Laura Farris
Main Page: Laura Farris (Conservative - Newbury)Department Debates - View all Laura Farris's debates with the Home Office
Criminal Justice Bill
Laura Farris ExcerptsTuesday 28th November 2023
(2 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Laura Farris)
It is a pleasure to close this important debate on the Second Reading of the Criminal Justice Bill, a Bill that puts public protection and community confidence at its core. It has a strong empirical basis, building on the detailed work undertaken by the Law Commission, by Baroness Casey into misconduct in the Metropolitan police, by Clare Wade KC into domestic homicide and coercive control, and by the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse.
It consolidates the significant progress this Government have made since 2010 and it was disappointing to hear the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), the shadow Home Secretary, only rely on the statistics from police recorded crime when she knows as well as I do that the Office for National Statistics says that the correct measure is the Crime Survey for England and Wales, which provides—
Laura Farris
I will not because I have little time. That survey provides a more reliable measure of long-term trends than police recorded data.
Laura Farris
If we use the correct measure, the regrettable conclusion for the Opposition is that like-for-like crime is down by 56%.
Laura Farris
Violent crime is down from where it was in 2010 by 52%, and domestic burglaries are down by 57%. If we compare—[Interruption.] If we compare where we were in 2019 to today—
Laura Farris
Domestic abuse, a sensitive category of crime, has fallen between 2019, before the pandemic, to today by 16%. [Interruption.]
Mr Deputy Speaker (Sir Roger Gale)
Order. Even the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) has to understand that the Minister is not giving way.
Yvette Cooper
On a point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker. The Minister will know that the time is not limited. We do have time and she has named me. I do understand that she has the right not to take an intervention but she will also know that, having named me, as a courtesy to the House, she would normally do so.
Mr Deputy Speaker
That is not strictly a point of order for the Chair. The right hon. Lady understands the procedures extremely well.
Laura Farris
The hon. Member for Stockton North (Alex Cunningham) said that this Government have failed in their duty to keep citizens safe. It is regrettable that His Majesty’s chief inspector of constabulary, Andy Cooke, takes a different view. He has said:
“England and Wales are arguably safer than they have ever been.”
In the limited time I have available, I will address some of the points that came up today. I will respond in writing to those whose speeches I cannot address. Under this Bill, we are taking the fight to serious organised criminals, cutting off their capacity to churn out new firearms, mass-produce illegal drugs and perpetrate fraud with devices using multiple SIM cards. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Witham (Priti Patel) elegantly put it, we are designing crime out. We are cracking down on some of the most pernicious harms, which are often hidden from view. We are developing recommendations of the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse, and we are developing the package of measures announced by the Prime Minister in April by creating an obligation in law to treat grooming as an aggravating factor in sentencing.
I congratulate the hon. Member for Rotherham (Sarah Champion) on the name change measure. I also pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Bolsover (Mark Fletcher), who introduced a ten-minute rule Bill on that issue. I will just pick up on the point about mandatory reporting, which the House will know was the subject of a principal finding and recommendation of the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse. I hope that the hon. Member for Rotherham agrees that the measure is a good step forward.
I will briefly address two other issues. Making murder at the end of a relationship an aggravating factor, recognising that the moment of maximum danger for many victims is when they tell him finally that they are leaving, is not the only thing we are doing in that space. Yesterday, the Ministry of Justice announced a consultation on whether coercive and controlling behaviour or the use of a knife or weapon that is already on the scene should become aggravating features in any murder case. I pay tribute to Carole Gould and Julie Devey for their campaign on that.
Finally, I will address the point that was raised about whether the measures we are taking adequately answer the findings of Baroness Casey in her report into misconduct in the Metropolitan police and our handling of it. The measures in the Bill are not the only ones we are taking. We are also acting to ensure that any officer who cannot hold appropriate vetting clearance can be removed from office and that a finding of gross misconduct will automatically result in summary dismissal, and we are giving chief constables the right of appeal following a misconduct hearing if the conclusion is that one of their subordinates has not been subject to an adequate sanction.
The depth and breadth of this debate highlights the need to stay ahead of criminal ingenuity through enhanced supervision, interception and disruption, and by cutting criminals off from the tools of their trade. We are developing legal principles that find their roots in the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021, the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 and the Online Safety Act 2023. We are cracking down on crime at every level. From antisocial behaviour all the way to serious organised crime, it blights our communities and targets the most vulnerable. I therefore commend this Bill to the House.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read a Second time.
Criminal Justice Bill (Programme)
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83A(7)),
That the following provisions shall apply to the Criminal Justice Bill:
Committal
(1) The Bill shall be committed to a Public Bill Committee.
Proceedings in Public Bill Committee
(2) Proceedings in the Public Bill Committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion on 30 January 2024.
(3) The Public Bill Committee shall have leave to sit twice on the first day on which it meets.
Proceedings on Consideration and Third Reading
(4) Proceedings on Consideration shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion one hour before the moment of interruption on the day on which those proceedings are commenced.
(5) Proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the moment of interruption on that day.
(6) Standing Order No.83B (Programming committees) shall not apply to proceedings on Consideration and Third Reading.
Other proceedings
(7) Any other proceedings on the Bill may be programmed.—(Scott Mann.)
Question agreed to.
Criminal Justice Bill (Money)
King’s recommendation signified.
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 52(1)(a)),
That, for the purposes of any Act resulting from the Criminal Justice Bill, it is expedient to authorise the payment out of money provided by Parliament of:
(a) any expenditure incurred under or by virtue of the Act by a Minister of the Crown, and
(b) any increase attributable to the Act in the sums payable under any other Act out of money so provided.—(Scott Mann.)
Question agreed to.
Laura Farris
Main Page: Laura Farris (Conservative - Newbury)Department Debates - View all Laura Farris's debates with the Home Office
Criminal Justice Bill (Third sitting)
Laura Farris ExcerptsThursday 14th December 2023
(2 years, 8 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 12 December 2023 - (12 Dec 2023)
Alex Norris
Q
Nick Smart: The purpose of vetting is to make sure that the right people get into the organisation. There is certainly a reputational risk in having the wrong officers in the organisation; we have seen the damage it can do to trust and confidence in the police service. I believe that the measures that the College of Policing will instigate for licence and vetting units are a positive step to make sure that they adhere to a certain standard.
Having His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary review vetting units as part of its inspections is a sensible way of safeguarding and making sure that they are working effectively. As with any issue, if you want to enhance the vetting it will mean more staff, which will cost more. The current budgets are set, so if you put more people and resources into more robust vetting, which is a sensible idea, something at the other end will have to give, because there is no endless money pit for the police budget.
Yes, we welcome it and we believe that it is the right thing to do. As an observation, an officer is vetted at the time of joining, but you could have repeat vetting at some point during their service, to make sure that they still have the appropriate vetting. Also, when you get promoted to superintendent level, for example, you go to management-level vetting, which is slightly more intrusive. If you are a counter-terrorism officer, you may get some even more enhanced and developed vetting that takes more time and resources. We would welcome more robust vetting, and I think most chief constables would welcome it, but it is a question of resourcing and staffing to make sure that the process is fit for purpose.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Laura Farris)
Q
Nick Smart: In terms of the appeals process?
Laura Farris
In terms of the two things. Do you think that that is the range of tools that they need in order to better manage?
Nick Smart: In terms of the appeals process, having a JR is really expensive and takes time. If the officer is to be dismissed, a JR prolongs the period unnecessarily. An appeals tribunal should be swifter, so if the officer is dismissed the process is more satisfactory for everybody concerned. We believe that this is an appropriate tool for chief constables.
Laura Farris
Q
Nick Smart: It plugs a gap. Previously, officers who were lawfully on premises could not seize knives that were essentially held there—we all have knives in our house—but there are examples of domestic situations in which a knife could be used to commit a heinous offence. This provision allows us to seize that knife if there are reasonable grounds to believe that a criminal act will be committed. We would support this.
Laura Farris
Q
Nick Smart: Basically, yes. There are examples of officers who have attended various incidents, perhaps with people with mental health problems, in domestic situations where knives had been lawfully bought but could be used in a criminal act, and the officers have not been able to seize them properly. Again, where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a criminal act may be committed with a bladed article—a weapon—it is entirely appropriate that we have the power to seize it and stop that from happening.
Laura Farris
Q
Nick Smart: I think it is a reasonable belief rather than a suspicion. Giving that power to our officers is welcome. It comes with the caveat that there is a legitimacy angle. Officers not having to obtain warrants to enter premises presents a big trust and confidence issue for the public, and rightly so. That is where the quality of policing comes in with respect to officers’ guidance, understanding and application, and with respect to His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary making sure that those powers are used appropriately and that there is accountability.
It plugs a gap. For example, we all have an iPhone, and we all have Find My Friends on it. If somebody has lost a bit of tech and the app can pinpoint an address, that, along with other reasonable lines of inquiry, gives the officer the reasonable belief to enter the premises and recover the property. That seems appropriate.
Laura Farris
Q
Nick Smart: Yes, I do. On the scale of reasonable suspicion to reasonable belief, you have to have virtually no doubt that the item is in that property before you enter it. Rather than reasonable suspicion, where you can just have a hunch, there have to be active lines of inquiry based on intelligence to justify a reasonable belief, but if it is there, it is entirely appropriate for an officer to enter and recover a member of the public’s stolen property.
Laura Farris
Q
Nick Smart: I think it gives us the flexibility and dynamism we need to address issues that occur, fight crime, deter crime and reassure the public. In my force, West Yorkshire, public spaces protection orders have been used against nuisance vehicles where individuals have been wolf-whistling at females, so they link to the violence against women and girls agenda and they have been used quite successfully. Our power to create PSPOs is entirely appropriate in the circumstances and is very welcome.
Laura Farris
Q
Nick Smart: Again, it relates to the accountability for everybody’s actions. It is not just older people who commit antisocial behaviour; it is often youth-related and it is linked to families. We welcome the provision allowing social housing providers to remove nuisance tenants, but we understand that they have an obligation to rehouse them, so it is not just about moving them from one place to another and the same behaviour happening. There has to be community safety partnership work to ensure that there is the health, education and social care provision to change their behaviour. Otherwise, you are just displacing the problem from one area to another.
Stephen Metcalfe (South Basildon and East Thurrock) (Con)
Q
Nick Smart: On the powers, possession with intent is a really useful operational tool for officers. It is similar to firearms legislation, in which there is an offence of possession of firearms with intent to endanger life. Having an offence for knives with a similar intent is welcome. We have seen gangs taunting each other with knives on social media, on podcasts and things like that. Possession with intent is a welcome operational tool, used in line with intelligence and obviously monitored with the usual safeguards. Operationally it is very welcome, and if it saves lives we are all for it.
The Chair
Q
Nick Smart: If I may, there is one item—the powers of entry—which I think you alluded to. An issue that we looked at was that of immediacy. Section 18 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 allows the police to search after arrest, and that requires an inspector’s authority. In certain circumstances, if the inspector is not available or there is a policing need, the constable can go in and get retrospective authority.
In the circumstances outlined in the Bill’s powers of entry, nothing in there regards that immediacy. If the officer at the time needs to go in to recover the property but cannot get hold of the inspector—for example, if the inspector is in custody dealing with a review, or they are dealing with a complaint or a critical incident, and because they need to review what is going on and then give that authority—it would be helpful to have that provision in so that the officer can seek that respective authority from the inspector as per section 18 of PACE. The precedent is there, but a provision would tackle immediacy—
Laura Farris
Q
Nick Smart: Absolutely. I think in 99% of the cases the inspector’s authority would be granted.
Laura Farris
Q
Nick Smart: There is always the potential when you go through somebody’s door without a warrant for that. I think Andy Cooke from HMIC said that mistakes will be made. However, if there is a genuine belief that you are at a property, you have somebody with a mobile phone, they have seen you and you think that they will run out the back door of the property, or try to hide or destroy that property, you must wait for the inspector to give you the authority. That gives the individual time to act and potentially lose, damage, alter or destroy that property, so that when you go through the door you do not find it for whatever reason. It is an observation; we are not saying that it should be in there, but it is a consideration. As I say, the precedent is there in section 18 of PACE, which I think certainly we, and HMIC, would say has not been abused over time.
The Chair
Thank you for your evidence. If there is anything you would like to add or that you feel you have missed when you go back on the tube, you can always write to the Clerk.
Examination of Witnesses
Councillor Sue Woolley, Emily Spurrell and David Lloyd gave evidence.
Alex Norris
Q
Emily Spurrell: From my point of view, if the system was working as it should—again, I am reflecting on my own experience in Merseyside—you should all be talking about the same things anyway. When I look at my CSPs in Merseyside, if they are not all talking about serious organised crime, something has gone wrong. They are all talking about it, because it is an issue in all their areas. There will be some really specific issues that I think CSPs need to be able to look at but, generally speaking, if they are not talking about those issues, something else has gone wrong further upstream. It could be helpful to put this in because then, as David says, there is a reminder that you need that connection. The reality is that if they are not really talking about those things, there are bigger issues at play, in terms of why those same priorities are not being picked up.
Councillor Sue Woolley: I think that if at all possible, when you have partners around a table and they are equal partners, that is a conducive way to good practice and working. I am quite sure that works really well in some places. In my own area, that works particularly well. All partners are equal around the table; everybody works together. I am quite sure that in other areas, that bond may not be as strong. Rather than just legislating for something, I would suggest that, if at all possible, there could be something around a duty to work together. You will know the language better than me.
Emily Spurrell: That actually already exists for PCCs. It is within our duty to work in partnership as well.
Laura Farris
Q
David Lloyd: We of course hold the chief constable to account in a variety of ways and in different places. Realising that there is a duty of candour is another part of the armoury, because it is something that we can push back. I know that this was very much part of the post-Hillsborough legacy. Clearly, that whole lack of candour was one of the things that went wrong. We are good at holding the chiefs to account, and it should happen locally. With this extra duty there, it is something that we will need to be reminded about—it is helpful for us to be reminded that there is a duty of candour—but we can then ask those questions as well.
Laura Farris
Q
David Lloyd: Clearly, there are people who are homeless, who are also almost aggressively begging; there are people on the streets who are aggressively begging, and are almost aggressively homeless, if that does not sound like a strange thing to say. However, I think we do need a great deal of care. I suspect that the vast majority of people who are homeless on the streets would not be seen as committing a criminal offence by any court, police officer or PCC. They require care and a way of ensuring that any drug and alcohol addiction or mental health issues are supported. It is a difficult area.
Laura Farris
Q
David Lloyd: I think there is a distinction. We have heard evidence, and I am sure that you have heard evidence, of people sleeping in doorways who cannot be moved on by the local authority and there is nothing that can be done.
I suppose my real concern within this is that, especially as budgets get tighter and tighter, the duty around homelessness may change from being a duty on the local authority to a police issue. I do not think that that would be overly helpful if it were not structured in the right way—that it is seen that the principal duty is on the local authority rather than it being a policing issue. I think that there is a real danger of getting to the point that the police need to pick this up. Clearly, policing is not going to be able to deal with anything other than the very sharp and focused bit about this moment; there is far more to it than just this moment.
Laura Farris
Councillor Woolley, given your role, do you have a view on that?
Councillor Sue Woolley: I think we have to be very careful that we do not unnecessarily criminalise rough sleeping. As you are probably aware, through their various services, councils work very closely with those people that might be rough sleeping. There is a combination of rough sleeping and begging.
If we go down the road of criminalising something, then we run the risk of not being able to support those people and the one thing that we do want to do as a society is to support those people. I would just play back that, during covid, we got those people off the street. When we got them off the street, we were able to put services in for them and work with them. I would love to see that happen again. However, we do have a cohort of those who engage in nuisance begging, and we also have a situation of organised gangs sitting behind those who are begging. It is not a black and white answer at all.
Laura Farris
Q
Emily Spurrell: I think it would be useful. We obviously already have the community trigger process in place at the minute, where if someone is dissatisfied with the response from the local authority, they can ask for a review from the PCC’s office to check whether the process was followed sufficiently. I think there are challenges around that in terms of public awareness; I do not think we are seeing huge numbers of that in some areas because much of the public are not aware that that is an option.
It comes back to what we were talking about at the beginning: it is not about the PCC trying to instruct or direct; it is about being able to have the powers to question, challenge and say, “As a partnership, are we doing enough to tackle this issue?” There will be times when actually it will be the police that need to step up in that response, but there will also be times when the local authority have not made a good enough response to that particular incident. It is about having someone who has the power to take another look and say, “Actually, I think we have missed something here. How do we put that right?” and then giving reassurance and saying, “Actually, the local authority or the partnership have done everything possible and there is no more that we can do.” It is a helpful check, and it probably is just an expansion of what we already do at the minute around the community trigger.
Laura Farris
Q
Emily Spurrell: It is a step in the right direction, yes. It is useful just to ensure that those victims of ASB are not dismissed as low level and are considered. We do see incidents where, if victims of ASB are not taken seriously at that first stage, things can escalate and become quite serious, so it is important that victims feel as though they have been heard and that everyone is working towards trying to find a solution, which is not always the case.
The Chair
Q
David Lloyd: I am broadly supportive of the Bill. I am particularly interested in suspending short custodial sentences. I think that makes a great deal of sense and I would highly recommend that. I have covered the piece on nuisance begging and rough sleeping that I was interested in. As a real victims champion and someone who has pushed hard on violence against women and girls since 2012, the aggravating factor for murder at the end of a relationship and MAPPA for controlling and coercive behaviour is something that, again, I highly commend and think that we need to do.
The other thing I picked up from the earlier session was the question around vetting. We need to just consider whether we need to, in many ways, vet to values. We are clearly doing it more and more in our recruitment process, but it strikes me that there are very few officers who have met the criminal threshold and therefore are likely to have on their file a criminal conviction. That does not mean to say that we do not have misogynists or racists or homophobes within the organisations. We have much to do around that. We need to just think about what else we might be able to do to vet to values, so that we make sure we have police forces that are fit for the public. I think that the very vast majority are fit, by the way—I am not suggesting for one moment that they are anything other than that—but we might want to look at that quite closely.
Emily Spurrell: I echo some of what David said there about some of those challenges. To go back to the begging point, which is a wider issue and I know that it is linked with what is going through to the Sentencing Bill, there is a real emphasis and a real push to try to reduce the number of short-term sentences and we want more people in the community. I worry whether some of the provisions for the Criminal Justice Bill, such as the aggressive begging provisions, will actually see an increase in that, which is not what we want, and the two will work counter to each other. I would just say to be mindful around that.
As for some of the bits that David alluded to around vetting and some of the work that is under way to try and increase trust and confidence, there is probably scope to go further. I know there is work being done. The Mayor of London has been quite keen to push some of that and I think he has been working with Harriet Harman on an additional level of scrutiny around the ability to dismiss officers who have been convicted of serious criminal offences and more flexibility around pension forfeiture, for example. There is more scope to do more around that building of trust and confidence within policing in terms of that scrutiny.
Around the vetting, there is work under way. I am aware that there is a national project to try and increase vetting. Echoing what the superintendent said in the previous session, trying to make sure that there is that regular touch base, particularly when officers are crossing forces, is really helpful.
The only other thing I will say around that is that the big challenge we face is around how long these things are taking. It would not matter so much that people were going through a process if it was resolved quickly. Instead, we see some of the examples the superintendent was referring to, where officers accused of gross misconduct sit for years waiting for an outcome and then it gets an NFA or gets downgraded. There is a real challenge here around capacity in the system, both internally in professional standards and with the Independent Office for Police Conduct, and how we can speed up those processes so that we have a robust system that is not taking up so much time and taking officers off the streets.
My only other comment would be in relation to the introduction of the express power for the courts to direct prisoners to attend their sentencing hearings. You will obviously be aware that this came up quite strongly after Olivia was murdered on Merseyside and her family have been very clear about the insult to her mum and her family when the offender did not turn up to hear the victim’s personal statement. I really welcome this, notwithstanding some of the logistical challenges, because it is a really welcome change: offenders should be expected to listen to the impact of their crimes on their victims and their families.
Councillor Sue Woolley: Very briefly, and following on from the point that Emily just made, I would just make a point about the capacity issue, particularly around child sexual abuse reporting. We must be very careful that justice needs to be seen to be swift. What has been shown with various reports on child sexual abuse is that reports have been made but it is taking too long for those individuals—those young people—to be supported when they have then been taken through a process.
Therefore, although it is laudable and the right thing to do to ensure that reports are made in a timely fashion, let us make sure that we have the capacity at the other end to be able to support those young people.
Laura Farris
Q
Mark Fairhurst: Judges have always had the discretion to order a defendant into the dock. When we used to run a court in the ’90s, there was many a time that we would have used force on a prisoner to get them in front of a judge. That discretion has always been there. It is the right way to do things—we are best suited to decide when it is appropriate and proportionate to use force.
I would like to see dialogue between the staff in the courts and the judge because, if the prisoner is being extremely violent or aggressive, I do not think sitting them in front of a judge is the right way to do things. Maybe we could do it remotely, in a secure room, so the victim still has the opportunity to read out their impact statement, rather than proceedings being disrupted—when you do things remotely, you have the ability to mute. We could still force the prisoner to address those victims, and the victims would feel as if they were getting some sort of justice.
Laura Farris
Q
Mark Fairhurst: Yes, there have been some really high-profile cases over the past couple of months in particular. It does seem to be a trend, because there is no deterrent. If you are already getting a lengthy sentence, then really, in your eyes, as the perpetrator of the crime, you are untouchable.
As well as sentencing people for failing to appear, maybe we need to look at what we can do when they are serving their sentence. What privileges can we take off them? Can we stop them getting face-to-face visits from family and friends, or force them to do the visits remotely, as a consequence of their actions? Let’s take some privileges off them while they are serving their sentence so it really hits them hard, and so that people think that justice is actually being served—“You are not untouchable, and we are going to affect the way you serve your sentence.”
The Chair
Q
Mark Fairhurst: There is just one concern in particular with this Bill, where you are forcing serious offenders —particularly sexual offenders—to serve their entire sentence.
Laura Farris
That is in the Sentencing Bill.
Mark Fairhurst: Usually, they get released at the two-thirds point for good behaviour. If there is no incentive to behave in prison, that could have a knock-on effect on staff. Also, if you force someone to serve their entire sentence, we must remember that they are no longer subject to a licence in the community, so there is no supervision for them when they are released after serving their entire sentence. That is another consideration.
The Chair
Thank you very much for your contribution, and have a good day.
Mark Fairhurst: Thank you very much, everyone.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Scott Mann.)
Laura Farris
Main Page: Laura Farris (Conservative - Newbury)Department Debates - View all Laura Farris's debates with the Home Office
Criminal Justice Bill (Second sitting)
Laura Farris ExcerptsTuesday 12th December 2023
(2 years, 8 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 12 December 2023 - (12 Dec 2023)
Alex Norris
Q
Rebecca Bryant: Yes. I would like to bust a few myths, if that is possible while giving evidence. There is a perception in the media and the community that young people are the main perpetrators of antisocial behaviour when, in fact, they are not: the vast majority of antisocial behaviour is perpetrated by adults.
In focusing on young people, we should be thinking about how they are impacted by antisocial behaviour. They are often victims. You will have seen terrible films on TikTok and social media outlets of fights, violence and aggression. That means that those young people are victims rather than perpetrators as a whole. We certainly need to recognise that if we can get in early and use the early intervention and prevention tools available to us to stop the antisocial behaviour or stop those young people becoming antisocial, we will be able to reduce antisocial behaviour as a whole.
Antisocial behaviour is often a precursor to more serious crime, so if we can use our opportunity—I call it a “golden moment”—to intervene with a young person, perhaps with an alternative trusted adult from outside the home, and work with them to understand the impact of the behaviour that they may be perpetrating, that in itself does not fall into the idea that we should be reducing the CPN to the age of 10.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Laura Farris)
Q
Harvey Redgrave: I am in favour of this measure. I think it was used relatively effectively under the last Labour Government in relation to prolific offenders. [Interruption.] Sorry, do I need to speak a bit louder?
The Chair
Please try to speak up a bit.
Harvey Redgrave: I am in favour of the measure. It is right to test more offenders, particularly prolific offenders, many of whom are driven by addiction. The more we can divert offenders into treatment to address their offending behaviour, the better. I think there needs to be a broader look at how we deal with prolific offenders who recycle around the system sometimes tens or hundreds of times before they stop their offending. There used to be something called the prolific and other priority offenders programme, which was disbanded along with the whole infrastructure around it.
There is a need to place this drug-testing measure within a broader set of interventions that look at how we grip prolific offenders, how judges are able to defer sentencing, and how offenders are able to be rehabilitated and dealt with much earlier on rather than them serving short sentences, coming out, reoffending and going back in at great expense to the taxpayer.
Laura Farris
Q
The other question I wanted to ask is about Crest Advisory’s role in Baroness Casey’s review—again, if you were not personally involved in that, you can correct me. I think Crest Advisory played some role in supporting her review into the misconduct issues in the Met police, and there are two provisions in this Bill that at least partially respond to that. I would like to look at clause 73, which is on ethical policing and the duty of candour. In the light of your work with Baroness Casey, do you think it is important, and if so why? What does it answer in relation to her findings about failings in the Metropolitan police?
Harvey Redgrave: To clarify, some of my team at Crest Advisory were seconded in to support Baroness Casey on her review, but obviously she led the review and wrote it herself. It is really important that we look at the ethics and systems around misconduct within policing. There is a crisis of public confidence in policing at the moment, particularly among women. The Commissioner of the Met has spoken repeatedly about wanting to have more say and control over getting rid of officers when there are cases of misconduct, and I think the Government have acted on some of that.
I support the measure, but I would argue that there is a case for going even further and looking at the whole system around vetting and how that takes place within policing, and the system of who really upholds the professional standards within policing. Which body do we hold responsible—the College of Policing, the National Police Chiefs’ Council, or the Home Office? It feels to me like there is a slight lack of clarity at the moment about where the buck stops on some of this at a national level, with each force able to adopt slightly different practices.
Laura Farris
Q
Harvey Redgrave: I think that it is helpful and is a welcome step, but I am not sure that, in isolation, it will be enough to bring about the kind of culture change that Baroness Casey believes is necessary, within not just the Met but policing as a whole.
Laura Farris
Q
Harvey Redgrave: It comes back to the question of whether the chief constable should have more discretion over being able to hire and fire people, and to be able to get rid of people they are unhappy with. We have created systems and processes over the last 20 or 30 years that have taken some of that discretion away. It is a balance, and we need proper professional standards to be upheld by the College of Policing. In general, I think it a good thing for there to be greater discretion for chief constables to be able to act when they believe there is misconduct within their force.
Laura Farris
Q
We heard from the Crown Prosecution Service this morning, and it said that it did not think such an offence was necessary because the mechanics of an assault charge apply anyway—obviously, with actual bodily harm and grievous bodily harm, if that should arise. There is also a statutory aggravating factor for assaulting a retail worker. Do you have a view on this? If you do, could you set out what it is and why?
Harvey Redgrave: Shoplifting is a real concern and we need some deterrents in the system, but I am not sure that we get those deterrents through harsher sentencing. A bigger problem is whether we are catching offenders, charging them, and convicting them. All the evidence shows that for this type of offending, it is swiftness and certainty that deter rather than severity. Not many shoplifters are thinking about aggravating factors or how long they are going to spend in prison.
Laura Farris
Q
Harvey Redgrave: In general, the Bill probably focuses too much on sentence lengths and not enough on what is happening at the front end, around the police’s ability to catch, detain and bring offenders to justice. That is where I think the real gap is.
The Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire (Chris Philp)
Q
Rebecca, thank you for joining us this afternoon. In response to the shadow Minister, you raised questions about reducing the minimum age for community protection notices from 16 to 10, which is enclosed within clause 67 of the Bill. Do you agree that bringing 10 to 15-year-olds into the scope of CPNs provides an opportunity to halt a path into criminality that might otherwise occur? Combined with that, there is an opportunity to make other interventions to try to prevent the young person from getting into crime.
Rebecca Bryant: It is using a hammer to crack a nut. For 10 and 11-year-olds in particular who are on the cusp of causing antisocial behaviour, there are many other tools available to partners. I am not necessarily thinking about fining parents, because a lot of the young people who are involved in antisocial behaviour come from more deprived backgrounds, and breaching and fining is not going to enable change.
What we are looking for is a change of behaviour in the longer term. Yes, we are looking to prevent in the first instance, but then we look for change. Being able to engage with a young person and their parents by putting in positive mentoring and other youth interventions would surely have longer term success than a community protection notice would have. Also, there is a community protection warning before a notice; that kind of warning and discussion between a parent, a child and the authorities, which could be the housing provider, the local authority or the police, has much more impact when you are offering a positive intervention.
Laura Farris
Q
Andy Marsh: To explain the process, when a complaint is raised, internally and externally, the chief constable will have a delegated appropriate authority, which tends to be the deputy chief constable. They will have a pretty much weekly meeting, but sometimes it is a real-time daily meeting if something crops up that they need to consider.
The first thing that would happen is that a complaint would reach a threshold of gross misconduct or, indeed, criminal. Once it has reached that threshold, the deputy chief constable—the delegated appropriate authority—needs to make a decision about what should happen to that person. Should they be suspended? Can they continue with their duties? Should they engage in some degree of protected-type duty? What I can say, from my experience of working with police forces across England and Wales, is that the threshold and the tolerance before suspension has dropped substantially.
Laura Farris
Q
Andy Marsh: No, I am not expressing it clearly, because if it would appear to be a substantial complaint—a complaint which would undermine the trust and confidence of the public should that officer remain serving—then they should be suspended. Actually, I can reassure you, in all the cases that I am aware of and that I look at where there are allegations of violence against women and girls, I see a very low threshold for suspension, so if I have misled you at all, I am sorry.
Laura Farris
Q
Andy Marsh: Then they are very likely to be suspended, and I am really happy to write to the Committee and share the guidance and information—
Laura Farris
Q
Andy Marsh: It is very low. If I was accused of any form of domestic abuse, verbal or physical, or coercive control, I can guarantee you that I would be suspended.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Andy Marsh: In explaining this, I am in no way seeking to justify a lack of attention, but when a call is made to a police control room, they will triage it and they will use something called a threat, harm and risk matrix. If the offender has left the scene and no one is at immediate risk, that is unlikely to secure an immediate deployment. There is more likely to be a follow-up investigation. The retail crime action plan and guidance on our website, and all the focus on the use of images and facial recognition and on persistent offenders, is bringing a much sharper focus to an area of standards and police response that has slipped to an unacceptably low level.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Dame Vera Baird: I think they probably need to be strengthened quite a lot. I do not think there is anything in there that could criminalise somebody who provided a means for doing it as opposed to encouraging it. So if someone provides—I do not know—a knife or some drugs, I am not sure there is provision for that, and I think that is a big miss. This is a really worrying area and we need to legislate, and that is one of the good things in the Bill.
Laura Farris
Q
In that context, coercive control is making its way through in different forms. I have a narrow question about what you thought about the use of MAPPA—multi-agency public protection arrangements—in relation to the management of a serious coercive control offence.
Dame Vera Baird: I think it is good to state that formally. I am sure that it happens now quite a lot.
Laura Farris
Q
Dame Vera Baird: It is a strict regime and it is very carefully managed. The probation service is aware of the high level of risk. It is definitely beneficial for dangerous offenders, and the probation service has recognised domestic abusers. Even when they have not committed domestic abuse offences, it still recognised them as presenting that danger, if they are already in MAPPA. I am sure that the most coercively controlling offenders already go into MAPPA. It is not a closed box that you can only fight your way into through these five categories of offending. It is much wider than that, but let’s do it—fine.
Laura Farris
Q
Dame Vera Baird: That is a very interesting question, but they are better and they have positive bits to them, don’t they?
Laura Farris
A DAPO does allow GPS monitoring, for example.
Dame Vera Baird: That is an improvement on the current model. There will have to be close working between those who apply for the DAPOs and those who are running MAPPA to make sure that there is no overlap or missing bits and so forth. This cross-boundary working is going to be particularly important with that. But they are both good steps. I do think MAPPA is slightly redundant, but let us do it, and the DAPOs and those positive requirements are definitely a big step forward. What you said about the statutory instrument is really interesting—
Laura Farris
Lord Bellamy, today in the Lords—
Dame Vera Baird: Yes, that is really good to hear, but these are going into statute. Why is the protection for women only going into a statutory instrument, which frankly fewer people will ever get to know about? Why is it being done in that way? Why is it not in here with these?
Laura Farris
I will have to revert to the Committee on the answer to that, because I actually do not know.
Dame Vera Baird: Anyway, I am not supposed to ask you questions—[Laughter.]
Laura Farris
Q
Dame Vera Baird: I think it is bound to, yes. I have felt since their inception that DAPOs, because of those positive requirements, were likelier to be more effective than just the negative nature of whatever they were called—I forget what they are called currently.
MAPPA is an effective mechanism. You raise very interesting questions about how they will interact, and I just think it is about cross-working, really, between police and probation in particular. They have to work in IOM anyway, so they must have ways of working together that ought to be reasonably effective. But I hope that you will, as it were, as a Government draw to their attention the need for an understanding of how those mechanisms will work together, because that would be an important way to point out that it needs to be done effectively.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Jonathan Hall: No, I do not think so at the moment. I am in constant contact with counter-terrorism police and the Home Office. I am not aware that the Government are looking for yet further types of measure; if they were, I think they would have sought to bring them in within this Criminal Justice Bill. All that this particular measure does is allow an existing measure, polygraphs, to be applied to a wider range of people. My beef with that is that it allows it to be applied to people who have never been convicted of terrorism, without it going in front of a judge. So I think that the answer is no.
Laura Farris
Q
Jonathan Hall: I was in favour of polygraph measures after Fishmongers’ Hall. It was partly on the back of one of my recommendations that polygraph measures were brought in. They always, or at least for a long time, existed for sex offenders. You will recall Usman Khan, who was clearly a very deceptive man. My view was that polygraph measures could be useful.
Laura Farris
Q
Jonathan Hall: Let us say that someone is in the community. They could be asked about their daily routine. The most likely outcome is that someone who is subject to a polygraph measure would feel that they have to tell the truth, and the evidence is that people who are subject to polygraphs make admissions. You could say, “Are you in touch with the well-known terrorist Jonathan Hall?”, and the effect of polygraphs tends to be that people go, “Actually, I am,” because they are worried about giving it away through the polygraph measure. That would give counter-terrorism police an amazing source of information to show that, contrary to what that person had been telling his probation officer, he was still in touch with the dangerous terrorist Jonathan Hall. That would allow new licence conditions, for example: if Jonathan Hall lived in a certain part of Birmingham, a licence condition could be imposed that prevented that person from going there.
Laura Farris
Q
Jonathan Hall: Yes. You are completely right. This is not about extracting evidence that can be used in a criminal trial; it is about extracting information that is relevant to the management of offenders. If you think about a released terrorist offender who is now serving their sentence in the community, what you want to know is what their pattern of life is, who they are meeting, where they are going and what their objectives are. Are they visiting shops that sell knives, for example? Usman Khan must have gone to a shop to buy knives and tape to create the weapons used to kill two people. There are lots of factual matters that they can be asked about.
One of the benefits of the polygraph, I suppose, is that ultimately it is not covert. While MI5 and the police may have covert monitoring, it would be quite hard for them to put that information to the suspect. If the suspect has made an admission—“Yes, I am going to meet Jonathan Hall, the well-known terrorist,” or “Yes, I am going to visit knife shops”—that can be put to the offender, and you can work on rehabilitating the offender.
The Chair
As there are no further questions, I would like to thank the witness for giving evidence.
Laura Farris
Main Page: Laura Farris (Conservative - Newbury)Department Debates - View all Laura Farris's debates with the Home Office
Criminal Justice Bill (Fourth sitting)
Laura Farris ExcerptsThursday 14th December 2023
(2 years, 8 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 14 December 2023 - (14 Dec 2023)
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Laura Farris)
Q
Kennedy Talbot: No, neither am I. I am just here for clause 32 and schedule 4, and that is in schedule 5. However, I can say that I acted for a bank in a case in the High Court last year, which was effectively part 5 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 being used to recover all the funds that were in suspended accounts, so it is possible to do it without new law, but I have not looked at the provisions of schedule 5 in any detail to be able to help with that; I am sorry.
Laura Farris
Q
Kennedy Talbot: Do you mean as they stand?
Laura Farris
In the Bill.
Kennedy Talbot: I think that the good things about the Bill include the statutory process to reach settlements immediately after a defendant is convicted. It is abbreviated to EROC, early resolution of confiscation, where the court can direct the parties to meet and seek to reach a settlement. I think that is a good idea. In my view, it needs some tinkering with, because at the moment the convicted defendant has no incentive to co-operate, and most defendants want to put off for as long as possible the day when their assets are confiscated, as you might expect. Unless we can work in some incentives, I do not think that will work as well as it might.
Laura Farris
Q
Kennedy Talbot: It might be difficult for the court to be able to ameliorate the sentence that the defendant might suffer. It may be possible to reduce slightly his confiscation liability—to give a reduction, as one gives a reduction to defendants who plead guilty—but by that stage, when we come to confiscation, most defendants are serving prison sentences, and their prison conditions are the most important thing to them, so prison privileges and categorisation might be the way to incentivise without damaging the public interest and people getting reductions in their sentences unjustifiably.
The Chair
Do any other Members have questions for this witness? No. In that case, thank you very much, Mr Talbot, for your time and for assisting the Committee in the way you have.
Kennedy Talbot: It has been a pleasure and a privilege. Thank you for inviting me.
Examination of Witnesses
Paddy Lillis, Paul Gerrard and Helen Dickinson OBE gave evidence.
Laura Farris
Q
We all know that you are, of course, supportive of the clause 24 provision, which mirrors what you recommended, but I wanted to ask you about some of the things that you have just said. You said in your report that you found that coercive control underpins all domestic abuse. I think that you also made reference to the fact that there is now a consultation happening on minimum sentences in two regards. The first is in relation to whether any killing—any domestic homicide, to use your language—where there has been coercive control should attract a minimum sentence. I think that that goes a bit wider than anything that you put in your review. I will ask you about that first, and then I will go on to the second part.
Clare Wade: My view about setting minimum sentences in stone is quite strong. I am actually not a fan of minimum terms and starting points because I think that it takes away quite a lot of judicial discretion. Even though they are only starting points, we often get stuck with them. There is an argument that schedule 21 is probably not fit for purpose. As I say in the paper, it is frozen in 2003 and it comes with the problem that there is always this issue of, “Do we add another starting point in?” I think that the 25-year minimum terms has done nothing but cause problems.
Laura Farris
Q
Clare Wade: Yes, it was.
Laura Farris
Q
Clare Wade: Yes, that is one of the problems, I think. There are two issues. First, it creates legal anomalies anyway, because once you delineate a starting point for something like that, you have all sorts of problems about, “When is it taking something to the scene?” and you then have laws saying that taking a knife to the doorstep is taking it to the scene but taking a knife to another room is not taking it to the scene. That just reduces confidence in the law, I think; it just causes anomalies.
Secondly, as it stands, it does not fit with the other sorts of categories of harm within schedule 21 because, as I say in the report, it does not consider the vulnerability of the victim. It has one harm at purpose. That has caused all sorts of issues in terms of an obvious disparity, and we identified that disparity in the review. There is a disparity of six and a half years on average.
So it causes problems, and yes, you are absolutely right: it obfuscates the real issues because, by looking at the cases that we have looked at, looking at the literature and looking at our experience and the experiences of frontline responders and so forth, we know that the real issues are about what is now being identified as overkill or gratuitous excessive violence. The real issues are about, “Why do we not have a proper forensic approach to domestic abuse?” We do not have that. The whole idea of placing controlling and coercive behaviour and the model that I have identified at the forefront of the thinking is to achieve a proper forensic approach. We will not have this woolly attitude and people saying, “That’s not proper abuse,” and basing stuff on myths and so forth.
Laura Farris
Q
Clare Wade: First of all, there were only two cases in the actual sample that came within the “rough sex” category: gross negligence manslaughter and unlawful act manslaughter. In one of those cases, culpability was levelled at category C, so around the middle, and in the other at category B, so higher culpability.
I said that those cases should always involve higher culpability, because the risks of some of the behaviour, in particular with strangulation—while that was not apparent in the cases that we looked at—are high. At the moment, the law distinguishes between “obvious” and “high”, and my view is that this is just a legal nicety when you are talking about strangling or choking somebody. All the experts will say—
Laura Farris
Q
Clare Wade: No, it is not. The court is always constrained in terms of section 36 applications and referrals. They are always constrained by what evidence was before the sentencing court. There was found to be this distinction between “obvious” and “high”, and I am not sure that can exist.
My view is that we need to look at everything, and look at society as a victim. We need to dismantle the cultural scaffolding that goes with some of this offending, if we are really going to tackle domestic homicide. There is such a resonance with other harms. Even the harm of overkill, which is about obliterating women’s bodies because of anger and the motivation to kill and so forth, is apparent in strangulation. It was very important to look at that.
Laura Farris
Q
Clare Wade: It is a source of tension. The Sentencing Council has also said that the cases are decided on their own facts. I would agree that a real tension is there. In only one of the cases that we looked at did the sentencing judge find that it was high culpability.
Laura Farris
Q
Clare Wade: Yes, there was another one that was category C—given that there were two cases, 50% of them were category C.
The review is probably the first document that brings into consideration the current thinking of academics, campaigners, specialists and doctors. There has been a lot of research done, for example, by Dr Cath White on strangulation. It brings it all into play, and we are trying to have a coherent approach. The beauty—if I can call it that—of using the coercive control model, is that it gives us that. As I said before, ultimately we want a proper forensic approach to domestic abuse in criminal law.
My view is that that approach is lacking at the moment, and that is why we struggle. That is why there is seeming injustice, for example, when a minority of women kill their abusive partners. They do not always get justice, as some of the research shows. Only by having that proper forensic approach across the board will we be able to change things. That is important.
The other point is that the Sentencing Council is conducting its own review—I have not seen all the cases it looked at—and what applies to that applies to my review as well: sentencing comments in themselves are an imperfect way of measuring everything that underpins these cases.
Laura Farris
Q
Clare Wade: The victim cannot give evidence. If you are looking at sentencing comments, you are not looking at the evidence in the case. Take the two cases with which we started the review, those of Ellie Gould and, in particular, Poppy Devey Waterhouse—the review was initiated by the campaign on those cases. I was able to look at the prosecution case files and see that some of the factors we were able to identify in looking at the evidence were apparent in those cases.
In one of the cases, there was some stalking; in both cases, the killing happened at the end of the relationship where the victim wanted to leave the relationship; there was a little bit of violence. We found those factors, but they were not necessarily apparent from the sentencing remarks—one had to look at the papers through the coercive control prism to be able to identify them. Looking only at sentencing remarks is an imperfect way of looking at all these cases. That is why I welcome the Law Commission looking at the issue of defences.
Alex Cunningham
Q
Clare Wade: I would obviously welcome that. We have had some very high-profile cases where police officers have committed dreadful offences. Public confidence, particularly the confidence of women, needs to be restored in policing, so I would welcome that transparency.
I suppose there is an underlying cohesion in some of what we say. For example, one of the questions that we wanted to answer in the review is how domestic homicides sit and fit with misogynistic killings of women generally. I hope that by identifying the real harms and placing them at the forefront of the law, we are able to show that. That goes back to some of the things we were saying a moment ago, namely that strangulation is a particular harm. It is pertinent to domestic killings, as we identified in the review, but it is also something that happens in other misogynistic killings of women. It is important to not just be able to isolate domestic killings of women, but have a policy that encompasses the misogyny that underpins some of the awful offences we have seen in the last few years.
Laura Farris
Main Page: Laura Farris (Conservative - Newbury)Department Debates - View all Laura Farris's debates with the Home Office
Criminal Justice Bill (Sixth sitting)
Laura Farris ExcerptsThursday 11th January 2024
(2 years, 7 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 11 January 2024 - (11 Jan 2024)
Alex Norris
I am grateful for the Minister’s answer, which has given me a significant degree of comfort. The point we will hold under review is the nature of delivery companies and the nature of their employment. Some of that is third party and some involves self-employment, which has been a matter of debate in this place on many occasions. I fear that that weakens to some degree the chain of accountability. Nevertheless, very significant fines are in place, as the Minister said. I wonder whether a custodial sentence backstop would strengthen the provisions a little further, but given that the current guidelines are relatively new, as the Minister said, we ought to give them time to work.
The point about online marketplaces was important and has been of interest to the shadow Home Secretary. We are very keen that that should happen as soon as possible. We are grateful for that assurance from the Minister. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 10 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 11
Encouraging or assisting serious self-harm
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Laura Farris)
I beg to move amendment 23, in clause 11, page 8, line 23, after “conviction” insert “in England and Wales”.
This amendment and amendments 24 and 43 extend the offence under this clause to Northern Ireland.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendments 24 and 43.
Clause stand part.
Clause 12 stand part.
Laura Farris
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Bardell. Government amendments 23, 24 and 43 amend the penalty provisions in clause 11 and the extant provisions in clause 77 extend the broader offence of encouraging or assisting serious self-harm to Northern Ireland.
Clause 11, together with clause 12, fulfils a commitment made by the Government during the passage of the Online Safety Act to broaden the offence of encouraging or assisting serious self-harm to cover all the means by which that may occur, including direct assistance such as giving somebody a substance or even a weapon with which to perform the act.
Unlike the offence in section 184 of the Online Safety Act, which it replaces in so far as that offence applies to England and Wales, the broader offence is not confined to verbal or electronic communications, publications or correspondence. In that respect, it implements the recommendation that the Law Commission made in 2021, in its important “Modernising Communications Offences” report.
There are two key points that I want to draw the Committee’s attention to today: capacity and intent. Clause 11(1) says that a person commits the offence if they do an act that is
“capable of encouraging or assisting the serious self-harm”
and if their act was intended to elicit that response. In so far as those two threshold tests are met, it is then a strict liability offence.
Subsection (2) provides that the person committing the offence does not need to know or be able to identify the person to whom their conduct is directed; it is enough that the conduct takes place at all. Secondarily, the offence is committed irrespective of whether serious self-harm eventually materialises.
Subsection (5) sets out the maximum penalties for the offence. The offence is triable either way; in a magistrates court it is subject to a fine or, on conviction on indictment, to a custodial term, or both, and in the Crown Court it is subject to a fine or a custodial term not exceeding five years, or both.
Broadening the offence has allowed us to simplify the drafting in a way that is more consistent with the offence of encouraging or assisting suicide. Members of the Committee will recall that that was discussed extensively during the passage of the Online Safety Act 2023—that we should be bringing self-harm, in terms of the elements of the offence, to read more consistently with the law on suicide.
Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)
I missed Clare Wade’s evidence because I was unwell when she gave evidence to this Committee. Are we to assume that the clause will be used in the prosecution of cases where self-harm is caused by incidents within domestic abuse relationships or as a result of grooming, sexual violence and broader violence against women? I think that it was clarified during the evidence session that that was the case.
Laura Farris
I thank the hon. Lady for her question. It is quite clear that Parliament’s intention, in the way that we are framing the clause, and how the clause might actually play out when it comes before the courts, are probably quite different. I have been thinking about that myself. This is very much an extension of what I may call—I hope you will forgive me if I use this as a shorthand—the “Molly Russell” principle, which was established by that tragic case and led to all the new principles of the Online Safety Act—bringing them into line with the offline environment.
However, I think that you are quite correct; when we read clause 11, we see that it belongs in a range of different circumstances, all of which I have thought through. Yes, I think that you are right to say that it could very easily exist within a domestic—
The Chair
Order. I remind the Minister to speak through the Chair and observe the usual conventions.
Laura Farris
My apologies. I am sorry for being too informal; I am not familiar with this. I think that it is the case that the issue is readily identifiable within certain forms of domestic abuse scenario, and that the clause would apply in those circumstances. It is obvious in the statutory language.
Jess Phillips
I will speak more broadly about the issue in a moment, and I am pleased to hear what the Minister has said; that is what we would all want to see. However, I am concerned about the each-way offences that the Minister outlined. Let us say that in a case of suicide a coroner found that domestic abuse had been involved—I mean, chance would be a fine thing in most cases—and a manslaughter charge was laid and then the perpetrator pled guilty. There has only been one case of this. I just wonder how these summary limits and these each-way offences would work in that situation.
Laura Farris
I thank the hon. Lady again for her question. Actually, I think that we would have to concede immediately that it would be on the charge sheet. However, the hon. Lady has raised the topical, important and very difficult issue of whether or not a domestic abuse perpetrator has elicited suicide in circumstances where, as she will know, there are evidential difficulties. There is a discussion happening within Parliament, and more widely within the legal profession, about the offence of manslaughter and its ambit when it takes place in the context of suicide.
Perhaps I can reassure the hon. Lady, though, by saying this: if we stop short of suicide—very much mindful of the fact that that engages quite difficult legal issues—and we think about the offences created under clause 11, I think that it is almost inconceivable that there would be a circumstance in which a clause 11 offence existed and was not accompanied by an offence of coercive control under the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. I just do not think that, in a domestic abuse context, those two things would not exist in parallel. Therefore I think that we would already be looking at a more serious form of sentencing if we were into an “eliciting self-harm” clause 11 offence. It would also be automatically brought under the ambit of the Domestic Abuse Act, and it is already a more serious offence in that context.
Clause 12 is the facilitation element of the offence, and subsection (1) provides that anyone who arranges for somebody else to do an act capable of amounting to inducing self-harm is also committing an equivalent offence. Subsection (2) provides that an act can be capable of encouraging or assisting self-harm even when done in circumstances where it was impossible for the final act to be performed. For example, if pills were provided to a person and they ended up not to be the pills that were intended, it is exactly the same offence. Equally, if something harmful was sent by post but never arrived, the offence and sentence are the same irrespective.
Subsection (3) provides that an internet service provider does not commit the offence merely by providing a means through which others can send, transmit or publish content capable of encouraging or assisting serious self- harm. Subsection (5) provides that section 184 of the Online Safety Act 2023 is repealed in consequence of these provisions, which create a much broader basis, bringing the online and offline environments into parity.
Jess Phillips
The Minister and I have had some back and forth on this. I rise really to hammer home the point regarding the good intentions of the clause, but the need to think about it in the context of a domestic abuse, grooming or sexual violence situation. It is undoubted in any professional’s mind that one of the consequences of violence, abuse and coercion against an individual, specifically in young women, is self-harm and suicide.
As the Minister rightly says, it is important that we recognise that in the vast majority of cases self-harm falls short of suicide. There is a huge amount of self-harm going on across the country, genuinely encouraged as a pattern of domestic abuse, and we need to ensure that this piece of perfectly reasonable legislation, which was designed for those on the internet trying to get people to be anorexic and all of that heinous stuff, which we are all very glad to have not had to put up with in our childhood—I look around to make sure that we are all of a relatively similar age—also covers that.
There is one particular risk: how does the clause interact with institutions? Perhaps the Minister could assist me with that. The Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire, a Home Office Minister, is sat in front of me. I was a few minutes late for the sitting this morning because I was in court with one of my constituents in a case—I am afraid to say—where we were on the other side from the Home Office. My constituent literally had to take medication during the court proceedings, such is the mental health trauma that has been caused to her by the Home Office. I wonder how this piece of legislation might be used. I suppose I worry that there is too much opportunity for it to become useful, in that there are so many ways in which institutions and individuals cause people to end up in a self-harm and suicidal situation. I seek clarity on that, unless Ministers wish to be found wanting by the Bill.
Alex Norris
I am really grateful for my hon. Friend’s contribution. I think that is exactly right. We will hear from the Minister in her reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley where the Government settle on that point. Certainly on the face of the Bill, institutions are left out. I do wonder whether clause 14 would give us the opportunity to reconnect institutions. I suspect that is not the motivation behind that clause, but it may work in that way. Those are pertinent questions that I am sure the Minister is about to address.
Laura Farris
A number of very good points have been made and I will try to respond to all of them. On Scotland, the offence relates to devolved matters, but Scottish Ministers have decided that the broader offence should not extend to their jurisdiction. They are sticking with section 184 of the Online Safety Act for now. That is why the amendment does not extend the offence to Scotland.
Let me turn to the point that the shadow Minister and the hon. Members for Birmingham, Yardley and for Bootle all made about the ambit of clause 11(1). If I may recap what I said to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, I think it is absolutely possible that some forms of domestic abuse will fall under the provisions of clause 11. She gave a good illustration of where that might occur. As I have said already—I hope I satisfied her with my answer—I think there is almost no circumstance where the clause would not be read or even pleaded in tandem with the Domestic Abuse Act. It will be a compound offence, and the charge sheet will have more than a section 11 offence if it occurs in the context of an intimate relationship or a former relationship. Conversion therapy was raised, and I think it is possible that that could fall within the ambit of clause 11 too. It is quite obvious how that could be the case.
Laura Farris
Well, okay, but I struggle to conceive of circumstances, other than very unusual and extreme ones, where it would be said that a statutory body was doing an act with the intention of eliciting the consequence of self-harm. Anyway, the point has been made and I have responded to it. I know the hon. Lady’s case is an emotive one.
Jess Phillips
I am not going to talk about my case, but with regard to the charge sheet, coercive control legislation does not currently cover adults who are sexually exploited in grooming situations. In the case of a woman who is sexually exploited by an adult, like the woman I was with this morning, coercive control legislation does not apply. However, self-harm—I mean, I am going to say that literally being forced to be raped by 20 men a day is self-harm—is absolutely part of the pattern of coercion and abuse that those people suffer, so we would assume that adult-groomers would be covered by the Bill.
Laura Farris
I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention. I think a very helpful fabric of possible scenarios has been identified this afternoon. I simply say that in the different circumstances that she has just outlined, there are different criminal offences that would also apply. My simple point is that a case of the nature that she has described would not be confined to a section 11 offence under the Criminal Justice Act 2024, as I hope it will become in due course; there would be a range of serious criminality connected to that.
Jess Phillips
There isn’t. I hope, as the Minister hopes, that there will be by the time we have got to the end of our scrutiny of the Bill, but there is no crime of grooming adults in sexual exploitation; that exists only for children as an aggravating factor in offences. I suppose pimping legislation would not count in the case I mentioned if self-harm was caused. I do not think there are other bits of legislation for adult victims of sexual exploitation.
The Chair
Order. We are having a very important and thoughtful debate, but can we please try to observe the normal procedures so that Hansard colleagues, and those who are watching, can catch all of the proceedings?
Laura Farris
I am sorry if I misunderstood the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley. I thought she was identifying a rape scenario, which would be caught by the Sexual Offences Act 2003. It is probably not particularly fruitful for us to talk about every instance of criminality, but I think there is a point of agreement between Members on both sides of the Committee. Opposition Members have quite rightly and properly identified that clause 11 is likely to go much wider—the way it will be interpreted or pleaded, or how it will end up in court, is probably a bit different from the way in which it was presented to the House during the progress of the Online Safety Bill, when we were confined to two or three particular instances of self-harm. The Opposition correctly identified that issue, as we did on the Government Benches. I am not trying to get out of responding, but I think the provision will be tempered by common law as it goes through the courts.
Amendment 23 agreed to.
Amendment made: 24, in clause 11, page 8, line 24, at end insert—
“(aa) on summary conviction in Northern Ireland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);”.—(Laura Farris.)
See the statement to amendment 23.
Clause 11, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 12 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 13
Offences relating to intimate photographs or films and voyeurism
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 20—Sharing or threatening to share intimate photograph or film: modesty clothing—
“(1) Section 188 of the Online Safety Act 2023 is amended as follows.
(2) After inserted section 66D(5)(e) insert—
‘(f) the person not wearing modesty clothing such as a hijab or niqab when they would normally do so.’”
This new clause would see definition of “intimate image” extended to include specific categories of image that may be considered intimate by particular religious or cultural groups.
Laura Farris
The clause is the latest in a sequence of legislation dealing with intimate image abuse. People may correct me if I am wrong, but I think I am right to say that we have not dealt with intimate image abuse until this Parliament. The first time it hit the statute book properly was the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. I think it is also right to say that, as a Parliament, we have framed it correctly as something that is more often than not just another ugly incarnation of coercive control. It is highly intrusive, humiliating and distressing conduct.
In November 2022, following the passage of the Domestic Abuse Act, the Government announced their intention to create a suite of new offences to deal with intimate image abuse, closely based on the Law Commission’s recommendations in its July 2022 report. Under the Online Safety Act 2023—I hope the Committee will not mind if I spend a moment on the chronology and the legislative journey on intimate image abuse—the Government repealed the offences of disclosing or threatening to disclose private sexual images, replacing them with four new offences of sharing or threatening to share intimate images.
The Bill goes further to tackle the taking of intimate images without consent, and the process of installing equipment for that purpose. First, it repeals two voyeurism offences related to voyeurism of a private act and taking images under a person’s clothing, for which we use the shorthand “upskirting”—although that precedes the life of this Parliament, so I am wrong about that. Anyway, both those offences are reasonably new and have resulted in amendments to the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The Bill will replace them with new criminal offences to tackle the taking or recording of intimate images without consent and the installing of equipment for such purposes.
Those taking offences build on the sharing offences identified in the Online Safety Act to provide a unified package of offences using the same definitions and core elements. That addresses the criticism that there was previously a patchwork of protection, which the police told us led to gaps in provision when it came to this type of behaviour. I pay tribute to my right hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Dame Maria Miller), who is not a member of the Committee. She has done a lot of work on the issue, and identified this problem in particular. As we know, one of the issues was proving intent.
I am grateful to the Law Commission for its work. It consulted widely with the police, prosecutors and legal practitioners, so we could not only read its report, but hear from a range of experts, including those supporting and campaigning on behalf of victims, and others who are far more knowledgeable than any of us.
The clause will insert a suite of new provisions after section 66 of the 2003 Act. The clause will create three new offences: the taking or recording of an intimate photograph or film without consent; and two new offences about installing equipment to enable a taking offence. I will go through them briefly.
The first provision of the clause is the creation of what we call a base offence of taking any intentional image of a person in an intimate state without their consent. That amounts to what we will call a section 66AA offence. It removes the requirement for a reason or motive. It does not matter if the person was doing it for a joke or for financial payment, or even if their reason was not particularly sinister. The base offence would be met if those elements were established. The offence is triable summarily only and will attract a maximum prison term of six months.
The wording of the two more serious offences mirrors some of the language that we are familiar with; the offences refer not just to “intentionally” taking an image, including of a person in an intimate state without their consent, but to having the intent of causing them “alarm, distress or humiliation”, or taking the image for the purpose of “obtaining sexual gratification” for themselves or another person. The offences are serious and carry a maximum sentence of two years. The three offences are designed to achieve the right balance between the protection of the victim and the avoidance of any over-criminalisation. I will return to that when I speak to new clause 20, tabled by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley.
The base taking offence is subject to a defence of reasonable excuse, such as a police officer taking an image without consent for purposes connected with criminal proceedings. Similarly, a base sharing offence is subject to the defence of reasonable excuse; for example, images taken for the purpose of a child’s medical treatment would meet that threshold, even if the victim was distressed by that. There is another exemption—I do not know who came up with this example, but it is a good one—if the image is taken in a public place and the person shown in the image is in the intimate state voluntarily. A distinction is therefore drawn between, for example, a photo of a streaker at a football match, and that of someone who had a reasonable expectation of privacy; that would relate to upskirting, for example.
We are also creating two offences to do with the installation of spycams, which I am afraid we see more and more of in cases going through the courts: an offence of installing, adapting, preparing or maintaining equipment with the intention of taking or recording intimate photograph or film; and an offence of supplying for that purpose. To be clear, it will not be necessary for the image to have been taken; if equipment was installed for that purpose, that is enough to meet the requirements of the offence.
Overall, the clause amends the Sexual Offences Act 2003 to ensure that notification requirements can be applied, where the relevant criteria are met, to those convicted of the new offence of taking for sexual gratification and installing with the intent to enable the commission of that offence. I commend the clause to the Committee. I will respond to the new clause later.
Jess Phillips
I will be brief. New clause 20 would extend the definition of “intimate image” to include specific categories of image that may be considered intimate by particular religious or cultural groups—for example, instances of a person not wearing modesty clothing such as a hijab or niqab when they would normally do so.
Alex Norris
Clause 13 is right and is a welcome addition, so I do not have much to say about the two lines that form it. I will keep my powder dry for my amendments to the schedule that the clause introduces, which is where the action is.
New clause 20 is a welcome addition to the debate and would be a welcome addition to the Bill. As my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley says, some people get forgotten in our discussions. The point of having a diverse Parliament that represents the country that we serve is that we try to work that out, but we all have a responsibility to step up and meet the moment. I will be interested to hear what the Minister says about the new clause. When we talk about intimate photos or films, the question is: to whom is it intimate? The new clause—and we—say that it is intimate to the person who has suffered that photo or filming, and who is being threatened with the sharing of those images. It is intimate to them, rather than to the perpetrator. Nothing could be clearer than that in the horrible case that my hon. Friend raises. We support the new clause, and I hope that the Minister does, too.
Laura Farris
I am very sensitive to the issues that have been raised and will respond to them, but I will also explain why we do not accept the new clause.
We have steered very close to the course recommended by the Law Commission in what we have defined in law as an intimate image. It includes anything that shows a person who is nude or partially nude, or who is doing anything sexual or very intimate, such as using the toilet. It is a wider definition of “intimate” than was used in the revenge porn provisions under the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. We have expanded it, but we have confined it to what we think anyone in this country would understand as “intimate”.
One of the challenges in adopting a definition of “intimate” that includes, for example, the removal of a hijab is that we are creating a criminal offence of that image being shared. It would not be obvious to anyone in this country who received a picture of a woman they did not know with her hair exposed that they were viewing an intimate image and committing a criminal offence. The Law Commission has made very similar points in relation to showing the legs of a woman who is a Hasidic Jew, or showing her without her wig on. This would be grotesquely humiliating for that victim, but that would not be completely obvious to any member of the public who might receive such an image of them.
Jess Phillips
I strongly suggest that the hon. Lady does not come from the same community as me. I described images being sent to the community; the nature of the image would absolutely be clear to lots of people where I live.
Laura Farris
I was going to complete the point. If the hon. Lady will forgive me, I will do so before I give way again. We have to create laws that apply equally to everybody in the United Kingdom. If we are to create an offence of sharing intimate images, we have to have a translation of intimacy that is absolutely irrefutable to anybody sending that image around. Even if they do not know the person in the image, it has to be absolutely clear to the sender that they are sending an intimate image. I have already made the point that it would not be immediately obvious to everyone in the United Kingdom that an image of a woman showing her hair was a humiliating image of her. It would not automatically be an intimate image even if the person sharing it knew that the woman in the image was Muslim, because some Muslim women do not wear headscarves.
The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley described a very dark case. She mentioned the language of blackmail and honour-based violence. She intimated coercive control. My simple point is that in the circumstances she has identified, there are a host of serious criminal offences being committed in conjunction with the use of the intimate image. We would say, very respectfully, that we think that kind of crime belongs much more comprehensively within other offences.
Laura Farris
I am not going to engage in a case-by-case discussion. It is so difficult for me to do that; I do not have the papers in front of me. I understand the issue about community-based events, but if the purpose of sending the image is to blackmail a person, they have already engaged another element of the criminal law, and there is already aggravation, in that the perpetrator is being domestically abusive or is committing an honour-based offence, as the hon. Lady described.
I want to make it clear that by introducing the base offence, this legislation is removing the need to show an intention to cause distress. That is the issue that Georgia Harrison had, but managed to circumvent when she got that very successful and high-profile conviction against Stephen Bear, who went to prison for two years. She had an evidential difficulty in proving intent in her case. Although she did, she then became a really powerful advocate for removing intent from the offence, and we have done so.
I am not for a moment suggesting that there will not be cases of maximum sensitivity in which somebody is humiliated, but as I say, in the case that the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley described, in the background, other offences were materialising. Our view is that it is more appropriate that they are dealt with under other elements of the law, rather than our muddling the police response, or even creating offenders where we do not mean to, because under the hon. Lady’s offence, the offender does not know they are committing an offence. They might think that they are sharing an image of a glamorous woman, not knowing that it is grossly offensive that they have shown a picture of a woman who does not have her hair covered as she normally would, because they do not know her.
I hope that answers the hon. Lady. With great respect, I urge her not to press her new clause. However, I would like to hear from her, because I did not give way to her a moment ago.
The Chair
The rules allow the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, to come back again—and the Minister can, in fact, respond again, if she would like to.
Laura Farris
I have probably gone as far as I can. There are no circumstances in which Georgia Harrison’s case would not be covered by the provision that we are discussing. The other person can be a current partner or an ex, or there can be no relationship. [Interruption.] I know that the hon. Lady is talking about a different category of case. I wonder whether one of the problems in the case that she raises is the adequacy of the police response, rather than whether an offence exists for it. It is difficult, in drafting legislation, to create a category of offender when an image would not be recognised as being intimate by everybody in the United Kingdom. On that basis, with great respect, I am afraid that we would have to reject her new clause.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 2
Offences relating to intimate photographs or films and voyeurism
Alex Norris
I beg to move amendment 56, in schedule 2, page 82, line 4, at end insert—
“66AD Publishing or hosting unlawfully obtained intimate photograph or film
(1) A person (A) commits an offence if A publishes, hosts or makes viewable a photograph or film of another person (B) which has been obtained (1) unlawfully under sections 66A, 66AA, 66AC or 66B, subject to the provisions of sections 66AB and 66C.
(2) For the purposes of this part, “publishing, hosting or making viewable” includes—
(a) physical or online publication, and
(b) uploading to a user-to-user service,
(c) in relation to owners or administrators of a user-to-user service, allowing public access to a photograph or film uploaded by another person, and
(d) maintaining or providing for the presence or availability of a photograph or film by any other means or in any other place, whether or not such service or access is conditional on the payment of a fee.
(3) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.”
This amendment would make it an offence to make publicly available, either through publishing or online hosting, intimate photographs or videos which have been obtained unlawfully.
Jess Phillips
I rise to support both amendments, and, in fact, what the hon. Member for Wyre Forest said as well. No one should have the ability to host an image of a person that they did not want out there in the first place. Unfortunately, what people tend to get back is that it is very difficult to place these things, but all sorts of things around copyright are traced on all sorts of sites quite successfully. We put a man on the moon 20 years before I was born, and brought him back. I reckon we could manage this and I would really support it.
Turning to the point made by the hon. Member for Wyre Forest and the issue of faking intimate images, I am lucky enough to know—I am almost certain that most of the women in this room do not know this about themselves—that deepfake intimate images of me exist. As I say, I am lucky enough to know. I did not ever once consider that I should bother to try to do anything about it, because what is the point? In the plethora of things that I have to deal with, especially as a woman—and certainly as a woman Member of Parliament in the public eye—I just chalk it up to another one of those things and crack on, because there is too much to be getting on with. But on two separate incidents, people have alerted me to images on pornographic websites of both me and my right hon. Friend the Member for Ashton-under-Lyne (Angela Rayner); they have a thing for common women, clearly. There is nothing that even somebody in my position can do about it.
The first time I ever saw intimate images of me made on “rudimentary” Photoshop, as my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham North called it, if I am honest, like with most abuses against women, I just laughed at it. That is the way we as women are trained to deal with the abuses that we suffer. They could only be fake images of me, because, unlike my children, I do not come from an era where everybody sends photos of everybody else naked. As a nation, we have to come to terms with the fact that that is completely and utterly normal sexual behaviour in the younger generation, but in that comes the danger.
The reality is that this is going to get worse. Rudimentary Photoshop images of me were sent to me about five years ago, or even longer—we have been here for ages. Covid has made it seem even longer. The first time I saw fake images of me, in a sexualised and violent form, was probably about eight years ago. Over the years, two, three or four times, people have sent me stuff that they have seen. I cannot stress enough how worrying it is that we could go into a new era of those images being really realistic. On the point made by the hon. Member for Wyre Forest, I have heard, for example, two completely deepfake recordings of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) that were put out and about. To be fair to Members on the Government Benches, they clearly said, “This is fake. Do not believe it; do not spread it.” We must have that attitude.
However, it is one thing to stop something in its tracks if it is the voice of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras saying, in that instance, that he did not like Liverpool, but that is nothing compared with the idea of me being completely naked and beaten by somebody. It is like wildfire, so I strongly encourage the Government to think about the amendments and how we make them law.
Laura Farris
Opposition Members have made two very good points, which I will respond to. The issue of publishing or hosting unlawfully obtained internet photographs is salient. It was probably thrown into its sharpest relief by Nicholas Kristof at The New York Times when he did a big exposé of Pornhub. I have never read off my phone in any parliamentary sitting before, but I will briefly do so, because the opening to his article is one of the best that I have read about Pornhub:
“Pornhub prides itself on being the cheery, winking face of naughty, the website that buys a billboard in Times Square and provides snow plows to clear Boston streets. It donates to organizations fighting for racial equality…Yet there’s another side of the company: Its site is infested with rape videos. It monetizes child rapes, revenge pornography, spy cam videos of women showering”.
The point is very well made.
Under the Online Safety Act 2023, we have ensured that all user-to-user services in scope of the illegal content duties are required to remove that type of illegal content online when it is flagged to them or they become aware of it. That would cover something such as the Pornhub apps I have described. We believe that the robust regulatory regime for internet companies put in place by the Act, with the introduction of the offence of sharing intimate images, which extends to publication, are the most effective way to deal with the problems of the spread of that material.
Our essential answer is that under the Online Safety Act a host site—I have given a big name, because I am critical of that particular site—would be under a legal obligation to remove content flagged to it as featuring prohibited content, so it would have an obligation under the law to remove an intimate image of an individual created without their knowledge or consent or to be subject to criminal sanctions. Under the Online Safety Act, those are substantial; Parliament worked collectively to ensure that meaningful sanctions would be applied in that regard.
There is a concern that creating a new offence would partially overlap with existing criminal offences—for example, that we would basically be duplicating some of the provisions under section 188 of the Online Safety Act. We worry that that would dilute the effectiveness with which such activity will be policed and charged by the Crown Prosecution Service. I understand that the provisions under the Act have not yet been commenced, so we would be legislating on top of legislation that has not been commenced. Respectfully, I invite hon. Members to allow the Act to come into force comprehensively before we make an assessment of whether we need to legislate again on the issue of hosting unlawful content. However, I am sympathetic to it, and I think the whole House agrees with the principle.
Equally, the Law Commission was asked to look at the issue of deepfakes, which it considered and responded to. I will remind the Committee of how it undertook its inquiry into the issue. It undertook a full public consultation on the point and engaged with the CPS and police, and it concluded that making a deepfake offence was not necessary. It identified certain associated risks, including difficulties for law enforcement and, again, the risk of overcriminalisation, which potentially would outweigh the benefits. The Government share the view of the Law Commission and have decided not to create a separate making offence.
I will provide hon. Members with some reassurance: nobody is in any doubt about the risk. The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley described harmful, culpable conduct relating to her personally and to other senior politicians in this House. My hon. Friend the Member for Wyre Forest gave hypotheticals that could easily materialise, and we all know that there is an increased risk of that as we move into an election year on a global scale, because elections are happening all over the world this year. Nobody doubts the risk. I want again to provide the reassurance that such conduct generally involves sharing of these images, or threats to share, both of which are criminalised by offences under the Online Safety Act, or by other offences—communication offences and harassment offences—so it is already captured.
The secondary issue identified by the Law Commission concern the prosecution difficulties, because it would be difficult to prove some elements of the offence, such as an intention to cause distress, in circumstances in which the image had not been shared—by the way, I take out of that a circumstance in which the defendant has told the victim that they hold the image, because that has already crossed the threshold. The question that I asked officials—I have now lost the answer, but they did give it to me. Hang on a minute; someone will know where it is. Will the Committee give me one moment?
Alex Norris
Now I have to work out something to say. There was certainly a degree of bravery in saying to my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley that there is a belief that there is a robust regime in place— I thought I could hear steam coming out of her ears. It is a given that we all share a view, but that does not mean that that is necessarily reflected in output at the moment. [Hon. Members: “Keep going!”] It is very important that what is in the Bill reflects what we are trying to solve, and I am concerned that at the moment it does not, but the Minister clearly takes a different view.
Laura Farris
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his forbearance. Just to pick up on that point, I think he is right to hold the Government’s feet to the fire on the commencement of the Online Safety Act, because it is all very well having these provisions in law, but if they are not actually operational, they are not doing any good to anyone. I accept that tacit criticism as it may be advanced. I recognise that implementation now is critical; commencement is critical.
I will disclose the question that I put to officials. I was interested in the question of what happens if, for example, a schoolboy creates a deepfake of another pupil and does not share it, so that it is not covered by the Online Safety Act but is none the less an offence. I am told that that is covered by two separate bits of legislation. One is section 1 of the Protection of Children Act 1978, which includes making indecent images of a child, including if that is a deepfake, which would be covered by the statutory language. The second provision is section 160 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, which is possession of any indecent image of a child and would include where it had been superimposed.
I am satisfied that the current law, including the Online Safety Act—I have already accepted that there are commencement issues—deals with deepfakes. I am sensitive to the prosecutorial difficulties that I have identified and I think that these are covered, particularly by the Online Safety Act. We accept the Law Commission’s very careful work on the issue, which was a detailed piece of research, not just a short paragraph at the end. On that basis, I very respectfully urge the hon. Member for Nottingham North to withdraw or not press the amendments.
Jess Phillips
On the answer that the Minister got from her officials, there are so many bits of legislation about abuses of children, sexual violence towards children, sexual grooming of children and sexual exploitation of children, and there are none about adults, as though such behaviour is not harmful when someone turns 18. If the same kid in the same class is 17 and makes images of a person who is turning 18, the view is that one day it would be a problem and the next day it would not, as though the abuse of adult women is just fine. The Online Safety Act does not say the word “woman” once, so I will gently push back on the idea that it deals with this. I am going to scour Pornhub now—I will not do it while I am in Parliament in case somebody sees me—to look for these images, and I will rise to the Minister’s challenge. I am going to go to the police once the Online Safety Act is in force and we will see how far I get.
Laura Farris
I thank the hon. Lady for her point. She is making very, very good ones, as she always does. That is a legitimate challenge. I just would also ask her to bear this in mind. She has heard our answer. First, we are accepting the Law Commission’s recommendation for now. Secondly, we think the Online Safety Act covers what she has described in terms of sharing. The third point that I draw her attention to is the pornography review launched today. That is a critical piece of work, and she made the good point that we focus extensively on children. There is a really important element of that.
First, we know that there is a dark web element where a lot of online pornography is focused directly on child pornography. We also know that adult pornography not only contributes to the pubescent nature of abuse that we see in the violence against women, but also violence against women much more widely. I have spoken about this; the hon. Lady has spoken about this—we have been in the Chamber together numerous times talking about it. I hope that that review will get on top of some the issues that she is raising today. I hope she will accept our gentle refusal of her amendment and maybe consider withdrawing it.
Alex Norris
My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley made the point about copyrights, which was absolutely bang on the nose. We should not give any succour to any platform telling us that this is too hard to do. All we need to do is, on Saturday, sit with our phones at about 3.15 pm and wait for someone to score in the premier league. We will be able to see that goal for about 90 seconds—someone will share it because it is watchable in other countries. Within 90 seconds, however, we will no longer be able to watch it and it will say, “This is no longer available due to a breach of copyright”. That is how quick it is—no more than 90 seconds. This absolutely can be done when the stakes are considered high enough.
I am grateful that my hon. Friend was willing to share her personal experience—I did not know whether she would choose to or not. Again, what she has to put up with is extraordinary and would test any human being. I am often amazed by her strength to carry on, but those people do not know the person they are taking on. But that is no excuse and gives no cover. This penalty is being exacted on her for a supposed crime: yes, it is for being a prominent person in politics and yes, it is for holding strong views on the left of politics. But the real crime, at root, is that she is a woman. I do not have a public platform like my hon. Friend’s, I am absolutely delighted to say. If I did, my treatment would be entirely different because I am white and I am a man. This again has to be seen through a gendered lens, and we have a responsibility to protect women in this regard.
I will refer to a couple of points that the Minister made. First, on hosting, we will see about this robust regime. I would be keen to know either today or at another point how soon these provisions are going to be turned on. They need to be turned on and used, otherwise they are of absolutely no use to anyone. We will see. It is reasonable for her to want that regime to have its chance to operate. I accept that and withdraw amendment 56 on that basis. But we will see and we will certainly come back.
Similarly, on deepfaking, I know the Law Commission chose not to go into this space, but its report was not carved on tablets of stone. We are allowed to go further if we think that the case is there. [Interruption.] I do not share—my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley is going to have steam coming out of her ears soon—much of a concern around overcriminalisation in this space. That just does not connect to reality. [Interruption.]
Laura Farris
Main Page: Laura Farris (Conservative - Newbury)Department Debates - View all Laura Farris's debates with the Home Office
Criminal Justice Bill (Eighth sitting)
Laura Farris ExcerptsTuesday 16th January 2024
(2 years, 6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 16 January 2024 - (16 Jan 2024)
Chris Philp
It is not often that someone says that after I have been speaking. I hope I have given a bit of a flavour of how this could help catch serious criminals who might otherwise not be caught. We would debate the specifics when the time came. There would, of course, be a code of practice and everything else to set out those guard rails. I have already indicated in response to, I think, the hon. Member for Bootle, that there is a case for a wider policy statement setting out the strategy in this area, which we can discuss and debate.
I appreciate that we have strayed a little beyond the strict confines of this clause, Ms Bardell, but the Opposition raised some reasonable questions that I really wanted to try hard to answer. I will finish by saying that I spoke to my local police commanders, Superintendent Mitch Carr and Chief Superintendent Andy Brittain, encouraging the deployment of live facial recognition in Croydon. I know 17 people got arrested. We have heard how it was done in Essex: in Southend and in Chelmsford. I encourage members of this Committee to talk to their local police and say, “Try it out in your area,” and see who gets caught. At the moment, South Wales police and the Met have the necessary vans, but they will lend them. I think South Wales police lent the vans to Essex. If anyone wants to suggest it, they could ask their chief constable to borrow the van from South Wales police or the Met, try out in their constituency, and see who gets caught.
Amendment 33 agreed to.
Amendments made: 34, in clause 21, page 18, line 19, leave out “police force listed in subsection (4)” and insert “body”.
This amendment and amendment 35 specify in more detail the relevant chief officers of bodies to which the provisions will apply.
Amendment 35, in clause 21, page 18, line 20, at end insert—
“(aa) in relation to a police force listed in subsection (4)(b) to (d), the chief constable of that police force;
(ab) in relation to a service police force listed in subsection (4)(p) to (r), the Provost Marshal of that service police force;
(ac) in relation to the tri-service serious crime unit, the Provost Marshal for serious crime;
(ad) in relation to the Service Police Complaints Commissioner, the Service Police Complaints Commissioner;”—(Chris Philp.)
See the statement for amendment 34.
Clause 21, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 22
Powers to compel attendance at sentencing hearing
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Laura Farris)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairwomanship, Ms Bardell. I am pleased to be able to speak to the provision contained in clause 22, which has had widespread support from Members across the House. In the past year or two, several high-profile murderers—Thomas Cashman, Jordan McSweeney, and most recently Lucy Letby—have refused to attend their sentencing hearings, causing the victims’ families significant further distress. This can be seen as the final insult, and it is also the coward’s approach, affronting the victims one last time by robbing their families of a chance to look them in the eye as the judge determines their fate. The worst offenders should be required to face the consequence of their actions, and hear society’s condemnation expressed through the sentencing remarks of the judge. Indeed, it is with those words ringing in their ears that they should hear the prison door clang shut.
Clause 22 inserts new sections 41A and 41B into a new chapter 2A within part 3 of the sentencing code. New section 41A creates an express statutory power for a Crown court judge to directly order the most serious offenders to attend their sentencing hearing. It applies to adults and children who are convicted of a sentence for which the maximum potential penalty is life. Any offender falling in that category who refuses to attend without a reasonable excuse commits a contempt of court. In the case of an adult offender they could face a maximum penalty of an additional two years in prison; in the case of a child offender who refuses to attend, the maximum penalty is a £2,500 fine.
New section 41B is intended to enshrine current common law practice in statute, making it absolutely clear that the Crown court has a power in law to direct a prison to produce any adult offender, not just those looking at a potential life sentence, to court for their sentencing hearing. It makes clear that prison officers and prisoner escort officers may use reasonable force to produce an adult offender to court for their sentencing hearing where it is necessary and proportionate. The final decision on reasonable force remains with the prison governor and the escorting staff working under his or her authority. Children will not be subject to reasonable force for that purpose, in line with existing policy. It will remain a matter for judges to decide whether to order an individual to attend court or to require a prison to produce them.
Alberto Costa (South Leicestershire) (Con)
I thank my hon. Friend and the Government for bringing forward this clause, which I wholeheartedly support. It is a way of ensuring that there is an element of responsibility that the public can see in what is, after all, an open court forum.
On the use of reasonable force—if the Minister does not have an answer today, perhaps she can write to me—is there a way of ensuring that there is a mitigation against the possibility of the offenders raising civil proceedings against the state for alleged excessive force? Has any thought been given to that? If not, perhaps the Department could write to the Committee to explain how that would be dealt with. We would not want a situation where the public then say, “How is this individual able to make a claim against the state on the grounds that he or she had to attend court?”
Laura Farris
I thank my hon. Friend for his sensible question; I will write to him. One of the points I have clarified is that prison officers understand the use of reasonable force, because they have to use it at other times, and it is well understood by the police. “Reasonable force” has a meaning in context—it is not just a judgment call to be made on the day. However, that is a good point, and it deserves a response.
Returning to my remarks, in exercising their discretion a judge may decide not to order an individual to attend if they may cause significant disruption in court or further distress to victims, or if there is a significant mental health complaint that may prevent their attendance. Courts will also be required to consult with young offending teams before any decision is made on a child offender. I recognise that the provisions may not guarantee that every offender will end up attending their sentencing hearing.
Peter Dowd
I am unsure whether the Minister has considered the issue in relation to the victims charter. The victim’s family could be in court. Is there the potential, as part of the victims charter, to consult the family—
Peter Dowd
Yes—to consult the victim or the victim’s family on that issue? The victim or their family could be sat there, and the person could be brought in and be challenging, difficult and so on. As part of victims’ rights, would the Minister consider giving consideration to the consultation of the victim or their family in those situations?
Laura Farris
The hon. Gentleman makes a good point. It is generally accepted—this is consistent with the thrust of what we have heard—that it is an affront to the victim’s family when the defendant, who is a ward of the court for the purposes of the criminal proceedings, elects not to attend their sentencing. It has always been presented in one way, but the hon. Gentleman is correct: there is an argument to be made, particularly if the defendant is difficult, disruptive or perhaps politically motivated—[Interruption.] I have been reminded that it is for judges to decide, but the point that the hon. Gentleman makes is that perhaps the victim’s family should be part of that decision-making exercise.
Peter Dowd
Yes, I think it is important that families be consulted throughout the process and beyond it. The judge has discretion, but the victim should have the right to be consulted. What the judge does is a completely different matter, but the families or the victim should be consulted if appropriate.
Laura Farris
Let me revert to the hon. Gentleman in writing on that point. I conceded that there is no guarantee that every single offender will attend their sentencing, but the Bill provides a power for a Crown court judge to order that to happen in certain circumstances. It will also ensure that serious offenders who fail to attend receive punishment. That sends the clear message that offenders are expected to attend their sentencing hearing, and that the wider public have the right to see that justice is done. I commend the clause to the Committee.
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Bardell. I assure the Minister that in the interests of a continuing atmosphere of co-operative working, I, like my hon. Friend the shadow Minister for policing, will be constructive in my comments, to enable the Government to justify their legislation by explaining how it will work. Where we have reservations or see the need to offer new ideas, we will do so to help them get it right. I am sure that they are as keen as we are to improve this Bill and ensure it is fit for purpose. Judging by the huge number of Government amendments, they have already recognised at least some of its weaknesses.
As outlined, the first part of clause 22 enables the Crown court to directly order an individual to attend their sentencing hearing by creating an express statutory power to make an attendance order. According to the Library research document, and as the Minister mentioned, any adult who refuses to attend without reasonable excuse will commit a contempt and therefore faces a maximum penalty of an additional custodial sentence of up to 24 months. Any child who refuses to attend faces a penalty of £2,500, but I wonder how a child will ever be in a position to pay such a penalty, particularly if they are given a custodial sentence.
The second part of the clause creates an express power for judges to require prisons to produce adults to court for sentencing hearings. It also makes it clear that prison officers and prisoner escort officers may use reasonable force to produce an adult to court for their sentencing hearing where that is necessary and proportionate. However, the final decision on whether to use reasonable force remains with the prison and escorting staff. Children will not be subject to use of reasonable force for this purpose, in line with domestic policy, guided by the Taylor review of 2020 and the UK’s commitments under the UN convention on the rights of the child. We can only welcome that.
There are many questions that the Minister needs to answer about how easy it will be to implement this policy. We will not oppose the clause, but would like her to spell out how practical it is, and what alternative provision she has in mind if it is impossible to compel a defendant to attend a sentencing hearing.
There is nothing in the Government’s explanatory notes about the resources needed to deliver the policy, and I hope that the Minister will address that. If it is not resourced, it simply will not happen, so we seek clarity there. Likewise, there is little if anything about how the staff who will be at the sharp end of delivering a defendant to court will be protected.
We would also like to understand what the new law would add to judges’ existing powers to compel people to attend their sentencing hearing. Above all, we would like to explore with the Minister whether this new law could actually work, and whether it is in the best interests of the victims. We do not want them to be further traumatised by the sentencing hearing.
We know why this proposal is being brought forward. The Minister talked about a number of high-profile cases in which the defendants refused to attend their sentencing hearing. There have been many: Zahid Younis, in September 2020, sentenced for the murder of Henriett Szucs and Mihrican Mustafa; Koci Selamaj, in April 2022, for the murder of Sabina Nessa; Jordan McSweeney, in December 2022, for the murder of Zara Aleena;Thomas Cashman, in July 2023, for the murder of Olivia Pratt-Korbel; and of course Lucy Letby, in August 2023, for the murder and attempted murder of 13 infants. In those cases, the families never had the chance to look the killer in the eye, or to spell out the effects of their loss.
Perhaps that is why the witnesses we questioned at the start of this Bill’s progress in Committee were supportive of the new law, though from the quotations I am about to use from their evidence, it is clear that many questions are still to be answered. Baljit Ubhey, director of strategy and policy at the Crown Prosecution Service—apologies if I mispronounce these names—described it as
“an important measure, given some of the high-profile cases we have seen and the impact they have had on victims.”
She went on:
“We will have to look very carefully at how we apply for that power—which allows the court or the prosecutor to apply for compulsory attendance—and seek victims’ views”.
Others have made that point this afternoon. She went on:
“The consideration to think about is whether that would cause extra violence. There is something in the Bill about the use of force, which prison custody officers would need to think about”.
I will address that in detail later. Baljit went on:
“I can see why it is in the Bill, but we will have to wait and see how it operates in practice.”––[Official Report, Criminal Justice Public Bill Committee, 12 December 2023; c. 20, Q46.]
Baroness Newlove, the Victims’ Commissioner for England and Wales, expressed concerns about victims:
“In terms of victims and their families, both personally and professionally assumptions are made about them when people do not even understand the victim’s journey. I get annoyed at that. I think this is a very important point, because victims sit there for weeks…on end, listening to evidence and having no voice at all. Part of the victims code is to have the victim impact statement, and there is the ability to read it out if there is conviction. I think it should be respected that the family have that kind of relationship, because they have listened to that evidence about their loved ones.”
She went on:
“I also think that you do not know how to judge an offender. They could say that they are coming in the dock and then not play ball. I have seen for myself—evidence shows this—that even through the court trial they will turn their backs, goad you and do everything. If it is still to the judge’s discretion and direction, I would like—I have said this previously—for the judge to own the courtroom if the offender does play in the dock and does not respect the perimeters. Victims’ families are told to respect the perimeters of the courtroom, and the judiciary needs to have that respect. If it happens that they do not want to turn up in dock, a deadline should be put on what is going on. If not, put something in their cell if they are in the court building.”––[Official Report, Criminal Justice Public Bill Committee, 12 December 2023; c. 25, Q59.]
I ask the Minister to address Baroness Newlove’s concerns, which many of us in Committee share, and specifically the concern about how a defendant kicking off will be dealt with under this proposed new law.
Dame Vera Baird KC, the former Victims’ Commissioner, questioned the need for the clause at all:
“As I am sure the Ministers know very well, this adds absolutely nothing to the current law. A judge can order somebody to come into court. If they do not, it is a contempt of court.”
When I pointed out to her during the evidence session that the
“clause actually talks about using ‘reasonable force’”,
she responded:
“But you can already use reasonable force. As long as it is proportionate and necessary, the Prison Service is entitled to use reasonable force to fulfil the orders of the judge. If the judge says, ‘You must come’ and you do not come, it is, No. 1, a contempt of court”—
just as in the proposals before us—
“And guess what the maximum sentence is for a contempt of court? It is two years, exactly as it is in the Bill. If a person does not want to come and the officers regard it as necessary and proportionate to use force to bring them, they are entitled to do exactly that to fulfil the judge’s requirements. There is really no change here.
I well understand the sense from a victim that they want this moment—‘Right, he’s going to face what he’s done now and I’m going to get some benefit from that.’ But the reality is that you cannot capture somebody’s mind, can you? There are always risks that people who are dragged into court might be a nuisance.”
Later on, she said:
“I think it was the former Lord Chief Justice John Thomas who suggested that a better way was to make sure that if the person does not come out of the cell, he is in a cell to which the sentencing can be broadcast. He cannot get away and the victims know that he has, as it were, faced his moment.”––[Official Report, Criminal Justice Public Bill Committee, 12 December 2023; c. 59-60, Q156-157.]
I hope that the Minister will take the time to outline just what her proposal adds to the law, and what alternatives there are to forcing an angry, abusive and possibly violent defendant to sit in the dock.
I will now move on to proposed new section 41B(4) of the sentencing code, which refers to using “reasonable force” to ensure that a defendant attends court. We heard evidence from Mark Fairhurst, chairman of the Prison Officers Association, on the issue. Members will recollect that he told the Committee that he saw no problem for his members in delivering their role in the policy. He told us:
“It is quite easy for prison officers to force someone to attend court; we restrain them on to a cellular vehicle and then they are taken to court. The problem arises at the other end because the courts are run by private security firms now. Have they got the staffing levels needed to take someone who has been recalcitrant off a bus and into a cell in the court? Have they got the resources to drag them into the dock if they are still displaying violent tendencies? Will that disrupt proceedings in the court? Will they be abusive to victims? Will it be distressing for the victims of crime to witness that in the dock? There are a lot of issues we need to look at.”––[Official Report, Criminal Justice Public Bill Committee, 14 December 2023; c. 96, Q39.]
I have made some inquiries about how reasonable force is currently used by prison officers to deliver a defendant into the hands of the security company or court that receives them. It came as a surprise to learn that it involves three prison officers in full riot gear—including overalls, gloves, steel-toed boots, helmets and shields—approaching the prisoner, securing them and getting them into the transport vehicle. Their job is then complete, and responsibility passes to the private security firm staff to deliver the defendant to the court. Unlike the prison officers, neither private security staff nor receiving court staff are equipped with either the personal protective equipment or the training to transfer the defendant first into the court cell and then to the dock.
That level of restraint of a defendant, and risk to employees of the court or agency staff, may be required only occasionally, but what training and equipment will agency and court staff be provided with to ensure that they are as protected as our prison officers? Training is a real issue, and I would be obliged if the Minister would outline what training staff will receive to ensure their and the defendant’s safety. What financial provision has been or will be made to provide such support for staff? The Minister will be the first to recognise our duty of care to these people. If she wants the measure to succeed, she must outline to the Committee exactly how it can be implemented safely. What risk assessment of the whole policy has been conducted? Perhaps more relevantly, what risk assessments will be conducted each time the measure is applied?
I mentioned the case of Lucy Letby. She refused to attend her sentencing hearing and refused to attend via video link. She remained in the cells below Manchester Crown court as bereaved family members delivered victim personal statements, and the judge passed a whole life order in her absence. Like Letby, Thomas Cashman travelled to Manchester Crown court but declined to leave his cell for his sentencing hearing, claiming that he had been provoked by court officials.
Assuming that the Minister’s intention is that defendants such as Letby and Cashman would be forced into court, can she advise how that will be done, and whether she believes such an action is in the best interests of the victims? Perhaps she believes that sanctions can be placed on such people. However, in Letby’s case, the threat of a lengthier sentence would be entirely pointless, because the sentence of life without parole is the most severe penalty the law of England and Wales allows. What sanction can be placed on an offender who knows that the judge will pass a whole life order? Will they be refused visiting rights, or other rights enjoyed by prisoners? What are the Minister’s thoughts on Baroness Newlove’s view that, if defendants object to leaving their cell, a live link should be set up inside? That is also the view of the former Lord Chief Justice, as we heard. It is hard to see how that will be achieved when our justice system’s funding is already stretched to the limit. Perhaps the Minister can also address that.
The charity Justice is also cautious about the introduction of new powers to compel defendants’ attendance at sentencing heroes—hearings. Not heroes; there are no heroes in this business. The charity said that the new powers are unlikely to address the issue in a positive manner:
“A statutory power to require individuals facing a life sentence to attend sentencing hearings is at best unnecessary and at worst, when backed by force, dangerous.”
The briefing from Justice aligns with others in saying that this policy puts staff at risk. It goes on to say that it is questionable whether the discretion to use force in proposed new clause 41B(4) is real, or merely apparent in view of subsection (6). That subsection provides that a
“person is to be treated as having complied with an order under subsection (2) if they have done all that they reasonably can to secure that the offender is produced before the court for the sentencing hearing.”
Given that subsection (4) provides the authority to use reasonable force, failure to use such force when it is available arguably places those responsible for securing production at risk of being held in contempt themselves for failing to comply with a court order. Prison governors and custody officers are accordingly placed in an invidious position.
Laura Farris
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his remarks. I would like to clarify immediately that attendance by video link is attendance. If the judge deems that the person would be disruptive in the courtroom, they will still be deemed to have attended if there is a live video link to the cell.
I think the hon. Gentleman asked about methods of restraint, and I will deal with that through two points. It is, of course, within the power of the Prison Service to have the person restrained in the cell, so that they are compelled to listen to the judge’s sentencing remarks. Prison officers are familiar with exercising restraint, and with moving disruptive or reluctant prisoners around the estate, and out of the estate into court.
The hon. Gentleman asked whether court security staff would have sufficient training and would be able to carry out their role. That is a fair point, but they are protected at work under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 and the Manual Handling Operations Regulations 1992, which would cover something like this. It would be for the employer to ensure that staff are reasonably safe in carrying out roles. I would anticipate that a judge could take this issue into consideration in making their order in the first place. I remind him that there is more than one way that a person can be compelled to attend their sentencing hearing.
Alex Cunningham
I gave the example of prison officers in full riot gear, and with shields, restraining a prisoner. Is the Minister really saying that the employer will be responsible for providing similar equipment to court staff, to ensure that they carry out this policy?
Laura Farris
Just to be clear, that is not the statutory duty that would apply. If somebody was deemed to be that level of violent, threatening or difficult, one might assume that the judge consider that very carefully and exercise their discretion. I have said that there is more than one way that attendance is deemed to have taken place, and it does not involve being dragged kicking and screaming into the courtroom. I hope that answers some of the questions. The duty on the employer is to create a reasonably safe place of work, obviously within the parameters that some court staff are engaged in a security capacity and therefore a more robust form of engagement might be reasonably anticipated. I will leave that there.
The hon. Gentleman made a good point about the sanction. If somebody faces a whole-life tariff, why does adding a couple of years matter? It is true that with a whole-life tariff, a person probably has the greatest difficulty with an increased sentence, but I remind the hon. Gentleman very gently of Jordan McSweeney, who used that argument when he said he would not attend. This was reported. He said he did not want to go to court and did not care because he was going to get a long sentence anyway. He got 37 years. But shortly afterwards he was in the Court of Appeal, appealing against his sentence. He was successful and got it reduced by four years. So he did care about the length of his sentence. I think that rather negates that point, if I may say so.
A point was made by the former Victims’ Commissioner, Vera Baird, that I want to take forward. I tried to make this point in my speech, but perhaps I was not clear enough. We accept that the judge now has discretion to make such an order, but we have found that it is not evenly or always applied. It depends who the judge is and where they are sitting. By putting the measure in the Bill, we are creating a power in statute for a judge to make an order to compel a person to attend their sentencing for any serious offence where the maximum is a life sentence, as I have said. That is a change. In proposed new section 41B, the judges can direct a prison to produce any adult offender irrespective of the offence.
Alex Cunningham
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way, but I do not accept her explanation of how this adds to the law. Perhaps she would like to take it away and come back to the Committee to spell out exactly how it does. Her explanation, I am afraid, did not cut it.
Laura Farris
Let me give the hon. Gentleman a practical illustration. Lucy Letby was not compelled to attend her sentencing hearing. She was a young woman in her early 30s and not obviously a massive danger to the victims’ families or somebody who was going to be disruptive, yet the judge did not compel her attendance. We think that the provisions in the Bill alter that and make it far more likely that somebody would be required to attend their hearing.
Jess Phillips
With regard to that particular case, the Minister is absolutely right. It would seem that somebody could use reasonable force to get Lucy Letby there. The fact that she is a woman and the vast majority of the security staff in the court would be men would, I imagine, make them pause with concern as employers. My hon. Friend the Member for Swansea East just pointed out to me that these court security officers earn around £18,000 a year. If this piece of law is saying that it is still up to the judge, where is the compulsion? Currently, it is up to the judge. In Lucy Letby’s case, it was up to the judge. The measure still says that it is up to the judge. So why does it make a difference?
Laura Farris
The difference it makes is that now we will not necessarily even see a judge consider exercising that discretion. By putting it into primary legislation—I appreciate the word “may” is used, and I am not going to pretend otherwise—you are essentially saying to the judge, “The time has come for you to exercise your discretion. Considering this defendant, in these circumstances in this case, are you going to compel attendance in the circumstances that are set out in the Bill?” There are other examples of where we put things on the statute book that existed somewhat loosely as a practice or in common law and were not been evenly applied, and it has ended up with a much more linear application of something that we think is socially desirable. That is the effect.
I want to make one other point. The hon. Member for Stockton North made some good points about people in riot gear, but I think one of the things he would perhaps gently concede, looking back particularly over the last two to three years of some of the most high-profile cases, is that it has developed into something of a trend. In some high-profile cases, people are aware that they have got away with not going. People say to their lawyer, “Do I have to go?” and the answer is no. The clause changes that. Actually, if you get back into a pattern where the defendant is in the dock for sentencing, you will see much less resistance. I am afraid to say that there has been a bit of contagion around this particularly pernicious conduct, and the clause is aiming to right that wrong. By embedding a practice where effectively they do have to go, or at least they will be video linked up, there will be no way in which the court will not be able to see their face as the remarks are read out to them. In some way or another, I hope that alters this ugly pattern of behaviour.
Carolyn Harris
I totally agree that somebody should be held accountable and should appear in court. We have already established that prison officers will load the prisoner on to a van. Those prison officers, for no other reason, are on approximately £30,000 a year. They will have had appropriate Home Office training to do that job. However, at the other end, you are asking security officers, who may only have a Security Industry Authority licence and are on approximately £19,000 to £20,000 a year, to do the job that you have asked the prison officers to do. Why would they want to put their life on the line in dealing with these potentially dangerous people for that kind of money, without the appropriate training to allow them to do the job?
Laura Farris
I think that warrants a further answer to Committee members. I think that the measure is feasible and could be considered by the judge. On most occasions, you will not be dealing with a necessity for three people in riot gear, but I accept that that might occur. You are entitled to an answer as to what it would look like at the court stage of the proceedings if the judge had decided that somebody who was deemed to be that dangerous on the way in was going to be transported to court. I accept that, so we will get back to you.
The Chair
Order. Before the hon. Member for Stockton North intervenes, I have been very flexible, but I remind Members to adhere to the regular rules of the House and speak through the Chair rather than referring to each other as “you”. I know that it is difficult because you are all sitting opposite each other, but it would be helpful, particularly for Hansard colleagues.
Alex Cunningham
The Minister’s point about the trend in high-profile criminals opting not to face the music in court was well made. That is why we certainly will not oppose, and in fact support, this provision. However, it is fair for us to ask and understand exactly how these things will happen. The Minister suggests that the provision is different from the existing powers. Does that mean that perhaps through the judiciary, the judges will be given some form of direction in relation to this piece of legislation that will say to them that if a defendant refuses to appear, they must consider whether they are going to compel them to do so? Or will we be in the same place as we are now, where it is just up to the judge whether it suits him or not?
Laura Farris
The statutory intention is that judges will exercise this power. It is plainly recognised and has been well publicised that there is public opprobrium towards the idea that the defendant, particularly in very serious cases, somehow has any kind of control at the end of the process. To be completely honest, the video link would not have been a viable option for a judge until very recently—probably in the life of this Parliament since the general election—but now that that exists, we would reasonably expect judges to make that order as a minimum quite frequently.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 22 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 23
Child sex offences: grooming aggravating factor
Amendment made: 36, in clause 23, page 22, line 11, at end insert—
“(2) In section 238 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (deciding the seriousness of an offence), after subsection (7) insert—
‘(8) In section 70A of the Sentencing Code (sexual grooming of child as aggravating factor)—
(a) the references in that section to a court are to be read as including a court dealing with an offender for a service offence, and
(b) the reference in subsection (1) to a specified child sex offence is to be read as a reference to an offence under section 42 as respects which the corresponding offence under the law of England and Wales is a specified child sex offence.’”—(Laura Farris.)
This amendment modifies section 70A of the Sentencing Code (inserted by clause 23), as it applies under the Armed Forces Act 2006.
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 25—Grooming as an aggravating factor—
“After section 72 of the Sentencing Code (supply of psychoactive substance in certain circumstances) insert—
‘(72A) Grooming
(1) This section applies where a court is considering the seriousness of an offence which is aggravated by grooming.
(2) The court—
(a) must treat the fact that the offence is aggravated by grooming as an aggravating factor, and
(b) must state in open court that the offence is so aggravated.’”
This new clause ensures grooming is to be seen as an aggravating factor in certain cases where the victim is an adult.
Laura Farris
I am pleased to be able to speak to clause 23. We are all familiar with the range of high-profile cases involving so-called grooming—
The Chair
Order. I do not want to single anybody out, but I just want to remind Members of the importance of our proceedings and the seriousness of what is being discussed. There has been some activity going on on the Back Benches in some areas that is interrupting me and my flow, and disrupting my attention. I ask Members to be as still as they can during proceedings and to pay attention—not just for the business of this Committee but for those who are watching, for whom this is a very serious matter.
Laura Farris
I thank the Chair, and remember her direction to direct my own remarks towards her, which I will try to do on this occasion.
I am pleased to speak to the provisions contained in clause 23. In recent years, there have been a number of high-profile cases involving so-called grooming gangs—groups of offenders involved in child sexual exploitation—in Rochdale, Rotherham, Telford, Newcastle, Oxford and Reading, and those are just the ones we know about. The discovery of the network of those grooming gangs was a significant factor in this Government’s setting up the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse, chaired by Professor Jay, who did the initial report into Rotherham. The Government believe that grooming gang members should face sentences that reflect the seriousness of their offending, which is why, last April, the Prime Minister made a commitment to introduce a new statutory aggravating factor to target grooming behaviour.
This new measure, introduced by clause 23, creates a statutory obligation to consider grooming an aggravating factor when sentencing specified child sex offences, including rape and sexual assault. In plain English, that means they will get a longer sentence. It will capture offenders whose offending is facilitated by, or involves, the grooming of a person under 18. The grooming itself need not be sexual.
It is already the case that both grooming behaviour against the victim and acting together with others to commit an offence are high-culpability sentencing guidelines for a number of sexual offences. However, this measure goes further by creating an obligation to aggravate the sentence in instances where the offence has been facilitated by grooming undertaken by a defendant who is a participant in a grooming gang, even if they did not personally groom the victim. That means the aggravating factor will, for the first time, capture models of exploitation not currently directly addressed elsewhere: for example, where an offender assaults a victim who has been previously groomed by another member of the same grooming gang.
The measure requires the courts to consider grooming an aggravating factor when sentencing in relation to any of the listed child sex offences. It will remain within the court’s discretion to consider grooming an aggravating factor irrespective of the offence being sentenced where it is deemed to be relevant to the offending.
Jess Phillips
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship once again, Ms Bardell. I am pleased that the Minister leaned on it being a year on from the child abuse inquiry—not one of whose recommendations, I think it is fair to say, has yet come to fruition. Well, hope springs eternal for this year! There are plenty of recommendations for the Government to crack on with in this regard, and I look forward to seeing some sort of timeline from the Home Office of any progress in that particular area.
New clause 25, which I tabled, seeks to try to include adult grooming victims on the same footing as children. The grooming of adults is widely and wildly misunderstood, despite there being considerable overlaps of perpetrators and, in fact, perpetrator behaviours and tactics of those seen in cases of child sexual grooming.
At the moment, sexual grooming is a crime only when the victim is a child, but grooming can and does happen to adults as well. It is a technique used by perpetrators to ensure compliance on the part of the victim and to avoid detection, as the victim’s actions are more likely to appear consensual when they are being groomed. Grooming is a deliberate process of limiting the freedoms of a person by gaining control over them and creating a dependency.
New clause 25 would make an aggravating factor of grooming in certain adult cases, including around domestic and sexual abuse. That would both challenge the misconception that adults cannot be groomed and send a message to perpetrators of domestic and sexual abuse that the grooming of adults is being taken seriously and will not be tolerated.
The 2018 Spicer report acknowledged for the first time that not only children but women over 18 are being groomed and sexually exploited. Since 2019, STAGE, the partnership against adult sexual exploitation—I make a declaration that I am the chair—has supported over 700 adult women who have experienced grooming just in the north-east and Yorkshire. The issue is widespread and prevalent in every part of the UK, but is under-represented in UK legislation.
STAGE’s work has confirmed that grooming is a common technique used to manipulate people for sexual exploitation. It has a negative impact on people’s ability to consent and to make capacitated decisions. However, for adults who have experienced grooming, this is often reduced to making “poor life choices”, because of the belief that grooming can only happen to children.
Everything that we heard yesterday about what was said to the girls in Rochdale is being said today to somebody over the age of 18, or even to somebody of the age of 18. Adult victims of grooming are repeatedly asked victim-blaming questions such as “Why did you get back in the car?”, “Why did you stay with them?” and “Why didn’t you leave?” by professionals and services that are meant to be protecting them. This ignores the immense impact of grooming. Because of this, many victims and survivors feel unable to leave their perpetrator, or may not even recognise the abuse that they are experiencing. Until the grooming of adults is recognised in legislation, it will continue to be misunderstood by law enforcement and the criminal justice system, and victims will not be adequately protected. That is why I have tabled new clause 25.
Yesterday, in the light of the Rochdale report, I thought of a woman I had supported. I wanted to make sure, because of the media, that she was okay, because when these sorts of things happen it is pretty traumatic for women who have been exploited in childhood and adulthood. She is 27 years old, so the legislation we are debating would not include her. I needed to search through my email to find her phone number. I found among my emails a letter that I had forgotten, which she had written to the now ex-Home Secretary, the right hon. and learned Member for Fareham (Suella Braverman). I will read it now:
“Following on from your statement on the 2nd of April 2023, I am writing this letter as a victim who has been let down by countless professionals and services, but worryingly the Home Office itself.
I will begin by providing a summary of my experiences. I was groomed at the age of 13 and this then led on to me experiencing sexual and criminal exploitation for over a decade, whereby I was trafficked all-round the country and sold from one gang to another. There were countless times where I was gang-raped, injected with heroin and left black and blue. I was exposed to serious and organised crime and my perpetrators would laugh at how they continued getting away with what they were doing to me and so many other girls. I did not see any of my family for years and my childhood and early adulthood was stolen away from me.
Whilst I acknowledge your statement that you vow to stamp out child grooming gangs, that is a very easy statement to make. Victims of this crime all around the country have heard it all before. Although you’ve announced new measures to tackle the issue, it makes me question how is this achievable when there are so many flaws in the systems already in place, such as The National Referral Mechanism (NRM).
The police did not refer me into the NRM, despite them full well knowing I had been trafficked. I have spoken with several police officers over the years who do not know what the NRM is, let alone know that they are first responders. It took 562 days for me to get my conclusive grounds decision and for most of that time I continued to be exploited. Nearly a year ago, I was sitting in a hotel paid for by the police, after I’d been physically and sexually assaulted. My accommodation was not safe, and I had requested a safe house. After a lot of back and forth, I was eventually told by…the Home Office’s contractor for NRM services, that a safe house was not an option as I was a British national and that there were no other appropriate housing options. I had to return to unsafe accommodation to then be raped and physically assaulted again.
As you have overseen a system that has routinely let vulnerable people down, I would like to know what action has or is going to be taken to improve this?
I spent days and days in police interviews going into as much detail as I possibly could, with the hope that I would get justice and the men who had tortured me would end up behind bars. The reality is so many victims like me must drop out of investigations because we are not safeguarded, resulting in thousands of perpetrators on the streets continuing to exploit and intimidate vulnerable children and adults. If possible, imagine you are at a police station as a victim of this crime and a stream of text messages come through your phone from your perpetrators saying that they know where you are and that if you do not leave, they will kill you and your family. That is just one example of a threat I have received.
This is not going to stop until appropriate measures are put in place to protect us. In the meantime, the trauma victims experience at the hands of their exploiters is exacerbated when we are routinely let down by the so-called systems in place to protect us. I haven’t even covered in this letter, the battles we face accessing support for our mental health and the legal challenges.
I do hope that you read this letter and that it provides you with an opportunity to reflect on an example of someone who has experienced failures from the Home Office.”
I just ask that we do not fail her again and that we recognise the abuses that she suffered. For women who have been sexually exploited in adulthood—by the way, the sexual exploitation of adults is not defined in law; it has no legislation around it, but believe you me, there are some new clauses coming down the line later—I ask that we recognise that the people who groom children go on to groom the same women as they turn into adults, when they do not have the same protections. I completely agree with everything that the Minister has said; I just want it for her as well. That is all that new clause 25 seeks.
Laura Farris
Let me start with the shadow Minister’s comments. He asked about the definition of grooming, the nature of the prosecution and the scope of a grooming gang. There is no definition of grooming because of the broad range of behaviour that it can encompass. Identifying a grooming gang is a task for the police working in conjunction with the CPS. One force told me recently about a grooming gang prosecution in which they had to identify the number of defendants. They were talking about tens of defendants and tens of victims, and some of the defendants in the grooming gang had never met each other and had no idea who the other people were. It was quite a difficult exercise for the CPS to judge how best to get a prosecution and a conviction. In that case, they succeeded, but that is why the definition is not set out in law. It is dealt with on a case-by-case basis.
The shadow Minister challenges me to explain what this provision adds, when grooming is already an aggravating factor and is often considered in child sex offences and taken seriously. I hope I have explained, but I will clarify again if he did not understand. We are simply adding that a member of a grooming gang, as defined within the parameters of that case, can be subject to the aggravation provision at sentencing, irrespective of the fact that they did not directly groom the victim of that child sexual offence. They could be a tangential member of the gang—perhaps one of the people who has never met one of the other defendants, such as in the case I just outlined—yet they could still be subject to the aggravation.
The shadow Minister asked about cost. That is a fair question, and I will have to come back to him in writing on that. We will add it to the list.
Jess Phillips
I feel I know what grooming is, but, on the Minister’s earlier point about the Court of Appeal reducing the sentence, without a proper definition of grooming or at least a working definition in secondary legislation or regulation, are we not at risk of appeal? I do not know whether she or any of us has sat through a lot of court cases like this, but the idea that there is heavy knowledge in police forces, the CPS and the judges of our country about exactly what grooming or coercive control are, I have to say, is for the birds. I am a bit worried about the risk of appeal on a loosey-goosey case that could be grooming. Why would someone not just take it to appeal immediately, if their sentence was aggravated?
Laura Farris
I will come back to that. For the purposes of this afternoon’s Public Bill Committee, the issue is not whether the courts have an adequate understanding of grooming.
I will give my experience. I was appointed as counsel to the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse. I worked on that inquiry from 2016 to 2017, and it is on my Register of Members’ Financial Interests. I was also instructed by a Telford victim in a public law challenge—not a criminal law challenge in the High Court—against the local authority in relation to its breaches of various duties to her. So I have direct familiarity with cases of this nature.
There are many, many issues with this kind of offence. I think that the courts understand child sexual exploitation and grooming gangs and that it is left deliberately loose in law so that a range of behaviours can be encompassed. The one that the public are most familiar with is sexual exploitation, but there are other forms of grooming that go much wider and where there is no sexual element. It is right that that flexibility exists so that somebody is not outside the possibility of being a victim of a grooming offence.
Peter Dowd
This is an incredibly complex, difficult, challenging and sensitive subject. A question arises, though, and I will put it to the Minister. There are many definitions of grooming. There are international definitions —legal definitions in other countries—of what grooming is. So while I accept the point the Minister makes about trying to keep it flexible, we have the capacity to easily —if not easily, then as clearly as we can—determine what exploitation or grooming actually is. The work has been done and we have to build upon it. Does the Minister not agree that it is not beyond the wit of this Parliament to try to determine or define what we consider grooming to be? I say that with all of the sensitivity that I can bring.
Laura Farris
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention and I promise that I will give some thought to that, but I just wanted to come back to the new clause tabled by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley. This is not about creating a new offence. The treatment that the victim the hon. Lady described was subjected to is already covered by criminal law. This amendment is simply about an aggravating element going into statute in relation to grooming.
As the hon. Lady is well aware, the difference is that we are confining our amendment to the grooming of children for sexual purposes. That is our amendment. We have focused our amendment on that because child sexual exploitation by grooming gangs has been so problematic and so serious.
I will go back to some of the examples that the hon. Lady gave, although it is very difficult to respond to an individual’s case in the context of a Public Bill Committee, because I do not know all the details. I think that the hon. Lady said that the person was 27 and had been groomed since the age of 13. The vast part of what she suffered in the early days would be captured by this provision, because she was a child. I appreciate what the hon. Lady said about the continuing grooming—I think she said that that person is still being groomed today.
Laura Farris
But, in a case of this nature, the judge would still have the discretion to consider that treatment as an aggravating circumstance, so there is nothing precluding a judge—they would have to get to the end of the trial, get the conviction and get the offence—from treating it as aggravating. I have not been given an example, in the context of this particular clause, of somebody going to court about a case of this nature, getting the conviction and then getting a sentence that was not sufficiently serious.
Laura Farris
Well, grooming cases are brought to court, and convictions come from those cases.
One thing that I would gently say, since the example of Rochdale has come up a lot, is that the report that was published yesterday relates to the period between 2004 and 2013. When we worked on IICSA, Rochdale and Rotherham directly informed why IICSA was set up and why Alexis Jay was appointed chair of that inquiry. IICSA was informed by all the cases we were looking at, whether it was Dolphin Square, residential schools, the Catholic Church or the Australian migrant scheme. Even though Andy Burnham commissioned that review, it related to a time period that goes quite a long way back, starting from 20 years ago, rather than what is happening in your—[Interruption.]
Laura Farris
What came out of yesterday's report was shocking, but it was also known. As I said, it informed IICSA. We looked at Rotherham extensively throughout. I did not read the report and say, “I’ve never heard any of this before.” I knew about it, and I had spent time on stuff like this. I am simply saying about the case that the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley described—a horrific case—is that the clause would, first, cover a perpetrator being brought to justice who had abused her as a child. Secondly, if her case got to court and she got a conviction on the multiple offences that she seems to be describing, there is nothing to stop the judge from treating it as aggravating and enhancing the sentence.
Jess Phillips
If there is nothing to stop a judge in a case where an adult has been sexually exploited as an adult because of multiple perpetrators over many years—different faces changing, some just in adulthood, some from childhood, but basically a pattern is set when someone abuses a child and that carries on for a lot of their life—is the Minister saying that as we can already aggravate on the basis of grooming an adult, what do we need this piece of legislation for children? Also, to push back heavily, I cited in my speech the 700 cases of adult sexual exploitation found in Yorkshire and Newcastle alone, so if her idea is that adult sexual exploitation is not a big issue in our country, on the same scale if not greater than child exploitation, I suggest that she has not been out to the country.
Laura Farris
I will keep my remarks concise. Let us look at adult sexual exploitation—I accept, by the way, the breadth of the problem without reservation. First, the adult, simply by virtue of being an adult, has more ability to vocalise their experience than a child does. Secondly, there are more forms of exploitation—for example, forced labour or human trafficking, both of which overlapped with what the hon. Lady described. The case of children who are victims of grooming gangs is specific, and it is also a direct thing that we dealt with. The clause is directed just at children.
Peter Dowd
I hear the point that the Minister makes about the ability to vocalise. I gently challenge her on that one, however, because people who have been abused and exploited for many years, from childhood through, also find it incredibly difficult to vocalise. There is no question about that whatever. That is not to dismiss anything she says, but it is to recognise that vocalisation does not start at 18, 20 or 21; it might never, ever appear, given the nature of the exploitation and abuse that has happened to that particular person. I ask her just to think on that particular issue, not necessarily to respond now, but to put it into the mix.
Laura Farris
I have to take this back to what it is. It is not about creating an offence. It is not about saying, “If you sexually exploit a child, you’ve committed a criminal offence, but if you sexually exploit an adult woman, you haven’t.” That is not what this is about, and I do not want to get lost in that. The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley described a series of offences that, if they achieved convictions, would be category A offences. They are unbelievably serious offences. We are not denying that.
The clause, however, is directed at grooming gangs as they relate to children. The purpose of the clause is to capture the wider membership of the grooming gangs so that even if people did not directly groom the victim, they are on the hook for the same aggravation. It is to bring in the entirety of the grooming gang. As I said, that is usually defined by the CPS in terms of how it will choose to prosecute a case. That can be very wide indeed. It can bring hundreds to court, or certainly tens, but that is a decision for the CPS. The clause potentially brings all gang members within the scope of the aggravation, simply because they have been identified as part of the gang, if one of those victims has been groomed. That is the purpose of the clause.
Jess Phillips
I did not for one second think that I was asking for a new offence. If I had been, I would have tried to write it into the clause. The Minister is suggesting that there are not wide-scale gangs grooming adults in our country that need targeting. It is exactly the same. There are grooming gangs. Perhaps we could all spend a bit of time at the National Crime Agency or watch any drama about organised crime, which always includes drugs, sexual exploitation and prostitution. There are grooming gangs grooming adults, both men and women. Especially when we are talking about men, it is very silenced. There is a trade in drug addict, down-and-out men in our country that would make people’s toes curl. I have rarely met a young heroin addict who was not traded for sex by powerful men.
I cannot believe the categorisation of it. I do not believe it, because I know the Minister well. For children it is, “grooming matters more”. For adults, we might as well say, from what I have heard today, “Why did you get back in the car?” I have to say, it is not characteristic and not what I was expecting. I find it very disappointing. There is no crime of adult sexual exploitation. It does not exist. It is as if we just do not care that adults get sexually exploited. It is as if we tolerate it in society.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 27—Aggravating factor relevant to offence of murder: honour-based violence and abuse—
“(1) Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Code (determination of minimum term in relation to mandatory life sentence for murder etc) is amended as follows.
(2) After paragraph 9(g) insert—
‘(h) the fact that the offender inflicted honour-based violence or abuse on the victim.’”
A new clause to instate honour-based abuse as an aggravating factor in murder cases.
New clause 28—Aggravating factor relevant to offence of murder: strangulation—
“(1) Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Code (determination of minimum term in relation to mandatory life sentence for murder etc) is amended as follows.
(2) After paragraph 9(g) insert—
‘(h) the fact that the offender strangled the victim as part of the homicide.’”
A new clause to instate strangulation as an aggravating factor in murder cases.
New clause 29—Infidelity of victim not to be used as part of a defence to murder—
“When considering a charge of murder, the court may not take into account as part of the defendant’s defence an allegation that the victim was at any time or in any way, physical or verbal, sexually unfaithful to the defendant.”
This new clause would ensure sexual infidelity can never be used as a defence to murder.
Laura Farris
Clause 24 sets out the new statutory aggravating factor for murders that are connected with the end of a relationship. This provision is one of four that the Government are taking forward in response to the independent review of sentencing in cases of domestic homicide that was undertaken by Clare Wade KC. Together they will ensure that the seriousness of murder committed in a domestic context is reflected in our sentencing framework. Around a quarter of all homicides in England and Wales are classed as domestic. In other words, the perpetrator is a partner or former partner of the victim.[Official Report, 1 March 2024, Vol. 746, c. 6MC.] (Correction) The vast majority of these homicides are committed by men against women and usually follow a pattern of years of abuse prior to the homicide.
The legal framework for murder sentencing is contained in schedule 21 to the Sentencing Act 2020, a piece of legislation that was first introduced in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, 20 years ago. While every case of murder carries a mandatory life sentence, this framework sets out the principles to guide the court in determining the minimum custodial term. It is a non-exhaustive list. It is always open to judges to consider aggravating and mitigating factors not contained in schedule 21.
Until now, schedule 21 has contained no express recognition of the seriousness of domestic murders, but over the past 20 years—I would argue particularly in the past five—our understanding of offending committed in a domestic context has improved. As Clare Wade highlighted in her review, our sentencing framework needs to be updated to reflect that. On the overall measures, last year, a statutory instrument was laid before Parliament to introduce both a statutory aggravating factor and a statutory mitigating factor for murder in relation to controlling or coercive behaviour, in line with the recommendations. Where an abusive partner has killed their victim, in recognition of the seriousness of the preceding abuse of coercive control and the experience of the victim before death, the coercive control will constitute an aggravating factor for the purposes of sentencing.
A new mitigating factor will apply in cases where the victim of an abusive partner or family member has killed their abuser, in recognition of their experience as a victim of abuse preceding the killing, which is exactly what happened in the Sally Challen case. This is consistent with the conclusion of the Court of Appeal—it is essentially taking the court’s conclusion and making it a statutory mitigating factor.[Official Report, 1 March 2024, Vol. 746, c. 7MC.] (Correction)
We have also introduced new statutory aggravating factor for murders involving gratuitous and excessive force, sometimes referred to as overkill. That is something that Clare Wade found to be strikingly prevalent in not only domestic murders,[Official Report, 1 March 2024, Vol. 746, c. 7MC.] (Correction) but all the cases she assessed. The perpetrator in cases of overkill—to use that shorthand—was male in all but one case.
Clause 24 introduces the fourth legislative measure that the Government committed to take forward in response to Clare Wade’s recommendations. This provision will make murders connected to the end of a relationship, or the victim’s stated intention to end a relationship, a statutory aggravating factor. In 40% of the murder cases analysed by Clare Wade as part of her review, the murder occurred at the end, or perceived end—an important qualification—of the relationship. The perpetrator was male in all those cases, and, in over two thirds of them, a history of coercive or controlling behaviour was also identified.
Killing in those circumstances is often the final controlling act of an abusive partner. As Clare Wade put it in her report, when the perpetrator learns he no longer has control over his partner because she is going to leave, the final act is homicide—the last way he can control her. The old shorthand used in court is: “If I can’t have you, no one will.” It is striking how often it twins with overkill—the use of gratuitous and excessive violence—at that moment. They often occur at the same time.
While it is for the judge to determine the appropriate weight given to the aggravating factors in each case, we expect that this change, along with the other statutory aggravating factors we have introduced in response to Clare Wade’s recommendations, will have a significant impact on the minimum custodial terms. It will also get the court to consider the nature and context of domestic homicides specifically, which has never happened before. These changes mark a step change in the way our sentencing framework responds to and understands cases of domestic murder. For the first time, the nature of these murders and the unique harms underpinning them will be recognised expressly in our sentencing framework. The perpetrators must serve sentences that truly reflect the severity of their crimes.
Jess Phillips
I will speak to new clauses 27 to 29. I do not disagree on the issue. I worked very closely with the families to get Clare Wade’s review up and running under the then Lord Chancellor, the right hon. and learned Member for South Swindon (Sir Robert Buckland)—who I believe was just speaking in the Chamber, making a nuisance of himself today as well. While we are making these changes, I think that Clare Wade has herself said, as have many of the families involved, that making these limited and piecemeal changes is not good enough. I will place some of my own thoughts on record for the sake of showing the many ways in which the aggravating factors for cases of domestic homicide need to be updated.
Alex Cunningham
Follow that!
Clause 24 would insert a new aggravating factor into paragraph 9 of schedule 21 to the sentencing code, to be considered when determining the minimum term for a life sentence imposed for murder. It would apply where the offence was connected with the end of the offender’s intimate personal relationship with the victim; the victim intending to bring about the end of that intimate personal relationship; or a belief by the offender that the intimate personal relationship had ended or that the victim intended to bring about the end of the personal relationship. The new statutory aggravating factor would apply to offences committed on or after the date the relevant provision comes into force.
We do not oppose the clause, but I hope that the Minister will clearly define what is meant by “intimate personal relationship”. We will discuss clause 30 later, but it refers to
“controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship”.
Does clause 24, then, refer only to that of a partner or ex-partner?
We know the context surrounding this measure. Around a quarter of all homicides in England and Wales are classed as domestic—that is, they are committed by the partner, ex-partner or relative of the victim. They represent an average of nearly 160 homicides per year, with almost 90 being committed by a partner or ex-partner, over the last 10 years. I join others in commending the excellent work of Clare Wade KC, who utilised her expertise in this field to conduct the independent domestic homicide sentencing review, published on 17 March 2023.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley said, the review coincided with an ongoing campaign by the families of two women who were murdered by their male partners: Ellie Gould, who was 17 at the time of her murder by Thomas Griffiths, and Poppy Devey Waterhouse, who was 24 when she was murdered by Joe Atkinson. In her report, Clare makes the important argument that not only are women wronged by a breach of trust, which is an integral part of domestic abuse, but the harms to them often extend to further harm to secondary victims in the form of families, many of whom are the children—we have heard that before—and friends of the victim. There is also the harm to society in general, which, to date, may not have been sufficiently considered.
Clare made it clear to Committee members in her oral evidence session that the proposals in the Bill fall well short of what she set out in her report. In her evidence, Clare said, of clause 24:
“I have to say that it looks a little odd in the Bill because it is, as it were, stand-alone. The intent behind the policy is to have a coherent legislative policy that addresses all the harms, and addresses the particular harms in these cases. We now have in the secondary legislation the aggravating factor of coercive control as something that has happened in terms of the history of the relationship by a perpetrator towards a victim, and vice versa—it is a mitigating factor as well.”
Does the Minister understand why the clause looks a little odd? Perhaps she needs to do some work to make it fit for purpose and able to capture more of Clare’s recommendations.
I recognise that my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley has tabled new clauses 27, 28 and 29 in respect of these matters, which we will come on to. I am pleased that the Government are accepting the recommendation to make a murder that takes place at the end of a relationship a statutory aggravating factor in sentencing for murder. In 48% of murder cases looked at in the Wade report, the sentencing remarks disclosed that there were reports of either jealousy or resentment on the part of the perpetrator at the breakdown of the relationship. In the majority of cases, that appeared to be the catalyst for the murder.
The perpetrator was male in all but one of those 43 cases. A history of controlling or coercive behaviour was identified within the case sample. Clare also said in her oral evidence that
“these killings nearly always happen within the context or confines of domestic abuse and, in the cases we looked at, we found that there was frequently an escalation in domestic abuse when the victim—in the majority of cases, a woman who is killed by her male partner—wants to leave the relationship. That particular recommendation was made because not only is that a real harm, and that represents the real danger, but the policy underlying the other recommendations is one that places the concept of controlling and coercive behaviour at the forefront of the thinking.
The real harm in terms of coercive control, which the law does not yet recognise, is entrapment. It is not fear, as in being continually afraid, and it is not necessarily physical injury. It is entrapment, which is what prevents people who are being abused from leaving relationships. Putting that into legislation as an aggravating factor that can be taken into account by the courts would make it clear that that is one of the harms, but it would also, I suppose, bring to our consciousness the real harm in domestic abuse.”––[Official Report, Criminal Justice Public Bill Committee, 14 December 2023; c. 114-115, Q64.]
In the Government’s response to the Wade report, they proposed four legislative measures to give domestic homicide specialist consideration in the sentencing framework for murder for the first time. Clause 24 is the final one of these measures, with three already laid before Parliament as draft statutory instruments. I will not rehearse again the issues around grooming, which have been covered previously, but does the Minister recognise that she may have lost an opportunity to bring forward more of the recommendations from Clare’s review?
Although we certainly do not oppose the clause, we must consider the practical implications at this stage. In the Government’s impact assessment, they state that the impacts of the clause
“fall beyond the 10-year period”
of measurement. However, in the longer term, the impact assessment states that the measure
“is estimated to require a further 42 additional prison places in steady state, reached around 2065, at a 40-year net present cost”
of £19.2 million. To reaffirm what I said in reference to clause 23, without the Government getting on with tackling the crisis in our prisons, any measures that impact on capacity are a cause for a degree of concern.
I turn briefly to the new clauses that my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley spoke about so comprehensively. Again, I find it difficult to add value to what she had to say. New clauses 27 and 28 would introduce aggravating factors for honour-based abuse and strangulation respectively. New clause 29 would ensure that sexual infidelity can never be used as a defence for murder. I cannot add much to what my hon. Friend said in her well-illustrated speech, and I take this opportunity to thank and pay tribute to her. She has many years of working in this space. From what I have seen, heard and read, I know my hon. Friend has been not just a leading voice fighting for change, but a driving force in supporting both organisations and individuals.
We on the Opposition side recognise the importance of tightening up sentencing in this area. As outlined in my speech on clause 23, that will form a vital part of the wholesale review that Labour has committed to, so we can consider all the measures necessary to ensure that the criminal justice system works for victims. As always, I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Laura Farris
I align myself with the shadow Minister’s comments about the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley. I would like to pick up where the shadow Minister left off, in talking about sentencing more broadly. That will bring me on, quite naturally, to the new clause concerning strangulation.
I agree with the reservation about the gendered aspect of strangulation throughout domestic abuse and particularly in domestic homicide. The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley talked about the problem with the law at the moment, where if someone takes a weapon to the scene of the crime, they get longer than if they use a weapon that, for example, comes out of the kitchen drawer. It is well known that this is the Ben Kinsella amendment, which Jack Straw introduced in 2007 in response to a campaign fought very passionately by Ben’s sister, Brooke, and his family.[Official Report, 1 March 2024, Vol. 746, c. 7MC.] (Correction) Ben was a young man killed in gang violence, and his sister campaigned very passionately for a 25-year starting point for anybody who takes a weapon to the scene of the crime. Clare Wade dealt with that issue quite extensively in her report. I am not expressing a view of the Government here; I am just reflecting what Clare Wade said. She was critical of the starting point. In fact, she was quite critical of starting points in general.
The Government are conducting a murder sentencing consultation at the moment. It is on the Government website, and it remains open until March this year. It addresses all these points, including where sentences do not look like they are quite right—where some are too low or too high; I am not saying that they are necessarily too high, but it is about whether starting points are right. If the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley will forgive me, I will say no to the new cause about strangulation, but I encourage her—particularly given her background and expertise—and all Members to contribute to that consultation, because we are looking at this blend of issues at the moment.
Another important concern that Clare Wade recognised in her report was about ranking methods of murder. A well-known example is that a 25-year starting point applies to any convicted offender who has taken a weapon to the scene of the crime, but a victim of domestic abuse—what we might in the old language call “the battered wife”—is almost always going to use a weapon. That is the only way a woman is likely to kill a man, and a woman has very often taken one to the scene of the crime. We did not actually intend to capture that category of offender, but the law currently does.
We think it is important that we are not, at this point, setting one category of offence above another, and that we conduct this consultation and consider this area of the law carefully. As the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley effectively acknowledged, and as I think Clare Wade also did, some issues need to be looked at in the round. I hope the hon. Lady will understand why, on that basis, I will say no to her new clause, with all due deference and respect for how she made the case so powerfully put in Clare Wade’s report. All Governments should consider it carefully. That is my first point.
The second point was about honour-based abuse, which again the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley articulated well. We are clear that we will not allow political or cultural sensitivities to get in the way of tackling it. There is no specific offence for such abuse; the term is used to encompass various offences, including not only the usual range of domestic abuse, but some of the psychological pressure that the hon. Lady described. Forced marriage can fall within that, with elements of family shame. She talked about a case with a large number of participants who were part of the abusive ring.
Alex Cunningham
I appreciate being able to make an intervention. During my contribution, I talked about Clare Wade and the clause being a little odd because it is a stand-alone one. I know that the Minister has addressed the new clauses of my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley, but will she comment on that? Is there an opportunity to adopt more of the recommendations of the Clare Wade report?
Laura Farris
I thank the shadow Minister for his intervention. We are thinking hard on that point.
I want to check that I have not missed anything from section 55, where anything
“done or said amounted to sexual infidelity is to be disregarded.”
That is still good law. I suggest that the issue of some defendants claiming as a defence that they had killed a victim because she had been unfaithful to them has now been resolved and it is excluded as a qualifying trigger for the loss of control defence.
Clare Wade recommended that sexual infidelity should also be prohibited from being considered as a mitigating factor when it came to sentencing. We published our response to her review in July last year, setting out why we will not take that forward. The domestic abuse sentencing guideline already expressly states that provocation is no mitigation to an offence in a domestic context, except in rare circumstances. No evidence was provided in the review that sexual infidelity was ever being taken into account inappropriately as mitigation. I am therefore satisfied—it is the only point on which I really disagree with the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley—that the law already has sufficient protection in place. I urge the hon. Member not to move the new clauses.
Jess Phillips
I do not actually move them yet, as we do not do that for new clauses until the end. I was saying to myself, “I don’t think I have to do anything.”
I have, of course, already taken part in the consultation alongside the Killed Women network, which I work with incredibly closely. To the Minister’s final point, I started my remarks by saying that I do not agree with myself, having to do a piecemeal job. Schedule 21 needs an overhaul, but we will all start tinkering with it until it ends up in the place it already is, with bolt-ons and batons hanging off it, when something much more fundamental, in a modern world, needs doing.
On the final point about the defences, it may surprise the Minister to hear that that definitely came to me from some pretty eminent lawyers who work in the field—maybe even Clare Wade. I will take that back and speak to them about what exactly was concerning them with regard to that particular issue. I will bring it back to the Committee when we discuss new clauses at the end, of which there will be loads.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 24 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)
Laura Farris
Main Page: Laura Farris (Conservative - Newbury)Department Debates - View all Laura Farris's debates with the Home Office
Criminal Justice Bill (Ninth sitting)
Laura Farris ExcerptsThursday 18th January 2024
(2 years, 6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 18 January 2024 - (18 Jan 2024)
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 64, in clause 26, page 23, line 7, at end insert—
“(2A) The Secretary of State may not issue a warrant under subsection (2) where—
(a) the prisoner has less than 180 days to serve of the requisite custodial period;
(b) the prisoner is serving an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment or detention for public protection; or
(c) the Secretary of State is satisfied that the prisoner should continue to be detained in a domestic prison for the purposes of—
(i) receiving instruction or training which cannot reasonably be provided in a prison in the foreign country, or
(ii) participating in any proceeding before any court, tribunal or inquiry where it is not reasonably practicable for the participation or to take place in a prison in the foreign country.”
This probing amendment would introduce exclusions on the type of prisoner that could be issued with a warrant to serve their sentence in a foreign country. It excludes people with less than 6 months to serve, those serving indeterminate sentences for public protection and those who need to be detained in the UK for education/training purposes or for legal proceedings (e.g. parole).
Clauses 26 and 27 stand part.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Laura Farris)
It is again a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Bardell.
Clauses 25 to 27 concern the transfer of prisoners to foreign prisons. Clause 25 introduces the measures that are relevant to the transfer of prisoners to rented prison spaces overseas. It defines key terms relevant to the following sections, and establishes the nature of the agreements and to whom those provisions may be applicable. The measures have been drafted to apply to a broad cohort of adult prisoners. This will ensure that the measures are applicable to the final cohort that will be decided on under the terms of any final agreement with a partner state. Prisoners will be subject to a transfer only after an assessment of the individual circumstances of their case. Although the details will be subject to future negotiation and agreement, additional exclusion criteria may apply.
Clause 26 deals with the transfer of prisoners between the territory of the United Kingdom and rented prison spaces overseas. It will allow the Secretary of State to issue warrants for the transfer of individuals from the United Kingdom to rented prison spaces overseas or for the return of prisoners held in rented spaces overseas to the territory of the United Kingdom. It allows for transfers both ways, as needed. Like many of the provisions relating to the transfer of prisoners to rented prison spaces overseas, these provisions may be used only once prison rental arrangements with foreign countries are in place, and may be used only for the specific purpose of transferring prisoners as part of that arrangement. The clause also provides that time spent in a rented prison space overseas will count towards the prisoner’s sentence as determined in England and Wales.
Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)
Will the Minister tell the Committee whether the Government intend to transfer women prisoners? Literally decades of data shows that women prisoners are predominantly victims of domestic and sexual violence, which is often a pathway to their offending.
Laura Farris
The hon. Lady’s question is a good one. She will know that women form a very small part of the overall cohort of prisoners, that women prisoners have unique vulnerabilities and that they experience prison in a very different way from the male cohort. It is true that women are not expressly excluded from the provision, but obviously the United Kingdom Government are bound by the considerations under the European convention on human rights, and one can readily imagine how those will extend to female prisoners. It is obviously more likely that men will be transferred, because of the size of the cohort.
Jess Phillips
Would it not be better to put on the face of the Bill that women are carved out? I do not see any reason why we could not do that, if it is so vanishingly unlikely that a Government would transfer women prisoners. I am afraid to say that Governments are not always great on the issue of women in prison—not just this Government, but any Government, including any that might come in—so would it not be better to include that safeguard?
Laura Farris
I am sympathetic to the hon. Lady’s point, which I will take away. The purpose of the provisions is to set the framework for future agreements, so of necessity they are deliberately quite widely drafted and do not seek to tie our hands. The hon. Lady’s points are irrefutable; I looked at the issue when I was a member of the Justice Committee.
Domestic powers to transfer individuals to rented spaces such as these do not currently exist in UK law, and the provisions, widely drafted though they are, are essential for the operation of a future agreement. Clause 27 contains provisions regarding the operation of warrants, which are proposed in clause 26. The provisions allow the Secretary of State to appoint individuals to escort prisoners in transit to and from rented prison spaces overseas and to provide those individuals with the powers necessary to exercise those duties.
The provisions are similar to existing transport and escort provisions contained in the Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984 and are built on long-standing operational practices. They are an essential complement to the powers set out in clause 26 and are necessary for the effective operation of a warrant for transfer. The clause also contains provisions to enable designated individuals to detain prisoners who may attempt to escape or who find themselves unlawfully at large in the process of transit to or from a rented prison space overseas. I commend clauses 25, 26 and 27 to the Committee.
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
I am grateful to the Minister for the introduction to this cohort of clauses, which I will address along with my amendment 64.
As the Minister has outlined, the clauses facilitate the transfer of prisoners in England and Wales to an overseas jurisdiction and make provision to ensure the oversight of any agreement with a foreign country under which the UK prisoners will be held. Sadly, the Bill and accompanying notes do not provide the detail of exactly how the scheme will work, who the partner countries will be, nor where responsibilities will actually lie.
The charity Justice has provided some useful context. It says:
“In advancing his policy the Home Secretary made reference to arrangements which existed between Belgium and Norway on the one hand, and the Netherlands on the other, within the last two decades, as a successful means of increasing prison capacity. In fact, neither was an overwhelming success in terms of either rehabilitation or reduction in prison overcrowding. That is despite the fact that, particularly in the case of Belgium and the Netherlands, there were linguistic and cultural similarities, and geographical proximity. There is no guarantee that this will be true of any future arrangements that the United Kingdom may enter into.
Indeed, it is understood that the Ministry of Justice has been in talks with Estonia about using space in its prisons. While one of these is located in the capital, Tallinn—itself a three-hour flight from London, with no direct flights from elsewhere in the UK—the other two are 150-200km away by road. This is one illustration of the difficulties which will arise in facilitating family visits to those imprisoned abroad wherever they are, and of course access must also be provided to HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, Independent Monitoring Board members and legal representatives.”
I will return to some of those issues later, but perhaps the Minister can share with the Committee which countries the Government are actually negotiating with. More importantly, perhaps she can give us some insight into how the very real barriers to this policy will be addressed.
Amendment 64 in my name and that of the shadow Justice Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Ladywood (Shabana Mahmood), proposes limitations on the types of prisoners who can be transferred. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley has addressed very specifically the issue of women, and I welcome the fact that the Minister has agreed to take that away. I am sure we could support any amendment that she cares to bring forward on Report in order to exclude women from being accommodated abroad.
Others we would have excluded are prisoners with less than 180 days or six months of their custodial period left to serve, those serving an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment or detention for public protection, and those participating in any proceedings before a court, tribunal or inquiry where it is not reasonably practicable for the participation to take place in a prison in a foreign country. Releasing prisoners from foreign prisons back into the community in the UK would also pose severe challenges for probation and other services in ensuring that the necessary resettlement support is in place on their return.
The services and support that prisoners typically need on release include accommodation, welfare and employment support, ongoing treatment of drug and alcohol addictions, and health and social care. Arrangements to effectively monitor and supervise the individual unlicensed in the community also need to be put in place ahead of release. Making arrangements for the provision of these services requires effective co-ordination between the prison offender manager and community offender manager. In England and Wales, both of these roles are provided by His Majesty’s Prisons and Probation Service.
Releasing an individual directly from a foreign prison into the UK would require co-ordination between services based in two separate jurisdictions. That would present considerable logistical challenges and may lead to mistakes being made and the necessary support not being put in place. That could put the individual and others at risk and increase the likelihood of reoffending.
Excluding prisoners with a period of less than 180 days to serve from being issued with a warrant would help ensure that prisoners continue to be released from UK prisons into the community. The sentences of imprisonment for public protection and detention for public protection were abolished in 2012. However, the abolition was not retrospective, which means that thousands of people remain in prison, yet to be released after having been recalled to custody.
The plight of those prisoners, serving a sentence that Parliament has not deemed fit to remain on the statute book, has been well documented in the authoritative report of the cross-party Select Committee on Justice. In 2022, there were nine self-inflicted deaths of IPP prisoners, the highest number of self-inflicted deaths among the IPP prison population since the introduction of the sentence. As of December 2022, there have been 78 self-inflicted deaths of IPP prisoners since the sentence was introduced in April 2005. That is 6% of all self-inflicted deaths during the period. Forcing IPP and DPP prisoners to serve their sentences could further increase the risk of suicide and self-harm if they are accommodated abroad. Furthermore, it would make it extremely difficult for them to access the courses and interventions they need to demonstrate reduced risk and access timely legal advice and support through the parole process.
The amendment would also enable the Secretary of State to exclude a prisoner from being issued with a warrant if they are satisfied that the prisoner should continue to be detained in a domestic prison for the purposes of receiving instruction or training, which cannot reasonably be provided in a prison in a foreign country. That may include prisoners who are engaged in higher education that could only be provided in the UK, or prisoners involved in an employment scheme with the prospect of further training or a job opportunity on release in the UK.
Transferring prisoners abroad would have an impact on a prisoner’s access to legal advice, legal remedies for prison-related issues or their ability to participate in any ongoing legal processes related to their conviction or sentence at home, including the parole process. That is contrary to European prison rule 23 and Mandela rules 41 and 61, which give the right to accessible, timely and confidential legal advice. Being sent abroad would have a significant impact on someone being able to meaningfully participate in any legal process.
There is history in the immigration context of the Government legislating to say that people can pursue appeals against being removed and deported and then having to do so after actually being removed to their home countries. In those cases, the courts have ruled that, in practice, that is not possible and is therefore a breach of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the European convention on human rights. The Law Society has expressed concern that certain groups of vulnerable prisoners could be issued with a warrant to serve their sentence in a foreign country. That includes those with health issues, such as individuals who are pregnant or disabled, and those who have mental health or learning difficulties. There are currently no explicit safeguards or guarantees to protect against that. How will the Minister ensure effective resettlement arrangements under the provisions?
Prisoners with primary caring responsibilities could be issued with a warrant to serve their sentence in a foreign country. Transferring UK prisoners abroad will have a significant impact on their ability to maintain family ties. The Farmer review found family relationships to be the “golden thread” to help reduce reoffending.
There is recognition in the Government’s impact assessment that the policy will need to
“ensure prisoners’ rights to family life are protected in accordance with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, including access to visitation on par with what would be provided in HMPPS.”
However, the impact assessment goes on to say:
“It has not been determined who would bear the cost of these visits.”
Can the Minister offer any clarification on who is expected to foot the bill? Does she expect the children or the families of those imprisoned abroad to have to finance a trip abroad to visit their loved ones? Families and loved ones already struggle to meet the cost of visits to prison in the UK and they are unlikely to be able to meet the additional costs or logistical challenges involved in visits abroad. Imagine somebody having to spend five hours travelling to a foreign prison for a one-hour visit and then having to spend another five hours travelling back. That is total nonsense.
Mrs Flick Drummond (Meon Valley) (Con)
I rise to speak to the three clauses, which I also have deep concerns about. I once asked a prison officer at Winchester prison how many prisoners were truly evil and how many just got it wrong. He said, “About 5% are truly evil.” They are the ones that I am sure we would like to export to a gulag in Siberia and never see again, but I assume we will not use Russian prisons.
Any criminal who is a danger to society should be locked up for life and never released. However, the other 95% are capable of being rehabilitated, and in many cases part of that rehabilitation is to stay in contact with their families. A constituent wrote to me recently about this. She told me that her son had got into trouble and gone to prison. She believed that one reason why he has now become a responsible citizen was that his family were frequent visitors and able to be there for him.
What will we do about access for families if we send prisoners abroad? I have deep concerns about sending our prisoners overseas. There are many legal reasons why that is problematic. The impact assessment recognises the need to ensure that a prisoner’s right to a family life is protected, in accordance with article 8 of the European convention on human rights, and that access for families should be the same as the access that our Prison Service offers. Other issues include access to legal advice, and the ability to participate in ongoing legal processes; there are also potential problems with day release. The hon. Member for Stockton North laid those issues out clearly, and I will not repeat everything that he said.
We need clarification on what type of prisoners will be subject to transfer. We need to know what the criteria will be, and what support there will be for vulnerable prisoners. What will happen if things go wrong for the prisoner? Will that be dealt with under the host country’s legal processes, which may be different from ours?
Lastly, there is the cost of the system. The impact assessment says that it will cost £200 million up front, with an annual cost of £24 million, based on 600 prisoners being held abroad, but as we have not got any agreements in place how can we know what the true cost is? The policy will not come into effect until 2026, so it will not alleviate the issues that the prison estate currently faces.
I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to the issues that I have raised, as this is a major change in policy, and I will not be comfortable supporting it until I get further clarification. She mentioned that the provisions are a framework, but I would like details before I support the clauses.
Laura Farris
I thank the shadow Minister and my hon. Friend the Member for Meon Valley for their contributions, and I will respond to them as best I can. First, I want to talk a little about the context of the pressure on prison places. As of September 2023, 16,200 people were on remand in prisons in England and Wales. The reason why we have such a big remand population is that during the white heat of the pandemic, the Government took the decision to continue with full jury trials.
I remember listening very carefully to what the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy)—now shadow Foreign Secretary, then shadow Justice Secretary—said on the issue. Colleagues may recall that at one point he called for a reduction in the size of juries. He said that it was imperative to keep the criminal justice system moving, and he advocated for a shift to juries of five, only during covid. He was robustly attacked by Baroness Kennedy in the Lords, a Labour peer, who said that that was an absolute dereliction of article 6 rights. She gave a very passionate speech about it, brilliantly written, and I noticed that the shadow justice team never mentioned reducing the size of juries again.
Respectfully, I say it is reasonable to infer that the Opposition supported our decision to continue with full jury trials. If I am wrong about that, they can direct me to where they called for something different, but as I say there was a tension between the then shadow Justice Secretary and Baroness Kennedy. [Interruption.] It was incredibly difficult, and I think that is why the shadow Justice Secretary got himself into a bit of a muddle.
The decision to continue with full juries of 12 people determining the result of criminal trials during covid contributed heavily to the backlog, and to why we have so many people on remand awaiting trial.
Laura Farris
I will continue a little more. We are undertaking the biggest prison building exercise since the Victorian era. We have committed to creating 20,000 new prison places, and have already got 5,700 of those places on stream, but we are not there yet.
The amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Stockton North gives rise to a number of sensible points. Let me distil them: he thinks that prisoners should not be transferred if they are getting near to the end of their sentence, have a sentence of imprisonment for public protection, are going through constructive rehabilitation treatment, or are implicated in some form of criminal proceeding. All those are very sensible ideas, but we respectfully believe that they are best addressed through policy, based on the appropriate expertise from within the prison system, not set out in primary legislation.
In fact, I think the hon. Gentleman made the point tacitly himself. He gave a number of other very good examples, including prisoners who have serious mental health conditions, are pregnant or are someone’s primary carer. All those factors are highly material. Let me reassure him slightly, if I can. To the extent that the exploratory conversations have begun, we are only having them with other European countries. That means that they are bound by the same obligations under the European convention on human rights, which would be material in the types of cases the hon. Member for Stockton North has suggested.
Alex Cunningham
Is that a confirmation, then, that no prisoners will be moved to countries not covered by the ECHR?
Alex Cunningham
With respect to the Minister, this is a fundamental point going forward. As I said in my speech, if prisoners are removed to a country—Rwanda, let us say—they will not have the same protections as they would have if they were moved to Holland. It is important that the Government clarify exactly whether people will be removed to jurisdictions outside the ECHR.
Laura Farris
I thank the hon. Gentleman, who makes a fair challenge. I am only aware of exploratory conversations with European countries bound by the European convention on human rights. I understand that there will be no partner country that is not also complying with the European convention rights, but I think he deserves clarity on that point.
Alex Cunningham
I appreciate what the Minister is saying; she has been very clear about the point being well made. But if prisoners cannot be removed to a country that is not covered by the ECHR, perhaps that needs to be stated in the Bill.
Laura Farris
It is in the Bill that the Bill itself is compliant with the European convention on human rights.
Alberto Costa (South Leicestershire) (Con)
This may well be helpful to the Minister: the ECHR may in fact apply extraterritorially to British subjects or British prisoners who are placed in prisons outwith the member states that are part of the Council of Europe. She might want to check whether it applies in extraterritorial circumstances. [Interruption.]
The Chair
Order. I know that Members feel passionately about this issue, and they are, of course, welcome to make further contributions. If they want to, can they please indicate that once the Minister has finished?
Laura Farris
I want to address the points made by the hon. Member for Stockton North and explain why we think these matters are best placed in the policy itself rather than in the Bill. He will respect the fact that the whole status of IPP prisoners is currently a matter of review; as a member of the Justice Committee, I contributed to the report that has now been taken up by the Ministry of Justice, so I have looked at the issue of IPP prisoners carefully during my time in Parliament.
The points that the hon. Gentleman made about rehabilitation are, of course, important. He raised a number of other points and I will try to answer all of them. He asked how on earth the Parole Board could be expected to successfully manage a prisoner if they were released directly from a foreign prison to the United Kingdom. I want to reassure him that prisoners will be repatriated for the final section of their prison sentence before that, so that they are assessed by the Parole Board in the normal way. He also asked about the availability of legal advice, which was a very good point. First of all, the whole landscape of court procedure has changed in the last few years. Receiving legal advice can be done remotely, and court proceedings often take place remotely via a live link.
It is imperative under article 6 of the European convention on human rights that somebody should be able to access legal advice where appropriate, but I gently remind the hon. Gentleman that the first time the possibility of obtaining legal advice from the United Kingdom in a foreign country was embedded in primary legislation was under the last Labour Government. That was in a slightly different context, under the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002—David Blunkett’s legislation—but it provided for the removal of people whose immigration appeal had failed and for them to then submit out-of-country rights of appeal. The last Labour Government ran that quite successfully, and that was before we were really in the technological era that we are in now; in every single area of the law, we now make more and more use of video proceedings and online courts. I hope I have provided some reassurance on this point.
The hon. Member for Stockton North made a lot of sensible points about how prisoners’ families would travel to visit them. We have not set the criteria for who the prisoners are, but I gently make the point that more than 10% of the people in prisons in England and Wales are not British nationals anyway—somewhere in the region of 10,000 out of a total prison population of over 80,000. Some family and primary care considerations are already rather different with that cohort because they are not British nationals.
Vicky Ford (Chelmsford) (Con)
The Minister is making an important point. An excellent point was also made by my hon. Friend the Member for Meon Valley on the importance of prisoners being close to their family.
There is a very busy local prison in my constituency of Chelmsford. From time to time, I get the prison governor and other experts explaining to me that sometimes it is important to split people up. For example, if people have come from the same criminal gang or opposing criminal gangs, it can be important to move them so that they are not all in the same prison. There are parts of the country where getting “overseas” can sometimes be easier than visiting a family member who may, for example, be a long distance away in our own country. Sometimes, cases are different and are not about making sure that the prisoner stays in the local prison. That might not provide the best circumstances for that prisoner’s rehabilitation.
Laura Farris
I thank my right hon. Friend for her intervention. She is quite right. I will try to distil her point. I expected the challenge from the Opposition this morning about the circumstances of each prisoner being vital—whether they have family or connections—but it is true, as she said, that some prisoners will not have family or connections; there may be different imperatives. Obviously, we would be looking precisely at considerations of that nature before making a decision about prison transfer.
It is not possible to say that every prisoner needs to be imprisoned locally or is going to be the primary carer for all their children. Look at how decisions on the deportation of foreign national offenders are made by the immigration appeal tribunal: if an offender who has committed a serious offence tries to rely on the fact they have children in the UK, the tribunal will very often say, “You have already abandoned them because you were in prison for 10 years.” Some of that claim is lost anyway.
Mrs Drummond
The Minister made the very good point that 10,000 people in our prisons are foreign nationals. Why are we not sending them back to their countries and relieving the pressure for our own domestic prisoners?
Laura Farris
I reassure my hon. Friend that we are making significant progress on that. It is a good point. There has been an acceleration in that process. I have some data here. Between January 2019 and September 2023, over 16,000 foreign national offenders were removed from the United Kingdom. In the last 12 months alone, that returns rate increased by 20% when compared with the previous 12 months. There has been an acceleration in the returns agreements.
We have also expanded the early removal scheme, so that we can remove FNOs up to 18 months before the end of their sentences. The Home Office has deployed more caseworkers to focus on prison removals; we also have prisoner transfer deals with some countries, including Albania, that are already operational. I want to provide reassurance that that work is continuing at pace.
Alex Cunningham
I accept the points about foreign prisoners, but many are European nationals who have families in the UK. We cannot have a one-size-fits-all solution to this situation. I hope the Minister will acknowledge that.
Laura Farris
The provisions on the removals of foreign nationals are set out in the 2012 immigration rules; it is section 339 that governs removal. If the sentence has been two years or more, only truly exceptional circumstances would allow them to stay. The simple fact of somebody who has committed a category A or B—
Laura Farris
Let me finish the point. It has to be truly exceptional. I have done cases in court for the Home Office. The Home Office is nearly always successful when it relies on that clause because, as the court always says, when the offence is serious, there is an overwhelming public interest in the removal of a dangerous offender from the United Kingdom. Article 8 is qualified under paragraph 339 of the immigration rules.
Carolyn Harris
Would those exceptional circumstances include prisoners whose crime was committed after they had been trafficked to the United Kingdom, if they committed it because of the trafficking?
Laura Farris
I have never been involved in a case of that nature; cases where the offending is really serious tend to be much more straightforward. There is flexibility, because we can take such cases to court to appeal the removal. Obviously, when someone is already a victim of crime, that is a different context, so I do not know how the courts would deal with it. The law itself, however, is set out under the established immigration rules, in primary legislation and has been operational for 12 years now. That is not part of the dispute today.
To continue, it is right that we take innovative measures to ensure that we always have sufficient prison capacity to fulfil the orders of the court and to punish the most dangerous offenders. I reiterate at this stage that the powers simply lay down the foundation for future arrangements. I repeat: all the points raised by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton North, about the considerations that might apply were relevant, but this is about future arrangements so that we will have the power to transfer prisoners to rented foreign prisons. No foreign prison rental agreements are yet in place, however. As he is aware, there is precedent in Europe: both Norway and Belgium have similar arrangements with the Netherlands at present.
Jess Phillips
I want to respond to some of what the Minister said. She told us not to worry about people’s families visiting, because 10% of them are foreign nationals. She went on to say that foreign nationals have children abroad. I represent loads and loads of people who are not British nationals but who definitely have family in the UK, so the idea that 10% of the prison population do not have any families who want to visit them, or that the families of all non-British nationals in UK prisons live back home, is wrong. Welcome to the world—people move about and they have babies with people here in this country. That is a bit of a reality check on some of what was said.
I also did not understand the Minister saying that we now have a massive backlog because the justice system carried on during the pandemic. Was the justice system due a three-year break to stop the backlog? Do we normally have a three-year break to make sure that we have enough prison places? That is a weird justification, which I did not really understand.
On human trafficking, there are more victims of human trafficking in prison than there are human traffickers; the woeful rates of conviction of people who people-smuggle or commit modern slavery are well charted. Last week, I was in a meeting with the bishops, the Lords Spiritual—I always think “Lords Spiritual” sounds like a rock band—about this exact issue. Prison wardens and governors from a variety of prisons were there to give evidence, as was the Bishop of Gloucester—I believe her role is as the overarching Lord Spiritual for prisons—the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and lots of organisations who work with trafficking victims, including the Salvation Army and others. I was there, and the prison governors made it very clear that lots of people in prison have a pattern to their behaviour.
If we look at the Rochdale case from last week, we see that a young girl was criminalised as a pattern of her sexual abuse. That is not uncommon or unknown; it is in fact the opposite—it is well known, well charted and well evidenced. There is a huge amount of evidence for that, so I absolutely want to see a carve-out in that particular space for anyone identified as a victim of modern slavery.
The Minister asks us to wait for policy to feel comfortable about this, rather than writing things into the Bill. I totally understand that legislation does not necessarily need to be very detailed, but I would have liked, for example, to have had the word “women” once in the Domestic Abuse Bill—but, you know, we can’t be picky.
The trouble is that I have seen what happens when we leave things to policy that is skew-whiff and ambiguous in the Home Office, especially when it comes to cases of human trafficking. As the Minister said in response to my hon. Friend the Member for Swansea East, she has not been involved in any particular cases.
Currently, Government policy is a bit skew-whiff on how we remove or deal with victims of human trafficking. It is not exactly clear, and even the lawyers are not clear, both those from the Home Office and those seeking to represent victims of human trafficking who are threatened with deportation. Last week, I was with a barrister in a case, and she clearly said that the policy is to remove all victims of human trafficking from Albania, which the Government have said is a completely safe country—perhaps, unless you are a young woman who has been trafficked repeatedly, in which case all of the evidence suggests that Albania is incredibly dangerous.
I was in court because the Government were trying to deport a victim of human trafficking who had stayed within the national referral mechanism—in fact, had had her therapy paid for by that very same Home Office —for three and a half years. The Home Office had agreed yes, she is a victim of human trafficking. Literally, she has a piece of paper from the Home Office—it might as well have been signed by the Home Secretary—to say, “You are a victim of human trafficking.” She had two children, and both had lived in Britain for seven years, both born here of the rapes that she had suffered. But the Home Office was trying to deport her to Albania, a place they had already deported her to once; she had been re-trafficked from there immediately after reporting to the police. So excuse me if I do not trust something not being written into a Bill about how to handle these difficult cases.
I want to see on the face of this Bill provision so that no woman, no victim of human trafficking and no one with autism—the number of people with autism in our prison estate is phenomenal. Where are the safeguards so that barristers such as the one I was with last week have something to lean on when the Home Office decides that its policy is a little bit grey and so it can actually do what it wants?
Laura Farris
I thank the hon. Lady for her submission. I will confine myself simply to arguments as they relate to the prison transfer issue. Furthermore, this part of the Bill is Ministry of Justice, not Home Office.
Let me address two points. I am sorry if I was insufficiently clear when I talked about foreign-born offenders. Of course I do not make the crude assumption that none of them will have connections with the United Kingdom, including family, but some will not. We know we have problems with foreign gangs coming over. My simple point in response to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, is that not every single prisoner will have strong local ties in the United Kingdom, because that is not true and will be a relevant consideration in assessing the cohort for transfer.
On my other point, I am again sorry—perhaps it was my mistake—if I was confusing about the decision to maintain full jury trials during covid. That decision was a controversial one because of the number of jurors required. Those were physical trials at the time, and having the number of jurors required to sit together in a courtroom during a period when social distancing was set out in law was incredibly difficult. Without doubt, that delayed the process of the criminal justice system, so much so that some Supreme Court justices urged the Government to dispense with juries altogether. As I said in an earlier observation, the then shadow Justice Secretary, the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy), suggested we shrink juries rather than abandon them altogether. Other eminent lawyers—I cited one—thought that that was the wrong idea.
This was a very difficult decision on how to operate criminal trials, but in the end we decided that it was imperative, in the interests of justice and of article 6, the right to a fair trial, that everyone who was charged with a criminal offence in the Crown Court had the right to have justice administered as fairly as possible, so we stuck with the juries. That has led to delay, and that is why the remand population—in other words, people still awaiting trial—is higher than it otherwise would be, which has caused pressure on prison places. I apologise if that was insufficiently clear. That concludes my remarks.
The Chair
My powers may be great, but they are not sufficient for me to compel a Minister to intervene against her will. You are welcome to intervene, Minister, if you would like to do so.
Alex Cunningham
I am grateful.
The right hon. Member for Chelmsford made an interesting contribution about gangs. I agree that it is often necessary to move people to different areas to break gangs up—that is absolutely essential. I do not know whether the Government intends that such people would be a popular cohort to be moved abroad to foreign prisons, but perhaps the Minister will address that when she winds up the debate.
The Minister referred at some length to my amendment. I am not convinced that we should not press it to a vote. I will press it, because we cannot rely on policy unless it is written down. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley said the same and illustrated exactly why we cannot depend on policy. Policy changes all the time, so we need to nail down the provisions in the Bill and who will be included and excluded. Someone may table an amendment on Report in relation to whether women should be sent abroad to serve their prison sentence, but it is important to address the issue of foreign nationals—I spoke briefly about this earlier—who have families here, are in married relationships here and may be European citizens who are entitled to be here. I accept what the Minister says about the two-year threshold and everything else, but we cannot just say that it is okay to send men off to foreign prisons because they are foreigners—that does not wash at all. I will leave it at that, but I would like to press the amendment to a Division.
Laura Farris
I thought my last speech was supposed to be my final response, but I will come back on the two points made by the hon. Gentleman. First, I will come back to him on the point about bearing the cost. Secondly, I hope I was not speaking so crudely as to suggest that anybody foreign-born would be shipped off immediately; that is not what I was trying to say. I was simply saying that not every prisoner in a British jail has local ties, family or some of the compelling circumstances that he outlined. We do not disagree that some prisoners have very compelling circumstances; in the course of this debate, we have heard about people who would be at the top of that list for consideration. It is clear that there will have to be a difficult exercise.
I acknowledge that there is not much detail in the Bill. I remind the hon. Gentleman that we are putting it into primary legislation to create the framework for the agreements. There will then be individual agreements with European states. I have provided that clarity: each one will be a bespoke agreement. These are the legislative provisions to allow that, which is why the Bill does not go into more detail.
The Chair
To clarify, Minister, you can go back and forth a number of times.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 25 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 26
Warrant for transfer of prisoner to or from foreign prison
Amendment proposed: 64, Clause 26, page 23, line 7, at end insert—
“(2A) The Secretary of State may not issue a warrant under subsection (2) where—
(a) the prisoner has less than 180 days to serve of the requisite custodial period;
(b) the prisoner is serving an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment or detention for public protection; or
(c) the Secretary of State is satisfied that the prisoner should continue to be detained in a domestic prison for the purposes of—
(i) receiving instruction or training which cannot reasonably be provided in a prison in the foreign country, or
(ii) participating in any proceeding before any court, tribunal or inquiry where it is not reasonably practicable for the participation or to take place in a prison in the foreign country.”—(Alex Cunningham.)
This probing amendment would introduce exclusions on the type of prisoner that could be issued with a warrant to serve their sentence in a foreign country. It excludes people with less than 6 months to serve, those serving indeterminate sentences for public protection and those who need to be detained in the UK for education/training purposes or for legal proceedings (e.g. parole).
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Alex Cunningham
I have already addressed many of the principles pertaining to the Government’s proposals in this part of the Bill, so I will largely confine my remarks to amendments 65 to 68, with some relating to clause stand part.
Amendment 65 would require the controller to make a report to the Secretary of State on any breaches of the arrangement between the foreign country and the UK. Clause 28 provides for the Secretary of State to appoint a “controller” role to keep under review, and report on, the running of any rented prison spaces abroad. It also extends the power of His Majesty’s chief inspector of prisons to inspect and report on the conditions of any such spaces.
As it stands, the Bill places a great deal of unaccountable authority in the hands of the Executive to make provision for any arrangement by means of secondary legislation. It is silent on how those subject to this arrangement will be treated. Similarly, it provides no guarantee that the prison rules in secondary legislation, which govern crucial issues including segregation, complaints and the use of force, would apply. I would hope that the Government would agree that, given the potential human rights implications, any agreement made between the UK and a foreign state should be subject to full parliamentary scrutiny and oversight, and to guarantees of compliance with existing human rights standards and obligations.
Furthermore, the implementation of any agreement by a foreign state will need careful monitoring and oversight to ensure compliance. It will also be vital to ensure that any breach of the agreement by the foreign state is promptly reported and acted on. Amendment 65 would help to enable that by requiring the controller to report any breaches of the arrangement to the Secretary of State.
The Bill should also be amended to ensure that it is the UK’s responsibility to investigate and bring to justice any ill-treatment or torture, should it occur under this arrangement, in line with the UK’s obligations under the Human Rights Act 1998 and the UN convention against torture. It should also require that any prisoner transferred to serve their sentence in a foreign country would have to be held in and have access to equivalent conditions and the same quality and range of services afforded to prisoners held in England and Wales, as mandated under Prison Rules 1999. As it stands, nothing in the Bill and related documents gives any indication that the same legal standards and rights in relation to treatment of prisoners, as set out in the prison rules, would apply.
I would be obliged if the Minister would address a number of related questions. Will she confirm the need for the operation of the scheme to be under constant review and that Parliament is entitled to reports on how successful or otherwise it is? Will British prison rules apply to UK prisoners sent abroad? Does she accept that it should be the UK authorities that investigate any allegations of ill treatment or torture of prisoners accommodated abroad under her policy?
I know that services, particularly work and access to rehabilitation services, are very limited in UK prisons because of the crisis in the service, but does the Minister agree that any prisoners sent abroad should have access to at least the same level of services as those held at home?
Amendment 66 would ensure that the prisons inspectorate “must” conduct the duties specified in proposed new subsection 5D in section 5A of the Prisons Act 1952, and would ensure its consistency with the legislative basis for its role in England and Wales.
We are concerned that the oversight of both the controller and His Majesty’s inspectorate of prisons will ultimately be subject to negotiation with a relevant partner country. The wording in the Bill relating to the powers of HM inspectorate of prisons differs from the Prisons Act in that it states the chief inspector “may” inspect rather than “shall” inspect. The implication is that inspections could take place only by invitation of the foreign state rather than as a statutory requirement. That leaves open to future negotiation crucial aspects of HMIP’s role and methodology, such as its ability to conduct unannounced inspections, to speak to prisoners in private and to access records such as those relating to the use of force. That would mean a lower standard of independent scrutiny would be applied to the treatment and conditions for UK prisoners held under such arrangements. It would fall short of the UK’s obligations under the optional protocol to the convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment—OPCAT—which establishes requirements for independent detention monitoring to be conducted by a national preventive mechanism.
In the UK, the national preventive mechanism was established in 2009 and HMIP is one of the bodies designated to it. Amending the Bill to ensure that HMIP’s role can be performed in accordance with its duties under OPCAT would provide an important safeguard to ensure rigorous independent scrutiny of the treatment and conditions for prisoners held under these arrangements. Will the Minister guarantee that HMIP will be able to conduct its crucial role to the same standards that we would expect for any inspection on home soil, with unfettered access to prisoners, their records and staff?
Amendment 67 would ensure that HM inspectorate of prisons can inspect escort arrangements under which prisoners are transferred to foreign prisons. Clause 28 specifies that the chief inspector may inspect or arrange for the inspection of any prisons where prisoners are detained under an arrangement between the UK and a foreign state. Our amendment would bring the legislation into line with the inspectorate’s powers in relation to prisons in England and Wales by also enabling it to inspect or arrange for the inspection of escort arrangements.
The inspectorate’s powers to inspect escort arrangements were made by amendments to the Prisons Act in section 46 of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006. It is particularly important that the inspectorate should be able to inspect the escort arrangements for the transfer of UK prisoners to foreign prisons. We had a debate the other day about escort arrangements and the security of staff, which comes into play here. How do we ensure the safety of the staff of whichever organisation is moving people from this country to another?
A foreign state with which the UK makes an agreement could potentially be many thousands of miles from the UK. The transfer of prisoners could involve a lengthy journey involving a variety of modes of transport, including potentially prison vans, planes, trains and ferries.
As countless HMIP inspection reports show, escort, particularly when a person is being transferred against their will, can pose a number of risks to prisoners, including the mixing of men, women and children in the same transport—although I acknowledge that children will not be sent abroad; poor information sharing with escort services of the needs and risks presented by prisoners; poor conditions; poor escort safety and lack of seat belts; risk of suicide and self-harm, which may be exacerbated by long journeys under stress; lack of food, drink and comfort stops; poor treatment by escort staff; failure to address health and welfare needs; overuse of restraints with potentially fatal consequences; poor complaints processes and accountability; and damage to prisoners’ property.
The potential for trouble appears limitless. I hope that the Minister will recognise that she needs to act now to ensure all the necessary processes are in place to make sure that it is contained. Failure to do so could result in all manner of actions against the Government, including civil actions by prisoners who could well have grounds for going to court because they have not been treated properly in line with the UK law under this new policy.
12.30 pm
I turn to amendment 68. This probing amendment would clarify how the Government intend to apply their obligations under article 2 on the right to life of the Human Rights Act, through ensuring that the duties of the coroner also apply to any death involving a prisoner subject to a transfer agreement with a foreign country.
It is our view that the nature of the arrangement to send individuals to overseas prisons will establish the UK’s jurisdiction over any deaths that occur. Given the unprecedented nature of these arrangements, it is crucial that the responsibility of coroners to investigate overseas deaths be established clearly in advance, otherwise it would invite significant uncertainty and likely legal challenge if any individual were to die while imprisoned overseas. Furthermore, such a move will ensure that the coronial system is prepared to address the practical challenges of holding such an inquest, which are likely to include challenges in obtaining evidence and witness statements.
I move on to my comments on clause stand part. I am well aware that there is a school of thought that says that prisoners give up their rights to everything when they commit a crime and are deprived of their liberty, but I hope the Minister will agree with me that they do have rights and we have a responsibility to ensure they are not deprived of them, whether in a prison on home or foreign soil. It is critical that we nail down exactly how UK systems will be implemented abroad. I see that as all but impossible if we do not specify in the Bill the necessary requirements for that to happen.
The Minister is likely to say that we have to have a level of trust in the agreement with any foreign Government to stick to the standards required, but I am not so sure it is as simple as that. There will be huge costs associated with what may well just be a Government experiment—costs relating to travel and escort services, the fees to the receiving prison, potential costs for families of prisoners to travel abroad to visit, plus all the costs related to managing, inspecting and reporting on the services provided.
Put simply, the choice to send British prisoners abroad is a serious endeavour that requires meaningful protections to prevent abuses. It is also likely to come at substantial cost to the taxpayer, with the Government’s own best estimate of cost being £24.4 million per year to house a tiny number—600 prisoners. That amounts to £40,700 per prisoner, approximately £8,000 less per prisoner than to house them in a domestic prison: figures which are difficult to reconcile given that incidental costs like transportation will be additional to ordinary prison expenditure.
In any event, the proposal is going to create only a small number of spaces, meaning that it is not just an easy answer to the overcrowding crisis. Rather, if prisoners end up being mistreated or are simply unable to engage in rehabilitation and other processes that can help get their lives back on the straight and narrow, it could lead to more problems than it solves.
If the Minister is not prepared to accept our amendments, I ask her to take them away and consider exactly how she will fulfil her duties under the law in relation to UK prisoners accommodated abroad, and perhaps bring forward her own amendments on Report, which we would happily consider.
Laura Farris
I thank the hon. Member for his amendments, which I will address before turning to clause 28. I hope that nothing we have said and nothing that appears in the Bill would suggest for a moment that any of the 600 prisoners who end up being transferred to a foreign prison would not have their human rights respected. We remind the hon. Member that prisoners remain the responsibility of the Secretary of State. Although the matter of the exact arrangements will need to be negotiated, we are committed to ensuring parity for prisoners—that they have access to the same regime and the same rehabilitation opportunities—as part of any agreement.
I thank the hon. Member for his views on performance management mechanisms. We agree that they need to be in place. The controller role stands alongside our wider plans for robust and effective scrutiny mechanisms, including making arrangements for independent inspection and monitoring in rented prison places. The UK-appointed controller will be responsible for reporting to the Secretary of State on the running of a rented prison via HMPPS performance-monitoring mechanisms, and will be expected to report to the Secretary of State on the running of a rented prison overseas. I want to provide some reassurance that we have begun the process of engaging a number of existing inspection monitoring bodies in England and Wales to discuss how best that service might be provided.
My second point is that we are committed to ensuring that Parliament has appropriate opportunities to scrutinise any treaty that we negotiate with a partner state. Our current intention is that any future treaty establishing rental arrangements, including monitoring and control, would be subject to ratification, which would of course be subject to further scrutiny by Parliament, according to the procedure set out in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010.
On amendment 66, clause 28 currently only extends the inspectorate’s remit and does not place an obligation on it to inspect rented prisons overseas, as the shadow Minister pointed out, but we fully agree that rented prison places must be subject to effective inspection and we are ensuring that an appropriate inspectorate will be able to conduct such inspections. That commitment is made with due regard to the inspectorate’s need for operational independence and freedom of access to prisoners, including in private as the shadow Minister described, and to prison facilities. We are considering the logistical realities that that kind of access implies.
We are already working with HM inspectorate of prisons to discuss how best to ensure that the inspections will take place. The exact arrangements will be subject to negotiation and agreement with a partner country, at which point, if necessary, we can confirm what the law ought to say on this matter and make amendments as necessary using the delegated power that we are seeking in clause 29.
Alex Cunningham
The Minister just said that these rights and arrangements would be “subject to negotiation”. Could she explain what she means by that? Does that mean that some rights and arrangements may well not be available to prisoners or to inspectors in carrying out their duties?
Laura Farris
We are committed to ensuring that any foreign prison will be subject to an inspection arrangement; it is simply the terms of that inspection arrangement that we are not putting into primary legislation.
Amendment 67, tabled by the shadow Minister, is important. Arrangements for the independent inspection of escort arrangements in England and Wales already engage HM inspectorate of prisons to some extent, and the Prison Act 1952 allows the Secretary of State to investigate any matter connected to prisoners and prisons in England and Wales. We are committed to ensuring that effective scrutiny of escort arrangements is in place but, again, the exact terms of the arrangements are yet to be concluded and it is inappropriate to attempt to distribute specific responsibilities without prior agreement.
Amendment 68 addresses deaths in custody. This is an important point and must be subject to high-level scrutiny. That is especially true where there may be a death in custody that occurs overseas. This matter will be of primary importance to us during negotiations with any partner country. We are committed to ensuring that we are able to comprehensively investigate any deaths that may occur in rented prisons overseas.
This subject is a prime example of how we intend to use the delegated power we are seeking in clause 29. Once we have agreed arrangements with a partner country, we intend to use our delegated power—by potentially extending the remit of relevant bodies in England and Wales, for example. Until those arrangements are finalised it would be inappropriate to bind any potential body or person, including coroners, in law.
We are also committed, of course, to upholding the human rights of prisoners, including their rights under articles 2 and 3 of the European convention on human rights. That is legally binding on us, and those are absolute rights. We are currently considering only entering into arrangements to rent prisons from countries that can demonstrate that their prison conditions and capabilities—including for death investigations—comply with that same human rights law and our expectations on the fair treatment of prisoners.
On the basis that this is an important issue for future negotiations, or is non-negotiable given our international obligations, it is too early to begin considering how issues such as death investigation will be accounted for without first making precise arrangements with a partner country. I therefore urge the hon. Member for Stockton North to withdraw this amendment and to not press the other amendments in his name in this group.
I will speak now to clause 28, which concerns oversight arrangements for rented prison spaces. I have said already that the clause establishes a duty on the Secretary of State to appoint a controller. I have also set out their responsibilities for ensuring that any prisoner transferred to a foreign prison will be returned before the end of their sentence to allow for sufficient time for resettlement and reintegration back into the United Kingdom before release.
Clause 28 also extends the remit of His Majesty’s inspectorate of prisons to allow for inspections of any rented prison spaces overseas and subsequent reports to the Secretary of State on their findings—respecting their operational independence. Consideration of prison conditions and the treatment of prisoners has been, and will remain, central to our decision making.
Jess Phillips
On the point of saying here, and the law even saying, although the law does not say it, that prisoners will be returned to the UK before the end of their sentence, is there—well, I imagine that there is—a chance that their sentence might be extended because there is no place for them to be brought back to?
For example, our modern slavery laws say that we would have to wait for 45 days of reflection in cases of modern slavery. In reality, it is 700 days at the moment. So, laying out a term: is there any worry that, if we say that prisoners have to come back here before they are released to do a period of parole, we will in fact be extending people’s sentences because there are not any places for them to come back into?
Laura Farris
I think it would have to be part of the planning for any prisoner who was going to be transferred for there to be space for them to be returned, because that is part of the policy—that they will be brought back into a domestic prison before release so that there can be proper engagement with the parole and probation services. That is, as hon. Members would expect, to facilitate a smooth release back into the community, as with any prisoner.
We are mindful of the need to ensure that effective inspection and monitoring provisions are in place. While the exact arrangements will be subject to future negotiation, we will ensure that those are sufficient, and they will also be subject to further parliamentary scrutiny. I commend clause 28 to the Committee.
Alex Cunningham
I have listened carefully to what the Minister said, and an awful lot of it seems to be about something that might happen in the future or be subject to negotiation. Many of the measures that we are pushing for are in our amendments; as I said, I invite the Minister to take the amendments away and consider them in some detail. Being “subject to negotiation” is not good enough. We actually need to know that the necessary access or protections will actually be in place.
I will not press any of the amendments to a vote—with the exception of amendment 66, because I think that the inspector must carry out the necessary inspection. I accept that the Minister said that that is the intention, but “intention” is not good enough; that provision needs to be in the Bill. I beg to ask leave to withdraw amendment 65.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Laura Farris
Before I come on to clause 29, I want to address one point made by the shadow Minister, as this is part of the same family of clauses. The reference to negotiation does not mean that things like inspection and equivalent conditions themselves are a matter for negotiation—in other words, that we might not have any of those things. We are going to insist on all those things, but the terms are the matter for negotiation—what the inspection regime would look like, for example. It is not that we would not be monitoring what happens in a rented prison space overseas. The mandatory language in clause 28(1) about the use of a controller goes to that on the issue of oversight.
Alex Cunningham
I am really quite interested because the issue is about negotiations. Is the Minister actually saying that there will be no agreement with any country that cannot provide the same standards of service, accommodation and access that a person would have in the UK?
Laura Farris
I cannot say that the programme would be exactly the same, but we are looking for equivalence. We even set out in the Bill that there will be a supervisory arrangement already, and I talked in the previous debate about what inspection would look like and who we are engaging on that.
Clause 29 creates a delegated power that would allow the Government to make future legislative amendments strictly for the purposes of implementing a future prison rental agreement. We are currently in exploratory talks with potential partner countries, but, as previously noted, formal negotiations have not commenced. While we have sought to draft broad enabling provisions that will facilitate any future arrangements, it is impossible to be certain on what legislative changes will be necessary to give effect to the agreements prior to the conclusion of negotiations and the subsequent agreement with a partner country on those terms.
For that reason, we are seeking a delegated power that will allow us to amend legislation for the sole purpose of complying with the terms of any future prison rental agreement that we sign. That is to ensure that the UK is able to swiftly comply with our obligations under such agreements. Parliament will have the opportunity to scrutinise our proposed use of any delegated power by means of the proposed affirmative procedure when amending primary legislation. That will ensure that Parliament may be content that such amendments are made pursuant to future prison rental agreements.
It is not possible, at this stage, to anticipate the outcomes of any negotiations, and any anticipation could significantly bind negotiating power. It is also not clear which matters will remain the responsibility of the Government and which will fall to other jurisdictions. Without this delegated power, further primary legislation would need to be taken through Parliament at the conclusion of individual negotiations to implement the international agreements. That would impact the Government’s ability to act swiftly.
The delegated power forms an essential part of the future-proofing framework that we have designed to accommodate future negotiations and arrangements with partner countries. It ensures that Parliament will still have sufficient opportunity to scrutinise the use of the powers and to feel content that the powers are strictly limited to use further to prison rental arrangements agreed with the partner country.
Alex Cunningham
My concerns are the same as those I expressed about previous clauses. I remain concerned that items not in the Bill are being delegated to secondary legislation. We are not going to oppose the clause, but the Minister needs to bear in mind all the things that have come before and to reassure us that there will not be any abuse here, as what should be important primary legislation is being pushed upstairs to a Delegated Legislation Committee.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 29 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Laura Farris
On a point of order, Ms Bardell. What are the timings for this morning’s sitting?
Laura Farris
Main Page: Laura Farris (Conservative - Newbury)Department Debates - View all Laura Farris's debates with the Home Office
Criminal Justice Bill (Tenth sitting)
Laura Farris ExcerptsThursday 18th January 2024
(2 years, 6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 18 January 2024 - (18 Jan 2024)
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Laura Farris)
Clause 30 makes amendments to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to ensure that offenders who are convicted of coercive or controlling behaviour and receive a sentence of 12 months or more in custody are automatically managed under the multi-agency public protection arrangements. That will mean that the police, probation and prison services must assess and manage the risk of controlling or coercive offenders in the same way as violent, sexual and terrorist offenders. A range of agencies will also have a duty to help to assess and manage these risks.
This is just the latest development of the law on coercive and controlling behaviour. This Government were the first to formalise coercive control as a criminal offence under section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015. We extended it to apply even after the end of a relationship under the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. In a number of different legislative vehicles, we have applied coercive control as an aggravating or, in some cases, mitigating factor for the purposes of sentencing. Today, we are adding it to the MAPPA arrangements in certain circumstances.
We are doing this for three reasons. First, it will build on what we have already done to ensure MAPPA is used for high-risk domestic abuse cases. We have strengthened the statutory guidance to require agencies to consider discretionary management under MAPPA in all domestic abuse cases. In the last reporting year, we have seen a 30% increase in the take-up of that offer. For that reason, we consider it appropriate to put it in the Bill.
Secondly, we also know that it is a significant risk factor for future abuse and that it is a known risk factor in domestic homicide, so this clause is pre-emptive. It will support the identification and risk management of perpetrators, thereby disrupting potential abuse, preventing revictimisation and protecting future victims.
Third, we are bringing coercive and controlling behaviour offences in line with other violent offences connected with domestic abuse. Perpetrators of other forms of domestic abuse, including threats to kill, actual and grievous bodily harm, attempted strangulation, harassment and certain stalking offences, are already eligible for automatic MAPPA management. We think that it is right to bring coercive control in line with those.
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
The clause makes a straightforward amendment that would provide for the automatic, rather than discretionary, MAPPA management of offenders convicted of controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship who are sentenced to 12 months or more. As a result, such offenders will be treated as category 2 rather than category 3 offenders for MAPPA purposes.
It should come as no surprise to the Government that we enthusiastically support the clause. Labour has committed to halving incidents of violence against women and girls within a decade. For far too long, those dangerous criminals have been let off and victims have been let down. Indeed, the multi-agency public protection arrangements were introduced by the last Labour Government in 2001 under the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000, being strengthened again in the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Those arrangements see the police, probation and prison services working together to ensure the proper management and monitoring of sexual or violent offenders. In a joint thematic inspection of MAPPA, I have seen them called
“one of the success stories of the criminal justice system”.
The inter-agency approach of MAPPA improves public protection by bringing together criminal justice organisations, as well as others, in a structured way to address and actively manage the behaviour of offenders who can sometimes be difficult to accommodate and who may pose serious levels of risk. Labour is in complete agreement with the Government that perpetrators of coercive and controlling behaviour should be brought more directly under the remit of MAPPA. As Women’s Aid said, this signals that the crime of coercive and controlling behaviour, which is central to so much domestic abuse, is being taken more seriously by the justice system. As it also points out, bringing CCB offenders automatically under the remit of MAPPA is particularly important given the links between coercive control and homicide.
For cases where there is high risk of domestic abuse, the active management and inter-agency engagement that MAPPA provides can be an effective response. However, a report by His Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services in 2021 identified a lack of multi-agency management of individuals who posed the most significant risk of harm to women and girls through domestic abuse. As part of the inspection, HMICFRS asked forces to identify the five individuals whom they considered posed the highest threat to women and girls within the local force area. Of the 40 individuals identified, only three were being managed under MAPPA.
Additional guidance for category 3 offenders who are perpetrators of domestic abuse has been welcome, but HMICFRS noted in its 2022 MAPPA review that there
“is still not a clear enough pathway for those who pose a risk of harm through domestic abuse, particularly for those who commit lower-level offences over a sustained period of time but pose a real risk of harm to their victims through long-term abuse.”
The impact that the clause might have, while welcome, as my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley said, is relatively limited, given the number of individuals who have been convicted of coercive and controlling behaviour since the introduction of the offence in 2015. Fewer than 2,000 people have been convicted of that offence, and yet—I think this is probably one of the most important points that I will make during this Committee—the data from the crime survey in England and Wales estimates that 2.1 million people experienced domestic abuse in the year ending 2023. Not every case of domestic abuse will include instances of coercive and controlling behaviour, but given the centrality of such offending behaviours in many cases of domestic abuse the number of CCB convictions still appears very low. Since the provision will apply to that relatively small cohort of offenders, it is difficult to discern what huge impact it will have.
I am interested to hear from the Minister about any additional provisions that her Department has been looking at in preparation for the Bill in relation to MAPPA and perpetrators of domestic abuse, particularly if it has looked at other measures that would make individuals who have committed domestic abuse MAPPA-eligible, because repeat perpetrators of this appalling violence against women and girls too often get away with their patterns of criminality and go on to commit more violence and cause more harm.
As I said, we fully support the clause and will vote with the Government, but we fear the level of impact that it will have. The criminal justice system is in crisis, and the Government are completely failing to address the shocking levels of violence against women. As with much of the Bill, we do not oppose the measures, but we are left wondering if these tweaks are all that the Government have to offer a system in crisis.
Laura Farris
I thank the shadow Minister for his speech and for supporting the clause. In answer to his final criticism that we have abandoned women and girls, the Serious Crime Act that created the offence of coercive, controlling behaviour received Royal Assent in February 2015. With respect to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, it predates her arrival in Parliament, but we created that criminal offence and we have been evolving its implementation since.
Laura Farris
I will make some progress. I want to respond to the points raised by the shadow Minister. [Interruption.]
The Chair
You do not need to apologise, but we are more freewheeling in Committee. If the hon. Lady wants to come back in later, she can.
Laura Farris
The provision has been welcomed by the Domestic Abuse Commissioner. She said:
“This provision will help to ensure that perpetrators are properly managed in the community and victims can be kept safe from further harm. The Commissioner welcomes this provision and will continue working with the government to develop proposals for the effective management of perpetrators.”
In answer to the hon. Lady’s question, in the data we have, which is from 2022, 566 people were convicted of coercive control, and it is estimated that, as she suggested, around 200 would be serving 12 months or more and would have been eligible for MAPPA management. We simply make the point that the MAPPA framework is used for the most serious offenders; whether it is a sexual, violent or terrorist offence, people qualify for MAPPA if their sentence is one year or more. We are not doing anything unorthodox or irregular in having that criteria in relation to coercive control.
I will respond to one of the shadow Minister’s final points. He asked whether there was provision for other forms of domestic abuse to fall under MAPPA management —the answer is yes. We strengthened the statutory guidance to clarify that MAPPA management can be considered by the relevant agencies in all domestic abuse cases. I hope that answers his query.
Jess Phillips
I did not find the piece of paper from Refuge, but I knew it would be about 200 people. Just to make it clear for the record, in one ward in my constituency there will be 200 violent perpetrators of domestic abuse. To the Minister’s point that she did not wish to take my intervention on the piece of legislation that was passed, I will never, ever criticise this Government on that. They have passed lots of legislation, so the skins of goats have had lots of words written on them. It means absolutely nothing—pieces of words on goat skin mean absolutely nothing if they are not then properly resourced, managed and implemented in our communities. The women in refuge accommodation speak of little else than what a nirvana it has been recently under this Government.
Laura Farris
I beg to move amendment 37, in clause 31, page 26, line 23, at end insert
“(and, in the case of a service offence, the corresponding offence is not so specified).”
This amendment provides that, for a service offence, the corresponding offence must also not be specified in Schedule A1 to the Sentencing Code.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government amendment 38.
Government amendment 39.
Clause stand part.
Laura Farris
Amendments 37 to 39 are not technical amendments, as my brief says; they are amendments that extend the operation of clause 31 to Scotland. I will be scolded by my officials if they do not agree, but that is what the amendments do.
Clause 31 ensures that categories of offender who were previously out of scope for polygraph testing are brought into scope. It ensures that there is express provision to enable the Secretary of State to impose mandatory polygraph testing as a licence condition for the most serious offenders who pose a risk of sexual offending or who committed historic offences connected to terrorism.
Polygraph examinations are used, most importantly, to monitor compliance with licence conditions, and the information obtained during testing is used by probation practitioners to refine and strengthen risk management plans. They have proved to be somewhere between 80% and 90% effective and have been used successfully by the probation service in the management of sexual offenders since January 2014. More recently, they were extended to terrorist offenders under the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021. Provisions in the Domestic Abuse Act also enabled the Secretary of State to commence a three-year pilot of mandatory polygraph testing on specified domestic abuse perpetrators.
Laura Farris
I don’t—[Interruption.] Yes, it has.
The clause extends eligibility for polygraph testing to offenders who have been convicted of murder and are assessed as posing a risk of sexual offending on release. It extends eligibility to those who are serving multiple sentences where the index sex offence will already have expired. To give a rather grim illustration of what that might look like, if somebody is sentenced for convictions of rape and murder, by the time of their release the sentence for the sex offence will have expired, and they would therefore not automatically qualify for polygraph testing without the extension that the clause provides.
The clause also extends polygraph testing to a cohort of individuals who have received non-terrorism sentences. At this point, I want to pick up on what Jonathan Hall told the Committee in evidence just before Christmas. This measure could apply, for example, in the case of someone who was convicted of conspiracy to murder but whose offences were an act of terrorism, took place in the course of an act of terrorism or were committed for the purposes of terrorism, if they committed their offences before the relevant legislation came into force.
The way in which we make that assessment will depend on the judge’s sentencing remarks. If, in sentencing, the judge made an express reference to the offending being in the course of terrorism, the extension provided by the clause would make polygraph testing applicable. We define this cohort as historical terrorism-connected offenders, and the polygraph testing licence condition is currently unavailable as a tool to manage the risk that they pose, although it would be available for an individual who commits the same offence today.
The intention of the clause is to fill the gap and provide more effective risk management in the community. I reassure the Committee that that does not mean that the person can be recommitted to prison. It is an assessment of their licence conditions. It affects their risk management. If it should later transpire that they have breached licence conditions, they could be recalled, but not by the polygraph test alone. As a whole, the clause will ensure that polygraph testing can be used to strengthen the management of those who pose a risk of sexual offending and those who committed historical terrorism-related offences.
Alex Cunningham
In his evidence to the Committee, Jonathan Hall said:
“In fact, if you look at the wording of the Bill, the Secretary of State will be allowed to be ‘satisfied’—not beyond reasonable doubt, just satisfied—on exactly the same test that currently applies to judges”
in determining whether the test should be taken. He went on to say:
“There is obviously a fundamental issue there, which I can expand on, but there is also a really practical issue, because what is a terrorism offence is not always very obvious.”—[Official Report, Criminal Justice Public Bill Committee, 12 December 2023; c. 66, Q170.]
He was clear that the clause might not have all the bolts and washers that it needs to be totally effective.
Nevertheless, I thank the Minister for introducing the clause. As she said, it will allow the polygraph condition to be imposed where the Secretary of State considers that an offender convicted of murder
“poses a risk of committing a relevant sexual offence on release”,
and where an offender is
“serving a relevant custodial sentence in respect of an offence who…at an earlier time during that sentence was concurrently serving a relevant custodial sentence in respect of a relevant sexual offence”.
It will also extend the use of polygraph conditions for terrorist offenders by enabling the Secretary of State to extend polygraph conditions to offenders where the Secretary of State is satisfied—just satisfied: this was the issue that Jonathan Hall was concerned about—that the offence
“was, or took place in the course of, an act of terrorism, or…was committed for the purposes of terrorism.”
Labour supports the clause. Where polygraph conditions have proved to be effective with certain offender cohorts, we should certainly be enabling the courts to impose such conditions to improve public protection. The extensions included in the clause are sensible additions to the scope of polygraph conditions.
We are also happy to support the Government amendments to the clause. They clarify some matters in relation to service offences and offences with alleged terrorism connections in Scotland. I would be interested if the Minister could share any additional recent evidence that she may have of the effectiveness of polygraph conditions on public protection, particularly if there are any ongoing assessments by her Department of the current use of polygraph conditions in England and Wales. Conducting polygraphs can be an expensive and time-consuming process, so I am sure the Minister will agree that we need to ensure that there is a robust evidence base to show that expanding the conditions will contribute further to public protection.
Although we support the clause, I am left to ask the Minister: is this all there is? Offender management has been in disarray for years, especially following the failed structural reforms through which the Government have dragged it. The Public Accounts Committee said that the probation service was
“underfunded, fragile, and lacking the confidence of the courts.”
That was even before the additional serious challenges that it has faced throughout and following the pandemic.
The chief inspector of probation noted that the high-profile independent reviews into the supervision of the likes of Damien Bendall and Jordan McSweeney found
“broader systemic issues in both cases which we are seeing time and time again, both in our local probation inspections and thematic reviews. These included: overloaded practitioners and line managers with well above their target workloads; significant delays in handing over cases from prison to community probation staff, resulting in last minute and inadequate release planning; and incomplete or inaccurate risk assessments. This is the case at both the court stage and start of supervision, with very inexperienced staff being handed inappropriately complex cases with minimal management oversight.”
That is the reality of our probation service today. It is another criminal justice agency in deep crisis.
A properly functioning probation service—I will say more about this on a later clause—is essential to keep the public safe by managing the risk of offenders in the community. The Government have brought yet another justice Bill before us and have given themselves another chance to improve the probation service and provisions around offender management. The Minister will probably talk about the new investment in the probation service, but we have to set that in the context of the huge cuts that the service has suffered since the current Government came to power in 2010. They have missed a lot of opportunities with this Bill. As I said on the previous clause, the offender provisions in the Bill are so slight that their impact will be negligible.
We are seeing a Government who have simply run out of ideas and are not doing enough to keep our communities safe. Although we fully support the clause, I again put on record our disappointment at the lack of ambition that the provisions show when our justice system is in chronic and intractable crisis.
Laura Farris
On Jonathan Hall’s comments, there are two points to make. First, given his expertise, it is relevant to consider what he said about polygraphs in general, which is that
“polygraph measures for released terrorist offenders are a good thing.”––[Official Report, Criminal Justice Public Bill Committee, 12 December 2023; c. 64.]
You asked for an updated example of where polygraph testing had been instrumental, and he gave an example—in fact, I do not think it had been used—when he said:
“I was in favour of polygraph measures after Fishmongers’ Hall. It was partly on the back of one of my recommendations that polygraph measures were brought in. They always, or at least for a long time, existed for sex offenders. You will recall Usman Khan, who was clearly a very deceptive man. My view was that polygraph measures could be useful.”––[Official Report, Criminal Justice Public Bill Committee, 12 December 2023; c. 66.]
It is difficult to prove a negative, but they were brought in shortly after that.
Carolyn Harris (Swansea East) (Lab)
Can the Minister clarify whether the polygraphs are administered by the private sector or the statutory sector? Given that we have had some startling problems with technical issues in the private sector of late, it would be interesting to know who is responsible for the polygraphs.
Laura Farris
Can I come back to you on that? The shadow Minister talked about the categorisation of former terrorist offenders, and I hope I can answer his point.
We have made the point, and I hope it was clear, that those who were convicted of an alternative offence where there was a strong belief that there was a terrorism connection—it is a small cohort—were convicted before the counter-terrorism law came in. They would have been convicted separately. Politicians are not making a random adjudication of whether an offender should be classified retrospectively as a terrorist. It is about looking at the sentencing remarks and what the judge, who heard all the evidence and sat through the trial, made of that offender.
It is a fair challenge. I know that it is quite an irregular provision in law to have, effectively, a retroactive clause. However, when you look at the failings that applied in the Fishmongers’ Hall case, there is a very strong public interest in ensuring that we maximise and extend the protection of this provision in a way that the public would find reasonable. When you refer back to sentencing remarks, you can be reasonably confident that you are—
The Chair
Order. I gently remind members of the Committee, from Ministers down, that when you use the word “you”, you are referring to me. You must refer to the hon. Gentleman either by his constituency or by his title, otherwise I might get a bit worried about what I have been up to.
Laura Farris
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention, although I am not sure that I completely followed it.
To answer the point about who administers the polygraph testing, it is the probation service.
The hon. Gentleman asked about resourcing and funding. We have injected extra funding into the probation service, as he acknowledged: it is now getting an extra £155 million a year. In the past 12 months, there has been a recruitment exercise that brought in over 1,500 new recruits. That is on top of the 2,500 since 2021, so in the past two and a half years alone we have added 4,000 people to the service and given it some increased funding. I hope that that answers the hon. Gentleman’s questions.
Amendment 37 agreed to.
Amendments made: 38, in clause 31, page 26, line 31, after “applied” insert
“(and was not an offence in relation to which section 31 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 would have applied if paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of that section were omitted)”.
This amendment excludes, from inserted subsection (4BB), an offence tried in Scotland where it was alleged but not proved that the offence was aggravated by having a terrorist connection.
Amendment 39, in clause 31, page 27, line 4, leave out “(4BB), (4BC) and” and insert “(4BA) to”.—(Laura Farris.)
This amendment is consequential on amendment 37.
Clause 31, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 32
Confiscation
Amendment made: 40, in clause 32, page 27, line 8, at end insert—
“(2) In Schedule 5 to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (criminal lifestyle offences: Northern Ireland), after paragraph 9A insert—
‘Offences relating to things used in serious crime or vehicle theft
9B (1) An offence under section 1 of the Criminal Justice Act 2024 (articles for use in serious crime).
(2) An offence under section 3 of the Criminal Justice Act 2024 (electronic devices for use in vehicle theft).’”—(Chris Philp.)
This amendment adds the offences created by clauses 1 and 3 of the Bill to the offences listed in Schedule 5 to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (criminal lifestyle offences: Northern Ireland).
Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 62, in schedule 4, page 119, line 18, leave out paragraph 25.
This amendment would remove the risk of dissipation as a condition for the making of a restraint order.
Schedule 4.
Criminal Justice Bill (Fourteenth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateDepartment: Home Office
Laura Farris
Main Page: Laura Farris (Conservative - Newbury)Department Debates - View all Laura Farris's debates with the Home Office
Criminal Justice Bill (Fourteenth sitting)
Laura Farris ExcerptsThursday 25th January 2024
(2 years, 6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 25 January 2024 - (25 Jan 2024)
Jess Phillips
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 74 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 75 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 76
Regulations
Amendment made: 146, in clause 76, page 68, line 15, after “purposes” insert “or areas”.—(Chris Philp.)
This amendment provides that regulations under the Bill (other than regulations under clause 78) may make different provision for different areas.
Clause 76, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 77
Extent
Amendments made: 41, in clause 77, page 68, line 36, leave out “5” and insert “1”.
This amendment provides that clauses 1 to 4 extend to (ie form part of the law of) Scotland and Northern Ireland, as well as England and Wales.
Amendment 42, in clause 77, page 69, line 2, at end insert—
“(ea) section (Terrorist offenders) (and Schedule (Notification orders));”.
This amendment provides that the new clause and Schedule moved by NC14 and NS1 extend to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.
Amendment 43, in clause 77, page 69, line 10, at end insert—
“(3A) Sections 11 and 12 extend to England and Wales and Northern Ireland.”.
See the statement to amendment 23.
Amendment 44, in clause 77, page 69, line 11, after “by” insert “section 32(2) or”.—(Chris Philp.)
This amendment to the extent provision is consequential on Amendment 40.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Laura Farris)
I beg to move amendment 147, in clause 77, page 69, line 11, after “by” insert
“section (Administering etc harmful substances (including by spiking))(2) or”.
This amendment provides that consequential amendments made by subsection (2) of the new clause moved by NC45 have the same extent as the provision amended.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government new clause 45—Administering etc harmful substances (including by spiking).
New clause 15—Intentionally administering a substance with intent to cause harm—
“(1) A person (‘P’) commits an offence if P intentionally administers a substance to, or causes a substance to be taken by, another person—
(a) without the consent of that other person, and
(b) with the intention of causing harm to that other person.
(2) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years.”
As it stands, spiking is covered by several different offences. This amendment is intended to create a standalone offence of spiking.
Laura Farris
It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Robert. New clause 45 concerns the issue of spiking. The offence of spiking is captured under various criminal provisions, including, but not limited to, section 61 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003—although that is primarily directed towards date rape—and what I might loosely term the poisoning provisions in sections 23 and 24 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861. It is the latter that the new clause will amend.
I hope that members of the Committee have had a chance to consider new clause 45, which amounts to a wholesale replacement of sections 23 and 24 of the 1861 Act. It modernises the language, captures the complete range of offending and puts the term “spiking” in legislation for the first time. [Interruption.] I am sorry; I pulled out a page and now cannot find it.
Alex Norris
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I would not want to pre-empt anything I might say in the debate, but I wonder whether she might join me in praising my hon. Friend the Member for Bootle for tabling new clause 15—he has had more success with his new clause than I have had with any of my amendments or new clauses—and my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford South (Judith Cummins), who has shown real leadership on this issue.
Laura Farris
I am grateful to the hon. Member for his intervention. I have no hesitation in congratulating and thanking all the members of the Committee, and Members across the House, for what they have done to help us on this issue.
The drafting of new clause 45 seeks to strike a balance between reflecting that the offences cover spiking, while ensuring that the other behaviour caught by the offences remains covered. For example, section 24 of the 1861 Act is also used to prosecute incidents of potting, where prisoners use urine or faeces to assault a prison or police custody officer. I hope that we can all agree that it is important that that behaviour is still captured by the criminal law. The new clause also alters the mode of trial for these offences, from indictable-only to triable either way. That means that a case can be progressed in either the magistrates court or the Crown court, rather than only in the Crown court.
Members will probably have already seen that, to some extent, the new clause replaces antiquated language. It uses language that we are much more familiar with in modern criminal law: terms such as “intentionally” and “recklessly”. Importantly in relation to spiking, it refers to a “harmful substance”, which is defined with reference to “poison” and “destructive or noxious thing”, but we have lost the language of poisoning, which was previously the headline in such offences. That language imported something that some police officers felt was quite unhelpful in understanding the precise nature of the offending that was taking place. Our amendments do not intend to change the existing approach to the mental element that is required as part of these offences.
Alex Norris
I rise to add our support to new clause 45, which is important. Spiking is a coward’s crime, as is potting, but we know that it is a stock in trade for a very small number of people who can have a devastating impact on people’s lives. It is an exceptionally harmful and dangerous practice. I congratulate colleagues on both the Opposition Benches and the Government Benches, as well as the Government themselves, on bringing the measure forward.
Legislation is clearly only part of the process. We need cultural change and strong messages. People need to hold each other to account and tell each other how important it is not to do things like this, because they are so dangerous. The right hon. Member for Chelmsford made the important point—we will hear the Minister’s response—that, to the extent that it can be, the law should be agnostic on the method of transmission. As technology changes, those who choose to do such things for their own ends will use whatever methods they can. That spiking could be done by vaping was new to me, but it seems obvious that that would be possible. I am keen to know how the legislation can keep pace with that.
Laura Farris
I pay tribute to my right hon. Friend the Member for Chelmsford, who has been an important voice on the issue. When I made a statement to the House just before Christmas, I thanked everybody: my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester, the right hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North and the hon. Member for Bradford South. Theirs have been important voices, and they have been helpful to us as we have worked our way through this issue.
I did not set out our thinking in my initial remarks, so it might be helpful for me to do so. First, it was said that spiking was covered by other offences, but when we look at the language of the Offences against the Person Act, it is accurate to say that parliamentarians at the time had something different in mind. We can tell that just by reading the legislation.
Secondly, all parliamentarians are familiar with being told that something is already covered by another law, but it is worth asking, “Would this particular offence be better captured in a defined way?” We have done the same with offences such as stalking in the life of this Parliament. For lots of offences, it is possible to think, “Can we crystallise the offence in a more accurate way?” That was material to our thinking, and that is why we have made these changes. I hope that that is helpful to the Committee.
I reassure my right hon. Friend the Member for Chelmsford that all forms of spiking are included, whether by needle, vape, drink or a food substance. New clause 45 is deliberately widely constructed so as to capture the whole range. She made a point about urine testing. We have been told by police that the biggest barrier to conviction is that even if the victim reports the incident the following morning and immediately gives a sample for a toxicology test, they can be left with the disappointing news that the substance has left their body, even though the police often accept that everything that they and perhaps their friends are describing is consistent with a spiking incident. That is why investment in rapid drinks testing kits, which are at a nascent stage, has been a big part of the non-legislative measures. If we can get those up and running, we can roll them out across night-time venues to facilitate on-site testing without having to go through the standard toxicology route. We think that would be really helpful in getting convictions.
We have been working with the Security Industry Authority on the training of nightclub doormen and bouncers. From April this year, there will be a condition for any new nightclub bouncer entering the industry to have specific training on spiking. From September, we will begin a refresher element, including a spiking course, for those already employed in the sector. It is anticipated that, within three years, all nightclub bouncers will have had had specific night-time training, and we are doing something similar with bar staff.
There is also a national reporting tool, which is currently operated by 20 police forces in England and Wales. It is being rolled out, but about half of the forces are using it. It allows people to report spiking anonymously. That does not have to be the victim; anyone who has seen something that they think is consistent with a spiking incident can make a report. That will help forces to develop a clearer picture of where spiking is happening and whether there are hotspots or problem areas, which will allow them to intensify the police response. Finally, we are doing some police intensification work.
I have probably gone on too long. Suffice it to say that dealing with spiking properly requires more than a change in the law, but we do think a change in the law is necessary and desirable, and we therefore hope that Members will support new clause 45.
Amendment 147 agreed to.
Amendment made: 50, in clause 77, page 69, line 12, at end insert—
“(5) Nothing in subsections (1) to (4) limits the extent within the United Kingdom of the armed forces provisions.
(6) Section 384(1) and (2) of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (extent outside the United Kingdom) applies to the armed forces provisions as it applies to the provisions of that Act.
(7) In subsections (5) and (6) the “armed forces provisions” means—
(a) a provision made, or inserted, by or under this Act so far as it is applied (by whatever words) by or under the Armed Forces Act 2006;
(b) an amendment, modification or repeal made by or under this Act of—
(i) a provision of or made under the Armed Forces Act 2006,
(ii) a provision that amends, modifies or repeals a provision of, or made under, that Act, or
(iii) any other provision, so far as the provision is applied (by whatever words) by or under that Act.”.—(Chris Philp.)
This amendment makes provision about the extent of provisions of or made under the Bill which relate to the Armed Forces Act 2006.
Clause 77, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 78
Commencement
Amendments made: 45, in clause 78, page 69, line 18, after “sections” insert
“(Testing of persons outside of police detention for presence of controlled drugs),”.
This amendment makes provision to bring NC13 into force on Royal Assent for the purpose of making regulations and issuing codes of practice.
Amendment 131, in clause 78, page 69, line 18, leave out “, 21 and 34” and insert “and 21”.
This amendment and amendment 132 provide for the clauses about serious crime prevention orders to be brought into force by regulations.
Amendment 46, in clause 78, page 69, line 18, after “regulations” insert
“or issuing codes of practice”.—(Chris Philp.)
See the statement for amendment 45.
Jess Phillips
I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 78, page 69, line 21, at end insert—
“( ) section ([Removal of women from the criminal law related to abortion]).”
This is an amendment conditional on the introduction of NC1. It would bring the new law into force on the day the Act is passed.
Alex Cunningham
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Robert. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley, made a detailed speech on new clauses 1, in particular, and 2, which were tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North and my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy) respectively. We all recognise how sensitive and controversial the issue of abortion is. It is important that we get the law exactly right and ensure that any changes do not have unintended consequences. I am grateful to my colleagues for ensuring that the debate on the law around abortion remains very much a focus for us in this place as we strive to make the right changes. I commend the work of all colleagues across the House on this issue.
New clause 1 would disapply criminal law on accessing or providing abortion care from women acting in relation to their own pregnancy at any gestation, ensuring that no woman would be liable for a prison sentence as a result of seeking to end her own pregnancy. New clause 2 seeks to repeal sections 58 to 60 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 and
“provide that no offence under these regulations or any other legislation is committed by a person complying with the requirements of subsection 1 of the Abortion Act 1967”.
The Abortion Act 1967 renders lawful activities that would otherwise constitute a crime under the Offences against the Person Act 1861. It provides criteria under which abortions or terminations can legally take place. Labour believes that abortion is an essential part of healthcare that is highly regulated. Let me make it perfectly clear today that we do not believe that women should be jailed for getting an abortion when they are doubtless at their most vulnerable. For that reason, a Labour Government will provide parliamentary time for free votes on modernising abortion law to ensure that Members of Parliament can deal with this issue once and for all.
Many cases and reasons over the years have led us to this point, but I will highlight again the custodial sentence in the case mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley. It was deeply sad, and something that we do not want repeated. This mother was jailed for illegally taking abortion tablets to end her pregnancy during lockdown. The Court of Appeal reduced her sentence, and she has since been released. The original judge decided that she should serve half her 28-month term in custody and the remainder on licence, but the Court of Appeal reduced the term to 14 months suspended. Dame Victoria Sharp KC, who heard the appeal, rightly noted that—we have heard this already this afternoon, but I make no apologies for repeating it—this was a case that called for “compassion, not punishment”. Carla Foster pleaded guilty to a charge under section 58 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861—administering drugs or using instruments to procure abortion—a plea accepted by the prosecution. As we have heard, she will carry that record throughout her life. Dame Victoria told the court that “no useful purpose” was served by detaining Ms Foster in custody and added that her case had “exceptionally strong mitigation.”
The Government have put forward an amendment to the 1861 Act in relation to the administering of harmful substances. We have just debated that and can all welcome that amendment, but it gives rise to the question: why have the Government not proposed any modernisation of the abortion offences, including the sentencing range? We are talking about a very similar provision of the same Act. Can the Minister say why the Government are not taking this opportunity, while the matter is under the spotlight and the subject of important debate, to remove custodial sentences?
We know that there are strongly held views on abortion—I have said that already—but it is rightly a matter of conscience for Members. The threat of prosecution is a real fear for women, and very sadly it is a fear that deters doctors from wanting to enter this fundamental area of women’s healthcare. It may help the Committee to know that health professionals, in the shape of the British Medical Association, support action, too. The BMA’s brief said that abortion should be regulated in the same way as other clinical procedures that are subject to an extensive range of professional standards, regulations and criminal and civil laws, but it stresses that it does not support criminal sanctions for women who procure and administer their own abortion, or for health professionals administering abortions in the context of their clinical practice.
I await with interest the Minister’s response to Committee members’ comments and those of the BMA. Specifically, I would like to know what action the Government plan to take to stop women being jailed for this offence. I am well aware that Members from across the House have been working together in an attempt to get this right and may well table a different amendment on Report. What discussions has the Minister had with Members? Is she open to further discussions? Is there any prospect of the Government bringing forward their own clause to right this wrong? She knows, as I do, that we must take action. There is a clear consensus on this.
Laura Farris
I am grateful to everybody who has spoken on this matter. Both new clause 1 and new clause 2 seek to decriminalise abortion. The Government maintain a neutral stance on these issues, but there are strongly held views across the House on this highly sensitive matter. They engage considerations of women’s rights and health, the rights of the unborn child, the viability of a foetus and the involvement of the criminal justice system. None of this is straightforward. It is an issue that, quite properly, Members will decide on according to their consciences, and I agree that it should be determined on the Floor of the House.
Let me begin by emphasising that the Government are committed to ensuring that all women in England and Wales have access to safe, regulated abortion services on the NHS under our laws. That includes telemedical abortions—sorry, I should probably refer to taking abortion pills at home when eligible, because “telemedical” is a confusing word.
As hon. Members know, in England and Wales the criminal offences relating to abortion must be read in conjunction with the provisions of the Abortion Act 1967, which provides exemptions to the criminal offences. The new clauses tabled by the right hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North and the hon. Member for Walthamstow seek, in different ways, to decriminalise abortion for women acting in relation to their own pregnancies. If the will of the House is that the criminal law on abortion should change, whether by exempting pregnant women from the offences or otherwise, the Government would not stand in the way of such change, but we must of course be concerned with the fitness for purpose of any legislation proposed. With that in mind, I turn to the detail of the amendments, but it may be helpful if I first set out the relevant offences.
Under section 58 of the Offences against the Person Act, it is an offence for a pregnant woman, with the intent to procure her own miscarriage unlawfully, to take drugs or use instruments, and for another person, with the intent to procure the miscarriage of a woman unlawfully, to administer drugs or use instruments. Section 59 makes it an offence to supply or procure drugs, poison or an instrument intended to be used to procure a miscarriage.
Laura Farris
Okay, but it is one, to give the Committee a sense of the scale of this issue in the criminal courts.
I turn first to amendment 1 and new clause 1, tabled by the right hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North. The purpose of new clause 1 is to disapply existing criminal law relating to abortion from a woman acting in relation to her own pregnancy at any stage of gestation. Under section 6 of the Abortion Act 1967, “the law relating to abortion” means
“sections 58 and 59 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, and any rule of law relating to the procurement of abortion”.
Section 5(1) of the 1967 Act provides:
“No offence under the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 shall be committed by a registered medical practitioner who terminates a pregnancy in accordance with the provisions of this Act.”
New clause 1 refers to “the law related to abortion”. Unlike the Abortion Act, it is not limited to specific provisions, and it could therefore be interpreted as applying more widely. It could, for example, include other offences against the person that may apply in this context, such as maliciously administering a poison so as to endanger life or inflict grievous bodily harm. In that regard, it differs from the law as it applies in Northern Ireland.
The hon. Member for Walthamstow takes a different approach. Her new clause 2 would require the Secretary of State to decriminalise abortion through regulations. Among other things, the regulations would repeal sections 58 to 60 of the Offences against the Person Act and make provision for alternative offences in relation to non-consensual abortion.
I reiterate that, should Parliament wish to change the law, the Government will not stand in the way, but hon. Members may consider that there would be alternative ways to amend primary legislation. Leaving aside the way in which decriminalisation might be achieved, there is the question whether the repeal of section 60 of the Offences against the Person Act is appropriate. Section 60 makes it an offence for a person to conceal the birth of a child by disposing of the child’s body after its birth. There is a high-profile case in the papers today concerning exactly that issue. It is not generally considered to be an abortion offence and it is not limited to the abortion context. Repealing the offence could have unintended consequences.
Jess Phillips
On the point made by the right hon. Member for Chelmsford, I have to say that I have noted from prior conversations people’s level of fear that they might have to vote on this issue today. If I were on the other side of this debate, I would not stop and think for a second that the will of the House needed to be tested, or that there was not a sneaky way to change the legislation—but I am not. We have tested the will of this House a number of times in the nine years that I have been here, and on every single occasion Parliament has acted in a pro-choice manner and has had a pro-choice majority. I have no doubt that I would hold the majority should I press new clause 1 to a Division in this Committee.
I agree with the right hon. Member for Chelmsford that it is the will of the House that these issues need to be tested. As I have said, I have no doubt that we will win in that context. What I would say is that it is always women’s bodies that we say this about. There is a load of people who will never have the experiences that I have had personally, or that some of the other women in this room have had, but get to have an opinion about the way that I live my life and make my choices about my own body, and we are taught to sort of genuflect and respect that. It should be a women’s health issue. If this was the women’s health Bill, we would be more than happy to amend all sorts of things in this room, but we allow this issue to retain some sort of grandiosity, as if it is any more than having a prostate exam, which even the King is doing and talking about. It should not be a thing any more. We are doing line-by-line scrutiny; we should be amending small bits.
On the Minister’s point about the things that the Government have put in place, let me say on behalf of my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North that she is welcome, because every single one of them came from an amendment that my right hon. Friend tabled. This is not her first rodeo; it is a long passion.
The thing I heard today that gave me solace was from my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton North, who said from the Opposition Front Bench that the Labour party will move to ensure that, under any Labour Government, Parliament has time to actually consider this issue, so that people do not have to tack things on to Bills that they might not quite fit in.
The Minister mentioned one person having been criminalised. I imagine that, if she goes away and gets the data on the number of incidents of domestic abuse where a miscarriage has been forced and the man has been charged with the same offence that she identified under the Infant Life (Preservation) Act, she will find that it is zero, yet that will have happened hundreds of times in the last few years.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment made: 148, in clause 78, page 69, line 24, at end insert—
“(aa) section (Maximum term of imprisonment for certain offences on summary conviction);”—(Laura Farris.)
This amendment provides that the new clause moved by NC47 comes into force two months after Royal Assent.
Amendment made: 132, in clause 78, page 69, leave out line 28.—(Chris Philp.)
See the explanatory statement to amendment 131.
Clause 78, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 79 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
New Clause 10
Power to seize bladed articles etc: armed forces
“In the Armed Forces Act 2006, after section 93ZC (inserted by section (Stolen goods on premises (entry, search and seizure without warrant): armed forces) insert—
“93ZD Power to seize bladed articles etc
(1) This section applies where—
(a) a service policeman is lawfully on any premises which are searchable by virtue of this Part, or
(b) a person subject to service law who is not a service policeman is lawfully on any premises in the exercise of a power of search conferred by virtue of this Part.
(2) If the service policeman or person subject to service law—
(a) finds, on the premises, an article which has a blade or is sharply pointed (a “relevant article”), and
(b) has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the relevant article would be likely to be used in connection with unlawful violence (if it were not seized),they may seize the relevant article.
(3) The following provisions apply where a relevant article is seized under this section.
(4) The service policeman or person subject to service law who seized the relevant article—
(a) must give a record of what was seized to a person who is on the premises, or
(b) if there is no person on the premises, must leave a record of what was seized in a prominent place on the premises.
(5) The record must—
(a) describe the relevant article,
(b) state that it has been seized under this section,
(c) specify the date of seizure,
(d) give the reason why the relevant article was seized, and
(e) specify the name, rank or rate, and the unit, of the service policeman or person subject to service law who seized the relevant article.
(6) Following seizure of the relevant article, the service policeman or person subject to service law may—
(a) retain it, or
(b) destroy it or otherwise dispose of it. This is subject to subsections (7) and (12).
(7) A person (“P”) claiming to be the owner of the relevant article may apply to the commanding officer of the relevant person for a determination that the relevant article should be delivered to P.
(8) The “relevant person” is the person by virtue of whose occupation of or other connection with the premises, the premises are within subsection (1).
(9) The commanding officer may make a determination under subsection (7) if it appears to them that—
(a) P is the owner of the relevant article, and
(b) it would be just to make the determination.
(10) If the commanding officer does not make a determination under subsection (7), P may appeal to a judge advocate.
(11) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision—
(a) with respect to the practice and procedure which is to apply in connection with applications for a determination under subsection (7) and appeals under subsection (10);
(b) conferring functions on judge advocates in relation to appeals under subsection (10).
(12) The relevant article may not be destroyed or disposed of—
(a) in the period of 6 months beginning with the day on which it is seized, or
(b) if an application under subsection (7) is made in that period, until the application (including any appeal) has been finally determined or otherwise disposed of (and then, only if no determination is made that the relevant article should be delivered to P).
(13) In this section “unlawful violence” includes—
(a) unlawful damage to property, and
(b) a threat of unlawful violence (including of unlawful damage to property).””—(Chris Philp.)
This new clause amends the Armed Forces Act 2006 to make provision equivalent to that made by clause 18 of the Bill.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 11
Stolen goods on premises (entry, search and seizure without warrant): armed forces
“In the Armed Forces Act 2006, after section 93 insert—
“93ZA Search for particular stolen goods
(1) A service policeman of at least the rank of naval lieutenant, military or marine captain or flight lieutenant may authorise a service policeman to—
(a) enter specified premises which are relevant residential premises, and
(b) search the specified premises for specified items.
(2) An officer may give an authorisation under subsection (1) only if satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that—
(a) the specified items are stolen goods,
(b) the specified items are on the specified premises, and
(c) it is likely that the purpose of the search would be frustrated or seriously prejudiced if no search could be carried out before the time mentioned in subsection (3).
(3) That time is the earliest time by which it would be practicable—
(a) for a service policeman to obtain and execute a warrant under section 83 authorising the entry and search of the premises, or
(b) in a case where a member of a UK police force could obtain a warrant under section 8 of PACE or any other enactment authorising the entry and search of the premises, for a member of such a force to obtain and execute such a warrant.
(4) An officer may give an authorisation under subsection (1) orally or in writing.
(5) As soon as reasonably practicable after giving the authorisation the officer must record in writing—
(a) if the authorisation is given orally, the authorisation, and
(b) in any case, the officer’s reasons for being satisfied as mentioned in subsection (2).
(6) The powers conferred by an authorisation under subsection (1) may be exercised only—
(a) by a service policeman in uniform,
(b) before the end of the 24 hour period beginning with the time the authorisation is given, and
(c) at a reasonable hour (unless it appears to the service policeman that exercising them at a reasonable hour may frustrate or seriously prejudice the purpose of exercising them).
(7) The power of search conferred by an authorisation under subsection (1) is exercisable only to the extent that is reasonably required for the purpose of searching the specified premises for the specified items.
(8) Where the occupier of the specified premises is present at the time the service policeman seeks to enter and search them, the service policeman must—
(a) identify themselves to the occupier, and
(b) state the purpose for which they are entering and searching the premises.
93ZB Seizure on search under section 93ZA
(1) This section applies where a service policeman is lawfully on relevant residential premises in exercise of the powers conferred by an authorisation under section 93ZA(1).
(2) The service policeman may seize anything which is on the specified premises (whether or not it is a specified item) if the service policeman has reasonable grounds to believe—
(a) that it is stolen goods, and
(b) that it is necessary to seize it in order to prevent it being concealed, lost, damaged altered or destroyed.
(3) The service policeman may seize anything which is on the specified premises (whether or not it is a specified item) if the service policeman has reasonable grounds to believe—
(a) that it is evidence in relation to—
(i) an offence under section 42 which the service policeman is investigating, or
(ii) any other offence under section 42,
as respects which the corresponding offence under the law of England and Wales is theft, and
(b) that it is necessary to seize it in order to prevent the evidence being concealed, lost, damaged, altered or destroyed.
(4) The powers of seizure in subsections (2) and (3) include power to require information which is stored in an electronic form and is accessible from the premises to be produced in a form—
(a) in which it can be taken away and which it is visible and legible, or
(b) from which it can readily be produced in a visible and legible form.
(5) As soon as reasonably practicable after exercising a power of seizure conferred by this section, the service policeman must record in writing—
(a) the grounds on which the power was exercised, and
(b) the items seized.
93ZC Sections 93ZA and 93ZB: supplementary
(1) The powers conferred by sections 93ZA and 93ZB do not include powers to search for or seize—
(a) items subject to legal privilege,
(b) excluded material, or
(c) special procedure material.
(2) In sections 93ZA and 93ZB “specified” means specified in an authorisation under section 93ZA(1).
(3) Sections 93ZA and 93ZB are to be construed in accordance with section 24 of the Theft Act 1968, reading references in that section to blackmail and fraud as including an offence under section 42 as respects which the corresponding offence under the law of England and Wales is blackmail or fraud.
(4) In sections 93ZA and 93ZB the following expressions have the meanings given by section 84—
“excluded material”
“items subject to legal privilege”
“relevant residential premises”
“special procedure material” .””—(Chris Philp.)
This new clause amends the Armed Forces Act 2006 to make provision equivalent to the provision inserted into the Theft Act 1968 by clause 19 of the Bill.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 12
Powers to compel attendance at sentencing hearing: armed forces
“(1) The Armed Forces Act 2006 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 259 insert—
“Attendance at sentencing hearings
259A Power to order attendance
(1) This section applies where—
(a) an offender has been convicted of a service offence in respect of which a life sentence may, or must, be passed,
(b) the offender is kept in service custody awaiting sentencing by the Court Martial, and
(c) the offender has refused, or there are reasonable grounds to suspect the offender will refuse, to attend court for the sentencing hearing.
(2) The Court Martial may order the offender to attend court for the sentencing hearing.
(3) An order under subsection (2) may be made by the Court Martial of its own motion or on the application of the Director of Service Prosecutions.
(4) Before making an order under subsection (2) in relation to an offender aged under 18, the Court Martial must have regard to the welfare of the offender.
(5) In this section—
“life sentence” means any of the following sentences imposed by virtue of this Act—
(a) a sentence of imprisonment for life,
(b) a sentence of detention for life during His Majesty’s pleasure, or
(c) a sentence of custody for life;
“sentencing hearing” means a hearing following conviction that is held for the purposes of sentencing an offender.
(6) Nothing in this section limits any other power of the Court Martial to order an offender to attend court for a sentencing hearing.
259B Power to order production of offender
(1) This section applies where—
(a) an offender aged 18 or over is kept in service custody awaiting sentencing by the Court Martial or the Service Civilian Court in respect of a service offence, and
(b) the offender has refused, or there are reasonable grounds to suspect the offender will refuse, to attend court for the sentencing hearing.
(2) The court may order that the offender is produced before the court for the sentencing hearing.
(3) An order under subsection (2) may be made by the court of its own motion or on the application of the Director of Service Prosecutions.
(4) A person subject to service law who is authorised for the purposes of this section by the Provost Marshal of the Royal Military Police may use reasonable force, if necessary and proportionate, to give effect to an order under subsection (2).
(5) In this section “sentencing hearing” has the meaning given by section 259A.
(6) A person is to be treated as having complied with an order under subsection (2) if they have done all that they reasonably can to secure that the offender is produced before the court for sentencing.
(7) Nothing in this section affects—
(a) any other power of the court to order that an offender is produced before the court for a sentencing hearing;
(b) any other power to use force.”
(3) In section 309 (offences of misbehaviour in court etc)—
(a) after subsection (1) insert—
“(1A) The Court Martial also has jurisdiction under this section to deal with an offender who fails without reasonable excuse to comply with an order under section 259A(2) (order to attend sentencing hearing).”
(b) in subsection (2)(a) after “days” insert “or, in a case within subsection (1A), 2 years”.”—(Chris Philp.)
This new clause amends the Armed Forces Act 2006 to make provision equivalent to the provision inserted into the Sentencing Code by clause 22 of the Bill.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 13
Testing of persons outside of police detention for presence of controlled drugs
“(1) The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 is amended as set out in subsections (2) to (5).
(2) In section 30 (arrest elsewhere than at police station), after subsection (11) insert—
“(11A) Nothing in subsection (1A) or in section 30A prevents a constable delaying taking a person to a police station, or releasing the person under section 30A, for such time as is reasonable for the purpose of taking a sample under section 32A.
(11B) Where there is any such delay the reasons for the delay must be recorded when the person first arrives at the police station or (as the case may be) is released under section 30A.”
(3) After section 32 (search upon arrest) insert—
“32A Testing for presence of controlled drugs upon arrest at a place other than a police station
(1) An approved constable may take a single non-intimate sample from a person for the purpose of ascertaining whether any specified controlled drug is in the person’s body, if the following conditions are met—
(a) the arrest condition,
(b) the age condition, and
(c) the request condition.
(2) The arrest condition is that section 30(1A) applies in respect of the person and either—
(a) the offence for which the person was arrested is a trigger offence, or
(b) a constable of at least the rank of inspector—
(i) has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the misuse by the person of a specified controlled drug caused or contributed to the offence for which the person was arrested, and
(ii) has authorised the sample to be taken.
(3) The age condition is that the person is aged 18 or over.
(4) The request condition is that an approved constable has requested the person to give the sample.
(5) Before requesting the person to give a sample, an approved constable must—
(a) warn the person that if, when so requested, the person fails without good cause to do so the person may be liable to prosecution, and
(b) in a case within subsection (2)(b), inform the person of the giving of the authorisation and of the grounds in question.
(6) A sample may only be taken under this section—
(a) at or near the place where an approved constable requested the person to give the sample, and
(b) before the person has been taken to a police station or released under section 30(7) or 30A.
(7) If a sample is taken from a person under this section, an approved constable must give the person a notice in writing which sets out—
(a) the offence in respect of which the arrest condition is met;
(b) in a case within subsection (2)(b), details of the authorisation and the grounds in question;
(c) the date and time when the sample was taken;
(d) the location where the sample was taken;
(e) whether an analysis of the sample reveals that a specified controlled drug may be present in the person’s body.
(8) A notice under subsection (7) must be given as soon as reasonably practicable and in any event before the earlier of the person being released or charged with the offence in respect of which the arrest condition is met.
(9) A person who fails without good cause to give any sample which may be taken from the person under this section commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 months or a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale (or both).
32B Section 32A: supplementary
(1) A constable of at least the rank of inspector may give an authorisation under section 32A(2)(b) orally or in writing but, if it is given orally, the constable must confirm it in writing as soon as is practicable.
(2) If a person from whom a sample is taken under section 32A is taken to a police station, the constable giving the notice under section 32A(7) must secure that a record is made, as part of the person’s custody record, of the matters set out in the notice.
(3) If a person from whom a sample is taken under section 32A is released under section 30(7) or 30A, the constable giving the notice under section 32A(7) must, as soon as is practicable after the notice is given, make a record in writing of the matters set out in the notice.
(4) Section 32A does not prejudice the generality of section 63.
(5) In section 32A—
“approved constable” means a constable who has been approved for the purposes of section 32A by the chief officer of police of the police force to which the constable belongs (or, where the constable belongs to the British Transport Police Force, by the chief constable of the British Transport Police Force);
“non-intimate sample” has the same meaning as in Part 5 (see section 65(1));
“specified controlled drug” means a controlled drug (within the meaning of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971) specified in regulations under section 32C;
“trigger offence” means an offence specified in regulations under section 32C.
32C Section 32A: regulations
(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations for the purposes of section 32A—
(a) specify a controlled drug as a “specified controlled drug”;
(b) specify an offence as a “trigger offence”.
(2) Regulations under subsection (1)—
(a) may make different provision for different purposes or different areas; and
(b) may make transitional, transitory or saving provision.
(3) Regulations under this section are to be made by statutory instrument.
(4) A statutory instrument containing (whether alone or with other provision) regulations under subsection (1)(b) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.
(5) Any other statutory instrument containing regulations under this section is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.
(6) In this section “controlled drug” has the same meaning as in the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971.
32D Section 32A: disclosure of obtained information
Information obtained from a sample taken from a person under section 32A may be disclosed—
(a) for the purpose of informing any decision about granting bail in criminal proceedings (within the meaning of the Bail Act 1976) to the person;
(b) for the purpose of informing any decision about the giving of a diversionary caution under Part 6 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 to the person;
(c) where the person is in police detention or is remanded in or committed to custody by an order of a court or has been granted such bail, for the purpose of informing any decision about the person’s supervision;
(d) where the person is convicted of an offence, for the purpose of informing any decision about the appropriate sentence to be passed by a court and any decision about the person’s supervision or release;
(e) for the purpose of an assessment which the person is required to attend by virtue of section 9(2) or 10(2) of the Drugs Act 2005;
(f) for the purpose of proceedings against the person for an offence under section 12(3) or 14(3) of that Act;
(g) for the purpose of ensuring that appropriate advice and treatment is made available to the person.”
(4) In section 63B, after subsection (5D) insert—
“(5E) A sample may not be taken from a person under this section if—
(a) the person is in police detention by virtue of being taken to a police station after being arrested at a place other than a police station, and
(b) a sample was taken from the person under section 32A.”
(5) In section 66(2) (codes of practice), after “section” insert “32A or”.
(6) In Schedule 1 to the Bail Act 1976 (persons entitled to bail: supplementary provisions), in Part 1 (defendants accused or convicted of imprisonable offences), in paragraph 6B(1)(b)(i), after “under section” insert “32A or”.”—(Chris Philp.)
The new clause provides for testing of controlled drugs upon arrest at a place other than a police station and makes related changes.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 14
Terrorist offenders
“(1) Schedule (Notification orders) amends Part 4 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (notification requirements) so as to enable courts to make notification orders in respect of persons who have committed certain domestic offences or service offences.
(2) In section 43B of the Terrorism Act 2000 (terrorist offenders released on licence: arrest without warrant pending recall decision) in subsection (4) after paragraph (d) insert—
“(e) a person in respect of whom—
(i) a domestic offence notification order (within the meaning of Schedule 4A to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008), or
(ii) a service offence notification order (within the meaning of Schedule 6A to that Act),
has been made and who is serving a sentence for the offence by virtue of which the order was made.””—(Chris Philp.)
This new clause introduces the Schedule moved by NS1 (which provides for orders applying the notification requirements in Part 4 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 to persons who have committed certain domestic offences or service offences) and also extends powers of arrest and search to persons in respect of whom such orders are made.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 21
Dispersal powers: removal of senior police officer authorisation
“(1) Omit section 34 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 (authorisation of constables to use dispersal powers by police officer of at least the rank of inspector).
(2) In consequence of subsection (1), in section 35 of that Act (directions excluding a person from an area)—
(a) in subsection (1)—
(i) omit “and an authorisation is in force under section 34”;
(ii) for “in the locality specified in the direction” substitute “in a locality”;
(b) in subsection (4), omit the second sentence.”—(Chris Philp.)
This new clause removes the requirement that a police officer of at least the rank inspector must authorise the use of dispersal powers under section 35 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 22
Dispersal powers: extension to local authorities
“(1) The Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 35—
(a) in subsections (1), for “a constable in uniform” substitute “an authorised person”;
(b) in subsection (2), (3) and (6), for “constable” substitute “authorised person”;
(c) after subsection (4), insert—
“(4A) Each of the following is an “authorised person”—
(a) a constable in uniform;
(b) a person authorised for the purposes of this Part by the local authority in whose area the public place mentioned in subsection (1) is situated (“authorised LA officer”).”
(d) after subsection (6), insert—
“(6A) A direction given by an authorised LA officer under this section is not valid if the officer—
(a) is asked by the person to whom the direction is given to show evidence of their authorisation, and
(b) fails to do so.”
(e) in subsection (7), for “the constable” substitute “a constable in uniform in the public place”;
(f) for subsection (8) substitute—
“(8) Any constable may withdraw or vary a direction given by a constable under this section.
(8A) Any authorised LA officer may withdraw or vary a direction given by an authorised LA officer under this section.
(8B) A variation under subsection (8) or (8A) must not extend the duration of a direction beyond 48 hours from when it was first given.”
(g) in subsection (11), for ““exclusion period”” to the end substitute “—
“authorised person” has the meaning given by subsection (4A);
“exclusion period” has the meaning given by subsection (1)(b);
“local authority” has the same meaning as in Part 1 (see section 20).”
(3) In section 36 (restrictions)—
(a) in subsections (1), (2), (3) and (4), for “A constable” substitute “An authorised person”;
(b) in subsection (1), for “constable”, in the second place it appears, substitute “authorised person”;
(c) in subsection (5), for “a constable” substitute “an authorised person”.
(4) In section 38 (record-keeping), in subsections (1) and (2), for “A constable” substitute “An authorised person”.
(5) In section 41 (guidance), in subsection (1), for “chief officers of police” to the end substitute “—
(a) chief officers of police about the exercise, by officers under their direction or control, of those officers’ functions under this Part;
(b) local authorities about the exercise, by persons authorised under section 35(4A)(b), of those persons’ functions under this Part.””—(Chris Philp.)
This new clause confers dispersal powers under Part 3 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 on persons authorised by local authorities for the purposes of the Part.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)
Criminal Justice Bill (Fifteenth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateDepartment: Home Office
Laura Farris
Main Page: Laura Farris (Conservative - Newbury)Department Debates - View all Laura Farris's debates with the Home Office
Criminal Justice Bill (Fifteenth sitting)
Laura Farris ExcerptsTuesday 30th January 2024
(2 years, 6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 30 January 2024 - (30 Jan 2024)
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Laura Farris)
I apologise to the Committee for being late—I had left something behind.
The new clause amends a number of existing criminal offences in the Sexual Offences Act 2003. Currently, it is an offence for a person intentionally to engage in sexual activity where, for the purposes of obtaining sexual gratification, they do so when a child is present and they know or believe that the child is aware that they are engaging in the sexual activity. There are similar offences that target such behaviour where the victim is an adult with a mental disorder.
We have listened carefully to those on the frontline, who have identified a small category of cases involving this type of behaviour where there was insufficient evidence that the perpetrator knew, believed or intended that the child, or the person with a mental disorder, was aware of the sexual activity, most typically because the child was asleep. The new clause will expand the criminal law so that successful prosecution does not depend on the alleged victim’s awareness of the sexual act or the defendant’s intent. It will capture cases where, for example, a defendant masturbates over a sleeping child for the purpose of sexual gratification and subsequently seeks to argue that they did not believe the child was aware of the activity and did not even intend that the child should be aware of the activity. The new clause therefore alters the mental elements of the offences.
I thank the National Police Chiefs’ Council, a number of individual police forces and the Crown Prosecution Service for bringing to the Government’s attention these troubling cases, which have informed our response and led us to conclude that we should amend the existing offences to protect vulnerable adults and children. The amended offences will retain the need for a link between the child’s presence or observation and the perpetrator’s sexual gratification. That requirement is critical because of the risk of over-criminalising those who engage in sexual activity with no malicious intent where a child may be present, such as parents sharing a bedroom.
We want to ensure that these behaviours are prosecuted, not just to bring offenders to justice but, importantly, to enable the management of offenders and to prevent further escalation where there is the potential for a more serious sexual offence against children or vulnerable adults.
Alex Norris (Nottingham North) (Lab/Co-op)
It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Mrs Latham, for the Committee’s final day.
The new clause is a welcome addition to the Bill. Clearly, experts have identified that the person B knowledge gap is really important and is creating risk with respect to those who seek gratification in this way. It is right that that loophole is closed. My only question for the Minister is about the sort of scale we are talking about. She mentioned a small number of cases. Do the Government have an estimate of the number of cases that the measure is likely to apply to?
Laura Farris
I do not have any indication of the number of cases, but we have heard from the police that there have been problems with getting a prosecution where they cannot prove intent.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 46 accordingly read a Second time and added to the Bill.
New Clause 47
Maximum term of imprisonment for certain offences on summary conviction
“In the following provisions for “6 months” substitute “the general limit in a magistrates’ court”—
section 1(6)(a) of the Prevention of Social Housing Fraud Act 2013 (unlawful sub-letting: secure tenancies);
section 2(7)(a) of that Act (unlawful sub-letting: assured tenancies and secure contracts);
section 30(3)(b) of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (breach of certain orders or requirements);
section 339(2)(a) of the Sentencing Act 2020 (breach of criminal behaviour order);
section 354(4)(a) of that Act (breach of sexual harm prevention order);
section 363(2)(a) of that Act (breach of restraining order).”—(Laura Farris.)
This new clause provides that the maximum term of imprisonment for certain offences, on summary conviction, is the general limit in a magistrates’ court.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 3
Removal of parental responsibility for men convicted of sexual offences against children
‘(1) After section 2 (parental responsibility for children) of the Children Act 1989, insert—
“2A Prisoners: suspension of parental responsibility
(1) This section applies where—
(a) a person (“A”) has been found guilty of a serious sexual offence involving or relating to a child or children; and
(b) A had parental responsibility for a child or children at the time at which the offence was committed.
(2) A ceases to have parental responsibility for all children, for a time specified by the sentencing court or until an application by A to the family court to reinstate parental responsibility has been approved.””—(Jess Phillips.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this morning, Mrs Latham. I welcome the new clause tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Camberwell and Peckham and outlined by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley. New clause 3, as we have heard, seeks to remove the parental responsibility of people convicted of sexual offences against children and I welcome the tremendous cross-party support it has received. The new clause’s core aspect is the welfare of the child. I am one of those whose ambition in being elected to this place was to work for the benefit of young people, and the new clause does that.
The proposal would go some way to strengthening the law around the welfare of a child whose parent has been convicted of sexual offences against children. There are very limited cases where the court has allowed an application to terminate a person’s parental responsibility. They include a 1995 case in which the court terminated the parental responsibility, acquired by a parental responsibility agreement, of a father who had been sent to prison for causing serious injuries to his child.
In 2013, the court removed the parental responsibility of a father who had been imprisoned for sexual abuse of his child’s half-sisters. In a further case in 2013, the court terminated the parental responsibility of a father who was serving a prison sentence for a violent attack on the child’s mother. Finally, in a 2021 case, the court terminated the parental responsibility of a father who had a significant offending history, including sexual offences against children. In other words, this is already happening.
On Second Reading, I spoke about the need to amend the Bill so that offenders who have sexually harmed children and are sent to prison as a result lose the ability to control their own children from behind bars. That measure is long overdue and will ensure all children are safe from those dangerous predators, including their own parents. The key problem to address is: how can a man—it is usually a man—considered too dangerous to work with or be around other people’s children be allowed to have parental responsibility that effectively makes him responsible for all manner of decisions affecting their child’s life, but which may not be in the best interests of the child? Why should any child be subject to any form of control by a convicted sex offender who is unlikely to be part of their lives for years ahead, and possibly forever?
In response to a question on the proposed new clause, Dame Vera Baird told Committee members that she had reservations about the definition of a sexual offence in the context of the Bill as she felt it might be too wide. That said, I hope the Government will at least support the new clause in principle and perhaps return to the issue on Report so that we can take another step in the quest of all of us here to protect children. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Laura Farris
The new clause seeks the automatic suspension of parental responsibility where a parent has been convicted of a serious sexual offence against a child. We understand fully the motivation in bringing the new clause. We have discussed it and I respect the remarks that have been made. I want to confine my remarks to the contours of the current system and where that fits in relation to Jade’s law, which the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley has already alluded to, and how that was introduced in the Victims and Prisoners Bill.
Starting with the current state of the law, the paramountcy principle is the cornerstone of the family justice system. There must be full consideration of the best interests of the child as a starting point. The hon. Member for Stockton North has just given an example of a number of cases where the parent had committed a very serious sexual offence and the family court acted accordingly to suspend parental responsibility.
Jess Phillips
Perhaps the Minister would like to see my email account, which has a folder specifically for the thousands of cases from the family court where the cornerstone is absolutely not the safety of the child. There are lots of cases where that does not happen—far more than the handful that have been referred to.
Laura Farris
I noted what the hon. Lady said in her opening remarks, but I will go through the legal landscape before I come to other issues. As I say, we are carefully considering the force of the new clause.
In cases in which a parent has been convicted of a child sexual offence, the family court has the power to strip out parental responsibility. That decision is made only after careful consideration of the best interests of the individual children, to ensure that their needs are the driver for action. Decisions about suspending or restricting parental responsibility have significant ramifications for children, which is why judges prefer to consider each case on its individual merits and make a decision that is specific to the best interests of that child.
We must not conflate suspending an individual’s parental responsibility with a punishment. It is a step that is taken to protect the child from harm, and because of that it must be taken when it is in the best interests of the child. The new clause, as drafted, makes no provision for the consideration of the best interests of the child. For that reason, we think it engages article 8 consideration under the European convention.
Members are of course aware that the Government recently tabled an amendment to the Victims and Prisoners Bill that will automatically suspend parental responsibility where a parent has been convicted of the murder or the manslaughter of the other parent. We wish to make clear that distinction. In many cases in which one parent has killed the other, the children involved will have no one left to exercise parental responsibility, apart from the killer of their other parent. In such circumstances, we think that it is right that whoever is left caring for the child, whether that be a grandparent or even the local authority, is spared the onus being on them to commence family proceedings to restrict the offender’s parental responsibility.
Where a parent has committed a serious offence other than murder or voluntary manslaughter, it is likely that there will be another parent able to exercise parental responsibility and apply to the family court.
Jess Phillips
Does the hon. Lady think it is okay for a woman who has been abused and had her husband convicted of paedophilia to pay £30,000 in order to keep her children safe?
Laura Farris
I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention. That case has caused concern, and we have been looking carefully at the legal aid position, which I will come on to.
As I was saying, where a parent has committed a serious offence other than murder or manslaughter, it is likely that there will be another parent able to exercise parental responsibility and make the application to the family court—I will come to legal aid in a moment—for the well-established method of restricting the offender’s parental responsibility.
Lord Meston, a family court judge who sits in the House of Lords, made a speech on the Victims and Prisoners Bill in which he warmly welcomed the inclusion of Jade’s law as a way of automatically restricting the rights of the other parent. I just say this in passing. He was invited to consider whether there should be the automatic suspension of parental responsibility if another kind of crime was committed. He said something that we have noted as part of our thinking:
“However, on reflection, I do not think that the Crown Court should be expected, as part of a sentencing exercise, to make automatic prohibited steps orders”
in different cases. He continued:
“The Crown Court will not have, and cannot be expected to have, a full appreciation of the family’s structure and dynamics, and of the circumstances of the children concerned, and will not have input from Cafcass.” Lords—[Official Report, House of Lords, 18 December 2023; Vol. 834, c. 2094.]
That is not determinative of our thinking, but it is the reflection of a family court judge who sits in the other place. That is what he said in relation to Jade’s law while, of course, welcoming it.
The automatic nature of the new clause would mean there would be no space for the court to consider the wishes of the other parent or the wishes of the children as to whether the matter should be brought to a family court.
Jess Phillips
The new clause clearly states that the other parent can apply to the court to have their wishes heard, but it is not the responsibility of a completely innocent mother, in most cases, to have to protect her child from a sex offender.
Laura Farris
I accept that the new clause gives the other parent the right to return to the family court, but effectively it could force a child to make applications to the family court to have their wishes considered.
Laura Farris
Because there has to be an application for the reinstatement of parental responsibility. That is what the new clause states at proposed new section 2A(2).
Jess Phillips
The hon. Lady said that a child would have to make an application to the family court. How is that the case?
Laura Farris
The child would have to advance what their best interests are to the family court, if parental responsibility has already been suspended.
Laura Farris
We have carefully considered the case in Cardiff. I want to make it clear that legal aid is available for a prohibited steps order and specific issue order in specific circumstances, subject to means and merits tests and evidence requirements relating to domestic abuse or the protection of children being met. Where the subject of an order has a relevant conviction for a child abuse offence, it is likely that the application would satisfy the relevant evidence and merits criteria. We are looking into why that was not the case for the lady in Cardiff.
Jess Phillips
Could I also open all the other cases with the Legal Aid Agency? The vast majority of people I encounter—there are thousands, and I have sat in the family court for hours—have not been able to access legal aid. Every one of them is a victim. Perhaps the Minister could look into that.
Laura Farris
That warrants a response, and the hon. Lady will get one.
My final point, to which the hon. Lady alluded in her opening remarks, when she said she hoped the provision might go wider, is that one of the conceptual difficulties with the new clause is that it would seek to remove parental responsibility in cases of serious child sexual abuse, but it is silent on, for example, child murder. Or what about perhaps a serious case of terrorism, where we could advance a plausible argument? We think there are issues around the scope of the new clause.
Jess Phillips
I could not agree more—the scope needs to be much wider—so will the Minister and the Government, by Report stage or in the Lords, finally act on the harms review by tabling amendments to the Bill that we can all be proud of?
Laura Farris
As I say, we are looking at the definitional issues. We are also looking carefully at the paramountcy principle, which underpins the way in which cases are approached in the family court. The new clause has a worthy aim. We have huge sympathy for families in these circumstances and want to do as much as possible to support them in getting the right outcome for their children. At present, we do not think the new clause is the right way to do that, and we urge the hon. Lady to withdraw it.
Jess Phillips
For nearly 10 years I have had Ministers stand in front of me and say, “We are a bit worried about” some legal word or other. How many children have died because of family court proceedings in the 10 years that we have been trying to raise the alarm? The family courts in our country will be the next Rotherham or Rochdale. State-sanctioned child abuse is going on and we all just turn a blind eye. The things that I have seen in courts are harrowing. I have watched children being removed from their loving mothers and placed fully in the care of paedophiles—proven child abusers. For me, we cannot casually sit here and pretend that that is okay.
Funnily enough, one of the people I started this campaign with, all those years ago, was the current Justice Secretary. Why is it taking so long to do something about the family courts in our country? They are actively dangerous, everybody knows it and nobody is doing anything about it. It is like the Post Office; I will not be one of those people who sat by and did nothing.
I will not press the new clause to a Division, because its scope is not wide enough and does not deal with half the harms that I see. If the Minister wants to take away the parental responsibility for children from terrorists she can knock herself out—I will support it. I will support any movement towards progress in the family court, because I have seen none. I look forward to the Government coming forward with an all-singing, all-dancing proposal that will make children safe. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
Alex Cunningham
I will be brief. As the hon. Gentleman said, this is a distressing new clause, but the Opposition believe it is very much necessary. I was briefed on it last week by the right hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells, and I was really shocked by what he had to tell me about the murderer David Fuller. The facts have been outlined to the Committee today. Fuller was of course jailed for murder, but that someone could carry out the assaults that he did on dead people and not be prosecuted beggars belief. None of us can comprehend the distress caused to the families of the deceased people Fuller violated. It is important that we ensure that anyone who acts as he did is suitably punished.
I note that the hon. Member for South Basildon and East Thurrock does not intend to press the matter to a vote, but I hope the Minister will be sympathetic to his cause and that of the right hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells. I reiterate our support for the new clause and ask the Government to bring forward a new clause, perhaps on Report, to deal with this most horrendous crime.
Laura Farris
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for South Basildon and East Thurrock for his speech. I am grateful for the opportunity—
The Chair
Order. May I intervene? I have been passed a note to say that the mics in the room are for the audio recording of proceedings, not for amplification in the room, so Members should be advised to speak up if others are having difficulty hearing. I understand that when somebody has their back to the people they are speaking to, it is very difficult to hear, so would the Minister mind speaking up a little?
Laura Farris
Thank you, Mrs Latham. I am grateful for the opportunity to speak about the new clause. I hope people can hear me this time.
It is actually quite rare in this place that we find that there is a crime that is not reflected at all in the law. This is one of those examples. It follows the truly disgusting offending by David Fuller. I want to start by acknowledging the experience of his victims’ families and how distressing it has been for them. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford and my right hon. Friend the Member for Tunbridge Wells for their work on this matter.
The Government have been reviewing the sexual penetration of a corpse offence in section 70 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, which currently carries a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment following conviction on indictment, and we agree that there is a gap in the law. Section 70 applies only to sexual penetration of a corpse, so any form of sexual touching falling short of penetration is not currently a criminal offence. The Government have therefore concluded that the criminal law should be expanded to include non-penetrative sexual activity with a corpse.
The Government have also concluded that the current statutory maximum does not adequately reflect the harm caused by an offence of this nature, and that it should be increased from two years’ to five years’ imprisonment. We therefore support my right hon. and hon. Friends’ laudable aims in tabling their new clause.
In the interests of completeness, I will set out why we cannot accept the new clause as drafted. It would not repeal section 70 of the Sexual Offences Act but would create a new offence, in proposed new section 70A, with a higher maximum penalty than the behaviour already covered by section 70. It would also introduce the concept of interference with a corpse. With respect, we say that is unnecessary, because touching is already defined in section 79(8), and we think that section can be expanded and read across to apply to victims in the circumstance we are discussing. Introducing a new concept of interference, which could arguably be interpreted differently, could lead to confusion in the prosecution of the offence, which we think is not necessary.
In addition, the offence in the new clause as drafted does not require the offender to know or be reckless to the fact that what is being interfered with is a dead body. We think the mental element of the offence is important so that we capture those who are genuinely committing a criminal offence.
Again, I thank all the Members who have spoken on this matter, particularly my right hon. Friend the Member for Tunbridge Wells and my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford who have been to see me. They continue to make efforts on behalf of their constituents who have been so badly affected by this uniquely disgusting and horrific crime. We support the intentions behind the new clause, and I look forward to working with hon. Friends to find a way to bring forward the necessary legislation in this Bill. With that reassurance, I urge my hon. Friend to withdraw his new clause.
Stephen Metcalfe
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 16
Complicity in joint enterprise cases
In section 8 (abettors in misdemeanors) of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, after “shall” insert—
“, by making a significant contribution to its commission,”.—(Peter Dowd.)
This new clause would clarify the definition of ‘joint enterprise’ (or secondary liability), so that an individual must make a “significant contribution” to an offence committed by another to be criminally liable.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Alex Cunningham
I begin by paying tribute to the work of my hon. Friend the Member for Bootle on the new clause, and the ongoing work of my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Riverside (Kim Johnson), who we have already heard has introduced a private Member’s Bill to the House on the same issue. I am sure that Members across the Committee will share my admiration and respect for the campaigners from JENGbA, who have been tirelessly working on challenging injustices in joint enterprise convictions for well over a decade.
As we have just heard, the new clause mirrors the Joint Enterprise (Significant Contribution) Bill, which we hope will receive its Second Reading on Friday 2 February. I would prefer to see the Government making commitments on this matter, as it is a complex area of law and practice and any reforms will need careful consideration and monitoring to ensure that they are working, especially after the unexpected absence of change following the Jogee decision in 2016, which I will come back to later.
I am glad that the new clause has been tabled to enable a discussion in Committee, because the issue deserves more parliamentary time. Even though we have had many criminal justice Bills before this House in the past 10 years, all while alarms have been raised about continuing problems with joint enterprise law, Parliament has not engaged substantially with the issue for some time. During my tenure as shadow Justice Minister, I met the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies and the PCS, among others, and heard about ongoing challenges with joint enterprise convictions, despite the decision in Jogee and the very active collaboration between campaigners, legal practitioners and academics over the last decade. So I will be very interested to hear from the Minister about the work her Department has been doing in this area and, indeed, about any ongoing engagement it has had with campaigners, experts and practitioners who are collaborating on reform in this area.
The processes of prosecution and conviction in our criminal justice system should be fair, transparent and accountable, but joint enterprise law can be vague and confusing, and it can lead to apparently unjust outcomes. Some examples of individuals who are potentially at risk of being prosecuted under joint enterprise have been provided by Dr Felicity Gerry KC, who was the lead counsel in the case of Jogee. My hon. Friend the Member for Bootle has already outlined them to the Committee.
In 2016, when the Supreme Court ruled that the law of joint enterprise had taken a “wrong turn” for over 30 years, it restored the proper law of intention so that those who intended to commit or assist a crime, rather than those who might have foreseen it, could be properly convicted under joint enterprise law. These are all based on real cases, and as I have said, my hon. Friend has given the example of the taxi passenger getting out and becoming involved in a stabbing, or the woman who pulled somebody’s hair while trying to defend her boyfriend who may well have carried out a serious offence. Those individuals were charged under joint enterprise law, and they were at risk of extremely lengthy sentences, as if they were the primary offender, even when it is very difficult to discern how they contributed to the crime in question. Joint enterprise law has been used to convict young people who have not been present at the scene of the crime, and young people who listen to certain kinds of music, and there is a risk that such a trial focuses on character and culture, not contribution to a crime. My hon. Friend spoke about that in some detail. It is clear that joint enterprise law needs to be reformed in some way.
Last September, the CPS finally recorded and published a set of pilot data about joint enterprise cases, as a result of legal action by Liberty and JENGbA. While the results were shocking, they were, sadly, not surprising, as they confirmed much of what has been said by joint enterprise reformers for years. The data revealed that over half of those involved were aged under 25. Some 30% of the defendants in the cases were black, compared with the 4% of black people in the wider population, and black 18 to 24-year-olds were the largest demographic group identified in the pilot data. The data illustrated what we already knew about joint enterprise, which is that there is a serious racial disproportionality in its use.
The CPS pilot data suggests that black people are 16 times—I repeat, 16 times—more likely than white people to be prosecuted for homicide or attempted homicide under joint enterprise laws, which is a very significant divergence. I would be grateful to hear from the Minister the results of the data analysis, particularly about what she believes are the reasons behind the shocking disparities, given that the CPS has said that no conclusions about its decision making can be drawn from the pilot data. At the very least, we have to ask questions about the possibility that this level of divergence is at least in part caused by discriminatory practices in our criminal justice system. Looking at those figures, is the Minister confident that the framework for joint enterprise prosecutions is fit for purpose?
It has taken a number of years for the CPS to finally publish data on this important issue, but now that we have it, we must ensure that the Ministry of Justice is using that data to explore how it can best improve practice. I would also be grateful if the Minister could share any other plans for data collection and analysis in relation to the application of joint enterprise law, and anything she is aware of in the Ministry of Justice, the CPS or other Government body that is happening to progress this.
I was personally quite surprised at the scale of joint enterprise prosecutions, with the CPS data showing 680 defendants in 190 cases of homicide or attempted homicide across six of 14 CPS areas in just six months. That number is considerably higher than I would ever have anticipated. If the Minister has any thoughts on the number of prosecutions, I ask her to share them with the Committee. The high level of joint enterprise prosecutions demonstrates that at the very least it is an issue deserving of considerably more active consideration by parliamentarians and the Government.
Finally, I would be grateful if the Minister could speak to any discussions that she has had in her Department about the recent Fiaz case, in which the Court of Appeal suggested that a jury need not be specifically directed by the judge to consider the legal significance of a defendant’s contribution towards an offence. Dr Gerry has argued that the case highlights the need for additional legal clarity, as judges do not always direct juries to consider the significance of a defendant’s contribution toward an offence. Does the Minister also recognise the need for additional clarity in that area, and has her Department considered any means by which that may be achieved? It is an area with substantial cross-party recognition that more needs to be done to increase the fairness, transparency and accountability of prosecutions, and I look forward to hearing the Department’s position on the matter.
Laura Farris
I thank the hon. Member for Bootle for tabling new clause 16, which would amend section 8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 to provide that a person must have made a “significant contribution” to an offence committed as part of a joint enterprise to be indicted or punished as a principal offender. Its effect would be that the prosecution would have to identify the precise nature of the defendant’s role in aiding, abetting, procuring or counselling the commission of a crime committed in order to prove that the defendant had made a significant contribution—a threshold that need not currently be met.
Joint enterprise is a common law doctrine used in a variety of situations, most commonly to describe a situation in which two or more individuals have a common purpose to commit any criminal offence, or a secondary party encourages or assists the principal offender to commit an offence. It is a long-standing principle of criminal law that in either of those situations, both or all of the offenders may be held equally responsible and could be subject to the same penalty.
The hon. Member for Bootle has set out a number of examples, but I will start with a high-profile one. Members of the Committee may well recall the Victoria station attack in 2010, when a group of young men chased another young man over the ticket turnstile and down the escalator, where they set upon him. In the course of that attack, the young man was kicked in the head and torso repeatedly and was stabbed, and he died. At the end of it, the cause of death was multiple injuries, but it was impossible for the coroner to say who had struck the fatal blow with the knife or who had administered the fatal kick to the head. The whole group of assailants was put on trial; a number were convicted of murder and a number were convicted of manslaughter. That was classic joint enterprise, where they went with a common purpose to attack seriously an individual, and it could not be identified who had made the significant contribution, but the young man—the victim—was killed.
I say with great respect that R v. Jogee, which went before the Supreme Court in 2016 and to which the hon. Members for Stockton North and for Bootle both referred, was not an ordinary case. It was not even close to being an ordinary case. The Supreme Court reviewed 500 years of common-law jurisprudence on joint enterprise, and not only changed the law but issued really important guidance. I would like very briefly to talk the Committee through the framework that the Supreme Court applied, because it will help to explain why the Government will not accept new clause 16 today.
The Supreme Court said that it circumscribed the ambit of the offence and removed, as a matter of common law, the principle of parasitic accessory liability. To give an example that is sometimes given in case studies, if two people go to a farm with the purpose of stealing some farm machinery, and the farmer approaches them, and then person No. 1 pulls out a weapon and uses it on the farmer, that would not be decisive evidence that person No. 2 intended to kill or cause serious harm. That would previously have been the case under the principle of parasitic accessory liability, but the Supreme Court said that that went too far. In plain English, it said that joint enterprise cannot be inferred from the fact that it was foreseeable that a secondary offence would take place; there has to be an intention to assist. It said that the existence of foreseeability was something that the court should treat as evidence of intent, but was not necessarily decisive of it.
The judgment concluded by saying that joint enterprise essentially requires two elements. The first is a conduct element: the accessory must encourage or assist the crime committed by the principal. Secondly, the prosecution must show that the mental element existed, in other words that the accessory intended to encourage and assist the commission of the crime committed by the principal.
I have done a bit of a review of the case law—although I question whether it is helpful or unhelpful to go through case law during a Bill Committee in which nobody has the opportunity to read the case report—and am satisfied that there have been examples of case law since the Jogee case that show that approach being fairly applied. One example is of a group of young men who undertook a burglary on a care home. One person was tasked with searching the rooms before the others went in. In the course of events, one of the residents of the care home was brutally attacked. The young man who had done the search went in to try to stop it; he established that in court. He was convicted of burglary but not of the secondary attack, because that had not been his intention as part of the joint enterprise exercise.
Jess Phillips
Can the Minister tell me what protections are in place for the woman in the case that I outlined? She was considered to be an accessory to a crime. She was a victim of coercive and controlling behaviour, and the crime was a part of a pattern of domestic abuse.
Laura Farris
In that circumstance, the defence of duress would be available to the victim in the ordinary way.
Jess Phillips
Currently, that is absolutely not what is happening in our criminal courts. It is currently no defence for victims of domestic abuse in these cases to say, “I’m a victim of domestic abuse: that’s why I ended up here.” The Minister is saying that there is the defence of duress; I am saying that it never gets used. It does not stack up, and this is not happening in reality. She has spoken of her pride in the Government over coercive control. Does she think that there need to be specific elements, within this conversation about joint enterprise, to protect people who are coerced into such behaviours?
Laura Farris
We will come on to some amendments of that nature and I will deal with them in due course, but the defence of duress is a standard defence in the criminal context. [Interruption.] These are the criminal defences that get advanced.
In response to the hon. Member for Bootle, this is an area of the law that is intrinsically linked with other inchoate offences such as encouraging or assisting a crime. We think that it is too difficult to require the prosecution to prove a significant contribution; as we say, the very important case of Jogee has set clear parameters for both the conduct element and the mental element, which we think creates the correct framework of common law. For those reasons, the Government are unable to support the new clause, and we ask the hon. Member for Bootle to withdraw it.
Alex Cunningham
I shall be brief. My hon. Friends the Members for Bootle and for Swansea East have addressed new clauses 17, 18 and 49, and I pay tribute to them and to my hon. Friend the Member for Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney for the work they have done on road traffic incidents. All three new clauses illustrate the need for a sentencing review for serious road traffic offences, and Labour is committed to doing that alongside sentencing for other serious crimes across the system.
The Minister and the Committee heard the tragic accounts outlined by my hon. Friends, including that of a runaway car that killed a young child. Sadly, in that case, there could be no justice for the child or her family as no offence related to the circumstances of her death. Surely that cannot be right. I am sure the Minister agrees that we have a duty to act in all three areas outlined in the new clauses. Has she examined the impact of those measures on cost, particularly in relation to the additional cost of prison places? If she has not, will she consider doing so before Report and share that information with the Committee, so that we are better informed? If she cannot support the new clauses today, I would be obliged if she told us what action, if any, her Department is considering for such offences and whether the Government plan to address them in the Bill at a later stage, or perhaps during Committee of the whole House on the Sentencing Bill, which I believe is due within the next few weeks.
There can be no doubt that the new clauses would close loopholes in the law that currently prevent families of loved ones killed in tragic circumstances from achieving either justice or closure. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Laura Farris
I thank the hon. Members for Bootle and for Swansea East for compellingly setting out the impact of various forms of driving offence that are raised in our surgeries. When we talk about driving offences, there is often a narrow focus on things such as drink-driving for which the penalties are serious; we do not talk enough about things such as causing death by dangerous driving, which can be unbelievably reckless and irresponsible and cause the most serious harms.
The hit and run that the hon. Member for Bootle so powerfully described was an extension of dangerous driving. Whether panic, cowardice or other offences that the perpetrator is concerned about come to the fore, such incidents are absolutely devastating for the families of the victim. I therefore pay tribute to those hon. Members for the way in which they presented the new clauses.
It was helpful to hear that the hon. Member for Bottle is not wedded to the language he has used in his new clause. I had some remarks to make about that, but I will not spend too much time on that because of his indication. I do not know whether this applies to the hon. Member for Bootle too, but I understand that the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney is having conversations with the Department for Transport. I hope the hon. Member for Bootle will allow time for those conversations to happen and for us to engage with them before the Bill comes back. With all that in mind, I will lay out the framework for how we deal with the hit and run issue and I will then come on to the other points and where the Government’s thinking lies at present.
Laura Farris
Hon. Members will know what I mean: those things that are not cars. There is, therefore, quite a lot of classification. We have a two-part system.
Mark Garnier
I am slightly confused. I get all the stuff about not being insured and not needing a driving licence, but surely if a person clobbers somebody with a quad bike and causes them injury, there has to be some recourse?
Laura Farris
My hon. Friend is correct, but that would be a civil action for negligence, for which remedies would be available. We treat private land separately, but I think the was saying something rather different, about where private land becomes public land. When the index offence takes place, it relates to a motor vehicle on public land; we are not dealing with particularly difficult definitional issues. I undertake to take that point away; I had not understood it from the motion and the explanation of the hon. Member for Swansea East, so it might require some further thought. I hope conversations are happening in the Department for Transport, but I will ensure that that point is included in the Department’s thinking.
I point out, in the interest of completeness, that there is a broad definition of land that is defined as “private”. Some complications may exist around the classifications of private land, such as that used for military, commercial or other official purposes or land that is exempt from legal proceedings for offences committed there. There is a legal framework in place. Accidents on private land are covered by civil law and compensation—I talked about negligence in relation to a quad bike. In extreme cases such as gross negligence manslaughter or breaches of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, the criminal law may be engaged too. With all that in mind, I urge hon. Members to withdraw the motion.
Peter Dowd
I hear what the Minister says, and I will withdraw the motion. It was a probing amendment in an attempt to give consideration to this issue, which affects so many people—our constituents—day in, day out; I gave the figures. As I said, I recuse myself from giving examples, because they are dreadfully distressing for people and I do not want to distress Members any more than I need to. I recused myself from giving examples, of which there are so many, but I hope the Minister hears the spirit of what I tried to say. It is not about people wanting vengeance; it is about getting an element of justice. I hope the Government will give serious consideration to these matters, because at some point they will come back.
I acknowledge and accept that this is not a transport Committee, but my proposals are within the scope of the Bill, so the Government have the power to pursue them if they wish. I ask the Ministers to take them away and think about them. I will be in touch with the Department for Transport, although, as I mentioned earlier, Departments are often packed out with work. None the less, this issue is of such import—it impacts on the lives of our constituents day in, day out—and we and the Government must consider it very carefully as early as practically possible. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 19
Use of another person’s dwelling place for criminal purposes: cuckooing
“(1) A person ‘P’ commits an offence if—
(a) P makes regular use of or takes up residence in a residential building lawfully occupied by another person ‘R’,
(b) P uses the residential building as a base for criminal activities including but not limited to—
(i) dealing, storing or taking unlawfully held controlled drugs,
(ii) facilitating sex work,
(iii) taking up residence without a lawful agreement with R in circumstances where R is under duress or otherwise being coerced or controlled, or
(iv) financially abusing R.
(2) For the purposes of this section—
(a) ‘building’ includes any structure or part of a structure (including a temporary or moveable structure), and
(b) a building is ‘residential’ if it is designed or adapted, before the time of entry, for use as a place to live.
(3) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or a fine (or both).”—(Alex Cunningham.)
This new clause would make cuckooing an offence. Cuckooing is where the home of a vulnerable person is taken over by a criminal in order to use it to deal, store or take drugs, facilitate sex work, as a place for them to live, or to financially abuse the occupier.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Criminal Justice Bill (Sixteenth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateDepartment: Home Office
Laura Farris
Main Page: Laura Farris (Conservative - Newbury)Department Debates - View all Laura Farris's debates with the Home Office
Criminal Justice Bill (Sixteenth sitting)
Laura Farris ExcerptsTuesday 30th January 2024
(2 years, 6 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 30 January 2024 - (30 Jan 2024)
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Laura Farris)
The Opposition Members are all correct: how the Government approach prostitution, and the way society views it, has changed and developed significantly in the last decades. Our policy towards sex work and prostitution is now much more focused on the harm associated with it and appropriately supporting people who wish to exit that industry. We are sympathetic to the new clauses and are considering them carefully.
The acts of buying and selling sex are not illegal in England and Wales, but many of the associated offences are: controlling prostitution and the kinds of offences that present a public nuisance, for example. New clause 23 amends the wordings of sections 52 and 53 of the Sexual Offences Act, which concern, respectively, the offences of causing or inciting another person to become a prostitute and controlling prostitution for gain. New clause 23 seeks to make more real the nature of the offence, which is to sexually exploit. The section 52 offence is designed to punish individuals who coerce others into sexual activity from which they or a third party profits. The section 53 offence punishes offenders who coerce or force others into sexual activity from which they or a third party profit. As a matter of law, the Government consider those offences fit for purpose. They enable the police to take enforcement action against the range of relevant offending that arises from an individual controlling the behaviour of an intimate partner or an organised criminal gang trafficking victims internationally. But wherever it sits on that spectrum, all such conduct is inherently exploitative.
The National Police Chiefs’ Council’s sex work guidance was updated in June 2003. At its core are five principles that recognise the complexity of the sex industry and the risks that sex workers face, and emphasise the imperatives to build mutual trust to improve sex workers’ safety and tackle exploitation by taking enforcement action against criminal exploiters.
Carolyn Harris
As someone who has done a lot of work on this, and as I am sure my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley would agree, the terms “sex work” and “industry” are extremely offensive. We are talking about victims of prostitution, and this is not an industry—it is an exploitative environment.
Laura Farris
I am happy to take that correction—sorry, I was just speaking informally when I should not have been.
On new clauses 26 and 30, section 1 of the Street Offences Act 1959 enables the police to divert individuals engaged in on-street sex work to alternative interventions. I will reference some of the points made by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, because we did some research into what is happening. First, the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s guidance, which advises officers, makes clear that it will not be commonplace to prosecute individuals who sell sex in public, and that every effort should be made to refer them to partner agencies and seek a diversionary route where possible. I have looked at the most recent data, which I will share with the Committee. In the year to March 2023, 301 soliciting crimes were recorded, of which 32—around 10%—resulted in either a charge or a summons. Of those that were charged, there has been on average less than one conviction a year from 2010 until today.
The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley also raised the issue of criminal convictions staying on people’s records. If someone is trying to exit enforced prostitution and rebuild their life, that is profoundly unhelpful—I agree with her without reservation. She will be aware of the announcement that spent convictions are now being removed from criminal records; that was in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act, but has been reinforced by the Lord Chancellor a number of times. I have already said that I will write to her about something, but I will just update her on that. We are working to try to get criminal records off people’s profiles, so that they can move on with their lives. That applies for all offences, because we think it is important that rehabilitation should have a serious meaning, whatever the offence.
Where we have this offence at the moment, we are principally seeing the police using it as a tool for diversion—that can be interpreted in a number of ways, but that is what we are principally seeing. The police have a challenging role, balancing the need to safeguard vulnerable on-street women who are selling sex from the harm they face, with the need to protect neighbourhoods from the negative consequences of that type of activity. Obviously, other crimes can often be concomitant to prostitution, particularly on the part of the people who control the women. There is also the issue of children being able to witness stuff like that. The police have to strike a balance there. Careful consideration of the law in this area is warranted, even when such considerations are placed in the balance. At the moment, the law in this area gives the police the flexibility to balance the different priorities, but we are thinking hard.
New clause 44 was tabled by the hon. Member for Swansea East, who raised interesting points that intersect with modern slavery. She made an interesting observation about something that I have seen in some of my other work, about where numbers all link to one person, or whether the same number is being duplicated across different sites. That goes right to the heart of modern slavery, and is a pressing issue for the Home Office.
I want to flag to the hon. Lady one of the difficulties that cuts across her new clause. It would effectively put an end to online services where individuals selling sex advertise lawfully. The research that the Home Office commissioned from Bristol University, which we published in 2019, showed that some people prefer to use technology to advertise because they feel safer doing so. The Government’s priority is to keep people engaged in this kind of work safe from harm, so we have to tread a difficult balance. We do not want to do something antithetical to protecting people from harm, which might happen if individuals selling sex were deprived of using technology and somehow diverted on to the street, forced underground or forced into an inherently more dangerous practice. It is reasonable for us to consider all the outcomes that could result, although I am not disagreeing with the force of the hon. Lady’s argument.
The Online Safety Act 2023, which is going through various stages of commencement now, should ensure that online platforms for individuals advertising are responsible and accountable for the content on their sites. They are required in law to take proactive steps to prevent those sites from being used by criminals. The commencement of the Online Safety Act is happening currently, so it is difficult to give an assessment, but all of this was covered in it. That includes a requirement for sites to proactively identify and remove content that is linked to priority offences, including controlling and inciting prostitution for gain, and human trafficking and modern slavery. As I have said, this cuts across these issues. With all due respect to the arguments advanced, I invite hon. Members not to press their new clauses.
Jess Phillips
I would welcome any intervention from the Minister. We would never write the phrase “child prostitute” into a document, so we should be really mindful of why on earth we allow that to continue with adults. We would call it exploitation; we call it the crime that it is.
Paying anybody for sex, even if completely legitimately —let’s face it, this mainly involves women—is fundamentally not a consensual act. None of us would choose it, would we? Would anybody here choose to have sex for money? We do not have to choose it from within a framework that means we will never have to. Would any of us choose it for our daughters? Would any of us be happy for our daughters to be on OnlyFans, selling it legally? I do not have any daughters, but I would certainly have a problem with my sons purchasing it.
The idea that this is a choice-based environment always gets used as a reason for not making progress on the issue. My concern is that there is no definition of adult sexual exploitation on a statutory footing, as my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton North has pointed out. Perhaps I would withdraw the motion on the basis that the Government go away and include the idea of adult sexual exploitation in the Bill, or even in the Victims Bill as it goes through. Why on earth do we not have a definition of adult sexual exploitation, as if the adults who do these things choose to do them, even though we have recognised that none of us would?
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 24
Human trafficking
(1) Section 2 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1) for ‘arranges or facilitates the travel of’ substitute ‘recruits, transports, transfers, harbours or receives through force, fraud or deception’.
(3) In subsection (2) for ‘travel’ substitute ‘the matters mentioned in subsection (1)’.
(4) Omit subsections (3) to (5).
(5) In paragraph (6)(a) for ‘arranging or facilitating takes’ substitute ‘matters mentioned in subsection (1) take’.
(6) Omit paragraph (6)(b).
(7) In paragraph (7)(a) for ‘arranging or facilitating takes’ substitute ‘matters mentioned in subsection (1) take’.
(8) In paragraph (7)(b) for the first ‘the’ substitute ‘any’.—(Jess Phillips.)
This new clause brings the definition of human trafficking in the Modern Slavery Act 2015 in line with the UN definition, particularly removing the requirement for exploitation to have involved travel.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Laura Farris
I thank the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley for setting out her case for the new clause. I understand the concern underpinning the new clause that there are inconsistencies between the definition of human trafficking in the 2015 Act and some of the international definitions, including the Palermo protocol. However, the definitions set out in sections 1 and 2 of the 2015 Act capture all aspects of modern slavery offending, from international cross-border human trafficking in section 2 to the enslavement of victims in a domestic setting.
In cases where the travel aspect of trafficking is not present or cannot be proven to the criminal standard, criminals can be prosecuted for an offence under section 1 of the 2015 Act. That makes it an offence for a person to hold someone in any kind of slavery or servitude, or to require them to perform forced, coerced or compulsory labour. There is no need for the prosecution to prove that travel was an element of the section 1 offence. I point out too that both section 1 and section 2 attract the same maximum penalty of life, which is a reflection of how seriously both offences are viewed.
Jess Phillips
Does the Minister know how many cases of that were convicted last year, or in how many life has ever been given?
Laura Farris
But the police do not tell us that they lack the tools or that there is a gap in the law that requires us to amend section 2. Together, the offences defined in sections 1 and 2 comprehensively cover modern slavery and they are collectively aligned to the international definitions. The police tell us that they provide a clear legal framework. We think that new clause 24 would create overlapping offences, which could cause confusion among the police and prosecutors. I hope that, in light of that explanation, the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley will be content to withdraw her new clause.
Jess Phillips
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 31
Reasonable force in domestic abuse cases
(1) Section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (reasonable force for purposes of self-defence etc.) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (5A) after ‘In a householder case’ insert ‘or a domestic abuse case.
(3) In subsection (6) after ‘In a case other than a householder case’ insert ‘or a domestic abuse case’.
(4) After subsection (8F) insert—
‘(8G) For the purposes of this section ‘a domestic abuse case’ is a case where—
(a) the defence concerned is the common law defence of self-defence,
(b) D is, or has been, a victim of domestic abuse, and
(c) the force concerned is force used by D against the person who has perpetrated the abusive behaviour referred to in paragraph (b).
(8H) Subsection (8G)(b) will only be established if the behaviour concerned is, or is part of, a history of conduct which constitutes domestic abuse as defined in sections 1 and 2 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, including but not limited to conduct which constitutes the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship as defined in section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 (controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship).’
(5) In subsection (9) after ‘householder cases’ insert ‘and domestic abuse cases’.—(Jess Phillips.)
Statutory defence for victims of domestic abuse who may have been coerced into committing certain crimes or driven to use force against their abuser, as a result of being a victim of domestic abuse.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Alex Cunningham
I will be brief, because my hon. Friend’s contribution was very thorough. The explanatory statements make it clear that the aim of these new clauses would speak to the agenda of the House in relation to ending violence against women and girls while ensuring that they get the protection of the law. There is no doubt that the development of such defences in law is far from easy—in fact, it is extremely complicated, as was illustrated—but it is important that we get it right. Labour is determined that women and girls are protected from violence. The work done by my colleagues will help to ensure that we as a society do better in that regard.
No one can doubt that women can be driven to defend themselves when subject to controlling behaviour and domestic abuse, and they can then face prosecution for their actions. Similarly, the controller can drive them to commit other crimes for the benefit of that controller. It can be well argued in both cases that those women are not responsible for their own actions. I am interested in what the Minister will say and how she will address such things to ensure that the victim is not turned into a criminal.
Laura Farris
I thank the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley for tabling new clauses 31 and 32 and new schedule 2, which would create two new statutory defences for victims of domestic abuse. She mentioned the defence of self-defence, which is not available to householders only; self-defence is a complete defence available to anyone put in a situation where they are required to engage it. I make that point in passing.
The Committee is aware of the work that the Government have done on domestic abuse, so I will confine my remarks to our most recent work, which has focused on the issues set out in the hon. Member’s new clauses and new schedule. First, she is aware that we commissioned a domestic homicide review—undertaken by Clare Wade KC, who has given evidence to the Committee—which was the first from any Government to look at homicide in a domestic context. As part of that exercise, we invited Clare Wade to look at the law on domestic abuse defences. She did not have time to do so then, but she recommended that a further review should be undertaken. At the end of 2023, we commissioned that review by the Law Commission to look specifically at women driven to kill their abusive partners and the defences available to them, and to consider specifically whether legislative change was necessary. The review is due to conclude later this year—I understand by the summer.
I hope to reassure the hon. Member by reading out a few sections—I will only read short sections—of the review’s terms of reference, which I believe dovetail neatly with the points she has made in her new clauses and new schedule. Those terms of reference state:
“Most deaths that occur in the context of domestic abuse involve male abusers who kill their female victims. A much smaller number of (almost entirely female) victims of domestic abuse kill their (almost entirely male) abusers…Despite reforms to the partial defences of provocation (now loss of control) and diminished responsibility, concerns continue to be raised that the existing defences to murder and their application in the courts do not achieve just outcomes for this group of victims of domestic abuse who become defendants.”
It continues:
“The Law Commission will review the use of defences in domestic homicide cases in the light of modern understandings of the effects of domestic abuse on victims. The project will consider, but is not limited to, the following:
(1) whether the existing defences to murder, and arguments as to lack of requisite intent for murder, operate satisfactorily in the context of a defendant who has suffered domestic abuse;
(2) if not, whether reform of the existing defences or a new bespoke defence or defences are needed for the group identified…while ensuring that reformed or new defences are appropriately limited…
(3) the operation of the applicable rules of evidence, procedure, and ways that the defences are considered from the beginning of the police investigation up to and including at trial, in this context”.
Jess Phillips
I recognise all that good work, and I was pleased to see that, but that is specifically about murder and killing, not offending per se, which is what I was talking about. The Law Commission will not come back to the example I gave, with duress defences being used. I was talking about magistrates court cases, where medical evidence of domestic abuse needs to be produced to get a duress defence.
Laura Farris
The hon. Member is correct. I will come on to the other parts but I am starting with the most serious category of offences; I think there has been a particular concern in the law about whether they are adequately dealt with. However, I hope she will understand why we are keen to see the Law Commission’s review through to its conclusion, although we are sympathetic to the general aims.
Jess Phillips
Is the Minister still talking about murder? I am not denying that it would be taken into account in murder, but it would not be taken into account in theft or the car incidences. It would not be taken into account like any offence would be for a victim of modern slavery. I am not talking about murder; I recognise the environment for that.
Laura Farris
Well, I have made the point. I was addressing new clause 31. The householder defence is really a homicide defence; those were the circumstances in which it came up, which is why I made those remarks.
New clause 32 and new schedule 2 seek to create a new and specific statutory defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence. The first version provides a defence where a person aged 18 or over does an act because they are compelled to do so as a result of the fact that they are a victim of domestic abuse, and a reasonable person in the same situation as that person, with the same relevant characteristics, would have no realistic alternative to doing that act. The second version applies to persons under 18, and provides a defence where a person acts as a direct consequence of being, or having been, a victim of domestic abuse. New schedule 2 sets out the offences to which that proposed defence would not be available.
I am sympathetic to the thrust of this new clause, particularly because of the correlation between domestic abuse and women who find themselves in the prison system. I know that the Prison Reform Trust, in conjunction with the Centre for Women’s Justice, has done really important work on this issue.
I will respond to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley about the case that she mentioned. She called it “JS”, but I think it is fair to use its title, because it is in the public domain: Stevens v. The Director of Public Prosecutions. She was quite right to outline the facts of the lady concerned, who said that she had found herself behind the wheel of a car, she was in her pyjamas and her other half was next to her; I think he had cocaine in his system. There was a background of coercive control. However, it is also true to say that her defence failed not only at first instance but on appeal, and I will just tell the Committee why, because I was troubled by the case and I wanted to see what factors the Court had considered.
The woman was driving dangerously at the time. However, she had already been disqualified from driving and she purchased the car when she was disqualified from driving. She conceded that she had driven it unlawfully a number of times before, with or without her husband. I am simply going through the factors. These are the factors that the Court of Appeal—the High Court, I think it was—had considered.
The jury took into consideration the fact that the woman did not tell the police at the time, or even in the police station, that she was under duress; she had also called her mum and had not mentioned being under duress. She had also—
Jess Phillips
I am afraid all the Minister is doing is identifying that this change is needed. So that woman did not tell her mother what her cocaine-fuelled partner, who her mother probably hated, was doing to her? Her mother has probably been isolated from seeing her daughter. She did not tell her mother? Has the Minister told her mother about every terrible thing that has ever happened to her? This is all just based on absolute myth and stereotype.
Laura Farris
I am simply going through how the higher court approached it. The point is that the Court found that the jury had not been persuaded that this was a duress case; duress was advanced as a defence, but that defence was not accepted. That is the nature of the system. So, it was not a case that the arguments were ignored; it was that she was not believed.
Laura Farris
Before I do, may I say that I am not asserting my own view, but I did bother to read the case, because I thought it was a difficult case? And I think that it is probably difficult in Committee for MPs to weigh in to whether the appeal courts are right or wrong. The Court’s conclusion was that she had not made out her case; that was its conclusion. That is not my view; it is a fact.
Jess Phillips
It may very well be a “fact” that that woman was not successful in getting the defence of duress. In different circumstances, would she have been able to get the defence that I am talking about today? That would be easier to prove, because cases of duress require relevant characteristics to be established, including “battered woman syndrome” and “learned helplessness”. Those are outdated concepts, which pathologise women rather than offering an effective defence suitable for the actual circumstances. These concepts require a production of medical evidence—I do not have that for coercive control. That is not practicable and in many cases involves low-level offending tried in magistrates courts.
Laura Farris
I thank the hon. Member for her intervention, which leads into the point I wanted to address in her new clause. Subsection (3)(b) of new clause 32 says that the criminal offence must be:
“a direct consequence of a person being, or having been, a victim of such abuse.”
My point is that whatever we make of this case, that woman did not prove causation; the jury was not satisfied that there was causation. And that would still be the case even under the new clause, as drafted. Someone would have to prove a causal connection between domestic abuse and the criminal offence that took place.
So, while we are interested in this area of the law, at the moment it is difficult to see how the new clause changes the defences of duress or self-defence, which already exist in common law.
Jess Phillips
I will just quote the Minister to herself. Earlier, when we were discussing spiking, she said that it was all too well and easy to say, “This already exists. We shouldn’t do anything about it.” I am just quoting her back at herself. These defences already exist.
Laura Farris
I am simply making a point about causation. The hon. Member has put a causal measure into her new clause and she raised a case, and I am simply saying that it was the conclusion of the jury in that case that causation was not established. I cannot go behind that finding, because we have an independent court system.
Laura Farris
That has assisted there.
A new statutory defence would also be restrictive in how it is framed and, unlike the common law defence, is less able to respond to the changing nature of forms of domestic abuse. We have seen how in recent years the courts have recognised the development of certain forms of domestic abuse, such as controlling and coercive behaviour, and have been able to weigh that into the application of certain defences in law.
I am interested in this area of the law; I just do not think the new clause is right yet. It is very wide and could provide a full defence to any criminal act, save for those offences listed in schedule 2, without considering the range of seriousness. I recognise that the list of behaviours in schedule 2 is based on the modern slavery defence, but the behaviours covered by that statutory defence are much narrower than those in the Bill, and they apply only where the pressure on the defendant would amount to an offence under the Modern Slavery Act 2015.
To conclude, the Government do not agree at present that the measures proposed by new clauses 31 or 32 are necessary, and I ask the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley not to press them.
Jess Phillips
I will just read the first bit of my speech again and then sit down, because we have to get through proceedings today. More than six years ago, in 2017, the Home Office Minister for Crime, Safeguarding and Vulnerability said there needed to be
“a root and branch review of how women are treated in the criminal justice system”.
I will welcome it when it eventually comes. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 39
Requirement for specialist rape and serious sexual offence teams
(1) The chief officer of each police force in England and Wales must establish a specialist team for the investigation of rape and serious sexual offences within the relevant force area.
(2) The chief officer must provide for members of the specialist team to be provided with such training and guidance on the investigation of rape and serious sexual offences as the chief officer sees fit.
(3) Any chief officer who fails to establish a specialist team must produce and publish a report to the Secretary of State outlining–
(a) the reasons for the chief officer’s decision not to establish a specialist team;
(b) how rape and serious sexual offences are to be investigated in the absence of a specialist team;
(c) what training and guidance is given to officers on the investigation of rape and serious sexual offences.”—(Alex Norris.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Laura Farris
I am grateful to the shadow Minister for raising this important issue. I agree without reservation that centralisation is crucial to the effective policing of rape and serious sexual offences. When we published the end-to-end rape review, we took our obligations seriously. One of the things that has absolutely transformed the policing response is—initially as a pilot, now the national roll-out—Operation Soteria, which I saw in action with the Avon and Somerset police, who were the pioneers. The hon. Member will be glad to know that one of the academics behind its inception, Katrin Hohl, has just been recruited, so we have ongoing involvement with the academics behind it who are guiding us.
Let me give an idea of how effective Operation Soteria has been. As the hon. Member is aware, it is a completely new model of policing. We call it suspect-focused, but it is much more than that; it is a deep dive into the patterns of behaviour that the suspect has undertaken before the rape was committed, whether they were a family member, a stranger, a Tinder date or a long-term partner. Not only has it enabled the police to make far more referrals, but it is leading to far more convictions. To give the Committee an idea of what that looks like, now that Operation Soteria has been rolled out nationally the police are referring three times the number of cases to the CPS for a charging decision as they were in 2016, which was the high point before the Liam Allan case had that catastrophic effect on police outcomes.
Operation Soteria has been key therefore, but aligned with that is our commitment to recruiting 2,000 specialist RASO—rape and sexual offences—officers. That is very similar to the thrust of the new clause of the hon. Member for Nottingham North. Before appearing in Committee today, I considered the letter that the College of Policing sent to all 43 forces in England and Wales about implementation, which is called the RASO investigator skills development programme for first responders.
The training is available to everyone, and the letter includes a direction as to how many RASO specialists are required in each force—I can send a photocopy of the letter to the hon. Member afterwards. That number is worked out from the size of the population that the force serves, so it is appropriate, and no force will not have a healthy population of appropriate RASO-trained specialists. The date for the conclusion of the exercise is April 2024. With all that in mind, I respectfully invite him to withdraw his new clause.
Alex Norris
I note what the Minister says around the transformed approach. The only evidence that will work is whether the charging number increases and cases get to judgment. We will wait to see whether that proof is in the pudding, but on that basis I am happy not to press the new clause, although we might have to return to the matter on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 40
Doorstep theft: aggravating factor in theft offence
“(1) The Sentencing Code 2020 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 72 (supply of psychoactive substance in certain circumstances) insert—
‘72A Theft from outside a dwelling place
(1) This clause applies where the court is considering an offence under section 1 of the Theft Act 1968.
(2) Where the theft is of an item delivered to, but not yet taken inside, a person’s dwelling place, the court must—
(a) treat this fact as an aggravating factor, and
(b) state in open court that the offence is so aggravated.’”—(Alex Cunningham.)
This new clause defines theft from a doorstep as an aggravating factor for the purposes of sentencing in cases of theft.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Alex Cunningham
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Increasing numbers of people are choosing to shop online regularly, as opposed to shopping on the high street. With that comes an increase in the number of opportunist thieves. Examples of crime prevention advice on doorstep thefts include, on the Staffordshire police website, Chief Inspector Giles Parsons advising shoppers
“to do all that they can to stop this crime happening… Ask for your deliveries to be diverted to trusted neighbours or friends if you’re not going to be home. If this isn’t possible, attempt to rearrange to a time when you know you will be in or choose to collect it instead.”
Similar advice urging preventive safety measures can be found on the Merseyside police website.
Meanwhile, parcel theft has received little attention in Parliament, although it was raised in the other place in June last year, when the then Business and Trade Minister, the Earl of Minto, said:
“Under the Consumer Rights Act 2015, it is the seller’s responsibility to ensure items ordered are delivered and Ofcom requires postal operators to take all reasonable steps to minimise exposure of postal packets to risk of loss, theft, damage or interference in terms of an essential requirement.”
Citizens Advice assumed a statutory responsibility to represent consumers of postal services in 2014. It publishes a parcels league table, and the 2023 results showed that the rate of parcel problems is incredibly high. It says that urgent action is needed, but it focuses its work on better regulation of the parcel delivery sector, rather than on sentencing for individual offenders. Overall, there has been a more limited focus on the offenders themselves.
Contrary to the lack of parliamentary discussion, the issue has been gaining attention in the media. The Telegraph reported on “porch pirates” in December last year, arguing:
“It’s a crime born of modern lifestyles, the explosion in online shopping providing new opportunities for thieves.”
The technology and locker company Quadient submitted freedom of information requests to UK police forces seeking statistics on parcel theft. The average reported value of a stolen parcel is £115.07, which, with Citizens Advice claiming that 5.5 million parcels are stolen each year, suggests a hidden economy of up to £630 million. Police forces warn that just a fraction of parcel theft is actually reported, meaning nobody knows the true extent of the problem. Comparing data held by the police to Citizens Advice’s figure, it appears that fewer than 0.002% of parcel thefts are ever reported.
The material released in response to the freedom of information request also indicated that the most common time for thefts to occur is between 9 am and 5 pm. Forces report that people aged 22 to 34 are the most likely to have a parcel stolen, suggesting that many parcels are stolen from young people while they are at work. The highest average value indicated for a stolen parcel was—no surprise—from City of London police, at £1,128, almost 10 times higher than the UK average. Conversely, Durham constabulary reported an average of £9.78, less than a tenth of the UK average and £1,118 lower than City of London.
Given the growing concern among consumers, whose doorsteps are no longer safe places, it is clear that firm action must be taken. The new clause would introduce an aggravating factor for such offences, recognising that, while the thieves may not actually enter properties, they do trespass in the gardens or yards of their victims, who may well come face to face with them. Criminals should know that, if they are prepared to enter people’s property to steal—just like a burglar would—they risk a higher sentence than for theft from, say, a shop.
The Minister will be pleased to know that I have no intention of pressing the new clause to a vote, but I hope that she will recognise this growing crime in our communities and take action to address it.
Laura Farris
I thank the hon. Member for shining a spotlight on an increasingly common offence. I reassure him that we take theft offences seriously. He will be aware that the maximum sentence is already seven years.
Courts are already required to consider an offender’s culpability when sentencing, which allows sentences to reflect the circumstances of the individual case. As the sentencing guidelines are structured, cases of theft that indicate a high level of culpability include those where planning took place, where there was premeditation, where a vulnerable victim was deliberately targeted, or where the offending was undertaken as part of a group and the offender played a leading role. By contrast, a theft that took little or no planning—for example, some kids nicking a box off a doorstep—would be a lower-culpability offence. That is how we square the nature of the offending.
Alex Cunningham
I accept that, and a child who nicks a box off a step just needs a good talking to, in my opinion, but I illustrated in my speech that this activity is becoming more and more organised, and doubtless will be more so in the future. We have to think ahead and make sure that we are ready. It might be the organised crime thing of the year. If people can pick up parcels worth more than £1,000 from somebody’s doorstep, there is certainly a need for proper action.
Laura Farris
The guidelines already include a range of aggravating factors for theft, among which are stealing to order, an intention to cause harm to the victim personally, and where the theft was an act of revenge. Obviously, previous convictions of any kind will also be an aggravating factor and result in a higher sentence.
At the moment, the Government resist the new clause, on the basis that it treats doorstep theft more seriously than other theft in similar circumstances, such as the theft of something that had not been delivered but was still sitting in the back of the van. We think that should be treated comparably. At the moment, we think the new clause would lead to discrepancies in the law of theft, which would not be a good development. Therefore, with respect to the hon. Member for Stockton North for raising a perfectly valid point—and I rather regret that he might be right that this is a growing area of crime—I urge him to withdraw the new clause.
Alex Cunningham
As I have indicated, I will withdraw the new clause, but I am grateful for the opportunity to raise the fact that this is a growing problem in our society. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 41
Offence of assaulting a retail worker
“(1) It is an offence for a person to assault, threaten or abuse another person who is a retail worker, and who is engaged, at the time, in retail work.
(2) The offence under section 1 of threatening or abusing a retail worker—
(a) is committed by a person if the person—
(i) behaves in a threatening or abusive manner towards the worker, and
(ii) intends by the behaviour to cause the worker or any other person fear or alarm or is reckless as to whether the behaviour would cause such fear or alarm.
(b) applies to—
(i) behaviour of any kind including, in particular, things said or otherwise communicated as well as things done,
(ii) behaviour consisting of—
(A) a single act, or
(B) a course of conduct.
(3) No offence is committed under subsection (1) unless the person who assaults, threatens or abuses knows or ought to know that the other person is a retail worker and is engaged, at the time, in retail work.
(4) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable, on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine not exceeding £10,000 (or both).
(5) An offence committed under subsection (1) is aggravated if the behaviour constituting the offence occurred because of the enforcement of a statutory age restriction.
(6) Where, in proceedings for an offence under subsection (1), it is—
(a) specified in the complaint that the offence is aggravated by reason of the retail worker enforcing a statutory age restriction, and
(b) proved that the offence is so aggravated,
the court must—
(a) state on conviction that the offence is so aggravated,
(b) record the conviction in a way that shows that the offence is so aggravated,
(c) take the aggravation into account in determining the appropriate sentence, and
(d) state—
(i) where the sentence imposed in respect of the offence is different from that which the court would have imposed if the offence were not so aggravated, the extent of and the reasons for that difference, or
(ii) otherwise, the reasons for there being no such difference.
(7) Evidence from a single source is sufficient to establish, for the purposes of this section—
(a) whether a person is a retail worker,
(b) whether the person is engaged, at the time, in retail work,
(c) whether an offence committed under subsection (1) is aggravated because of the enforcement of a statutory age restriction.
(8) In this section—
“retail worker” —
(a) means a person whose usual place of work is retail premises, or whose usual place of work is not retail premises but who does retail work,
(b) includes, in relation to a business that owns or occupies any premises in which the person works, a person who—
(i) is an employee of the business,
(ii) is an owner of the business, or
(iii) works in the premises under arrangements made between the business and another person for the provision of staff,
(c) includes a person who delivers goods from retail premises.
“retail premises” means premises that are used wholly or mainly for the sale or supply of goods, on a retail basis, to members of the public.
“retail work” —
(a) in the case of a person whose usual place of work is retail premises, means any work in those retail premises,
(b) in the case of a person whose usual place of work is not retail premises, means work in connection with—
(i) the sale or supply of goods, on a retail basis, to members of the public, or
(ii) the sale or supply of services (including facilities for gambling) in respect of which a statutory age restriction applies,
(c) in the case of a person who delivers goods from retail premises, means work in connection with the sale or supply of goods, on a retail basis, to members of the public done during the period beginning when the person arrives at a place where delivery of goods is to be effected and ending when the person leaves that place (whether or not goods have been delivered),
(d) is not dependent on a person receiving payment.
“enforcement” , in relation to a statutory age restriction, includes—
(a) seeking information as to a person's age,
(b) considering information as to a person's age, or
(c) refusing to sell or supply goods or services,
for the purposes of complying with the restriction (and “enforcing” is to be construed accordingly),
“statutory age restriction” means a provision in an enactment making it an offence to sell or supply goods or services to a person under an age specified in that or another enactment.”—(Alex Norris.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Alex Norris
It is a pleasure to follow the excellent contributions from my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley and from the right hon. Member for Chelmsford. I have spoken to the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland about the new clause; I commend her for her efforts and her courage. It takes real bravery to talk about this issue and press for change.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley said, the new clause intends to create a penalty commensurate with the impact and the nature of the offence. The right hon. Member for Chelmsford talked about unduly lenient sentences; what strikes me from even very cursory research on the topic is the significant range in outcomes, which is hard to understand. It shows that there is a bit of looseness in the legislative framework around this sort of offence.
We will not divide the Committee on the new clause today, but I hope collectively we will send the message that this crime is as dangerous as other forms of serious violence. It has a devastating impact—a ripple effect, as One Punch UK puts it—on individuals, families, local areas and communities.
We have just debated an important new clause about violence against retail workers. The setting for that is quite defined, so we can plan what the response to a crime of a certain nature that happens in a certain place should be. One of the trickier things about this sort of crime is that it could be part of antisocial behaviour or a dispute among neighbours; it could be done in a shop by someone who intended to commit a crime, but not the crime that ended up killing someone; or it could be related to drug use, driving or football. We need to keep an eye on football violence—I am a fan who has been going to matches for three decades, and it feels as though behaviour is changing. Every time we see that sort of aggression or violence, there is a possible moment of manslaughter.
Taking a lead from the Australian approach has merit. I am very keen to hear the Minister’s views. I commend the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland for her new clause.
Laura Farris
I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland, who has been such an effective campaigner on this deeply personal offence that completely devastated her young life. She has made sure that it is seen not as a minimal offence or a nasty accident, but as the most serious form of assault. I know that she has been engaging with the Lord Chancellor, and I do not want to pre-empt those conversations. I was due to meet her this week; she was unwell, but we will still do so, and there is a process of discussion.
I want to say a little about new clause 50, and about one or two of the concerns that we have at this point. One-punch manslaughter is already a form of unlawful act—manslaughter—and it closely overlaps with that offence. The new clause closely reflects the existing law, but the common-law offence of unlawful act manslaughter has a maximum penalty of life imprisonment.
The new clause has two elements that differ from unlawful act manslaughter, meaning in practice that it would apply only to a small number of cases. First, the unlawful act set out in the new clause requires
“a single punch to the head or neck”.
Secondly, whereas unlawful act manslaughter requires that a reasonable person would have understood that the act posed some risk of harm, the new clause requires a “significant risk” of harm. In other words, it is setting a higher evidential threshold for what the perpetrator knew than the current principles of manslaughter. We would not wish to create an offence that made it harder to get a conviction rather than easier, as is currently the case with manslaughter.
We make similar observations in relation to GBH. Murder can be charged in two circumstances: where there was an intention to kill, or where there was an intent by the perpetrator to cause serious harm to the level of GBH. An intent to kill is not usually present in one-punch cases, but an intent to cause serious harm to the level of GBH may be present. That is called the GBH rule, and in some ways it overlaps with the specific circumstances described in the new clause. There is therefore a risk that people who could be charged with murder would deviate to pleading guilty to the lesser offence because they think that they would get less time. We want to avoid that.
I had another point to make in passing about the Australian system—I cannot lay my hand on my note, but I was going to say that it results in lower sentences than what is suggested here, so it is not a perfect read-across.
The Government’s other concern, as nobody on this Committee will be surprised to hear, is about the new clause setting a minimum sentence. We do not wish to create anomalies in the law. How would the family of a victim who was killed by a single punch to the abdomen feel if the minimum sentence did not apply? How would the family of a victim who was killed by two punches to the head feel if their case was treated differently?
As the Committee has seen over the course of our debates, minimum sentences sometimes create difficulties in the law on homicide and irregularities in sentencing. When we extrapolate those to certain circumstances, some of which we probably cannot even imagine as we sit here today, they could cause irregularities further down the line. None of that is fatal to the new clause, by way; it simply informs our thinking and our nervousness with the minimum-sentence suggestion at the moment.
We appreciate, without any reservation, the very serious harm that the new clause targets. We want to see laws and sentencing powers that are flexible enough to deal with different levels of culpability. We would not wish for more people either to get away with it because the intent could not be proved or to use this new offence as an alternative to murder.
We are thinking hard about it, and we wish to maintain consistency in the law. At the same time, we recognise the harm that is caused by this offending. We recognise the seriousness of it, and we recognise the importance of the campaign that my hon. Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland has presented to the House. I ask the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley to withdraw the new clause at this point, but we are continuing conversations with my hon. Friend.
Jess Phillips
The hon. Member for Bishop Auckland did not ask me to press new clause 50. However, I can see from looking through the list of supporters that she has managed to unite me and the hon. Member for Ashfield (Lee Anderson)—she may be the only person ever to have managed that. I hope he doesn’t take my ribbing too seriously and change his vote on something.
The hon. Member for Bishop Auckland tells me that the Minister and the Secretary of State have both been engaging with her and that she wishes to continue that engagement, so I imagine that these issues will arise again on Report or even in the Lords. I will not press the new clause to a vote today, but the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland is young, bright and short and is determined to see some action on the issue before she leaves this place. Who could blame her, considering her experiences? I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 51
Aggravated offences: hostility towards transgender identity, sexual orientation and disability
“(1) The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 is amended as follows.
(2) For the first cross-heading under Part II, substitute ‘Offences aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity: England and Wales’.
(3) In section 28—
(a) for the heading, substitute ‘Meaning of “aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity”’;
(b) in subsection (1), omit ‘racially or religiously aggravated’ and insert ‘aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity’;
(c) in subsection (1)(a), omit from ‘based on’ to the end of sub-subsection (a) and insert—
‘—
(i) the victim’s membership (or presumed membership) of a racial group;
(ii) the victim’s membership (or presumed membership) of a religious group;
(iii) a disability (or presumed disability) of the victim;
(iv) the sexual orientation (or presumed sexual orientation) of the victim; or
(v) the victim being (or being presumed to be) transgender, or’;
(d) in subsection (1)(b), omit from ‘hostility towards’ to the end of sub-subsection (b) and insert—
‘—
(i) members of a racial group based on their membership of that group;
(ii) members of a religious group based on their membership of that group;
(iii) persons who have a disability or a particular disability;
(iv) persons who are of a particular sexual orientation; or
(v) persons who are transgender.’;
(e) in subsection (2), in the definition of ‘membership’ leave out ‘racial or religious’ and insert ‘relevant’.
(4) In section 29—
(a) for the heading, substitute ‘Assaults aggravated on grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity’;
(b) in subsection (1), omit ‘racially or religiously aggravated’ and insert ‘aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity’.
(5) In section 30—
(a) for the heading, substitute ‘Criminal damage aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity’;
(b) in subsection (1), omit ‘racially or religiously aggravated” and insert ‘aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity’.
(6) In section 31—
(a) for the heading, substitute ‘Public order offences aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity’;
(b) in subsection (1), omit ‘racially or religiously aggravated’ and insert ‘aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity’.
(7) In section 32—
(a) for the heading, substitute ‘Harassment etc aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity’;
(b) in subsection (1), omit ‘racially or religiously aggravated’ and insert ‘aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity’.”—(Alex Cunningham.)
This new clause would include offences motivated by hostility towards an individual’s disability status, sexual orientation or transgender identity (or perception thereof) in those which are aggravated under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Alex Cunningham
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 51 would address the disparity between existing characteristics and current hate crime legislation. It would create parity for maximum possible penalties for all five characteristics defined under the sentencing code. Under current hate crime legislation, hate crimes based on race and/or religion can have higher maximum penalties than their base equivalents, whereas hate crimes based on sexual orientation, transgender identity and/or disability cannot. This creates a two-tier system of justice.
There are precedents for expanding the characteristics covered by aggravated offences. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 originally defined only racially aggravated offences; this was amended in the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 to include religiously aggravated offences. In December 2021, the Law Commission published “Hate crime laws: Final report”, a comprehensive review of all hate crime legislation. Its conclusion was:
“We remain of the view that we expressed in our 2014 report that the current hierarchy of protection is unfair and sends a distinctly negative message to victims of hate crimes on the basis of disability, sexual orientation and transgender identity. We therefore recommend parity of protection for aggravated offences across all five characteristics.”
It also stated:
“There was very strong support for a consistent approach amongst organisational stakeholders…For example, The Bar Council simply said…‘There would not appear to be any good reason to withhold parity of protection across the range of protected characteristics.’”
Does the Minister agree with the Law Commission’s recommendation that offences motivated by hostility towards an individual’s disability status, sexual orientation or transgender identity should be encompassed within the aggravated offences under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998?
New clause 51 comes in the context of soaring levels of hate crime reporting. Over 145,000 cases were reported in 2022-23. Across all monitored strands of hate crime, the numbers of offences have soared since 2011-12. Racially motivated hate crime rose by over 200% in the period, topping 100,000 instances for the first time in 2021-22. Meanwhile, hate crime motivated by religion increased by 433%. What is wrong with our bloomin’ society? By sexual orientation, it has increased by 493% and, by transgender identity, it has increased by 1,263%. Violent crime or crimes against the person rose as a proportion of hate crime offences from 29% in 2012-13 to 41% in 2022-23. The number of violent hate crime offences has risen sixfold, from 12,739 to 63,895 in 2022.
LGBT+ people and people with a disability should be able to live their life free from fear, abuse or violence. Labour has committed to take back our streets and be tough on hate crime. We will do so by strengthening and equalising the law so that every category of hate crime is treated as an aggravated offence, to ensure that everyone who falls victim to a hate crime is treated equally under the law. I hope that the Government will support new clause 51.
Laura Farris
I will be brief. I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his explanation of the new clause, which seeks to add disability, sexual orientation and trans-gender identity as protected characteristics for the purposes of the aggravated offences set out in the Crime and Disorder Act. I agree with him that it is important that our legal framework is robust and comprehensive when it comes to hate crime. It was for that reason that the Government asked the Law Commission to carry out a detailed review of hate crime legislation.
The Law Commission provided very helpful recom-mendations on the reform of hate crime laws in December 2021, and the Government intend to publish later this year a full response that will address each recommendation. In the interest of brevity, I hope the hon. Gentleman will agree that it would be premature to make decisions before the formal Government response is published. The Law Commission made 34 recommendations, and we want to respond to each one. Accordingly, I respectfully invite him to withdraw the new clause.
Laura Farris
Main Page: Laura Farris (Conservative - Newbury)Department Debates - View all Laura Farris's debates with the Home Office
Criminal Justice Bill
Laura Farris ExcerptsWednesday 15th May 2024
(2 years, 3 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Criminal Justice Bill 2023-24 Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Consideration of Bill Amendments as at 15 May 2024 - (15 May 2024)
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Laura Farris)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Sir Roger Gale)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: RTA Section 27B Causing serious injury by dangerous cycling. (a) Summarily. (b) On indictment. (a) 12 months or the statutory maximum or both. (b) 5 years of a fine or both. RTA Section 27C Causing death by careless of inconsiderate cycling. (a) Summarily. (b) On indictment. (a) 12 months (in England and Wales) or 6 months (in Scotland) or the statutory maximum or both. (b) 5 years or a fine or both.””
Government new clause 62—Sexual activity with a corpse.
Government new clause 87—Manslaughter: sexual conduct aggravating factor.
Government new clause 88—Length of terrorism sentence with fixed licence period: Northern Ireland.
Government new clause 89—Reviews of sentencing: time limits.
Government new clause 94—Cuckooing.
Government new clause 95—Cuckooing: interpretation.
Government new clause 103—Restricting parental responsibility when sentencing for rape of a child.
Government new clause 104—Report on duty to make prohibited steps orders and power to repeal.
New clause 2—Removal of parental responsibility for men convicted of sexual offences against children—
‘(1) After section 2 (parental responsibility for children) of the Children Act 1989, insert—
“2A Prisoners: suspension of parental responsibility
(1) This section applies where—
(a) a person (“A”) has been found guilty of a serious sexual offence involving or relating to a child or children; and
(b) A had parental responsibility for a child or children at the time at which the offence was committed.
(2) A ceases to have parental responsibility for all children, for a time specified by the sentencing court or until an application by A to the family court to reinstate parental responsibility has been approved.”’
New clause 7—Occupation or control of another person’s residence for criminal purposes “Cuckooing”—
“(1) A person commits an offence if the person occupies or exercises control over the home of another person (V) in connection with the commission of a criminal offence or offences using any of the following methods—
(a) the threat or use of force or other coercive behaviour;
(b) abduction, kidnap or false imprisonment;
(c) fraud or other deception;
(d) the abuse of power or a position of vulnerability;
(e) the giving of payments or other benefits to achieve the consent of a person who has control over V.
(2) A person also commits an offence under this section if the person arranges or facilitates the activity set out in subsection (1).
(3) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—
(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years,
(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both).”
This new clause makes it an offence to exercise control over another person’s residence for the purpose of criminal activity by means of coercion, threats or abuse of a position of vulnerability.
New clause 8—Offence of enabling or profiting from prostitution—
“(1) A person or body corporate (C) commits an offence if they—
(a) facilitate, whether online or offline, or
(b) gain financially from
a person (A) engaging in sexual activity with another person (B) in exchange for payment or other benefit, or the promise of payment or other benefit, and the conditions in subsection (2) are met.
(2) The conditions are—
(a) that C knows or ought to know that A is engaging in, or intends to engage in, sexual activity for payment or other benefit; and
(b) that C is not a dependent child of A.
(3) For the purposes of this section—
(a) “Sexual activity”—
(i) means any acts which a reasonable person would, in all the circumstances but regardless of any person’s purpose, consider to be sexual,
(ii) requires A and B to be in each other’s presence,
(b) “Facilitates” includes, but is not limited to, causing or allowing to be displayed or published, including digitally, any advertisement in respect of sexual activity involving A.
(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years.”
This new clause would make it an offence to facilitate or profit from the prostitution of another person.
New clause 9—One-punch manslaughter—
“(1) A person (P) is guilty of an offence where they cause the death of another person (B) as a result of a single punch in the circumstances described in subsection (2).
(2) The circumstances referred to in subsection (1) are—
(a) P administered a single punch to the head or neck of B;
(b) there was significant risk that the punch would cause serious physical harm to B;
(c) P was or ought to have been aware of the risk mentioned in paragraph (b);
(d) P did not administer the punch referred to in paragraph (a) in self-defence; and
(e) B’s death was caused by—
(i) the impact of the punch, or
(ii) further impact or injury resulting from the single punch.
(3) In this section “serious physical harm” means harm that amounts to death or serious personal injury for the purposes of the Offences against the Person Act 1861.
(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a minimum of seven years.”
This new clause is intended to create a specific offence of “One Punch Manslaughter”, with a minimum sentence of seven years.
New clause 12—Controlling or coercive behaviour by persons providing psychotherapy or counselling services—
“(1) A person (“A”) commits an offence if—
(a) A is a person providing or purporting to provide psychotherapy or counselling services to another person (“B”),
(b) A repeatedly or continuously engages in behaviour towards B that is controlling or coercive,
(c) the behaviour has a serious effect on B, and
(d) A knows or ought to know that the behaviour will or may have a serious effect on B.
(2) A’s behaviour has a “serious effect” on B if—
(a) it causes B to fear, on at least two occasions, that violence will be used against B, or
(b) it causes B psychological harm which has a substantial adverse effect on B's usual day-to-day activities.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (1)(d) A “ought to know” that which a reasonable person in possession of the same information would know.
(4) In proceedings for an offence under this section it is a defence for A to show that—
(a) in engaging in the behaviour in question, A believed that he or she was acting in B’s best interests, and
(b) the behaviour was in all the circumstances reasonable.
(5) A defence under subsection (4) requires A to have shown—
(a) sufficient evidence of the facts, and
(b) that the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
(6) The defence in subsection (4) is not available to A in relation to behaviour that causes B to fear that violence will be used against B.
(7) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—
(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or a fine, or both;
(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or a fine, or both.”
New clause 16—Amendments to the Road Traffic Act 1988—
“(1) The Road Traffic Act 1988 is amended as follows.
(2) In each of the sections listed below, after “a road or other public place” insert “, or a private place adjacent to a road,”—
section 1 (causing death by dangerous driving);
section 1A (causing serious injury by dangerous driving);
section 2 (dangerous driving);
section 2B (causing death by careless, or inconsiderate, driving);
section 2C (causing serious injury by careless, or inconsiderate, driving);
section 3 (careless, and inconsiderate, driving).”
This new clause would extend the Road Traffic Act 1988 so that a range of driving offences can be committed in private places adjacent to roads as well as on public roads or in public places.
New clause 18—Definition of unauthorised access to computer programs or data—
“In section 17 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990, at the end of subsection (5) insert—
“(c) he does not reasonably believe that the person entitled to control access of the kind in question to the program or data would have consented to that access if he had known about the access and the circumstances of it, including the reasons for seeking it;
(d) he is not empowered by an enactment, by a rule of law, or by the order of a court or tribunal to access of the kind in question to the program or data.””
New clause 19—Defences to charges under the Computer Misuse Act 1990—
“(1) The Computer Misuse Act 1990 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 1, after subsection (2) insert—
“(2A) It is a defence to a charge under subsection (1) to prove that—
(a) the person’s actions were necessary for the detection or prevention of crime; or
(b) the person’s actions were justified as being in the public interest.”
(3) In section 3, after subsection (5) insert—
“(5A) It is a defence to a charge under subsection (1) to prove that—
(a) the person’s actions were necessary for the detection or prevention of crime; or
(b) the person’s actions were justified as being in the public interest.””
New clause 24—Definition of exceptional hardship—
“In section 35 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, after subsection (4) insert—
“(4A) In subsection (4)(b), the hardship that would be caused by an offender’s disqualification should be regarded as exceptional only if it is significantly greater than the hardship that would be experienced by a large majority of other drivers if disqualification were imposed on them.
(4B) In assessing whether the hardship arising from the offender’s disqualification would be exceptional a court may take account of—
(a) any circumstances relating to the offender’s economic circumstances or location of residence which would make it exceptionally hard for them to access essential services and facilities;
(b) any hardship that would be incurred by the offender’s family or others who are disabled or who depend on the offender to provide care for them; and
(c) any other circumstances which it believes would make the hardship exceptional.””
New clause 25—Offence of possession of guidance on creating child sexual abuse content—
“(1) Section 69 (Possession of paedophile manual) of the Serious Crime Act 2015 is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1), omit from “to” to the end of the subsection and insert—
“possess, create, share or distribute any item that—
(a) contains advice or guidance about abusing children sexually; or
(b) contains advice or guidance about the creation of content which depicts the sexual abuse of children.”
(3) In subsection (2)(b)(ii), after “sexually” insert—
“or about the creation of content which depicts the sexual abuse of children”
(4) In subsection (8)—
(a) after “sexually”” insert “(or “the sexual abuse of children”),
(b) omit “(but not pseudo-photographs)” and insert “, including pseudo-photographs”,
(c) after second “or Northern Ireland” insert—
““creation of content” includes using any tool to create visual or audio content;”,
(d) at end insert—
““tool” includes, but is not limited to, any computer or other digital technology, program, platform or application, including those which utilise artificial intelligence or machine learning.””
This new clause would expand the existing offence of possessing guides about abusing children sexually to include guides on creating child sexual abuse content, including through the use of artificial intelligence or machine learning.
New clause 26—Offence of simulating sexual communication with a child—
“(1) A person commits an offence if they—
(a) use;
(b) design;
(c) distribute; or
(d) provide access to
a tool to simulate sexual communication with a person under 16.
(2) For the purposes of this section—
(a) a communication is sexual if—
(i) any part of it relates to sexual activity, or
(ii) a reasonable person would, in all the circumstances but regardless of any person's purpose, consider any part of the communication to be sexual,
(b) “tool” includes, but is not limited to, any computer or other digital technology, program, platform or application, including those which utilise artificial intelligence or machine learning.
(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable to the same penalties as apply to an offence committed under section 15A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.”
This new clause would create an offence of using, creating or sharing online or digital tools which simulate sexual communication with a child.
New clause 28—Complicity in joint enterprise cases—
“In section 8 (abettors in misdemeanours) of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, after “shall” insert “, by making a significant contribution to its commission,”.”
This new clause would clarify the definition of “joint enterprise” (or secondary liability), so that an individual must make a “significant contribution” to an offence committed by another to be criminally liable.
New clause 29—Human trafficking—
“(1) Section 2 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1), for “arranges or facilitates the travel of” substitute “recruits, transports, transfers, harbours or receives through force, coercion, fraud, deception, the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability, or the giving or receiving of payments or benefits”.
(3) In subsection (2), for “travel” substitute “matters mentioned in subsection (1) or to V being exploited”.
(4) Omit subsections (3) to (5).
(5) In paragraph (6)(a), for “arranging or facilitating takes” substitute “matters mentioned in subsection (1) take”.
(6) Omit paragraph (6)(b).
(7) In paragraph (7)(a), for “arranging or facilitating takes” substitute “matters mentioned in subsection (1) take”.
(8) In paragraph (7)(b), for the first “the” substitute “any”.”
This new clause brings the definition of human trafficking in the Modern Slavery Act 2015 in line with the UN definition, particularly removing the requirement for exploitation to have involved travel.
New clause 32—Aggravated offences: hostility towards transgender identity, sexual orientation and disability—
“(1) The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 is amended as follows.
(2) For the first cross-heading under Part II, substitute “Offences aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity: England and Wales”.
(3) In section 28—
(a) for the heading, substitute “Meaning of “aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity””;
(b) in subsection (1), omit “racially or religiously aggravated” and insert “aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity”;
(c) in subsection (1)(a), omit from “based on” to the end of sub-subsection (a) and insert—
—
(i) the victim’s membership (or presumed membership) of a racial group;
(ii) the victim’s membership (or presumed membership) of a religious group;
(iii) a disability (or presumed disability) of the victim;
(iv) the sexual orientation (or presumed sexual orientation) of the victim; or
(v) the victim being (or being presumed to be) transgender, or”;
(d) in subsection (1)(b), omit from “hostility towards” to the end of sub-subsection (b) and insert—
—
(i) members of a racial group based on their membership of that group;
(ii) members of a religious group based on their membership of that group;
(iii) persons who have a disability or a particular disability;
(iv) persons who are of a particular sexual orientation; or
(v) persons who are transgender.”;
(e) in subsection (2), in the definition of “membership” leave out “racial or religious” and insert “relevant”.
(4) In section 29—
(a) for the heading, substitute “Assaults aggravated on grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity”;
(b) in subsection (1), omit “racially or religiously aggravated” and insert “aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity”.
(5) In section 30—
(a) for the heading, substitute “Criminal damage aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity”;
(b) in subsection (1), omit “racially or religiously aggravated” and insert “aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity”.
(6) In section 31—
(a) for the heading, substitute “Public order offences aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity”;
(b) in subsection (1), omit “racially or religiously aggravated” and insert “aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity”.
(7) In section 32—
(a) for the heading, substitute “Harassment etc aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity”;
(b) in subsection (1), omit “racially or religiously aggravated” and insert “aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity”.”
This new clause would include offences motivated by hostility towards an individual’s disability status, sexual orientation or transgender identity (or perception thereof) in those which are aggravated under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.
New clause 33—Taking of dog without lawful authority—
“(1) A person commits an offence if, without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, the person takes or detains a dog in England—
(a) so as to remove it from the lawful control of any person, or
(b) so as to keep it from the lawful control of a person who is entitled to have lawful control of it.
(2) No offence is committed if the person taking or detaining the dog is connected with any of the following—
(a) any person entitled to have lawful control of it;
(b) where it is removed from the lawful control of a person, that person.
(3) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum summary term for either-way offences or a fine (or both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or a fine (or both).
(4) In this section—
“connected person” : a person is connected with another person if—
(a) they are married to each other,
(b) they are civil partners of each other,
(c) one is the parent of the other, or
(d) they are siblings (whether of the full blood or the half blood);
“detaining” : references to a person detaining a dog include the person—
(a) inducing it to remain with the person or anyone else, or
(b) causing it to be detained;
“maximum summary term for either-way offences” , with reference to imprisonment for an offence, means—
(a) if the offence is committed before the time when paragraph 24(2) of Schedule 22 to the Sentencing Act 2020 comes into force, 6 months;
(b) if the offence is committed after that time, 12 months;
“taking” : references to a person taking a dog include the person—
(a) causing or inducing it to accompany the person or anyone else, or
(b) causing it to be taken.”
This new clause makes provision for the creation of an offence of taking a dog from the lawful control of another person.
New clause 35—Offence of failing to remain at the scene of a traffic collision—
“In section 170 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, after subsection (4) insert—
“(4A) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (4) is liable—
(a) if a person other than the driver of the vehicle suffered a fatal injury—
(i) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years;
(b if a person other than the driver of the vehicle suffered a serious non-fatal injury—
(i) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or a fine not exceeding £20,000 or both;
(ii) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years;
(c) in any other case—
(i) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or a fine not exceeding £20,000 or both;
(ii) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years.””
This new clause would expand the existing offence of failing to stop after a road collision to create more serious penalties for failing to stop after collisions which result in death or serious injury.
New clause 36—Time to report road collision—
“In section 170 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, omit subsection (6) and insert—
“(6) In complying with a duty under this section to report an accident or to produce such a certificate of insurance or other evidence, as is mentioned in section 165(2)(a) of this Act, it is an offence for a driver—
(a) not to do so at a police station or to a constable as soon as is reasonably practicable, and
(b) not to do so within two hours of the occurrence of the accident in relation to reporting an accident, or within twenty-four hours of the occurrence of the accident in relation to the production of a certificate of insurance or other evidence.””
This new clause would amend the Road Traffic Act 1988 to reduce the time within which a driver must report a road collision in which they were involved from twenty-four hours to two hours, and make it an offence not to report an accident.
New clause 38—Senior manager liability for neglect in relation to offences committed by bodies corporate and partnerships—
“(1) Where an organisation commits an offence under section 16, a person (“S”) also commits an offence if—
(a) S was a senior manager of the same body corporate or partnership at the time the offence was committed under section 16; and
(b) S failed to prevent the offence from being committed, or was negligent such that an offence was committed.
(2) It is a defence for S to prove that they took all reasonable steps to prevent the offence being committed.
(3) In this section, “body corporate”, “partnership” and “senior manager” have the meanings given in section 16.
(4) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term of 12 months;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term of 5 years and an unlimited fine.”
New clause 43—Offence of creating or sharing misleading content—
“(1) A person (“P”) commits an offence if they—
(a) create, using any computer or other digital technology, program, platform or application, including those which utilise artificial intelligence or machine learning; or
(b) share, distribute, or otherwise provide access to,
visual or audio content which shows or represents, or appears to show or represent, another person (“R”), where conditions A, B and C are met.
(2) Condition A is that the words, actions, beliefs or behaviours shown or represented in the content have been artificially created or manipulated.
(3) Condition B is that the content has been created or shared for the purposes of—
(a) misleading a person viewing or hearing the content as to R’s real words, actions, beliefs or behaviours;
(b) causing offence, alarm, distress or humiliation to—
(i) R; or
(ii) any other person; or
(c) influencing the voting intention or activity of another person.
(4) Condition C is that R has not consented to the creation or sharing of the content.
(5) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.”
New clause 44—Sexual exploitation of an adult—
“(1) The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is amended as follows.
(2) Section 52 is amended as follows—
(a) in the title for “Causing or inciting prostitution” substitute “Sexual exploitation”, and
(b) in paragraph (1)(a) for “causes or incites another person to become a prostitute” substitute “sexually exploits another person”.
(3) Section 53 is amended as follows—
(a) in the title for “prostitution” substitute “sexual exploitation”, and
(b) in paragraph (1)(a) for “prostitution” substitute “sexual exploitation”.
(4) Section 54 is amended as follows—
(a) in subsection (2) for “sections 51A, 52, 53 and 53A” substitute “section 53A”, and
(b) at end insert—
“(4) In sections 52 and 53 “sexual exploitation” means conduct by which a person manipulates, deceives, coerces or controls another person to undertake sexual activity.”.”
An amendment to the Sexual Offences Act 2003, specifically in sections 52 and 53, replace “prostitution for gain’” with “sexual exploitation of an adult”.
New clause 45—Loitering and soliciting: repeal—
“Section 1 of the Street Offences Act 1959 (loitering or soliciting for purposes of prostitution) is repealed.”
An amendment that repeals soliciting and loitering as an offence.
New clause 46—Power of Secretary of State to disregard convictions or cautions: Loitering or soliciting for purposes of prostitution—
‘(1) Section 92 of the Street Offences Act 1959 is amended as follows.
(2) For subsection (1) substitute—
“(1) A person who has been convicted of, or cautioned for, an offence in circumstances where—
(a) the conduct constituting the offence was sexual activity between persons of the same sex, or
(b) the offence was committed under Section 1 of the Street Offences Act 1959,
may apply to the Secretary of State for the conviction or caution to become a disregarded conviction or caution.”
(3) In subsection (2) after first “caution” insert “received in the circumstances set out in subsection (1)(a)”.’
A new clause that allows a process allowing the Secretary of State to disregard convictions and cautions received under section 1 of the Street Offences Act 1959.
New clause 47—Grooming as an aggravating factor—
“(1) After section 72 of the Sentencing Code (supply of psychoactive substance in certain circumstances) insert—
“72A Grooming
(1) This section applies where a court is considering the seriousness of an offence which is aggravated by grooming.
(2) The court—
(a) must treat the fact that the offence is aggravated by grooming as an aggravating factor, and
(b) must state in open court that the offence is so aggravated.””
Grooming to be seen as an aggravating factor in certain cases where the victim is an adult.
New clause 48—Aggravating factor relevant to offence of murder: strangulation—
“(1) Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Code (determination of minimum term in relation to mandatory life sentence for murder etc) is amended as follows.
(2) After paragraph 9(g) insert—
“(h) the fact that the offender strangled the victim as part of the homicide.””
An amendment to instate strangulation as an aggravating factor in murder cases.
New clause 49—Reasonable force in domestic abuse cases—
“(1) Section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (reasonable force for purposes of self-defence etc.) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (5A) after “In a householder case” insert “or a domestic abuse case”.
(3) In subsection (6) after “In a case other than a householder case” insert “or a domestic abuse case”.
(4) After subsection (8F) insert—
“(8G) For the purposes of this section “a domestic abuse case” is a case where—
(a) the defence concerned is the common law defence of self-defence,
(b) D is, or has been, a victim of domestic abuse, and
(c) the force concerned is force used by D against the person who has perpetrated the abusive behaviour referred to in paragraph (b).
(8H) Subsection (8G)(b) will only be established if the behaviour concerned is, or is part of, a history of conduct which constitutes domestic abuse as defined in sections 1 and 2 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, including but not limited to conduct which constitutes the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship as defined in section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 (controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship).”
(5) In subsection (9) after “householder cases” insert “and domestic abuse cases”.”
Statutory defence for victims of domestic abuse who may have been coerced into committing certain crimes or driven to use force against their abuser, as a result of being a victim of domestic abuse.
New clause 50—Defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence—
“(1) A person is not guilty of an offence if—
(a) the person is aged 18 or over when the person does the act which constitutes the offence,
(b) the person does that act because the person is compelled to do it,
(c) the compulsion is attributable to their being a victim of domestic abuse, and
(d) a reasonable person in the same situation as the person and having the person’s relevant characteristics would have no realistic alternative to doing that act.
(2) A person may be compelled to do something by another person or by the person’s circumstances.
(3) Compulsion is attributable to domestic abuse only if—
(a) it is, or is part of, conduct which constitutes domestic abuse as defined in sections 1 and 2 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, including but not limited to conduct which constitutes the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship as defined in section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, or
(b) it is a direct consequence of a person being, or having been, a victim of such abuse.
(4) A person is not guilty of an offence if—
(a) the person is under the age of 18 when the person does the act which constitutes the offence,
(b) the person does that act as a direct consequence of the person being, or having been, a victim of domestic abuse as defined at subsection (3)(a) above, and
(c) a reasonable person in the same situation as the person and having the person’s relevant characteristics would do that act.
(5) For the purposes of this section “relevant characteristics” means age, sex, any physical or mental illness or disability and any experience of domestic abuse.
(6) In this section references to an act include an omission.
(7) Subsections (1) and (4) do not apply to an offence listed in Schedule [Offences to which the defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence does not apply].
(8) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend Schedule [Offences to which the defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence does not apply].
(9) The Secretary of State must make arrangements for monitoring of the types of offence for which victims of domestic abuse are prosecuted and use this evidence to inform an annual review of the offences listed in Schedule [Offences to which the defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence does not apply] and any amendment to Schedule [Offences to which the defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence does not apply].”
Statutory defence for victims of domestic abuse who may have been coerced into committing certain crimes as a result of being a victim of domestic abuse.
New clause 55—Offence of child criminal exploitation—
“(1) A person (“P”) commits an offence if they—
(a) recruit or attempt to recruit, or
(b) ask or compel another person to recruit or attempt to recruit,
a child (“C”) for the purpose of C’s involvement in criminal activity.
(2) An offence is committed under subsection (1) regardless of whether C—
(a) engages in criminal activity, or
(b) is prosecuted for or found guilty of a criminal offence.
(3) It is not a defence to a charge under subsection (1) to prove that P did not know that C was a child.
(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—
(a) if the offence for which C was, or was attempted to be, recruited was murder, to imprisonment for life,
(b) if C was, or was attempted to be, recruited for any other offence, to the penalty to which a person guilty of that offence would be liable.
(5) For the purposes of this section—
“child” means a person under the age of 18;
“criminal activity” means any activity or conduct which constitutes a criminal offence;
to
“recruit” includes by direction, inducement, incitement, coercion or compulsion.”
New clause 57—Offence of causing death or serious injury by dangerous, careless or inconsiderate cycling—
“(1) The Road Traffic Act 1988 is amended as follows.
(2) Before section 28 (dangerous cycling) insert—
“27A Causing death by dangerous cycling
A person who causes the death of another person by riding a cycle dangerously (as defined in section 28) on a road or other public place is guilty of an offence.
27B Causing serious injury by dangerous cycling
(1) A person who causes serious injury to another person by riding a cycle dangerously (as defined in section 28) on a road or other public place is guilty of an offence.
(2) In this section “serious injury means—
(a) in England and Wales, physical harm which amounts to grievous bodily harm for the purposes of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, and
(b) in Scotland, severe physical injury.
27C Causing death by careless or inconsiderate cycling
A person who causes the death of another person by riding a cycle on a road or other public place without due care and attention, or without reasonable consideration for other persons using the road or place, is guilty of an offence.”
(3) In section 28 (dangerous cycling), after subsection (3) insert—
“(4) For the purposes of subsection (2), what would be expected of a competent and careful cyclist includes that their cycle is equipped and maintained in accordance with regulations made under section 81 of this Act.”
(4) After section 32 (electrically assisted pedal cycles), insert—
“32A Interpretation of sections 27A to 32
(1) For the purposes of sections 27A to 32 of this Act, “a cycle” includes but is not limited to—
(a) a pedal cycle,
(b) an electrically assisted pedal cycle, and
(c) a mechanically propelled personal transporter, including—
(i) an electric scooter,
(ii) a self-balancing personal transporter (including a self-balancing scooter, self-balancing board or electric unicycle), and
(iii) any other mechanically propelled personal transporter provided for by the Secretary of State in regulations made under this section.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(c), mechanically propelled personal transporters are to be defined in regulations made by the Secretary of State under this section.”
(5) The Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 is amended as follows.
(6) In the table in Part 1 of Schedule 2, after the row beginning “RTA section 27” insert in columns 1 to 4—
New clause 59—Ban on “ninja swords”—
“(1) The Secretary of State must exercise their powers under section 141(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 to amend the Schedule to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988 as follows.
(2) In paragraph 1, after sub-paragraph (t) insert—
“(u) the weapon sometimes known as a “ninja sword”, “katana” or “ninjato”, being a single-edged straight blade of up to 60cm in length with a long hilt or guard”.
(3) Regulations laid under subsection (1) must—
(a) be laid within six months of the date of Royal Assent to this Act,
(b) be laid following consultation on the definitions of possession for sporting use and possession of antiques, and
(c) include, subject to the results of the consultation under subsection (3)(b), exemptions for sporting use and for possession of antiques.”
New clause 60—Senior manager liability for illegal sale of bladed articles—
“(1) A person “P” commits an offence where—
(a) P is a senior manager of an internet service “C”,
(b) C commits an offence under—
(i) sections 141A or 141B of the Criminal Justice Act 1988; or
(ii) sections 38 to 42 of the Offensive Weapons Act 2019, and
(c) P has failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent that offence being committed by C.
(2) For the purposes of this section—
(a) “internet service” has the meaning given in section 228 of the Online Safety Act 2023;
(b) “senior manager” means an individual who plays a significant role in—
(i) the making of decisions about how C’s relevant activities are to be managed or organised, or
(ii) the actual managing or organising of C’s relevant activities.
(3) Where P is charged with an offence under this section, it is a defence for P to show that P was a senior manager of C for such a short time during the relevant period that P could not reasonably have been expected to take steps to prevent that offence being committed by C.
(4) Where P is guilty of an offence under this section, P is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine (or both).”
New clause 61—Classification of Fenethylline as a Class A drug—
“In Schedule 2 (Controlled Drugs) to the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, after “Etryptamine” insert “Fenethylline”.”
This new clause would add Fenethylline – also known by the brand names Captagon, Biocapton, and Fitton – to the list of Class A drugs under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971.
New clause 91—Offence of failing to meet pollution performance commitment levels—
“(1) A water or water and sewerage company (“C”) commits an offence where C has—
(a) failed to meet its pollution performance commitment level for three consecutive years; or
(b) experienced an increase in—
(i) total pollution incidents per 10,000km2, or
(ii) serious pollution incidents
for three consecutive years.
(2) For the purposes of this section—
“water or water and sewerage company” means companies which are responsible for the provision of water, or water and sewerage, services and which are regulated by Ofwat and the Environment Agency;
“pollution performance commitment level” means the level of performance on pollution that the company has committed to deliver, and which is reported against by Ofwat in its annual water company performance report;
“total pollution incidents per 10,000km2” and “serious pollution incidents” mean the relevant figures under those headings reported by the Environment Agency in its annual environmental performance report.
(3) If guilty of an offence under this section, C is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to a fine;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to a fine.”
New clause 92—Senior manager liability for failure to meet pollution performance commitment levels—
“(1) A person (“P”) commits an offence where—
(a) P is a senior manager of a water or water and sewerage company (“C”),
(b) C commits an offence under section [Offence of failing to meet pollution performance commitment levels], and
(c) P has failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent that offence being committed by C.
(2) For the purposes of this section—
“senior manager” means an individual who plays a significant role in—
(a) the making of decisions about how C’s relevant activities are to be managed or organised, or
(b) the actual managing or organising of C’s relevant activities;
“water or water and sewerage company” has the meaning given in section [Offence of failing to meet pollution performance commitment levels].
(3) Where P is charged with an offence under this section, it is a defence for P to show that P was a senior manager of C for such a short time during the relevant period that P could not reasonably have been expected to take steps to prevent that offence being committed by C.
(4) Where P is guilty of an offence under this section, P is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to a fine;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to a fine.”
New clause 93—Compensation orders: loss suffered by victim—
“In the Sentencing Act 2020 after section 138 insert —
“138A Loss suffered by victim of offence of coercive and controlling behaviour
(1) Subsection (2) applies where the court is determining whether to make a compensation order against an offender in respect of an offence under section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 (controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship).
(2) The court must have particular regard to the desirability of compensating the victim of the offence for injury, loss or damage, including economic loss, resulting from the offence.””
Government new schedule 4—Cuckooing: specified offences.
New schedule 1—Offences to which the defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence does not apply—
“Schedule
Common Law Offences
1 False imprisonment.
2 Kidnapping.
3 Manslaughter.
4 Murder.
5 Perverting the course of justice.
6 Piracy.
Offences against the Person Act 1861 (c. 100)
7 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861—
• section 4 (soliciting murder)
• section 16 (threats to kill)
• section 18 (wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm)
• section 20 (malicious wounding)
• section 21 (attempting to choke, suffocate or strangle in order to commit or assist in committing an indictable offence)
• section 22 (using drugs etc to commit or assist in the committing of an indictable offence)
• section 23 (maliciously administering poison etc so as to endanger life or inflict grievous bodily harm)
• section 27 (abandoning children)
• section 28 (causing bodily injury by explosives)
• section 29 (using explosives with intent to do grievous bodily harm)
• section 30 (placing explosives with intent to do bodily injury)
• section 31 (setting spring guns etc with intent to do grievous bodily harm)
• section 32 (endangering safety of railway passengers)
• section 35 (injuring persons by furious driving)
• section 37 (assaulting officer preserving wreck)
• section 38 (assault with intent to resist arrest).
Explosive Substances Act 1883 (c. 3)
8 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Explosive Substances Act 1883—
• section 2 (causing explosion likely to endanger life or property)
• section 3 (attempt to cause explosion, or making or keeping explosive with intent to endanger life or property)
• section 4 (making or possession of explosives under suspicious circumstances).
Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 (c. 34)
9 An offence under section 1 of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 (child destruction).
Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (c. 12)
10 An offence under section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (cruelty to children).
Public Order Act 1936 (1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6 c. 6)
11 An offence under section 2 of the Public Order Act 1936 (control etc of quasi-military organisation).
Infanticide Act 1938 (c. 36)
12 An offence under section 1 of the Infanticide Act 1938 (infanticide).
Firearms Act 1968 (c. 27)
13 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Firearms Act 1968—
• section 5 (possession of prohibited firearms)
• section 16 (possession of firearm with intent to endanger life)
• section 16A (possession of firearm with intent to cause fear of violence)
• section 17(1) (use of firearm to resist arrest)
• section 17(2) (possession of firearm at time of committing or being arrested for specified offence)
• section 18 (carrying firearm with criminal intent).
Theft Act 1968 (c. 60)
14 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Theft Act 1968—
• section 8 (robbery or assault with intent to rob)
• section 9 (burglary), where the offence is committed with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm on a person, or to do unlawful damage to a building or anything in it
• section 10 (aggravated burglary)
• section 12A (aggravated vehicle-taking), where the offence involves an accident which causes the death of any person
• section 21 (blackmail).
Criminal Damage Act 1971 (c. 48)
15 The following offences under the Criminal Damage Act 1971—
• an offence of arson under section 1
• an offence under section 1(2) (destroying or damaging property) other than an offence of arson.
Immigration Act 1971 (c. 77)
16 An offence under section 25 of the Immigration Act 1971 (assisting unlawful immigration to member state).
Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 (c. 2)
17 An offence under section 170 of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 (penalty for fraudulent evasion of duty etc) in relation to goods prohibited to be imported under section 42 of the Customs Consolidation Act 1876 (indecent or obscene articles).
Taking of Hostages Act 1982 (c. 28)
18 An offence under section 1 of the Taking of Hostages Act 1982 (hostage-taking).
Aviation Security Act 1982 (c. 36)
19 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Aviation Security Act 1982—
• section 1 (hijacking)
• section 2 (destroying, damaging or endangering safety of aircraft)
• section 3 (other acts endangering or likely to endanger safety of aircraft)
• section 4 (offences in relation to certain dangerous articles).
Mental Health Act 1983 (c. 20)
20 An offence under section 127 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (ill-treatment of patients).
Child Abduction Act 1984 (c. 37)
21 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Child Abduction Act 1984—
• section 1 (abduction of child by parent etc)
• section 2 (abduction of child by other persons).
Public Order Act 1986 (c. 64)
22 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Public Order Act 1986—
• section 1 (riot)
• section 2 (violent disorder).
Criminal Justice Act 1988 (c. 33)
23 An offence under section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (torture).
Road Traffic Act 1988 (c. 52)
24 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Road Traffic Act 1988—
• section 1 (causing death by dangerous driving)
• section 3A (causing death by careless driving when under the influence of drink or drugs).
Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990 (c. 31)
25 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990—
• section 1 (endangering safety at aerodromes)
• section 9 (hijacking of ships)
• section 10 (seizing or exercising control of fixed platforms)
• section 11 (destroying fixed platforms or endangering their safety)
• section 12 (other acts endangering or likely to endanger safe navigation)
• section 13 (offences involving threats).
Channel Tunnel (Security) Order 1994 (S.I. 1994/570)
26 An offence under Part 2 of the Channel Tunnel (Security) Order 1994 (SI 1994/570) (offences relating to Channel Tunnel trains and the tunnel system).
Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (c. 40)
27 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997—
• section 4 (putting people in fear of violence)
• section 4A (stalking involving fear of violence or serious alarm or distress).
Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (c. 37)
28 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 —
• section 29 (racially or religiously aggravated assaults)
• section 31(1)(a) or (b) (racially or religiously aggravated offences under section 4 or 4A of the Public Order Act 1986).
Terrorism Act 2000 (c. 11)
29 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Terrorism Act 2000—
• section 54 (weapons training)
• section 56 (directing terrorist organisation)
• section 57 (possession of article for terrorist purposes)
• section 59 (inciting terrorism overseas).
International Criminal Court Act 2001 (c. 17)
30 An offence under any of the following provisions of the International Criminal Court Act 2001—
• section 51 (genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes)
• section 52 (ancillary conduct).
Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (c. 24)
31 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001—
• section 47 (use of nuclear weapons)
• section 50 (assisting or inducing certain weapons-related acts overseas)
• section 113 (use of noxious substance or thing to cause harm or intimidate).
Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003 (c. 31)
32 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003—
• section 1 (female genital mutilation)
• section 2 (assisting a girl to mutilate her own genitalia)
• section 3 (assisting a non-UK person to mutilate overseas a girl’s genitalia).
Sexual Offences Act 2003 (c. 42)
33 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Sexual Offences Act 2003—
• section 1 (rape)
• section 2 (assault by penetration)
• section 3 (sexual assault)
• section 4 (causing person to engage in sexual activity without consent)
• section 5 (rape of child under 13)
• section 6 (assault of child under 13 by penetration)
• section 7 (sexual assault of child under 13)
• section 8 (causing or inciting child under 13 to engage in sexual activity)
• section 9 (sexual activity with a child)
• section 10 (causing or inciting a child to engage in sexual activity)
• section 13 (child sex offences committed by children or young persons)
• section 14 (arranging or facilitating commission of child sex offence)
• section 15 (meeting a child following sexual grooming)
• section 16 (abuse of position of trust: sexual activity with a child)
• section 17 (abuse of position of trust: causing or inciting a child to engage in sexual activity)
• section 18 (abuse of position of trust: sexual activity in presence of child)
• section 19 (abuse of position of trust: causing a child to watch a sexual act)
• section 25 (sexual activity with a child family member)
• section 26 (inciting a child family member to engage in sexual activity)
• section 30 (sexual activity with a person with a mental disorder impeding choice)
• section 31 (causing or inciting a person with a mental disorder impeding choice to engage in sexual activity)
• section 32 (engaging in sexual activity in the presence of a person with a mental disorder impeding choice)
• section 33 (causing a person with a mental disorder impeding choice to watch a sexual act)
• section 34 (inducement, threat or deception to procure sexual activity with a person with a mental disorder)
• section 35 (causing a person with a mental disorder to engage in or agree to engage in sexual activity by inducement, threat or deception)
• section 36 (engaging in sexual activity in the presence, procured by inducement, threat or deception, of a person with a mental disorder)
• section 37 (causing a person with a mental disorder to watch a sexual act by inducement, threat or deception)
• section 38 (care workers: sexual activity with a person with a mental disorder)
• section 39 (care workers: causing or inciting sexual activity)
• section 40 (care workers: sexual activity in the presence of a person with a mental disorder)
• section 41 (care workers: causing a person with a mental disorder to watch a sexual act)
• section 47 (paying for sexual services of a child)
• section 48 (causing or inciting child prostitution or pornography)
• section 49 (controlling a child prostitute or a child involved in pornography
• section 50 (arranging or facilitating child prostitution or pornography)
• section 61 (administering a substance with intent)
• section 62 (committing offence with intent to commit sexual offence)
• section 63 (trespass with intent to commit sexual offence)
• section 64 (sex with an adult relative: penetration)
• section 65 (sex with an adult relative: consenting to penetration)
• section 66 (exposure)
• section 67 (voyeurism)
• section 70 (sexual penetration of a corpse).
Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 (c. 28)
34 An offence under section 5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 (causing or allowing a child or vulnerable adult to die or suffer serious physical harm).
Terrorism Act 2006 (c. 11)
35 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Terrorism Act 2006—
• section 5 (preparation of terrorist acts)
• section 6 (training for terrorism)
• section 9 (making or possession of radioactive device or material)
• section 10 (use of radioactive device or material for terrorist purposes)
• section 11 (terrorist threats relating to radioactive devices etc).
Modern Slavery Act 2015 (c. 30)
36 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Modern Slavery Act 2015—
• section 1 (slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour)
• section 2 (human trafficking).
Ancillary offences
37 (1) An offence of attempting or conspiring to commit an offence listed in this Schedule.
(2) An offence committed by aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring an offence listed in this Schedule.
(3) An offence under Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 (encouraging or assisting) where the offence (or one of the offences) which the person in question intends or believes would be committed is an offence listed in this Schedule.”
Amendment 69, in clause 9, page 7, line 36, at end insert—
“(3) The Secretary of State must, within two years of the date of Royal Assent to this Act, publish a report on convictions for the offence introduced by this section.
(4) In preparing the report under subsection (3) the Secretary of State must consult with whichever individuals or bodies the Secretary of State sees fit.
(5) The report under subsection (3) must include—
(a) the number of convictions for offences under section 139AB of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 in each year for which this section has been in force;
(b) the types of relevant weapon involved in such offences;
(c) details of how the individual came into the possession of the relevant weapon, including details of whether any laws relating to the sale or delivery of bladed or other offensive articles were breached; and
(d) recommendations on whether, in light of the findings of the report, further review is needed on existing laws and processes relating to the sale or delivery of bladed or other offensive articles.”
Amendment 32, in clause 13, page 10, line 15, after “Administering” insert “or attempting to administer”.
Amendment 33, page 10, line 19, after “administers” insert “or attempts to administer”.
Amendment 34, page 10, line 20, after “administration” insert “or attempted administration”.
Amendment 35, page 10, line 23, after “causes” insert “or attempts to cause”.
Amendment 36, page 10, line 25, after “administration” insert “attempted administration”.
Amendment 37, page 10, line 26, leave out from “life” to end of line 27 and insert
“, inflicts grievous bodily harm on them, or causes them annoyance or humiliation, and”.
Government amendments 142 and 143.
Amendment 38, page 11, line 3, leave out from “Administering” to end of line 4 and insert
“or attempting to administer etc harmful substance with intent to injure, aggrieve, annoy or humiliate”.
Amendment 39, page 11, line 6, after “administers” insert “or attempts to administer”.
Amendment 40, page 11, line 7, after “causes” insert “or attempts to cause”.
Amendment 41, page 11, line 9, leave out from “aggrieve” to end of line 10 and insert
“, annoy or humiliate the other person, or for the purposes of the entertainment of the person or any other person.”
Government amendments 144 to 150
Amendment 57, in clause 28, page 34, leave out lines 34 and 35 and insert—
“(4) The court may, as part of an order under subsection (2), add conditions about the use of reasonable force, if necessary and proportionate, to give effect to an order under subsection (2).
(4A) Conditions referred to in subsection (4) may only be added if the court is satisfied that there are sufficient, properly trained and equipped staff available to give effect to the order, and the conditions added to it, safely.”
This amendment would ensure the courts satisfies itself that staff would not be put at risk when ordering a defendant to attend sentencing.
Government amendments 151 to 153
Amendment 58, in clause 33, page 39, line 14, at end insert —
“(2A) The Secretary of State may not issue a warrant under subsection (2) where—
(a) the prisoner has less than 180 days to serve of the requisite custodial period;
(b) the prisoner is serving an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment or detention for public protection; or
(c) the Secretary of State is satisfied that the prisoner should continue to be detained in a domestic prison for the purposes of—
(i) receiving instruction or training which cannot reasonably be provided in a prison in the foreign country, or
(ii) participating in any proceeding before any court, tribunal or inquiry where it is not reasonably practicable for the participation or to take place in a prison in the foreign country.”
The amendment would introduce exclusions on the type of prisoner that could be issued with a warrant to serve their sentence in a foreign country. It excludes people with less than 6 months to serve, those serving indeterminate sentences for public protection and those who need to be detained in the UK for education/training purposes or for legal proceedings (e.g. parole).
Amendment 59, in clause 35, page 40, line 41, at end insert—
“(c) report to the Secretary of State on any breaches of the arrangement made between the United Kingdom and a foreign country.”
This amendment would require the Controller to make a report to the Secretary of State on any breaches of the arrangement between the foreign country and the UK.
Amendment 60, page 41, line 3, leave out “may” and insert “must”.
This amendment would ensure that the prisons inspectorate must conduct the duties specified in new section 5A(5D) of the Prisons Act 1952 and ensures its consistency with the legislative basis for its role in England and Wales.
Amendment 61, page 41, line 4, after “prisons” insert “and escort arrangements”.
This amendment would ensure that HM Inspectorate of Prisons can inspect escort arrangements under which prisoners are transferred to foreign prisons. This would bring the legislation into line with inspectorate’s powers in relation to UK prisons and escort arrangements under amendments to the Prisons Act made by the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 (s.46) and ensures scrutiny of an area of evidenced risk.
Amendment 62, page 41, line 8, at end insert—
“(4) In section 1 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, after subsection 2(c) insert—
“(d) the deceased died while in custody or otherwise in state detention in a foreign country pursuant to a warrant issued by the Secretary of State under section 26 of the Criminal Justice Act 2024 (warrant for transfer of prisoner to or from foreign prison).””
This amendment would clarify how the government intends to apply its obligations under Article 2 (right to life) of the Human Rights Act, through ensuring the duties of the coroner also apply to any death involving a prisoner subject to a transfer agreement with a foreign country.
Amendment 56, in schedule 2, page 105, line 4, at end insert—
“66AD Faking intimate photographs or films using digital technology
(1) A person (A) commits an offence if A intentionally creates or designs using computer graphics or any other digital technology an image or film which appears to be a photograph or film of another person (B) in an intimate state for the purposes of—
(a) sexual gratification, whether of themselves or of another person;
(b) causing alarm, distress or humiliation to B or any other person; or
(c) committing an offence under sections 66A or 66B of the Sexual Offence Act 2003.
(2) It is a defence to a charge under subsection (1) to prove that—
(a) A had a reasonable excuse for creating or designing the image or film, or
(b) that B consented to its creation.
(3) A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.”
This amendment would make the creation of ”deepfake” intimate images an offence.
Amendment 160, page 110, line 14, at end insert—
“Online Safety Act 2023
21 In Schedule 7 to the Online Safety Act 2023 (priority offences), after paragraph 31 insert—
“Non-consensual intimate photograph or film
31A An offence under any of the following provisions of the Sexual Offences Act 2003—
(a) section 66A (sending etc photograph or film of genitals);
(b) section 66AA (taking or recording intimate photograph or film);
(c) section 66AC (installing etc equipment to enable taking or recording of intimate photograph or film);
(d) section 66B (sharing or threatening to share intimate photograph or film).””
This amendment makes non-consensual intimate photographs and films “priority illegal content” and so subject to duties to prevent individuals from encountering such content and to minimise the length of time such content is present (as is currently the case for child sexual exploitation and abuse content).
Government amendment 161.
Government amendment 163.
Government amendments 154 to 157.
Government amendment 70.
Government amendments 158 and 159.
Laura Farris
I have heard what was said by the hon. Member for Poplar and Limehouse (Apsana Begum) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Dame Maria Miller) and made a careful note. The fact that this debate is split over two days may have contributed to that, but I have listened carefully and will take that point away.
It is an honour, again, to open this debate and bring this important Bill back to the House on Report. Its focus is on countering developing criminal threats, intercepting serious organised crime, and protecting vulnerable victims. I thank Members across the House for their constructive engagement on the Bill, as well as the police, leading academics, practising lawyers and campaign groups, some of whom appeared before us in Committee. They have all contributed to the Bill’s development. There are many topics to discuss today, and I look forward to hearing the views of Members.
The Government are bringing forward a number of amendments that we believe are appropriate and necessary to punish offenders and enhance the protection that victims deserve. Briefly, I will explain the key Government amendments, starting with those about which I anticipate there will be no dispute: namely, the extension to Northern Ireland of our new spiking measures in clause 13, and the statutory aggravating factor for grooming activity in relation to child sexual offences in clause 30. New clause 88 provides for equivalence in sentencing for terrorist offenders between England and Wales and Northern Ireland, as a consequence of the irregularity that was identified in the case of R v. Perry.
Government new clause 89 extends the time limit for the unduly lenient sentence scheme, and will extend the overall time limit to six weeks. A request must still be submitted by any prospective appellant to the Attorney General’s Office within the usual 28 days, but the Attorney General’s Office will have an additional 14 days to consider whether the case is appropriate for submission to the Court of Appeal. In recent years the number of cases referred to the Law Officers has increased, in part due to a better awareness of the scheme. We consider it to be in the interests of justice that each application is given due care and attention, even when it is submitted close to the 28-day deadline, and we believe that the new clause is a proportionate way of achieving that.
On attendance at sentencing hearings, a change has been initiated already in the legislation in response to public concerns about high-profile cases, such as those of Lucy Letby, Jordan McSweeney and Thomas Cashman, all of whom refused to attend their sentencing hearing.
Rob Butler (Aylesbury) (Con)
Does my hon. Friend agree that such cases, which have rightly gained a huge amount of public traction, are ones where it is appropriate for the Government to be making further announcements and putting in measures at this stage?
Laura Farris
I agree with that sentiment entirely. We are already creating an express statutory power at clause 28 to compel an offender to attend the sentencing hearing if they have been convicted of a crime for which the maximum sentence is life, but we have also listened to those concerned about offences that might not be caught by that power. I confirm that the Government has tabled amendments 148 to 150 to extend the measure to all offences that might attract a maximum sentence of 14 years or more.
James Wild (North West Norfolk) (Con)
I am grateful to the Lord Chancellor, the Minister and other Ministers for listening to the case I made on Second Reading for extending the power. I had a case in my constituency where an offender was convicted of sexually assaulting a child under 13, which carries a 14-year sentence. They hid away in their cell and did not come to court. Under the original provisions, they would not have been captured, but under these amendments they will be, and I welcome that.
Laura Farris
I thank my hon. Friend, because the speech he gave on Second Reading played a major role in the changes we are introducing today. I reassure him that the change brings into scope most sexual assault cases, terrorist cases and racially aggravated offences, and I confirm to him that the specific case he raised on Second Reading would have been brought into scope by the change for which he has campaigned. I remind the House that the sanction for non-attendance at a sentencing hearing is up to a maximum of another two years in custody.
Government new clause 86 creates an offence of creating a sexually explicit deepfake of an adult without their consent. Members will be aware that the sharing of intimate images, whether real or fake, is already proscribed under the Online Safety Act 2023. We consider that we cannot complete the task of protecting people, principally women, unless we add the creation of pseudo-images or deepfakes to that package of protection. We are the first national legislature to take this step—if I am wrong about that, we are among the first—and we do so because we recognise the inherent risk posed by the creation of these images, both to the individual depicted and to society more widely.
Caroline Nokes (Romsey and Southampton North) (Con)
I know that the Minister will have given thought to this, but does she agree that there is a problem not just with deepfake sexual images, but more widely with deepfake images that purport to show individuals and potentially even Members of this House doing and saying things that they have not and that have no sexual connotations whatever?
Laura Farris
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for raising that point. We are encountering a rapidly changing world of deepfake images that can be used for the purposes of manipulating voices to try to influence political attitudes and choices. I have to make it clear that the new clause is confined only to the creation of sexually explicit images. However, it is my hope, humbly expressed at this Dispatch Box, that it may provide a gateway and lever for the development of more law in this area, and I thank her for her intervention.
Vicky Ford (Chelmsford) (Con)
I particularly thank the Minister for this new clause. It obviously only covers adults, because producing sexual content of children is already illegal, but I am told that since the Government announced their intention to move the new clause, Apple and Google have already removed from their app stores a number of apps that were enabling users to produce deepfake nudes. Those applications have been used to create indecent images of children, as well as of adults. Disabling those apps has already helped to keep the public safe and to significantly improve the safeguarding of children. Just by tabling the new clause, the Government have already forced the industry to act in the UK.
Laura Farris
That is music to our ears. It was not lost on us that, within days of making the announcement, two of the major deepfake or nudify sites had blocked access to UK users in anticipation of the fact that even the act of using that site would become a criminal offence under our impending legislation.
Greg Clark (Tunbridge Wells) (Con)
I thank the Minister for her personal championing of this new clause. As she knows, the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee recommended it, and we benefited from a seminar conducted with the campaigners that Glamour magazine brought together to bring the experience of people right across the country to a focal point. They deserve credit for having brought this issue to the House, as does the Minister for championing it so brilliantly and bringing the new clause today.
Laura Farris
I have to thank the team at Glamour magazine, because they led an excellent campaign. I was halfway through trying to make the change myself when I became aware of it, but I read the material that they put out. It totally chimed with our objectives, and I know that my right hon. Friend welcomed the team to Parliament just a few weeks ago.
Dame Maria Miller (Basingstoke) (Con)
Intimate image abuse is an important issue to be dealt with. Can the Minister explain why she has not approached it in the same way as her colleagues approached it in the Online Safety Bill? It was a long-fought battle to have the Online Safety Bill recognise consent as pivotal, yet she has chosen not to take that approach at this stage, which I think many will find disappointing.
Laura Farris
I want to be crystal clear that, under the new clause, the offence is committed if the pseudo-image is created without the consent of the person who is the subject. That is at subsections 1(c) and 2(c) of proposed new section 66AD.
Let me talk for a moment about intent. The new clause differs from some of the content in the Online Safety Act 2023. It does not relate to intimate images, such as a person wearing a swimsuit, but applies to sexually explicit images, which are defined in legislation. It requires not only that the image is sexually explicit and is created without the consent of the subject matter, but that it is done for the purposes of sexual gratification or with the intent of causing humiliation, alarm or distress. I gently say that a similar measure was debated in the Bill Committee. I think it was tabled by the hon. Member for Nottingham North (Alex Norris), and he will recognise that the intent of the provisions that the Government have adopted is the same as the Opposition’s.
I am aware of what my right hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke is saying about the base events. Perhaps I can allay her concerns by simply saying this: it is a novel new measure for any Government to take. She makes sensible and compelling arguments on this point, and I hope she will feel reassured if we take an iterative approach for the time being. She will recall that the Law Commission recommended that we did not introduce legislation at all, and I will come on to say a little about that. It is right to say that other countries are looking at us carefully. The Justice Secretary was at the G7 in Venice just last weekend, and other G7 Justice Ministers had noticed that we are making this change and were observing carefully. We are making this change because we recognise the inherent risk posed by these images and that the offence is overwhelmingly targeted at women, predicated on an absence of consent. As such, we consider it a gateway to more serious offending.
We make some points by way of clarification. We carefully considered the Law Commission’s recommendations in its excellent report on intimate image abuse, which has informed much of our recent work, although respectfully on this, we have diverged from its point of view. In response to some of its concerns, I would like to reassure the House. We recognise that the amendment could criminalise young people, particularly teenage boys. To reduce the risk of over-criminalisation, we believe that we have set pragmatic parameters. Creation alone will be a non-imprisonable offence, although it will incur a potentially unlimited fine. The offence of creation alone would not attract notification requirements, meaning that the offender will not be placed on the sex offenders register. As hon. Members will know, all of that changes if the image is shared. Victims of that offence will be entitled to automatic anonymity in line with all the other sexual offences and they will also be eligible for special measures at trial. We are delighted to see major deepfake websites withdraw from the United Kingdom and we encourage the others to follow their lead.
I turn to Government new clause 87, which introduces a statutory aggravating factor for manslaughter involving sexual conduct. The clause corresponds to, and potentially should be read in conjunction with, section 71 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, which says that it is not a defence to argue that a victim consented to the infliction of serious harm for the purpose of sexual gratification.
We have long held concerns about killing of this nature where, by definition, the victim cannot give an account of consent, yet on occasions the court has implicitly sought to categorise the killing as a consequence of sexual choice, as opposed to the consequence of the development of social norms based on structural inequality. We invited the eminent criminal barrister Clare Wade KC to consider the issue specifically in her domestic homicide review last year. She said that cases of this nature must be viewed through the prism of coercive control and that
“the policy underpinning law ought to consider the wider harms which emanate from the behaviour which can and does lead to this category of homicide.”
We agree, and we are increasing the punishment for degrading and abusive conduct of this nature. Following careful consultation with the Sentencing Council, we are tabling a statutory aggravating factor so that sentences for manslaughter involving sexual conduct must be more severe. It will cover all cases where the act is directly attributable to sexual conduct.
I want to provide the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley (Jess Phillips) with one point of reassurance. She will know from all her work, and particularly the research conducted by We Can’t Consent To This and the team, that of all these homicides almost 60% are strangulation cases. I know that that is not the point that she wishes to make with her amendment, but there is some overlap.
On parental responsibility, as hon. Members will be aware, the Government have already amended the Children Act 1989 via the Victims and Prisoners Bill to provide for the automatic suspension of parental responsibility in cases where one parent kills the other. We are making an amendment to develop the law further, providing that, where a father is convicted of child rape, parental responsibility that he may have for any child will be automatically suspended.
I pay tribute to the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman)—I think that she is in the wars at the moment—for the way in which she has presented this issue. She has advanced the compelling argument that we have long-established principles to protect children from sex offenders by placing people on the sex offenders register and protecting them from working with children, but while we have measures to protect other people’s children, the same protection does not exist for the children of the offender unless the mother goes to the family court to remove his rights.
I also pay tribute to Sanchia Berg, the journalist who revealed this issue through her work and highlighted the practical obstacles that some mothers had faced in making this application, as well as other families who have talked about their experience, including via their Member of Parliament, one example being my hon. Friend the Member for Meriden (Saqib Bhatti); I am not sure if he is in his place.
The father will still be able to apply to the family court to have the suspension of his parental responsibility lifted, but it is obviously fair to assume that, if he has been convicted of child rape, such an application is unlikely to succeed. We have also included a clear requirement for this measure to be reviewed after it has been in place for three years.
Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to see in the Public Gallery some of the families who have championed this issue in the west midlands. Am I right in thinking—I really hope that I am not—that this measure covers only those convicted of the rape of a child, not other sexual offences against a child and a child aged 13 or over?
Laura Farris
The hon. Member is correct. I simply want to say again that this is a novel power that we are extending to Crown court judges, who typically do not have any knowledge of family law matters or a family law background. Once again, we think it is right that we take an iterative approach. There was a dialogue between the Mother of the House and the Lord Chancellor on this point, and she agreed with the approach. I do not want to put words in her mouth, and I am keenly aware of her absence when she should be speaking to her new clause, but I believe that she is satisfied with where we have got to. I commend the new clause and urge all colleagues to give it their support.
I turn next to new clauses 94 and 95 and new schedule 4. I commend my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) for his excellent campaign and dedication to crafting a new offence. I must also mention my hon. Friends the Members for Eastbourne (Caroline Ansell) and for Hertford and Stortford (Julie Marson), who also came to see me and made a really compelling argument.
Sir Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green) (Con)
I am grateful for that. The key bit about cuckooing is that the police have never been able to arrest somebody because they have taken over a house; they have to prove that there are criminal activities inside. This new offence will therefore break new ground and protect people.
There is an important point about coercion. Will the Minister guarantee that in the guidance notes attached to the Bill it will be clear to the police that they should be checking that victims are not being coerced into saying that they have given their consent? It is important for the police to know that.
Laura Farris
That is an excellent suggestion. I confirm that and thank my right hon. Friend once again.
Before I conclude, I would like to address a number of other matters that have been raised by hon. Members and tabled as amendments. I start with the new clause tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford (Dame Tracey Crouch)—
Mr Alistair Carmichael (Orkney and Shetland) (LD)
Before the Minister moves on—I apologise if she has addressed this and I missed it—could I get from her an explanation about Government new clause 102, which seeks to remove the protections of the Human Rights Act by effectively excluding the defence of lawful or reasonable excuses? This is now the fourth piece of legislation that the Government have introduced that will remove the protections of the Human Rights Act. We understand the reasons why they could not proceed with a Bill of rights, but surely if they are to remove human rights protections, that should be done in a proper, considered manner and not through salami slicing such as this.
Laura Farris
I will have to double-check that new clause, but I simply say that, with two exceptions, all the convention rights are qualified rights, which can be restricted in reasonable circumstances. I promise that I will check that and come back to the right hon. Gentleman in winding up the debate, if I may.
I was in the process of paying tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Chatham and Aylesford and my right hon. Friend the Member for Tunbridge Wells (Greg Clark) for the outstanding representation that they have given to their constituents who were affected by David Fuller’s acts of depravity. That is reflected in new clause 62, which the Government support, on the offence of necrophilia.
It is perhaps a rare thing in 2024 that an offence can be identified that Parliament has not previously considered, but such was the extent of Fuller’s offending that we have had to do so. The Government are pleased to confirm that the Sexual Offences Act 2003 will be amended by the Bill to capture the sexual touching of a corpse with a new maximum sentence of seven years for penetrative offences and five years for non-penetrative acts.
Dame Tracey Crouch (Chatham and Aylesford) (Con)
I thank the Minister for her kind comments. My right hon. Friend the Member for Tunbridge Wells (Greg Clark) will try to catch the Deputy Speaker’s eye later to speak in more detail on this, but let me take this opportunity to pay tribute to the Minister for taking a lot of time to work through this amendment thoughtfully and correctly, to provide greater protection and give some comfort to the families of the victims of David Fuller that justice has been thought about. She has listened sensitively and carefully to the comments of our constituents.
Laura Farris
I thank my hon. Friend for her comments. They were truly appalling crimes, and I had the constituents of both my hon. Friends in mind when I thought about how to develop the law. We cannot change what happened in the past, but I hope we can send the clearest possible message in future.
I want to come to a couple of other matters, though I will not pre-empt what hon. Members might be inclined to say. First, I want to talk about new clause 9, on one-punch manslaughter. I pay special tribute to my hon. Friend, and my friend, the Member for Bishop Auckland (Dehenna Davison). This was not an ordinary campaign for her, but one born out of the deep tragedy of her childhood. I know that she will speak to the new clause, and I will respond in detail, but I hope she will not mind my saying that I think her dad would feel very proud of how she has conducted herself on this issue, and would be pleased with the changes that we are making.
I come to the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Stockton North (Alex Cunningham) on prisoner transfer to overseas prisons. I want to set out the Government’s position in general, and in particular in relation to the transfer criteria. The Government agree that not all prisoners will be appropriate for transfer to rented prisons overseas—indeed, the hon. Member has set out some very sensible principles in his own amendment. I would like to give him three points of reassurance. The proposal for foreign prisoner transfer will extend to approximately 600 prisoners—equivalent to just under half of 1% of the entire prison estate. I can confirm that we will not negotiate a prison transfer agreement with a women’s prison.
We will conclude a deal only with a country that can demonstrate that its prison conditions and capabilities meet the applicable human rights standards. The Secretary of State retains responsibility for each prisoner, which ensures that any transferred prisoner retains all their rights under the European convention on human rights, irrespective of where they may be transferred. However, we believe that legislation is the best place for negotiating further terms, with the appropriate involvement of experts. The Lord Chancellor has already confirmed that the use of these powers requires a valid international agreement, and any such agreement would be put before Parliament as a treaty, subject to ratification procedures contained in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010.
Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)
I am grateful to the Minister for those reassurances, but some of us have marked misgivings about the whole concept, which speaks a little more of gimmickry than anything likely to ease the real pressures on our prisons. That said, I can see that it might be a tool in the box. Could she help me on two matters that the Law Society has raised? If the agreements are used, what arrangements will ensure that prisoners are able to access legal advice in a proper way, perhaps in relation to appeal or other proceedings? That is essential to ensure a fair approach. How will they be able to participate remotely if necessary in any ongoing legal proceedings? Secondly, what is to be done about family visits? As the Minister will know, the retention of family ties is particularly important, and recognised universally as a key factor in rehabilitation and preventing reoffending. We would not want to disrupt those opportunities for anyone being transferred.
Laura Farris
I thank my hon. and learned Friend for his sensible intervention, which engaged two issues: article 6 considerations on the right to a fair trial, and article 8 considerations on the right to respect for private and family life. We are keenly aware of those obligations. I am sorry that I cannot give more detail on that, only the extra reassurance that the Lord Chancellor has insisted that prisoners will retain all their rights under the convention. These will be principal considerations. I will ask the Lord Chancellor to write to my hon. and learned Friend to flesh out some of those responses.
Ruth Edwards (Rushcliffe) (Con)
My hon. Friend has given a wide-ranging opening speech, but I want to press her on one more issue: spiking. First, I thank her for recognising the importance of creating an offence to cover it. We had a spate of spiking attacks in Nottingham, and the stories of the young people affected were chilling. I seek her reassurance that we will create the most robust possible legislation in this area, and that she will look kindly on the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester (Richard Graham), who has led a fantastic campaign to get spiking recognised in law. It is so important that we cover all the intentions that someone might have when they set about spiking someone, even if it is that they thought it might be a bit of fun. It is certainly not fun for their victims, and it is important that we do not create a loophole where offenders might be able to wriggle off the hook.
Laura Farris
I hope that I can provide my hon. Friend, my right hon. Friend the Member for Chelmsford (Vicky Ford) and my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester (Richard Graham) with some reassurance. The offence is drafted to cover all possible outcomes. We looked very carefully at the wording. I want to provide some specific reassurance about “attempt”, which I know my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester is concerned about; it is in his amendment. It is not necessary to put a separate offence of attempting to spike in the Bill, because it is captured as an inchoate offence under section 1(4) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, which covers all forms of attempt of a crime that is on the statute book. I hope that provides some reassurance.
I thank Members on all sides of the House for their engagement in the Bill, their joint commitment to its successful development as legislation that enhances our criminal justice system, and that delivers robust protection, appropriate penalties and a better framework of justice for the public. Our Government amendments achieve that, and I will respond in due course to Members’ views. I commend the amendments and new clauses to the House.
Laura Farris
This has indeed been a wide-ranging debate—we use that phrase too often in this place, but it is true today—and it is a pleasure to bring it to a close. I am grateful to all hon. Members who took part. In the time available to me, I will seek to respond on as many of the non-Government new clauses and amendments as I can, and to answer questions. If I fail, please give me a nudge. I will then write to hon. Members or catch up with them at some point and give them a response.
I will begin with new clause 9, picking up where I left off. I was addressing my hon. Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland (Dehenna Davison) and her excellent campaign. Let me set out the steps that the Government are taking. She alluded to them in her excellent speech, but I will confirm what they are. We have worked with the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead for homicide, Kate Meynell, to appoint a named lead for one-punch homicides. That person will carry out an initial scoping exercise to properly establish how many of these cases are occurring, and to understand whether there are barriers to investigation and prosecution for these offences. I take my hon. Friend’s point that we should consider how the offence is communicated to the family, given the particular issues that arose in her case.
We will also build on action already taken, including the three-month Walk Away campaign that was launched in December 2023. That dovetails very neatly with the work of One Punch UK. I know that that is something my hon. Friend will be involved in.
We will establish a lower-culpability manslaughter homicide service practice review, led by Victim Support, which delivers the homicide service. The review will consider cases of manslaughter where there is lower culpability, and I look forward to working with my hon. Friend and getting started on that. We will also conduct individual sentence reviews into particular cases where there is an objection to the end of the sentence, and we will look at the sentencing remarks. She gave the names of a number of campaigners in her speech, and I look forward to picking those up with her.
I will comment briefly on new clause 28, relating to joint enterprise, which was raised by the hon. Member for Liverpool, Riverside (Kim Johnson), by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), the Chair of the Justice Committee, and by others. The new clause would caveat and curtail the law of joint enterprise only to those who had made a significant contribution. The hon. Member for Liverpool, Riverside knows that joint enterprise is there so that those who act as the burglary lookout, who provide the weapon in the murder or who drive the getaway vehicle do not escape the consequences of their crimes, which shatter lives.
It is already the case, following the Supreme Court decision in R v. Jogee, that the person must have helped or encouraged the commission of the offence and intended to do so. I have considered a number of examples of cases where there have been convictions on this basis in recent years, such as the boy who sent a WhatsApp to his colleague to encourage her to conduct a fatal attack or the 14-year-old lad who stood on the edge of a woodland as lookout while his friends gang-raped a girl. They are very painful cases. I will simply say this: I think that people who participate in crime, even on the periphery, should not escape liability, and I do not think anyone can advance a credible argument that they should. We on the Government side still think that those people ought to be locked up.
Kim Johnson
I admit that, and I have not said that we should get rid of joint enterprise, but we know that thousands of young people and children have been incarcerated for something they have not done. The law is not being used in the way it should be, as the hon. and learned Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill) mentioned in respect of the Jogee case. We took a wrong turn and we have taken another wrong turn. We need to get it right.
Laura Farris
I am going to respectfully differ from the hon. Lady. I am happy to have another conversation with her about it, but I am afraid that even those on the periphery often have their hands all over the crime.
I will return briefly to new clause 59 on bladed articles, which was tabled by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Nottingham North (Alex Norris). The issue of ninja swords was raised by the other shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton North (Alex Cunningham). I want to provide reassurance that both straight-bladed ninja swords, which the new clause is directed at, and curved swords are covered. Curved swords were banned by the Government in 2008, and he will know that possessing a sword or any knife—even a kitchen knife—in a public place without good reason is already a criminal offence, punishable by up to four years in prison.
The reason why straight swords are more difficult to ban is that some of them are held by military historians and for commemorative purposes. However, I wanted to provide reassurance to those on the shadow Front Bench that the Policing Minister engaged recently with the NPCC lead on knife crime, who reassured him once again that the NPCC was not seeking a ban on the use of straight-bladed swords. In fact, of all the knife crime fatalities in the last year, around 1% were caused that way.
What the NPCC is asking for is a clampdown on the online sale of knives to under-18s, which we are doing under the Online Safety Act; the power to seize knives in a private place if the police think they will be used for a criminal purpose, which is already in the Bill; and a ban on machetes and zombie knives, which we are bringing in in September. I wanted to provide that reassurance.
New clauses 25 and 26 were introduced by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chelmsford (Vicky Ford), who I cannot see, but I am sure—
Dame Karen Bradley (Staffordshire Moorlands) (Con)
She has just popped out.
Laura Farris
She has just popped out. She made an outstanding speech, which illuminated and identified yet more of the nefarious ways that child abusers find to conduct some of the most serious offences against children. She knows, as was clear in her constructive speech, that artificial intelligence raises unique problems. I agree without hesitation with the force of what she said, and about the identification of an offence as she has presented it. I recognise that it is our duty as parliamentarians to future-proof our legislation, and I thank her for her detailed work on this issue. I commit to working with her and to trying as best we can to get something ready for Report in the other place.
I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Elliot Colburn) for the sensitive and thoughtful way in which he approached the Law Commission’s report and the issue of hate crimes, and for his new clause 32 to introduce protected characteristics to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. Of course, I have read the Law Commission’s excellent report on this matter, and I can confirm that a response to it was always forthcoming this year. I want to make two slight qualifications that might explain some of the delay.
Many Members will be aware that the Law Commission did not recommend making sex a protected characteristic for hate crimes, and may remember that there was a campaign to make misogyny a hate crime, which the commission rejected. That required careful thought, because not all the protected characteristics have been treated in the same way. Another issue is the implementation of the hate crime legislation in Scotland, which has been both highly contentious and, I am afraid, somewhat chaotic. Of course, we wish to avoid replicating those mistakes. However, I want to provide reassurance by saying that our intention is to deal with this matter—subject to all the normal approvals—in the House of Lords, and I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Carshalton and Wallington will come and work with me on it.
The other excellent speech that I want to refer to was that of my right hon. Friend the Member for Romsey and Southampton North (Caroline Nokes). She alighted on two important issues—cyber-flashing and intimate image abuse—that are not on the priority offences list in schedule 7 to the Online Safety Act 2023. That is not because we did not consider them important or sinister offences—she will need no persuading, given everything that we have done on intimate image abuse, that the opposite is true. The fact is that they were not on the statute book, or certainly had not been commenced, when we passed the 2023 Act. I know that the Secretary of State is well aware of that, particularly in relation to both those issues. I know that my right hon. Friend is conducting an urgent review as we speak, and I am sure that, in the weeks ahead, I will be able to update her on where we are on this. I do not want her to think for a moment that we are dragging our feet.
Caroline Nokes
I appreciate that my hon. Friend is seeking to give me an assurance from the Dispatch Box, but it is perhaps not quite as fulsome as I would wish. She says that the priority offences register can be reviewed. It would be very helpful if we had a specific timescale by which the measures could be added. That would give reassurance to all victims that such images will be made illegal in their in own right, and that Ofcom and internet service providers will work together to take them down. We already have the criminal offence, so the perpetrators can go to prison, but the victims want the images—the repeat offence—to be removed from the internet.
Laura Farris
I listened very carefully to what my right hon. Friend said, and I agree with every single word of it. Some of this sits with the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, as she knows, so I would need to have a conversation with the relevant Minister, but I feel as strongly as she does on this matter, and I assure her from the Dispatch Box that I will use my best endeavours.
The road traffic amendments, which I will talk about briefly, were beautifully presented during the Committee and again today. I have spoken a few times with the Members who tabled them, who are well aware that those matters sit with the Department for Transport. I understand that they have had engagement with the Department and that an important review of this issue has certainly been contemplated.
Vicky Ford
I apologise to my hon. Friend—I was briefly out of the Chamber, discussing my amendments with the Home Secretary. It is clear that AI technology is moving incredibly quickly in a vile, disgusting way that is putting children at risk of sexual abuse. Could my hon. Friend repeat the commitment she has given: that she will work with me on the two areas that my amendments have highlighted, and will work with me, the IWF and others to ensure that the issues we have pinpointed are addressed as the Bill goes through this House and the Lords?
Laura Farris
I thank my right hon. Friend for her intervention, and I am sorry that we somehow did not manage to overlap when I made my comments about her. I thought her speech was outstanding, and I agree without hesitation: she is quite right to say that we need to future-proof our legislation. As I said, I think we are the first country—if not, we are one of the first—to put an offence on to the books relating to the creation of deepfakes, which shows that we are alive and very responsive to this issue. I will make the commitments that my right hon. Friend has requested.
Vicky Ford
To be clear, is the Minister giving a cast-iron guarantee that we will address these issues of paedophile manuals and using a chatbot to communicate sexually, including raping a child through a chatbot, by working with the IWF and others to ensure that the laws are clear, and that if necessary, there will be amendments in the Lords?
Laura Farris
Yes, I can give my right hon. Friend that commitment.
I was interrupted, but I was briefly paying tribute to the very passionate speeches that have been made about road traffic accidents. These are not small matters—the case of the little girl in the constituency of the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney (Gerald Jones) is such a painful one, and I know that the Transport Secretary and other Ministers have been very affected by it. As the hon. Member knows, this matter is not straightforward for reasons that we have discussed, but I hope progress will be made on it in a way that helps his constituent.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) made an excellent speech on the offence of causing death or serious injury by dangerous, careless or inconsiderate cycling. It is not in dispute that whether a vehicle is a car, an electric scooter or a bicycle, if it is operated in a certain way, it is effectively a dangerous weapon on the road. We are supportive of my right hon. Friend’s amendment, and we will be bringing it back in the Lords; we will be changing it in the Lords, as he knows, but we are accepting it.
I think I have covered all the amendments that have been selected.
Sir Iain Duncan Smith
I assume that my hon. Friend meant that she will accept the amendment when I move it.
Laura Farris
Yes, I did mean that.
The final amendments that I will speak to are new clauses 91 and 92, relating to a new criminal sanction on water companies.
Philip Dunne (Ludlow) (Con)
Everyone in this House wants to ensure that our water regulators have at their disposal all the tools they need to get on top of the sewage discharge issue, but as the Minister sums up, could she explain to the House whether Ofwat already has the powers being sought in the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale (Tim Farron)? If the same powers were given to the Environment Agency, that would be more likely to lead to confusion and a lack of clarity about which agency is taking the lead on such prosecutions, which might lead to prosecutions falling through the cracks.
Laura Farris
My right hon. Friend is quite correct: that is the basis on which the Government cannot accept the amendments. Of course, everybody agrees that water companies should be punished as robustly as possible, but it is also the case that we have pre-existing offences that apply. Pollution incidents are already the subject of criminal sanctions available to the Environment Agency under the Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2016, and there is a serious risk of duplication, not least because—I hope the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale (Tim Farron) will not mind my saying this—the sanctions he has included in his amendments are just more fines, and we already have a fines regime.
Let me set out very briefly the basis on which, in a principled way, we are saying no to the amendments. As the environment regulator, the Environment Agency can and does prosecute company directors and other senior officers under the relevant regulations. It has a power to fine, and there can be convictions for polluting rivers and coastal waters, where it can be proved that the offence has been committed. Expanding criminal liability would simply create a repetition of the existing powers. It is the Government’s view that the amendments would create a dangerous and unacceptable risk of double jeopardy across the two regulatory regimes that are administered by Ofwat and the Environment Agency.
The amendments would simply duplicate the existing sanctions, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Ludlow (Philip Dunne) put it, for not meeting performance commitments. More seriously, they could undermine the robustness of the Environment Agency’s criminal sanction regime. On that basis, I hope the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale will understand why we do not want to see duplication in an area where there is already the capacity to prosecute, a criminal law regime and the sanction of fines, which is everything that his amendments seek.
Jess Phillips
I fear the Minister is coming to the end of her remarks, but she has not addressed my new clause 44. Does she have any comment on it?
Laura Farris
I thank the hon. Lady for reminding me, but I had not forgotten. I listened carefully to her speech and I have read all her amendments, not all of which were selected, but some of which she has raised before. On the general defence, she will know that the Law Commission is currently undertaking a review of the defence of duress in relation to women and the crime—
Laura Farris
I know that the amendment has not been selected, but I want to provide the hon. Lady with some reassurance on it, because we on this side of the House continue to think about the issues she has raised. She is aware of the Law Commission’s review of the defence of duress as it applies to murder. I want to provide her with an update and some reassurance that we will take the lessons that come out of that review, and consider it more widely, if appropriate, in alignment with the point that I think she made earlier in this debate.
On new clause 44, this is an important point between us, but the Government are resisting it not because there is any real dispute of principle, but because there is dispute of degree. There is a concern that by amending the wordings of sections 52 and 53 of the Sexual Offences Act, as so drafted, we could unnecessarily narrow the scope of section 52 as it has been applied in the criminal courts and potentially add an additional element to be proved in relation to section 53 that could make prosecution harder. We disagree not on the principle but about whether it will have the effect she is looking for. I did listen carefully to her speech and the way that she has presented the argument on previous occasions.
Richard Graham
The safeguarding Minister will have been briefed by my right hon. Friend the Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire on the exchanges across the House on the key issue of spiking, which will make its first ever appearance in legislation if the Bill is passed. I asked specific questions, which I would be grateful if she returned to. Although my amendments will not be pursued, it would be reassuring for everyone in the country if she said that the spiking clauses now injected will cover attempts to spike as well as proven spiking, and will apply to spiking attempts that may not be considered harmful in substance but are incredibly harmful to the people they humiliate.
Laura Farris
Yes, I can confirm that those inchoate offences—attempt offences—are all captured in the 1981 Act to which I referred in my opening speech.
On whether naming the offence of spiking will improve police record keeping, I say to my hon. Friend that it will absolutely do that. It will remove the discrepancy between what might have been called date rape under the Sexual Offences Act and what would have been recorded previously as a poisoning act under the Offences against the Person Act. For consistency in recording, we are very pleased to make the change.
Richard Graham
I thank the Minister for giving way again. On that specific point, she is effectively saying that the data collected by the police will now be collected under the umbrella of spiking, so we will have much better data and know how widespread the problem really is, which I think everyone will be reassured to hear. May I also thank her, the Home Secretary and the Justice Secretary for their fantastic and immediate support in getting this provision into the Bill, which I very much hope will pass through this Parliament before the next general election?
Laura Farris
It is not just the effect of the amendment that will improve police recording; one purpose of the amendment was to improve police recording and it will give, I hope, a much more accurate picture of the extent of the problem.
On the comments that my right hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Dame Maria Miller) made regarding the creation offence related to deepfake images and intent, I will consider the point carefully. I would like to have further discussions on it.
Dame Maria Miller
I hope the Minister was listening to the Chair of the Justice Committee, who wholeheartedly agreed with the point I was making, namely that it would be entirely consistent with the sex offences law to remove intent from that measure and simply focus on consent. That is what we need to hear, and I hope the Minister will now agree at the Dispatch Box that she will consider that strongly.
Laura Farris
I certainly give my right hon. Friend that reassurance. I look forward to continuing our discussions throughout the passage of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 86 accordingly read a Second time and added to the Bill.
New Clause 62
Sexual Activity with a Corpse
(1) In the Sexual Offences Act 2003 for section 70 substitute—
“70 Sexual activity with a corpse
(1) A person commits an offence if—
(a) the person intentionally performs an act of touching (with a part of their body or anything else),
(b) what is touched is a part of the body of a dead person,
(c) the person knows that, or is reckless as to whether, that is what is touched, and
(d) the touching is sexual.
(2) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding—
(i) if the touching involved penetration of a part of the body mentioned in subsection (1)(b), 7 years;
(ii) otherwise, 5 years.”
(2) In consequence of the amendment made by subsection (1), in the following provisions for “sexual penetration of” substitute “sexual activity with”—
paragraph 152 of Schedule 15 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003;
paragraph 35 of Schedule 3 to the Sexual Offences Act 2003;
paragraph 33 of Schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015;
paragraph 38(ba) of Schedule 18 to the Sentencing Code.” —(Laura Farris.)
This new clause replaces the offence under section 70 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 with an offence that covers any intentional touching of a corpse that is sexual, and increases the maximum sentence of imprisonment for an offence involving penetration to 7 years and in other cases to 5 years. It is proposed to add the new clause after clause 15.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 87
Manslaughter: sexual conduct aggravating factor
“(1) In Chapter 3 of Part 4 of the Sentencing Code (seriousness and determining sentence), after section 72 insert—
“72A Manslaughter involving sexual conduct
(1) In considering the seriousness of an offence of manslaughter involving sexual conduct, the court must—
(a) treat the fact that the offence involves sexual conduct as an aggravating factor, and
(b) state in open court that the offence is so aggravated.
(2) This section has effect in relation to a person who is convicted of an offence on or after the date on which section (Manslaughter: sexual conduct aggravating factor) of the Criminal Justice Act 2024 comes into force.”
(2) In section 238 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (deciding the seriousness of an offence), after subsection (8) (inserted by section 23) insert—
“(9)In section 72A of the Sentencing Code (manslaughter involving sexual conduct)—
(a) the reference to an offence of manslaughter is to be read as including a reference to an offence under section 42 as respects which the corresponding offence under the law of England and Wales is manslaughter, and
(b) the references to a court are to be read as including a court dealing with an offender for a service offence.”.”—(Laura Farris.)
This new clause makes the fact that an offence of manslaughter involves sexual conduct an aggravating factor (as well as making the same provision as regards the corresponding service offence.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 88
Length of terrorism sentence with fixed licence period: Northern Ireland
“(1) In Article 7 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 (S.I. 2008/1216 (N.I. 1))—
(a) in paragraph (2) omit “Articles 13A, 14 and 15A and”;
(b) in paragraph (3) before sub-paragraph (a) insert—
“(za) Articles 13A and 14 of this Order;”.”
(2) The amendments made by this section apply in relation to convictions occurring on or after the day on which this section comes into force.”—(Laura Farris.)
This new clause results in Article 7(2) of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 (requirement that term of sentence is commensurate with seriousness) applying to a sentence under Article 15A of that Order (terrorism sentence with fixed licence period).
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 89
Reviews of sentencing: time limits
“(1) Schedule 3 to the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (reviews of sentencing - supplementary) is amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph 1 (time limit for notice of application for leave to refer a case)—
(a) the existing provision becomes sub-paragraph (1) of that paragraph;
(b) at the end of that sub-paragraph insert “(“the relevant period”); but in England and Wales this is subject to sub-paragraph (2).”;
(c) after that sub-paragraph insert—
“(2) Where—
(a) the Attorney General receives a request to review the sentencing of a person, and
(b) the request is received in the last 14 days of the relevant period,
notice of an application for leave to refer the case in question to the Court of Appeal under section 36 may be given within 14 days from the day on which the request is received.
(3) For the purposes of this Part, a certificate of the Attorney General as to the date on which a request to review the sentencing of a person was received is conclusive evidence of that fact.
(4) Where more than one request to review the sentencing of a person is received, references in sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) to a request are to the first request that is received.”
(3) In paragraph 12 (application of Schedule to Northern Ireland), after paragraph (d) insert—
“(da) paragraph 1 has effect as if sub-paragraphs (2) to (4) were omitted;”.”—(Laura Farris.)
This new clause provides that where the Attorney General receives a request to review a person’s sentence in the last 14 days of the current period for giving any notice of application for leave to refer the case to the Court of Appeal, the Attorney General may give such notice within 14 days from the date the request is received.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 94
Cuckooing
“(1) A person commits an offence if they—
(a) exercise control over the dwelling of another person, and
(b) do so for the purpose of enabling the dwelling to be used in connection with the commission (by any person) of one or more offences listed in Schedule (Cuckooing: specified offences).
(2) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that the person mentioned in subsection (1)(a) consented to the exercise of control for the purpose mentioned in subsection (1)(b).
(3) Section (Cuckooing: interpretation) contains provisions about the interpretation of this section.
(4) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend Schedule (Cuckooing: specified offences).
(5) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or a fine (or both).”—(Laura Farris.)
This clause, together with NC95 and NS4, create an offence of exercising control over another person’s dwelling, for the purpose of enabling it to be used in connection with the commission of certain offences.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 95
Cuckooing: interpretation
“(1) This section supplements section (Cuckooing).
(2) A reference to “the dwelling of a person” is to any structure or part of a structure occupied by the person as their home or other living accommodation (whether the occupation is separate or shared with others), together with any yard, garden, grounds, garage or outhouse belonging to it or used with it.
(3) In subsection (2) “structure” includes a tent, caravan, vehicle, vessel or other temporary or movable structure.
(4) The circumstances in which a person “exercises control over the dwelling of another person” (B) include circumstances where the person exercises control (whether temporarily or permanently) over any of the following—
(a) who is able to enter, leave, occupy or otherwise use the dwelling or part of the dwelling;
(b) the delivery of things to, or the collection of things from, the dwelling;
(c) the way in which, or the purposes for which, the dwelling or part of the dwelling is used;
(d) the ability of B to use the dwelling or part of the dwelling for B’s own purposes.
(5) For the purposes of section (Cuckooing)(2), a person is regarded as “consenting” to the exercise of control for the purpose mentioned in section (Cuckooing)(1)(b) only if—
(a) they are aged 18 or over,
(b) they have capacity (within the meaning of the Mental Capacity Act 2005) to give consent to the exercise of control for that purpose,
(c) they are given sufficient information to enable them to make an informed decision about whether to consent,
(d) they give consent freely, and
(e) the consent is not withdrawn.”—(Laura Farris.)
See the statement for NC94.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 103
Restricting parental responsibility when sentencing for rape of a child
“(1) The Children Act 1989 is amended in accordance with subsections (2) to (5).
(2) In section 10A (inserted by section (Restricting parental responsibility where one parent kills the other)(3) of the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024)—
(a) for subsection (1) substitute—
“(1) This section applies where the Crown Court is sentencing—
(a) a person (“the offender”) who is a parent with parental responsibility for a child (“the child”) for the murder or, in the circumstances mentioned in subsection (2), manslaughter of the child’s other parent;
(b) a person (“the offender”) who has parental responsibility for a child (“the child”) for an offence under section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (rape) against a child or under section 5 of that Act (rape of a child under 13).”;
(b) in subsection (3), for “when sentencing the offender” substitute “with respect to the child”;
(c) in subsection (5)(b), for “offender is convicted of manslaughter” substitute “Crown Court is sentencing the offender for manslaughter”;
(d) in subsection (7), for “murder or manslaughter” substitute “offence”;
(e) after subsection (9) insert—
“(10) In subsection (1) “sentencing” is to be read in accordance with the Sentencing Code (see section 401 of the Code).”
(3) In section 10B (inserted by section (Restricting parental responsibility where one parent kills the other)(3) of the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024)—
(a) in subsection (1), for “parent” substitute “person”;
(b) in subsection (3)(b), for “parent is acquitted on appeal of the murder or manslaughter” substitute “person is acquitted on appeal of the offence”.
(4) In section 33(3A) (inserted by section (Restricting parental responsibility where one parent kills the other)(5) of the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024), in both places, for “parent” substitute “person”.
(5) In section 91—
(a) in subsection (5B) (inserted by section (Restricting parental responsibility where one parent kills the other)(6)(b) of the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024)—
(i) in paragraph (a), for “parent (“P”) with respect to a child (“C”)” substitute “person with respect to a child”;
(ii) in paragraph (b), for “P with respect to C” substitute “the person with respect to the child”;
(b) in subsection (5C) (inserted by section (Restricting parental responsibility where one parent kills the other)(6)(b) of the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024), for “P with respect to C” substitute “the person with respect to the child”.
(6) In section 379 of the Sentencing Act 2020 (other behaviour orders etc), after subsection (1) insert—
“(1A) See section 10A(1) of the Children Act 1989 for circumstances in which the Crown Court may be required to make a prohibited steps order when dealing with an offender for murder, manslaughter or the rape of a child.””—(Laura Farris.)
This new clause expands the circumstances in which the Crown Court must make a prohibited steps order under section 10A of the Children Act 1989 (inserted by the Victims and Prisoners Bill) to cases where a person with parental responsibility is convicted of the rape of a child.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 104
Report on duty to make prohibited steps orders and power to repeal
“(1) As soon as reasonably practicable after the end of the period of three years beginning with the day on which section (Restricting parental responsibility when sentencing for rape of a child) comes into force, the Secretary of State must—
(a) prepare a report on the operation of sections 10A and 10B of the Children Act 1989 (duty on Crown Court to make prohibited steps order) during the period, and
(b) publish the report and lay it before Parliament.
(2) The Secretary of State may by regulations repeal either—
(a) section 10A(1)(b) of the Children Act 1989, or
(b) sections 10A and 10B of that Act.
(3) But regulations under subsection (2) may only be made during the period of 6 months beginning with the day on which the report under subsection (1) was laid before Parliament.
(4) The consequential provision which may be made by regulations under subsection (2) by virtue of section 86(1)(a) includes provision amending or repealing any provision made by an Act of Parliament or an Act or Measure of Senedd Cymru.” —(Laura Farris.)
This new clause requires the Secretary of State to prepare a report on the operation of sections 10A and 10B of the Children Act 1989 and confers the power to repeal those sections or their application to cases involving rape of a child (whether because of the report or otherwise).
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 44
Sexual exploitation of an adult
(1) The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is amended as follows.
(2) Section 52 is amended as follows—
(a) in the title for “Causing or inciting prostitution” substitute “Sexual exploitation”, and
(b) in paragraph (1)(a) for “causes or incites another person to become a prostitute” substitute “sexually exploits another person”.
(3) Section 53 is amended as follows—
(a) in the title for “prostitution” substitute “sexual exploitation”, and
(b) in paragraph (1)(a) for “prostitution” substitute “sexual exploitation”.
(4) Section 54 is amended as follows—
(a) in subsection (2) for “sections 51A, 52, 53 and 53A” substitute “section 53A”, and
(b) at end insert—
“(4) In sections 52 and 53 “sexual exploitation” means conduct by which a person manipulates, deceives, coerces or controls another person to undertake sexual activity.”.”—(Jess Phillips.)
An amendment to the Sexual Offences Act 2003, specifically in sections 52 and 53, replace “prostitution for gain’” with “sexual exploitation of an adult”.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.