Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism
Diana Johnson Excerpts(10 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Diana Johnson (Kingston upon Hull North) (Lab)
I thank the Minister for his statement and I am grateful for the Home Secretary’s letter to my right hon. Friend the shadow Home Secretary. On the basis of the Minister’s statement and that letter, the Opposition will support the Government’s motion.
We recognise, of course, that events in Syria, Iraq and northern Africa are fuelling a rapidly evolving network of inter-related terror groups who pose a real threat to the UK and our allies. It is absolutely right to use all legal measures to try to counter the spread of these groups and to ensure that they cannot establish themselves in the United Kingdom.
In this case, we have two groups with close links to other proscribed groups. Jund al Khalifa-Algeria is an Algerian-based Islamic militant group, linked to al-Qaeda and hoping to establish a caliphate in northern Africa. The group is affiliated to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Secondly, Jund al-Aqsa or Soldiers of al-Aqsa is a splinter group of the al-Nusra front, and it is just three months since we proscribed JKI—Army of the Islamic Caliphate, another splinter group of the al-Nusra front. In common with the al-Nusra front, the JAA is largely based in Syria, and as a group has attracted many jihadists from outside Syria. JAA started out as a campaign against the Syrian Government, but in recent attacks the group has seemed happy to target innocent civilians.
At this point in a proscription order, I normally have to conclude that we will take the assurances of the Home Secretary that she has sufficient evidence that the groups are conducting the activities described. This is obviously because the Opposition do not have access to the same intelligence as the Government. In this case, however, there is no need to see sensitive information to conclude that these are terrorist groups. Far from hiding their activities, they are actively boasting about them on social media, using YouTube, Facebook and Twitter to spread images of the most horrendous violence, alongside messages justifying it. These are not groups that want to hide; these are groups that are actively recruiting.
The JAA YouTube channel was opened on the 28 July 2014, apparently replacing a previous YouTube channel that had been closed down. The latest Twitter account opened in September in English, again replacing an account that had been closed down. The English Twitter account—we looked at it just yesterday—has 1,460 followers. Tweets declare fallen supporters to be martyrs, and there are links to YouTube videos and other Twitter pages run by JAA. One of these pages is the official JAA Twitter page in Arabic, which has some 17,500 followers.
The videos on the YouTube channel are even more disturbing. Let us take, for example, the video uploaded on to the official JAA channel on 21 September 2014. This video depicts JAA fighters engaging with Government forces—kicking, hanging, abusing the bodies of the dead and taking part in training exercises. It seems quite clear that this video is intended to glorify grotesque violence as a form of extremist propaganda. This video has been viewed 13,000 times, attracted 40 comments and has been “liked” on the YouTube rating system 96 times.
I have met Google in the past to discuss YouTube’s hosting of terrorist propaganda, and it is supposed to be taking down extremist content when it comes across it. The Home Office’s counter-terrorism internet referral unit is also supposed to be identifying this content and getting it taken down. Here, however, is a whole YouTube channel run by, as we know, a known terrorist organisation and including sermons advocating terrorism and videos of violent terrorist acts attracting thousands of views.
At one level, there is an irony that these extremist terrorist groups, rallying against western consumerism, are happy to use these enormous western companies to spread their message of hate, but there is also a very serious point. As the Minister said in an earlier speech to the House, the
“effect is that a listed organisation is outlawed and is unable to operate in the UK. It is a criminal offence for a person to belong to…support…arrange a meeting in support of a proscribed organisation, or wear clothing or carry articles in public which arouse reasonable suspicion that an individual is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation.”—[Official Report, 2 April 2014; Vol. 578, c. 948.]
A very brief look at what was available on social media enabled me to come across deeply offensive and worrying videos and tweets. I am very pleased that we are proscribing the organisations that produced them, but I think that the Minister should bear in mind that social media companies are making such videos and tweets available for everyone to see, and consider what more can be done about those companies.
Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill
Diana Johnson Excerpts(10 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Diana Johnson (Kingston upon Hull North) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 7, page 15, line 21, leave out subsection (5) and insert—
‘(5) Before giving guidance under this section, or revising guidance already given, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament—
(a) the proposed guidance or proposed revisions; and
(b) a draft of an order providing for the guidance, or revisions to the guidance, to come into force.
(6) The Secretary of State must make the order, and issue the guidance or (as the case may be) make the revisions to the guidance, if the draft of the order is approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.
(7) Guidance, or revisions to guidance, come into force in accordance with an order under this section.
(8) Such an order—
(a) is to be a statutory instrument; and
(b) may contain transitional, transitory or saving provision.”
This would ensure that statutory guidance produced under Clause 24 was subject to an affirmative resolution of each House.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Mrs Eleanor Laing)
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 6, in clause 29, page 17, line 29, leave out subsection (7) and insert—
‘(7) To support panels exercising their functions under this section the Secretary of State must—
(a) provide guidance on the exercise of those functions;
(b) provide a list of approved providers for de-radicalisation programmes that may be referred to under subsection (4); and
(c) ensure that the providers listed under paragraph (b) are subject to monitoring.”
This would give a greater role to the Secretary of State in supporting the role of local support panels. The Secretary of State would have to provide guidance (rather than it being optional) and she would also have to provide a list of approved providers for de-radicalisation programmes and ensure they would be subject to monitoring.
Diana Johnson
Let me begin by expressing my horror at the terror attack that took place in Paris today. I am sure that the thoughts of the whole House will be with the family and friends of the victims of that attack, and, of course, we all stand in solidarity with the French people at this time.
Part 5 of the Bill contains measures to counter extremism in communities and to deal directly with vulnerable individuals. As Ministers will recall, it was the last Labour Government who introduced both the Prevent agenda and the Channel programme, and we remain absolutely committed to supporting and, indeed, strengthening both policies. Obviously the Government reviewed Prevent when they came to office, and it is important for us to view the measures in the Bill in the context of the changes that they introduced. I think that those changes are a rather mixed bag, and I am not sure that they were particularly successful.
Both Prevent and Channel require a partnership between central Government and local agencies, and amendments 7 and 6 are intended to ensure that the Government support local bodies in the delivery of both programmes. While we agree that Prevent should involve local delivery, it seems to us that the recent problems stem from central Government. There has been a marked decline in Prevent’s funding, which has fallen from £17 million a year to just £1 million. Some of that clearly resulted from a conscious decision, but there also appears to have been mismanagement. Every year £5.1 million has been allocated for local delivery, but I understand that over the past four years more than 60% of it has gone unclaimed.
In Committee, I raised a number of concerns about the delivery of Prevent at national level, and about the monitoring and support supplied by central Government to local agencies. I am sure that the Minister for Security and Immigration, the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (James Brokenshire)—although I am pleased to see the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the hon. Member for Staffordshire Moorlands (Karen Bradley) in the Chamber today—recalls that I spoke at length about my concern about the performance of the Department for Education. I do not want to go through all that again, but I think that the Government’s role should be formalised in the Bill so that we know what is expected of them.
Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)
Does the hon. Lady agree that this provision should relate not only to public bodies? If an individual believes that someone is likely to become radicalised, it really should be incumbent on that individual to tell someone about it so that something can be done. It is not only bodies such as schools that should have responsibilities in this area; individuals should, too.
Diana Johnson
The hon. Gentleman makes the important point that we all have a responsibility in this area. My concern, however, is about the specific responsibilities being placed on local authorities and other public bodies under the Channel programme. We must make sure that we get this right, which is why I am focusing on why the first stage of the programme is not being placed on a statutory basis but the second stage is so being placed. I wonder whether that is the best way of doing it. I take the hon. Gentleman’s point, however.
Only when a person has been identified as at risk will the provisions in clause 28(3) kick in. That subsection allows a chief officer of police to make a referral to the local support panel that has been set up by the local authority. My first concern is with the level of expertise that those panels must have, and that is where amendment 21 comes in. As provided for in the Bill, local support panels will have to assess the individual’s risk of radicalisation and tailor a support panel to address the risks. The issues involved are complex and varied.
The current guidance cites 22 vulnerability indicators that could lead to a Channel referral. The panel must weigh up those factors and tailor a support package, which could have any number of elements. In some areas, however, the panel will be addressing issues that it has never faced before, such as sectarian hatred, which can be exacerbated by poorly provided support. That is why we feel that the Home Office needs to support local panels by providing an approved list of support providers who are able to give the specialist interventions needed to address the specific issues facing the individual.
This is a crucial stage of the Channel process and it should be recognised in the Bill. My understanding is that the Home Office is already doing this work to some extent, and I welcome the Minister’s commitment on Second Reading to continue to do it, but as we are putting the obligations of local authorities into the Bill, I think we should also be placing the responsibilities of central Government in the legislation. That could be particularly important for local authorities that are making referrals for the first time. I have repeatedly asked for the number of occasions on which each local authority has made a Channel assessment and referral, but unfortunately my requests for that information have been repeatedly refused. However, there must be many parts of the country that have never had to deal with issues such as these before.
This Government have repeatedly claimed to be stepping up efforts to stop Prevent funding going to organisations that are radicalising people, but that cannot be done unless the Home Office takes a lead in vetting those bodies. Under clause 32, the Home Secretary may indemnify Channel providers, so it is accepted that the Home Office has a role in that regard. It therefore seems reasonable for it also to have a role in assessing and vetting providers and ensuring that they are fit for purpose. These are really important issues. I know the Minister shares the commitment to making sure this Bill is as good as it can be and to getting Prevent and Channel right. I therefore hope she will realise that the support the Home Office is providing on Prevent and Channel needs to be reviewed again and improved, and that the guidance that has been issued as a consultation document can be improved in many areas. I hope she will feel able to accept the amendments.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Karen Bradley)
Today’s events in Paris are yet another shocking reminder of the threat we all face, and our thoughts and prayers are with the families, friends and colleagues of the victims. I echo the comments of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister in condemning that barbaric attack, and I am sure the whole House stands united with the French people in our opposition to all forms of terrorism.
Part 5 of the Bill and schedules 3 and 4 deal with an important area of our counter-terrorism work: preventing people from being drawn into terrorism. That was subject to a long and insightful debate in Committee, and I recognise and welcome the deep interest many right hon. and hon. Members have in the area. The shadow Minister made a number of points about the Prevent programme in general, and I wish to address those before dealing with the specifics of the amendments.
The hon. Lady made a point about funding for Prevent, so let me make it clear that this Government are committed to the Prevent programme: £40 million has been allocated for Prevent spending in 2014-15, and the spending has been £36 million in 2011-12, £35 million in 2012-13 and £39 million in 2013-14. She knows as well as anybody that the spending is not just done by the Home Office and that that is spending across government, including by local authorities, the Department for Communities and Local Government and the Home Office. It is worth saying that the Prime Minister announced on 25 November that an additional £130 million was being made available for increased counter-terrorism work, which includes Prevent activity. With that funding, we will introduce a clear legal obligation on our universities, prisons, councils and schools to play their part in tackling extremism. The new funding being made available will also include additional resources for programmes to prevent radicalisation.
The hon. Lady asked about the Prevent projects. We have delivered more than 180 community-based Prevent projects since 2011, and we are currently supporting more than 70. Prevent local projects have reached more than 45,000 people since early 2012. All our current Prevent projects are focused on the current threat, including Syria and Iraq. In the 2013-14 financial year, Prevent local co-ordinators in our 30 Prevent priority areas worked with more than 250 mosques, 50 faith groups and 70 community groups. In addition, since the revised Prevent strategy was issued in June 2011, we have trained more than 120,000 front-line public sector workers to identify and support those at risk. We are currently rolling out new updated training, through the Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent—the WRAP training programme—now in its third iteration. We have seen a significant rise in the number of referrals to the Channel programme, which provides tailored support to people identified as being at risk of radicalisation; the Association of Chief Police Officers reported a 58% increase in the past year. Since April 2012, there have been more than 2,000 referrals to Channel, and hundreds of people have been offered support.
Let me now deal with the amendments. Amendment 7 is a repeat of an amendment first tabled in Committee, which was taken to a vote. It concerns the guidance that the Secretary of State may issue to specified authorities that are subject to the new duty to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. Under clause 24, the specified authorities subject to the duty must have due regard to such guidance in carrying out that duty. Amendment 7 would require that the guidance may be issued only subject to parliamentary approval. In Committee, hon. Members were clear that an amendment of this type was not required, at least not at that stage. Clause 24 already provides that the Secretary of State must consult before issuing guidance and, as my hon. Friend the Minister for Security and Immigration announced to the House by written ministerial statement on 18 December, that consultation has already begun.
The shadow Minister asked about the draft guidance on which we are consulting. It is draft guidance, and we will be holding regional consultation events to explore further examples of best practice with those who will be subject to the duty. The consultation exercise also includes an opportunity for people to comment via the gov.uk website, or by e-mail or post. It is aimed at all those who will be subject to the duty, as well as the public at large.
This public consultation provides sufficient opportunity for interested parties, particularly those who will be subject to the Prevent duty, to scrutinise and influence the guidance. The guidance will benefit from extensive consultation and expert input, and I trust that the final guidance that is published will be all the better for having had this period of formal public consultation. The draft guidance, which we are currently consulting on, sets out, over 40 pages, the type of activity we expect specified activities to consider when complying with the duty.
The starting point for all specified authorities will be an assessment of the risk in their area, institution or body. Where a risk has been identified, they will need to develop an action plan to address it. Staff training and working together with other partners will be key themes.
Let me give some examples of what we expect a specified authority to consider when complying with the duty. Local authorities should ensure that publicly owned premises are not used to disseminate extremist views. Higher education institutions should have policies and procedures in place for the management of events on campus and for the use of all university premises that apply to all staff, students and visitors. Further education providers should have policies in place relating to the use of IT on their premises. Schools and their governors should make sure that they have training to give them the knowledge and confidence to identify children at risk of being drawn into terrorism, and know where and how to refer children and young people for further help.
The health sector should ensure that training is provided to front-line staff to ensure that where there are signs that someone has been or is being drawn into terrorism, the health care worker can interpret those signs correctly and is aware of and can locate support for them. Prisons should offer support to an individual who is vulnerable to radicalisation or move them away from an individual of concern, and those at risk of radicalising others should face the removal of privileges and segregation from others. The police should support individuals vulnerable to radicalisation, for example, through the Channel programme and support partner organisations to deliver Prevent work.
Those are just a few examples, and the shadow Minister asked about childminders. Carers in early years have a duty of care to the children in their care similar to existing safeguarding responsibilities. We are not expecting childminders or nursery workers to carry out unnecessary intrusion into family life, but we expect them to take action where they observe behaviour of concern. It is important that children are taught fundamental British values in an age-appropriate way. For children in early years, that is about learning right from wrong and challenging negative attitudes and stereotypes—for example, if a child makes anti-Semitic remarks.
Karen Bradley
I thank my hon. and gallant Friend for his comments. I understand that anonymity would be provided to people coming forward in that circumstance.
The shadow Minister asked about areas with low risk. The guidance sets out very clearly that we are looking for a risk-based approach, but areas need to understand the local risk. This is the starting point, and we are clear that the type and scale of the response will vary. She also asked about the number of Prevent priority areas. The Government have changed our method for prioritisation of local authority areas since 2011 and it is now based on assessment of the risk of exposure to radicalisation in specific areas rather than on simple demographics. The prioritisation also takes into account activity that we have seen by terrorist organisations and terrorist sympathisers. The process is regularly reviewed and activity is currently focused on 30 local authority priority areas where the risk of radicalisation is identified as being higher. Those priority areas received funding for a dedicated Prevent co-ordinator and are able to bid for funding for targeted local projects to work with communities and partners. There are also a further 14 supported areas where we support projects only.
Diana Johnson
I thank the Minister for going through the answers to my questions in such detail. The impact assessment says that 90 local authority areas are at high risk, the consultation document identifies 50 priority areas and the Minister is now talking about 30 areas and an additional 14 areas. These numbers all seem a bit confused to me. Will she say the exact number of Prevent priority areas the Government are concerned about?
Karen Bradley
If the hon. Lady will give me a few moments, I will come on to that point.
We do not believe that it is crucial for the guidance to be subject to additional parliamentary approval because we are conducting a wide-ranging consultation and, although the specified authorities must have regard to the guidance, they are not required to follow it in all cases. That is not an uncommon approach for statutory guidance of this nature and we set that out in detail in the delegated powers memorandum published with the Bill. However, I recognise the need for these issues to be properly considered, and that is why my hon. Friend the Minister for Security and Immigration made clear in Committee our intention to await the conclusions of the Select Committee on Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform before giving further consideration to whether we should make any changes of this sort. I hope that the hon. Lady will agree that that is a sensible approach and will be content to await the report of that Committee. On that basis, I invite her to withdraw the amendment, so that we can return to the issue in the other place.
Let me now turn to amendment 6, which would amend clause 29 to require the Secretary of State to issue guidance to support panels in carrying out their functions. The amendment would also require that the panel had sight of the list of approved providers for deradicalisation programmes and that the providers were subject to monitoring. As my hon. Friend the Minister for Immigration and Security explained in Committee, Channel is a multi-agency programme that provides support to people identified as vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. It has been in operation in all areas of England and Wales since 2012. In Scotland, the relevant programme is known as Prevent Professional Concerns. It is the Government’s hope and intention that these provisions should also apply to Scotland and discussions with the Scottish Government are ongoing.
As the hon. Lady asked about the devolved Administrations, I want to confirm that we are speaking to the Scottish and Welsh Governments about how the duty should be implemented in those Administrations and consulting on how we should make the guidance appropriate to bodies in Scotland and Wales, particularly because the different legal system in Scotland might mean that we need to implement things differently there. As part of the process, we are consulting them on how the duty should be monitored and enforced.
Diana Johnson
It is very helpful to hear the Minister set that out, but once agreement has been reached with the devolved Administrations, will there be a further period of consultation on the guidance, so that local authorities and other bodies can comment on what has been agreed between the Governments?
Karen Bradley
I am not sure that that is how we envisage it happening, but we are consulting and working very closely with the devolved Administrations to ensure that we take into account their views and get this right for them.
The hon. Lady asked about the number of priority areas under Prevent, so let me clarify. There are currently 30 Prevent priority areas, and we anticipate that that will rise to up to 50 in the next financial year. The impact assessment allows for up to 90 priority areas, should the need arise.
The hon. Lady asked about referrals to Channel relating to the far right and whether the Channel programme targeted only Muslim radicalisation. Like Prevent as a whole, Channel covers all forms of terrorism and extremism related to terrorism. It does not target Muslims and anyone can refer a person of any age, ethnicity or faith background to Channel. A significant number of people who have started receiving support through Channel were referred for far-right concerns. ACPO has reported that around a quarter of Channel referrals relate to the far right.
The hon. Lady has expressed concern about the expertise that panels must have and has retabled the amendment that we considered in Committee. Clause 28 includes provision for the Secretary of State to issue guidance to support panels in carrying out their functions. I can assure the hon. Lady that existing guidance is being updated in consultation with relevant persons, including those who deliver on the ground such as panel chairs. My right hon. Friend, the Home Secretary, will issue this guidance before the provisions are commenced.
Local panels assess the individual’s risk and, if appropriate, develop a support package. It is the job of the panel members to provide advice in respect of their areas of expertise, and to arrange, where agreed, support interventions from their services. Interventions that are delivered by such statutory partners are subject to existing monitoring arrangements.
In respect of theological or ideological support, the police representative will recommend to the panel the provider most suited to the case. The list of approved providers for such support is already made available to key members of the panel.
Safeguards and measures are in place to monitor the support providers—I hope that that reassures the hon. Lady—and they are all bound by a service level agreement with the Home Office that sets out the terms and conditions of their appointment, including conduct. In addition, the police, as part of their co-ordination role, regularly review progress made against any interventions commissioned. Any misconduct or quality concerns will be treated seriously by the Home Office, with the option of terminating an agreement with a provider.
On this basis, I hope that the hon. Lady is reassured that amendment 6 is unnecessary. I invite her to withdraw amendment 7, so that we can return to the parliamentary scrutiny of the Prevent guidance in the other place.
Diana Johnson
I am grateful to the Minister for going through my questions in such detail. On amendment 7, I am surprised that the Government are not willing to agree that both Houses should have the opportunity to scrutinise the final version of the guidance, which we have not yet seen. I note what she said about keeping the matter under consideration. I am sure that the matter will be returned to when the Bill goes to the other place. On that basis, I will not seek to divide the House on amendment 7. I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Schedule 3
Specified authorities
Karen Bradley
I beg to move amendment 13, page 47, line 10, at end insert—
“A person carrying out a function of an authority mentioned in section 1(2) of the Local Government Act 1999 by virtue of a direction made under section 15 of that Act.”
This amendment would add the authority specified to those subject to the duty contained in clause 21 and would make the relevant entry consistent with the corresponding entry in Schedule 4.
Karen Bradley
In respect of the duty to have due regard to preventing people from being drawn into terrorism in clause 21, the Government have tabled a number of corrective amendments to the list in schedule 3, which specifies the authorities subject to the duty. The amendments will ensure that the intended specified authorities are subject to the duty.
Amendment 13 would add:
“A person carrying out a function of an authority mentioned in section 1(2) of the Local Government Act 1999 by virtue of a direction made under section 15 of that Act.”
This appears in schedule 4, as regards Channel, and should also appear in schedule 3. The effect will be to ensure that where local authority functions are transferred, for example to commissioners if an authority is failing, the duty will apply to them too.
Amendment 14 will add the principal of a secure college to the criminal justice section of schedule 3. That will ensure consistency with schedule 4. Amendment 15 will remove an unnecessary entry. An institution
“within the higher education sector within the meaning of section 91(5) of the Further and Higher Education Act 1992”
will also be a qualifying institution within the meaning of section 11 of the Higher Education Act 2004, which has its own entry.
Amendment 16 ensures that the privately funded higher education providers are listed in schedule 3 as intended. They are covered in schedule 4, as regards Channel, but are at present missing from schedule 3. The draft guidance published for consultation has been drafted as though they are included in schedule 3. Amendment 17 corrects an inadvertent error by removing reference in schedule 3 to police authorities.
Diana Johnson
Very briefly, I was surprised that there was reference to police authorities when they were abolished by the Government some time ago. I guess that that is what comes when Bills are hastily drafted. I have one question for the Minister, which relates back to the issue of Scottish bodies that will be covered by the Bill. Currently, they are not listed anywhere. When will we have a list of the Scottish bodies that are covered?
Karen Bradley
I thank the shadow Minister for her question. If she will forgive me, I will have to get back to her on that point at a later date.
Amendment 13 agreed to.
Amendments made: 14, page 47, line 16, at end insert—
“The principal of a secure college.”.
This amendment would add the authority specified to those subject to the duty contained in clause 21.
Amendment 15, page 47, leave out lines 20 to 22.
This amendment would remove an unnecessary entry. An institution within the higher education sector within the meaning of section 91(5) of the Further and Higher Education Act 1992 would also be a qualifying institution within the meaning of section 11 of the Higher Education Act 2004 (which has its own entry).
Amendment 16, page 48, line 25, at end insert—
(b) courses of a description mentioned in Schedule 6 to the Education Reform Act 1988 (higher education courses).”.
This amendment would make the relevant entry consistent with the corresponding entry in Schedule 4.
Amendment 17, page 49, leave out lines 5 and 6.—(Karen Bradley.)
This amendment removes references to police authorities which no longer exist.
Clause 36
Privacy and Civil Liberties Board
Diana Johnson
I beg to move amendment 3, page 22, line 14, leave out subsection (1) and insert—
‘(1) The Secretary of State shall by regulations made by statutory instrument establish a body to—
(a) provide advice and assistance to the persons appointed under—
(i) section 36(1) of the Terrorism Act 2006;
(ii) section 31(1) of the Terrorist Asset-Freezing &c. Act 2010; and
(iii) section 20(1) of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011.
in the discharge of their statutory functions.
(b) review the operation, effectiveness and implications of the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001, the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, [this Act] and any other law or prerogative power to the extent that it relates to counter-terrorism;
(c) consider whether such legislation contains appropriate safeguards, is proportionate and remains necessary;
(d) review intelligence-sharing guidance and practice to the extent that it relates to counter-terrorism and the functions of the Board;
(e) make recommendations to any public authority about the exercise of its statutory functions relating to the prevention of terrorism;
(f) undertake inquiries relating to counter-terrorism when invited to do so by the Home Secretary, the Treasury or the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, or on the initiative of the Board;
(g) encourage good practice in the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of terrorism;
(h) provide advice and assistance to Government on the development and implementation of policy relating to the prevention of terrorism.”.
This expands the remit of the body to match that which is described in the Government’s Terms of Reference for this body.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 2, page 22, line 22, leave out
“Privacy and Civil Liberties Board”
and insert “Counter Terrorism Oversight Panel”.
This would rename the body created by clause 36.
Amendment 4, page 22, line 25, at end insert
“in accordance with the Code of Public Appointments”.
Amendment 5, page 22, line 32, at end insert—
“(i) the information-gathering powers of the board;
(j) reporting requirements, and the formulation of and consultation on an annual work plan; and
(k) the access to such relevant classified material as may be required in order for the board to undertake its functions under subsection (1);”.
This increases the points that have to be included in regulations brought forward by the Secretary of State to include information gathering powers, formulation of an annual work plan and relevant to classified material.
Diana Johnson
These amendments relate to part 7, which confers powers on the Secretary of State to establish a body to be known as the privacy and civil liberties board. While most of the Bill introduces new powers, part 7 introduces checks on those powers. It is worth mentioning at this stage that no level of general oversight will ever negate the need for proper judicial oversight of the specific use of these powers, which until yesterday the Government unfortunately were fiercely resisting.
Labour has always said that strong powers need strong checks, which is why we support the principle of a new oversight body. It is also why we tabled amendments to the Justice and Security Bill when it went through Parliament to increase the powers of the Intelligence and Security Committee and why we have consistently called for a bigger role to be given to the intelligence and surveillance commissioners.
Although the creation of a new body is good in principle, what is actually set out in the Bill does not match the name “privacy and civil liberties board” or what the Government set out in their terms of reference, and it does not introduce what we think is needed. That is why we have tabled amendments 2 to 5. The problem is that the Bill determines nothing other than the name of the body. The name evokes the idea of a body with a wide remit to work on privacy and civil liberties issues in the UK, a body to safeguard human rights, a body similar to the Joint Committee on Human Rights created by the Labour Government, but that is not actually what is provided for in the Bill.
The terms of reference published by the Government suggest a body that will support the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation in providing oversight of counter-terrorism legislation in the UK and investigating its operations. Broadly, we think that what is contained in the terms of reference is very sensible and that it would provide both capacity and openness to the oversight of counter-terrorism policy. It would also address some of the issues relating to the capacity of the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation that the current incumbent, David Anderson QC, identified earlier this year—I went through some of that in detail in Committee.
However, what we see in the terms of reference does not match what we see in the Bill. The third version of the board is the one provided for by clause 36, a body that the Home Secretary may create in future if she wishes. In future she may decide on the body’s procedures, membership, work plan and the publishing of its reports. If the body is created, it will have very limited statutory remit and powers. We do not think that is good enough, so amendments 2 to 5 address what we see as the Bill’s shortcomings as currently drafted.
Amendment 3 would ensure that the panel or board will have a remit that includes all the key counter-terrorism issues. Specifically, it includes the terrorism statutes, which the independent reviewer is currently precluded from investigating. Unlike the independent reviewer, we do not envisage a remit that is overly prescriptive or requires annual reviews of certain pieces of legislation. Amendment 3 would also give the board a role in undertaking specific inquiries in certain circumstances, to make recommendations to public authorities, to review intelligence-sharing guidance and to encourage good practice in the prevention and investigation of terrorism.
Bob Stewart
On classified information, all the information will be very sensitive, so presumably whoever is considered for appointment to such a board will be vetted and security cleared to receive such information. Is that assumption correct?
Diana Johnson
No doubt the Minister will be able to confirm that. My understanding is that the level of information and intelligence given to the board will mean that its members will have to undergo appropriate vetting to make sure that they are suitable. Perhaps the Minister will comment on that.
The amendments would give the board a proper remit, with members appointed on merit, procedures for agreeing a work plan and access to the relevant information. Finally, amendment 2 would give the board a name that matches the role that we envisage for it—the counter terrorism oversight panel.
Mr David Heath (Somerton and Frome) (LD)
The hon. Lady is making good points about the role of the panel, but does she not think that the name she suggests increases confusion? She and I want judicial oversight of the operation of the Bill and other counter-terrorism Acts. To call the board an “oversight panel” invites confusion because that is not precisely its role.
Diana Johnson
We have argued throughout our discussions that we want proper judicial safeguards where appropriate, especially in relation to the provisions of the early parts of the Bill. I am not sure I agree with the hon. Gentleman about the proposed name of the panel causing confusion. The current name, the privacy and civil liberties board, does not describe its role. The name is problematic. We have suggested an alternative. If it can be improved, I am happy to consider that, but we think the name proposed in the amendment best serves us at present.
Diana Johnson
Perhaps the matter can be discussed further in another place. “Counter terrorism oversight panel”, the name that we have suggested, best describes the role that we envisage for the body.
As I have stressed, these amendments do not seek to do anything radical. They aim to ensure that the legislation matches what the Government have previously committed to do, and they ensure that what is in the Bill goes some way to addressing the concerns raised by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. The amendments are not overly prescriptive; they leave plenty room for the detail to be spelled out in secondary legislation, but they would ensure that that secondary legislation was meaningful as it related to the provisions of the Bill. I hope the Minister will seriously consider accepting the amendments.
Karen Bradley
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for tabling the amendments.
Our debate has built on the one held in Committee where there was broad support for the principle of creating the privacy and civil liberties oversight board. The Bill introduces a comprehensive package of measures to disrupt people’s ability to travel abroad to fight, reduce the risks they pose on their return, and combat the underlying ideology that feeds, supports and sanctions terrorism. As my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has made clear, these powers are essential to keep up with the very serious and rapidly changing threats we face. Of course, as that threat evolves, we need to consider and update our legislation accordingly. However, it is also right that at this time, in the light of the increased threat level, and as the legislative landscape changes, we consider the oversight arrangements that we have in place for UK counter-terrorism laws to ensure that we are getting the balance right between responding to these threats and the protection of privacy and civil liberties.
The United Kingdom already has a very effective and transparent system of independent oversight and scrutiny. Few, if any, other countries in the world manage as well as the UK the balance between the need for powers that must necessarily be exercised in secret and the need to provide reassurance to the public about what is being done in their name. However, we should not rest on our laurels. During the passage of the Bill that became the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014, which received Royal Assent in July, the Government committed to establishing a board that would provide additional assurance to the public.
Clause 36 provides the Secretary of State with a power to create a privacy and civil liberties board, which will support the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, currently David Anderson. The increased demand for a review of particular aspects of counter-terrorism legislation means that this is a substantial task for one individual to undertake. David Anderson himself has been clear that there is a need for reform of the independent reviewer role. The board will be chaired by the independent reviewer. It will assist, advise and undertake particular duties in support of the independent reviewer’s statutory functions, and expand the capacity and breadth of experience available in our oversight arrangements.
Diana Johnson
What is the reason for the name of the board, because it does not seem to fit with the role that the Minister has described? “Privacy and civil liberties board” goes much wider than that.
Karen Bradley
I assure the hon. Lady that I will come to that point.
Clause 36 provides for the making of regulations that would set out the detail of the board, including provisions about composition, functions and appointment. These regulations will be subject to the affirmative procedure. We can debate, as we are, the precise details of the board’s composition and functions, but, as my hon. Friend the Minister for Security and Immigration noted when the Bill was in Committee, no one took issue with the principle that establishing such a board would build on the already strong oversight arrangements that exist in this country. I am pleased to say that since that debate took place, the Government have published a consultation paper on the composition, functions and remit of the board. It can be found on the gov.uk website, and copies have been placed in the libraries of both Houses.
I encourage all right hon. and hon. Members, as well as those from outside Parliament with an interest in these matters, to participate in the consultation exercise. We hope that it will elicit a large number of replies covering a wide range of views. The results of the consultation exercise will certainly influence the terms of the regulations. Those regulations will be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure and will cover all the key questions about the board’s composition, remit, powers and functions. Those responding to the consultation will be free to express an opinion on all relevant questions relating to the board. That is why I do not believe that amendment 5 is necessary.
Amendment 3 deals with the board’s functions. As my hon. Friend the Minister for Security and Immigration explained in Committee, the board will fully support the independent reviewer. In doing so, it will provide much needed capacity to allow the reviewer to consider a wider range of areas than it is perhaps currently possible for one individual to undertake. It is therefore right that we ensure that the board’s statutory functions and objectives are in line with those of the role it is designed to support. Should the statutory role of the independent reviewer change in future, we would need to ensure that the board’s role fully reflected that change.
On amendment 4, one of the issues that the consultation covers is the appointment of board members, including those to whom that task should fall and whether there are any prior qualifications that board members should have. It might emerge, for example, that there is strong support for the notion that each board member should represent a particular interest group or category and that that interest group should have a say in the appointment. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) asked whether members will be vetted. It will clearly be important that any individuals appointed to the board are provided with an appropriate level of security clearance. The independent reviewer is cleared to see classified information, and if necessary the same will apply to the board members.
Diana Johnson
Has the Minister given any thought to whether it would be appropriate for Members of Parliament or Members of the House of Lords to serve on this body?
Karen Bradley
I will return to that point in a moment.
I am sure that we will want to ensure that all appointments are made in accordance with best practice, but it seems to me that it would be premature unduly to prescribe the process until we have decided exactly how appointments are made. I think that that applies in this case.
Amendment 2 would change the board’s name. We have been clear that the primary objective of the board is to offer further assurance to the public that careful, independent scrutiny is being given to the UK’s counter-terrorism powers to ensure that, in the face of the threat to the UK, we are getting the balance right and that our legislation and policies have due regard for civil liberty and privacy concerns. The board’s name properly reflects that purpose, and I see no reason to change it.
I am pleased to say that there is no great disagreement within the House on what we are seeking to do. Given the threats that the UK faces, it is a sad necessity that we need a suite of counter-terrorism powers. My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary said in Committee:
“I have always taken the view that without our security we cannot enjoy our civil liberties”.—[Official Report, 15 December 2014; Vol. 589, c. 1229.]
To return to the point about Members of Parliament, we have no firm views on that question. We are currently consulting on the board’s composition, and we will take all views expressed into consideration.
Karen Bradley
My right hon. Friend has clearly given considerable thought to that matter. We will of course consider all points of view when we look at the responses to the consultation, and the point will be considered at that stage. Does the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith) wish to intervene? [Interruption.] He was going to make the same point.
Given the exceptional nature of counter-terrorism powers, it is right that they should be subject to proper oversight and scrutiny. This country has been very well served by the very distinguished individuals who have been independent reviewers, not least the present incumbent, but it is right for us to keep our oversight arrangements under review and be prepared to change them when required. It is worthwhile creating a new board to support the work of the independent reviewer, providing greater capacity in this area and giving the public greater assurance that in framing our legislation we are striking the right balance between privacy and civil liberties.
As I have said, the Government have published a full public consultation inviting comments on the proposals. We will seek to act on the points made in response to the consultation, which covers the composition and functions of the board. I believe that will address most of the issues covered by the amendments. Accordingly, I invite the hon. Lady to withdraw amendment 3.
Diana Johnson
There is a question about the board’s name, and I hope that that will be considered in the other place. I am interested to hear about the consultation on its membership. On the basis of what the Minister has said about this group of amendments, I will not press them, but we will want to return to them in the other place. I beg to ask leave to withdraw amendment 3.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 38
Power to make consequential provision
Karen Bradley
I beg to move amendment 12, page 23, line 24, at end insert—
“( ) Before making regulations under this section the Secretary of State must—
(a) if the regulations contain provision that would fall within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament if included in an Act of that Parliament, consult the Scottish Ministers;
(b) if the regulations contain provision that would fall within the legislative competence of the National Assembly for Wales if included in an Act of that Assembly, consult the Welsh Ministers;
(c) if the regulations contain provision that would fall within the legislative competence of the Northern Ireland Assembly if included in an Act of that Assembly, consult the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to consult the relevant devolved administration before making consequential provision by regulations under clause 38 if any of that provision would fall within devolved competence.
Diana Johnson
It is very nice that the Government have tabled amendment 12, as it is effectively the same amendment that the Opposition tabled in Committee to ensure that there is proper consultation with the devolved Administrations if the Home Secretary introduces changes. We are pleased that the Government have seen the sense of what Labour suggested, and that we can claim a victory on ensuring that there is full consultation. I am happy not to press amendment 1, because Government amendment 12 is exactly what we were trying to achieve.
Pete Wishart (Perth and North Perthshire) (SNP)
As we discuss counter-terrorism for a fifth day, our thoughts are very much on the appalling murders in Paris today. It was not only an appalling attack on journalists and a newspaper office but an attack on free speech, and today all of us can say, “Je suis Charlie”. Given those sickening events, it is pretty hard to discuss counter-terror measures today, but we live in a democracy and we will discuss them. We will not let any terrorist attack deter us from our influence on the matter or how we approach our business.
We are eternally grateful for amendment 12, because it is the beginning of a recognition of Scotland’s distinct responsibilities for measures under the Bill. The Bill asks that we be consulted on competencies for which we are actually responsible. It is not consultation that the Minister requires, it is our consent. We are responsible for delivering those competencies in the Scottish Parliament. We are responsible for education and health, we have a distinct legal system, and we are responsible for the judiciary. The Scottish police force, Police Scotland, is accountable to the Scottish Parliament. We have our own institutions and our own set of responsibilities and competencies. Yes, we are grateful that the UK Government are going to pick up the phone and consult our Ministers, but it is our consent that they require when passing measures under the Bill.
We will agree with the Government on most measures, and I am sure we will get on perfectly well, but we take a different and distinct approach on a number of issues. Of course we do—we have a different culture in Scotland. We do not have the same size of ethnic communities as there are south of the border, and we have a different and distinct approach to community relations. We see and deliver some things very differently from the UK Government.
The vast platform of the Prevent strategy will be administered in Scotland by Scottish public bodies, responsible to the Scottish Parliament and under the guidance of Scottish Ministers. Consultation—great. Thank you ever so much, Home Secretary, for being prepared to consult Scottish Ministers, discuss things with them and maybe even ask their views, but what we need is to give consent. If we are to be realistic about the devolution settlement and the range of responsibilities we have, and if we are talking about the respect agenda, that consent is required. Consultation is certainly not good enough.
Our approach to Prevent is different, of course. We see it more through the lens of safeguarding, with an emphasis on keeping people safe, community cohesion, participative democracy and ensuring that action is consistent with the needs of, and risks to, all our communities.
Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill
Diana Johnson Excerpts(10 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Diana Johnson (Kingston upon Hull North) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 8, page 11, line 3, at end insert—
(iii) any information beyond that which is necessary to allow the identification of the user from the public Internet Protocol address.”
This amendment would make it explicit that the extra data retention provided for in Clause 17 does not extend beyond that which is necessary for the purpose of identifying a user from the IP address. This amendment is not intended to impact on the rest of the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act, only the extra retention requirements created by Clause 17.
The amendment attempts to clarify the limit of data that may be subject to a retention notice allowed for under clause 17. To put this into context, we need to understand that the Government are attempting in clause 17 to increase the types of metadata that the Secretary of State may require communications service providers to store. The amendment seeks to clarify the limits on what those extra data actually are. The aim of the Government’s proposals is to ensure that CSPs store internet protocol address information: the information required to enable the identification of the device that received a communication from the IP address that received the communication. The Opposition support the principle of what the Government are trying to achieve, and this is the one area of the Government’s ill-fated draft Communications Data Bill for which there was clear evidence and a relative consensus. We agree that this will be a vital and proportionate tool in fighting not only terrorism, but other serious and organised crime, most notably online child abuse.
However, the Opposition have some concerns about how this measure will be implemented, both legislatively and in practice, which is why we have tabled amendment 8. Clause 17 amends the definition of “relevant communications data” for the purposes of section 2 of the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 and subsequently the meaning of “relevant communications data” within the Data Retention Regulations 2014, which were created under the powers conferred on the Secretary of State under section 1 of DRIPA. This is not perhaps the most straightforward way of implementing change, and it certainly adds to the confusion and suspicion about data retention.
The Minister informed the House in Committee that the Government did not intend to issue new regulations following on from this Bill, because the change in the definition of “relevant communications data” would alter the meaning of the 2014 regulations. So the combination of this primary legislation and the existing secondary legislation is meant to be sufficient to bring about a change in the types of data retained by CSPs. I believe that could create confusion in interpreting the regulations, which is exactly what we want to avoid when we are trying to increase confidence in the use of retained data.
If we look at the definition of “relevant communications data” in the 2014 regulations, we find that such data are specified in the schedule and that they are the same as those in the schedule to the Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2009. Although the regulations make it clear that section 2 of DRIPA is not being prejudiced, no explicit reference is made.
Would it not be clearer for all concerned if the schedule were updated with clear explanations of what exactly is intended? As I explained in Committee, there are serious issues with the drafting of clause 17, and it contrasts unfavourably with the clear wording currently used in the 2014 regulations. If the Minister is not willing to make that update, will he accept amendment 8, as he agrees with its principle? In Committee, he argued that it was unnecessary, but accepting it would be an important step to achieving clarity.
James Brokenshire
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson) for raising these important issues. This is a complex and technical area, and I am grateful for the opportunity to return to some of the points that we discussed in Committee. Communications data—the who, where, when and how of a communication but not its content—are a vital tool in the investigation of serious crime, including terrorism, and in safeguarding the public.
The hon. Lady explained that her amendment seeks to limit the scope of the provision to the retention of data that are necessary to allow the identification of a user from a public internet protocol address. She is trying to restrict the provision and to gain clarity, and as I explained in Committee, I do not think there is any difference between us on the principle. It is important that the provision goes only so far as is necessary to ensure that communications service providers can be required to retain the data necessary to link the unique attributes of an internet connection to the person or device using it at any given time—in other words, to link person A to person B. At the moment, internet service providers might not be required to retain that level of information. That was the Government’s clear intention when drafting the clause, so the provision is already limited in a way that I believe reflects what the hon. Lady intends.
Subsection (3) restricts the data to be retained to data that might be used to identify or assist in identifying the internet protocol address or other identifier that belongs to the sender or recipient of a communication. Any data that cannot be used to identify or assist in identifying the user of an IP address is already outside the scope of the provision, which deals with a number of the specific points about communications platforms that the hon. Lady highlighted.
I appreciate that the wording in the clause is quite technical, but I want to assure the House that great care has been taken to ensure that the Bill is tightly drafted. In particular, clause 17(3)(c) excludes so-called weblogs, a record of internet communications services or websites a user has accessed. The Bill provides for the retention of data relating to IP resolution and only such data. Anything else is already beyond the scope of what clause 17 permits. It is also important for the House to note that any requirement for communications service providers to retain data under the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014, which the clause amends, may be imposed only where it is necessary and proportionate. Access to that communications data is then subject to robust safeguards, and the UK already has one of the most rigorous systems in the world for safeguarding the acquisition of comms data.
Before such data can be acquired, an application must be made that clearly demonstrates that the request is both necessary and proportionate to the objective of a specific investigation for one of the statutory purposes in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. The process is clear and accountable and includes a strong and rigorous system of oversight, which includes the interception of communications commissioner, who must have held high judicial office. Following DRIPA, he will report every six months on the interception of communications data, and of course he regularly inspects all relevant public authorities.
The hon. Lady asked whether we intend to issue new retention notices. The Government will issue new data retention notices to affected communications services providers following the enactment of the legislation. We will also enable law enforcement agencies to resolve a communication to an individual or device, not to ascertain which services or websites an individual has accessed. The data would be considered to be weblog data, as I have said, which is already excluded from the Bill.
A communication can include any message sent over the internet. The legislation relates not to the retention of what the message contained, but purely to the fact that a message was sent, which is the key distinction between comms data and what might be regarded as the interception of a communication. The provision amends the definition contained in DRIPA, not the meaning of the regulations. The definitions in the Act are used in the regulations, so there is no requirement to amend the regulations. Accordingly, I agree with the sentiment behind the amendment. If I have any reflections on the detail of the further points that the hon. Lady has highlighted, perhaps I can write to her further. However, with these assurances, I hope that she will withdraw the amendment.
Diana Johnson
I am grateful to the Minister for going through this very technical part of the Bill. I think it is helpful to have heard that explanation on the Floor of the House. I do not wish to press the amendment any further at this stage, although I think that it might be returned to in the other place, and so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Bill to be further considered tomorrow.
Oral Answers to Questions
Diana Johnson Excerpts(10 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
James Brokenshire
This country is doing its fair share in many different ways through the direct aid that is being provided—£700 million that is directly affecting and benefiting the lives of hundreds of thousands of people—and the asylum that is being granted through the vulnerable persons relocation scheme. We are also working overseas with countries affected to create a long-term settlement of this issue, as well as confronting the organised crime that exploits the vulnerable.
Diana Johnson (Kingston upon Hull North) (Lab)
The UK does indeed have a very proud tradition of offering refuge to those in desperate need. The Government’s relocation programme for Syrian refugees was supposed to help orphan children, sexually abused women, victims of torture, and those needing specialist medical treatment. Other European countries are providing this support, with 310 people going to Ireland, 1,000 people going to Norway, and 1,200 people going to Sweden. As the Minister said, in the UK last year only 90 people were accepted. How many victims—specifically, how many orphan children and sexually abused women—will the UK be offering support to this year?
James Brokenshire
We remain on track to support several hundred vulnerable individuals over the next three years. The figures underline that. Those who benefit from the scheme are chosen by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, with whom we work in close co-operation. It is therefore the UNHCR that advances and puts forward individual cases based on the vulnerability-type factors that the hon. Lady identified.
Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill
Diana Johnson Excerpts(10 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Diana Johnson (Kingston upon Hull North) (Lab)
I thank my right hon. Friend the Member for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears) for opening the debate and making a compelling case, along with the hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis), for why the amendments are important to today’s debate on Prevent. I agree with her sentiments about the appalling events in Sydney. Our thoughts are with the families and friends of the people who died. We stand in solidarity with the Australian people. We stand, too, with the people of Pakistan, where dreadful events have unfolded this morning, with hundreds murdered.
Part 5 introduces a series of obligations on public bodies and local authorities to deliver the Prevent agenda. I hope the Minister will respond to the issue raised by the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon) on part 5 not covering Northern Ireland, and to the issue raised by the hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire (Pete Wishart) in relation to Prevent in Scotland.
Most of the Bill is taken up with tough measures to tackle those who are thought to be involved in terrorism, but part 5 deals with preventing people becoming involved in the first place. The previous Labour Government introduced the Prevent agenda and we remain absolutely committed to supporting and strengthening it where necessary. However, before we look in detail at the measures to strengthen the delivery of the Prevent programme, I want to point out two areas where I think there are gaps in the Bill. First, there needs to be a much clearer commitment from central Government to do more to support and facilitate the Prevent agenda. A lot of additional duties are being put on to local authorities and public bodies, but there is more of a role for central Government to support them in fulfilling that duty. Secondly, in the past four years there has been some confusion in relation to the Prevent agenda and the roles of the Home Office and the Department for Communities and Local Government. It would be helpful if the Minister is able to enlighten us on the problems that have arisen due the confused situation relating to Prevent.
We all agree that Prevent should be about local delivery, but, as I said, there have been some problems because of a mixed approach by central Government. For example, it was a Government decision early on to reduce the number of priority areas for Prevent from 90 to 23. The Government then realised that leaving areas such as Greenwich out of the priority areas was a mistake, so a number of local authority areas had their funding reinstated. Even within those priority areas, however, I do not think the Government have been paying enough attention to whether the Prevent agenda is being successfully delivered with evaluations. Only four of the 30 priority areas provided evaluations to the office for security and counter-terrorism last year. That is obviously of concern when public money is being spent, because we want to know that it is being used effectively.
There has also been a marked decline in funding streams for Prevent: funding is down from £17 million to £1 million a year. Some of that has been part of a conscious decision about reallocating funding, but questions are raised by the fact that, while £5.1 million has been allocated every year for local delivery, over the past six years more than 60% of it has gone unclaimed by local authorities.
Jeremy Corbyn
My hon. Friend is making a very good point about funding. Does she agree that it is also important, from the point of view of a public message, that we place a strong emphasis on preventing extreme right-wing racism in our society, and on combating it as vigorously as we combat any other kind of issue?
Diana Johnson
My hon. Friend makes a very important point as part of the debate about Prevent spending on combating extremism across the piece.
On the Government’s record with Prevent, it is striking that, while overall spending has gone up—it reached £40 million last year—spending on local delivery accounts for barely 10% of the total. Will the Minister confirm whether those figures are correct?
Local authorities are not the only bodies captured by the new duty. Universities will also be covered and my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central (Paul Blomfield) has just addressed some of the concerns relating to the university sector. However, just because universities are included in this particular duty does not mean that they have not previously been included. My hon. Friend referred to work that was done many years ago to tackle these issues. A significant section of the Prevent agenda is devoted to universities, which are asked to agree Prevent action plans with local police forces. I have repeatedly asked parliamentary questions to find out how many universities actually have a Prevent plan in place, but the Government have repeatedly refused to provide an answer. I do not understand why, because it is not a matter of national security: the information requested is simply a number. Do the Government refuse to answer the question because they do not actually know how many universities have agreed a plan or because they are not willing to tell Parliament? Why are we not allowed to know?
The Bill also extends obligations on schools, which were also not excluded from the previous Prevent agenda. A significant thread of Prevent has always been aimed at schools. Indeed, the 2011 Prevent review identifies a significant number of threats to schools and suggests measures to counter those threats. Given the conclusions of Oftsted’s investigations into Birmingham and Tower Hamlets, the 2011 review seems remarkably prescient. It identified a series of risks facing schools, including that posed by people with radical beliefs who were attempting to obtain positions in schools—that is, on school governing bodies.
The review also identified some challenges that needed immediate action in schools. For example, 70% of schools felt that they needed more training and information to build resilience to radicalisation. To address those issues, the Department for Education committed to a nine-point plan of action to prevent radicalisation in schools. However, it has provided no evidence on the delivery of that plan. I have asked it numerous questions—both written and on the Floor of the House—about the overall implementation of the Prevent agenda and the specific commitments contained in the 2011 review, but I have received no evidence in response to my inquiries. I have asked the Department to provide a general update on its work delivering the Prevent agenda, but to no avail. Will the Minister tell the House whether the measures in the Bill that relate to schools are a response to the failure of the DFE to deliver on previous commitments?
Also missing from the Bill are measures to address radicalisation outside public institutions. Local councils can of course try to counter radicalisation in public places and public bodies, and universities can try to counter it on campus, but as my right hon. Friend the Member for Salford and Eccles said, much more work needs to be done on broadcasting and the internet industries to reduce hate speech and extremism arriving directly into homes through social media and satellite television.
Last week, the Prime Minister announced international efforts in partnership with industry to tackle online child abuse. We all welcome those. However, equivalent measures on terrorist propaganda are in their infancy. Although the Internet Watch Foundation has forged vital links with industry to actively prohibit the dissemination of abusive images, my understanding is that the Home Office’s counter terrorism internet referral unit has never received a referral from a communications service provider about extremist conduct. I will be interested to hear from the Minister whether that is correct. Although we welcome the measures in the Bill, which are about the Government telling other authorities to do more, we should remember that there are areas where the Government themselves could do more and have failed to deliver so far.
I turn now to the specific provisions in the Bill, starting with clause 21, which puts a general duty on various public bodies to tackle terrorism; the bodies are numerous and are listed in schedule 3. The clause is complemented by the provisions in clause 24, which allow the Secretary of State to introduce guidance on how authorities should implement their obligations. The Secretary of State’s power in this area is strengthened still further by the provisions in clause 25 for her to direct public bodies to act in a certain way.
Parliament’s scrutiny of the Bill has been constrained, once again, because we are debating the principle without getting to see the specifics. It is extremely unfortunate that the Government have not published draft guidance to aid our considerations. We have no problem with the principle of a general duty to prevent terrorism, but that could mean a number of things. It is therefore essential that we have access to the guidance, so that we can debate what is in it.
For that reason, the Opposition have tabled amendment 19, which would ensure that the Government must use their powers to issue guidance, and amendment 20, which would ensure that Parliament could scrutinise the guidance under the affirmative procedure. I would like to hear the Minister’s views on those amendments, but if he is not able to accept amendment 20 I will test the opinion of the House on giving Parliament an opportunity specifically to debate the guidance.
The Secretary of State could introduce guidance of potentially enormous scope, which, as my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central said, could have a bearing on free speech and academic freedoms—I would go so far as to say it could even affect patient-doctor relationships—yet at the moment Parliament would have no role in debating that guidance. My understanding is that only one set of guidance will be issued. It will apply to the numerous bodies set out in schedule 3, and will therefore have to apply in disparate settings. It is important that the implications of the guidance are discussed fully in Parliament to allow the potential implications for different sectors to be raised and debated fully.
The guidance will also be important in ensuring that the policies implemented are both efficient and effective. Thousands of similar bodies will be implementing policies under clause 21, and it is important that they do not all start from scratch in deciding how to comply with their new duty. The issues that bodies will need to address are complex and disparate, ranging from the far right, as my hon. Friend the Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) just mentioned, to the intra-religious issues that have been discussed this afternoon. The Home Office needs to support organisations in dealing with those disparate issues, particularly intra-religious conflicts of the sort we see in Syria, which are the driving force behind the rise of ISIL. They are particularly difficult to address, and public bodies need full support in tackling them.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Salford and Eccles talked earlier about the counter-narrative issue and the Muslim community is trying very hard to combat sectarianism with a narrative of peace and unity. Public bodies should be supporting community bodies in doing that, but they need guidance on how best to achieve it. That is why the Opposition think we must have guidance and that it must be properly and effectively scrutinised. I hope that the Minister will therefore agree to accept amendments 19 and 20.
Pete Wishart
I presume from her comments that the hon. Lady does not want Scotland included in this. I am sure that she has heard about the different, more holistic approach that we have. Could she help us to persuade the Minister to allow us to do our thing uninterrupted by what has been proposed in the Bill?
Diana Johnson
We are at the Committee stage of the Bill, looking specifically at the Government’s provisions. Scotland is covered by Prevent. I am concerned that within schedule 3, which lists the bodies that are covered by the duty, there is nothing from Scotland. That worries me. I want to hear from the Minister why that is and what discussions are being held. As the rest of the Bill applies, I assume that there is a gap that needs to be filled.
On Northern Ireland, when the Government introduced the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, they neglected to consult the Northern Ireland Executive. The result is that, after four years, the National Crime Agency still does not have a remit to work in Northern Ireland. I am concerned that we could end up with a similar situation with Prevent and the agenda in Scotland.
Lady Hermon
I am grateful to the hon. Lady but I just want to correct a tiny detail. The National Crime Agency’s full remit does not extend to Northern Ireland because Sinn Fein and the Social Democratic and Labour party refused to allow that. It is not about consultation with the rest of the parties or with the Northern Ireland Executive; they all want it. The people of Northern Ireland want it, but two parties are holding the rest of us hostage, so to speak.
Diana Johnson
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for that comment and for putting the record straight.
Although clause 38 is not covered by this group, I want to refer to it as it confers upon the Secretary of State the power to make amendments to any piece of legislation that interferes with the operations of the Bill, including Acts of the Scottish Parliament or Welsh Assembly. If I have read this correctly, if the Home Secretary thinks, for example, that the setting up of a new type of school in Scotland by the Scottish Parliament is affecting not just the implementation of clause 21 but the specific policies provided for under clause 24, she can change the devolved legislation on its operation. She can even do that without consulting the relevant Government, which is why I have tabled amendment 18, which we will discuss in the next group.
Similar issues exist with the Channel programme. It would be placed on a statutory footing alongside the rest of Prevent. As with Prevent, this is a policy area of enormous importance and the Opposition support efforts to strengthen it. Once again, however, the Government are putting obligations on local authorities without ensuring that there are provisions to make sure that they are fully supported by central Government. Clause 28 provides for the creation of local assessment and support panels in every local authority. According to clause 33, this includes county councils, district councils and unitary authorities in England and Wales. Again it seems that the Government have not yet reached agreement with the Scottish Government on how this would be implemented in Scotland. I am sure that the Minister will respond to that point. In addition, the legislation is not clear on which local authorities are meant to have a panel when there are multiple tiers of local government. Does the responsibility rest with district or county councils? What happens where there are unitary authorities and district councils? Has this yet been decided and thought through? The impact assessment says that local authorities will be able to combine to create support panels, but can the Minister explain why that is not provided for in the Bill?
Many panels should already exist and comply with the current guidance provided by the Home Office. Will the Minister tell the Committee how many councils have created these boards and what assessment has been made of their operation? What evidence led the Government to decide that the current system was not working? I have asked parliamentary questions about this in the past, but the Government have refused to give details or even to confirm that a monitoring framework is in place. Will the Minister provide further information about how well these panels are working?
Under clause 28(3), a chief officer of police must make the referral to the local support panel. The current system allows numerous local bodies, including schools, colleges, universities, youth offending teams, local authority troubled families teams, charities and voluntary groups to be able to refer to the police, who can then conduct a screening process. Will the Minister confirm that this process will be allowed to continue, and will he explain why this particular aspect was not put on a statutory footing as well?
My first concern is with the level of expertise that these panels must have, which is why I tabled amendment 21. As provided for in the Bill, local support panels have to assess the individual’s risk of radicalisation and tailor a support package to address those risks. The issues are complex: the current guidance cites 22 vulnerability indicators that may lead to a Channel referral. The panel must weigh up these factors and tailor a support package, which could have any number of elements. In some areas, the panel will be addressing issues it has not faced before, such as sectarian hatred, which can be exacerbated by poorly provided support.
This is why we feel the Home Office needs to support local panels by providing an approved list of support providers who are able to give the specialist interventions needed to address the specific issues facing the individual. The panel is tasked with assessing the progress the individual makes, but it does not necessarily have the ability to assess the quality of support provided by other agencies, which is why we want the Home Office to assess providers.
The Government have repeatedly claimed to be stepping up efforts to stop Prevent funding going to organisations that could be radicalising people. That cannot be done unless the Home Office takes a lead in vetting those bodies. Under clause 32, the Home Secretary may indemnify Channel providers, so it seems quite reasonable for her to assess them as well. Indeed, it is my understanding that the Home Office, along with regional groups of police forces, do provide this level of support. It is our view that this role should be in the Bill, alongside the responsibilities given to local authorities. I hope that the Minister will be able to accept this amendment. We both want to see support working better to provide locally led interventions, but the Home Office needs a stronger role in supporting local authorities.
The second amendment I shall speak to is amendment 22, which seeks to expand the membership of panels provided for under clause 29. At present, the Bill provides for just two statutory members of the panel: the local authority and the local police force. The local authority may, according to the explanatory notes, appoint other members. This contrasts sharply with current best practice as set out in the Home Office guidance, which suggests panels of up to 14 members. We do not think all need to be on every panel, and indeed many of them are part of the local authority, so they could be brought in as and when necessary, but we do think that both probation and health professionals should always be on the panel.
There are two advantages to increasing the expertise on the panel. First, the panel will be in a better position to assess the 22 vulnerability indicators that I mentioned and to make a correct decision. Secondly, it ensures that more of the bodies that will provide the support have a role in determining that support. If we look at the existing guidance, we find that it may include: life skills, anger management, cognitive and behavioural contact, health awareness contact and drug and alcohol awareness. Each of those categories would obviously need to be tailored, and would come with a cost. We therefore think it is important for probation and health professionals to be included as statutory members of the panel.
Diana Johnson
We have not had the advantage of seeing that guidance. Is the Minister saying that there will be just one set of guidance covering all the bodies we have been discussing this afternoon?
James Brokenshire
It is intended to be one set of guidance covering all the relevant public bodies, but our intention is not simply to publish it; we also intend to hold a public consultation. It is not simply about the House being satisfied with the guidance; we intend to consult widely so that these issues can be examined carefully. The hon. Lady also mentioned clinical commissioning groups. Certainly, as part of the consultation, we will want to receive inputs regarding whether any other bodies should be brought within the ambit of the Bill.
Diana Johnson
I beg to move amendment 24, page 22, line 14, leave out subsection (1) and insert—
“(1) The Secretary of State shall by regulations made by statutory instrument establish a body to—
(a) provide advice and assistance to the persons appointed under—
(i) section 36(1) of the Terrorism Act 2006,
(ii) section 31(1) of the Terrorist Asset-Freezing &c. Act 2010, and
(iii) section 20(1) of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011,
in the discharge of their statutory functions;
(b) review the operation, effectiveness and implications of the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001, the CounterTerrorism Act 2008, this Act, and any other law or prerogative power to the extent that it relates to counter-terrorism;
(c) consider whether such legislation contains appropriate safeguards, is proportionate and remains necessary;
(d) review intelligence-sharing guidance and practice to the extent that it relates to counter-terrorism and the functions of the Board;
(e) make recommendations to any public authority about the exercise of its statutory functions relating to the prevention of terrorism;
(f) undertake inquiries relating to counter-terrorism when invited to do so by the Home Secretary, the Treasury or the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, or on the initiative of the Board;
(g) encourage good practice in the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of terrorism.
(h) provide advice and assistance to Government on the development and implementation of policy relating to the prevention of terrorism.”
This expands the remit of the body to match that which is described in the Government‘s Terms of Reference for this body.
The Temporary Chair (Mr Gary Streeter)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 23, page 22, line 22, leave out “Privacy and Civil Liberties Board” and insert “Counter Terrorism Oversight Panel”.
This would rename the body created by Clause 36.
Amendment 25, page 22, line 25, at end insert
“in accordance with the Code of Public Appointments”.
Amendment 26, page 22, line 32, at end insert—
“(i) the information-gathering powers of the board;
(j) reporting requirements, and the formulation of and consultation on an annual work plan;
(k) the access to such relevant classified material as may be required in order for the board to undertake its functions under subsection (1);”
This increases the points that have to be included in regulation brought forward by the Secretary of State to include information gathering powers, formulation of an annual work plan and relevant to classified material.
Amendment 8, page 22, line 32, at end insert—
“(3A) Regulations under section (3) shall include provision requiring the board to undertake an inquiry into the retention of and access to data relating to professions that operate under a duty of confidentiality.”
Amendment 9, page 22, line 34, at end insert—
“(4A) Regulations under section (3) shall provide for the membership of the board to include representatives of professions who operate under a duty of confidentiality.”
Amendment 10, page 23, line 9, at end insert—
““professions who operate under a duty of confidentiality” shall include, but not be limited to, journalists, legal representatives, medical professionals and Members of Parliament.”
Clause 36 stand part.
Clause 37 stand part.
Amendment 18, in clause 38, page 23, line 31, at end insert—
“(4A) The Secretary of State must consult with Welsh Ministers before making provisions under subsection (1) so far as relating to any Measure or Act of the National Assembly of Wales.
(4B) The Secretary of State must consult with Scottish Ministers before making provisions under subsection (1) so far as relating to any Act or instrument of the Scottish Parliament.
(4C) The Secretary of State must consult with the Northern Ireland Executive before making provisions under subsection (1) so far as relating to any Act or instrument of the Northern Ireland Assembly.”
This would ensure that the Secretary of State could not amend legislation from the Scottish Parliament or Welsh Assembly or Northern Ireland Assembly without first consulting with the Scottish or Welsh Governments or the Northern Ireland Executive.
Clauses 38 to 41 stand part.
Government amendment 12.
Clauses 42 and 43 stand part.
New clause 3—Intercept Evidence—use in legal proceedings—
“(1) Section 18 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (c.23) is amended as follows.
(2) After paragraph 1(f) insert—
“(g) any proceedings relating to an offence which, if committed in England and Wales at the time of the conviction, would have constituted an offence triable only on indictment (“an indictable-only offence”) under section 51 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.””
This new Clause removes the exclusion of intercept evidence from legal proceedings in criminal prosecutions.
New clause 7—Review of Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament resources and powers—
“The Secretary must, within a reasonable time period, consult the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament and lay a report before Parliament within six months of the commencement of this Act, on the resources and powers of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament.”
Diana Johnson
This group of amendments relates to the Government’s plans to create a privacy and civil liberties board. Clause 36 does not actually tell us very much—it is an enabling clause—so I have tabled amendments 24 and 25 to allow us to debate what the board will actually do.
As the clause is drafted, we have a name for the board, and there are three possible ways it could go. First, we have an idea of what a privacy and civil liberties board could look like from its name, which invokes the idea of a body with a wide remit of work on privacy and civil liberties issues in the United Kingdom, and which would safeguard human rights. Such a body would be very similar to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which was created by a Labour Government.
Secondly, the Home Office has published terms of reference, which suggest a body that will support the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation in providing oversight of counter-terrorism legislation in the UK and investigating the operation of that legislation. We think that what is contained in the terms of reference is sensible and would provide both capacity and openness in the oversight of counter-terrorism policy. However, as I have said, clause 36 is quite an empty provision at the moment.
The third possible version of the board is as currently constituted in clause 36, which gives the Home Secretary powers to create—in future, if she wishes to do so—procedures, membership and the work plan for the board and provisions on publishing of reports. All those details are left to future secondary legislation.
If the body is created it is important that it has strong powers. Our amendments 23 to 26 would help achieve that. The post of independent reviewer of terrorism legislation has been around for over 40 years and its current formulation was created by a Labour Government. The post works well, and both holders of it since 2001 have served with real distinction. That does not mean that we are opposed to further strengthening of the oversight arrangements. Earlier this year, the current independent reviewer, David Anderson, QC, identified the limitations of his reviewer role, including the fact that it was restricted to certain statutes and the fact that significant powers, including those in the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, were excluded and were therefore going unreviewed. He also pointed out that as a part-time reviewer without proper administrative support, he has extremely limited capacity.
Mr David Davis
I guess that the precursor of the proposal is the organ with exactly the same name in the United States, which was activated only after the Snowden events, when information was not just put in the public domain but became controversial and raised issues in Washington. The danger is that the body becomes toothless, does not have investigatory powers and cannot pre-empt a future Snowden. It seems to me that the most important aspect of that is the investigatory powers, not the rest.
Diana Johnson
I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman will contribute to the debate, and I certainly have things to say about the title of the body and what it will be doing.
It is important to note what David Anderson said about being a part-time reviewer without proper administrative support and limited capacity. If the proposals on clause 36 were meant to address those concerns, they do not achieve that. They do nothing to address the areas of counter-terrorism legislation excluded from the remit of the commissioners, such as those in the 2008 Act, the powers in this Bill or use of the royal prerogative. David Anderson notes:
“These omissions reduce confidence in counter-terrorism law and are hard to understand, particularly after the Home Secretary agreed, as recently as March 2013, that ‘the scope of the Independent Reviewer’s responsibilities should keep pace with changes to primary legislation’, and accepted in principle my recommendation that the 2001 and 2008 Acts ‘should be examined with a view to extending your statutory functions to include the review of relevant sections of those Acts’. Indeed, as initially proposed in July, the functions of the PCLB would have extended to both these Acts.”
The Bill does not address issues of capacity and resources for the independent reviewer, either, although the impact assessment suggests that the board will receive far greater resources than those given to the independent reviewer. The cost of members of the board seems to take up much of that, and the impact assessment anticipates that the rate will be £897 a day. Is that correct and will the Minister comment on it?
The work that members of the board will do is not clear, either. The current reviewer describes the relationship between the independent reviewer and the proposed new board as
“ill-defined and potentially problematic”
and goes on to say that
“the idea is…for the Board ‘to provide advice and assistance’ to the Independent Reviewer. Both advice and assistance are always welcome: but the former, including from the most eminent and knowledgeable quarters, is already frequently sought and freely given, whereas the latter is critically lacking. To require the Independent Reviewer to chair a Board…will make further claims on the Independent Reviewer’s time and could easily lead to competing priorities and inefficiencies. For there to be a net benefit, commensurate with the cost of resourcing the Board, its members will have to be doers rather than talkers, willing to accept direction in relation to often unglamorous researching and writing tasks.”
The Bill does not make provision for this, nor does the impact assessment’s description explain who will undertake the research and assistance roles that are so badly needed.
Finally, there is an issue about access to documents. Will the panel be security-cleared to the same standard as the independent reviewer? Will the staff? What will be the procedures for redacting documents either before they are passed on to the board or before they are published? These are the issues we are trying to address with our amendments.
Amendment 24 has been tabled to ensure a board with a statutory remit that includes the areas that the independent reviewer does not cover. It will also ensure that the board could respond to other areas of considerable and understandable public concern about the operations of counter-terror policy. We want the board to consider not just privacy but other human rights impacts, as well as the effectiveness of counter-terror policy. As David Anderson points out, counter-terrorism oversight in the past has taken strength from not being limited. If the office of the independent reviewer has influence with the authorities, it is in part because the reviewer can make recommendations to improve not just the fairness, but the effectiveness of counter-terrorism law.
Importantly, especially given the earlier discussions about the breadth of public bodies going to implement Prevent, we also want the board to be allowed to make recommendations to public bodies and public authorities. We tabled amendment 25 in particular to ensure that appointments to this body are made in line with the code of public appointments. We want the board to include real experts who will be able to access materials and provide real insight. We do not want a body compiled through patronage. We tabled amendment 26 to ensure that the statutory instrument creating this body addresses key questions about information gathering, reporting and access to documents.
We would rename the body to give it a title that reflects the nature of what it will actually do. As I said, the current name is misleading. As David Anderson has pointed out, the name not only offers little clue as to the function of the proposed body, but suggests a pure civil liberties watchdog, which this is not. It is not clear why privacy is singled out. Other important human rights are potentially infringed by counter-terrorism law, including the right to liberty, the right to a fair trial and freedom of expression. Mr Anderson takes issue with the word “board”, which he feels is better suited to the historical management of waterways than to the rigorous exercise of scrutiny under the direction of an independent reviewer. So Labour would call the board “a counter-terrorism oversight panel”, and we would give it the powers to back that up.
If the Government are genuinely committed to creating the body they outline in the terms of reference, they should accept these amendments without any hesitation. Of course, this is only part of the oversight package that we require. When the Justice and Security Bill was before the House, the Opposition suggested a number of ways of strengthening the Intelligence and Security Committee to give it a stronger, more independent and more open remit. We remain absolutely committed to the ISC and want it to continue to play a vital role in the oversight of the security agencies alongside a more prominent role for the intelligence commissioners, which is why we tabled new clause 7.
Let me turn briefly to the miscellaneous provisions, particularly clause 38, to which I have tabled amendment 19. Under clause 38, the Secretary of State can make changes that are
“consequential on any provision of this Act”
in any piece of legislation made by any UK legislative body, including the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly. This is important because under part 5, and particularly under clauses 21, 24 and 30, the Bill creates obligations on a range of bodies that are otherwise entirely devolved. As I mentioned in speaking to an earlier group of amendments, I do not think the Home Secretary should be able to amend devolved legislation without first consulting the relevant Government. That is why we tabled amendment 19, which I hope the Minister will feel able to accept.
Mr David Davis
I shall speak to new clause 3, tabled in my name. It is entitled “Intercept Evidence—use in legal proceedings”. It is a probing amendment and I do not propose to press it to the vote on this occasion. If I had wanted to press it, I would have included in the new clause the relevant legal machinery required, which is complex but not difficult to achieve if I wanted to do so. My aim is to provoke some sort of non-partisan debate on what is the cornerstone of counter-terrorism strategy—the legal treatment of intercept evidence. If need be, depending on what the Minister says and what the Government do in the meantime, I shall come back to the issue on Report.
The United Kingdom is unique among major western powers—common law powers and European Union countries—in not allowing the use of intercept evidence in court. I shall come on to the few exceptions in a moment. Why is that the case? It is difficult to know. GCHQ and its predecessor has always resisted putting any intercept evidence into the public domain. Frankly, this has probably been the case since the invention of the telephone. In the early days, I suspect it happened because gentlemen thought it ungentlemanly to listen in on other people’s conversations. Today, however, the argument advanced by the agencies concerns the protection of technique and capacity. Their attitude is very different from that of every other agency of its sort in the world. All our allies in the “five eyes” countries and beyond are equally concerned about protecting capability, but they also give high priority to the prosecution and conviction of terrorists and those who commit serious crimes. They manage to square that circle, but we do not appear to be able to do so at present.
Diana Johnson
I listened to what the Minister said, in particular, about the amendments on clause 36. While I will not press them to a vote, I am minded to reserve our position until we return after the Christmas break. I thank everybody for their contributions to the Bill’s Committee stage on the Floor of the House, and wish everybody a very merry Christmas. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clauses 36 to 41 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 42
Commencement
Amendment made: 12, page 25, line 3, at end insert—
“() section 18(10);”—(James Brokenshire.)
Clause 42, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 43 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
The Deputy Speaker resumed the Chair.
Bill, as amended, reported.
Bill to be considered tomorrow.
Mr David Winnick (Walsall North) (Lab)
On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. I understand that references have been made during the course of today’s proceedings to the atrocities that have occurred in Pakistan. The latest information is that 141 have been murdered in Pakistan, of whom 132 were children aged between five and 14. As we would all agree, this has undoubtedly been an act of murderous inhumanity.
Madam Deputy Speaker, I raise this point of order not just to give the latest information, but to ask you whether there is any way in which the House can express its horror at and condemnation of what has occurred in Pakistan. It is an act of terror carried out —and recognised and admitted as such—by the Taliban. I hope that it will be possible for such condemnation to be expressed by the House.
Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill
Diana Johnson Excerpts(10 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Diana Johnson (Kingston upon Hull North) (Lab)
I beg to move amendment 4, on page 8, line 11, leave out subsection (3).
This would remove the 200-mile limit on the Home Secretary’s ability to relocate people.
The Second Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Dame Dawn Primarolo)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clauses 12 and 13 stand part.
Amendment 7, in clause 14, page 9, line 33, at end insert—
‘6B Regulated Activity Measure
(1) The Secretary of State may impose on the individual restrictions on taking part in regulated activity relating to—
(a) vulnerable adults;
(b) children; or
(c) both.
(2) In this section “Regulated Activity” is as defined in Schedule 4 of the Safeguarding Vulnerable Adults Act 2006.’.
This amendment would allow the Secretary of State to prevent an individual on a TPIM working (including voluntary work) with children or vulnerable adults or both.
Clause 14 stand part.
Amendment 6, in clause 15, page 10, line 8, at end insert—
‘(3) Appointments required under subsection (1) may include appointments with persons involved in delivering programmes established under Part 5, Chapter 2 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2014.’.
This amendment would make clear that the Secretary of State can instruct an individual on a TPIM to attend de-radicalisation programmes.
Clauses 15 and 16 stand part.
Diana Johnson
Part 2 of the Bill relates to terrorism prevention and investigation measures. This grouping includes clauses 12 to 16 as well as Labour’s amendments, so I intend to use my contribution to address all the issues concerning TPIMs in part 2. The amendments are all probing, as we are broadly supportive of the changes the clauses introduce, especially the U-turn on relocation powers, which clause 12 reintroduces.
The Home Secretary introduced TPIMs in the first Session of this Parliament to replace Labour’s control orders. She claimed at the time that that was a fundamental rebalancing of security and liberty. In fact, there were only two major differences between control orders and TPIMs, or control orders-lite, as they have been called: the relocation power and the two-year limit. She also said that she had been forced to introduce TPIMs because too many control orders were being challenged in the courts. Although judicial oversight was of course a key element of the control orders regime, the courts had continued to find that control orders, including the power to relocate, were both necessary and proportionate in a number of cases, including all those that were later transferred to TPIMs.
I think that every Member of this House would agree that it is always better to prosecute individuals, wherever possible, for terrorist offences. No one wants TPIMs or control orders; we would all much rather see prosecutions for those involved in terrorism activity. However, in a very small number of cases evidence is inadmissible, for example because it would compromise security, and therefore prosecutions cannot be brought. That means we need an alternative measure to deal with the threat those individuals pose.
Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion) (Green)
Does the hon. Lady recognise that TPIMs have never led to a terrorism-related prosecution and that they are therefore not only against human rights, but counter-productive and ineffective?
Diana Johnson
If the hon. Lady will bear with me, I will move on to that point shortly, because one of the claims that the Government made was that the new regime would lead to more prosecutions.
It is worth remembering that we are talking about a very small number of individuals, but they pose a serious danger to the public and we need some powers to manage that risk. David Anderson QC, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, has made it clear that those who are subject to TPIM notices are accused of terrorist activities
“at the highest end of seriousness, even by the standards of international terrorism.”
TPIMs are a set of restrictions imposed on an individual who is suspected of, but has not been convicted for, involvement in terrorism. A TPIM order, like a control order, is imposed at the behest of the Home Secretary, with judicial oversight, but can be appealed to the High Court, which must find that the TPIM and all the measures it includes are both necessary and proportionate.
When the Government scrapped the control order regime, they argued that their new regime would allow more suspects to be prosecuted—this relates to the point just made by the hon. Lady. The Security Minister has repeatedly said that the aim of the regime was to secure more prosecutions and that extra resources were being provided to achieve that. I wonder whether he could confirm today exactly how many successful prosecutions for terrorist-related activity there have been for individuals on TPIMs. Like the hon. Lady, I understand that there has not been one successful such prosecution. David Anderson has commented that the TPIMs regime has not aided the prosecution of individuals, and the Joint Committee on Human Rights has stated that it
“failed to find any evidence that TPIMs have led in practice to any more criminal prosecutions of terrorism suspects.”
All three of the prosecutions attempted in 2012 for breaching the conditions of TPIM orders collapsed. When Mohammed Ahmed Mohamed absconded, he had just answered bail on 20 charges relating to breaches of his TPIM. Some of those breaches lay on the file for 18 months. Given that prosecutions were meant to be a priority, as the Government had said on numerous occasions, perhaps the Minister can explain why he thinks there was such a delay in taking that case to court and whether the Government actually opposed Mohammed Ahmed Mohamed being granted bail. Will he also confirm how he believes the changes proposed in part 2 will deliver what he had attempted to do when the TPIMs regime first came in—secure more prosecutions?
The number of people on TPIMs, as with control orders, has remained very small, but they are believed to pose a serious threat. There were nine people on the control orders regime when it ended in January 2012, all of whom were British citizens, and the Crown Prosecution Service has consistently said that none of them could be prosecuted. All those individuals were transferred to TPIM orders, and another individual was subsequently put on a TPIM order. We believe that there is currently just one person on a TPIM order. It would be helpful if the Minister could confirm that when he speaks.
There are other concerns about the TPIMs regime. In January 2014, the Joint Committee on Human Rights stated:
“We are left with the impression that in practice TPIMs may be withering on the vine as a counter-terrorism tool of practical utility”.
I will be interested to hear the Minister’s response to those comments and how he feels that part 2 will deal with some of the criticisms raised.
I now turn to clause 12 and the issue of relocation, and amendment 4. As I said, the key difference between control orders and the TPIMs regime was the power of relocation, which was removed. It is helpful to give specific examples of how the relocation power was used under the control orders regime and the effects of the changes introduced by the coalition through the TPIMs legislation.
Diana Johnson
The Minister is shaking his head. It would be interesting to hear his views about the resources available to carry out surveillance and what additional resources might be needed for the relocation power proposed in the Bill.
I want to turn to the practical issues involved when someone is subject to a TPIM, and where they would actually live. Clause 12 allows for the Secretary of State to provide a residence, but there is no requirement. Presumably, the Home Secretary would find somewhere for an individual to live if they did not have a place to stay. What would be a local authority’s responsibilities if there was a power of relocation several miles away from where the individual usually resides? Would local councils have a responsibility to provide accommodation? What standard of accommodation would the Minister expect to be provided to somebody subject to a TPIM relocation order? What type of accommodation would it be? Would the Home Secretary consider a prison to be a suitable place to accommodate an individual? If the individual lives in the private rented sector, who would meet the costs of that accommodation? Would the individual be able to make a claim for and obtain housing benefit? Concerns have also been raised in the past about immediate close family members, including children, young children, husbands and wives. Would accommodation be provided for them?
Ian Swales (Redcar) (LD)
I am certainly not an expert on this area, but is the shadow Minister suggesting that an organisation’s standard Criminal Records Bureau check fails to pick up the people to whom she is referring?
Diana Johnson
That is the very question I am asking. The Disclosure and Barring Service obviously keeps records of people who should not have access to children in a regulated activity, such as working as a teacher in a school. However, because of the coalition’s changes, volunteering at a school is not considered a regulated activity, so no information would necessarily be given by the DBS. Most people would be concerned if someone subject to a TPIM had access to young people. Will the Minister help us to be clear about what exactly that means?
Clause 15 allows the Secretary of State to require an individual to attend meetings with such persons as the Secretary of State may specify, at such locations and at such times as the Secretary of State may by notice require. The specified persons may choose the time and place of the meeting.
We think that clause 15 is rather vague and very broad, and we have tabled a probing amendment. Amendment 6 is designed to tie down the clause on the specific issue of Channel—the deradicalisation programme —which we will come on to later. It is important that the Secretary of State can make people attend Channel meetings and appointments, and possibly those relating to other parts of the Prevent programme. The probing amendment is an attempt to tease out exactly what such appointments are about. We certainly think that the appointments such a person is required to attend should cover the Channel and Prevent programmes.
Clause 16(1) amends section 3(1) of the TPIM Act so that, to meet condition A, the Secretary of State must be
“satisfied, on the balance of probabilities,”
that an individual is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity. That changes the current wording for the test under condition A, which is that
“the Secretary of State reasonably believes that the individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity”.
As I have set out at great length, the Secretary of State spent four years arguing that relocation was unnecessary and impossible, because courts kept overruling it. We know that the independent reviewers of terrorism legislation have always taken a different view on that point. The relocation power is now being reintroduced, and the Home Secretary has toughened up the test.
I want to make it clear that Opposition Members have always been comfortable with having robust oversight of TPIMs, because we think that good and strong evidence—such evidence ensures that TPIMs are used only in exceptional cases—would pass the test the Home Secretary is now introducing in clause 16. It is important not only to have such a test, but to continue to have judicial oversight so that TPIMs are always considered in the courts.
Pete Wishart
The hon. Gentleman hits the nail on the head. These measures are counter-productive in trying to make our country safe. All they do is tip people off that there is a particular issue with an individual. If there is a terrorist community, the first thing that they will take note of is the fact that somebody has been the subject of a TPIM or a control order. It alerts them to the fact that something is going on. I am all for making our country safe, but have there been any prosecutions? No.
The saddest and most bizarre feature of control orders and TPIMs is that they are all about suspicion. There is never enough evidence to test these matters in court, to take them to trial, to have a judge and jury decide whether something is going on. It is all about suspicion. That is the critical feature of TPIMs, as it was of the control order regime. How can anybody try to secure their innocence when they are subject to such measures? They have no opportunity to do so at all. They just have to accept the situation.
Unfortunately, the relocation measures will bring TPIMs right back to where we were with control orders. That was the defining difference between TPIMs and control orders. It is therefore particularly depressing that relocation is a feature of the new TPIM regime in the Bill. I hope that the Minister will resist Labour’s call to extend the powers further by making relocation even more restrictive and having another list of qualifications in the TPIM regime. I know that he will resist that and ensure that Labour, in its new Labour guise, will not have its way.
Diana Johnson
I am listening carefully to the hon. Gentleman. He should have listened to what I said, which was that these are probing amendments to allow us fully to understand the Government’s thinking. They are intended not to extend the powers in the Bill, but to seek clarification. I hope that he will take that on board.
Pete Wishart
I am a bit more satisfied, but on the face of it, the amendments do call for further restrictions. If they are just probing amendments, that is fair enough and we will hear the Minister’s response. Regardless of whether the amendments are probing or active, I hope that he is not convinced to back anything that Labour is suggesting, because that would make matters worse.
It seems to me that the Labour leopard has not changed its new Labour, anti-civil libertarian spots. Labour still wants further restrictions. It still wants the Government to go further, despite the critical balancing act that we always have to consider between the necessary steps to keep our nation safe and the civil liberties that we cherish and value in a democracy. New Labour got the balance drastically, appallingly wrong. Unfortunately, the Conservatives are moving on to that territory once again. I hope that the amendments are resisted. I understand that they are just probing amendments, and that is fine, but I hope that the Minister will not be probed into accepting what is being suggested by the Labour party.
James Brokenshire
This is intended to be a very focused power on the basis—rightly, as we have discussed—that our strong preference is to see prosecution, and that it is only in the cases where prosecution, or indeed deportation, is not available to us that we would need to rely on the use of the TPIM measures. As no doubt the hon. Gentleman will be aware, there have been 10 TPIM notices imposed since their introduction. Perhaps that gives him some reassurance that this is not reached for as the first option. Indeed, we always look for prosecution, and there is a requirement in the TPIM legislation to show that those steps have been explored and that there is no reasonable prospect of being able to secure that.
The impact on communities was carefully considered at the time of the counter-terrorism review and, indeed, led to the creation of the TPIMs Act and the measures that we now have on the statute book. In placing this type of restriction—now that we are saying we believe that relocation is appropriate in the light of the changed picture—it should not be unbounded; hence this restriction is in place so that an individual may only be a few hours’ away from their family rather than relocated to the other side of the country.
Should exceptional circumstances arise that require more stringent measures, we retain the ability to enact the Enhanced Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill, which has passed pre-legislative scrutiny. This Bill includes a range of more stringent powers, including curfews of up to 16 hours. As we said at the time of the counter-terrorism review, we reserve the right to be able to do that in those exceptional circumstances.
Clause 13 amends the TPIMs Act and allows the Secretary of State to impose restrictions on an individual from leaving either the UK or a specified area within the UK within which they reside, and increases the maximum sentence for breaching this measure to 10 years, as the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion has said. This underlines the Government’s commitment to ensuring that TPIM subjects are appropriately managed, but that if they breach their TPIM notice, appropriate sentences will be given to recognise the seriousness of the issues at hand. I hope that the House is reassured that these measures strike the right balance between privacy and security and, on this basis, I invite the hon. Lady to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment 7 would insert a new clause 6B after clause 14, which is entitled “TPIMs: weapons and explosives measure”. Both the weapons and explosives measure and the proposed new clause 6B are designed to put beyond doubt what a TPIM subject is permitted to have access to on a TPIM notice. This amendment seeks to add an additional requirement in that respect.
The hon. Lady asked a series of questions that were linked to this issue in relation to the vetting and barring service and what might apply. Perhaps I can reassure her that someone who wants to work in a school or other educational establishment will be eligible to obtain an enhanced criminal records certificate from the Disclosure and Barring Service, as the hon. Lady will know. The certificate will include convictions and cautions held on the police national computer, plus any other information that is available to the police and which a chief police officer both reasonably believes to be relevant and considers ought to be disclosed. This may include the fact that a person was or is subject to a TPIM notice. In addition the legislation governing barring allows specific criteria to be prescribed that would require someone to be automatically barred. There would be scope to use the provision in relation to a TPIM if that were considered appropriate. This is something that we already cover in the TPIM legislation, in that the Act provides the ability to prevent TPIM subjects from taking part in a regulated activity relating to vulnerable adults and children under the association measure in schedule 1(8) or the work or studies measure in schedule 1(9).
The association measure in schedule 1 allows the Secretary of State to impose a requirement that a TPIM subject must not associate or communicate with specified persons, or specified descriptions of persons, without permission. In addition, the work or studies measure allows the Secretary of State to impose a restriction on a TPIM subject carrying out specified types of work, which includes unpaid work, or studies without the permission of the Secretary of State. We can and do use these measures to prevent TPIM subjects from associating with particular people or working or studying in areas that are assessed to be inappropriate. The measure proposed in this amendment duplicates that measure, which is why we judge that it is neither appropriate nor needed.
Diana Johnson
Just to be clear: if somebody is subject to a TPIM order, work that is voluntary and is not in a regulated activity could, under the current legislation, be something that the person is not allowed to take part in by decision of the Home Secretary.
James Brokenshire
That is the very point; we have that ability from the work and studies measure to be able to control that, and the Secretary of State effectively has to give permission for work to be conducted. There is an additional measure, plus the information that will be provided. The police update the police national computer when a TPIM subject has a notice imposed to ensure that this information can be taken into account in relation to any decision and checks on the subject, so it is flagged in that way. I hope that that gives the hon. Lady assurance on that specific point.
As I said, amendment 7 would amend the appointments measure in clause 15, which allows the Secretary of State to require an individual to attend meetings as specified by the Secretary of State. The appointments measure is already a broad power that allows the Secretary of State to require a TPIM subject to meet relevant organisations or people who can contribute to their ongoing management. The measure already includes the ability to require TPIM subjects to attend a deradicalisation programme, with persons involved in delivering programmes established under part 5, chapter 2 of the Bill. In our judgment, it is therefore unnecessary explicitly to specify this as part of the appointments measure. In essence, the existing language is broad enough and sufficient to allow us to require the link with deradicalisation programmes.
The hon. Lady flagged up some other issues relating to offensive weapons and explosives. On that, we are seeking to put the issues beyond doubt. There is, of course, existing legislation that governs some of these issues, and it is our judgment that it ensures that these items are properly and firmly addressed. As I have indicated, the link to the police national computer is already there. This further underlines and underpins each of the specific issues already on the statute book.
On the boundary that could be imposed, there is further specific provision on the requirement for the Secretary of State to provide certain guidance and indications on the factors that will be used in the assessment. These can include the original location of the TPIM subject; access to services; ability to prevent or restrict involvement in terrorism-related activity; proximity to airports or ports; and proximity to other TPIM subjects or prohibited associates. Those are the sort of factors that can be taken into account.
The definition of terrorism-related activity, to which the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North referred, was followed through in David Anderson’s recommendations. His concern about the existing definition was that it has people almost three steps removed from the activity. We have consulted the police and security services in respect of this amendment, and they have been reflecting on David Anderson’s consideration. We continue to judge that the measures remain appropriate.
I will gladly answer any of the hon. Lady’s questions if I have omitted to do so, but I think what I have said covers the bulk of what she asked.
Diana Johnson
I do not recall the Minister responding to my point about families and whether a relocation of an individual could also include young children and a partner. It would be helpful to understand that situation.
James Brokenshire
Yes, families could live in the accommodation to which the TPIM subject has been relocated. In that relocation situation, it would be for the Home Office to provide the accommodation, as has happened under previous arrangements. We would seek to adhere to the same circumstances.
With those assurances, I hope that the hon. Lady will be minded to withdraw the amendment.
Diana Johnson
I am grateful to the Minister for responding to the many lengthy questions I put to him. We have had a useful opportunity to understand the thinking behind clauses 12 to 16. As I indicated at the outset, the amendments I tabled were probing ones, intended to allow us to have this debate and to understand more fully the thinking behind the Government’s approach.
It is clear, however, that no one absconded under a control order with a relocation power, and it is worth reiterating that, but on the basis of what the Minister has said, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 12 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 13 to 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 17
Retention of relevant data
Diana Johnson
I beg to move amendment 5, page 11, line 3, at end insert—
(iii) is beyond that which is necessary to allow the identification of the user from the public Internet Protocol address.”
This amendment would make it explicit that the extra data retention provided for in Clause 17 does not extend beyond that which is necessary for the purpose of identifying a user from the IP address. This amendment is not intended to impact on the rest of the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act, only the extra retention requirements created by Clause 17.
Mr Speaker
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clause 17 stand part.
New clause 1—Access to retained data; judicial oversight—
“(1) The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 22 insert—
“22A Access to retained communications data: judicial oversight
(1) This section applies where a person designated for the purposes of this Chapter believes that it is necessary on grounds falling within section 22 to obtain relevant communications data retained under section 1 of the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 relating to professional activities covered by a duty of confidentiality.
(2) Before granting an authorisation or issuing a notice under section 22 the designated person must have obtained the permission of the court.
(3) In determining whether to grant permission under subsection (2) the court shall in particular balance the reasons why the designated person believes it is necessary to obtain the data against the public interest in upholding the duty of confidentiality.
(4) The Secretary of State may by regulations specify—
(a) the court or courts that shall determine applications for permission under this section;
(b) the process for the court or courts to determine whether to grant permission;
(c) the period for which permission shall apply before being renewed by the court; and
(d) the process for a person or persons to appeal against a decision to grant permission.
(5) Regulations under this section may not be made until they have been laid in draft before and approved by both Houses of Parliament.
(6) In this section “professional activities covered by a duty of confidentiality” shall include, but not be limited to, the professional activities of journalists, legal advisers, medical professions and Members of Parliament.”
New clause 2—Review of timing for disclosure of Relevant Internet Data—
“(1) The Secretary of State must instigate a review of the time taken for communications service providers to comply with a request for subscriber information made under Part 1, Chapter 2 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.
(2) In this section “subscriber information” means relevant internet data as defined in section 17 of this Act in so far as it relates to information required to link a public internet protocol address to an individual user.”
This New Clause would require the Home Secretary to instigate a review regarding the time taken by communications service providers to disclose information which links an individual to an IP address.
Amendment 11, in clause 42, page 25, line 5, at end insert—
‘(3A) The Secretary of State shall not make regulations under subsection (3)(a) until a report by the Interception of Communications Commissioner on the use of powers under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 to access the records of journalists has been laid before both Houses of Parliament.”
Diana Johnson
I shall speak to new clause 2 standing in my name and those of my right hon. and hon. Friends. It would be helpful to start by providing some background to clause 17, although I do not wish to pre-empt the Minister’s comments. I must say at the outset that clause 17 is not the easiest clause to follow, and reference was made to that on Second Reading.
Diana Johnson
If the hon. Gentleman will be little patient, I shall move on to that subject in a few moments.
As I was saying, the Opposition accept that this extra category of data will be a vital tool for law enforcement—not just in protecting national security, but in combating a whole range of online crimes, including online child abuse, on which I shall speak in greater detail when we come on to new clause 2. The provisions for this extra category of data were first proposed in the Government’s ill-fated draft Communications Data Bill—I think that might help the hon. Gentleman in respect of his intervention. Although initially reluctant to provide any public evidence for why these extra data were needed, the Government did then provide the evidence that convinced the Joint Committee on the draft Bill of the necessity of this extra retention. The draft Communications Data Bill has been subject to much coalition grandstanding over the past few years, with the Home Secretary proposing a Bill of unprecedented, and in our view unnecessary, scope, while the Deputy Prime Minister refuses to accept the need for any legislation at all. Of course there was room for compromise and the Opposition have always supported this compromise. Some additional data retention is required, but not on the scale the Home Secretary proposed.
Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)
How can the hon. Lady say that my right hon. Friend the Deputy Prime Minister did not see the need for any legislation at all when we are sitting here in this Committee this afternoon considering the legislation which we think properly balances the privacy issues with the need for public safety?
Diana Johnson
The right hon. Gentleman has made his point, and we will obviously disagree on what I have just said.
Our view, agreed with by most of the Joint Committee on the draft Bill, is that the data required to link an IP address to a device is one such category of data that is required and therefore we welcome what in principle clause 17 seeks to achieve. I say “in principle” because we do have some concerns about the drafting of clause 17, which is why we have tabled amendment 5.
Diana Johnson
I will give way, but, as I have said, I do want to get on to the substantive issues.
Julian Smith
I am grateful to the shadow Minister for giving way. Will she just clarify briefly the further categories that she sees becoming more important, and where the Government and coalition can expect Labour’s support as they seek to put more of these areas on to the statute book?
Diana Johnson
What I will come on to say about some of the concerns we have might help the hon. Gentleman, but his question obviously leads into a debate that goes wider than this particular grouping, which is specifically on clause 17, and in the Committee stage of the Bill. I will therefore continue with my points on this grouping, because I am sure I would be in trouble if I did not do that.
To repeat, although in principle we support clause 17, we have some concerns about its drafting, which is why we have tabled amendment 5. Because of the broad label “relevant internet data”, we want to put it beyond doubt that the category of data to be retained under clause 17 does not extend beyond what is strictly necessary to link an IP address to a user.
In the Bill, the definition of “relevant internet data” is data which
“relates to an internet access service or an internet communications service”
and
“may be used to identify, or assist in identifying, which internet protocol address…belongs to the sender or recipient of a communication”.
While this appears to include a whole host of other traffic data, including web logs, clause 17 also states that “relevant internet data” is not “communications data” as defined by the schedule to the Data Retention Regulations 2014 or information as defined in clause 17(3)(c), which is supposed to exclude web logs from this provision. We have concerns about the accuracy with which subsection (3)(c) captures the nature of web logs, which is why we have tabled amendment 5. I hope the regulations this clause will enable will be clearer than this primary clause in the legislation. It is disappointing that, unlike with the DRIP Bill, the draft regulations have not yet been published alongside the Bill. This has caused problems for Parliament’s ability to provide proper scrutiny of this clause.
As well as accepting our amendment 5, which I hope the Minister will be able to do, I urge him to go back and look again at the drafting of clause 17 before Report. In order to increase public confidence in the use of retained communications data we need to be clear about what is retained and I believe clause 17 and the accompanying explanatory notes could be better in this regard.
Julian Smith
The hon. Lady talks about web logs. Will she clarify the Opposition’s long-term position on that issue, and what she sees will happen in the future, when on many sides of the security spectrum there seems to be a consensus that there is a need to bring these areas in eventually?
Diana Johnson
I will just reiterate that we are dealing with clause 17, and we are very mindful that we want to ensure that web logs are not included under this clause. My focus is on getting clarity on that from the Minister. What might happen in the long term is perhaps a debate for another time. I am concerned that we get the drafting of this clause as accurate as we can.
I was talking about making sure the public are confident about what we are trying to do through clause 17, and what is included and what is not included. The data at the heart of clause 17 appear to be what is commonly referred to as “IP resolution data”, but this term does not appear in the text of the explanatory notes, and I hope the Minister will be able to explain whether they do refer to the same thing, as there is some confusion here.
As I explained, clause 17 is meant to plug a gap within the current framework for data retention, but when we compare the language of the Bill with the text of the current regulations, the gap is not immediately obvious. Clause 17 refers to data which
“relates to an internet access service or an internet communications service”
and
“may be used to identify, or assist in identifying, which internet protocol address…belongs to the sender or recipient of a communication”.
However, part 3, paragraph 11 of the schedule to the existing regulations refers to the subscriber information
“to whom an Internet Protocol (IP) address, user ID or telephone number was allocated at the time of the communication.”
I ask the Minister to look at this and see whether he cannot amend the language to make clear on the face of the Bill the exact data category that will be provided for in the regulations.
I am also concerned about the degree to which clause 17 relies on definitions provided from the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. I am sure the Minister is aware of the findings of the Joint Committee on the Draft Communications Data Bill that the definitions used in RIPA were out of date and needed to be replaced. Given this, it is surprising to see both the definition of “communication” and section (3)(c) of the clause rely so heavily on RIPA definitions.
I would also like the Minister look again at the definition of “identifier.” According to clause 17
“‘identifier’ means an identifier used to facilitate the transmission of a communication”.
This is at least partly circular, and again adds to the confusion around this clause. Finally, in subsection (2)(b) will the Minister confirm that he does indeed mean “paragraph (a)” rather than subsection (a)?
In addition to the five questions above regarding the drafting, I have 10 questions about the implementation that I hope the Minister will be able to address in his comments. First, will he tell the House whether he expects to introduce new retention regulations under DRIPA section 1, or will the Government be seeking to amend the Data Retention Regulations 2014? Secondly, and on a similar note, will he update the House on when he expects to publish these draft regulations and when he hopes they will be in force? Thirdly, when the data covered under clause 17 is traffic data, while the relevant authority wants to reveal the subscriber information behind this, will this be covered under a single request under RIPA, or could clause 17 data simply lead to a disclosure which requires a further RIPA request to be made? Fourthly—this is particularly relevant to amendment 5—will he assure the House that the retention by the Crown Prosecution Service of this relevant internet data can be done in such a way that does not require deep package inspections of the type that would be considered intrusive surveillance? Fifthly—and again relating to amendment 5—will the Minister explain in practice how the regulations will separate out communications going to a device, which could be a web log, such as access to an app, which would be considered a website, and communications going to a device which enables a communication, such as an app which facilitates web e-mail storage?
Sixthly, will the Minister confirm that the extra reporting requirements imposed on the interception of communications commissioner by the DRIP Act will extend to the data retained and subsequently requested under clause 17? Will the Minister be providing additional resources to the commissioner to meet those additional requirements?
Sir Alan Beith
The hon. Lady has produced a formidable list of questions, but I only have one for her, on amendment 5. It seems to me that the process we are describing does not enable people to discover who the user of an instrument was; it locates or identifies only the instrument from which the communication was made. Therefore, amendment 5 would be inoperative, because it could never be demonstrated that it was being used to establish who the user was as it cannot be guaranteed to do that.
Diana Johnson
I am grateful for the right hon. Gentleman’s observations on amendment 5. As with the previous grouping, the amendment was tabled to give us the opportunity to look at the specifics of clause 17 and to understand fully the thinking behind the Minister’s approach. I take on board what the right hon. Gentleman has said, which may be correct, but the amendment allows us to debate what would be disclosed and what information would be available.
I have just bombarded the Minister with a whole range of questions and I know that, as usual, he will be very thorough and go through each in turn. However, I want to turn briefly to new clause 2, which seeks to move on from the retention of data to a review of whether the form of storing the data is allowing the key authorities to access it in a timely manner. I will say, so everyone understands where I am coming from, that this proposal aims to probe the Minister’s argument, and to look at the clause to see what more can be done and whether we need to be aware of any issues for companies.
My concern arises from the police’s apparent problems in pursuing the majority of suspected paedophiles identified through Operation Notarise. My understanding is that Operation Notarise identified between 20,000 and 30,000 individuals whom the communications data suggested were taking part in online abuse. From that, only 700 people have been named, investigated and arrested, so well in excess of 20,000 IP addresses have been identified, but that information has not been translated into named users. At this point, I am not even talking about arrests, but about identifying the users to enable effective safeguarding interventions.
Once a user is identified, even if it is just an address, the police can make several key checks: first, against the police national computer to see if there is a known sex offender living at the address; secondly, against the Disclosure and Barring Service database to identify anyone who might be working with or have access to children; and thirdly, against the Department for Work and Pensions database to see if a child is registered at the property for the purpose of claiming child benefit.
At the moment, the police do not know how many of the people they have identified are known sex offenders working with children or living with children. Most people would see that as unacceptable and would believe there should be a response. This could start with a review of the degree to which the difficulty of linking IP addresses to users is behind the police’s problems with moving this forward.
Finally, I turn to the amendments and new clauses tabled by my hon. Friends the Members for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) and for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn), and by the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas), on the degree to which RIPA is being used to access the records of certain professionals, including journalists. They address a real concern that Members and the general public have about the use of RIPA to access the records particularly of journalists and those in the media.
As the shadow Home Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), has said, this issue has to be addressed. Indeed, a key concession secured by the Opposition during the passage of the DRIP Bill was that a review of RIPA would be conducted by David Anderson QC, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, and that it would include the use of RIPA to look at the records of journalists. It is because we have confidence in that review that we do not feel amendment 11 is necessary.
However, that is also why the Opposition have a great deal of sympathy with the aims of new clause 1, which would require a court order before relevant authorities could access communications data that could be covered by a professional duty of confidentiality. The clause does not state whether the role of the court would be simply to ensure that due process is followed, or to apply some test of proportionality or necessity. However, the clause provides for the right of appeal for the individual. That means that an individual would have prior knowledge that their communications data were to be disclosed to law enforcement agencies. It is also important to note that the clause would apply not just to journalists but to doctors, lawyers and others, including Members of Parliament, when a professional duty of confidentiality could be construed.
Mark Field (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)
The hon. Lady referred to journalists, but how broadly would she or her colleagues define “journalists”? We are living in a world of bloggers and of a whole range of individuals who would consider themselves to be part of the media overall, but presumably she would not necessarily want each and every one of those self-professed journalists and bloggers to be caught by these potentially restricting and constricting provisions, essentially watering down elements of RIPA?
Diana Johnson
I have the disadvantage of speaking first on this group of amendments, and obviously, this is not my amendment, so I am very much looking forward to hearing what the proposers feel would happen. However, the hon. Gentleman raises an important point, because we are not only talking about a limited group of people who describe themselves as journalists and who, in the past, we would have been able to identify clearly. Perhaps the proposers of the amendment would be able to address that when they speak to it.
I want to make a further point about the broad definition of professional duty that concerns me, especially when combined with the right of appeal. As I have said, a large number of professionals have some form of duty of confidentiality, and in many cases it is not clear, particularly when discussing communications data, how that potential duty of confidentiality would be separated from other investigations about which we would not allow the individual to have prior knowledge. There is a clear case for preventing a journalist from being targeted for their sources unless there is an overwhelming need to do so. However, the case is less clear in respect of other professions, particularly as we may be investigating issues involving criminal misconduct. Let me give an example for the Committee to consider: the case of Myles Bradbury, the doctor recently convicted of a string of horrendous sexual assaults of boys in his care. As a doctor, he would potentially have been covered by the new clause, especially in respect of some of his communications, and the Committee would be concerned about that. If he had been alerted to the fact that the police were investigating him, he would have had some time to delete much of the evidence which was then used to lead to his prosecution. I just give that as an example of the care we have to take in considering these matters.
I hope the Minister will respond in detail—I am sure he will—to the issues I have raised on this group, particularly the need for the drafting of clause 17 to be made much clearer so that the general public can be reassured about exactly what it is attempting to do.
Sir Alan Beith
The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson) is right to seek clarification to satisfy herself and her colleagues that clause 17 achieves its intended purpose and no more. Its intended purpose is reasonable: to keep up with the technological changes that lead evildoers to move from one technology to another, and become more difficult to track as they do so.
James Brokenshire
I am constrained in what I can say because of the legal action that the hon. Gentleman highlights, but I hope he will see that the code of practice and the consultation address a number of the key recommendations of the Home Affairs Committee report that was published on Saturday, such as those on the manner in which the existing legislation is operated in practice.
The hon. Gentleman will know that David Anderson is conducting a broader examination of the legislation, including the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, and will report in May. That will inform consideration in the next Parliament of the provisions that are on the statute book. I assure him that it will address the issue of separation and the need for additional consideration to be given to requests that touch on protected professions.
However, I would not want an amendment that was passed today to pre-empt the interception of communications commissioner’s inquiry. We do not know what he will conclude. It is right that we should wait for him to report and then consider his recommendations, rather than make a major change now, when questions have been raised about the benefits and utility of such an approach.
Finally, I hope to deal swiftly with amendment 11, which would prevent the provisions relating to IP resolution from being brought into force until the interception of communications commissioner had completed his review of the accessing of journalists’ communications data, to which I just referred. I think I can reassure hon. Members on that point. As I have said, the commissioner intends to report by the end of January. The Bill will not complete its passage through this House until after the Christmas recess. After that, it needs to go through the House of Lords and there might have to be consideration of Lords amendments in this House. Even without that, there seems to be no way the Bill could achieve Royal Assent before the commissioner reports at the end of January. We therefore do not believe that amendment 11 is required.
In the light of what I have said, I hope that hon. Members will not press their amendments.
Diana Johnson
I thank the Minister for going through all the questions that I posed. On the basis of what he has said, I happily beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 17 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 18
Authority-to-carry schemes
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Temporary Chair (Mr David Amess)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clauses 19 and 20 stand part.
That schedule 2 be the Second schedule to the Bill.
Deferred Divisions
Diana Johnson Excerpts(10 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Diana Johnson (Kingston upon Hull North) (Lab)
The Home Secretary set out in her opening remarks why she believes it is necessary to introduce this Bill. She referred to the threat level, which has increased, and to the number of terrorist threats thwarted by our intelligence and security services and the police. She also referred to the need for the Bill’s additional powers to keep this country safe.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), the shadow Home Secretary, said that we will work with the Home Secretary: “We agree with her on some things, but we do not think she has got it right yet on others, and amendments are needed. Parliament as a whole must be thoughtful and responsible, because our liberty and security depend on each other. We need both in a democracy to keep us safe.”
This afternoon’s debate has been very thoughtful and responsible. The contributions of Members on both sides of the House have been of very high quality, and the debate has been very well informed and knowledgeable. The former Attorney-General, the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), started with a succinct but powerful speech. The Chair of the Home Affairs Committee, my right hon. Friend the Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz), reminded the House of the need for effective scrutiny of legislation and the role the Committee can play in that regard. He was followed by the right hon. and learned Member for North East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell), who is an esteemed member of the Intelligence and Security Committee. My right hon. Friend the Member for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears), who is also a member of the ISC and a former counter-terrorism Minister, said that the provisions were both necessary and proportionate.
I will comment on Members’ contributions when I refer to specific provisions. The hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) is another member of the ISC, and he was followed by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Perry Barr (Mr Mahmood), who speaks with such authority, as a member of the Muslim community, about his own experience in Birmingham, particularly with regard to schools and Operation Trojan Horse. He was followed by the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Martin Horwood) and it is important to note that GCHQ is in his constituency. I think that all Members would want to pay tribute to the security and intelligence services for all the work they do, every day of the week and every week of the year, to keep us all safe. I think the hon. Gentleman is the Liberal Democrat spokesman on this issue and it was interesting to hear him say that he thought the Bill strikes broadly the right balance. He noted in particular the support for the data retention provisions.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Knowsley (Mr Howarth), who is a former Home Office Minister and another member of the ISC, spoke powerfully about radicalisation and the work of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation at King’s college to inform the debate. We then heard from the hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire (Pete Wishart). We know, of course, that terrorism has touched Scotland in recent years, with the attack on Glasgow airport. Finally, my hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South East (Yasmin Qureshi) spoke with her experience as a prosecutor and her knowledge of her community.
I will now briefly refer to the specific contents of the Bill to pick up some of the issues raised in the debate. Part 1, which deals with exclusion and passports, introduces new powers to deal with the emerging threat from ISIL—it is known by various names—and the British citizens and residents who have gone out to fight for it. The level of the threat is unprecedented, and we accept the need for new powers.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Salford and Eccles referred, very interestingly, to academic studies about those who go to fight but then want to return to this country, and she mentioned the three categories of the disturbed, the dangerous and the disillusioned. That will help to inform our debate on ensuring that the laws are proportionate and deal with the problems we face.
As my right hon. Friend the shadow Home Secretary set out, we have some concerns about aspects of part 1. Strong powers must be accompanied by equally strong checks and balances, but such checks and balances are absent from the Bill.
That issue was raised by the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield, who made a very interesting comparison. He used the fact that a regime was put in place to ensure that there was judicial oversight, originally for control orders and then for TPIMs, to argue very effectively that we need to do something similar for exclusion orders. He also made a point about passports and possible claims for compensation, and I hope that the Minister for Security and Immigration will respond to that. The right hon. and learned Member for North East Fife also talked at length about exclusion orders and his concerns about interfering with the right of return.
We will table amendments in Committee to strengthen part 1. My hon. Friend the Member for Bolton South East asked whether we would do so, and I can reassure her that we will. We will also seek information about the exclusion power, as it is called in the Bill. As my right hon. Friend the shadow Home Secretary mentioned, the Prime Minister originally promised to exclude people from the United Kingdom, but the Home Secretary has said that the power is in fact about managing the reintroduction of individuals into the UK on certain terms. The process is important, but many questions remain about how part 1 will work, and about whether the powers will be used proportionately.
On part 2 on TPIMs, we of course welcome the Government U-turn. Having looked at the evidence, they are reintroducing relocation powers. The Opposition have called for that to be done for several years. The last Tory Home Secretary, the noble Lord Howard, has also called for it, as have both the current and the former independent reviewers of terrorism legislation. We are therefore very pleased by that change, and we also welcome the proposals to strengthen TPIMs in various ways.
We will seek clarification from the Minister on certain issues in Committee, including the 200-mile relocation limit and firearms licences, which my right hon. Friend mentioned. There is concern about the fact that firearms licensing officers did not know in the past that someone was on a TPIM.
Diana Johnson
I am very pleased that the Home Secretary is shaking her head, but it would be helpful if the Minister enlightened us about why the Government feel the need to make a provision specifically about that issue.
Part 3 is about data retention. We know that telephone records have always shown who receives calls and from whom, and that it has always been possible to link a number to the individual who owns the line. The Opposition think that it is appropriate for equivalent records to be kept for e-mails and peer-to-peer sharing.
As my right hon. Friend said, that issue is particularly important in relation to the National Crime Agency. It has IP addresses for about 20,000 individuals whom it suspects of accessing online child abuse images, but against whom it has not been able to follow through. We think that this power is urgently needed because, until the NCA can get the names of the 20,000 individuals, it will not know how many of them are known sex offenders, are working with children or are living with children. Those are the most basic checks that should be undertaken. The case of Myles Bradbury, which ended in the last 24 hours, should serve as an urgent reminder to the Government of the dangers of the NCA failing to follow up on leads. We accept what was said this evening about the drafting of clause 17. It should be looked at to improve the clarity.
On part 5, we welcome the fact that Prevent is being put on a statutory footing. My right hon. Friend the Member for Salford and Eccles made an excellent contribution on that and spoke, in particular, about the need for consistency and evaluation. It is important to show that whatever is put in place is working and having an effect. We are concerned that the guidance must be made available as soon as possible. Even if the guidance is in a draft format, it would be helpful to have it available when the Bill is in Committee over the next couple of weeks so that we can see what the Government’s thinking is on this issue.
There is, of course, a need for the community to develop resilience and for us to get into the DNA of the community, as a number of hon. Members said. The point has been made strongly this evening that the Department for Communities and Local Government has not taken the lead on the Prevent agenda in the way that the Home Secretary had perhaps hoped. It is therefore important that Prevent is put on a statutory footing. There are lessons to be learned from the experience of my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Perry Barr of schools in Birmingham in relation to Prevent and the duties that will be put on schools.
Finally, the hon. Member for New Forest East gave a thoughtful speech about the need for a counter-narrative at a national level, and my right hon. Friend the Member for Knowsley spoke about how private companies can be engaged in getting that message out. That area needs to be developed.
In conclusion, this Second Reading debate has been constructive. It has highlighted where there is support for the provisions in the Bill and where changes are needed. It has raised a series of specific questions for the Government to answer in the coming stages of the Bill’s passage. We must act proportionately, ensuring that the balance between security and liberty is dealt with properly, and that all the checks and balances are in place, in order to secure as much support as possible for the proposals.
Historical Child Sex Abuse
Diana Johnson Excerpts(10 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Tim Loughton
I feared my hon. Friend was about to say that Hillsborough was a terrible inquiry. No, it was a good inquiry about a terrible event and I think he is probably right. This is a huge, many-headed hydra that will go into many Departments and include documents and information from the intelligence services and others.
Fourthly, we must recognise that we have a good panel of experts. Questions have been asked about the way certain members of the panel were appointed. That was up to the Home Secretary, with advice from her officials. The gang of seven and others were invited to make any suggestions helpfully. I made some suggestions. Some of the people I suggested had been recommended by other institutions. Some of the people I suggested have not made it on to the panel. Some people think that, because they have been suggested by MPs, they must therefore be tainted. Please recognise that we have a good panel of experts from a wide variety of disciplines who bring great skills to the panel. To think that any one of them, let alone the eventual chair or chairs, could in any way, in such a high-profile inquiry with such a spotlight shining on them, sweep something under the carpet or try to divert the inquiry’s deliberations is just not realistic.
Diana Johnson (Kingston upon Hull North) (Lab)
I accept what the hon. Gentleman says about the panel members, but it would have been better had survivors, representatives and groups at least been consulted on the members before they were announced. The fact that they were not has caused undue suspicion among some survivors. I am sure he thinks it would have been a better way of putting the panel together.
Tim Loughton
I actually said that just now. It should have been handled better, but we are where we are.
I agree with the hon. Member for Rochdale that the terms of reference, particularly for whistleblowers, need to be reviewed. We do not want people, be they police officers or others, not coming forward to help uncover the truth because of a fear of procedures. I am not a supporter of mandatory reporting, but we need a system of whistleblowing that is fit for purpose and does not get in the way of the truth in this inquiry.
The chair and the panel need to be completely transparent, accountable and accessible. I recommend we have a sounding board panel of survivors who are consulted not just at the beginning—it should have happened earlier—but as the inquiry progresses so they can give their input on whether the inquiry is getting under the right stones, going in the right direction and being rigorous enough. They need to be part of that process all the way through.
As I said earlier, Parliament should have no fear if the inquiry encroaches on our own sort, and it does not help any party or politician to be party to a cover-up. We need to ensure, and all the survivors need to trust, that we have a shared agenda and aim to which many of us are wedded: to root out criminals; to uncover the truth, however unpalatable; to give survivors a voice; and to ensure that the system in 2014 is working to keep our children and young people safe.
Survivors need help and counselling. I have met survivors who have had to set up charities to give counselling and advice to other survivors and who are doing it on a shoestring. Organisations such as the National Association for People Abused in Childhood have done excellent work but are now being overwhelmed. There is a huge demand for counselling services from survivors having to relive a trauma they thought had gone away, and there have even been suicides by former survivors since this was uncovered. We have to do more on that score.
Finally, however, there are grounds for optimism. Notwithstanding Rotherham and the fact that there will be more Rotherhams, our awareness of child exploitation is higher than ever. The child sexual exploitation action plan, which I launched as children’s Minister in November 2011, is the thing of which I am most proud from my time at the Department. It has brought about a sea change in the way we recognise, intervene on and tackle child sexual exploitation, and has brought together the police and social, education and health workers through local safeguarding children boards—they are not good enough, as the Ofsted recently showed, but we are going in the right direction—and ensured that taxi firms and hotels have a means of sharing information if gang abuse is happening on their premises or in their taxis.
Furthermore, we now have an Archbishop of Canterbury who takes this issue so seriously that he will not consecrate any new bishop until they have gone through a child sexual exploitation training course, and clergy and volunteers throughout the Church of England and—I am sure—other Churches are being brought up to speed. We have also seen changes in court procedures meaning that victims are more confident about coming to court and can give evidence in greater safety, without being intimidated by barristers, and that more perpetrators are going to jail. We owe it to the survivors and to vulnerable children and young people now to get this overarching inquiry under way; to make its investigations robust; and to ensure that its findings stick. We must do that if we are to restore confidence in the child protection system we so desperately need.
Diana Johnson (Kingston upon Hull North) (Lab)
I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Rochdale (Simon Danczuk) on securing this debate, which is on the progress of the historical child abuse inquiry. I pay tribute to him for his doughty campaigning on child abuse since entering the House of Commons, and for telling the real story about Cyril Smith.
It is right to acknowledge that in his opening speech my hon. Friend set the tone for what has been a good and important debate. He started his speech by describing the experience of survivors. He talked about William and about John and the life chances that had been limited by the people who abused them. I want to use my speech this afternoon to focus on survivors in relation to the inquiry.
We have heard powerful speeches from the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton), who brings a wealth of experience as a former children’s Minister, and the hon. Member for Mole Valley (Sir Paul Beresford), who has introduced many changes to the law to protect children over the years. He is another doughty fighter on behalf of children and young people. The hon. Member for Richmond Park (Zac Goldsmith) spoke eloquently about what he knew had happened in his constituency and the Elm guest house allegations. The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley (John Hemming) has spoken on many occasions about these issues.
What is powerful about all the speeches is that they were informed in the main by the stories of survivors of abuse. The House owes a huge debt to the survivors, who have shown enormous courage in coming forward, in the hope that their experience can prevent what happened to them from happening again, and that justice can, wherever possible, be done. This debate and the wider inquiry that we are discussing have to have at their heart the survivors’ voices. I want to thank all those people who have taken the time to speak to me and tell me what they want to see out of this child abuse inquiry, including Peter Saunders of the National Association for People Abused in Childhood and Andrew Kershaw of the Survivors of Forde Park, both of whom have done so much to give a voice to those abused as children.
Having listened to the debate today, the Minister can be in no doubt about the commitment of hon. Members to the success of this child abuse inquiry and to ensuring that it has the confidence of survivors. Hon. Members appreciate the scale of the task facing the inquiry panel and the need for the panel to carry out the inquiry in a timely manner, as we know that many perpetrators are growing older and must be brought to justice wherever possible.
Along with the shadow Home Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), many Members have been calling for the overarching inquiry for about two years, so when the Home Secretary announced that she would set it up, that was welcomed across the House. As we know, however, she appointed a chair without proper vetting or consultation. After that sorry saga, we ended up, unbelievably, in the same position with a second chair. We know that the Home Secretary apologised for that and is trying to make sure that from now on there is proper consultation and vetting of the prospective chair. I listened to what the permanent secretary at the Home Office told this place this week, when he said that the child abuse inquiry would be one of the top three issues for the Home Office. That is encouraging to hear.
In relation to the chair, perhaps the Minister will be able to help the House. I understand that about 100 nominations have been made. With due diligence checks and the pre-appointment consultation and hearings that have been scheduled, a chair is unlikely to be in place before the spring of 2015. Will the Minister comment on that timetable?
Although I have just mentioned how important it is to make sure that a chair is appointed as soon as possible, that is not nearly as important as making sure that the survivors of abuse have a voice in the inquiry and that they are involved in discussions about how the inquiry is to proceed. That has not happened enough, which is a problem. It was a fundamental mistake not to consult survivors about the panel members. Although I accept that all the panel members have a great deal to commend them, survivors tell me that they would like to have been consulted. I noted that the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham said that MPs were asked for their opinion and for any suggestions. That is welcome, but the Government missed a trick by not making sure that survivors were also consulted about panel members. As all hon. Members will recognise, if the inquiry is to succeed, survivors must have confidence in the panel to which they will give evidence.
A number of hon. Members referred to the terms of reference. Again, I note that there was no consultation with survivors about the terms of reference for the inquiry. One issue that I would like to take up with the Minister is the cut-off date of 1970. The Home Secretary has said that if that cut-off date is a problem, she will listen to any representations in favour of taking it back further that the chair considers appropriate, but I wonder why the date of 1970 was chosen. I was told just this week that approved schools where a number of children and young people were abused closed in 1969, so they would not come within the scope of the terms of reference. The survivors feel that their experience would not automatically be considered by the panel. Will the Minister explain to the House why 1970 was the date chosen? I have heard suggestions from survivors that the terms of reference should set a cut-off date just after the second world war, which would allow any person still living who has suffered abuse to come forward and feel that their experiences could be part of the inquiry.
Most importantly, I want to talk about how survivors’ voices should be heard in the inquiry. The hon. Member for Mole Valley referred to the experience in Northern Ireland. Its historical institutional abuse inquiry commenced, as he said, with an acknowledgement forum, for the purposes of listening to those who were abused as children in those institutions. That process has taken many months and allowed anyone who has been abused in institutions to come forward and be heard. The acknowledgment forum spoke to more than 500 people. That was not the end of its process of listening to survivors, but the start, informing the next stage of the inquiry, but still hearing from survivors directly.
Australia’s child abuse inquiry has been very good about moving around the country. It reached out to survivors, and the response has been overwhelming. It has taken 17,500 telephone calls, received more than 7,800 letters and e-mails and held over 2,500 private sessions. The English and Welsh inquiry, however, seems to have had two sessions in London and plans two more outside London. They appear to be open meetings. I am very unclear about what it is proposed should happen at those events. It feels to me that they are insufficient, and it is very unclear how they will support survivors who come forward. In Australia and Northern Ireland, people were asked to contact the inquiry, and the inquiry team then worked with individuals to enable them to give evidence in the most appropriate way. They were signposted to support and advice.
I do not think there is any point in proceeding with this inquiry until a process for involving and supporting survivors is established. Existing services, as the hon. Member for East Worthing and Shoreham said, are stretched to breaking point, including NAPAC, which faces losing its offices early next year, at a time of unprecedented demand for its support.
Julian Smith
On the remarks that the hon. Lady has just made about the inquiry, which I am really pleased has started its work—the panel members got started on 12 November—are she and the Labour party recommending that that work should now be paused? Will she clarify her remarks?
Diana Johnson
The problem is that there seems to be a lack of clarity—probably because there is no chair in place—as to how the inquiry is going forward and what the purposes of the regional meetings are. I have asked a number of people to explain to me how those meetings will be conducted. If survivors are to come forward and give evidence at those meetings—I do not know whether that is their purpose—there is a concern about the lack of clarity and the lack of an agreed process as to how that is to be handled. That is why I wanted to refer to the Northern Ireland example, as it is very clear what it was going to do in that first period: hear from survivors so that it could get to grips with the extent of the problem through the evidence before it, which would then determine how the rest of the inquiry would proceed. My purpose in referring to that inquiry was to highlight the need for clarity on how proceedings should go on.
On the point about the support available to survivors, I think that we need a very clear process—this fits in with what the hon. Gentleman has just asked—for the inquiry, whereby survivors are fully involved and supported and it has their confidence. I think that we are all looking to ensure that survivors are in that position as the inquiry moves forward.
Julian Smith
The hon. Lady has still not directly answered my question about the Labour party’s view, given what she has said. Does she agree that it is very problematic to ask Ministers to micro-manage this inquiry? There are some very senior people on the panel, and they must now be able to get on with their work. Has she spoken directly to the panel members about their plans for the next few months?
Diana Johnson
I am not trying to imply that the Minister or the Home Secretary should micro-manage. I am merely highlighting where the inquiry is not operating in a clear way, such that survivors are saying that they are not sure what the process is or what the purpose of the regional meetings is. I think the problem stems from the fact that no chair is in place directing the inquiry. As I said, the chair may not be appointed for many months. That causes me some concern. I hope that the Minister will be able to assist us on what the Home Office and Ministers may be able to do to support the panel in making the process a bit clearer so that survivors really understand what is happening during this period.
We must make sure that survivors who come forward with their evidence are fully supported afterwards. I worry that the Home Secretary has talked about the NHS being part of providing that support, given that the NHS is under such stress, particularly in terms of counselling services, where there are often long waiting lists. What additional support will be available to survivors, and particularly to third sector groups?
This inquiry must aim to investigate historical child abuse, to try to bring justice to those who have seen justice denied for too long, and to inform current practice in the field of child protection to stop children being abused in future. While it is important to investigate historical allegations, we must never forget that children are still being abused today, as a number of hon. Members said.
I want to make a suggestion to the Minister about the way forward. While the main inquiry establishes a forum for hearing from survivors, in the first instance, the other inquiries that have been set up—such as the north Wales care homes inquiry, the BBC inquiry, and the ongoing NHS inquiries—would have time to conclude and to put forward their recommendations for a response. My hon. Friend the Member for Wrexham (Ian Lucas) mentioned the potential confusion about how those other inquiries will fit with the overarching inquiry, and that is part of the overall problem of how this is going to work. The main inquiry could then commence in the position of having heard from survivors of abuse and seen the recommendations of the other inquiries and what they have come up with.
On the legal status of the inquiry, there is a particular issue relating to documents. Lawyers have told me that because the inquiry has not been put on a statutory footing, organisations could destroy documents with no legal consequences, whereas if it were to be put on a statutory footing, there would be criminal consequences for that type of behaviour. The Home Secretary has said that the chair can decide whether to make the inquiry statutory, so that suggests that her mind is open to it. However, as we know, the chair is unlikely to be appointed for many months, and lawyers are saying that in the meantime documents could be destroyed. The hon. Member for Richmond Park also raised this point. Will the Minister comment on it?
We need to hear from the Minister how she is going to make this inquiry work with the confidence of survivors, and how she will give survivors the voice that they deserve and that the inquiry has to hear. She needs to give us an overview of how she sees survivors being consulted and to explain how they will be listened to in the inquiry. I hope that she will also address the broader question of how the inquiry will build on the other inquiries already set up and work to inform best practice. The survivors need to know that this Government and this Parliament want the inquiry to succeed. We want to give survivors whatever redress is possible and to learn lessons so that these terrible situations do not arise in future.
Diana Johnson
I thank the Minister for that very useful information, but I am a little concerned. Are survivors not therefore expected to give evidence to the panel? Obviously, there is no chair and the support—I hope the Minister will come on to that shortly—is not in place at the moment. Will she say a little more about the listening events?
Karen Bradley
The Home Secretary and I are obviously not instructing the panel on how to go about this exercise. The important point is that this is an early opportunity to make sure that victims and survivors can help to frame how the panel approaches the inquiry.
On the hon. Lady’s point about Government support, victims must be able to come forward to report abuse to the police and to get the support they need. If child abuse takes place, it must be thoroughly and properly investigated, and those responsible must be arrested and brought to justice. As part of a series of meetings that the Home Secretary is chairing in response to Rotherham, the Government are looking at how best to provide urgent support to victims. We are very aware that we need to make sure that there is proper and appropriate support for victims, so that they can have the confidence to come forward and we can support them when they do.
The panel is considering as a priority the best ways in which to engage with victims and survivors, and how to ensure that the right package of support is available to those who take part in the inquiry. Those giving evidence will share and relive some of the most appalling experiences anyone can live through. The panel will endeavour to make the process of giving evidence the most supportive and least traumatic for survivors that it is possible to make it.
Both the secretariat to the inquiry and officials in the Home Office are already in discussion with officials in the Department of Health, and they will work with charitable organisations, all of which have a vital part to play in making sure that the right support and counselling is available. My hon. Friend the Member for Richmond Park asked about whether we are working with other Departments. It is important to say that the permanent secretary has written to all Departments to tell them that they must fully support the inquiry. That information has gone out to all Departments to make sure that they are aware of the inquiry.
The panel is working on the approach it will take and the methodology it will use in the collection and analysis of information and evidence. These fundamentals for the inquiry will be the way in which it ensures that the terms of reference are met, that survivors and victims of sexual abuse are given a voice, and that that voice is heard and makes a difference for future generations. The panel is also seeking to learn lessons from the Australian royal commission into institutional responses to child sexual abuse about what worked well and what did not.
The Home Secretary will be happy to discuss the terms of reference for the inquiry, including its territorial extent, and the composition of the panel with the new chair, when they are appointed. It is important that the inquiry be able to work fully with the devolved Administrations, including with the Hart inquiry in Northern Ireland and the Oldham inquiry in Jersey, to ensure that no information and no institution or individual with a case to answer falls through the cracks.
Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism
Diana Johnson Excerpts(10 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Diana Johnson (Kingston upon Hull North) (Lab)
I thank the Minister for his statement. There is a long tradition of cross-party co-operation on issues of national security and the Opposition will, of course, support the Government motion this evening.
Under section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000, a group can be proscribed if the Home Secretary is persuaded that it:
“(a) commits or participates in acts of terrorism,
(b) prepares for terrorism,
(c) promotes or encourages terrorism, or
(d) is otherwise concerned in terrorism.”
It is a largely judicial role in that the Home Secretary has to assess whether the evidence before her meets the test. The Opposition do not have access to that evidence, of course, but on the basis of the statement that has been made by the Minister and the Home Secretary’s letter to my right hon. Friend the shadow Home Secretary, we will support the Government tonight.
I thank the Government for the letter to my right hon. Friend the shadow Home Secretary. May I say how pleased we were to receive that letter before the newspapers were briefed? I am sure that the Minister will recall that the last time we discussed a proscription order, he had to apologise to the House for the contents of the order being given to The Sun newspaper before they were given to the House. Is he able to report back on the investigation that he said would happen to find out how that had occurred?
Moving back to the order before us, we accept that proscription is an important tool to use against terrorism. It enables us to tackle and disrupt terror groups in co-operating around the world. Of course, that makes proscription a serious matter. Proscription makes it illegal to belong to or support in any way a listed organisation. It is a draconian measure, so we should use it only when we know that it is appropriate. The evidence that we heard tonight suggests that the measure is appropriate because all three groups have been involved in terrorism of the highest seriousness, including some directed at our citizens and allies.
The groups that we are discussing are active from Chechnya to Libya and include groups that operate in Syria, Egypt and Libya. They demonstrate the enormous challenge that is posed by the fallout from the Arab spring across the middle east and north Africa. I will start with Syria, where we know a number of organisations that pose security concerns are operating. We support the proscription of JKI, which is an Islamist jihadist group that consists predominantly of Chechen fighters who appear to be part of a web of interrelated organisations. The most prominent of those is the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, but there is also the al-Nusra front—both of those have been proscribed recently—and Jaysh al-Muhajireen wal Ansar.
To emphasise the challenge of separating out these groups, JKI was until recently known as the Majahideen of the Caucasus and the Levant or MCL. JKI has been linked to a number of attacks, including—as the Minister pointed out—a suicide attack in Aleppo by a British national, Abdul Waheed Majeed. In Egypt, we have the Soldiers of Egypt, another jihadi group and again a splinter group of a known terror group, in this case Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, one of the most high-profile terror groups in Egypt. Again, this is a group that was proscribed in the UK this year. This group is also linked to ISIL and shows dramatically the size of ISIL’s sphere of influence that we are trying to combat. Although Soldiers of Egypt is believed to be just a year old, it has already been linked with a series of attacks targeting Cairo airport, border operations, police stations and Cairo university.
Finally, in Libya another Sunni group, Ansar al-Sharia-Benghazi or AAS-B—also known as Partisans of Islamic Law—seeks to use violence to achieve the aim of strict implementation of sharia law in post-Gaddafi Libya. The group is led by Mohammed Ali al-Zahawi, and Ahmed Abu Khattalah is another senior leader. As the Minister explained, since the fall of Gaddafi the AAS-B has been linked with numerous terror attacks against civilian targets, and frequent assassinations and attempted assassinations of security officials and political actors in eastern Libya. Many of these have resulted in the loss of innocent lives, including the attack on the US embassy in Benghazi in September 2012, which led to the death of the US ambassador and three of his colleagues.
While we support the Government’s motion tonight, I want to raise two other issues with the Minister that arise out of yesterday’s Intelligence and Security Committee report on the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby. The first is about social media. This is an issue I have raised in debates on previous proscription orders. Yesterday, we learnt that messages had been shared on the internet by Michael Adebowale which, because of their content, were picked up and the accounts were closed by the internet companies. But no follow-up action was taken and no referrals made. That raises serious questions about social media companies and the Home Office’s counter terrorism internet referral unit, which clearly is not receiving all the referrals it should be. Will the Minister review the working of this unit in the light of yesterday’s report and see what more can be done? We know that all the groups we are discussing tonight have had a significant online presence, including on Facebook and Twitter. Those companies may operate across the world, but they generate significant revenue in the UK and we need to make it clear that we expect them to do more than they are doing at the moment.
Keith Vaz
My hon. Friend is a serial attender of these proscription order debates and she will know that we have raised on several occasions the position of Hizb ut-Tahrir. In 2009, the now Prime Minister said that he wanted that organisation banned. It has still not been banned. Does she share my concern that no progress has been made on that?
Diana Johnson
I am grateful to the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee, and he is right that I am—like him—a serial attender of these debates. The issue of Hizb ut-Tahrir has been raised at every proscription order debate in which I have been involved and we have asked the Minister what progress has been made on the promise by the then Leader of the Opposition that he would ban it when he became Prime Minister. It is now several years since the Prime Minister made that promise. It would be interesting to hear from the Minister if any progress has been made on that point.
May I take this opportunity to wish the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee a happy birthday? I understand that it is my right hon. Friend’s birthday today. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”]
Finally, I would like to turn to the issue of prosecutions of members, supporters and facilitators of proscribed organisations. The Intelligence and Security Committee report published yesterday highlighted the low number of prosecutions and the difficulties the police face in obtaining prosecutions in this area. What do the Government intend to do to address this problem? In particular, does the Minister think that the way of defining terror for the purpose of proscription is sufficient to allow a terror group to be clearly identified? All three of the groups we have discussed today have had a series of associate groups; in most cases, groups that have been proscribed this year or in previous years. Those groups are often difficult to separate out. Will the Minister comment on the degree to which the way in which we define groups gives sufficient clarity to enable us to link an individual with a specific proscribed group? What more does he think we can do to ensure more prosecutions, where appropriate, in these types of cases where organisations have been proscribed?
Madam Deputy Speaker (Mrs Eleanor Laing)
With the good wishes of the House for a very happy birthday, I call Mr Keith Vaz.
Modern Slavery Bill
Diana Johnson Excerpts(10 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Karen Bradley
The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. This is about getting transparency in supply chains. On the very first day I started as a Minister, the first thing I was lobbied on was transparency in supply chains, and it became clear that this is all about finding out what is going on—shining a light. As he says, there may well be slavery within these supply chains, and if so action can be taken to deal with that.
I would add that in my experience of meeting Governments overseas where there may be concerns about human rights abuses, one of the strongest and most powerful tools to convince those Governments that they need to take action is that their businesses will not be able to trade with businesses here in Britain because we expect to be sure that there is no slavery in the supply chain, that human rights are not being abused through the supply chain, and that when consumers buy goods in Britain they can be confident that all action that possibly can have been taken has been taken to eradicate these practices from the supply chain. That is what transparency does—it shines that light and gives that clarity to the consumer.
New clause 15, tabled by the hon. Member for Foyle, seeks to require the Secretary of State to lay regulations to ensure that individuals who have benefited from modern slavery that has been perpetrated by a third party are criminally liable where their lack of supervision made the modern slavery offence possible. We do of course want business to take action to eliminate modern slavery from supply chains, and, as we have discussed, the Government are bringing forward a legislative measure to achieve this. However, I am not persuaded that a potentially very broad criminal liability in this area is the best approach. I want these provisions to drive a change in behaviour. That is why I firmly believe that the Government’s amendment to introduce a bespoke provision into the Bill is the right one. As I said, it goes much wider than the provisions in the California Act by including all sectors, not just retail and manufacturing, and the provision of services, as well as goods, but it does so in a way that does not create undue burdens for business.
I fully acknowledge the good intentions behind right hon. and hon. Members’ amendments. However, in the light of discussions and the work that the Government have undertaken in this area, and the effective provision that we are proposing today, I hope that they will feel able to withdraw them.
Diana Johnson (Kingston upon Hull North) (Lab)
I rise to welcome the Government’s new clause 11 and to speak to new clause 5, which stands in my name and the names of other right hon. and hon. Members. It is very good news that the Government have finally moved on this matter in the final stages of the Bill. Not including supply chains was the single biggest omission from the draft Bill and the Bill introduced to this House, and it is good to see that this important concession has been secured from the Government.
I congratulate all those who have campaigned on this issue, including my hon. Friends the Members for Linlithgow and East Falkirk (Michael Connarty), for Slough (Fiona Mactaggart) and for Birkenhead (Mr Field), and, on the Government Benches, the right hon. Members for Uxbridge and South Ruislip (Sir John Randall) and for Meriden (Mrs Spelman). The hon. Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan) has tabled two new clauses that seek to extend the responsibilities of UK companies towards those who work in the supply chains, including compensation for victims and a ban on the importation of products produced using slavery.
Outside this House, a huge number of groups have also campaigned on the issue. I pay particular tribute to the Walk Free Foundation, the Ethical Trading Initiative, and the British Retail Consortium. I would like personally to thank all the groups and companies that I have met in order to inform Labour’s position, including Next, Primark, the Co-operative Group, Focus On Labour Exploitation, and Amnesty International.
Stephen Barclay
The hon. Lady is making powerful points about what teeth the guidance will have. Does she think that there are lessons to be drawn from when this House debated the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, when it was believed that the behaviour of the banks would be influenced by reputational damage, a belief that was found to be false in the light of their future conduct? There seems to be a reliance on the idea that guidance in itself will have a deterrent effect on major corporations, but that has to be backed up with some teeth.
Diana Johnson
I could not agree more. That is why it was important that I set out why new clause 5 deals in detail with the kind of issues that need to be clearly addressed in secondary legislation. I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s intervention.
Just to recap: we support the Government’s new clause 11. Obviously, we want to wait and see what happens with the secondary legislation as it is introduced. It is surprising that the Government have gone against the Joint Committee’s recommendation and the evidence presented by several large companies arguing against stand-alone regulation, although the Government have now seen fit to pursue that. That poses particular problems for enforcement. I am sure the Minister has seen the briefing from the coalition of groups campaigning for change, which states:
“Monitoring of compliance with the provision needs to be taken seriously as this will be central to its success in driving change. We are concerned that the provision is currently weak on how monitoring and enforcement will be undertaken. The Government’s approach relies on a civil enforcement procedure by the Secretary of State, which means that in reality the measure would be unlikely to deter any businesses other than those who would in any case seek to comply on a voluntary basis.”
Sir Andrew Stunell
I thank the hon. Lady for giving way—I hope she will be able to wet her whistle while I speak. Does she agree that the monitoring process could make a start through the anti-slavery commissioner taking a more active role in observing and supervising company reports?
Diana Johnson
The right hon. Gentleman makes a very important point. Time is limited this afternoon, but I hope there will more discussion in the other place about extending the role of the independent anti-slavery commissioner to do exactly what the right hon. Gentleman has said.
In the Minister’s closing remarks, I want assurances that whatever is proposed will apply to all large companies; that the regulations will be detailed enough to allow comparability; and that there will be a clear enforcement mechanism so that consumers, investors and NGOs can see who has complied and know that they can trust the report they have read.
Mr Burrowes
It is a pleasure to contribute to this debate and, in particular, to support the principles in new clause 11. Some good points have also been made about new clause 5. As was evident on Second Reading, the House has coalesced around the principle of providing transparency of supply chains. It has taken a while to get there. I pay particular tribute to the Minister for the work she has done and the leadership she has shown in bringing together the Government in this way. That takes some doing.
The importance of the integrity of basic human rights in supply chains has not been recognised until now, unlike—shamefully, in some ways—the integrity of products in supply chains of hardwood, tobacco and pharma- ceuticals. Today represents a big and important step change in recognising the integrity of those human rights.
New clause 11 covers the principles of accountability and reporting, which are also addressed by new clause 5. We can deal with the qualms and queasiness surrounding burdens by saying that any responsible business will welcome new clause 11 as an empowering measure that can help them disclose any issues and root out slavery.
I accept the point made by the right hon. Member for Birkenhead (Mr Field). When I said that we should name and shame, I did not mean that this is about good guys and bad guys. This is about disclosure. We should take a rounded approach. There needs to be full, transparent disclosure all the way along the chain so that everyone can shine a light to see what is happening and then deal with it appropriately. By shining that light all the way down and up, the most responsible businesses will expose some things that they are not happy about. They will then be able to say, robustly and confidently, “We’ve done that.” We should ensure disclosure by naming those who are disclosing in a proper and full way, and shaming those who are not disclosing, which is an issue of concern.
Once this measure is on the statute book, compliance and enforcement must be effective. From a light-touch point of view, I agree that transparency and accountability can happen through individual company websites, but we need to go further and enable all concerned to access information centrally. That is why I suggested in an intervention that the independent anti-slavery commissioner should have a portal. The responsibility for maintaining it would not be the commissioner’s alone, but people would be able to look at that independent website and see the names of those companies that have complied with the manner, spirit and intention of the statutory guidance. That is important and I think it would help. Given the timing involved with this measure and the need to get the office of the anti-slavery commissioner up and running, it is important that we make progress, possibly through the Home Office website, ahead of any parliamentary processes, including secondary legislation, and give people the opportunity to show that they are very much on the side of full disclosure.
I must say that I have one or two concerns. I am concerned about whether new clause 11 may be unduly complex, particularly in relation to enforcement via civil enforcement injunctions. Are such injunctions to expose the fact that a company is not up to speed on disclosure, or are they to get to the root problem of exposing its supply chain? The provision may be unduly bureaucratic and costly, and it may well not serve the purpose that everyone wants.
Karen Bradley
The shadow Minister makes the point that perhaps that needs to be by the end of March, if the right hon. Gentleman is asking whether it will happen before the general election. I cannot answer that question at the moment. Perhaps I could write to him on the specifics.
I am delighted that new clause 11 will amend the Bill to include the measure on transparency in supply chains that so many have worked so tirelessly for, for so long. I hope right hon. and hon. Members will not press their amendments to a Division. I look forward to this measure being part of the world-class Bill we all wish to create.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 11 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 3
Offence of child exploitation
‘(1) A person commits an offence if they exploit a child.
(2) It shall be such an offence even if there was no threat or use of violence, other forms of coercion, deception or any abuse of a position of vulnerability.
(3) A child may be in a situation of exploitation whether or not—
(a) escape from the situation is practically possible for the child; or
(b) the child has attempted to escape from the situation.
(4) The consent or apparent consent of the child to the exploitation is irrelevant.
(5) “Child Exploitation” includes but is not limited to, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation; the exploitation of labour or services including begging or practices similar to slavery, servitude or forced or compulsory labour; the exploitation of or for criminal activities including benefit fraud; the removal of organs; forced or servile marriage or enforced surrogacy; exploitation for unlawful adoption; and exploitation by enforced drugs smuggling, manufacture, production or distribution.”—(Diana Johnson.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Dawn Primarolo)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 4—Offence of exploitation—
‘(1) A person commits an offence if they exploit a person by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or abuse of a position of vulnerability, or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person.
(2) A person may be in a situation of exploitation whether or not—
(a) escape from the situation is practically possible for the person; or
(b) the person has attempted to escape from the situation.
(3) The consent or apparent consent of the person of the exploitation is irrelevant where any of the means set forth in section 9(1) has been used.’
New clause 24—Human trafficking—
‘(1) Any person who for the purpose of exploiting a person or persons—
(a) recruits, transports, transfers, harbours or receives a person including by exchange or transfer of control over that or those persons;
(b) by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or abuse of a position of vulnerability, or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person,
commits an offence of human trafficking.
(2) The consent or apparent consent of a person to the acts referred to in subsection 2(1)(a) or to the exploitation shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in subsection 2(1)(b) have been used.’
New clause 20—Control of assets related to modern slavery offences—
‘(1) In section 40 (Restraint orders) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 after subsection (9) insert—
“(10) In the case of an investigation or prosecution under the Modern Slavery Act the court shall presume that the alleged offender will dissipate his assets unless restrained.”
(2) The Secretary of State shall within six months of this Act coming into force bring forward regulations to—
(a) presume a freezing order will be granted within 24 hours in respect of assets where the court is satisfied that—
(i) there are reasonable grounds to suspect that some of those assets have been obtained as a result of an offence under this Act, and
(ii) those assets are over and above those reasonably required for living and business expenses.
(b) confer on the police power to issue a notice on financial advisers and institutions placing a duty of care on those institutions in respect of movement of assets that might hinder an investigation into an offence under this Act.
(3) The Chancellor of the Exchequer shall within six months of this Act coming into force bring forward regulations to provide that assets recovered in respect of an offence under this Act shall be paid to one or more of—
(a) the police and/or,
(b) the Gangmasters Licensing Authority, and
(c) the victim or victims of the offence.
(4) The court will require an asset declaration from anyone subject to a restraint order within 24 hours in respect of any financial interests in assets held in whole or in part in the United Kingdom and in overseas territories. In the event of a false declaration, this will be treated as an aggregated factor in the setting of any future penalty.
(5) Regulations under this section shall be made by statutory instrument and shall not be made unless laid before in draft and approved by both Houses of Parliament.’
New clause 21—Civil remedy—
‘(1) An individual who is a victim of an offence under section 1, 2 or 4 may bring a civil action against the perpetrator in the County Court and may recover damages and reasonable legal costs.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) “damages” shall include the greater of the gross income or value to the defendant of the victim’s services or labour or the value of the victim’s labour as guaranteed under the national minimum wage guarantees of the National Minimum Wage Act 1998.”
This provision creates a civil remedy for victims of trafficking, to allow victims to pursue a civil claim for compensation directly from the trafficker in the absence of a criminal prosecution.
Amendment 132, in clause 1, page 1, line 12, at end insert—
‘(c) the person exploits another person within the meaning of section 3(4), (5) or (6) of this Act and the circumstances are such that the person knows or ought to know that the other person is being exploited.”
Amendment 135, page 1, line 12, at end insert—
‘(1A) For the purposes of this Act—
(a) it is irrelevant whether a child consents to being held in slavery or servitude; and
(b) a child may be in a condition of slavery, servitude or forced or compulsory labour whether or not—
(i) escape from the condition is practically possible; or
(ii) the child has attempted to escape from the condition.”
Amendment 136, page 1, line 12, at end insert—
‘(1A) For the purposes of this Act—
(a) it is irrelevant whether a person consents to being held in slavery or servitude; and
(b) a person may be in a condition of slavery, servitude or forced or compulsory labour whether or not—
(i) escape from the condition is practically possible; or
(ii) the person has attempted to escape from the condition.”
Amendment 133, page 1, line 17, after “labour”, insert “or is being exploited”
Amendment 143, page 2, line 3, at end add—
‘(5) The consent or apparent consent of a person to the acts referred to in subsections 1(1)(a) or 1(1)(b) shall be irrelevant.”
Amendment 152, page 2, line 4, leave out clause 2.
Amendment 134, page 2, line 30, clause 3, at end insert—
‘(1A) For the purposes of section (1) a person is exploited only if one or more of subsections (4), (5) or (6) of this section apply in relation to the person.”
Amendment 151, in clause 7, page 4, line 30, at end insert—
00 “Proceeds of Crime Act 2002
In section 69, subsection (2) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, after “debt owned by the Crown”, insert—
“(e) in the case of an investigation or prosecution under the Modern Slavery Act the court must presume that the alleged offender will dissipate his assets unless restrained.””
Amendment 138, in clause 41, page 29, line 29, at end add—
‘(9) A child is not guilty of an offence if—
(a) he or she was under the age of 18 when the act which constitutes the offence was done; and
(b) the offence was integral to or consequent on the trafficking, slavery or exploitation of which he or she was a victim.”
This amendment aims to ensure a child victim of trafficking is not obliged to prove they were compelled to commit an offence before being able to access the protection of the statutory defence in line with international standards.
Diana Johnson
New clause 3 and new clause 4 seek to introduce specific offences for child and adult exploitation, and I would like to test the opinion of the House at the appropriate time.
The Bill fails to cover cases of severe labour exploitation, and many recent high profile cases show we need specific laws to tackle it. New clause 3 would also help to stop workers being exploited and paid below the minimum wage, which is often a driving force behind local businesses being undercut by unscrupulous employers. The new clause would be a historic measure that would, for the first time, make the exploitation of workers, adults and children an offence. Importantly, it also addresses what has been described as “a lacuna” in the Bill, which fails to recognise the specific nature of exploitation of children in the UK and fails to address the issues that have led to so few successful prosecutions for child trafficking and slavery. This grouping incorporates a series of amendments from all parties with a common aim—to enable more prosecutions for trafficking, slavery or exploitation. This is exactly in line with what the Minister said repeatedly in Committee about getting more prosecutions.
At this stage, the Opposition are focusing specifically on the offences of exploitation, even though in Committee we tabled or supported many of the other amendments that have been tabled today. We support their aims and hope to return to them in the other place.
The Government claim that the Bill will enable more prosecutions. To do so, it transposes existing offences from three pieces of legislation into a single Bill. The Bill maintains the current offence of holding someone in slavery and merges two existing offences of human trafficking into a single offence of human trafficking. To secure a prosecution for human trafficking, it is necessary to show that X was trafficked and that this trafficking was done for the purposes of exploitation. It is important to stress that, because nothing in the Bill deals with the structures of these offences or the very high threshold needed to get convictions. In short, I do not think there is anything here that will enable more prosecutions.
Stephen Barclay
Is the hon. Lady as surprised as I am that, as far as I am aware, only one person has ever gone to jail for breach of a Gangmasters Licensing Authority offence? Does that speak to the high hurdles to which she alludes?
Diana Johnson
The hon. Gentleman makes a very important point. We shall discuss the GLA later, but the hon. Gentleman’s point shows why we need to think again about the offences in the Bill and how we can make them stronger to ensure that we get more prosecutions.
Sir Greg Knight (East Yorkshire) (Con)
Does the hon. Lady agree that the offence of exploitation ought to be committed even when the threat of force is against someone other than the person being exploited—against a relative of the person who is being exploited, for example?
Diana Johnson
The right hon. Gentleman makes an important point, which should perhaps be debated more fully in the other place. I absolutely agree that this is a strong point that needs to be considered.
Returning to the low number of prosecutions, in 2011-12 there were 15 prosecutions for slavery offences, but no convictions. Since the introduction of the offence, there has shockingly never been a prosecution where the victim was a child. In 2011, there were 150 prosecutions for trafficking offences, but only eight convictions. To put those figures in context, in 2013 the national referral mechanism received 1,746 separate referrals of cases of human trafficking, 432 of them involving minors. The UK Human Trafficking Centre identified 2,744 victims of human trafficking last year, 600 of whom were deemed to be children.
Sir John Randall
One problem—not necessarily about the offences per se—is getting the victims to bear witness and testify against those who trafficked them. Victims’ fear is one reason we are not getting successful convictions, and we need to do more for them.
Diana Johnson
I absolutely agree with the right hon. Gentleman about the need to ensure that victims feel able to come forward and give evidence against those who have trafficked them, but I still think that we need to get the offences right and ensure that the offences are fit for purpose—an argument that I shall develop.
The new clause in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central (Paul Blomfield) is designed to address some of the structural problems with the drafting of the trafficking offence, and I want to put it on record that we fully support it. The amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Enfield, Southgate (Mr Burrowes) are designed to clarify the law on slavery to enable more prosecutions. I am sure that he will speak eloquently to those amendments. Again, we support what he is trying to achieve in principle.