Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Caroline Lucas Excerpts

Tuesday 9th December 2014 Commons Chamber

[Diana Johnson]

Part 2 of the Bill relates to terrorism prevention and investigation measures. This grouping includes clauses 12 to 16 as well as Labour’s amendments, so I intend to use my contribution to address all the issues concerning TPIMs in part 2. The amendments are all probing, as we are broadly supportive of the changes the clauses introduce, especially the U-turn on relocation powers, which clause 12 reintroduces.

The Home Secretary introduced TPIMs in the first Session of this Parliament to replace Labour’s control orders. She claimed at the time that that was a fundamental rebalancing of security and liberty. In fact, there were only two major differences between control orders and TPIMs, or control orders-lite, as they have been called: the relocation power and the two-year limit. She also said that she had been forced to introduce TPIMs because too many control orders were being challenged in the courts. Although judicial oversight was of course a key element of the control orders regime, the courts had continued to find that control orders, including the power to relocate, were both necessary and proportionate in a number of cases, including all those that were later transferred to TPIMs.

I think that every Member of this House would agree that it is always better to prosecute individuals, wherever possible, for terrorist offences. No one wants TPIMs or control orders; we would all much rather see prosecutions for those involved in terrorism activity. However, in a very small number of cases evidence is inadmissible, for example because it would compromise security, and therefore prosecutions cannot be brought. That means we need an alternative measure to deal with the threat those individuals pose.

[Caroline Lucas (Brighton, Pavilion) (Green)]

Does the hon. Lady recognise that TPIMs have never led to a terrorism-related prosecution and that they are therefore not only against human rights, but counter-productive and ineffective?

[Diana Johnson]

If the hon. Lady will bear with me, I will move on to that point shortly, because one of the claims that the Government made was that the new regime would lead to more prosecutions.

It is worth remembering that we are talking about a very small number of individuals, but they pose a serious danger to the public and we need some powers to manage that risk. David Anderson QC, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, has made it clear that those who are subject to TPIM notices are accused of terrorist activities

“at the highest end of seriousness, even by the standards of international terrorism.”

TPIMs are a set of restrictions imposed on an individual who is suspected of, but has not been convicted for, involvement in terrorism. A TPIM order, like a control order, is imposed at the behest of the Home Secretary, with judicial oversight, but can be appealed to the High Court, which must find that the TPIM and all the measures it includes are both necessary and proportionate.

When the Government scrapped the control order regime, they argued that their new regime would allow more suspects to be prosecuted—this relates to the point just made by the hon. Lady. The Security Minister has repeatedly said that the aim of the regime was to secure more prosecutions and that extra resources were being provided to achieve that. I wonder whether he could confirm today exactly how many successful prosecutions for terrorist-related activity there have been for individuals on TPIMs. Like the hon. Lady, I understand that there has not been one successful such prosecution. David Anderson has commented that the TPIMs regime has not aided the prosecution of individuals, and the Joint Committee on Human Rights has stated that it

“failed to find any evidence that TPIMs have led in practice to any more criminal prosecutions of terrorism suspects.”

All three of the prosecutions attempted in 2012 for breaching the conditions of TPIM orders collapsed. When Mohammed Ahmed Mohamed absconded, he had just answered bail on 20 charges relating to breaches of his TPIM. Some of those breaches lay on the file for 18 months. Given that prosecutions were meant to be a priority, as the Government had said on numerous occasions, perhaps the Minister can explain why he thinks there was such a delay in taking that case to court and whether the Government actually opposed Mohammed Ahmed Mohamed being granted bail. Will he also confirm how he believes the changes proposed in part 2 will deliver what he had attempted to do when the TPIMs regime first came in—secure more prosecutions?

The number of people on TPIMs, as with control orders, has remained very small, but they are believed to pose a serious threat. There were nine people on the control orders regime when it ended in January 2012, all of whom were British citizens, and the Crown Prosecution Service has consistently said that none of them could be prosecuted. All those individuals were transferred to TPIM orders, and another individual was subsequently put on a TPIM order. We believe that there is currently just one person on a TPIM order. It would be helpful if the Minister could confirm that when he speaks.

There are other concerns about the TPIMs regime. In January 2014, the Joint Committee on Human Rights stated:

“We are left with the impression that in practice TPIMs may be withering on the vine as a counter-terrorism tool of practical utility”.

I will be interested to hear the Minister’s response to those comments and how he feels that part 2 will deal with some of the criticisms raised.

I now turn to clause 12 and the issue of relocation, and amendment 4. As I said, the key difference between control orders and the TPIMs regime was the power of relocation, which was removed. It is helpful to give specific examples of how the relocation power was used under the control orders regime and the effects of the changes introduced by the coalition through the TPIMs legislation.

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Those are all my remarks on part 2 of the Bill.

[Caroline Lucas]

I will say only a few words, but I want to explain why I will not support amendment 4.

My opposition to TPIMs and their predecessors, control orders, is on the record. The latest proposals do nothing to address my long-held concerns. The measures before us will take us back in time to when the Secretary of State could require an individual to live in a residence and locality in the UK that he or she considered appropriate. That was a feature of the previous Administration that was abandoned by the current Home Secretary for good reasons. She has now taken a step backwards. Given that these measures will make it possible for individuals to be removed from their families and communities and placed, effectively, in isolation, I do not share the pleasure that is apparent on the Opposition Front Bench, nor the view of the Opposition that it is acceptable to allow people to be relocated without any limit on the distance.

The courts have ruled on a number of occasions that internal exile, in conjunction with the imposition of other restrictions, constitutes a violation of article 5 of the European convention on human rights. That stands whether someone is relocated 50 miles, 150 miles or 250 miles away from their home. In one case, Mr Justice Mitting ruled that, on the basis of evidence provided by the wife of the individual who was subject to a control order, the threat that the detainee posed would be reduced if he were able to remain with his family. That brings us to the crux of the matter. There is not a scrap of evidence that such a brutal and punitive regime plays a role in countering terrorism. In fact, it may well be counter-productive.

When a suspect is subjected to a TPIM, it tips them off, making it much more difficult to gather evidence of terrorism-related activity. TPIMs exacerbate the potential for increased alienation and radicalisation, because they can be made against those who pose no direct threat to the British public. Moreover, as Liberty and others have reported, and as the shadow Minister just said, TPIMs have never led to a terrorism-related prosecution. If the purpose of such proposals is to counter terrorism and make us more secure, TPIMs have little to recommend them and neither did control orders before them. I believe that we should move forward, rather than take a step backwards, as the amendment would have us do.

Clause 13 removes the defence of a reasonable excuse for those who breach a TPIM and leave the UK. The measures in the Bill undermine some of the basic tenets of our justice system. Clause 13 will allow for somebody to be imprisoned for up to 10 years for breaching a TPIM, even though a TPIM can be imposed without any need for them to be arrested, charged or convicted for a terrorism offence. In other words, it will allow somebody to be criminalised and locked up for 10 years for breaching a civil sanction. That move will turn our justice system on its head. It is at odds with everything we ought to hold dear. I hope that Members will not stand by and let such a draconian measure pass.

One former Law Lord, referring to the control order regime, said:

“They are, and always have been, a blot on our jurisprudence.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 3 March 2010; Vol. 717, c. 1528.]

That criticism stands, with or without the changes that have been outlined today. I am disappointed that the Home Secretary is advocating more of what Justice calls

“an ineffective and draconian diversion from prosecution of criminal behaviour.”

[Pete Wishart (Perth and North Perthshire) (SNP)]

These are terrible amendments. They are so sadly and typically new Labour. The control order regime was the centrepiece of what is commonly described as the new Labour anti-civil libertarian state. It had all the usual new Labour features: suspicion, restrictions without trial and sweeping powers for the Secretary of State to make up her mind about convictions. New Labour was always on the wrong side of the crucial balance between making our nation safe through security-related legislation and upholding civil liberties. The control order regime was part of the central agenda that new Labour constructed, which included the suggestion that suspects should be locked up for 90 days without trial, ID cards and national databases. Under new Labour, we became probably the most restrictive, anti-civil libertarian state anywhere in the European Union.

As Members have said, there have been no prosecutions of people on control orders or TPIMs. That suggests that they are either really good or really rubbish. I supported the Conservatives when they moved against control orders. They did the right thing in abolishing control orders. We did not like TPIMs because they had features that were sadly reminiscent of new Labour’s control order regime, but the Conservatives seemed to be rowing back from the anti-civil libertarian state that had been constructed by new Labour and we supported them on that basis.

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[Mr George Howarth (Knowsley) (Lab)]

I wish to take slight issue with the hon. Members for Perth and North Perthshire (Pete Wishart) and for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas). The hon. Gentleman’s speech seemed to play to a particular event that will take place over the next few months in Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom, and it was more about distancing the Scottish National party from the position taken by Labour. That is fair enough; he is entitled to do that but he seemed to be putting rather more heat than light into the debate. To be slightly more serious—as I am sure he intended to be—the problem with the approach taken by him and the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion is that they describe a black and white world where either we have the evidence, in which case we go through the court system, prosecute someone and if that is successful they receive an appropriate sentence, or else there is not enough evidence to bring forward a court case so someone is not controlled at all. The difficulty is that the world is not black and white in that way.

Suppose one of our intelligence agencies has information from a liaison partner—the United States, for example—about somebody’s connections, or plans that they may be involved in with a third party elsewhere in the world to commit an act of terrorism in this country. There is a problem with taking such a case through the courts because the information it is based on is governed by the control principle—namely that that information is the property of the other agency, which in this case is in the United States. To allow that information to appear in a court case as evidence would undermine the relationship between the UK and that liaison partner.

[Caroline Lucas]

rose—

[Mr Howarth]

There is an argument against that, which I suspect the hon. Lady is about to make, but an inescapable choice has to be made.

[Caroline Lucas]

No one is suggesting that the issue is black and white. There are shades of grey and balances of judgment, but the hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire (Pete Wishart) and I are saying that with TPIMs and control orders, that balance of judgment is wrong. If we look at things such as intercept evidence, we can see that there will be other ways of bringing evidence to bear to help us reach a solution, rather than the draconian and counterproductive measures suggested by those on both Front Benches.

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[James Brokenshire]

The contribution by the right hon. Member for Knowsley (Mr Howarth), a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee, encapsulates some of the challenges and difficulties surrounding the principles of this debate. It is notable that contributions over the past hour have been about some of the principal issues concerning the types of measures that should be available to deal with the threat of terrorism, as well as—obviously and rightly—more detailed examination of the Bill.

We have had this debate on previous occasions, and I respect the view of the hon. Members for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) and for Perth and North Perthshire (Pete Wishart), whose approach has been entirely consistent. In some cases, however, there will be an inability either to prosecute or deport an individual, yet a significant risk will be attached to them—the point made by the right hon. Member for Knowsley. The Government have a responsibility to deal with that risk.

My strong preference would be for prosecutions—absolutely, there are no two ways about it—but that is not always possible for a range of reasons. That is the challenge the Government face in terms of seeing the threat and the risk, and being able to assure national security, as the public and the House would expect. Therefore, reluctantly, a measure is required, and we judge that TPIMs are the appropriate way to meet that risk and challenge. I would prefer that that were not the case—in that I agree with the hon. Members for Brighton, Pavilion and for Perth and North Perthshire—but from the intelligence picture that I have seen and the advice I have been given, sadly and regrettably I believe that TPIMs are necessary to be able to guard national security in that way.

Since April 2010 more than 750 people have been arrested for terrorism-related offences. More than 210 have been charged and more than 140 successfully prosecuted. I say to the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson) that the introduction of TPIMs was part of a careful and considered counter-terrorism review. She will recall the debates. Consideration was not rushed, but made on the basis of careful analysis of all counter-terrorism legislation to examine the risk and the threat, and what was appropriate and proportionate. That led to a number of changes under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, the point that the hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire was underlining. An assessment was made of which powers were no longer necessary because they no longer added to the protection of the public. That is why we made a number of changes and I was proud to be the Minister leading that Bill through the House. It was part of the process of constantly evaluating and assessing the measures in place in order to consider what is proportionate, appropriate and necessary to guard our national security. In our judgment it is appropriate to make further changes, which is why we seek to bring these measures before the Committee today.

TPIMs have always been part of a package of legislative measures and investment provided to the police and security services to undertake further investigations. That investment will have led to other prosecutions. People who not have gone on to a TPIM have been brought before the courts as a consequence of that investment in capabilities. That is a positive result and something I think right hon. and hon. Members wish to see.

The Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 provides a powerful range of measures to manage the threat from terrorists who cannot be prosecuted or deported. TPIM notices are imposed only in cases that require stringent measures, but where they are used, they provide a valuable capability. The Government are committed to ensuring that the appropriate tools are available to our security services and the police for the protection of national security. That is why clause 12 introduces a new power for the Secretary of State to compel a TPIM subject to reside anywhere in the UK, subject to the restrictions we have talked about in the debate thus far. It is important to recognise the benefits that accrue and that there are safeguards in place. The Secretary of State has to make an assessment to determine whether a TPIM should be granted, why we judge it is human rights compliant and how that view has been upheld by the courts.

[Caroline Lucas]

Perhaps I am pre-empting the Minister, but I wanted to press him on clause 13. He talks about safeguards and so on, but how can he justify the fact that a 10-year prison sentence could be handed down to someone who may never have been arrested, let alone convicted, of a terrorism offence? That length of sentence is higher than that given for many violent offences that have been properly proved.

[James Brokenshire]

It is a question of the seriousness of the measures. We recognise, because of the changes we are making, that there should be a higher burden placed on the Secretary of State in determining whether one of these measures should be provided. That is why we have moved this up to the “balance of probabilities”. Let us not forget that under the previous control orders regime it was not at that level, but two notches down at “reasonable suspicion”. Under TPIMs, we brought it up to “reasonable belief” and, on the balance of the measures we now have, we judge that moving to the “balance of probabilities” is the right stance to take. I will come on to clause 13 later.

The changes are being introduced in the light of the changing threat picture: the ongoing conflict in Syria and Iraq; the fact that 500 subjects of interest have travelled to that region; the risk that they may pose on their return; and the risk of more people seeking to travel out. It is against that assessment that the threat level has been raised to severe, the second highest threat level, and that has had an impact on our assessment of the measures that need to be available to the police and the Security Service, and it is why we have brought forward the measures in this way.

The measures also follow the recommendations from David Anderson QC, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, in his most recent annual report on TPIMs. As he has said, however, there is no need to turn back the clock. Control orders were not working and were being struck down by the courts, whereas TPIMs have been consistently upheld and therefore provide a basis in law that is robust and has withstood the scrutiny of the courts. TPIMs have been endorsed by the courts, counter-terrorism reviewers, the police and the Security Service. This change enhances the powers available to manage TPIM subjects by moving them away from harmful associates and making it harder for them to engage in terrorism-related activity. That is why we judge, at this time against the threat picture we see, that it is appropriate to introduce these measures.

It is important, however, that appropriate limits are placed on the use of the powers, and the Bill seeks to do that. We are also acting on David Anderson’s other recommendation to increase the test for imposing a TPIM notice, so that the Secretary of State must be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that an individual is, or has been involved, in terrorism-related activity, as well as narrowing the definition of what that activity can entail.