The Minister for Security and Immigration (James Brokenshire)
indicated dissent.
Pete Wishart
I think I took part in practically all the debates in this House on these issues—indeed, the hon. Gentleman and I would have sat on the same Benches when arguing against what new Labour was trying to create with these measures. He is right: are such measures necessary? One individual in the country is subject to a TPIM, yet we are discussing the issue in Parliament and ensuring that what will probably be expensive resources are allocated to ensure that this new restrictive measure goes through. Is it worth while?
I do not like TPIMs—the Minister knows that—and I disliked control orders even more. Are they necessary? I suspect not. Do they do anything to make our nation safe? No, they do not. Should we be doing other things to make our country safe? Yes, we should, but unfortunately no amendment has been tabled that will deal with those issues. I hope that the Minister is not in the mood to accept Labour’s suggestions—
Pete Wishart
I see by his response that he is not. I hope the amendments are rejected and that in future we do something that will make our country safe without having to resort to measures such as TPIMs.
Mr Howarth
I am interested in the hon. Lady’s intervention. Later in the proceedings we will discuss intercept evidence, although I suspect that she will take an entirely different view on that from me, my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson) and the Minister. I hope to comment on the limitations of intercept evidence because it is not always feasible to rely wholly on evidence that in some cases may not exist. Some people may operate in a world where they are not connected online, and do not make telephone calls or give any indication of their intentions. The obvious example is Roshonara Choudhry who was convicted and is now serving a prison sentence for trying to kill a Member of this House. It would have been impossible to find out through intercept evidence what she was intending to do, so there is not always the possibility of relying on that entirely.
My hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North asked the Minister a series of questions and I hope he will respond positively. For some people the court system is not appropriate although they are known to be a threat for various reasons, and there must be some way of dealing with that.
James Brokenshire
The contribution by the right hon. Member for Knowsley (Mr Howarth), a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee, encapsulates some of the challenges and difficulties surrounding the principles of this debate. It is notable that contributions over the past hour have been about some of the principal issues concerning the types of measures that should be available to deal with the threat of terrorism, as well as—obviously and rightly—more detailed examination of the Bill.
We have had this debate on previous occasions, and I respect the view of the hon. Members for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) and for Perth and North Perthshire (Pete Wishart), whose approach has been entirely consistent. In some cases, however, there will be an inability either to prosecute or deport an individual, yet a significant risk will be attached to them—the point made by the right hon. Member for Knowsley. The Government have a responsibility to deal with that risk.
My strong preference would be for prosecutions—absolutely, there are no two ways about it—but that is not always possible for a range of reasons. That is the challenge the Government face in terms of seeing the threat and the risk, and being able to assure national security, as the public and the House would expect. Therefore, reluctantly, a measure is required, and we judge that TPIMs are the appropriate way to meet that risk and challenge. I would prefer that that were not the case—in that I agree with the hon. Members for Brighton, Pavilion and for Perth and North Perthshire—but from the intelligence picture that I have seen and the advice I have been given, sadly and regrettably I believe that TPIMs are necessary to be able to guard national security in that way.
Since April 2010 more than 750 people have been arrested for terrorism-related offences. More than 210 have been charged and more than 140 successfully prosecuted. I say to the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson) that the introduction of TPIMs was part of a careful and considered counter-terrorism review. She will recall the debates. Consideration was not rushed, but made on the basis of careful analysis of all counter-terrorism legislation to examine the risk and the threat, and what was appropriate and proportionate. That led to a number of changes under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, the point that the hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire was underlining. An assessment was made of which powers were no longer necessary because they no longer added to the protection of the public. That is why we made a number of changes and I was proud to be the Minister leading that Bill through the House. It was part of the process of constantly evaluating and assessing the measures in place in order to consider what is proportionate, appropriate and necessary to guard our national security. In our judgment it is appropriate to make further changes, which is why we seek to bring these measures before the Committee today.
TPIMs have always been part of a package of legislative measures and investment provided to the police and security services to undertake further investigations. That investment will have led to other prosecutions. People who not have gone on to a TPIM have been brought before the courts as a consequence of that investment in capabilities. That is a positive result and something I think right hon. and hon. Members wish to see.
The Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 provides a powerful range of measures to manage the threat from terrorists who cannot be prosecuted or deported. TPIM notices are imposed only in cases that require stringent measures, but where they are used, they provide a valuable capability. The Government are committed to ensuring that the appropriate tools are available to our security services and the police for the protection of national security. That is why clause 12 introduces a new power for the Secretary of State to compel a TPIM subject to reside anywhere in the UK, subject to the restrictions we have talked about in the debate thus far. It is important to recognise the benefits that accrue and that there are safeguards in place. The Secretary of State has to make an assessment to determine whether a TPIM should be granted, why we judge it is human rights compliant and how that view has been upheld by the courts.
Caroline Lucas
Perhaps I am pre-empting the Minister, but I wanted to press him on clause 13. He talks about safeguards and so on, but how can he justify the fact that a 10-year prison sentence could be handed down to someone who may never have been arrested, let alone convicted, of a terrorism offence? That length of sentence is higher than that given for many violent offences that have been properly proved.
James Brokenshire
It is a question of the seriousness of the measures. We recognise, because of the changes we are making, that there should be a higher burden placed on the Secretary of State in determining whether one of these measures should be provided. That is why we have moved this up to the “balance of probabilities”. Let us not forget that under the previous control orders regime it was not at that level, but two notches down at “reasonable suspicion”. Under TPIMs, we brought it up to “reasonable belief” and, on the balance of the measures we now have, we judge that moving to the “balance of probabilities” is the right stance to take. I will come on to clause 13 later.
The changes are being introduced in the light of the changing threat picture: the ongoing conflict in Syria and Iraq; the fact that 500 subjects of interest have travelled to that region; the risk that they may pose on their return; and the risk of more people seeking to travel out. It is against that assessment that the threat level has been raised to severe, the second highest threat level, and that has had an impact on our assessment of the measures that need to be available to the police and the Security Service, and it is why we have brought forward the measures in this way.
The measures also follow the recommendations from David Anderson QC, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, in his most recent annual report on TPIMs. As he has said, however, there is no need to turn back the clock. Control orders were not working and were being struck down by the courts, whereas TPIMs have been consistently upheld and therefore provide a basis in law that is robust and has withstood the scrutiny of the courts. TPIMs have been endorsed by the courts, counter-terrorism reviewers, the police and the Security Service. This change enhances the powers available to manage TPIM subjects by moving them away from harmful associates and making it harder for them to engage in terrorism-related activity. That is why we judge, at this time against the threat picture we see, that it is appropriate to introduce these measures.
It is important, however, that appropriate limits are placed on the use of the powers, and the Bill seeks to do that. We are also acting on David Anderson’s other recommendation to increase the test for imposing a TPIM notice, so that the Secretary of State must be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that an individual is, or has been involved, in terrorism-related activity, as well as narrowing the definition of what that activity can entail.
Mr Kenneth Clarke (Rushcliffe) (Con)
I intervene on my hon. Friend as someone who supported the original move from control orders to TPIMs and thought the Government had got the balance about right in the original proposals. I am just wondering what the particular reason is for reintroducing the location requirements. What has been revealed to be missing by getting rid of them? They were thought to be a great restriction on freedom. The shadow Minister appears to believe that two people absconded because there was no location requirement. I think it is possible to put on a burqa wherever one is living and that it is quite possible to get into a black cab if someone has let one keep one’s passport. If that is being used as a reason, it strikes me as an excuse for letting two people go.
James Brokenshire
In large measure, it has been the changing nature of the threat picture. My right hon. and learned Friend will know from his time in government that in the past two years we have seen a very altered threat picture and, as he will no doubt recognise, a rise in the threat level earlier this year. The Government need to consider, in a responsible fashion, that changed threat picture and the advice we received from the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. The proposals in the Bill are formed with that insight clearly in mind and David Anderson’s specific recommendation on this point. It has been against all those factors that we have judged that the right thing to do is to introduce the measures in this way, subject to the safeguards I have spoken about in respect of the change in the burden of proof and the specific limitation on relocation being limited to 200 miles from the location of the individual. I will come on to speak on that in a more direct fashion, recognising the point the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North rightly raised in her amendment.
Pete Wishart
I am sure the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke), with his years of distinguished service to the House, deserves a better answer than that pathetic response from the Minister. The question the Minister has to answer is: why? What evidence does he have to suggest that relocation is now necessary? Why relocation? Why now?
James Brokenshire
If the hon. Gentleman is not able to recognise the change in the nature of the threat and the evolving picture taking place in recent months, I am sorry he is blind to it. The Government have a responsibility to respond to it in a fair way. We have to take into consideration the advice we receive from the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, and listen to the Security Service and the police, who we have consulted, to ensure we have the right package of measures, challenging ourselves and others, to do all we can in a proportionate and necessary way to ensure that those agencies have the appropriate powers to guard against the changed risk picture, as well as ensuring an appropriate balance between privacy and security. I agree with the hon. Gentleman and my right hon. and learned Friend on the issue of absconds. A point that David Anderson made directly was that the only way in which one could be absolutely certain that someone was unable to abscond was by putting them in a prison cell, which is why my preference always is to seek a prosecution, when the evidence is there. The challenge is that it is not always available.
James Brokenshire
This is intended to be a very focused power on the basis—rightly, as we have discussed—that our strong preference is to see prosecution, and that it is only in the cases where prosecution, or indeed deportation, is not available to us that we would need to rely on the use of the TPIM measures. As no doubt the hon. Gentleman will be aware, there have been 10 TPIM notices imposed since their introduction. Perhaps that gives him some reassurance that this is not reached for as the first option. Indeed, we always look for prosecution, and there is a requirement in the TPIM legislation to show that those steps have been explored and that there is no reasonable prospect of being able to secure that.
The impact on communities was carefully considered at the time of the counter-terrorism review and, indeed, led to the creation of the TPIMs Act and the measures that we now have on the statute book. In placing this type of restriction—now that we are saying we believe that relocation is appropriate in the light of the changed picture—it should not be unbounded; hence this restriction is in place so that an individual may only be a few hours’ away from their family rather than relocated to the other side of the country.
Should exceptional circumstances arise that require more stringent measures, we retain the ability to enact the Enhanced Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill, which has passed pre-legislative scrutiny. This Bill includes a range of more stringent powers, including curfews of up to 16 hours. As we said at the time of the counter-terrorism review, we reserve the right to be able to do that in those exceptional circumstances.
Clause 13 amends the TPIMs Act and allows the Secretary of State to impose restrictions on an individual from leaving either the UK or a specified area within the UK within which they reside, and increases the maximum sentence for breaching this measure to 10 years, as the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion has said. This underlines the Government’s commitment to ensuring that TPIM subjects are appropriately managed, but that if they breach their TPIM notice, appropriate sentences will be given to recognise the seriousness of the issues at hand. I hope that the House is reassured that these measures strike the right balance between privacy and security and, on this basis, I invite the hon. Lady to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment 7 would insert a new clause 6B after clause 14, which is entitled “TPIMs: weapons and explosives measure”. Both the weapons and explosives measure and the proposed new clause 6B are designed to put beyond doubt what a TPIM subject is permitted to have access to on a TPIM notice. This amendment seeks to add an additional requirement in that respect.
The hon. Lady asked a series of questions that were linked to this issue in relation to the vetting and barring service and what might apply. Perhaps I can reassure her that someone who wants to work in a school or other educational establishment will be eligible to obtain an enhanced criminal records certificate from the Disclosure and Barring Service, as the hon. Lady will know. The certificate will include convictions and cautions held on the police national computer, plus any other information that is available to the police and which a chief police officer both reasonably believes to be relevant and considers ought to be disclosed. This may include the fact that a person was or is subject to a TPIM notice. In addition the legislation governing barring allows specific criteria to be prescribed that would require someone to be automatically barred. There would be scope to use the provision in relation to a TPIM if that were considered appropriate. This is something that we already cover in the TPIM legislation, in that the Act provides the ability to prevent TPIM subjects from taking part in a regulated activity relating to vulnerable adults and children under the association measure in schedule 1(8) or the work or studies measure in schedule 1(9).
The association measure in schedule 1 allows the Secretary of State to impose a requirement that a TPIM subject must not associate or communicate with specified persons, or specified descriptions of persons, without permission. In addition, the work or studies measure allows the Secretary of State to impose a restriction on a TPIM subject carrying out specified types of work, which includes unpaid work, or studies without the permission of the Secretary of State. We can and do use these measures to prevent TPIM subjects from associating with particular people or working or studying in areas that are assessed to be inappropriate. The measure proposed in this amendment duplicates that measure, which is why we judge that it is neither appropriate nor needed.
Diana Johnson
Just to be clear: if somebody is subject to a TPIM order, work that is voluntary and is not in a regulated activity could, under the current legislation, be something that the person is not allowed to take part in by decision of the Home Secretary.
James Brokenshire
That is the very point; we have that ability from the work and studies measure to be able to control that, and the Secretary of State effectively has to give permission for work to be conducted. There is an additional measure, plus the information that will be provided. The police update the police national computer when a TPIM subject has a notice imposed to ensure that this information can be taken into account in relation to any decision and checks on the subject, so it is flagged in that way. I hope that that gives the hon. Lady assurance on that specific point.
As I said, amendment 7 would amend the appointments measure in clause 15, which allows the Secretary of State to require an individual to attend meetings as specified by the Secretary of State. The appointments measure is already a broad power that allows the Secretary of State to require a TPIM subject to meet relevant organisations or people who can contribute to their ongoing management. The measure already includes the ability to require TPIM subjects to attend a deradicalisation programme, with persons involved in delivering programmes established under part 5, chapter 2 of the Bill. In our judgment, it is therefore unnecessary explicitly to specify this as part of the appointments measure. In essence, the existing language is broad enough and sufficient to allow us to require the link with deradicalisation programmes.
The hon. Lady flagged up some other issues relating to offensive weapons and explosives. On that, we are seeking to put the issues beyond doubt. There is, of course, existing legislation that governs some of these issues, and it is our judgment that it ensures that these items are properly and firmly addressed. As I have indicated, the link to the police national computer is already there. This further underlines and underpins each of the specific issues already on the statute book.
On the boundary that could be imposed, there is further specific provision on the requirement for the Secretary of State to provide certain guidance and indications on the factors that will be used in the assessment. These can include the original location of the TPIM subject; access to services; ability to prevent or restrict involvement in terrorism-related activity; proximity to airports or ports; and proximity to other TPIM subjects or prohibited associates. Those are the sort of factors that can be taken into account.
The definition of terrorism-related activity, to which the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North referred, was followed through in David Anderson’s recommendations. His concern about the existing definition was that it has people almost three steps removed from the activity. We have consulted the police and security services in respect of this amendment, and they have been reflecting on David Anderson’s consideration. We continue to judge that the measures remain appropriate.
I will gladly answer any of the hon. Lady’s questions if I have omitted to do so, but I think what I have said covers the bulk of what she asked.
Diana Johnson
I do not recall the Minister responding to my point about families and whether a relocation of an individual could also include young children and a partner. It would be helpful to understand that situation.
James Brokenshire
Yes, families could live in the accommodation to which the TPIM subject has been relocated. In that relocation situation, it would be for the Home Office to provide the accommodation, as has happened under previous arrangements. We would seek to adhere to the same circumstances.
With those assurances, I hope that the hon. Lady will be minded to withdraw the amendment.
Diana Johnson
I am grateful to the Minister for responding to the many lengthy questions I put to him. We have had a useful opportunity to understand the thinking behind clauses 12 to 16. As I indicated at the outset, the amendments I tabled were probing ones, intended to allow us to have this debate and to understand more fully the thinking behind the Government’s approach.
It is clear, however, that no one absconded under a control order with a relocation power, and it is worth reiterating that, but on the basis of what the Minister has said, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 12 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 13 to 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 17
Retention of relevant data
John McDonnell
That is a valid point. I tabled the amendments to say that there is a sense of urgency. Something needs to be done now; some steps need to be taken immediately—before the Anderson review, to be frank.
I have raised this matter previously and engaged in dialogue with the Minister. I have a clutch of papers here, because I wanted to be sure of the accuracy of my remarks. I raised it way back on 22 July, in the debate on regulations made under DRIPA. The Minister responded in a letter received on 28 July:
“The Government…intend to bring forward amendments to the Acquisition and Disclosure Code of Practice to make this clear”.
What he was making clear was, I think, the importance of some form of understanding of the role of journalists and their sources, and therefore sensitivity in the approach taken. That becomes even more important now that in this legislation we are extending the range of the data to be collected. I take the point that this does not identify individuals, but on the information provided by Big Brother Watch and contained in the House of Commons research paper, the definitions have been narrowed. Big Brother Watch is concerned about
“the possibility of more personal information being accessed than first implied. … This means that the identity of an individual has the potential to be fully revealed by these powers.”
There is thus some uncertainty about how the powers could be used to drill down into the information to identify an individual and therefore a source and put everyone at risk.
I do not believe that the code has yet been published. I will give way to the Minister if he wishes to tell me.
James Brokenshire
I intend to address that point specifically when I respond to the debate, which I hope will be helpful to the hon. Gentleman.
John McDonnell
I am never sure what it means when a Minister says that he is about to be helpful. He was helpful when I led a delegation from the NUJ with its lawyer to meet the civil servants who were drafting the new code of practice. We put some suggestions to them. I note—I am sorry to scramble around with these bits of paper—that the new code of practice on covert surveillance comes into effect on 10 December, and it covers legally privileged and confidential information. It demonstrates that particular care should be taken in cases in which the subject of the investigation or operation might reasonably expect a high degree of privacy or where confidential information is involved. Confidential information consists of communications subject to legal privilege, communications between a Member of Parliament and another person—the point that my right hon. Friend the Member for Knowsley raised—on constituency matters, confidential personal information or confidential journalistic material, so there is an element of reference to privilege and the role of journalists in other codes coming into force this week.
At this stage, it is critical that the code is published and implemented as quickly as possible, as a stepping stone to what might then come out of the wider review. I tabled an amendment to ensure that the legislation should not be implemented until the review is concluded, and I can argue that case. Hon. Members can see where I am coming from. I want a sense of urgency to give at least some protection to journalists in the interim before the review is published, which I believe it will be in a period of time that has been designated. I hope that the review will contain a recommendation that there should be some process in which the courts are involved. I do not believe that there will be sufficient protection against in-house decisions by any authority, be it the police, the intelligence services or, as we have seen with RIPA, local authorities and other agencies, which have used RIPA to investigate their staff, journalists and others on some of the most trivial grounds. In one instance, it was for the protection of the council’s reputation. I do not believe that in-house procedures would satisfy the general public or Members of this House. That is why I hope that some process will come out of the review which will involve the courts. My view is that there should be not just a review of the process but in some instances a review of the merits of the case itself.
I note that not just this review but a range of reviews are taking place. I also note that some momentum is building for involving the courts. The Deputy Prime Minister and—well, blow me—the Mayor of London have called for the law to be changed to require a judge to sign off applications involving the data of journalists. The Government would be wise, once the review is finished, to come forward with proposals that involve some form of judicial oversight of the process. That would build the confidence of professionals.
My hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North raised the issue of other professions. I understand her particular example involving the medical profession, but that would be determined by a court. The merits of the case plus the process would be argued in such a case.
John McDonnell
Let me give one example of where RIPA was used. The case of Kirsty Green was in the evidence presented to the Home Affairs Committee by Michelle Stanistreet, the general secretary of the NUJ. Kirsty was a former regional newspaper journalist. Derby council spied on her meeting with local authority staff in 2009. Two Derby city council employees watched her when, as Derby Telegraph’s local government correspondent, she met four current and former council employees in a Starbucks coffee shop. The local authority said that RIPA was used to get surveillance authority for officials because they were protecting the council’s interests. The consequences for those individuals was a risk to their job in the local authority.
It is important that communication is protected, but names and sources also have to be protected, especially for whistleblowers, as we have seen when social workers have come forward in child abuse cases. The right hon. Gentleman makes the point well, but to me it emphasises even further the need for some judicial process in the oversight of access to the data and the way in which the legislation has been proposed.
James Brokenshire
We have had an interesting and informative debate focusing on the broader aspects of the ability of the law enforcement and intelligence agencies to do their job in a fast-moving environment where technology continues to change, and their ability to continue to protect us in those circumstances. I will argue that we have an eroding capability and although the measure will deal with one element, there is still more that we need to do. That is a point on which my hon. Friend the Member for Skipton and Ripon (Julian Smith) has intervened on other speakers in the debate and he is right to make the point. I will come on to the possible next steps in the context of the various reviews that are taking place.
The gap was highlighted by the right hon. Member for Knowsley (Mr Howarth). I know that his Committee is looking carefully at the issue of privacy versus security. The need to strike a balance between them and some of the issues arising from that have rightly been played out in the context of interception, data retention and communications data. I look forward to the publication of the Committee’s report, which I expect to be extremely informative in this regard.
Mark Field
Without giving a preview of anything in the Committee report, I think it is important, for the benefit of the House and those Members who take the matter very seriously, that we should remember that privacy and security are not a zero sum game. Although my hon. Friend uses the word “balance”, as many of us do from time to time, there is also a sense that these are important safeguards individually and in their own right. One of the broader recommendations that we make from the evidence we took from a wide range of people is that the notion that there is a balance and a zero sum game should be dispelled.
James Brokenshire
I appreciate the comments of my hon. Friend. As a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee, he will recognise the challenges. He is right to underline the significance and to reiterate what I said on Second Reading—that security and liberty should be mutually reinforcing. His point about it not being a zero sum game is well made.
The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson), who speaks for the Opposition, identified a list of 10 points, and I will do my best to respond to some of them. The hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) underlined the role of sensitive categories of person and additional safeguards that may be provided in respect of them when we consider communications data and the ability of the police to request such data. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith) pointed out, we are looking at metadata—who said what to whom, when and where—rather than the content.
It is clear from the contributions that we have heard that gaps in communications data capability have a serious impact on the ability of law enforcement and intelligence agencies to carry out their functions—the point that was made clearly by the right hon. Member for Knowsley (Mr Howarth) and the shadow Minister. One such gap is internet protocol address resolution. The Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 maintained our lawful data retention regime. It did not create any additional powers, nor did it address any of the gaps in capability. To respond to the point made by the hon. Lady, we remain confident about the manner in which it did that in seeking to address the points raised by the European Court of Justice.
Clause 17 amends that Act—DRIPA—to ensure that communications service providers can be required to retain the data necessary to link the unique attributes of an internet connection to the person or device using it at any given time. Every internet user is assigned an IP address to ensure that communications service providers know which data should go to which customer and route it accordingly. Addresses are sometimes assigned to a specific device, such as a broadband router located in a home or within the work environment, but they are usually shared between multiple users—hundreds or even thousands—and allocated automatically by the provider’s systems. Many providers currently have no business reason for keeping a log of who has used each address. It is therefore not always possible for law enforcement agencies accessing the data to identify who was using an IP address at any specific point in time.
The provision would ensure that these data are available to law enforcement. It would improve the ability of the police and other agencies to identify terror suspects who may be communicating with each other via the internet and plotting attacks. It would also help to identify and prosecute paedophiles, organised criminals, cyber-bullies and computer hackers, and to protect vulnerable people. For example, it could be used to identify a child who has threatened over social media to commit suicide. The IP address has direct relevance to all these issues and it is evidence that can be brought before the court. In the context of the previous debate, it is often instrumental in bringing prosecutions. Communications data are used in about 95% of all serious crime prosecutions, so they have a direct utility.
Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)
Just a question to the Minister—does this also apply to medical in confidence communication between, say, a doctor and a patient, and documents being intercepted, or am I totally out to lunch, as it were?
James Brokenshire
I am not sure that my hon. Friend would ever be out to lunch, particularly at 3.26 in the afternoon. I think he is talking about interception. The clause is about the connection, the metadata—about who communicated with whom—rather than the content of the communication. The hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington spoke specifically about interception and the way in which certain protected categories of individual may be affected. My hon. Friend highlights a specific point, but I will come on to communications data, DRIPA and the codes of practice, and the status of certain individuals in respect of requests that may be made for that information.
Amendment 5, as the hon. Lady explained when she moved it, seeks to limit the scope of the provision to the retention of data that is necessary to allow the identification of a user from a public internet protocol address. I am pleased to say that there is no difference of principle between us on this issue. It is important that this provision goes no further than necessary to ensure that communications service providers can be required to retain the data necessary to link the unique attributes of an internet connection to the person or device using it at any given time.
I can confirm that the provision is already limited in the way the Opposition propose. Subsection (3) defines the data to be retained as data that
“may be used to identify, or assist in indentifying, which internet protocol address, or other identifier, belongs to the sender or recipient of a communication”.
As such, any data that cannot be used to identify, or assist in identifying, the user of an IP address are already outside the scope of the provision. A requirement to retain the data may be imposed only where it is necessary and proportionate to do so.
On the hon. Lady’s specific point about web logs, I can assure the Committee that the Bill is already tightly drafted. In particular, clause 17(3)(c) excludes so-called web logs. It provides for the retention of data relating to IP resolution, and only such data. Anything else is already beyond the scope of what the clause permits. Accordingly, although I entirely agree with the sentiment behind the amendment, I do not believe that it is necessary.
Mr George Howarth
I have a suggestion. Where a situation is changing rapidly, such issues are sometimes dealt with in legislation by adding a schedule that can then be updated by order. It is not necessarily the best way, but it is one way of dealing with that type of situation.
James Brokenshire
I recognise that in certain circumstances that might be appropriate, but the challenge in this case is the fast-paced nature of technology, which means we would always be playing catch-up. The original RIPA legislation was therefore intended to be technology-neutral so that, if the technology moved on, it was still able to capture that, just as our criminal law is intended to cover all forms of communications. I think that might be a better way of seeking to achieve that. However, that is part and parcel of David Anderson’s review of RIPA, and therefore the existing legislation and a number of the themes that have been touched on by right hon. and hon. Members in this debate, and also the continuing utility of these provisions.
Julian Smith
It will be almost two years since the Liberal Democrats and one or two other Members scuppered the Communications Data Bill. What is the Minister’s assessment of the risk of waiting until next year, because my concern is that the enemy is not going away?
James Brokenshire
This issue is not going away, and we need to make further changes. I can see the eroding capability of our law enforcement and security agencies. While this plugs an element, there is still more to be done to ensure that our police and security services are able to protect us, and that there is evidence that can be presented in court. On these issues relating to communications data, we are talking about evidence, not merely intelligence. These are hard pieces of information that can be presented in court to secure prosecutions. This is really essential because of the underpinning that it provides to our prosecutorial system.
The Bill does not incorporate provisions on weblogs, but apps and weblogs can be directly instructive in this respect, and the House will need to confront that in, I hope, an informed way. The reviews that the Intelligence and Security Committee and David Anderson are undertaking will inform that debate rather than its being completely informed by belief or emotion, important as those elements are to ensure that it is properly reflective of the view of our communities and the public. We must ensure that the facts are there as we examine the picture, in order to provide the basis for a rational debate when the House considers the legislation it will need to pass before December 2016.
Mark Field
Does my hon. Friend accept that another issue, which was skilfully outlined by the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell), is arbitrage, in the sense of authorities being able to choose one piece of legislation rather than another—for example, as he said, RIPA rather than PACE? Given the complications arising from there being more and more legislation in this area, is it not almost essential to move towards a consolidation to ensure that we entirely understand our rights and responsibilities?
James Brokenshire
I am sure that that issue will be presented in representations made to David Anderson as part of his examination. Clearly, none of us will wish in any way to prejudge the way in which that evidence is presented. He intends to report back by May. That is the right timing to ensure that the new Parliament after the next general election has the benefit of seeing his report, which will have examined these issues in close and careful detail.
The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North asked about the role of the interception of communications commissioner. He will oversee the acquisition of data retained under clause 17, just as he oversees the acquisition of all communications data retained under DRIPA. The Home Office will ensure that he has the necessary resources to discharge his function.
The hon. Lady referred to multiple requests for traffic and subscriber data. Public authorities can request communications data only when it is considered necessary and proportionate for one of the purposes set out in DRIPA. A communications service provider could disclose only data that have been requested. It is an operational matter for the public authority as to how it makes such requests for data. Where it holds limited information at the outset of the investigation, it is likely that it will need to make more than one request, which means there may be multiple requests relating to a particular criminal inquiry.
The hon. Lady highlighted the issue of costs. The totals that were put into the impact assessment published alongside the Bill were based on studies of IP resolution conducted by the industry and prior work with service providers and the industry on similar projects. This has been an informed process in which there has been consultation with individual service providers likely to be most affected by the provisions of the Bill.
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for tabling new clause 2 to highlight the oversight of the acquisition of communications data retained under these provisions. The data retention regulations passed earlier this year specifically require communications service providers, subject to a data retention notice, to retain data in such a way as to ensure that they are available without undue delay in response to requests. I assure the Committee that in the vast majority of cases, data retained under this obligation are disclosed in a timely fashion. Of course, things may not always work perfectly, but there are systems in place that seek to resolve such issues should they arise. Indeed, there are industry groups that work on precisely that. The law enforcement community works closely with the communications service providers, and the Home Office seeks to establish the best technical solutions to support that.
The issue that we hear about more often than that highlighted by the hon. Lady is the broader one of key categories of communications data which communication service providers do not currently retain and which are therefore unavailable to the law enforcement and security agencies that require them. The hon. Lady raised the issue of additional regulations. The provision amends the definition of “relevant communications data”. The regulations use that definition, so there is no need to amend further or to put it in other regulations, because the intention is that they will follow the change being made to this Bill.
On deep packet inspection, no solution will provide for the retention of or access to the content of a communication. Obviously, it is for the companies themselves to decide how best to implement the legal requirements that would be put upon them, but I wanted to make that point clear.
On compatibility with the European Court judgment, we are confident that the legislation passed by Parliament this summer, and this Bill, are fully compliant with all relevant legal provisions.
Although I share the Opposition’s wish to see the most efficient and timely provision of data, I do not believe that the special review proposed by new clause 2 is required. Indeed, if there are concerns they can be referred to David Anderson as part of his review. With that assurance, I hope the hon. Lady will be minded to withdraw her amendment.
In new clause 1, the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington raises the specific and important issue of the position of journalists and others in relation to sensitive provision. He and I debated the issue when the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 made its way through Parliament this summer. Let me be clear that a free press is fundamental to a free society, and the Government are determined that nothing be done to put that at risk. Although most of the focus in the debate has been on journalists, the same issues arise equally in respect of other sensitive occupations, as Members have highlighted. Individuals should be able to speak freely and frankly to their lawyers if we are to have justice in this country. Similarly, patients must be able to speak freely to doctors, and constituents to their Members of Parliament.
I do not believe that anyone would question that those are important principles, but equally I hope that no one would take issue with the proposition that our law enforcement and intelligence agencies need the tools to carry out their vital roles. They carry out a difficult job day in, day out, protecting the public from crime and from terrorism. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 provides a clear legal basis for many of their critical investigative powers, including the acquisition and disclosure of communications data. The current process is clear and accountable and includes a strong and rigorous system of oversight. I have already explained what communications data are, but they do not contain the content of the communication.
I should like to point out that the interception of communications commissioner has said that communications data
“do not contain any details of what was said or written by the sender or the recipient of the communication. As such, the communications data retained by CSPs do not contain any material that may be said to be of professional or legal privilege—the fact that a communication took place does not provide what was discussed or considered or advised.”
The point that the data do not attract any form of legal or professional privilege is important. Nevertheless, the Government recognise that they are sensitive data that need to be protected accordingly.
The process of acquiring communications data requires a designated person—a senior officer of a rank stipulated by Parliament—to examine applications for such data, which can be authorised only when the officer is fully satisfied that it is both necessary and proportionate to acquire those data. The applications are facilitated by individuals known as single points of contact, who are trained in this area and can provide expert advice and support to the designated person.
John McDonnell
I am grateful to the Minister for launching the consultation on the code of practice. It is important to have a balanced view of the Home Affairs Committee report, which concluded that
“RIPA is not fit for purpose”.
Although it did go so far as to make a specific recommendation on the involvement of the courts, the Committee suggested that
“the Home Office use the current review of the RIPA Code to ensure that law enforcement agencies use their RIPA powers properly.”
What action has the Minister taken on that point, bearing in mind that a legal action is also taking place at the moment?
James Brokenshire
I am constrained in what I can say because of the legal action that the hon. Gentleman highlights, but I hope he will see that the code of practice and the consultation address a number of the key recommendations of the Home Affairs Committee report that was published on Saturday, such as those on the manner in which the existing legislation is operated in practice.
The hon. Gentleman will know that David Anderson is conducting a broader examination of the legislation, including the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, and will report in May. That will inform consideration in the next Parliament of the provisions that are on the statute book. I assure him that it will address the issue of separation and the need for additional consideration to be given to requests that touch on protected professions.
However, I would not want an amendment that was passed today to pre-empt the interception of communications commissioner’s inquiry. We do not know what he will conclude. It is right that we should wait for him to report and then consider his recommendations, rather than make a major change now, when questions have been raised about the benefits and utility of such an approach.
Finally, I hope to deal swiftly with amendment 11, which would prevent the provisions relating to IP resolution from being brought into force until the interception of communications commissioner had completed his review of the accessing of journalists’ communications data, to which I just referred. I think I can reassure hon. Members on that point. As I have said, the commissioner intends to report by the end of January. The Bill will not complete its passage through this House until after the Christmas recess. After that, it needs to go through the House of Lords and there might have to be consideration of Lords amendments in this House. Even without that, there seems to be no way the Bill could achieve Royal Assent before the commissioner reports at the end of January. We therefore do not believe that amendment 11 is required.
In the light of what I have said, I hope that hon. Members will not press their amendments.
Diana Johnson
I thank the Minister for going through all the questions that I posed. On the basis of what he has said, I happily beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 17 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 18
Authority-to-carry schemes
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
The Temporary Chair (Mr David Amess)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Clauses 19 and 20 stand part.
That schedule 2 be the Second schedule to the Bill.
James Brokenshire
Part 4 and schedule 2 deal with aviation, maritime and rail security. For the benefit of the Committee, I will go through each of the provisions, listen to right hon. and hon. Members’ contributions and then respond to their questions. I welcome the right hon. Member for Delyn (Mr Hanson) to the Opposition Front Bench. He has taken a close interest in these issues.
Clause 18 provides a new legal basis for the operation of authority-to-carry schemes, which are commonly known as no-fly schemes. We have a scheme in place that relates to passengers being carried to the UK. The clause makes provision for a broader scheme that relates to individuals who are arriving or are expected to arrive in the UK, and individuals who are leaving or are expected to leave the UK.
Authority to carry is necessary to prevent the entry or return to the UK of foreign nationals who pose a terrorism-related threat and to mitigate the threat of an attack, primarily on aircraft. It is also necessary to disrupt the return to the UK, and prevent the departure from the UK, of British nationals who are subject to legal restrictions on their travel. Under the clause, any scheme must set out the carriers to which it applies and the classes of individuals a carrier may be refused authority to carry to or from the UK. Classes of individuals may be specified in a scheme only if it is necessary in the public interest. When travelling to the UK, that could include persons who are excluded or have been deported from the UK, individuals whose presence in the UK would not be conducive to the public good, and those who would otherwise be inadmissible to the UK. It may also include individuals subject to a temporary exclusion order under clause 2.
When travelling from the UK, carriers might be directed not to carry individuals subject to a TPIM or a post-custodial licence preventing travel following a conviction for a terrorism-related offence. The scheme may also include individuals who have had their passport cancelled or not issued on public interest grounds, or seized under powers in schedule 1. Any scheme must set out the process for carriers to request authority to carry, and state how that authority is granted or refused. That may include requirements for carriers to provide passenger information by a certain time before departure, or for carriers to be able to receive information that grants or refuses authority to carry in a way compatible with the Government’s border system.
We will work with carriers to resolve any compliance issues, but if a carrier fails to comply, clause 19 provides regulations to impose a civil penalty on those who breach a scheme. The new regulations set out how a penalty will be calculated, imposed and enforced, and must provide a means for carriers to object to a proposed penalty. The regulations are subject to the affirmative procedure, and the authority-to-carry scheme to which the regulations refer must be laid in Parliament at the same time.
Clause 20 makes provision for schedule 2 to the Bill. Part 1 of schedule 2 amends passenger, crew and service information relating to aircraft and ships, and may be extended to international trains through secondary legislation. Paragraphs 1(2) and 1(3) mean that a carrier may be required to be able to receive communications about information that it has provided to the border authorities in a way compatible with the Government’s border system. That might be a simple receipt, or an alert about errors in the format of the information.
Paragraphs 1(4) and 1(7) of schedule 2 allow the regulations to introduce requirements for advance information about persons on flights or voyages to and from the UK that do not operate to a published schedule—collectively referred to as “general aviation” and “general maritime.” The regulations will set out the classes of ships or aircraft to which they apply, the information required, the time by which it must be supplied, and how it is to be supplied. That will allow a much clearer picture of incoming and outgoing traffic and the identification of aircraft and ships that require close attention from the border authorities. Those paragraphs also provide for regulations to impose a civil penalty for a failure to comply with new requirements to provide information. The regulations may set out how a penalty will be calculated, administered and enforced, and make provision for an appeal.
Bob Stewart
The Minister has not mentioned this so far, although I assume he will come to it, but is it correct to say that if a carrier brings someone to this country whom we do not want to come, not only will it receive a civil penalty, it has a responsibility to take that person back to whence they came immediately?
James Brokenshire
As my hon. Friend will realise, provisions in the Bill overlap with other issues and provisions. He will be aware of sanctions that are already available and establish penalties for those who have no lawful authority to be in the UK, and of the checks that are obliged on people to ensure that appropriate visa or other requirements are in place. These measures build on that and there are established processes for the return of individuals who should not be here.
The new transport security provisions in part 2 of schedule 2 build on existing powers and enhance our ability to respond effectively to transport-related terrorism threats. They amend transport security legislation to strengthen existing powers and require certain security measures to be implemented before an operator may operate into the UK or, in the case of ships, a UK port. The schedule makes similar provisions for services in the aviation, maritime and rail transport industries.
The schedule inserts provisions into the respective aviation, rail and maritime statutes enabling faster collection of security related information from operators. It provides enabling powers to make regulations, imposing a wider range of methods for electronic service of security directions or requests for information, to ensure that security directions become effective in the shortest possible time. In addition, it inserts a power into the Aviation Security Act 1982 for the Secretary of State to make regulations to introduce civil sanctions for non-compliance by the aviation industry, with information requests or security directions subject to the affirmative procedure.
Julian Smith
We are all aware that Eurotunnel is expanding its services, with more train services going to the continent. Will the Minister confirm that the provisions will apply to those services?
James Brokenshire
Under existing regulations and requirements, existing Eurostar and freight services through the channel tunnel are already obliged to meet security requirements on screening and other steps. The intent behind the provisions in the Bill is to look to a future where we have open access, and ensure we have the ability to impose similar controls, assurances and protections in relation to security. It is precisely for that future-proofing that we are introducing the provisions. I hope that explanation is helpful to the Committee.
Mr David Hanson (Delyn) (Lab)
There has been a change on the Opposition Front Bench, while the Minister has had to continue, but I assure him that he will have our support on this group.
There is a substantial and severe threat of terrorist attack in the United Kingdom and the Opposition support the broad thrust of these measures. The Minister did not explicitly say it, but the explanatory notes indicate that about 500 individuals have travelled to Syria and Iraq because of their wish to join terrorist organisations, in particular ISIL. The measures are designed to enhance legislation—section 124 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, put in place by the previous Labour Government, and the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (Authority to Carry) Regulations 2012—in response to the changed circumstances. We support the broad thrust of the measures.
I have a few questions for the Minister and I hope he will reflect on them. They relate mostly to consultation, cost and scope. The Minister said that clauses 18 and 19 form the main provisions for the changes to authority-to-carry schemes, and that clause 20 and schedule 2 amend the law on the provision of information from carriers to the Secretary of State. The explanatory notes state that the Minister has undertaken a consultation, but I think he will recognise that the consultation was swift, if I may say so, and relatively short. I would welcome information on who responded to the consultation and what the responses were. If he does not have that information today, perhaps he could write to me.
I raise those issues because the Government’s impact assessment makes it clear that the measures, although welcome, relate to border security and will cost UK-registered businesses about £2.1 million net cost a year, with start-up costs approaching £10 million, at £9.7 million. The Minister has information relating to 11 scheduled registered carriers, but he will know that 144 carriers were not included in the assessment. Many carriers do not currently have the systems, which are referred to in previous legislation, in place. Scheduled carriers may be required to install interactive systems that would mean no-fly alerts and passenger screening requirements provided directly into carriers’ systems. The impact assessment makes it clear that while there are 11 registered carriers, of which only one already uses the system the Government want, there are 144 carriers operating scheduled flights into and out of the UK that are not UK-registered, of which only 11 use the system the Government want to introduce. I would welcome some clarity from the Minister not just as to the discussions he has had with the registered carriers, but on what assessment he has made of the wider costs for those carriers that are not registered. For a non-interactive carrier, the estimated cost of implementing an interactive system is £975,000, with annual maintenance costs of £125,000. That means that there could be costs of around £139 million to non-UK carriers who do not have those systems in place.
The impact assessment says:
“The consultation to gather relevant data was brief. Whilst data was provided by a sample of UK carriers we cannot be sure they are fully representative. In addition different carriers may face different costs dependent on their size or their existing systems. In the absence of this data we assume that carriers are all affected in the same way.”
That is the Government’s own impact assessment and it is really important that, as part of our consideration this afternoon, we have some indication from the Minister of the consultation responses. He may well already have published these—sometimes things pass one by in opposition—and if so, I would be grateful if he could refer me to where they are. If not, I would be grateful if he published the responses to the consultation.
It is also important—the Minister has touched on this—that the clauses ultimately include rail, maritime and non-scheduled aviation traffic as part of the regime that he is seeking to introduce. But I believe—I would welcome his confirmation—that there has been limited, or dare I say nil, consultation with rail, maritime and other suppliers. The Minister has indicated that there will be affirmative resolutions on these matters, but I would welcome him confirming at what stage he intends to undertake further consultation on costs and implementation with rail and maritime providers.
I have had a helpful brief from the Immigration Law Practitioners Association, which has raised a number of issues, some of which the Minister will be able to answer. But it is important that we are clear that the Minister’s aspiration—one shared by the Labour party—to have exit and entry checks undertaken at the earliest opportunity is separate from the measures in the Bill, particularly given the difficulties we have had with the e-Borders programme recently, the cancellation of e-Borders and the progress that the Government seek on an entry and exit check by April 2015. Helpfully the Minister has today answered a parliamentary question to indicate that that is still the Government’s objective but I just wanted to examine the relationship between the proposals in the clause, which may not be in law until February or March next year, and the wider exit and entry checks the Government are seeking to introduce.
I would particularly welcome the Minister’s confirmation that the measures in the Bill are fully compatible with EU law and with the laws of other states that passengers will travel to and from and with whose laws carriers must comply. It is important that we put in place measures in our own legislation, but I would welcome the Minister’s consideration of the compatibility between them and our obligations to our European colleagues and elsewhere.
The Labour party supports the measures because of the threat and the need to monitor and to take effective action against not just those coming to the UK, but those leaving the UK. The need to ensure that we prevent individuals leaving these shores from undertaking terrorist acts is paramount. The Minister will not find a cigarette paper between us on dealing with that issue, but I hope that he is able to reflect on the points I have made today on three issues: cost, compatibility with other legislation in Europe and beyond, and the key question of implementation, not just in terms of current carriers but in terms of the carriers who are not registered but who do currently travel both to and from the UK.
James Brokenshire
I am grateful for the warm welcome given to these provisions from all parts of the House this afternoon. That is because there is a recognition of the nature of the threat we now face, and of the fact that we face an enduring threat from terrorism. There are particular terrorist groups that will seek to attack aircraft and other forms of transport, which is why we must remain vigilant and continue to challenge ourselves on what further improvements can be made to legislation and the schemes that are in place to ensure we have the right information to prevent those intent on conducting such acts from boarding aircraft, trains or other forms of transport—and, indeed, ensure that our various forms of transport conduct appropriate searches and checks to make sure that appropriate standards are met and adhered to. We seek to respond through that approach and the pragmatic, practical measures set out in the Bill.
As the right hon. Member for Delyn (Mr Hanson) highlighted, there is the further requirement for additional regulations and details of specific schemes to be brought before this House. As that detail is then added to, it is appropriate that ongoing consultation take place with the relevant industry sectors. I shall say a little more about that in response to the various points the right hon. Gentleman raised.
I am also grateful to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Perry Barr (Mr Mahmood) for bringing to my attention the work of DS Mike Redmond and the Sussex police based at Gatwick airport, and how bringing forward proposals is obviously about their practical implementation. Where there is good practice, there should be networks through which it can be shared, leading to greater consistency of approach. I know the police take that seriously, with the relevant structures they have enabling them to look at practice and share knowledge and learning. The work mentioned by the hon. Gentleman sounded very interesting, and I look forward to seeing further details of the BIG MAC that he will no doubt be sending through to me.
In terms of the utilisation of the powers, if it is necessary and proportionate we will use powers as a means of putting special additional measures in place to combat current threats. The right hon. Gentleman will know from his previous experience how we look at the threat assessments that are maintained by the joint terrorism analysis centre, and how that may mean that additional security enhancements need to be put in place in respect of particular routes or modes of transport. That will inform some of the additional protective security-type powers that could be drawn on in respect of these provisions, and therefore, those specific provisions would be used where justified by the prevailing terrorist threat and the assessed risk.
The right hon. Gentleman highlighted the issue of costs, and rightly referred to the regulatory impact assessment that was published alongside the Bill. On the number of airlines that were engaged—I will come on to talk about who was consulted—many airlines within the big global groups of airlines will share common booking systems. Therefore, whether they are part of one alliance or another, that will determine a number of the elements of the systems that may be in place, and smaller airlines may piggyback on some of the bigger airlines’ systems. All airlines are not necessarily operating specific individual systems; they may be utilising some of the bigger carriers’ systems as part of their global booking systems, because of the alliances and groups that they are part of.
The cost to the Government of an interactive advance passenger information system is currently £1.2 million per year, and the staffing costs of maintaining a help desk to assist with interactive API is around £302,000 annually. Border Force estimates that an additional £82,000 will be required for additional staff to bolster the help desk as a result of the legislation. Consultation with airlines has shown that they recognise the significant security and financial benefits that flow from interactive API systems.
Various Governments are increasingly requiring that their own carriers implement these types of systems and solutions, and carriers are likely to incur set-up costs, whether required to do so by the UK Government or not. The right hon. Gentleman highlighted the reference in the explanatory notes to 500 subjects of interest having travelled to Syria and Iraq from this country. It is important to understand, given the nature of the travelling threat, that individuals have travelled to that area from many other countries across Europe and across the globe, and there is a growing recognition of the utility and importance of being able to use advance passenger information. A number of countries globally are seeking to align that approach in this area.
On the proportion of advance passenger information that we hold, as the right hon. Gentleman will know from his parliamentary questions to me, we receive advance passenger information for just over 80% of all passengers travelling to and from the UK, which is up considerably from just over 60% at the end of 2009. That includes 96% of all air passengers. According to the European Commission, that is the highest for any European country and is among the best in the world.
As the impact assessment indicated, we consulted all UK-registered airlines, and their comments are reflected in the impact assessment, which the right hon. Gentleman has obviously seen. I will reflect after this debate on what further details it may be possible to provide, and if I may, I will write to him on any further information or background that can be shared.
On briefing others, we have briefed maritime carriers and Eurotunnel, but we will be consulting further on the detail of the regulations to be put before Parliament. With regard to rail, as I indicated in a previous intervention, the existing operators are already covered by a great deal of the existing legislative framework, but we will seek to continue to consult those that may be affected by any further changes introduced under authority-to-carry schemes, and it is absolutely appropriate that we do so, as the right hon. Gentleman has highlighted. On the broader legal issues he proffered, it is not for me to give legal advice on the Floor of the House, but I can say to him genuinely and directly that we have undertaken a full assessment of the legal implications of these proposals and consider them to be compatible.
On the work the Government are doing to introduce exit checks by spring next year, the provisions before this House are connected but separate, if I may put it in those terms. Information about passengers departing from the UK will inform the operation of outbound authority-to-carry arrangements, which the Bill will put on a statutory basis. Obviously, that is a significant difference between what is in this Bill and the existing authority-to-carry scheme introduced just before the Olympic games, which is focused purely on the inbound. The intent is to have statutory underpinning and a statutory framework in respect of the outbound, too.
I say to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Perry Barr that legislation is in place to direct carriers on the form in which they must provide passenger information to the Government’s border system. That includes the timeliness with which data are provided relative to when the passenger departs to or from the UK. Obviously, the Bill’s provisions will also give specific statutory underpinning to that, to ensure that information is provided in a timely fashion.
I noted what the right hon. Member for Delyn said about e-Borders. The tone of this afternoon’s debate has broadly been one where everyone has shared the same approach, but I say to him that this Government have had to deal with some significant problems with a number of the previous Government’s systems, e-Borders being one of them. We have therefore made the necessary changes and checks to ensure that we have a system that delivers what it needs to deliver.
I am grateful for the support that has been provided from all parts of the House for these provisions, and I ask that the clause stand part of the Bill.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 18 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clauses 19 and 20 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 2 agreed to.
To report progress and ask leave to sit again.—(Harriett Baldwin.)
The Deputy Speaker resumed the Chair.
Progress reported; Committee to sit again tomorrow.