Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 20th September 2021 Commons Chamber

[Mr Wallace]

The Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre sets the threat levels for this country, and it does so independently of Ministers. When those levels are changed, it will make a statement and the House will be informed. As far as a bulletin or update to the House is concerned, the hon. Lady is obviously free either to apply for an Adjournment debate or to table written questions, and we will be happy to ensure that we respond. On top of that, we have periodical updates on Afghanistan and the counter-Daesh strategy, and we will continue to provide them from time to time.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Given that long-term nation building from the ground up is not a feasible option in the future, and given that terrorist attacks could happen again, will the Secretary of State institute a serious review of counter-terrorism strategy, possibly based on pre-positioned forces in regional bases, to follow an active containment strategy?

[Mr Wallace]

My right hon. Friend highlights an important point: when there is no partnership on the ground, how do we deal with imminent threats to the United Kingdom? I cannot speak for the whole Government on a review of the counter-terrorism strategy, first of all, because Contest, in its many iterations starting under the last Labour Government, is probably a world-leading counter-terrorism strategy. It is periodically refreshed, which will always be done in time to meet the changing situation. What I can tell my right hon. Friend is that, even before the decline in Afghanistan, I had instigated work on how we deal with changes to the environments in which we fight terrorism and on what capabilities we will need in future.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Wallace]

Whenever we examine new arrangements for services for our military, of course we examine all the impacts on security, accountability and indeed performance.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Will the Secretary of State inform the House what Members should do when they are contacted by people who have been of assistance to our armed forces in Afghanistan but whom they have reason to believe the Taliban are hunting? Is there any help that we will be able to give them, and how should we go about approaching the Government to secure that help?

[The Minister for the Armed Forces (James Heappey)]

In the first instance, my right hon. Friend could advise them to go to the ARAP website and apply to the scheme, but it does no harm at all to write to me or my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State in parallel, as many colleagues have done, and we are working through those cases at best speed.

Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 5th July 2021 Commons Chamber

[James Heappey]

In June 2021, UK F-35B aircraft carried out their first operational sorties in support of the counter-Daesh operations from HMS Queen Elizabeth in the eastern Mediterranean, providing a valuable contribution to Op Shader and the coalition effort. This activity has formed a key part of improving the UK’s carrier strike capability to operate closely with allies and our interoperability with the US and others. We are delighted with how those sorties have gone. The F-35B is a phenomenal aircraft launched from a magnificent aircraft carrier.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

What conclusions have our Ministers and strategists drawn from our use of military force from outside the borders of states such as Syria and Iraq that might help to prevent the re-emergence of Afghanistan as a base and a launchpad for international terrorism campaigns like those of Daesh and al-Qaeda following the withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan?

[James Heappey]

My right hon. Friend knows from our previous exchanges on this matter that we have absolutely reserved the right to counter terrorist threats to the United Kingdom that may re-emerge in Afghanistan. He is absolutely right to point us towards an outside-in model such as that prosecuted from Cyprus in support of Operation Shader. That is very much in the thoughts of those who are planning for that eventuality in Afghanistan.

Loss of Secret Documents

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 28th June 2021 Commons Chamber

[Jeremy Quin]

I will take all those points in turn. I share the right hon. Gentleman’s concern over the incident. We take the loss of all data and documents very seriously. In direct answer to his question, the MOD police are involved as part of this investigation. On the timing, I have said “shortly”. I hope that it will be in very short order. I hope that it will be as little as a week, but I cannot commit to that in case the investigation finds more stuff that they need to go into. I would hope that it will be a very short process indeed, and that we will be able to inform the House in Defence questions next week, but forgive me, Mr Speaker, if the investigation needs to take longer. We will explain that on Monday if so.

Regarding espionage, again this is clearly a matter for the investigation, but I emphasise to the House that the individual self-reported when he became aware—when the individual became aware—that the documents had been mislaid. We have certainly informed the United States. It is aware of this circumstance. If anything further comes out of the investigation, it will be informed again. The right hon. Gentleman referred to our armed forces’ totally professional conduct in the Black sea last week. He is absolutely right to do so. They behaved absolutely impeccably, and I share his concerns that we must always be providing good back-up and good support to those armed forces.

I assure the House that, as it would expect, there is intense preparation and intense work to ensure that every angle and every analysis is covered before armed forces conduct themselves around the world, but clearly evidence of that should not be forthcoming from the Department. These are secret documents. The investigation will be appropriately conducted, and we will see what we can learn to improve our procedures for the future.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con) [V]]

One thing that would seem only common sense to anyone finding classified documents is that they should hand them to the police. Can the Minister advise us what the legal position is? Was any official secrets legislation broken by somebody handing these documents to anybody other than the police? Was any official secrets legislation broken by the BBC in not handling them directly to the police but in choosing instead selectively to quote from classified information? Will the Government inquire as to whether the BBC paid any money for the acquisition of these documents from someone who ought to have handed them to the police straightaway?

[Jeremy Quin]

In an ideal and proper world, the documents should not have been available where they were, so that is where the original fault clearly lies. In the event of documents of this nature being found, clearly one would encourage members of the public to hand them in to the police. In this instance, they were handed in to the BBC. Naturally, I would have preferred the BBC to hand them over immediately and not made reference to them, but it has a job to do, and I recognise that it has behaved responsibly and handed the documents back to the Department. We are analysing that now.

UK Defence Spending

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Thursday 24th June 2021 Commons Chamber

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Oh, Madam Deputy Speaker, the disparity in that vote is almost as great as in the results when we voted to renew the nuclear deterrent—where we had very large majorities—on a cross-party basis, in agreement with that step. On a generous interpretation of the terms of this debate, and if I am not prevented by the Chair, I hope to say a little more about one aspect of the nuclear deterrent under the scope of subjects of a defence nature on which we are going to spend a considerable amount of money.

However, let me start by expressing some sympathy with Defence Ministers, because they have fought long, hard and valiantly to get a significant increase, in real terms, in the defence budget, and they have done that and deserve credit for it. The problem with which they have to contend is that, set in the context of defence expenditure over a very long period, defence still remains far too far down—way down—the scale of our national priorities.

Not for the first time, I should like to paint this picture, with the aid of a prop that I am not allowed to use but which I am, I trust, allowed to consult. It shows the falling percentage of GDP spent on defence over a very long period and the rising percentage of GDP spent on three other costly Departments: those dealing with education, health and welfare. I paint this picture just to give people the idea of the long-term trend. In the mid-1950s, an age ago, we were spending 7% of GDP on defence. In 1963, the falling graph on defence crosses over the rising graph on welfare and benefits, at 6%. We now spend six times on welfare and benefits what we spend on defence, but then of course 1963 was also a very long time ago. In the mid-1980s, which is not such a long time ago, we were still spending similar sums on education, on health and on defence. We were then investing roughly 5% of GDP in each, but now we spend two and a half times as much on education and nearly four times as much on health as we spend on defence. The mid-1980s was the last time until recently that we faced a threat from both a strongly assertive Russia and a major terrorist campaign. Then, it was Irish republicanism; now, it is Islamist fundamentalism.

I said that I wanted to talk about one area of defence spending because it had attracted attention from the references to it in the integrated review, and I see to my great pleasure that the next speaker on the list is the right hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn). I should be very surprised indeed if he did not have certain observations to make about the change in the maximum number of warheads that it is envisaged might be held in stockpile for the future nuclear deterrent.

Ever since NATO’s September 2014 Wales summit, which restated its 2% guideline for defence spending as a proportion of gross domestic product, it has become necessary tediously to repeat that that figure is a floor, not a ceiling. For example, although it is sometimes proudly proclaimed that we meet the NATO guideline, historically, as I have shown, we used to spend way above that. Even as late as the mid-1990s, half a dozen years after the fall of the Berlin wall, we were not spending 2.1% or what is now going to be 2.2% of GDP on defence; we were spending fully 3% of GDP on defence. It was the view of the previous Defence Committee, and I understand that it is still the view of the Chairman of the present Defence Committee, my right hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood), that 3% would be a realistic and sensible target for a country with our worldwide interests to seek to hit.

[Mr Ellwood]

indicated assent.

[Dr Lewis]

I am delighted to see my right hon. Friend nodding his assent. Therefore, when we talk about the 2% guideline, we should bear in mind that it is not a ceiling nor a target; it is merely a floor or a minimum. Now we face a similar task regarding the increase in the cap on the size of our nuclear stockpile recently announced in the integrated review. That should be described as a ceiling, not a floor. In other words, it is a maximum and not a target for the number of warheads we will retain.

The integrated review states:

“In 2010 the Government stated an intent to reduce our overall nuclear warhead stockpile ceiling from not more than 225 to not more than 180 by the mid-2020s. However, in recognition of the evolving security environment, including the developing range of technological and doctrinal threats, this is no longer possible, and the UK will move to an overall nuclear weapon stockpile of no more than 260 warheads.”

Predictably, this is being denounced as a more than 40% increase in the stockpile, on the basis that increasing a total of 180 to 260 would be an uplift of 44.4%. However, the cancellation of a reduction that has not yet been completed—if indeed it ever began—means that, at most, the total might rise from the previously declared maximum of 225 to a new maximum of 260. Were those the actual present and future totals, the increase would be only about 15.5%, a perfectly reasonable increment to ensure that advances in anti-ballistic missile technology over the 40-plus years of our next generation of Trident warheads cannot undermine our policy of minimum strategic deterrence.

[Stewart Malcolm McDonald]

The right hon. Gentleman does not have to wait for the right hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn). He knows that we disagree on this—he mentioned at the start of his speech the last vote on the nuclear deterrent, and I seem to recall that we were in agreement that there should be a vote on the nuclear deterrent. However, when the integrated review was published—he has just mentioned the change in threat and doctrines as a reason for the expansion of the new nuclear policy—it was said that this was somehow to do with things such as cyber-threats, so which computer are we aiming these nuclear weapons at? Does he agree that to say that we would use nuclear weapons in response to a cyber-attack or threat is wholly absurd?

[Dr Lewis]

If the hon. Gentleman, whom I regard as a friend, waits for the next part of my analysis, I hope that all will become clear. However, it is absolutely the case that nuclear weapons, as a deterrent, do not deter every sort of threat that could be ranged against us. If they did, we could abolish all the other armed forces. The truth of the matter is that they deter other weapons of mass destruction. Unless there were a development in the cyber world that could inflict destruction on a mass level comparable with a nuclear exchange, it is entirely incredible to think that nuclear weapons would be used in retaliation to an attack of that sort. I hope that satisfies him on the main point that he was making.

Minimum deterrence relies on the fact that possession of a last-resort strategic nuclear system that can be guaranteed to inflict unacceptable and unavoidable devastation in response to nuclear aggression does not require any ability to match the aggressor missile for missile or warhead for warhead. Nuclear superpowers have huge overkill capabilities that offer zero extra protection against countries with much smaller weapons of mass destruction arsenals, as long as the latter can retaliate with an unstoppable and unbearable counter-strike against any nuclear aggressor who is seeking to wipe them out. Overkill capabilities may have symbolic political value, but in the dread event of a nuclear exchange, all they can do, as was famously said, is to “make the rubble bounce”.

There may exist more up-to-date estimates, but the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s inventory totals for world nuclear stockpiles, published at the beginning of last year, are sufficiently instructive. China, France and the UK, with estimated totals of 320, 290 and 215 respectively, fall into the camp of minimum strategic nuclear deterrence. By contrast, the estimated totals of 5,800 for the United States and 6,375 for Russia go way beyond anything needed to pursue such a policy. The notion that, at some stage in the future, the United Kingdom might end up with 35 more warheads than its previously declared theoretical maximum does not change the fact that we are currently, and shall probably remain, fifth out of five in the size of the nuclear stockpiles held by the permanent member states of the UN Security Council. So why have the Government chosen to take the controversial step of cancelling the reduction in the ceiling of our warhead total from 225 to 180 and raising it to a new ceiling of 260 instead?

[Stewart Malcolm McDonald]

Can I answer?

[Dr Lewis]

I was just going to say that this is the analysis that the hon. Gentleman was waiting for, but if he really wishes to come in, he can.

[Stewart Malcolm McDonald]

It is a shame that the Chair of the Defence Committee, the right hon. Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood), is no longer here, but I was with him when he said that it is to cover for the fact that we are cutting the Army by 10,000 as a sweetener to the Americans. That is what it is.

[Dr Lewis]

Let us see if the hon. Gentleman was right in anticipating what I have to say.

In the absence, at present at any rate, of any briefing on the issue, classified or otherwise, from my parliamentary colleagues on the Defence ministerial team, here are the four possible explanations that occur to me. Explanation 1—most probably, as already stated—is that it is an insurance policy to prevent a potential aggressor from calculating that advances in anti-ballistic missile systems have reduced our retaliatory capability to a point where our response to an attack becomes bearable or even avoidable. Explanation 2—quite probably—is that it is to give more headroom for the time, in the late 2030s or early 2040s, when we are due to exchange our current stockpile of warheads for next-generation nuclear warheads, while at the same time preventing disruption of our continuous at-sea deterrent patrols. Explanation 3— possibly—is that it is to send a signal internationally that the UK is determined to keep nuclear weapons as long as other countries have them and remains committed to doing whatever is required to maintain their invulnerability. And—here it comes—explanation 4, conceivably, is that it is also tailored for a domestic audience worried about cuts in the size of the Army, in order to offer reassurance, or at least to divert some attention from those reductions.

What seems most unlikely is an intention to invest in additional warheads of the existing design. We are certainly cancelling their reduction from a theoretical maximum of 225 to one of only 180 for any or all of the four reasons listed, particularly the first explanation. Raising the maximum from 225 to 260 to provide extra headroom for the eventual transition from current warheads to their replacements is a sensible explanation, though not a conclusive one, given that the changeover is not due to happen for well over a decade.

Despite the imposition of a dedicated supporter of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament as the Leader of the Opposition in 2015, hon. and right hon. Labour Members ensured that their party’s policy remained multilateralist. Previously, on 14 March 2007, Parliament had voted by 409 to 161 in favour of proceeding with the initial gate for renewal of the Trident submarine fleet. Even that huge majority was eclipsed on 18 July 2016, when it rose to 355 after MPs voted for the decisive main gate stage to proceed by 472 to only 117.

There is nothing in article VI of the non-proliferation treaty that requires any country already in possession of a recognised nuclear arsenal to get rid of it and to achieve a nuclear-free world prior to a state of grace when general and complete conventional disarmament—also referred to in the non-proliferation treaty, but seldom cited by those who quote it selectively—can be guaranteed. There is a very good reason for this, because if we were to abandon all nuclear weapons in an unreformed world, that would be a recipe for disaster. In a conventional war taking place in a nuclear-free world, the former nuclear powers would immediately race to reacquire the bomb. The first to succeed would then use its monopoly, as occurred in 1945. If the treaty’s vision of general and complete conventional disarmament ever becomes reality, then nuclear weapons can indeed also safely be declared redundant; but, until that day dawns, the United Kingdom is perfectly capable of changing the size of its warhead stockpile without breaching the non-proliferation treaty in order to maintain indefinitely the credibility of its strategic minimum deterrence policy.

--- Later in debate ---

[James Heappey]

I very much agree with my hon. Friend. That is why the training and education programme within our workforce is so important. I do not think anybody in the House would argue that, in the past, MOD contractual negotiations have not gone swimmingly.

Our defence and security industrial strategy, published in March, is the first critical step in achieving all of this. It gives our sector partners more transparency and more clarity on our requirements, and provides for a more co-operative approach. Meanwhile, we will be bringing out a refreshed shipbuilding strategy to supercharge the sector. We are making sure that shipbuilding investment will double over the life of this Parliament to more than £1.7 billion a year. Our spending reforms are signalling that we are ready to create the jobs and skills that will help to level up our country, and ready to build on the talents of different areas—frigates in Scotland, satellites in Belfast, armoured vehicles in Wales and aircraft production in the north of England—to strengthen our Union.

In a competitive age, it is vital that we get our defence spending right. Failure to do this in years gone by has often cost our country dear, but we have upped our spending, transformed our approach and put in place a plan for the long term. We have aligned our resources and our ambition, and by giving our great men and women the tools they need to succeed, we are helping them to focus on what they do best: safeguarding our shores and advancing our interests throughout the world.

This week as we celebrate Armed Forces Week and look forward to Armed Forces Day, the Royal Navy has three capital ships at sea: HMS Prince of Wales in the Atlantic; HMS Albion returning from the Baltic; and HMS Queen Elizabeth in the Mediterranean. The Royal Navy is forward present in the south Atlantic, the Mediterranean and the Caribbean, and our submariners are maintaining the continuous at-sea deterrent beneath our oceans. The Army is part of NATO in Estonia and Ukraine, fighting violent extremism in Mali, Somalia, Nigeria and Ghana, and doing the same against Daesh in Iraq and against the Taliban, as well as keeping the Falklands secure. Our Air Force has our quick reaction alert pilots at high readiness to protect UK airspace, while Typhoon pilots in Cyprus participate in Operation Shader. As well as that, we have more Typhoon pilots in Romania on Op Biloxi and, of course, those on board the carrier with F-35.

[Dr Lewis]

I do not wish to inject a depressing note into proceedings, but the Minister mentioned the Taliban in Afghanistan. There are many of us who are very concerned about the announcement of a specific end date without a clear military support plan for the Government for which our troops have sacrificed so much. It does not sit well with the objectives that we set ourselves all those years ago in intervening in Afghanistan. I wonder whether he can say anything about that.

[James Heappey]

That could be the subject of an entire Backbench Business debate and I know, Mr Deputy Speaker, that you are keen to move the business on. I will say two things in response to my right hon. Friend’s point. First, he gives me an opportunity to mark the enormous sacrifice of all British service personnel who have served in Afghanistan since 2003. They have done amazing things in an extraordinarily challenging country, and I know from my own experience soldiering there just how grim the grimmest days of that campaign were. He also rightly makes the point that Afghanistan has reached a crossroads. I stand by the argument that I made during the statement on our withdrawal from Afghanistan three or four weeks ago. I believe that it has forced a moment of political decision making in Afghanistan that would not otherwise have come, and I think it is right that the international community has done that, but we all, of course, share his concerns about what the future of the country might hold.

Yesterday, I had a number of opportunities to meet reservists who have been serving in the civil service throughout the last year. People have been involved in certifying vaccines and as part of distributing it around our country. To think that people have been doing that as their day job and then still finding time to serve in our armed forces at the weekend is the most amazing demonstration of just what wonderful people our reservists are. This morning, in the dead of night, in the land beneath Corsham in Wiltshire, I saw— in this case, men of Ulster, but they were representative of all our armed forces who are hugely professional—do the most incredible and amazing things in pitch black.

Being the Minister for the Armed Forces, is, in my view, the best job in Government. It is an honour to associate myself with these extraordinary people, especially as a veteran. I wish them all a happy Armed Forces Day and thank them for their service.

Ajax Programme

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Tuesday 8th June 2021 Commons Chamber

[Jeremy Quin]

The hon. Gentleman asks serious questions. I just reiterate that there is a difference between what a vehicle can do and what it is certified to do. With things like fire or manoeuvre and the speed limitation, we should not read into them that the vehicle is incapable either of firing on the move or of going above 20 mph. That is not the case; it is simply that that is not what it is certified to do at the moment.

The hon. Gentleman also highlights, perfectly reasonably, the issues that I touched on about noise and vibration. On noise, there are mitigations in place at the moment, and there are further mitigations in terms of the headsets. When we introduced Ajax, the problems occurred in using the standard British Army headset for use in armoured vehicles; the concern that we came across in testing the inner ear was that that was not adequate for the task.

There are two issues that we are therefore looking at: the headset and the noise of the vehicle itself. The noise can have two components; it can be mechanical, but it can also be the electronic noise generated by the aircraft that is communicating with the headsets. I wish that I could tell the hon. Gentleman that a week on Tuesday it will all be resolved. I cannot, but I can tell him that there are issues that we are seriously working through with the suppliers to ensure that we get there.

With vibration, General Dynamics has not had the same experience that we have had, apparently: over many thousands of miles of driving, it has not seen the same issues. That is why we are going to Millbrook, which will have sensors all over the vehicles to test where the vibration is happening and whether we can isolate it. It may be resolvable quickly; it may not be. I can commit only to telling the hon. Gentleman that we will do the work and that I will ensure that people are aware of how it progresses.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

It is encouraging that General Dynamics has been able to make a vehicle work satisfactorily in the United States, so will my hon. Friend confirm that the Government will not be rushed into bringing this already much delayed vehicle into service until these problems are solved to the satisfaction of the people in the armed forces who will have to fight in it?

[Jeremy Quin]

I am so glad that my right hon. Friend asks that question, because it requires a very simple answer: absolutely. Unfortunately, as he rightly says, there has been a long pattern of delays with the project, but we are not going to take into service something that does not meet our requirements. It is a firm price contract; we need to have it right, and take it into service when it is right to do that. We are not going to obfuscate in order to do so.

Oral Answers to Questions

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 24th May 2021 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

I call the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, Dr Julian Lewis.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I hope we are not so naive as to believe that the Taliban will stick to any peace deal unless they recognise adverse consequences for breaking it. So will the Government take steps, in conjunction with the US and other NATO allies, to find a new strategy, possibly based on a strategic base in the region, to deter the Taliban and protect Afghanistan from a total Islamist takeover after our land forces have totally been withdrawn?

[Mr Wallace]

My right hon. Friend makes a very pertinent point and a very real suggestion. The US, in that peace agreement, chose not to make it conditions-based at the end. That was a regret for most of the NATO allies, as we thought that that was important. However, a lot of people have lost their lives in that conflict and sacrificed a lot, and I do not intend that to be for nothing. As I said, we will explore all options that we can to make sure that we protect not only Britain’s interests and citizens, but her allies.

We are also protected by international law in doing what we need to do to defend ourselves if a threat emanates from that country or any other around the globe, and we have the capabilities to do that. Allies will continue to talk, and our support for and funding to the Afghan Government will continue to at least 2024. The one thing I would say to the Taliban is that they will remember what happened the last time they played host to al-Qaeda.

Carrier Strike Group Deployment

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Monday 26th April 2021 Commons Chamber

[Mr Wallace]

First and foremost, we cannot separate trade from security. We need to secure our trade. The hon. Gentleman’s party’s whole economic basis used to be about exporting oil around the world. If a country cannot export its oil, it cannot run its economy, according to some of the Scottish National party’s previous manifestoes. It is really important that we secure our trade and do not let the values in the rules-based system be undermined far away until it is too late and it gets close to our shores. That is really important.

I am not ashamed at all that this deployment will also be linked to trade. I am proud of standing on British-made equipment, made by Scottish hands, and English, Welsh and Northern Irish hands, and I am proud that there is equipment on those ships that can be used for a whole range of things—humanitarian and non-military-method means, and all sorts of things. We should be really proud that we will be showing that off to the world.

We will not leave Britain undefended. We will still have our Type 23s, our Type 45s and our P-8s, which are based in Lossiemouth, as excellent maritime patrol vessels. We will still have a number of capabilities. Our submarines will be on watch based out of Faslane. I pay tribute to those submariners who will be departing from Faslane to join and escort the carrier group. They do an amazing job, and it is something special to understand what submariners do.

We have had long-scheduled deployments into the Black sea. This is not new. It is not an increase or decrease. We have taken a view that we should stick to our planned exercises and deployment. I think that is the right thing to do—to say that we will not be intimidated from it and that we will stick up for our friends in the Black sea—Romania, Turkey and all those other nations that we work alongside. We will be doing that, as we had planned long before the recent friction we saw up in Ukraine. I hope the hon. Gentleman recognises that we are not off to go around picking a fight; we are there to stand up for our values and I think the Royal Navy will do a great job.

Fundamentally, this comes back to the point that we rely on each other. The security of Europe is incredibly important to the United Kingdom and to the continent of Europe. Even last year, in December, when the Russians appeared with a number of ships, the French, the British and the Dutch all set about that issue. We will continue to do so. As I said, the greatest thing about our friends and allies is that we are all in a partnership with solidarity, and that is the best way to defeat or push back our adversaries.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

If we want the United States to help defend our interests in Europe, it is only right that we should help it defend common interests in the far east. Does the Secretary of State accept that having Americans intimately involved in this whole process adds to the deterrent effect of a carrier strike force? We do not want to get, in the digital age, into a situation where a surface ship, no matter how powerful, up against a peer enemy armed with hypersonic missiles, might find itself at a fatal disadvantage, but for the deterrent effect of our joint activity with our strategic allies.

[Mr Wallace]

I note my right hon. Friend’s final phrase, “strategic allies”. Not only are they allies, but they make a strategic difference, and they stand for the rule of law and the same values we do. Today, I met the US commander on the Queen Elizabeth. He said not only that it was an amazing ship, but that they look forward to working with us. As my right hon. Friend said, it is about partnership: “You attack us, you attack us all” is a strong message around the world. The number of people from different countries around the world who have got in touch wanting to be part of this deployment speaks volumes about what is going on in their neighbourhood and their backyard. Finally, as my right hon. Friend rightly says, the United States has always been a significant net contributor to the security of Europe; it is only right that we do the same when its interests are under threat.

Afghanistan

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Tuesday 20th April 2021 Commons Chamber

[James Heappey]

I do not accept that we have not achieved what we were there to do in the first place. We went into Afghanistan as a direct consequence of what happened on 11 September 2001. Article 5 was invoked because an attack on one was an attack on us all, and that attack originated in Afghanistan. Since then, there has been no international terrorist attack launched from Afghanistan on the UK, the US or, indeed, any other NATO ally, so in that sense the mission was achieved.

Actually, the mission has gone far further, as we have explored in our exchanges on the urgent question: in the 20 years that we have been there, we have given the opportunity for the Afghan Government to establish and strengthen and for an Afghan civil society to flourish. I truly believe that we have set the conditions within which a political process now has the best chances of success.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I know that the Minister will take back the very strong feelings expressed on both sides of the House that interpreters and other locally employed civilians must not be abandoned to a terrible fate at the hands of our enemies.

When the Minister says that the military process is over, does he not realise that the only thing that will prevent the Taliban from going back to the position they were in before we intervened 20 years will be the threat that if they try to overthrow the Government, they themselves will face a military consequence—if necessary, from outside the borders of the country? If he rules that out, he is basically giving them carte blanche.

[James Heappey]

As my right hon. Friend will know from his extensive experience of peace processes around the world, it is very likely—indeed, almost certain—that a lasting peace settlement in Afghanistan will involve the Taliban as part of the Afghan Government. It is in all our interests to support the political process as it plays out, but if there is a return to an ungoverned space that gives succour to international terrorism that is a threat to the UK homeland or the interests of our allies, we of course reserve the right to protect our interests, both unilaterally and multilaterally through NATO.

Strength of the UK’s Armed Forces

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Wednesday 14th April 2021 Commons Chamber

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

May I warmly endorse what the hon. Member for Rochdale (Tony Lloyd) just said about our late, dear colleague Cheryl Gillan?

It is often said, in the military context, that quantity has a quality all its own. That is perfectly true, but it does not mean that the strength of the armed forces should be measured by their size alone. A revolutionary advance in military technology in the hands of a few can defeat almost any number of assailants; think of the Somme and the mass slaughter of troops by limited numbers of machine guns with interlocking fields of fire—only other new technologies eventually broke that dreadful stalemate. After the end of the cold war, the threat picture finally shifted away from Europe and towards expeditionary warfare, based on carrier-strike, which is air power from the sea, and amphibious capability, which is land power from the sea. Such traditional technologies are still essential for those sorts of campaigns against opponents who are no match for us militarily. Yet against advanced peer opponents armed with hypersonic anti-ship missiles, for example, traditional assets such as surface ships are potentially very vulnerable. As we know, the pendulum has now swung back from countering insurgencies and their sponsors to state-on-state confrontation with major military powers.

As has been pointed out, at the root of our defence dilemma is one inescapable limitation: between 1988 and 2018, defence expenditure halved as a proportion of GDP. The most welcome pledge of an extra £16.4 billion spread over a four-year period should fill a “black hole” in the equipment budget and facilitate investment in critical new areas of technology. What it will not do, sadly, is prevent serious cuts in conventional armed forces. An estimated 2.2% or 2.3% of GDP defence budget is well short of the 3% recommended by Defence Committees past and present, let alone the 4.5% and above regularly allocated during the cold war years. Yet, even if all our dreams came true on the size of the defence budget, we would still be at the mercy of nuclear blackmail and attack if we had not voted in July 2016 to proceed with the renewal of the Trident missile submarine fleet. Given that the right hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn), a former Labour leader, and I have debated such matters good-naturedly for more than 20 years and he is up next, let me conclude with reference to the Government’s announcement that they will no longer reduce the total of our nuclear warheads from a maximum of 225 to a maximum of 180 by the mid-2020s. Instead, they will set a new overall ceiling of 260. This is predictably being denounced as a 40% increase; but the cancellation of a reduction is not an increase. Most probably, it is a recognition that advances in anti-ballistic missile technology might tempt an aggressor to think—probably mistakenly—that he could avoid a devastating response. Why, then, raise the theoretical maximum from 225 to 260? The Government have not said so, but my guess is that it is to cover any temporary overlap when the current generation of UK warheads are replaced by their successors. We have always followed a policy of minimum strategic deterrence, and long may we continue to keep ourselves safe by doing so.

Defence and Security Industrial Strategy

Julian Lewis Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd March 2021 Commons Chamber

[Jeremy Quin]

I should just be clear that we look at every tender on a case-by-case basis, and we look at each company and each competitive situation on a straightforward tender-by-tender basis. I will not go into the details of what the hon. Gentleman stated.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

I am sure that the Minister knows that friends of defence on both sides of the House wish to campaign for the 3% of GDP, as recommended by successive Defence Committees, to be spent on defence, but to do that, we need accurate figures. Does the Minister accept that the black hole in the defence budget was correctly described as £17 billion? How much of that £17 billion would be met by cuts and cancellations? How much would be topped up by money from the extra £24 billion, and, at the end of the process, how much of the extra £24 billion will be left for new projects?

[Jeremy Quin]

It is interesting to hear that there are colleagues in the House wishing to campaign for 3% of GDP to be spent on defence.

[Dr Lewis]

For a long time.

[Jeremy Quin]

My right hon. Friend says that to a Minister for Defence Procurement who is interested to hear it. I think we have a good settlement this time round. I am sure that he welcomes the extra £24 billion and regards it as a very good step forward for the defence of our country.

I do not recognise the £17 billion number, but there was a black hole—of that there is no doubt; we said that the equipment plan was not affordable. We recognise that there will be programmes as part of the equipment plan that we want to take forward, so within the £24 billion there will be programmes that we were hoping to finance but did not have the money for, including the Type 26s and the Type 31s. The equipment plan will be published in due course, and my right hon. Friend will be able to get all the details he wishes, and more, from that.