Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 11th March 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Pannick]

393B: Clause 168, page 219, line 13, leave out subsections (3) and (4) and insert—
“(3) The court may, on application by or on behalf of D and on notice to the media, make an order—(a) withholding from the public in proceedings before the court—(i) D’s name, (ii) D’s address,(iii) D’s date of birth,(b) giving a reporting direction (see section 170) in respect of D (if one does not already have effect), or(c) making an anonymity order (see section 171) in respect of D.(4) To make an order under subsection (3) the court must—(a) be satisfied that the order is necessary—(i) to protect against a real risk to the safety of D or another person arising from D being identified as the person alleged to have committed the offence, or(ii) to prevent real harm to the public interest, and(b) be satisfied that the order includes the least restrictive measures possible to address the conditions in (a)(i) or (ii) and is proportionate having regard to the principle of open justice.(4A) Where the court considers that giving notice under subsection (3) would defeat the purpose of the application, it may make a temporary order without notice, which must be reconsidered at the earliest opportunity after notice has been given to the media.”Member’s explanatory statement
The amendment would replace the presumption of anonymity for firearms officers in Clause 168 with a power for the Court to grant anonymity where it is necessary to protect against a real risk to the safety of the officer or another person arising from D being identified as the person alleged to have committed the offence, or to prevent real harm to the public interest, having regard to proportionality and the principle of open justice.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I hope the Minister will give me as satisfactory a response in relation to this group as the other Minister just gave to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey.

Amendments 393B to 393F in this group are in my name. They address Clauses 168 to 171, which will create a presumption of anonymity for an authorised firearms officer who is charged with an offence in relation to the use of a weapon in the exercise of his or her functions. That presumption will apply unless and until that defendant is convicted of the criminal offence.

I am very grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Faulks and Lord Black of Brentwood, and to the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, for adding their names to these amendments. Unfortunately, the noble Lord, Lord Black, and the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, cannot be here tonight. They send their apologies. We will all miss their contributions, as they made powerful speeches on this subject in Committee. I also record my gratitude to Emma Snell of Justice and to Sebastian Cuttill of the News Media Association for their very helpful briefings.

Amendment 393B would replace this presumption of anonymity in the Bill with a power for the court to grant anonymity where it considers it necessary to protect against a real risk to the safety of the firearms officer or another person, such as a member of the officer’s family, or to prevent harm to the public interest, having regard to proportionality and to the principle of open justice. That, in essence, is the common-law position that applies now.

I recognise the need for courts to have this power to grant anonymity in appropriate cases, but it would be a mistake to legislate for a statutory presumption. That is because the criminal courts have long proceeded, and rightly so, on the basis that open justice is a core principle of our legal system. It is a core principle because it is essential to maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice. Restrictions on reporting what goes on in our courts always need to be justified. In the context addressed by Clause 168, there are especially strong reasons for upholding open justice.

We are here typically concerned with the actions of a firearms officer acting on behalf of the state, whose use of a weapon has killed another human being. That event will have led the CPS to bring a criminal prosecution, which means that the CPS believes that two criteria are satisfied—first, that on the available evidence, the court is more likely than not to convict, and secondly, that it is in the public interest to proceed with the prosecution. Of course, the prosecution must prove its case, but in this context the interests of open justice are very important in the public interest. The public, not just the family and friends of the deceased, surely have a strong interest in knowing what is alleged against whom.

Open justice, I suggest, is of particular importance at this time, when public confidence in our police force is low—perhaps lower than ever before. A presumption that the press cannot fully report a murder trial will, I fear, inevitably cause further damage to public confidence.

I accept that there will be cases where open justice should give way to the need to protect the defendant and his or her family. The court must have power to provide protection by requiring anonymity, but that must be because of information that provides a reasoned basis for concern that such protection is required in the particular circumstances of the case.

I also emphasise that Clause 168 would confer special protection on firearms officers. The Government do not suggest that other police officers or prison officers whose conduct may lead to the serious injury or death of another person should enjoy this presumption of anonymity, and rightly so. To confer this unique protection on firearms officers is unnecessary because a discretion for the court suffices, and it is wrong in principle because this is a context where the interests of open justice are at their strongest.

In Committee my noble friend Lord Carter of Haslemere—I am very pleased that he is in his place—suggested that firearms officers might be deterred from taking up such posts if there is no presumption of anonymity. That seems to me, with great respect, a weak argument when no other police officer enjoys such a presumption, when Clause 168 does not guarantee anonymity, when our amendments would allow anonymity in appropriate cases and when a firearms officer is far more likely to be concerned about the risk of prosecution than about the question of anonymity.

Also in Committee, my other noble friend—I do not have very many—Lord Hogan-Howe, whom I am also very pleased to see in his place tonight, emphasised the difficult and important job done by firearms officers. I recognise that, and I agree with my noble friend. That should be carefully borne in mind when decisions are taken in the public interest on whether to prosecute. Once a prosecution is brought, no defendant should enjoy a special presumption of anonymity. My noble friend Lord Hogan-Howe also drew attention to the fact that there are not many of these cases. That is no doubt true, but I suggest that adds nothing to the debate on how such cases should be treated when a prosecution is brought.

In Committee the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, emphasised that firearms officers can face serious death threats and intimidation—very regrettable but no doubt true. So can other police officers, and if there is information suggesting such circumstances or a risk of such circumstances, our amendments would allow the judge to protect anonymity. That is the right way to ensure both protection and open justice.

The other amendments that I have tabled, Amendments 393C and 393D, would ensure that the criteria for courts imposing restrictions are the same after conviction and pending an appeal, and Amendments 393E and 393F would ensure that courts have flexible powers to vary or revoke reporting restrictions or anonymity orders in the light of any changes. I beg to move.

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[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister and to all noble Lords who have spoken in what has been an interesting and important debate on a vital question. I am also grateful to the Minister and her officials, who have devoted considerable time to meeting me and others concerned about this matter, for taking our concerns so seriously. My noble friend Lord Carter of Haslemere made the point that there is much agreement on all sides, and there is. It is very important to emphasise that. We all agree that firearms officers do a vital job. They do it in the public interest, they do it in exceptionally difficult circumstances, and they have our thanks for their service.

Respectfully, I cannot agree with the noble Lord, Lord Davies, on Amendment 394, for all the reasons given by my noble friend Lord Faulks. To say to the public that a particular category of defendant—firearms officers—should be prosecuted only if the circumstances are exceptional would send a terrible message to the public and damage public confidence in cases where someone has died by reason of the actions of an officer of state. Surely the standard principle should apply: the CPS asks itself whether a conviction is more likely than not and whether it is in the public interest for there to be a prosecution. As my noble friend Lord Faulks said, in assessing the public interest and whether a conviction is likely, the CPS of course takes into account all the circumstances; in particular, whether the officer is acting normally in the heat of the moment in exceptionally difficult circumstances.

I have a couple of points on my amendment in relation to anonymity. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made the powerful point that firearms officers are unique in that they are licensed to shoot, and that, in almost all cases where they exercise that power, the likely outcome is death. I say to the House that this special and unique role makes it all the more important that open justice fully applies, unless there is information before the court suggesting that anonymity is needed.

The noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, made the powerful point that these officers deserve certainty, because otherwise, when they go out to work and are faced with an immediate threat, or what they perceive to be an immediate threat, they might hesitate before shooting as they are worried about the consequences for them. This would be very much against the public interest. I say to the noble Viscount that, under Clause 168, the firearms officer does not have certainty. All that the Government are providing is a presumption, and, as the Minister rightly emphasised, the court will decide, even with a presumption, whether anonymity should apply.

However, whatever noble Lords may think of my judgment on this, I can count, and therefore I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 393B withdrawn.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 11th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Addington (LD)]

My Lords, I am an unworthy substitute for the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, but I am afraid it is one of those occasions when real life catches up with your Lordships’ House; it has stopped her being here today. She supports the amendment. When you start to think about it, it comes under the heading of a no-brainer: there should be a consistent approach. If you are taking on an economic activity to transport something across the country, you should have a rough idea about a consistent approach to transporting it. If you have not, there should be a very good reason. There does not seem to be one, other than it having been decided that they will be charged at this rate.

Heritage railways are a nice cause, but there are more widespread and universal economic impacts from this if you transport goods on our main transport system without incurring extra, sometimes prohibitive costs. It would be comparatively easy for the Government to at least bring them into line and give them some steer as to a realistic level of charge to be placed on them. At the very least, admin considerations around this can be cut down. I hope the Minister will be able to tell us that it is all in hand and that the Government have a timetable for making sure anybody involved in this knows what is happening, so that everybody can say “thank you very much” and move on to the next issue.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I too support the amendment. I suggest that if, as I hope, the Minister agrees that regulations are needed, they should not just deal with consistency but impose a substantive limit on the fees to be charged. It seems that in this context, as in many others, the maximum that should be charged is the cost incurred to police forces.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, although the movement of abnormal loads may seem like a niche and marginal activity, my noble friend Lord Attlee, who recently retired from your Lordships’ House, laid out a compelling argument in Committee for why that is not the case. The heavy haulage industry is a vital component of our national infrastructure and construction sectors, yet the framework governing when police escorts are required and how much may be charged for them is inconsistent.

It is wonderful that my noble friend Lord Parkinson has now taken up the mantle on this matter. He began his contribution by outlining his concerns about the use of heavy haulage by the heritage railway industry, an issue also raised by the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner of Worcester. The issues are wider than that. In Committee, Earl Attlee spoke with considerable authority on this matter and set out the difficulties that parts of the industry have experienced. In particular, he highlighted the sharp increase in charges in certain areas and the absence of any national framework governing those fees. In some cases, police forces have charged for a full shift of officers, even where the escort itself may take a very short period of time. Industry representatives have raised understandable concerns that such practices can result in costs that far exceed the cost of the haulage operation itself.

The overwhelming majority of police forces apply the relevant legislation in good faith and without difficulty. The problem appears to arise in only a minority of forces, where the absence of national guidance has led to practices that the industry considers disproportionate. The result is uncertainty for hauliers, increased costs for major infrastructure projects and, ultimately, inefficiency within a system that should be operating smoothly.

Therefore, the amendment seeks to ensure that there is a clear national framework. It sets out when police escorts are truly necessary, as opposed to private self-escorts, and would establish a transparent schedule of fees. It also sensibly seeks to allow police forces to apply to the Secretary of State for flexibility in genuinely exceptional circumstances. Put simply, the amendment balances the need for consistency with the operational realities that police forces face. For those reasons, I am grateful both for the tireless campaigning of Earl Attlee and to my noble friend Lord Parkinson for continuing to push the Government on this matter.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

My Lords, I join all the speakers in the debate on this small but important issue in praising the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, who, after almost 34 years of service in this House, retired just a few days ago. It would be remiss of me not to join in paying tribute to him, his work and the tenacity with which he pursued this issue, including recruiting the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, and my noble friend Lord Faulkner of Worcester to take up the cudgels on his behalf. He was a true champion of the heavy haulage industry. As the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, said, it is important that we focus on this not just because of the impact on the Heritage Railway Association—as dear as it is to many hearts in your Lordships’ House—but because of the importance it has to our economy, including all the construction and infrastructure that we wish to provide.

Earl Attlee took great pride in being the only Member of your Lordships’ House to hold an HGV licence. I hope that, in his absence, he is pleased to know that that knowledge gap has been bridged in some part by my newly introduced noble friend Lord Roe of West Wickham. By virtue of being a firefighter, he holds—or at least held—an HGV licence for the purpose of driving fire engines. I think that Earl Attlee would have appreciated that.

Moving to the matters before us in the amendments, as noble Lords have explained, the amendment relates to setting criteria specifying when a police escort is required and charges levied by the police for escorting abnormal loads and would require the Secretary of State to establish a framework to regulate such fees. While I recognise that the aim of the amendment is to improve consistency and predictability for operators moving such loads, we do not believe that a new statutory framework is necessary.

Changes have already been made to support greater consistency. In May last year, the National Police Chiefs’ Council published new guidance outlining when police escorts should be provided for abnormal loads. This was developed in collaboration with policing, industry and national highways. The NPCC Abnormal Load Guidance 2025 is the national framework used by all UK police forces to determine whether an escort is required and, if so, whether that escort must be provided by the police or can be undertaken as a self-escort. Furthermore, a national framework setting out charges for escorting these loads already exists. Section 25 of the Police Act 1996 contains a power for the police to recharge the cost of policing in specific circumstances. Fee levels are set out in the guidance on special police services by the NPCC, and this is updated annually.

Introducing a standardised regulatory framework—as I said in Committee, and I will repeat it here—undermines the ability of forces to respond flexibly and proportionately to local needs. We cannot escape this fact. The operational demands placed on police forces by abnormal load movements can differ across the country and are influenced by a range of local factors, including geography, road infrastructure, traffic additions and the availability of police resources.

To be clear, the Government take this issue seriously. As we have heard, following a meeting with the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, my colleague, Policing Minister Jones, wrote to West Midlands Police to pass on her concerns. I am grateful for the commendation from the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, and my noble friend Lord Faulkner, of that correspondence. As a result, I understand that West Midlands Police is undertaking an independent, expert evaluation to assess the force’s compliance systems and processes against the NPCC guidance.

It is important to allow time for the recent guidance to have effect before considering further action. Furthermore, to ensure that it remains fit for purpose, the NPCC has committed to formally review its abnormal loads guidance 12 months after publication; that is, in May of this year—a couple of months’ time.

I understand noble Lords’ concerns around the adherence of police forces to this guidance. Therefore, I can confirm that the Government will write to the NPCC following Royal Assent of the Bill to remind forces of the need to follow the guidance I have mentioned.

The noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, and, in the same spirit, my noble friend Lord Faulkner asked what weight could be given to the guidance issued by the NPCC and what actions might be pursued by West Midlands Police as a consequence. As I have already said, West Midlands Police is undertaking a review. This is NPCC guidance, which it is itself reviewing to make sure that it remains current and responsive to issues that emerge over time.

There is always a balance between having inflexible statutory guidance, inflexible statutory regulation and guidance that is operated locally. We are currently on the side of the latter. Within that, this is national guidance. Police forces will pay great attention to that. They will pay even greater attention to the idea that, to quote my noble friend Lord Faulkner, the Policing Minister is “on the case” with this. With respect, I think that is an appropriate level of intervention. The Government are aware that it is an important issue. We will always keep our eyes on it and make sure that we can have a level of scrutiny to ensure that police forces behave respectfully toward hauliers while maintaining their local operational independence.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am very grateful to the Minister. Will the letter that the Minister mentioned make the point that it is unacceptable in principle for police forces to seek to make a profit via the imposition of these fees?

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I would need to go back and check on the correspondence for the noble Lord, but this is about making sure that this is covering costs, rather than anything else.

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[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I have real reservations about Amendment 385, which I am afraid I cannot support. I am glad that my noble friend is not thinking of testing the opinion of the House.

I speak as a cyclist and I fear, for the reason touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, that what is proposed in Amendment 385 is likely to damage relations between the police and innocent cyclists. The truth is that, when bicycling, we all wear a variety of things that are capable of disguising our identity. I did this morning. One always wears a helmet, very frequently one wears goggles or spectacles, either as sunglasses or to keep the rain out, and when it is cold one wears a ski mask or scarf around the bottom of one’s mouth. All these things are capable of concealing one’s identity. I saw several people doing this today when I was bicycling in from King’s Cross. This will damage relations between the police and innocent cyclists.

I ask, rhetorically, what kind of person is the police officer likely to stop? Most probably, I suspect, it will be a person from an ethnic minority, who may be young too. Anybody who has been in Parliament as long as I have knows the trouble that you have from stop and search. That is proportionate, because the carrying of weapons is a serious risk. I acknowledge that it is perfectly correct that cyclists on occasion conceal themselves in order to seize bags and mobiles—that is true—but the remedy is disproportionate.

Furthermore, the amendment gives rise to an interesting question of principle. If it is right to impose this restriction in respect of cyclists, what about motorcyclists? They come into exactly the same category and are perfectly capable of snatching a bag or mobile, and most of them now have visors over their helmets. So, what are you going to do about that?

My own view is that, yes, there is a problem, but this is a disproportionate remedy. It will impact on innocent cyclists, as I venture to describe myself, and it will damage relationships between the police and the cycling community. I was very glad to hear that my noble friend indicated he will not test the opinion of the House because, had he done so, I would have voted against him.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I hear the concerns of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, about Amendment 385. It would confer a power on a constable to stop a cyclist without any basis, reasonable or otherwise, to suspect that they are committing an offence or are about to commit an offence, when they may have, as the noble Viscount said, a perfectly good reason to be wearing a face mask. They may have influenza, which they do not wish to share with others, or they may be concerned to avoid diesel or petrol fumes on the road. Moreover, the amendment would confer an unrestricted power on the constable to require the person concerned to remove the face covering, with the sanction of a fine or imprisonment, without any requirement on the constable to consider whether that individual has a proper reason for wearing a face mask and without any defence of reasonable excuse. I too could not support such an amendment.

In Amendment 387A, the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, made a powerful case about the mischief which afflicts local communities. My only concern is whether her proposed new clause would do much, if anything, to address this real mischief. The remedy would still depend on enforcement action by local authorities or the police, and would still depend on evidence which is difficult to obtain. I appreciate that police forces are independent, but the Government need to do all they can to encourage them to take action to deal with these problems. If that requires further resources then they should have further resources, but it should be a priority for effective policing.

[Viscount Goschen (Con)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend Lady Buscombe in the thrust of what she is seeking to achieve with her Amendment 387A. I do not think I heard my noble friend say that this would be a panacea or the answer to this complex situation, which clearly needs a multi-agency response. There seems to be a widespread agreement or understanding that there has recently been a substantial proliferation of essentially cash-only businesses on our high streets for nefarious purposes.

Many businesses may well be totally legitimate and carrying on as they have done for many years, but, as one example, in a town not very far away from where I live in the West Country, I recently counted 10 barbers or nail bars in a relatively short street. There are not enough nails or hair within that area, when, only a couple of years ago, approximately two would have sufficed. Either there has been a massive demand by the locals for these services or there are other motives. It seems clear that the police, trading standards and the Government know what is going on.

It is incumbent on the Minister, when he replies to the debate, to acknowledge the scale of what is happening and to give the House an indication of how a truly multi-agency and tough, robust approach will be taken to this issue to nip it in the bud. Where the public see acceptance of widespread law-breaking, there needs to be action for the law to continue to be respected.

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[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

I am not going to try to argue the case; I am making my argument, and the noble Viscount is making his. The other regulatory bodies do not have something called the IOPC, a body that is charged with investigating this type of thing. That is fine, but it imposes a further burden and further process. Two groups are badly affected: the family of the person who has died and the officer in the case. Of course, I make the case for the officer, but both matter in that both are badly damaged. For me, this is a subset of the later discussion we will have about police firearms officers, but it is just one indication of some of the aggravation of their position, when, in every case, when charged, they have been found not guilty. In the Kaba case, following a three-year process, it took three hours for a criminal court to find that there was no case to answer and the officer was found not guilty.

It is very hard to understand why the IOPC, after all that time, having not charged in the first place at the time of the event, suddenly instigated the case at a later stage. For all those reasons that I have tried to identify, police firearms officers, who take incredible risks on our behalf, are an important group that we have to consider and, unless we find some comfort for them in law, the danger is they will turn around and stop doing it on our behalf. I think this is a help. I accept the fundamental point from the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, that it may be inconsistent, but I would argue that we are in a pretty inconsistent place now so far as the law and the process is set up.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, can I add a further point to the points made by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, with which I agree? The purpose of the criminal proceedings is distinct from the purpose of the disciplinary regulatory proceedings. The purpose of the criminal proceedings, of course, is to decide whether this individual should face a serious sanction of many years in prison for what is alleged. The purpose of the disciplinary proceedings is entirely different. It is to protect the public and decide whether a person who serves as a police officer is an appropriate person in all the circumstances to continue to do so.

It is uncomfortable, but it may well be the case that the director-general, on reviewing all the evidence, takes the view that this particular officer should not continue to be in the police force, should not continue to hold the responsibilities that he or she does, and should not continue to have the powers that he or she does. If this amendment is passed, we will be putting the director-general in an impossible position. It will mean that he or she has to take no action to seek to impose disciplinary proceedings on an officer against whom there may be very considerable evidence that they are simply unsuitable to remain in the police service.

That is very similar, I would suggest, to the situation the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, drew attention to, because the purpose of the family law proceedings is entirely different to the purpose of the criminal proceedings. The purpose of the family law proceedings is to decide whether the child needs to be protected and therefore those proceedings can quite properly continue in relation to the same allegations that were rejected by the criminal court.

[The Lord Bishop of Manchester]

My Lords, can I add my two-penn’orth to this? I declare my interest as the co-chair of the national police ethics committee, but I am speaking more as a serving Bishop. I have to hear disciplinary complaints against clergy. Sometimes those clergy have committed something which is being investigated first by the police. To answer the point from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, often the police tell us, “We don’t want you interfering until we have finished”. If the result of the criminal proceeding is that the person is convicted, I can then do quite a summary process in terms of applying a penalty or perhaps depriving that member of the clergy from serving in their parish, perhaps banning them from ministry for a time or for life. But all of that is very much on that balance of probabilities, on the civil standard. It is very different from the criminal standard.

There are many cases where the police investigation may not lead to a trial or may lead to a trial and acquittal but there are still major issues around the suitability of that person to be a minister of religion, such as their safeguarding ability. I need to be able to reassure my people in my diocese by following a proper disciplinary process on exactly the same facts as the criminal case was dealing with, but to that very different standard of proof.

Again, as chair of police ethics, I think the ability of the police to be respected by the public, for me, demands that there are occasions when somebody who has been acquitted at the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt should still then face the disciplinary matter at that civil standard of the balance of probabilities, so I could not support this current amendment.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 9th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, we are talking today about live facial recognition at protests and why the police must not be allowed to use it until Parliament has agreed a clear and democratic code of practice. At its heart, Amendment 374 is about power and trust. Live facial recognition is not just another camera on a street corner; it is a mass surveillance tool that can scan every face in a crowd, compare people in real time against a watch-list and permanently change what it feels like to stand in the public square. Once you normalise all that at protests, you change the character of protest itself.

If people think that simply turning up at a demonstration means that their face can be scanned, logged and potentially mismatched to a suspect list, some will decide that it is safer to stay at home. That is a direct, chilling effect on the right to protest, to assemble and to speak out against, or for, the Government. We should not let that happen by stealth through a patchwork of local decisions and internal guidance that most citizens will never see. That is what is happening at the moment.

The technology itself is far from neutral. We know that facial recognition systems can and do get things wrong. They perform differently across age groups and ethnicities. A false match in the context of a protest is not a minor inconvenience. It can mean being stopped, questioned, detained or stigmatised in front of your friends, your colleagues or your community, not because of something you did but because an algorithm made a guess. Allowing that at political protests without proper rules and oversight is an invitation to injustice.

It is not enough to say, “Trust the police. We have internal policies”. The question here is not whether any particular chief constable is well-intentioned; it is whether the state should be able to scan and track people at political gatherings without Parliament having debated, defined and limited that power. In a democracy, if the Government want tools that can alter the balance of power between citizen and state, they must come to Parliament, set out the case and accept constraints.

That is why a publicly debated statutory code of practice matters. It is where we answer basic questions that are currently left in the grey zone. In what circumstances, if any, is live facial recognition at a protest justified? Who sets the watch-lists and on what criteria? What happens to images of people who are not of interest? Are they actually deleted? If so, how quickly? Who can access them and for what purposes? What independent oversight exists when things go wrong? Until those questions are answered openly, the use of live facial recognition at protests rests on unpublished risk assessments and technical documents that ordinary citizens cannot challenge and that elected representatives cannot easily amend. That is the opposite of how intrusive powers should be operated in a liberal democracy.

We should also be honest about the precedent. If we accept live facial recognition at protests now, without a code, it will be used more often and for more purposes later. Once the infrastructure is there and the practice is normalised, it will be very hard to row back. The time to set limits is before the rollout, not after the abuses. Police should not have, without parliamentary approval, the ability to quietly turn every protest into a data-harvesting exercise, watching not just the few who pose a risk but the many who are simply exercising their rights.

The principle is simple: if live facial recognition is to be used at all in the context of political protest, it must be under a clear and democratically approved code of practice, debated in Parliament, tested against our human rights obligations and subject to real oversight and redress. Until that is in place, the police should not be allowed to deploy this technology at protests.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

This is another context where there has to be a fair balance between competing interests. One can easily see that the use of live facial recognition is a vital policing tool. However, as has been explained, it has an adverse impact on privacy. What concerns me is that the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act require not merely that steps taken are necessary and proportionate, which the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, rightly referred to, but it is a requirement that any restrictions or provisions in such a context must be prescribed by law.

I am very concerned that having police authorities and police officers exercising a pure discretion, without any statutory guidance or code of practice, may well fail that legal test of prescribed by law, because of the uncertainty and the excess of discretion. Therefore, the Government would be well advised in this sensitive context to ensure that there is statutory guidance and a statutory code of practice. The Minister may be unable to accept this amendment, but I hope he will be able to tell the House that steps will be taken to provide clear guidance to police authorities as to the use of this technology.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 374, which I have signed, but also to Amendment 430, which I tabled.

The use of live facial recognition in our public spaces is an extraordinary expansion of state power that currently exists in a legal vacuum. We are not Luddites on these Benches; we recognise the utility of technology, but we must ensure that live facial recognition is a targeted tool used under the rule of law and not a blanket surveillance net that chills the right to move freely and anonymously in our streets. The use of live facial recognition technology in public spaces poses a profound challenge to our civil liberties that cannot be met purely by internal police guidance. We are witnessing a fundamental shift in the nature of British policing—a shift, if you like, from the line-fishing of traditional human observation to the deep ocean trawling of automated mass surveillance.

Amendments 374 and 430 collectively seek to provide the democratic and judicial safeguards currently missing from what the experts have called a regulatory lacuna or legislative void. Amendment 374 prohibits the use of LFR during public assemblies or processions, unless a specific code of practice has been approved by both Houses of Parliament, as my noble friends have explained. In a free society, individuals should not have to pay the price of handing over their sensitive biometric data just to engage in democratic protest. We must safeguard public privacy and civil liberties by requiring democratic oversight before this technology is deployed against those exercising their right to assembly. We cannot have policing by algorithm without democratic oversight.

The current lack of oversight creates a documented chilling effect. Research by the Ada Lovelace Institute indicates that nearly one-third of the public are uncomfortable with police use of LFR, and up to 38% of young Londoners, for instance, have stated they would stay away from protests or public events if they knew that this technology was being used. We cannot allow our public squares to become spaces where citizens are treated as walking barcodes or a nation of suspects.

Critically, Amendment 430 would establish that the use of LFR in public spaces must be limited to narrowly defined serious cases and require judicial approval. It would provide the fundamental safeguards our society requires. It would prohibit the use of LFR by any authority unless it was for the investigation of serious crimes and had received prior judicial authorisation specifying the scope and duration of its use. We must ensure that this technology is used as a targeted tool, not a blanket surveillance net.

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[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I welcome the opportunity for debate that the Government’s Amendment 375 has afforded us. This is obviously a highly contested issue but, before we start, I put on record the very specific nature of the issue we are debating. In 2024, the High Court declared that a specific section of the Conservative Party’s Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 was incompatible with Article 14, the prohibition of discrimination, and Article 8, the right to private life, of the European Convention on Human Rights. That section extended the prohibition on returning to land covered by requests to leave from three to 12 months. That is why the Government are now attempting to reverse that change. The judgment did not, as claimed in Committee, nullify that no-returns order.

I will make His Majesty’s Loyal Opposition’s position clear: although we accept that the law as it currently stands renders the continuation of the current offence of returning to or re-entering prohibited land untenable, we would ultimately rather that the human rights law that has caused this incompatibility be repealed and the offence upheld. It is not racial discrimination to uphold one of the fundamental governing systems of our society. As perhaps some noble Lords in the Chamber will want to hear, private property has been a continuous thread throughout our history that has galvanised peace and prosperity in our country. Remove the right to private property and you create a system that favours freeloaders and fraudsters.

In the judgment, the presiding judge spoke of a balanced structure between the property rights of landowners and occupiers and the interests of Travellers. The increase in a no-returns order from three to 12 months would supposedly disproportionately affect the balance in favour of landowners. I do not believe that the interests of trespassers should be equally balanced with those of landowners and occupiers, if at all. That does not pertain to the Gypsy Traveller community; it does not matter who the people are. Declaring that the right to private property should trump the subjective desires of an individual or group does not have a racial element. It is an entirely neutral law and fundamentally liberal, in that it affords the same freedoms to all.

It is true to the latter point that it is disheartening to see the party that was once the vehicle of Manchester liberalism now supporting such a partial and anarchic view of the world. Therefore, if the law posits that upholding the belief in private property and enacting its enforcement in law is considered wrong, the law should be repealed. If the law ascertains that private property undermines an abstract theory of human rights and that the latter should prevail, the law should be repealed. If the law favours the human rights of the infringer over the victim, the law should be repealed. If the law is able to overturn the decision of a sovereign, elected Parliament acting of its own volition, the law should almost certainly be repealed.

Therefore, although we welcome the Government’s attempt to find a compromise between our legal commitments, we are unfortunately of the opinion that they are amending the wrong Act entirely. They are still rather dogmatic in their commitment to this outdated doctrine, but they are simply kicking the can down the road and delaying the inevitable. Whether the courts allow a three-month no-return period is immaterial; there would still exist an extrajudicial doctrine that has the ultimate say over the United Kingdom’s Parliament. There will simply be an appeal to this amendment, and if that is unsuccessful, they will find themselves facing the ECHR in another challenge to another Act.

We are sympathetic to the Government’s attempt at a balancing act, but they are targeting the symptoms over the cause. That cause is the ECHR enshrined in the Human Rights Act. The ECHR has served its purpose, but the fact that it now favours rule-breakers over rule-takers shows that it does so no longer. The Government must recognise this truth, and I suspect that deep down they do. They should follow the advice of the Conservative Party and leave the ECHR. Perhaps the Minister will reply bearing good news.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Before the Minister replies, I suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that the rule-breakers are not those who want to return within three months; they are the local authorities that have statutory obligations to provide proper sites for Travellers but are failing to do so.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

I accept that, to a certain degree.

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[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I have added my name to my noble friend Lord Faulks’ amendment and I support it. To repeat a point I made on an earlier amendment, the police generally need simplicity, not complexity. Generally, Ziegler created complexity in what, in that case, was the simplest of offences. It was all about wilful obstruction of the highway. That used to be fairly straightforward. It was on a highway; it got obstructed and it was done wilfully: that was the offence. That is all that had to be proved. Of course, it is used not only in cases of protest, but Ziegler said that, in the case of protesters blocking the highway, that simple test could not be applied; it had to consider further issues. In fact, what it said was that the person could be convicted of obstructing the highway only if the prosecution could persuade the court that a conviction would be a proportionate interference in his or her convention rights, which, in effect, shifted it for the police to prove proportionality when someone was blocking the highway.

My point is that, although we understand the intellectual background to that, it has left the law in such a confused position that the cops do not know whether to enforce it at the moment of the crime. That is never a good position to be in. There is a secondary issue, which is that senior officers often become involved in planning for marches that are to happen in the next week or two weeks. They probably have a little bit more time to consider these issues, but frankly, the police have always used discretion. People block the highway fairly regularly; we all do. If you stop in your car, if you are walking on the highway, you can block it, so they do not arrest everybody who blocks the highway. They do not arrest every protester who is walking on the highway and clearly is obstructing it. That is what marchers do; it happens all the time. Of course, it becomes a bit tricky when a group within the protest decides to sit down in the middle of Oxford Circus and want to stay there for some time. That, I think we might all accept, is unreasonable. The police will try to persuade them. At some point, they might want to intervene and say, “Actually, I think you need to move or, alternatively, you are going to get arrested. There is a consequence to what you are doing. That’s your right, but there will be a consequence”.

I am afraid this judgment has left the police really confused. This is about obstruction of the highway, but it applies to all the different aspects of public order law. I do not think that it is fair to ask the police to start balancing human rights on the street. Of course, there is the issue of reasonableness, which is where discretion comes in—they are not going to arrest everybody and should exercise their powers only if somebody refuses to move or repeatedly causes an aggravation to the simple offence—but the danger of this judgment is that the law is confused and the police are caught in the middle. This amendment is an opportunity to clarify it. I think that is reasonable and I support it.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, criticism of the Ziegler decision is well-founded and well-taken, but the law has moved on. For example, in the Supreme Court’s abortion services case, 2022 UKSC 32, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reed, speaking for a seven-judge Supreme Court, said at paragraph 42:

“The decision in Ziegler was widely understood as having established that every criminal conviction of protesters involved a restriction upon their Convention rights, and must be proved to be justified and proportionate on the basis of an assessment of the particular facts. As explained, that understanding was mistaken”.


The law has moved on.

As the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, recognised, there have been a number of more recent cases in which the courts emphasised, in the context of protest, that it is sufficient that Parliament has laid down a particular offence. It is therefore not necessary for the prosecution to prove proportionality on the facts of the individual case. It may well be that more clarity is required in this area, but the House should proceed on the recognition that Ziegler, for all its faults, is not current law.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, for the elegant way that he introduced this amendment and the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for explaining his perspective on it. In effect, it was a police perspective, given that the police find it difficult to apply the law as it was thought to be after Ziegler. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for explaining that the law has moved on since Ziegler.

I do not propose to get into the argument of precisely what the law is in the light of Ziegler as subsequently interpreted. I am concerned with the way that this amendment addresses the question of reasonable excuse. This is achieved by, in effect, spelling it out in proposed new subsection (2), which says:

“A person has no excuse for the conduct if … it is intended to intimidate, provoke, inconvenience or otherwise harm members of the public by interrupting or disrupting their freedom to carry on a lawful activity”.


That hides within it an open question about the meaning of intention in that context. It is for that reason that I do not support the amendment as drafted.

It may well be that a person recognises that conduct that is otherwise perfectly lawful, particularly in a context of peaceful protest, may inevitably carry the consequence of provoking or inconveniencing other members of the public by interrupting or disrupting their freedom to carry on a lawful activity. That comes back to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, made in the context of obstructing the highway. Any obstruction or interference with traffic or movement or getting to work, or any delay, could all be intended consequences of lawful protest. What worries me is that this amendment, as drafted, would acknowledge that intention and say that there could be no excuse. It is not then a question of weighing up any excuse in the light of what the courts may consider to be an excuse in any particular case; the question is what the intended consequence would be, and the intended consequence may appear to the people charged with the conduct to be entirely reasonable, though intended, and may objectively be entirely reasonable, though intended.

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[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I know a young man who has just got his driving licence. He is very excited and sees it as a rite of passage; he is now a grown-up. He has joined the club of drivers and he shows his driving licence with pride. I can assure noble Lords he has no idea that applying for a driving licence means that he is joining a vast biometric police database, a club of police surveillance, and his mugshot will be treated like one of those Most Wanted gallery of rogues images.

This is a corruption of public trust. The public apply for one thing, only for it to be subverted and used for something else. It seems to me to be duplicitous and behind the backs of the public. Currently, police forces can directly access and search DVLA data only in relation to road traffic offences and must phone the DVLA in relation to other offences. I note that the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, would not prevent police forces accessing DVLA data for law enforcement purposes, but it should not be the default position. It is important to create this safeguard to prevent such data being used to conduct, in effect, phishing exercises of facial recognition. Therefore, we need this amendment to be taken seriously and I will be interested in what the Minister has to say.

This is not some paranoid dystopian vision. In a recent submission to the Home Affairs Committee, the National Police Chiefs’ Council stated that police chiefs were indeed seeking access to the DVLA database for facial recognition. That would be a huge expansion of police surveillance powers, granting them access, as we have heard, to the biometric data of tens of millions of citizens. We cannot overestimate how important it is that we do not just nod this through but take seriously the risk to civil liberties. It is why the noble Baroness’s Amendment 380, which creates a safeguard, is so important: to protect the civil liberties and privacy of innocent driving licence holders.

I conclude with a quote from Big Brother Watch, which says that this represents

“a disproportionate expansion of police powers to track and identify citizens across time and locations for low-level policing needs”.

In a way, it is an abuse of the police to ask them to use these underhand methods, and it is therefore vital that there are safeguards in law to prevent this happening, particularly because it is happening behind the backs of ordinary people.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

There is no question, as I understand Clause 154, of a blank cheque, and there is no question here of underhand methods. What the clause requires is that the Secretary of State produces regulations, and the regulations must specify the circumstances in which information may be made available under this section. I am assuming that in due course, the Government are going to bring forward regulations to implement this provision. Those regulations will have to be laid before Parliament, and there will be an opportunity, if any noble Lord wishes to do so, to debate those regulations. I suggest that that is the time to assess whether the regulations contain a fair balance between the rights of the individual and the public interest.

[Lord Strasburger (LD)]

My Lords, the DVLA driver database must not be turned into a ready-made line-up for facial recognition systems. This is about more than data protection; it is about the basic relationship between citizen and state. People did not hand over their photographs to the DVLA so that the Government could quietly repurpose them for mass identification; they did so under legal compulsion to get a driving licence.

Using those images to power facial recognition searches fundamentally changes the deal after the fact. It turns a compulsory single-purpose database into an all-purpose surveillance tool, without anyone ever having given meaningful consent. Once you allow the police to run facial recognition matches against the DVLA database, you create the possibility of identifying almost anyone, almost anywhere, from a single image. That goes far beyond investigating named suspects. It enables trawling through the entire driving population to find possible matches, with all the risk of false positives that facial recognition systems already carry. A bad match here is not an abstract error. It is a real person, wrongly flagged, questioned or even arrested, because a machine thought their face looked similar.

The DVLA database is also nearly universal for adults. That makes it uniquely tempting. If we normalise using it for facial recognition in one context, it will not stop there. Today, it might be justified for serious crime. Tomorrow, it could creep into protests, public events or routine inquiries. Once the precedent is set that every licence holder’s image is fair game for search, the barrier to expanding that use becomes paper-thin.

There is also a democratic principle at stake here. When the state wants new investigative powers that are this sweeping, it should come to Parliament and ask for them openly, with clear limits, safeguards and independent oversight. What must not happen is a quiet, technical integration between the facial recognition system and the DVLA database, introduced by secondary legislation and governed mainly by internal policies and obscure memoranda of understanding. This is legislation by the backdoor, not by debate.

If we allow the DVLA database to be searched with facial recognition, we are not just making investigations a little more efficient; we are rebuilding the basic infrastructure of our democracy so that the state can, in principle, put a name to almost any face. We are doing that using images people had no real choice about providing, and for a completely different purpose. So, the line we should draw is simple and firm: the DVLA driver database is for licensing drivers, not for powering facial recognition line-ups. If any Government want to change that, they must come back to Parliament with primary legislation, make their case in public and accept strict statutory constraints. Until then, we should say clearly that turning a compulsory licensing database into a de facto national ID gallery is a step too far for a free society. That is what Amendment 380 does and I commend it to the House.

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[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

I suggest that the Minister has been watching too many of these television programmes. There is a complete lack of transparency. The Information Commissioner’s Office had to learn about the use of passport databases through media reports, rather than Home Office disclosure, even though this appears to have been happening since 2019. It is just so completely and utterly wrong. If people had given their information for it be used for those purposes, it would be fair enough and no problem at all, but they did not and the Government have taken it without permission. The whole situation is absolutely appalling.

There is the potential for 50 million drivers to be put on a permanent database and to be checked every single day. Of course, the police want it; I would want it if I were the police. It will make their lives so much easier. It will make it very easy for them to check everything they need to check, but that should not be the purpose of this.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

The noble Baroness is very eloquently making her case on the basis of a lack of consent. I suggest to her that the police regularly use material that people have not given their consent for them to use—for example, their fingerprints and saliva.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

I do not accept that that is the same as 50 million innocent drivers being put on a database. However, I have given all the arguments and we have had this debate twice. The noble Lord is gesturing. I am sorry; what does that mean?

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 9th March 2026 Lords Chamber

Clause 140 is an oppressive clause. It would provide the police with the powers to restrict the very protests that are most likely to be justified and effective. There is no way of curing it and we should have none of it.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

The noble Lord has already accepted that the right to protest has to be balanced against the rights of others. Surely the virtue of the cumulative disruption provision, Clause 140, is that it is totally unacceptable that the rights of others who wish to pray in their synagogue, who wish to get to their synagogue, who wish to get away from their synagogue, should be repeatedly disrupted in the same place every week. The cumulative nature of the disruption pushes the balance in favour of asking the protesters not to cease protesting but to do it somewhere else.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

The answer to that is that the cumulative nature of the disruption is not what causes the oppression to worshippers at synagogues or mosques or anywhere else. We have accepted, for the purpose of Report, restrictions on the right to protest near places of worship on condition that it is relevant and that we are talking about the place of worship and worshippers being disrupted. The fact that a legitimate protest is repeated is not a reason for restricting the protests. If the rights and freedoms of others are restricted, that in itself is, under our Amendment 369, a reason for restricting protest, because there is a right to protest. It is not helped by the fact that repeated protests are seen as more difficult. I see the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, about repeated protests at synagogues and mosques, but they are covered by our condition on restriction at a place of worship. I beg to move.

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[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, before I speak to my amendments in this group, I would like to say that I learned to read a long time ago—more than 70 years ago, before I went to school. This alphabet soup of a Bill is quite confusing, partly because so many people disagree with it. The noble Lord, Lord Hanson, should perhaps be aware that it is moderately unusual to have this many amendments; perhaps it would help if he accepted one or two. Obviously, all of my amendments are incredibly reasonable, so I urge him to pick them up. My first amendment in this group would solve the problem outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, so I expect his strong support on that.

The noble Lord, Lord Marks, moved Amendment 369 on the right to protest. In Committee, we were all reassured that this was not necessary, because the right to peaceful protest is already protected under the Human Rights Act. We were correctly reminded that Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights protect the freedoms of expression and assembly, and that public authorities are already bound by those duties, but that reassurance is based on the assumption that those protections will remain intact. As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, pointed out, we cannot be sure of that; we cannot speak for future Governments, who might cause our right to protest to deteriorate.

Over recent years, under this Government and the previous one, we have seen a steady erosion of our right to protest and an expansion of police powers to restrict those protests. Each time, we are told, “The powers are modest—you will hardly notice them”. Of course, that is not true, because the effect is cumulative, damaging and leads to much greater constraint on people who are campaigning and protesting. The balance is shifting and Parliament continues to widen state power without at the same time reaffirming the underlying right.

I have also cosigned Amendment 369A, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger. There are many legitimate reasons why people might want to cover their faces at protests. Some noble Lords on this side of the Chamber might benefit from wearing masks sometimes, just to hide their look of derision at other noble Lords who are speaking coherently, cogently and sensibly. People might fear losing their job if their political views were known. They might fear backlash from family or their local community. They might be worried about racial profiling, particularly given the increased use of facial recognition technology. They might be protesting against a foreign regime and be genuinely concerned about repercussions for loved ones overseas. It is not unreasonable to wear masks.

I turn now to my Amendment 372ZA. Clause 139 is very problematic. It gives the police significant new powers to restrict protests near places of worship. I am an atheist, but I absolutely protect the right of people to worship freely, as they want to, and without fear. At a time of rising antisemitism, Islamophobia and racism, that duty is paramount for us here in Parliament. All our diverse communities must be supported and defended, and every faith group must have the ability to worship freely. As drafted, Clause 139 risks undermining that balance between rights. If the Government are not prepared to remove it, it must at the very least be clarified and narrowed. My amendments are offered as a compromise and an attempt to introduce clarity where the drafting is currently vague and overly broad.

My amendments, which address the phrases “in the vicinity”, “within 50 metres” and “the purpose of intimidating”, seek to establish clarity on these broad definitions in Clause 139. The clause seeks to restrict the right to protest by giving the police new powers to ban or restrict protest “in the vicinity” of places of religious worship, based on the false premise that these powers are required to protect freedom of religion. “In the vicinity” is a vague definition that could mean 10 metres or 10 miles. At the very least, the clause must be amended to make it more specific and contained, with an eye towards protecting Article 11—the right to freedom of assembly. “In the vicinity” needs to be clarified in terms of a specific distance. Many cities and towns have a large concentration of places of worship. The clause as it stands could make it virtually impossible to protest, as other noble Lords have said, including taking protests to Parliament or other such places on which protesters might wish to focus in order to make their point to people in positions of influence—for example, in government.

The Green Party feels that 50 metres is a sensible compromise that would provide clarity for police on the threshold for imposing conditions on protests while protecting the Article 11 right. Amendment 372ZA would help the police because it is so specific that they could take a tape measure to protests to make sure that protesters were at the designated distance. It would also help protesters, because they would know whether they were legally allowed to protest at that point or not. I urge the Minister to think about this and to clarify what “in the vicinity” means. It is far too vague to bring in in legislation. Surely the Government must see that.

The phrase “may intimidate” again is terribly vague, and I do not understand why anybody would put that in a Bill. This is bad writing—which is why we have so many amendments labelled ZA, ZZ and BZ and so on Report. All our diverse communities have to be supported and defended, but Clause 139, as it stands, will not do that because it is too vague. There are existing powers to address racial and religious hatred and violence. Under the Public Order Act 1986, the police can impose conditions on protests that may compel people not to worship, disrupt the activities of an organisation or intimidate or harass people in the vicinity. My amendment tries to make things clearer. As always, I am just trying to help the Government get things right.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Before she sits down, I put to the noble Baroness that her amendments would not achieve the purpose that I understand the Government to have with Clause 139. If you confer the power in relation only to a protest that takes place within 50 metres then you are not going to achieve the purpose, which is to ensure that people are able to get to and away from their synagogue every Saturday. If there is a march of hundreds or thousands of people that impedes their access, 50 metres is not going to work. As I have already put to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, protest is a balance between the rights of protesters and the rights of other people. The noble Baroness is ignoring the rights of others.

[Noble Lords]

Hear, hear!

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[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

My Lords, this is indeed Report and I have a great deal of sympathy with the amendments that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, spoke to. I also take the point of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones: this is a large group, with a large number of amendments. But I will restrict my comments to Amendment 369A.

As the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox and Lady Chakrabarti, said, it is much simpler to apply the test of “reasonable excuse”, rather than the complicated language used in Clause 133(2), where there is a test of whether the wearing of the clothes of concealment had

“a purpose relating to the health of the person or others”.

That is just asking for a complicated interpretation, and the “reasonable excuse” test is, in my view, sounder.

I will make one comment relating to the entirety of Report on this Bill. I, and I am sure other Members of this House, have extreme concern that we are having to sit every night beyond 11 pm to midnight. I am glad to see a nod from the Liberal Democrat Benches. That places great strain, not only on Ministers—I hasten not to ask the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, how many midnights he has been sitting up in this House for. He would find it difficult to count on his fingers: there are only 10 fingers to count on, so I am afraid he does not have enough fingers to count the number of times. So it imposes a strain on him, and it also imposes a great strain on all of us who need or want to participate in this Bill throughout every debate. There is another problem: with the House sitting so late, some important amendments are not considered. This happened to me on Monday last week. I had a very important amendment down, together with others, which was not reached. Indeed, it was not even spoken to. This goes for the whole of Report.

I am blaming nobody: I am certainly not blaming Ministers or the Government Chief Whip, all of whom I greatly respect. But there is a problem, and I cannot help recalling that, on Wednesday last week, when again the House sat to midnight, I was sitting in a committee room in Portcullis House and the annunciator said that the House of Commons rose at 7 pm. There is a disproportionate burden being placed on this House and I protest about it.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, in my experience, the later the sitting, the more persuasive the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, gets—but that is just a personal view.

I shall make one general comment and then make my observations on Amendments 369 and 369A. The modest changes—and they are modest—introduced in the Bill by the Government to public order legislation do not justify some of the alarmist comments that we have heard today about the death of the right to protest in this country. Protest is alive and well, as we see constantly, and will continue to be alive and well—and there is nothing in this Bill or in the Government’s proposals that will stop the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and others protesting against matters they disapprove of—so let us keep this in perspective, please.

[Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer (LD)]

I thank the noble Lord for giving way, but perhaps I could give him a very small example of something that is completely relevant to what he says. On 5 March this year, the Metropolitan Police raided a Quaker meeting house and arrested a number of young, non-violent activists who were being trained in non-violent protest. How can that happen? They were not even protesting: they were just planning how to be non-violent at protests. The noble Lord must concede that that would have a chilling effect on people.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, who makes a forceful point, but my understanding is that that led to no charges. I certainly would not defend what the police did in those circumstances. Perhaps more relevantly, it has nothing whatever to do with the contents of the Bill or the proposals that the Government are putting forward in this proposed legislation.

Amendment 369 is an important amendment, from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and others, proposing that we should insert into the statute book a right to protest. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, that it would be most inappropriate. It cannot be right to introduce a statutory right to protest when we are not introducing into the statute book, and rightly so, any other provision in the European Convention on Human Rights, such as the right to freedom of speech or to religious freedom. The reason for that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, is that we already have the protection of the Human Rights Act, which is applied by our judges.

With respect, I do not accept the criticisms made by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, when he focused on the European concept, in the European Court of Human Rights, of the “margin of discretion”. But that is an international concept, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said. There is something similar here—a discretionary area of judgment—but the European concept is an international concept that is not applied by the domestic courts. Then the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said, “Well, we need to put a marker down in case future Parliaments interfere with the right to protest”. But nothing that we do today will prevent a future Parliament, should it wish to do so, legislating in a way we may think is inappropriate. That is a matter for the future Parliament, and a matter for debate at the time.

The third point the noble Lord, Lord Marks, made was that the convention allowed for a restriction for the protection of morals. He said that was surely inappropriate. Well, yes, but I cannot think of any case where protest has been limited because of a moral view imposed by the police or any other authority. I would not go quite as far as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, who said—I wrote it down—that morals were a “dead letter” nowadays, which is perhaps a wider proposition than she intended to suggest. But Amendment 369 would be most unfortunate. It would cause confusion and achieve no sensible purpose, if I may respectfully say so.

I take a different view of Amendment 369A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, and I have signed it. It deals with Clause 133, which introduces this new offence of concealing your identity at a protest. No defence of reasonable excuse is included, despite the fact that the Joint Committee on Human Rights, in its fifth report of the Session, proposed that there should be such a defence. The absence of such a defence is very puzzling, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, because in Clause 133(2) there are defences

“relating to the health of the person … religious observance, or … a purpose relating to the person’s work”.

In Committee I gave an example of why a defence of reasonable excuse is required. The example—and it is a very topical example—was of a man or a woman who wishes to protest outside the Iranian embassy or at some other demonstration against the conduct of the Iranian regime. They may well have a very strong reason for concealing their identity, which is that they have relatives in Iran. Are we really to say that they are committing a criminal offence, despite the obvious need for them to conceal their identity in those circumstances?

With great respect to the Minister, I heard no convincing answer to that point in Committee. That is why I have joined the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, in suggesting that a defence of reasonable excuse should be added to this new criminal offence. If the noble Lord wishes to test the opinion of the House—and I hope he does, if the Minister cannot give any comfort on this—I will certainly support him.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I rise mainly to support the Government. It seems to me that they are broadly taking steps to stop intimidation of the public, not to stop intimidation of the Government, which is what those who support the right to protest seem to be suggesting. The amendments, on the whole, seem to try to restrict that right. For the reasons that many people have already said, I do not think it is necessary.

The job of the police is to ensure that peaceful protesters are able to protest and that they are not intimidated. It is not their job to maximise the impact of the protest, which is what the implications of facilitation seem to suggest. Other people’s rights have to be respected; in the heat of a protest it is very difficult for the police to get that right. It can be a little easier in preparation for the protest, if you are able to plan, but many of these decisions often have to be made during the protest. When there are thousands of people who are emotional and shouting, perhaps outside the Israeli embassy, it can have an intimidating effect on everybody. We have to think seriously about how the police are able to implement these amendments.

I accept that proportionality is a very important part of the ECHR—I would not argue against that—but it is quite hard for the cops to measure this on the ground. In Northern Ireland it became such an issue that we ended up with a Parades Commission, which took the issues away from the police. The way that legislation is going, I suspect it might be wiser to leave someone independent to make these decisions rather than the police. But while it is with the police, it has to be as simple as possible, not because the police are simple—I speak personally—but because it is not easy to get that balance right. This is an acute judgment, not one that is measured in a court.

I want to speak about two other issues. If Parliament decides that it wants face coverings, we have to think carefully about the reasonable excuse. I do not disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, but I suspect that everybody will have a reasonable excuse. Imagine, as a police officer, confronting somebody about wearing a mask and trying to determine whether they have a reasonable excuse, together with four or five other people in a crowd. It would be almost impossible. Do they have a cold? That is one of the defences in the Act already. I think it would be almost unenforceable. I am not saying that it is wrong to have a reasonable excuse, but it is difficult to determine it during a protest.

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We heard discussion about the fear of reprisals when it comes to transnational repression. I say particularly to my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti that introducing a statutory defence relating to transnational repression would introduce operational complexities for the police, as it is of course the role of the courts, not law enforcement, to assess reasonable doubt and evaluate any defences raised by the defendant. In the context of transnational repression cases, which are often internationally complex, such a defence would place an unnecessary burden on police to disprove claims relating to potential threats to an individual’s safety from a particular state, for example. I stress as well that clear—

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

So is the Minister saying to the protestor at the Iranian embassy that he or she has only two choices: not to protest, or to protest not wearing a face mask and thereby run the risk that their relatives in Iran may be killed or tortured?

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

In that example, I revert to what I said about the locality being designated only if the police suspect that criminality is likely to occur or has occurred on previous occasions. I put it to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that a largely peaceful protest outside an embassy and at an appropriate distance would not fall into that category of protest.

As I was going to say, clear operational guidance from the NPCC—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I do not disagree with the noble Lord. What I am saying is that the police designation of a locality where this offence would apply would be made only in cases where they thought that criminality and an offence would occur. It is not related to the fact that, in this case, there are Iranians protesting. I reflect the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, who, to paraphrase, said that the reasonable defences we list in the clause are common-sense and easily explicable.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

May I test the patience of the Minister? I am very grateful to him. The defence he is offering—that this applies only if there is criminality—does not explain why Clause 133 recognises the defences of health, religious observance or a person’s work. If the Government recognise those defences, even though they are in the context of criminality, surely the clause should also cover the type of example I have given.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

The noble Lord can never test my patience too far. I simply say that, in terms of the police’s operational use, there are three clear, easy-to-understand, easy-to-interpret defences one could use in this situation. Fear of dissident reprisal does not necessarily fit into that category so easily. Notwithstanding his inability to test my patience, I am going to make some progress, as we have more to discuss.

Under Amendments 372A, 372B and 372C in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, Clause 139 would apply only where a protest is directed at or connected with the place of worship, before conditions could be imposed. Additionally, Amendments 372ZA, 372AA, 372AB, 372BA, 372BB and 372D in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, would raise the threshold for police intervention by requiring proof that a protest has the explicit purpose of intimidating individuals accessing a place of worship and that it would, in fact, intimidate them. The amendments also propose limiting police powers to protests occurring

“within 50 metres from the outer perimeter”

of a place of worship.

As seen with recent demonstrations, protests can have an unintended impact on the lives of a community and those seeking to exercise their freedom of religion without intimidation or fear. I want to be clear that Clause 139 seeks to address a clear legislative gap arising from such protests. Police currently have powers to intervene where there is a serious disruption to the life of the community or intentional intimidation. However, we have already heard consistently from both the police and religious communities that these thresholds are too high to protect worshippers who feel too intimidated to attend their place of worship, even though the protesters do not intend to have such an effect. Requiring officers to demonstrate both the purpose and effect of intimidation would restrict their ability to act at an earlier stage, reducing operational flexibility.

Clause 139 responds directly to that problem. It does not ban protests; it simply gives the police the ability to impose proportionate conditions where a procession, assembly or one-person protest may create an intimidating atmosphere in the vicinity of a place of worship. This will protect the freedom to worship without undermining the fundamental right to protest. Both rights are essential, and the clause is carefully designed to balance them. As the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, herself said, the duty to protect minority communities and their right to go about their lives—whether it is their freedom of worship or any other aspect—is indeed paramount. The clause seeks to do that.

The noble Baroness’s proposal to introduce a rigid 50-metre boundary would further constrain the police, as we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. The noble Baroness calls the proposal in the Bill vague, but I put it to her that the rigidity of a 50-metre boundary goes too far. For example, let us consider the practical example of the proximity of St Margaret’s Church to both this House and Parliament Square. Having this rule in place, notwithstanding any particular provisions on protests in Parliament Square, would make that sort of protest impossible. To use one of the examples promoted by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, any protest outside churches or cathedrals would presumably also be limited in that way.

Activity occurring outside that distance may still create an environment that discourages worshippers from entry, yet the police would be unable to impose conditions unless the protest moved closer. This would undermine the clause’s purpose of enabling proportionate intervention where there is a risk of an intimidatory atmosphere near a place of worship. As noble Lord, Lord Pannick said, that includes the comings and goings—going to and from a place of worship, as well as actually being within the building.

I take this opportunity to thank the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley, who, I am afraid, is not in his place, for meeting me and members of Jewish community organisations, including the Board of Deputies of British Jews, CST and the Jewish Leadership Council, to discuss the clause. As I reiterated at that meeting, I want to make it clear that the Government will write to police forces and local authorities following Royal Assent to remind them of their existing powers to protect community centres, schools and places of worship. This will ensure that all agencies are fully aware of the tools they already have to respond to intimidatory behaviour in these settings.

Amendment 373, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, seeks to remove the cumulative disruption clause from the Bill. I have been clear that the right to peaceful protest is a fundamental democratic right in this country. However, it should be balanced with the need for individuals and communities to feel safe in their own neighbourhoods. Over the past few years, we have seen the impact of protests on the lives of communities and, of course, the tragic antisemitic terror incident that took place at the Heaton Park Hebrew Congregation’s synagogue on 2 October, which led to the unfortunate murders of Adrian Daulby and Melvin Cravitz. Protests subsequently continued, which highlighted concerns around the protection of specific communities, including Jewish communities, which are affected by the cumulative impact of protests.

There are other examples where communities face serious disruption from protests taking place in the same area week after week. On this, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. On the streets of London over the past couple of years, we have seen protests almost weekly. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, is right that the cumulative impact has the effect of forcing home a particular message that those protesters want to make. However, that should not come at the price of other citizens not being allowed to enjoy their regular rights.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Walney, for bringing forward Amendment 371A and all noble Lords who have added their name to it. I thank the Members of your Lordships’ House who, I hope, will be speaking to it. This amendment is eminently sensible. We have heard several examples already of groups which engage in criminal and intimidating behaviour to further their ideological ends, but which do not necessarily pass the terrorism threshold. There is no justification for their continued lawful existence, but to proscribe them as terrorists obfuscates the meaning of the category and incorporates inactive supporters within the definition. The pertinent example of this is Palestine Action. I will not speculate on whether the behaviour actually amounts to terrorism, but the actions of its supporters following its proscription highlight the necessity for action.

An organisation that damages defence infrastructure and attacks members of the public should cease to exist, but for the police to then have to spend precious time arresting hundreds of protesters with placards is clearly not ideal. It may seem morally dubious on behalf of those protesters, but I think we can all agree that they are a far cry from the archetypal terrorist supporters of, say, ISIS or the Taliban. Most importantly, it is a waste of police time to have to deal with sanctimonious protesters who otherwise peacefully support a general ideological cause. That is why we entirely support the noble Lord’s amendment. Our Amendment 371B introduces a minor change to the drafting that reflects our belief that the proscription of groups in this category should not be contingent on whether they fulfil the criteria of both subsections (1A) and (1B). Individually, the actions in both subsections should merit a protest group being proscribed and prohibited from taking further action.

If a listed crime is committed that creates a serious risk to the safety of the public, then the line is crossed from dissent to danger. I think noble Lords can agree that whether a group is for an ideological end or not, this should merit proscription. The very act of a group entering an arms factory with sledgehammers should preclude its existence, regardless of motive. That said, ideological motive is also a factor that should be considered in its own right: if a group shuns peaceful protest and becomes willing to commit criminal offences to further a political end, that should be grounds to ban it. Take, for example, BASH BACK, the activist group which has consistently engaged in criminal damage, vandalism and intimidation in the name of so-called transgender rights. To take one example—as I am sure my noble friend Lady Cash will highlight—it recently spray-painted the office building of the Equality and Human Rights Commission for simply declaring that biological sex is biological sex.

This vandalism is an offence under Section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 and should result in a group being proscribed. I am, however, wary that spray painting and other forms of vandalism may not be seen to create a risk of serious harm to public safety, and I am not confident that, with the right lawyers, the actions of these groups would result in them being proscribed, because of a technicality. Criminality alone introduces the possibility of restricting the practice of a protest group. Whether this is augmented by either a risk to public safety or by an intention to influence political decision-making should confirm that decision.

That being said, I reaffirm my support for the noble Lord’s original amendment. It is a pertinent time for this debate, and I believe that Amendment 371A finds the right balance between prohibiting criminal activity and permitting peaceful support. I hope all Members of your Lordships’ House can recognise the rationale for moving away from a rigid binary between terrorism and protest and acknowledge that it is a spectrum that will benefit from more nuance. His Majesty’s loyal Opposition will support this amendment, and I look forward to hearing the closing remarks of the Minister and of the noble Lord, Lord Walney.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 371A from the noble Lord, Lord Walney. As the noble Lord mentioned, the House will be very familiar with the problems that have arisen from the use of the power that the Secretary of State has to proscribe a terrorist group. The virtue of Amendment 371A is that it avoids any such description. It focuses on the severe mischief that we know certain groups are causing in our society.

Who could object to the Secretary of State having a power, by regulation, to designate a group as an extreme criminal protest group if there is a reasonable belief that its purpose and practice is the deliberate commission of the serious offences set out in this amendment: riot, violent disorder, destroying or damaging property, and interference with the use or operation of key national infrastructure? Surely the Secretary of State should have power to take action, particularly when, as the amendment requires, those offences are carried out with the intention of influencing public policy, parliamentary debate, ministerial decision-making or the exercise of democratic functions, and they create a risk of serious harm to public safety, democratic institutions or the rights of others.

We all support the right to protest, but there are limits, and these clearly are breached by deliberate conduct the purpose of which is to act in the way set out in the tightly drawn amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Walney. As he has pointed out, he has avoided in his drafting the real problem that has arisen in the Palestine Action case: that people are criminalised by reason of support for that body. That has caused problems. The Court of Appeal case is pending, but this amendment avoids those difficulties.

So I support this. I hope the Minister will not tell the House that this is not the time and that we should wait in particular for the report of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven. I too have the highest regard for him, but we should bear in mind that, with this Bill, the Government have not waited for his report in a number of provisions relating to public order, particularly and rightly on cumulative disruption. So I say to the House: let us deal with this. This is a legislative opportunity; it is a pressing problem, and we should deal with it now.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, for the reasons given by the noble Lords, Lord Walney and Lord Pannick, I strongly support this amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 371A from the noble Lord, Lord Walney, because it addresses a difficult area—something that falls short of terrorism and which causes problems for legislators, policing and the courts. Terrorism is fairly well understood. It is the application or the threat of violence for a political purpose; it is easily stated. In this case, it seems to me that there are some indications that there might be a gap. It is not the first time we have been confronted by this problem. Before terrorism was defined—probably by the terrorism which started in Northern Ireland—in the 1930s, we saw that people were parading on the streets for political motives, so legislation had to be introduced on uniforms and various other things that indicated that people were trying to use violence or political aspirations to influence the Government.

It seems that the gap that has evolved is around Palestine Action. There are probably three indicators of a need for a solution to a gap that has developed. First, we have had a criminal case in which a police officer was hit by someone with a hammer, and the people who appeared to have been involved have been found not guilty. That case has been appealed, but that one issue has obviously caused some concern for everybody affected—the police, in part, but mainly the businesses being attacked by this group. The second case is a civil case, which is already—

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

May I just correct the noble Lord? In that case, what happened was that the jury could not agree and there is a retrial of those serious criminal allegations.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

That is quite right, and thank you for that correction, although, clearly, they were not found guilty.

Secondly, the civil case is about prohibition. The High Court has decided that it does not prefer the Government’s judgment that Palestine Action should be a proscribed group. I find that constitutionally quite odd. I understand that sometimes, the court will come to a different opinion on legislation, but it seems to me that the Government, faced with the best information possible, have concluded that it should be proscribed, and the court has decided that that is not proportionate. Whatever the outcome on appeal—which the noble Lord, Lord Walney, has alluded to and we will hear eventually—this needs to be resolved quickly because it is hard to understand.

Both cases might indicate that there were some doubts about the proscription of this group. Most of the time, terrorist groups are obvious. Terrorism is mass and indiscriminate violence that murders tens of people. We see it and it is very obvious. In this case I did wonder, but sometimes governments have information that the rest of us do not. One of the other signs, which has already been mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Walney, was that, when support began to be expressed for a proscribed group, people then said, “This is quite odd; why are we arresting them?” They did not have the same qualms about Irish terrorism or about ISIS when they were beheading citizens of this country. It indicates that, perhaps, there is something different about this group. The amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Walney, has identified a reasonable solution to that gap. Conspiracy alone is not a sufficient answer. It is possible to charge someone with conspiracy to commit a violent act or conspiracy to riot, but you cannot prosecute people who might fund that conspiracy. This amendment would start to address the protest group and the way it is funded and supported.

My final point—quite narrowly defined in this sense—is that this is about the intent to cause serious harm to public safety or to affect public policy and democracy. Both are substantial bars to pass before somebody could be convicted of this offence. The Government ought seriously to consider filling the gap with this amendment, or, if they do not, with something very much like it.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Wednesday 4th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Cash (Con)]

My Lords, I support the amendments of my noble friend Lord Young of Acton and oppose the Government’s amendments in their entirety, on principle.

I did not expect to be beginning in the way I am about to begin, but I want to say this because the quality of debates around hate crime have become increasingly polarising. In my first year in this House, which has been a great privilege, I have grown to deeply admire the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint, in particular for the way he has conducted the passage of this Bill and the many late nights and long hours he has put in. Indeed, I have grown slightly fond—if that is okay to say—of him and our exchanges in the corridors. Therefore, it is with some trepidation and fear that I get to my feet to say that I hope we can engage in a respectful debate. I do not agree that this is the right vehicle for the objectives but I do agree with the objectives.

The Minister used these words—I hope I have taken them down correctly; I think it is verbatim. He happens to believe that trans and disabled people “should be able to live without hostility”. I 100% agree with that, but I do not believe that this is the right vehicle. My noble friend Lord Young of Acton has already covered the existence, introduced in 2020, of the aggravating factors in sentencing which allow all those characteristics and categories to have increased sentencing as a result of hostility acted out on those people. I want to clarify that, because I do not believe there is a single person here, whether Peer or guest in the Gallery, who would disagree with anything that the Minister said. I hope we can have a debate on what the right vehicle is, which does not denigrate anything when it comes to what the principles should be.

Seeking to amend the Bill to add “aggravated factors”, alongside race and religion, introduced a quarter of a century ago, is a significant departure. It is an extension and expansion of the structure of our criminal law. The traditional structure is that conduct constitutes the offence: for example, he hit him and he meant to. The motive may aggravate the sentence; the law does not need to prove why. But once we subdivide offences by protected characteristic or identity, we depart from that principle. We know—because the Home Office itself says that only 7% of recorded hate crimes result in charging—that this becomes a complicated way of proceeding against this kind of conduct, particularly when we already have a vehicle for punishing it. The same conduct becomes a different offence depending on the identity of the victim and the alleged beliefs of the defendant. The motive for the crime moves from sentencing into the definition of the crime itself. It is, of course, more complex to establish, and harder to charge and then to prove. What better way to approach it than by the sentencing mechanism, where a judge has heard the evidence, and it has become quite clear and apparent during the course of the trial that this was an underlying motivation. He or she—I note, with deference, the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, sitting opposite—can then increase the sentence accordingly.

This is not something I have just come up with today. Many respected academics and lawyers have questioned the aggravated defence regime. Professor Richard Taylor has argued that racially or religiously aggravated offences created by the 1998 Act are conceptually confused and duplicate what could be, and is now, more adequately addressed through sentencing law. The Law Commission of England and Wales has recognised this structural tension. In fact, the Law Commission goes so far as to comment on sex not becoming a characteristic at all. There have also been a number of reports by Policy Exchange, and I declare my interest as a senior fellow. These reports warn against the steady multiplication of identity-based criminal categories, and emphasise that the criminal law should focus on the conduct, rather than proliferating protected characteristic variants of an offence.

Others, including Lord Sumption, have cautioned that we should not push the criminal law from punishing harmful conduct towards adjudicating belief and motive. We do not need any reminder of the risks, because we are currently dealing with the failure of the non-crime hate incident reporting regime. Why, at the very moment that Parliament is moving to curtail the recording of non-crime hate incidents—recognising the problems created when policing becomes entangled in the recording of perceived hostility—are the Government proposing to expand hostility-based criminal offences themselves? I noted that the Minister said that this was a manifesto pledge, but it makes me very uneasy that we are coming to it only on Report. It is such a significant structural change in the criminal law and an expansion of the regime that I would have appreciated the opportunity to speak to it at Second Reading and to challenge and scrutinise it in detail in Committee.

We need to have an honest and evidence-led debate. It is too easy to reflexively say that this is the kind thing and the right thing. It will not produce change or the results that we want it to. The aggravated offence model has been operating for more than a quarter of a century as a large-scale behavioural and sociological experiment in using identity-based categories to address prejudice. It is taboo to question it and to question whether it has worked, but we must. If it had reduced hostility or strengthened social cohesion then there might be a case for expansion, but it has not, and no evidence of that has been produced.

Hate-crime legislation is not a demonstrably effective enforcement tool. It is wholly wrong to divert resources in this way, in an already overstretched criminal justice system, where we are challenging the very existence of the jury trial without a solid evidential base for doing so. I oppose the amendment.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I support the Government’s amendments. As I understand them, they do not create any new criminal offences; they are concerned only with sentencing for criminal offences that are proved and on the statute book. It is elementary that the sentence the court imposes for any criminal offence must depend on the circumstances of that particular offence. I cannot see the objection to the court being told that one of the things it should take into account is whether the defendant, who has been convicted of a particular offence, has acted by reason of hostility based on the victim being, or being presumed to be, transgender.

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

The court can already take all the aggravating factors into account, save for hostility to sex. If a crime is aggravated by one of three of the four aggravators that the Bill would introduce into the charging regime, the CPS can flag those as aggravating factors and they can be taken into account at the sentencing stage, so what material difference would the government amendments make?

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, but he is running two inconsistent arguments. He is saying first that the law already allows this, and secondly that this amendment to make the position clear is fundamentally objectionable on grounds of principle. He cannot run both arguments, nor say that it is objectionable for one of the factors that the court should take into account to be whether the hostility is based on sex. Why should we exclude sex? Why does the law currently allow the victim’s membership, or presumed membership, of a racial or religious group to be a factor that the court can take into account, but not sex or transgender status? That makes no sense whatever when the Equality Act deals with all these protected characteristics.

I emphasise that whether it is right or appropriate for the judge to take these factors into account in the circumstances of a particular case, and to what extent, will depend on the discretion of the sentencing judge, which will inevitably depend on the circumstances of the crime. Therefore, to exclude entirely the factor of the victim being, or being presumed to be, transgender, as the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, seeks to do, seems arbitrary.

Of course, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, that we must be very careful indeed to ensure that people are not punished for the exercise of free speech, but the law protects that exercise. It protects it by reference to Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which the sentencing judge must take into account in all cases. I do not know the circumstances of the case that the noble Lord referred to, where there was an acquittal at the appeal stage, but I strongly suspect that Article 10 had something to do with it. I support the Government’s amendment.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have serious reservations about the Government’s amendments on aggravated offences. I appreciate that this puts me at odds with the Minister, but I knew that long before today, because in Committee he made a passionate speech, as he has today, telling us how proud he would be to move these amendments and claiming that they show a Government prepared to protect LGBT and disabled people.

If this is such an important change in the law for the Government, and a principled flagship for progressive Labour that appeared in its manifesto, we have to ask why the Government waited until Report in the Lords—so late in the Bill’s passage—to table the amendments. They must have thought that they were principled and important before, so why are we seeing them only now? I am afraid that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, explained, this denies this House the constitutional right to properly scrutinise and mull over the complex details of the amendments—let alone the fact that that was denied to the elected Chamber.

In the limited space that we have here, I will start by raising some general concerns I have with aggravated offences. Some people might say that this is a Second Reading speech; if it is, it is because the Government did not bring the amendments forward until now, so I will say it anyway. In my view, the state’s job, via criminal justice, is to prosecute material, clearly defined offences. When the authorities attempt to either infer or impute motivation for a crime, seemingly to signal its particular gravity, that is a dangerous move towards punishing ideas, beliefs or attitudes. Some of those ideas, of course, might be bigoted or abhorrent, but they are none the less ideas and opinions. We need to be wary of inadvertently stepping towards thought-crime solutions just to signal our moral virtue, and I am worried about expanding that regime.

This has consequences. Offences such as these carry higher maximum penalties when offenders demonstrate hostility, and this can mean prison. But hostility can be interpreted broadly in the law as ill will, antagonism or prejudice. Let me be clear: violence, harassment, assault or whatever against a disabled person, a trans person, a woman or anyone should be punished appropriately—severely, if that is your take—and certainly uniformly, regardless of motive. But aggravated sentencing can lead to some perverse outcomes.

On hate crime aggravators, in Committee I used an example from the CPS report Our Recent Hate Crime Prosecutions. A man was put in jail for 20 weeks for

“assaulting his father, sister and a police officer, and using racist slurs against his sister’s partner”.

But the CPS notes that, without the racist slurs, he would have only received a community order. So for the assault he would have retained his freedom but, with the racist words, he got 20 weeks in jail. What is more problematic is that many of the offences we are talking about are not actually those kinds of aggressions but often speech that is promiscuously criminalised.

This sentencing anomaly really hits home when it comes to the much boasted-of addition of sex into the aggregation. “At last”, people will say; “misogyny taken seriously”. But, during the Sentencing Bill, the Government refused to accept a perfectly reasonable amendment exempting sexual assault offences and domestic violence offences from the early release scheme. Surely, a real, material commitment to women would be to have accepted that amendment, not increased sentences for offences deemed driven by hostility to women.

Instead, my view is that we should prosecute actual offences committed against any woman. When those offences involve, for example, sexual violence or domestic abuse, we should give appropriate sentences to perpetrators and then not let the offenders out early to free up prison places. That would help women far more than this amendment, the wording of which says that the aggravators must be announced in “open court” to declare an offence aggravated—if ever there were an indication of the performative nature of this, that is it.

One worry is that many of the offences to which “aggravated” will be attached will be the tangled plethora of hate speech crimes, already leading to the scandal of Britain’s declining free speech reputation internationally, with so many arrested for speech crimes, as we have heard about. So many of these offences are wholly subjective, because hostility can be defined by the victim. We have seen the recent weaponisation of speech against those who do not share the same views, the whole cancel culture and toxicity that has proliferated, and identity groups and those with protective characteristics pitched against each other in grievance complaints.

Although it was not in the criminal law, we saw a gross example of this when John Davidson, a man with Tourette’s and the subject of an award-winning sympathetic film, involuntarily ticked and shouted out the N-word. Subsequent commentary refused to accept that there was no intent to offend. Race and disability were put at odds, rather than empathetically understanding the issues, and that is one of the problems with playing the identity politics issue. Increasing aggravated offences will just add to this toxic mix, and that, combined with public order and communications arrests—if not prosecutions for speech crimes, as described by the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton—will make this issue really difficult.

The issue of hostility to transgender identity is likely to stir up further tensions. I want to ask: what is transgender identity? At best, it is a subjective category. It is a self-defined description. That is not a criticism; it is just an observation. Transgender identity does not require a gender recognition certificate or surgery. By the way, the wording in the amendment is confusing here: it gives credence to the fact that surgery might be a key, but then it says “proposing to undergo” gender reassignment, which is a very odd phrase. That is why the amendments of the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, are right to query and probe it, which is what we should be doing, even though it is so late in the day. How transgender people are defined will matter to how these amendments will be understood.

The clarification of the noble Lords from the Official Opposition, in Amendments 337, 350, 351 and 352, establishing what sex means in the Bill, is also helpful. Emphasising biological sex—sex at birth—is necessary to ensure that the cultural clash between gender identity and sex is not muddled up in this Bill or in these amendments. The noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, in his Amendment 334A, also hopes to ensure that the proposed changes do not criminalise misgendering.

I just note that I hate the word “misgendering”. If a male identifies as a female, even if he has a certificate or has had surgery, he is still a man. Saying that is not misgendering; it is factually accurate. Asking me to call him a woman is compelled speech, asking me to repeat misinformation. But would that statement, which I am very nervous about making, be seen as evidence of hostility to someone based on their gender identity? Guess what: too often, those accused of, and punished for, so-called misgendering offences are women. Police criminalised Sex Matters’ Helen Joyce for some tweets referring to Freda Wallace by his former name Fred and using he/him pronouns, and the police recorded that as “criminal harassment” with “transgender aggravators”.

What about the young lesbian who says that she is not attracted to a male—a man who thinks that, by wearing stilettos and a dress, he is a woman and should be allowed into a lesbian-only group at a workplace—

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Wednesday 4th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord. Can he give a practical example of when there has ever been a relevant criminal offence committed against a person because they are not deaf?

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

I cannot—not as a lawyer; I cannot refer to case law on this—but I would not rely on past example alone. If we are passing laws that seek to apply equality, we should seek to apply it on the basis of somebody’s disability status, whether they are disabled or not. It is not implausible—though I accept it is far less likely and far less numerous in past occurrence—for that to be the case. In some of the other areas in the heated debates that we see, it is not as implausible as many of us would like to assume. If it is possible to tighten this up in the drafting, I think it would do the job the Government are seeking to do in a complete way.

That would not prevent the Government fulfilling their manifesto commitment for delivering protections to trans people and disabled people; it would simply ensure that everybody was treated in this area of the law on the basis of protected characteristics in the same way. At the moment, there are greater protections for everybody of every conceivable sexual orientation and people of either sex, but there are not on each of the areas set out in the Equality Act. More pertinently, it would avoid fuelling what is already a very unhelpful public discourse about two-tier policing and laws, or some of the more charged debates that we have in the darker corners of the internet or from the more far-fetched foreign critics who have been mentioned previously.

On Amendment 336 from my noble friends Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, while it is understandable that they are probing this area, I do not think that their amendment is warranted. It probes the question of whether protections for transgender people should apply to people who are “proposing to undergo” a process of gender reassignment. In fact, Section 2 of the Gender Recognition Act 2004, which has been the law of the land for 22 years, requires somebody applying for a gender recognition certificate to undergo that process to have

“lived in the acquired gender throughout the period of two years”

preceding their application. Signalling an intention to propose to go through that process is an important part of the law as it stands, and therefore Amendment 336 is not needed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness for her intervention. I was just about to get on to that in my second point, which is that the whole idea of an aggravated crime increasingly weaponises and politicises the concept of hate.

In the previous debate, the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, made some very affecting comments. I was able to talk with her about the incident that she also mentioned this evening outside the Chamber. Over the years, my very long-standing and noble friend Lord Shinkwin has told me some very harrowing things that have happened to him. The disabled protected characteristic having an aggravated crime is possibly the most difficult of these to speak against.

But whatever that protected class is, it is exactly the point that the noble Baroness was making. This is an aggravator to a crime that exists. If the crime is committed, it does not matter why it was committed; it can still be prosecuted. If it cannot be prosecuted, you cannot prosecute the aggravated aspect of it either. Weaponising hate and making it into a thing ignores the fact that these are merely aggravator laws. They are not laws that in and of themselves create a crime; they merely aggravate an existing crime. That has received very little attention in the debate this evening.

Thirdly, it further creates and promotes the concept of society as identity groups. I have the view that we are all human beings and the way to have a coherent and well working society is for us all to work together, whereas with aggravated crimes, people with one or another protected characteristic are encouraged to say, “I’ve been discriminated against. They are the things against me. These people are hateful”, instead of saying, “Let’s all join together and just stop crime”.

I would like to lean on two actors who I very much respect and think of as very thoughtful people: Denzel Washington and Morgan Freeman. They have both been quoted on numerous occasions as saying, “How do you stop hate crime? How do you stop racial hatred? The answer is you stop talking about it”. If they believe that, and I happen to agree with them, what is it about what they say that noble Lords disagree with?

My final point is on this idea of looking into people’s minds. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, talked about a case where the difference between committing a bad crime and committing it because you dislike the gender or whatever it was of the individual was a wrap on the knuckles or going to jail for six weeks. How do you know exactly what was in that person’s mind? Was it just an off-the-cuff remark, or was it some deep hatred that deserved society’s censure? You do not know. Queen Elizabeth I said, “I do not want to look into men’s souls”. It has been a fundamental part of British jurisprudence since the 17th century—I do not know why the noble Baroness thinks that is funny; it is fundamental to the way we conduct our society.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord. Will he accept that there is no question of a court looking into someone’s soul? The aggravation has to be proved. It has to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and it is proved beyond a reasonable doubt by what the person has said, or what they have done, and the circumstances of the case. That is a matter for the judge.

[Lord Moynihan of Chelsea (Con)]

The noble Lord evinces the certainty that comes from a lifetime in the courts. Those of us who sit outside those courts are maybe a little less certain of the courts’ ability to reach such a fine state of discernment.

I will wrap up; it is getting late.

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[Baroness Sugg (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Government for tabling their Amendments 339 and 340, and thank all noble Lords who supported this call in Committee.

These amendments respond to a campaign from Karma Nirvana and 60 other specialist violence against women and girls organisations, along with survivors and their families, calling on the Government to introduce the statutory definition of honour-based abuse. That campaign was established in memory of Fawziyah Javed, whose case demonstrates the tragic consequences of failing to identify honour-based abuse. Despite multiple calls for help, including two police visits just days before her murder, the abuse she endured was never recognised as honour-based abuse. Crucially, professionals failed to identify the multi-perpetrator nature of the abuse, which involved not only her partner but members of his family. Sadly, Fawziyah’s case is not isolated. Again and again, inquiries and serious case reviews show that, when honour-based abuse is not recognised early, victims are left unprotected, escalation is missed, and all those involved in abuse are not held to account.

The hope is that this definition, supported by clear guidance, will enable front-line professionals to identify, understand and respond to honour-based abuse before tragedies occur, and, crucially, to recognise all perpetrators involved. While this progress in the Bill is welcome, the Government’s chosen approach does not explicitly recognise the specific multi-perpetrator nature of honour-based abuse—an omission with real safeguarding consequences. The current wording risks being read as referring to only one additional perpetrator. Honour-based abuse, however, commonly involves multiple family or community members acting collectively, often across households and generations. Failing to reflect this reality in the Bill risks embedding the very misunderstanding that the definition seeks to correct.

My Amendment 340A would address this by making a simple and proportionate change to subsection (2) of the Government’s amendment. It would clarify that honour-based abuse can involve a person or persons, ensuring that statutory language reflects operational reality. It would align the law with the lived experience of victims, the expertise of specialist services and existing safeguarding practice. It is a modest change with major consequences for victim safety.

I am grateful for the engagement of Ministers and officials on this issue. I anticipate that the Minister may argue in response that this amendment is unnecessary because Section 6 of the Interpretation Act 1978 provides that

“words in the singular include the plural”—

I acknowledge that. However, this principle does not translate effectively in safeguarding practice. I appreciate that this issue will be made explicit in the guidance, and I am grateful for the Minister’s reassurances on that point, but we are concerned that legislation may be read literally, and that the harm of relying on “person” is therefore not theoretical. Focusing on a single actor risks professionals misunderstanding the collective nature of the threat and failing to safeguard against a wider group. That is precisely the gap that has led to missed risks and preventable deaths.

I very much hope that the Minister can accept my amendment or perhaps commit to coming back at Third Reading with the Government’s own version. If he cannot, please can he explain two things? First, what is the legal risk or harm of including the words “or persons”? The safeguarding risks of not including them are clear and substantial. Secondly, why have other areas of the criminal law, such as legislation on harassment, organised crime, gangs, affray and riot, been able to use explicit plural language, yet this Bill has not? In each of those contexts, Parliament has recognised the need for clarity where multiple actors are inherent to the offence. Honour-based abuse is no different; indeed, it is a textbook example of collective harm.

In closing, I am very grateful to the Government for taking this significant step forward. I pay tribute to the many survivors of honour-based abuse, and to the families of those who have been killed. Despite unimaginable trauma, they have fought for this definition so that others may be protected. They are following this debate closely, and their message is clear: honour-based abuse is collective abuse; if the law does not say this plainly, professionals may not act on it. I very much hope that the Minister recognises the strength of feeling, the weight of evidence and the safeguarding imperative, and accepts this small but vital amendment that will materially improve professional understanding and, most importantly, save lives.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, that it is not merely that, under the Interpretation Act, “person” includes “persons” unless the context requires otherwise—which I do not think it does here. I hope that the Minister will make it clear that the object of his amendment is indeed to cover cases where there is more than one person. If the Minister can say that that is the Government’s objective, the courts will have regard to that if there is any ambiguity at all, which I do not think there is.

[Lord Lucas (Con)]

My Lords, I congratulate the Government on bringing forward these amendments. However, reading Amendment 340 as it is written, in the context of our treatment of Lord Mandelson in this House, I cannot see how we are not guilty of honour-based abuse. We are a community that considers that a person has dishonoured us; we have subjected them to economic abuse and greatly restricted their access to money and income. How does it not apply? How would it not apply to a part of a community deciding to ostracise people who have been involved with a grooming gang? There is nothing in this definition that exempts “abuse” directed at people who have done serious wrong.

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[Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to support this amendment, which would have been avoided if we had been able to have proper regulation of psychotherapy professionals. The problem is that the voluntary registration through the British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy, the UK Council for Psychotherapy or the National Counselling & Psychotherapy Society requires people to be appropriately trained and have ethical standards. But if there is a serious complaint against them and they are removed from there, they can still carry on seeing clients and practising in a completely unethical way. There is absolutely no recourse for people who are seriously harmed by whatever activities are undertaken.

There are times in people’s lives when they are particularly vulnerable. One of those is when they are bereaved. Some older people, when they are bereaved, may be in what you could call that pre-dementia phase of being particularly emotionally vulnerable. They may have people who recommend in good faith that they go to see somebody who has some counselling label up, but who then goes on to exploit them tremendously to create dependency, charge huge fees and make the person emotionally dependent on them, which results in coercive behaviour to carry on seeing this person and carry on handing over money. They may also, in the process, implant the idea that their family are being unsupportive and that the best thing they could do would be to cut off contact with their family.

I have seen this first hand, when a family, who were well-meaning and wanting to provide support, had the most awful acrimonious correspondence sent to them by the person who was being advised for their own good in their counselling to have no contact whatever with these family members, and the counselling service that this person was accessing drained many thousands of pounds from their personal account. The problem is that, at the moment, there is no recourse for the public. They can complain and try to take a legal process against the person, but they are very vulnerable people. This amendment would provide a route to having some control, if you like, over some of these quack practitioners who should not be out there, putting up nameplates and calling themselves counsellors.

It is worth remembering that, particularly in primary care, we have talking therapies that have very good outcomes, such as cognitive behavioural therapy, delivered by people who are properly trained, subject to ethical standards and have appropriate diplomas. They provide non-judgmental, confidential, professional assistance and guidance to help people find a solution to their problems. It has become popular in primary care and in the community, but the backlash against it is that an unsuspecting person and their friends may not realise, or have any way of knowing, that somebody who claims to be a counsellor is completely bogus.

In 2024, Alastair Campbell campaigned hard against this, and there was a very good article in the i newspaper about it—I do not think it is advertising for me to name the paper. I recall the discussions we had about trying to get the registration of professionals, so that those who are providing a valuable service can carry on doing so and are not tainted in the minds of the public by those who are completely bogus. This amendment seems to be essential to protect the public.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Marks, mentioned the reservations which I expressed in Committee. I have thought further about this matter since Committee. Indeed, the purpose of the gap between Committee and Report is precisely so that all noble Lords—not only noble Lords on the Cross Benches and Back Benches but Ministers—can reflect on what was said in Committee.

I have looked in particular at the provision which the noble Lord, Lord Marks, mentioned, Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, which creates an offence of:

“Controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship”.


It uses, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, rightly said, the same concepts that the amendment tabled by the noble Lord and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, seeks to implement in the law in the present context. It seems to me that there is a very close analogy between that existing criminal offence and the present context, which is not in the same intimate or family relationship but in the relationship between the psychotherapist or counsellor and the patient.

For my part, I cannot see why the mischief—and it is a mischief—which the amendment seeks to identify should not be a criminal offence. Why should it be that persons who carry out conduct that is defined in this provision should not be subject to the criminal law? Regulation is important, but it is not the answer. The mischief defined in Amendment 358 should be a criminal offence. I have changed my mind.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, for bringing his amendment back on Report, and commend him for his continued championing of this issue. Regrettably, these Benches cannot endorse his amendment. We acknowledge that there is plainly a gap in the current law that is causing an issue within the counselling and psychotherapy sector, but are less sure that the amendment as drafted would best serve victims and help them get redress.

As has just been said, the amendment would introduce an offence modelled on Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, which itself introduced the offence of controlling and coercive behaviour by intimate relations or family members. Like the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I understand the parallel with this, but I believe that they are fundamentally different in nature, with counselling and psychotherapy being a relationship with a client and a provider in a different setting.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 25th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, I apologise to the House; I was not ready, but it is worth waiting for. This amendment would change the legal test for imposing a respect order, requiring the court to consider this step “necessary and proportionate”, and not merely “just and convenient”, in preventing a person engaging in anti-social behaviour. This small, targeted change would ensure that the test is more proportionately aligned with the potentially serious consequences of these quasi-criminal orders, since a breach can result in up to two years’ imprisonment. It would also better reflect the Government’s stated intention that these orders should be used to tackle the most persistent cases of anti-social behaviour.

As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, noted in Committee, these cases would be adequately covered by a “necessary and proportionate” framework. The Minister says that judges must already take necessity and proportionality into account under the Human Rights Act. If that is so, I struggle to see why that very safeguard cannot be placed transparently in the Bill. This is a critical point, given the well-documented failures of previous anti-social behaviour powers. The evidence shows that, in practice, vague legal tests not only lead to inconsistent decisions: they sometimes deter the courts from using orders.

A more rigorous test would also address concerns about systemic bias. Existing anti-social behaviour powers continue to fall more heavily on minority-ethnic and other disadvantaged groups. Without stronger safeguards, this will almost inevitably be repeated by respect orders. Tightening the test is a modest way to reduce that risk, and will provide greater clarity for all concerned—judges, counsel and victims—as well as those made subject to these orders. It also better aligns the order with the risk assessment duty already outlined in new Section J1 inserted by Clause 1.

In Committee a number of Peers expressed concern about judicial overreach, particularly with tools so sweeping that they can order somebody to do anything described. But the current broad and vague test will do nothing to solve this. In fact, it will make matters worse. The quasi-criminal nature of these orders will invite legal challenge, causing delay in already backlogged courts, potentially clogging the system with marginal cases while doing little for victims of persistent and ongoing anti-social behaviour. A clear necessity and proportionality requirement would sharpen the law, focus efforts on the worst cases and help ensure that respect orders become the tool of choice for serious or repeat anti-social behaviour, rather than just another broad but inconsistently used power added to an already confusing landscape.

I have one final point. In Committee we welcomed the Home Office’s plan to pilot these orders, only to be told that the Government had decided that this was no longer necessary. On that occasion, the Minister informed me that things change. However, since then things appear to have changed again: the latest policy paper says that respect orders will now be piloted before being rolled out nationally. That is obviously very welcome, but I hope that today the Minister can reassure the House that—in this matter, at least—there will be no further changes. One change I strongly advocate is that outlined in Amendment 1. If it sharpens the law, improves enforcement and offers greater protection against injustice for the price of a modest drafting alteration, why resist it? I beg to move.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I agree with everything said by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. As I understand the Government’s position, they accept that it would not be appropriate to impose such an order unless it is necessary and proportionate, and indeed that is the test applied by the European Convention on Human Rights, so the only question is whether the language of the Bill, and the Act that it will become, should reflect the true test. It seems to me, as it seems to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, highly appropriate that what is in the legislation should set out the true test. This has to be applied not just by judges but by police officers, local authorities, communities and everyone who is responsible for considering and enforcing this legislation. Let us put the true and proper test on the face of the Bill.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, there is a lot in this group. The Government are undoubtedly sincere in wanting to use the Bill to further tackle anti-social behaviour, and such moves to take on this blight on communities will certainly be popular. However, we have to pause a moment and say that there is already a plethora of tools on the statute book designed to tackle anti-social behaviour, and yet it does not seem to be improving. This is the group in which we need to ask why. Perhaps anti-social behaviour orders and injunctions in all their various guises, from community penalty notices to public spaces protection orders, are just not fit for purpose.

I fear that, instead of tackling this, the Government are taking an easy and performative route and affording the state even more of the same—with more draconian powers—under a different label, that of respect orders. They are doing all this with little clarity or evidence of efficacy. That is what the amendments in this group are designed to tackle. By and large, I support them all.

I tabled Amendment 6, which calls for an independent —I stress the word “independent”—review of existing powers under the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, which should be published prior to the commencement of Sections 1 and 2 of the Act. As legislators, we have an obligation to take responsibility for assessing the impact of, and the evidence about, laws that we made in the past before we duplicate their weaknesses. We need to understand the pros and cons.

This review would look at solving the evidence gap. It is extraordinary that there is significant variation in data captured across relative authorities. Because ASBIs are locally administered in a patchwork of varied use, there is a worrying variation in the types and quality of data collected, the location of that data and the ability of that data to be extrapolated and shared internally or with relevant agencies where appropriate. This is surely a slap across the face of evidence-based policy-making, because without data it is not possible to adequately assess the effectiveness of behaviour orders and to fully understand any trends arising out of their imposition, enforcement or breach, including disproportionate impacts.

That is why Amendment 24 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, who is not in her place, which would require the Home Office to publish quarterly data, is so important, as well as Amendment 12 from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, which calls for an annual report. Both amendments positively try to tackle the limits of the availability of the evidence base, without which I do not know how we can make informed policy decisions.

At present, all the critiques of present behaviour orders are invaluably brought to us from sporadic academic research, FoI-based research led by the likes of Josie Appleton and her team at the Campaign for Freedom in Everyday Life, and the excellent campaign group Justice. They want their work to be made redundant by the Government; they want the Government and officialdom to do their work instead. If the Home Office does not understand its own legislative tools because it does not have the data, the misery of anti-social behaviour will remain untouched while the statute book grows.

I hope the Minister will listen to the front-line workers who have to implement and use these orders and who, reasonably, bemoan the lack of proper consultation with those who understand the ASBI regime in real life. I note the government amendment on consultation, which is welcome.

The majority of practitioners who Justice consulted believe that the new respect orders are unnecessary and replicate flawed laws already available. Only 6% conclude that they will improve outcomes for victims; 82% of respondents to the practitioners survey have called for the review of the existing 2014 Act and of existing powers prior to respect orders being introduced. There was unanimous agreement that the Government should address problems inherent in existing injunctions and orders before creating more, and that failure to properly consult has meant that opportunities to resolve problems with the way orders operate in practice, not on paper, and to increase their effectiveness have been missed. Surely the Minister will want and feel the need to understand why research shows that a significant proportion of CPNs and PSPOs are, for example, being overused for trivial activities, such as feeding the birds, honking horns, gathering in groups or idling in your car, or imposed in inappropriate circumstances against, too often, the homeless and the mentally ill, where the behaviour complained of falls far below the threshold of antisocial behaviour that the public are concerned about and that the 2014 Act was envisaged to tackle.

All that we are asking in these amendments is for the Minister to look at what has gone wrong so that we can improve it. Surely the Government are worried about the vastly varied use of existing orders, which creates a postcode lottery for victims and means that British citizens do not know what is allowed from one town to another. Conduct that is totally lawful in Lincoln might be subject to state sanction in Leeds. Surely such a differential variation in the volume of orders imposed, the type of orders imposed, the conditions imposed, and so on, undermines the rule of law that I know this Government strongly support. It makes enforcement dependent on the victim’s location, rather than circumstances, or on the perpetrator’s location, rather than precisely how they are behaving badly. This makes a mockery of the notion of all of us being equal under the law. A review would look at these problems and recommend practical solutions.

Amendments 1 and 3, especially, are important in relation to ensuring that respect orders are used only when necessary and in a proportionate way. We have already heard about that. I think this is very helpful, particularly in creating a right to appeal. I am worried that the statutory test and the language used for imposing these new respect orders are so broad that, rather than capturing behaviour that is serious and persistent in nature, they will criminalise more trivial behaviour. That these orders can be imposed on individuals without their knowledge and, most egregiously, for an indefinite duration—for example, until further notice—is why we need this appeals process. How is it fair or proportionate that an individual who has never been found guilty of an offence is required to comply with serious restrictions on their liberty and personal life indefinitely, yet someone convicted of an offence by the criminal justice system is at liberty and free of prohibitions once they reach the end of their defined term of sentence, or even sometimes before that these days? This is reminiscent of that stain on our justice system, the abolished and abominable IPP indefinite sentence, which caused such a scandal. Why would the Government now create these new, oppressive orders that flout the important principle that if individual lives are subject to state interference, they need to know how long the interference will last and when it will end?

Finally, I have added my name to Amendment 7, an excellent contribution from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, on fixed-term penalty notices, based on the work of the Campaign for Freedom in Everyday Life. This, I hope, will ring true with any Labour Government, because ensuring that private companies dishing out on-the-spot fines for antisocial behaviour, and doing so to profit financially, is surely something that offends the Government’s values. There are concerns that antisocial behaviour orders have been corrupted for income generation and commercial purposes. With fines increasing so much under this Bill, surely that tendency will be turbocharged. I think it is something that the Government will want to tackle, because all the orders in Clause 4 being issued at such a low benchmark are likely to result in fines going up. I am worried that this will encourage councils to become trigger-happy with orders and so on.

I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint, will remember, as I do, the scandal of Kingdom Security in north Wales in, I think, 2019, when councils including Conwy, Denbighshire, Flintshire, Gwynedd and Anglesey outsourced the collection of their on-the-spot fines to a private security group, Kingdom, which illustrated that the behaviour of the enforcers could well be seen as being far more anti-social than any of the behaviour of local residents for which they were supposed to be fining them. A grass-roots campaign attracted 8,000-plus members to its Facebook page and led to numerous protests all over north Wales, with the security group’s wardens accused of threatening, bullying and even stalking north Walians, following dog walkers and smokers at a distance just so they could catch them out and fine them. They expressly targeted the elderly and women and children; the tissue of one 95 year-old lady blew from her wheelchair to the ground, and she was fined.

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There is a point to be made, and if the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, wish to make it, that is fine, but this is consistent with Acts of Parliament that are currently in place on similar orders. Courts will take the necessity and proportionality of an order into account as a result of the duties that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, raised under the Human Rights Act. Therefore, it is an unnecessary procedure to amend the legal test, particularly as the effect would be to increase the threshold for the use of these orders, making the job of the police, local authorities and others in protecting communities that much harder.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Would the Minister accept that it is very difficult ever to think of circumstances in which it would be appropriate for a court to impose a respect order, with all the implications that has for an individual, unless the court is satisfied that it is necessary and proportionate?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord has made his point. I am trying to give the defence from the Government’s perspective. That is our view. He has made a reasonable point, but that is our view and I hope he accepts our comments on those issues in good faith.

On Amendment 2, I hope the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, will understand when I say that I agree with the points that he made. Amendment 2, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, is rather bureaucratic, in that the council must carry out a full public consultation prior to any application to the court for a respect order to be made.

I was leader of a council for some years. We had six or seven meetings per year. Does the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, really expect, in the event of this legislation becoming law, that the council would consider respect orders and agree them on a six or eight week basis, six times per year, before the police could go? I am with the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, on this one. Some areas undertake this as a matter of course as part of local practice, but there is no requirement for a public consultation prior to a public spaces protection order being implemented. It is certainly my and the Government’s view that such requirements would add an inappropriate and disproportionate barrier to respect order applications and delay important relief for ASB victims. I hope that, on reflection, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, will agree with His Majesty’s Opposition and me. He may not, but I put that point to him for his consideration.

Amendment 3, again tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, would add a provision for a respondent to appeal the making or variation of a respect order. I hope I can assure noble Lords that there are express provisions in the Bill that provide for an application to be made to vary or discharge a respect order. The ordinary rules of appeal will apply to decisions to grant a respect order or a refusal to vary or discharge an order. To be absolutely clear on this issue, decisions to grant or vary respect orders, as well as decisions not to grant or vary one, will be appealable through the usual avenues under Civil Procedure Rules. I hope that assists.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington, for his Amendment 5. I know that he wished to speak to that in Committee. He seeks to add for-profit registered social housing providers to the list of relevant agencies that can apply for a respect order. I recognise the importance of relevant agencies having the tools to tackle anti-social behaviour, but we should exercise caution before extending these powers without more consideration. I say that in the spirit of friendship and co-operation with the noble Lord. The Home Secretary has a power to amend the list of relevant authorities that can apply for a respect order. If it is considered appropriate to add a for-profit registered social housing provider to the list then we can do that via secondary legislation after the Bill has achieved Royal Assent, but I would like to give more consideration to this point. This is not a “no”; it could be added later with more consideration. I hope that will at least help him in the discussions that he has had today.

Amendment 6 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, would require the Home Secretary, within six months of the Bill becoming law, to commission an independent review of the existing powers under the 2014 Act prior to introducing respect orders, housing injunctions or youth injunctions as a whole. Again, I go back to what I said to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel. It is a manifesto commitment that we fought the election on to improve anti-social behaviour responses, and one such response that we specifically put in the manifesto at the general election was respect orders. So, the idea that we wish to—

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[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, we support the principle underlying this amendment. Serious and organised waste crime both is an environmental nuisance and has real consequences for communities and the taxpayer. As we heard from the noble Earl, Lord Russell, the Government’s own estimates say that around 20% of waste in England may be illegally managed at some stage in the supply chain, and that over a third of waste crime is linked to organised crime groups. These figures underline that waste crime is not simply limited to opportunistic fly-tipping; in many cases it is co-ordinated criminal activity driven by profit. It is therefore entirely understandable that noble Lords wish to see it recognised as a national strategic priority.

However, we have some reservations about placing such a requirement in statute. Under Section 3 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013, the Secretary of State already determines the NCA’s strategic priorities following consultation. At present there is no fixed statutory list of priorities, and to single out one specific crime type in primary legislation would be unusual. The question, therefore, is not whether waste crime is serious but whether this is the right legislative mechanism. I look forward to hearing from the Minister how the Government intend to ensure that serious and organised waste crime receives a sustained and meaningful focus.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I too have concerns about this amendment. Nobody could dispute that waste crime is a very serious problem that needs to be addressed. But as I understand it, the NCA’s strategic priorities at the moment—whether they are required by the Secretary of State or otherwise—focus on degrading the highest-harm organised crime groups, with a particular emphasis on tackling drugs, online fraud and organised immigration crime. There may be others. The NCA surely cannot treat all serious matters as a priority. The whole point of a priority is that it focuses on the most serious criminal offences that our society faces. I am not persuaded that identifying this very real problem as a strategic priority is going to assist.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Earl, Lord Russell, for his amendment. As he explained, it would allow the Secretary of State to include serious and organised waste crime as a strategic priority for the National Crime Agency. We have all agreed that waste crime blights local communities, that it damages the environment and that serious organised crime—which is on the rise—is a factor in that. The Environment Agency is now regularly alerted to new illegal waste sites.

As evidence for the noble Earl that the Government take this matter seriously, the Environment Agency’s additional waste crime enforcement budget for 2025-26 has been increased by more than 50% to £15.6 million, a £5.6 million increase on the previous year. That is because we recognise that there is a potential area of concern here. It has allowed the Environment Agency to increase its front-line criminal enforcement resource by 43 full-time staff in the Joint Unit for Waste Crime and area environmental crime teams, as well as bringing additional staff for enforcement duties under our major waste reforms.

The Environment Agency works closely, as the noble Earl mentioned, with the National Crime Agency and the Joint Unit on Waste Crime. There are multi-agency prevention and disruption tactics taking place, as well as investigatory activities to impact successfully on criminals. Between the organisations, they have developed enhanced intelligence-sharing and an enhanced approach to targeting organised criminal gangs. We are looking, with other law enforcement bodies, at recommending and introducing new technical capabilities to look at how we can, through an agreed strategy, target waste crime.

Therefore, there is a role for the National Crime Agency but, as the noble Lords, Lord Cameron of Lochiel and Lord Pannick, alluded to, the National Crime Agency is not the lead agency for tackling waste crime. That is the Environment Agency. Under the Crime and Courts Act 2013, the strategic priorities for the National Crime Agency need to reflect changing threat levels in respect of different crime types. I am pleased to see the noble Baroness, Lady May of Maidenhead, here, who would have been lead Minister on the 2013 Act that established the National Crime Agency. I served as a shadow Minister at the time, when dealing with that Bill. Section 3 of that Act is deliberately silent on types of organised crime because it does not want to fetter the National Crime Agency—the very point the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, made in relation to the Home Secretary’s discretion to skew the National Crime Agency’s priorities. Therefore, to insert a crime type, however well-meaning or needed, would be to undermine the principles of Section 3 of the 2013 Act.

In short, the Government fully agree with the sentiment underpinning the amendment. We take waste crime extremely seriously; the increase in the budget is evidence of that, as is the co-operation between the NCA and the Environment Agency. I hope that with those comments, the noble Earl will agree that his approach of tying the National Crime Agency to specific targets would not be as helpful as he had hoped and that he can withdraw his amendment.

Government Website: Registering a Death

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Tuesday 10th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful for that, and I will certainly pass it on to the appropriate authorities. For information, my own mother died a long time ago, on Christmas Day, and we had a very difficult time dealing with that, given the holiday period. The service that was provided, in that case in the Liverpool region, was exemplary, and it is important that we recognise good service when it happens. We are trying to improve the situation, as I have said to the noble Baroness. I will reflect on the points that the noble Lord has made.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, will the Minister reflect on the fact that there are serious delays not just in the registration of deaths but in the operation of coroner’s inquests? The outgoing chair of the Justice Committee at the time of the last election, Sir Bob Neill, said the committee had been told that the coroner service was “chronically under-resourced and underfunded” and that this was leading to totally unacceptable delays. Could the Minister or the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, add this to the shopping list of matters they will look at?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I feel as if I am answering for three departments today: the Department of Health, the Home Office, and now the Ministry of Justice has been thrown in. I will reflect on and share with my noble friend Lord Timpson the points that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has made. I cannot answer him today but I will certainly make sure it is looked at.

Shamima Begum

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

On the first part of my noble friend’s question, the Government are obviously deeply concerned about developments in north-east Syria. However, we welcome the agreement between the Syrian Government and the Syrian Democratic Forces to integrate military and civilian institutions, and we will continue to monitor what happens in northern Syria. Regarding Shamima Begum, my noble friend knows that I try to be helpful on these matters. However, I cannot be any more helpful than I was last time, which is to say that a process has been followed and there is further discussion in the European courts. I cannot anticipate or comment upon that matter until such time as those issues are resolved.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords—

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords—

[Captain of the Honourable Corps of Gentlemen-at-Arms and Chief Whip (Lord Kennedy of Southwark) (Lab Co-op)]

We have plenty of time. We will hear from the Cross Benches first and then from the noble Viscount.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I declare an interest as a former legal counsel of Shamima Begum—there are many of us in that position. The Minister has repeatedly stated that the existence of legal proceedings in the European Court of Human Rights prevents him answering detailed questions. I am aware of no doctrine of the European court that imposes such a restriction. Why are the Government hiding behind the European court’s proceedings to avoid answering the Question from the noble Lord, Lord Dubs?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

With due respect to the noble Lord, I am not hiding behind that. We have taken a judgment that we are in discussion on that matter in the European court with legal teams. I am not able to give a running commentary on those matters in this House. The noble Lord may not like that, but that is the position I have to give the House today.

Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Pannick Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, as one of the vice-chairs of the APPG on Counter Extremism, I support the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, in these amendments. He has already referenced the Time to Act publication, which was published late last year and deals with a number of statistics that are quite startling and deserve to go on the record today. It was found that one in five voters— 21%, actually—

“say that political violence in the UK is acceptable in some conditions, and 18% would consider participating in violent protests as the state of Britain declines”.

That is a very concerning thing to read. We know that there has been a nearly 600% rise in antisemitic incidents in the UK following 7 October 2023. We also know that anti-Muslim hate has doubled over this last decade. Those are statistics that cannot be ignored. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, outlined why she finds some difficulty with these amendments, but there is recognition in the report that extremism

“is one of the primary domestic security and societal threats facing the UK”.

When the noble Baroness was detailing some examples of extremism, the noble and right reverend Lord asked why people were not prosecuted. I would argue—and I know that the noble and right reverend Lord will recognise that I have an amendment later in the day—that the glorification of terrorism needs to be much more clearly defined in law. We will come to that later in the amendments. Defeating terrorism is not just about dealing with it from a military point of view but about dealing with the narrative around those terrorist organisations—“draining the swamp”, as the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, would put it. We are allowing glorification to continue on the streets of our country and then not recognising that extremism will grow as a result. I hope that when we come to debate that issue, there will be a good airing of the issues around the glorification of terrorism.

The first thing we need to do in this area is to recognise that there is a problem, and then to define the problem and move on to understand it and deal with it. I very much welcome these amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Goodman.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I share the concerns expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, and indeed by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, but I am very doubtful that further legislation is required. There is, as previous speakers have said, a very worrying degree of antisemitic extremist speech, particularly, I am sorry to say, in the Muslim community and not just in speeches in mosques. Opposition to the policies of the Israeli Government—opposition shared by many Jews—cannot begin to justify such speech.

The sort of people who murdered Jews in Heaton Park synagogue come from a community. They have been to school in this country. They are members of mosques. The real question is how the whole community, not only the Muslim community, is going to address this problem. I know, and the Minister will no doubt confirm, that the Government do a great deal to ensure that civic values and the lessons to be learned from the Holocaust are taught in schools, but I fear that much more needs to be done and there really is a responsibility on the leaders of the Muslim community to take further steps to ensure that those lessons are understood.

It is, as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, said, particularly poignant that this issue is raised on Holocaust Memorial Day, and sad that these matters need to be readdressed. It is a problem in our society; it needs to be dealt with, but, as I say, I am very doubtful that legislation is the answer.