The difficulty that we have, as I say, particularly with industries that are working on moderate profit margins, is that those industries could be put out of business by the fact of the injury being assessed at a perhaps inaccurate level.
A lot of these fledgling industries that we are looking at, such as clean energy—solar panels is a good example—are new forms of industry that we want to see develop in the UK, and the Government have on more than one occasion identified them as being great growth industries. However, China also likes the look of that market, as does Vietnam. If we are not prepared to protect British industry to grow those new industries, then by overuse of the lesser duty rule we are cutting them up before the roots have started to take in the ground. It is a consideration for us more widely to look at the lesser duty rule in terms of our economic ambitions for UK manufacturing industry into the future, because we are in a position of “cake and eat it” there on a lot of young industries.
The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mel Stride)
Q
Kathleen Walker Shaw: My union is of a school that believes that, in terms of remedies, we should be looking to a much broader assessment of what is taken into consideration, so we have welcomed the recent movement at the European level on trade defence measures and consideration of environmental and social issues. That is a bit of progress. We would have liked more of that progress. What we do not want to see is a narrowing of trade defence instruments that cut out the scope for that. Guaranteeing consumers good prices is one thing, but keeping the quality of good manufacturing in the UK is something very close to home for our members—obviously not just of our union, but all colleagues here. It is an issue of getting that balance.
The EU trade defence mechanisms and its anti-dumping rules are still within the WTO rules. For us to be going bargain basement on WTO is perhaps not the safest bet for dealing with a post-Brexit economy. We would like to see robust trade remedies that protect our industries from unfair competition, rather than working on the margins of the risk of putting good, competitive industries in the UK out of business.
Mel Stride
Q
Kathleen Walker Shaw: It goes back to the point that it is very difficult to assess that accurately.
Mel Stride
Q
Kathleen Walker Shaw: Our great concern with the Bill in its current form is that the provisions are not there to guarantee that. As our colleagues have said, the resources in terms of Government trade experts are not there to guide us through. For the best part of more than 15 years, we have not dealt with trade. You will need the resources to get those injury claims accurately assessed, and we have no confidence that the provisions are there in the Bill to guarantee that.
Rosa Crawford: I think this links with the issue of who is making the assessment. We have a concern about the parallel Bill to the one we are considering here: the Trade Bill, which sets out the provisions to create the Trade Remedies Authority. There is nothing in that Bill that indicates who will be on that authority. For trade unions, it is important that we have equal representation of trade unions and employer representatives, because we are directly involved in those sectors and we believe that trade remedies should be assessed using the insights of those directly affected in those sectors. It is unfortunate that from the Trade Bill we do not have confidence that we will have that representation, but we hope that we will see it developing in the legislation.
If trade unions were asked honestly to assess the lesser duty rule—if we had that discussion and we were genuinely taken into the process—that would be a very different conversation. At the moment, through this Bill we are being given a compulsory lesser duty rule without having seen any evidence that suggests that we need it and it is desirable. I would flip it round and say, why do we need the lesser duty rule and how are trade unions involved in the assessment of its effectiveness? Consumers are also workers who are employed in some of these industries, and they will not benefit from having unfair trade practice disadvantage them and the quality of their goods. That is something we must bear in mind.
Mel Stride
Q
Rosa Crawford: I refer to the specific case about solar panels, and I am happy to provide more information. The trade remedies alliance has done additional research that we can supply to the Committee, so there is evidence that we can supply that it has not been effective.
Nic Dakin (Scunthorpe) (Lab)
Q
Ben Richards: Not that I am aware of, and I think that what happened with that steel crisis is one of the reasons our members do not have confidence in what is in the Bill at the moment. Even with the reservations that we have about the way EU trade remedies worked, as Kathleen spoke about, the EU was trying to deal with that situation. Unfortunately, our members felt that it was their own Government who were holding back the process of imposing sufficient remedies at a European level to deal with the situation of Chinese steel dumping.
Nic Dakin
Q
Kathleen Walker Shaw: The introduction of the economic interest test in itself, and then a further public interest test that the Secretary of State would then make a final decision on, is a confusion. First of all, the economic interest test is not defined clearly enough in our view, in terms of what it is assessing. The public interest test is just not defined at all. We have to assume that that would be an issue of national security, but a concern that we have about the economic interest test in terms of the procedure as laid out—it is still very vague in some of these areas—is that it would come before interim measures. If you are an industry that is suffering from anti-dumping, you do not want to be waiting for the conduction of an economic interest test—we still do not know the nuts and bolts of how that will happen—while somebody is roasting your fingers in an anti-dumping case. By the time you get to the interim measures, said British company may not be there any more. Having that where it is in the process is very flawed. Having it at all has a serious question mark over it, in terms of its broadness and definition. It is something that you cannot pin down.
Another concern that I have is the—
The Chair
Can I just ask that you keep it short? We have three more Members to get some questions in.
Kathleen Walker Shaw: Sorry. The lack of scrutiny, in terms of parliamentary process, over the economic and public interest elements of it is a huge worry to us regarding the Bill.
The Chair
I have Anneliese Dodds, Jonathan Reynolds and Peter Dowd, and we must finish by 2.45 pm.
Anneliese Dodds (Oxford East) (Lab/Co-op)
Q
Rosa Crawford: A step forward would be to use as a baseline the new rules that the EU has adopted, whereby non-market economies are not regarded as reliable in having a price indication for the goods that they export. Rather, an analogue country of a similar level of development would be used to judge whether an unfair pricing practice was used. We hope that that will allow the EU to take stronger measures against countries—not just China, but Vietnam and other countries that are using undue levels of Government influence to set prices at a low level.
In the current UK legislation, we do not see any approach like that. Indeed, we know that the UK Government have been holding back EU attempts to take stronger measures against China and other non-market economies. I think we can be forgiven for not quite believing it when we are told that in the secondary legislation we will have adequate measures to deal with non-market economies. We do not have an indication that the Government are likely to introduce secondary legislation on that.
Ben Richards: A key new development within the European Union is that, when they are assessing an analogue country, where there is more than one, they can now also take social and environmental factors into account. That is obviously absolutely crucial, because if a country is abusing labour rights or environmental regulations, that is also trade distortion, and should be taken into account in our trade remedies regime.
Kathleen Walker Shaw: There are two more points that are vital in terms of dealing with the distortions in the UK within the Bill framework, the first of which is the timing of it. To expedite these procedures at a time when they can actually help the companies while they remain competitive and able to see off the challenge was a problem that we had in the steel crisis, as some of you will be aware. Even the EU timetables at that time were dragging on too long and exacerbating some of the problems that we had across the steel industry, so the speed with which we can move the procedures is vital. The placing of the economic interest test in there makes me doubt that we will be able to do that.
Again, setting the tariffs at a level at which they will have the effect of adding the effective protection that we need was something that we struggled with agreement on at European level. The European Commission was going to set the levels on certain types of steel much higher than the UK Government. In the end, it became a political process rather than an economic process of what was required to protect and maintain the competitiveness of British industries and other European industries in that case.
Jonathan Reynolds (Stalybridge and Hyde) (Lab/Co-op)
Q
My worry on the public and economic tests is that, even in something like the steel crisis, there were people arguing for the benefits of very cheap steel coming into UK for construction and so forth. If those tests are not drafted correctly, frankly, we do not have any trade remedies at all. If we are going to have them in the Bill, how can we draft them to ensure that they are robust and fair? Who should be involved in the Trade Remedies Authority to ensure that that is the case?
Ben Richards: We need an opportunity to have that debate, which we will not have at all with the Bill as it is currently drafted. It will simply be written into secondary legislation—we will not have that ability. We have four or five minutes left to have a discussion about how it should be drawn up. It would take us another couple of hours. That is what we want, as a trade union movement: an involvement in these discussions and debates.
We have huge concerns about the way in which the appointments are being made to the Trade Remedies Authority. In effect, in the way that the Bill is currently written, we are not seeing one economic interest test but three. To give you a one-sentence answer about how it should be is very difficult: we want to engage in that debate. We want to have a role in that process in the future to ensure that our members are confident that those decisions are being taken with their interests in mind.
Kathleen Walker Shaw: On the Trade Remedies Authority, its structure is very important. We would like to see it set up in line with the Health and Safety Commission, where we have three employers, three trade unions and three other interests. I am a bit concerned that we are limiting that to nine, because I have a strong concern that devolved Administrations need to be involved in that process as well.
I would also like to see the Bill developed to give a role for parliamentary scrutiny—for the TRA to be liaising with structures within wider parliamentary scrutiny—on the European economic area IT, and on the decisions of the TRA, and to remove the power of the Secretary of State to veto a decision of the collective scrutiny of Parliament and the TRA on remedies. In that way, we might be some way to getting to the bottom of a justified and effective remedy.
Peter Dowd
Q
Kathleen Walker Shaw: You are picking at a wound there. I was the poor person that drafted our response to the trade White Paper. I spent a lot of evenings doing that and I was more than a little concerned when I submitted that paper—less than eight hours later, the Bills were published. For people who take policy and their engagement with Government and Parliament very seriously, it was difficult not to feel the contempt with which that response that I spent hours sweating over to place before Parliament was received.
Consultation over the trade and customs Bills is vital because the Government have to get this right. There is no margin for getting this wrong. The future of Brexit hangs on these two bills: trade and the taxation cross-border. That is what our success or failure post-Brexit will hang on. I am very nervous about it, but I am more nervous about the fact that the Government are pretending that they are consulting us and they are not. We are very serious people and we want to be taken seriously. We want to help you to get the trade Bill and the cross-border trade Bill right, but we can do that only if we are a serious part of the process.
We have been engaging, but we have not been listened to. It is not enough for the Government to say, “We have consulted”, because if you miss off, “But we haven’t listened to a word you’ve said”, the quality and the integrity of that consultation is brought into severe question. It will not stop us from being delighted at being invited to come and have these conversations with you—we are not making this up, particularly Alan, who works for HMRC.
Alan Runswick: On delivery, my union wrote to Jon Thompson, the chief executive of HMRC, immediately after the referendum result to say that it was a game changer, that he needed to pause the office closure programme, stop making people redundant and evaluate this new situation. We have not even mentioned, and we will not get to, the issue of import VAT for business and for delivery. As well as customs duties, there will be a big increase in import VAT transactions. They will need to be processed, and staff will need to run a compliance regime under the new situation, to counter evasion and avoidance.
We also feel that we have not been properly consulted. We have been trying to engage the Department in serious talks about delivery, how staff can be recruited and trained and how we can retain the existing skills. We most definitely feel that we have not had those serious discussions about how HMRC can be made fit for purpose in the new Brexit position.
The Chair
There are no further questions from Members, so I thank the witnesses for their evidence this afternoon.
Examination of Witness
Joel Blackwell gave evidence.
The Chair
Good afternoon. We will now hear oral evidence from the Hansard Society until 3.15 pm. Mr Blackwell, would you like to introduce yourself and tell us a little about yourself?
Joel Blackwell: It is a pleasure to be in front of the Committee. I am a senior researcher at the Hansard Society. We are a non-partisan, independent research charity that seeks to promote representative democracy in the UK and across the world. In particular, we do a lot of work on parliamentary procedure and the legislative process.
In 2014, I co-authored the first comprehensive study of delegated legislation in more than 80 years, called “The Devil in the Detail: Parliament and Delegated Legislation”. I am here in the capacity of having a keen interest in research in the delegated legislation processes, particularly Parliament’s role in the scrutiny of statutory instruments.
Mr William Wragg (Hazel Grove) (Con)
Q
Joel Blackwell: That is a good question. In 2014, with our “The Devil is in the Detail” report, we wanted to tell the story of delegated legislation. The research that we did, as far back as the Statute of Proclamations, but particularly in the 20th century, showed that many reports had been published that raised big concerns with the way that the House of Commons in particular scrutinises statutory instruments. In 1933, the Donoughmore Committee reported on the inadequate procedures in place and the inadequate scrutiny of SIs by Parliament. We wanted to raise the point that the issues raised by that Committee in 1933 had not been resolved.
There has been a problem in the past, particularly in the House of Commons, with engagement with the scrutiny of delegated legislation. Part of that could be because it is very technical and can be, dare I say it, quite boring at times.
Mr Wragg
Q
Joel Blackwell: Exactly. We think that the lack of engagement has been primarily because of the inadequate procedures in the House of Commons—particularly two things. The first is the way that MPs, if they want to debate a negative instrument, have to use the early-day motion procedure. Secondly, we think the Delegated Legislation Committees for debating under the affirmative procedure are inadequate. We think that has been the issue with engagement thus far.
Mr Wragg
Q
Joel Blackwell: It is a very complex, convoluted process. During our research, which started in 2011 and culminated in the report in 2014, that was a big issue for parliamentarians and, more importantly, for individuals and businesses that are supposed to adhere to the rules and regulations that are being brought forward in Parliament. Complexity is a problem, but I think it is more to do with the processes, particularly in the House of Commons.
Mr Wragg
Q
Joel Blackwell: It is bringing forward old questions that are yet to be addressed, despite numerous parliamentary Committees trying to, and then putting them on the “hard to do” pile. Knowing that the Brexit Bills are going to have to be framework Bills—based on the fact that the legislation for Brexit is going to need some speed and flexibility—the Hansard Society thinks that this is a perfect opportunity to highlight the problems and for parliamentarians to get to grips with them, when challenged and faced with one of the most complex legislative tasks that Parliament has seen.
The Chair
Thank you. There are five Committee members who wish to pose a question. I would ask that you keep your answers as concise as possible, so that everyone gets a chance to touch on the point that matters to them.
Anneliese Dodds
Q
The question that I wanted to ask was, do you think there might be a role for sunset clauses in relation to some pieces of delegated legislation?
Joel Blackwell: I warmly welcome the House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee report, which took the unusual step of publishing its report on this Bill while it was still in the Commons, as it did with the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill. Usually it waits until its introduction in the Lords. The report raised the issue of sunset clauses, which are very important in terms of the links between making changes to EU law in the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill and doing that through clauses 42, 45, 47 and 51. It makes valid comments on the potential of those powers. The powers are not required to be used in perpetuity, and sunset clauses, such as the ones inserted for clauses 7, 8 and 9, would bring some consistency, and that makes perfect sense. We would support the view of the Delegated Powers Committee on that point.
Kirsty Blackman
Q
Joel Blackwell: The negative procedure is the default procedure for scrutiny of delegated legislation, and in this Bill that represents that fact; the majority are subject to the negative procedure. Again, referring to the Delegated Powers Committee report, we would agree with the clauses they highlight that they think are negative and should be affirmative, particularly the ones that are what we call Henry VIII powers amending primary legislation. That Committee has always said that there needs to be a compelling reason why a negative procedure would be adequate for Henry VIII powers. Reading the delegated powers note, I cannot see a compelling reason; I think they should be made affirmative.
Emma Hardy
Q
Joel Blackwell: Of course. At the moment, the Chair of the Procedure Committee, Charles Walker, has tabled amendments that would introduce a sifting mechanism for clauses 7, 8 and 9 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, which means that for those SIs laden with those powers that are subject to the negative power, a new European statutory instruments Committee—in the House of Commons only at the moment—would have the ability to recommend an upgrade if it thinks it more appropriate that the negative should be subject to the affirmative procedure.
At the moment that is only a recommendation; the Government is not obliged to follow that recommendation, and we have concerns about that. We proposed in September our variation of a sifting committee, which would combine the sifting mechanism with Committee scrutiny. That is in keeping with what we call the strengthened scrutiny procedure, but many others call the super-affirmative procedure: if you see a power in a Bill that you think is extremely wide—particularly if it involves numerous policy areas and Government Departments—you would say, “The affirmative is probably not rigorous enough; we would like a more rigorous procedure than the affirmative.”
You would create what we call a strengthened scrutiny procedure, which is in essence Committee scrutiny work. It is not just sifting; sifting is one element of that super-affirmative, but it potentially involves the ability to table conditional amendments as a Committee, and the Government being obliged to listen to those recommendations. That was the Committee we wanted to see—a Committee with teeth. At the moment, we do not think the amendments tabled by the Chair of the Procedure Committee go very far, and we would like to see more amendments tabled to the Bill, particularly in the Lords, that would give that Committee more bite, in keeping with strengthened scrutiny procedures.
Nic Dakin
Q
Joel Blackwell: It is a good question. Referring back to Ms Blackman’s question, I think all Henry VIII powers should be subject to the affirmative procedure unless the Government give a compelling reason, and we do not think that that has happened in the Delegated Powers Committee note. The six Henry VIII powers contained in this Bill are not as wide as clauses 7, 8 and 9 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill or the clauses we have seen in the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006 and the Public Bodies Act 2011. They are constrained merely by the fact that this Bill is focusing particularly on taxation, border trade, customs arrangements and what-have-you. So I think, in keeping with the views of the Delegated Powers Committee, that the affirmative procedure would be sufficient in this context.
However, parliamentarians, particularly in the House of Commons, have made it clear over the last few months that there are issues with the scrutiny of delegated legislation—more so than they have since we have been doing our research. In particular, there seems to be a view that they would like to have more meaningful and effective oversight over Brexit SIs. The sifting committee was intended to be part of that, but at the moment the sifting committee will only look at clauses 7,8 and 9 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill and will not touch the other Brexit-related Bills. If it is still the view of the House of Commons that they would like to look at all Brexit-related SIs then you could, for example, insert into Standing Orders that the new European statutory instruments Committee looks at clauses 42, 45, 47 and 51 of this Bill if it so wishes.
Mel Stride
Q
Joel Blackwell: A Member of either House who wants to pray against or seek to annul a negative instrument has to do so within a 40-day period. That is one of the restrictions: you have to do it within 40 days, otherwise you have the situation that arose with the personal independence payment regulations and the student fees regulations. The Opposition wanted to debate those regulations but the 40-day period had ended, so they used Opposition day debates in another Session. They had to hold the debates on “revoke” motions, and there was the issue of whether those would be statutorily binding if the Government were defeated. It turned out that the Government did not vote at that point. So there is that limit.
We think the negative procedure is fundamentally flawed, because in order to debate a negative SI, an MP has to use an early-day motion, for which no fixed time is allocated. That means that whether a negative instrument is debated is purely in the hands of the Government. We would like to see that changed. In “Taking Back Control”, we proposed that a new sift and scrutiny committee should be created, and that that power should be given to that committee. You would have to tweak Standing Orders to ensure that the debate was heard, but that is our view.
Mel Stride
Q
Joel Blackwell: Yes, absolutely. The negative procedure plays an important role. There is legislation that is extremely technical and almost administrative in nature, for which the negative procedure is appropriate. In our view, the scrutiny procedures in the Commons—not in the Lords—are inadequate. Our position is not that the negative procedure should not exist, but that something needs to be done to improve MPs’ ability to debate those SIs.
Peter Dowd
Q
Joel Blackwell: I do not think I would agree in those terms. There are serious constitutional issues raised by the withdrawal Bill and the related Brexit Bills. This is not the first time that the Government have used Henry VIII powers. This is not the first time, nor will it be the last time, that we see framework legislation, or skeleton legislation. In all honesty, the use of delegated legislation is unavoidable in legislating for Brexit. Framework legislation is probably unavoidable for Bills that deal with issues such as welfare and indirect tax law, particularly if they are subject to change and involve highly complex and technical detail. The key is parliamentary oversight of that.
There are numerous ways that you can constrain powers in Bills. We have seen some attempts to do that in the House of Commons, and no doubt we will see that happen in the House of Lords with the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill. Fundamentally, though, although you can try to tightly define powers or to insert a list of actions that you are not able to use SIs for, you are ultimately going to have to confront the inadequate procedures for scrutinising negative and affirmative instruments in the House of Commons; otherwise, it will not matter. If you really want to take back control and have meaningful and effective oversight of delegated legislation, you have to focus on improving the negative and affirmative procedures in the House of Commons.
Peter Dowd
Q
Joel Blackwell: I am not sure it is a significant shift; the problem has always been that the balance between Parliament and the Executive in the control of delegated legislation has always been on the side of the Executive. We have always argued, and have argued in this report, that you need to redress that balance, and part of that would be to improve the scrutiny procedures that I have mentioned. I would not say that there has been a fundamental shift from this Bill onwards. There has always been an issue regarding the balance of power in the use and scrutiny of delegated legislation.
Peter Dowd
Are you saying, therefore, that this is neither a quantitative nor a qualitative shift of power from Parliament to—
The Chair
I think that question has been posed in three different ways, so unless Mr Blackwell has anything else to say, I am not sure he can add to it.
Joel Blackwell: No.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for International Trade (Graham Stuart)
Q
Joel Blackwell: It is important that Members take note of the delegated powers Committee’s concerns on particular issues that it has highlighted. I do think that there is an issue with the use of the made affirmative procedure for cases that do not seem to me to be urgent; that procedure is used for reasons of urgency and should be confined to that. I have never been entirely clear or comfortable with the use of the first instance affirmative procedure. If it has been viewed that a provision should be subject to the affirmative procedure for the first time, it should be subject to the affirmative procedure all the time. The two Henry VIII powers are subject to the negative procedure as well. So there are issues with the Bill.
In terms of saying that the Bill is fine, yes, you have to use framework legislation for issues like this. What concerns the Hansard Society is when framework Bills are laid before Parliament and contain no detail whatsoever on the powers that they wish to confer on Ministers. The lack of an opportunity for the Government to provide draft regulations alongside scrutiny of this Bill, for example, will be a matter of concern, and is something we raised about the Welfare Reform Act 2012. So there are issues with framework Bills.
If there is a huge lack of detail on what the Government intend to do with delegated powers, what usually happens is that you get situations that we would like to avoid where you have clause 7 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill that is so wide that there are issues regarding the balance of power between Parliament and the Executive.
Jonathan Reynolds
Q
Joel Blackwell: That is a question I have been posing to myself for the last few days. Honestly, no. We have to be careful, knowing that the procedures for the scrutiny of delegated legislation in the Commons are inadequate, that we do not just fall back on using a strengthened, enhanced or super-affirmative procedure for everything when the affirmative procedure would be appropriate. We need to play the ball rather than the man, to use a football analogy. You have to look at the powers that are brought in front of you and decide there and then whether the scrutiny period is appropriate.
The problem with this Bill, and with other supply Bills, is that the vehicle to highlight inappropriateness in the degree of scrutiny and the appropriateness of delegated powers is the House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, and there is no counterpart in the House of Commons. The Bill just highlights the lack of that counterpart. But no, looking at the powers, I do not think that the strengthened scrutiny procedure would be useful in this case.
Mr Wragg
Q
Joel Blackwell: Having said that I do not think the strengthened scrutiny procedure would be appropriate for any of the powers, they are wide powers. If we look at clause 51 in particular, the wording is very similar to that used for clause 7, so I think there are similarities. What has been highlighted is that people would like, potentially, to use a Committee to look at all Brexit statutory instruments and at the moment that will not happen. You could insert a change into the Standing Orders that would allow you to do that, which is something to consider.
Kirsty Blackman
Q
Joel Blackwell: I think that the Hansard Society would like to see an equivalent Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, first off, in the lower House—or some MP in the composition of a Joint Committee or what have you. That would be a good opportunity.
I think that delegated powers notes are extremely useful documents. This one is 174 pages long. There are well over 150 delegated powers in the Bill. Some of the justifications I am struggling with, particularly as regards the use of urgency and non-urgency. I think time is an issue here, particularly if you do not have the backstop of further scrutiny by a Chamber—the second House—that is usually very good at looking at delegated legislation and has taking the lead on it in the past.
When we were doing a similar Bill, which became the Welfare Reform Act 2012, a call by many MPs on the Public Bill Committee at the time was that it would be really useful if they had draft regulations alongside the scrutiny of the Bill. You could do things like that to improve scrutiny of delegated powers but, fundamentally, the lack of representation, the fact that you would have to wait for the Bill to get to the House of Lords for a report to be published, is an issue.
Perhaps one way around that is that the House of Lords Delegated Powers Committee does what it has done for this Bill and the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, and publishes, as usual practice, the Bill as soon as it enters the House of Commons.
Anneliese Dodds
Q
Joel Blackwell: On the first point, with regards to sub-delegation or tertiary legislation and this use of public notice, the fact that they will not be subject to any parliamentary scrutiny is concerning. We basically reiterate the points made in the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee: that if public notices can do the same as regulations they should be subject to parliamentary scrutiny, just as regulations would be. Sub-delegation is an issue for us because there is a lack of parliamentary scrutiny. In some cases it might not be appropriate, but it should still be considered as usual practice, and at the moment it appears not to be.
With regard to the Trade Remedies Authority, the Hansard Society has not really considered that yet. My colleague Brigid has probably, as I speak, just finished on the Trade Bill, so I am happy to write to the Committee about our points on that.
Peter Dowd
Q
Joel Blackwell: The fact that it is usually not subject to any parliamentary scrutiny is of concern to us.
Mel Stride
Q
Joel Blackwell: It is a good point. Specifically on this Bill, it is the fact that it says it can do what regulations could do and that would be an issue. In terms of guidance codes of practice, they are laid before Parliament and that is not the case for this Bill. You would not necessarily have to clog up the system with things that are extremely administrative in nature, but there is the fact that Parliament is delegating a legislative power to the Government and if you can do what is done in regulations, it would make sense that they should be subject to the same level of parliamentary scrutiny as those regulations.
The Chair
Kirsty Blackman, this will probably have to be the last question, depending on how lengthy the answer is.
Kirsty Blackman
Q
Joel Blackwell: I am afraid I am not a lawyer, so I am not particularly comfortable answering that question, but there is an issue with regards to the hierarchy of primary and delegated legislation. As much certainty as possible is a big thing for lawyers.
The Chair
Are there any further questions from the Committee? No. Thank you for your time and services this afternoon, Mr Blackwell.
Examination of Witnesses
Tim Reardon, Robert Windsor and Richard Ballantyne gave evidence.
The Chair
For the record, could you gentlemen please briefly introduce yourselves to the Committee?
Robert Windsor: I am the director of the British International Freight Association and my primary responsibility is to do with policy and compliance.
Tim Reardon: Good afternoon. I am from the UK Chamber of Shipping, which is the trade association for shipping companies based in the UK, carrying goods and passengers into and out of the country. My role there is as policy director looking after, among other things, the industry’s relations with Customs and Excise.
Richard Ballantyne: Good afternoon. I am the chief executive of the British Ports Association. My role and association covers all areas of ports policy. I have to apologise: I am not a technical or customs expert, but I am here in the spirit of co-operation and to help you where I can.
Mike Hill (Hartlepool) (Lab)
Q
Tim Reardon: Our members are carriers of goods. The obligation to submit a customs declaration falls on the importer—it does not necessarily fall on the carrier, although the carrier can do it as part of the service that he offers to his customer. Our concern is that unless the process for submitting and processing those declarations does not interrupt the physical movement of the goods, then the movement of the goods off our ships, through the terminal and into the domestic market will be interrupted. Similarly, leaving the country we would want to be able to ensure that those vehicles, particularly in a ferry context, are able to drive straight through the docking gate, through the terminal and on to the ships in the same seamless way as they do now.
Richard Ballantyne: Following Tim’s points, it is probably fair to say that the majority of UK port authorities are relatively calm about Brexit, but we have the operational interest. Tim alluded to the ro-ro ferry terminals, such as Dover, Holyhead, Portsmouth and many others, which provide and facilitate around 10,000 lorry movements a day between the UK and the EU. It is a substantial part of trade. The operational impact—how those customs processes will be facilitated at the border—is a big concern for a large portion of my membership.
The Chair
The witnesses are free to answer if you would like to add something, but do not feel obliged to.
Robert Windsor: My members are heavily involved in the provision of customs entries. I am sure that you have seen the figures of what the new numbers could be—they are substantial. It would depend largely on the type of customs entry—whether it was a simplified or non-simplified entry that had to be submitted at the frontier—and on how that will impact on trade.
Back in 1992, we had 125 members in the Dover area alone doing customs entries. We now have 24 members and they take care of all aspects of it. My members are quite categorically saying that we cannot go back to 1992: that would gum up the thing completely, and the impact on my members would be more staff, facilities, time taken for training, and how all that will work. There is the big impact of the re-imposition of VAT on goods coming in to the country, because if you have a duty deferment with customs, you have to fund it. The point is that you fund two months’ deferment, not one. Those elements are definitely concerning my members.
Kirstene Hair (Angus) (Con)
Q
Richard Ballantyne: It is a concern. You can imagine that a lot of the Government’s attention is on the Dover corridor, and probably rightly so—that is where the main challenge is.
Going back to my opening statements, if we remove ro-ro for one minute, for a lot of bulk shipments—Robert may correct me if I am wrong—where there is one commodity on a shipment, there is a bit more time, and the environment is one where shipping agents are usually helping out, submitting information that then is facilitated to HMRC. We hope that either those agents or inventory linking as part of the Union customs code, which is coming forward, would mean that smaller ports such as Montrose are not disadvantaged.
There are concerns that there could be certain delays at the border—we would not want to see that, but perhaps the sensitivity at a bulk handling port or a port with break bulk is less than at a ro-ro terminal, where lorries basically want to get out as soon as possible. If they are stuck in a terminal, backlogs and queues start and the operational challenges associated with that.
Anneliese Dodds
Q
Robert Windsor: My members are very concerned about that. The Dover straits corridor is causing particular concern because it is a 24/7 activity—those lorries are coming in all the time. There have been issues with staffing at those areas. You have to differentiate between Border Force activity, which tends to be frontier, and the work done at the national clearance hub based in Salford. They provide 24/7 cover but, in air and sea, you could basically say that from about 6 o’clock or 7 o’clock in the evening there is a noticeable decline in the workload. If you put ro-ro coming in through Dover with a customs declaration, there will be less of a decline in the work being undertaken there.
It is not just Border Force that we have to consider. A lot of foodstuffs potentially could do with some sort of inspection. Even if there is a risk-based system, a certain proportion of that may still require inspection. Multiple Government agencies at a national level and a local level will face this impact. It will have an impact on my members because you will require more people to work in what is regarded as an out-of-hours situation. That will have a considerable impact on costs.
Kirsty Blackman
Q
Tim Reardon: From our perspective, it would depend on what the nature of the customs union was—whether it provided for goods to move freely between the UK and the EU without any form of declaration, or whether it related only to customs fiscal controls. For example, if the agreement did not also cover animal and plant health standards, you would end up with a significant chunk of the traffic still being controlled. Only stuff that did not contain foods or anything like that would be within the scope of that customs union agreement.
Clearly, if the effect of any agreed union was to replicate the existing arrangements, we would expect no disruption to the movement of goods, but to achieve that it would need to be a very broadly drawn union agreement that extended beyond purely customs fiscal issues.
Richard Ballantyne: I run an association. We are not a political organisation, so we took no side in the referendum. Statements such as, “We think the UK should or should not be in the customs union” are difficult for me to make. What I would say, which is a bit of a cop-out, is that we are looking for a deal that might be able to secure as many of the current benefits that we have through customs union membership as possible. That is a basic, raw point for us. It is all about trade facilitation, so any kind of arrangement that continues the frictionless transport of goods between the EU and the UK is essential. That is felt most at the roll-on, roll-off ferry terminals that we have mentioned.
Robert Windsor: BIFA’s position is always that we should maintain something as close to the present arrangements as possible. That would be a customs union that is as close as we can possibly get.
That is important for two reasons. People tend to focus on import work, but we venture that exports are actually more important. If we can have an agreement that the EU27, as they will be, find acceptable, we feel that that is important. That gets particularly important when you put a truck into France. If you have an accepted agreement, it can pass through other member states. That is one of the things we are concerned about. If you have a shipment going from here to Poland, for instance, it may have to transit two or three member states. We think it is very important to have something that would permit that. My colleagues are absolutely right that it is not just the fiscal stuff; it is all the agreements that are not in it about access to the market, truck regulations and all those sorts of things.
Kirsty Blackman
Q
Tim Reardon: It is very much a concern. Dover has by far the biggest number of vehicle units entering and leaving the UK. It is the biggest gateway to the UK— 2.6 million trucks passed across that terminal last year. That compares with, for example, 750,000 between Dublin and Holyhead and Liverpool collectively, or 750,000 across the north channel between Northern Ireland and Great Britain. There are big flows out of the Humber and the Thames, but we tend to use Dover as a shorthand because it is where the problem is. It is the UK’s biggest gateway for roll-on, roll-off freight.
Chris Davies (Brecon and Radnorshire) (Con)
Q
Tim Reardon: Certainly. There is not a straightforward comparison because, by and large, the types of ships that come from our near neighbours are different from those that come from further afield, but in principle a vessel arriving from one of our European neighbours needs nobody’s permission to come here because its movement is free. The port to which it goes does not need to have approval from anybody to handle it, because it falls within the scope of free movement within the European Union. In theory, the ship could pole up anywhere around the coast and do what it wanted to do. In practice, of course, it goes to a place that has facilities to handle it. Just as the ship is free to come and go as it pleases, so the goods and vehicles on board are not subject to control and can drive straight off the ships ramp, through the terminal and out through the dock gate, unless one of the control agencies has intelligence that leads it to want to make an exceptional intervention in that movement.
By contrast, a vessel coming into the UK from outside the European Union can arrive only at a port that has been approved by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs to receive traffic from outside the European Union. It is required to tell Revenue and Customs that it is unloading cargo on to the quay, and to tell it what that cargo is. That cargo is then not permitted to leave the confines of the port until Revenue and Customs has given permission for it to go. You have a contrast between essentially a completely free arrangement, as you would have for any domestic traffic—a ferry between Hampshire and the Isle of Wight, for example. Traffic goes, the ship goes, and there is no intervention on it anywhere unless the police have a reason to stop it. Compare that with an international arrival from outside the European Union where every single stage requires somebody’s permission.
Chris Davies
Q
Tim Reardon: The process of unloading—
Chris Davies
Q
Tim Reardon: Our real concern—I will take Holyhead as an example—is that the ability to discharge the ship depends on a flow of traffic through the terminal. There typically is not space in any ferry terminal to discharge a complete ship, park its traffic there and reload it. The terminal’s ability to handle the traffic is predicated on the traffic flowing continually through it. As soon as that flow is interrupted, you end up with the backlog that Richard mentioned a moment ago, and the whole process is slowed.
Chris Davies
Q
Tim Reardon: It would depend on what the agreement said, but on the experience of ones that exist elsewhere, that is extremely unlikely. The effect of a free trade agreement tends to be to reduce, perhaps to zero, the customs duty that an importer has to pay. It tends not to make a material difference to the administrative process of getting that unit across the quay.
Richard Ballantyne: My members would be relatively calm about free trade agreements, actually. I thought when we had the vote, and in the time after, that a lot of ports would be getting concerned about potential tariffs on a lot of commodities. There are one or two high-profile exceptions where there are relatively high tariffs, such as the automobile trade—new cars and trade cars—but a lot of the trade and the ports are reporting that tariffs are relatively low. As, operationally, they are collected away from the border—they are not a condition of entry —they are not seen as a direct issue for port authorities. Obviously, if they have an impact on trade, ports will be interested.
Just to bring up a very general point, you may find it useful to know that roughly 500 million tonnes of freight is handled at UK ports. That is 95% of UK international trade. About 20% of that is roll-on, roll-off ferry traffic, which by definition and by its nature is overwhelmingly—99.5%, I think—with other EU ports. Then you have the container sector, which accounts for about 10% or 11% of tonnage and is probably about 70% from third-country sources—countries outside the EU. The other big area is bulk commodities—liquid bulks and dry bulks—which, from memory, account for about 40%.
Nic Dakin
Q
Robert Windsor: I will take the lead on that, because the freight borders are heavily engaged in this. CDS has been an ongoing project for about three and a half years. Customs did quite a lot of research with industry on what its requirements were. They have been doing a development stage, which, I have to be honest, is highly technical and way beyond anything that I can understand, although software suppliers and the community service providers have been part of the technical workshops on it. They are now starting to talk directly to us and, as a trade association, we are receiving quarterly updates on the project. I really do not want to comment on whether we think it is going to succeed or be delivered on time, because at the moment it is still under development. Part of the problem that they have, which is not of the team’s making, is that some of the data elements are still to be defined within the Union customs code, such as the format of a unique consignment reference. That matter still needs to be resolved.
Richard Ballantyne: This is a technical area, and Robert and his colleagues will be concentrating on that, but all three of us sit on the Joint Customs Consultative Committee, which is HMRC’s main stakeholder committee, and there are opportunities to get briefings on CDS. I feel personally that if we want the information, it is there.
Tim Reardon: What I would say on CDS is that it is an importers and exporters system. As carriers, we have very little interface with it, but our engagement with Revenue and Customs has been constant and continual since the referendum result, when it became apparent that there was a significant new element of uncertainty about whether the 40% of the UK’s international trade that arrives and leaves in trucks on ferries was going to be able to continue doing as it did.
Richard Ballantyne: Yes, at a very general level, ports touch many Government Departments in terms of policy regulation, and of all the Departments, HMRC has been the most forthcoming since the referendum. The amount of engagement has been quite unprecedented. That is not necessarily to speak negatively about the other Departments, but HMRC has really taken the lead.
Peter Dowd
Q
Robert Windsor: The Joint Customs Consultative Committee meets three times a year, and it covers areas of strategy that are impacting on importers, exporters, freight forwarders, shipping lines, whatever. Since Brexit, the JCCC has established sub-committees specifically dealing with Brexit as an issue and that group, if I remember correctly, meets about four times a year.
The Chair
Before we go too far down a route that is not to do with this Bill, I hope that you can get your remarks back on track. I know you are answering Mr Dowd’s question, but the discussion seems to be somewhat off the message.
Richard Ballantyne: This Bill, this legislation, will be considered by that group.
Peter Dowd
Q
Robert Windsor: There was consultation about the White Paper but there has been no consultation about the actual Bill as it has come out.
Tim Reardon: The clauses of the Bill were not exposed to consultation at all before the Bill was published, as far as I am aware, and certainly not through the forum of the JCCC.
Richard Ballantyne: No—we are all on circulation lists so we get the information directly but, as you both say, it has not been formally considered, although part of that is because this has been quite a quick process. When we had the proposals to update CEMA—the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979—which I think was four or five years ago, there was time and consideration at the JCCC, so perhaps we had a better experience last time .
Peter Dowd
Q
“The Government’s White Paper…outlined an intention to apply a requirement for the goods in such vehicles to be declared prior to shipment so that, on arrival in the port, they can pass straight through in all but exceptional circumstances”.
You go on:
“Schedule 7, paragraph 28, appears to create powers for such an arrangement but is expressed in notably vague terms: their practicability will depend absolutely on detail that is absent.”
How significant is that at this stage, given that we are 15 months away from Brexit? When do you think that you will actually need the detail, especially in light of the fact that you have not been consulted on the Bill in the first place?
Tim Reardon: We would have liked it about four years ago, to be honest. The Bill—that particular paragraph in the schedule—provides for the concept that nothing may be shipped unless the vehicle operator has checked that a declaration has been put in. As a concept, that is unobjectionable, and it has the potential to work, but the devil is entirely in the detail.
Who will the vehicle operator be deemed to be, for example? The Bill widens the definition of a vehicle beyond what anyone in this room I would imagine understands a vehicle to be, so it is no longer simply a thing on wheels but a ship maybe, a train or an aircraft—all of those fall within the scope of “vehicle”. The vehicle operator is any one of those parties in the chain. What is the process by which that business will be required to establish that something has happened? All of those things are critical details to work out whether the thing can work or not.
The issue for us is that it is impossible to tell purely from the powers in the Bill that we will end up with a system that works. We might, and I have absolutely no doubt that everyone’s intention is to create a system that works, but it is impossible to say on the basis of something that is as vaguely drawn as the Bill that it will work. If this is the sole stage of the process where any scrutiny is applied, then clearly one has to take a great deal on trust and faith.
Peter Dowd
Q
Tim Reardon: To be honest, the answer depends on how different where we end up is from where we are now, because what takes time is changing of business processes, construction and reprogramming of IT systems and—worst-case scenario—civil works in terminal infrastructure development. All those things have lead times. How long the lead time needs to be depends entirely on what it is you are trying to do and how much you are trying to change from the current practical reality. Until we can define how different the end state is from where we are now, then—to be honest—it is impossible to put a timeframe on how long it will take to get there.
Richard Ballantyne: To follow on from that, all three of us were at a meeting this morning on border processes and so on, and one of the things we were talking about is the fact that the operators—the port operators, the carriers, the customs providers and other specialists—will not want to make any investments until they know exactly what the detail of the deal is and when that is firmed up.
The Chair
I call Kirsty Blackman. I am aware the Minister responding to the debate in the Chamber is on his feet, so we may well be interrupted for a vote; it will be up to the Committee to decide whether it wishes to resume with this panel after the vote.
Kirsty Blackman
Q
Richard Ballantyne: Not easily, but some will have slightly more space than others, and they may have facilities down the road that could be turned into use. We hope it does not come to that. We are working with Government to push forward some kind of arrangement that is not conditional on checks that cause such delays. That is not good for freight, or for prices of goods and products, and things that manufacturers use, and things that end up in shops.
Kirsty Blackman
Q
Tim Reardon: We hear a lot of talk about it, but I think on every route that has published its traffic stats for last year the freight volumes have risen from what they were in 2016. First, of course, that is a national success story; it is an indication of economic health. It is great for all the businesses that we all represent, which handle that traffic, but of course it means that the system overall is increasingly full. There is not a great deal of spare capacity cumulatively across the UK.
The issue is more than just space on the terminal. The road network serves two or three main gateway points into and out of the UK. There needs to be a really good-quality landside connection from the terminal, to enable it to flourish; it needs more than just space on the berth. It would be very, very difficult to flick a switch and say, “Actually, the traffic will go somewhere else”.
Richard Ballantyne: Towards the end of last year, there was a new direct service from Zeebrugge to Dublin for roll-on roll-off traffic, and there was a lot of noise about, “Look! That’s a consequence of Brexit”, but when you actually looked into that investment, it was probably made before the referendum. There may be people looking at further direct calls from the Republic of Ireland to continental Europe, but as of yet we have not seen them.
Robert Windsor: Many of my members are multinationals —European-based forwarders. I know that there are discussions about this issue, which is inevitable given the situation, but we have not seen anything move yet, as such. What we are receiving is a lot of inquiries from European-based freight forwarders with no UK base who are inquiring whether they can establish in the UK because they obviously see an opportunity the other way round.
Richard Ballantyne: The warehousing industry is looking at potential new sites because they see that there could be further interruptions to trade flows, where they would need more storage.
Anneliese Dodds
Q
Richard Ballantyne: The British Ports Association is part of the European Sea Ports Organisation, which has a meeting tomorrow on Brexit that I am going to. It includes some of the main UK-facing ports, such as Dublin, Zeebrugge, Calais and beyond. It has been quite difficult. Some of those ports are state-owned, and it is quite difficult for the UK Government to talk with them, although there have been a number of information-type visits looking at customs arrangements as they are and what the operational situation will look like post-Brexit. We have good conversations.
In terms of what is going on with the customs authorities in those countries, it is varied. There is a French customs taskforce—that is an internal taskforce—that I think the ports there are plugged into. I went to see the French ports association to talk about Brexit, and it seemed on top of things, but it is a difficult one. There is a lot of mystery there. Just as the UK Government cannot divulge all the discussions they are having, the ports cannot divulge everything to us. They have to remember that negotiations are being led through the European Commission, so that is the correct avenue.
Peter Dowd
Q
Richard Ballantyne: As you know, the ports industry in the UK is market-led and market-driven. We have three types of port: local authority-owned ports, which operate on a commercial basis in competition with private ports; full private sector ports, or equity ports; and the trust ports, which are Dover, Aberdeen, London and so on, and they are still run on a private basis and pay corporation tax on any profits they make. Significantly, all of them are financially and strategically independent of Government decisions. That has worked. Effectively, the Government have delegated the authority to run the ports because they understand that you need technical experts to manage such things as safety and the commercial arrangements.
In terms of what is going on at the moment, the Government do influence the connections to ports. Ports have publicly owned road and rail connections. Following a lot of lobbying from my association and others, the Department for Transport is undertaking a port connectivity study, which is not about spending any money on connections but about assessing the state of the road and rail connectivity of the UK ports industry, and how we get ports more on the radar when big investment decisions like the road investment strategy and rail strategies are made and Treasury spending budgets are allocated. It is about us, perhaps, rising up. There has been a lot of big-ticket passenger-focused spend, such as HS2, Heathrow and Crossrail. Freight has felt a bit of a poor relation. We are working to improve that, but unfortunately freight does not vote, so it is a challenge for us.
Emma Hardy
Q
Richard Ballantyne: The Department is considering a lot of feedback from the ports. I know Sir John Randall, a former Member of this House, oversaw that as an independent chair. The officials are now working on the final detail. I hope it will make a number of recommendations, and it should be out within the next month. As I say, I think Sir John went to visit Hull.
Emma Hardy
He probably got stuck on the way there. That is good news, thank you.
Peter Dowd
Q
“It has been commented that the Bill is not as precise as Members would have hoped for”—
I suspect you were a diplomat in a different life—
“in terms of either the areas covered by the legislation or in certain cases the powers vested in the authorities. Also from our understanding this document will have to be read with other documents such as CEMA and secondary legislation which still has to be written which has the potential to cause confusion and thus perhaps hinder compliance from Trades perspective.”
To what extent will compliance be hindered? How extensive, how comprehensive, how problematic will that compliance be?
Robert Windsor: It is always more difficult where you have more than one source to draw the compliance requirements from. One of the things that my members have been used to are the codified laws and regulations that have come from Europe, in particular customs codes and things like that. They got more complex as time went on. Basically, there was a single point of reference, so people would go to that and at that point they would pretty much know what was written, how it could be interpreted in different member states—[Interruption.]
The Chair
Order. We are quorate. As has been explained, Mr Stace is giving evidence at another Committee and will be joining us somewhat later. We will now hear oral evidence from UK Steel, the Chemical Industries Association and the British Ceramic Confederation. This sitting will finish at 5 o’clock. Can I ask the witnesses who are here to introduce yourselves for the record?
Dr Laura Cohen: I am Laura Cohen, chief executive of the British Ceramic Confederation. I also chair the Manufacturing Trade Remedies Alliance, a group of seven manufacturing associations, three trade unions and the TUC with an interest in trade remedies.
Ian Cranshaw: Good afternoon. I am Ian Cranshaw, from the Chemical Industries Association. I am the head of international trade and the head of business development.
Peter Dowd
Q
Dr Laura Cohen: The EU has a number of trade remedies in place, the transition of which is being considered by the Department for International Trade at the moment. In the ceramics sector, which I am probably best placed to talk about, we have two measures in place, in tableware and in tiles. These are EU anti-dumping tariffs against Chinese-manufactured products. In tableware, until 2004, Chinese imports had been fairly steady, at around £20 million a year. They then rocketed to £160 million a year. The anti-dumping tariff was introduced in 2013. The Chinese imports have held steady, but even that has allowed our members to stabilise and invest, and employment has increased by 20% to 5,000 UK jobs since 2013.
On tiles, there were about £2 million to £4 million of imports in 2004, and that increased pretty rapidly to £30 million. Anti-dumping duties started in 2011, and they have now fallen back to about half that. Please note, we have just had a renewal in Europe of the measures, on 22 November 2018, following an expiry review. The dumping margin had increased during that period. UK manufacturing employment has increased by 40% to 1,000-plus UK jobs since 2011, so that is good news for UK jobs, but both measures really benefited the UK supply chain, not least the kaolin and ball clay industry in Devon and Cornwall, which employs about 1,500 people. That is part of the 2,500 jobs in the materials supply section of our membership.
Just to bring this example to life, the Minister, Mel Stride, met British Ceramic Tile in his constituency, which has about 400 manufacturing jobs, last week, and it reinforced the message. The Minister also has two Imerys clay quarries at Newbridge and Ringslade in his constituency, which supply the sector.
I just wanted to point out something about the renewal. The Chinese spare capacity increased between 2011 and 2016 by more than four times the entire European Union consumption. The European Commission was very concerned by this development. The extra capacity is propped up by state distortion. I do not say that lightly, because the evidence is quite clear. In December 2017, the European Commission produced a report on the Chinese economy which found gross subsidies and state interference in the manufacturing industry. I quote from the report. The first parts show:
“The overall picture that emerges concerning the framework in which economic activity takes place in China is one where the State continues to exert a decisive influence on the allocation of resources and on their prices.”
The second part of the almost 500-page report says:
“The analysis shows that the allocation and pricing of the various factors of production is influenced by the State in a very significant manner. The third part…examines a number of sectors. These include steel, aluminium, chemicals and ceramics. The sectors have been selected because they are the ones that have featured most in the EU’s anti-dumping investigations since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. Taking the perspective of individual sectors allows a closer look at the specific rules and dynamics in that sector, but this examination also echoes the findings in the preceding two parts, i.e. the significant distortions resulting from the specific features of the Chinese economy and those found in relation to the various factors of production.”
The report noted that the State Council in China combines the implementation of the belt and road strategy, to actively conquer markets such as Europe. Therefore, anti-dumping remedies are there when competitors do not play by the rules.
The Chair
That was a very comprehensive answer. I hope we can condense further answers slightly.
Peter Dowd
Q
Ian Cranshaw: I may not go into the same detail that Laura did—I am sure I will receive some encouraging signs.
Just looking at some of the bigger numbers so that we all know how many trade remedies we are talking about, I think the EU has something like 130: 50-plus in steel alone; 27 in chemicals; and I think Laura mentioned a couple in ceramics. Again, you need to drill down and understand what the UK’s standing is in those 27 in chemicals across Europe. I believe there is just one where we have gone out, and I know there is a call for evidence by the Department for International Trade of all UK standing in all of the wider remedies in place. That puts it into context.
Again, I would hold my hand up and say that we are all on quite new ground in this area, apart from UK Steel, which has been incredibly active over the past couple of years. I held a roundtable with some member companies a year ago and got all of the major players in the UK chemical industry. That is interesting, because more than 70% of UK production is by companies headquartered overseas—so that was not necessarily UK companies.
It was very interesting that, when I talked to one of the German companies about trade remedies and trade defence instruments—I will not mention the name, but you will probably work it out—its perspective was, “Well, we have no trade remedy experience or personnel in the UK at all.” Nor did the trade association. We have happily contributed to EU development of policy, but actually, in leading on this, we had no expertise.
The German company pondered for a moment and said, “Actually, if in the future we had to raise a trade issue with the EU—us accusing it or it accusing us of dumping or subsidy—the UK transplant would have to ask our headquarter operation for advice and policy in the expertise in which to raise a concern or complaint to the WTO.” That was quite interesting. I am not sure if I answered the question, but that was a specific example.
Peter Dowd
Q
Dr Laura Cohen: A remedy is addressing unfair competition when overseas manufacturers are not playing by the rules. The ceramics industry and the tiles industry, such as in the Minister’s constituency, has invested very heavily in state-of-the-art, energy-efficient manufacturing with digital printing technology. Given a level playing field, it can take on the world. All we want is a level playing field, and trade remedies allow us to ensure we can get that free trade.
The Chair
Before we go any further, I would like to welcome Mr Gareth Stace, director of UK Steel. I know that you have been very busy on another Committee, so I am glad you have joined us. Do you want to come in on this? You got the drift of the question.
Gareth Stace: Yes. Apologies for arriving late, and thank you.
I would like to look at it from a different angle in terms of using what is the trade remedy and what are protections. The steel sector thrives on free, liberalised trade. A third of all steel produced in the world is traded across borders. We actually have zero tariffs—that is, zero customs tariffs—for steel between developed countries. What does that do? It enables us to be even more liberalised in our free trade. Trade remedies is a safety valve to enable that free trade to take place. I would say that, without trade remedies, we will actually see a rise in protectionism—it is not that with trade remedies we will see a rise in protectionism. Trade remedies allow for free trade to take place; it is not the other way round.
Ian Cranshaw: Within the Manufacturing Trade Remedies Alliance, which we are a member of, we actually do not use the phrase “protection”. There is a global rule-kit of trade, and all we are asking for is that people play by those rules and, if they do not, remedies come in. I was here listening to some of the earlier evidence and there was a balance of the consumer or the producer. Our view has always been that it is in the interests of all parties that inappropriate trade practices are removed—just play by the rules.
Peter Dowd
Q
Dr Laura Cohen: We have three major concerns with the Bill that we think, taken together, will give much lower duties than the EU, and that will attract dumped products from around the world. Those three main concerns at a high level are: first, the measurement of the dumping margin—the calculations and the methodology —particularly where there are distorted economies, and the absence of a methodology in the Bill; secondly, the combinations of various economic interests tests and public interests tests, and I will go into more detail on those; and thirdly, this lesser duty rule, and that is very much an alliance position. Overall, the effectiveness of trade remedies depends so much on the detail of the legislation that is completely absent in the Bill.
Much detail may be in secondary legislation eventually, as we heard from the Hansard Society, but that may be without much parliamentary input: it is likely to be a negative procedure. Even worse, much may be in guidance written by officials with hardly any parliamentary scrutiny at all. Important changes going through the European Parliament and the EU in trade remedies legislation have had extensive scrutiny, and important amendments have been made by MEPs and ex-MEPs, often working across parties. We need a similar level of political oversight in the UK system, but to do that the Bill needs alterations in those three areas. We are concerned because businesses, jobs and investment are at stake. I can go into more detail on those, or my colleagues can.
The Chair
We have quite a few questions, so maybe somebody can come back to you on that point if they need to. Mr Stace, did you wish to come in at this point?
Gareth Stace: There is a lost opportunity in the Bill in terms of looking at what is happening in the EU, which Laura has highlighted, particularly on changes that are taking place at EU-level on how it tackles the lesser duty rule—the UK Government have firmly said, “No, we are not going to follow that; we are going to do something different”—and how it treats non-market economies or economies that subsidise their industries. The Government are saying, “Yeah, we will follow that,” but because the detail is not really there, as Laura said, are they going to follow it to the letter, which would be great, or just broadly in principle? That is that whole thing of everything—I am sure you had already heard that before I arrived.
The problem with this Bill, and also with the Trade Bill, is that the proof will always be in the pudding. The Government can promise anything they like, but more than a third of all tariffs in place affect the steel sector and it hits us hard, therefore, if this system, when it comes out, is not appropriate for what it is trying to do. That is why we, in this primary legislation stage, are putting that in so much detail. Why are we doing that? Because we just do not know whether it will be in the secondary legislation or the guidance. That is not our fault; we have to set out our case in full now, at this stage. If the Government said to us, “Honestly, trust us completely and utterly. It will be in secondary or it will be in guidance, to the letter of what you are asking for,” then great, but at the moment we are sitting here very much in the dark. When we talk about day one from when we leave the EU, is that day one next year or day one in 2021? We do not know. If it is next year, we should be planning right now for doing something very different very soon.
Ian Cranshaw: One of the issues is the fact that these things cannot be rushed. We know that they are very complicated. The trade defence instruments modernisation programme in Europe took more than four years, and that is just in modernising a regime that has been in place for 40 years. One of the important concessions we got out of the EU somehow in the chemical sector, which we refer to as an enabling industry or a foundation industry, was about the importance of raw materials. On raw materials, the EU said, “Okay, if the raw material cost is 17% of the overall product cost, we will take in the raw material cost because we are aware of distortions that take place across many markets.”
We have one UK producer, which is specific in the UK, for which the energy cost is 40% of the total costs of the individual company, so it is hugely important. Its remedy is against Russia and gas coming out of Russia. Russia not only subsidises that industry, but does not observe the same environmental standards as we do. It has had every opportunity to do so, but it does not. There is a wider responsibility at play and that goes back to the comment earlier about it being in everyone’s interest to get this right.
Kirsty Blackman
Q
Gareth Stace: No.
Dr Laura Cohen: No.
Ian Cranshaw: No.
Kirsty Blackman
Q
Gareth Stace: Those remedies might well be challenged, in the sense that anyone can challenge anything, but that does not mean that they should not be rolled over. It is our firm view that the UK Government can roll over all the remedies that are applicable to the UK within World Trade Organisation rules, and we have set that out very clearly to the UK Government.
We have heard lawyers. I gave evidence to the International Trade Committee, and there was a lawyer saying that it could not happen, but when we explained it to her she thought, “Ah yes, actually it could happen.” We need to remember that if they could not roll over from the EU to the UK because the calculations were wrong, because it is just the UK and not the EU, they would also all be invalid in the EU, because they are based on 28 member states and there would be only 27. I think they can easily roll over and will then be reviewed when those cases expire after five years.
Dr Laura Cohen: In our association, we appreciate the way in which the Department for International Trade is going about the consultation at the moment, just checking UK interest. Certainly, we are gathering evidence from our members on tiles and tableware, but the consultation is also forcing us to check the three or four other sectors where we think there could be some UK manufacturing interest. That is particularly in the technical ceramics and refractory areas, which are quite diverse and complex, and we need to take enough time to explore those properly.
Nic Dakin
Q
Dr Laura Cohen: I want to explain that the EU uses a Union interest test as a sanity check, to balance the possible conflicting interests of member states. The wording of the rules around that test are crucial. For example, in the tiles renewal that I just talked about, the Official Journal text says:
“In weighing and balancing the competing interests, the Commission gave special consideration to the need to eliminate the trade distorting effects of injurious dumping and to restore effective competition.”
It is essential, if the UK is doing that sort of test, that such clarity of purpose is in the Bill that you are considering. It is not at present.
I would argue, as my colleagues said earlier, that addressing dumping is always in the long-term consumer interest because it restores a competitive market. We would expect the Competition and Markets Authority to take strong action if UK companies were not playing by the rules. In the absence of international competition laws, strong trade remedies are the best we have. The EU is only one of five countries or areas out of 32 main anti-dumping users in using that type of test. In Brazil and Canada, it is a conditional test used in certain circumstances only.
What is the UK proposing? First, I want to state that the WTO does not require a public interest test. It appears in the Bill as if the UK is proposing something very new to replace the Union test. That seems to run counter to the principle that global free trade cannot mean trade without rules. As some of the previous witnesses said, three opportunities are provided to stop remedies against rule breakers. The text in the Bill suggests the three stages, the first of which is an economic interest test by the TRA. The research commissioned by the Department for International Trade strongly hints that that may contain a cost-benefit analysis and/or an economic model. No other country uses that approach. The USA tried it and stopped. The Union interest test is just a sanity check. Secondly, if the Secretary of State does not like the result by the TRA, he or she may overrule it with their own economic interest test. Finally, that may be overruled again by the Secretary of State’s public interest test. A recent article in The Telegraph—we can provide a link if the Committee wishes—alluded to the implications of a potential UK-China free trade agreement and inward investment being weighed up in such a test. If true, that would be highly alarming.
Those second and third tests are not carried out in the EU. They add a lot of uncertainty to the process, particularly with a very unclear presumption at present in favour of adoption of duties in the Bill text. No wonder some UK manufacturers are scared witless by this. I think you heard similar emotion from the unions. Manufacturers have enough uncertainty around Brexit to cope with, without the fear that if they bring a case, despite dumping and injury being found there will be three chances for that ruling not to be implemented, and they might have all sorts of legal challenge. We heard this morning that the Bill is not even clear if we can do that.
Mel Stride
Q
Can I just go into the area of the lesser duty rule in a little more detail? To the extent that the lesser duty rule functions as proposed, and it does provide remedy for injury caused through dumping to those producers who have been affected, why would you want to go further than that in terms of a potential remedy? Why would you want to go beyond that particular threshold? The argument from consumer groups is that that will then start disproportionately to damage consumers and those businesses that use those imports within their own production processes.
Dr Laura Cohen: I am going to let Gareth answer first. Then I will come back and refer to what the unions were talking about; I have some evidence from the alliance.
Gareth Stace: It seems that we are constraining ourselves in the UK when we do not need to. One of the aims of Brexit was to strip things away, make things more simple and have fewer people employed working on these things; much of what we have seen in both Bills seems to add layer upon layer that is probably not needed. The lesser duty rule is used quite a lot in various different regimes, but it is not used in the US at all. We want to create strong links with the US in terms of trade, so that seems a bit odd.
We could say yes, but I could not tell you that if we did not have the lesser duty rule, we would have seen less dumping in recent years. The lesser duty rule has not meant that new cases did not stop dumping. The point I would like to make is this: we are always told that the lesser duty rule ensures that the consumer is not ripped off—that prices do not rise significantly because tariffs are imposed at too high a rate.
I have an example. In the hot rolled coil case recently—hot rolled flat is used for car bodies and washing bodies, but I am using the example of the car—the injury margin was 17.5% and the dumping margin was 29%. That is a difference of 11%. So the 17.5% was applied, not the 29%. If we think of a luxury car that cost €45,000, because this is a European example, if the lesser duty rule was not applied in this case, it would increase the value of the €45,000 car by €16. We are not suddenly going to see runaway costs and the poor old consumer having to pay lots and lots more. We are going to have a robust system that ensures that we have free liberalised trade continuing as a safety valve. In that case, it increases the cost by €16 on €45,000.
Mel Stride
Q
Gareth Stace: One of the things that we were talking about right from the beginning of this process was that calculating the dumping margin is a really easy process. It can be done fairly quickly. It does not need a lot of people to do it and does not need a lot of work from industry and the Government. Calculating the injury margin does. It is a bit of a black box—you do not know what is going to come out of it—whereas the dumping margin is very transparent.
We said right from the beginning that if you have a clean sheet of paper, why not just go for the easiest and quickest system, so that you could get provisional measures in place very quickly? In the US, they get them in in 45 days, whereas in Europe until very recently, it has been after nine months. There is a really good opportunity to do that. I am not sitting here saying that we have to have 29%, not 17.5%—the point is that it is not a huge difference.
If the Trade Remedies Authority did the dumping calculation and then said, “Well, actually, it is 29%; we think it could probably be effective at perhaps a bit less,” it has the flexibility to do that—you would have the economic interest test and the public interest test to weigh that up—rather than having a fixed system that says, “I do not care what the dumping margin is; we are going to ignore it and are only going to go for the injury margin.”
The Chair
Mr Cranshaw wants to come in at this point. I have five or six other people who want to ask questions. I ask Committee members to make their questions as condensed as possible, but still factual. I call Mr Cranshaw.
Ian Cranshaw: The chemicals sector exports a massive proportion of our product. We are an import-export business, so free trade is something that we have always encouraged. We are free traders: 60% of our product goes to the EU, 75% of raw materials come in—it is products that cross borders multiple times, and integrated supply chains. We do want that. Sorry, I had not actually got to my point. Can I come back on that?
Dr Laura Cohen: I want to support what Gareth said. These are subjective and time-consuming calculations. As we heard from the unions, these will require stipulating what profits industries should make. They can only underestimate injury because they do not cover, for example, whether there is a general subsidy in the country that is doing the dumping.
It is not compulsory in the WTO: only nine out of 32 main anti-dumping—AD—users have them. Australia and, imminently, the EU will have conditional use. The UK has no such provision and is not even thinking about pasting it into the Bill. Out of 32 main AD users, only three—the EU, the Eurasian Economic Commission and Brazil—have both a public interest test and a lesser duty rule. The EU is moving to a conditional lesser duty rule, and Brazil has a conditional public interest test. Why does the UK want to be such an outlier?
Mel Stride
Q
Gareth Stace: Picking up on Laura’s earlier points about the economic interest test and public interest test, at the moment there are six tests. Six! You only need two: an economic interest test that a TRA does, which the Secretary of State looks at and takes note of; and, I agree, you need a public interest test at the end, because there may be those extraordinary circumstances where it is or is not in the public interest to apply or not apply tariffs. But we only need two, not six—not five economic interest tests and one public interest test. That would speed up the process.
The Chair
I am going to Anneliese Dodds next. We must finish at 5 o’clock and I am conscious that there are several people wanting to get in.
Anneliese Dodds
Q
Dr Laura Cohen: Particularly on the methodology, I will suggest two provisions that are not mutually exclusive; the UK needs to alter the Bill to include them both. The first provision is how the dumping margin will be calculated in highly distorted economies such as China. The UK should be stating clearly that there should be a special methodology for non-market economies. That would allow the UK to keep that option open for China until the WTO jurisprudence is clear. Indeed, that needs to be in place anyway for countries such as Tajikistan and Vietnam.
The second provision is a methodology that constructs what is called a normal value wherever price distortions occur. That is the EU’s new approach, which takes into account a number of price distortions, including several non-market economy indicators and an absence of labour or environmental standards. That can be used against a country, including former non-market economies such as Russia, which I know has been a problem in the chemicals sector. Indeed, the pasting in of EU legislation is an important principle of Brexit, as is being done in the EU (Withdrawal) Bill, and this part should be done as a default.
Gareth Stace: In the EU, that became law on 20 December. The UK Government are saying that they will broadly follow it. It would be the easiest thing to say, “That is what happens in the EU on those sorts of economies, and we will do the same”—done! They do not need to invent anything else.
Ian Cranshaw: It is a theoretical debate that we have been having with the DIT about where the risk is. Is the risk in following the new methodology that the EU is introducing or in the approach that the DIT are now taking in going with something that we have been delivering for x number of years, so that they believe they are following something we already have? The EU is moving in a different direction. From our industry the concern was that many of our companies here are EU-based or EU-headquartered, so they want something consistent. Then you have the political debate that we are leaving the EU because we want more flexibility. That is more of a political decision.
Emma Hardy
Q
Dr Laura Cohen: First, do you need them at all? It is not compulsory under the World Trade Organisation. Secondly, we should definitely have the text that is in the EU: weighing and balancing the competing interests, and special consideration to the need to eliminate the trade-distorting effects of injurious dumping and to restore effective competition. That would help.
Emma Hardy
To put that into the Bill.
Dr Laura Cohen: Into the Bill. Can I give an example on the tiles review? This goes back some of the evidence given this morning. The European Commission contacted more than 1,000 known importers and users of tiles. Only 11 companies replied to the sampling form. No user or user association came forward. After the review was published, the Tile Association, which includes UK retailers and tilers as well as overseas manufacturers, published in its magazine an article saying that when they had surveyed their members a year ago,
“A sizeable majority of respondents were in favour of the tariffs continuing and also believed that the level of tariff was about right.”
The EU—an example similar to Gareth’s—as part of its calculation had said that this would add about €1 to a square metre of tiles. It is not a large amount.
Gareth Stace: We do not have any detail of what that economic interest test is going to be. It could be there on the face of the Bill in primary legislation; it could be wishful thinking that it might be elsewhere. It cannot be that the Government do not know what that might be. We set out in July in a paper here exactly what we felt the economic interest test should be and the weighting it should apply to producers, users and importers and so on. We set it out in firm detail there, so there is no reason why it could not have been in the primary legislation.
Graham Stuart
Q
Dr Laura Cohen: We could have much lower duties.
Graham Stuart
So we may not.
Dr Laura Cohen: Given that the lesser duty rule in the EU is becoming conditional, that is one strand of it and may give rise to lower duties. We have no clarity about the methodology for working out the dumping margin, particularly where there are distortive economies, and the EU has that clarity. The triple test—the economic interest test by the TRA followed by the economic interest test by the Secretary of State, followed by the public interest test, actually may result in no duties. It is very unlikely that the duties are going to be higher than the EU and quite likely, given what is in the Bill at the moment, that they will be lower.
Graham Stuart
Q
Dr Laura Cohen: We do not know what the economic interest test is going to be, but there are two further opportunities over and above what is currently in the EU for overruling it. We have had some concerns, which we shared with Government, about the economic research published by the Department for International Trade on Friday 5 January, which could help determine how that is carried out. We can share that with the Committee after this meeting if that would be helpful.
Graham Stuart
Q
Dr Laura Cohen: We do not need one under the WTO, but if we do, it is about keeping it really simple, with a presumption in favour of eliminating the trade-distorting effects of injurious dumping, and restoring effective competition.
Graham Stuart
Q
Dr Laura Cohen: All three tests should have that presumption.
Ian Cranshaw: The specific issue is the language: there is not that specific phrase. There is a presumption in favour of duties written into the Bill, and we would like to see that specifically written much clearer than it currently is. That would reassure many of our companies.
Nic Dakin
Q
Gareth Stace: The timescales are not set out clearly enough. I do not want to go over old ground, but the hoops to go through at all the different stages will only lengthen that process. I am sure that will happen, calculating injury and dumping, but if was just dumping, that would happen very quickly.
I might have said already that in the US, provisional measures come in after 45 days and in the EU they come after nine months, which is coming down to seven. The UK has the opportunity to say that we will do it at six months, and we always—unless there are circumstances where it is not appropriate—apply retrospective duties of three months. So you get provisional duties coming after three months, which sends a very strong message to the market: do not dump your illegally traded goods here in the UK.
Ian Cranshaw: I think we would all be disappointed if we could not expedite the EU system, when it has to canvass views across 28 member states. We would have to canvass views in just the UK, so if we cannot bring that nine months—soon to be seven months—down further, an opportunity will have been missed.
Dr Laura Cohen: There is a tremendous opportunity here for Brexit. If an industry is suffering injury and dumping, it is really important that it gets sorted out quickly.
Peter Dowd
Q
Gareth Stace: From my point of view of steel, this time last year we had written five very detailed papers that DIT officials have been very pleased to receive. We have had very good engagement with them, so I could not actually fault that. We probably have had some difference of opinion, so although I heard, “We agree with 95% of what you are putting out,” I said, “That’s fine, but it’s the 5% that is crucial.” Like everything with Brexit, the issue is around that 5% and we do not understand the detail around that.
We continue to engage with DIT, but we have provided all the information we can; there is nothing more we can provide. That is why we are disappointed: in the face of this Bill in primary legislation, we have not seen the detail that the Government had the opportunity to put in.
Dr Laura Cohen: From our sectors, I echo what Gareth has said. As an association, we have had really good engagement with DIT officials. BCC has had four meetings as an association with Ministers or Secretaries of State in the past year. That is really appreciated. However, we have made our case very clearly and I do not know what else we can say. We need to ensure that businesses, investment and jobs get the best possible deal from Brexit.
Ian Cranshaw: As a group, we met Greg Hands. The Minister gave us a considerable amount of time. He had been briefed well and he understood our issues, but he just did not accept them—he had a different view. That is fine; we have to go away and refine our position and give the evidence that was required. Some of the evidence that he called on we would call less than proven.
We know that there was a discussion earlier about the make-up of the TRA and who helped formulate the Government view. They say that for the review on trade remedies they went to a very liberal think-tank and asked what the view is on this, so of course they got a very predictable response. We would have questioned whether they had taken in some of the advice and evidence from business, as they might have got a rounder view of what was required.
Gareth Stace: It was not a liberal think-tank, but a company that represents the Chinese steel sector against the EU. They could have chosen many; why did they choose that company?
The Chair
That is not for me to answer. There are no further questions from Members, so I thank the witnesses for their very comprehensive evidence this afternoon.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(David Rutley.)