Trident Renewal

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Tuesday 20th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

rose—

[Angus Robertson]

On the basis of the hon. Gentleman’s long-standing and principled support for nuclear weapons, I would be pleased to take an intervention.

[Dr Lewis]

In return, I acknowledge the seriousness of the hon. Gentleman’s point about not finding anybody prepared to kill millions of people, but the logical conclusion of that standpoint is that we remain pacifists —[Interruption.] Let me explain. It would mean we could never declare war on any country, whatever the circumstances, because when we do, millions of people inevitably die. The question is, therefore: how do we prevent war? We do it by showing someone that they cannot attack us with these weapons without suffering similar retaliation.

[Angus Robertson]

I like the hon. Gentleman a great deal, but I note that even he, one of the leading supporters of nuclear weapons, could not give an example of circumstances where he would be prepared to see the killing of hundreds of millions of people.

The case is stronger than ever for embracing the non-replacement of Trident, which would offer serious strategic and economic benefits, as outlined in the June 2013 report “The Real Alternative”, including,

“improved national security—through budgetary flexibility in the Ministry of Defence and a more effective response to emerging security challenges in the 21st century”

and

“improved global security—through a strengthening of the non-proliferation regime, deterring of nuclear proliferation and de-escalation of international tensions”.

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[Michael Fallon]

The right hon. Gentleman anticipates me, because I now want to turn—indeed, I think we all now want to turn—to the position of the Liberal Democrats. On the one hand, the Liberal Democrats have said that they want to spend billions to

“replace some of the submarines”,

and to make our deterrent part time. They have also committed themselves—at their most recent conference—to allowing our submarines to go to sea with unarmed missiles. Those would be pointless patrols, and that is a pointless nuclear deterrent policy. There are no Liberal Democrats in the Ministry of Defence, and the fact that they have adopted such a reckless and, frankly, dangerous approach explains why.

This country faces the threat of nuclear blackmail from rogue states. It is therefore contemptible for the Scottish nationalists or the Liberal Democrats to suggest that they might use the ultimate guarantor of our freedom and independence as some kind of bargaining chip in some grubby coalition deal. To put it more simply, it is only the Conservative party that will not gamble with the security of the British people.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

While the Secretary of State is dealing with the Liberal Democrats—only two of whom I see in the Chamber today—will he confirm that a policy of sending unarmed submarines to sea and waiting for a crisis to arise, then sending them back to port to be rearmed while the enemy stands idly by, is actually more dangerous than a policy of keeping them in port all along? Will he also confirm that there will never again be a deal between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats to delay the maingate decision, as there was in 2010? That is something with which he had nothing to do, but which should never have been allowed to happen.

[Michael Fallon]

Let me assure my hon. Friend, in response to his first point, that we are not planning to make future deals of any kind with the Liberal Democrats. On the contrary, we hope to be returned in May with an absolute majority that will restore defence policy to the hands of a Conservative Government. As for my hon. Friend’s first point, he is entirely right to draw attention to the absurdity of an unarmed submarine, perhaps several hundred miles from its base, asking our enemies to hold off for a time while it returns to be kitted out with missiles before heading off on patrol again. That is an absurd policy, and we rather look forward to hearing the Liberal Democrat spokesman trying to justify it.

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[Dame Joan Ruddock]

The hon. Gentleman is citing countries that are of course the minority—the nuclear-armed states. They all have the same attitude as him: they all have cold war thinking. Many of them have reduced their nuclear arsenals, but they remain more dangerous today.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I will try to deal with this in the same theoretical terms as the right hon. Lady is trying to do. If her argument is that we have moved on from the cold war—it must be noted that at the height of the cold war she, as the head of CND, wanted us unilaterally to disarm—the point is that there can be no guarantee that we will not move back into a cold war or face some other threat. We cannot know what threats will arise over the next 30 to 50 years, which is why we need an array of deterrent weapons.

[Dame Joan Ruddock]

The hon. Gentleman says we cannot know what will happen in the future, but we have a pretty good idea. The threats that were part of the cold war scenario are very different from those we face today.

[Dr Lewis]

Tomorrow?

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[Dame Joan Ruddock]

I will come on to suggest what the world community thinks about that. It is of course my opinion that we would be safer without nuclear weapons. If the hon. Gentleman were both to read the research on nuclear winters and the report of the accidents that have been recently published, he would realise that there is no safety in the possession of nuclear weapons, even if they are not used in anger.

It is instructive to look at how we view the world. We need to reflect on the deaths of those 17 people in Paris at the hands of terrorists. We were rightly outraged and right to mourn them, so how can it be that we are willing to contemplate the deaths of millions? Why do we have such moral certitude over the banning of chemical and biological weapons, land mines and cluster bombs but not nuclear weapons? It is also instructive to inquire how other countries and institutions view the nuclear weapon states such as Britain.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

As always, the right hon. Lady is enormously courteous in giving way. It was discovered after the event that the Russians had been massively cheating on the 1972 biological weapons treaty. Therefore, it is the assurance of the underlying deterrent against other weapons of mass destruction that we have to worry about and be concerned with.

[Dame Joan Ruddock]

I am afraid that the hon. Gentleman does not make a coherent case. Chemical weapons have certainly been used in recent times—we do not know whether biological weapons have been used—which means that nuclear weapons did not act as a deterrent, so his argument is not sound.

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[Oliver Colvile]

That was what I was coming to. As my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence has repeatedly said, such an approach would mean that we would have only a part-time deterrent. We would depend on a part-time enemy. No doubt we could also go on holiday all the time.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

May I commend to my hon. Friend and the whole House the lyrics of a song that was prevalent at the Liberal Democrats’ last conference, which came from their own side? Sadly, I have not committed all the verses to memory, but they were wonderful, and the chorus was, “We believe in a part-time submarine.” It was sung to the tune of “Yellow Submarine”, made famous by the Beatles.

[Oliver Colvile]

I thank my hon. Friend for that.

Scrapping or even reducing the number of nuclear submarines would have a devastating impact on my constituency and on Plymouth’s travel-to-work economy and skills base. No SNP, Green or Plaid Cymru Members have talked about the importance of nuclear submarines to my constituency and I hope that my comments on Plymouth will be in accord with the views of the hon. Member for Plymouth, Moor View (Alison Seabeck), who is unable to comment as she sits on the Opposition Front Bench. In the past we have had a similar approach and I am sure that we will continue to do so. I hope that I and my hon. Friend the Member for South West Devon (Mr Streeter), my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and West Devon (Mr Cox), my hon. Friend the Member for South East Cornwall (Sheryll Murray) and the hon. Member for Plymouth, Moor View, all of whom have constituencies in the Plymouth travel-to-work area, speak with one voice on this issue, which involves Devonport’s future. I thank my hon. Friend the Minister again for the £2.6 billion of investment in the future of Devonport announced last September. That will secure 3,000 to 4,000 jobs over the next four years.

Retaining Britain’s nuclear deterrent, a strategic concept that seeks to prevent war, is a key element of and cornerstone in the defence of our country. It is a vital ingredient of our membership of NATO and of our relationship with the United States, which is our strongest ally, and it ensures our seat on the UN Security Council. It helps to prevent attacks from would-be aggressors and stops other countries using their nuclear arsenal to try to blackmail us. The United Kingdom is an island nation that is dependent on protecting its trade routes, which means that we need a strong Royal Navy.

Our ownership of this highly successful deterrent came about after the bombing of Hiroshima, which brought about the very dramatic final phase of world war two. I note that there has been no mention in the debate of Hiroshima, the event that ended the second world war. Like a slap in the face, it shocked the world with its catastrophic implications, which were so dramatic that no one has ever dared to push international conflicts to a point at which any country has used nuclear weapons again.

The nuclear deterrent has been Britain’s most effective insurance policy and it continues to play a significant role in maintaining peace throughout the world. Unpredictable countries such as Iran and North Korea, which are threatening to develop nuclear capabilities, make it vital that Britain retains its nuclear deterrent. It continues to act as a pressure point—conventional capabilities cannot and will not have the same deterrent effect as nuclear weapons. To quote the Prime Minister, it is the “ultimate weapon of defence”.

Indeed, the development of nuclear weapons since Hiroshima continues to have a significant impact on those veterans who were dispatched to Christmas Island, Montebello and Malden Island to take part in the tests that made the nuclear deterrent we are discussing today possible. I pay tribute to them and encourage the Government to try to look after those people. We must remember that we owe them a great debt of gratitude and it would be most helpful if my hon. Friend the Minister paid tribute to them when he winds up the debate.

For Plymouth, the deterrent is not just a defence weapon but a key part of our local economy, as well as of the national economy. It helps us retain our skills base, especially in Devonport, which is part of my constituency, and, of course, in Barrow-in-Furness. Devonport dockyard, which is responsible for refuelling and refitting our nuclear submarines, is a vital part of our local economy as more than 25,000 people in the Devonport travel-to-work area depend on defence for their livelihood. The mind-boggling announcement by the Liberal Democrats that the UK should move away from a continuous at-sea deterrent and reduce the number of submarines from four to three would have a devastating impact on my city’s economy. Their insistence that the maingate decision should be delayed until after 2015 has produced real uncertainty in our local economy.

If the ill-minded desire of the Liberal Democrats, the Scottish national party, Plaid Cymru and the Greens were to become reality, it could damage not only the livelihoods of 25,000 people but the skills base in a city with a low-skills and low-wage economy. It would damage the job prospects of those young people who are at the university technical college in Devonport, which is set to give youngsters an education that will eventually deliver a skilled work force who want to be employed in our dockyard. The measure would be most unhelpful.

A reduction in the number of nuclear submarines would mean less refitting work, and our highly skilled work force in the dockyard would have to move elsewhere in the country, which would also be problematic for the local economy. Given the importance of Devonport to the south-west economy and the defence of our nation, I find it extraordinary that the majority of the smaller parties in the House are doing everything they can to delay maingate for the Trident replacement. It is quite apparent that the future security of our country is going to be one of the bargaining tools that they can use in any negotiations that they have with Labour, should the result of the general election be a score draw, as happened in 2010.

Sadly, the leader of the Labour party has not said that the future of four nuclear submarines and a continuous at-sea deterrent is not up for negotiation in any potential coalition or supply and demand agreement. At least we now know that only an outright Conservative victory will ensure that our country will continue to play a significant part in global politics and that we have the necessary tools to defend ourselves. That is why I will continue to use the Royal Navy’s truly excellent toast from the Napoleonic wars: confusion to the enemy on this issue so that we can ensure that Drake’s drum can be put away for the next five years and we will not hear a drum beat for many a year yet.

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[Mr Godsiff]

I take note of what the hon. Gentleman has said, but we are where we are. We acquired these weapons from the USA.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

The hon. Gentleman, as always, is being very thoughtful on the subject. What he has said is true: the missile bodies are from a common pool that we share with the Americans. What makes a weapon system independent is not who manufactures it, and not who co-owns it—it is who is in a position to launch it if the need arises. There would be an enormous lead time to any withdrawal of the sort of co-operation that we need from America, so if there were any attempt at a surprise attack on the UK, because America does not have its finger on our nuclear trigger, the independent system is exactly that.

[Mr Godsiff]

The hon. Gentleman is knowledgeable about defence issues, but he will recognise that one of NATO’s founding beliefs was, and still is, that an attack on one is an attack on all. The view that the country could be subject to a nuclear attack without the response of the American nuclear umbrella is, in my opinion, inconceivable, and is completely contrary to what NATO is and why it has been successful.

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[Sir Nick Harvey]

As I have said, it was something that we calibrated to be our need in 1980. If one casts one’s mind back to 1980, one will see that our conventional defences were very much greater than they are today. The scale of the nuclear deterrent that we mounted at that time was a relatively small proportion of a large defence, but what we are considering now, as we look forward to the next 30 or 40 years, is a much greater proportion of a much smaller defence because of the succession of cuts that have been made since then.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

The hon. Gentleman says that we can look forward in anticipation of certain types of dangers but that there is no known nuclear threat. May I remind him of how suddenly the crisis in Ukraine blew up; if it were to develop, as it could, into all-out war that then spilled over into Lithuania or Poland, which are NATO members, nuclear deterrents might become very relevant indeed, very quickly.

[Sir Nick Harvey]

I will come on to talk about the implications and the consequences of using nuclear weapons, but—although the hon. Gentleman is right to say that the security situation in and around Ukraine deteriorated rapidly—I do not accept for one moment that anything that has happened there makes the prospect of nuclear conflict between ourselves and Russia any more likely than it was before all that started.

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[Sir Nick Harvey]

If the hon. Gentleman bears with me, I shall do my best to explain my position and where I am coming from.

I profoundly agree that we should not allow the Barrow submarine-building capability to fall apart—if we do not place such orders at that shipyard in the next few years, it will be necessary to give it other contracts—but I do not support the construction of submarines whose sole purpose and capability is to carry a nuclear weapon, thus committing us to a £30 billion investment programme with but one purpose and forcing us to be a nuclear power for the next 30 and 40 years unless we are prepared to write off a capital investment of that scale.

The United States has used some of its Ohio class submarines for quite different purposes. The US has developed a means of firing conventional weapons through their missile tubes, and it has used those submarines in a tactical role and in support of special forces operations. To my mind, it is certainly the case that if we are to build new submarines—I think we should, for the reasons I have given—we must ensure that they are capable of performing other functions, as the United States has done with its large submarines.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

The hon. Gentleman is being terribly generous in giving way. The fact is that his party’s policy, strange though it is, is to build another two Trident submarines, however they are deployed. Does it not follow logically, given the terms of the motion, that the hon. Gentleman and his party should vote with us against it?

[Sir Nick Harvey]

No, because that would imply that we were in favour of a full-scale, like-for-like replacement of the Trident programme. [Interruption.] If one is going to be pedantic, the motion refers to a missile system that is not due for replacement for some years. In fact, what needs to be decided in the next year or so is whether we shall build new submarines. I think we should, but if we make such an investment, it is essential that the submarines are capable of performing other functions. I do not believe that it makes any sense whatever for us to sail the high seas 24/7, waving weapons of mass destruction at the rest of the world, because we thought it was necessary in 1980 or because we would be left looking embarrassed if we did not make that £30 billion investment.

The Defence Secretary seemed to suggest that to adopt any deployment posture other than continuous at-sea deterrence was somehow risible and laughable, but many sensible studies by serious people have looked at a ladder of different postures for the UK to take. My belief is that we should for the time being retain the components of a nuclear deterrent—the warhead, and the ability to look after it; the missile, and the arrangement with the Americans; and the submarines capable of firing a nuclear weapon—and maintain a highly skilled work force who are regularly exercised in how to put back together the deterrent’s components. NATO air-based nuclear systems in eastern Europe operate on the same basis of a well-exercised drill to put the pieces of the deterrent together if it is thought necessary.

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[Sir Nick Harvey]

I invite the Minister to look at how the NATO air-based nuclear capability in eastern Europe operates, because what I am describing is a precise replica of what goes on there. That capability is not on constant patrol or constantly armed; it exists in its component parts, and there is a well-rehearsed exercise for mobilising it and putting it together. Does that have a deterrent impact? I believe it does. If anybody intends to strike faster than that capability can be put together again perhaps it would not, but who is going to do that?

This brings us to the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, which I think are singularly under-perceived in this country and many others, although that is changing fast. The participation of many Governments at conferences—the first in Oslo, the second in Mexico, and the most recent in Vienna—is bringing a far greater degree of awareness around the globe of the impact of using nuclear weapons. I do not believe that the public who have come of age since 1983—the last time we had a meaningful national debate about our nuclear deterrent—understand what the consequences of unleashing the payload of one of our Vanguard submarines, armed with Trident missiles, would constitute.

If one of our submarines were to unleash its payload against, for instance, Moscow—those were the traditional criteria on which we based our capability—I think that some people in this country, possibly even in the House, labour under the misapprehension that the consequences would be pretty grim for people in Moscow and perhaps not very clever for those a few hundred miles around. In reality, if we were to unleash the payload of one of our submarines, the consequences would be global and felt for at least a decade, and at least a billion people would be at risk of dying. The more widely that is understood, the more inconceivable it is that any sane person could ever push the button, and the more widely that is understood, the less deterrent effect the possession of this great paraphernalia comes to have.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

Does the hon. Gentleman recognise that although the British deterrent is used all the time to deter, the only scenario in which it is conceivable that it would be fired would be in retaliation for someone having fired a nuclear salvo against us? Therefore, all the consequences that he mentions would already have happened, and the only question would be whether it would be worthwhile replying under those terrible circumstances. The purpose is to prevent anyone firing the weapons in the first place, and that is how we avoid the environmental consequences.

[Sir Nick Harvey]

I am surprised to hear the hon. Gentleman make that case, because I believe he is right. After such a volley had been unleashed against us, no earthly good could possibly be done by firing one back in retaliation, and the more we think our way through that, the more pointless the whole exercise becomes. Indeed, it is not simply pointless, but the rest of the world is becoming increasingly irate about the complacency of those who continue to have these weapons while saying to everybody else, “You’ve got no right to them, but we’re all right, Jack. We’re going to have them.” That situation is not sustainable for much longer, and it was regrettable that the P5 boycotted the first two conferences. It is much to be welcomed that there was British, American and even Chinese attendance at the most recent conference, because I predict an increasing clamour from other countries around the globe for the nuclear states to begin taking steps down the nuclear ladder. Traditionally that has been done by reducing the stockpile of warheads, but today I have attempted to explain that there are other ways of doing that, and the posture we strike and the way we use our capabilities has an important part to play. It is not 1980 and we do not face the threats we thought we faced then; it is a very different world and there is a way for us to begin climbing down the nuclear ladder. We have the opportunity to do that, and we should take that opportunity and get on with it.

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[John Woodcock]

Goodness! If the hon. Gentleman wants to tell me that firing grain out of the torpedo tubes of the successor to Vanguard-class submarines is an effective use of public money, then he should go ahead. I will come on to his policy in a little while, if he does not mind.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I am greatly enjoying the hon. Gentleman’s speech. Coming back to the real world, is it not the case that the need to have a continuous at-sea deterrent follows directly from the fact that we have a minimum strategic deterrent? We only have four submarines. At any one time only one or two of them can use or fire their missiles—they use them all the time to deter—but the fact is that if we did not have one continuously at sea, a surprise attack would wipe out the whole capacity.

[John Woodcock]

That is exactly right, which is why a part-time deterrent is no real deterrent at all. The point of having submarines that are continuously at sea means that they are, in effect, completely invulnerable. If, in a future nightmare scenario, the UK was seriously threatened by a nuclear attack, any potential nuclear adversary would know that they could not fire without being fired on. Even if they flattened the UK, they would always face the counter-strike. That is why it is a genuine deterrent and makes a nuclear attack less likely.

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[Rory Stewart]

We can, of course, agree with the hon. Gentleman on that. That is true. One of the questions is working out what Britain is going to do, but of course the biggest question for Vladimir Putin is what the United States is going to do. But the reason why these questions, and the uncertainty around them, are relevant is that Vladimir Putin’s decisions on whether to use ambiguous warfare, conventional troops or nuclear weapons will be guided by his perception of what we—the United States or Britain—are likely to do in response.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

Does my hon. Friend agree that the whole point of article 5 of the NATO treaty is not the question of which of the members of NATO an attacked country will look to to get most military help; rather, it is to take any uncertainty out of the question of who will declare war if a NATO country is attacked? Therefore, if a NATO country is attacked, our existing obligations are to declare war on the attacker. Does that not mean that we must be very careful how widely we extend NATO membership?

[Rory Stewart]

I agree absolutely, and that is a very important point. This NATO obligation is an unbelievably serious and important obligation. We have stretched it absolutely to its breaking point. If we are going to be serious about it, we have to follow through and that absolutely means we should not be giving guarantees to people we have no intention of protecting. We should not be writing cheques we are not prepared to have cashed.

The nub of this issue is, of course, that deterrence depends not on whether Britain would use a nuclear weapon, but on whether the other side believes that we would use it. Therefore, the most important support for our nuclear warheads lies not in the Trident missiles or even the submarines; it lies in the character of our nation, which is why there is absolutely no point in our having a discussion about a nuclear deterrent without looking at our defence strategy and posture in general. Deterrence cannot make sense if we get ourselves into a situation, which I sometimes worry my hon. Friend the Member for North Devon (Sir Nick Harvey) is getting himself into, where we believe that simply investing in fancy bits of kit is going to keep us safe. If people do not believe we are going to use them—that we are serious about using them—they will be entirely meaningless.

We can see the problems already, so let us just run through the various justifications that have been laid out here for nuclear weapons. The first was P5 membership. The big question for Britain on P5 membership is whether we are serious about our role in the United Nations at all. Why are we not contributing more to UN peacekeeping?

The subject of Iraq has been raised. The big question on Iraq is not our posturing about caring about terrorism or saying it is a tier 1 threat, but what we are actually doing? At present on the ground outside Kurdistan, while Australia has 300 soldiers, and Italy and Spain are deploying 300, we have exactly three. That means that Britain is not displaying and consistently demonstrating seriousness. This is not about combat troops; it is about being able to analyse the mission, have an intelligent conversation with the Iraqi Government, engage with our coalition allies and play the global role that our enormous defence budget is supposed to provide us with.

On Ukraine and Russia, again, we cannot simply rely on kit; we need to be doing things. The big question for us in Britain is how are we responding to the ambiguous warfare that we can see being propagated in Ukraine? What kind of investments are we making in military intelligence? What kind of investments are we making in cyber and in special forces? How much do we understand the situation on the ground in Ukraine and Russia?

On NATO, it is fine to talk about how important it is for us to be in NATO and to have nuclear weapons, and indeed it is. But it is meaningless if we are not going to stick to the commitments that we made in Wales of 2% of GDP. The most important thing we can do to deter Russia now is to ensure that Russia believes that NATO is serious about defending itself. If we say in a Wales summit that we will spend 2% of GDP, and if we go around telling other countries to spend 2% of GDP—and we should be telling other countries to spend 2% of GDP—we must retain our own promise and commitment, otherwise the nuclear deterrent will not be taken seriously.

Putin will look at us and ultimately conclude that there is a minimal chance of our doing anything if he were to intervene in the Baltic, because in respect of the rapid reaction force commitments, the framework nations—Germany, France and Britain—appear to be struggling to commit in 2016 to maintaining a deployable brigade. It seems to be very difficult to get the countries to work out how that will be funded in 2016. Whereas Russia can deploy 40,000 troops at 72 hours’ notice, the NATO deployment rates are running at about six months.

If we do not reach out to the public, which is why this debate is important, if we do not talk about why Britain is a global power, why we care about the Baltic, why we care about the global order, why we set up NATO, why we have nuclear weapons in the first place, all this will be lost.

To conclude, the fundamental rationale for all this depends on something on which the hon. Member for Newport West (Paul Flynn) and I disagree. This is the nub of the disagreement: do we believe in a world order? Do we believe in NATO? Do we believe Britain is a global power? Do we wish to play a role in the world? If we do, I will vote in favour of those weapons, but the deterrent will not make sense unless the character of the nation is in place, otherwise what we will be doing is creating something a little like the gold inkstand on the Table—a golden pinnacle on top of a cathedral, when the foundations and the structure of that cathedral are lacking and the faith of the nation has been lost.

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[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I begin by saying a word in defence of the Labour party. Scottish National party Members seem to regard anyone who disagrees with them as trivialising the subject and anyone who agrees with them as taking it seriously. I personally greatly value the bipartisan approach taken by successive Labour and Conservative Governments to the maintenance of the nuclear deterrent. It is true that for a few years in the 1980s, the Labour party was captured by its left wing and went down the unilateralist road, but after two massive election defeats in 1983 and 1987, when the nuclear deterrent issue was central to the campaigns, the Labour party changed back to its bipartisan policy of nuclear deterrence.

We saw that reflected the last time we had a vote on this subject, as far as I can recall, which was on 14 March 2007. Tony Blair was still Prime Minister and he was proposing the approval of the renewal of the nuclear deterrent—the first stages of the process which should have got to maingate during this Parliament but are now due to get there in the next one. In that debate, we saw something interesting: almost all the Conservative MPs voted in favour of renewing the nuclear deterrent and keeping it in existence for the next generation; a considerable majority of Labour MPs were also in favour, but a sizeable minority of about 90 were opposed—they were the CND supporters who have been consistent in their principled opposition to nuclear weapons throughout their political lifetime; and also in the “against” camp were the Liberal Democrats and the nationalists. The result of that vote came about because of an agreement between the Front-Bench teams, with the motion being carried by 409 votes to 161.

That vote represented something more than a decision taken in this House; it also represented, quite fairly, the general spread of opinion consistently in this country throughout the cold war and in the years afterwards. When the fundamental question is asked in poll after poll, “Do you think that Britain should continue to have nuclear weapons as long as other countries have them?”, almost exactly two thirds of the population say yes and almost exactly one quarter say no, with single figures or thereabouts, if my arithmetic is correct, for the undecided. It is indeed a very divisive issue and it is one on which it is difficult to have a foot in both camps, although, as we have seen today, our friends the Liberal Democrats are doing their best to do that.

[Mr MacNeil]

The hon. Gentleman will probably know that the last time this was debated was in 2007—and there was a vote—the majority of Scottish MPs voted against—we had an example of English votes for Scottish bombs.

[Dr Lewis]

I was generous in giving way to the hon. Gentleman so soon after he has made his own contribution. All I would say is that I know there was a vote on that day—that is what I just said—and if he tells me that a majority of Scottish MPs may have voted the other way, I accept that; but Scotland is, by choice, part of the United Kingdom and decisions on issues such as this are decisions for the United Kingdom as a whole. I do not believe even the SNP thinks that devo-max ought to include defence policy. If it does, we are in an even worse situation than I anticipated.

We heard from the hon. Member for North Devon (Sir Nick Harvey), who is a friend of mine, about moving away from the cold war. What one moves away from, one can move back to, and more quickly than one anticipates—particularly if, as the Chairman of the Defence Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Rory Stewart), said in his excellent speech, one’s enemies or potential enemies have good reason to doubt one’s will and determination to stand up for the agreements one has made and to use the deterrent power one has to prevent war from breaking out in the first place. I was very surprised that the hon. Member for North Devon did not think that the events in Ukraine had any bearing on our discussions today. I think the events in Ukraine are highly relevant, particularly as NATO has a rather strange open-door policy to membership, which it should not have. It should not grant membership to any country that we are not prepared to go to war for if it is invaded.

[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

Does the hon. Gentleman also accept that the importance of Ukraine and Kiev is that this is the first time that we have had a unilateral breach of international borders since world war two? It is the kind of thing that we thought would not happen again, and it has, so the context remains the same.

[Dr Lewis]

It does indeed, and what really worries me is that because the intensity of the fighting has been so great, it is easy to imagine that it could spill over into a nearby country that is a member of NATO. If that happens, we would be at war with Russia. It is frightening to think what our summer would have been like if we had previously gone down the route of admitting Ukraine to NATO membership, sympathetic though we are. I remember that we stood by during the uprisings in central and eastern Europe that occurred when half the continent was under Russian control. We were very sympathetic to the Hungarians, and I remember with total clarity that we were terribly sympathetic to the Czechoslovakians, but nobody seriously suggested that we could go to war for those countries because of the geopolitical realities at that time.

[Bob Stewart]

I seem to recall in December 1994 that four nations—three nations and Ukraine—guaranteed the sovereign integrity of Ukraine in return for it getting rid of its nuclear weapons. It has got rid of its nuclear weapons, but we have not guaranteed its security.

[Dr Lewis]

Yes, and that should serve as a warning to us not to enter lightly into agreements that we have no intention of defending—I mean defending in the military sense.

It is just over 100 years since the outbreak of the first world war. I remember looking back in the archives of the inter-war period when a great debate was raging over whether or not it was safe to continue with the 10-year rule. I have mentioned it in the House before. It is highly relevant, so I will mention it again. The idea of the 10-year rule was that the Government would look ahead for a decade and see whether they thought there was any danger of a major war breaking out. If they did not see any such danger, they would cut the defence budget. That was rolled forward from 1919 right through to the early 1930s when it was eventually scrapped when Hitler came to power. It had a very damaging effect on our level of preparedness.

Lord Hankey, as he later became, was the Military Secretary of the Cabinet. In 1931, as an argument for scrapping the 10-year rule, he looked back to that summer of 1914 and said that far from having 10 years’ warning of the outbreak of the first world war, we had barely 10 days because of the rapidity with which the various alliances triggered each other into action. Suddenly, from nowhere, we have found ourselves drawn into a conflict with practically no notice whatever.

[Rory Stewart]

My hon. Friend pointed out in an essay that Maurice Hankey had said that we had failed to predict the 1870 Franco-Prussian war. Most recently, we failed to predict Russia going into Ukraine and Daesh taking over western Iraq, so I agree very wholeheartedly with my hon. Friend.

[Dr Lewis]

I am flattered to know that my hon. Friend the Chairman of the Committee reads my writings, and even quotes them back to me. I am very grateful to him.

I want to stress that I believe that the SNP has chosen this debate today—I congratulate the hon. Member for Moray (Angus Robertson), who I am pleased to see back in his place to hear my contribution, on securing it—with a particular political scenario in mind. SNP Members know that the majority of Labour Members and their supporters across the country agree with the concept of nuclear deterrence. They know that an overwhelming majority of Conservatives agree with nuclear deterrence. They are hoping to obtain something that they can use in the event of a future hung Parliament, in precisely the way that the Liberal Democrats were able to use their bargaining power to secure the postponement of the passing of the maingate decision from this Parliament to the next one. I think that was a terrible decision and it set a terrible precedent, but I am greatly reassured by the strength of the speech made by my right hon. Friend the Defence Secretary today.

When my hon. Friend the Minister winds up, I wish to hear that something will be done about the future of Trident and the holding of the maingate vote on time, as scheduled, in 2016 similar to what we have said about other areas of policy. We have seen authoritative statements in the press that no coalition will be entered into by the Conservatives unless it provides for an in/out referendum on the EU; similarly we have seen that no coalition will be entered into by the Conservatives unless it provides for passage of the draft Communications Data Bill. Those are two very important issues, but I submit that the future of the British minimum strategic nuclear deterrent is just as important as those two issues, if not more so. Until that vote is held, and held successfully, I shall continue to press those on my Front Bench for a commitment that we will never again allow the future of the strategic nuclear deterrent to be used in the way that it was in 2010 by a minority party in coalition negotiations.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

Order. The hon. Gentleman spoke for 31 minutes, and very long interventions will not help those Members who want to speak.

[Dr Lewis]

I shall also try to be more concise in the remainder of my speech, Mr Deputy Speaker.

All I can say to the hon. Member for North Devon, whom I greatly respect and admire, is that he ought to have a word with the then president of the Liberal Democrats, who proudly proclaimed on the Liberal Democrats’ official website that it was entirely as a result of the Liberal Democrats that we had not taken the decisive step of signing the maingate contract in this Parliament. I can only leave them to decide the issue between themselves.

Let me return to some of the purely military arguments in favour of the continuation of the strategic deterrent, mercifully leaving the politics to one side. The most important argument, as I have stated in previous debates in this House, is the recognition that future military threats and conflicts will be no more predictable than those that engulfed us throughout the 20th century. That is the overriding justification for preserving armed forces in peace time as a national insurance policy. No one knows which enemies might confront us during the next 50 years, for that is the period we are discussing by the time everything is designed, constructed and deployed, and has served out its operational lifetime. It is highly probable that at least some of those potential enemies will be armed with weapons of mass destruction.

Secondly, it is not the weapons themselves that we have to fear but the nature of the regimes that possess them. While democracies are usually reluctant to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear dictatorships, although they did so against Japan in 1945 as has been pointed out, the reverse is not true.

[James Morris (Halesowen and Rowley Regis) (Con)]

There is consensus in the international community about the Iranian nuclear programme and efforts to reduce it. Significant nuclear proliferation in the middle east is likely in the next 20 or 30 years, which feeds into my hon. Friend’s argument about the 50-year time span that we should consider in this debate.

[Dr Lewis]

It does indeed. I cannot think of an existing nuclear power that has done more than the United Kingdom to slim down and reduce the firepower of its independent nuclear deterrent. The response, as has been repeatedly pointed out by Government Members and by some Opposition Members, to those unilateral reductions on our part has been absolutely zero. There is not the slightest shred of evidence that if we were to abandon our nuclear deterrent completely any other country would follow suit. All that would happen would be that those near-misses, which have been discussed so eloquently today—the risks of nuclear Armageddon by accident—would continue between the superpowers if they are tangible risks, but we would add another risk: the risk that someone hostile to us with a nuclear armament could blackmail us into concessions, surrender or absolute annihilation. The risk of the deliberate firing of nuclear weapons against us is something that we would be crazy to accept voluntarily and unnecessarily.

Returning to the reluctance of democracies to launch nuclear weapons against countries that do not have them—although we use them, as I have said, continuously as deterrents—we should consider the alternative. If a dictatorship such as that in Argentina had had an arsenal of even a few small atomic weapons and the means to deliver them, no matter how many conventional forces we had had, we would not have dared to retake the Falkland Islands, because we must not project on to other countries that do not share our political principles and freedoms the sense of self-restraint that we apply to ourselves.

The third argument that I always outline is that the United Kingdom has traditionally played a more important and decisive role in preserving freedom than other medium-sized democracies have been able or willing to do. Democratic countries that do not have a nuclear deterrent have little choice but to declare themselves neutral and hope for the best or to rely on the nuclear umbrella of more powerful allies. The United Kingdom, for historical reasons, is a nuclear power, and it is much harder to defeat it than many other democracies by conventional means because of our physical separation from the continent.

The next argument is that our prominence as the principal ally of the United States, our strategic geographical position, to which I have just referred, and the fact that we are the junior partner might tempt an aggressor to risk attacking us separately. Given the difficulties of overrunning the UK with conventional forces, compared with our more vulnerable allies, an aggressor might be tempted to use one or more mass-destruction weapons against us on the assumption that the United States would not respond on our behalf. Even if that assumption were false, the attacker would find out his mistake only when it was too late for all concerned. An independently controlled British nuclear deterrent massively reduces the prospect of such a fatal miscalculation.

The fifth military argument, which was mentioned earlier, is that no amount of conventional force can compensate for the military disadvantage that faces a non-nuclear country in a conflict against a nuclear-armed enemy. The atomic bombing of Japan is especially instructive not only because the emperor was forced to surrender but because of what might have happened in the reverse scenario. If Japan had developed atomic bombs in the summer of 1945 and the allies had not, a conventional allied invasion to end the war would have been out of the question.

I tend to find that people wish to try to sweep aside the patent logic of nuclear deterrence by projecting on to historical figures events that did not happen and could never possibly be tested. The hon. Member for Na h-Eileanan an Iar (Mr MacNeil), who has now left his place, asserted that Hitler would not have been constrained by a nuclear deterrent held by the allies if he had had nuclear weapons. In 1943, Hitler proposed to use the nerve gas, tabun, which was far, far more deadly than the gases that the allies then possessed. When he consulted his chief scientists, they said that it was most unlikely that the allies had not discovered tabun too, and he therefore decided not to employ it, even though it would have had a devastating effect. That is an example of even Hitler being deterred by the mistaken belief that his enemies had a weapon when in fact they did not.

The hon. Member for Moray made his points with clarity and calmness, as always. He said that he did not think that deterrence had worked. Of course, when something does not happen—that is, world war three—it is difficult to show that it would have happened if one had done something different. However, I always apply the test of the proxy war. The right hon. Member for Lewisham, Deptford (Dame Joan Ruddock) observed that throughout the cold war period many proxy wars went on around the globe. In fact, that is an argument in favour of the case that nuclear deterrence had something to do with the fact that the superpowers did not fight each other in Europe. If no other conflicts had been going on among proxies of the superpowers, one could have argued that they would not be likely to have been at each others’ throats if they did not have a nuclear deterrent. The fact that they were fighting each other by every means possible other than open war—state to state—on the European continent strongly suggests that the possession of the nuclear deterrent, and the balance of terror, had something to do with that stability.

[Mark Tami (Alyn and Deeside) (Lab)]

The hon. Gentleman will no doubt agree that in the preceding period, which is the only thing we can base our evidence on, there was a whole series of European wars with the major powers fighting each other.

[Dr Lewis]

Exactly. That leads us back to the heart of what the concept of deterrence requires in order to work. Deterrence means that a potential aggressor must not only face a degree of retaliation that is unacceptable if inflicted, but be convinced that that retaliation is unavoidable.

The key point about nuclear deterrence was made in a 1945 study by the leading defence scientist when nuclear weapons were first being considered as a concept. I love quoting the example—I have done so on previous occasions—given by Professor Sir Henry Tizard, who was one of the chief scientific advisers to the wartime Government, when he first considered what the atomic bomb would mean if it worked. He said that he could see no way of preventing an atomic bomb from being used except by the fear of retaliation, and he illustrated that by saying:

“A knowledge that we were prepared, in the last resort”—

our deterrent has always been the final resort, if the future existence of the nation is at stake—

“might well deter an aggressive nation. Duelling was a recognised method of settling quarrels between men of high social standing so long as the duellists stood twenty paces apart and fired at each other with pistols of a primitive type. If the rule had been that they should stand a yard apart with pistols at each other’s hearts, we doubt whether it would long have remained a recognised method of settling affairs of honour.”

The hon. Member for Moray referred to a number of things that I will touch on briefly. He talked about our obligations under article VI of the non-proliferation treaty, which states:

“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

The only thing that is time-limited in that commitment is the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date. We are not engaged in a nuclear arms race with anyone. We never have been and we have successively, as I said earlier, been reducing our capacity with little or no response from the other nuclear powers.

The other two, open-ended commitments are to achieve nuclear disarmament and to achieve general and complete disarmament. The article wisely recognises the link between the two, because one thing we do not wish to do by removing the balance of terror and by achieving even multilateral nuclear disarmament is to make the world safe again for conventional conflict between the major powers.

[Angus Robertson]

Will the hon. Gentleman update the House on the initiatives led by his Government to fulfil their obligations? He will forgive me, but I have not caught up with the discussions his Government have had with other nuclear powers to fulfil those obligations.

[Dr Lewis]

I do not think the hon. Gentleman has understood the three obligations I have listed. The first is to work for the cessation of the nuclear arms race—we are not a part of the nuclear arms race—at an early date. The second is to achieve world nuclear disarmament, and the third is to achieve general and complete conventional disarmament. I believe that those are, frankly, utopian visions that we work towards but which suffer setbacks according to the state of the world at any time, and the state of the world at the moment is one of grave disturbance and serious potential threats.

[Mr Jenkin]

I am sorry that I missed the earlier part of my hon. Friend’s speech. Surely the point is that there is no obligation at all to disarm unilaterally in any shape or form, yet that seems to be the policy favoured by the supporters of this motion.

[Dr Lewis]

I entirely agree.

I must bring my remarks to a close for the sake of other Members, but I would simply say that, although much has been said about the cost of the deterrent, so far as I know our deterrent has never amounted to more than 10% of the overall defence budget. Arguments about the deterrent must be made on the basis either that people believe it is necessary to have one to prevent this country from facing nuclear blackmail, or they do not. If people believe that a deterrent is necessary for such a role, 10%, 20% or even 30% of the defence budget is not too much to pay. Fortunately, we will not have to pay anything like that sum. It is comparable with the cost of the High Speed 2 rail system that we propose to build. In my opinion, our priorities should lie in a slightly different direction, given the cuts that defence has taken.

[Mr Marcus Jones (Nuneaton) (Con)]

My hon. Friend is an expert on these matters and is making a compelling case. Does he agree that it would be completely naive to accept the SNP’s position as set out in the motion, particularly in thinking that if we disarm in this sense, others will follow?

[Dr Lewis]

Yes, indeed. As I said, the evidence points in the opposite direction.

I have covered the point about gaps in conventional capability. If the nuclear deterrent were scrapped, there is no guarantee that the money saved—all of it, or even any of it—would be put towards conventional forces. Even if it were, no amount of conventional forces can compensate for the absence of the ability to deter nuclear blackmail.

We have heard in graphic terms the consequences of the explosion of a nuclear weapon. All I can say is that everybody agrees it would be a disaster if nuclear weapons were fired and exploded. The question is: what is the best way of preventing that from happening? Time after time, when asked the key question about keeping a nuclear deterrent as long as other countries have one, people have shown in overwhelming numbers that they subscribe to the route of peace through deterrence. I subscribe to that, as do most Labour Members, but the smaller parties do not. It would be an outrageous betrayal of the first duty of government—namely, defence—if either of the two main parties, if there were a hung Parliament after the next election, allowed this matter to become a negotiating issue in forming a coalition. The issues at stake are far too important for that.

Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 12th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

Successive Governments, Labour and Conservative, have been committed to our continuous at-sea deterrent for more than 45 years, and I hope that the Labour party in Scotland will not waiver from that. It would be extremely dangerous to move to any kind of part-time or lesser deterrent, and the Conservative party will not gamble with Britain’s national security.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend has just made that commitment to continuous at-sea deterrence and, as I understand, it is the position of both main parties that the successor submarines for Trident should go ahead. Will he therefore guarantee to me that there will be no question of any delay in signing the main-gate contracts if we end up with another hung Parliament and the Liberal Democrats or Scottish nationalists seek to exact that as a price for their participation and support?

[Michael Fallon]

I confirm to my hon. Friend and to the House that the main-gate decision is scheduled for 2016. I will not speculate on the possibility of a hung Parliament, except to note that I know the Liberal Democrats would favour some kind of part-time deterrent, although it is pretty obvious to me that our enemies are not part time.

UK Armed Forces (Iraq)

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 15th December 2014 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

I think the House will endorse that. The right hon. Lady knows as much about Iraq, in particular about the Kurdish areas, as anybody in this House. There are lessons on the type of aid that was given and what we can do now to help the new democratically elected Government in Iraq to build on some of the earlier support we offered. On whether there should be a debate on Iraq, that is not a matter for me. However, I look forward to my appearance before the Select Committee later this week.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

When insurgents such as ISIL break cover and seize and hold territory, they lose the advantages of secrecy and surprise. It should therefore not be too difficult in the short to medium term to expel them, but then they will go back to guerrilla and terror tactics. Will the Government have in place a medium to long-term strategy for containing that sort of warfare? We have lacked such a strategy in the past when we oscillated between nation building at one extreme and doing little or nothing at the other.

[Michael Fallon]

The tactics of ISIL vary and there is some evidence that it is already altering its tactics in the face of air strikes. The overall strategy has to be led and endorsed by the Government of Iraq. It is very important that, in the end, the campaign is led by the home-grown army of Iraqi and Kurdish forces, with the support of the international coalition. The strategy has to be formulated there rather than here, but we can offer specialist expertise.

Afghanistan

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Thursday 27th November 2014 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his first comment. The tragic event in Kabul this morning is a reminder that this campaign has involved all kinds of people—civilian contractors, locally employed staff, and so on—in addition to the combat troops that we seconded. The intention is that the main London memorial will pay tribute to the memory of all those involved—everyone from the civil service staff in my Ministry all the way through to those who fought and those who supported those who fought. That will certainly include those who were employed on a civilian basis in Kabul. I will certainly look at his suggestion about encouraging local authorities to play their part in this memorialisation. I understand that some councils have already taken the decision to name particular streets after local heroes who lost their lives in the campaign. This is certainly something that we ought to encourage.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Many of the specialists involved in the successful withdrawal of heavy equipment from Afghanistan are from the 17th Port and Maritime Regiment of the Royal Logistic Corps based at Marchwood in my constituency, and I hope that the Secretary of State will take this opportunity to confirm that that military port facility will be neither run down nor degraded in any way.

On the question of the lessons of the campaign, it is a fact that there are al-Qaeda-type groups in many other countries, too, and we must develop a doctrine—based on strategic bases and bridgehead areas, as I have endeavoured to suggest on previous occasions—to enable us to tackle those groups without having to take on nation-building from the ground up in every country where they appear, because that is an impossible strategy and we need a flexible, sensible strategy for the future.

[Michael Fallon]

I note what my hon. Friend says about Marchwood, of which he has been a great champion. He does not need me to confirm the important role that it has played in the recovery of so much equipment, matériel and vehicles from Afghanistan. I can certainly confirm that we will have a continuing use for that kind of facility.

I also note what my hon. Friend says about the doctrine. We are seeing al-Qaeda in different forms in some countries, and we are seeing it mutate into ISIL. He makes the important point that the western nations are simply unable to reconstruct whole countries time and again.

Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 24th November 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Dunne]

What I can confirm to the hon. Lady and to the House is that we have today signed a contract for the first batch of four operational aircraft for the first squadron to operate, both from the aircraft carriers and on land.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

When the carriers are happily operational there will still be one other gap at sea, which will be in marine patrol aircraft. Can the Minister share with the House any moves as to how that gap is going to be filled?

[Mr Dunne]

As my hon. Friend knows from his persistent challenging of the Front-Bench team on this and other equipment issues, we recognise the need to consider how to meet the maritime patrol aircraft capability gap as part of the strategic defence and security review 2015.

--- Later in debate ---

[Michael Fallon]

I certainly welcome that suggestion. I think there should be a wide-ranging process. The point I made earlier was that we cannot start the review now in 2014—it is scheduled for 2015—but it is important, obviously, that we consult widely when it gets under way, not least with our international allies.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

In welcoming the announcement about war widows, may I ask whether it is the case that a war widow who lost her widow’s pension on remarriage but who has subsequently become single again is eligible to have it reinstated and never taken away under any circumstances thereafter?

[Anna Soubry]

I believe the answer is yes, but I have to be cautious and say that if I am wrong I will, of course, inform both the House and my hon. Friend.

Points of Order

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 24th November 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

There is no difference between commissioned and non-commissioned for this purpose. Beyond that, I would tell the hon. Gentleman, to whom I would never intend any discourtesy, that the decision whether to use the term—the newly appointed Under-Secretary of State for Defence, the hon. Member for Canterbury (Mr Brazier), chooses to do so—is purely a matter of taste. If memory serves, the former Minister, the right hon. Member for South Leicestershire (Mr Robathan), was himself partial to using the term, and I think it has been used in relation to him as well. It is a matter of parliamentary taste. I am sure that we all intend to show good taste to the hon. Member for Huddersfield (Mr Sheerman), as he is now in his 35th year of parliamentary service.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

On a point of order, Mr Speaker. May I ask, while members of the Defence team are still in their places, whether you have been informed that we are in sight of having the statement or debate on the ending of the campaign in Afghanistan, and the lessons to be drawn from that, which we were promised a little while ago?

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Michael Fallon)]

indicated assent.

Armed Forces (Investment)

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Tuesday 18th November 2014 Westminster Hall

[Oliver Colvile]

Or the DUP—but let me deal with the other two.

Earlier today I looked at the Liberal Democrats’ website. They are still saying:

“Britain's nuclear deterrent, which consists of four Trident submarines, is out-dated and expensive. It is a relic of the Cold War and not up-to-date in 21st century Britain. Nowadays, most of our threats come from individual terrorist groups, not communist countries with nuclear weapons.

The Liberal Democrats are the only main party willing to face up to those facts.

The UK has four Trident submarines on constant patrol, which are nearing the end of their life. A decision needs to be made about what we do to replace them.”

I emphasise that I am quoting the Liberal Democrats:

“It would be extremely expensive and unnecessary to replace all four submarines, so we propose to replace some of the submarines instead. They would not be on constant patrol but could be deployed if the threat from a nuclear-armed country increased.”

They quite obviously have taken no notice of what has been going on in Ukraine.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

My hon. Friend is making a crucial point. It is worth adding that the Liberal Democrats, when sending a submarine to sea, would send it unarmed, wait for a crisis to arise and then sail the submarine back to its home port in order to put the nuclear weapons on board, presumably by the grace and favour of the country now threatening us.

[Oliver Colvile]

I thank my hon. Friend for making that point. The Liberal Democrats are making it clear that they want to reduce the number of submarines and they might make that a condition of being in any coalition with the Labour party.

On Saturday, Nicola Sturgeon, the new leader of the SNP, told her party conference:

“My pledge to Scotland today is simple—the SNP will never, ever, put the Tories into government.”

She added that Labour would

“have to think again about putting a new generation of Trident nuclear weapons on the river Clyde.”

On Andrew Marr’s programme on Sunday, Mr Findlay, a candidate to be leader of the Scottish Labour party, set out a radical agenda for his party. He confirmed that under his leadership Scottish Labour would oppose Trident on the Clyde. He confirmed that that had been Scottish Labour’s policy for some little while. That is in line with the position of the Scottish trades unions.

I very much hope that the Minister will confirm that a future Conservative-led Government will remain committed to four continuous at-sea deterrent submarines. My concern is that if the nuclear submarines are thrown out of Scotland, the Government of the day might decide that our submarine base and dockyard should be relocated from Devonport to another site. Some 25,000 people in the travel-to-work area of Devonport depend on defence for their jobs.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister for the Armed Forces (Mr Mark Francois)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport (Oliver Colvile) on securing this debate and giving us the opportunity to discuss this important subject. Before turning to the matter at hand, namely investment in our armed forces, I will take this opportunity to offer my public thanks to him for his staunch support of the armed forces, including in his role as the vice-chairman for the Royal Navy and Royal Marines in the all-party group on the armed forces, and for his support of the 350th anniversary of the Royal Marines this year.

As for investment in the armed forces, the UK is one of the 12 founding members of NATO and takes that role seriously. We have the second largest defence budget in the alliance, behind the United States, and the largest in the European Union. This Government are committed to and indeed meet both key NATO spending targets, spending 2% of our GDP on the defence budget and over 20% of that budget on new equipment. Those commitments were reaffirmed in September by the defence spending pledge made at the NATO summit that the UK proudly hosted in Wales.

Our equipment programme represents a substantial investment of some £164 billion over 10 years, and is expressed annually in our published defence equipment plan. The Army is receiving significant investment in a number of equipment programmes. In September, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence announced a £3.5 billion contract for the highly advanced Scout armoured vehicle, which will boost our capability and sustain 1,300 jobs across the United Kingdom supply chain. We are also investing in expanding our fleet of battle-proven Foxhound armoured vehicles and upgrading our fleet of Apache attack helicopters and our Challenger 2 main battle tank fleet.

The Royal Air Force boasts an impressive equipment programme, which includes enhancing the Typhoon via Tranche 2 and Tranche 3 upgrades to maintain its battle-winning edge and procuring the new F-35 Lightning II joint strike fighter, which will place this country at the forefront of fighter technology, as the United Kingdom is the only level 1 partner with the United States in that programme. We recently announced agreement in principle to procure the next four F-35B aircraft for the United Kingdom. This month, the Ministry of Defence has taken delivery of its first A400M Atlas, marking the start of the RAF’s next generation of airlift capability. Production and delivery for the remaining fleet will continue at pace to deliver the full fleet of 22 aircraft by early 2018. We have also recently acquired 14 new heavy-lift Chinook Mk 6 helicopters, to be based at RAF Odiham, giving us one of the largest Chinook fleets in the world after the United States.

To move particularly close to my hon. Friend’s heart, the Royal Navy continues to be one of the premier navies in the world, especially as we look forward to the delivery of the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers, the largest ships ever built in the United Kingdom. I was delighted and honoured to be at the naming ceremony of HMS Queen Elizabeth in July, a truly historic occasion. I was also pleased that the Prime Minister announced at the NATO summit that the second carrier, HMS Prince of Wales, will also be brought into service, ensuring that we always have one carrier available 100% of the time. The Navy is also procuring and supporting seven Astute class nuclear attack submarines and six Type 45 Destroyers, and is starting the transition from Type 23 frigates to the new Type 26 global combat ships. The recent contract award for three offshore patrol vessels also serves to strengthen the Royal Navy’s capabilities and maintain shipbuilding skills in the United Kingdom.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

Will the Minister confirm that 13 Type 26 vessels will be ordered?

[Mr Francois]

As my hon. Friend will know, we are still at the assessment phase for the Type 26 programme, but 13 is still the planning assumption.

Additionally, the latest version of the Royal Marines’ protected mobility Viking vehicle is being rolled out, and four new Royal Fleet Auxiliary tankers will be built over the next four years, with the first due to enter service in 2016.

We are also making full provision for the successor deterrent system, providing the ultimate guarantee of our national security. In answer to the question asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport—and to an intervention by my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) before he has made it—the Royal Navy has maintained a continuous at-sea deterrent for over 50 years, based on four boats. It is envisaged that that will continue under a new Conservative Government.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

I would not have liked the Minister to have anticipated an intervention that was not then made, so can we therefore conclude that in a hung Parliament there would be no question of our ever agreeing again to a deal with another party to postpone the main-gate contract signing, as unfortunately happened in 2010?

[Mr Francois]

My hon. Friend, with his usual eloquence, tempts me down a difficult alley. I cannot give him the assurance that he wants on that point, but I think I have made the party’s position on four boats clear. I regret that I disappoint him, as I know he has hankered for a fifth boat for some time, but I cannot promise that to him either.

Furthermore, we are significantly increasing our investment in cyber-security, ensuring our armed forces are equipped with cutting edge capabilities across all environments. That combined investment is not only securing the best possible military capability, but helping to secure UK jobs and growth. The UK defence industry employs more than 160,000 people, with a turnover of some £22 billion.

I turn now to naval bases. For generations, up and down the country, many communities have given outstanding support to our armed forces. That is particularly true for those around the Royal Navy’s three main naval bases at Devonport, Portsmouth and Clyde.

Her Majesty’s naval base Devonport delivers world-class, safe and secure operational capability and support to the fleet. Devonport is home to Britain’s amphibious ships, HMS Ocean, HMS Bulwark and HMS Albion; HMS Protector, the ice patrol ship; survey vessels; half the Royal Navy’s frigates; flag officer sea training, the training hub of the front-line fleet; and the centre of amphibious excellence at Royal Marines Tamar. Devonport is also the main support base for the Royal Navy, particularly with its unique deep maintenance refuelling and defuelling facility for nuclear submarines.

The Devonport base employs 2,500 service personnel and MOD civilians, supports around 400 local firms and generates around 10% of Plymouth’s income. In all, some 25,000 people in Devonport’s travel-to-work area depend on defence for their livelihoods—and in my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport they have a worthy champion.

Portsmouth naval base is home to almost two thirds of the Royal Navy’s surface ships, including the Type 45 destroyers, half the Type 23 fleet and the mine countermeasures and fishery protection squadrons—something close to my heart, as my father, to whom my hon. Friend kindly referred, served on a minesweeper at D-day. HMS Clyde, the Falkland Islands patrol vessel, is also based at Portsmouth, which will be home to the two new Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers, the first of which should arrive in early 2017.

Her Majesty’s naval base Clyde is the naval service’s main presence in Scotland. It is home to the core of the submarine service, including the nation’s nuclear deterrent, and the Royal Navy’s newest and most advanced submarines, HMS Astute and HMS Ambush. From 2020, Clyde will be the Royal Navy’s single integrated submarine operating base and submarine centre of specialisation. The nearby Royal Navy armaments depot at Coulport is responsible for the storage, processing, maintenance and issue of key elements of the UK’s trident deterrent missile system and the ammunitioning of all submarine-embarked weapons.

The 2010 strategic defence and security review confirmed the requirement to maintain all three naval bases. This commitment is evidenced by the recently announced maritime support delivery framework—MSDF.

Turning specifically to that framework, on 13 October my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence notified the House that the Ministry of Defence had awarded two contracts to provide continued support to the management of the UK’s naval bases, and maintenance and repair of Royal Navy warships and submarines to ensure that they are able to meet their operational commitments. The award of these contracts, with a combined value of £3.2 billion, shows a clear indication of our continued commitment to invest in the support provided to the Royal Navy.

MSDF contracts have been awarded to both our industrial partners at naval bases. The contract awarded to Babcock to provide support services at Her Majesty’s naval bases at Devonport and Clyde is valued at £2.6 billion, and the contract awarded to BAE Systems to provide support services at Portsmouth naval base is worth some £600 million. The Babcock MSDF contract covers the 5.5 years to March 2020. The BAE Systems contract covers an initial period of 4.5 years to March 2019, with an option to extend it for an additional year.

We should recognise the contribution that this level of investment will make to the long-term economic health of the nation’s three main naval bases. They will sustain around 7,500 industry jobs across the three naval bases, with 4,000 of those jobs in my hon. Friend’s constituency at Devonport naval base. I thank him for his kind words and I will ensure that his gratitude is passed on personally to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, whom I will see in about an hour. I hope my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport considers that to be telegraphing the message pretty quickly.

There will also be 1,500 jobs at Clyde naval base and more than 2,000 at Portsmouth. MSDF is a modern commercial and financial strategy replacing a number of existing support contracts with one wider contracting framework with each company. We have consolidated several different contracts into two main ones. This new strategy incentivises industry to transform and rationalise to meet the needs of the Royal Navy, to drive continuous performance improvement and to provide a better deal for defence and the taxpayer by delivering significant savings. We estimate that those savings will be of the order of £350 million over the life of the contracts.

Investment is not just about equipment, infrastructure and support contracts. It is also about people and we are investing in them. Like other employers, our armed forces face a challenge in recruiting and retaining personnel, especially in engineering and nuclear cadres. That is being addressed through a range of measures, including affiliations with four university technical colleges. My hon. Friend the Minister for Defence, Equipment Support and Technology—Min DEST—is in discussion with colleagues at the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills about a new engineering college. My understanding is that those discussions have not yet concluded and that there is still some way to go, but it may assist my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport to know that it is planned that the next meeting on the project will take place early in the new year.

Reserve Recruitment

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 17th November 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

Order. We need a pithy question without preamble, perhaps to be authored and delivered by the hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis).

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Is not part of the problem that the increase in reserves has been seen as a cover for a cut in regular forces? What can the Minister, as a champion of the reserves even when we were spending more money on the armed forces, say to dispel that impression?

[Mr Brazier]

I am grateful for my hon. Friend’s question, not least because he is a former member of the Royal Naval Reserve, who are well ahead of their recruiting targets. The short answer is that if we want defence to prosper in this country when there are very many calls on the public purse, we need the footprint around the country that the reserve forces have—they are represented in half of all the constituencies in this House—to remind people what armed forces are all about.

Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 20th October 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

If the Minister is able to induce happiness in the hon. Member for Colchester (Sir Bob Russell), it will be regarded, I think, by all as a great triumph.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

17. What recent assessment he has made of the effectiveness of the UK’s contribution to the future stability of Afghanistan.

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Michael Fallon)]

The United Kingdom can be proud of its achievements in Afghanistan. The terrorist threat from the region has substantially reduced. We have helped to build the Afghan national security forces, which are now 330,000-strong and lead on providing security. The United Kingdom remains committed to supporting the new Afghan Government and the Afghan forces as part of the new NATO mission after 2014.

[Dr Lewis]

As a new Defence Secretary—I congratulate him on his appointment—my right hon. Friend may not be aware of my view that strategic bases are necessary if the hard-fought gains in Afghanistan are not to unravel. Given that we ourselves are not going to provide such a strategic base, what news does he have of whether the Americans will do so, given the recent welcome sign of an agreement between them and the Afghan Government?

[Michael Fallon]

I was, in fact, aware of my hon. Friend’s views, which he always articulates so forcefully. The international community has reaffirmed its commitment to Afghanistan at the NATO summit. On current plans, the resolute support mission will have approximately 12,000 personnel. It plans to operate one hub in Kabul/Bagram and four spokes to that hub in Mazar-e Sharif, Herat, Kandahar and Jalalabad. We, of course, have made our commitment to assisting with liaison, support and training at the officer academy.

Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 14th July 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

Time for the good doctor. I call Dr Julian Lewis.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

In welcoming what the Secretary of State for Defence has said, may I remind him that those on the Labour Front Bench have similarly committed to the retention of Trident and continuous at-sea nuclear deterrence? Does he therefore agree with me that whatever the complexion of the next Government, there can be no possible excuse for failing to renew Trident—whether in coalition, in government or in opposition? Wherever we are, we all ought to be committing to renewal in the next Parliament.

[Mr Hammond]

I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend that there is no possible excuse for not doing something that is absolutely necessary to Britain’s long-term strategic protection. However, I note that there are two parties represented in the Chamber this afternoon that do not support that agenda.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Soubry]

That is a long-running problem. As my hon. Friend will know, those in our defence fire and rescue service are actually employed as civil servants, so it is a difficult one, but we hope to make a decision as soon as possible.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

As Ministers cannot sign early-day motions, may I exceptionally ask the Secretary of State for a comment on EDM 252, which commemorates the sacrifice of 7,000 British soldiers in the Normandy battle for Hill 112? It was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Sir William Cash). What it does not say is that his father was one of those 7,000: Captain Paul Cash won the Military Cross a few days before he was killed 70 years ago yesterday.