Royal Fleet Auxiliary

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 6th December 2010 Commons Chamber

[John McDonnell]

Thank you, Mr Speaker.

I refer to my interest as the convenor of the RMT group of MPs. I requested this debate to draw attention to and applaud the work of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, and to raise concerns about its future in the face of looming cuts to ships and crew, and the threat of privatisation.

In the statement to the House on the strategic defence and security review, the Secretary of State for Defence made no reference to the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, nor is there a reference to it in the document. However, in the supporting documents, the future of the RFA is explained more specifically. It is clear from the policy briefing that there will be a range of cuts to ships:

“We plan to withdraw from service one Landing Ship Dock Auxiliary, one Auxiliary Oiler and one Auxiliary Oiler replenishment.”

It goes on to state that there will be personnel cuts:

“The Department has announced that there will be sizeable reductions in the number of civilians employed by MOD. The RFA will bear its share of these. The future manpower strength of the RFA will reflect its reduced size. Details will be announced in due course.”

More specific details were announced in a memorandum from Commodore Bill Walworth:

“SDSR for the RFA means we will lose a tanker, probably Bayleaf, an LSD(A)”—

landing ship auxiliary—

“probably Largs Bay, and an AOR”—

auxiliary oiler replenisher—

“probably Fort George.”

He stated that that would probably happen by April 2011. At the same time, we heard about the regeneration of Fort Austin, which is certainly welcome.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I am extremely surprised and alarmed at the suggestion that one of the Bay class ships might be disposed of. Those ships are brand new and have enormous military value, so much so that the Royal Navy has cast covetous eyes on them in the past, thinking that they ought to be fully RN-manned. Is the hon. Gentleman absolutely certain that there is a suggestion that Largs Bay might be disposed of so early in its service life?

[John McDonnell]

I can only refer the hon. Gentleman to the memorandum from Commodore Bill Walworth, who is responsible for the RFA, which specifically names those ships. I think that it is now in the public domain as a result of reports in Lloyd’s List. We will know the situation more clearly by April 2011, but those ships have been identified. I agree with the hon. Gentleman that it is worrying that a relatively new craft is concerned.

Further reviews are taking place, in particular the value for money review. The value for money review undertaken by the previous Government came to conclusions about the future of the RFA and its retention in the public sector. A further value for money review is linked to the SDSR and the comprehensive spending review. It looks as though the proposals, again according to a memorandum from Commodore Walworth, identify a target figure of 10% savings, which includes a significant number of personnel. If 10% is translated across, 220-odd seafarers could be faced with redundancy.

Anxieties have been raised in the various memorandums and documents that have entered the public domain about the potential privatisation of the service. A letter from Commodore Bill Walworth that I believe went to all personnel, including the unions, refers to a benchmarking exercise that has taken place with the shipping industry that was

“intended to demonstrate the value for money of the operational outputs that we all deliver.”

Benchmarking is perfectly appropriate if we are trying to ensure that there is value for money, but I have anxieties because of a further e-mail that is quoted in Lloyd’s List—I am not sure whether it has leaked or is in the public domain. It is from the RFA’s value for money review group:

“To date there has been work carried out to establish baseline costings of the RFA to inform the review and establish a set of requirements for the RFA that is understandable to”

the shipping industry. It continues:

“Two members of the Review Group will approach”

the shipping industry

“shortly to gauge their appetite to conduct the range of operations carried out by the RFA…This will probably start next week and we can anticipate some press interest.

RFA management has been involved in this work, to ensure that the private sector understands what is required to replicate current activity.

We will continue to work to ensure that when commercial offers are considered by the Review Group they take into account all that the RFA offers alongside that of the commercial options.”

--- Later in debate ---

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Andrew Robathan)]

I congratulate the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) on securing this Adjournment debate on the very important issue of the future of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, and on providing me with an opportunity to speak on the issue, albeit rather more briefly than I had expected. I understand his relationship with the National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers, and I applaud him for speaking up for the work force. I absolutely accept that that is right and proper. I will put a plug in for myself and mention that, when I first came into the House—in 1983, I think—I served on the Employment Select Committee, as it then was, and instigated and chaired an inquiry into employment in the merchant navy, which was then under serious pressure—as indeed it has been since.

I shall deal in a few moments with the review mentioned by the hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones). I say to everyone in the Chamber—there is a surprisingly large number of Members present for an Adjournment debate—that this is not the place from which we would have wished to start. I do not want to get into party political point scoring, but everyone understands that we are in a difficult financial and economic situation and that the Government cannot go on spending money that they do not have.

[Dr Lewis]

I fully appreciate the financial hole in which the Government find themselves, but surely it is a false economy when money has been spent on brand-new vessels such as the Bay class even to think of disposing of them at such an early stage of their lives.

[Mr Robathan]

As I said a moment ago, no one would have wished to start from here, but we have to look at all options. Some programmes in the defence budget have already been cancelled—they have been announced—even though we have spent a lot of money on them. We did not wish to do so, but we had no further money to pour into them.

Let me speak briefly about the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. It was established in 1905, providing coaling ships to supply the Royal Navy’s network of bases around the world. It has continued to evolve into what we see today in the global reach that the RFA delivers for defence and the Royal Navy. Although its origins are the merchant navy, the RFA has developed in a specialised way to meet the Royal Navy’s requirements. It is linked to the Royal Navy by heritage, which has been mentioned, tasks, management, chain of command and ethos.

The commercial merchant navy has had a long history of working with the Royal Navy over many centuries and has had to fight and defend itself to develop commerce around the world. Defending itself against piracy, for instance, is not a new challenge. More recently, developments in warfare and warships, specialisation of commercial ships and their design limit the utility of commercial shipping to providing core support to military operations. While commercial shipping has little knowledge of warfare, over the past 30 years the RFA has developed to meet the specialised needs of 21st century warfare.

The RFA is the modern example of merchant shipping working and prepared to fight alongside the Royal Navy. It is the means by which the Navy operates globally. Equally exposed to the risk, it is a key enabler for worldwide reach of the UK’s armed forces. The RFA has essential qualities that make it different, as the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington said, and that enable it to deliver operational quality effectively to the Ministry of Defence and the Navy, blending the commercial manning and ship management models into military operations. As a result of the versatility of the ships and the knowledge that the work force has accumulated over many years, the RFA has become a deliverer of operational capability as well as an enabler.

Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 8th November 2010 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

The whole point of the nuclear deterrent is to deter, therefore we shall not use it. The success of our whole policy of nuclear deterrence since world war two is that we have never had to use it.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I realise that nothing would please my right hon. Friend more than to go into the next election fighting in defence of the rationale for the nuclear deterrent. Does he not recognise, however, that the appalling decision to postpone signing the main gate contracts leads us to a situation in which if—heaven forbid—there is another hung Parliament, the Liberal Democrats, who are really unilateralist, would be able to blackmail both parties to cancel the deterrent entirely?

[Dr Fox]

There are two things of which I am sure. The first is that my own belief in the need for an independent, minimal, credible nuclear deterrent for the United Kingdom is and will remain undimmed. The second is that I shall be fighting the general election to see a majority Conservative Government returned.

Aircraft Carriers

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 1st November 2010 Commons Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Peter Luff)]

It is right that I should begin by joining the right hon. Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Mr Brown) and the hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife (Thomas Docherty) in paying tribute to the armed services at this time of all times, and also to Rosyth for its work in preparing the country for the Falklands war and for its skills, which were mentioned by the hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife.

I seem to pick my Adjournment debates, or perhaps they pick me. On the last occasion, my hon. Friend the Member for Fylde (Mark Menzies) initiated a debate on the aerospace industry which we had thought would last half an hour. It lasted for three hours, and attracted an only slightly smaller audience than tonight’s debate. Tonight we have had the privilege of being footnotes in parliamentary history.

I am glad to be able to respond to the debate in, I hope, a constructive spirit. I am tempted to say some of the things that are on my mind, but I shall leave them for another occasion. [Interruption.] I shall resist the temptation.

Let me begin in the customary way by congratulating the hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife on securing the debate, which comes soon after the Prime Minister’s announcement of the details of the strategic defence and security review. The review was, by definition, strategic, and we are now working through the detail that flows from that strategy. Given that some of the issues discussed by right hon. and hon. Members tonight have focused on specifics, I hope that the House will accept that I am not yet in a position to answer all their questions. I will, however, try to provide as much information as I can in response to the issues that have been raised.

I particularly welcomed the contribution of the right hon. Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath. I well remember sitting on the Opposition Benches and making similar points on behalf of my own constituents, and I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will find my response as constructive as I found many Government responses then.

Let me say how impressed I have been by the work undertaken at all the shipyards involved in the Queen Elizabeth class project. Although I have not yet had an opportunity to visit every yard, I recently visited the Govan shipyard to see the progress on the Queen Elizabeth carrier. While I was there I spoke to a range of staff, all of whom showed their skills and complete dedication to the project. They were a credit to the programme, and I pay tribute to them.

The progress achieved so far, such as the delivery of the bow unit and installation of diesel generators, is genuinely remarkable. To appreciate the scale of the project, one has to see it with one’s own eyes. That success is largely due to the skills of shipyard workers not just at Rosyth but around the country, at Appledore, Birkenhead, Govan and Portsmouth, and on the Tyne.

I shall not go into the wider issues raised by the former Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath. Let me merely say that the strategic defence and security review has confirmed that we will build both carriers. The Government believe that it is right to retain, in the long term, the capability that only carriers provide: the ability to deploy air power anywhere in the world, without the need for friendly air bases on land. Once delivered, the carriers will be in service for about 50 years. Indeed, the final commander of the carriers is unlikely even to have been born yet.

At this point we expect to operate only one of the ships, the other being retained in extended readiness. I assure the House, however, that we will maximise the carrier’s effectiveness by adapting it to operate the more capable carrier variant of the joint strike fighter, which will require the installation of catapults and arrester gear. Conversion to CV will take longer, but it will provide greater interoperability with key allies such as the United States and France.

The hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife asked a number of detailed questions, but I am afraid that I can travel only a certain distance in answering them tonight. We plan to deliver the carrier strike capability from around 2020, and are now investigating the optimum means of achieving that outcome, working with members of the Aircraft Carrier Alliance and wider industry as well as our international partners. We expect the work to take a number of months, but the building work will continue to maintain the momentum in the delivery of this important capability. We will investigate a number of different aspects, including the type of launch system, the procurement route, the delivery date, and whether one or both ships should be converted and in what order. However, I stress that no decisions have yet been made, as the work has only just begun.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Can my hon. Friend at least go as far as dispelling any rumour or suggestion that the second carrier will be sold rather than remaining a part of the Royal Navy?

[Peter Luff]

That option is indeed spelt out in the SDSR document, but I think that it is unlikely to be adopted. Extended readiness is a much more likely option.

I am sure hon. Members will appreciate that until the work on all the options we are looking at has been completed, we will not be in a position to confirm the exact nature of our contracting approach for future support or maintenance work. The main investment decision for support arrangements for the Queen Elizabeth class is expected to be taken before the middle of this decade—that is as precise as I can be tonight—and will reflect the aircraft launch system changes that have been agreed in the SDSR. [Interruption.] An Opposition Member says from a sedentary position, “After the general election.” That is a completely irrelevant consideration; this decision will be taken at the right time for the project.

Strategic Defence and Security Review

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Thursday 16th September 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Ainsworth]

The hon. Gentleman was not here in the last Parliament. He will know if he looks at the record that we took decisions on Trident in a timely way in 2006 and that we put work strands in place. Those work strands cannot be significantly disrupted without massive industrial consequences. We have a skill base that is pretty unique and capable of building those submarines. We lost it before and we had to rebuild it. If we lose it again, we will have to rebuild it again, but perhaps the Government do not want to do that. Perhaps they are seriously trying to get rid of our nuclear deterrent without a debate. I do not know, but all I would say to the hon. Gentleman is that the person who cast the bread on the water this morning is either a total fool for proposing the delay in the way that they are, or there is some other agenda. The other agenda must be either to get rid of or to reduce massively our deterrent. Perhaps that is a debate that we should have, but I do not understand the common sense—neither does anybody else who knows anything about it—behind the trailing, spinning and leaking that has gone on.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

May I seek to reassure hon. Members on both sides of the House who are firmly committed to the continuation of the nuclear deterrent, given that I was my party’s spokesman on this issue for many years, that both I and the Secretary of State for Defence came into politics primarily to ensure that this country would always have nuclear weapons as long as other countries have them? I cannot answer directly for the Secretary of State for Defence, but I would be amazed if he remained Secretary of State for Defence if a decision of the sort that was aired on the BBC were to be taken in defiance of all the pledges given to the electorate and given to Conservative MPs by our leadership when we were asked to join the coalition.

[Mr Ainsworth]

Let me reassure the hon. Gentleman that I do not believe that the current Secretary of State is the person who is responsible for casting the bread on the water and doing the spinning this morning. The problem that we have is the same problem that we have in dealing with the strategic defence review—not only are the Government not talking to industry, the armed forces and the country, but their members are not talking to each other. I asked the Secretary of State on Monday if he would repeat his unequivocal support for the Trident replacement. Not only did he do that, he absolutely leapt at the chance. However, within the hour, the Government’s position was being clarified and now we have the situation that we are in today.

To coin a phrase, we can’t go on like this. We need the Minister to have a Government position—not a Liberal Democrat position—and to give that position to the House so that we know exactly where the Government stand. Let us stop hearing all this nonsense through the BBC and from leaks, spins and so on.

--- Later in debate ---

[Nick Harvey]

My hon. Friend makes a good point, as he always does on these matters, and I can reassure him that it will be taken into account.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Nick Harvey]

I need to make a bit of progress, and I have a suspicion that my hon. Friend will want to come in a bit later.

The economic context of this security review is one that we cannot ignore. Next year the interest bill alone for the debt that Labour has left the nation will be more than £46 billion—more than the entire defence budget for the UK. Unfortunately, defence cannot be immune from the fiscal challenge that we face, especially when other Departments face strict cost management. As the shadow team knows, the specific challenges in defence are immense, and that is in no small part due to the fact that it bequeathed a forward defence programme with a £38 billion black hole between its commitments and the budget put in place to pay for them. They sat there making future commitments in a manner that resembled a child writing a Christmas wish list to Santa, and they had absolutely no idea how they were going to pay for it all. So on top of the deplorable economic legacy that the previous Government have left, specifically in defence they left a £38 billion black hole—a gap between their forward programme and the forward budget, and that is the size of the challenge facing the new Government.

--- Later in debate ---

[Nick Harvey]

I rather agreed with the right hon. Member for Coventry North East, who said that that point is largely academic: the cost all comes out of the Treasury as a whole, and the particular line on which it is accounted is neither here nor there. We would want to be clear that the funds for Trident were on a separate line from that of the core defence budget. That is what the White Paper said, and as I understand it, that is still the position. However, where precisely it is accounted is neither here nor there; it is a completely semantic and academic point.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

rose—

[Nick Harvey]

Ah! I had anticipated my hon. Friend wanting to come in, and this was the point at which I thought he would want me to give way.

[Dr Lewis]

And the Minister has done so very graciously. He is doing his best at damage limitation. What would reassure me even more would be to know from him that no one employed by the Government was responsible for the extremely damaging story that was leaked to the BBC last night.

[Nick Harvey]

I have absolutely no grounds whatever to think or believe that it was, and to the extent that I am able, I am happy to offer that reassurance. Obviously, I cannot account for every employee anywhere in government, which is rather a large thing, but I do not believe that that is what happened or think that there is any point in the House dwelling on any speculation about what happened.

[Dr Lewis]

Will the Minister allow me one more time?

[Nick Harvey]

Well, as it is my hon. Friend, I will.

[Dr Lewis]

If that is the case and we are meant to discount the story, will the Minister just confirm one thing? When he talks about possible decisions about main gate in the context of value for money, does he accept that no interpretation of a value-for-money assessment could result in a decision that the Trident replacement should not go ahead at all?

[Nick Harvey]

I do not think that that is within the scope of the study under consideration; the study is about how we might improve the existing programme’s value for money and delivery. Again, I cannot pre-empt the decisions that the National Security Council will arrive at shortly, when it addresses the value-for-money report, but my hon. Friend’s point is considerably wide of its scope.

The coalition agreement also said:

“Liberal Democrats will continue to make the case for alternatives,”

and the Liberal Democrats will. I shall continue to argue that in government; my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for North East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell) will continue to argue the case for alternatives outwith government. But, the Government are proceeding with the programme, and that is the point that I wish to make clear today. The arrangements that the right hon. Member for Coventry North East left in place are those which the value-for-money report is studying, and to the extent that any better value for money can be squeezed out of the programme, that is the objective of the exercise.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

“When it comes to our nuclear deterrent, there are some straightforward questions to answer. Should it be replaced? Do we need a submarine-based system? Does the decision need to be taken now? Our approach to all those questions is to answer yes.”

Those are not my words, but the words of my right hon. Friend the Member for Witney (Mr Cameron), now the Prime Minister, on 4 December 2006, when he gave an excellent response to the statement by the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, on why the Trident programme should be renewed. My right hon. Friend went on to say:

“Conservative Members have always believed that Britain should have an independent nuclear deterrent”—

and that

“Those who argue that the world has changed so that no deterrent is required miss the point. Yes, the world has changed, and it continues to change rapidly, but that is the very case for keeping up our guard. Just as today’s threat is so different from that predicted 20 years ago, today we cannot predict the threat that we will face in 20 years’ time. Still less can we predict the threat in 40 to 50 years’ time, when the next generation of submarines will still be in service.”

Finally, my right hon. Friend pointed out that we need a credible deterrent, both against rogue states and against serious, modern, well-equipped states that pose a more traditional threat to our security. He said:

“We should have a credible deterrent to both.”

He went on to say that

“the key to a credible system is that it is not vulnerable to pre-emptive attack…Do not all the experts agree that, of the three options of land, air or submarine-based systems, the submarine-based system is the least vulnerable by far?”—[Official Report, 4 December 2006; Vol. 454, c. 24.]

That was why, when the vote was held on replacing the nuclear deterrent with a successor to Trident on 14 March 2007, the Conservative Opposition voted very strongly with the Government. The motion was carried by 413 votes to 167, with the Liberal Democrats and some Labour rebels voting against.

Following that, the Conservatives gave a manifesto commitment at the last election, committing our party to replacing the Trident nuclear system with a successor system that would be submarine-based. We went into the election on that basis, but did not win enough seats—sadly, it must be said—to form a Government by ourselves. Conservative MPs were summoned, got together and addressed by our party leader. We were told about the various offers made to form a coalition with the nuclear deterrent—[Laughter.] Sorry, I mean with the Liberal Democrats. Because the nuclear deterrent was such a major issue of difference between us and the Liberal Democrats, a special mention was made of it, and it was stated that the successor to Trident would be carried forward and that the Liberal Democrats would have to accept it. I particularly remember a senior colleague looking at me, catching my eye at that moment, and giving me a reassuring nod because he knew of my concern about this issue. That was my right hon. Friend, as he now is, the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

I must say that when I came to the Chamber this morning, I was very agitated because it appeared that someone—a Government source—had spoken to the BBC suggesting that this commitment was in doubt. As I said in an intervention, if so, this was particularly alarming because it would be a betrayal of the commitment the Conservative party gave to the electorate and a betrayal of the commitment the Conservative party leader gave to Conservative MPs when seeking their support, which we gave, to the formation of the coalition. I cannot imagine that such a betrayal would take place. I must say that I am considerably reassured by the answers I have had from the Minister for the Armed Forces to questions put to him earlier in the debate.

[John Woodcock]

I associate myself with much of what the hon. Gentleman is saying, although I cannot comment on the internal workings of the Conservative party. Does he agree that although the earlier assurance from the Minister for the Armed Forces was welcome, there has been so much confusion on this issue that it requires the Prime Minister to clarify once and for all precisely what the policy is, without ambiguity?

[Dr Lewis]

I think it would do no harm at all for the Prime Minister to make a further statement. He has always been unambiguous about this in the past and he was unambiguous about it when he was seeking the leadership of the party. It was a specific issue about which I asked him personally when I was reflecting on who to support and he was very firm in his commitment to the continuation of the nuclear deterrent.

I am not quite sure what actually happened with the generation of this story. We have heard from the Armed Forces Minister that, as far as he knows, it had nothing to do with anyone employed by the Government. On the other hand, the BBC says it got its story from “Government sources”. Those two statements are hard to reconcile. It is possible that someone somewhere on the press side in government thought they would take a punt at it, or perhaps someone thought they would fly a kite. The idea of flying a kite would be to say, “Well, let us see if we can shift this decision a little and see what sort of a reaction it gets.”

I hope that the reaction this has got so far—notably from my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin) in his excellent interview on the “Today” programme this morning and to some extent, I hope, from the contributions I have made in the Chamber today—has been sufficient to send a message to anyone anywhere in government that if they think that Conservative Members who have devoted their political lives to the protection, the maintenance, the justification and the support for a strategic nuclear deterrent would be prepared to play back-somersaults on an issue of this sort, they have got another think coming. This is not going to happen.

One of the advantages of my having been able to campaign for 28 or 29 years on the same subject both outside and inside Parliament is that I have seen these things happen over and over again. It may be that some bright spark in the coalition thought that it would be a good idea if we could just shift the particular decision from one side of the next general election to the other, it would postpone some potential fissure between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats within that coalition. Let me assure anyone who holds that view that, on the contrary, any such move to delay will fuel the very divisions and uncertainty that people wish to avoid.

I have been here before, on an international scale. I remember when the decision was made in 1979 to deploy the cruise and Pershing II missiles in five NATO countries to counter the SS-20 deployments by the Soviet Union from 1977. However, there was a fatal flaw in what was done. It was announced in December 1979 that the deployment would take place, but it was not actually due to take place until November 1983, which was when the cruise missiles came in. That reopened the whole controversy, and gave new life to those who always oppose a nuclear deterrent or deployment. It was a fatal mistake. Anyone who makes a decision on a matter of this sort must make it in principle. We made it in principle, and we made it in principle in 2007.

Our attention has been drawn to some small print. We have been told that if we look at the coalition agreement, we will see that the deterrent will be replaced, and that it will be replaced on the basis of value-for-money assessments. Hon. Members will have heard me ask the Armed Forces Minister whether that could possibly be interpreted as meaning that the deterrent should not go ahead at all. He seemed to say that that could not be the case, but there is a problem. If we put off the decision about the main gate, we will reach a point at which, if it were decided not to proceed through the main gate with a replacement of Trident, the only conceivable alternative would be the one that we hear time and again from the Liberal Democrats: cruise missiles on Astute class submarines. That whole programme would have to be designed right from the beginning, and there would be no way of preventing a fatal gap which would ensure that by the time the programme had been designed, there would be no submarine-building capacity left at Barrow-in-Furness. I see the hon. Member for Barrow and Furness (John Woodcock) nodding in agreement.

I have seen these tricks played over and over again. People are unwilling to say that they want to get rid of the deterrent because they know that, politically speaking, that would be suicide, so they try to find indirect means of scuppering it. We will not fall for that sort of trickery.

Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 13th September 2010 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

The priority in the defence review is to ensure that the UK has at its disposal what it needs for its wider national security and that the industrial implications of that are taken into account. I intend to have discussions with the devolved Administrations over the coming weeks to be fully apprised of their concerns about the industrial implications of the SDSR. Ultimately, in a constrained financial environment the No. 1 procurement priority is to ensure that the armed forces have what they need when they need it at a reasonable cost to the taxpayer.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Given the highly specialised tasks involved in defending our airspace for the indefinite future, does the Secretary of State agree that it would not, in any way, compromise the integrity of the strategic defence and security review if he were to state today, in the week in which we celebrate the 70th anniversary of the climax of the battle of Britain, that he will give no time to the strategically illiterate suggestion that the Royal Air Force should be abolished and absorbed into the other two services?

[Dr Fox]

In general it would be wrong of me to pre-empt the SDSR, but I can give my hon. Friend an absolute assurance that the Royal Air Force will continue.

UK Armed Forces in Afghanistan

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Thursday 9th September 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Ainsworth]

Yes, and I congratulate the Government on that. However, I would say to the hon. Gentleman that the changes were introduced at the same time as a freeze in service pay.

I have a couple more questions to ask the Secretary of State about things that I hope the Government will do in a timely manner. I do not know whether he is going to respond to the debate, because I know he has to leave the Chamber.

Force densities are not the only thing that we will need to succeed. We need the right equipment, and I wish to ask two specific questions about that. Last December I made some changes to the defence budget, partly to address some of the pressures ahead of the strategic defence and security review and partly to prioritise equipment for Afghanistan. That included an order for 22 Chinook helicopters. Why have the new Government not gone ahead with that order? The Secretary of State, the very man who continually criticised our record on helicopters, seems now to be allowing delay in that order, and I should like to ask him why. Equally, in the summer of 2009 I made it my business to intervene to put maximum speed and effort behind the development of a light protected patrol vehicle. Why have the Government not yet placed that order?

As we have discussed, the Deputy Prime Minister has said definitively:

“By 2015 there will not be any British combat troops in Afghanistan”.

Yet in a debate that I attended earlier this week the hon. Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood), the Defence Secretary’s Parliamentary Private Secretary, said that we should think of that announcement in the same terms as General Petraeus’s clarification of the US position. He said that there were a lot of conditions, and that there would still be special forces there. I absolutely agree with the Defence Secretary that we must be as clear as we can with all the sets of people involved in such an important matter as our intervention in Afghanistan, but the situation is currently not clear.

There appear to have been definitive statements from both the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister that irrespective of what happens, the combat mission will end in 2015. The Secretary of State knows that that is causing angst both within and outwith our armed forces. He did his best today to finesse that argument, but too many intelligent people who follow the record carefully know that there is a problem. Unless there are conditions-based timelines rather than an arbitrary finish date, the success of the mission is not helped. He need only read this morning’s edition of The Daily Telegraph to see the confusion that can occur, with people believing that Sherard Cowper-Coles’s departure indicates that the Government no longer have comprehensive determination to pursue the mission in Afghanistan.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Does the shadow Secretary of State accept that the reason why both President Obama and our Prime Minister seem intent on setting deadlines is the high level of casualties being incurred? Does he accept that if they did not set a deadline and continued with the current strategy, we could end up having that high level of casualties for perhaps another 20 or 30 years? Will he consider the fact that given a choice between taking too many casualties for a very long period or, perhaps, very few casualties through precipitate withdrawal, we ought to go for an intermediate strategy that has no deadline but does not incur the same number of casualties? That is the basis of the amendment that I shall move later, which I hope the right hon. Gentleman might consider encouraging his party to support.

[Mr Ainsworth]

I know the hon. Gentleman’s views and that he has tabled an amendment to the motion. He has spoken on this issue previously, and he has given a lot of thought to it, but the reason he gave is not one of the reasons given publicly for the strategies that are being pursued. Perhaps we need a debate in this country on whether we are sufficiently steely or enduring to pursue prolonged counter-insurgency conflicts, but that is not the reason for the Government’s strategy. If it is, let the Government encourage such a debate and let us have it in the House. However, what he says is not what the Government are saying. He has added yet more complexity to the reasons for what the Deputy Prime Minister and Prime Minister are saying.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I beg to move amendment (a), at end add—

‘provided that a more realistic military strategy is adopted designed to fulfil the United Kingdom’s long-term interests in the region at lesser cost in life, limb and financial resources.’.

It is a privilege to have the opportunity to move the first Back-Bench amendment to a motion selected for debate in this House by Back Benchers themselves. I have a friend who is engaged to a corporal in the Army. He is a medic who has been on two tours of Afghanistan, the second of which he volunteered for before he had to go. As a medic, he is one of a small number of people who go out on every patrol because something horrible may happen to one of their comrades. He understands the importance of that vital role and so decided to stay on for two weeks longer than necessary at the end of his second tour, to avoid there being no proper handover to the medics who would succeed him.

In the second of those two extra weeks that he voluntarily undertook, on the second tour for which he also volunteered, he was blown up. He was in a new Husky armoured vehicle, so he and his entire crew survived. It is typical of his spirit that the picture of him grinning in front of the absolutely devastated vehicle now adorns the laptop of his fiancée, my friend. Had he been blown up a week earlier, he would have been in a Vector armoured vehicle and he and all his comrades would be dead. So, in this case, it is one up for the former Government and for the armed forces, but it is not one up for the strategy that we have been pursuing.

Over past months, I have made various inquiries about where casualties are primarily incurred, because the question of deadlines is related to casualties more than to anything else. The previous and present Governments have made no secret of the fact that the overwhelming majority of casualties are incurred on predictable patrols by uniformed military targets, which is what our armed forces have become under the current strategy.

For the sake of clarity—it is important that people following this debate should understand this, given what we are told about the audiences who will listen to, see and read what we say today—may I spell out the difference between my amendment and the original motion? The motion is very simple and it states:

“That this House supports the continued deployment of UK armed forces in Afghanistan.”

Those who think that the mission should be open-ended should therefore vote for the motion. If they think that the troops should come home straight away and that the whole thing is a lost cause, misguided and counter-productive, as some have argued today, they should vote against the motion. However, if Members think, as I do, that the mission is justified and important, but that it is not being pursued in the right way, they should consider voting for my amendment.

The reason for that was made clear when my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot), the Chairman of the Select Committee on Defence, so typically put his finger on the heart of the matter. As he said, it is true that if the public believe we have a strategy that will succeed, they will support the mission. Why is public support for the mission draining away? It is because the public are not satisfied with the strategy. That is why I propose adding the words of the amendment to the end of the motion.

[Sir Robert Smith]

Does the hon. Gentleman think that the coalition’s move to much more of a political engagement to try to move things forward is the right way to proceed in order to bring the troops home in the long run? Does he think that we need to find a political solution on the ground, and that it is not so much the military strategy that has had to be refocused but the political context of that strategy?

[Dr Lewis]

The answer to that is yes and no: yes in the sense that all counter-insurgencies end, eventually, with a negotiated political outcome, which is what the hon. Gentleman is saying; and no in the sense that now is not the time to negotiate. There has been a lack of strategic consistency in the advice given to Governments. The hon. Member for Walsall North (Mr Winnick) referred approvingly to General Richards’ recent statement that we ought to negotiate with the Taliban. What he did not state was the Taliban’s response to that, as relayed through the BBC, which has some quite good contacts with the Taliban in a purely professional way. It was that they saw no reason to negotiate because they were winning anyway and deadlines had been set for withdrawal.

The strange thing is that this is the same general—he is a talented and charming man and I have had a number of conversations with him over the years—who said a few months ago when appointed head of the Army that we would need to be in Afghanistan for 30 to 40 years and that there was no question of our withdrawing. Now, because we are getting political messages from the White House and from Downing street that the Governments—or at least the leaders of the Governments—of the United States and the United Kingdom are not prepared to go on indefinitely, we are being told, “Oh yes, well perhaps we could get out in four years after all,” and, “Oh yes, let’s talk to the Taliban.”

[Mr Winnick]

If the general has changed his view in such a substantial way, I welcome it. In my view, he has seen the light. If he was wrong on the subject of talking, as the hon. Gentleman is suggesting, why was he not contradicted by Defence Ministers at the time or by those who are now Ministers?

[Dr Lewis]

That is, of course, the reason for my amendment. I am saying that all the Governments are signed up to an unrealistic strategy which ought to be changed. The reality is that General Richards was not really wrong in what he said previously and he is not really wrong when he says that we ought to be talking to the enemy. It is a question of timing. The truth of the matter is that General Petraeus is absolutely right to pursue such a counter-insurgency strategy, provided that we have all the time in the world and that we are prepared to take the casualties that are being inflicted on us by irregular forces. If we are not prepared to take those casualties, we will have to adopt a more realistic strategy, because otherwise we will withdraw arbitrarily and, on our withdrawal, the likelihood of the Afghan Government’s being able to sustain themselves is open to doubt.

What should we be thinking about in terms of our policy? There are those who believe that it should be possible to fight using special forces alone, and they have a particular point, which is as follows. I have been concerned at the artificial distinction drawn between counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism, as if insurgents and terrorists were two different things. Terrorism is not an ideology but a tactic. Sometimes insurgents use it and sometimes they use other methods.

In Afghanistan at first, the insurgents were using much more open methods—mass attacks and ones that enabled us effectively to take their armed forces on and to defeat them in fairly open conflict. Gradually, they learned the lesson from Iraq and adopted a different strategy. They started to use terrorism tactics that enabled them to pick off our servicemen and women one by one in an attritional method of campaigning which uniformed armed forces are unable to counter effectively. That is why the answer to such fighting is the deployment of special forces who can meet it appropriately; but that in itself is not enough. If we put pressure on one side by saying, “We are going to withdraw in a few years’ time, President Karzai, so you had better get your act together”, but we want to negotiate with the other side and to get a settlement, we have to put pressure on them too.

That is why I say that we ought to be doing something that I have mentioned in the House before: we ought to be using the time that has been bought by the surge to build up a strategic or sovereign base and bridgehead area, so that when the time comes at which we say, “We are going to withdraw from being thinly spread over the entire country”, rather than quitting completely we withdraw into an impregnable base.

Time does not permit me to take this issue further, but I say simply to hon. Members on both sides of the House that there is nothing dishonourable in fighting for a better strategy for our troops—it is not sending a signal that we are not supporting the troops. To support the troops when they are being led by a faulty strategy is not to support the troops at all. I will be pressing my amendment and I urge Members to vote for it to show that we support the cause and the campaign but we know that the strategy needs to be modified.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Geoffrey Robinson (Coventry North West) (Lab)]

I am very pleased to be able to follow the hon. Member for Penrith and The Border (Rory Stewart), who speaks with considerable authority and knowledge on these matters. I believe that he has served out in Afghanistan and lived there for quite a while. Nevertheless, I am still not entirely sure that I follow the logic of what he said. Perhaps I shall return to that a little later.

Like many other Members, I congratulate the Backbench Business Committee on selecting this debate. It is the first such all-day debate that we have had, and it is most important. When I say that unfortunately I cannot support the motion, I mean no disrespect to the Committee. I am not sure how the motion came to be drafted, but I cannot see how Members can support so open-ended and black-and-white a motion stating that the House

“supports the continued deployment of UK armed forces in Afghanistan.”

There is no mention of a limited period, even though the Prime Minister himself has said—quite rightly, in my opinion—that it is inconceivable that we shall still be in a combat role by 2015. The Foreign Secretary agreed with that at the last Foreign Office questions, having made it absolutely clear that counter-insurgencies invariably end in a political settlement, which means talks. I shall come back to that in a moment. The Defence Secretary also agreed today, although he gave a mixed message. On the one hand he said that he wanted the troops to return as victors—a singularly ill-chosen word, since that is clearly not what will happen—and, on the other, he said that he knew there had to be a political solution.

If Members do not find themselves able to support the motion, as I cannot, that leaves us with the amendments. I congratulate the hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) on tabling his amendment and having it selected, but when he explained the nature of his alternative strategy I had doubts about whether an impregnable, sovereign strategic base with an enormous number of troops could be established and function in the role that he envisages. He has not had time to develop his argument today, nor have I had the occasion to talk to him further about it. However, his amendment is somewhat difficult to vote for, even though I would like to be able to do so given that it states what I believe is essential, which is that the current strategy is not working. While it is now said that we have learned to deal better with IEDs, the insurgents have switched their tactics and are now killing more and more successfully with sniper bullets.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

On a purely procedural matter, there is nothing in the wording of my amendment that commits hon. Members to backing any particular solution. I have given my own interpretation, but as long as the hon. Gentleman agrees with the wording of the amendment, there is no reason why he, and I hope other hon. Members, should not vote for it.

[Mr Robinson]

The hon. Gentleman is now at his most persuasive and irresistible best, and I will give the matter further thought during and after my speech.

As for the other amendments, while I agree with much in amendment (c), tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas), it is inadequate in that it implies a cut-and-rush approach of getting out willy-nilly as soon as we can. I do not think that is on, or that the country would want to see us scuttle away. I believe that the only approach is the one that I outlined in an early-day motion that I circulated to most Members, which I hope will find support throughout the House. It arose from the message that came from the Taliban in August, which was the subject of a front-page article in The Guardian. It stated that the Taliban were open to negotiations and discussions about civilian deaths. That is a major problem for the allied forces and is central to the counter-insurgency strategy that was mentioned earlier, but it would not necessarily lead immediately to talks about how we could reach a political settlement involving the Taliban. I do not think that any other exit strategy makes sense. Unpleasant though it is to many, and although we may not get everything we need from talks with the Taliban, the sooner we begin them, the sooner we have a chance of achieving what the hon. Member for New Forest East and I want, which is a reduction in the unnecessary and awful killings that are taking place, including of civilians in front of their own troops. They are bound to continue if we pursue the current strategy under the terms under which our forces are operating.

We cannot simply cut and run, so I do not support the amendment in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion, but I will do my very best to meet the request of the hon. Member for New Forest East. I certainly cannot vote for the motion, which is defective and unacceptable because it does not give a time scale. Much though we may dislike time scales, Ministers are always asked, “How long will it last?” and they cannot dodge that and leave things open-ended. Time goes very quickly. If we are not up against a deadline, in no time at all we could find that there is mission creep and that the conflict expands. Before we know what has happened, we have built the conflict up to being about the defence of the whole western way of life.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Robinson]

The coalition Government are realistic on the matter—I have privately congratulated the Defence Secretary on his realism—but he was today conscious that, if they were listening, people will take comfort if they think they have the prospect of winning the war against ISAF in Afghanistan. He therefore painted a more rosy picture than the situation on the ground would properly allow him, and sent a more hard-line message to the Taliban than necessary.

I agree entirely with the hon. Member for Gloucester (Richard Graham). It is now accepted throughout the House that there is no military victory to be won for either side in Afghanistan. The only prospect we have is of a few years—or many years, if we are not careful—of futile conflict that will get us nowhere. I am not saying that we should stop, which is where I disagree fundamentally with the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion in whose name amendment (c) stands. I cannot see the negotiations or discussions with the Taliban getting anywhere unless we remain in Afghanistan at our current strength and sustain our attack on them.

Indeed, from the early-day motion that I tabled, it was clear that the information, such as we have, is that we have a firm offer from the Taliban. The offer is not endorsed by the quetta shura—the central council in Pakistan—but comes from local commanders. Let us also bear in mind that 80% of the casualties occur within 10 miles. In other words, the fighting and deaths are very localised. We do not face an al-Qaeda insurgency campaign directed from outside; it is a local campaign.

The offer of talks, which appears to be serious, has emanated not from the top council leadership, which should encourage us to respond to it, yet as far as I can see, we are ignoring it. I entirely accept that the Government will say, “We can’t tell you what’s going on,” but the Americans say that they see no prospect of talks going anywhere. Panetta says that the time to talk is when the Americans have increased the pressure so that the Taliban believe that they are losing, but I take issue with the hon. Member for New Forest East on that, because that approach would mean that there will never be a right time for talks. Either we are winning, and therefore we do not need talks, or doing badly, when talks would mean weakness. If we were doing better, we might think that if we did a bit more, we might win. There is never a right time. What we have learned from previous insurgencies of this kind, and much larger ones, is that the earlier we get talks going and see what we can get, the better people understand why we are fighting, and the better the chance of a solution.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

The correct time is when there is a stalemate, not when one side or the other thinks it is winning.

[Mr Robinson]

I agree, but it is difficult to send troops to fight in a stalemate. Even Mr Robert Gates, the US Defence Secretary, has said that he hates signing troop deployment orders when he is sending troops to fight in a stalemate. I take the hon. Gentleman’s point, but who knows what a stalemate is anyway.

The message that we have to send tonight is that although we would love to see an ISAF victory, we do not believe that that is possible, and that the only way forward is discussions with the Taliban, realistic, hard and unpleasant though those would be. The sooner we get into such discussions, the sooner the level of casualties will fall, and the sooner we would be able to bring the troops home. We clearly cannot bring them home before then.

First World War Commemoration

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Thursday 8th July 2010 Commons Chamber

[Damian Collins]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that intervention, and I am happy to support that very worthwhile project. The television series produced by Ian Hislop, “Not Forgotten”, was a good demonstration of the power of memorials, some of which had fallen into abeyance and loss. In two local projects in the villages of Lyminge and Sandgate, in my constituency, local people have decoded the war memorials, using new online materials to look up the stories of the servicemen who served in their own communities, for example, Walter Tull. He is named on the Folkestone war memorial and was the first person who was not a European white male to be commissioned into the British Army—he was commissioned in the field as a second lieutenant during the first world war. He also had the distinction of being the first black man to play in an outfield position in the English football leagues, and his story was really uncovered by a project run by the Dover War Memorial Project. It would be a wonderful way to mark the centenary of the outbreak of the war if similar projects could be launched across the country, perhaps supported by the Imperial War museum and the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, to give people toolkits to understand where their memorials are and the stories of the men that lie beyond them.

We are all familiar with the fact that although the men who served in that war have passed—indeed, many of their children are probably no longer with us—their stories remain. Part of the Chamber in which we sit today is, in some ways, a memorial to the 20 Members of this House who lost their lives on active service during that war and the many others who saw active service. One of my predecessors as the Member of Parliament for the Folkestone and Hythe area, Sir Philip Sassoon, was on active service as an officer of the East Kent Regiment, which was known as “the Buffs” during the war, and he also led a lot of the local recruitment. Many other distinguished Members of this House served in that war too. As Members of Parliament, we too can think of a fitting commemoration for that centenary.

Today’s conference at the Imperial War museum is also being attended by Ann Berry, a former mayor of Folkestone, who has worked closely with me on our own project in Folkestone, Step Short. It seeks to mark the recognition of Folkestone’s role during the war. I wish to talk a little about that, because it is important to think of the centenary in terms not only of the sacrifices made by allied servicemen in the trenches on the western front and around the world, but of sites of significance in this country. Such sites were well understood in the years after the first world war, but, of course, memory has been lost.

My friend, Professor Nick Bosanquet, who has kindly joined us in the Public Gallery this evening, has, aside from his duties at Imperial college and with the Reform think-tank, also done work on the significance of UK sites—particularly Folkestone, which was the major port of embarkation and disembarkation for about 9 million men during the war, as well as sites in Gretna and Liverpool and of major munitions production as well as other sites around the country. It is important that those stories are not forgotten.

The anniversary of 1914 is in many ways the start of an important series of anniversaries: the outbreak of the first world war in 1914; for many in the Commonwealth and the UK, Gallipoli in 1915; the battle of the Somme in 1916; Passchendaele in 1917; and, of course, the Armistice in 1918. That theme was picked up by the Irish Taoiseach, Brian Cowen, in a recent speech he made to the institute for British-Irish studies. He said that in 2016 in particular—a significant date for Ireland—

“the centenary of the Somme will be commemorated here in Dublin, as in Belfast, to honour the heroism of those who fought and died there, Protestant and Catholic, side by side.”

The centenary gives us a chance to remember and reflect. The significance of the first world war is great, not only because of the enormous loss of life on all sides but because that war shaped, in many ways, the politics of the 20th century and so much of the world in which we live today.

The centenary is a good way of uncovering the human story. I was very moved last week to attend a service at Shorncliffe military cemetery in my constituency on 1 July, which is Canada day. The Canadians had many thousands of men stationed in Folkestone during the war, 296 of whom are buried in the cemetery. After the war, the people of the town promised Canada that they would look after and maintain those graves. Every year, 296 schoolchildren from the constituency sit by individual graves with individual presentations of flowers that they make to the graves as part of a service of memorial. That links the town not only to the story of the first world war but to the lives of individual servicemen, too. That is a fitting act of memorial.

On the harbour arm of Folkestone harbour, there was a canteen maintained by Florence and Margaret Jeffrey. They ran the harbour canteen, dispensing free cups of tea and refreshments to men before the troops boarded. In the case of most people who have an ancestor who served in the first world war, that person would probably have passed through Folkestone in one way or another during that time. There is a record of 40,000 names collected in the visitors’ books from those of general servicemen to those of people such as Field Marshall Haig, David Lloyd George and Winston Churchill who passed through the town. With the support of Kent county council, we have started a project to create a digital record of those names and to scan each of the pages of those books. We are looking to raise funds to have that as a resource that can be accessed online by people around the world who want to search for stories of their ancestors. It will record them as being in Folkestone on a particular time, place and day during that war.

Most of the men who were in Folkestone during the war would have assembled on the Leas, outside the Grand, which was a great society hotel in the period before the war. It was also the place where Wilfred Owen, the war poet, spent his last night in England. They would have been assembled and marched along the Leas, down a road that during the war was known as the Slope road, to the harbour before they embarked for the trenches of Belgium and France. For many of them, that would have been their last journey in England before they went to the trenches, not to return.

That is the significance of the UK sites. Hundreds and thousands of people every year make that pilgrimage themselves to walk in the footsteps of their ancestors in the battlefields. As a schoolboy doing my GCSE studies, I made that same journey, as many people studying history as part of the national curriculum and their GCSE courses will do today. To continue shamelessly to plug my constituency’s heritage links, people can start those journeys and see part of them in this country, too, without making the trip to France. They can walk, as many men did, down the Leas in Folkestone and down the road that, after the war, was renamed the Road of Remembrance as a national memorial to the sacrifices made by those men—a walk down which many people could go, retracing their steps. There are elements of our heritage, particularly as regards the first world war, that have been lost and forgotten and anything that we can do to use the centenary to reconnect people with those stories and the sacrifices that so many millions of people made during that war would be excellent.

Will the Minister consider what support the Government could give? It need not necessarily be financial support, but could be support in co-ordinating a national day of remembrance to mark the centenary, perhaps with a national programme of events. They could work with the major galleries and museums and the regimental museums, particularly at sites with a strong interest, and, as my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate (Mr Burrowes) has said, work in support of the memorials themselves. That would be a particularly fitting memorial.

I should also like to know whether the Government will consider marking a national day of remembrance, potentially in the form of a bank holiday or a part-bank holiday on the day of the centenary of the outbreak of the war. Might they consider having a permanent national bank holiday of remembrance, perhaps on Armistice day or a day of the week near to it, as other countries do? Australia and New Zealand have Anzac day as a national memorial day, and there are national memorial days in other countries, such as the United States. Perhaps it is time for us to consider making such a move, and the centenary of the first world war would be a fitting time to introduce such a national holiday or day of remembrance. If it could not be an additional holiday, perhaps there could be discussions about it replacing another bank holiday, as it might be a more fitting to have a bank holiday on that day.

So, although Adjournment debates involve closing the proceedings of the House, my intention was to start a debate among our colleagues and people around the country who have a great interest in the historical and community significance of the first world war about how we in the country and in the House should lead the country in marking that centenary.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on raising this matter. He is absolutely right that there is huge interest in it, despite the long lapse of time. One reason for that is the availability of so much more information, including the online record of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission of every serviceman who lost his life in that disastrous war. Given that we spend so much time commemorating the events and triumphs of the second world war, is it not right that we should remember that twice as many were killed in the first world war as in the second, and in a smaller geographical area? So many of the political mistakes of the first world war paved the way for the second world war. Surely, therefore, we have to give it serious attention when the anniversary comes.

[Damian Collins]

I thank my hon. Friend for his meaningful contribution to the debate. He is absolutely right about the enormous significance of the war and that the far greater loss of life in that war is sometimes forgotten.

In some ways, the burden of memorial falls on new generations, which is why this is a particularly important challenge for the House. There are still alive today many service veterans from the second world war and many people who have vivid memories of that war, as was seen at the 70th anniversary of Dunkirk, which was marked last month. For the first world war, those memories are not there, so there is a greater challenge for this generation and new generations to continue celebrations when those events are so much further away. I want to mark that challenge with a nod to the huge canon of literature about the first world war. Let me adapt slightly Kipling’s words in his lament for his son:

“Then hold your head up all the more,

This tide,

And every tide;

Because they were the sons Britain bore,

And gave to that wind blowing and that tide!”

Afghanistan

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Wednesday 7th July 2010 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

There are a number of points to make in response to the hon. Gentleman. I fully accept that he has long held the view that the war was not justified, but we must agree to disagree on that. I believe that it is a vital national security mission for this country. There has never been any doubt that ultimately there must be a political element. The international coalition, the previous Government and this Government have always held the view that we cannot win the wider regional conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan by military means alone.

There is difficulty in determining who is reconcilable to the Afghan constitution and Government and who is not—that is an ongoing process—but I fundamentally disagree with the hon. Gentleman. The measure of a conflict or war is not the number of those who, sadly, die, but whether we succeed in our mission and strategy. I believe that we should at all times see our armed forces not as victims, but as champions of the freedoms and security that they are trying to bring for our country. I am sure that that is how they would like to be seen: as victors, not victims.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend is undoubtedly the right man in the right role, and he is loyally defending a strategy even though it might not be the right one. Does he accept that there is a fundamental tension between classic counter-insurgency warfare down among the people, which takes many years to bring to a conclusion, and the statement made by the Foreign Secretary yesterday? He said that

“there will not be British troops in a combat role or in significant numbers in Afghanistan in five years’ time”—[Official Report, 6 July 2010; Vol. 513, c. 168.]

If we are not to sacrifice our strategic interests in the area, will the Defence Secretary hold himself open to the possibility that a plan B might be necessary if plan A does not work out on schedule?

[Dr Fox]

The Government believe, in alliance with the United States and the other members of the international coalition, that we have the correct strategy. We believe that the counter-insurgency aim of protecting the population, and of providing them with security so that there is a space for better governance, is the correct strategy.

There is a difference between our national security mission to ensure that Afghanistan can develop in a way that enables the Afghan forces to look after their own security, and the wider mission of reconstruction and development—that is complementary to, but not the same as, the national security mission—which will have to be undertaken for a very long time, given the social state of Afghanistan.

Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 5th July 2010 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

I am responsible for a lot of things, but the Liberal Democrats’ answers on specific points of policy are a matter for them, not for me. The coalition agreement is very clear that although the Government have set out their policy, the Liberal Democrats are very good at coming forward with their own particular solutions, as I can make clear to the hon. Lady.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

In the inexplicable absence of any Liberal Democrat on his feet, may I ask my right hon. Friend whether he agrees that as an alternative to Trident, the idea of putting nuclear-armed cruise missiles on Astute class submarines would be more expensive and less effective, would put the submarines at risk and, because one cannot know what sort of warhead is on a cruise missile until it has landed, could start world war three by accident? Does he agree that apart from that, it is a great Liberal Democrat idea?

[Dr Fox]

I am unlikely to be tempted down that route.

As the House will know, when we considered the entire issue in 2006 and 2007 we looked at options for other systems, including cruise missiles, silo-based missiles and air-launched weapons. Those other options were discounted due to effectiveness and cost. That analysis has not changed, and alternative systems will not be considered as part of the value-for-money review.

--- Later in debate ---

[Peter Luff]

I wish I could answer the right hon. Gentleman’s question at length, but all I can say is that the A400M, like all other major projects, is part of the strategic defence and security review—the long overdue strategic defence and security review.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

T1. If he will make a statement on his departmental responsibilities.

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Dr Liam Fox)]

My departmental responsibilities are to ensure that our country is properly defended now and in the future, that our service personnel have the right equipment and training to allow them to succeed in their military tasks, and that we honour the military covenant.

[Dr Lewis]

Only last August, a top military adviser stated publicly that it would take between 30 and 40 years for us to nation-build in Afghanistan under the present strategy and that there was no question of NATO pulling out. Within the last few days, the same top military adviser has stated that the time has begun for talks with the Taliban and that we could indeed have resolved our mission within the next four years. What does this conflicting advice say about the quality, the coherence and the consistency of the strategy which our Government have inherited in Afghanistan?

[Dr Fox]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend. He will probably remember a former Prime Minister saying that advisers advise and Ministers decide. For the benefit of newer Members, let me say that she was absolutely correct to do so. The Government decide the strategy in Afghanistan. We believe that we are there for reasons of national security, and we believe that we will have succeeded in our mission in Afghanistan when it is a stable enough state to manage its own internal and external security without reference to outside powers.

Strategic Defence and Security Review

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 21st June 2010 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

There are a number of elements in the Trident renewal programme, and we are looking for value for money in each of them, and trying to see where we can, if possible, get that capability for lesser cost. However, there is no question but that we will move ahead with a continuous, minimum, credible at-sea nuclear deterrent for the United Kingdom.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

[Dr Fox]

I will in a moment.

This brings me to the second aspect of the armed forces’ primary mission. Defence is also there for when everything goes wrong—when despite our best efforts, deterrence and containment have failed, diplomacy is exhausted, and, as a last resort, the use of lethal force is required. No other arm of government can deliver this or is designed for this purpose. So our armed forces must be structured, first, to deter; and secondly, to deliver the use of force in support of our national interest and to protect national security. We undertake this strategic defence and security review at a time when our armed forces are delivering on that primary mission in Afghanistan. We must have strategic patience and resource that mission fully, but it would be a mistake to base our future security on the assumption that future wars will be like the current ones. That is why we must maintain generic capability able to adapt to changing threats.

I now give way to my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis).

[Dr Lewis]

My right hon. Friend must have read my mind; perhaps that is not difficult to do. I congratulate him on taking up his post; it is a pleasure to see him there.

My right hon. Friend says that we cannot assume that future wars will be like current counter-insurgency campaigns, yet some very senior figures in the Army are asking us to make that very assumption. It cannot be safe for this country to plan on the basis that just because we are engaged in irregular warfare now, we do not have to worry about state-against-state conflict in future. Will he say, once and for all, that there is a danger that we could one day find ourselves opposed by a modern, well-armed, industrialised state, and that we have to be prepared for that terrible eventuality?

[Dr Fox]

I would never be so presumptuous as to believe that I could read the complexities and high intellectual level of my hon. Friend’s mind, but let us just say that having spent four years in opposition together, I have a fair idea of what he is likely to raise and when. He is absolutely correct, and I reiterate that it would be wrong, and fly in the face of everything that we have learned from history, to believe that future wars will be predictable or like the ones in which we are currently engaged. We must maintain generic capability that is flexible, adaptable and able to deal with changing future threats of a sort that we cannot possibly predict with any certainty.

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[Mr Ainsworth]

I am not certain of that. I would not go as far as my hon. Friend. I have, however, seen unfortunate headlines when, as a result of things that were being said, the press were able to suggest that the Government were propagating some kind of exit strategy. I do not believe that that is so. I believe that the Government are pursuing the same strategy that we pursued. I believe that they accept that we must stay in Afghanistan until such time as the Afghan forces themselves are able to defend their own country, and that they will not take any precipitate decision to reduce our force levels in that country before that happens. I certainly hope that that is the case.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I thank the shadow Secretary of State for being so generous in giving way, but he must accept that it is not just a question of mixed messages in one part of the alliance, given that President Obama himself has suggested the possibility of a run-down of troops in Afghanistan as early as 18 months from now. If we are to come out with our strategic interests intact, we must have new thinking about how best to protect them, and sending people out on uniformed patrols day after day to be shot at and blown up may not be the most intelligent way of doing that.

[Mr Ainsworth]

I know the hon. Gentleman’s views. I have heard him describe, both privately and publicly, his position on Afghanistan and how we can pursue it. I have to tell him, however, that we are pursuing a counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan—that is agreed across the coalition—and while that is so, while there are people in theatre and while they are doing the very difficult work that we have asked them to do, we must give them support.

During Labour’s years, big changes were made to the structure of our armed forces’ capability. A great deal of modernisation took place. There were big moves away from cold war capability towards the modernised expeditionary capability that our armed forces have shown in recent years. I accept what the Secretary of State has said—that he wants to continue that move—and I also accept that the threats have changed. We need to examine the emerging threats, and consider what role we need to play in the world. I hope and believe that I made a start on that during the Green Paper process, about which the Secretary of State has used very kind words. I hope he will be as open and engaging in the methods he will use in relation to the strategic defence review as I tried to be with the Green Paper.

What the Secretary of State has effectively said to us, it seems, is that a process is under way and that he will invite everyone to participate, but the way in which we will participate is by having an opportunity to make submissions to him. I suggest to him that anyone and everyone has always had that ability. If this means we cannot continue to write to him expressing our views, I think he will miss a real opportunity. He knows that there are considerable financial pressures on both the MOD budget and the public finances overall. I do not believe that, when he is faced with all those difficulties, it is in his interests or those of a proper debate to do anything other than continue to be open and give people an opportunity to share—[Interruption.] Well, if the Secretary of State did say that, I am wasting my breath, but I am worried that what he said was, “We have a decision-making process, and if you want to make a submission, you are free to do so.”

I would have thought that it was in the Secretary of State’s interests, and those of the Government and the nation, that he share his emerging thinking with us. It seems that he has even cancelled the interim assessment or interim announcements that he was going to give. When are we going to hear what his emerging thinking is, because he has said very little about that today? We are only six weeks away from the recess and the Government have set themselves a very tight time scale. Do they genuinely want to engage the nation, the Opposition, academia, industry and everyone else who needs to be involved; or are they simply going to invite us to make written submissions?

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[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

It is a great pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Barrow and Furness (John Woodcock), and he will not be surprised to hear that I agree with almost every word—no, actually with every word—that he said about the nuclear deterrent. I hope that that does not damn his political career for eternity. He paid generous tribute to my hon. Friends the Members for Fylde (Mark Menzies) and for Lancaster and Fleetwood (Eric Ollerenshaw) for their maiden speeches, which I am happy to endorse.

Perhaps I can cheer the hon. Gentleman up a little by letting him into a secret. When my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister was aspiring to the leadership of our party, he held a series of interviews with his hon. Friends, of whom I was one. When I went in, I asked him only two questions. One need not concern us today, but the other was about his attitude to the nuclear deterrent, and I am delighted to say that he was extremely robust about it. If the hon. Gentleman and other hon. Members care to check the response of our current Prime Minister to the statement of former Prime Minister Tony Blair on the subject in December 2006, they will see that it was once again extremely strong. That was the only occasion when I was ever called in to have anything to do with drafting a response to a Government statement. Our current Prime Minister made two alterations to what his speechwriter and I had drafted between us, both of which were to toughen up his response, not to weaken it. Although our coalition partners may hope to chip away at the edges on this matter, if I know the Prime Minister as well as I think I do, at least on this subject, they will undoubtedly be disappointed.

As hon. Members on both sides of the House will undoubtedly be aware, in the mid-1920s, a glassy-eyed rabble-rouser called Adolf Hitler was incarcerated in Landsberg prison, putting the finishing touches to “Mein Kampf”. At the same time as, sad to say, that man was pre-determining future history unregarded in that cell, the chiefs of staff of the armed forces were trying to decide what they would have to defend Britain against in the future. So incapable were they of predicting the future, understandably, that each of the armed forces prepared its hypothetical contingency plans against an entirely different potential enemy.

The Royal Navy—understandably, because Japan had a large navy—felt that we should prepare against possible Japanese aggression in the far east. The Army—understandably, because Russia had a large army—felt that we should prepare against possible Russian aggression somewhere in the area of the Indian subcontinent. The Royal Air Force was a little bit stuck, but eventually came up with an idea. Because the French had a rather large air force, it decided that we should prepare against a possible war with the French. Not one of the three wise men heading the three services, which had eventually done so well in the final stages of the great war, predicted that the real enemy that would face us, only 15 years later or less, would be a revived Germany led by that man scribbling away in a cell in Landsberg prison.

[Mark Tami]

I agree with the hon. Gentleman, and we do not need to go that far back. When I was growing up in the 1970s—I know it does not seem possible, but I am genuinely that old—we were facing what we were sure was the actual threat, which was the Soviet Union pouring across the plains of Germany, massed tank battles and the use of tactical nuclear weapons, and then no doubt some form of nuclear holocaust engulfing the world. Nobody mentioned North Korea or Iran—they were not even on the radar. It is clearly difficult to guess what the future holds.

[Dr Lewis]

I am delighted that I gave way to the hon. Gentleman, who is absolutely right. I could add to the examples that he gave the Yom Kippur war, which was not predicted by hypersensitive Israel, the Falklands war, which was not predicted by us, the invasion of Kuwait, which was not predicted by anybody, and the attacks of September 2001, which were not predicted by the world’s then only superpower. I therefore very much welcome the Secretary of State’s acknowledgment that there is an unpredictability factor. We simply do not know what enemies will arise, when, and what sort of threat we will face.

This argument has been had over and again throughout the history of defence, most notoriously between 1919 and 1932, when something called the 10-year rule was in operation. It was felt that we could cut forces, because we could always look ahead a decade and say, “Well, there doesn’t seem to be any threat facing us now.” It is impossible to know significantly in advance, if at all, when we will next find ourselves at war. That means it is a limiting factor when we say that a defence review must be foreign policy-led, or even defence policy-led. At the end of the day, what we are doing in the strategic defence and security review is calculating the premium that we are prepared to pay on the insurance policy against harm befalling this country. With a normal insurance policy, if we knew when an accident would happen or when an injury would be inflicted, we could probably take steps to avoid it and would not need to spend money on the premium in the first place. However, we do not know, and that is why we have to spend the money.

As I indicated in an earlier intervention, I am particularly concerned about a frame of mind that is prevalent in some quarters of the Army, and which asserts that, because we are engaged in a counter-insurgency campaign now, anybody who says that in 20 or 30 years, or even longer, we might need modern aircraft to defend our airspace, modern naval vessels to defend our waters and lines of communication or even modern military vehicles to enable our Army to fight—hopefully alongside others—a foreign aggressor that not just had irregular or guerrilla forces but was possibly a hostile state, is living in the past or still thinking in cold war terms. I think like that, but I am not still thinking in cold war terms. I am thinking of the wars that we might have to face two or three decades hence, not just the conflicts in which we are engaged today.

A few years ago, I heard a senior military officer say that a tipping point might come when we had to choose between fighting the conflicts in which we were currently engaged and fighting a war at some time in the future. In other words, he was trying to contrast the small expectation of a big war in the future with the big expectation of a small war that we might have to fight sooner. I said at the time that I felt that to be a false choice, but if I had to make the choice, I would rather insure against the danger of a big war in the future than that of a small war closer to hand.

[Mr Jenkin]

My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech. To reinforce his point, I add that the small wars that we have fought recently have had more characteristics of state-on-state warfare than many people would care to admit. Serbia fought like a state, as did the Taliban, and Saddam Hussein certainly fought like a state twice. The idea that we should give up state-on-state warfare capability is absolute madness.

[Dr Lewis]

I entirely agree with my hon. Friend that that is absolute madness. I shall not name the senior Army officer who first proposed that thesis—all I will say is that he has become a very senior Army officer, and some say that he might even become an extremely senior Army officer—but leave it to people’s reading of the runes.

The reality is that in those conflicts that we fought, our high-end, precision materiel, our modern techniques, and our use of aircraft, naval vessels and mechanised warfare equipment, have been essential in getting us into theatre. The country has been disturbed and worried not by the casualties we have taken going into a theatre and displacing a hostile Government, but the casualties we take in day-by-day attrition that result from our persisting with methods that make it inevitable that our opponents can inflict them. I say this to shadow Ministers: it is not unpatriotic to question the strategy that is being followed in Afghanistan. Strategies can be improved. In previous wars, we have used strategies that failed over and again. Eventually, when they were changed, the outcomes improved. That can happen in Afghanistan.

I understand that resources are scarce and that each of the armed forces will want to make a case that suits its book best, and to claim most of those scarce resources, but we must have balanced forces, and I am delighted that the Secretary of State indicates that we will.

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[Eric Joyce (Falkirk) (Lab)]

I listened with great interest to the speech of the hon. Member for Portsmouth North (Penny Mordaunt). She certainly advanced a sophisticated argument for the interests of the Navy and she should be congratulated on listening so carefully to her predecessor, Sir Roger. However, I am not sure about all of that knights on chargers stuff—I am always a bit sceptical about all that. I thought she was a bit scary. It was nice that she referred to my colleague and her predecessor, Sarah McCarthy-Fry. I know that everyone who serves a constituency with a big military naval or air force interest must largely follow that trend, but I think that the world we are in leads us to leave that behind. Today’s debate leads us to reflect on the fact that many people, including Opposition Members, have to consider not only their constituents’ interests but the fact that we are in a complex and difficult time financially and that we have to look to defend the realm in ways that leave sectional interests behind. However, I thought that the hon. Lady’s speech was super. I can imagine her on a horse, but I am trying to stay legal here. It was a tremendous speech. There have been a number of really good opening speeches tonight. I have probably said enough about that, except I must say that I thought her comments about her predecessor were a bit acerbic.

I want to address two issues in the brief time available to me, starting with a quick word about Trident. My personal perspective is that Opposition Front Benchers are slightly constrained by the fact that we were in government until quite recently, so we cannot really put a proper Opposition perspective on things at the moment. That is simply the way it is. I am not being critical of Labour Front Benchers, who are all very good and who excelled as Defence Ministers. It is just the way things are: things change, we are now in opposition, and I think that our profile will change in some ways too.

It is bizarre to argue that we voted Trident through in 2007, so now it should be fine, which is essentially the Secretary of State’s position. There are many things that we voted for in 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 on which the position will have changed, because, as I understand it, this Government have a different prospectus from the previous Government. The idea that Labour had that as a policy when in government and should therefore follow that line is not really an argument at all. The fact is that both the Conservatives and Labour are afraid of Trident as a truly political issue, and this is not really a defence issue, but a political issue. The Conservatives are afraid—some Back Benchers are afraid—because it looks as though we are yielding something to the French or yielding some international prestige. Labour is, to some degree, afraid, because it looks as though we are going back to the 1980s.

The Secretary of State said something quite prescient in his opening speech—that we must not have a view that is essentially the view of that a generation ago. There are Members on the Government Benches who know much more about this than I do, but that is a classic position on defence policy—that we must not look to the past few campaigns to work out what to do in future. However, that is exactly what we are doing with Trident.

I have with me a whole bunch of cheap quotes—I could not help noticing that the Minister for the Armed Forces glanced up at me then—but I am not going to use them. I just am not cheap enough. I cannot; I am not going to do it. The Minister has advanced many intelligent arguments, but now he is in government he cannot do that, so he must be very frustrated. There was a piece in The Guardian today by Baroness Williams from the other place. I do not know whether the Minister put her up to it, but it was preposterous, saying that we should perhaps reduce from four boats to three. Conservative Members might say, “Hang on—that was kind of hinted at from your perspective six months ago”, but it is ridiculous and absolutely mad. People at the Ministry of Defence probably spent 15, 20 or 25 years thinking what our policy on replacing Polaris should be. They did not just say, “Is it four, or is it three?” Hon. Members can imagine a guy turning up at the MOD with a very large lorry, going upstairs to the fifth or sixth storey and saying to the Secretary of State, “Here are your boats mate; here are your Tridents,” and the Secretary of State saying, “Right, let’s have one up there in Scotland, one doing training or something and one out at sea.” Can hon. Members imagine the chap saying, “Well, you’ve got another one—a fourth one,” and the Secretary of State replying, “There’s a fourth! I didn’t know about that. Can you stick it up in Hertfordshire and cover it with foliage and twigs, and we’ll chat about it in a couple of years’ time”?

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I am fascinated by this point about the number of submarines required. Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the plan was originally to have five Polaris submarines and that the number was reduced to four by the incoming Labour Government to give them an excuse to say that they were doing something different from the previous Conservative Government? I sometimes get the impression that some of my now allies are trying to make the same sort of suggestion about changing the number from four to three for a similar reason.

[Eric Joyce]

I enjoy giving way to the hon. Gentleman. He made an excellent speech earlier, and I will come to him in a moment; the second part of my speech is on Afghanistan.

Although I may not be qualified to say this, the position of successive Governments on Trident is incoherent militarily; it is political argument. Frankly, the idea that someone can simply pop up in an article in The Guardian or as part of the Government and say, “Let’s knock it from four down to three” is completely mad. Therefore, this turns on a geopolitical argument, which we can discuss, but—guess what?—if it is excluded from a defence review or, indeed, to be fair, a shadow defence review, we cannot discuss it. We simply say, “That’s not going to cut the mustard, so we’ll just leave it out. It’s a bit embarrassing, so just push it out.” That is like suggesting that we should exclude Trident when considering how much we spend on defence each year, or not saying that we spend 2.3% of our gross domestic product on defence, but, for those reasons, we should not do that.

Trident is not really a military question at all; it is a geopolitical question and one for the Prime Minister. I sometimes think that it is rather odd that we even discuss it in defence debates. It is most peculiar that Trident is excluded, and perhaps any defence review with proper integrity would include it. Such a review may conclude that we need Trident or its successor, that we need something different or that we need nothing, but leaving it out is simply an admission that we cannot stack up the argument.

In my last two minutes and four seconds, I shall zoom on to Afghanistan. The same problem exists, because we have an interim situation in the Opposition. The hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) has ideas that are worth fleshing out. We cannot properly oppose the position at the moment, because politics is as it is. I listened to the hon. Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) and other Members with very great interest. My instinct is that Government Back Benchers have considerable experience, which creates a sense of not disloyalty but ambivalence, with a generation of different ideas that are not classically conservative but are creative and imaginative. That is not to say that one agrees with them, but a lot more of that is going on among Government Members than can happen among Opposition Members. The difficulty is where we are at the moment politically. That will change at the end of the year, but defence debates can be decidedly dull for correspondents in other places, because we tend to agree, which is a bit boring, is it not? However, quite interesting stuff is going on among Government Back Benchers, and Opposition Back Benchers are a little constrained at the moment.

Crucial though issues such as jobs are, I should like to think that future debates in the House would not simply revolve around constituency sectional interests and manufacturing. Our debates need to be about something rather more than that; they need to be much more about the future of foreign and defence policy, what we need to do in this country, whether we pay too much obeisance to the United States and whether we get back in return what we give in geopolitical influence. Those are the key issues that we should be considering, and some of them have been broached tonight.