Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 15th January 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mark Lancaster]

I am sorry to have to disappoint the hon. Gentleman, but I can only repeat what has already been said: the Government take the security of our nation incredibly seriously. I think it is far more important to ensure that the review is robust, comprehensive and detailed than to rush to make announcements simply to appease the hon. Gentleman.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

May we take a moment to acknowledge the courageous service of Surgeon-Captain Rick Jolly, whose death has just been announced? He was the only person to be awarded a gallantry medal by both sides in the Falklands war.

Will the Minister please take back to those conducting the review the united opinion on both sides of the House that any loss of frigates and amphibious vessels before their due out-of-service dates would be totally unacceptable?

[Mark Lancaster]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for highlighting the very sad passing of Commander Rick Jolly. He was indeed an absolute legend, and the service that he provided in the Falklands is worth reading about. It is unique to have been given awards for gallantry by both the United Kingdom and the Argentine forces. I also note my right hon. Friend’s other point.

Defence

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Thursday 11th January 2018 Commons Chamber

[Vernon Coaker]

My right hon. Friend makes a very good point. North Korea and China are threatening some of the rules-based international order—particularly, as he says, North Korea. We have to meet that threat, and this debate is partly about how we do that. We have to win the argument again with the British public on this. The British public have to be persuaded—or not, because they can say, “We don’t agree.” We as a Parliament have to make the case again for why it is sometimes important for us to be concerned about actions that are taking place thousands and thousands of miles away, and understand why they have an impact on our own interests and our own security here at home. It can no longer be enough just to assert a problem—we have to once again make the case as to why matters such as North Korea are important.

Just two years after the strategic defence and security review of 2015, here we are in the midst of another review, led by Mark Sedwill. I know—other Members have mentioned this to me—that the Defence Secretary is trying to pull away the defence part of the security capability to provide a longer time to reflect, and I hope he is successful in doing that. However, as it stands, we have a review that is shrouded in uncertainty and that we are now told is to be delayed. One particular thing that was said in the Committee is completely wrong and has to be changed by the Government. Mr Sedwill said that

“this exercise was commissioned by the Council as fiscally neutral.”

Fiscally neutral? How can we come to such a conclusion before all the strands of the review are finished? Surely this is about matching resources to threats, not the other way round. Let this be the line in the sand that ensures that this principle is at the heart of the decisions we take as we now move forward.

We see story after story appearing in the media, speculating on which capability may or may not be cut. Why does this speculation abound? Why are there not statements to Parliament? Why is there no explanation of what is actually going on? To be fair to the Minister, I know that he will be concerned about some of this, but it is not good enough for the Government to dismiss these potential capability cuts as mere speculation by saying, “We don’t comment on these” or “No decisions have been made”. I do not want—nor, I am sure, does any Member of this House—a statement to be made to this House in three months’ time telling us what is going to be done rather than this House having debated and discussed it and come to a view as to where we should go. I do not want, and I do not believe Parliament wants, to wait for a set of decisions to be presented to us as a fait accompli. That is not good enough. Our country deserves better. The public and Parliament need to be properly informed. I am certain that colleagues across this House believe that it is for Parliament to debate the issues, to inform the decisions, and to play our full part in the choices we make as to how we defend our country and its freedoms.

According to the permanent secretary at a hearing of the Defence Committee at the end of last year, it appears that the Secretary of State has, as yet, made no explicit request for additional funding from the Chancellor. Will the Minister tell us where the discussions that have been reported in the media have got to? Will he confirm what the Defence Secretary is now saying to the Chancellor? Has he demanded any additional funding? Where has the discussion got to, or not, as to whether there is to be any additional funding? Will the Minister also confirm whether the defence aspect of the capabilities review has been delayed?

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

The hon. Gentleman will probably be astonished to learn that the National Security Adviser—Sir Mark Sedwill, as he now is—wrote to me on 23 October and said:

“Because the main decisions on Defence were taken during the”

2015

“SDSR, this review is not defence-focused. Defence capability is one of several projects within the review.”

We are therefore finding difficulty in bringing the National Security Adviser to the Defence Committee because he says that the review is not defence-focused. Yet the first thing we will know about the review is when we are told what major defence capabilities are going to be cut.

[Vernon Coaker]

I could not agree more with the Chair of the Defence Committee. He is absolutely right. Sir Mark Sedwill says that the review is not defence-focused, but he also said to the Committee, if I remember correctly—he has certainly been reported as saying this in the media—that there is a need for us to increase spending on our cyber and intelligence capabilities. This is fiscally neutral, so where is the money going to come from? That is why we get the speculation about the cuts in defence capabilities to which the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) refers. Because this is fiscally neutral, we are looking to take money from one thing to pay for another. The whole thrust of my argument is that if one thing is a threat and another thing is a threat, we do not rob from one to pay for the other—we fund them both because our country would demand that we do so.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Gedling (Vernon Coaker). Not for the first time, he has given great service to the cause of defence. He was an outstandingly good shadow Defence Secretary, and as long as there are people like him in the ranks of the Labour party the prospects for a bipartisan approach to defence remain excellent. I must extend that praise to all 11 Members from the four parties represented on the Defence Committee, every one of whom is strongly committed to the defence of this country.

Until recent years, little attention was paid to a possible threat from post-communist Russia, because for a long time after 9/11 counter-insurgency campaigns in third world countries were thought to be the principal role of the armed forces. However, we are now spending just £0.4 billion on operations of that type out of an annual defence budget of about £36 billion. According to the 2015 SDSR, that budget should by 2020 fund 82,000 soldiers, more than 30,000 sailors and marines, and almost 32,000 RAF personnel, plus another 35,000 reservists. To these must be added some 41,000 civilians, many of whom, like those who serve in the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, are service personnel in all but name. Finally, there are special forces, as well as new units that have been created to deal with cyber-security and counter-propaganda. Then there is all the equipment, which currently comprises over 4,000 Army vehicles, including tanks and artillery; about 75 Royal Navy ships and submarines, including the nuclear deterrent; and over 1,000 RAF fixed-wing and rotary aircraft. As a portent of things to come, the services also operate a mixture of large and small surveillance drones and 10 unmanned hunter-killer aerial attack vehicles.

All in all, we still have a fairly full spectrum of military capability, and in absolute terms—as I am sure we would all accept—£36 billion a year is a considerable sum. Set in historical perspective, however, that level of defence investment falls far below the efforts that we have traditionally made when confronted by danger internationally.

The Defence Committee published a report on defence expenditure in April 2016. Entitled, “Shifting the Goalposts?”, it attracted attention for highlighting the inclusion of costly items such as war pensions and MOD civilian pensions at a time when Prime Minister Cameron and Chancellor Osborne were scrambling to meet the 2% of GDP benchmark which, as we know, was set by NATO as a minimum—not as a target—for all its members. The Government were entitled to include such items in their 2% calculations, but they had never chosen to do so previously. It was therefore clear that by resorting to a form of creative accountancy, we were no longer strictly comparing like with like in overall expenditure terms.

Our report was especially revealing in its tables and graphs, which were well researched by Committee staff. They showed UK defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP, year by year, from the mid-1950s to the present day, and compared those data with the corresponding figures for spending on welfare, education and health. We found that in 1963 we spent similar sums—about 6% of GDP—on both welfare and defence. Now we spend six times on welfare what we spend on defence. In the mid-1980s, the last time we faced a simultaneous threat from an assertive Soviet Union, as it then was, and a major terrorist threat in Northern Ireland, we spent similar sums—about 5% of GDP—on education, on health, and on defence. Now we spend two and half times on education, and nearly four times on health, what we spend on defence.

At the height of the east-west confrontation, in every year from 1981 until 1987, we spent between 4.3% and 5.1% of GDP on defence. Between the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the failure of the Moscow coup in 1991, the cold war came to an end. Consequently, and predictably, a reduction in defence expenditure followed. That was known as the peace dividend yet—this is the key point—even after it had been taken, and even as late as the financial year 1995-96, we were still spending not 2% of GDP, which is the NATO minimum, but fully 3% of GDP on defence. That was without the accounting adjustments that have been used to scrape over the 2% line in the past few years.

To sum up, from 1988 when the cold war began to evaporate, until 2014 when we pulled back from Afghanistan, defence spending almost halved as a proportion of GDP. Now that we face a newly assertive Russia and a global terrorist threat, the decision to set 3% of GDP as our defence expenditure target can no longer be delayed.

[Toby Perkins]

I have also looked at the statistics mentioned by the right hon. Gentleman, and he is absolutely right about the creative accounting. Even taking that into account, it seems impossible to reach the conclusion that we have ever spent as little as we currently spend on defence in comparison with our GDP.

[Dr Lewis]

That is absolutely right. It is a measure of how far downwards our expectations were managed during the reductions in percentage GDP spent on defence under the Blair Government and the Cameron coalition Government, that it was regarded as a cause for triumph and congratulation when it was finally confirmed that we would not be dropping expenditure below 2%. The matter had never been questioned at all prior to that period.

[Mr Francois]

I thank my right hon. Friend for giving way, and it is a pleasure to serve under his stout chairmanship of the Defence Committee—[Interruption.] I mean stout in personality terms.

In some ways, the situation is even more challenging than the one my right hon. Friend lays out. He has rightly given the figures in terms of GDP, but in recent years—as we heard in testimony from the permanent under-secretary—in almost every strategic defence and security review and comprehensive spending review, the MOD has had to sign up to additional sets of efficiency savings, now totalling some £30 billion over time. Not only does the MOD have a constricted budget, it has had to find those efficiency savings as well, which makes the situation even more challenging.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Lewis]

My right hon. Friend speaks with great experience as a former Armed Forces Minister, and he made a considerable input to our recent report, “Gambling on ‘Efficiency’: Defence Acquisition and Procurement”, by making that very point.

Quite rightly, the hon. Member for Gedling emphasised the current process involving the national security capability review, and he focused on the question of fiscal neutrality, which the National Security Adviser says he has been told to observe. When I challenged the National Security Adviser with that on 18 December, when he appeared before the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, he said, “Well, it’s not as if the defence budget isn’t growing; it is fiscal neutrality within a growing budget.” He then did something else, which is indicative of a worrying trend: he lumped together the £36 billion that we are spending avowedly on defence with all the other money that we spend on everything else related to security, and he started talking about a £56 billion budget. That lumping together of money for security and intelligence services, counter-terrorism and even the relevant aspects of policing with the defence budget, is a form of sleight of hand that causes me concern. That is what I wish to address in the second half of my remarks.

We have a real problem in this country because the tried and tested system for strategic decision making has broken down. In my years as a research student, my area of study was the way that Britain planned towards the end of the second world war, and the early period after it, for what form of strategy we would need to deal with future threats. I was struck by the fact that there was a huge argument between 1944 and 1946 between clever officials in the Foreign Office who wanted to make the Anglo-Soviet alliance of 1942 the cornerstone of our post-war foreign policy, and the Chiefs of Staff who wanted to prepare their assessments of what Britain might have to face militarily on alternative assumptions that that alliance might well continue—in which case all would be well—but that it might break down. There was a tremendous stand-off until 1946, when finally the iron curtain had descended and it became clear that the Chiefs of Staff, who had looked at the Anglo-Soviet alliance in theoretical terms and said, “Well it could work, but it might not”, had been right to be cautious, and the Foreign Office staff, who wanted to put all their eggs in the basket of being able to continue the wartime alliance into peacetime, had been wrong. I was very struck by the systematic way in which the strategic arguments were hammered out, and at the centre of it all was the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

The Chiefs of Staff Committee, as we all know, is made up of the heads of each of the three services. The shocking thing that I have to say to the House today is that one can now become chief of staff of any of the three armed services—one can become head of the Royal Navy, or head of the Army, or head of the Royal Air Force—and yet have no direct input into the strategic planning process. This is all part of the lumping together of military strategic planning with national security strategies that are vague and amorphous and, above all, primarily in the hands of civil servants.

If the civil servants themselves were steeped, as they used to be, in the subject matter of their Departments, that would be less of a problem than it is today. But some years ago, it was decided that those in the senior levels of the civil service—which are, of course, peopled by very clever and able individuals; that is not in dispute—should be able to hop from one Department to another. One might be at a senior level in one Department and then go for the top job in another, including, for example, the Ministry of Defence. What we have is a combination where formerly specialist civil servants have become generalists and the professional military advisers—the Chiefs of Staff—have become more like business managers serving as chief executives with an allocated budget to administer to their services. All their thoughts about strategy get fed through just one single individual—the Chief of the Defence Staff—who then has to represent all their views on the National Security Council. It is this melding together, this mishmash, of the military, the security and the civilian roles that is undermining what we need, which is a clear-headed and systematic approach to the strategic challenges facing this country.

[James Gray]

My right hon. Friend is making an extremely important point about the whole structure of decision making within the Cabinet Office and the Ministry of Defence. Does he agree that he has not yet mentioned a very important element in that, namely Ministers? He has not yet discussed Ministers’ role in considering the strategy of the nation. Is it not particularly interesting that when Sir Mark Sedwill appeared before the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy the other day, he let us know that the review that is currently being undertaken by his Department was commissioned during the general election campaign, when presumably Ministers had their minds on something else? I would be interested to know exactly who it was who commissioned the strategy at that particular time.

[Dr Lewis]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right, and he made a very useful contribution to the questioning of Mark Sedwill on 18 December. The reason I have not really mentioned Ministers is that, frankly, Ministers do not seem to be having much of a role in this, either. What I did not say, because I did not want to dwell too long on it, is that the stand-off between the Chiefs of Staff and the Foreign Office in 1944 was finally resolved when it went all the way up to Churchill, who finally gave the Chiefs of Staff permission to continue doing the contingency planning for a possibly hostile Soviet Union that they wanted to do, and that the Foreign Office did not want them to do. The reality here is that there has been a loss of focus. There is no proper machinery, other than this rather woolly concept of a National Security Council, served by a secretariat, run effectively by the Cabinet Office.

In conclusion, what I really want to say is this. Constitutionally, we know what is right. That was confirmed when we spoke to the former Secretary of State for Defence in the Defence Committee and he was attended by a senior MOD official. We asked him, “Is it still the case that the Chiefs of Staff—the heads of the armed forces—retain the right to go directly to No. 10 if they think the danger to the country is such that they have to make direct representations?” The answer was yes, it is. But what is the point of their having that right if they are not actually allowed to do the job of planning the strategies and doing what they used to do as a Committee —serving as the military advisers to the Government? As my hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire (James Gray) says, ultimately, the Government always have the right to accept or reject such military advice as they get from the service chiefs, but the service chiefs ought to be in a position to give that advice.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Tobias Ellwood)]

My right hon. Friend is coming to his peroration, and I want to go back to his initial point, if I may try your patience, Madam Deputy Speaker. The important point, which was also raised by the hon. Member for Gedling (Vernon Coaker), was the comparison between defence, education and health spending going back a couple of decades. Of course we have had the cold war demise, but I would recommend that hon. Members read the Prime Minister’s speech at the Guildhall in November, which talks about the new threats that are coming round. I pose the question: as we try and passionately make the case for the necessary funding for our armed forces, would it be easier for that case to be made if the passion and enthusiasm for our armed forces on the doorstep, as we campaign for general elections and so on, was comparable with that for health and education? I pose that question because I think there is a role for all of us to play in confirming what status our armed forces should have in future.

[Dr Lewis]

I am grateful to the Minister for making that point in that way, and nobody could be doing more than he is, within the constraints of his office, to make the case. We all know that.

The reality is that defence is always difficult to get funded in peacetime because it is analogous to paying the premiums on an insurance policy, and people are always reluctant to pay the premiums, although they are very glad to have paid them when the time comes to call in the policy because something adverse has occurred.

[John Spellar]

I thank my right hon. Friend the Chairman of the Committee for giving way, but surely this is the role of Ministers. It is the role of the Prime Minister, the Chancellor and the Secretary of State for Defence to be providing that leadership, setting out that strategic vision, and therefore the reason for that expenditure. That is where the leadership has to come from.

[Dr Lewis]

I agree, but I think it is something more important than that. They must have a proper strategic planning machine at their service; otherwise, they are just a bunch of individuals giving their personal opinions.

It may suit civil servants to sideline the military professionals—to reduce the uniformed contribution to strategic planning to the input of one individual, the Chief of the Defence Staff. It may suit them, too, to sideline the Ministry of Defence and reduce its contribution to a single strand of a so-called national security strategy, but it does not suit the national interest to have inadequate specialist military pushback against politicians with poor strategic grasp and a political bee in their bonnet. That is how disastrous own goals, like the Libya fiasco, come to be inflicted upon us, despite the warnings of the then Chief of the Defence Staff against overthrowing the Libyan regime.

A single military adviser, no matter how capable, cannot have the same impact as the combined contribution of a Joint Committee of the heads of the armed forces. So it is not enough just to set ourselves a 3% target for defence expenditure, as indeed we must; it is vital also to recognise that our tried and tested machinery for making military strategy has been vitiated and largely dismantled. The Chiefs of Staff must once again be more than budget managers, stuck on the sidelines while politicians and officials call the shots and, as often as not, call the shots incorrectly.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

--- Later in debate ---

[John Woodcock]

I would be interested in discussing that matter further with the hon. Gentleman. I am not sure whether I accept that point. The whole point of this is that we are talking about very difficult decisions, and I do not envy the Ministers on the Front Bench. We are shifting around money from an overall pot, which is just woefully, woefully inadequate.

Let me talk about personnel. First, locally, I was saddened to see the departure from Barrow shipyard of Will Blamey after only a few months in the job. I wish him very well. I know that he has a big contribution to make in the future and, hopefully, that will be in the field of the strategic defence of our realm. I welcome Cliff Robson as the new managing director. I say that not just to get it on the record, but to make the point that the challenges facing our submarine programme must not be all put at the door of the good men and women at Barrow shipyard.

There has been a level of mismanagement of the submarine programme as part of the suboptimal management of the entire defence equipment programme, and it may be reaching a critical point. It is not acceptable for the Government to lay blame at the door of people who are doing extraordinary work for the defence of the realm; Opposition Members will not allow the Government to get away with that. The Government are currently seeking to starve our future capability of the vital equipment budget, which is not great at the moment, but it is now vital in order to create future capabilities so that we can continue in the business of building submarines.

My final point on personnel relates to the ministerial team here. I am really glad to see the Minister in his place. From the fact that he kept his job in the reshuffle, I take it that he has been given the assurances he sought that the Army will not recede any further. I look forward to him making that clear in his winding-up speech. I welcome the new Minister for defence procurement, who comes in at a critical time. I hope that Opposition Members will be a constructive force in helping him to meet the challenge of arguing for greater resources and ensuring that they are properly spent. Let me finish on the Secretary of State, who is not a man I knew a great deal about. In fact, I get the sense that he is not a man that many in the armed forces knew a great deal about before he took his job. I look forward to working with him constructively, particularly on the future of the submarine programme.

This is a time for seriousness—for serious people and people who are able to establish a grip over their roles. In various roles, I have briefed a newspaper occasionally and ended up with a story, sometimes in The Sun and sometimes in the Daily Mirror. But I have looked at the way in which the Ministry of Defence has been run over the past couple of months, and, although I welcome the fact that the Secretary of State has apparently intervened directly to save some military dogs and is personally cutting down on the Chancellor’s ability to use military flights, I question whether this shows that he is spending sufficient time ensuring that our equipment programme is up to scratch in a way that will be effective for the nation. He still has a window of time in which to prove himself, but he needs to do so in short order.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

It is very kind of the hon. Gentleman to give way at this late stage. May I just say that I, for one, want to give the new Secretary of State the benefit of every possible doubt, because what we need at this moment in time—the debate has really brought this out—is someone who is going to have a bare-knuckle fight with the Treasury to get the money we need for defence? The fact that he may not have much of a background in defence is not the main issue. The main issue is whether he will fight for money for defence and whether he can win that fight.

[John Woodcock]

It is, absolutely. I suppose it remains to be seen whether the tactics he has so far adopted continue and are effective. We will be as supportive as we can in ensuring that that is the case. I wish that the Secretary of State were here so that I could say this to him in person. I do not know what his other commitment is, but this has been a really important debate with many important contributions, and he would do well to listen to what has been said this afternoon by colleagues on both sides of the House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stewart Malcolm McDonald]

The hon. Gentleman is much more optimistic than me. I have seen just this week, on the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, how the Government do this kind of thing. They take every opportunity to pull the wool over people’s eyes. He need only ask his colleagues the hon. Members for Moray and for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine, as well as the rest of the Scottish Conservative intake. We need a proper SDSR that takes account of the fact that we will no longer be members of the European Union, and of the fact that we have had currency fluctuations and the devaluation of the pound. I am in favour of taking more time if we get a more considered outcome, but the cynic in me suggests that that is not what is at play.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I hope that the hon. Gentleman will see that separating defence from the amalgam that has been created could be a good thing, by focusing attention on the purely defence aspect, as he acknowledges, and by giving a new Defence Secretary the opportunity to fight and win the battles with the Treasury that need to be fought and won.

[Stewart Malcolm McDonald]

I am amazed that with their combined experience, the hon. Member for North Wiltshire and the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) appear so optimistic, and I fear they are trying to square a circle that cannot be squared. For more than a year, the SNP has called for a proper SDSR to take account of the fact that we are leaving the European Union, as well as the devaluation of the pound and currency fluctuations.

We must also address the nonsense that we have heard about 2% of GDP. The Government do not spend 2% of GDP on defence, and we should not let them get away with claiming that they do. That 2% includes things such as pensions, efficiency savings, and all sorts of things that it ought not to include. [Interruption.] I see that you are getting nervous about the time, Madam Deputy Speaker, so I will conclude my remarks and say that I think we should have more such debates on defence in the House. I think we should do that in Government time, and that the Defence Secretary should have turned up to the first defence debate of his tenure. It should not always be up to the Opposition to drag the Government to this Chamber to explain their woeful record.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Ellwood]

My hon. Friend makes an important point. As I have said, it is for the Secretary of State to spell that out in more detail, and that will happen shortly, but that is the big question that we must ask ourselves as fiscal, and responsible, Conservatives. The money must come from somewhere, which is why we cannot simply rush in and say that it will be provided. The details need to come through, and I hope that we will hear more details from the Secretary of State in due course.

It is clear from the contributions that we have heard today, and also from the world around us, that the world does not stand still, and nor should we. We must be sure that we possess the right combination of conventional and innovative capabilities to meet the varied and diffuse threats that I have outlined. We must also retain our long-standing position as one of the world’s most innovative nations, and do more to harness the benefits of technological progress and reinforce our military edge. I can assure the House that the Ministry of Defence has no intention of leaving the UK less safe, or the brave men and women of our armed forces more vulnerable, as a result of this review.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Ellwood]

I will in a moment.

The House is well aware of my position on the size of the armed forces. I want to see the UK maintain its long-held military edge and its enduring position as a world leader in matters of defence and security. The Ministry of Defence and the Government as a whole share my ambition. I should also like to address the involvement of Ministers, and indeed generals and others in uniform, in the process. This has been run not just by the permanent secretary but by a team of generals. That point was touched on by the Chairman of the Defence Committee, and I give way to him now.

[Dr Lewis]

The Minister has just said that we will not be left more vulnerable. On 25 January last year, the then Defence Procurement Minister wrote to me to say that she could reassure me that the out-of-service dates for HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark remained 2034 and 2035 respectively, and that their roles remained vital. Surely that rules out the scrapping of those ships. They obviously still had a vital role to play in January last year. Why would their role be any less vital in January this year?

[Mr Ellwood]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend. He asks an operational question about the amphibiosity of our capability. I stress to the House that we must maintain our amphibiosity, a capable Royal Marine presence and, dare I say it, a capable Para presence as well, so he can rest assured. I will not go any further than that because we are getting into the weeds of operational decisions, and more will become clear very soon.

Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 27th November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Gavin Williamson]

What we have in our national security and capability review is the opportunity to step back, look at the threats and challenges that face this country, whether it is from cyber or from more conventional threats, and make sure that we have the right resources in place to deliver for our armed forces. That is what I will be looking at. I am looking forward to meeting the Chancellor as well as many others and having those discussions going forward.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I warmly congratulate my right hon. Friend on taking up office in this vital position. When he speaks to the Chancellor, will he take the opportunity of reminding him that, in the cold war years, we spent 5% of GDP on defence and that now we spend barely 2% of GDP on defence? Perhaps a target nearer to 3% of GDP on defence might prevent our armed forces from being further hollowed out.

[Gavin Williamson]

I will always listen intensely and very carefully to the arguments of my right hon. Friend. I have always seen 2% as a base as opposed to a ceiling, and I will certainly take on board his thoughts and comments in discussions going forward.

UK Amphibious Capability

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Tuesday 21st November 2017 Westminster Hall

[Ruth Smeeth (Stoke-on-Trent North) (Lab)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered UK amphibious capability.

It is genuinely a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Gray. Let us be clear why we are here today. In recent months, there has been simply too much speculation on the future of our amphibious capabilities, from reports of staggering cuts to the numerical strength of our Royal Marines to the apparent proposed sale of HMS Bulwark and HMS Albion to the Chileans or the Brazilians. All of that is seemingly without any consideration of why we have those capabilities or what our current commitments are.

It is clear, not only from the number of Members here on a Tuesday morning but from the growing concerns that emerged in the media over the weekend, just how important this issue is to people right across the House, across our forces and across the country, and why cuts to our amphibious capabilities are not only strategically bizarre but politically unwise.

I had planned to start the debate with an unusual comment for an Opposition MP. I wanted to welcome the statement of the Secretary of State for Defence, as reported in The Sun, that he was seeking an additional £2 billion for our armed forces from the Treasury rather than see our defences undermined. However, after yesterday’s reports in the Mail, I find myself a little confused as to whether the Secretary of State thinks we need more resource or not, and whether the Government recognise that our security may cost more money and that if we are going to operate on a global stage, we may need a proper military. Perhaps the Minister would clarify the current thinking of her new boss for us.

As we prepare to leave the European Union, we find ourselves looking towards an uncertain future in an increasingly turbulent world. The global order is facing a period of rapid and unprecedented change, and it seems that the post-cold-war consensus is disintegrating in front of us. In the last week alone, we have seen coalition talks fail in Germany and witnessed the long-awaited, if slow-motion, collapse of the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe. In the middle east, the proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran has reached terrifying new depths in Yemen, with knock-on consequences in Iraq, Lebanon and Syria. That is only in the last seven days.

There are other threats we need to ensure we can militate against, from our counter-Daesh efforts to, most importantly of all and most directly applicable to today’s debate, a resurgent Russian Federation, which—as you know better than anyone, Mr Gray—poses a renewed threat to our friends and allies in the High North as well as across eastern Europe. Old certainties are disappearing and new threats are coming to the fore. The world is changing, and so is our place in it.

That is why the timing of this mini defence capability review—which increasingly seems an excuse to cut our military, if the media reports are anything to go by—is so perverse. At this moment we should be looking to broaden our capability, not to narrow it; to invest in our armed forces, not to run them down; and to expand our horizons and our influence, not to retreat from our commitments.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

In support of what the hon. Lady just said, may I remind her that when the former Secretary of State for Defence came before the Defence Committee, he said that the reason for the review was an intensification of the threats? We would therefore expect to have more resources put into defence, rather than fewer.

[Ruth Smeeth]

I could not agree more. At this point, we need to agree what capabilities we need, and then what the budget should be—not the other way around. That is what the former Secretary of State said to us, and that is what we need to do.

--- Later in debate ---

[Harriett Baldwin]

I can confirm that there have been press reports. [Laughter.] I can also confirm that we are one of only 13 NATO countries that meet the guideline to spend 20% of our defence budget on major equipment and research and development. I can also confirm that the Ministry of Defence will spend £178 billion on equipment and associated support between 2016 and 2026.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

Will the Minister give way?

[Harriett Baldwin]

Members are eating into my time, but I will give way to the Chair of the Defence Committee.

[Dr Lewis]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way, but she does seem to have moved into discussing general expenditure issues and away from the specific topic. Does she remember writing to me on 25 January this year to say:

“There are no current plans to decommission the ships”—

that is, HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark—

“early, and I can reassure you that their out of service dates are 2033 and 2034 respectively…HMS Bulwark continues to prove a vital asset to the Royal Navy…HMS Albion…is programmed to replace HMS Bulwark as the high-readiness ship this year”?

Does that remain the position?

[Harriett Baldwin]

I can indeed confirm that I not only wrote those words but recall writing them.

[Dr Lewis]

Does that remain the position?

[Harriett Baldwin]

I have already made it very clear on the record what today’s position is. [Interruption.]

We can all see that the global security context is challenging. So, Members would expect us to ensure that, as we spend our growing budget, we focus expenditure on those capabilities that are most effective at keeping us and our allies safe, and at deterring or defeating our adversaries or potential adversaries.

Defence Aerospace Industrial Strategy

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Thursday 16th November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

In the run-up to this debate, which was so ably introduced by the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent North (Ruth Smeeth)—a star of the Defence Committee—I and no doubt other members of the Committee were almost inundated with communications from defence companies that wanted to showcase how much they do for industry in this country. For example, Boeing UK wanted to draw attention to its 18,700 workers in the UK. MBDA, the missile specialists, wanted to draw attention to the £1 billion of annual sales that it generates. BAE Systems, however, is in a rather special position. It has over 83,000 employees in 40 countries. It describes itself as a global leader in making and supporting combat aircraft and states:

“If we are to sustain this leading position, a government commitment to the development of a next generation of combat aircraft”—

precisely as the hon. Lady just said—

“would be of immense value to the industry.”

The Government are committed to an industrial strategy process, with a defence sector deal as a component of that. The question is whether that is sufficient or if we need a separate strategy. It seems rather strange that when we have a separate national shipbuilding strategy—shipbuilding, for all its valuable potential for export, does not even begin to approach the potential and actual magnitude of aerospace industry exports—we should want to subsume a strategy for the aerospace industry under a general industrial strategy.

In the case of the joint strike fighter—the Lightning II, which has been referred to—we provide parts for all the aircraft that are built, but only sections of the aircraft. As valuable as that may be, it is not enough to sustain our importance as a prime integrator with all the supplying companies that depend on that process.

The industry is asking the Government to think ahead and to make advance investment so that we will be able to be in the van of future development in aircraft, but I believe that requests for investment have to be a two-way process. For example, it is not just BAE Systems asking for this; Rolls-Royce itself says that the current research and development investment in future combat engine capability ceases at the end of 2017. I would therefore just say this: if these companies want the Government and the country to invest in the future of the industry, we are entitled to say to them, “You need to invest in the future of the workforce.” As I pointed out in proceedings on the urgent question about the BAE Systems redundancies on 10 October, BAE Systems is a giant company enjoying a

“near monopoly position in many parts of the British defence procurement structure.”—[Official Report, 10 October 2017; Vol. 629, c. 169.]

It should therefore be working, in the closest possible co-operation, with the Government to see whether job losses can be mitigated. It is a two-way process; we need the companies to invest in the workforce.

Armed Forces (Flexible Working) Bill [Lords]

Julian Lewis Excerpts

2nd reading: House of Commons
Monday 30th October 2017 Commons Chamber

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

As the Front-Bench speeches have indicated, there is a high degree of cross-party consensus on this initiative. That consensus was also evident in the report of the outgoing Select Committee on Defence published in April 2017, “SDSR 2015 and the Army”. The report concluded:

“We support the Chief of the General Staff’s commitment to changing the culture of the Army through initiatives on employment, talent management and leadership. Successful implementation of these initiatives could provide a structure within which all soldiers can achieve their full potential. However, we recognise that this must not be to the detriment of the Army’s ability to undertake its core role of warfighting. We note the concerns expressed about cultural resistance within the Army to this agenda, particularly in respect of Flexible Engagement.”

In their reply, the Government referred to their

“programme to widen opportunities for all, thereby better reflecting the demands of a modern society. This programme includes promoting a culture of inclusivity in which every Service person is treated with respect and is able to access a range of employment opportunities, including flexible working.

The Flexible Engagement System continues to be considered to be a positive and appropriately contemporary employment system.”

In the opening speeches, we heard reference to a point made by the Chief of the General Staff, Nick Carter, back in February 2015:

“We have a career structure at the moment which is fundamentally a male career structure. It has a number of break points which sadly encourage women to leave rather than encouraging them to stay.”

Although one aspect of the Bill, to do with presentation, was controversial in the upper House—I will come to that in a few moments—it is notable that the people who were concerned about that presentational point are four- square behind the substantive principles of the Bill. For example, Lord Stirrup, the former Chief of the Defence Staff, stated in the debate on the Queen’s Speech:

“Too many talented people, especially women, are leaving early because the terms of their service are not flexible enough to accommodate their evolving personal circumstances and the associated pressures. We cannot afford such waste: it is expensive in terms of training replacements and it impacts on our operational capability.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 22 June 2017; Vol. 783, c. 91.]

When considering what my reaction should be to the central proposals in the Bill, I came up with the following five questions. First, will an arrangement be overridden in cases of emergency? The Government have been absolutely clear from the outset that it will be overridden. There is no question that people will not be available to serve in the armed forces in a national crisis, when required, no matter what arrangements they have entered into for flexible working.

The next question I ask is: will skills be diminished? It appears from the scheme’s structure that that is not a significant danger, because the idea of flexible working in this way will involve people doing so only for a finite period after full-time service and before further full-time service. So the range of skills ought not to be diminished, and I believe that that safeguard is sufficient.

Where I am a little more concerned and would welcome further contributions is on my third question: will bureaucratic logjams be caused by appeals? The Government have done well in their briefing material, and it may be that some of it was prepared in response to the advantage of having had this Bill considered in the upper House by senior former heads of the services and even former Chiefs of the Defence Staff. Government briefing material has been very full and they have set out a complex scheme of how appeals will work. I am still in need of reassurance that we will not become bogged down in bureaucratic trials and tribulations, possibly going all the way up to ombudsman level. That is one danger that needs further commentary.

My fourth question is: will this send a positive or a negative signal to—

[Toby Perkins]

On a point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker. I am apologetic for interrupting the right hon. Gentleman. I was waiting for him to take a natural pause, but one did not appear. Am I right in saying that there is a convention in this House that speakers should remain in their place for two speeches before they leave? The Secretary of State has left after only one speech, and the Chair of the Defence Committee is speaking. Have you been notified of any reason why the Secretary of State has had to leave so soon, when many of us would have expected him to want to know what was being said?

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

The Secretary of State went at such speed that he did not even say goodnight or anything, so I am not sure why; he may well be coming back. He may have been taken short, given the speed he went at. It is convention that Members normally hear at least two speeches, and it is normal for Ministers to stay around to hear a bit more. Of course, when we have such a learned Member as the Chair of the Select Committee, we all wish to hear him. I had better bring him back on.

[Dr Lewis]

Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker. I must say in defence of the Defence Secretary that he spent no fewer than two hours and 25 minutes before our Committee last Wednesday afternoon, and I felt that was—

[Mr Deputy Speaker]

Order. That is no reason for him not to be here—let us put that on the record now.

[Dr Lewis]

But I did feel it was somewhat beyond the call of duty, and I believe that the whole Committee appreciated it.

My fourth question is: will this new system send a positive or a negative signal—first, to recruits and, secondly, to potential adversaries? That is where the controversy arose in the upper House, as grave concern was expressed about the Bill’s repeated use of the terminology of “part-time service”. To give a brief example of the dangers of the use of such terminology, I take a moment to refer to the lyrics of a “Glee Club” song composed by Liberal Democrat activists at their 2014 conference, sending up their party’s policy of sending nuclear submarines to sea either without warheads—we appear to be without Liberal Democrats, too—or only for part of the time. I will not sing it, the House will be glad to hear. [Hon. Members: “Do!”] It is done to the tune of “Yellow Submarine” and, talking of the boats, one of my favourite verses goes, “We can send them back to base if we’re really up the creek and request the war’s postponed until the middle of next week.” The chorus then is, “We believe in a part-time submarine, a part-time submarine, a part-time submarine,” and so on. Members can, thus, see the potential for the use of “part-time” in relation to armed forces to allow our adversaries and our critics in the media to suggest there is something less professional and less committed about the way in which we are conducting ourselves. Lord Craig of Radley, former Chief of the Air Staff, did suggest an alternative wording, which I hope might still be considered in Committee.

My final question is: will it be possible to apply to go on so-called part-time service just in time to avoid an operational deployment? The answer to the first question about emergency service clearly covers the issue of whether someone about to be deployed to a war zone could use this scheme to get out of it—clearly, they could not—but I would like a little more clarification from Ministers on whether there is any risk that some people might see a less popular deployment looming up on the near horizon and decide that the time was appropriate to start thinking about applying not for so-called part-time service but for a change, a reduction or an alternative to full-deployment just at that point.

Subject to those caveats, I wish the Bill well. I look forward to hearing further elaboration on the points I have raised, perhaps in the closing speech from the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, my right hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood), who I believe will be summing up. I endorse the commendation of both Front Benchers for this measure.

--- Later in debate ---

[Kevin Foster]

It is wonderful to hear that piece of family history. It is not always known that a large percentage of the tanks used in the counter-attack at Moscow in 1941 that finally drove the Germans back from threatening the Russian capital were supplied via the Arctic convoys. While Russia did get its industry going and almost achieved a miracle of production between 1941 and the ultimate victory in 1945, the convoys played a huge role in the crucial first months of the war and literally kept the Soviet Union in the fight, laying the ground for the defeat of national socialism in Europe.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

As proof that great minds think alike, the fact that my hon. Friend referred to the second world war means that I cannot pass up the opportunity to point out that today is the 75th anniversary of the seizure of vital Enigma documents from the U-boat, U-559. Three young men swam over to that sinking U-boat and went on board in the dead of night. Two of them, Tony Fasson and Colin Grazier, went down with the sinking boat and were posthumously awarded the George Cross, and the third, a 16-year-old called Tommy Brown, who did not survive the war, was awarded the George Medal. By their sacrifice and bravery, thousands upon thousands of allied lives were saved.

[Kevin Foster]

I thank my right hon. Friend for that reminder of the sacrifice that people made—breaking those codes made a huge difference in the battle of the Atlantic. It also brings us to a slightly sadder reminder, which perhaps partly relates to what the hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport alluded to, of a time when someone’s commitment to this country was not the only thing that we judged them by. Alan Turing also did so much to ensure that the Enigma code was broken and that German messages could be read, probably shortening the war by a year. If it did not shorten the war, it at least turned the war and allowed us to keep vital lifelines open.

Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 23rd October 2017 Commons Chamber

[Sir Michael Fallon]

If Opposition Members were really concerned about jobs at BAE Systems, they would get behind our export campaigns for Typhoon and Hawk aircraft, rather than undermining them by criticising potential customers. When I saw the chairman of BAE Systems last week, I reassured him that we wanted to continue to work with the company. I have emphasised the importance of keeping production lines open, should new orders for Typhoons and Hawks materialise, and of staying on track in developing RAF Marham for the arrival of the F-35.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Does the Secretary of State recall that several years after we took the peace dividend, in the mid-1990s, we were still spending 3% of GDP on defence? Will he assure us that no inadequacy in the defence budget will lead to the loss of HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark, which are scheduled to leave service in 2033 and 2034, as the defence procurement Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for West Worcestershire (Harriett Baldwin), wrote to the Defence Committee to say only in January?

[Sir Michael Fallon]

On the latter point, I have referred to the purpose of the capabilities review, which is simply to make sure that the equipment programme that we set out in 2015 is on track and is spending our money in the best possible way to deal with the threats, which have intensified since then. On the first point, about finance, the defence budget was £34 billion when I became Defence Secretary. It is £36 billion today and it will reach £40 billion by 2020.

--- Later in debate ---

[Harriett Baldwin]

I assure the hon. Lady that an extensive programme of work is under way not only in the Ministry of Defence, but with our colleagues in the Department for Exiting the European Union. We are very conscious of the importance of those supply chains.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

T9. Given the concern on both sides of the House about the prosecution of Northern Ireland veterans up to 40 years after incidents occurred for which no new evidence is available, what would the Secretary of State’s reaction be to an approach from the main Opposition party to see whether some form of consensus could be agreed on how to prevent that from happening?

[The Minister for the Armed Forces (Mark Lancaster)]

There is broad agreement within Northern Ireland that the current systems and structures for dealing with the legacy of the troubles are not delivering enough for victims, survivors and wider society. We are working with the Northern Ireland Office to ensure that investigations are fair and proportionate, and that they focus on terrorists, not the personnel who kept us safe. We think that there should be, and would welcome, further discussions.

Defence Capability

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Thursday 19th October 2017 Westminster Hall

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

As time is so pressing, and so many people wish to speak who do not get as many opportunities as I do to speak on this subject, I shall just raise a few brief points.

First, I wish to place on record the gratitude of the Defence Committee as a whole to my hon. Friends the Members for Beckenham (Bob Stewart), for Filton and Bradley Stoke (Jack Lopresti) and for North Wiltshire (James Gray) and the hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife (Douglas Chapman), who served on the Committee in the last Parliament, for everything they did to buttress the strength and depth of our inquiries and conclusions. We are very grateful to them all.

I would like to raise the following questions. What is this review about? Who should be able to scrutinise the process? What should we be spending on defence? What is our concept for defence? Is our decision-making process adequate to produce a strategy? Is our soft power adequately resourced? The answers necessarily will be inadequate.

The answer to the first question—what is this review about?—is: I do not know. It is about either increasing the money, sorely needed for defence, or further cutting capability in order to balance the books. I know which of them I should like it to be, and I know which I fear it will be.

Who should be able to scrutinise the process? This process is being carried out by the National Security Adviser, Mark Sedwill. The Defence Committee has applied to have Mr Sedwill appear before us, but the initial response has not been encouraging. It is being suggested that the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy would be the appropriate body for the National Security Adviser to appear before, notwithstanding the fact that National Security Advisers have appeared before us previously. I hope wiser counsels will prevail there.

What should we be spending on defence? I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Yeovil (Mr Fysh) for not only initiating the debate, but making the point very well about what percentage of GDP we used to spend on defence. We used to spend the same on defence as we spent on education and health in the 1980s. Now we spend two and a half times on education and nearly four times on health what we spend on defence. Although we are spending more on defence, defence has indisputably fallen down our national scale of priorities.

What is our concept for defence? That was ably set out by the Labour-led strategic defence review of 1997-98, which came to the conclusion—at a time when we were not facing a threat on the continent of Europe—that we needed an amphibious taskforce and a carrier strike taskforce in order to form a sea base that could go anywhere in the world. I hope to reassure the hon. Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport (Luke Pollard) by quoting to him from what the Minister for Defence Procurement wrote in a letter deposited in the House of Commons Library in January, after I raised the question of the future of HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark on the Floor of the House. She said:

“There are no current plans to decommission the ships early, and I can reassure you that their out of service dates are 2033 and 2034 respectively.”

It would be diabolical to take ships with that amount of life left in them and retire them early.

[Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)]

I absolutely agree with what my right hon. Friend said, not least because he is my boss on the Defence Committee. To take Albion and Bulwark out of service would be an absolute false economy, and I very much hope that the Minister will convey that back to the Department.

[Dr Lewis]

The idea that anyone could be my right hon. Friend’s boss on the Defence Committee is polite, but fanciful.

Is our decision-making process adequate to produce a strategy? In a word, no. We have got to a situation where the chiefs of staff are too divorced from strategy-making. They are then left to have to make cuts in capacity themselves, while they are not able to get together to thrash out a joint strategy in the way that the Chiefs of Staff Committee traditionally did.

Finally, is our soft power adequately resourced? It could be, but the signs are not promising. For example, we produced a report entitled, “Open Source Stupidity”—I think that is probably the first time the word “stupidity” has appeared in an official Select Committee report title—referring to the fact that, for £25 million a year, we need not close the BBC Monitoring centre at Caversham. It is not too late to reverse that extremely stupid decision; and I am glad that the Foreign Secretary, the Chairmen of the Foreign Affairs Committee and the International Development Committee and I will have the opportunity to visit that excellent establishment soon, in the hope that we can, even now, prevent that folly from proceeding.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

National Shipbuilding Strategy

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Wednesday 6th September 2017 Commons Chamber

[Sir Michael Fallon]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady—I think that that was a welcome for the strategy, even though she had some detailed questions. Let me try to answer the, I think, seven of them.

First, Sir John Parker did report at the end of last November and we initially hoped to publish the strategy in early summer. The hon. Lady asked why it had been delayed. I think I recall a general election around that time—she may recall it, too. There was therefore necessarily a delay. We have now introduced the strategy—I wish it had been a few months earlier.

Secondly, the hon. Lady asked when we intend to start placing the orders. We will run the competition at pace next year. We hope to place the order by the end of next year and start the building programme in 2019.

The hon. Lady asked about contingency. The problem with naval procurement under successive Governments for many years has been cost overruns. The frigates will be procured in a completely different way. We are setting a price per ship and challenging the yards to come up with the right bids to match that price. It is a reasonable price and it is now up to industry to meet it.

I hope that the eventual winner—or winners—of the tender programme will be encouraged to show us how it proposes to involve its local supply chains, and certainly the British steel content it can provide. Not all specialist steels for shipbuilding are made in this country, but we certainly encourage the use of British steel. We now have the means to do that through the procurement policy, which enables us specifically to consider that factor when weighing up the different tenders.

The hon. Lady asked about exports. It is a sad fact that we have not exported a new warship from this country under any Government since the 1970s. The new frigate is specifically designed to be exportable—a ship that other navies want to use. We already have an intensive export campaign for the Type 26 frigate. I have been championing its case in Australia, which is about to purchase an anti-submarine frigate, and also in Canada. I assure her that the Type 31e will be designed for export and we will put the full weight of Government behind that campaign.

The hon. Lady asked what we are doing to secure British defence companies’ continued participation in the European market after Brexit. We will shortly publish how we see the future of foreign policy and of defence and security policy in the new partnership that we want with the European Union. That will include our view of future participation in European defence programmes and funding.

Finally, the hon. Lady asked about manning in the Royal Navy. It is currently over 97% manned. We are spending a great deal of money on recruitment marketing and improving retention in the Royal Navy. We have spent some £40 million a year on recruitment marketing for the Royal Navy. She will have noticed that unemployment in this country is the lowest for 40 years. The Royal Navy, like many other large organisations, has to compete with other sectors of the economy, but I assure her that we will ensure that it does so. She will recall from the strategic defence review of two years ago that we are increasing the number of personnel in the Royal Navy by 400 sailors to man the additional ships.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Where warships are concerned, quantity is a form of quality because even the most powerful warship can be in only one place at any one time. I therefore warmly welcome the strategy, particularly its acknowledgement, in the section on strategic context, that:

“There is a need for greater volume in the destroyer and frigate force if we are to deliver the required operational flexibility.”

The Secretary of State mentioned the 1970s. He will know that in the 1970s we had as many as 70 frigates and destroyers. In the mid-1990s, we had 35 frigates and destroyers, and successive Governments incrementally reduced that to 32, 31, 25 and our current total of 19, which the Select Committee on Defence described as “woefully inadequate”.

My right hon. Friend is entirely on the right lines in saying that we need to grow the fleet. Will he do everything in his power to ensure that what happened to the Type 45 destroyers, and to some extent to the Type 26 frigates—as the build went on, they became increasingly complex and expensive so that we ended up with fewer ships at the end of the process—does not happen to the Type 31e?

[Sir Michael Fallon]

The light, general-purpose frigate is specifically designed to avoid that fault, which, as my right hon. Friend said, has plagued previous programmes.

My right hon. Friend took us back to the 1970s. Perhaps only he and I now remember them and what happened then. I note his comments about the number of ships. I gently say that today’s ships are of course much more powerful than those that were involved in, for example, the liberation of the Falklands, and that although they can be in only one place at once, they can fight conflicts at different ranges at the same time.

It is my ambition to grow the fleet. We are expanding the Royal Navy. If industry can rise to the challenge and deliver the frigates to time and in the price cap that we specify, it will enable us to expand the Royal Navy beyond the numbers set out in 2015.

Counter-Daesh Update

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Thursday 13th July 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

On his re-election, I call Dr Julian Lewis.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Thank you, Mr Deputy Speaker.

The reason why, surely, these cities have not been liberated sooner is precisely the care that is being taken in the targeting of the aerial bombardment. Does the Secretary of State accept that whereas the intervention with airstrikes in Iraq was non-controversial because we were prepared to see the army of the Iraqi Government win, the same does not apply in Syria? Apart from the Kurdish elements in Syria, who else does he expect to run the country when Daesh’s land is taken from it, if not the Syrian Government, with or without Assad?

[Sir Michael Fallon]

Let me repeat your congratulations, Mr Deputy Speaker, to my right hon. Friend on resuming his chairmanship of the Select Committee. I look forward to working with him on that.

I know that my right hon. Friend and I have always differed on the nature of the Syrian campaign and that he has had reservations about it. He is right to recognise the difference in that we are not working with the Syrian regime. However, we do want to see Daesh driven out of Syria. It remains a threat—in Syria, to this country—and it needs to be defeated in Syria. But of course, as he says, we then need those parts of Syria returned to civilian control—a control that properly involves the Arab population as well as, in the north, the Kurdish elements. That is all part of the process that we are encouraging in Geneva. He is right that the solution lies in Arab-led governance.