Royal Navy Ships

Angus Robertson Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd December 2013 Westminster Hall

[Angus Robertson (Moray) (SNP)]

I pay tribute to the hon. and gallant Member for Bournemouth East (Mr Ellwood), who has a long track record and experience in defence matters. I congratulate him on securing the debate and on outlining many thoughtful points, in particular relating to the littoral dimension, global strategic challenges, and interoperability and joint effect.

When considering future and current vessels, one must consider future and current maritime roles and taskings as an important starting point. I think that Members from across the House agree that naval forces are there to protect and patrol, to secure freedom of movement, to enforce the boundaries of territorial waters, to control exclusive economic zones, and to secure the environment—a significant consideration—renewables and critical infrastructure. That is particularly important when one bears in mind what is likely to happen in the decades ahead with offshore wind, tidal and wave power and the development of super-grid systems, which are likely to connect Iceland, the Faroe islands, Scotland, Norway and the rest of Europe. Other dimensions include subsea infrastructure and, of course, the trafficking of drugs and people. I had a quick look at the Royal Navy’s website before the debate and noted the five key current areas of maritime security, which were counter-piracy, counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, keeping sea lanes open and “around the UK”.

I join the hon. Member for Bournemouth East not only in praising UK personnel and those of other countries for their life-saving roles far from home—including, most recently, in reacting to the humanitarian catastrophe in the Philippines—but in acknowledging the importance of anti-piracy operations, and the maintenance of free-trade routes through measures such as Operation Ocean Shield, which is ably commanded from a Norwegian vessel, the Fridtjof Nansen.

It is the fifth and surely most important task in the Royal Navy’s list that I want to address in the context of future and current conventional naval vessels, capabilities and tasking: maritime domain awareness, or MDA, to use the Navy’s terminology, which we should understand. It is the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact on security, safety, the economy or the environment. I want to examine the issue in terms of recent developments close to home.

There is no better place to start than with an incident that happened two years ago and has close connection to my part of the world. The 65,000-tonne Admiral Kuznetsov anchored on the edge of UK waters off my constituency. Other Russian ships that also sought shelter in the Moray firth included the anti-submarine warfare ship Admiral Chabanenko, and the escort ship Yaroslav Mudryy. The vessels did not warn domestic authorities that they were going to come so close to the coast, and are believed to have blamed bad weather for making that approach. It was the first time the Kuznetsov, or a vessel of its size, had deployed near UK waters, and it was the closest in 20 years that a Russian naval task group had deployed to Scotland or anywhere else in the UK.

In previous years, Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft would have been loitering and would have been aware of the presence of a Russian deployment of that size. Of course, by 2011, the UK had no such aircraft; it is the only northern European military without them. Nevertheless, the Russians were there without any UK escort. At that stage, the Ministry of Defence was relying on Scottish fishing vessels to report developments, including fly-tipping by the visitors. When the MOD became aware of the Russians’ presence, a 30-year-old Type 42 frigate, the HMS York, was scrambled from Portsmouth, around 1,000 miles away. That distance, at 20 to 24 knots, takes more than 24 hours to travel. The responsibility that the HMS York was fulfilling was that of fleet ready escort, which means being the deployable and capable vessel in UK waters ready to perform emergency response tasks. The Kuznetsov case raises serious questions relating to current and future naval vessels, and I would be grateful if the Minister could address them. I know that he is well advised today, so I am sure that he will have time to respond to my points.

Is the availability of a fleet ready escort a mandated task of the Royal Navy? Will the Minister confirm that, owing to the unavailability of vessels, the fleet ready escort provision has been repeatedly gapped? Will he confirm that Ministers need to be informed by the Royal Navy every time such a gap exists? Will he confirm how many times over the last five years and for how long the fleet ready escort has been gapped? Will he confirm that offshore patrol and mine countermeasures vessels have been assigned for fleet ready escort duty during gapped periods? When considering future ships, it is important to understand the current state of play and what one might want to ensure does not happen in future.

Staying with recent experience, in May 2007, Tornado F3 jets from RAF Leuchars in Fife were sent to intercept two Russian aircraft spotted observing a Royal Navy exercise off northern Scotland. The jets were scrambled after the foreign planes were detected by radar in the skies over the western isles. They were identified as Russian Bear Foxtrot planes, commonly seen by RAF pilots during the cold war. In this case, they were intercepted and their return was escorted.

Although there have been recent developments, I do not want to explore in any detail in this forum the interest shown by some countries in subsea infrastructure, but I am sure that both the Government and Opposition Front-Bench representatives will understand its importance and the importance of its integrity. The examples that I have given underline that, with regard to the maritime domain awareness of future and current vessels, there are important tasks close to the UK that must be properly managed as a priority.

I want to raise the question of tasking in our immediate wider maritime region and, in particular, the contribution towards joint allied responsibilities and training. NATO has, as part of its immediate reaction force, standing NATO maritime group 1, which primarily operates in the eastern Atlantic. Similarly, standing NATO mine countermeasures group 1 operates in northern waters. They are relevant for future and current naval vessel provision, as they are standing operational commitments for allied nations, which provide destroyers, frigates and mine countermeasure vessels. It is notable that the UK has not provided vessels to either of the groups for several years.

Similarly, on joint training, there is a real issue of properly committing current and, hopefully, future vessels. Last month saw the largest NATO training exercise in northern Europe in nearly a decade. Some 6,000 troops from 20 allied and partner nations took part in Steadfast Jazz, which involved land, air, and sea elements. Of the 6,000 participants in the exercise, the UK contributed precisely 52 personnel aboard a single mine hunter. It followed a large-scale exercise with maritime dimensions in Norway, where the UK provided just one aircraft, which is more than has ever been provided to the NATO air policing commitments in Iceland.

When it comes to our immediate maritime backyard, the UK is sadly posted missing too often and is not taking its responsibilities seriously. The absence of any mention of the high north and Arctic in the most recent strategic defence and security review eloquently underlines my point.

This is all especially relevant to Scotland when it comes to current and future conventional vessels. Scotland is a maritime nation with a sea area five times larger than its land area. Our coastline is over 11,000 km long, and is longer than that of the People’s Republic of China and that of India. It constitutes 61% of the entire UK coastline, and there are more than 800 islands. Remarkably, however, there is not a single major, ocean-going, UK conventional vessel based in Scotland to perform the key tasks that I have outlined; no frigates or offshore patrol vessels are based in Scotland. That can and will change after a yes vote in next year’s independence referendum in Scotland. Last week, the Scottish Government published their White Paper, “Scotland’s Future”, which included plans for naval forces. I commend the White Paper to Members of all parties, although I understand that the print run has already been fully exhausted.

[Oliver Colvile]

rose—

[Angus Robertson]

If the hon. Gentleman wishes to place an order, I am sure a copy will be sent to him. Of course I give way to him.

[Oliver Colvile]

The hon. Gentleman is making an interesting case, but I point out that every proposal has been to ensure that the nuclear submarines remain up at Faslane, which is useful for employment in that part of Scotland.

[Angus Robertson]

This issue is close to my heart, and I would be happy to debate at great length the Scottish public’s overwhelming opposition to nuclear weapons being based in Scotland—something ignored, sadly, by the hon. Gentleman’s party and by the official Opposition in Westminster—but I am looking closely at the clock. In the White Paper, however, which I commend to him, the plans for Faslane are for a vibrant conventional naval base, and I am sure that most people would welcome that. I am delighted at the strong commitment in the White Paper to maritime capabilities, including frigates, OPVs, patrol boats, auxiliary ships and, crucially, newly procured maritime patrol aircraft.

UK assets and liabilities are key, and they must be a consideration for the Ministry of Defence, now and after a yes vote. Future vessels are very relevant. The referendum will have a significant bearing on issues relating to current and future vessels, but as yet we have had no indication from the Government as to their preferences on defence assets. According to the most recent UK asset register, published in 2007, MOD assets totalled more than £92 billion in value; on a population share basis, Scotland would be entitled to £7.7 billion in defence estate, equipment and vessels, or a financial offset. With regard to future vessels, that is important, because the UK Government have to date given no indication of the effect of a yes vote on their planning assumptions or procurement plans.

The MOD has projected the need for £160 billion of spending on defence equipment and support over the next 10 years; £13 billion of that spending is predicated on continuing guaranteed Scottish taxpayer support. With independence, Whitehall will need to work with the Scottish Government on joint procurement even to come close to those commitments. It is in the interests of both Governments to work together. The Scottish Government’s White Paper included the following commitment:

“This Scottish Government will take forward the procurement of four new frigates, to be built on the Clyde, preferably through joint procurement with the rest of the UK.”

That presents a good chance for massive procurement gain, with the potential to extend the production run of the Type 26 frigate. Unless the Government were to signal a further reduction in demand for frigate numbers, we could see more ships built rather than fewer, which is good news for the Clyde, good news for taxpayers across these islands, and good news for defence with appropriate conventional capabilities.

In conclusion, current and future naval vessels have essential tasks at home and further afield. I have stressed the importance of providing for necessary maritime territorial and regional defence, which is the core business of defence responsibility. Sadly, the UK Government have taken their eye off the ball, so I look forward to a sovereign Scotland taking those responsibilities seriously, and having the vessels and capabilities to do so.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Lewis]

The distinction that I achieved cannot be overemphasised: I advanced from probationer ordinary seaman to full ordinary seaman. I was very proud to be one, because even in those days—it was from 1979 to 1982, or thereabouts—I was too old to be an officer cadet. I feel the bus pass jingling in my pocket.

Yesterday, I took the day off and had the great pleasure of travelling to Southampton university at the invitation of Commander Chris Ling, commanding officer of Thunderer Squadron, which is the defence technical undergraduate scheme at the university, and Lieutenant Amie Jackson. She—I emphasise “she”—is the commanding officer of the warship HMS Blazer, which is attached to the university’s Royal Navy unit. It was wonderful to celebrate with them the opening of their new joint headquarters at the National Oceanography Centre. Looking at the fine young people who are coming through the system and having a first-class maritime education there, I could not help wondering how many opportunities they would have, and how many naval vessels would be available for them to serve in, in the years ahead, when they go on, as so many of them do, to professional careers in the Royal Navy.

I said that I would talk a bit about strategy. I have always acknowledged on a cross-party basis that the concepts of Labour’s 1998 strategic defence review were very sound. They recognised that we were no longer facing as our primary concern the cold war threat on the continent, and that if our forces were engaged, it would be in more far-flung theatres. As we were no longer an empire and no longer had a string of bases all over the world, it would be necessary to have a portable, movable sea base that we could use to take our joint forces to the theatre in which they were engaged. That seemed sound then, and it is sound today. That concept required two sorts of taskforce: one to allow air power to be projected from the sea, hence the aircraft carriers; and the other to enable military power to be landed from the sea, hence the amphibious taskforce. Broadly speaking, we have the central elements of those taskforces.

We know that the aircraft carriers are moving steadily forward, whatever financial peaks and troughs they have had in their chequered history, and that they will come to fruition. I would like to predict that the Government will bring both carriers into service, because it would be sheer madness to build one of the largest ships that the Royal Navy has ever seen and not deploy it.

The Albion, the Bulwark, and our Bay-class ships of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary Service form the core of the amphibious taskforce, and again, it would be interesting to know—although I do not expect an answer today—what plans there are to think about the next generation of assault ships to follow the Albion and the Bulwark. However, the point about the two taskforces, and the relevance to today’s debate, is that they will have to be protected against air threats, surface threats and submarine threats. As I said before, if we need a certain number of frigates—let us say as many as four to protect a taskforce, if it were in a serious regional conflict—given the roles that the frigates will have to perform in other areas, including ongoing and standing tasks, I find myself querying how the idea that we will generate a minimum of seven available anti-submarine warfare frigates from only eight out of the 13 will work.

I shall say a brief word about numbers. I start from the standpoint that we are simply not spending enough on defence. I know all the economic arguments about that, but the fact is that as a proportion of gross domestic product, defence spending has declined too far down our list of priorities. Spending was between 4% and 5% during the cold war years. When Labour came into office in 1997, it went from 2.9% to 2.6%, then to 2.8%. Then, in successive years, it was 2.7%, 2.7% again, 2.5%, 2.5% again, and so on. That looked fairly consistent, but the problem was that during that period, we were engaged in fighting two large regional conflicts, and the Treasury was not prepared to stump up the extra money to fund those conflicts in full. As a result, we found the core military budget being eaten away by the financing of current conflicts, and since then, under the present Government, the situation has not improved. I believe that we are down to something like 2.1% of GDP at present, and I feel that that is the root of the problem.

At the time of the strategic defence review that set out those concepts, the Labour Government proposed reducing the combined number of frigates and destroyers from 35 to 32. The admirals gritted their teeth and accepted that, but it quickly emerged that 32 had actually gone down to 31, and the then Secretary of State, Geoff Hoon, formulated what I later dubbed the “Hoon excuse”, which was, “It doesn’t really matter that we have lost an extra frigate, because they are more powerful than they used to be, so 31 ships can do what 32 used to do.” That, I am afraid, was the start of a very slippery slope.

The next bite taken out of the total by the Labour Government took the number down from 31 to 25. I remember standing up in the House of Commons at the beginning of 2007 waxing eloquent about persistent rumours that the Government intended to mothball, if not permanently dispose of, another half a dozen frigates to take the total down to 19. In the end, that gradually slipped away, but a couple of Type 23 frigates were paid off, and effectively the total went down to 23 from 25. It took the Conservative-led coalition coming in before we went down to 19 in the 2010 SDSR, yet the concept set out in 1998 remained basically sound: we needed to be able to fulfil certain standing tasks, to protect a mobile base, and to escort an amphibious taskforce or an aircraft carrier taskforce. I do not see what doctrinal developments since then justify such a radical reduction in the numbers.

That leads to me to my final point, about the design concept, which my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Bournemouth East mentioned. It is about whether it might be worth looking at the other five more general-purpose hulls that are proposed to bring the total number of frigates up to 13, and whether it might be worth considering doing something simpler to get more hulls in the water from which we can regenerate the surface fleet. Back in February 2005, in putting forward that concept, I was unwise enough to say that, really, the replacement general-purpose frigates ought to be “as cheap as chips”, which is not the sort of phrase that a proud Navy wants to hear. However, the point is based on an important development that I referred to in my opening questions—the idea of plug and play.

When the Type 45s were designed and put into service, they had a very large gymnasium. Why? Because they were designed in such a way that at a future stage in their life cycle, when we could afford it, we would be able to plug into that large space a module of land attack cruise missiles, which would hugely increase the ships’ power, even though we felt that we could not afford to do so at the beginning. It is perfectly possible to design ships that are relatively simple, but that have that capacity; I am extremely glad to see the hon. Member for Moray (Angus Robertson) nodding in agreement. We are very capable of upgrading those ships in their lifetime, and adding to their capacity. Perhaps it is too late now—I do not know—but we could at least try to keep the number of hulls a bit larger and lessen the complexity a bit; we would then have the basis for upgrading the quality of the vessels during their lifetime.

[Angus Robertson]

I suggest that the hon. Gentleman looks closely at the royal Danish navy’s StanFlex system, which does exactly that.

[Dr Lewis]

It is very much one of the examples that I have in mind. Those vessels are extremely economical, but they are out there in good numbers, and as was said by my hon. Friend the Member for Gosport (Caroline Dinenage), who had to leave, they are exportable.

I think that the Chamber has heard more than enough from me on these matters. I very much look forward to hearing the wind-ups and, in particular, answers to some of the questions I posed. If I cannot have them all just now, perhaps I can have some of them in writing.