(10 years, 11 months ago)
Westminster HallWestminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Mr Walker, as a master of parliamentary procedure, you will know that when participating in a debate, one is not supposed to refer to the presence of anyone outside the confines of the Chamber. However, I am sure that you will allow me to say what a pleasure it is to know that Sir Neil and Sheila Thorne are present today to hear all the wonderful tributes to them and, as I am sure they would be the first to acknowledge, to hear the tributes that must be made to the civilian and uniformed staff of the Ministry of Defence over 25 years for their huge efforts in arranging the visits from the armed forces’ side.
It is a real honour to make the last speech by a Back Bencher in a debate about a scheme that has been an unalloyed and phenomenal success for a quarter of a century. I am delighted that this is one of those debates in which one can honestly feel that one agrees with every sentiment expressed so far.
The scheme has many things to recommend it, and I will pick up one or two of them in the time available. Both the Labour members of the Defence Committee, the hon. Members for Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney (Mr Havard) and for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Ms Stuart), referred to the sense of involvement in and participation with the armed forces, and to the difference between visits to the armed forces wearing their civilian suits as Committee members and wearing whatever variation of military uniform they have been privileged to wear on their scheme visits. I know that lawyers have been taking a close look at that, but I assure hon. Members that if we simply revert to being civilians visiting the military, something very precious will be lost from the scheme. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”] I am delighted that colleagues are endorsing that with various signals, and I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire (Mr Gray) will do so explicitly.
May I take the opportunity absolutely to reassure my hon. Friend that we most certainly will not return to civilian dress during those visits? There is a debate about exactly what we wear, when and how we wear it and the legalities, but he is absolutely right to say that appearing on visits in some form of dress appropriate to the occasion is definitely what the future will hold.
I could not have expected or desired a more reassuring comment.
I now look for a second reassuring comment. I will not get it immediately, but I am looking to my old Front-Bench colleague of many years’ standing on the former shadow defence team—he is now, thank goodness, the Minister—to address what one might call the issue of trust. The reason why the scheme has worked so well is that people have been given privileged access to members of the armed forces at every level. There has been, as it were, an unwritten understanding that that privilege would not be abused. When one considers the very large numbers of colleagues of all parties who have been through the scheme, it is remarkable that there have been hardly any cases—in the low single figures—of raised eyebrows about someone going on the scheme and immediately tabling a raft of hostile questions on the Floor of the House.
That excellent outcome is very different from what might have been predicted at the start of the process. As something of an amateur military historian, I look forward to the day when I can go to the National Archives at Kew and look for the file of correspondence that must exist relating to the period in which Sir Neil originally approached the Ministry of Defence to propose that MPs have direct informal access to all ranks of the armed forces.
We all look forward to those archives being open. May I suggest to my hon. Friend that informed questions, as opposed to hostile ones, are very much part and parcel of the experience of taking part in the scheme?
Exactly. That is precisely how people who have engaged in the scheme have understood their responsibilities, with very few exceptions. When one considers that the final stage of the scheme is membership of the Royal College of Defence Studies, that is quite remarkable. It may not be common knowledge, but those of us who are fortunate enough to be parliamentary members of the RCDS are taken on as full members and are considered to remain members for life. The essence of the RCDS course is meeting people, learning from them and establishing formal and informal contacts that will stand one in good stead in relation to one’s understanding of defence developments at home and abroad.
To inject a slightly quizzical note into my speech, that is why I was a little concerned recently to read an article about the eminent military historian Sir Max Hastings being refused the sort of informal contact that for many years he and many others have been allowed with senior serving personnel in the MOD network. That runs counter to the spirit of the armed forces parliamentary scheme, but I hope that it is simply a case of over-zealous application of some rule against leaking things to the media.
Certainly, if we reach a situation in which people like Sir Max Hastings—eminent historians and public commentators—cannot secure the degree of access that they used to have, or indeed if a similar bar is put on hon. Members, all I can say is that Ministers should take a deep breath, look at what has happened with the armed forces parliamentary scheme and realise that a tunnel vision approach to access by civilians, whether they are reporters or Members of Parliament, to the military is counter-productive.
The armed forces parliamentary scheme is a boon to hon. Members with little knowledge of defence, as it is to hon. Members when, as sometimes happens, their political party goes through a phase of anti-militarism. There was a period—thank goodness, long in the past—when the Labour party shifted in a unilateralist direction, and I am sure that it was very valuable to those courageous members of the Labour party who did not go in that direction to be able to recharge their intellectual batteries by having access to such a scheme. It is important that Members of Parliament who want to support the armed forces have the intellectual ammunition, on a non-partisan basis, to speak with authority about them.
I conclude by pointing out that the scale of the scheme when it started was for two Members of Parliament to visit each of the three armed forces, with two more visiting the Royal Marines, which is of course a subset—some would say, a superset—of the Royal Navy.
Indeed, which was the reason for my quick interjection of the word “superset”.
The scheme then moved to having five Members per service, and it now has very large numbers. We measure the effectiveness of a scheme or organisation by the demand for it. There is a huge demand for this scheme, and we are very grateful that the supply will continue to meet the increased demand.
(10 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberOn the last point, I think that history teaches us that unilateral abandonment of nuclear weapons is not the way to bring about a more rapid elimination of those weapons, much as we would all like to see that happen. I can tell the hon. Gentleman that the estimates produced in the 2006 White Paper for the cost of replacing the existing submarines with a four-boat solution were between £15 billion and £20 billion—in terms of the 2006 economic conditions—and they remain unchanged.
In order that the Secretary of State does not keep having to tell us that he must not go above his pay grade, will he carry the message back to No. 10 that as Labour Front Benchers say they are willing to sign up to two of the four boats before the next election, and as the majority of people in this House would like to have that main-gate decision implemented at least in part, why should we not go ahead so that we cannot be blackmailed by the Liberal Democrats in the event of a hung Parliament after the general election?
I understand my hon. Friend’s point of view. He has on other occasions raised the issue of entering into a contract for the submarines at an early stage. Our current way of managing our equipment programme is to enter into contracts with industry at the point at which projects are mature enough to enable us to secure the best possible value for money for the taxpayer. Entering into a contract at this stage, when the project is relatively immature, would not represent value for money.
(11 years, 1 month ago)
Westminster HallWestminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
My hon. Friend touches on a key issue. I will come on to that in a moment if I may, because I have some important questions on which the Minister can give us some reassurance.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his generosity in giving way. I should like to revert to the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Woking (Jonathan Lord), whom I thank for his kind remarks, which I did not deserve. Will the hon. Gentleman cast his mind back to the last Defence questions, when the hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) made the excellent point from the Dispatch Box that if the alternatives study says that the choice is between a full-time deterrent and a part-time deterrent of, say, only two submarines, then at least we should get round to signing the contract straight away for the two submarines? I was encouraged by that and I shall be pressing the Secretary of State for a meeting to discuss that proposal so that Trident cannot again become a political football between the Liberal Democrats and the two major parties that support it.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his wise words on this issue, which we hear so often from him. There could well be a number of reasons why it makes sense to bring forward the main gate decision. Indeed, if that requires a new coalition for that one issue in this Parliament, then I know that many of us, from across the House and in this Chamber today, will be prepared to be a part of it.
I will make a little more progress. Although it seems that the Trident alternatives review is set to dismiss such options as a land-based, air-based or surface ship delivery system, and indeed to give up finally on the Liberal Democrats’ mini-deterrent fantasy of adapting Astute-class submarines to carry nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, recent media coverage has suggested that the review may set out proposals to abandon the UK’s posture of continuous at-sea deterrence, which for decades has ensured that at least one British deterrent submarine is operational at all times.
We read that that could take place either when the Vanguard submarines reach the end of their life or perhaps even within the next few years, if the extensive leaks to the national newspapers can be believed. Colossal savings could be realised, says the unnamed brain-box who briefed the Financial Times in May. We are also told that we could build half the boats and save half the capital costs. As the submarines are predicted to cost, on average, about £2.5 billion each, that must mean a £5 billion saving to the Exchequer. Also, we are told that £1 billion a year could be saved by downgrading Britain’s nuclear capability to a part-time deterrent. Perhaps we could even keep Britain’s nuclear warheads in a cupboard, as the hon. Member for North Devon (Sir Nick Harvey) has curiously put it in the press. Alternatively, perhaps the main gate decision could not be brought forward but further delayed, and the proposed in-service date for the new submarines could be put back yet again.
Unfortunately, I am afraid that like so much that the Minister’s coalition partners transmit on defence issues, all of that is complete bunkum. For starters, does the Minister agree that it is nursery school logic to believe that we can save half the capital by building half the boats? The outlay on the submarine fleet is not simply a matter of purchasing these submarines; it is also about investing in the ability to design and build them. Those costs are fixed, whether we order two, four or more submarines—I am not necessarily suggesting that we order more than four submarines. Therefore, can the Minister confirm that he anticipates that the first of class would cost effectively double the average across the fleet, and that the fourth boat would be the cheapest of the batch? Can he also confirm that there would be significant savings from placing a four-boat order from the outset, rather than ordering two with the option to order two more? Also, can he confirm that if the Government were inclined to press ahead with the main gate decision in this Parliament, as was originally planned, there could be further substantial savings for the British taxpayer?
Similarly, with running costs the savings would not be anything like the amount that the antis boast it would be. Will the Minister confirm that at least 70% of those costs are fixed, covering the fuelling and basing facilities, and that they will be the same whether Britain operates patrols around the clock or takes the submarines on the occasional fishing expedition once or twice a year? What is his estimate—if he can share it with the House—of the annual savings that would accrue from stepping down from a class D posture?
Also, given the high fixed costs, does the Minister agree that abandoning class D would mean a disproportionate downgrading of the deterrent’s capacity to deter the grotesque horror of a nuclear war, by removing the guarantee that currently exists, namely that any nation that launched a nuclear attack on the UK could be hit by a counter-strike no matter what damage our country sustained? Furthermore, does he agree that it would be highly perverse if those who pursue disarmament—admittedly for absolutely laudable motives—were actually to increase the risk of nuclear conflict in future decades through their unilateral gestures, rather than making the world safer? Also, if I can tempt him to speculate, does he think that it was that woolly thinking from the Liberal Democrats that has left the party in the extraordinary position of having no representation at all in the defence ministerial team at this vital moment?
Well, let us see.
On the timing of main gate, will the Minister confirm that a further delay to the build process is effectively ruled out by his Department’s assessment, which was communicated to me by the Secretary of State at the last oral questions, that the Vanguard hulls would be rendered unsafe if their life was extended beyond the current 35-year plan, which of course is the longest period that any British submarine has ever been in service?
Finally, building two boats rather than four means that work across the UK supply chain could grind to a halt as early as 2031, six years earlier than is currently expected. Without more submarines to build, Barrow’s unique specialised work force will break up, as they did the last time there was a gap in the submarine drumbeat. However, as we have just discussed, the consequences would be felt in every part of the United Kingdom. That would leave us with two expensive choices. Either the Government, and taxpayers, would have to pick up the tab for the sustained unemployment of that work force, and consign to history the nation’s capacity to build submarines, with the loss of valuable skills and export spin-offs that would occur as a result, or alternatively—this is surely more likely—the Government of the day would bring forward the next submarine programme. That programme would involve the successors to the Astute class submarines, which of course have not been built yet, sooner than those vessels are actually needed from a military naval capability assessment, to keep the industrial drumbeat going. Can the Minister confirm that because that would mean that the bulk of capital spending on that next generation of boats would be required as early as the Parliament after the next one, bringing that spending forward—by bringing forward the successor to the Astute class—would completely wipe out the savings from ending continuous at-sea deterrence?
Bluntly, that is the choice that we would face if the decision was made to abandon class D. We would have to be prepared either to put at grave risk a significant part of Britain’s cutting-edge industrial base or to bring forward a significant amount of spending well before it would actually be needed.
Everyone in this House has a responsibility to guard against siren voices peddling false economies. The submarine supply chain is one of Britain’s great unsung assets, providing high-skilled manufacturing jobs that will rebalance the economy. We must not sacrifice those 13,000 jobs on the altar of cuts that would end up saving nothing significant at all but would leave the country vulnerable in future decades.
I am afraid that I do not have time to cover that point, but I am more than happy to meet the hon. Gentleman in the autumn to talk about the disposal programme. We made an announcement recently. The hon. Gentleman knows that this multi-year challenge is being carefully monitored and managed by the Ministry of Defence.
The sensor support programme contract that we signed with Thales will provide support to the eyes and ears of the fleet, which includes periscopes, sonar and electronic warfare systems for both the current and future submarine classes, as well as vessels in our surface fleet.
Although the ongoing build programme and the support to the current fleet are the most visible signs of our continued investment, defence is all about planning for the future and we must look ahead to building the next classes of submarine, the subject to which the hon. Member for Barrow and Furness devoted most of his speech. I will attempt to deal with some of the questions that he posed, but will not cover all of them, as he may not be surprised to learn.
We have learned much about the importance of sustaining this supply chain from the 10-year gap in submarine production in the UK after HMS Vengeance was launched in the 1990s, which the hon. Gentleman mentioned in respect of delays to the Astute class. Having to re-establish a submarine design, build, testing and commissioning capability that had lain dormant for a decade had a serious impact on the delivery of the Astute class and economic ramifications in Barrow. This has been well documented, but it is important that we do not lose sight of these hard lessons. For this reason, the Astute programme is crucial to sustaining the skills and the work force we need to meet our clear commitment to retain and renew a credible, continuous and effective minimum nuclear deterrent.
I thank the Minister for giving way. I know that his time is so limited. It is worth putting on the record that the Prime Minister has said that, as long as he remains leader of the Conservative party, we will have a continuous at-sea deterrent. But it would help—and it would be nice—if those of us who have requested a meeting with the Secretary of State to discuss how we can prevent being blackmailed in future by the Liberal Democrats in the event of a hung Parliament, as we were in the past, could be given a particular date to look forward to.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for reinforcing the commitment of the Conservative party, from the highest levels, to continuous at-sea deterrence. I was not aware that he had requested a meeting with the Secretary of State. I am happy to take that up, and if the Secretary of State is unavailable I am happy to meet him as a fall-back, in the first instance.
The Astute programme is crucial to sustaining the skills and the work force that we need. Through that programme, we are undertaking the planning required to prepare for the successor submarines that will replace the Vanguard class from the late 2020s. Hon. Members will be aware that we are taking the steps necessary to be ready to start building the first submarine as we lead up to a main gate decision in 2016.
The hon. Member for Barrow and Furness asked whether this decision could be advanced, saying that this might help both cement the decision and, potentially, reduce the cost. Another lesson that we have learned from shipbuilding programmes is that unless the design is mature enough at the time that the investment decision is made—in other words, if a decision is rushed—additional frictional cost could be built in, through changes to the design programme after the contract has been priced, which can delay the programme and add significantly to the cost thereafter. We do not want to repeat the mistakes made at the time of the Astute contract being laid, by making a premature decision on the successor design.
(11 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberWe can disagree with nothing in the motion, but without wishing to break the consensual mood of the House, I think that this is too good an opportunity not to ask at least some questions of Ministers, in the hope that they will at least reflect on them and perhaps return later.
I am concerned, as are a number of Members on these Benches, that by keeping on cutting defence expenditure, we risk creating imbalances on a variety of fronts. Can it be right, for example, that the budgets of Departments dealing with health, welfare and international aid are being protected, if not expanded, as a percentage of Government expenditure? That puts disproportionate pressure on other Departments, such as Defence, when trying to save costs. I also wonder whether imbalances are being created in regard to our transatlantic relationship. Our defence capability is one of the key anchors of that relationship, but it is not a one-way ticket. There are obligations on both sides, including our own. If we keep shaving our defence capability, might we put elements of that relationship at risk?
I also suggest that we might be creating imbalances in other areas, such as our capability to meet our foreign policy objectives, whatever they might be, and defend our interests overseas. The House knows that I have not been supportive of our military interventions over the past decade, but let us put that to one side. There have been moments during those interventions when our resources have not matched our ambitions. It was not the fault of the troops on the ground, but in Iraq and Afghanistan in particular the necessary resources were lacking, and that had a knock-on effect on our ability to achieve our objectives.
I have other concerns but, as an ex-soldier, I shall focus on the Army. The plan to disband 20,000 regulars before knowing whether the plan to recruit 30,000 reservists to take their place will work is high risk, given that we do not know whether those reservists will be able to plug the gap from a capability point of view, or from a boots-on-the-ground point of view. I ask Ministers to ensure that that issue is centrally addressed in the forthcoming White Paper. There are key questions that need answering very soon, because redundancies are taking effect as we speak, and we do not know whether the plan will work.
There is a real danger that Government proposals will prove a false economy, in financial terms and in terms of military capability. Let us take cost savings as an example. I am conscious of the figure of £1.8 billion over 10 years, and more details will follow in the White Paper, but at the moment the Government are long on promise and short on costings and details. They have admitted in the Green Paper that it costs more to train reservists than regulars. The financial incentives being offered to regulars to join the reserves mean that they will be on a better scale of pay than a serving brigadier, if we include the £5,000 sign-up bonus, the bounty, the daily rate and so forth. There is also the question of civilian salaries being matched, although I am aware that the Government are considering capping an element of that. Again, we need to see the details. And all that is before we even consider the fact that the reservists will not be deployable in their first year.
I have already raised the question of the number of reservists that will be required. According to Ministry of Defence figures, the present Territorial Army mobilisation rate is 40%. If we apply that to the 20,000 regulars, we will need 50,000 reservists. I look forward to seeing the details of how that magic figure of 40% is going to be increased. It will take a concerted effort to achieve a mobilisation rate of much more than 40%, given that many people in the Army believe that we are not even hitting 40% at the moment.
There is also the question of the capability gap. In the 1980s, when many of us served, the TA did a very good job that basically involved reservists being transported out to Germany, digging a trench and waiting for the Soviet or Warsaw pact forces to arrive. Today, asymmetric warfare is becoming the norm. The skills base will become much higher, and our requirements will be much more demanding, yet I understand that the number of training days is being increased to 40 overall—an increase of only five days. I question that on the capability front, particularly when those forces are going to be mobilised as groups rather than as add-ons. That factor must be considered.
Does my hon. Friend share my fear that, with the scale of priorities we have at the moment, there is a danger that if we reduce the size of the Army much more, they will all be able to fit into the single first High Speed 2 train?
Let us hope it is not a one-way ticket!
Let me finish with a concern some of us have about the potentially distorting effect on the ground. Excellent, well recruited battalions, such as the 2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, are being axed, while more poorly recruited battalions are being saved. It is costing millions of pounds to keep over-strength battalions up to the mark. Such a policy is, in many respects, simply reinforcing failure.
In conclusion, I think this is a high-risk policy, and I ask Ministers to make sure that they cover the base very carefully. In my view, we need to see concrete evidence that the reservist plan will take effect and will work—before we let the regular battalions go. Here we are dealing with the defence of the realm, and this is happening when many countries not necessarily friendly to the west are arming and increasing their expenditure on defence. No one here can tell when or where the next threat will come from. I therefore ask Ministers to consider these points very carefully.
(11 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberFirst, I will check my diary. I thank the hon. Gentleman for his kind invitation.
I am not sure whether the hon. Gentleman is asking if we have considered whether it is possible to extend further the life of the existing submarines or to design the successor class with a longer in-service life. On the first question, he will know that we have already extended the life of the Vanguard class once, and it is not judged possible or safe to extend it further. On the second question, we will of course be looking to design the successor class with the longest possible in-service life.
My right hon. Friend is clearly very robust on this issue, but may I urge him to consider deeply the suggestion of the shadow Armed Forces Minister, the hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones)? If those on both Front Benches agree on the need to renew Trident and to keep continuous-at-sea deterrence, why should they not agree before the general election to make this irreversible, so that Trident cannot again become a political football, as it unfortunately did between my party and the Liberal Democrats in 2010?
I have to say to my hon. Friend—who is a great expert on this subject and has been one for longer than I can remember—that the essence of our strategy for defence procurement, which is at the heart of our determination to maintain a balanced budget, is that we do not make contractual commitments until we need to for the delivery of equipment in a timely fashion, when we need it. Locking in decisions before they need to be made merely reduces flexibility and, as the previous Government found out, drives cost into the programme if changes have to be made.
(11 years, 3 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe hon. Gentleman’s views on this subject are well known. As I have announced, a small number of people—mainly logisticians—will possibly remain after 31 December 2014 to complete our redeployment from Bastion. In addition, we have committed to providing trainers and life support personnel for the Afghan national army officer training academy outside Kabul, which is a military training academy modelled on Sandhurst. Those are the only commitments we have made at the moment, amounting to a couple of hundred personnel on an ongoing basis. We judge that to be an effective and appropriate way for us to continue supporting Afghan national security forces, together with the £70 million a year cash support that we have pledged as part of the international community’s commitment.
Even before British troops have left, our brave Afghan interpreters have been threatened with assassination. How many of them must be killed before we do what we ought to do and offer those who wish to come to this country the opportunity to do so, as the previous Government rightly did for Iraqi interpreters?
The situation in Afghanistan is not the same as that in Iraq. Lessons were learned from the Afghan campaign, and the way that interpreters and other civilian employees have been recruited in Afghanistan has been modified accordingly to take those lessons on board. I assure my hon. Friend, however, that we will not turn our back on those who have served us in Afghanistan as locally employed civilians. We believe that Afghanistan has a future that will require skilled, capable people who are committed to building it post-2014. We want to explore all options for encouraging people, wherever they can, to be part of that future and help to build their country in which we have invested so heavily. We have and will continue to have mechanisms that deal with cases of intimidation or threat, including those that could, in extremis, allow for resettlement in this country.
(11 years, 4 months ago)
Westminster HallWestminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
You are extremely kind, Dr McCrea, and I shall stick to two minutes if I possibly can. Not for the first time has my gallant and hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) done a great service to the country and to the House—to the country previously in his distinguished military career and to the House today in securing this debate. Inevitably, the debate has concentrated on the Territorial Army, or the Army Reserve as it may be known in the future. Let us also put in a word for the Royal Naval Reserve, the Royal Marine Reserve, and the RAF Reserves, all of whom make a valuable contribution.
As a former junior member of the senior service reserve, I well recall what a bridge the reserves constituted, and still constitute, between the armed forces and society. The role of the reserves should be flexibility to deal with the unknown. As my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) said, we do not know from where the next crisis will come, and we will not know the nature of that crisis until it is upon us. Reserves should be an augmentation of, not a substitute for, regular forces. If trained-up former regulars constitute our reserve, we will have a better chance to get them to the sort of standards that we need very quickly than when we are dealing with civilian-only reserves. Nevertheless, there is potential in both cohorts. I am concerned that the strategic context is being skewed by budgetary constraints. The truth of the matter is that we are having the debate in these terms because not enough money is being spent on defence.
Finally, I am concerned that in the future we will see a repeat of the sort of false opposition that was put forward by certain people in the past between what was called preparing for a war in the future against an unknown modern state, and fighting the war in which we are engaged at the moment, namely counter-insurgency. We have seen how quickly the threats change. We are making important decisions about the future. For example, we must decide about the future of the nuclear deterrent. I do not want to see that debate skewed by people who think that if we cancel Vanguard class replacement submarines we will get more troops. The truth is, we get the defence that we pay for. We are not paying enough; we should pay more.
(11 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberI do not think that is right; I am conferring with my right hon. Friend the Minister for the Armed Forces. I am happy to write to the hon. Gentleman to confirm to him, as set out in the document, exactly what the lay-down will be in Wales after the completion of this move.
May I welcome the Defence Secretary’s recent statement to the Treasury that it should stop basing its tanks on the MOD lawn? May I congratulate him on an entry in the basing plan that seems to suggest that Marchwood military port in New Forest East will continue as the military port for the Army for the indefinite future?
I would not want to encourage my hon. Friend to draw that conclusion. Marchwood military port is scheduled for disposal, and—this is not part of this announcement, of course—it may well still be used by the Army but under the ownership of a civilian contractor.
(11 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberTalking of alternatives, does my hon. Friend agree that the few percentage points of the defence budget that will be spent on replacing Trident give far better value for money than the alternative of putting nuclear cruise missiles on Astute class submarines, as has been recommended by the Liberal Democrats, almost all of whom are unaccountably absent from the Chamber today?
My hon. Friend is a stalwart defender of this country’s nuclear deterrent. I applaud him for that and for the debate that he called on this subject at the end of last year. It remains to be seen what costings are attached to the alternative plans that our coalition partners may or may not publish in due course.
(11 years, 6 months ago)
Westminster HallWestminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Yes, he did. I have been searching for something positive to say about the hon. Gentleman’s right hon. Friend, and I am happy to say that he was right about that.
I got the House of Commons Library to do some research for me last week. I pay tribute to the Library, which does a fantastic job for us. The Library found that this year, the overseas aid budget will increase by £2.65 billion. The Government are struggling to spend the money as it is. We have done our bit and shown an example to the rest of the world. It does not make sense for us to increase overseas aid when we lack such important capability.
Perhaps my right hon. Friend the Minister will go back to our right hon. Friend the Prime Minister—I know that they are close friends—and say that this is what we should do. When I put to him the issue of ring-fencing overseas aid and not defence, the Prime Minister said, “I gave a commitment in 2009, as I did on the third runway.” I respect the Prime Minister for that principled view, but the world has changed. We have had the Arab spring and turmoil around the world. Our armed forces are one of this kingdom’s greatest assets, and our defence industry is one of the economy’s. There is a need, a requirement and an obligation, and we have a number of options to deliver that capability. I believe we should provide it now and that, quite legitimately, we should divert funds from overseas aid to provide a maritime patrol aircraft, which would contribute to stability around the world and greater prosperity among the countries we are trying to help.
I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire and his colleagues on the Defence Committee on their report and on bringing the matter before the House. They have done a great service to Parliament and the country.
I have told the hon. Gentleman that I will not engage with him again, because we have done it before and he is in denial. One cannot have military or economic security based on unsustainable defence spending. The Soviet Union found that out. That is why we took a number of difficult decisions during the SDSR, including the decision not to bring the Nimrod MRA4 into service.
At the beginning of the debate, my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire said that he did not wish to concentrate on Nimrod, but I am afraid that it has been largely about Nimrod, which I will therefore have to deal with in some detail. I asked the officials present—this huge number of serving personnel and civil servants—at what date the original Nimrod decision was taken, so I knew before his confession that it was, sadly, taken under the previous Conservative Government.
We should not forget the background to the decision to cancel Nimrod. There were no maritime reconnaissance aircraft flying in the RAF when we came into government. We did not create the capability gap—the capability did not exist. Owing to cost growth in the programme, the original plan to convert 21 airframes for the MRA4 had by 2010 been scaled back to only nine. The in-service date had been delayed from 2003 to 2012, costs had none the less risen from £2.8 billion to £3.6 billion, there were still outstanding technical problems which would have taken further large sums of money to solve and we knew that it would cost about £2 billion to operate over the next decade. While the capability’s role in support of anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare, strategic intelligence gathering, and search and rescue remained important, in a financially constrained environment dominated by the operations in Afghanistan among other threats, it made the most military and financial sense to discontinue the programme, however unhappy that made us.
I was particularly interested in the comments of the hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife. I joined the armed forces in 1970 and, during my time in the Army and in Parliament since, I have seen a long list of poor procurement projects—[Interruption.] That is the Leader of the Opposition ringing. Out of a litany of procurement disasters, as the hon. Gentleman said, this has been one of the worst. It was more than nine years late, each aircraft was to cost three times the original amount and we still had not finished. We did not where the programme was going, there was no end in sight and we were not asked to throw good money after bad. I am afraid that that decision, much as it is regretted, was the right one.
I apologise to the Minister and to other right hon. and hon. Members for coming late to the debate. I was serving on the Justice and Security Bill Committee, which has only just finished. Given that so much money was sunk into this project and that considerable technological advances were made for the equipment that was to be carried on the Nimrod, will we still get the benefit of that advanced technology development for possible use in future programmes?
My hon. Friend asks a good question, but I am afraid that I cannot answer at this moment. I will write to him and let him know but, certainly, technological advance does not go away—it has happened.
We have not been idle in dealing with the consequences of the decision. Revised plans and operating procedures are in place for other platforms to mitigate the absence of a maritime patrol aircraft capability. I will not go into too much detail, as some things are classified, but we can request support from allies and partners if necessary and we have established a seedcorn initiative to maintain the skills and knowledge necessary to operate maritime patrol aircraft in the future, should circumstances change. I was in New Zealand last year and saw some of our RAF personnel who were taking part in the seedcorn initiative. They said it was extremely valuable, and I thought it also sounded like a pretty good posting.