Crime and Policing Bill

Diana Johnson Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 17th June 2025 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Mr Speaker]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government new clause 53—Arranging or facilitating begging for gain.

Government new clause 54—Proving an offence under section 38.

Government new clause 55—Special measures for witnesses.

Government new clause 56—Causing internal concealment of item for criminal purpose.

Government new clause 57—Secretary of State guidance.

Government new clause 58—Department of Justice guidance.

Government new clause 59—Removal of limitation period in child sexual abuse cases.

Government new clause 60—Threatening, abusive or insulting behaviour towards emergency workers.

Government new clause 61—Threatening or abusive behaviour likely to harass, alarm or distress emergency workers.

Government new clause 62—Interpretation of sections (Threatening, abusive or insulting behaviour towards emergency workers) and (Threatening or abusive behaviour likely to harass, alarm or distress emergency workers).

Government new clause 63—Extraction of online information following seizure of electronic devices.

Government new clause 64—Section (Extraction of online information following seizure of electronic devices): supplementary.

Government new clause 65—Section (Extraction of online information following seizure of electronic devices): interpretation.

Government new clause 66—Section (Extraction of online information following seizure of electronic devices): confidential information.

Government new clause 67—Section (Extraction of online information following seizure of electronic devices): code of practice.

Government new clause 68—Extraction of online information: ports and border security.

Government new clause 69—Extraction of online information following agreement etc.

Government new clause 70—Lawful interception of communications.

Government new clause 71—Law enforcement employers may not employ etc barred persons.

Government new clause 72—Meaning of “law enforcement employer”.

Government new clause 73—Application of section (Law enforcement employers may not employ etc barred person) to Secretary of State.

Government new clause 74—Application of section (Law enforcement employers may not employ etc barred person) to specified law enforcement employer.

Government new clause 75—Duty of law enforcement employers to check advisory lists.

Government new clause 76—Application of section (Duty of law enforcement employers to check advisory lists) to specified law enforcement employer.

Government new clause 77—Interpretation of sections (Law enforcement employers may not employ etc barred persons) to (Application of section (Duty of law enforcement employers to check advisory lists) to specified law enforcement employer).

Government new clause 78—Special police forces: barred persons lists and advisory lists.

Government new clause 79—Consequential amendments.

Government new clause 80—Power to give directions to critical police undertakings.

Government new clause 81—Ports and border security: retention and copying of articles.

Government new clause 82—Extradition: cases where a person has been convicted.

Government new schedule 1—Amendments to Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022.

Government new schedule 2—Confiscation orders: Scotland.

Government new schedule 3—Special police forces: barred persons lists and advisory lists.

Amendment 157, in clause 1, page 1, line 6, leave out “The Anti-social” and insert—

“Subject to a review of existing anti-social behaviour powers under the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2014 being conducted and completed by the Secretary of State within six months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, the Anti-social”.

Amendment 167, page 1, line 13, leave out “18” and insert “16”.

This amendment would lower the age to 16 at which a court can impose a respect order on a person to prevent them from engaging in anti-social behaviour.

Amendment 168, page 2, line 29, at end insert—

“(9A) If a court makes a respect order against a person (P) more than once, then P is liable to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale.”

This amendment means that if a person gets more than one Respect Order, they are liable for a fine.

Amendment 169, page 2, line 30, leave out from “behaviour” to end of line 31 and insert

“has the same meaning as under section 2 of this Act.”

This amendment would give “anti-social behaviour” in clause 1 the same definition as in section 2 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014.

Amendment 170, page 4, line 18, at end insert—

“D1 Power to move person down list for social housing

(1) A respect order may have the effect of moving any application the respondent may have for social housing to the end of the waiting list.”

This amendment would mean that a person who receives a respect order would move to the bottom of the waiting list for social housing, if applicable.

Amendment 171, page 8, line 2, at end insert—

“(4A) A person who commits further offences under this section is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates' court or a fine (or both);

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 5 years or a fine (or both).””

This amendment sets out the penalties for repeated breaches of a respect order with a prison sentence of up to 5 years.

Amendment 158, in clause 2, page 9, line 35, at end insert—

“(4) Prior to issuing any guidance under this section, the Secretary of State must conduct a full consultation exercise.”

Amendment 2, in clause 8, page 17, line 23, insert—

“(3) To facilitate the ability of the Police, under the provisions of section 59 of the Police Reform Act 2002, as amended by subsection (1), to seize e-scooters or e-bikes that have been used in a manner which has caused alarm, distress or annoyance, the Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, issue a consultation on a registration scheme for the sale of electric bikes and electric scooters.

(4) The consultation must consider the merits of—

(a) requiring sellers to record the details of buyers, and

(b) verifying that buyers have purchased insurance.”

Amendment 172, in clause 9, page 17, line 34, at end insert—

“(c) section 33B (Section 33 offences: clean-up costs).”

Amendment 173, page 17, line 34, at end insert—

“(1A) Guidance issued about the enforcement of section 33 offences must ensure that, where a person is convicted of a relevant offence, they are liable for the costs incurred through loss or damage resulting from the offence.”

This amendment would ensure the Secretary of State’s guidance on fly-tipping makes the person responsible for fly-tipping, rather than the landowner, liable for the costs of cleaning up.

Amendment 174, page 18, line 3, at end insert—

“(4A) The consultation undertaken by the Secretary of State must include an examination of establishing a penalty point fine to those found convicted of an offence under sections 33 or 87 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to consult on establishing a system for those who fly tip or leave litter to receive penalty points on their driving licence.

Amendment 175, in clause 25, page 30, line 24, leave out “4” and insert “14”.

This amendment would increase the maximum sentence for possession of a weapon with intent to commit unlawful violence from four to 14 years. The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation recommended an increase in his review following the Southport attack.

Government amendments 24 to 33.

Amendment 176, in clause 35, page 50, line 38, at end insert—

“(4) If the offender has previous convictions for an offence under section 14 of the Crime and Policing Act 2025 (assault of a retail worker) or for shoplifting under section 1 of the Theft Act 1968, the court must make a community order against the offender. The community order must include a tag, a ban, or a curfew.”

This amendment clause would require the courts to make a community order against repeat offenders of retail crime in order to restrict the offender’s liberty.

Government amendment 34.

Amendment 4, in clause 38, page 51, line 29, leave out “criminal conduct” and insert “conduct for criminal purposes”.

This amendment would expand the remit of the offence created under clause 38 to include exploiting a child into conduct for criminal purposes.

Amendment 7, page 51, line 31, leave out paragraph (b).

This amendment would remove the requirement that for an offence of child criminal exploitation to be committed, the perpetrator did not reasonably believe that the child was aged 18 or over.

Government amendment 35.

Amendment 5, in clause 38, page 51, line 37, leave out “criminal conduct” and insert “conduct for criminal purposes”.

This amendment would expand the remit of the offence created under clause 38 to include exploiting a child into conduct for criminal purposes. It is consequential on Amendment 4.

Amendment 6, page 52, line 2, leave out “or” and insert—

“(b) activity that is undertaken in order to facilitate or enable an offence under the law of England and Wales, or.”

This amendment would expand the remit of the offence created under clause 38 to include exploiting a child into conduct for criminal purposes.

Government amendments 36 to 49.

Amendment 8, in clause 53, page 61, line 5, after “(A)” insert ““aged 18 or over”.

This amendment would ensure children cannot commit an offence of cuckooing.

Government amendments 50 to 66.

Government motion to transfer subsection (4) of clause 59.

Government amendments 68 and 69.

Amendment 177, in clause 64, page 73, line 24, at end insert—

“4A) For the purpose of this section—

“Child” means a person under the age of 18.

“Grooming” means meeting or communicating (in person or online) with a child and or their network (on one or more occasion) with a view to intentionally arrange or facilitate child sexual abuse (in person or online) for an act including themselves or others.”

This amendment would introduce a legal definition of grooming.

Amendment 178, page 74, line 31, at end insert—

“70B Group-based sexual grooming of a child

(1) This section applies where—

(a) a court is considering the seriousness of a specified child sex offences,

(b) the offence is aggravated by group-based grooming, and

(c) the offender was aged 18 or over when the offence was committed.

(2) The court—

(a) must treat the fact that the offence is aggravated by group-based grooming as an aggravated factor, and

(b) must state in court that the offence is so aggravated.

(3) An offence is “aggravated by group-based grooming” if—

(a) the offence was facilitated by, or involved, the offender, who was involved in group-based grooming, or

(b) the offence was facilitated by, or involved, a person other than the offender grooming a person under the age of 18 and the offender knew, or could have reasonably been expected to know that said person was participating, or facilitating group-based grooming, or

(c) the offender intentionally arranges or facilitates something that the offender intends to do, intends another person to do, or believes that another person will do, in order to participate in group-based grooming.

(4) In this section “specified child sex offence” means—

(a) an offence within any of subsections (5) to (7), or

(b) an inchoate offence in relation to any such offence.

(5) An offence is within this subsection if it is—

(a) an offence under section 1 of the Protection of Children Act 1978 (taking etc indecent photograph of child),

(b) an offence under section 160 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (possession of indecent photograph of child),

(c) an offence under any of sections 5 to 8 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (rape and other offences against children under 13),

(d) an offence under any sections 9 to 12 of that Act (other child 25 sex offences),

(e) an offence under section 14 of that Act (arranging or facilitating commission of child sex offence),

(f) an offence under any of sections 16 to 19 of that Act (abuse of position of trust),

(g) an offence under section 25 or 26 of that Act (familial child sex offences), or

(h) an offence under any of sections 47 to 50 of that Act (sexual exploitation of children).

(6) An offence is within this subsection if it is—

(a) an offence under any of sections 1 to 4 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (rape, assault and causing sexual activity without consent),

(b) an offence under any of sections 30 to 41 of that Act (sexual offences relating to persons with mental disorder),

(c) an offence under any of sections 61 to 63 of that Act (preparatory offences), or

(d) an offence under any of sections 66 to 67A of that Act (exposure and voyeurism), and the victim or intended victim was under the age of 18.

(7) An offence is within this subsection if it is an offence under section 71 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (sexual activity in a public lavatory) and a person involved in the activity in question was under the age of 18.

(8) For the purposes of this section—

(a) “group-based grooming” is defined as a group of at least three adults whose purpose or intention is to commit a sexual offence against the same victim or group of victims who are under 18, or could reasonably be expected to be under 18.”

This amendment would introduce a specific aggravating factor in sentencing for those who participate in, or facilitate, group-based sexual offending.

Amendment 159, in clause 65, page 74, line 39, leave out subsection (2) and insert—

“(2) An officer may seek independent judicial authorisation to engage in conduct which is for the purpose of obtaining data from the person.

(2A) Authorised conduct may consist of an officer—

(a) scanning the information stored on the device using technology approved by the Secretary of State for the purpose of ascertaining whether information stored on an electronic device includes child sexual abuse images,

(b) requiring the person to permit the scan, and

(c) requiring the person to take such steps as appear necessary to allow the scan to be performed.”

This amendment subjects any searches of electronic devices to prior authorisation by a judge.

Amendment 179, in clause 66, page 75, line 16, leave out subsection (7).

This amendment would keep an individual under the duty to report child abuse despite the belief that someone else may have reported the abuse to the relevant authority.

Amendment 3, page 75, line 31, at end insert—

“(2) the duty under subsection (1) applies to—

(a) any person undertaking work for the Church of England, the Roman Catholic Church, or any other Christian denomination on either a paid or voluntary basis,

(b) any clergy of the Church of England, the Roman Catholic Church, or any other Christian denomination, notwithstanding any canonical law regarding the seal of confession, and

(c) any person undertaking work on either a paid or voluntary basis, or holding a leadership position, within the Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim or Sikh faiths, or any other religion, faith or belief system.”

This amendment would ensure that the duty to report suspected child sex abuse covered everyone working for the Church of England and the Roman Catholic Church whether paid or on a voluntary basis, including clergy, as well as all other faith groups. Reports received by clergy through confession would not be exempt from the duty to report.

Amendment 10, page 76, line 28, at end insert—

“(10) A person who fails to fulfil the duty under subsection (1) commits an offence.

(11) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale.”

This amendment would implement part of recommendation 13 of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse that a failure to report a suspected child sex offence should be a criminal offence.

Amendment 22, page 77, line 13, at end insert

“or

(c) an activity involving a “position of trust” as defined in sections 21, 22 and 22A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.”

This amendment would implement part of recommendation 13 of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sex Abuse that any person working in a position of trust as defined by the Sexual Offences Act 2003, should be designated a mandatory reporter.

Amendment 11, in clause 68, page 78, line 19, at end insert—

“(7) The sixth case is where P witnesses a child displaying sexualised, sexually harmful or other behaviour, physical signs of abuse or consequences of sexual abuse, such as pregnancy or a sexually transmitted disease, to an extent that would cause a reasonable person who engages in the same relevant activity as P to suspect that a child sex offence may have been committed.

(8) The seventh case is where P witnesses a person (A) behaving in the presence of a child in a way that would cause a reasonable person who engages in the same relevant activity as P to suspect that A may have committed a child sex offence.

(9) A failure to comply with the duty under subsection (1) is not an offence where the reason to suspect that a child sex offence may have been committed arises from subsection (7) or subsection (8).”

This amendment would implement part of recommendation 13 of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sex Abuse that there should be a duty to report where a person recognises the indicators of child sexual abuse. Failure to report in these instances would not attract a criminal sanction.

Government amendment 70.

Amendment 9, in clause 80, page 84, line 22, at end insert—

“(b) if the name change is by deed poll, 7 days prior to submitting an application for change of name (whichever is earlier), or”.

This amendment would require relevant sex offenders to notify the police of an intention to change a name 7 days before making an application to do so by deed poll.

Amendment 180, page 85, line 26, at end insert—

“(11) If a relevant offender does not comply with the requirements of this section, they shall be liable to a fine not exceeding Level 4 on the standard scale.”

This amendment imposes a fine of up to £2,500 if a registered sex offender does not notify the police when they change their name.

Amendment 181, in clause 81, page 86, line 41, at end insert—

“(10) If a relevant offender does not comply with the requirements of this section, they shall be liable to a fine not exceeding Level 4 on the standard scale.”

This amendment imposes a fine of up to £2,500 if a registered sex offender does not notify the police when they are absent from their sole or main residence.

Amendment 182, in clause 82, page 88, line 25, at end insert—

“(9) If a relevant offender does not comply with the requirements of this section, they shall be liable to a fine at Level 5 of the standard scale.”

This amendment imposes an unlimited fine if a relevant registered sex offender does not notify police if they are entering a premises where children are presented.

Government amendments 71 to 73.

Amendment 19, in clause 94, page 115, line 25, at end insert

“, or

(c) the person does so being reckless as to whether another person will be injured, aggrieved or annoyed.”

This amendment would expand the offence for administering harmful substances, including by spiking, to include those who do so being reckless.

Amendment 20, in clause 95, page 116, line 37, at end insert—

“(6A) In determining a sentence for an offence committed under this section, the Court is to treat encouragement or assistance of self-harm, when preceded by a history of abuse perpetrated against the victim/other person by D, as an aggravating factor.

(6B) The criminal liability for D, when the other person mentioned in subsection 1(a) or 1(b) commits suicide, and where D has subjected that person to physical, psychiatric or psychological harm, is the offence of murder.”

This amendment treats encouragement or assistance of serious self-harm when preceded by a history of abuse as an aggravating factor in sentencing with explicit recognition of murder as the criminal liability for perpetrators who cause serious physical, psychiatric, or psychological harm that directly results in, or significantly contributes to, suicide.

Government amendments 74 to 76.

Amendment 14, in clause 102, page 124, line 16, leave out from subsection (1) to “where” in line 29 and insert—

“(1) A person who possesses a SIM farm without good reason or lawful authority commits an offence. For the meaning of ‘SIM farm’, see section 104.

(2) In subsection (1) the reference to a good reason for possessing a SIM farm includes in particular possessing it for a purpose connected with—

(a) providing broadcasting services,

(b) operating or maintaining a public transport service,

(c) operating or maintaining an electronic communications network (as defined by section 32 of the Communications Act 2003),

(d) tracking freight or monitoring it in any other way, or

(e) providing or supporting an internet access service or the conveyance of signals (as defined by section 32 of the Communications Act 2003).

This subsection does not limit subsection (1).

(3) For the purposes of subsection (1),”.

This amendment would mean that a person would only commit an offence if they possessed a SIM farm without a good reason, such as for broadcasting purposes, or lawful authority.

Amendment 15, in clause 103, page 124, line 37, leave out from subsection (1) to “prove” on page 125, line 2, and insert—

“(1) A person who supplies a SIM farm to another person commits an offence unless subsection (2) applies.

(2) It is not an offence for a person to supply a SIM farm under this section provided the person (‘the supplier’) can”.

This amendment would mean that a person would only commit an offence if they supplied a SIM farm without taking reasonable steps to confirm that the person receiving the SIM farm would have a good reason, including for broadcasting purposes, or lawful authority to possess the SIM farm.

Amendment 16, in clause 104, page 125, line 34, after “interchangeably,” insert “and designed primarily” and line 39, at end insert—

“(1A) For the purposes of subsection (1), a device is not a SIM farm if it uses five or more SIM cards simultaneously or interchangeably for the purposes of provided data only services or internet access services or conveyance services.”

This amendment would amend the meaning of “SIM farm” to cover only devices that are primarily used for calls and text messages and would exclude devices primarily used for data connectivity such as Bonded Cellular Devices used by broadcasters.

Amendment 164, page 128, line 5, leave out clause 108.

Amendment 184, in clause 108, page 128, line 10, leave out lines 10 and 11 and insert—

“(2) No offence is committed under this section where a person wears or otherwise uses the item for—”

This amendment would ensure that Clause 108 does not apply to people wearing the hijab, niqab or wearing a mask for health reasons.

Amendment 185, page 128, line 25, at end insert—

“(6) Within a year of this section coming into force, the Secretary of State must review the equality impact of the provisions of this section, and lay a report of the review before both Houses of Parliament within a month of its publication.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to review the equality impact of the provisions of Clause 108.

Amendment 165, page 128, line 26, leave out clause 109.

Amendment 166, page 129, line 28, leave out clause 110.

Government amendments 77 to 86.

Amendment 161, page 131, line 29, leave out clause 114.

This amendment would delete Clause 114 which would place restrictions on the right to protest near places of worship.

Amendment 160, in clause 115, page 133, line 12, at end insert—

“(4) Prior to imposing conditions under either Section 12 or 14, the senior officer of the Police Force in question must confirm that live facial recognition will not be in use, unless a new code of practice for the use of live facial recognition surveillance in public spaces in England and Wales had previously been presented to, and approved by, both Houses of Parliament.”

Amendment 21, in clause 120, page 140, line 37, at end insert—

“(8) The authorised persons listed in Clause 71A may not use the information referenced in subsection (1) for the purposes of biometric searches using facial recognition technology”

Government amendment 87.

Amendment 162, page 148, line 1, leave out clause 126.

Amendment 163, in clause 126, page 148, line 13, at end insert—

“(3) Within a year of this section coming into force, the Secretary of State must review the human rights and equality impact of the provisions of this section, and lay the report of the review before both Houses of Parliament within a month of its publication.”

Government amendments 88 to 91.

Amendment 183, in clause 141, page 168, line 5, leave out subsection (7) and insert—

“(7A) A youth diversion order must specify the period for which it has effect, up to a maximum of 12 months.

(7B) An assessment must be taken of the respondent before the conclusion of a youth diversion order to determine if they continue to hold extremist views or pose a terror threat.

(7C) An assessment must be made by a qualified expert in extremism and counterterrorism.

(7D) Assessments taken by the respondent’s youth offending team must be reviewed by an external expert with no pre-existing relationship to the respondent.

(7E) If the respondent is assessed as holding extremist views or as a terror threat the youth offending team or a chief officer of police must apply to an appropriate court for the youth offending order to be extended up to a maximum of 12 months.

(7F) All provisions, prohibitions and requirements of a youth diversion order remain in effect until the respondent has been assessed as holding no extremist views or posing a terror threat.”

This amendment would give the police the ability to apply for youth diversion orders in cases of youth extremism and terror risks. The diversion orders would conclude automatically after a maximum of twelve months without an assessment as to whether the individual remained a terror risk or extremist.

Government amendments 92 to 101, and 134 to 151.

Amendment 23, in schedule 9, page 229, line 15, at end insert—

“(11) Section 127 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 (time limit for summary offences) does not apply to an offence under subsection (1).”

This amendment allows the offence of taking or recording intimate photograph or film to be tried by a Magistrates’ Court at any time by disapplying the six-month time limit in s.127 of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980.

Government amendments 152 to 156 and 102 to 133.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Before I speak to the key Government amendments tabled on Report, I quickly remind the House why the Government have brought forward this Bill. It is a vital part of our safer streets mission, and contains a host of measures to tackle antisocial behaviour, retail and knife crime, and the epidemic of violence against women and girls, and to restore confidence and trust in policing.

It is worth reminding the House that on the previous Government’s watch, shoplifting soared to record-high levels; there was a 70% increase in their last two years in office alone. Street theft was rapidly rising; it was up by almost 60% in just the last two years. Antisocial behaviour was rampant in our towns and cities, with 1 million incidents last year. In the year to June 2024, the crime survey of England and Wales estimated that 25% of people perceived antisocial behaviour to be a fairly or very big problem in their area. That is the highest level since at least March 2013, over a decade ago. Violence and abuse against shop workers was at epidemic levels. The British Retail Consortium said that incidents of violence and abuse against shop workers stood at more than 2,000 a day in ’23-24—up by almost 50% on the previous year, and nearly treble the pre-pandemic figures from 2019 to 2020.

[Mr Toby Perkins (Chesterfield) (Lab)]

I have been down to the local Co-op in Chesterfield and met one of the shop workers, who faced a terrible attack. Luckily, the people were jailed, but in so many cases there is a sense that shoplifters are able to walk out the door without anything being done. The traumatic effect that this has on shop workers has to be seen to be believed. Would the Minister say that the message the Bill sends to anyone who wants to walk out of a store after doing these things is that the police will come after them, and they will end up going to jail?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

My hon. Friend puts that very well. Attacks on retail workers are totally unacceptable. The Co-op and the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers have done important work to highlight this issue and ensure that measures on it will be enacted through the Bill.

The previous Conservative Government wrote off a number of the crime types I have just talked about as low-level crime, and allowed them to spiral out of control. At the same time, they decimated local neighbourhood policing teams, causing untold damage to our communities, as we all know.

[Wendy Morton (Aldridge-Brownhills) (Con)]

On neighbourhood policing, I welcome the fact that we have some extra capacity coming into the west midlands, but I have not yet had clarification on whether the money that is coming to the west midlands will cover all the extra national insurance costs. The Labour police and crime commissioner is already saying that his budgets are underfunded under the Labour Government.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

The right hon. Lady and I have had this discussion before, and I have made it very clear that the national insurance increases have been funded through the money that is available to police forces this year. That is in stark contrast to the situation under the previous Government, who did not make a proper allocation for the police pay award for last year. This Government had to supplement it when we came into power in July.

[Chris Vince (Harlow) (Lab/Co-op)]

Will the Minister join me in celebrating the five new neighbourhood police officers we have in Harlow? I cannot take all the credit for them, because I only taught one of them maths.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Absolutely. I think we will have 3,000 additional neighbourhood police officers by the end of March next year, as part of our commitment to putting in place 13,000 neighbourhood police officers by the end of this Parliament.

It has been clear throughout the Bill’s passage that it commands broad support across the House. I hope that over the next two days, right hon. and hon. Members from all parts of the House can come together and recognise the shared goals that the Bill fulfils. The Government are tireless in our drive to make our streets safer.

[Simon Hoare (North Dorset) (Con)]

The right hon. Lady is setting out very clearly what the Bill is intended to be, and has rightly pointed to the cross-party support for the main thrust of it. Does she agree that that unanimity of purpose is put in grave jeopardy by the Christmas tree-ing of significant amendments relating to abortion? I know that she had a personal interest in this issue in opposition. These very dramatic changes to abortion law require a much fuller debate in this place than can be had on an amendment to a Bill that has the purpose that the right hon. Lady has set out. The Government never intended the Bill to be a Christmas tree Bill, but it has become one. The House runs the risk of fracturing its unanimity of purpose if those amendments are pressed to a vote and become part of the legislation.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I do not want to try Mr Speaker’s patience, but time has been allocated for that debate this afternoon. The hon. Gentleman is a very experienced Member of this House, and he will know that crime Bills often become Christmas tree Bills due to their very nature, as Members wish to table amendments on all sorts of areas of the criminal law. We have the Bill that is before us, and the amendments that have been tabled.

The Government and, I hope, other parties in this House are committed to making our streets safer. Where there are gaps in the law, we will not hesitate to address them, and the Government amendments that have been tabled are very much directed to our achieving that end. I will start by going through them. New clause 54 will aid legal certainty and the consistent application of the new offence of child criminal exploitation. The new clause makes clearer to the courts that the offence is focused on the criminal intentions of the adult only, rather than those of the child. It puts beyond doubt that the offence captures circumstances in which the child is used as an entirely innocent agent and cannot satisfy all the elements of the intended criminal conduct themselves. The new clause also puts beyond doubt that the offence is capable of capturing earlier-stage grooming; as such, it addresses the concerns raised in amendments 4 to 6, tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion (Siân Berry). It will also cover perpetrators who arrange for another person to exploit a child on their behalf. At the request of the Scottish Government and the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland, we are also extending the offence of child criminal exploitation to Scotland and Northern Ireland.

New clause 56 criminalises the highly exploitative and harmful practice of coerced internal concealment. It is commonly associated with county lines drug dealing, and involves a child or adult being intentionally caused to conceal drugs or other objects—such as weapons or SIM cards—inside their body to facilitate criminality. The new clause creates two new offences. The first targets perpetrators who intentionally cause a child to conceal a specified item inside their body. The second applies in cases where an adult victim is caused to internally conceal a specified item through compulsion, coercion or deception, or through controlling or manipulative behaviour, and where the perpetrator intends, knows or reasonably suspects that the item has been or may be used in connection with criminal conduct. These new offences will carry a maximum penalty of up to 10 years’ imprisonment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

The Bill applies to England and Wales, but it is important for knowledge and information to be shared with the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Scottish Parliament, for example, so that they are aware of what is happening here—and people may move from England or Wales to Northern Ireland or Scotland. We should ensure that information can be exchanged between police forces and other authorities here and those in the devolved Administrations: if we want security and safety for all our people, that really needs to happen.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I entirely agree with the hon. Gentleman about the importance of sharing information, good practice and policy development, and I hope that that will go from strength to strength under this Government.

Let me now say something about abusive behaviour towards emergency workers. As we all know, they put themselves in harm’s way to protect us every day, and they deserve robust protection in return. That includes protection from racial and religious abuse, which is not only deeply harmful but undermines the values of decency, respect and public service. Unlike most people, emergency workers cannot walk away from abuse. When they enter private homes they do so not by choice, but because it is their duty to do so. Whether they are responding to a 999 call, providing urgent medical care or attending an incident involving risk to life or property, they are legally and professionally required to remain and act. They cannot remove themselves from the situation simply because they are being abused. The law must recognise that and ensure that they are properly protected in every setting, including private dwellings.

At present, there is a clear and pressing gap in the law. Although existing legislation provides important protections against racially and religiously aggravated offences in public places, they do not extend to abuse that occurs inside private homes. Policing stakeholders have highlighted that gap, and have emphasised the need for stronger safeguards for emergency workers. New clauses 60 to 62 therefore introduce specific offences relating to the use of racially or religiously threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour towards emergency workers acting in the course of their duties. Crucially, that includes incidents that take place within a private dwelling.

This is a focused and proportionate measure. It does not interfere with freedom of expression; rather, it reinforces the principle that emergency workers should be able to carry out their critical roles without being subjected to hate or hostility because of their race or religion. I hope that the hon. Member for Esher and Walton (Monica Harding) will agree that these Government new clauses achieve the underlying purpose of her new clause 120.

Clause 112 strengthens the protection afforded to nationally significant war memorials by providing for a new offence of climbing on specified war memorials without lawful excuse. We believe that the same protection should now be extended to other nationally significant memorials, starting with the statue of Sir Winston Churchill in Parliament Square. The Churchill statue, which is a prominent national symbol of Britain’s wartime leadership, has repeatedly been targeted and climbed on during protests in recent years. Including it within the new offence ensures the consistent protection of one of the foremost culturally significant monuments linked to national remembrance. Amendments 77 to 84 therefore expand the scope of the new offence to include other memorials of national significance, as well as adding the statue of Sir Winston Churchill to the list of specified memorials set out in schedule 12.

New clauses 63 to 70 and 81 and new schedule 1 deal with remotely stored electronic data, clarifying powers for law enforcement agencies to access information stored online and extract evidence or intelligence for criminal investigations, to protect the public from the risk of terrorism and safeguard our national security. The powers will apply when law enforcement agencies have lawfully seized an electronic device, as part of national security examination at UK borders or when a person provides his or her agreement. New clause 70 also amends the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 to permit the interception of access-related communications, such as two-factor authentication codes. Those reforms are necessary to ensure that our law enforcement agencies have clear powers to access vital evidence and intelligence when investigating serious offences, including child sexual abuse, fraud, terrorism and threats to national security, at a time when more and more information is stored remotely in the cloud rather than on people’s electronic devices.

Let me now turn to new clauses 72 to 79 and new schedule 3. A crucial aspect of our safer streets mission is to rebuild public confidence in policing. Among other things, that means ensuring that only those who are fit to serve can hold the office of constable or otherwise work in our law enforcement agencies. As well as strengthening the vetting regime for police officers, the new clauses and the new schedule require the National Crime Agency, the British Transport police, the Civil Nuclear Constabulary and the Ministry of Defence police to establish barred persons lists and advisory lists, similar to those created in 2017 for territorial police forces in England and Wales The chief officers of these forces, and others, will be under a legal duty to consult the lists before employing or appointing an individual to prevent those dismissed from policing from rejoining another force in the future.

My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has announced a new police efficiency and collaboration programme to cut waste and bureaucracy. It is important that undertakings providing services to the police are delivering the most benefit, and unlocking the efficiency savings needed by forces to achieve better outcomes for the public. Announcing the Government’s intention to consult on establishing a new national centre of policing, the Home Secretary said that she envisaged the body’s being responsible for existing shared services, national IT capabilities, and force-hosted national capabilities. It is right that the Home Secretary has the powers to ensure that those capabilities are fully aligned with the priorities of the police efficiency and collaboration programme, and that they are adequately prepared for transition into the new body with no disruption to service delivery. New clause 80 ensures that the Home Secretary has the power to direct undertakings providing critical services and capabilities to policing to take appropriate action to strengthen their service delivery to better deliver our efficiencies programme, and, ahead of any future legislation to establish the national centre for policing, to remove any barriers to the transition of services into the new centre.

We tabled new clauses 52 and 53 against the backdrop of the Government’s commitment to bring into force the repeal of the outdated Vagrancy Act 1824, which criminalises begging and many forms of rough sleeping. It is generally the case that when begging reaches the threshold of antisocial behaviour there are already sufficient powers available to the police and others to address that, but we have identified two gaps in the law that will arise from the repeal of the 1824 Act, which the new clauses would address. New clause 52 makes it a criminal offence for any person to arrange or facilitate another person’s begging for gain. Organised begging, which is often facilitated by criminal gangs, exploits vulnerable individuals and can undermine the public’s sense of safety. This provision makes it unlawful for anyone to organise others to beg—for example, by driving people to places for them to beg. That will allow the police to crack down on the organised crime gangs that use this exploitative technique to obtain cash for illicit activity.

[Chris Vince]

The Minister is being very generous in taking interventions. Having worked for a homelessness charity, I have seen this issue at first hand. Does she agree that when there is an organisation behind the begging, the person forced to beg is actually being exploited, so these laws will help to tackle a form of exploitation?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

My hon. Friend makes that point very well. These individuals are exploited by serious and organised criminal gangs, and we are going to clamp down on those gangs’ activity.

New clause 53 re-enacts the offence of being on enclosed premises for an unlawful purpose. It will make it an offence for a person to trespass on any premises—that covers any building, part of a building or enclosed area—with the intention of committing an offence. Without this replacement offence, the police would be able to rely only on the trespassing provisions in the Theft Act 1968, which covers trespassing only in relation to burglary. It is important that the police have the powers to tackle all cases of trespassing with intent to commit an offence, and new clause 53 will ensure that.

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[Jim Dickson (Dartford) (Lab)]

I congratulate the Minister both on the Bill as it stands and on today’s amendments. Near my constituency, there has been a troubling spate of recent incidents in which younger people, in some cases encouraged by older men, are filming themselves catapulting and injuring wildlife, and placing that footage on TikTok. The footage is deeply unpleasant, and I do not recommend anybody looks at it. Would the Minister agree that that behaviour goes well beyond antisocial behaviour, and may at some point require a ban perhaps on the sale of catapults, but certainly on their use for that purpose?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Sadly, that is not the first time I have heard about such appalling behaviour of attacking and injuring animals using catapults. I will certainly be raising that with my counterparts in the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs to see what more we can do. I am aware that this issue needs to be looked at, and I thank my hon. Friend for raising it.

Amendments 24 to 33 will require operators of collection points for items such as knives and crossbows to carry out the same enhanced age verification checks before handing over knives to the buyer, or in the case of crossbows and crossbow parts, to the buyer or even the hirer of the item. Clause 30 imposes similar requirements on couriers.

Clause 128 introduces costs and expenses protections for law enforcement agencies in civil recovery proceedings, under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, in the High Court or the Court of Session in Scotland. As currently drafted, it is not clear how the cost protection measure applies to pre-existing cases, particularly where cases have started before the provision comes into force but costs are incurred after the provision comes into force. As a result, it may be difficult and costly to determine which costs are covered. Amendment 89 provides that cost protections apply to any case where proceedings start after the measure comes into force.

Schedule 15 to the Bill introduces reforms to the confiscation regime in England and Wales in respect of the proceeds of crime. Among other things, the reforms make provision for the provisional discharge of confiscation orders made under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, allowing outstanding confiscation orders to be placed in abeyance when there is no realistic prospect of recovery in the immediate term and all enforcement steps have been exhausted. Amendments to schedule 15 extend the provisional discharge measures to confiscation orders made under legislation predating the 2002 Act.

Chapter 1 of part 14 provides for youth diversion orders, which are a new counter-terrorism risk management tool for young people who, on the balance of probabilities, the court assesses to have committed a terrorism offence or an offence with a terrorism connection, or to have engaged in conduct likely to facilitate a terrorism offence, and where the court considers it necessary to make the order for the purposes of protecting the public from terrorism or serious harm.

The amendments to clause 139 make a change to the scope of YDOs to ensure that applications can be made for individuals up to and including 21-year-olds. Currently, a court may make a YDO in respect of a person aged 10 to 21, but exclusive of 21-year-olds. Following further engagement with operational partners on the types of cases that could benefit from a YDO, we have concluded that this change would increase the operational utility of the YDO and ensure that it can be considered as an intervention in a wider variety of cases involving young people.

Clause 141(2) enables a YDO to include prohibitions or requirements relating to the respondent’s possession or use of electronic devices. The amendments to this clause set out a non-exhaustive list of some of the most common or intrusive requirements that may be imposed to support the police’s ability to monitor compliance with restrictions on electronic devices, providing a clearer statutory footing for imposing such requirements. For example, it would allow the court to impose a requirement on someone subject to a YDO to enable the police to access their device for the purposes of checking compliance with restrictions such as accessing specific websites or applications. It would allow the police to identify harmful online activity at an earlier stage and intervene before it escalates. As with other YDO measures, the court would need to assess that any monitoring requirements are necessary and proportionate for the purposes of protecting the public from a risk of terrorism or serious harm.

Technical amendments are also required to clauses 142 and 150 relating respectively to the definition of “police detention” for Scotland and Northern Ireland and to the appeals process in Northern Ireland. The amendments will adapt the relevant provisions for the purposes of the law in Scotland and Northern Ireland. The amendments to clause 151 provide that, where a person ceases to have a reasonable excuse for failing to comply with notification requirements but continues to fail to comply, they commit an offence.

The other Government amendments in this group, which make necessary refinements to existing provisions in the Bill, were detailed in the letter that I sent last week to the hon. Member for Stockton West (Matt Vickers), a copy of which has been placed in the Library. With your permission, Madam Deputy Speaker, I will therefore seek to respond to the non-Government amendments in this group when winding up. For now, I commend the Government amendments to the House.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)]

I call the shadow Minister

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[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am grateful to Members for setting out the case for their amendments, and I will seek to respond to as many Members as possible in the remaining time available.

The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton West (Matt Vickers), tabled amendments 167 to 183, which echo many of the amendments considered in Committee. I do not propose to repeat the considered responses that my ministerial colleagues and I provided at that stage, but I will deal with a couple of the amendments to which the shadow Minister referred today.

Amendment 175 deals with the possession of weapons with intent to use unlawful violence. It seeks to increase the maximum sentence for possession of a bladed article or offensive weapon with the intention to use unlawful violence from four years to 14. Increasing the maximum penalty for that offence in isolation, without looking at other possession offences, would result in inconsistency in the law in this area. We have set the maximum penalty for the “possession with intent” offence at four years’ imprisonment to be consistent with the maximum penalties for all other knife-related possession offences. We will conduct a review of the maximum penalties for knife-related offences, and establish whether they are still appropriate.

The shadow Minister said that the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation had recommended that the sentence for the new offence of possession of a weapon with intent to cause violence should be increased substantially. In his recent report, the independent reviewer recommended the creation of a new offence for cases where an individual prepares to kill more than two people. He said:

“If this offence is created, then there is no need to reconsider the maximum sentence for the proposed offence of possessing an article with violent intent under the Crime and Policing Bill.”

As I have said, the Government are considering creating such an offence, so increasing the maximum sentence for the new offence of possessing an article with violent intent is unnecessary. We will debate the matter further tomorrow, when we consider the shadow Minister’s new clause 143.

The shadow Minister also tabled, and referred to, amendments 172 and 173, which would make those responsible for fly-tipping

“liable for the costs of cleaning up.”

When local authorities prosecute fly-tippers, on conviction, a cost order can already be made by the court, so that a landowner’s costs can be recovered from the perpetrator. While sentencing is a matter for the courts, guidance on presenting court cases produced by the National Fly-Tipping Prevention Group, which the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs chairs, explains that prosecutors should consider applying for compensation for the removal of waste, and we will consider building on that advice in the statutory guidance issued under clause 9. Amendment 174 concerns points on driving licences as a penalty for fly-tipping. Again, sentencing is a matter for the courts, but I will ask my counterparts at DEFRA, who are responsible for policy on fly-tipping, to consider the benefits of enabling the endorsement of penalty points for fly-tippers.

The hon. Member for Hazel Grove (Lisa Smart) spoke to amendment 160 on the use of live facial recognition in the policing of protests. Live facial recognition is a valuable policing tool that helps to keep people safe. Its use is already governed by the Human Rights Act 1998 and data protection laws. I do, however, recognise the need to assess whether a bespoke legislation framework is needed, and we will set out our plans on this later in the year.

[Dawn Butler (Brent East) (Lab)]

On facial recognition, does the Minister agree that my amendment 21 would stop the police accessing everybody’s driving licences to use them for complete surveillance, which is not the intention of the Bill?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for raising that point. I probably will not have time to go into detail, but the amendment is not required because what my hon. Friend describes is not what the Bill is intended to do. I am very happy to speak to her outside the Chamber about that, but I reassure her that that is not its intention.

On amendment 157, the Home Office regularly engages with frontline delivery partners and practitioners to understand how the antisocial behaviour powers are being used, and their effectiveness in preventing and tackling ASB. That is why the Bill includes measures to strengthen the powers available to police and local authorities. New requirements in the Bill for local agencies to provide information about ASB to the Government will further enhance our understanding of how the ASB powers are used to tackle antisocial behaviour.

On amendment 158, I want to make it clear that housing injunctions and youth injunctions are not novel. They are already provided for in legislation in the form of the civil injunction, which is being split into three separate orders: the respect order, the youth injunction and the housing injunction. The youth and housing injunctions retain elements of the existing civil injunction that are not covered by the new respect orders—namely, elements relating to offenders under 18 and housing-related nuisance ASB. I also assure the House that any revisions to the ASB statutory guidance are extensively consulted on with relevant stakeholders, including frontline practitioners.

The Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Hazel Grove, also spoke to amendment 3, tabled by the hon. Member for Wells and Mendip Hills (Tessa Munt), which would apply the duty to report child sexual abuse to anyone working or volunteering in any capacity for religious, belief or faith groups. I know that she has had an opportunity to discuss that amendment in recent days with the Minister who has responsibility for safeguarding.

Turning to the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for North West Cambridgeshire (Sam Carling), I thought it was very helpful and useful for the House to hear his experience and knowledge of the issues involving Jehovah’s Witness groups, and he brought to life what it means when such reports are made.

On amendment 10, the Government do not consider that it would be proportionate to provide for a criminal sanction that may inadvertently create a chilling effect on those who wish to volunteer with children or enter certain professions. We are creating a specific offence of preventing or deterring a person from complying with the duty to report, and anyone who seeks deliberately to prevent someone from fulfilling their mandatory duty to report child sexual abuse will face the full force of the law.

[Sam Carling]

Will the Minister give way?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I will continue, because I need to cover other amendments that have been tabled.

On amendment 11, assessing the signs and indications of abuse can be complex and subjective, particularly for the very large number of non-experts that this duty will apply to, many of whom are engaging with children infrequently or irregularly. We have therefore chosen to focus the duty on scenarios in which a reporter has been given an unambiguous reason to believe that they are in receipt of an allegation of child sexual abuse.

Amendment 22 seeks to add a reference to the legislative definition of “positions of trust” in schedule 7. However, a person occupies a position of trust only in relation to specific sexual offences committed against a specific child, and the term’s value as a definition for a reporter of abuse is therefore limited. The amendment also has the potential to create confusing duplication, given the significant overlap between regulated activity with children and positions of trust. The list of activities in schedule 7 has been drawn up to set out activities involving positions of trust that may not be adequately covered by the definition of regulated activity. The Government will of course keep this list under review, and amend it if necessary.

My hon. Friend the Member for Bolton North East (Kirith Entwistle) spoke to amendment 20, which relates to the new broader offence of encouraging or assisting self-harm in clause 95. She made a very passionate speech on this issue, and I know that she, too, has met the Minister to discuss it in recent days. On sentencing, the courts must already consider the circumstances of each case, including aggravating and mitigating factors, and follow relevant guidelines set by the independent Sentencing Council. Where a defendant has previous convictions, this is already recognised as a statutory aggravating factor in sentencing.

On whether a charge of murder should be brought in the circumstances set out in the amendment, I have to say to my hon. Friend that the amendment is wholly inconsistent with the criminal offence of murder, which has different elements that must be met before a person can be convicted. That said, it is important to recognise that where the encouragement or assistance results in suicide, the separate offence of encouraging or assisting suicide applies; manslaughter may be charged if there is a direct link between the abuse and the suicide.

The right hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) spoke to amendment 161, which aims to delete clause 114. The clause will allow the police to impose conditions on a protest near a place of worship if the police have a reasonable belief that the protest may deter individuals from accessing the place of worship for religious activities, even if that effect is not intended. That gives the police total clarity on how and when they can protect places of worship, while respecting the right to peaceful protest.

A number of hon. and right hon. Members spoke about spiking, including my hon. Friends the Members for Hitchin (Alistair Strathern) and for Darlington (Lola McEvoy), the right hon. Member for Dumfriesshire, Clydesdale and Tweeddale (David Mundell), and my hon. Friend the Member for Milton Keynes Central (Emily Darlington), as well as the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East (Joe Robertson), who tabled amendment 19. Before I say anything else, I pay tribute to all those who have campaigned on this issue for many years, including families and campaign groups. Richard Graham, a former Member of this House, was a pioneer of the case for bringing forward a spiking amendment.

As discussed in Committee, the offence as drafted already captures a wide range of criminal behaviours, which cover both spiking and non-spiking incidents; for example, it covers the victim being pepper sprayed. As for the reference to a specific intent to “injure, aggrieve or annoy”, that wording is of long standing and has been widely interpreted by the courts. Every case will be judged on the facts. For instance, if someone administers a harmful substance as a prank, they would likely be found to have intended to “annoy” or “aggrieve”. The broadness of the new offence, and the increase in the maximum penalty as compared to the penalty for the existing offence under section 24 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, is, in the Government’s view, sufficient. Introducing recklessness as an alternative to intent risks over-complicating the law and is unnecessary for securing appropriate convictions.

The hon. Member for Isle of Wight East spent a lot of time looking at this issue, so I want to address it. The spiking clause in the Bill is modelled on the offence under the 1861 Act, which does not have a recklessness test. In the 2004 case of Gantz, an intention to “loosen up” the victim—he referred to that intention in the example he gave today—was covered; it may be helpful for him to reflect on that. We also understand that as recently as last month, a person was convicted of spiking another person “as a joke”. We therefore deem that the inclusion of “recklessness” is unnecessary to ensure the appropriate convictions that we are looking for with this new offence. However, we are very happy to continue to have conversations about this to ensure that we get the law absolutely right.

Many other speeches were made today that I would like to comment on, but I am running swiftly out of time. In my earlier comments, I referred to amendments 4 to 8 from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion (Siân Berry). I fully understand why amendment 2 was tabled by the hon. Member for Moray West, Nairn and Strathspey (Graham Leadbitter), but those who cycle have a duty to do so safely and in accordance with the highway code, and they are wholly responsible and liable for their actions.

In conclusion, I hope that in the light of the responses I have given to the amendments today, Members will not press them. I commend new clause 52 to the House.

Police Presence on High Streets

Diana Johnson Excerpts

Thursday 5th June 2025 Westminster Hall

[The Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this afternoon, Ms Furniss.

I start, of course, by thanking my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington (Paulette Hamilton) for making such a passionate and eloquent speech on behalf of her constituents, and for what she said about her fight—indeed, her mission—to take back Erdington High Street. I think she said that she wanted to make her voice and her community’s voice heard; she has certainly done that this afternoon. It was clear that Erdington deserved better than it was getting and she has delivered that improvement, so she should be very proud of that.

It has been a really wide-ranging debate with lots of local and national flavour. Many different areas and constituencies have been referred to, and I am grateful to all the Members who have spoken today. The fact that it has been such a comprehensive debate reflects the significance that is attached to these issues by us as parliamentarians and by our constituents.

Before I respond to some of the specific points that were raised, I will be really clear about this Government’s position. We believe wholeheartedly and unreservedly in the value of a visible and responsive police presence in our communities. As we have heard, that is especially important on high streets and in town centres.

It is very encouraging indeed to hear about initiatives that have made a real difference, such as Operation Fearless in Erdington, in Birmingham. As I have already said, I commend my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington for her work. I also commend the police and crime commissioner, Simon Foster, the chief constable of West Midlands police, Craig Guildford, and the assistant chief constable, Jen Mattinson, for driving this initiative forward for the community.

Across the country, however, far more needs to be done, and we need to build on the work of Operation Fearless and similar operations around the country. In recent years, too many neighbourhoods have been plagued by antisocial behaviour and crime, with shoplifting and street theft in particular surging. As those offences have shot up, we all know the reality—neighbourhood policing was eroded under previous Governments. Actually, let us be clear: it was slashed by previous Governments.

The impact of that is very well documented. Across the country, the belief set in among local businesses and residents that police were not on the streets. Antisocial behaviour and shop theft were treated as low level, and if people called the police, nobody came and nothing was done.

I think we all agree now that that is totally unacceptable and needs to be fixed. That is why this Government have made rebuilding neighbourhood policing a focus of our safer streets mission, which is central to the Prime Minister’s plan for change. Under the mission, we are aiming to halve violence against women and girls and knife crime in a decade, tackle shop theft, street crime and antisocial behaviour, and improve trust in the criminal justice system. All those aims are tied in some way to another of the mission’s core strands: rebuilding the neighbourhood policing model. Without a strong local police footprint, our communities are left exposed and people suffer. Put simply, neighbourhood policing is the beating heart of our law enforcement system. After years of neglect, this Government will restore it to full health.

I also want to make a comment about police funding and resources, because a number of hon. Members have talked about that this afternoon. Clearly, the funding formula is the one we inherited. We have been in power for 11 months, but we have been clear that we will embark on police reform, and there is a White Paper coming in the next few months. I want to make clear to hon. Members this afternoon that, within that, there will undoubtedly have to be a discussion about finances and resources for policing.

Let me turn to the points that have been raised. We have already made £200 million available to forces to kick-start year one of our programme, which will support the first step of delivering 13,000 additional officers into neighbourhood policing roles. Like the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton West (Matt Vickers), I welcome PC Coyle to his new role in Durham. I also pay tribute to all our police officers, who work for us day in, day out, particularly the neighbourhood police officers I met this morning in Milton Keynes, who were doing a fantastic job for their community. Our approach to delivering on the 13,000 in 2025-26 has been designed to deliver an initial increase to the neighbourhood policing workforce in a manner that is flexible and can be adapted to the local context and the varied crime demands in certain neighbourhoods. Police forces have embraced that and want to make a positive start towards achieving the goal of 13,000 additional neighbourhood officers by the end of this Parliament.

The neighbourhood policing guarantee was announced by the Prime Minister on 10 April. He said that, along with the Home Secretary, he had written to all chief constables and police and crime commissioners, setting out key objectives. The guarantee aims to reverse the decline in visible policing through clear commitments, designed with the support of policing, to be achieved throughout the course of this Parliament. By July, every neighbourhood throughout England and Wales will have named contactable officers. These officers will know their areas and build relationships with residents and businesses, and they will understand local concerns. In too many instances in the past, residents felt they had no one to go to. By July, there will be a guaranteed response time to local neighbourhood police queries from members of the public and businesses of 72 hours.

Having committed to these steps, it is now down to Government and policing to deliver on them. We expect that by July, all police forces will be able to demonstrate that that commitment to the guarantee has been achieved. Additionally, the College of Policing will begin the national roll-out of its neighbourhood policing training programme during the neighbourhood policing week of action in June. The training will equip officers with essential skills, such as problem solving, relationship building and crime prevention, to effectively tackle local issues and enhance community engagement. This dedicated training aims to transform neighbourhood policing services, ensuring trusted and effective policing that cuts crime and keeps people safe. There is also the hotspot action programme, which focuses on particular hotspots and really putting in the resources—it sounds very similar to what my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington referred to.

I want to make some comments about retail crime. It has been very helpful to hear from Members today who have experience of the retail sector. We know that in the last two years of the previous Government, shop theft soared by 70%. There is an epidemic in shop theft, and we need to do something about it. As has been said, in the Crime and Policing Bill we have brought forward a new offence of assaulting a retail worker to protect the hard-working and dedicated staff who work in stores, after years of campaigning by USDAW and the Co-op, among others.

Also included as part of the Bill is the removal of the legislation that makes shop theft of and below £200 a summary-only offence, which meant that it could only be tried in the magistrates court. This sends a clear message that any level of shop theft is illegal and will be taken seriously. I noted what the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) said about that, but there is a deterrent in this, as was said by my hon. Friend the Member for Luton South and South Bedfordshire (Rachel Hopkins). It is about saying that shop theft of any value is theft, and action will be taken. We still expect that the vast majority of cases will be heard in the magistrates court—[Interruption.] I do not have time for an intervention, but I am happy to discuss it with Members after the debate.

There is also additional funding going into the National Police Chiefs’ Council to give further training to police and retailers on preventive tactics. We are putting £5 million into the specialist analyst team within Opal, which is the national policing intelligence unit dealing with the serious organised criminal gangs that are now getting involved in shop theft. There will also be £2 million over the next three years for the National Business Crime Centre, which provides a resource for both police and businesses to learn, share and support each other to prevent and combat crime. We also have the retail crime forum with representatives from major businesses, which I chair.

We are determined that this summer, for the next three months starting at the end of this month, we will put increasing the safety of our town centres and high streets under the microscope, in partnership with PCCs, councils, schools, health services, businesses, transport and community organisations. I am aware that tackling criminality and antisocial behaviour in town centres is already a focus for many police forces, but we need to do more and go quicker. We have to take that action, and I look forward to the plans that PCCs have been drawing up and will be providing to the Home Office in the next few days. Once again, I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington for calling this debate, as it is an issue that every Member of this House cares passionately about.

Oral Answers to Questions

Diana Johnson Excerpts

Monday 2nd June 2025 Commons Chamber

[Amanda Hack (North West Leicestershire) (Lab)]

4. What steps her Department is taking to help tackle violence against shop workers in rural areas.

[The Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)]

Under the previous Government, shop theft was allowed to reach epidemic proportions. There was a 70% increase in the last two years of the previous Government. We are working hard to tackle this epidemic in every area of our country, including rural areas. Through our Crime and Policing Bill, we are introducing a new stand-alone offence of assault against a retail worker. We will not tolerate workers facing abuse and violence simply for doing their job, whether that is in towns or in rural areas.

[Amanda Hack]

Convenience stores are at the heart of our communities and provide employment for over 700 people in shops in North West Leicestershire, but workers often face abuse. When I visited one of my local shops recently, I was told that just a few days earlier the assistant manager had been punched in the face when he was just doing his job. Although the assault had been reported, the police had yet to pay a visit. Will the Minister share her plans to support rural policing in constituencies such as mine, so that we can tackle violence against shop workers?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

May I express my concern about the attack on my hon. Friend’s constituent? It is totally unacceptable. Under the retail crime action plan, the police made operational commitments to prioritising attendance where violence had been used. Some progress has been made, but much more needs to be done. I will ensure that every police force understands how seriously the Government take this offence. The additional 35 police officers and 21 police community support officers who will be in place as a result of our neighbourhood policing guarantee might go some way to helping with that.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

I recently visited the Huntingdon branch of Barclays bank in my rural constituency, where staff highlighted to me that although the Crime and Policing Bill will make assaulting a shop worker an offence, branch staff in banks and building societies are not included in that classification, despite the fact that they work on the high street and are subject to the same threats and intimidation as shop workers. There were over 10,000 instances of abuse in branches last year. What rationale can the Minister provide for excluding branch staff in banks and building societies from the protections given to retail staff, who work next to them?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

A case has been made over several years for why retail workers should be covered by this specific offence. Work was done with the Co-op, the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers and many others to get the evidence together. If there is evidence from the financial sector and from banks, I want to see it, so I ask the hon. Gentleman to talk to the people with whom he was having conversations about this. I am very open to looking at this, but at the moment, we have drawn up the offence on the basis of the evidence available to us.

[Marsha De Cordova (Battersea) (Lab)]

5. What assessment she has made of the potential merits of creating a visa scheme for people in Gaza related to UK nationals.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West) (Lab)]

T5. On Saturday, residents in Westerhope told me how nuisance vehicles, illegal and modified e-bikes, off-road bikes and speeding cars are making their lives an absolute misery, and I have had similar complaints from residents in Slatyford and Newbiggin. The chief constable of Northumbria tells me that his force has already tripled the number of vehicles impounded over the past few years, so it is keen to enforce the laws, such as they are. Will the Minister set out how her new proposals will make life better for residents in Newcastle?

[The Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)]

I welcome what my hon. Friend has said; this is a problem up and down the land. At the moment, police forces are doing their best, but the Crime and Policing Bill will allow them to seize vehicles that are being used in an antisocial way, without having to give any warnings, and then to destroy them. That is the way forward, but I pay tribute to the work that is already ongoing with police forces.

--- Later in debate ---

[Esther McVey (Tatton) (Con)]

Regarding non-crime hate incidents and the amount of police time taken to investigate them, does the Minister agree that the clue is in the name? They are “non-crime”. Does she also agree that already stretched police should focus their efforts on tackling real crime, rather than being the virtue-signalling thought police?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

The Home Secretary has been very clear about the priorities that police forces should actually focus on. As agreed with the Home Secretary, the National Police Chiefs’ Council and the College of Policing are conducting a review of non-crime hate incidents. We will update Parliament in due course on the findings of that review and any changes that may be required to the code of practice introduced by the shadow Home Secretary in March 2023.

[Lee Pitcher (Doncaster East and the Isle of Axholme) (Lab)]

T9. Doncaster East’s neighbourhood policing team recently seized multiple stolen offroad bikes using tactics including drones and high-visibility patrols. Its swift action has made a real difference in tackling antisocial behaviour in places such as Hatfield and Dunscroft. I commend the team on its work and the public support it has received through its “Where’s the bike” campaign. In the light of that, I ask the Minister about the progress around the neighbourhood policing guarantee and when Doncaster East and the Isle of Axholme can see named police officers in their towns—

--- Later in debate ---

[Shockat Adam (Leicester South) (Ind)]

Leicestershire police has signed a reported £800,000 contract with Palantir—a company that has a worrying history of racial profiling and surveillance concerns in the USA. It has since removed all the contract details from the public record, and the Home Office holds no central records of such a deal. What reassurances can the Home Secretary give that the people of Leicester are protected from intrusive and discriminatory policing practices? How can transparency and oversight be upheld in such partnerships where no central records are kept?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I wonder whether the hon. Gentleman might write to me with the details of what he has outlined. If so, I will look at them.

[Kim Johnson (Liverpool Riverside) (Lab)]

I thank the Home Secretary and the Prime Minister for visiting my constituency last week after the horrific incident following the Liverpool football club victory parade. Will the Home Secretary join me in congratulating the emergency services on acting so swiftly, but also in condemning the Reform UK party and the far right for trying to stoke up hatred? Can she explain how her Department will tackle this misinformation to prevent further action in future?

2025 UEFA Women’s European Championship: Extending Licensing Hours

Diana Johnson Excerpts

Thursday 15th May 2025 Written Statements

[The Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)]

The Government consulted on, and will be proceeding with, the proposal to make a contingent licensing hours order under section 172 of the Licensing Act 2003, after the majority of respondents to the consultation were in favour of the relaxation. This order will relax licensing hours in England and Wales for the 2025 UEFA women’s European championship, subject to any of the competing home nation teams (England and Wales) reaching the semi-final(s) or final of the tournament.

The order will apply to premises already licensed until 11pm for the sale of alcohol for consumption on the premises in England and Wales. The order will extend the licensing hours for such premises from 11 pm to 1 am the following day on the days of the semi-final(s) (22 and/or 23 July) and final (27 July) of the tournament should the criteria of the contingent order be met.

The Government consider the semi-finals and final of the tournament to be an occasion of exceptional national significance and an extension to licensing hours will enable communities to come together at their local licensed premises to support any of the home nation teams if they reach the later stages of the tournament and celebrate any subsequent success. This will also provide support to the hospitality sector by enabling businesses to extend their trading hours if they so wish.

The results of the consultation will be published on gov.uk and a copy will be placed in the Libraries of both Houses. The Government are grateful to everyone who responded to the consultation. The order will be laid in Parliament in due course and an economic note will be published alongside it on legislation.gov.uk.

[HCWS644]

Crime and Policing Bill (Fifteenth sitting)

Diana Johnson Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th May 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

We continue line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill. According to the programme order agreed at the start of Committee stage, the Committee must conclude today at 5 pm.

[The Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)]

On a point of order, Dr Allin-Khan. I want to clarify remarks that I made during the previous Committee sitting, in response to a point raised by the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam, about officer numbers in the Metropolitan police. I stated that the Government anticipated that, under the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime budget for 2025-26, there will be a reduction of around 1,000 police officers and police community support officers in the Metropolitan police.

There has been some confusion about the anticipated reduction in police officers, PCSOs and staff at the Met, which has been very unhelpful in getting a clear picture. The final MOPAC budget report states that the Met police is expecting a reduction of 1,419 full-time equivalent officers, PCSOs and staff—it includes staff—as opposed to the 1,700 figure that was previously reported. As I said in my remarks at the end of last week, I am obviously concerned about reductions, and the Government have done everything they can to minimise the number of officers, staff and PCSOs who will lose their roles. I hope that clarification is helpful to the Committee.

[The Chair]

Thank you.

Before we begin line-by-line scrutiny, I have a few preliminary reminders for the Committee. Please switch electronic devices to silent. No food or drinks are permitted during sittings of the Committee, except the water provided. Hansard colleagues would be grateful if Members could email their speaking notes to [email protected] or pass their written speaking notes to the Hansard colleague in the room. Members are reminded to bob and catch my eye if they wish to speak in a debate.

New Clause 42

Report on the organisations responsible for implementing and enforcing youth diversion orders

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within three months of the passing of this Act, publish a report on the organisations responsible for implementing and enforcing youth diversion orders.

(2) That report must include—

(a) the organisations which will be responsible for implementing and enforcing youth diversion orders;

(b) what level of counterterrorism and de-radicalisation training and expertise they have; and

(c) what additional resources they will require to effectively administer the provisions, prohibitions and requirements of youth diversion orders.

(3) Within one month of the publication of this report, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a plan assessing the—

(a) training,

(b) financing, and

(c) guidance,

available to the organisations identified in the report under subsection (1) to bring their training, expertise and funding to the requisite level identified in that report.

(4) The Secretary of State must commission a report from the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation to assess whether the levels of funding, training and expertise proposed in the plan under subsection (3) are sufficient. This report will be laid before Parliament with the plan under subsection (3).”—(Matt Vickers.)

This new clause would require the Government to publish a report on the organisations responsible for implementing and enforcing youth diversion orders and a plan and independent report on the funding, training and expertise they need.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Allin-Khan. This new clause was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate (Rebecca Paul) in an effort to raise a subject that affects many of her residents. She says that dangerous delivery drivers have become an increasingly common sight on the roads of Reigate, Banstead and Redhill. She has spoken with constituents who have reported near misses, actual collisions and a growing sense that people and property are being put at risk by these individuals, who simply do not have the skills to operate their vehicles safely.

My hon. Friend believes that the new clause would both address this problem and protect the rights of regular moped users. In a world with an increasing number of home delivery transactions being undertaken, there are more and more delivery drivers on our streets. Many are not properly qualified to drive, but they are working potentially long shifts, having to find addresses in areas that are alien to them. The fact that they are doing so using a licence that exists to allow people to learn to drive poses real challenges for road safety.

The new clause would amend section 59 of the Police Reform Act 2002, which grants police powers to seize vehicles being used in a manner that causes “alarm, distress, or annoyance”. Proposed new subsection (3A) would deem mopeds being used for commercial purposes by riders with only provisional licences as likely to fall into that category, effectively lowering the threshold for police action in such cases.

The use of mopeds for delivery services—for example, food and parcel deliveries—has expanded rapidly. However, a concerning number of riders continue to operate on provisional licences, often without any training or supervision, putting both the riders and the public at risk. By allowing the police to treat such behaviour as likely to cause alarm or distress, the new clause would ensure faster and more decisive action to remove unsafe vehicles from our roads. It would allow police to actively deal with individuals on mopeds abusing the lack of legislation.

If the Minister does not support the new clause, I would welcome her views on how the issue can be tackled.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am grateful to the shadow Minister for setting out the case for the new clause on behalf of his hon. Friend the Member for Reigate. As he explained, it concerns the important issue of mopeds being used for commercial purposes by riders with provisional licences.

I assure the Committee that any kind of antisocial behaviour is unacceptable, and that is why the Government are undertaking an ambitious programme of work to tackle it. The antisocial use of vehicles such as e-scooters and off-road bikes causes havoc in local communities, as we all know from our constituency postbags.

We are making it easier for the police to seize such vehicles from offenders and dispose of them. Clause 8, which we have already debated, strengthens the law so that vehicles being used to commit antisocial behaviour can be seized immediately by police without the need first to provide a warning. Furthermore, the Department for Transport, together with the Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency, is considering plans to review existing requirements for motorcycle training, testing and licensing, taking account of recent proposals by the motorcycle industry.

As we have heard, it is currently legal for moped riders with provisional licences to work as delivery drivers. The new clause would therefore create an ambiguity in the law, which could result in confusion for the moped riders, as well as for employers and the police, because it is legal to drive on a provisional licence for these purposes but they could have their moped seized.

There is also no clear definition of “commercial activities”. That could extend to a range of scenarios and cover people such as food and grocery delivery riders, couriers, parking enforcement officers, medical laboratory technicians, blood bank workers and so on. The new clause could therefore result in such sectors operating with diminished capability.

The new clause may also have the unintended consequence of an increase in the use of modified electrically assisted pedal cycles that do not comply with current EAPC regulations for use on public roads, or the illegal use of off-road bikes on public roads for the same commercial purposes.

The shadow Minister asked what more we could do on this issue. I highlight the work of Transport for London, which launched a road safety charter for meal and grocery delivery companies in September 2023 to identify ways to reduce death and serious injury among riders and raise road safety standards. The charter was developed in collaboration with the then five largest meal and grocery delivery companies and consists of 10 road safety principles that aim to keep food delivery motorcycle couriers and other road users safe. TfL is evaluating the impact of the charter’s implementation over the past 18 months and will share its findings with the Government in due course.

On that basis, I ask the shadow Minister to withdraw new clause 46.

[Matt Vickers]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 47

National statutory inquiry into grooming gangs

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 3 months of the passing of this Act, set up a statutory inquiry into grooming gangs.

(2) An inquiry established under subsection (1) must seek to—

(a) identify common patterns of behaviour and offending between grooming gangs;

(b) identify the type, extent and volume of crimes committed by grooming gangs;

(c) identify the number of victims of crimes committed by grooming gangs;

(d) identify the ethnicity of members of grooming gangs;

(e) identify any failings, by action, omission or deliberate suppression, by—

(i) police,

(ii) local authorities,

(iii) prosecutors,

(iv) charities,

(v) political parties,

(vi) local and national government,

(vii) healthcare providers and health services, or

(viii) other agencies or bodies, in the committal of crimes by grooming

(f) identify such national safeguarding actions as may be required to minimise the risk of further such offending occurring in future;

(g) identify good practice in protecting children.

(3) The inquiry may do anything it considers is calculated to facilitate, or is incidental or conducive to, the carrying out of its functions and the achievement of the requirements of subsection (2).

(4) An inquiry established under this section must publish a report within two years of the launch of the inquiry.

(5) For the purposes of this section—

‘gang’ means a group of at least three adults whose purpose or intention is to commit a sexual offence against the same victim or group of victims;

‘grooming’ means—

(a) activity carried out with the primary intention of committing sexual offences against the victim;

(b) activity that is carried out, or predominantly carried out, in person;

(c) activity that includes the provision of illicit substances and/or alcohol either as part of the grooming or concurrent with the commission of the sexual offence.” —(Matt Vickers.)

This new clause would set up a national statutory inquiry into grooming gangs.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for setting out the rationale for his new clause, and I will refer to a number of related issues. New clause 58 would give the Home Secretary the power to amend or withdraw any code of practice, or related guidance documents, from the College of Policing and/or the National Police Chiefs’ Council. As the Home Secretary is accountable to Parliament and the public for policing, it is important that she works with policing bodies to ensure consistent standards and practice across England and Wales. The issuing of guidance is just one part of achieving that aim.

The hon. Member referred to the ability of Ministers to take action. It is worth noting that there are existing provisions for the Home Secretary to approve the issuing and revision of codes of practice published by the College of Policing. Such guidance is rightly categorised as statutory and covers a wide range of issues—from armed policing through to the requirement for ethical policing—that are relevant to ensuring that the public are safe and that communities have confidence that officers are held to the highest standards.

Although the new clause would go further and provide the Home Secretary with powers to amend any guidance issued by the College of Policing and the NPCC, we should not forget—in fact, the shadow Minister referred to this—that policing is operationally independent of Government. That is a vital principle in our democratic society, and it is fundamental to our model of policing by consent. Having said that, I note that the Home Secretary and I have very productive relationships with police leaders. We work hand in hand with police leaders to develop policy and guidance with the ultimate shared aim of keeping the public safe.

I remind the Committee that the Government will publish a White Paper on police reform later this year. The Home Secretary has signalled her intention to work more closely with police leaders to drive improvements and to ensure that policing is set up to succeed. We will set out our plans for strengthening how the policing system works to tackle a range of issues, from the future workforce to tackling fast-changing crime. I encourage all hon. Members to engage with that work when the consultation on the White Paper opens.

As the hon. Member for Stockton West said, the new clause was inspired by recent issues such as the update to the police race action plan. The plan was jointly developed by the NPCC and the College of Policing, and it commits to zero tolerance of racism in policing, on which I am sure we all agree. It is worth reflecting that the plan was originally published under the previous Conservative Government.

I support the plan’s aims, and I completely reject the notion that it encourages preferential treatment for some groups over others. Of course, police officers should be conscious of the history of race relations in their local area—for example, by working with community leaders and key stakeholders from different communities on issues such as stop and search. Having said that, the police are required to apply the law equally, regardless of ethnicity.

I think this new clause is misguided. In any event, given the levers available to the Home Secretary in relation to statutory police guidance, and given the wider work on police reform, the new clause is unnecessary. For those reasons, I invite the hon. Member to withdraw it.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

New clause 59 would abolish non-crime hate incidents as a distinct form of police record. Police authorities would no longer be permitted to report, record or investigate such incidents unless specific exceptions apply. This marks a significant departure from previous practice, where incidents not amounting to criminal conduct could still be logged if perceived as motivated by hostility related to protected characteristics.

The new clause would establish that the processing of relevant data by police authorities is unlawful under key UK data protection laws. “Relevant data” is defined as personal data relating to a person’s conduct that is unlikely to constitute criminal conduct but has been perceived by someone else as motivated by hostility or prejudice. There is an exception to allow for relevant data to be processed where it is required for an ongoing criminal investigation or prosecution. Other forms of retention would have to meet stringent conditions. A police officer of the rank of inspector or above could authorise the retention of relevant data where they believe it is likely to assist materially in preventing or detecting future criminal conduct.

By abolishing the category of non-crime hate incidents, the new clause would address widespread concerns about the chilling effect such records can have on free speech. Under the previous system, individuals could be recorded by the police simply for expressing controversial or unpopular opinions, even when no law had been broken. The new clause would ensure that lawful speech is no longer subject to disproportionate scrutiny or police record.

Nationally there are 13,200 non-crime hate incidents recorded per annum, according to Policy Exchange, which reasonably concludes that over 60,000 police hours each year are spent on NCHIs. Given the challenges facing the police, it is essential that they are able to focus on what matters most: tackling crime.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

New clause 59 seeks to abolish non-crime hate incidents and to make the processing of personal data in relation to such incidents unlawful. It also seeks to introduce a new type of incident, known as a non-crime perception record, to ensure that data that may assist in the detection or prevention of criminal conduct can still be collected.

It may be helpful for the Committee to know that, in 2023, the previous Government introduced the statutory non-crime hate incidents code of practice on the recording and retention of personal data for police forces in England and Wales, and that the College of Policing updated its operational guidance on hate crime for the police in 2023 to ensure it aligned with the code. The College of Policing also publishes operational guidance, known as authorised professional practice, for numerous crime types and police business areas.

Members should be in no doubt that this Government’s top priority for policing is delivering on our safer streets mission, including through essential reforms to rebuild neighbourhood policing, restore public confidence and deliver our commitment to halve knife crime and violence against women and girls, as well as reducing antisocial behaviour.

Against that backdrop, the Home Secretary has been clear that a consistent and common-sense approach must be taken to non-crime hate incidents. Accordingly, she has already agreed that the National Police Chiefs’ Council, supported by the College of Policing, will conduct a review on the recording’s use and effectiveness. The review will cover when the police should record information that does not reach the criminal threshold but where it is still deemed necessary to monitor community tensions and keep the public safe. It will also consider the fundamental right of freedom of expression and recent court rulings in this area.

The Government will work closely with the NPCC and the College of Policing as we develop our findings and any proposals. I hope the hon. Member for Stockton West agrees that it would be premature to make decisions on the future of non-crime hate incidents before the review concludes later this year. I therefore invite him to withdraw his new clause.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause seeks to amend section 4A(1)(a) and (b) of the Public Order Act 1986 by removing the word “insulting”. Its effect would be to raise the threshold for the offence of intentional harassment, alarm or distress, ensuring that only behaviour that is threatening or abusive is captured under that offence.

Freedom of expression is a cornerstone of British democracy. Although it is vital to protect people from genuinely threatening or abusive behaviour, the inclusion of the term “insulting” in criminal legislation casts too wide a net. Insults, however unpleasant, are part of everyday life and public discourse; they should not, on their own, lead to criminal charges. The new clause strikes a better balance between protecting individuals and upholding free speech.

The word “insulting” is vague, subjective and open to interpretation: what one person finds insulting, another may see as fair comment or robust criticism. Laws should be clear and proportionate. Removing the term provides greater legal certainty and reduces the risk of overreach in public order policing, especially in the context of protests, political debate or challenging conversations in public spaces.

The Government have already recognised such concerns. The word “insulting” was removed from section 5 of the 1986 Act by the Crime and Courts Act 2013, following widespread concern about its chilling effect on speech. The new clause would simply extend that same principle to section 4A, which relates to intentional conduct. If “insulting” is not sufficient for non-intentional offences, it should not justify criminal liability when intent is alleged either.

The new clause would help to restore public confidence in the fairness and clarity of our public order laws. It would ensure that only serious conduct was subject to criminal sanction, while reaffirming the UK’s commitment to open, democratic debate—even when it is uncomfortable or challenging. Removing the word “insulting” from section 4A is a proportionate and necessary step to safeguard civil liberties without compromising public safety.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

As the shadow Minister explained, the new clause seeks to remove the word “insulting” from section 4A of the Public Order Act 1986, which deals with intentional harassment, alarm or distress. That would raise the threshold for criminal liability by ensuring that the law only captures behaviour and displays that are threatening or abusive, not “insulting”. I fully understand the motivation behind the new clause, and am sympathetic to the need to strengthen protections for free speech and reduce the risk of criminalising conduct based on personal sensitivities.

However, there are legitimate concerns that removing “insulting” could narrow the tools available to respond to deliberate and targeted harassment. Given the potential implications of this issue, we believe it warrants further consideration. I will reflect on what the shadow Minister has said and therefore ask him to withdraw his new clause at this time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Littering from vehicles remains one of the most persistent and visible forms of environmental degradation on UK roads. Despite existing fines, enforcement has been inconsistent and existing penalties have proven insufficient to deter such irresponsible behaviour. By introducing the possibility of penalty points on the driving licence, this measure would add a meaningful consequence that better reflects the seriousness of the offence and its impact on the environment and local communities.

The addition of driving licence points introduces a real deterrent by linking antisocial environmental behaviour directly to a person’s ability to drive. Just as mobile phone use when driving or dangerous driving habits result in points, so too should reckless littering from vehicles. That aligns with the principle that the privilege of driving comes with broader responsibilities, including respect for public spaces and the environment.

Roadside litter is not just unsightly; it also poses real risks to wildlife, blocks drainage systems and requires expensive clean-up operations, costing local authorities tens of millions of pounds annually. A stronger deterrent, such as penalty points, would help reduce the burden on taxpayers and protect the UK’s countryside, towns and roadsides. Similar approaches have been adopted internationally with success. For example, jurisdictions in Australia and parts of the United States have linked littering from vehicles to driving licence consequences, resulting in measurable behavioural changes. The UK should not lag behind in taking bold, effective steps to tackle that form of pollution and to protect our environment and wildlife.

A study by National Highways revealed that 65% of drivers who admit to littering have thrown food and drink packaging from their vehicles. Additionally, the road safety charity, IAM RoadSmart, found that nearly 40% of motorcyclists had experienced car drivers or passengers throwing litter from windows while overtaking. The scale of the problem is huge. Roadside litter poses risk to wildlife, with discarded waste contributing to the deaths of millions of animals annually in the UK.

Furthermore, the cost of clearing litter from roads is substantial. For example, between April 2020 and March 2022, 45,000 bags of rubbish weighing 451 tonnes were collected from the M6 motorway alone. National Highways estimates that more than 150,000 sacks of litter are collected by contractors every year, averaging 83 bags per mile of motorway annually.

In short, introducing penalty points for littering from a vehicle would send a clear message that such behaviour is unacceptable and will carry real consequences. It would also reinforce the Government’s wider commitment to tackling environmental offences, empowering enforcement agencies and restoring pride in our public places.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

New clause 95 seeks to add three penalty points to the driving licence of a person convicted of littering from a vehicle. While I am sure we all want to see robust consequences for those who throw litter on to our streets, we do need to consider carefully how workable the proposal of the shadow Minister is. Currently, the number of prosecutions for littering when litter was dropped from a vehicle is low due to the requirement for the individual to be identified, which can prove difficult. The opportunity therefore for the courts to impose such a punishment would be limited.

The new clause also appears to assume that the person throwing the litter out of the vehicle would be the driver, which is not necessarily the case, and there will be instances when the offender does not have a driving licence to endorse in the first place. Is the shadow Minister suggesting that in such cases the driver—it could be a bus driver or a coach driver—should nevertheless be held liable? However, I agree that this is a serious issue, so I will ask my counterpart in the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs with responsibility for policy on littering to consider the benefits of designing a workable system to enable the endorsement of penalty points for littering offences committed from vehicles.

Local authorities can already issue civil penalties of up to £500 to the keeper of a vehicle from which litter has been thrown, and that amount doubles if not paid within 28 days. That civil penalty was introduced following consideration of the difficulty of identifying the individual who threw the litter. That measure can help when video evidence shows only the vehicle from which the litter has been thrown. The civil penalty also provides a more immediate means of redress and prevents pressures on the court system.

I am grateful to the shadow Minister for raising the issue. As I said, I will talk to my counterpart at DEFRA. However, for the reasons I outlined, I ask him not to press the new clause.

[Matt Vickers]

I thank the Minister for her comments and welcome the commitment to look at the issue, but I will press the new clause.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Diana Johnson]

New clause 97 seeks to block public funding of groups or organisations that promote criminal conduct or seek to subvert the democratic functions or constitutional integrity of the United Kingdom. I understand from the shadow Minister’s remarks that this stems from comments made by a group that has previously received funding through the music export growth scheme; the Committee may find it helpful to be reminded that that decision was taken under the previous Government, and it is this Government who have had to deal with the consequences.

While I utterly condemn the remarks made by the group, I stress to the Committee that it is the subject of an ongoing police investigation and it would therefore be inappropriate to comment any further. However, I want to make it clear that the Government do not believe that individuals expressing the views that we have heard should be receiving taxpayer funding. I know that the Prime Minister has asked the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport to review urgently the music export growth scheme in the light of the comments that have emerged. It would be right to wait for that review to conclude before considering what further action may need to be taken. Therefore, I ask that the shadow Minister withdraw new clause 97.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause addresses a crucial gap in the current police inspection framework. Over the years, tragic incidents have demonstrated the potential consequences of failures in firearms licensing. Public confidence in the licensing process hinges on the assurance that robust, consistent and professional standards are being applied across all police forces. While some forces operate highly effective systems, others have been found lacking, sometimes with devastating outcomes, yet at present there is no statutory requirement for HM inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services to review firearms licensing performance as part of its routine police efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy inspections.

The clause would put that right by ensuring that inspection of firearms licensing departments becomes a core part of how we assess the overall efficiency and effectiveness of police forces. By embedding that into the statutory inspection framework, we send a clear signal that public safety and accountability in firearms licensing is not optional, but essential.

I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for North Cotswolds (Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown) for his dedicated service as chair of the all-party parliamentary group on shooting and conservation. Throughout his tenure, Sir Geoffrey has been a steadfast advocate of responsible shooting practices and the preservation of our countryside. His efforts have contributed significantly to the ongoing discourse on firearms licensing and the importance of effective oversight in that area. His work underscores the need for continuous evaluation and improvement of our systems to ensure public safety and trust.

Importantly, the clause does not impose undue burden on our forces. It simply makes explicit what many already expect to be standard practice: that the licensing of deadly weapons is subject to the same scrutiny and performance benchmarks as other areas of policing. It is a measured, reasonable and necessary step towards a safer, more consistent and more transparent firearms licensing regime across England and Wales.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I thank the shadow Minister for explaining new clause 99. I note the work of the hon. Member for North Cotswolds and, in fact, I am due to meet him soon to discuss the subject of firearms.

The new clause would require every PEEL inspection to include an inspection of the efficiency and effectiveness of a police force’s firearms licensing department. I hope that I can persuade the shadow Minister that this change is unnecessary and, indeed, would be damaging, as it would curtail the independence of HMICFRS and its freedom to shine a light on the most pertinent issues facing policing.

It is vital that HMICFRS is independent from policing and from the Government. As part of that, it must have the freedom to set its own inspection programmes and frameworks when deciding how to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of police forces in England and Wales. That allows it to inspect police forces on the most pertinent and high-profile issues facing policing and to assess the basics of forces’ operational and organisational activity. In no other area of policing does the law set out what the inspectorate must include in its regular inspections. The change proposed by the new clause would set a most unhelpful precedent.

HMICFRS conducts detailed sector consultations ahead of each PEEL cycle to determine what will be covered in its assessment framework and how forces will be graded. It regularly updates its frameworks as necessary to include or remove areas for assessment where it identifies priority issues. HMICFRS also consults publicly on its inspection programme and frameworks before they are laid in Parliament. It consulted publicly on its latest programme, covering 2025 to 2029, late last year. The final programme was published in March 2025, following the approval of the Home Secretary.

The Home Secretary already has appropriate powers to commission the inspectorate to conduct additional inspections into high-profile and concerning issues, should the need arise. We saw that with the disorder in summer last year. If there are concerns about a force’s performance in respect of firearms licensing, the local policing body may also commission the inspectorate to assess its efficiency and effectiveness.

In line with our manifesto commitment, we will further empower HMICFRS to intervene in failing forces to ensure that the most high-risk recommendations it makes are properly acted upon by police forces. As part of its recently approved programme, HMICFRS plans to commence a thematic inspection of firearms licensing later this year. It will use that inspection to highlight good practice and make recommendations for improvement to all police forces. The Government will carefully consider the outcome of the inspection and any recommendations made to us following it.

Firearms licensing by police forces is fundamental to keeping the public safe. We keep firearms licensing under review, and in February we published the Government response to the 2023 firearms licensing consultation, which contained a number of important commitments focused on continuing to improve firearms licensing controls. We will shortly be issuing to chief officers of police refreshed statutory guidance on firearms licensing, which will contain stronger guidance for police licensing departments around domestic abuse, evidence of violence and the requirements for referees for firearms applications.

There is also now in place a national programme of training on firearms licensing for forces across England and Wales, run by the College of Policing. That will drive up standards and deliver a more consistent approach and good practice across police forces. The training is considered to be mandatory for forces and we are amending the statutory guidance to make that clear.

In addition, the performance of firearms licensing departments in forces is being monitored by the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead for firearms licensing, Deputy Chief Constable David Gardner. He has developed a table setting out performance data for firearms licensing departments in police forces, which was published in April this year and will be updated every quarter. It includes the percentage of applications received and decided in four months by forces. The table provides greater transparency on performance, including the time taken by licensing teams when dealing with firearms licensing applications. For all the reasons I have set out, I think the new clause is unnecessary, and I urge the shadow Minister to withdraw it.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

Question proposed, That the Chair do report the Bill, as amended, to the House.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

It is customary at this stage of our proceedings to say a few words to mark the end of our deliberations in Committee. It certainly feels a very long time ago that we started this process. I have been reflecting on the tumultuous events that have happened while this Committee has been sitting. We have had the death of the Pope and the election of a new Pope. We have had the saving of the British Steel industry and some rather interesting local elections as well. Against that backdrop, although we have had some disagreements, particularly over some of the new clauses, I welcome the fact that the measures in the Bill command a substantial degree of cross-party support. I have also learned a few new things. I had no idea what potting was until my hon. Friend the Member for Pontypridd raised it in the Committee.

I am pleased that the Bill’s provisions and the nearly 100 new clauses have had the benefit of rigorous scrutiny by hon. Members on both sides of the Committee over the eight days we sat. I thank you, Dr Allin-Khan, and your co-Chairs, Sir Roger, Ms Lewell and Mr Pritchard, for keeping us in very good order. I thank my fellow Ministers, my hon. Friends the Members for Birmingham Yardley and for Pontypridd, for womanfully sharing the considerable workload in Committee with me, and I thank the Government Whip, my hon. Friend the Member for Selby, for keeping us in good order.

I thank the Opposition Front Bench, including the hon. Member for Stockton West, who I think must be setting some new parliamentary record for the number of Bills back-to-back on which he has led for the Opposition. I thank the hon. Member for Gordon and Buchan, who reminded us that the proceedings on a Public Bill Committee are a marathon and not a sprint—one of her contributions was certainly a marathon in terms of the speaking notes she had provided for her.

I thank the Clerks, Hansard Reporters and Doorkeepers. I pay tribute to all hon. Members who have served so diligently on the Committee from both sides, and made such thoughtful and valuable contributions. The Bill teams, other officials and lawyers from the Home Office, the Ministry of Justice, the Department for Transport, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology have all provided excellent support to the Committee.

The Bill is, I believe, much enhanced as a result of our deliberations. The new measures we added will help us all the more with the delivery of our safer streets mission. I just realised that, of course, I have not paid tribute to the Liberal Democrat members of the Committee, and want to do so—I do not want them to feel missed out. I thank them for their contributions. I look forward to further debate on Report, which I am sure will come soon. On that basis, thank you, Dr Allin-Khan.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill, as amended, accordingly to be reported.

Crime and Policing Bill (Fourteenth sitting)

Diana Johnson Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 8th May 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Vickers]

Requiring CCTV on the rail network to meet police access and retention standards could bring important benefits for public safety and criminal justice. Ensuring footage is readily accessible to the police would help to deter crime, enable faster investigations and support prosecutions with reliable evidence.

Victims and witnesses benefit when their accounts can quickly be corroborated, and cases are more likely to be resolved effectively. Standardising CCTV systems across train operators would also reduce inefficiencies, removing delays that can occur due to incompatible formats or outdated technology. In high-risk areas or busy urban transport hubs, this kind of clarity and consistency could make a real difference to public confidence and police capability.

No doubt some will argue that increased surveillance on public transport raises questions about privacy and civil liberties, particularly if passengers feel that they are being constantly monitored. Also, rail operators may face high financial and logistical burdens if they are required to overhaul existing CCTV infrastructure to meet new standards. For smaller operators in particular, the cost of compliance could be significant, potentially impacting service provision or ticket prices.

I would be grateful if the Liberal Democrats told us whether this requirement would apply to all train operating companies, including heritage railways and smaller, regional operators. What specific technical or operational standards would CCTV systems be expected to meet, and how would those be determined or updated over time? Have they reviewed how many operators already meet or fall short of the proposed standards, and what level of upgrade would typically be required? Have they assessed the financial implications for train operators, and would they expect any Government funding or support to assist implementation?

[The Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)]

New clause 9 would introduce a requirement that all CCTV camera images on the railway be made immediately accessible to the British Transport police and the relevant local Home Office police force. I am sympathetic to the cases that the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam, who speaks for the Liberal Democrats, shared with the Committee. I particularly sympathise with his plight and predicament when his saddle was stolen; having to cycle home without a saddle must have been incredibly painful, so I fully welcome the aims of this new clause. We know that lack of immediate access to railway CCTV camera images has been a significant issue for the British Transport police, as it may reduce their ability to investigate crime as quickly as possible. However, I do not believe that legislation is necessary to address the issue. Let me explain why.

My colleagues at the Department for Transport are looking to implement a system that will provide remote, immediate access for the BTP, Home Office forces and the railway industry where relevant. As I said, that does not need legislation. What is needed is a technological solution and the resources to provide for that. I am sure that the hon. Member will continue to press the case with the Department for Transport, and for updates on the progress of the work, but for now, I invite him to withdraw his new clause.

[Luke Taylor]

In response to the specific comments from the Opposition spokesperson, the hon. Member for Stockton West, this measure relates entirely to existing footage and would allow access to existing footage. I thank the Minister for addressing the points made. At this point, are happy to withdraw the new clause. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 12

Domestic abuse aggravated offences

“(1) Any criminal offence committed within England and Wales is domestic abuse aggravated, if—

(a) the offender and the victim are personally connected to each other, and

(b) the offence involves behaviour which constitutes domestic abuse.

(2) In this section—

(a) ‘domestic abuse’ has the meaning given by section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, and

(b) ‘personally connected’ has the meaning given by section 2 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021.”—(Luke Taylor.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

Rural communities deserve the same protection, visibility and voice as those in urban areas, yet too often rural crime goes under-reported, under-resourced and underestimated. From equipment theft and fly-tipping to wildlife crime and antisocial behaviour, the challenges facing rural areas are distinct and growing. Having rural crime recognised in police structures and developing a specific taskforce could send a strong signal that rural communities matter, that their concerns are heard and that they will not be left behind when it comes to public safety.

However, although the new clause is clearly well-intentioned I would like to put some operational questions to those who tabled it, to ensure greater clarity. What assessment has been made of the additional resources that police forces might need to implement such a strategy effectively, particularly in already stretched rural areas? The new clause refers to the creation of new roles. The National Police Chiefs’ Council already has a rural crime lead and many police forces across the country already appoint rural crime co-ordinators. How would the suggested additional roles be different?

How does the new clause balance the need for a national strategy with the operational independence and local decision making of police and crime commissioners? Is there a clear definition of what constitutes a rural area for the purposes of this strategy? How will this be applied consistently across the country? I am interested to hear the answers, but would be minded to support the new clause if it was pressed to a Division.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

As the hon. Member for Frome and East Somerset set out, new clause 14 would require the Government to establish a rural crime prevention taskforce. Let me first say that the Government take the issue of rural crime extremely seriously, and that rural communities matter. I want to outline some of the work going on in this area.

I take the opportunity to acknowledge the vital role that the national rural crime unit and the national wildlife crime unit play in tackling crimes affecting our rural areas, as well as helping police across the UK to tackle organised theft and disrupt serious and organised crime. Those units have delivered a range of incredible successes. The national rural crime unit co-ordinated the operational response of several forces to the theft of GPS units across the UK, which resulted in multiple arrests and the disruption of two organised crime groups. The unit has recovered over £10 million in stolen property, including agricultural machinery and vehicles, in the past 18 months alone.

The national wildlife crime unit helped disrupt nine organised crime groups, with a further nine archived as no longer active, as well as assisting in the recovery of £4.2 million in financial penalties. It also oversees the police national response to hare coursing, which has resulted in a 40% reduction in offences.

I am delighted to say that the national rural crime unit and the national wildlife crime unit will, combined, receive over £800,000 in Home Office funding this financial year to continue their work tackling rural and wildlife crime, which can pose a unique challenge for policing given the scale and isolation of rural areas. The funding for the national rural crime unit will enable it to continue to increase collaboration across police forces and harness the latest technology and data to target the serious organised crime groups involved in crimes such as equipment theft from farms. The national wildlife crime unit will strengthen its ability to disrupt criminal networks exploiting endangered species both in the UK and internationally with enhanced data analysis and financial investigation, helping the unit to track illegal wildlife profits and to ensure that offenders face justice.

The funding comes as we work together with the National Police Chiefs’ Council to deliver the new NPCC-led rural and wildlife crime strategy to ensure that the entire weight of Government is put behind tackling rural crime. That new strategy is expected to be launched by the summer. We want to ensure that the Government’s safer streets mission benefits everyone, no matter where they live, including those in rural communities. This joined-up approach between the Home Office, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and policing, as well as the confirmed funding for the national rural crime unit and the national wildlife crime unit, will help to ensure that the weight of Government is put behind tackling rural crimes such as the theft of high-value farm equipment, fly-tipping and livestock theft.

Given the work already ongoing in this area, I believe that the Liberal Democrat new clause is unnecessary, and I urge the hon. Member for Frome and East Somerset to withdraw it.

[Anna Sabine]

I want to come back on some of the questions asked by the Opposition spokesperson, the hon. Member for Stockton West. He asked about the resources that would be required to implement the strategy. Having spoken to the rural police force in my area, my understanding is that the issue is not necessarily one of rural officers being under-resourced, although more resource clearly would be helpful; it is actually to do with how those officers are allocated. For example, in Frome we have a rural crime team, but because of a lack of neighbourhood policing, if there is an incident in Frome on an evening—a fight outside a pub, for example—rural officers are deployed to go and deal with that rather than fighting rural crime. One of the challenges for those officers is that they are not actually allowed to do the job they are trained for, because they are covering for other areas.

The hon. Gentleman asked why the strategy was necessary when we already have various regional rural crime leads. The reason is that we need to ensure that rural crime is seen to be significant nationally—we need to have a national push and develop some strategies to tackle it. I welcome what the Minister said about that.

The shadow Minister’s third question was about defining rural areas. We are quite good at defining them now, so I am not sure why we could not continue to define rural crime areas in the way that constabularies do currently, but we could look at that.

I welcome the Minister’s comments on what is clearly a growing Government drive to take rural crime seriously. I do not doubt any of her figures about the reduction of crimes such as hare coursing. All I would say is that farmers in my constituency are really not reporting crimes, and I worry that crime figures are dropping simply because crime is not being reported, not because it is not occurring. The longer rural crime is not taken seriously, the more those numbers will drop.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I will respond directly to the points that have just been made about the Metropolitan police. It is worth reminding ourselves that the Metropolitan police are the best-funded part of policing in England and Wales. They constitute around 25% of policing, and this year they are receiving up to £3.8 billion to provide policing in London—it is worth reflecting on that. They have also received, as has every other police force, additional money to fund neighbourhood policing. I have had reassurance from the Met that the money will actually go into neighbourhood policing, which I think is worth saying.

While I fully appreciate what the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam is concerned about for his constituents, it has to be made clear that we have just come out of 14 years, many of which were years of austerity. I do not wish to labour the point, but the hon. Gentleman’s party was involved in the first five years of austerity, when cuts to the public services were most acute and severe. We are now at the end of that period and this Labour Government are trying to put money back into policing. I have been very clear that more money is going into the Metropolitan police and into every other police force, to build up neighbourhood policing in particular. A little bit of humility on the part of the Liberal Democrats might be helpful.

[Luke Taylor]

Again, I invite the Minister to respond to the specific point about the 1,700 fewer officers in London. Whatever the circumstances, people today are concerned about crime, including tool theft and sexual offences. We can argue back and forth about the note from the right hon. Member for Birmingham Hodge Hill and Solihull North (Liam Byrne), which said that there was no money left, about austerity or about how long memories go back. If there are to be cuts to the number officers next year in my constituency of Sutton and Cheam, and across London, let us address the issues at hand about how we mitigate the impact on our residents tomorrow.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I hear the hon. Gentleman’s point loud and clear. All members of this Committee are concerned about crime and want to ensure that crime goes down, that victims are supported and that the police are properly funded. We can probably all agree on that in this Committee. On the particular point about the Metropolitan police, I dispute the numbers that he has given. He is right that there will be a loss of PCSOs and police officers in ’24-25, but my understanding is that it is around 1,000, not 1,700. Subject to what happens in the spending review, we will have to look at what happens in future years.

The Metropolitan police have not had the necessary funding for years, which is why they are having to make some really tough decisions. Nobody wants to see a reduction in police officer numbers—I certainly do not, as the Policing Minister. The Home Secretary and I are working to do everything that we can to support police forces and not see reductions in PCSOs and police officers.

New clauses 15 and 16 seek to legislate for minimum levels of neighbourhood policing. I certainly agree with what the hon. Member for Frome and East Somerset said about the need to address the lamentable decline in neighbourhood policing since 2010, which we can all see, but legislating in the way that she proposes is unnecessarily prescriptive and risks imposing a straitjacket on the Home Office, police and crime commissioners and chief officers.

The Government are already delivering on our commitment to restore neighbourhood policing. We have already announced that police forces will be supported to deliver a 13,000 increase in neighbourhood policing by the end of this Parliament. By April ’26, there will be 3,000 more officers and PCSOs working in neighbourhood policing than there are today. This is backed up by an additional £200 million in the current financial year, as part of the total funding for police forces of £17.6 billion, which is an increase of £1.2 billion compared with the ’24-25 police funding settlement.

Additionally, the neighbourhood policing guarantee announced by the Prime Minister on 10 April sets out our wider commitment to the public. As part of that guarantee, every neighbourhood in England and Wales will have dedicated teams spending their time on the beat, with guaranteed police patrols in town centres and other hotspot areas at peak times, such as a Friday and Saturday night. Communities will also have a named, contactable officer to tackle the issues facing their communities. There will be a dedicated antisocial behaviour lead in every force, working with residents and businesses to develop tailored action plans to tackle antisocial behaviour, which we all know has blighted communities.

Those measures will be in place from July this year, in addition to the new neighbourhood officers, whom I have already mentioned, who will all be in their roles by next April. Finally, through the Government’s new police standards and performance improvement unit, we will ensure that police performance is consistently and accurately measured. The work of the unit will reinforce our commitment to transparency through the regular reporting of workforce data and the annual police grant report.

I wholeheartedly support the sentiment behind the new clauses. We absolutely need to bolster neighbourhood policing, reverse the cuts and set clear minimum standards of policing in local communities. Working closely with the National Police Chiefs’ Council, the policing inspectorate, the College of Policing and others, we have the levers to do that. Although the new clauses are well intentioned, I do not believe that they are necessary, so I invite the hon. Member to withdraw the motion.

[Anna Sabine]

The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton West, made a couple of points. The first related to who would set the levels of neighbourhood policing under the new clause. Our proposal is that it would be the Home Office, in discussion with local police forces and local councils—the people who know their area best. I can easily see that there would be a way of doing community engagement through councils as part of that discussion, which is another point that he made.

Of course it is important for local police and crime commissioners to have flexibility, but there is a problem with the lack of structure around the numbers for neighbourhood policing. In my constituency, if a big issue, event or activity happens in Bristol, a lot of the local police get taken off there, and we lose our neighbourhood policing. It is similar point to the one that was made earlier.

I welcome the Minister’s response, which was thoughtful as always, and I appreciate the commitment that the Government are making to neighbourhood policing. I hear all of that, but we will still press both new clauses in the group to a vote.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I thank the hon. Member for Frome and East Somerset for explaining the intention behind new clauses 17 and 18. The Government have been clear that water companies must accelerate action to reduce pollution to the environment. Ofwat, as the independent economic regulator of the water industry, sets water companies’ performance commitments, including those on pollution incidents, in the five-yearly price review process.

Where those performance commitments are not met, companies can incur financial penalties, which are returned to customers through lower bills in the next financial year. As a result of underperformance in the 2023-24 financial year, Ofwat is requiring companies to return £165.2 million to customers. Ofwat has just expanded those performance commitments further for the 2025-2030 period to include storm overflow spills and serious pollution incidents. That means that the regulator is already punishing water companies for failing to meet their pollution commitments.

Furthermore, the Water (Special Measures) Act 2025, which received Royal Assent earlier this year, significantly strengthens the power of the regulators and delivers on the Government’s commitment to put failing water companies in special measures. The Act introduced automatic penalties on polluters, and will ban bonuses for water company executives if they fail to meet adequate standards. Before introducing secondary legislation to implement automatic penalties, the Government will consult on the specific offences that will be in scope, and on the value of the penalties.

On the subject of senior management liability, the Water (Special Measures) Act creates a statutory requirement for all water companies to publish annual pollution incident reduction plans. The plans will require companies to set out clear actions and timelines to meaningfully reduce the frequency and seriousness of pollution incidents. Both the company and the chief executive will be personally liable for ensuring a compliant plan and report is published each year. In addition, measures from the Act, which came into force on 25 April, introduce stricter penalties, including imprisonment, where senior executives in water companies obstruct investigations by the Environment Agency and the Drinking Water Inspectorate.

The new clauses would cut across the recently strengthened regulatory regime, with enhanced penalties for the water companies that fail to live up to their obligations and increased powers for the regulator. Given that, the new clauses are unnecessary; indeed, they would add complexity and uncertainty in the regulatory process. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member to withdraw the motion.

[Anna Sabine]

I enjoyed the new clauses being called headline grabbing. They are certainly headline grabbing; the whole issue of sewage in our waters has been massively headline grabbing, because the public feel incredibly strongly that our waterways, and the rivers that we use and want to swim in, should not be full of sewage pumped out by private water companies. I think many members of the public would welcome a slightly more punitive approach than we saw under the last Government.

In terms of being unworkable, I think the new clauses are very practical and measurable—I am not sure in what way they are unworkable. Turning to the Minister’s comments, the Lib Dems have said that we welcome many of the directions taken in the Water (Special Measures) Act 2025, but we do not feel it goes far enough. Banning bosses’ bonuses is not the same as making them criminally responsible for some of the actions they are taking in terms of environmental negligence. Again, we will press both new clauses in the group to a vote.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

When deployed responsibly and with appropriate safeguards, facial recognition technology is an incredibly valuable tool in modern policing and public protection. It is already being used to identify serious offenders wanted for violent crime, terrorism and child exploitation; to locate vulnerable individuals, including missing children at risk; and to enhance safety in high-risk environments such as transport hubs, major events and public demonstrations. It enables rapid real-time identification without the need for physical contact—something that traditional methods, such as fingerprinting and ID checks, cannot provide in fast-moving situations. It can accelerate investigations, reduce resource demand and ultimately make public spaces safer.

The technology is improving in accuracy, especially when governed by transparent oversight, independent auditing and clear operational boundaries. I would be grateful for further comments on whether the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam and the Government feel that this proposed regulation of this crucial technology could limit the ability of law enforcement to respond swiftly to emerging threats or intelligence-led operations.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam for setting out the case for introducing new safeguards for the use of live facial recognition. I agree there need to be appropriate safeguards, but the issue requires careful consideration and I do not think that it can be shoehorned into this Bill.

I say strongly to the hon. Member that live facial recognition is a valuable policing tool that helps keep communities safe. If I may say so, I think that some of his information is a little out of date. Despite what he implied, the use of facial recognition technology is already subject to safeguards, including, among others, the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Data Protection Act 2008.

I fully accept, however, that there is a need to consider whether a bespoke legislative framework governing the use of live facial recognition technology for law enforcement purposes is needed. We need to get this right and balance the need to protect communities from crime and disorder while safeguarding individual rights. To that end, I have been listening to stakeholders and have already held a series of meetings about facial recognition, including with policing, regulators, research institutions, civil society groups and industry, to fully understand the concerns and what more can be done to improve the use of the technology.

I will outline our plans for facial recognition in the coming months. In the meantime, I hope that the hon. Member, having had this opportunity to air this important issue, will be content to withdraw his new clause.

[Luke Taylor]

Based on the comments and reassurances, I will be happy to withdraw the new clause. I would be interested in being involved in any discussions and updates as they come forward. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 22

Duty to follow strategic priorities of police and crime plan

“(1) The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 8(1) (Duty to have regard to police and crime plan), for ‘have regard to’ substitute ‘follow the strategic priorities of’.

(3) In section 8(2) for ‘have regard to’ substitute ‘follow the strategic priorities of’.

(4) In section 8(3) for ‘have regard to’ substitute ‘follow the strategic priorities of’.

(5) In section 8(4) for ‘have regard to’ substitute ‘follow the strategic priorities of’.”—(Matt Vickers.)

This new clause would require Police and Crime Commissioners to follow the strategic priorities of the police and crime plan rather than have regard to it.

Brought up, and read the First time.

--- Later in debate ---

Police and crime plans are regularly reviewed and updated in consultation with local communities and partners. The new clause would ensure that, once priorities are agreed, they are not sidelined, but instead become the backbone of local policing strategy. The new clause would strengthen the link between the democratic mandate of the police and crime commissioner, and the operational activity of police forces. It would ensure that the police and crime plan is not a token document, but a guiding framework for strategic decision making. By reinforcing the duty to follow agreed priorities, the new clause would enhance accountability, improve public trust and support the delivery of better, more responsive policing.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I thank the shadow Minister for tabling the new clause. As hon. Members will be aware, those vested with responsibility for providing democratic oversight of police forces—whether PCCs or mayors with PCC functions—have an important role in policing across England and Wales. They are responsible for holding their chief constable to account for the performance of their force and for setting, through their police and crime plan, their strategic objectives for the area. In setting police and crime plans, PCCs must consult their chief constable, the public and victims of crime in their area, as well as their local police and crime panel. As the directly elected representatives for policing in their area, PCCs have a choice as to how they implement their plan and the weight they give to each priority.

The new clause would have the effect of placing an inflexible duty on PCCs to follow their own priorities, with no ability to adapt to and reflect changing circumstances. The new clause would also encroach on the operational independence of chief constables. It risks constraining chief constables and the officers under their command, limiting their ability to balance local priorities as set out in the police and crime plan with their own assessment of threat, risk and harm.

In setting their police and crime plan, PCCs and chief constables must also have regard to the strategic policing requirement. If the amendments to the 2011 Act set out in the new clause were made, they would also have the effect of creating an inconsistency, making local police and crime plans the most important instrument for PCCs and others to follow, potentially at the expense of national priorities. The Home Secretary and I have been clear that the Government will work with PCCs and chief constables to set clear expectations for policing on performance and standards, and to ensure that our communities have an effective and efficient police force within their force area.

Through our forthcoming police reform White Paper, we are working closely with policing to explore and develop specific proposals to deliver effective and efficient police forces and to address the challenges faced by policing. That includes ensuring that policing is responsive to national and regional priorities, as well as to local needs. The Home Secretary will set out a road map for police reform in a White Paper to be published later this year, which will consider proposals to strengthen the relationship between PCCs and chief constables in a revised policing protocol. For those reasons, I invite the shadow Minister to withdraw his new clause.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

Used transparently and proportionately, stop and search can be a legitimate and effective tool in reducing violence. Clear communication about the rationale for its use, including public notifications when section 60 is authorised, helps to build trust in its deployment. Lowering the threshold would not undermine public confidence if the powers are exercised responsibly. Proposed new clause 35 is a measured and operationally meaningful change. It preserves the structure and safeguards of section 60, while allowing earlier, more effective intervention in response to anticipated violence. In so doing, it would strengthen the ability of the police to keep the public safe, particularly in urban areas, where violence may escalate quickly, and ensure that the law better matches the practical needs of modern policing, without compromising accountability or fairness.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I thank the hon. Member for his suggestions about the police response to violence and other serious offending. However, I believe that the changes contained in the proposed new clauses are unnecessary.

Regarding proposed new clause 29, I agree that transparency is important. That is why the Home Office already annually publishes extensive data on police recorded crime and the use of police powers. That data includes the number of stop and searches conducted, broken down by individual community safety partnership and police force areas. In addition, members of the public have access to detailed crime and stop and search maps on police.uk, which use monthly data directly provided by police forces. Police forces also publish detailed information on deployments of live facial recognition.

Turning to proposed new clause 35, I note that stop and search is a vital tool for tackling crime, particularly knife crime, but it must be used in a fair and effective way. That is particularly true of section 60 powers, which are the focus of the proposed new clause. Such powers may be authorised under certain conditions in response to, or anticipation of, serious violence, and allow officers to search individuals without the normal requirement for reasonable suspicion. The powers are rightly subject to strict constraints.

In practical terms, changing the threshold from “serious violence” to “violence” would not represent a meaningful change. Section 60 provides powers to search for offensive weapons or dangerous implements, and any use of such items is, by definition, serious violence. In the year to March 2024, the latest for which data is available, 5,145 stop and searches were undertaken in England and Wales under section 60 powers. They resulted in 71 people being found carrying offensive weapons and 212 arrests made on suspicion of a range of offences. I therefore urge the hon. Member to withdraw his proposed new clause.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause would mandate that the Secretary of State, through regulations, grant police access to His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs’ tobacco track and trace system. Such access would enable law enforcement to determine the provenance of tobacco products sold by retailers, specifically to identify whether those products were stolen. According to HMRC, the illicit market in tobacco duty and related VAT was £2.8 billion in 2021-22, preying on the most disadvantaged of communities. In 2023, about 6.7 billion counterfeit and contraband cigarettes were consumed, representing one in four cigarettes, thus undermining progress towards a smoke-free England by 2030.

With the negative impact that the illicit tobacco market has on communities and with UK revenue in mind, it is paramount that our police forces be provided with the resources required to counter the organised crime groups that dominate the illicit tobacco market. The sale of illicit tobacco on the black market also poses significant risks to public health, with illegal tobacco often containing five times the standard level of cadmium, six times as much lead, 1.6 times more tar and 1.3 times more carbon monoxide than regulated cigarettes and rolling tobacco.

The illicit tobacco market poses significant challenges, including revenue loss for the Government and health risks for consumers. Professor Emmeline Taylor’s report, “Lighting Up”, emphasises the potential of TT&T in identifying and prosecuting offenders involved in the illegal tobacco trade. Granting police access to TT&T would strengthen efforts to dismantle organised crime networks profiting from counterfeit tobacco sales.

Giving the police access to TT&T technology has the potential to disrupt the illicit tobacco trade and has been highlighted by the National Business Crime Centre, which argues that police utilisation of TT&T would allow them to routinely check tobacco sold by local retailers to ensure legitimacy, thus shrinking the pool of buyers for criminal gangs and lowering demand for stolen tobacco, helping police to tackle organised crime and safeguard legitimate business.

As a signatory to the World Health Organisation’s framework convention on tobacco control, the UK is obligated to implement measures that curb illicit tobacco trade. Providing police with TT&T access aligns with those commitments by enhancing the traceability and accountability of tobacco products throughout the supply chain. Illicit tobacco sales undermine legitimate retailers who comply with regulations and pay due taxes. Empowering police to identify and act against illegal tobacco products helps to level the playing field, ensuring that law-abiding businesses are not disadvantaged by competitors engaging in unlawful practices.

With that in mind, the Opposition believe that new clause 38, which would grant police access to the UK TT&T system to help determine whether a retailer has obtained stolen or counterfeit tobacco illegally, is necessary to facilitate the police in carrying out their duty in delivering the current plans for smoke-free England 2030. It will help to claim back revenue currently lost to the black market trade of tobacco and protect public health by disrupting the trade in these bogus products.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

New clause 38 seeks to grant the police access to the tobacco track and trace system, as we have just heard. The scourge of the illicit tobacco trade threatens the health of UK citizens, robs the public purse of billions of pounds and funds the wider activities of organised crime. All businesses in the tobacco supply chain are required to register within the track and trace system, and individual tobacco products are tracked from the point of manufacture up to the point of retail. The track and trace system includes a reporting platform that enables nominated authorities to access registry data, traceability data for individual products and UK-wide tobacco market data.

I understand the intention behind the shadow Minister’s new clause, and I know that we both share the same goal of working with our law enforcement agencies to tackle illicit tobacco. The principle of maximising the use of traceability data in these efforts to tackle illicit tobacco is sound. Existing legislation strictly limits who can access traceability and the purposes for which it may be used. At the moment, only HMRC and trading standards may access this data.

I reassure the Opposition that engagement is already under way between the police and HMRC to investigate opportunities for extending access for the police to traceability data. When that engagement is complete, the Government will consider whether it is appropriate to bring forward any necessary legislative changes. However, I do not wish, at this stage, to pre-empt the outcome of that engagement through legislation. In the light of those reassurances, I ask the shadow Minister to withdraw the motion.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

Crime and Policing Bill (Thirteenth sitting)

Diana Johnson Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 8th May 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

Before we continue line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill, I have a few preliminary reminders for the Committee—I am sure Members are aware of these. Please switch electronic devices to vibrate or silent. No food or drink is permitted during Committee sittings, except for water, unless you have a particular health need—obviously, speak to me, and I am sure that will be fine. Hansard colleagues would be grateful if Members email their speaking notes to [email protected], or alternatively pass their written speaking notes to the Hansard colleague in the room. Very importantly, Members are reminded to bob and catch my eye if they wish to speak in any debate. We will have a two-minute silence at 12 noon.

New Clause 21

Terrorism offences excepted from defence for slavery or trafficking victims

“(1) Schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (offences to which defence in section 45 does not apply) is amended as follows.

(2) In paragraph 29 (offences under the Terrorism Act 2000)—

(a) before the entry for section 54 insert—

‘section 11 (membership of a proscribed organisation)

section 12 (support of a proscribed organisation)

section 15 (fund-raising for terrorism)

section 16 (use and possession of property for terrorism)

section 17 (funding arrangements)

section 17A (insurance against payments made in response to terrorist demands)

section 18 (money laundering)

section 19 (disclosure of information: duty)

section 21A (failure to disclose: regulated sector)

section 38B (information about acts of terrorism)

section 39 (disclosure of information prejudicial to investigation)’;

(b) after the entry for section 57 insert—

‘section 58 (collection of information)

section 58A (eliciting, publishing or communicating information about members of armed forces etc)

section 58B (entering or remaining in a designated area)’.

(3) In paragraph 31 (offences under the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001), after the entry for section 50 insert—

‘section 67 (security of pathogens and toxins)

section 79 (disclosures relating to nuclear security)’.

(4) In paragraph 35 (offences under the Terrorism Act 2006)—

(a) before the entry for section 5 insert—

‘section 1 (encouragement of terrorism)

section 2 (dissemination of terrorist publications)’;

(b) after the entry for section 6 insert—

‘section 8 (attendance at a place used for terrorist training)’.

(5) After paragraph 35 insert—

‘Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (c.28)

35ZA An offence under section 54 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (offences relating to notification).

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (c. 23)

35ZB An offence under section 23 of the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (contravention of terrorism prevention and investigation measures notice).

Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (c. 6)

35ZC An offence under section 10 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (breach of temporary exclusion order or notice).’

(6) The amendments made by this section do not apply in relation to an offence committed before this section comes into force.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause excepts the listed terrorism offences from the defence in section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 61

Notification requirements

“(1) This section applies where a youth diversion order requires the respondent to comply with this section.

(2) Before the end of the period of three days beginning with the day on which a youth diversion order requiring the respondent to comply with this section is first served, the respondent must notify to the police—

(a) the respondent’s name and, where the respondent uses one or more other names, each of those names,

(b) the respondent’s home address, and

(c) the name and address of any educational establishment the respondent normally attends.

(3) If, while the respondent is required to comply with this section, the respondent—

(a) uses a name which has not been notified under the order,

(b) changes home address, or

(c) begins to attend an educational establishment the name and address of which have not been notified under the order,

the respondent must notify, to the police, the new name, the new home address or the name and address of the new educational establishment.

(4) A notification under subsection (3) must be given before the end of the period of three days beginning with the day on which the respondent uses the name, changes home address or first attends the educational establishment.

(5) A notification under this section is given by—

(a) attending at a police station in the police area in which the home address, or the court which made the order, is situated, and

(b) giving an oral notification to a constable, or to a person authorised for the purpose by the officer in charge of the station.

(6) A notification under this section must be acknowledged in writing.

(7) In this section ‘home address’ means—

(a) the address of the respondent’s sole or main residence in the United Kingdom, or

(b) where the respondent has no such residence, the address or location of a place in the United Kingdom where the respondent can regularly be found and, if there is more than one such place, such one of those places as the respondent may select.

(8) In determining the period of three days mentioned in subsection (2) or (4), no account is to be taken of any time when the respondent is—

(a) in police detention within the meaning of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (see section 118(2) of that Act);

(b) remanded in or committed to custody by an order of a court or kept in service custody,

(c) serving a sentence of imprisonment or a term of service detention,

(d) detained in a hospital, or

(e) outside the United Kingdom.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause enables a youth diversion order to require the respondent to notify to the police their name and address and the name and address of any educational establishment they normally attend.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 62

Electronic monitoring of compliance with order: England and Wales

“(1) A youth diversion order made by a court in England and Wales may impose on the respondent a requirement (an ‘electronic monitoring requirement’) to submit to electronic monitoring of the respondent’s compliance with prohibitions or requirements imposed by the order. This is subject to section (Conditions for imposing electronic monitoring requirement: England and Wales).

(2) A youth diversion order that includes an electronic monitoring requirement must specify the person who is to be responsible for the monitoring.

(3) The person specified under subsection (2) (‘the responsible person’) must be of a description specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State by statutory instrument.

(4) Where a youth diversion order imposes an electronic monitoring requirement, the respondent must (among other things)—

(a) submit, as required from time to time by the responsible person, to—

(i) being fitted with, or the installation of, any necessary apparatus, and

(ii) the inspection or repair of any apparatus fitted or installed for the purposes of the monitoring;

(b) not interfere with, or with the working of, any apparatus fitted or installed for the purposes of the monitoring;

(c) take any steps required by the responsible person for the purpose of keeping in working order any apparatus fitted or installed for the purposes of the monitoring.

These obligations have effect as requirements of the order.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause enables a youth diversion order to require the respondent to submit to electronic monitoring of their compliance with the prohibitions or requirements of the order (if the conditions set out in NC63) are met.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 63

Conditions for imposing electronic monitoring requirement: England and Wales

“(1) This section applies for the purpose of determining whether a court in England and Wales may impose an electronic monitoring requirement under section (Electronic monitoring of compliance with order: England and Wales).

(2) An electronic monitoring requirement may not be imposed in the respondent’s absence.

(3) If there is a person (other than the respondent) without whose co-operation it would be impracticable to secure the monitoring in question, the requirement may not be imposed without that person’s consent.

(4) A court may impose the requirement in relation to a relevant police area only if—

(a) the Secretary of State has given notification that electronic monitoring arrangements are available in the area, and

(b) it is satisfied that the necessary provision can be made under the arrangements currently available.

(5) For this purpose ‘relevant police area’ means—

(a) in any case, the police area in England and Wales in which it appears to the court that the respondent resides or will reside, or

(b) in a case where it is proposed to include in the order—

(i) a requirement that the respondent remains, for specified periods, at a specified place in England and Wales, or

(ii) provision prohibiting the respondent from entering a specified place or area in England and Wales,

the police area in which the place or area proposed to be specified is situated.

(6) In subsection (5) ‘specified’ means specified in the youth diversion order.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause sets out the conditions for imposing an electronic monitoring requirement under NC62.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 64

Data from electronic monitoring in England and Wales: code of practice

“The Secretary of State must issue a code of practice relating to the processing of data gathered in the course of electronic monitoring of persons under electronic monitoring requirements (within the meaning of section (Electronic monitoring of compliance with order: England and Wales)) imposed by youth diversion orders in England and Wales.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to issue a code of practice relating to the processing of data gathered under electronic monitoring requirements imposed under NC62.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 65

Reviews of operation of this Chapter

“In the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, in section 44(2) (provisions the operation of which the person appointed under section 36(1) of the Terrorism Act 2006 is also responsible for reviewing), after paragraph (e) insert—

‘(f) Chapter 1 of Part 14 of the Crime and Policing Act 2025.’” —(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This amendment provides for the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation to report on the operation of Chapter 1 of Part 14 of the Bill (youth diversion orders).

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 66

Remote sales of knives etc

“(1) Section 141B of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (remote sales of knives) is amended as follows.

(2) For subsection (4) substitute—

‘(4) Condition A is that, before the sale—

(a) the seller obtained from the buyer—

(i) a copy of an identity document issued to the buyer, and

(ii) a photograph of the buyer, and

(b) on the basis of the things obtained under paragraph (a), a reasonable person would have been satisfied that the buyer was aged 18 or over.

(4A) For the purposes of subsection (4) an “identity document” means—

(a) a United Kingdom passport (within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971);

(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom or by or on behalf of an international organisation;

(c) a licence to drive a motor vehicle granted under Part 3 of the Road Traffic 1988 or under Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/154 (N.I. 1));

(d) any other document specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.’

(3) In subsection (5)(b), for ‘a person aged 18 or over’ substitute ‘the buyer’.

(4) In subsection (6), for ‘a person aged 18 or over’ substitute ‘the buyer’.

(5) In subsection (8), omit ‘or a person acting on behalf of the buyer’ in both places it occurs.

(6) After subsection (9) insert—

‘(10) Regulations made by the Secretary of State under this section are to be made by statutory instrument.

(11) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause makes changes to the defences available to a person who sells knives etc to under 18s, in contravention of section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, where the sale is made remotely (e.g. online).

Brought up, and read the First time.

[The Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government new clause 67—Delivery of knives etc.

Government new clause 68—Duty to report remote sales of knives etc in bulk: England and Wales.

Government new clause 69—Remote sale and letting of crossbows.

Government new clause 70—Delivery of crossbows.

Government new clause 71—Sale and delivery of crossbows: supplementary provision.

Government new clause 72—“Relevant user-to-user services”, “relevant search services” and “service providers”.

Government new clause 73—Coordinating officer.

Government new clause 74—Notice requiring appointment of content manager.

Government new clause 75—Appointment of content manager following change of circumstances.

Government new clause 76—Replacement of content manager.

Government new clause 77—Duty to notify changes in required information.

Government new clause 78—Failure to comply with content manager requirements: civil penalty.

Government new clause 79—Unlawful weapons content.

Government new clause 80—Content removal notices.

Government new clause 81—Content removal notices: review.

Government new clause 82—Decision notices requiring removal of unlawful weapons content.

Government new clause 83—Failure to comply with content removal notice or decision notice: civil penalties.

Government new clause 84—Guidance.

Government new clause 85—Notices.

Government new clause 86—Interpretation of Chapter.

Government new schedule 1—Civil penalties for service providers and content managers.

Government amendments 80 and 81.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

It is nice to see you back in the Chair, Mr Pritchard. This group of new clauses makes extensive and timely changes to the law around the sale and marketing of offensive weapons, particularly knives and crossbows. These measures form part of the steps that we are taking to tackle knife crime. They will implement recommendations from the police’s independent end-to-end review of online knife sales, undertaken by Commander Stephen Clayman at the request of the Home Secretary, and will deliver on our manifesto commitment to hold to account senior managers who flout the rules on online sales.

New clauses 66 and 67 introduce new, stricter age verification at the point of sale and on delivery for knives bought online. New clauses 69 and 70 make the same changes in respect of crossbows. Commander Clayman’s review highlighted that existing age-verification methods for online sales are insufficient. Buyers can provide false birth dates and parcels can be left with neighbours so that there is no age check of the buyer. Existing legislation, as contained in the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and the Offensive Weapons Act 2019, already requires age checks for the sale and delivery of knives. We are introducing two key changes to the existing requirements.

First, the checks at the point of sale will have to include photographic identity documents, plus a current photograph to demonstrate that the identity documents belong to the buyer. Secondly, on delivery, couriers will be required to check photographic identification provided by the person receiving the package. There will also be a new offence of handing the knife to someone other than the buyer. That will mean that knives cannot be left on doorsteps or with neighbours with no checks of the intended recipient.

[David Burton-Sampson (Southend West and Leigh) (Lab)]

The Minister will remember me mentioning Julie Taylor, who has campaigned locally on this issue after the death of her grandson Liam. She welcomes these new clauses. She said to me that she welcomes anything that helps get rid of this awful crime, and that she thanks the Government for introducing them. Does the Minister agree that these measures give an even greater level of protection and prevention so that we can start to drive down the awful offence of knife crime?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that contribution. It is heartening to know that Julie supports these new clauses and recognises the important role that they can play in tackling knife crime. Again, I extend my condolences to Julie and her family on the death of Liam.

These clauses also have the support of the coalition to tackle knife crime, which involves many families, campaigners and victims of knife crime helping the Government to develop policy. They will make sure that we are held to account for our promise to halve knife crime over the next decade, including through the strengthened requirements in the new clauses, which aim to ensure that under-18s cannot easily evade checks when buying knives online, as they have sadly in the past.

Like knives, crossbows are an age-restricted item and cannot be sold or hired to anyone under the age of 18. Legislation for crossbows was brought in through the Crossbows Act 1987, but in contrast to knives, there has been little change to that legislation since. These new clauses seek to introduce the same age-verification requirements for the online sale, hire and delivery of crossbows as are being brought in, or are already in place, for knives.

New clause 69 amends the 1987 Act to introduce equivalent age-verification methods for crossbows to those in section 141B of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, which provides limitations on the defence to the offence of selling a knife. For crossbows, where the seller or seller’s agent is not in the presence of the buyer, the seller will not be regarded as having taken

“all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence”

unless all the conditions are met.

Condition 1 is that the seller obtained a copy of an identity document and a photograph of the buyer. Condition 2 is that the package containing the article was clearly marked by the seller to say that it contained a crossbow or crossbow part and that it should be delivered only into the hands of a person aged 18 or over. Condition 3 is that the seller took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to ensure that it would be delivered into the hands of the buyer. Condition 4 is that the seller did not deliver the package, or arrange for its delivery, to a locker.

As with bladed articles, before the dispatch of the crossbow or part of a crossbow, the seller must receive from the buyer a copy of an identity document issued to the buyer and a photograph of the buyer, and confirm that they are aged 18 or over. New clause 70 amends the Crossbows Act 1987 to create a new offence on the part of the seller if they deliver or arrange for delivery to residential premises in respect of the sale or letting of a crossbow or part of a crossbow, similar to equivalent defences to those in section 39A of the Offensive Weapons Act 2019 for knives.

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

I thank the Minister for setting out in detail the provisions for where crossbows are sold and the seller is not in the presence of the buyer. On providing identity documents and photographic evidence, is she concerned that the wording that she used is vague and that there is scope for providing false documents? Perhaps she could reassure me that, in some cases, copies would certified by a solicitor or someone of sufficient standing in the community—whatever the wording might be. I am concerned that false documents could be provided, but perhaps there is provision to stop that.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that point, and it is of concern to me as the Minister. We are introducing this new procedure because we think that the current legislation around buying and delivering is not strong enough. I take his point and I will reflect on it. It may be—I do need to think about it—that it would be onerous to have certified copies. We want to get this right, however, and ensure that accurate legal documents are used, so I will come back to that point.

I will return to the new clauses, so that the Committee is clear about what they will do. New clause 70 also provides for a new offence on the part of the courier or the person delivering on their behalf, equivalent to the new offence that I have described for the delivery of a knife. The courier or person delivering on behalf of the courier must provide the crossbow or parts of crossbows only into the hands of the actual buyer, and only at the address that the buyer provided at the outset. If the courier or person delivering on behalf of the courier fails to do that, they will commit a summary offence attracting a maximum penalty of an unlimited fine.

It will be a defence, however, for the courier or person delivering on behalf of the courier to show that they have checked an official identity document, and that the ID has the name of the person indicated by the seller, that it shows that the holder is over 18, and that as far as they can tell, the picture in the identity document is of the person at the doorstep. Where businesses hire out or let crossbows for corporate events or entertainment—something that I did not know happened, but apparently does—and do so online, the age-verification measures will apply to the hire and delivery of the crossbows where the hirer is an individual. New clause 71 also provides a power for the Secretary of State to issue statutory guidance on the new offence under the Crossbows Act 1987.

Turning to the reportable sale of knives, new clause 68 introduces a requirement to report all sales of knives where they are made remotely, including online sales. That will help the police to tackle what is called the grey market—the resale of knives on social media. The police tell us that grey market sellers act irresponsibly. For example, they promote knives as weapons, which is unlawful, and they do not conduct age-verification checks. The new clause will give the police information that will enable them to act. Sellers who do not comply will be liable to a fine.

Sales are reportable where six knives or more, or two or more qualifying sets of knives such as a block of knives, or one or more qualifying set together with five or more knives, are sold remotely in one sale and are to be delivered to the same residential address in England or Wales. The reporting requirement is also triggered when multiple sales meeting those limits are made to the same person or the same residential address in England or Wales within a 30-day period.

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Bishop (Forest of Dean) (Lab)]

I welcome the new clauses—thinking back to my policing days, they are extremely welcome. Is there a risk that if we do not add these clauses to restrict such sales, knife crime and crossbow crime could become more prevalent over the coming years?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

These new clauses on bulk and suspicious sales come directly from the police—from Commander Clayman’s report and his concern about the grey market. The police clearly believe that these new measures are necessary for them to use this intelligence to tackle our problems with knife crime. Obviously, that fits with the Government’s manifesto commitment to halve knife crime over the next 10 years.

That information and intelligence will be sent to a central unit in the first instance. We will provide guidance to the police on the use of that information. We expect that the information that is not connected to other relevant intelligence linking it to criminality will be deleted and not subject to further investigation.

I turn now to the sanctions on online executives. Government new clauses 72 to 86 and new schedule 1 introduce civil penalties for online companies and their senior managers should they fail to take down illegal knife and offensive weapons content when notified of it by the police. Knives and weapons that are illegally marketed to encourage violence or to promote their suitability for use in violent attacks are commonly sold online and then used in senseless attacks. We know that the boys who murdered Ronan Kanda did so using weapons that had been illegally sold online. Many of those types of knives are marketed on social media and other platforms, meaning that those companies indirectly profit from their sale.

Commander Clayman’s review set out the extent of the problem related to the online sale of knives and offensive weapons, particularly where it relates to knives illegally being made available to young people. That report recommended that social media platforms be required to remove such prohibited material within 48 hours of police notification. These new clauses deliver on that recommendation.

The Home Office consulted widely on these measures. We engaged directly with tech companies and also held a public consultation. Tech companies and associations, charities, councils and members of the public responded to the consultation, and our response to that was published recently.

Collectively, the new clauses will grant the police the power to issue content removal notices to online marketplaces, social media platforms and search engines. The notices will require them to take down specified illegal content relating to knives or offensive weapons. If the specified content is not taken down within 48 hours, the company and an executive designated as their content manager would be liable to civil penalty notices of up to £60,000 and £10,000 respectively. Additionally, should a company fail to designate an appropriate UK-based executive when required to do so by the police, it would be liable for a civil penalty notice of up to £60,000.

These measures provide important safeguards. Both online companies and their designated executives will have the opportunity to request that the content removal notice be reviewed. The police must comply with such requests. Should online companies not have an executive who meets the criteria to be designated as their content manager, they will have the opportunity to inform the police as such. Prior to the issuing of a civil penalty notice, the company and the content manager will have the opportunity to make representations to the police. Finally, penalty notices may of course be challenged in the courts.

I fully expect online companies to act responsibly and take down harmful illegal content when made aware of it. The measures will be used in the rare cases where reckless companies choose to continue hosting such content. Taken together, this is a comprehensive package of measures that will further help to restrict the supply of weapons, particularly to children, and to keep our communities safe. I commend the new clauses to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Pritchard. The Opposition welcome the measures that aim to restrict the sale of knives in a wider bid to tackle knife crime. The unregulated purchase of dangerous items such as knives or crossbows presents a serious and growing threat to public safety. Without proper controls the weapons can be easily acquired by individuals with harmful intent, including gang members, violent offenders and young people at risk of exploitation. The availability of such items online without age verification, purchase limits or traceability undermines efforts to reduce knife crime and protect communities. It also places law enforcement in a reactive position, forced to respond to violence that could have been prevented through stronger regulation and control. Ensuring proper safeguards around the sale and distribution of knives is not about restricting legitimate use: it is about closing loopholes that are currently exploited to devastating effect.

Government new clause 66 strengthens the legal framework around the remote sale of knives by tightening the requirement for verifying the age of the buyer. Under the proposed changes to section 141B of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, sellers must obtain both a copy of a valid identity document and a photograph of the buyer before the sale is made. A reasonable person would need to be satisfied that the buyer is 18 or over, based on the evidence. By increasing the burden of proof on the seller and clarifying acceptable forms of ID, the measure aims to reduce the availability of knives to young people and close key loopholes in online transactions, contributing to broader efforts to curb knife crime.

Government new clause 68 introduces a legal duty for sellers in England and Wales to report bulk remote sales of knives and other bladed articles, marking a significant step forward in tackling the online flow of potentially dangerous weapons. The measure is aimed at identifying suspicious buying patterns that might indicate stockpiling for criminal use or illicit resale, helping enforcement bodies to monitor and disrupt supply chains. Notably, the duty applies to individuals and businesses unless the buyer can prove they are a VAT-registered business or incorporated company. Failure to report such sales will rightly be a criminal offence, although sellers will have a due-diligence defence if they can demonstrate they took reasonable steps to comply. The clause bolsters the UK’s strategy to reduce knife crime by increasing accountability in the remote sales sector and closing gaps that criminals may exploit.

Government new clauses 69 to 71 amend the Crossbows Act 1987 to tighten the rules on remote sale and delivery of crossbows, preventing sales to under-18s. Government new clause 69 requires sellers to verify the buyer’s age with identity documents and photographs, ensuring marked packages are delivered only to the buyer, and not to lockers. Government new clause 70 creates offences for delivering crossbows to residential premises or lockers. Government new clause 71 defines terms, allows regulations for additional offences and extends guidance to cover crossbow offences. This aligns with the Bill’s aims to enhance public safety. I would be grateful if the Minister could tell the Committee how the Government will support businesses in complying with the new verification requirements. What resources will ensure effective enforcement of delivery restrictions?

Government new clauses 72 to 83 establish a framework for regulating online service providers by requiring the appointment of content managers to oversee compliance with a new chapter of the Bill. Government new clause 73 mandates the Secretary of State to designate a co-ordinating officer from a police force or the National Crime Agency to manage functions, with authority to delegate tasks. Government new clause 74 empowers the co-ordinating officer to issue an appointment notice requiring service providers to appoint a UK resident content manager within seven days or confirm that no suitable candidate exists, and provide contact details.

Government new clause 75 requires providers to appoint a content manager within seven days if a suitable candidate emerges within two years after they reported them non-existing. Government new clause 76 allows providers to replace content managers and mandates notification within seven days if a manager no longer meets eligibility criteria, requiring a new appointment or confirmation that there is no candidate. Government new clause 77 obliges providers to notify the co-ordinating officer of any changes in required information within seven days, and Government new clause 78 authorises penalties of up to £60,000 for non-compliance, including failure to appoint a manager, provide accurate information or correct any false statements. Government new clause 80 empowers authorised officers to issue content removal notices to providers and content managers, requiring removal of unlawful weapons content within 48 hours.

Government new clause 81 allows recipients to request a review of removal notices within 48 hours, with a senior officer reviewing and confirming, modifying or withdrawing the notice. Government new clause 82 requires decision notices post-review to enforce content removal within 24 hours or the remaining 48-hour period. Will the Government do anything to support service providers—especially smaller platforms—in meeting content manager appointment requirements and ensuring that there is appropriate guidance or training available? How will the co-ordinating officer ensure consistent enforcement of these obligations across diverse online services?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I thank the shadow Minister for the general tone of his response on this group of Government new clauses, which come directly from the review that Commander Clayman set out, as well the manifesto commitment we made, particularly around tech executives and holding them to account.

There has been a great deal of consultation, particularly around the tech executives, how it would work and engagement with tech companies. I take the shadow Minister’s point about smaller platforms, but there has been that engagement. On the issue around training and enforcement in terms of the new clauses relating to sale and delivery, it is clear that all courier and delivery companies will have to ensure that their staff are trained on these new legal requirements. To be clear, if the person who is delivering the package has taken all steps to make sure that they have checked the information that is being provided and the identification document, and they are acting reasonably, that is a defence, but there will be a need for training and for people to know what their legal obligations are, particularly when they are delivering, because we know that has been a particular issue. The engagement, particularly with tech executives, that I talked about has also happened with courier firms and delivery businesses, and will continue.

I want to go back to the point that the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East raised about identity checks, just so everybody is clear.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

I call the Minister.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Thank you, Mr Pritchard. I wanted to make it clear that the documents that are being talked about in relation to proving identity are passports and driving licences. I take the point that the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East raised with me in his intervention, but those are the two documents that will be looked at and provided. We will want to make sure that this works, and in the future, other documents may well need to be added to that list. However, just to be clear, it is those two documents.

As I have also said, we would expect that a person who is delivering would look at those documents. I do not really want to get into how those documents can be forged, because that is obviously an issue that is on the hon. Gentleman’s mind, but at the moment those are the two documents, and we would expect them to be examined by a delivery driver or courier when the items are delivered.

[Joe Robertson]

I thank the Minister; that is helpful. Those documents are obviously very hard to forge, so I was not suggesting that they might be forged. My question was about was the possibility—I may simply be wrong here—of someone else presenting those documents. They are not forgeries; they are simply not the passport or driving licence of the buyer. Clearly, if the buyer has to be present when they present those documents to the person making the delivery, there is plainly not an issue, so I welcome that.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am glad that the hon. Gentleman is clear. As we have said, photographic identity has to be provided at the beginning of the process—at the point of sale—as well as the identity document, to ensure it matches up.

With that, I commend these measures to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 66 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 67

Delivery of knives etc

“(1) The Offensive Weapons Act 2019 is amended as follows.

(2) After section 39 insert—

‘39A Defences to offence under section 38: England and Wales

(1) It is a defence for a person charged in England and Wales with an offence under section 38(2) of delivering a bladed product to residential premises to show that the delivery conditions were met.

(2) It is a defence for a person (“the seller”) charged in England and Wales with an offence under section 38(2) of arranging for the delivery of a bladed product to residential premises to show that—

(a) the arrangement required the person with whom it was made not to finally deliver the bladed product unless the delivery conditions were met, and

(b) the seller took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to ensure that the product would not be finally delivered unless the delivery conditions were met.

(3) It is a defence for a person charged in England and Wales with an offence under section 38(3) to show that they took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid commission of the offence.

(4) The delivery conditions are that—

(a) the person (“P”) into whose hands the bladed product was finally delivered showed the person delivering it an identity document issued to P, and

(b) on the basis of that document a reasonable person would have been satisfied—

(i) that P was over 18, and

(ii) if the buyer was an individual, that P was the buyer.

(5) In subsection (4) “identity document” means—

(a) a United Kingdom passport (within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971);

(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom or by or on behalf of an international organisation;

(c) a licence to drive a motor vehicle granted under Part 3 of the Road Traffic 1988 or under Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/154 (N.I. 1));

(d) any other document specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.

(6) A person is to be taken to have shown a matter for the purposes of this section if—

(a) sufficient evidence of the matter is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and

(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

(7) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide for other defences for a person charged in England and Wales with an offence under section 38.’

(3) After section 40 insert—

‘40A Delivery of bladed products sold by UK seller to residential premises: England and Wales

(1) This section applies if—

(a) a person (“the seller”) sells a bladed product to another person (“the buyer”),

(b) the seller and the buyer are not in each other’s presence at the time of the sale and the seller is within the United Kingdom at that time,

(c) before the sale the seller entered into an arrangement with a person (“the courier”) by which the courier agreed to deliver bladed products for the seller,

(d) the courier was aware when they entered into the arrangement that it covered the delivery of bladed products, and

(e) pursuant to the arrangement, the courier finally delivers the bladed product to residential premises in England or Wales.

(2) The courier commits an offence if, when they finally deliver the bladed product to residential premises in England and Wales, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—

(a) is aged 18 or over, and

(b) if the buyer is an individual, is the buyer.

(3) A person finally delivering the bladed product to residential premises in England and Wales on behalf of the courier commits an offence if, when they deliver it, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—

(a) is aged 18 or over, and

(b) if the buyer is an individual, is the buyer.

(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (2) to show that the delivery conditions (within the meaning of section 39A(4)) were met.

(5) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (3) to show that—

(a) the delivery conditions (within the meaning of section 39A(4)) were met, or

(b) the person did not know, and a reasonable person would not have known, that the person was delivering a bladed product.

(6) A person is to be taken to have shown a matter for the purposes of this section if—

(a) sufficient evidence of the matter is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and

(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

(7) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine.

(8) Section 39(2) to (5) applies for the purposes of subsection (1)(b) and (e) as it applies for the purposes of section 39(1)(b) and (e).

(9) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide for other defences for a person charged with an offence under this section.’

(4) After section 42 insert—

‘42A Delivery of bladed articles sold by non-UK seller to premises: England and Wales

(1) This section applies if—

(a) a person (“the seller”) sells a bladed article to another person (“the buyer”),

(b) the seller and the buyer are not in each other’s presence at the time of the sale and the seller is outside the United Kingdom at that time,

(c) before the sale the seller entered into an arrangement with a person (“the courier”) by which the courier agreed to deliver bladed articles for the seller,

(d) the courier was aware when they entered into the arrangement that it covered the delivery of bladed articles, and

(e) pursuant to the arrangement, the courier finally delivers the bladed article to premises in England or Wales.

(2) The courier commits an offence if, when they finally deliver the bladed article, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—

(a) is aged 18 or over, and

(b) if the buyer is an individual, is the buyer.

(3) A person finally delivering the bladed article on behalf of the courier commits an offence if, when they deliver the bladed article, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—

(a) is aged 18 or over, and

(b) if the buyer is an individual, is the buyer.

(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (2) to show that the delivery conditions were met.

(5) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (3) to show that—

(a) the delivery conditions were met, or

(b) the person did not know, and a reasonable person would not have known, that the person was delivering a bladed article.

(6) A person is to be taken to have shown a matter for the purposes of this section if—

(a) sufficient evidence of the matter is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and

(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

(7) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine.

(8) Section 42(2) and (3) applies for the purposes of subsection (1)(b) as it applies for the purposes of section 42(1)(b).

(9) In this section—

“bladed article” means an article to which section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 applies (as that section has effect in relation to England and Wales);

“delivery conditions” has the meaning given by section 39A(4), but reading the reference in that section to a bladed product as a reference to a bladed article.’

(5) In section 38(10) (offences) for “section” substitute “sections 39A and”.

(6) In section 39 (delivery of bladed products to persons under 18)—

(a) in the heading, at the end insert “: Scotland and Northern Ireland”;

(b) in subsection (1)(e) after “premises” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;

(c) in subsection (7) omit paragraph (a).

(7) In section 40 (defences to delivery offences under sections 38 and 39)—

(a) in the heading, after “39” insert “: Scotland and Northern Ireland”;

(b) in subsection (1) after “charged” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;

(c) in subsection (2) after “charged” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;

(d) in subsection (3) after “charged” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;

(e) in subsection (4) after “charged” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;

(f) in subsection (5) after “charged” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;

(g) in subsection (6) after “charged” insert “in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;

(h) in subsection (7), omit “England and Wales or”;

(i) in subsection (14), in the definition of “appropriate national authority” omit paragraph (a).

(8) In section 41 (meaning of “bladed product” in sections 38 to 40)—

(a) in the heading, for “40” substitute “40A”;

(b) in subsection (1) for “40” substitute “40A”;

(c) in subsection (2) for “40” substitute “40A”.

(9) In section 42 (delivery of knives etc pursuant to arrangement with seller outside UK)—

(a) in the heading, at the end insert “: Scotland and Northern Ireland”;

(b) in subsection (1)(e), after “article” insert “to premises in Scotland or Northern Ireland”;

(c) in subsection (5) omit “England and Wales or”;

(d) omit subsection (10)(a);

(e) omit subsection (11)(a).

(10) In section 66(1)(j) (guidance on offences relating to offensive weapons etc) for “42” substitute “42A”.

(11) In section 68 (regulations and orders)—

(a) in subsection (2) after “State” insert, “, except for regulations under section 39A(5)(d),”;

(b) after subsection (2) insert—

“(2A) A statutory instrument containing regulations under section 39A(5)(d) is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.”’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause makes changes to the offences and defences relating to delivery of knives to premises in England and Wales following a remote sale.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 68

Duty to report remote sales of knives etc in bulk: England and Wales

“(1) In the Criminal Justice Act 1988, after section 141C insert—

‘141D Duty to report remote sales of knives etc in bulk: England and Wales

(1) A person (“the seller”) must, in accordance with requirements specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State by statutory instrument, report to the person specified in the regulations any reportable sales the seller makes of bladed articles.

(2) A reportable sale of bladed articles occurs where the seller, in any of the ways set out in subsection (4), sells—

(a) six or more bladed articles, none of which form a qualifying set of bladed articles;

(b) two or more qualifying sets of bladed articles;

(c) one or more qualifying sets of bladed articles and five or more bladed articles that do not form a qualifying set.

(3) “Qualifying set of bladed articles” means three or more bladed articles packaged together for sale as a single item, where each bladed article is a different size or shape from the others.

(4) The ways are—

(a) in a single remote sale where the bladed articles are to be delivered to an address in England and Wales, or

(b) in two or more remote sales in any period of 30 days—

(i) to one person, where the bladed articles are to be delivered to one or more addresses in England and Wales, or

(ii) to two or more persons, where the bladed articles are to be delivered to the same residential premises in England and Wales.

(5) A sale of bladed articles is “remote” if the seller and the person to whom the bladed article is sold are not in each other’s presence at the time of the sale.

(6) For the purposes of subsection (5) a person (“A”) is not in the presence of another person (“B”) at any time if—

(a) where A is an individual, A or a person acting on behalf of A is not in the presence of B at that time;

(b) where A is not an individual, a person acting on behalf of A is not in the presence of B at that time.

(7) A sale is not reportable if the person to whom the articles are sold (“the buyer”)—

(a) informs the seller that the buyer is carrying on a business, and

(b) is—

(i) registered for value added tax under the Value Added Tax Act 1994, or

(ii) registered as a company under the Companies Act 2006.

(8) A person who fails to comply with subsection (1) commits an offence.

(9) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (8) to show that the person took all reasonable precautions, and exercised all due diligence, to avoid commission of the offence.

(10) A person is to be taken to have shown a matter for the purposes of this section if—

(a) sufficient evidence of the matter is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and

(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

(11) A person who commits an offence under subsection (8) is liable on summary conviction to a fine.

(12) In this section—

“bladed article” means an article to which section 141A applies (as that section has effect in relation to England and Wales), other than a knife which does not have a sharp point and is designed for eating food;

“residential premises” means premises used for residential purposes (whether or not also used for other purposes).

(13) Regulations made by the Secretary of State under subsection (1) may in particular include requirements about—

(a) how reports are to be made,

(b) when reports to be made, and

(c) the information reports must include.

(14) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (1) is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.

(15) The Secretary of State may by regulations made by statutory instrument amend—

(a) the number of bladed articles specified in subsection (2)(a);

(b) the number of qualifying sets specified in subsection (2)(b);

(c) the number of qualifying sets specified in subsection (2)(c);

(d) the number of bladed articles specified in subsection (2)(c);

(e) the period specified in subsection (4)(b).

(16) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (15) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.’

(2) In the Offensive Weapons Act 2019, in section 66(1) (guidance on offences relating to offensive weapons etc) after paragraph (g) insert—

‘(ga) section 141D of that Act (duty to report remote sales of knives etc in bulk: England and Wales),’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause imposes a requirement on sellers of bladed articles to report bulk sales to a person specified in regulations.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 69

Remote sale and letting of crossbows

“(1) The Crossbows Act 1987 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 1 omit ‘unless he believes him to be eighteen years or older and has reasonable grounds for the belief’.

(3) After section 1A insert—

‘1B Defences to offence under section 1: England and Wales

(1) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 1 to show that they took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence.

(2) Subsection (3) applies if—

(a) a person (“A”) is charged with an offence under section 1, and

(b) A was not in the presence of the person (“B”) to whom the crossbow or part of a crossbow was sold or let on hire at the time of the sale or letting on hire.

(3) A is not to be regarded as having shown that A took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence unless, as a minimum, A shows that the following conditions are met.

(4) Condition 1 is that, before the sale or letting on hire—

(a) A obtained from B—

(i) a copy of an identity document issued to B, and

(ii) a photograph of B, and

(b) on the basis of the things obtained under paragraph (a), a reasonable person would have been satisfied that B was aged 18 or over.

(5) For the purposes of subsection (4) an “identity document” means—

(a) a United Kingdom passport (within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971);

(b) a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom or by or on behalf of an international organisation;

(c) a licence to drive a motor vehicle granted under Part 3 of the Road Traffic 1988 or under Part 2 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/154 (N.I. 1));

(d) any other document specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.

(6) Condition 2 is that when the package containing the crossbow or part of the crossbow was dispatched by A, it was clearly marked to indicate—

(a) that it contained a crossbow or part of a crossbow, and

(b) that, when finally delivered, it should only be delivered into the hands of B.

(7) Condition 3 is that A took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to ensure that, when finally delivered, the package would be delivered into the hands of B.

(8) Condition 4 is that A did not deliver the package, or arrange for its delivery, to a locker.

(9) Where the crossbow or part of a crossbow was dispatched by A to a place from which it was to be collected by B, references in subsections (6) and (7) to its final delivery are to be read as its supply to B from that place.

(10) In subsection (8) “locker” means a lockable container to which the package is delivered with a view to its collection by B, or a person acting on behalf of B, in accordance with arrangements made between A and B.’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause makes changes to the defences available to a person who sells crossbows etc to under 18s, in contravention of section 1 of the Crossbows Act 1987, where the sale is made remotely (e.g. online).

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 70

Delivery of crossbows

“In the Crossbows Act 1987, after section 1B (inserted by section (Remote sale and letting of crossbows)) insert—

‘1C Offence of seller delivering crossbows or parts of crossbows to residential premises in England or Wales

(1) This section applies if—

(a) a person (“A”) sells or lets on hire a crossbow or part of a crossbow to another person (“B”), and

(b) A and B are not in each other's presence at the time of the sale.

(2) A commits an offence if, for the purposes of supplying the crossbow or part of a crossbow to B, A—

(a) delivers the crossbow or part of a crossbow to residential premises in England or Wales, or

(b) arranges for its delivery to residential premises in England or Wales.

(3) A commits an offence if, for the purposes of supplying the crossbow or part of a crossbow to B, A—

(a) delivers the crossbow or part of a crossbow to a locker in England or Wales, or

(b) arranges for its delivery to a locker in England or Wales.

(4) In subsection (3) “locker” means a lockable container to which the crossbow or part of a crossbow is delivered with a view to its collection by B, or a person acting on behalf of B, in accordance with arrangements made between A and B.

(5) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum term for summary offences or a fine (or both).

(6) The “maximum term for summary offences”, in relation to an offence, means—

(a) if the offence is committed before the time when section 281(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 comes into force, six months;

(b) if the offence is committed after that time, 51 weeks.

1D Defences to offences under section 1C

(1) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 1C(2)(a) to show that the delivery conditions were met.

(2) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 1C(2)(b) to show that—

(a) the arrangement required the person with whom it was made not to finally deliver the crossbow or part of a crossbow unless the delivery conditions were met, and

(b) the person charged with the offence took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to ensure that the crossbow or part of a crossbow would not be finally delivered unless the delivery conditions were met.

(3) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under section 1C(3) to show that they took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence.

(4) For the purposes of this section the delivery conditions are that—

(a) the person (“P”) into whose hands the crossbow or part of a crossbow was finally delivered showed the person delivering it an identity document issued to P, and

(b) on the basis of that document a reasonable person would have been satisfied—

(i) that P was over 18, and

(ii) if the person to whom the crossbow or part of the crossbow was sold or let on hire was an individual, that P was that individual.

(5) “Identity document” has the same meaning as in section 1B(5).

(6) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide for other defences for a person charged with an offence under section 1C.

1E Offence of delivery business delivering crossbows or parts of crossbows to residential premises in England and Wales on behalf of UK seller

(1) This section applies if—

(a) a person (“A”) sells or lets for hire a crossbow or part of a crossbow to another person (“B”),

(b) A and B are not in each other’s presence at the time of the sale or letting on hire and A is within the United Kingdom at that time,

(c) before the sale or letting on hire A entered into an arrangement with a person (“C”) by which C agreed to deliver crossbows or parts of crossbows for A,

(d) C was aware when they entered into the arrangement that it covered the delivery of crossbows or parts of crossbows, and

(e) pursuant to the arrangement, C finally delivers the crossbow or part of a crossbow to residential premises in England or Wales.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b) a person other than an individual is within the United Kingdom at any time if the person carries on a business of selling articles of any kind from premises in any part of the United Kingdom at that time.

(3) C commits an offence if, when they finally deliver the crossbow or part of a crossbow to residential premises in England or Wales, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—

(a) is aged 18 or over, and

(b) if the person to whom the crossbow or part of the crossbow was sold or let on hire is an individual, is that individual.

(4) A person finally delivering the crossbow or part of a crossbow to residential premises in England or Wales on behalf of C commits an offence if, when they deliver it, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—

(a) is aged 18 or over, and

(b) if the person to whom the crossbow or part of the crossbow was sold or let on hire is an individual, is that individual.

(5) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (3) to show that the delivery conditions (within the meaning of section 1D(4)) were met.

(6) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (4) to show that—

(a) the delivery conditions (within the meaning of section 1D(4)) were met, or

(b) the person did not know, and a reasonable person would not have known, that the person was delivering a crossbow or part of a crossbow.

(7) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide for other defences for a person charged with an offence under this section.

(8) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine.

1F Offence of delivery business delivering crossbows or parts of crossbows to premises in England and Wales on behalf of non-UK seller

(1) This section applies if—

(a) a person (“A”) sells or lets for hire a crossbow or part of a crossbow to another person (“B”),

(b) A and B are not in each other’s presence at the time of the sale or letting on hire and A is outside the United Kingdom at that time,

(c) before the sale or letting on hire A entered into an arrangement with a person (“C”) by which C agreed to deliver crossbows or parts of crossbows for A,

(d) C was aware when they entered into the arrangement that it covered the delivery of crossbows or parts of crossbows, and

(e) pursuant to the arrangement, C finally delivers the crossbow or part of a crossbow to premises in England and Wales.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b) a person other than an individual is outside the United Kingdom at any time if the person does not carry on a business of selling articles of any kind from premises in any part of the United Kingdom at that time.

(3) C commits an offence if, when they finally deliver the crossbow or part of a crossbow to premises in England or Wales, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—

(a) is aged 18 or over, and

(b) if the person to whom the crossbow or part of the crossbow was sold or let on hire is an individual, is that individual.

(4) Any person finally delivering the crossbow or part of a crossbow to premises in England or Wales on behalf of C commits an offence if, when they deliver it, they do not deliver it into the hands of a person who—

(a) is aged 18 or over, and

(b) if the person to whom the crossbow or part of the crossbow was sold or let on hire is an individual, is that individual.

(5) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine.

(6) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (3) to show that the delivery conditions (within the meaning of section 1D(4)) were met.

(7) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (4) to show that—

(a) the delivery conditions (within the meaning of section 1D(4)) were met, or

(b) the person did not know, and a reasonable person would not have known, that the person was delivering a crossbow or part of a crossbow.’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause creates offences relating to delivery of crossbows to premises following a remote sale equivalent to the offences relating to knives in sections 38 to 42 of the Offensive Weapons Act 2019.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 71

Sale and delivery of crossbows: supplementary provision

“(1) After section 1F of the Crossbows Act 1987 (inserted by section (Delivery of crossbows)) insert—

‘1G Interpretation of sections 1B to 1F

(1) This section applies for the interpretation of sections 1B to 1F.

(2) A person (“A”) is not in the presence of another person (“B”) at any time if—

(a) where A is an individual, A or a person acting on behalf of A is not in the presence of B at that time;

(b) where A is not an individual, a person acting on behalf of A is not in the presence of B at that time.

(3) “Residential premises” means premises used solely for residential purposes.

(4) The circumstances where premises are not residential premises include, in particular, where a person carries on a business from the premises.

(5) A person charged with an offence is taken to have shown a matter if—

(a) sufficient evidence of the matter is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and

(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.’

(2) After section 6 of the Crossbows Act 1987 insert—

‘6A Regulations

(1) Regulations made by the Secretary of State under this Act are to be made by statutory instrument.

(2) The Secretary of State may not make a statutory instrument containing (alone or with other provision) regulations under section 1D(6) or 1E(7) unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.

(3) Any other statutory instrument containing regulations made by the Secretary of State under this Act is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.

(3) In section 66(1) of the Offensive Weapons Act 2019 (guidance on offences relating to offensive weapons etc), after paragraph (ga) (inserted by section (Duty to report remote sales of knives etc in bulk: England and Wales) insert—

“(gb) any of sections 1 to 3 of the Crossbows Act 1987 (sale etc of crossbows) as they have effect in relation to England and Wales,”.’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause makes provision about the interpretation of the new sections added to the Crossbows Act 1987 by NC69 and NC70 and extends the guidance-making power in the Offensive Weapons Act 2019 to cover offences under the Crossbows Act 1987.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 72

“Relevant user-to-user services”, “relevant search services” and “service providers”

“(1) For the purposes of this Chapter—

(a) a ‘relevant search service’ is a search service other than an exempt service;

(b) a ‘relevant user-to-user service’ is a user-to-user service other than an exempt service.

(2) In subsection (1), ‘search service’ and ‘user-to-user service’ have the same meanings as in the Online Safety Act 2023 (the ‘2023 Act’) (see, in particular, section 3 of that Act).

(3) The following are exempt services for the purposes of subsection (1)—

(a) a service of a kind that is described in any of the following paragraphs of Schedule 1 to the 2023 Act (certain services exempt from regulation under that Act)—

(i) paragraph 1 or 2 (email, SMS and MMS services);

(ii) paragraph 3 (services offering one-to-one live aural communications);

(iii) paragraph 4 (limited functionality services);

(iv) paragraph 5 (services which enable combinations of user-generated content);

(v) paragraph 7 or 8 (internal business services);

(vi) paragraph 9 (services provided by public bodies);

(vii) paragraph 10 (services provided by persons providing education or childcare), or

(b) a service of a kind that is described in Schedule 2 to the 2023 Act (services that include regulated provider pornographic content).

(4) This Chapter does not apply in relation to a part of a relevant search service, or a part of a relevant user-to-user service, if the 2023 Act does not apply to that part of the service by virtue of section 5(1) or (2) of that Act.

(5) In this Chapter, ‘service provider’ means a provider of a relevant user-to-user service or a provider of a relevant search service.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause, which together with NC73, NC74, NC75, NC76, NC77, NC78, NC79, NC80, NC81, NC82, NC83, NC84, NC85, NC86 and NS1 are expected to form a new Chapter of Part 2 of the Bill, defines key terms used in the new Chapter.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 73

Coordinating officer

“(1) The Secretary of State must designate a member of a relevant police force or a National Crime Agency officer as the coordinating officer for the purposes of this Chapter.

(2) The coordinating officer may delegate any of the officer’s functions under this Chapter (to such extent as the officer may determine) to another member of a relevant police force or National Crime Agency officer.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to designate a “coordinating officer” to perform the functions conferred on that officer under the new Chapter referred to in the explanatory note for NC72.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 74

Notice requiring appointment of content manager

“(1) The coordinating officer may give a service provider a notice (an ‘appointment notice’) requiring the provider—

(a) either to—

(i) appoint an individual who meets the conditions in subsection (2) as the provider’s content manager for the purposes of this Chapter, or

(ii) if there is no such individual, confirm that is the case to the coordinating officer, and

(b) to provide the coordinating officer with the required information.

(2) The conditions are that the individual—

(a) plays a significant role in—

(i) the making of decisions about how a whole or substantial part of the service provider’s activities are to be managed or organised, or

(ii) the actual managing or organising of the whole or a substantial part of those activities, and

(b) is habitually resident in the United Kingdom.

(3) ‘Required information’ means—

(a) the contact details of any content manager appointed;

(b) an email address, or details of another means of contacting the service provider rapidly which is readily available, that may be used for the purpose of giving the provider a notice under this Chapter;

(c) information identifying the relevant user-to-user services, or (as the case may be) the relevant search services, provided by the provider.

(4) An appointment notice must—

(a) specify the period before the end of which the service provider must comply with the notice, and

(b) explain the potential consequences of the service provider failing to do so (see section (Failure to comply with content manager requirements: civil penalty)).

(5) The period specified under subsection (4)(a) must be at least seven days beginning with the day on which the notice is given.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause confers a power on the coordinating officer to require a service provider to appoint a senior executive as their “content manager” for the purposes of the new Chapter referred to in the explanatory note for NC72 or to confirm that there is no-one who meets the appointment conditions.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 75

Appointment of content manager following change of circumstances

“(1) This section applies where—

(a) the coordinating officer has given a service provider an appointment notice,

(b) the provider has confirmed to the officer (in accordance with the appointment notice or under section (Replacement of content manager)(5)(b)), that there is no individual who meets the conditions in section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(2), and

(c) at any time within the period of two years beginning with the day on which that confirmation was given, there is an individual who meets those conditions.

(2) The service provider must, before the end of the period of seven days beginning with the first day on which there is an individual who meets those conditions—

(a) appoint such an individual as the provider’s content manager for the purposes of this Chapter, and

(b) provide the coordinating officer with the content manager’s contact details.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause requires a service provider that at any time could not appoint a senior executive as its content manager when required to do so (because there was no-one who met the appointment conditions) to make an appointment if, following a change in circumstances within 2 years, there is someone who meets the conditions.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 76

Replacement of content manager

“(1) This section applies where a service provider has appointed an individual as the provider’s content manager (whether in accordance with an appointment notice or under section (Appointment of content manager following change of circumstances) or this section).

(2) The service provider may replace the provider’s content manager by appointing another individual who meets the conditions in section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(2) as the provider’s new content manager for the purposes of this Chapter.

(3) The service provider must, before the end of the period of seven days beginning with the day on which an appointment is made under subsection (2), provide the coordinating officer with the new content manager’s contact details.

(4) If the individual appointed as a service provider’s content manager ceases to meet any of the conditions in section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(2), the appointment ceases to have effect.

(5) The service provider must, before the end of the period of seven days beginning with the day on which an appointment ceases to have effect under subsection (4)—

(a) either—

(i) appoint another individual who meets the conditions in section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(2) as the provider’s content manager for the purposes of this Chapter, and

(ii) provide the coordinating officer with the new content manager’s contact details, or

(b) if there is no longer such an individual, confirm that is the case to the coordinating officer.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause makes provision for the appointment by a service provider of a replacement content manager, including in a case where the original content manager ceases to meet the appointment conditions (and so that appointment ceases to have effect).

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 77

Duty to notify changes in required information

“(1) This section applies where a service provider has, in accordance with an appointment notice or under section (Appointment of content manager following change of circumstances)(2)(b) or (Replacement of content manager)(5)(a)(ii)provided the coordinating officer with required information.

(2) The service provider must give notice to the coordinating officer of any change in the required information.

(3) The notice must specify the date on which the change occurred.

(4) The notice must be given before the end of the period of seven days beginning with the day on which the change occurred.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause requires a service provider that has given the coordinating officer required information (as defined in NC74) to inform the officer of any changes in that information.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 78

Failure to comply with content manager requirements: civil penalty

“(1) This section applies if the coordinating officer has given a service provider an appointment notice and—

(a) the period specified in the notice as mentioned in (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(4)(a) has expired without the provider having complied with the notice,

(b) the provider has failed to comply with a requirement under section (Appointment of content manager following change of circumstances), (Replacement of content manager) or (Duty to notify changes in required information),

(c) the provider, in purported compliance with a requirement to provide, or give notice of a change in, required information (whether in accordance with an appointment notice or under section (Appointment of content manager following change of circumstances)(2)(b), (Replacement of content manager) or (Duty to notify changes in required information)(2)) makes a statement that is false in a material particular, or

(d) the provider makes a statement that is false in giving the confirmation mentioned in section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(1)(a)(ii) or (Replacement of content manager)(5)(b).

(2) The coordinating officer may give the service provider a notice (a ‘penalty notice’) requiring the provider to pay a penalty of an amount not exceeding £60,000.

(3) In order to take account of changes in the value of money the Secretary of State may by regulations substitute another sum for the sum for the time being specified in subsection (2).

(4) Schedule (Civil penalties for service providers and content managers) makes further provision in connection with penalty notices given under this Chapter.” —(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause confers a power on the coordinating officer to impose a monetary penalty of up to £60,000 on a service provider that fails to comply with various requirements imposed by an appointment notice or under NC75, NC76 and NC77.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 79

Unlawful weapons content

“(1) For the purposes of this Chapter, content is ‘unlawful weapons content’ in England and Wales if it is content that constitutes—

(a) an offence under section 1(1) of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959 (offering to sell, hire, loan or give away etc a dangerous weapon),

(b) an offence under section 1 or 2 of the Knives Act 1997 (marketing of knives as suitable for combat etc and related publications), or

(c) an offence under section 141(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 under the law of England and Wales (offering to sell, hire, loan or give away etc an offensive weapon).

(2) For the purposes of this Chapter, content is ‘unlawful weapons content’ in Scotland if it is content that constitutes—

(a) an offence within subsection (1)(a) or (b), or

(b) an offence under section 141(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 under the law of Scotland.

(3) For the purposes of this Chapter, content is ‘unlawful weapons content’ in Northern Ireland if it is content that constitutes—

(a) an offence under Article 53 of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1996 (S.I. 1996/3160) (N.I. 24) (offering to sell, hire, loan or give away etc certain knives),

(b) an offence within subsection (1)(b), or

(c) an offence under section 141(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 under the law of Northern Ireland.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause defines “unlawful weapons content” for the purposes of the new Chapter referred to in the explanatory note for NC72.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 80

Content removal notices

“(1) This section applies where an authorised officer is satisfied that content—

(a) present on a relevant user-to-user service, or

(b) which may be encountered in or via search results of a relevant search service;

is unlawful weapons content in a relevant part of the United Kingdom.

(2) The authorised officer may give a content removal notice to—

(a) the provider of the relevant user-to-user service, or

(b) the provider of the relevant search service.

(3) If the authorised officer gives a content removal notice to a service provider in a case where the coordinating officer has the contact details of the provider’s content manager, the authorised officer may also give the notice to that manager.

(4) A content removal notice is a notice requiring the service provider and (if applicable) the provider’s content manager (each a ‘recipient’) to secure that—

(a) the content to which it relates is removed (see section (Interpretation of Chapter)(2)), and

(b) confirmation of that fact is given to the authorised officer.

(5) A content removal notice must—

(a) identify the content to which it relates;

(b) explain the authorised officer’s reasons for considering that the content is unlawful weapons content in the relevant part (or parts) of the United Kingdom;

(c) explain that the notice must be complied with before the end of the period of 48 hours beginning with the time the notice is given;

(d) explain that each recipient has the right to request a review of the decision to give the notice and how a request is to be made (see section (Content removal notices: review));

(e) set out the potential consequences of failure to comply with the notice;

(f) contain the authorised officer’s contact details;

(g) be in such form, and contain such further information, as the Secretary of State may by regulations prescribe.

(6) The authorised officer may withdraw a content removal notice from a recipient by notifying the recipient to that effect (but withdrawal of a notice does not prevent a further content removal notice from being given under this section, whether or not in relation to the same content as the withdrawn notice).

(7) In this section—

‘authorised officer’ means—

(a) a member of a relevant police force who is authorised for the purposes of this section by the chief officer of the force, or

(b) a National Crime Agency officer who is authorised for the purposes of this section by the Director General of the National Crime Agency;

‘relevant part of the United Kingdom’ means—

(a) where the authorised officer is a member of a relevant police force in England and Wales, England and Wales;

(b) where the authorised officer is a member of the Police Service of Scotland, Scotland;

(c) where the authorised officer is a member of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, Northern Ireland;

(d) where the authorised officer is a member of the Ministry of Defence Police or a National Crime Agency officer, any part of the United Kingdom.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause confers power on the police or an officer of the National Crime Agency to give a service provider and (if there is one) the provider’s content manager a notice requiring them to remove unlawful weapons content from the services they provide.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 81

Content removal notices: review

“(1) A person who is given a content removal notice (a ‘recipient’) may, before the end of the initial 48-hour period, request a review of the decision to give the notice.

(2) A request under subsection (1) is to be made by the recipient giving—

(a) a notice (a ‘review notice’) to the authorised officer, and

(b) a copy of the review notice to the other recipient (if applicable).

(3) The grounds on which a recipient may request a review include, in particular, that—

(a) content to which the notice relates is not unlawful weapons content;

(b) content to which the notice relates is insufficiently identified for the recipient to be able to take the action required by the notice;

(c) the provider that received the notice is not, in fact, the provider of the relevant user-to-user service or relevant search service to which the notice relates;

(d) the individual who received the notice as the service provider’s content manager is not, in fact, that provider’s content manager;

(e) the notice was otherwise not given in accordance with this Chapter.

(4) On receipt of a review notice, a review of the decision to give the content removal notice must be carried out—

(a) if the authorised officer is a member of a relevant police force, by another member of that force who is of a higher rank;

(b) if the authorised officer is a National Crime Agency officer, by another officer who holds a more senior position in the Agency.

The individual carrying out the review is referred to in this section as ‘the reviewing officer’.

(6) On completing the review or (in a case where two review notices are given) both reviews the reviewing officer must, in respect of each recipient, either—

(a) confirm in full the decision to give the content removal notice,

(b) confirm the decision to give the notice, but in relation to only some of the content to which it relates, or

(c) withdraw the notice.

(7) The reviewing officer must give each recipient a notice (a ‘decision notice’)—

(a) setting out the outcome of the review or reviews, and

(b) giving reasons.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause makes provision for the police or the NCA to review the decision to give a service provider or their content manager a content removal notice under NC80 where the recipient of the notice requests a review.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 82

Decision notices requiring removal of unlawful weapons content

“(1) This section applies where the reviewing officer—

(a) has carried out a review or reviews under section (Content removal notices: review), and

(b) confirms the decision to give the content removal notice to the service provider, the provider’s content manager or both of them (in each case whether as mentioned in subsection (6)(a) or (b) of that section).

(2) If the reviewing officer confirms in full the decision to give the content removal notice, the decision notice must require its recipient to secure that—

(a) the content to which the content removal notice relates is removed, and

(b) confirmation of that fact is given to the authorised officer.

(3) If the officer confirms the decision to give the content removal notice but in relation to only some of the content to which it relates, the decision notice must—

(a) identify the content to which the confirmation relates (the ‘confirmed content’), and

(b) require its recipient to secure that—

(i) the confirmed content is removed, and

(ii) confirmation of that fact is given to the authorised officer.

(4) A decision notice within subsection (2) or (3) must specify the period before the end of which the notice must be complied with, and that period must be whichever of the following is the longest—

(a) the period of 24 hours beginning with the time the decision notice is given;

(b) the period—

(i) beginning with the time the review notice or, if there was more than one, the first review notice, was given under section (Content removal notices: review), and

(ii) ending with the end of the initial 48-hour period.

(5) In this section, ‘reviewing officer’ has the same meaning as in section (Content removal notices: review).”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause provides for the police or NCA, following a review under NC81 which confirms (in full or in part) the decision to give a content removal notice, to give the service provider or content manager a decision notice requiring the removal of the unlawful weapons content concerned.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 83

Failure to comply with content removal notice or decision notice: civil penalties

“(1) Subsection (2) applies where—

(a) a content removal notice has been given to a service provider, or to both a service provider and the provider’s content manager, in accordance with section (Content removal notices), and

(b) the initial 48-hour period has expired without the notice having been complied with or a review notice having been given.

(2) A senior authorised officer of the issuing force may give a penalty notice—

(a) to the service provider, or

(b) if the provider’s content manager also received the content removal notice, to the content manager or to both of them.

(3) Subsection (4) applies where, following a review or reviews under section (Content removal notices: review)—

(a) a decision notice has been given to the service provider or to both the provider and the provider’s content manager in accordance with section (Decision notices requiring removal of unlawful weapons content)(2) or (3) confirming the decision to give the content removal notice, and

(b) the period specified in the decision notice under subsection (4) of that section has expired without that notice having been complied with.

(4) A senior authorised officer of the issuing force may give a penalty notice—

(a) to the service provider, or

(b) if the provider’s content manager also received the decision notice, to the content manager or to both of them.

(5) In this section a ‘penalty notice’ means a notice requiring its recipient to pay a penalty—

(a) where the recipient is a service provider, of an amount not exceeding £60,000;

(b) where the recipient is a service provider’s content manager, of an amount not exceeding £10,000.

(6) In order to take account of changes in the value of money the Secretary of State may by regulations substitute another sum for a sum for the time being specified in subsection (5).

(7) See Schedule (Civil penalties for service providers and content managers) for further provision in connection with penalty notices given under this section.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause confers a power on the police or NCA to impose a monetary penalty of up to £60,000 on a service provider or up to £10,000 on a content manager if they have failed to comply with a content removal notice or a decision notice.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 84

Guidance

“(1) The Secretary of State may issue guidance to the persons mentioned in subsection (2) about the exercise of their functions under this Chapter.

(2) The persons are—

(a) the chief officer, and any other member, of a relevant police force;

(b) the Director General of the National Crime Agency and any other officer of the Agency.

(3) The Secretary of State may revise any guidance issued under this section.

(4) The Secretary of State must publish any guidance or revisions issued under this section.

(5) A person mentioned in subsection (2) must have regard to any guidance issued under this section when exercising a function under this Chapter.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause confers power on the Secretary of State to issue guidance to the police and the National Crime Agency about the exercise of their functions under the new Chapter mentioned in the explanatory statement to NC72.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 85

Notices

“(1) This section applies in relation to any notice that must or may be given to a person under this Chapter.

(2) A notice may be given to a person by—

(a) delivering it by hand to the person,

(b) leaving it at the person’s proper address,

(c) sending it by post to the person at that address, or

(d) sending it by email to the person’s email address.

(3) A notice to a body corporate may be given to any officer of that body.

(4) A notice to a partnership may be given to any partner or to a person who has the control or management of the partnership business.

(5) A notice sent by first class post to an address in the United Kingdom, is treated as given at noon on the second working day after the day of posting, unless the contrary is proved.

(6) A notice sent by email is treated as given at the time it is sent unless the contrary is proved.

(7) In this section—

‘director’ includes any person occupying the position of a director, by whatever name called;

‘email address’, in relation to a person, means—

(a) an email address provided by that person for the purposes of this Chapter, or

(b) any email address published for the time being by that person as an address for contacting that person;

‘officer’, in relation to an entity, includes a director, a manager, a partner, the secretary or, where the affairs of the entity are managed by its members, a member;

‘proper address’ means—

(a) in the case of an entity, the address of the entity’s registered office or principal office;

(b) in any other case, the person’s last known address;

‘working day’ means any day other than—

(a) a Saturday or Sunday, or

(b) a day that is a bank holiday in any part of the United Kingdom under the Banking and Financial Dealings Act 1971.

(8) In the case of an entity registered or carrying on business outside the United Kingdom, or with offices outside the United Kingdom, the reference in subsection (7), in the definition of ‘proper address’, to the entity’s principal office includes—

(a) its principal office in the United Kingdom, or

(b) if the entity has no office in the United Kingdom, any place in the United Kingdom at which the person giving the notice believes, on reasonable grounds, that the notice will come to the attention of any director or other officer of that entity.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause makes provision about the ways in which a notice can be given, and the time at which a notice is to be treated as given, under the new Chapter mentioned in the explanatory statement to NC72.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 86

Interpretation of Chapter

“(1) In this Chapter—

‘appointment notice’ has the meaning given by section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(1);

‘authorised officer’ in relation to a content removal notice, means the member of a relevant police force, or officer of the National Crime Agency, who gave the notice;

‘chief officer’—

(a) in relation to a police force in England and Wales, means the chief officer of police of the force;

(b) in relation to any other relevant police force, means the chief constable of that force;

‘contact details’, in relation to an individual, means the individual’s—

(a) full name;

(b) telephone number;

(c) email address;

(d) residential address, or other service address, in the United Kingdom;

‘content’ has the same meaning as in the Online Safety Act 2023 (see section 236(1) of that Act);

‘content manager’, in relation to a service provider, means the individual for the time being appointed as the content manager of the provider (whether in accordance with an appointment notice or under section (Appointment of content manager following change of circumstances) or (Replacement of content manager));

‘content removal notice’ has the meaning given by section (Content removal notices)(4);

‘coordinating officer’ means the individual designated as such under section (Coordinating officer)(1);

‘decision notice’ means a notice given under section (Content removal notices: review)(7);

‘encounter’, in relation to content, has the same meaning as in the Online Safety Act 2023 (see section 236(1) of that Act);

‘entity’ has the same meaning as in that Act (see section 236(1) of that Act);

‘initial 48-hour period’, in relation to a content removal notice, means the 48-hour period specified in the notice as mentioned in section (Content removal notices)(5)(c);

‘issuing force’—

(a) in relation to a content removal notice given by a member of a relevant police force, means that force;

(b) in relation to a content removal notice given by a National Crime Agency officer, means the National Crime Agency;

‘relevant police force’—

(a) in relation to England and Wales, means—

(i) a police force in England and Wales, or

(ii) the Ministry of Defence Police;

(b) in relation to Scotland, means—

(i) the Police Service of Scotland, or

(ii) the Ministry of Defence Police;

(c) in relation to Northern Ireland, means—

(i) the Police Service of Northern Ireland, or

(ii) the Ministry of Defence Police;

‘relevant search service’ and

‘relevant user-to-user service’ have the meanings given by section (‘Relevant user-to-user services’, ‘relevant search services’ and ‘service providers’);

‘required information’ has the meaning given by section (Notice requiring appointment of content manager)(3);

‘review notice’ has the meaning given by section (Content removal notices: review)(2)(a);

‘search content’ and ‘search results’ have the meanings given by section 57 of the Online Safety Act 2023;

‘senior authorised officer’, in relation to a relevant police force, means—

(a) the chief officer of the relevant police force, or

(b) a member of the relevant police force of at least the rank of inspector authorised for the purposes of this Chapter by the chief officer;

‘senior authorised officer’, in relation to the National Crime Agency, means—

(a) the Director General of the National Crime Agency, or

(b) an officer of the Agency who—

(i) holds a position in the Agency the seniority of which is at least equivalent to that of the rank of inspector in a relevant police force, and

(ii) is authorised for the purposes of this Chapter by the Director General;

‘service address’ has the same meaning as in the Companies Acts (see section 1141 of the Companies Act 2006);

‘service provider’ has the meaning given by section (‘Relevant user-to-user services’, ‘relevant search services’ and ‘service providers’).

(2) For the purposes of this Chapter, a reference to ‘removing’ content—

(a) in relation to content present on a relevant user-to-user service, is a reference to any action that results in the content being removed from the service, or being permanently hidden, so users of the service in any part of the United Kingdom in which the content is unlawful weapons content cannot encounter it;

(b) in relation to content which may be encountered in or via search results of a relevant search service, is a reference to taking measures designed to secure, so far as possible, that the content is no longer included in the search content of the service that is available in any part of the United Kingdom in which the content is unlawful weapons content;

and related expressions are to be read accordingly.

(3) The following provisions of the Online Safety Act 2023 apply for the purposes of this Chapter as they apply for the purposes of that Act—

(a) section 226 (determining who is the provider of a particular user-to-user service or search service);

(b) section 236(5) and (6) (references to content being present).”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause contains definitions of terms used in the new Chapter mentioned in the explanatory statement to NC72.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 87

Dangerous, careless or inconsiderate cycling

“(1) The Road Traffic Act 1988 is amended as set out in subsections (2) to (6).

(2) Before section 28 (dangerous cycling) insert—

‘27A Causing death by dangerous cycling

A person who causes the death of another person by riding a cycle dangerously on a road or other public place is guilty of an offence.

27B Causing serious injury by dangerous cycling

(1) A person who causes serious injury to another person by riding a cycle dangerously on a road or other public place is guilty of an offence.

(2) In this section “serious injury” means—

(a) in England and Wales, physical harm which amounts to grievous bodily harm for the purposes of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, and

(b) in Scotland, severe physical injury.’

(3) In section 28—

(a) in subsection (1) for ‘on a road dangerously’ substitute ‘dangerously on a road or other public place’;

(b) omit subsections (2) and (3).

(4) After section 28 insert—

‘28A Meaning of “dangerous cycling”

(1) This section applies for the purposes of sections 27A, 27B and 28.

(2) A person is to be regarded as riding dangerously if (and only if) the condition in subsection (3) or (4) is met.

(3) The condition in this subsection is met if—

(a) the way that the person rides falls far below what would be expected of a competent and careful cyclist, and

(b) it would be obvious to a competent and careful cyclist that riding in that way would be dangerous.

(4) The condition in this subsection is met if it would be obvious to a competent and careful cyclist that riding the cycle in its current state would be dangerous.

(5) In determining the state of a cycle for the purposes of subsection (4), regard may be had (among other things) to—

(a) whether the cycle is equipped and maintained in accordance with regulations under section 81 (regulation of brakes, bells etc, on pedal cycles);

(b) anything attached to or carried on the cycle and the manner in which it is attached or carried.

(6) In determining what would be expected of, or obvious to, a competent and careful cyclist in a particular case, regard is to be had both to—

(a) the circumstances of which the person could be expected to be aware (taking account of, if relevant to the case, the age of the accused), and

(b) the circumstances shown to have been within the knowledge of the accused.

(7) References in this section to something being “dangerous” are references to it resulting in danger of—

(a) injury to any person, or

(b) serious damage to property.

28B Causing death by careless, or inconsiderate, cycling

A person who causes the death of another person by riding a cycle on a road or other public place without due care and attention, or without reasonable consideration for other persons using the road or place, is guilty of an offence.

28C Causing serious injury by careless, or inconsiderate, cycling

(1) A person who causes serious injury to another person by riding a cycle on a road or other public place without due care and attention, or without reasonable consideration for other persons using the road or place, is guilty of an offence.

(2) In this section ‘serious injury’ means—

(a) in England and Wales, physical harm which amounts to grievous bodily harm for the purposes of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, and

(b) in Scotland, severe physical injury.’

(5) In section 29 (careless, and inconsiderate, cycling)—

(a) after ‘a road’ insert ‘or other public place’;

(b) after ‘the road’ insert ‘or place’.

(6) After section 29 insert—

‘29A Meaning of careless, or inconsiderate, cycling

(1) This section applies for the purposes of sections 28B, 28C and 29.

(2) A person is to be regarded as cycling without due care and attention if (and only if) the way the person cycles falls below what would be expected of a competent and careful cyclist.

(3) In determining what would be expected of a competent and careful cyclist in a particular case, regard is to be had both to—

(a) the circumstances of which the person could be expected to be aware (taking account of, if relevant to the case, the age of the accused), and

(b) the circumstances shown to have been within the knowledge of the accused.

(4) A person (A) is to be regarded as cycling without reasonable consideration for other persons only if those persons are inconvenienced by A’s cycling.’

(7) The table in Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 (prosecution and punishment of offences) is amended as follows.

(8) After the entry relating to ‘RTA section 27’ insert in columns 1 to 4—

--- Later in debate ---

[Matt Vickers]

The devastating consequences of road traffic collisions caused by reckless or dangerous behaviour are not limited to motor vehicles. In recent years, a small but significant number of cases have emerged where pedestrians and other vulnerable road users have been seriously injured or even killed as a result of dangerous or careless cycling. This new clause rightly recognises that, while the majority of cyclists are law-abiding and responsible, the law must be equipped to deal appropriately with the minority who behave recklessly and put others at grave risk.

Currently, there is a glaring gap in the legal framework: while motorists who cause death or serious injury through dangerous or careless driving face severe legal consequences, no equivalent provision exists for cyclists. This clause introduces parity in accountability, ensuring that victims and their families are not left feeling that justice is denied simply because the vehicle involved was a bicycle rather than a car.

New clause 87, alongside Government amendment 82, ensures that the legal definitions of dangerous and careless cycling reflect the realities of modern shared road and path usage, including in public places beyond traditional roadways. With the increase in cycling on footpaths, shared spaces and pedestrianised zones, it is vital that the law keeps pace and applies wherever the public might be put at risk.

Importantly, the introduction of these offences does not criminalise cycling itself; it targets only those rare but serious cases where a cyclist’s conduct falls far below that which would be expected of competent and considerate road users. It draws on the well-established legal test from dangerous and careless driving legislation, helping to ensure that the proposed offences are proportionate, fair and clearly understood.

As Members will be aware, my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green has long campaigned for a change to the law regarding responsible cycling, and I pay tribute to his work to deliver this improvement to public safety. The last Government confirmed that they would adopt an amendment to the Criminal Justice Bill that would have resulted in a change comparable to the one we see today.

Much of this would not have been possible without the sustained efforts of people such as Matthew Briggs, who, in 2016, tragically lost his wife Kim Briggs, aged just 44, after she was hit by a cyclist riding a fixed-gear bike with no front brakes. She sustained catastrophic head injuries and sadly died a week later. Unfortunately, Kim is just one of many victims, and Matthew’s is just one of many families harmed by these situations, but he has campaigned for this change in the law after tragically losing a loved one. I pay tribute to Matt and his campaign for justice, and hope that this change effectively bridges the gap in the law that so many have highlighted.

Finally, this measure sends a strong message that all road users, regardless of their mode of transport, are responsible for the safety of others. It underlines the seriousness with which Parliament treats the loss of life or serious injuries, promotes responsible cycling, and contributes to safer public spaces for everyone.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 87 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 88

Places of worship: restriction on protests

“(1) The Public Order Act 1986 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 12(1) (imposing conditions on public processions)—

(a) at the end of paragraph (ab) omit ‘or’;

(b) at the end of paragraph (b) insert ‘or

(c) in the case of a procession in England and Wales, the procession is in the vicinity of a place of worship and may intimidate persons of reasonable firmness with the result that those persons are deterred from—

(i) accessing that place of worship for the purpose of carrying out religious activities, or

(ii) carrying out religious activities at that place of worship,’.

(3) In section 14(1) (imposing conditions on public assemblies)—

(a) at the end of paragraph (ab) omit ‘or’;

(b) at the end of paragraph (b) insert ‘or

(c) in the case of an assembly in England and Wales, the assembly is in the vicinity of a place of worship and may intimidate persons of reasonable firmness with the result that those persons are deterred from—

(i) accessing that place of worship for the purpose of carrying out religious activities, or

(ii) carrying out religious activities at that place of worship.’

(4) In section 14ZA(1) (imposing conditions on one-person protests)—

(a) at the end of paragraph (a) omit ‘or’;

(b) at the end of paragraph (b) insert ‘or

(c) the protest is in the vicinity of a place of worship and may intimidate persons of reasonable firmness with the result that those persons are deterred from—

(i) accessing that place of worship for the purpose of carrying out religious activities, or

(ii) carrying out religious activities at that place of worship.’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause gives the police power to impose conditions on public processions, public assemblies and one-person protests that may intimidate people and deter those people from accessing a place of worship for carrying out religious activities or from carrying out religious activities there. It does not provide power to impose conditions where those who may be intimidated are using a place of worship for other purposes.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government new clause 89—Powers of senior officers to impose conditions on protests.

Government new clause 90—Amendments relating to British Transport Police and Ministry of Defence Police.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

New clauses 88 to 90 further update our public order legislation to reflect operational experience. It is important that the legislation keeps pace with the operational realities faced by police on the ground.

In the wake of the events in Israel and Gaza on 7 October 2023, we have seen a wave of large-scale protests across the United Kingdom. Although the right to protest is of course a cornerstone of our democracy and the majority of demonstrations have been peaceful, we cannot ignore the very real impact that some of the gatherings have had on religious communities. We have heard troubling reports of people of all faiths feeling too intimidated to attend places of worship, and of services being cancelled due to the proximity and nature of the protests.

New clause 88 therefore seeks to provide religious communities with better protection from intimidation caused by protests within the vicinity of their place of worship. The police have powers under the Public Order Act 1986 to manage protests where there is serious disruption to the life of the community or intentional intimidation. However, the powers often do not capture the types of harm currently being experienced by religious communities, especially where the intimidation is not deliberate, but is none the less very real for those affected.

The intention of the new clause is to strengthen the police’s powers to manage intimidatory public processions, public assemblies or one-person protests near places of worship, specifically by allowing police to impose conditions where they reasonably believe that the procession, assembly or protest may result in the intimidation of and deter those seeking to access places of worship.

New clause 88 achieves that by creating a new threshold in sections 12, 14 and 14ZA of the 1986 Act, under which the police can impose conditions on public processions, public assemblies and one-person protests. To be clear, it does not ban protests outright, but it enables the police to use this threshold to consider the appropriate time, location or routing that a protest should have in order to avoid intimidating those wishing to practise their faith at their place of worship.

The new clause will allow the police to assess whether a protest may create an intimidating atmosphere that could deter people from accessing places of worship to carry out religious activities or from conducting religious activities there, regardless of whether the organisers of the protest themselves intended for the protest to have that effect.

I turn to new clause 89. In managing recent protests, the police have relied on their powers under sections 12 and 14 of the 1986 Act to impose those conditions, for example where there is a risk of serious public disorder or serious disruption to the life of the community. However, under the current law, only the most senior officers physically at the scene can impose these conditions on live protests or where people are assembling with a view to take part. That can cause delays, particularly when strategic or tactical commanders, known as the gold and silver commanders, who are often based in off-site control rooms, have better access to intelligence but are unable to impose conditions directly. That can also lead to inconsistencies in how similar protests are managed across different locations, especially when multiple events occur at once.

Policing stakeholders have made it clear that allowing gold and silver commanders to impose conditions remotely, where the statutory thresholds are met, would improve the timeliness, consistency and effectiveness of public order policing. Those commanders typically have the best oversight of unfolding events and are well placed to make informed decisions. New clause 89 therefore amends the 1986 Act to enable gold and silver commanders to exercise powers to impose conditions under sections 12(1) and 14(1) in relation to public processions and assemblies.

Finally, new clause 90 addresses two operational issues raised by the Department for Transport and the Ministry of Defence to ensure that public order powers can be used effectively by the British Transport police and the Ministry of Defence police. First, it amends the definitions in the Public Order Act 1986 to allow the BTP to impose conditions on public assemblies taking place at railway stations. Currently, the law restricts the use of these powers to open-air locations, which limits the BTP’s ability to manage protests in enclosed but high-risk public spaces such as major stations. This change will ensure that the BTP can act appropriately within its jurisdiction across England, Wales and Scotland.

Secondly, the new clause corrects a legislative error made in 2004 that unintentionally prevented the BTP from using section 60AA of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, the existing power to require individuals to remove face coverings. This amendment restores that power. It also empowers the MDP to issue authorisations under section 60AA and section 60 of the 1994 Act to enable MDP officers to exercise powers under these provisions within its jurisdiction, in the same way as territorial police forces.

These are technical but important amendments. They do not expand thresholds or the scope of the powers themselves, but simply ensure that the BTP and MDP can apply them, where appropriate, to keep people safe, particularly in transport hubs and around defence infrastructure. The proposals reflect direct feedback from operational policing and will bring clarity and consistency to the use of public order legislation. I commend the new clauses to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

New clause 88 rightly seeks to strengthen protections for the freedom of religion and belief by ensuring that individuals are not deterred or intimidated from attending or participating in religious worship due to protests taking place in the vicinity of places of worship. It balances the right to peaceful protest with the fundamental right of individuals to practise their faith without fear or obstruction. Places of worship are not just buildings; they are sanctuaries for reflection, community and faith. When people are intimidated from entering these spaces or carrying out religious observance because of aggressive or targeted protests, it undermines not only their personal freedoms, but the broader principle of religious tolerance.

This new clause helps to ensure that those attending religious services can do so without being subject to harassment or psychological pressure. The provision is not a ban on protests: it enables the police to impose conditions, not prohibitions, on processions, assemblies and even one-person protests that occur in the vicinity of a place of worship, where such demonstrations risk intimidating individuals of reasonable firmness and deterring from participating in religious activities. The threshold is carefully defined to target behaviour that causes harm, while still protecting legitimate expression of opinion.

While some may easily dismiss this new clause, it is important to recognise that there are real-world examples where people believe that protests are being used to undermine the ability to worship. For example, recently in Westcliff-on-Sea, a protest organised by Action for Palestine, which the Palestinian Solidarity Campaign described as “not constructive”, took place on Shabbat during the final week of Pesach, in a Jewish neighbourhood where many residents would be travelling to and from the synagogue. The local rabbi said:

“There were quite a few people in the community who were so intimidated that they decided to go to their parents’ in London for the weekend, to get away completely.”

Others decided to attend one of the other orthodox synagogues in the area, such as the Westcliff Charedi synagogue, and ending up having to walk a mile to make Saturday’s two services. While I would not expect the Minister to comment on the specifics of whether that protest would constitute a breach of the new clause in question, it highlights how people practising their religion have felt targeted by particular protests.

Given the rise in targeted demonstrations, whether based on religion, race or identity, this new clause ensures that the law is responsive to the realities of contemporary protest dynamics. It draws on the existing powers under the Public Order Act 1986, applying them specifically in a context where dignity, privacy and religious freedom deserve particular safeguarding. Ultimately, this new clause is a proportionate and necessary step to preserve the peaceful co-existence of rights: the right to worship freely and the right to protest responsibly. It affirms that places of worship must remain accessible and free from intimidation for all communities.

I would be grateful if the Minister could answer the following questions. How will she ensure that new clause 88 strikes the right balance between protecting freedom of religion and upholding the right to protest under articles 9, 10 and 11 of the European convention on human rights? What guidance will be provided to the police to assess whether a protest

“may intimidate persons of reasonable firmness”?

How will subjectivity be mitigated to avoid arbitrary enforcement? Has the Home Office identified particular recent incidents that demonstrate a pressing need for the power? How frequently does the Minister expect it to be used?

--- Later in debate ---

[David Burton-Sampson]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Pritchard. Like my right hon. Friend the Minister, I will always defend the right to protest, but it must be appropriate. Having one’s voice heard must not come at the expense of intimidating those who are peacefully worshipping.

As the hon. Member for Stockton West mentioned, only recently in Southend my constituents were affected by a march that was purposely routed past a place of worship at the time when people were due to be leaving that place of worship. We have heard similar evidence of that happening across the country. Let us be clear: it is not acceptable that people should be intimidated while they go to or from, or are in, their place of worship, whatever their religion. I welcome the new clauses.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am grateful for the short speech that my hon. Friend the Member for Southend West and Leigh just made. He has spoken to me about the events in Westcliff-on-Sea and their impact on that community. I was also grateful to the shadow Minister for referencing that incident, because it sets out clearly why the provision in new clause 88 is necessary. I welcome that.

The shadow Minister asked whether we will stop legitimate protests, and somehow put the right to religious worship above the right to protest. I want to make it clear that the new clause does not place the freedom of religion above the right to protest. I think we all agree that the right to protest is an important part of our democracy. The new clause seeks to balance those rights by ensuring that protesters do not unduly intimidate or prevent individuals from accessing places of worship.

Although the right to protest remains key and fundamental, the provisions in the new clause clarify police powers to manage those protests near places of worship, ensuring that the freedom of religion is protected without imposing a blanket restriction on demonstrations. The intent is not to curtail protest rights, but to prevent situations where protests create a hostile environment that discourages religious observance. It is important to note that it applies equally to all faiths and all places of worship, not just, as we started off talking about, a specific religious group.

The shadow Minister raised the resource implications for BTP and MDP. The request to bring forward the provisions was because of the operational needs of those police forces. I am expect that they will be able to deal with any costs arising from new clause 90 from their existing budget. The shadow Minister also mentioned training and making sure that police officers understood the introduction of these provisions. I am sure he agrees that there is extensive training of police officers. With public order in particular, we know that there is a very well-worn path of how officers are trained at the right level, depending on the situation.

I recently had the pleasure of meeting Metropolitan police officers, who do a lot of public order work, down at Gravesend to see that training first hand, and I saw the amount of resource that goes in to ensuring that those officers are equipped and know their rights and how most effectively to use them. The new provisions will be part of the continuation of that training for police officers, alongside the work of the College of Policing. On that basis, I commend them to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 88 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 89

Powers of senior officers to impose conditions on protests

“(1) The Public Order Act 1986 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 12 (imposing conditions on public processions)—

(a) in subsection (1), for ‘the’, in the first place it occurs, substitute ‘a’;

(b) in subsection (2)—

(i) in the words before paragraph (a) omit ‘the’;

(ii) in paragraph (a) for the words from ‘, the most’ to the end substitute ‘—

(i) the most senior in rank of the police officers present at the scene, or

(ii) in the case of a procession in England and Wales, a police officer authorised by a chief officer of police for the purposes of this subsection, and’.

(3) In section 14 (imposing conditions on public assemblies)—

(a) in subsection (1), for ‘the’, in the first place it occurs, substitute ‘a’;

(b) in subsection (2)—

(i) in the words before paragraph (a) omit ‘the’;

(ii) in paragraph (a) for the words from ‘, the most” to the end substitute ‘—

(i) the most senior in rank of the police officers present at the scene, or

(ii) in the case of an assembly in England and Wales, a police officer authorised by a chief officer of police for the purposes of this subsection, and’;

(c) in subsection (2ZB), for ‘reference in subsection (2)(b) to a chief officer of police includes’, substitute ‘references in subsection (2) to a chief officer of police include’.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause allows the powers in sections 12 and 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 to impose conditions on public processions and public assemblies to be exercised by a police officer authorised to do so by a chief officer of police.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 90

Amendments relating to British Transport Police and Ministry of Defence Police

“(1) The Public Order Act 1986 is amended in accordance with subsections (2) and (3).

(2) In section 14A(9) (prohibiting trespassory assemblies), in the definition of ‘land’, after ‘“land”’ insert ‘, except in subsections (4A) to (4C) of this section,’.

(3) In section 16 (interpretation), in the definition of ‘public assembly’, for the words from ‘wholly’ to the end substitute ‘—

(a) wholly or partly open to the air, or

(b) within any of paragraphs (a) to (f) of section 31(1) of the Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003;’.

(4) The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 is amended in accordance with subsections (5) and (6).

(5) In section 60 (powers to stop and search in anticipation of or after violence), after subsection (9A) insert—

‘(9B) So far as they relate to an authorisation by a member of the Ministry of Defence Police—

(a) subsections (1) and (9) have effect as if the references to a locality in a police area were references to a place in England and Wales among those specified in section 2(2) of the Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987, and

(b) subsection (1)(aa)(i) has effect as if the reference to a police area were a reference to the places in England and Wales specified in section 2(2) of the Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987.’

(6) In section 60AA (powers to require removal of disguises)—

(a) for subsection (8) substitute—

‘(8) So far as subsections (1), (3) and (6) relate to an authorisation by a member of the British Transport Police Force, those subsections have effect as if the references to a locality or a locality in a a police area were references to a place in England and Wales among those specified in section 31(1)(a) to (f) of the Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003.

(8A) So far as subsections (1), (3) and (6) relate to an authorisation by a member of the Ministry of Defence Police, those subsections have effect as if the references to a locality or a locality in a police area were references to a place in England and Wales among those specified in section 2(2) of the Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987.’;

(b) in subsection (9) omit ‘and “policed premises” each’.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This new clause extends certain powers under Part 2 of the Public Order Act 1986 to land which is not open to the air; allows Ministry of Defence Police to issue authorisations under section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994; and allows British Transport Police and Ministry of Defence Police to issue authorisations under section 60AA of that Act.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 91

Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences

“(1) This section applies where in criminal proceedings in a court in England and Wales, or in proceedings (anywhere) before a service court, a person (‘D’) is charged with a qualifying offence.

(2) An offence is a ‘qualifying offence’ if—

(a) it is alleged to have been committed by D acting in the exercise of functions as an authorised firearms officer,

(b) the conduct alleged to constitute the offence involved the use by D of a lethal barrelled weapon to discharge a conventional round, and

(c) D was, at the time of the alleged offence, authorised by the relevant authority to use that weapon with that round.

(3) The court must—

(a) cause the following information to be withheld from the public in proceedings before the court, in each case unless satisfied that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so—

(i) D’s name;

(ii) D’s address;

(iii) D’s date of birth;

(b) give a reporting direction (see section (Authorised firearms officers: reporting directions)) in respect of D (if one does not already have effect), unless satisfied that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so.

(4) The court may, if satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so, make an anonymity order (see section (Authorised firearms officers: anonymity orders)) in respect of D.

(5) If D is convicted of the offence—

(a) subsections (3) and (4) cease to apply in respect of D, and

(b) any restriction put in place under subsection (3)(a) and any reporting direction given, or anonymity order made, under this section in respect of D cease to have effect at the time D is sentenced for the offence.

(6) In subsection (1), ‘authorised firearms officer’ means—

(a) a member of a relevant police force who is authorised by the relevant chief officer to use a lethal barrelled weapon with a conventional round in the exercise of functions as a constable,

(b) a National Crime Agency officer who is authorised by the Director General of the National Crime Agency to use a lethal barrelled weapon with a conventional round in the exercise of functions as a National Crime Agency officer,

(c) a member of the Police Service of Scotland or the Police Service of Northern Ireland who—

(i) is provided under section 98 of the Police Act 1996 for the assistance of a police force in England and Wales, and

(ii) is authorised by the relevant authority to use a lethal barrelled weapon with a conventional round in the exercise of functions as a constable, or

(d) a member of the armed forces who—

(i) is deployed in support of a relevant police force or the National Crime Agency, and

(ii) is authorised by the Secretary of State to use a lethal barrelled weapon with a conventional round for the purposes of that deployment.

(7) In this section—

‘conventional round’ means any shot, bullet or other missile other than one designed to be used without its use giving rise to a substantial risk of causing death or serious injury;

‘lethal barrelled weapon’ has the meaning given by section 57(1B) of the Firearms Act 1968;

‘member of the armed forces’ means a person who is subject to service law (see section 367 of the Armed Forces Act 2006);

‘relevant authority’ means—

(a) in relation to a member of a relevant police force, the relevant chief officer;

(b) in relation to a National Crime Agency officer, the Director General of the National Crime Agency;

(c) in relation to a member of the Police Service of Scotland, the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Scotland;

(d) in relation to a member of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland;

(e) in relation to a member of the armed forces, the Secretary of State;

‘relevant chief officer’ means—

(a) in relation to a police force in England and Wales, the chief officer of police of that police force;

(b) in relation to the British Transport Police Force, the Chief Constable of the British Transport Police Force;

(c) in relation to the Ministry of Defence Police, the Chief Constable of the Ministry of Defence Police;

(d) in relation to the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, the Chief Constable of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary;

‘relevant police force’ means—

(a) a police force in England and Wales,

(b) the British Transport Police Force,

(c) the Ministry of Defence Police, or

(d) the Civil Nuclear Constabulary;

‘service court’ means—

(a) the Court Martial, or

(b) the Court Martial Appeal Court.

(8) This section does not apply in relation to proceedings begun before the coming into force of this section.”.—(Alex Davies-Jones.)

This new clause provides for a presumption of anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with (but not convicted of) an offence relating to the discharge of their firearm in the course of their duties

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Crime and Policing Bill (Ways and Means)

Diana Johnson Excerpts

Wednesday 30th April 2025 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)]

I am grateful to the shadow Minister for her support, but on the financial settlement to police forces this year, it is worth saying that there is up to £19.6 billion going into policing. She will be well aware of the additional funding going in to support neighbourhood policing, which we want to restore after the decimation that happened under the previous Conservative Government.

The shadow Minister can make her points, but it is this Government who are committed to funding policing and supporting police officers. We are getting more police officers on our high streets, and in our communities and local areas. I know that she has only recently joined the House, but 14 years of history explain why we have found ourselves in the position where police forces are in challenging circumstances with their finances. This Government are committed to supporting policing, and the financial settlement this year does exactly that.

Question put and agreed to.

Licences and Licensing

Diana Johnson Excerpts

Wednesday 30th April 2025 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)]

I beg to move,

That the draft Licensing Act 2003 (Victory in Europe Day Licensing Hours) Order 2025, which was laid before this House on 23 April, be approved.

Next week marks the 80th anniversary of Victory in Europe Day, which was of course a hugely significant and consequential moment in our country’s history. After more than five long years, during the first of which we stood alone, on 8 May 1945 Prime Minister Churchill proclaimed to cheering crowds in Whitehall, just a few hundred yards from this Chamber:

“This is your victory. It is the victory of the cause of freedom in every land.”

As the 75th anniversary commemorations involving public gatherings were, sadly, cancelled in 2020 due to the covid outbreak, the upcoming milestone is a precious chance to pay tribute to that greatest generation and hear the stories of those who lived through the war. At this point, I want to refer to my father, Eric Johnson, who served in the Royal Navy in the second world war, and my mother, Ruth Johnson, who worked in munitions factories.

Many people will want to come together with friends and family to mark the occasion, and to raise a glass to those who fought for our freedoms—the soldiers, sailors and airmen from the United Kingdom and across the Commonwealth, as well as our allies in Europe, and also those who contributed to the war effort at home, including civilians working in the emergency services, transport, the home guard, the wardens and those working in factories and on the land. Twenty three Members of this House and 20 Members of the other place gave their lives in world war two, and I know that Mr Speaker is working to mark that. We should celebrate the role of this place and our wartime coalition in saving democracy beyond our shores from what Winston Churchill called

“the abyss of a new dark age”.—[Official Report, 18 June 1940; Vol. 362, c. 60.]

Commemorative events will be held in many locations during the anniversary week, including: a military procession from Whitehall to Buckingham Palace; street parties across the country on the bank holiday; evensong at Manchester cathedral, followed by a celebratory ringing of bells; a celebratory picnic at Cardiff castle; a living history event at Sterling castle in Scotland; a series of commemoration events at Belfast city hall; and a service at Westminster Abbey, which will serve as both an act of shared remembrance and a celebration of the end of the war.

VE Day falls within the annual Commonwealth War Graves Commission’s War Graves Week, and the commission is marking the 80th anniversary of VE Day with the “For Evermore” tour, a mobile exhibition travelling the UK sharing stories of those who died in world war two. The commission is also holding a special VE Day concert on 2 May at the historic Coventry cathedral, which was rebuilt after being destroyed by bombing in 1940. A concert will also take place at Horse Guards Parade to mark the end of commemorations on 8 May.

As a Member of Parliament who represents Kingston upon Hull, a city that was routinely referred to anonymously in the second world war as a “north-east coastal town” despite bombing comparable to the east end of London, Hull’s celebrations for VE Day will be accompanied by a desire to see greater national recognition of the effects of the blitz on my city than we have had over the course of the past 80 years. Hull will have a memorial service at Hull cenotaph; the Hull History Centre will show free screenings of archive footage from VE Day in 1945 of the celebrations that took place in Hull; and in Cottingham there will be a 1940s music singalong at Cottingham civic hall.

It promises to be a special atmosphere in many communities and the order will allow people to celebrate for longer, should they so wish. Section 172 of the Licensing Act 2003 allows the Secretary of State to make a licensing hours order to allow licensed premises to open for specified, extended hours on occasions of exceptional international, national or local significance. By way of background, past occasions where the then Home Secretary has exercised this power to extend licensing hours have included: the King’s coronation; Her late Majesty the Queen’s platinum and diamond jubilee celebrations; the royal weddings in 2011 and 2018; and, most recently, the semi-final and final of the men’s UEFA European championship last year. The Government consider the 80th anniversary of VE Day to be an occasion of national significance and, as such, worthy of the proposed extension before the House today.

Turning to the practical details, the order makes provision to relax licensing arrangements in England and Wales, and allow licensed premises to extend their opening hours on Thursday the 8 May for a further two hours, from 11pm until 1am the following morning. A truncated consultation was conducted with key stakeholders who were supportive of the extension, and we take the view that the order will not bring about any significant crime and disorder due to the nature of the events. However, we recognise that there may be implications for police resourcing, and we will continue to work with stakeholders to mitigate any concerns around the impact.

As well as enabling celebrations, the extension has the added potential benefit of providing a welcome boost to the hospitality sector. I hope that Members across the House will agree that this order represents an appropriate use of the powers conferred on the Home Secretary by the Licensing Act 2003.

To conclude, this extension reflects our commitment to remembering what was a truly momentous event—our finest hour—and to celebrating those who defended our country, liberated Europe and secured peace. With that, I commend this order to the House.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Judith Cummins)]

I call the shadow Minister.

Crime and Policing Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Diana Johnson Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 29th April 2025 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:

Schedules 14 and 15.

Clause 103 stand part.

[The Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention (Dame Diana Johnson)]

When the Committee adjourned this morning, I had just started to set out that the Home Office had consulted extensively on the reform of confiscation orders in clause 102. Not only did we consult extensively on those new measures, which were recommended by the Law Commission, but we had the benefit of over 20 years of operational insight. The reforms will support the delivery of key objectives endorsed by the Government in the economic crime plan 2 to reduce money laundering and increase asset recovery returns, to ensure that criminals are deprived of their benefits from crime.

The wide-ranging reforms are introduced across 12 parts in schedule 14 in relation to England and Wales. The provisions in schedule 15 largely replicate the reforms for Northern Ireland, with appropriate modifications. I do not propose to go through the whole of schedule 14 part by part because much of it contains necessarily very technical provisions, but I am happy to explain particular provisions if any hon. Member would find that helpful.

Clause 103 introduces cost protections for enforcement authorities in the High Court, and the Court of Session in Scotland, in civil recovery proceedings under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. The Government are concerned that the current rules that govern how costs are awarded in civil recovery cases expose enforcement authorities to the risk of excessive strains on their budgets, particularly in cases against wealthy individuals who use very expensive legal teams. Even if a law enforcement agency applies for a civil recovery order in good faith and in the public interest, losing a case exposes enforcement agencies to paying substantial legal and court fees. Enforcement authorities work to make decisions in the public interest, and it is detrimental to the protection of the public if authorities are deterred from pursuing an investigation for fear that, if any resulting legal action is unsuccessful, they would face adverse costs and expensive litigation.

Clause 103 therefore amends the so-called “loser pays” principle to ensure that the court does not make an order for costs against an enforcement authority unless the authority has acted “unreasonably”, “dishonestly” or “improperly” during the course of proceedings or it would be

“just and reasonable to make such an order”

against them considering all the facts of the case. Cost protections will provide a positive step forward for the UK’s broader goal of recovering criminal assets and disrupting criminal activity, and I commend the clauses to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

Clause 102 reforms the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, aiming to clarify and strengthen the confiscation regime for proceeds of crime in England and Wales. Schedule 14 outlines several significant amendments with the primary goal of improving the effectiveness and fairness of confiscation proceedings.

One key change introduced by schedule 14 is the insertion of section 5A into the 2002 Act. The new section provides an overarching principal objective, which has been lacking, for the confiscation powers under part 2. The principal aim as defined in section 5A(2) is

“to deprive the defendant of the defendant’s benefit from criminal conduct, so far as within the defendant’s means.”

That will help to ensure that confiscation powers are used proportionately and in line with the objectives of the law, addressing gaps in case law and providing a clear framework for the court.

Paragraph 2 of schedule 14 now allows the prosecutor to decide whether to pursue a criminal lifestyle assessment rather than automatically applying it. That change allows for more flexibility in the application of these provisions, enabling prosecutors to allocate resources more efficiently and only pursue the criminal lifestyle route where appropriate.

Paragraph 4 introduces a change to the test for determining whether an offence constitutes part of a defendant’s criminal lifestyle. Previously, the law required at least three offences to qualify, but this change reduces that threshold to two offences. That will also apply if the defendant has benefited or intended to benefit from the criminal conduct involved in the offence, making the test easier to meet and broadening the scope of the confiscation regime.

A significant reform is found in paragraph 6, which amends section 7 of POCA to clarify how the value of the recoverable amount should be calculated. Currently, certain categories of property are ignored when calculating the value of a defendant’s benefit from crime, including property that has been forfeited or is subject to a recovery order. The proposed amendment extends that to further categories of property, such as property seized under any rule of law and property returned to victims. That ensures that the confiscation amount reflects only the actual benefit derived from crime and prevents double counting of assets that have already been returned or forfeited.

In the light of the changes introduced in clause 102 and schedule 14 on criminal lifestyle provisions, can the Minister clarify how the new flexibility in prosecutorial discretion will ensure that limited resources are effectively allocated, while safeguarding the fairness of confiscation proceedings for defendants who may not meet the criteria for a criminal lifestyle?

Clause 103(1) inserts new section 288A into part 5 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. This provision aims to protect the enforcement authorities from being ordered to pay costs in civil recovery proceedings conducted in the High Court. The court is prohibited from making such orders unless the enforcement authority acted unreasonably, dishonestly or improperly during the proceedings.

Proposed new section 288A(1)(c) of the 2002 Act introduces a discretionary power for the court to determine if, in unforeseen circumstances, it would be just and reasonable for an enforcement authority to pay costs. This provision acknowledges that civil recovery orders, which result in the permanent deprivation of a person’s property, engage the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions. It ensures that the enforcement process complies with the right to access to a court, as guaranteed by article 6 of the European convention on human rights. I would be grateful if the Minister would tell us what mechanisms would ensure that enforcement authorities could be held accountable if acting unreasonably, dishonestly or improperly during civil recovery proceedings.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I thank the shadow Minister; he went into some detail about how schedule 14 operates. I want to refer to the issue of criminal lifestyle offences in schedule 2 to POCA, which is about what the court utilises to determine whether a defendant has a criminal lifestyle. This is about the changes that we are adding. I refer in particular to the two environmental offences:

“depositing…certain waste, otherwise than in accordance with an environmental permit”

and

“operating a regulated facility, or causing or knowingly permitting a water discharge activity or groundwater activity, otherwise than in accordance with an environmental permit.”

The third offence that we are adding is the keeping of a brothel for prostitution. I want to make clear that those offences are being added.

The shadow Minister asked how this would be kept under review and whether unreasonable measures will be introduced. The legislation will set that out, but it is my understanding that the court will still have a role to play in any measures that are deemed to be unreasonable and forming a view about that. This part of the schedule is very technical, so I am happy to put in writing to the shadow Minister any further information that I have not been able to provide, but I think the general view is that it is implementing the recommendations from the Law Commission. As I understand it, it is very similar to what the previous Government were going to support. On that basis, I commend the provisions to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 102 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedules 14 and 15 agreed to.

Clause 103 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 104

Extension of polygraph condition to certain offenders

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clauses 107 to 109 stand part.

New clause 23—Previous conduct as factor in deciding whether to investigate a complaint—

“(1) The Police Reform Act 2002 is amended as follows.

(2) In Schedule 3, paragraph 1(6B)(d), at end insert ‘or

(e) the complaint is made about a person serving with the police who has previous convictions or has had previous complaints made against them.’”

This new clause would make previous complaints or convictions a factor in determining how to handle a new complaint against a police officer.

New clause 31—Automatic dismissal of officers who fail vetting—

“(1) The Police Act 1996 is amended in accordance with subsection (2).

(2) In section 39A (Codes of practice for chief officers), after subsection (1) insert—

‘(1A) Without prejudice to subsection (1) and subject to subsection (1B), a code of practice may provide for an officer to be dismissed without notice where—

(a) the officer fails vetting, and

(b) it is not reasonable to expect that the officer will be capable of being deployed to full duties within a reasonable timeframe.

(1B) Subsection (1A) does not apply where a chief officer concludes that—

(a) the officer, notwithstanding his vetting failure, is capable of being deployed to a substantial majority of duties appropriate for an officer of his rank; and

(b) it would be disproportionate to the operational effectiveness of the force for the officer to be dismissed without notice.’”

This new clause would ensure police officers who failed their vetting can be dismissed.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Part 13 of the Bill pertains to matters relating to the police. Before I talk in detail about clauses 106 to 108, it may assist the Committee if I first provide some context for these provisions. Following the shooting of Chris Kaba, and the subsequent trial and acquittal of Sergeant Martyn Blake in October 2024, the Home Secretary made a series of commitments in response to the issues raised under the previous Government’s accountability review. The measures announced by the Home Secretary will rebuild confidence in police accountability systems for both the public and the police.

As the Home Secretary said when making her announcement, the case happened against a backdrop of wider and long-standing concerns about accountability, standards and confidence in policing. The British model of policing relies on mutual bonds of trust between the public and the police. For our model of policing to work, it is essential that the police have the confidence of the communities they serve, and that officers have the confidence they need to do the vital and often extremely difficult job of keeping us all safe. Too often in recent times, both elements of that confidence have become frayed.

Clauses 106 to 108 give effect to certain findings of the accountability review. Clause 106 will improve timeliness in the system by allowing the Independent Office for Police Conduct to make referrals to the Crown Prosecution Service prior to completing its final report. Clause 107 will amend the threshold for the IOPC to make referrals to the CPS, and clause 108 places the IOPC’s victims’ right to review scheme on a statutory footing, further improving the robustness of the IOPC’s investigative process.

Clause 106 will improve timeliness in the misconduct system. At present, a number of factors cause delay in the misconduct system, one of which relates to the fact that in order for the IOPC to make a referral to the CPS, it is legally required to complete its final report, concluding its investigation, which causes delays in making referrals. The final report has to include misconduct findings and lessons learned for the IOPC. Such elements are not required for referrals to be made to the CPS, so the change that we are making will enable the IOPC to make a referral prior to completing its final report, allowing for an improvement in pace in the accountability system.

Currently, the law states that the IOPC may refer a police officer to the CPS where there is an indication that a criminal offence may have been committed. This is a relatively low bar for making referrals to the CPS. Clause 107 changes this to bring the system in line with the threshold that the police apply when making referrals of members of the public to the CPS, which requires there to be a realistic prospect of conviction. It is right and fair that, as a result of this change, officers and members of the public will be referred to the CPS at the same threshold. The CPS will continue to make charging decisions at the same threshold, which is the full code test. This change will improve overall fairness in the system.

Finally, the IOPC’s victims’ right to review currently allows for victims and their families to challenge the IOPC when it decides not to refer matters to the CPS. This right is currently available to victims and their families through guidance. Clause 108 places this right on the statute book to protect victims and demonstrate our clear commitment to victims’ rights. Taken together, these clauses are a balanced package of measures that will help to speed up IOPC investigations while strengthening the rights of those who may be aggrieved by the outcome of an investigation.

Clause 109 amends the powers of the Secretary of State to make provisions on appeals to the police appeals tribunals. It will enable chief constables to appeal the findings or outcome of police misconduct proceedings, with a similar right for police and crime commissioners to appeal where the officer subject to proceedings is a chief constable. It will also enable a right of appeal to be conferred on the director general of the IOPC where the IOPC has presented the case at the misconduct proceedings.

This Government are committed to restoring public trust and confidence in policing, which is something fundamental to our model of policing by consent. While the majority of our police officers act with bravery and integrity, where things go wrong the public rightly expect that there is a system to robustly hold the police to account.

In the context of recent high-profile cases that have damaged that vital trust and confidence, chief constables must be empowered to drive up standards. While chief constables are themselves rightly held to account for standards in their forces, they are not afforded the same ability to challenge disciplinary decisions as the officers in their force. The only route for chief constables to challenge decisions that they consider to be unreasonable is through judicial review. That is a lengthier and more complex process than the existing specialist police appeals tribunals.

Clause 109 will allow the Secretary of State to make amendments to existing rules. First, it will provide for a right of appeal for chief constables to challenge the findings or outcomes of misconduct proceedings in relation to officers within their force, and an equivalent right of appeal for police and crime commissioners where the officer concerned is a chief constable. This is designed to ensure parity within the system, supporting the wider responsibilities of police and crime commissioners in respect of chief constables.

Furthermore, the clause will provide an equivalent right of appeal for the director general of the IOPC, limited to circumstances in which the IOPC has presented at the misconduct proceedings. This again supports public trust and confidence by ensuring vital independence in the system in the most serious and sensitive cases. Amendments to secondary legislation will be developed in consultation with the sector, including the Police Advisory Board for England and Wales.

I will speak to new clauses 23 and 31, which are also in this group, once we have heard from the shadow Minister.

[Matt Vickers]

On 5 September 2022, an armed police officer shot and killed Chris Kaba during a vehicle stop in south London. The police referred the case to the IOPC, as required when someone dies or is seriously injured in police custody or contact. The IOPC investigated and referred the case to the Crown Prosecution Service, which authorised a murder charge in September 2023. Concerns over accountability systems led the Home Office to launch a review in September 2023. In March 2024, the officer was identified and the Home Secretary announced three immediate changes to improve accountability: raising the threshold for CPS referrals; relaxing restrictions on criminal proceedings; and formalising victims’ rights under the IOPC’s victims’ right to review policy.

Clauses 106 to 108 implement these proposals, which had previously been tabled as amendments to the Criminal Justice Bill. Clause 106 introduces significant procedural reform to allow certain criminal investigations into police misconduct to be expedited. It is clear that the clause will help to significantly speed up accountability, especially in cases involving clear and serious misconduct by police officers. By allowing criminal proceedings to be brought sooner, it reduces the delay in holding individuals accountable for their actions, ensuring that justice is not unduly postponed.

In situations where there is clear evidence of misconduct, that allows for quicker action. A quicker response can help to reassure the public that, where there are serious allegations, the authority is acting swiftly and decisively. It demonstrates that law enforcement and oversight bodies are committed to transparency and integrity. What safeguards are in place to prevent inappropriate or premature referrals to the Director of Public Prosecutions under this accelerated procedure? How will the IOPC or other appropriate authority be held accountable for determinations made?

Currently, chief officers have no right of appeal against panel decisions and may only challenge outcomes via judicial review. In October 2022, the Government launched a review of the dismissal process, with findings published in September 2023. Recommendations included a presumption of dismissal for gross misconduct; automatic gross misconduct designation for certain convictions; streamlined performance and vetting-based dismissal processes; and a new appeal right for chief officers. Met commissioner Sir Mark Rowley welcomed the reforms, citing the need for greater control to uphold standards. However, the Police Federation criticised the changes, warning they could undermine fair hearings and lead to excessive influence by chief officers, risking biased outcomes.

--- Later in debate ---

Importantly, the new clause includes a safeguard to prevent unfair or disproportionate outcomes. If a chief officer believes that, despite the vetting failure, the officer is still capable of performing a substantial majority of duties appropriate for their rank, and that dismissal would undermine the operational effectiveness of the force, they can decide not to proceed with a dismissal. This ensures that the decision remains proportionate, and sensitive to operational realities. The new clause builds on recommendations made in the Government’s 2023 review of police officer dismissals, which advocated for a clarified and consistent route for removing officers who fail vetting. By embedding this power in legislation, the new clause would give chief officers clearer authority to act in the interest of police professionalism and public trust.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I welcome what the shadow Minister has said. There have been no changes to the clauses that were introduced in the Criminal Justice Bill and that are now in the Crime and Policing Bill, so I think we are on the same page in terms of these being the appropriate measures to take forward. I am grateful that he set out in detail the case for introducing the new clauses, which seek to ensure that the provisions work in policing and are fit for purpose, and that everyone who is in policing is fit to be a police officer. I reassure the Committee that the Government take police integrity very seriously. It is essential, as I said in my earlier remarks, that we have public confidence in policing and that the highest standards are upheld and maintained. I think we all agree that individuals who fall below the standards the public expect should not be police officers.

New clause 23 seeks to ensure that previous complaints or convictions are considered a factor in determining when a complaint against an officer should be handled formally under schedule 3 to the Police Reform Act 2002. I recognise the shadow Minister’s desire to strengthen the legislation to that effect but, in reality, these elements are already established practice. Under existing statutory guidance issued by the IOPC, previous complaints against an officer should be taken into account when considering whether to handle a complaint under schedule 3. All those working in policing must have regard to that statutory guidance. Compelling forces to record complaints under schedule 3, where a historical complaint exists on an officer’s record, would limit their ability to handle those complaints in the most proportionate manner and in the interests of the complainant.

Similarly, information on historical convictions is available to forces on the police national computer and is relevant in determining the most appropriate way to handle a complaint. The Government have committed to ensuring that vetting rules are strengthened with regard to historical convictions. We intend to put mandatory vetting standards into law this year, so that those who have committed certain offences cannot hold vetting clearance and serve as police officers.

New clause 31 would amend the Police Act 1996 to ensure that a code of practice may provide that a police officer who fails their vetting will be dismissed without notice. It may help the Committee to understand that the Government have acted rapidly to develop new regulations in this area, which will enable forces to dismiss officers who cannot maintain vetting clearance. The regulations have taken into account the relevant legal proceedings, such as the Di Maria judicial review, which considered the adequacy of the Metropolitan Police Service’s processes to remove those officers without vetting clearance. The Police (Vetting) Regulations 2025, which were laid just last week on 23 April, introduced a duty on police officers to hold and maintain vetting clearance, and provide a bespoke regulatory mechanism by which they can be dismissed should they fail to do so.

The Government also strongly believe that there should be no circumstances in which an officer who is unable to hold vetting clearance should remain in policing, so I cannot support the qualification in new clause 31, which suggests that an officer may be capable of deployment to other duties despite failing to maintain their vetting clearance. I hope that, having had the opportunity to consider the existing framework for complaints, the new regulations that I just referred to and the ongoing work to strengthen the vetting rules, the shadow Minister will be content not to move his new clauses later in our proceedings.

I want to mention how the IOPC will keep an eye on the changes that are being introduced. It is clear that there will be scrutiny of what happens following the changes. If there are emerging patterns of cases where, for instance, the CPS declines to charge an officer, despite the IOPC referral, I would expect the IOPC to consider whether there are lessons to be learned and a further review to be undertaken.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 106 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 107 to 109 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 110

Power to make youth diversion orders

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I beg to move amendment 53, in clause 110, page 128, line 31, leave out “an” and insert “a relevant”.

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 54.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 54 and 55.

Clause stand part.

Clause 111 stand part.

Government new clause 61—Notification requirements.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Part 14 of the Bill is about counter-terrorism and national security. Protecting the public is the first duty of any Government, which is why national security is a key pillar of the Government’s plan for change. The UK has one of the strongest counter-terrorism frameworks in the world, but we cannot stand by while threats evolve.

As the Home Secretary has set out in her statements to the House, the Security Service, Counter Terrorism Policing and the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation have all consistently raised concerns related to the increasing number of young people being investigated for terrorism offences. While there must always be the potential to pursue prosecutions in the most serious cases, it is important to ensure that there are alternative risk management measures that do not automatically result in a young person receiving a terrorism conviction, which can have a hugely destructive impact on their life prospects. We have listened to operational partners about the need for alternative and earlier interventions, and we are taking the opportunity to build on a recommendation made by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Jonathan Hall KC. Chapter 1 of part 14 therefore introduces new youth diversion orders or YDOs.

YDOs will be a new civil order designed to better manage terrorist risk from young people, while reducing the need for their further involvement in the criminal justice system. They demonstrate this Government’s commitment to ensuring that operational partners have the tools they need to reduce terrorism risk and support rehabilitation.

Clause 110 introduces a new power for the police to apply to a youth or magistrates court for a YDO. To impose a YDO, the court will need to be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the respondent has either committed a terrorism offence, committed a non-terrorism offence with a terrorism connection, or engaged in conduct likely to facilitate the commission of a terrorism offence. The court will also need to consider that it is necessary and proportionate to make the order to protect the public from a risk of terrorism or serious harm, as defined in clause 111. This ensures that the new orders will be imposed only where there is a serious risk to the public.

The technical Government amendments 53 to 55 adjust the definition of “offence with a terrorist connection” to avoid the need to refer to legislation relating to sentencing. Sentencing will not take place in YDO applications, but the judge considering a YDO application will be able to consider whether the individual has committed an offence with a terrorist connection, in the same way as a judge would consider this on sentencing.

Finally, new clause 61 requires individuals to provide their personal details to the police where a YDO includes notification requirements. The relevant details are the respondent’s name, including any aliases, and their home address. This requirement will not be automatic or mandatory for every YDO, but will need to be agreed by the court on a case-by-case basis.

The notification requirement will also include a requirement to provide information about the individual’s school or other educational establishment if relevant. This information would be helpful, for example, in a scenario where someone moved school and there was no other trigger for the local authority to inform the police of the move.

The new clause is supported by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, and operational partners have confirmed that it is necessary to support the effective day-to-day management of YDOs. I commend the Government’s amendments to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

The new youth diversion orders are designed as a counterterrorism risk management tool for individuals under the age of 21. The purpose of the YDOs is to divert young people from engaging in terrorist activities, and to allow police to intervene at an earlier stage.

Clause 110 grants the police the authority to apply to the courts for a YDO. Clause 110 clarifies that a YDO can be applied for by a chief officer of police when the respondent meets certain criteria based on their age and involvement in terrorist-related offences. In England, Wales and Northern Ireland, the respondent must be between the ages of 10 and 21, and in Scotland, between 12 and 21.

The aim of the order is diversion, rather than punishment. The YDO is intended to help prevent further involvement in terrorism or related activities. The order may give rehabilitation, counselling or other interventions designed to steer the individual away from terrorism-related conduct. Clause 111 defines serious harm in the context of YDOs.

New clause 61 introduces notification requirements for a youth diversion order, where the respondent must notify the police within three days of being served with the order. The notification includes personal details such as the respondent’s name, any additional names, home address, and the name and address of any educational establishment the respondent normally attends. It is intended to help ensure the youth’s compliance with the order, as well as assist in tracking their progress or risk of non-compliance.

This approach strengthens the monitoring aspect of YDOs by tying in an educational component. It ensures that authorities have up-to-date information regarding the young person’s school involvement, which can be a crucial element in their rehabilitation. How will the Government ensure that the notification requirements, particularly educational details, do not inadvertently stigmatise the young person, or disrupt their education experience, especially in cases where the individual might already be vulnerable or at risk of exclusion from school?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am grateful for the shadow Minister’s comments. On his point about information on schools and stigmatising children, am I right in thinking he believes that information will be made available to the public? I was not clear.

[Matt Vickers]

In educational settings, if people are given the details and the contact, might that be reflected?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I do not wish to try your patience, Mrs Lewell, but my understanding is that this would not be public information that was shared. It would remain within the youth court or the magistrates court. I am looking to my officials, and they are nodding at me, so this is not information that would be in the public domain. I hope that that deals with the point around any stigmatisation of a young person who was subject to a YDO.

Amendment 53 agreed to.

Amendments made: 54, in clause 110, page 129, leave out lines 8 and 9 and insert—

“‘relevant offence’ means an offence which—

(a) was committed on or after 29 June 2021,

(b) is punishable on indictment with imprisonment for more than 2 years, and

(c) is not specified in—

(i) Schedule 1A to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, or

(ii) Schedule A1 to the Sentencing Code;”.

This amendment, Amendment 53 and Amendment 55 replace the concept of an “offence with a terrorist connection” with the concept of a “relevant offence with a terrorist connection” so as to enable the court dealing with an application for a youth diversion order to makes its own determination as to whether an offence has a terrorist connection.

Amendment 55, in clause 110, page 129, line 14, at end insert—

“(3A) For the purposes of subsection (2)(a)(ii), a relevant offence has a terrorist connection if the offence—

(a) is, or takes place in the course of, an act of terrorism, or

(b) is committed for the purposes of terrorism.” —(Dame Diana Johnson.)

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 54.

Clause 110, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 111 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 112

Content of youth diversion orders

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I beg to move amendment 56, in clause 112, page 130, line 11, leave out “subsection (2) or (3)” and insert “subsections (2) to (3A)”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 59.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 57 to 59.

Amendment 40, in clause 112, page 130, line 33, leave out subsection (6) and insert—

“(6) A youth diversion order must specify the period for which it has effect, up to a maximum of 12 months.

(7) An assessment must be taken of the respondent before the conclusion of a youth diversion order to determine if they continue to hold extremist views or pose a terror threat.

(8) An assessment must be made by a qualified expert in extremism and counterterrorism.

(9) Assessments taken by the respondent’s youth offending team must be reviewed by an external expert with no pre-existing relationship to the respondent.

(10) If the respondent is assessed as holding extremist views or as a terror threat the youth offending team or a chief officer of police must apply to an appropriate court for the youth offending order to be extended up to a maximum of 12 months.

(11) All provisions, prohibitions and requirements of a youth diversion order remain in effect until the respondent has been assessed as holding no extremist views or posing a terror threat.”

This amendment would give the police the ability to apply for youth diversion orders in cases of youth extremism and terror risks. The diversion orders would conclude automatically after a maximum of twelve months without an assessment as to whether the individual remained a terror risk or extremist.

Government amendment 60.

Clause stand part.

Government new clause 62—Electronic monitoring of compliance with order: England and Wales.

Government new clause 63—Conditions for imposing electronic monitoring requirement: England and Wales.

Government amendment 79.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Clause 112 sets out a non-exhaustive list of prohibitions or requirements that may be included in a YDO and the safeguards that the police and courts must consider. The police must have the ability to mitigate risk to the public from young people being drawn into terrorism—a growing problem, as we all appreciate. The YDO will enable the police to impose necessary restrictions on an individual, subject to a court order. These may include limits on accessing certain websites or apps, or restrictions on engaging with specific individuals or groups. For example, this could include engagement with other children who have been assessed to be vulnerable to radicalisation. A YDO may also include positive requirements that the respondent must comply with. These may be rehabilitative in nature, including, for example, mandatory attendance at intervention sessions that seek to support the respondent in moving away from extremist ideologies.

Although it is critical that the police are able to impose necessary risk management and rehabilitative measures, the legislation ensures that there are safeguards to limit the extent of such measures. First, each measure must be necessary and proportionate for the purpose of mitigating a risk of terrorism or serious harm. Secondly, any measure included as part of a YDO must not unnecessarily interfere with a respondent’s educational or work commitments, or their religious beliefs. Thirdly, any measure may not exceed a total duration of two years. The aim is to ensure that YDOs have enough time to make a positive impact on a young person’s life while remaining proportionate to the scale of risk they pose to the public by being drawn into terrorism.

The Government amendments to clause 112 provide further examples of the measures that may be imposed through a YDO. This increases transparency and provides a clear statutory basis for the most intrusive measures that will be available. The expanded list of prohibitions and requirements represents the measures that we expect the police will most commonly apply to the court to include in a YDO.

Amendment 57 allows for potential restrictions on entering a specific area, including travel restrictions inside or outside the UK. Amendment 58 outlines potential requirements for the respondent to answer questions, provide information, or produce documents. Amendment 59 provides that, if included in a YDO, the individual may be required to comply with notification requirements, as detailed in new clause 61, and may be subject to restrictions on the possession of weapons and explosives. Amendments 56 and 60 are consequential on these other amendments.

New clauses 62 and 63 and Government amendment 79 enable a YDO to include an electronic monitoring requirement. This will enable the effective monitoring of and compliance with measures such as curfew requirements and exclusion measures. Operational partners have been explicit that having this capability will maximise the utility and effectiveness of YDOs.

Finally, amendment 40, tabled by the shadow Minister, seeks to give the police the ability to apply for a YDO in cases where a young person exhibits extremist views; it would also prevent an order from expiring unless there is an independent expert assessment that concludes the individual no longer poses a terrorist risk or holds extremist views. YDOs are designed for terrorism-related cases only. A YDO is a tool to be used only when young people pose a public safety risk. There are no plans to use YDOs for cases that do not meet terrorism thresholds, as this would interfere with the rights of young people.

This Government take extremism very seriously, and we are committed to ensuring that we have the tools and powers needed to address this issue. Efforts to counter extremism span a broad range of Government and law enforcement activity, and we must persist in our efforts to challenge extremist narratives, to disrupt the activity of radicalising groups, and to directly tackle the causes of radicalisation. The Home Office leads work on countering extremism, and the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government will lead work with local councils on strengthening community cohesion. It is vital that the two programmes on cohesion and extremism work in parallel.

Clause 116(4), which we will debate in a later group, permits the police to apply for the extension of a YDO. There may be two extension applications, and each will be for a maximum of six months, so the maximum duration of an order is two years in total. I assure the hon. Member for Stockton West that counter-terrorism police will regularly assess the risk posed by the individual while the order is in force. Although decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis, the police may decide to apply to the court to extend an order. Where the police assess that the risk posed by the respondent remains despite the order having been in place, they may consider, in consultation with the relevant prosecutorial authority, whether the relevant test for prosecution for terrorist offending is met. Should the risk posed by the individual persist for longer than 24 months, other tools may be considered.

I hope the shadow Minister will agree not to press amendment 40 given the clear operational need for the Government’s amendments, which I commend to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

Amendment 40 primarily focuses on the duration, assessment and possible extension of YDOs, and it would ensure that the orders are subject to review and that further intervention is applied when necessary. Under the amendment, YDOs must specify a period of up to 12 months in which the young person is monitored and guided through the diversion programme. This would ensure there is a clear time limit with a defined end point for the intervention.

Additionally, before the order concludes, an assessment must be carried out to evaluate whether the individual continues to hold extremist views or poses a terrorism threat. This would add an important safeguard to the process, ensuring that young people who may still be a risk are identified before the order ends. A critical element of the amendment is the requirement that qualified experts carry out the assessment. The evaluation of whether the individual continues to hold extremist views or to present a terrorism risk must be conducted by an expert in extremism and counter-terrorism. This would ensure the assessment is informed by a high level of expertise and understanding of the complexities of radicalisation.

Assessments made by the youth offending team must be reviewed by an external expert who has no pre-existing relationship with the respondent. This independent review would guarantee objectivity and minimise any potential bias in the evaluation process. If the individual was assessed to be still holding extremist views or continuing to pose a terrorism risk, the youth offending team or a chief officer of the police would have the power to apply to the court for an extension of the youth diversion order. This extension could be granted for an additional 12 months, allowing continued intervention and monitoring of the individual. Importantly, the extension would ensure that the order remained in place for as long as the individual was considered to pose a risk to public safety.

Finally, the amendment specifies that all provisions, prohibitions and requirements set by the YDO will remain in effect until the individual has been assessed as holding no extremist views or posing no terrorism threat. This would ensure that the protective measures stipulated in the order were maintained throughout the duration of the individual’s involvement in the diversion programme, offering ongoing protection to the public while allowing continued monitoring of the individual’s risk level. The amendment would ensure that the diversion process is both effective and responsive to the changing nature of extremist behaviour, and that any decision to conclude or extend the order is based on robust and independent expert evaluations, thus improving the overall effectiveness of the youth intervention measures in countering extremism and terrorism.

Clause 112 outlines the content and conditions of a youth diversion order, providing the framework for how the order can be structured and what it can include. How will the Government ensure that YDOs do not interfere with religious or cultural practices of respondents, as the clause provides, especially when it comes to limitations on association or communication?

[The Chair]

My sincere apologies to the Committee: before I called the shadow Minister, I should have proposed Government amendment 56. I call the Minister.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

To answer the question that the shadow Minister just posed, I said in my earlier remarks that there would not be restrictions that interfered with educational and work commitments, or with religious observances. I think that deals with his question. On that basis, commend the Government amendment to the Committee.

Amendment 56 agreed to.

Amendments made: 57, in clause 112, page 130, line 18, at end insert—

“(d) the respondent’s presence in, or access to, a specified area or place or an area or place of a specified description;

(e) the respondent's travel (whether within the United Kingdom, between the United Kingdom and other places or otherwise).”

This amendment provides that the prohibitions or requirements a youth diversion order may contain include ones relating to the respondent’s presence in or access to particular areas or places, or to the respondent’s travel.

Amendment 58, in clause 112, page 130, line 22, leave out “provide information” and insert

“answer questions, provide information or produce documents”.

This amendment provides that a youth diversion order may require the respondent to answer questions, provide information or produce documents.

Amendment 59, in clause 112, page 130, line 23, at end insert—

“(d) require the respondent to comply with section (Notification requirements) (notification requirements).

(3A) An order may contain any prohibition that is of a kind that could be imposed by the Secretary of State in relation to an individual by virtue of paragraph 6A of Schedule 1 to the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (weapons and explosives measures).”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This amendment provides that a youth diversion order may require the respondent to comply with notification requirements under NC61 and may contain prohibitions relating to weapons and explosives.

Amendment proposed: 40, in clause 112, page 130, line 33, leave out subsection (6) and insert—

“(6) A youth diversion order must specify the period for which it has effect, up to a maximum of 12 months.

(7) An assessment must be taken of the respondent before the conclusion of a youth diversion order to determine if they continue to hold extremist views or pose a terror threat.

(8) An assessment must be made by a qualified expert in extremism and counterterrorism.

(9) Assessments taken by the respondent’s youth offending team must be reviewed by an external expert with no pre-existing relationship to the respondent.

(10) If the respondent is assessed as holding extremist views or as a terror threat the youth offending team or a chief officer of police must apply to an appropriate court for the youth offending order to be extended up to a maximum of 12 months.

(11) All provisions, prohibitions and requirements of a youth diversion order remain in effect until the respondent has been assessed as holding no extremist views or posing a terror threat.”—(Matt Vickers.)

This amendment would give the police the ability to apply for youth diversion orders in cases of youth extremism and terror risks. The diversion orders would conclude automatically after a maximum of twelve months without an assessment as to whether the individual remained a terror risk or extremist.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

Duty to consult

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I beg to move amendment 61, in clause 113, page 131, line 4, leave out from “order” to “consult” in line 5 and insert

“, a chief officer of police must, if the respondent will be under the age of 18 when the application is made,”.

This is a drafting change that ensures consistency between the drafting of subsection (1) of clause 113 and subsection (2) of that clause as amended by Amendment 62.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 62, 64 and 63.

Clause stand part.

Government amendments 65 and 66.

Clause 114 stand part.

Government amendment 67.

Clause 115 stand part.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Clauses 113 to 115 set out duties on the police to consult with relevant authorities, provide for applications to be made without notice in urgent circumstances, and provide for interim YDOs to be made.

The Committee will recognise the importance of ensuring that the police take wider factors into consideration—for example, a person’s age, mental health, safeguarding and educational needs—before applying for a YDO. Clause 113 therefore introduces a duty to consult before applying for an order or applying for variation or discharge of an order. In England and Wales, and in Northern Ireland, the police will be required to consult with youth offending teams and the Youth Justice Agency respectively for applications involving individuals under the age of 18. In Scotland, the police will be required to consult with the Lord Advocate for all applications. This is necessary to give effect to the different position in Scotland, where consultation with the Lord Advocate is appropriate for all YDOs, including for 18 to 21-year-olds, and for without-notice YDO applications. That reflects the Lord Advocate’s specific functions in relation to their role as the head of the system for the investigation and prosecution of crime, which includes a specific working relationship with Police Scotland.

Government amendments 62 and 65 make the additional requirement in respect of Scotland that the police consult with the local authority before making an application for a YDO, irrespective of the age of the respondent, and remove the requirement for consultation with the Scottish Children’s Reporter Administration for YDOs for under-18s. Again, the amendments are necessary to give effect to the different position in Scotland, where there is no equivalent to youth offending teams. Government amendments 63, 64 and 66 are consequential on those amendments, while Government amendment 61 ensures consistency of drafting between the subsections of clauses 113, as amended.

Consultation will be an important part of the YDO application process, ensuring that the police have thoroughly considered the necessity and proportionality of a YDO and taken into account the expertise of those who work closely with young people in the community. This statutory duty does not prevent the police from engaging with other authorities, such as the CPS or the Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland, wider social services, or the respondent’s school or college, where appropriate.

While it is likely to be rare in practice, there may be circumstances in which an urgent YDO application is required and providing notice to the respondent may increase risk. Therefore, clause 114 provides a route for police to apply for a YDO without notice to the respondent. The requirement to consult does not apply in such cases, although the police will still be required to consult relevant authorities before the full court hearing for a YDO.

Where an application is made without notice, the court will be able to consider whether to impose an interim order, in line with the approach taken with other preventive orders, such as knife crime prevention orders. Due to the temporary nature of an interim order, clause 115 ensures that the only positive requirements that can be included in such an order are to provide information and to comply with notification requirements. For example, the Bill does not allow the police to impose a requirement to attend intervention sessions similar to Prevent in an interim order, but they will be able to impose risk-management measures where necessary and proportionate, subject to the court’s permission. Amendment 67 clarifies the measures that can and cannot be imposed in an interim YDO.

I commend the amendments and the clauses to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 113 outlines the duty to consult before making an application for a youth diversion order or the variation or discharge of such an order, particularly when the individual involved is under 18. It ensures that key stakeholders are involved in the decision-making process, so that the young person’s best interests are taken into account, and it ensures that the relevant agencies are informed and consulted before any formal application is made. How do the Government plan to ensure that the agencies that are consulted—in particular the youth offending teams—have the necessary expertise and resources to adequately assess the case before the application for a YDO is made?

Clause 114 outlines the process for making an application for a youth diversion order without notice to the respondent. This provision is significant because it allows for situations in which immediate intervention is necessary and the respondent is not notified before the application is made. How will the Government ensure that respondents’ rights are protected in cases where an application is made without notice? What measures are in place to prevent misuse of this provision?

Clause 115 makes provision for an interim youth diversion order to be made during the adjournment of a hearing for a full YDO. It ensures that even while a decision on the full application is pending, the court can take immediate temporary action to manage the respondent’s risk, particularly in cases involving potential extremism or terrorism. The clause allows the courts to impose interim measures to temporarily manage a respondent’s behaviour, safeguarding public safety, while the full process is ongoing.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

The shadow Minister raised the issue of consultation with youth offending teams and their equivalent in the devolved nations. My understanding is that we are not talking about a large number of individuals being subject to these provisions. The reason we say that youth offending teams have to be consulted is that they have the expertise and the knowledge of working with young people, and it is likely that the individuals they will be consulted on will already be known to them. It is a good, positive measure to undertake that consultation with youth offending teams and recognise the skills and safeguards that they will bring. Their knowledge of the individual will perhaps include, as I spoke about earlier, issues in their background or safeguarding issues that need to be considered. That is really important.

An interim YDO may be required if there is an immediate risk that has to be managed. That is why provision needs to be made for interim YDOs, but of course they are interim, and a full hearing will take place. Interim YDOs will be used only in urgent circumstances, and of course the court will have to agree; while an application can be made, if the court does not recognise the urgency, it will not be granted. The independent reviewer of terrorism legislation has agreed that the power to make interim measures is necessary in order for YDOs to be effective.

I hope that, on the basis of those answers, the shadow Minister is satisfied that the clause should stand part of the Bill.

Amendment 61 agreed to.

Amendments made: 62, in clause 113, page 131, line 10, leave out from “Scotland” to end of line 15 and insert

“must consult—

(a) the Lord Advocate,

(b) the relevant local authority, and

(c) if the respondent will be under the age of 18 when the application is made, the Principal Reporter.”

This amendment changes who the chief constable of the Police Service of Scotland must consult before making an application for a youth diversion order or for the variation or discharge of such an order.

Amendment 64, in clause 113, page 131, line 21, at end insert—

“‘relevant local authority’ means—

(a) the Scottish local authority in whose area it appears to the chief constable that the respondent lives, or

(b) if it appears to the chief constable that the respondent lives in more than one such area, whichever one or more of the relevant Scottish local authorities that the chief constable considers it appropriate to consult;”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 62.

Amendment 63, in clause 113, page 131, line 21, after “section” insert “—

‘Scottish local authority’ means a council constituted under section 2 of the Local Government etc (Scotland) Act 1994;”.—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 62.

Clause 113, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 114

Applications without notice

Amendments made: 65, in clause 114, page 131, line 27, leave out “Section 113(1) does” and insert

“Subsections (1) and (2)(b) and (c) of section 113 do”.

This amendment disapplies the requirement to consult the relevant local authority and (where the respondent is under 18) the Principal Reporter where an application for a youth diversion order is made without notice in Scotland.

Amendment 66, in clause 114, page 131, line 35, leave out “section 113(1)” and insert

“subsection (1) or (2)(b) and (c) of section 113 (as the case may be)”.—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 65.

Clause 114, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 115

Interim youth diversion orders

Amendment made: 67, in clause 115, page 132, line 8, leave out subsection (3) and substitute—

“(3) The only requirements that may be imposed by an interim youth diversion order on the respondent are—

(a) a requirement of the kind mentioned in section 112(3)(b) (requirements to provide information etc);

(b) a requirement to comply with section (Notification requirements) (notification requirements).”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This amendment enables an interim youth diversion order to require the respondent answer questions, provide information or produce documents, or to comply with notification requirements under NC61.

Clause 115, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 116

Variation and discharge of youth diversion orders

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I beg to move amendment 68, in clause 116, page 132, line 33, at end insert—

“(4A) The court may make provision of a kind mentioned in subsection (4) only if it considers that the provision is necessary for the purpose of protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism or other serious harm.

(4B) Subsections (5) and (7) of section 112 apply to additional prohibitions or requirements included on a variation of an order.”

This amendment provides that a court may only vary a youth diversion order to include an additional prohibition or requirement or to extend its duration if it considers it necessary; and that certain provision in clause 112 about the content of orders applies equally to such additional prohibitions or requirements.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Clause stand part.

Government amendments 69 to 71.

Clause 117 stand part.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Clause 116 ensures that the police or the subject of a YDO can apply to the relevant court to vary the order once it is in place to, for example, add or remove measures or to change the duration of existing measures. The clause also allows the police or the subject of a YDO to apply to end the order before it is due to expire, allowing the police to withdraw the order if it is no longer considered necessary.

Clause 117 sets out the route for the police or a respondent to appeal against a court decision to impose a YDO, an interim YDO or any change made under clause 116. Appeals will be made to the Crown court in England, Wales and Northern Ireland and the Sheriff Appeal Court in Scotland. The court may then make changes on the basis of that appeal, as required. Government amendments 68 and 71 make changes to clarify and streamline the appeals process for YDOs, as do Government amendments 69 and 70, which provide that a second appeal in relation to a YDO may be made to the Court of Appeal in England and Wales.

The Committee will recognise the importance of the clauses in ensuring that there is a process for varying or revoking the order as well as for both the police and YDO subjects to have a prescribed and proportionate route for appeals.

Amendment 68 agreed to.

Clause 116, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 117

Appeal against youth diversion order etc

--- Later in debate ---

Offence of breaching youth diversion order

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I beg to move amendment 72, in clause 118, page 133, line 22, at end insert—

“(1A) Where a youth diversion order requires a person to provide information or produce a document, it is an offence for the person, in purported compliance with that requirement, to provide any information or produce any document which the person knows to be false.

(1B) Where a youth diversion order requires a person to comply with section (Notification requirements), it is an offence for the person, in purported compliance with that section, to notify to the police any information which the person knows to be false.”

This amendment makes it an offence for a person to knowingly provide false information, produce a false document or notify false information in purported compliance with notification requirements imposed under a youth diversion order.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 73 to 75.

Clause stand part.

Government amendment 76.

Clauses 119 and 120 stand part.

Government amendments 77 and 78.

Clause 121 stand part.

Government new clause 64—Data from electronic monitoring in England and Wales: code of practice.

Government new clause 65—Reviews of operation of this Chapter.

New clause 42—Report on the organisations responsible for implementing and enforcing youth diversion orders—

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within three months of the passing of this Act, publish a report on the organisations responsible for implementing and enforcing youth diversion orders.

(2) That report must include—

(a) the organisations which will be responsible for implementing and enforcing youth diversion orders;

(b) what level of counterterrorism and de-radicalisation training and expertise they have; and

(c) what additional resources they will require to effectively administer the provisions, prohibitions and requirements of youth diversion orders.

(3) Within one month of the publication of this report, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a plan assessing the—

(a) training,

(b) financing, and

(c) guidance,

available to the organisations identified in the report under subsection (1) to bring their training, expertise and funding to the requisite level identified in that report.

(4) The Secretary of State must commission a report from the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation to assess whether the levels of funding, training and expertise proposed in the plan under subsection (3) are sufficient. This report will be laid before Parliament with the plan under subsection (3).”

This new clause would require the Government to publish a report on the organisations responsible for implementing and enforcing youth diversion orders and a plan and independent report on the funding, training and expertise they need.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I wonder whether it might be helpful for the Committee if I respond after the shadow Minister has spoken to his new clause 42.

[Matt Vickers]

Clauses 118 and 119 outline the offence of breaching a youth diversion order and subsequent processes for issuing and revising guidance on the exercise of functions related to youth diversion orders.

Clause 118(4) provides that if a person is convicted of breaching a youth diversion order, the court cannot issue a conditional discharge requiring a substantive penalty instead. This provision prevents a lenient approach that might fail to deter non-compliance. The clause also establishes varying penalties based on age, with difference consequences for individuals under and over 18. How do these penalties balance deterrence with the goal of rehabilitating young offenders, particularly those under 18?

Clause 119 grants the Secretary of State the authority to issue guidance for local police forces. How does the Minister plan to ensure that that guidance brings consistency in the application of YDOs across different regions? Further clauses outline wider procedures, including for applications for YDOs.

New clause 42 would require the Secretary of State to publish a report within three months of the passage of the Act detailing the organisations responsible for implementing and enforcing youth diversion orders. The report must cover the organisations involved, the counter-terrorism and deradicalisation training they possess and any additional resources required to effectively manage the YDO provisions. Within one month of the report’s publication, the Secretary of State must present a plan to address training, financing and guidance to meet the required standards. Additionally, the Secretary of State must commission an independent assessment by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation to evaluate whether the proposed levels of funding, training and expertise are adequate, with that assessment being laid before Parliament alongside the plan.

The new clause would ensure the effective implementation of youth diversion orders with the necessary expertise. The requirement for a report and plan would ensure that organisations are prepared to handle counter-terrorism and deradicalisation issues. It would set clear expectations for training and funding, holding the Government accountable for providing sufficient resources. The independent assessment by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation would add scrutiny, ensuring that the Government’s plans meet the required standards. Overall, the new clause would introduce a proactive and transparent approach, fostering confidence in the system’s ability to address terrorism and extremism.

What steps are the Government taking to ensure that the organisations involved in implementing YDOs have the necessary counter-terrorism and deradicalisation training and expertise? Are the Government confident that those organisations are sufficiently prepared without the need for an independent assessment? Given the complexity of implementing YDOs, does the Minister agree that additional resources might be required to ensure that the orders are effectively enforced? If not, what plans are in place to guarantee that the organisations responsible are adequately resourced?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Clauses 118 to 121 will support the implementation of YDOs. Although the aim of a YDO is to divert a young person away from terrorist offending, it is critical that there is an effective deterrent against breaching the order, and that where a young person breaches the order, the police can take action.

Clause 118 ensures that a separate criminal offence is available for breaching a YDO without a reasonable excuse. In practice, we propose that statutory guidance will set out that the police will be expected to consult youth offending teams where there is a suspected breach, and for less serious breaches the police may consider alternatives to prosecution, such as varying the measures in the order or issuing a formal warning to the individual. Prosecution for this offence will therefore be a last resort.

Government amendment 72 makes it an offence for a person to knowingly provide false information, produce a false document or notify false information in purported compliance with notification requirements imposed under a YDO. Government amendments 73 and 74 make the offences under clause 18 triable either way irrespective of the defendant’s age, with a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment. The amendments ensure that there is a consistent maximum penalty for any breach of a YDO, regardless of the young person’s age, and that the legislation more accurately reflects the potential severity of breaching a YDO. For example, a serious breach may involve a breach of a weapons measure, such as by making plans to purchase knives or encouraging or assisting others to do so. We would expect a prosecution for that offence to be the last resort. Detail on other options to be considered beforehand will be included in the statutory guidance. The change is supported by operational partners and the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. Government amendment 75 enables a copy of a YDO to be admissible as evidence in criminal proceedings for breach of the order.

Clause 119 introduces a new power for the Secretary of State to issue guidance to the police in relation to YDOs. In issuing such guidance, we recognise the importance of proper consultation with relevant authorities, including the police, the prosecution service in England and Wales and in Northern Ireland, and the Lord Advocate in Scotland. That is why clause 119 requires mandatory consultation with certain parties and permits the Secretary of State to consult with other stakeholders, where appropriate. Government amendment 76 expands the list of consultees to include youth justice agencies.

Clause 120 ensures that rules of court can provide for anonymity for individuals going through civil proceedings for a YDO. That is important to ensure that reporting restrictions apply, and it is in line with the general policy aim of ensuring that young people do not feel stigmatised through engagement with the justice system—something that the shadow Minister has spoken about.

Finally, clause 121 makes procedural provision in respect of applications for a YDO. Government amendment 77 disapplies the time limit that would otherwise prevent an application for a YDO from being made in relation to matters arising more than six months prior to the making of the application. Amendment 78 enables proceedings in Scotland for, or in relation to, a YDO to be heard by a summary sheriff.

I turn to the Government new clauses in this group. To safeguard effectively the data that is gathered under electronic monitoring requirements, new clause 64 will require the Secretary of State to issue a code of practice for the processing of such data. The processing of such data will be subject to the requirements in the UK general data protection regulation and the Data Protection Act 2018. New clause 65 will enable the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation to review and report on the use and operationalisation of the youth diversion order. The independent reviewer already has a number of statutory functions, and this new clause aligns his statutory functions, enabling him to report on the YDO. The independent reviewer has been consulted on the clause, and his view is that the power to review the operation of the youth diversion order is important.

New clause 42, tabled by the shadow Minister, would require the Government to publish a report on the organisations that are responsible for implementing and enforcing YDOs, and a plan for delivering the relevant funding, training and guidance available for these organisations. It would also require the Government to commission a report from the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation.

As Matt Jukes, the head of counter-terrorism policing, set out in his written evidence to this Committee, counter-terrorism policing is a collaboration of UK police forces with a network of exceptional investigators. It is the lead law enforcement agency for managing terrorist risk, so it is appropriate that it will lead the implementation and enforcement of YDOs. It will be supported in this role by youth justice partners who have substantial experience of working with young people who are subject to court-imposed orders.

As I have already set out, Government new clause 65 already ensures that YDOs are added to the statutory remit of the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. As part of this role, the independent reviewer is required to review the operation of YDOs in practice and report to Parliament. I hope that the shadow Minister agrees that new clause 42 is therefore unnecessary.

On the other issue that the shadow Minister referred to, regarding the consistent use of YDOs across the UK, one of the key objectives of the statutory guidance under clause 119, which chief officers must have regard to, is to ensure that there is consistency. To go back to the point about the youth offending teams, given the small size of the cohort of children who are likely to be given a YDO, we do not anticipate that the changes will add significant pressures to those youth offending teams. On that basis, I commend the Government’s amendments to the Committee.

Amendment 72 agreed to.

Amendments made: 73, in clause 118, page 133, line 23, leave out subsection (2).

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 74.

Amendment 74, in clause 118, page 133, line 33, leave out “aged 18 or over”.

This amendment makes offences under clause 118 (breach of youth diversion order) triable either way whatever the age of the respondent.

Amendment 75, in clause 118, page 134, line 8, at end insert—

“(5) In proceedings for an offence under this section, a copy of the original youth diversion order, certified by the proper officer of the court that made it, is admissible as evidence of its having been made and of its contents to the same extent that oral evidence of those matters is admissible in those proceedings.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This amendment enables a copy of a youth diversion order to be admissible as evidence in criminal proceedings for breach of the order.

Clause 118, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 119

Guidance

Amendment made: 76, in clause 119, page 134, line 16, at end insert—

“(za) the Youth Justice Board for England and Wales;

(zb) the Scottish Ministers;

(zc) the Youth Justice Agency in Northern Ireland;”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This amendment adds to the list of persons the Secretary of State must consult before issuing or revising guidance to chief officers of police about youth diversion orders.

Clause 119, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 

Clause 120 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 121

Applications

Amendments made: 77, in clause 121, page 135, line 17, at end insert—

“(2) Section 127 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 (time limit for complaints etc) does not apply to a complaint under this Chapter.”

This amendment disapplies the time limit that would otherwise prevent an application for a youth diversion order being made in relation to matters arising more than six months prior to the making of the application.

Amendment 78, in clause 121, page 135, line 17, at end insert—

“(3) In Schedule 1 to the Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 (asp 17) (civil proceedings etc in which summary sheriff has competence), after paragraph 12 insert—

‘Youth diversion orders

13 Proceedings for or in relation to a youth diversion order under section 110 of the Crime and Policing Act 2025.’” —(Dame Diana Johnson.)

This amendment enables proceedings in Scotland for or in relation to a youth diversion order to be heard by a summary sheriff.

Clause 121, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 122

Prevention of terrorism and state threats: weapons etc

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Clause 122 amends the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 and the National Security Act 2023 to broaden the definition of weapons that are prohibited for individuals who are subject to terrorism prevention and investigation measures or state threat prevention and investigation measures. The clause gives the Secretary of State the power to prohibit individuals who are subject to terrorism prevention and investigation measures, or to state threat prevention and investigation measures, from possessing any items that she reasonably considers could be used to cause injury. The change builds on a recommendation by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Jonathan Hall KC, in his annual report “The Terrorism Acts in 2022”.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 43—Travel abroad to support a proscribed organisation—

“(1) A person commits an offence if they travel outside of the United Kingdom to support a proscribed organisation.

(2) For the purposes of this section, ‘support’ includes—

(a) becoming a member of a proscribed organisation, or an affiliated group of a proscribed organisation;

(b) working for any entity, either voluntarily or for financial gain, run by a proscribed organisation;

(c) attending political, religious or social gatherings in support of a proscribed organisation;

(d) meeting with members of a proscribed organisation;

(e) creating content, both online and offline, to raise support for a proscribed organisation; or

(f) travelling to territory controlled by a proscribed organisation without an exemption.

(3) This section does not apply to—

(a) accredited non-governmental organisations and humanitarian organisations;

(b) accredited media outlets and journalists;

(c) diplomats and other governmental officials travelling in an official capacity; or

(d) independent journalists and content creators reporting on a proscribed organisation, or in a territory with a proscribed organisation present.

(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable—

(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years, to a fine (or both), or

(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment of a term not exceeding 6 months, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both).”

This new clause would make travelling abroad to support a proscribed organisation an offence.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000 makes it an offence for a person to wear or display an article in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that they are a member or supporter of a proscribed terrorist organisation. The offence is committed only if the person carries out such conduct in a public place.

Clause 123 makes two key changes to section 13 of the Terrorism Act. The first is to create a new offence where a person carries out the conduct in one of the relevant premises set out in the Bill, including prisons, young offender institutions and immigration removal centres. In 2022, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation undertook a review of terrorism in prisons. That was in the context of the UK suffering four terrorist attacks in 2019 and 2020 committed by serving prisoners or terrorist offenders who had been released on licence. One of the reviewer’s recommendations was for the Government to consider amending section 13 to extend the offence to prison settings. This clause implements and builds on that recommendation. The new offence will act as a deterrent to such harmful conduct in the prison estate, and it will help to prevent exposure to articles that are linked to terrorist organisations. That, in turn, may reduce the risk of individuals being radicalised or otherwise encouraged to support such groups.

The second change concerns the powers of seizure under section 13. In his report “The Terrorism Acts in 2022”, the independent reviewer highlighted that the existing seizure powers would not be available where the police could not connect an article, such as a flag or banner, to specific individuals for the purpose of further criminal investigation. He recommended that that gap should be rectified. The clause will therefore amend section 13 to ensure that the police can seize such articles even when there is no real prospect of prosecuting an individual for a section 13 offence. An article may therefore be seized to prevent its continuing display and to preserve it as evidence.

Both changes to section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000 implement the independent reviewer’s recommendations and are supported by the police. They will ensure that the offence and associated seizure powers can be used to full effect. I am happy to respond to new clause 43 once we have heard from the shadow Minister.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 123 amends section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which concerns the offence of wearing or displaying articles in support of a proscribed organisation. The key amendment is the introduction of a new offence:

“A person commits an offence if, on relevant premises, the person…wears…or displays an article, in such a way…as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation.”

What is the rationale for introducing the concept of reasonable suspicion in the offence of wearing or displaying articles, as opposed to requiring more direct evidence of support for a proscribed organisation? I would also be grateful for clarity on how the list of relevant premises is determined. Could that include other locations or contexts beyond those listed?

New clause 43 introduces a criminal offence for individuals who travel outside the United Kingdom to support a proscribed organisation. The offence covers various forms of support, including joining or working for a proscribed organisation or its affiliated groups, attending events in support of such an organisation, meeting with its members, creating content to promote the organisation, or travelling to areas controlled by the organisation without a legal exemption. The new clause provides specific exemptions for accredited non-governmental organisations and humanitarian organisations, media outlets and journalists, and diplomats or Government officials travelling in an official capacity. A person who is found guilty under the provision could face a severe penalty of imprisonment for up to 14 years on conviction on indictment, or up to six months and a fine on summary conviction.

The measure is a proactive step to curb the influence and spread of terrorism. By criminalising travel abroad to support a proscribed organisation, it would help to prevent individuals from engaging in activities that might contribute to terrorism and destabilisation abroad. The inclusion of various forms of support, ranging from membership and financial involvement to attending gatherings or creating content, provides clarity on what constitutes illegal activity. That would ensure that law enforcement could pursue a wide range of actions that support proscribed organisations.

New clause 43 is designed to prevent individuals from becoming embedded with or supporting proscribed organisations. Why would the Government not support a preventive measure that helps to protect the UK from individuals travelling abroad to engage in terrorism-related activities?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

As the shadow Minister has explained, new clause 43 seeks to introduce a new offence for travelling abroad to support a proscribed organisation. The UK has one of the strongest counter-terrorism frameworks in the world. That includes, under the Terrorism Act 2000, the ability to proscribe an organisation that the Home Secretary reasonably believes is concerned in terrorism. That means that it commits and participates in terrorism, prepares for terrorism, promotes or encourages terrorism, or is otherwise concerned in terrorism. Some 80 terrorist organisations are currently proscribed.

As part of the counter-terrorism framework, there are a wide range of powers and offences that can be used by the Government and operational partners to disrupt travel overseas for terrorist purposes and to prosecute individuals on their return. That includes, for example, an executive power to cancel a British citizen’s passport and the power to temporarily seize a passport when there is a reasonable suspicion that the person is traveling to engage in terrorism-related activity.

There are also a wide range of terrorism offences that could be engaged in relation to an individual who travels to support a proscribed organisation. For example, it is an offence to be a member of a proscribed organisation, to invite support—the invited support can be intangible, and it is not limited to money, property or support that incites violence or encourages terrorism—for a proscribed organisation, to attend a place used for terrorist training or to provide or receive terrorist training, and to undertake preparatory acts with the intention of committing an act of terrorism or assisting another to commit an act of terrorism.

The counter-terrorism framework also includes the designated area offence, which permits the Secretary of State to designate an area if she is satisfied that it is necessary for the purpose of protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism to restrict British nationals and residents from entering or remaining in the area. It is an offence for UK nationals or UK residents to enter or remain in a designated area. I recognise that the power has not been used to date, but the Government’s view is that it remains a useful tool to disrupt terrorist travel in the right circumstances.

As the shadow Minister may be aware, the Government are considering a recommendation made by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Jonathan Hall KC, on the topic raised by his new clause. The Government will not hesitate to address gaps in our toolkit and to ensure that it keeps pace with the modern terrorist threat. We have brought forward measures in the Bill to implement and build on recommendations the reviewer put forward under the last Government. In November 2024, the Home Secretary accepted his recommendation to consider introducing a new terrorist travel offence. Officials are currently considering it with operational partners, as well as the extent to which there is a gap. It is vital that any new offence extends the ability of operational partners and the CPS to disrupt and prosecute those involved in terrorism. In due course, the Government will respond fully to that recommendation on disrupting terrorist travel.

Before I conclude, on the issue of reasonable suspicion and the requirement, this measure simply extends beyond private settings to designated settings. We are not changing the reasonable suspicion test; I hope that that is helpful to the shadow Minister. For the reasons set out, I hope he will be content not to press his new clause 43 when we reach it later in our proceedings.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 123 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 124

Management of terrorist offenders

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Schedule 16.

Government new clause 21—Terrorism offences excepted from defence for slavery or trafficking victims.

Government amendment 23.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Clause 124 introduces schedule 16, which amends the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. It gives powers to effectively manage a certain cohort of historical terrorism offenders. That cohort includes individuals who committed non-terrorism offences, such as conspiracy to murder, that would have been considered to have a terrorism connection had they not been committed before the relevant legislation came into effect. This is the same cohort of historical terrorism-connected offenders as captured by clause 104, relating to the polygraph testing of those offenders, which my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Justice spoke to earlier.

The 2008 Act introduced a requirement for courts to consider whether there is a connection to terrorism when sentencing certain specified offences. In circumstances where a court determines that an offence has a terrorism connection, it must aggravate the sentence. Where a terrorist connection is determined, the sentence imposed will reflect the risk profile of the offender. In addition, the offender can be more appropriately managed on their release because certain counter-terrorism risk management tools become available to the police in respect of that offender.

Since the passage of the 2008 Act, several further risk management tools have been introduced via various Acts of Parliament to manage terrorism and terrorist-connected offenders. The Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021 also expanded the scope of the terrorist connection provisions to require a court to aggravate certain non-terrorism offences with a maximum penalty of more than two years.

The clause and the associated schedule will extend the application of existing risk management measures. Those measures include powers of urgent arrest and personal search for those on licence, where it is suspected that they have breached a licence condition, as well as imposing terrorist notification requirements under the 2008 Act for this cohort of historical terrorism-connected offenders.

The independent reviewer of terrorism legislation noted that the schedule will allow the police to apply important counter-terrorism measures to serious offenders involved in terrorist plots backed by proscribed organisations, but who were convicted of non-terrorism offences. The amendments made in schedule 16 will also permit the police or the Secretary of State to apply to the courts for an order imposing the terrorist notification requirements on offenders whose historical offences have a terrorist connection. If such an order is made, the urgent arrest power and the power of personal search will also apply in respect of the offender. That measure is supported by the police and the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, who described it as a “sensible measure”.

Government new clause 21 will add certain existing terrorism-related offences to schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015. Government amendment 23 is consequential on new clause 21. As we have debated, schedule 4 to the 2015 Act contains a list of serious offences to which the section 45 defence of that Act does not apply. The list currently includes some terrorism offences, as well as serious violence and sexual offences. Section 45 provides a statutory defence against prosecution for victims of modern slavery, and is designed to give victims the confidence to come forward without fear of prosecution.

Schedule 4 to the 2015 Act ensures that those who commit the most serious offences specified in the schedule do not have the option to rely on that defence. New clause 21 adds existing terrorism offences to schedule 4, building on a recommendation made by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. Currently, only a limited number of terrorism offences are listed in schedule 4, including those in sections 5 and 6 of the Terrorism Act 2006—preparation of terrorist acts and training for terrorism, respectively. Others, such as the offence in section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000—collection of information useful to terrorists—are in scope of the section 45 defence.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Diana Johnson]

Clause 127 relates to the implementation of international law enforcement information-sharing agreements, clause 128 sets out the meaning of “appropriate national authority” and clause 129 relates to the consultation with devolved authorities about regulations under clause 127.

International law enforcement information-sharing agreements are a vital tool that provides law enforcement officers with access to new intelligence to fight crime, increase public protection and reduce the threat of societal harm posed by international criminality. Clause 127 will provide the appropriate national authority with the power to make regulations to implement any new legally binding international law enforcement information-sharing agreements. Such regulations may, for example, make provision for the technical and, where appropriate, operational detail needed to facilitate the information sharing provided for in a particular agreement. Clause 127 also stipulates that regulations can be made in connection with implementing an international agreement only in so far as it relates to the sharing of information for law enforcement purposes, and that any data sharing must comply with data protection legislation.

Clause 128 defines the appropriate national authority as the Secretary of State or, where a provision falls within devolved competence, Scottish Ministers, Welsh Ministers or the Northern Ireland Department of Justice. Clause 129 requires the Secretary of State, before making regulations, to consult devolved Governments about any provisions in the regulations that would be within the legislative competence of the relevant devolved legislature.

These measures will enable the swift implementation of new international agreements that are designed to help keep the public safe from the threat posed by international criminality and cross-border crime, and help to protect vulnerable people. I commend them to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 127 gives the Government the power to make regulations to implement international agreements relating to the sharing of law enforcement information. The agreements may evolve over time, and the clause ensures that UK law can adapt accordingly.

The clause allows regulations to override existing restrictions on information sharing, but with two key safeguards. A data protection safeguard means that regulations cannot require or allow the processing of personal data in a way that would breach UK data protection laws, unless the regulations themselves impose a legal duty or power. Regulations also cannot override the restrictions set out in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, which covers the surveillance and interception of communications.

The clause aims to ensure that the UK can meet its obligations under international law enforcement agreements, while still upholding important privacy and legal protections. Clause 128 defines who the appropriate national authority is for the purposes of making regulations under clause 127.

Clause 129 places a duty on the Secretary of State to consult the devolved Administrations before making any regulations under clause 127 that include provisions falling within the legislative competence of a devolved legislature, as set out in clause 128. That ensures proper engagement with, and respect for, the roles of the Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive when regulations touch on devolved matters. We welcome these measures, but could the Minister briefly comment on what format such consultation would take?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am happy to comment. With matters such as this, the normal procedures are in place around consultation. There has been extensive consultation on getting these provisions into the Bill. That is just the normal way that we consult. I hope that that satisfies the shadow Minister.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 127 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 128 and 129 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 130

Criminal liability of bodies corporate and partnerships where senior manager commits offence

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Dame Diana Johnson]

As we know, crimes can be committed by corporate bodies, just as they can be committed by individuals. It is important that corporate bodies are held liable for committing criminality and face justice accordingly. That is achieved through what is called the identification doctrine.

In the 1970s, the Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass case determined that a corporation can be held liable for a crime if it is committed by its “directing mind and will”, but there is a lack of clarity on what that constitutes. As companies have grown in size and complexity, there are often multiple controlling minds within different business functions who can exert control and cause harm through different functions of the business.

Through clause 130 the Government are placing the case law test for attributing crimes to corporate bodies on a statutory footing, and clarifying and extending the circumstances under which a body corporate or partnership is liable for any criminal offence, if that offence has been committed by its senior management.

The previous Government undertook the first stage of this reform in the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023, placing the identification doctrine in legislation for economic crime offences. However, the identification doctrine was never intended as an economic crime-only regime. It has historically applied to any criminal offence in case law, and it is important that statute reflects that.

Clause 130 therefore repeals the relevant sections of the 2023 Act and replaces them with an identification doctrine that applies to all relevant crime, not just economic crime. As a result of the clause, a body corporate or partnership in the UK can be held liable for any criminal offence and fined accordingly where a senior manager who has control over the whole or a substantial part of the business commits an offence while acting in the scope of their actual or apparent authority.

The broadening of the principle to senior managers with control over any substantial part of the body corporate reflects the wide decision-making responsibilities of organisations and mitigates prior concerns that individuals committing crime could escape liability by changing or removing their title. That will ensure that businesses cannot continue to avoid liability where senior management have clearly used the business to facilitate or conduct crime.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 130 holds organisations criminally liable when a senior manager commits an offence within their authority, expanding liability beyond economic crimes to all criminal offences. This reform addresses gaps in the previous identification doctrine and applies to both UK and non-UK entities. However, liability will not apply if the offences occur entirely outside the UK, unless it would be criminal at the corporate level in the UK. How will the Government ensure that the broader application of corporate liability strikes the right balance between holding organisations accountable and avoiding unfair penalisation for offences that occur in part outside the UK?

[Dame Diana Johnson]

I am grateful for the question. It is clear that offences committed outside the UK would not be covered by the clause—I think that that answers the shadow Minster’s question. It is clearly something that we need to keep under review, because other legislation does have extraterritorial application. I am certainly willing to go away and look at that point, and to come back to the shadow Minister.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 130 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered,

That the Order of the Committee of Thursday 27 March be varied by leaving out paragraph 1(g).—(Keir Mather.)

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Keir Mather.)