First World War Commemoration

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Thursday 7th November 2013 Commons Chamber

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Madam Deputy Speaker, I am very grateful for your permission to contribute to this debate, particularly as the first ever televised session of the Intelligence and Security Committee meeting today prevented me from attending by far the greater part of the debate. I shall just make a few very brief remarks and hope that I am not unwittingly repeating things that others have already raised.

We all have our different methods by which we have been in contact with or affected by the first world war. Mine dates back to my days as a schoolboy, when I became friendly with a veteran of the Royal Navy, Mr Leslie Horton, who served from 1915 to 1945 in just about every variety of royal naval ship. He served on the destroyer HMS Landrail in the first world war, for example, and the S-class submarine HMS Seadog in the second world war. The force of character and personality of all those people who have been through these vicissitudes, ordeals and dangers cannot help but transmit itself to people of a younger generation.

In the brief time available I want to make one point for the Minister to consider in his reply. It will not come as a surprise to him, because we have discussed it privately previously. I want to be certain that when, in the course of commemorating the events of the first world war, we focus on particular spikes in the history of that catastrophic conflict, we do not end up focusing solely on those events that marked terrible mistakes and defeats. It is a reality that the generalship behind the battle of the Somme was sadly lacking—some would say it was grossly negligent. It is a fact that the mistakes made at the battle of the Somme were repeated at the battle of Passchendaele, but it is also a fact that by the time we got to 8 August 1918, the lessons of those disastrous earlier offences had been learnt, however belatedly. The battle of Amiens, which hardly anyone has heard of by comparison with the earlier battles, was a stupendous victory for which our forces gain too little credit.

Of course commemoration is about reconciliation, but we must not blind ourselves to the fact that those battles took place not on the territory of a country that did the invading, but by definition on the territory of countries that had been invaded. It should be a matter of pride for the people of this country that we fought on the right side in the first world war. Indeed, the failure to draw the right lessons from what happened at the end of the war had the consequence that after the second world war we were determined there would have to be unconditional surrender—so that next time nobody could argue, as they had done after 1918, that they had not really been defeated. Let us of course reach out the hand of friendship and remember the terrible mistakes made, but let us remember the victories, too, and the justice of the cause for which British soldiers, sailors and airmen fought and died.

Aircraft Carriers and UK Shipbuilding

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Wednesday 6th November 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

I have not got an estimate of the number of jobs in the wider economy, but I can say this to the hon. Gentleman: when the carrier project was announced and the Type 45 destroyers were being built, everybody—including, I believe, the hon. Gentleman—understood that we were benefiting from a surge of work that was very welcome but that was never going to be sustainable in the long term. Of course the day when that work comes to an end is regrettable, and the consequent redundancies are difficult, but this is not something that has come unexpectedly; it is something that has long been understood and anticipated, and the announcement we have made today is good news for the Clyde, and I would have thought the hon. Gentleman would have wanted to welcome it.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Despite the Defence Secretary’s criticism of the contracts, does he accept that the restoration of carrier strike capability to the fleet is an absolute strategic necessity, and does he also accept that one reason for the loss of Portsmouth as a shipbuilder is that the last Government reduced the total number of frigates and destroyers from 35 to 19—and, regrettably, this Government have done nothing to reverse that?

[Mr Hammond]

My hon. Friend is factually correct: the last Government did, indeed, reduce the total number of destroyers to be built in the Type 45 programme, largely because of the hole that was opening up in the aircraft carrier budget due to the delay in the project that I mentioned earlier. He is right, too, that we can talk all day about the history of the placing of the order for these two very large ships—the largest ships the Royal Navy will ever have had—but the fact is that we are getting them: they are being built, and we are proud of them and we are going to make excellent use of them in projecting UK naval maritime power around the world.

Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 4th November 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Francois]

I can tell the hon. Lady, and indeed the House, that cyber-reserves will be subject to the same stringent vetting process as other members of the Ministry of Defence. Regarding criminal convictions, all applicants seeking to join the regulars or reserves are looked at individually, and a decision is made based on the type of conviction and sentence imposed. No one will be employed as a cyber-reserve if there is evidence that they represent a security risk which means that they cannot pass the vetting process.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

17. What assessment he has made of the conclusions and utility of the Trident alternatives study.

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Philip Hammond)]

I can tell my hon. Friend that the review demonstrated that no alternative system is as capable as a Trident-based deterrent, or as cost-effective. As to the utility, carrying out the review fulfilled a Government commitment but did not produce any unexpected conclusions.

[Dr Lewis]

Yes, well, it is good to know that the review came to such a predictable and predicted conclusion, but what does my right hon. Friend think of the fact that our coalition partners, the Liberal Democrats, have not adopted any of the options from the review but have decided instead to come off continuous at-sea deterrence and have only two Trident submarines? This was rejected as unworthy of consideration by the review, but now that even the Liberal Democrats want two submarines, should we take up the suggestion of the shadow armed forces Minister, the hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), and try to sign a contract for them?

[Mr Hammond]

As my hon. Friend suggests, the reason a two-boat solution was not considered in the review is that it did not meet the hurdle test of providing a credible deterrent. I am actually rather more interested in the views of official Opposition Front Benchers on this matter than the views of our coalition partners. I welcome the fact—[Interruption.] Hang on a minute. I welcome the fact that the first visit in office by the hon. Member for Gedling (Vernon Coaker) was to Barrow-in-Furness, the home of Britain’s submarine fleet.

Defence Reforms

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Thursday 17th October 2013 Commons Chamber

[Christopher Pincher (Tamworth) (Con)]

I welcome you to the Chair, Madam Deputy Speaker. The great challenge speaking before the two Front Benchers is that just about everything that can be said has been said. I shall try not to let that stop me.

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood) on his speech and his two-carrier Royal United Services Institute policy, which I am working my way through. I also congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) on his tenacious campaign. He has fought with great integrity and spoke today with great clarity.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I regret that an investigation being carried out by the Intelligence and Security Committee has prevented my taking part in the debate. My hon. Friend has referred to the two-carrier solution. Does he agree that the only reason we can consider that solution is the Government’s wise decision to have the short take-off and vertical landing joint strike fighter on the carriers? Otherwise, there was no way we could operate two carriers.

Armed Forces Parliamentary Scheme

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Wednesday 11th September 2013 Westminster Hall

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Mr Walker, as a master of parliamentary procedure, you will know that when participating in a debate, one is not supposed to refer to the presence of anyone outside the confines of the Chamber. However, I am sure that you will allow me to say what a pleasure it is to know that Sir Neil and Sheila Thorne are present today to hear all the wonderful tributes to them and, as I am sure they would be the first to acknowledge, to hear the tributes that must be made to the civilian and uniformed staff of the Ministry of Defence over 25 years for their huge efforts in arranging the visits from the armed forces’ side.

It is a real honour to make the last speech by a Back Bencher in a debate about a scheme that has been an unalloyed and phenomenal success for a quarter of a century. I am delighted that this is one of those debates in which one can honestly feel that one agrees with every sentiment expressed so far.

The scheme has many things to recommend it, and I will pick up one or two of them in the time available. Both the Labour members of the Defence Committee, the hon. Members for Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney (Mr Havard) and for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Ms Stuart), referred to the sense of involvement in and participation with the armed forces, and to the difference between visits to the armed forces wearing their civilian suits as Committee members and wearing whatever variation of military uniform they have been privileged to wear on their scheme visits. I know that lawyers have been taking a close look at that, but I assure hon. Members that if we simply revert to being civilians visiting the military, something very precious will be lost from the scheme. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”] I am delighted that colleagues are endorsing that with various signals, and I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire (Mr Gray) will do so explicitly.

[Mr Gray]

May I take the opportunity absolutely to reassure my hon. Friend that we most certainly will not return to civilian dress during those visits? There is a debate about exactly what we wear, when and how we wear it and the legalities, but he is absolutely right to say that appearing on visits in some form of dress appropriate to the occasion is definitely what the future will hold.

[Dr Lewis]

I could not have expected or desired a more reassuring comment.

I now look for a second reassuring comment. I will not get it immediately, but I am looking to my old Front-Bench colleague of many years’ standing on the former shadow defence team—he is now, thank goodness, the Minister—to address what one might call the issue of trust. The reason why the scheme has worked so well is that people have been given privileged access to members of the armed forces at every level. There has been, as it were, an unwritten understanding that that privilege would not be abused. When one considers the very large numbers of colleagues of all parties who have been through the scheme, it is remarkable that there have been hardly any cases—in the low single figures—of raised eyebrows about someone going on the scheme and immediately tabling a raft of hostile questions on the Floor of the House.

That excellent outcome is very different from what might have been predicted at the start of the process. As something of an amateur military historian, I look forward to the day when I can go to the National Archives at Kew and look for the file of correspondence that must exist relating to the period in which Sir Neil originally approached the Ministry of Defence to propose that MPs have direct informal access to all ranks of the armed forces.

[Sir Bob Russell]

We all look forward to those archives being open. May I suggest to my hon. Friend that informed questions, as opposed to hostile ones, are very much part and parcel of the experience of taking part in the scheme?

[Dr Lewis]

Exactly. That is precisely how people who have engaged in the scheme have understood their responsibilities, with very few exceptions. When one considers that the final stage of the scheme is membership of the Royal College of Defence Studies, that is quite remarkable. It may not be common knowledge, but those of us who are fortunate enough to be parliamentary members of the RCDS are taken on as full members and are considered to remain members for life. The essence of the RCDS course is meeting people, learning from them and establishing formal and informal contacts that will stand one in good stead in relation to one’s understanding of defence developments at home and abroad.

To inject a slightly quizzical note into my speech, that is why I was a little concerned recently to read an article about the eminent military historian Sir Max Hastings being refused the sort of informal contact that for many years he and many others have been allowed with senior serving personnel in the MOD network. That runs counter to the spirit of the armed forces parliamentary scheme, but I hope that it is simply a case of over-zealous application of some rule against leaking things to the media.

Certainly, if we reach a situation in which people like Sir Max Hastings—eminent historians and public commentators—cannot secure the degree of access that they used to have, or indeed if a similar bar is put on hon. Members, all I can say is that Ministers should take a deep breath, look at what has happened with the armed forces parliamentary scheme and realise that a tunnel vision approach to access by civilians, whether they are reporters or Members of Parliament, to the military is counter-productive.

The armed forces parliamentary scheme is a boon to hon. Members with little knowledge of defence, as it is to hon. Members when, as sometimes happens, their political party goes through a phase of anti-militarism. There was a period—thank goodness, long in the past—when the Labour party shifted in a unilateralist direction, and I am sure that it was very valuable to those courageous members of the Labour party who did not go in that direction to be able to recharge their intellectual batteries by having access to such a scheme. It is important that Members of Parliament who want to support the armed forces have the intellectual ammunition, on a non-partisan basis, to speak with authority about them.

I conclude by pointing out that the scale of the scheme when it started was for two Members of Parliament to visit each of the three armed forces, with two more visiting the Royal Marines, which is of course a subset—some would say, a superset—of the Royal Navy.

[Oliver Colvile]

A very fine subset of the Royal Navy.

[Dr Lewis]

Indeed, which was the reason for my quick interjection of the word “superset”.

The scheme then moved to having five Members per service, and it now has very large numbers. We measure the effectiveness of a scheme or organisation by the demand for it. There is a huge demand for this scheme, and we are very grateful that the supply will continue to meet the increased demand.

Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 2nd September 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

On the last point, I think that history teaches us that unilateral abandonment of nuclear weapons is not the way to bring about a more rapid elimination of those weapons, much as we would all like to see that happen. I can tell the hon. Gentleman that the estimates produced in the 2006 White Paper for the cost of replacing the existing submarines with a four-boat solution were between £15 billion and £20 billion—in terms of the 2006 economic conditions—and they remain unchanged.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

In order that the Secretary of State does not keep having to tell us that he must not go above his pay grade, will he carry the message back to No. 10 that as Labour Front Benchers say they are willing to sign up to two of the four boats before the next election, and as the majority of people in this House would like to have that main-gate decision implemented at least in part, why should we not go ahead so that we cannot be blackmailed by the Liberal Democrats in the event of a hung Parliament after the general election?

[Mr Hammond]

I understand my hon. Friend’s point of view. He has on other occasions raised the issue of entering into a contract for the submarines at an early stage. Our current way of managing our equipment programme is to enter into contracts with industry at the point at which projects are mature enough to enable us to secure the best possible value for money for the taxpayer. Entering into a contract at this stage, when the project is relatively immature, would not represent value for money.

UK Submarine Supply Chain

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Wednesday 10th July 2013 Westminster Hall

[John Woodcock]

My hon. Friend touches on a key issue. I will come on to that in a moment if I may, because I have some important questions on which the Minister can give us some reassurance.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his generosity in giving way. I should like to revert to the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Woking (Jonathan Lord), whom I thank for his kind remarks, which I did not deserve. Will the hon. Gentleman cast his mind back to the last Defence questions, when the hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) made the excellent point from the Dispatch Box that if the alternatives study says that the choice is between a full-time deterrent and a part-time deterrent of, say, only two submarines, then at least we should get round to signing the contract straight away for the two submarines? I was encouraged by that and I shall be pressing the Secretary of State for a meeting to discuss that proposal so that Trident cannot again become a political football between the Liberal Democrats and the two major parties that support it.

[John Woodcock]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his wise words on this issue, which we hear so often from him. There could well be a number of reasons why it makes sense to bring forward the main gate decision. Indeed, if that requires a new coalition for that one issue in this Parliament, then I know that many of us, from across the House and in this Chamber today, will be prepared to be a part of it.

I will make a little more progress. Although it seems that the Trident alternatives review is set to dismiss such options as a land-based, air-based or surface ship delivery system, and indeed to give up finally on the Liberal Democrats’ mini-deterrent fantasy of adapting Astute-class submarines to carry nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, recent media coverage has suggested that the review may set out proposals to abandon the UK’s posture of continuous at-sea deterrence, which for decades has ensured that at least one British deterrent submarine is operational at all times.

We read that that could take place either when the Vanguard submarines reach the end of their life or perhaps even within the next few years, if the extensive leaks to the national newspapers can be believed. Colossal savings could be realised, says the unnamed brain-box who briefed the Financial Times in May. We are also told that we could build half the boats and save half the capital costs. As the submarines are predicted to cost, on average, about £2.5 billion each, that must mean a £5 billion saving to the Exchequer. Also, we are told that £1 billion a year could be saved by downgrading Britain’s nuclear capability to a part-time deterrent. Perhaps we could even keep Britain’s nuclear warheads in a cupboard, as the hon. Member for North Devon (Sir Nick Harvey) has curiously put it in the press. Alternatively, perhaps the main gate decision could not be brought forward but further delayed, and the proposed in-service date for the new submarines could be put back yet again.

Unfortunately, I am afraid that like so much that the Minister’s coalition partners transmit on defence issues, all of that is complete bunkum. For starters, does the Minister agree that it is nursery school logic to believe that we can save half the capital by building half the boats? The outlay on the submarine fleet is not simply a matter of purchasing these submarines; it is also about investing in the ability to design and build them. Those costs are fixed, whether we order two, four or more submarines—I am not necessarily suggesting that we order more than four submarines. Therefore, can the Minister confirm that he anticipates that the first of class would cost effectively double the average across the fleet, and that the fourth boat would be the cheapest of the batch? Can he also confirm that there would be significant savings from placing a four-boat order from the outset, rather than ordering two with the option to order two more? Also, can he confirm that if the Government were inclined to press ahead with the main gate decision in this Parliament, as was originally planned, there could be further substantial savings for the British taxpayer?

Similarly, with running costs the savings would not be anything like the amount that the antis boast it would be. Will the Minister confirm that at least 70% of those costs are fixed, covering the fuelling and basing facilities, and that they will be the same whether Britain operates patrols around the clock or takes the submarines on the occasional fishing expedition once or twice a year? What is his estimate—if he can share it with the House—of the annual savings that would accrue from stepping down from a class D posture?

Also, given the high fixed costs, does the Minister agree that abandoning class D would mean a disproportionate downgrading of the deterrent’s capacity to deter the grotesque horror of a nuclear war, by removing the guarantee that currently exists, namely that any nation that launched a nuclear attack on the UK could be hit by a counter-strike no matter what damage our country sustained? Furthermore, does he agree that it would be highly perverse if those who pursue disarmament—admittedly for absolutely laudable motives—were actually to increase the risk of nuclear conflict in future decades through their unilateral gestures, rather than making the world safer? Also, if I can tempt him to speculate, does he think that it was that woolly thinking from the Liberal Democrats that has left the party in the extraordinary position of having no representation at all in the defence ministerial team at this vital moment?

[Dr Julian Lewis]

Thank goodness for that. [Laughter.]

[John Woodcock]

Well, let us see.

On the timing of main gate, will the Minister confirm that a further delay to the build process is effectively ruled out by his Department’s assessment, which was communicated to me by the Secretary of State at the last oral questions, that the Vanguard hulls would be rendered unsafe if their life was extended beyond the current 35-year plan, which of course is the longest period that any British submarine has ever been in service?

Finally, building two boats rather than four means that work across the UK supply chain could grind to a halt as early as 2031, six years earlier than is currently expected. Without more submarines to build, Barrow’s unique specialised work force will break up, as they did the last time there was a gap in the submarine drumbeat. However, as we have just discussed, the consequences would be felt in every part of the United Kingdom. That would leave us with two expensive choices. Either the Government, and taxpayers, would have to pick up the tab for the sustained unemployment of that work force, and consign to history the nation’s capacity to build submarines, with the loss of valuable skills and export spin-offs that would occur as a result, or alternatively—this is surely more likely—the Government of the day would bring forward the next submarine programme. That programme would involve the successors to the Astute class submarines, which of course have not been built yet, sooner than those vessels are actually needed from a military naval capability assessment, to keep the industrial drumbeat going. Can the Minister confirm that because that would mean that the bulk of capital spending on that next generation of boats would be required as early as the Parliament after the next one, bringing that spending forward—by bringing forward the successor to the Astute class—would completely wipe out the savings from ending continuous at-sea deterrence?

Bluntly, that is the choice that we would face if the decision was made to abandon class D. We would have to be prepared either to put at grave risk a significant part of Britain’s cutting-edge industrial base or to bring forward a significant amount of spending well before it would actually be needed.

Everyone in this House has a responsibility to guard against siren voices peddling false economies. The submarine supply chain is one of Britain’s great unsung assets, providing high-skilled manufacturing jobs that will rebalance the economy. We must not sacrifice those 13,000 jobs on the altar of cuts that would end up saving nothing significant at all but would leave the country vulnerable in future decades.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Dunne]

I am afraid that I do not have time to cover that point, but I am more than happy to meet the hon. Gentleman in the autumn to talk about the disposal programme. We made an announcement recently. The hon. Gentleman knows that this multi-year challenge is being carefully monitored and managed by the Ministry of Defence.

The sensor support programme contract that we signed with Thales will provide support to the eyes and ears of the fleet, which includes periscopes, sonar and electronic warfare systems for both the current and future submarine classes, as well as vessels in our surface fleet.

Although the ongoing build programme and the support to the current fleet are the most visible signs of our continued investment, defence is all about planning for the future and we must look ahead to building the next classes of submarine, the subject to which the hon. Member for Barrow and Furness devoted most of his speech. I will attempt to deal with some of the questions that he posed, but will not cover all of them, as he may not be surprised to learn.

We have learned much about the importance of sustaining this supply chain from the 10-year gap in submarine production in the UK after HMS Vengeance was launched in the 1990s, which the hon. Gentleman mentioned in respect of delays to the Astute class. Having to re-establish a submarine design, build, testing and commissioning capability that had lain dormant for a decade had a serious impact on the delivery of the Astute class and economic ramifications in Barrow. This has been well documented, but it is important that we do not lose sight of these hard lessons. For this reason, the Astute programme is crucial to sustaining the skills and the work force we need to meet our clear commitment to retain and renew a credible, continuous and effective minimum nuclear deterrent.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I thank the Minister for giving way. I know that his time is so limited. It is worth putting on the record that the Prime Minister has said that, as long as he remains leader of the Conservative party, we will have a continuous at-sea deterrent. But it would help—and it would be nice—if those of us who have requested a meeting with the Secretary of State to discuss how we can prevent being blackmailed in future by the Liberal Democrats in the event of a hung Parliament, as we were in the past, could be given a particular date to look forward to.

[Mr Dunne]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for reinforcing the commitment of the Conservative party, from the highest levels, to continuous at-sea deterrence. I was not aware that he had requested a meeting with the Secretary of State. I am happy to take that up, and if the Secretary of State is unavailable I am happy to meet him as a fall-back, in the first instance.

The Astute programme is crucial to sustaining the skills and the work force that we need. Through that programme, we are undertaking the planning required to prepare for the successor submarines that will replace the Vanguard class from the late 2020s. Hon. Members will be aware that we are taking the steps necessary to be ready to start building the first submarine as we lead up to a main gate decision in 2016.

The hon. Member for Barrow and Furness asked whether this decision could be advanced, saying that this might help both cement the decision and, potentially, reduce the cost. Another lesson that we have learned from shipbuilding programmes is that unless the design is mature enough at the time that the investment decision is made—in other words, if a decision is rushed—additional frictional cost could be built in, through changes to the design programme after the contract has been priced, which can delay the programme and add significantly to the cost thereafter. We do not want to repeat the mistakes made at the time of the Astute contract being laid, by making a premature decision on the successor design.

Armed Forces

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Tuesday 25th June 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

We can disagree with nothing in the motion, but without wishing to break the consensual mood of the House, I think that this is too good an opportunity not to ask at least some questions of Ministers, in the hope that they will at least reflect on them and perhaps return later.

I am concerned, as are a number of Members on these Benches, that by keeping on cutting defence expenditure, we risk creating imbalances on a variety of fronts. Can it be right, for example, that the budgets of Departments dealing with health, welfare and international aid are being protected, if not expanded, as a percentage of Government expenditure? That puts disproportionate pressure on other Departments, such as Defence, when trying to save costs. I also wonder whether imbalances are being created in regard to our transatlantic relationship. Our defence capability is one of the key anchors of that relationship, but it is not a one-way ticket. There are obligations on both sides, including our own. If we keep shaving our defence capability, might we put elements of that relationship at risk?

I also suggest that we might be creating imbalances in other areas, such as our capability to meet our foreign policy objectives, whatever they might be, and defend our interests overseas. The House knows that I have not been supportive of our military interventions over the past decade, but let us put that to one side. There have been moments during those interventions when our resources have not matched our ambitions. It was not the fault of the troops on the ground, but in Iraq and Afghanistan in particular the necessary resources were lacking, and that had a knock-on effect on our ability to achieve our objectives.

I have other concerns but, as an ex-soldier, I shall focus on the Army. The plan to disband 20,000 regulars before knowing whether the plan to recruit 30,000 reservists to take their place will work is high risk, given that we do not know whether those reservists will be able to plug the gap from a capability point of view, or from a boots-on-the-ground point of view. I ask Ministers to ensure that that issue is centrally addressed in the forthcoming White Paper. There are key questions that need answering very soon, because redundancies are taking effect as we speak, and we do not know whether the plan will work.

There is a real danger that Government proposals will prove a false economy, in financial terms and in terms of military capability. Let us take cost savings as an example. I am conscious of the figure of £1.8 billion over 10 years, and more details will follow in the White Paper, but at the moment the Government are long on promise and short on costings and details. They have admitted in the Green Paper that it costs more to train reservists than regulars. The financial incentives being offered to regulars to join the reserves mean that they will be on a better scale of pay than a serving brigadier, if we include the £5,000 sign-up bonus, the bounty, the daily rate and so forth. There is also the question of civilian salaries being matched, although I am aware that the Government are considering capping an element of that. Again, we need to see the details. And all that is before we even consider the fact that the reservists will not be deployable in their first year.

I have already raised the question of the number of reservists that will be required. According to Ministry of Defence figures, the present Territorial Army mobilisation rate is 40%. If we apply that to the 20,000 regulars, we will need 50,000 reservists. I look forward to seeing the details of how that magic figure of 40% is going to be increased. It will take a concerted effort to achieve a mobilisation rate of much more than 40%, given that many people in the Army believe that we are not even hitting 40% at the moment.

There is also the question of the capability gap. In the 1980s, when many of us served, the TA did a very good job that basically involved reservists being transported out to Germany, digging a trench and waiting for the Soviet or Warsaw pact forces to arrive. Today, asymmetric warfare is becoming the norm. The skills base will become much higher, and our requirements will be much more demanding, yet I understand that the number of training days is being increased to 40 overall—an increase of only five days. I question that on the capability front, particularly when those forces are going to be mobilised as groups rather than as add-ons. That factor must be considered.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend share my fear that, with the scale of priorities we have at the moment, there is a danger that if we reduce the size of the Army much more, they will all be able to fit into the single first High Speed 2 train?

[Mr Baron]

Let us hope it is not a one-way ticket!

Let me finish with a concern some of us have about the potentially distorting effect on the ground. Excellent, well recruited battalions, such as the 2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, are being axed, while more poorly recruited battalions are being saved. It is costing millions of pounds to keep over-strength battalions up to the mark. Such a policy is, in many respects, simply reinforcing failure.

In conclusion, I think this is a high-risk policy, and I ask Ministers to make sure that they cover the base very carefully. In my view, we need to see concrete evidence that the reservist plan will take effect and will work—before we let the regular battalions go. Here we are dealing with the defence of the realm, and this is happening when many countries not necessarily friendly to the west are arming and increasing their expenditure on defence. No one here can tell when or where the next threat will come from. I therefore ask Ministers to consider these points very carefully.

Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 17th June 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

First, I will check my diary. I thank the hon. Gentleman for his kind invitation.

I am not sure whether the hon. Gentleman is asking if we have considered whether it is possible to extend further the life of the existing submarines or to design the successor class with a longer in-service life. On the first question, he will know that we have already extended the life of the Vanguard class once, and it is not judged possible or safe to extend it further. On the second question, we will of course be looking to design the successor class with the longest possible in-service life.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend is clearly very robust on this issue, but may I urge him to consider deeply the suggestion of the shadow Armed Forces Minister, the hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones)? If those on both Front Benches agree on the need to renew Trident and to keep continuous-at-sea deterrence, why should they not agree before the general election to make this irreversible, so that Trident cannot again become a political football, as it unfortunately did between my party and the Liberal Democrats in 2010?

[Mr Hammond]

I have to say to my hon. Friend—who is a great expert on this subject and has been one for longer than I can remember—that the essence of our strategy for defence procurement, which is at the heart of our determination to maintain a balanced budget, is that we do not make contractual commitments until we need to for the delivery of equipment in a timely fashion, when we need it. Locking in decisions before they need to be made merely reduces flexibility and, as the previous Government found out, drives cost into the programme if changes have to be made.

Operation Herrick

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Tuesday 14th May 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

The hon. Gentleman’s views on this subject are well known. As I have announced, a small number of people—mainly logisticians—will possibly remain after 31 December 2014 to complete our redeployment from Bastion. In addition, we have committed to providing trainers and life support personnel for the Afghan national army officer training academy outside Kabul, which is a military training academy modelled on Sandhurst. Those are the only commitments we have made at the moment, amounting to a couple of hundred personnel on an ongoing basis. We judge that to be an effective and appropriate way for us to continue supporting Afghan national security forces, together with the £70 million a year cash support that we have pledged as part of the international community’s commitment.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Even before British troops have left, our brave Afghan interpreters have been threatened with assassination. How many of them must be killed before we do what we ought to do and offer those who wish to come to this country the opportunity to do so, as the previous Government rightly did for Iraqi interpreters?

[Mr Hammond]

The situation in Afghanistan is not the same as that in Iraq. Lessons were learned from the Afghan campaign, and the way that interpreters and other civilian employees have been recruited in Afghanistan has been modified accordingly to take those lessons on board. I assure my hon. Friend, however, that we will not turn our back on those who have served us in Afghanistan as locally employed civilians. We believe that Afghanistan has a future that will require skilled, capable people who are committed to building it post-2014. We want to explore all options for encouraging people, wherever they can, to be part of that future and help to build their country in which we have invested so heavily. We have and will continue to have mechanisms that deal with cases of intimidation or threat, including those that could, in extremis, allow for resettlement in this country.