Mull of Kintyre Review

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Wednesday 13th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

I am extremely grateful to the hon. Lady. I entirely echo her sentiments about the RUC.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Does the Secretary of State agree that this is a modern day version of the famous Archer-Shee case, which involved the Royal Navy and the theft of a postal order, and which became the basis of a famous play in which the service would not admit that it was wrong? Will he add to his list of people who should be thanked the right hon. Lord Chalfont, who more than a decade ago instituted a debate that focused on the very point that the Secretary of State has emphasised today? Finally, does he share my regret that some close family members of the pilots are no longer alive to get the vindication that they deserved more than a decade ago?

[Dr Fox]

This may well be a modern version of “The Winslow Boy”. It is not the size of the injustice that matters, but the fact that it is an injustice. I commend Lord Chalfont for what he did on this matter, just as I thank many colleagues in the other place who have done so much to keep this case alive.

Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 4th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[Peter Luff]

I am delighted to be able to tell the hon. Gentleman that I can give him an answer to that question. We have delayed publication because of the large number of defence-related reviews that the MOD is conducting at present, including the Levene review, the reserves review and the basing review. These will all lead naturally to the defence equipment and support White Paper, which will be published later this year. The Yellow Book review on non-competitive contracts will be released at the same time, not in July as originally intended, because the two documents will naturally sit together.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

6. What assessment he has made of the shape and size of the future surface fleet of the Royal Navy; and if he will make a statement.

[The Minister for the Armed Forces (Nick Harvey)]

As we set out in the strategic defence and security review, under Future Force 2020 the future surface Navy will have a world-class carrier strike capability, with 19 frigates and destroyers, including the state-of-the-art Type 45 destroyer; an amphibious fleet able to land and sustain a commando group from the sea; 14 mine countermeasures vessels; a global oceanographic survey capability; and a fleet of resupply and refuelling vessels. Work is also under way on the requirements and design of the Type 26 global combat ship, our next generation frigate.

[Dr Lewis]

I am encouraged by that response. Does the Minister remember when he and I sat on parallel Opposition Benches under the previous Government as the size of the frigate and destroyer fleet went down successively from 35 to 32 to 31 to 25 and then to 19? Will he specifically confirm that that figure of 19 frigates and destroyers will not be reduced to a pathetically inadequate baker’s dozen, as posited in some parts of the press?

[Nick Harvey]

I can certainly confirm that the situation remains unchanged from the SDSR. The future force will comprise 19 destroyers and frigates. It was a matter of great regret that the Government had to make a range of cuts in the SDSR, but that was a result of the general economic climate and, specifically, of the defence black hole that we inherited.

Defence Reform

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 27th June 2011 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

No one can deny the intellectual logic behind the hon. Gentleman’s point, but anyone who has spoken to a Canadian Defence Minister in recent years will have got a strong message: “Whatever you try, don’t try that.” There are differences in the approach of the single services, sometimes differences in the ethos of the single services and, clearly, differences in their history too. As we are asking our servicemen and women to do so much for us, the last thing that we want to do is to destroy that important emotional attachment to their heritage.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I welcome that response from my right hon. Friend. He knows that he is assured of my personal support for the work that he is doing, but I remain convinced that there is a difference between the management of defence procurement and the formulation of military strategy at the highest level. What bothers me is that the single service chiefs are increasingly separated from the Chief of the Defence Staff, and that is no way to end inter-service rivalry. We ran the second world war with a committee of three, and we ought to be running these wars with a committee of four, not with a CDS on his own on a defence board, even if supplemented by the Minister for the Armed Forces.

[Dr Fox]

But of course this is not a process that is run by the CDS. As part of the defence board, we have purposely set up the chiefs of staff committee so that the views of the chiefs of staff can be discussed collectively before the defence board and reflected to it by the CDS, not formulated unilaterally by the CDS.

Nuclear Deterrent

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Wednesday 18th May 2011 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

I appreciate the sincerity of the hon. Gentleman’s views; I just profoundly disagree with them. As I have said, we assess that the costs have not changed from the 2006 basic programme. I also said that, taking inflation into account, we expect them to be some £20 billion to £25 billion at out-turn. The hon. Gentleman is quite wrong: there is a growing nuclear threat in the world from such countries as North Korea and Iran. Who knows what other countries might be trying to develop nuclear technology and weaponisation? Those countries pose a wider risk and our nuclear deterrence is not just the UK’s independent deterrent but part of the wider NATO nuclear umbrella. It is important that the reductions that have been announced as regards warheads and stockpiles are not only within the letter but within the spirit of the NPT and set a clear direction for future Government policy.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I am really rather worried that my right hon. Friend is in danger of inflicting cruel and unusual punishment on the Minister for the Armed Forces, who is really quite a decent chap. If the Secretary of State, like me, had had the experience of watching the hon. Gentleman address the Liberal Democrat conference on this subject, he would have seen that it was indistinguishable from a CND revivalist meeting. How is it fair to the Minister for the Armed Forces to confront him on the one hand with serious arguments about why Trident is the only option while on the other hand requiring him to go back to the Liberal Democrats and tell them that unavoidable conclusion?

[Dr Fox]

I rather fear that my hon. Friend is a little too late. Having made my hon. Friend the Minister for the Armed Forces sit through some 57 hours of the strategic defence and security review, I feel I have already inflicted a cruel and unusual punishment on him. I refer my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) back to the advice he gave me when we were in opposition, which was that we should never be afraid to have the most rigorous look at alternative systems. When one considers the evidence, the costings and the threats, one inevitably comes to the conclusion that a submarine-based continuous at-sea deterrent based on the Trident system will be the best protection for the United Kingdom. I take him at his word and I am not at all afraid to consider the alternatives.

Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 16th May 2011 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

We are committed to maintaining the level of troops that we need for our main effort in the southern part of Afghanistan. The number of combat troops that we have had in Helmand has been at a consistent level, our force densities have improved and we intend to make no changes to those numbers until we see an improvement in the security situation there.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Is it not rather depressing that after everything that has happened in Afghanistan and, in particular, to the former Taliban regime there, people in the Taliban have not learned their lesson that al-Qaeda is poison to them? That was shown by the demonstrations against the death of bin Laden on the part of the Pakistani Taliban. If the Taliban want to be part of a settlement, is it not time that they realised how poisonous the al-Qaeda connection has always been?

[Dr Fox]

My hon. Friend makes a truly excellent point. We need to recognise that al-Qaeda involves violent political extremism that will guarantee no country and none of its people’s safety and security. The quicker that those who have previously dallied with the Taliban recognise that that cannot be a route for peace and reconciliation in the long term, the better.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Fox]

I cannot give the hon. Lady a precise answer about what discussions have taken place lately on that subject. If she will forgive me, I will write to her with the details.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Have Ministers had a chance to consider the imaginative scheme to retain HMS Ark Royal for the nation as a heliport facility in conjunction with the Homes for Heroes project, bearing in mind that this year is the centenary of the first naval aviators being taught to fly and bearing in mind the importance of keeping aircraft carriers in the forefront of our minds until they resume their rightful place in this country’s armoury?

[Dr Fox]

I doubt whether my hon. Friend, or many other Members, would believe some of the suggestions that we have had for the future use of Ark Royal. Its use as a helipad is one of them, and although I find it particularly attractive in some ways, I am not sure whether the residents where it might be placed would think exactly the same. Its use is subject to a range of issues, not least planning considerations but also a range of financial ones. As ever, however, he makes a welcome and creative contribution to the debate.

Armed Forces Covenant

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 16th May 2011 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

I used those figures myself in opposition, but may I say to my hon. Friend that there is dubiety about the actual numbers? However, let us cast that aside because the important point is that if any of those people who suffer from mental illness ultimately commit suicide, we have failed them. It is therefore very important to try to identify individuals who could be at risk, because the loss of someone’s life, at their own hand, after they have survived the rigours of combat is a tragedy not just for that individual but collectively for the country.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I do not wish to denigrate the legal profession as a whole, but does my right hon. Friend accept that there is a certain type of lawyer who specialises in persuading victims to bring court cases that otherwise might not, and indeed ought not, be brought? Is he satisfied that there will be enough safeguards to prevent that sort of abuse from happening as a result of putting into law the military covenant?

[Dr Fox]

I have a sister who is a doctor and a sister who is a lawyer. My father used to say we had the best of both worlds—the licence to steal and the licence to kill—but I have never taken such caricatures as necessarily being the honest truth. I will not be tempted down the road where my hon. Friend tries to tempt me, except to say that in striking a balance in the legislation, we have sought to minimise the risk of the kind of behaviour that he mentions, while trying to ensure that we honour our responsibilities and give a sound legal basis to the covenant that we are putting forward.

Submarines and Frigates (Plymouth)

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Tuesday 26th April 2011 Westminster Hall

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

It is a great pleasure to participate in the debate under your chairmanship, Mrs Brooke. It is also a great pleasure to see my hon. Friend the Minister in situ to respond to the debate, and I am sure that he will be as typically robust in responding in government as he was in opposition.

It is a particular pleasure to congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport (Oliver Colvile) on initiating the debate and on ranging so widely in his approach to it. We would err if we focused entirely on basing without considering, as he did, the larger issues of the state of the Royal Navy, the country’s strategic requirements from it and the amount that the country feels it can spend on it.

I want to start, however, by taking up some of the comments made by the hon. Member for Plymouth, Moor View (Alison Seabeck), who rightly said at the beginning of her speech that events in the middle east have rearranged the strategic furniture, as it were. She will not have been surprised by that, given that the odds are, strange to relate, usually very great that it will come as a surprise when some sort of conflict breaks out in that way. When conflicts have yet to break out, and still more when we are already fighting in such conflicts, it therefore behoves us not to be too dogmatic and rigid as we make arrangements for the Royal Navy and, indeed, the other armed services.

[Alison Seabeck]

I am merely pointing out that such conflicts come as a surprise, but is it not always the Navy that seems to be the first responder?

[Dr Lewis]

I will try to be as non-partisan between the services as possible but, following the hon. Lady’s provocation, I cannot resist pointing out that the Navy would have been an even quicker responder to the Libyan crisis had we not decided shortly before that blew up to take our last remaining aircraft carrier out of service. I have raised that issue a number of times, particularly with the Foreign Secretary, who on the most recent occasion informed me—I am sorry that he has such a low opinion of my knowledge of things nautical—that an aircraft carrier would not have been necessary because a Tornado could not be flown from it. I am reassured to know that the Government are well aware of which aircraft can fly from aircraft carriers and which cannot, but I do not hesitate to say that if we had had an aircraft carrier in commission when the events in Libya blew up so unexpectedly, I would have bet the farm on the fact that that particular warship—an aircraft carrier—would have been the first to be dispatched to the Mediterranean in response. It is very unwise to make decisions in peacetime, and still more unwise to make decisions when we are involved in not one but two conflicts simultaneously, that will bind us rigidly into circumstances that we might regret when the strategic situation changes as unexpectedly as it almost always does.

Let us consider the position with regard to frigates and submarines. I have never hesitated to say that the 1998 strategic defence review was a well thought-out document. The problem, as we know, was that the plans it outlined were not fully funded, although at least one had the feeling that a theory was being set out, which meant that some sort of balance was understood and some sort of flexibility was retained. We did not take the view that because our circumstances in the world were more limited in terms of the interventions we could make, we should reshape our defence forces in such a way that we would be incapable of responding to an unexpected crisis as we had responded in the past.

At one point during the years of the Labour Government, a naval base review was carried out. My hon. Friend the Minister will recall that we, as the shadow defence team in opposition, were adamant that it would be most unwise to rely on only two naval bases in the entire country, one of which would be in Scotland and the other in either Portsmouth or Devonport. In particular, we had regard to the argument put forward so eloquently by my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport in his introduction to the debate: if we put all our eggs in one basket, or all our ships in one or two ports—one at one end of the country and one at the far end from that—we will be in danger of the basket of eggs getting smashed or the ships getting bottled up. We therefore argued strongly for retaining the ports at Devonport and at Portsmouth, and it would be a grave mistake to change that argument now. If we believe that it is strategically wise, strategically necessary and, I would say, strategically essential to continue to have the potential to use both Devonport and Portsmouth as naval bases in the future—I can never emphasise enough that we cannot predict the future—it follows that we must spread out our assets to ensure that both ports remain viable. I have no prejudice as to which assets should be in Portsmouth and which should be in Devonport, but some assets should be in each of the two ports.

The Labour Government took office in 1997, and when their SDR was undertaken we had a total of 35 frigates and destroyers. The deal done in the SDR was that in return for the great future promise and asset of two large aircraft carriers, the number of frigates would be modestly reduced from 35 to 32, and the number of attack submarines—nuclear-powered, but not nuclear-armed—would be reduced from 12 to 10. We know what happened over the years: the number of frigates went down successively from 35 to 32, as predicted, and then to 31 and 25. If I remember correctly, at the last count the figure had gone down to 19. It is true that during that period six new Daring class—Type 45 —destroyers came into play, and they are, of course, much more powerful, potent and potentially lethal, so one could argue that they are a much better deterrent than the destroyers they replaced. However, one should fight shy of getting into the position that Geoff Hoon, the then Secretary of State for Defence, got into of saying that because a new warship is so much more powerful than the warship it replaces, the number of “platforms”, as they used to say—the number of ships to the rest of us—becomes irrelevant. That is not true, because no matter how powerful a warship is, it can be in only one place at any one time. Unfortunately, but necessarily, the activities of the Royal Navy often have to take place in many places simultaneously. At the moment, we are considering what we should do in relation to events in Libya.

There is something else that slightly bothers me: I lost count of the number of times that Conservative spokesmen said in opposition that although we could not be sure whether we would spend more money on defence until we saw what the books actually said about the economics, we would definitely keep expenditure on defence in line with the commitments undertaken. I often stood up and said that we would need either to spend more on defence or to reduce our commitments. In reality, as we know, we are very stretched indeed as a result of the ongoing commitment in Afghanistan, and we now find ourselves suddenly with an additional commitment in Libya. After some prodding, the Foreign Secretary conceded that its cost, on which I was rather aggravatingly pressing him, would be met from the Treasury reserve, but all signs are that the commitment to a Libyan no-fly zone will not prove decisive in ousting Colonel Gaddafi, even though it may prove, and arguably has proved, effective in preventing him from initiating the wholesale mass slaughter that he was not only ruthless enough but stupid enough to announce to the world that he intended to visit on the citizens of Benghazi.

If those two statements are true—first, that the no-fly zone will not be enough to oust Gaddafi and, secondly, that it will nevertheless be effective in limiting the massacre of innocent civilians, which was our purpose for intervening—the logical consequence is that the commitment will go on for a considerable time. The Government will have to think hard about what they are prepared to spend on defence.

The Government cannot meet the costs from Treasury reserves indefinitely. We all know what then happens: we tend to get ourselves into the situation encountered by Tony Blair, who said towards the end of his time as Prime Minister that spending on defence had remained roughly constant at 2.5% of gross domestic product throughout the decade of Labour rule, but then added the crucial words, “if the costs of Iraq and Afghanistan are included.” In other words, the cost of those two wars was effectively being counted as part of our basic expenditure on defence. Such a thing will always happen.

The Government must think clearly about whether to put the economic case at the top of their agenda or whether to put up there instead the ability to intervene, as we have intervened in Libya. They cannot have it both ways. Many countries, including in Europe, would doubtless love to be able to intervene to stop massacres in Benghazi, but they do not do so—or not more than minimally—because their simple view is, “Well, we’re very sorry but we’re too small, too ineffective, too weak and too poor, and we cannot afford to maintain the armed forces necessary to do that sort of thing.” That is fair enough.

[Penny Mordaunt]

My hon. Friend makes a case for flexibility and options versus the economy, but it is worth remembering that we need a strong Navy with the right number of platforms to protect trade, our fuel security and our fibre-optic cables. Our economy depends on the Royal Navy.

[Dr Lewis]

I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention, which takes my argument forward exactly as I intended. The key point is that the things that she outlines are constants. Those requirements of a strong Royal Navy will carry on regardless, even if we were not involved in those additional conflicts. It really worries me that if we continue to be driven by every crisis that pops up in other parts of the world, whether or not we have what is commonly described as a dog in the fight, something else will have to give. Unless we see a genuine increase in resources and in the priority given to defence, if we continue to take on roles such as the worthy one of trying to intervene in Libya, something will have to give, and it is precisely the sort of core functions to which my hon. Friend adverts that may suffer.

If we cap the defence budget, we might have to sell off or mothball vital defence assets, or not introduce new assets that had been planned for, but I am concerned that whenever a crisis pops up in another part of the world, we want to be at the forefront and to punch above our weight. There will be only one outcome of that approach: our very limited defence resources will be used up in dealing with these ad hoc crises, which are not of our choosing, but then one day, when we face an existential threat to the security of the United Kingdom, we will not have the assets necessary to defend ourselves. I predict that there will be attempts to derail the renewal of the nuclear deterrent on the grounds that we are so stretched in other conventional areas that we cannot afford to build those submarines.

That is not a subject for this debate but, with your indulgence Mrs Brooke, may I say that I am particularly alarmed about the Trident Commission? The commission is orchestrated by a well-known anti-nuclear group called the British American Security Information Council, and is funded by such anti-nuclear bodies as the Ploughshares fund and the Joseph Rowntree charitable trust but, nevertheless, such distinguished people as two former Secretaries of State for Defence—my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) and Lord Browne of Ladyton—have agreed to sit on it. What will the commission come up with? In my opinion, it certainly will not come up with a recommendation for the like-for-like replacement of Trident. What will it say? Will it say, “We’d better not have continuous at-sea deterrence,” or, “We must join up with the French”? Whatever it says, I bet that the root of its argument will be the statement that we cannot afford to continue with a properly self-sufficient strategic independent nuclear deterrent. If so, future generations may have cause bitterly to regret the sort of arguments that have been put forward when we one day find ourselves vulnerable as a result of that omission.

How does that relate to base-porting? It is simple: during times of economic stringency, it is vital to conserve defence assets. Whatever final decision my hon. Friend the Minister and his colleagues make about what should be based at Portsmouth or Devonport, one point is vital. Something must be based at each of those two ports so that their viability is retained, because we might need those naval bases one day not simply to allow us to intervene in wars of choice, but to safeguard ourselves against an existential threat to the United Kingdom itself.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Howarth]

The hon. Lady makes an extremely important point, which I endorse and emphasise for the record. It builds on something that the hon. Member for North Durham said about the Treasury. If we are to have the Future Force 2020 that we seek, it will depend on uplift in financial resources from the middle of the decade. One of the last things that the outgoing Chief of the Defence Staff, now Lord Stirrup, said to me was that if we want that uplift in 2015, we must start planning for it now. It is important that we as parliamentarians understand the importance of long- term planning. I hope the hon. Lady will forgive me for latching on to the point that she made about base-porting for the Type 26, but it feeds into a wider argument about defence planning, and she is right to make it.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

In referring to the new frigates as cheap and cheerful, to use the Minister’s phrase—

[Mr Howarth]

It was your phrase.

[Dr Lewis]

My phrase was “cheap as chips”, actually. It upset the First Sea Lord of the day, although not too much. Will the Minister confirm that the reason why it is important and practicable to make the new frigates in that way is that modern methods of naval design enable the production of a ship that is modular? Therefore, we can produce a considerable number of hulls initially and then upgrade them with bolt-on modules as resources allow, rather than producing something expensive from the outset.

[Mr Howarth]

My hon. Friend, as ever, has latched on to an extremely important point. A big selling-point in my discussions with other nations about working in co-operation on the programme is that modular building design not only gives extraordinary flexibility, but is something in which we in the United Kingdom have a world lead. We did it with the Type 45s and we are doing it with carriers; we can do it with global combat ships as well.

My discussions with the Royal Navy, from the First Sea Lord down, have proved extremely encouraging. The Navy has understood the force of the argument and is working enthusiastically to that end. All of us in the House have an interest in ensuring the success of the programme. Personally, I am staking a lot on it myself. If I were to leave office having done only one thing—securing a new fleet of frigates for the Royal Navy—I should feel extremely proud.

On submarines, we have made it clear that the Clyde naval base will become the base port for all Royal Navy submarines. The Vanguard class submarines are already based there, and as the Astute class enters service, it too will be based at and operated from the Clyde. The Department has announced that it will move in-service Trafalgar class submarines from Devonport to Faslane, although we are still assessing how best to implement that decision. None the less, Devonport’s highly skilled work force will continue to be called on to deliver the highest standards of engineering in the vital area of submarine maintenance.

It is important to recognise that decisions about changing the base-porting of naval assets are not simple or straightforward. Although factors such as sustainability and work loads are of importance locally and to the nation as a whole, I am sure we all appreciate that any changes have a major impact on the welfare of the service personnel affected, particularly those with young families. Any decisions to change the arrangements are made only after extensive deliberation and consultation. At this point, I would like to put on the record—I am sure on everybody’s behalf—what an immense debt of gratitude the nation owes to the families of our servicemen and women in all three services. Without their support, the men and women on the front line would never be able to do their job.

As part of the process, as the hon. Member for Plymouth, Moor View said, full consideration must be given to the impact on naval service personnel and their families, reflecting the need to give them sufficient notice to plan their futures, in line with the naval service individual harmony guidelines. The guidelines exist to ensure that naval personnel retain the ability to enjoy leisure at their place of duty and that they do not spend excessive time away from their homes and families.

I am pleased to be able to confirm, therefore, that we have made a decision that I hope will reassure my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport and the hon. Member for Plymouth, Moor View. We have decided to make no changes to base-porting arrangements for surface ships, including Type 23 frigates. The frigates at Devonport and Portsmouth will remain where they are for the foreseeable future. That will provide a period of stability for naval personnel and their families at our naval bases, for the naval bases at Devonport and Portsmouth and for our industrial partners, which I know my hon. Friend and other Members were seeking. It is our view that any review of those arrangements should be linked directly to the wider studies informing future strategic defence and security reviews, which we have committed to undertaking during each Parliament, so we do not anticipate any changes until 2020 at the earliest. I recognise that that decision will be of interest to many Members. The Minister with responsibility for defence equipment, support and technology, my hon. Friend the Member for Mid Worcestershire, will write to those Members shortly to provide the detail that I am sure they seek.

To answer a couple of points made by the hon. Member for Plymouth, Moor View, HMS Protector will be based at Portsmouth because, as I understand it, that reflects the base-porting arrangements in place for HMS Endurance. However, we expect to decide on the longer-term delivery of that capability, including base-porting arrangements and the future of HMS Endurance, next year. I hope that that puts the matter in context. My hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Sutton and Devonport referred to the university of Plymouth study. I say to all local Members that Ministers will be pleased to receive the results of that study.

In summary, I assure my hon. Friend and the whole House that we remain determined to make the fullest use of all three naval bases, including Devonport, and to capitalise on the excellent skills and experience that they have to offer. Difficult decisions have been taken, but everyone involved can now look forward to a period of stability, confident in the knowledge that they will continue to be central to our island nation’s influence, prosperity and security.

Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 14th March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Robathan]

I can confirm to my hon. Friend that when I was serving in the Coldstream Guards it was a matter of some upset when young-looking soldiers who were prepared to lay their lives on the line were denied entry to pubs. I pay tribute to my hon. Friend for his campaign, and I am particularly pleased to see that I am on the front of “Warrington Matters” in connection with it. I do not think the photograph of me is very flattering, though.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

7. What progress he has made on the implementation of the Trident replacement programme.

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Dr Liam Fox)]

The programme to replace the Vanguard submarine completed the initial concept studies, and we expect an announcement on initial gate approval in the coming weeks. There remain ongoing discussions, which have simply taken longer than it was anticipated a few months ago. It is important, given the size of the project, that we get the decision right.

[Dr Lewis]

At a press conference organised by the anti-nuclear deterrent front organisation, the British American Security Information Council, a Liberal Democrat Defence Minister stated that a very thin paper trail had led to the last Government’s decision to renew Trident. Does my right hon. Friend agree that the White Paper produced by his Department and the last Government was actually a first-class piece of work, was recognised as such by my right hon. Friend who is now Prime Minister and gave every good argument for why we went into the Division Lobby with the Labour Government to support that renewal?

[Dr Fox]

The White Paper was a thorough piece of work. It was the basis on which the House made a considered decision on the issue, and I still believe that for the long-term well-being and security of the United Kingdom, a continuous at-sea, submarine-based, minimum-credible nuclear deterrent in the form of the replacement for the Trident programme is the best way forward.

Military Covenant

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Wednesday 16th February 2011 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

We could spend a great deal of time detailing the failures of the previous Government. Labour Members constantly talk about making changes as though we were in a vacuum or, as my hon. Friend the Member for Dover (Charlie Elphicke) said, at year zero. We are in a very difficult economic predicament largely of their making, yet they talk about not only the military covenant but almost everything else as if there were no financial cost and as if we should not take what is happening in the economy into account when it comes to pensions and programmes in the Ministry of Defence.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that in the short term, while the economic situation is so bad, top priority should be given to the education of the children of those who have fallen in action or who have been so grievously wounded that their future earning power will never be restored?

[Dr Fox]

As I might have expected, my hon. Friend makes a very good point. In the programme for government, we listed a number of measures that will start the process of rebuilding the covenant, and I am pleased to be able to set out to him those that we have already accomplished.

As I have said on a number of occasions in the House, no decisions taken in the strategic defence and security review will have a negative impact on our mission in Afghanistan. In fact, we have already made great strides in improving the conditions for those serving on the front line. In our nine months in office, we have doubled the operational allowance that was paid under the previous Government to over £5,000. Labour could have done so, but did not. We have changed the rules on rest and recuperation, so any lost days of leave—due to delays in the air bridge or any other operational requirements—will be added to post-tour leave. The previous Government could have done that, but they chose not to. We have also pledged to provide university and further education scholarships to the children of members of the armed forces who have been killed since 1990. The previous Government could have chosen to do so, but in 13 years they did not. The current Government have now included 36,000 service children as part of the pupil premium, recognising the uniqueness of service life and its effect on service children and service communities. Labour could have done so, but did not in 13 years.

Armed Forces (Redundancies)

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Tuesday 15th February 2011 Commons Chamber

[Dr Fox]

I would hate the hon. Gentleman to get the wrong impression. What I am blaming the Labour Government for is the financial mismanagement that left a black hole of £38 billion in the MOD budget, and a massive deficit to get rid of. Without those, we would not have had to make redundancies of this scale in the first place.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

On the future loss of so many pilots of fixed-wing aircraft, I am sure that my right hon. Friend would never admit to acting under duress, even if his toenails were being torn out by the Treasury. However, can he at least reassure us that some degree of flexibility in the availability of future fixed-wing aircraft pilots will be preserved, just in case we need them in the next 10 years?

[Dr Fox]

All redundancies will be carried out under the compulsory redundancy process so that we have the correct shape of armed forces—and I can tell my hon. Friend that these days, even the Treasury conforms to the norms of human rights.