Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Bill [Lords]

Ben Wallace Excerpts

2nd reading: House of Commons
Monday 3rd December 2018 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Security and Economic Crime (Mr Ben Wallace)]

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.

As a simple soldier, it is nice to follow a debate full of so many learned colleagues. I have sat in wonder at the lawyers and their questioning over the last two and half hours. It was incredibly generous of the Attorney General to give so much of his time and to answer so many of my colleagues’ questions. I fear that we cannot normally afford lawyers for that long, but I hope the House managed to get to the bottom of it all.

This year, Dr Matthew Falder was sentenced to 25 years in prison. His charges included 137 offences of encouraging child sexual abuse, blackmail, forced labour and possession of indecent images. He tricked his vulnerable victims into sending him images of themselves naked or partially clothed and then blackmailed them into sending increasingly sickening images. He traded these abuse pictures on “hurtcore” forums, whose users revel in controlling and inflicting pain on victims. These hurtcore sites—hidden dark web forums—are dedicated to the discussion, and the sharing of images and videos, of rape, murder, sadism, torture, paedophilia, blackmail, humiliation and degradation. Long delays in getting vital evidence to our law enforcement agencies help people such as Dr Matthew Falder to continue abusing vulnerable children. It is our duty to protect victims from people such as him as quickly as possible.

The Bill is a straightforward piece of legislation designed to remove the bureaucratic barriers we currently face in investigating and prosecuting serious criminals when evidence is held by companies based outside the UK. The Bill provides a new route to allow law enforcement agencies and prosecuting authorities quick and efficient access to electronic data held by overseas communication providers. As I am sure hon. Members are aware, communication service providers are increasingly based outside the UK, and although we can currently access data held or controlled by these providers using mutual legal assistance channels, these processes are often long and bureaucratic, delaying serious criminals being brought to justice. In some cases, that even leads to investigations being abandoned.

Under MLA, there are several obstacles to overcome before law enforcement agencies can obtain data for use in an investigation. The requests must go through both countries’ executing authorities and both countries’ central authorities before getting to the relevant CSP. It can take anything from six months to two years to receive what could be vital evidence, meaning that the prosecution of criminals such as child sexual abusers can be severely delayed, in which time they can continue abusing. Indeed, less than 1% of child sexual abuse content stored online is hosted on UK platforms, meaning that 99% is hosted on platforms owned by companies overseas. The Bill will ensure that law enforcement officers and prosecutors can more effectively investigate and prosecute these horrific offences, so that children in all our constituencies can be kept safe.

Officials in the Home Office have been working closely with operational partners to understand the scale of the problem. Child exploitation and abuse is a very real, very serious and growing epidemic. The National Crime Agency received more than 80,000 individual referrals of horrific online content from the tech industry in 2017, a 700% increase since 2012. In 2014, the NCA made more than 1,600 referrals to UK police forces following tech companies highlighting horrific online content. After just three years, in 2017, the figure rose to nearly 10,000. The agency estimates that in the UK a minimum of 66,0000 to 80,000 individuals present some kind of threat to children. In one operation, it worked with overseas partners to take down a site that contained more than 100,000 videos of child sexual abuse material that had been downloaded more than 1 million times.

All the case studies that I have been given make chilling reading. There are examples of people abusing children online—people whom our agencies struggle to identify and prosecute because of the delays in accessing the data that they need. It is our duty to do something about it and to protect those who are vulnerable online. Of course, online crime goes beyond child sexual abuse. Electronic messages in the form of texts or emails can incriminate arms dealers, drug traffickers, people traffickers and those involved in other types of serious crime, including terrorism. We must ensure that our laws reflect the modern, technological world in which we live.

The overseas production order process offers a much simpler and quicker alternative to MLA for obtaining certain types of electronic data. An overseas production order could be served directly on the relevant overseas CSP rather than via that country’s courts and central authority, which means that our law enforcement agencies and prosecutors will be able to gain access to the data that they need in a matter of days or weeks rather than months or years. The orders will operate in a similar way to domestic production orders. To that end, the Bill was designed to reflect existing domestic legislation as far as possible. Of course, the necessary stringent safeguards will exist to govern access to the data. That includes a requirement that UK courts must be satisfied that the data is of substantial value to the investigation or proceedings, and that there is a public interest in its being produced before an order can be granted.

For the power to make an overseas production order to be available, a relevant international agreement needs to be in place. We envisage that the first agreement will be with the United States, given that a large majority of CSPs are based in North America. Parliament will have an opportunity to scrutinise each international agreement properly and thoroughly before it is ratified in the usual way.

Members of the other place have already expressed their broad support for the Bill, but a non-Government amendment was made to clause 1(6), on international agreements. As it stands, the subsection is technically deficient, because it refers to data that the UK provides “under this Act”. The Bill is only about the UK’s outgoing requests for data from overseas providers, so the UK would not be providing data under it. Because that subsection would not achieve what the Government understand to be the Opposition’s intended effect, “this Act” will need to be amended to “the agreement.” I have listened carefully to the arguments advanced by Members of the Lords, and I look forward to working with Members of this House to address their concerns.

Members may accept that bureaucracy is sometimes a necessary evil, but when electronic data could be obtained in a much quicker way and further criminal activities could be prevented, it needs to be reduced. The overseas production order process, together with the international agreements that will underpin it, will remove the unnecessary bureaucratic delay that currently exists in accessing the same electronic data through MLA.

Delay extends the investigation when someone has molested children. Delay leads to continued offending, and those children continue to be abused. Delay leads to serious criminals absconding before they can be brought to justice. Delay could even lead to our law enforcement agencies and prosecutors issuing fewer MLA requests to seek evidential data as they lose faith in the system, and thereby failing to pursue these vile criminals. We do not want to end up in that position: such delay is unacceptable. That illustrates why the Bill is so important, and the heavy price that we continue to pay every day without it.

[Mr Jim Cunningham (Coventry South) (Lab)]

Other countries are guilty of delays—indeed, long delays.

[Mr Wallace]

Under the current system, we present an MLA to a country’s central Government authority, which will take it to that country’s courts. Once it is out of our hands, the pace will be that of the country concerned. Its courts will recognise the order and enforce it against the CSPs overseas, which are predominantly in the United States—for instance, Facebook and Google—and will then bring it back to us. That whole process involves many bureaucratic delays. For instance, there is the time that it takes for the case to go to the central authority and then to the courts, and the time that it takes for the volume of the orders to be decided, and sometimes challenged, in the courts. We are simply seeking to introduce a system whereby our police go to a court in the United Kingdom, the court makes the order, and the international treaties allow our orders to be recognised by overseas CSPs.

[Mr Cunningham]

May I pursue the point a little further? Can the Minister give us a rough idea of the timescale, and what the delays actually cost?

[Mr Wallace]

As I have said, some of them have gone on for years. Some cases are still sitting in courts overseas. It is predominantly a matter of months and years at present, and we want to reduce that to days and weeks. Every day on which we cannot access content in this area—and let us remember that it is the court, not me, that must be satisfied that a request from the police is valid—is a day on which, in many cases, the offenders are still offending. That is why we think the Bill is so important. It reflects the changes in how offending is happening, and the fact that it is now happening online. For many months, Members on both sides of the House have asked what more the Government can do about not only online radicalisation but online offending. This is a concrete step to ensure that we can do more to counter it.

The MLA process will continue to exist. It remains critical to other types of evidence that are not within the scope of the Bill and to any electronic evidence that may not be provided for by the relevant international agreement. However, one of the biggest pitfalls of the current system is the long wait to secure electronic data that, by its nature, can be shared very quickly. The Bill provides the solution in the form of an additional, streamlined alternative: the overseas production order.

I do not doubt that Members will support the crucial purpose of the Bill, which is to provide a significantly faster mechanism for obtaining vital electronic data that is held by overseas providers in order to prosecute the most serious offenders and to safeguard vulnerable people in our society from further unnecessary harm. I commend it to the House.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds (Torfaen) (Lab)]

The Minister began by saying that he was grateful for the contribution of lawyers during the previous two and a half hours. Alas, I have not had a chance to leave yet, but hopefully that contribution will continue.

[Mr Wallace]

Put the rates up.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I doubt that even I could match the rates of the Attorney General.

As the Minister has explained, the purpose of the Bill is to permit a court in this country to require a person or company located overseas, such as an overseas service provider, to produce stored electronic information, as a court could if the information were located or controlled in the United Kingdom. That will be done via the overseas production order for which clause 1 provides. An order can be operative only if the UK signs a treaty enabling it to be exercised. UK law enforcement authorities will be able to apply for an order that requires the production of electronic evidence for the purpose of investigating or prosecuting crimes such as terrorism offences. At present, if UK law enforcement requires electronic data from another country, it must go via a mutual legal assistance treaty, but that process can be slow to complete.

I very much appreciate and accept that electronic information is crucially important for the investigation and prosecution of criminal offences, and indeed is gaining in importance. The Minister set out the case of Dr Matthew Falder and some of the horrific child sex abuse images found on various websites, and it is clear that having a smooth, fast, efficient process to obtain this information is important, which is why the Opposition support the aim of this Bill; we do need a faster system.

I should also point out that I recognise the particular importance of the United States, first because this is the country where so much of the data is held and so many communication services providers—CSPs—are based, and, secondly, because the UK has been negotiating a bilateral data-sharing agreement with the United States since 2015.

The Minister knows that the Opposition are always happy to work with him in trying to reach consensus on matters, but there are aspects of this Bill about which I and my colleagues in the other place have concerns. First, I say to the Minister that we will be looking in Committee to pursue issues such as bulk data, confidential personal records and non-disclosure requirements.

There are also two other specific points of controversy that I will draw to the Minister’s attention now. The first of them relates to assurances on the use of the death penalty in cases where this country hands over data. The Bill is reciprocal, which allows countries with which a treaty is negotiated to seek a court order for electronic data stored in the UK to be transferred to another country. The current treaty is being negotiated with the US, and US law enforcement could apply via its courts for electronic data in the UK to be used as evidence in a particular case. There are currently 30 states in America that retain the death penalty.

I appreciate the Minister’s efforts to make this a more transparent process than has previously been the case, when Home Secretaries could, in private, make decisions in individual cases that are capital cases about handing over information. My right hon. Friend the shadow Home Secretary asked an urgent question on one issue in this House in July, which was due to a leaked letter from the Home Secretary to the then US Attorney General, Jeff Sessions. In the letter, the Home Secretary stated:

“I am of the view that there are strong reasons for not requiring a death penalty assurance in this specific case, so no such assurances will be sought.”

The Minister responding to my right hon. Friend stated at the Dispatch Box:

“I can reassure the House that our long-standing position on the use of the death penalty has not changed.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 24 July 2018; Vol. 792, c. 1612.]

While I accept that the Government cannot control whether another Government provide assurances that are asked for, they can control, where assurances are not forthcoming, whether information will be handed over, and that includes information which could lead to evidence being gathered for use in a court, as well as evidence itself.

My noble Labour colleagues in the other place tabled a strong amendment in this regard which passed by 208 votes to 185 and was added to the Bill. The effect of it is to prevent such handing over of information unless there are assurances that the death penalty will not be imposed. This is important for those of us on these Benches who oppose the death penalty in all its forms and are passionate about human rights here and around the world. Furthermore, while we are, quite rightly, focused on the United States for the reasons I have set out, this Bill could be used, alongside a treaty, as the basis for reciprocal information exchange with other countries around the world where the rule of law is not respected by the regimes in power there, making the need for safeguards in this Bill even more pressing.

Secondly, there is a concern regarding the protection of journalists’ confidential information.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Edward Davey (Kingston and Surbiton) (LD)]

I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Chelmsford (Vicky Ford). I think the Internet Watch Foundation does a fantastic job, and it is already saving lives, so everyone involved in the organisation deserves our thanks and gratitude. It is in that spirit that I rise to support this Bill and to say that the Minister was absolutely right to make his argument in the way that he did. The legislation goes beyond defeating the people involved in child sexual exploitation, and others committing horrendous nasty, violent crimes will also be caught by these important measures. Beyond that, the Bill will act against terrorism and so on, so the Government are absolutely right to pursue it.

All that is part of the way that we in this House need to support international co-operation against crime. Although this Bill will help to speed up the work that needs to be done via the courts to enable the investigatory bodies to get these criminals and hopefully stop such activities, I gently point out that the European Union already has many successful tools and instruments, and it is a shame that it looks like we are reducing our ability to use them.

However, in totally supporting the thrust of the Bill, I associate the Liberal Democrats with the gentle criticisms of the Labour and SNP Front-Bench spokesmen, who made important points about death penalty assurances and journalistic freedom that must be considered and put right in Committee and on Report. On the death penalty assurances, joint efforts between Labour and Liberal Democrat Lords secured that amendment, and it will take some proof to convince us that it is defective. Indeed, the Liberal Democrats would like to go further. Although the amendment was welcome, the fact that it relates to section 52 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 means that there may well be other treaties involving the sharing of collected electronic data to which it may not apply. Given the significance of that, it is important that we go as far as we possibly can. The UK must oppose the death penalty in all circumstances, and we need an assurance from the Government that the law is extremely tight.

[Mr Wallace]

Will the right hon. Gentleman therefore clarify his party’s position if we were in a negotiation with another country and the other country said, “Look, we cannot give you the death penalty assurances.”? Some 99.9% of the data requests under this Bill will be concerned with crimes of paedophilia or the other crimes that I described earlier. Should the death penalty become a bar, is the right hon. Gentleman saying that the UK should not enter into an agreement because of the rare occasions on which an offence may involve the death penalty? Would he sacrifice the 99.9% for that?

[Sir Edward Davey]

The Minister is being slightly sneaky. It is quite possible to take the two issues separately and deal with them separately. It is quite easy to see how one would ensure that the welcome measures in this Bill apply to the cases to which we all want them to apply while ensuring that the death penalty assurance, which ought to unite the House, is also dealt with properly.

I am sure that the Minister understands that Opposition Members in the other place and in this place are using this point to try to ensure that the Government move on this point. He will be aware of the cases of Alexanda Kotey and El Shafee Elsheikh from earlier this year, in which the Home Secretary—I acknowledge that this was revealed in a leaked letter—assisted the US to prosecute them without seeking death penalty assurances. That shocked people on both sides of this House, and the Minister is absolutely aware of that concern, so it is incumbent on those on the Treasury Bench to explain to and reassure this House that that cannot reoccur and that we will find ways through such issues.

[Mr Wallace]

I fully understand the right hon. Gentleman’s point. He talks about “our wish”, but he cannot speak for the other country that may be involved in forming an international agreement. They may say, “That’s fine. We know what you want, but we are not prepared to do that.” In that case, the decision becomes whether we want to use this legislation for the urgent and speedy data requests that happen 99.9% of the time for offences that are egregious and horrible but do not warrant the death penalty. He cannot speak for another country, so would he sacrifice the whole Bill?

[Sir Edward Davey]

I am afraid that the Minister is still trying to split hairs. I am sure that no one in this House wants to get in the way of measures that will ensure that we can work with other countries to tackle criminals. Equally, however, it is incumbent on the Government to find a way to ensure that what we heard from the Home Secretary earlier this year does not happen again. The Minister is in the Government and has the officials to come forward with proposals to be able to manage both those issues.

It does not seem beyond the wit of man and the clever officials in the Home Office to produce such proposals. If he is saying that the amendment made in the other House is defective because it has the problem he is raising with me, let Home Office Ministers come to the House in Committee or on Report to show that and to produce an alternative that deals with the matter, about which I am sure he shares my concern.

[Mr Wallace]

My point is that the moment for the House to look at that is not when considering this Bill but when whatever treaty or international arrangement we make with whatever country we need to make it with comes before the House for scrutiny. Then we can have a debate about whether the international treaty we have sought to give effect to this order is right for the balance of risk, but the generic primary legislation that allows an order to be made is not the right vehicle.

[Sir Edward Davey]

What the Opposition parties are saying very clearly to the Minister is that he has to make that case in Committee, just as the hon. Member for Torfaen (Nick Thomas-Symonds), the Labour party’s Front-Bench spokesman, made clear when I intervened on this very point. The Minister should make the case, but he should also explain how the Government will deal with the problem, which has arisen because of the actions of the Home Secretary not because of the actions of the Opposition.

We are concerned about the potential for this Bill to undermine protections for the freedom of the press. To be generous to the Government, what I think has happened is that, in pursuing a laudable aim that we all support, they went to the statute book and said, “Which statutes can we copy and paste to enable us to meet our objectives?” Rather than looking carefully at how, in domestic law, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 has carefully nuanced the use of the Terrorism Act 2000, Home Office officials, possibly because of the culture in the Home Office, just cut and pasted mainly from the Terrorism Act. That may have been a mistake, and there may have been no deliberate intention for it to have the consequences that now appear before us, so I gently say that I hope the Minister will go away and think about this. I invite him to meet right hon. and hon. Opposition Members, as well as representatives of the media to hear in detail the genuine concerns not just of BBC lawyers but of lawyers representing other media organisations.

We have heard from other Members about the relevant evidence test, which is in our domestic law and has been carefully developed over a period of years, but that test will not be applied to protect journalists with respect to material that comes from their investigations abroad. That is quite worrying if one looks at the practical examples. Take the case of Mark Duggan, for example. He was shot by the police in Tottenham in 2011, and the BBC obtained mobile phone footage of the aftermath from a witness. The BBC was ordered to turn over the footage and, because it was relevant evidence, the footage was handed over. Then an application was made for information that would reveal the identity of the source of that footage. The person who had shot the footage was understandably concerned for their safety, and the BBC successfully opposed the application by pointing to the relevant evidence test in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. That test is not in the Bill, so there is a clear example that, by not being as subtle in this legislation as we are in our domestic legislation, there is a danger that journalistic freedom, as exercised abroad, will be curtailed.

The point about the notices is relevant, and it should worry the Minister because the way that notices work under domestic legislation is very helpful not just to journalists but to the police. Sometimes when the police put a notice to a journalistic organisation, that organisation will go back to the police and say, “You are asking for a huge amount, and we don’t really think it is necessary for your investigation. Let us enter a dialogue with you to narrow down your search so you can get information that will really help you, and therefore you will not have to waste so much time.” The notice actually turns out to be helpful in speeding up investigations. Given that that is the whole purpose of this Bill, the Minister should go away and look at that.

Moreover, it is not just about thinking of the police’s point of view in speeding things up; it is also about making sure the police know whether the evidence exists. The way some notices work at the moment is that the police go on a fishing trip. There is the example from Durham police, they applied to the BBC without notice. Durham police were eventually told that they could not do that and that, if they had submitted a notice, they would have learned that the material no longer existed. Again, the BBC was trying to save police time.

Some of the carefully constructed domestic law needs to be put into this internationally applying legislation in order to help the police and security services, not just journalists. I am sure this is just an unintended consequence, and I am sure there is no malice, so I hope this is the sort of issue that can be settled by a few meetings and a few amendments that garner support from both sides of the House. That is how scrutiny should operate in this Parliament, and I hope the Minister, with his usual generosity, will be open-minded to that approach.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Wallace]

With the leave of the House, I will close the debate on Second Reading. I thank hon. Members for engaging with the Bill, for their support of what it will achieve and for their considered comments.

Overseas production orders will be vital in ensuring that criminals do not remain at large for longer than is necessary due to delays in accessing electronic content data held overseas. Overseas production orders also reflect the technological developments of recent years. The use of modern electronic communication technologies by serious criminals to perpetrate their crimes and to seek to evade justice is increasing exponentially. This means that the evidence needed to convict such criminals is increasingly in the form of emails, Facebook messages, images stored with providers like Dropbox or elsewhere in the cloud, and similar electronic content data. UK law enforcement agencies and prosecutors now need a faster, 21st-century process for obtaining such evidence, not least to protect victims of child sexual abuse living in our communities and in our constituencies.

The length of time it currently takes to obtain electronic evidence leaves child victims to be abused while our dedicated law enforcement agencies and prosecutors navigate unnecessary bureaucracy. Bureaucracy prevents us from getting to the heart of an investigation sooner and puts more children at risk. The longer it takes, the longer these vile criminals are free to carry on offending. We must prioritise the safeguarding of the most vulnerable people in our society as far as possible.

I will now briefly address the comments of hon. Members. The hon. Members for Torfaen (Nick Thomas-Symonds) and for Paisley and Renfrewshire North (Gavin Newlands) and the right hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton (Sir Edward Davey) all spoke about journalistic data. I absolutely hear what they say, and will give substantial consideration to their ideas and suggestions. I can perhaps provide some clarity on this. I do not think that, as the right hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton suggested, officials picked this off the top of their heads; it was in not only the Terrorism Act 2000, but the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. As with a lot of different case law, there have been different developments on the definitions of “data” and “confidential data” as it relates to journalistic material. Of course, the substantial value and public interest test is already in place to ensure that data relevant to a particular investigation or proceedings can be the subject of an access production order, but I am happy to discuss this further in Committee.

The hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North talked about a number of things. First, he asked why we had not opted into the European protection order scheme, by which I assume he means the Europe e-evidence proposals. The Government chose not to opt into the e-evidence regulation as it is not clear that the new EU legislation will be a practical and effective way to address the global issue of providing lawful access to data held anywhere in the world. Clearly, however, I agree with the principles, which is why we are introducing this Bill.

The hon. Gentleman also raised the issue of bulk data. An application for an overseas production order must specify what data is being sought. The judge approving the order must be satisfied that the data requested is of substantial value to the proceedings or investigations and that it is in the public interest for the data to be obtained. I know the hon. Gentleman may not be satisfied by that, but the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), being a barrister, will no doubt be absolutely supportive of judicial discretion. Interestingly, people in this House often hold strong views on this—I am a great believer in judicial discretion—yet when we ask them to make that decision about public interest or certain tests, the same people sometimes seek to restrict that judicial discretion. I trust our judiciary and believe that in this environment of a bulk data request and so on, if this is laid by our law enforcement agencies before the court, the judge can use his or her discretion to make that decision, if it is in the public interest, and the police and law enforcement satisfy the requests made.

My hon. Friends the Members for Chelmsford (Vicky Ford) and for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Dr Johnson) were absolutely right about the potential damage that the online environment is doing to our young people and the tools that the internet gives some persistent offenders to exploit and abuse people, both adults and children. I mentioned Dr Matthew Falder at the opening of this debate. To see that case in detail is disturbing, and it will stay with me for most of my life. We know that he affected people’s lives, not just at home in the UK, but across the world, including by encouraging people to commit suicide and so on. He set up chatrooms where the qualification for entry was for people to bring their own abuse images into the chatroom—people were tasked with abusing children and bringing those images in. These are the people this Bill is targeted at, and every day we cannot deal with them is a day they continue to abuse.

The right hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton, and the hon. Members for Torfaen and for Paisley and Renfrewshire North asked about the issue of the death penalty. I understand the importance of it and the key principle that people hold on it. The right hon. Gentleman was a member of the first Government who published the overseas security and justice assistance guidance—OSJAG. This is human rights guidance on requests for evidence and it contains all the guidance for law enforcement and government on the extent to which we seek and uphold our principle on the death penalty. I am happy to debate this in Committee. It does, however, reflect the issues and challenges we face as to balancing our security with our belief on human rights. This affects any Government, including the last Labour Government, who did not have OSJAG but still believed there were exceptional circumstances when assurances need not be sought. That is why I will welcome the discussion in Committee, but I make the point to Members that this Bill is an enabling Bill. It is, in effect, a plug for international agreement that we will then go and negotiate around the world, depending on where risk comes from and need. Both Houses will get a further chance to scrutinise those individual agreements and we can then ascertain whether they uphold our principles. I look forward to debating with interested Members in Committee, and I commend this Bill on Second Reading.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time.

CRIME (OVERSEAS PRODUCTION ORDERS) BILL [LORDS] (PROGRAMME)

Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83A(7)),

That the following provisions shall apply to the Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Bill [Lords]:

Committal

(1) The Bill shall be committed to a Public Bill Committee.

Proceedings in Public Bill Committee

(2) Proceedings in the Public Bill Committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion on Tuesday 18 December 2018.

(3) The Public Bill Committee shall have leave to sit twice on the first day on which it meets.

Proceedings on Consideration and up to and including Third Reading

(4) Proceedings on Consideration and any proceedings in legislative grand committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion one hour before the moment of interruption on the day on which proceedings on Consideration are commenced.

(5) Proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the moment of interruption on that day.

(6) Standing Order No. 83B (Programming committees) shall not apply to proceedings on Consideration and up to and including Third Reading.

Other proceedings

(7) Any other proceedings on the Bill may be programmed.—(Amanda Milling.)

Question agreed to.

Draft Investigatory Powers Tribunal Rules 2018

Ben Wallace Excerpts

Tuesday 20th November 2018 General Committees

[The Minister for Security and Economic Crime (Mr Ben Wallace)]

I beg to move,

That the Committee has considered the draft Investigatory Powers Tribunal Rules 2018.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir David. I am pleased to have this opportunity to debate these important updates with the Committee. The Investigatory Powers Tribunal, which was established under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, investigates and determines complaints that allege that public authorities have used covert techniques unlawfully. The tribunal also investigates complaints against the security and intelligence agencies for conduct that breaches human rights.

The tribunal has delivered judgments on a number of landmark cases over the past 18 years. A notable example is its widely publicised 2015 judgment that the so-called Wilson doctrine, thought to protect the communications of parliamentarians from interception, was not enforceable in English law. That led to an emergency debate in Parliament and a statement from the Prime Minister, paving the way for the Wilson doctrine to be placed on a statutory footing in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016.

The tribunal’s rules set out the procedure that the tribunal should follow. They include details on such important matters as how complaints may be brought, how hearings should be conducted, how evidence should be received, in what circumstances sensitive information may be disclosed, and how complainants should be notified of the outcome of their case. The rules have not changed since the tribunal was established in 2000, so the time is ripe to update them to better reflect current tribunal practice.

I will briefly outline the changes that the statutory instrument will bring in. First, to improve the efficiency of decision making in the tribunal, we have amended the rules to allow further functions of the tribunal to be exercised by a single member of that tribunal. Secondly, to strengthen the power of the tribunal, we have added an explicit process for when the respondent refuses to consent to disclosure but the tribunal considers that disclosure is required. Thirdly, to further increase the transparency of the work of the tribunal, we have included the commitment to hold open hearings as far as is possible. Fourthly, to assist complainants and respondents to the tribunal, we have provided details of the function of counsel to the tribunal, including by listing the functions that a tribunal may request counsel to perform.

Finally, we have amended the rules to set out the process for the making and determination of applications to the tribunal for leave to appeal, as well as determining in which court the appeal should be heard. This is in preparation for the new right of appeal, which is coming into force as a result of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. Appeals may be made in certain circumstances on a point of law against any determination or final decision of a preliminary issue made by the tribunal. Appeals will be heard in the Court of Appeal in England and Wales and in the Court of Session in Scotland. As is necessary, the tribunal undertakes much of its work behind closed doors and many of its judgments are not published in full. The introduction of an appeals route will allow for greater transparency and greater levels of reassurance that justice has been done.

Of course, it is important that the affected parties are properly consulted before such changes are made. For that reason, the Government held a public consultation on the proposed updates to the rules. We have considered the responses carefully with colleagues across Government and with the tribunal itself. We accepted a number of amendments proposed in the consultation responses and they have been subsequently incorporated in the rules we see before us today.

In summary, the updates to the rules make the work of the tribunal more transparent and ensure that the legislation accurately reflects how tribunal processes and proceedings have evolved over time. I commend the draft rules to the House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Wallace]

I am grateful to the Opposition spokesperson for his question. We received three substantive responses to the public consultation. We rejected the suggestion that an amendment should be made to allow the tribunal to make disclosures to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, because section 237 of the 2016 Act already permits such disclosures. We also rejected the suggestion that the functions of the counsel to the tribunal should be specifically identified in the rules, because not all the counsel’s functions will be relevant in every case and the tribunal should have discretion over which functions would assist the counsel in each individual case.

We further rejected the suggestion that the tribunal should compel a witness to attend and give evidence; such a power could be counterproductive because the tribunal has functioned on the basis of voluntary co-operation. We rejected the use of special advocates in the tribunal, because there are considerable benefits to the tribunal employing its own counsel, which provides specific functions more suited to the tribunal’s work.

We have sought to allay concerns about the rule that the tribunal

“may receive evidence that would not be admissible in a court of law.”

Our response to the consultation states:

“It is important that the Tribunal has the flexibility to receive evidence in any form. However…it is inconceivable that a situation would arise wherein the admission of evidence that might have been obtained as a result of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment would not be subject to challenge—either by the complainant or by Counsel to the Tribunal.”

Those are the reasons that we have set out, but we accepted a considerable number of suggestions.

Overall, the draft rules are about improving access to the tribunal and setting out a clear appeals route, as is present in many other tribunal and court processes. They should therefore go some way towards continuing to reassure the public that there is good oversight. The tribunal is chaired by a judge of the Court of Appeal, Lord Justice Singh, so it is a solid court that can deal with some very weighty issues. It has dealt with a considerable range of matters, including challenges to the Investigatory Powers Act, as well as individuals’ concerns about whether their rights have been infringed either by the intelligence services or by the actions of an investigation that used investigatory powers.

We have to operate in a slightly different arena here. On some occasions we have to be in “neither confirm, nor deny” territory, to ensure that we can investigate whether someone has been under surveillance and, if so, whether it has been proportionate and necessary in accordance with the law, without tipping them off after the fact that they have definitely been under such surveillance. That is quite important, because otherwise lots of people could use the process for mischievous or indeed malevolent purposes.

The tribunal is a very important structure. I have every confidence that it is well advised and respected by the legal community in this country and that it protects the rights of citizens. Once again, I commend the draft rules to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Oral Answers to Questions

Ben Wallace Excerpts

Monday 29th October 2018 Commons Chamber

[Kevin Hollinrake (Thirsk and Malton) (Con)]

11. What steps he is taking to tackle organised crime through the National Crime Agency.

[The Minister for Security and Economic Crime (Mr Ben Wallace)]

We have made significant progress since the National Crime Agency was established in 2013. Capabilities have improved; partnership working is better; and we intervene earlier to prevent serious and organised crime. The agency has gone from strength to strength, with an impressive and sustained track record of disruptions across the full range of serious and organised crime threats.

[Kevin Hollinrake]

Thames Valley police spent £7 million investigating the HBOS Reading banking scandal. Will my right hon. Friend consider establishing regional fraud squads, which would be self-funded from the proceeds of both fines and recovered funds, to properly investigate business banking fraud and other financial crimes?

[Mr Wallace]

My hon. Friend’s suggestion is similar to what already happens through the regional organised crime units. We have injected £140 million in grant funding to help to establish them and to ensure that we put in place the right financial investigators in each region to tackle fraud.

[Yvette Cooper (Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford) (Lab)]

Organised crime crosses borders, and the National Crime Agency relies on the European arrest warrant and databases and joint operations with Europol, all of which will fall if we leave the European Union without a deal in place in April. Given that Ireland has repealed its extradition arrangements to do with the previous 1957 convention, will there be any legal way to extradite organised criminals from Dublin if there is no deal?

[Mr Wallace]

The right hon. Lady makes an important point about what happens post Brexit. She will of course know that the negotiations with Michel Barnier are all about issues like that. I suspect that Ireland will go along with whatever the EU’s deal is to implement, and we are seeking a security treaty so that we can put in place many of these important measures.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Lloyd Russell-Moyle (Brighton, Kemptown) (Lab/Co-op)]

23. Organised crime often leads to bad drugs on our streets, and one way to stop that is through drug testing in festivals. The Minister agreed that he would write to police forces about the legality of that. What is the response?

[Mr Wallace]

I hear what the hon. Gentleman says. We have to stem the demand for drugs, both recreational and in respect of other users. Therefore, it is important that we work with the police to deliver that.

Public Land for Public Good: Bootham Park

Ben Wallace Excerpts

Wednesday 17th October 2018 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Security and Economic Crime (Mr Ben Wallace)]

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. Last Thursday, the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) asked an urgent question on foreign fighters and the death penalty. During the questions, I was asked whether there had been any previous occasions when the UK Government had shared evidence without seeking or securing death penalty assurances from a foreign Government. In my reply I stated that on two occasions previously such exchanges had taken place under successive Governments. However, I wrongly asserted that the hon. Gentleman himself was a member of the Government at the time of one of these. He was a member of the governing party in the early 2000s, when the occasion happened, but he was not in the Labour Government. For this I apologise to the House and to the hon. Gentleman, and I hope this point of order will serve to correct the record.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

I thank the Minister for giving me notice of his point of order. I understand he has also informed the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) of his intention to come to the House to correct the record, and I am sure it will be appreciated that he has done so at the earliest opportunity.

Petition

Ben Wallace Excerpts

Wednesday 17th October 2018 Commons Chamber

[Rachael Maskell (York Central) (Lab/Co-op)]

[The Minister for Security and Economic Crime (Mr Ben Wallace)]

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

Drug Trafficking: County Lines

Ben Wallace Excerpts

Wednesday 17th October 2018 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Security and Economic Crime (Mr Ben Wallace)]

First, let me congratulate the hon. Member for Barrow and Furness (John Woodcock), a near neighbour, as I do not live that far from his constituency, on raising an important issue. Not only has the right hon. Member for Enfield North (Joan Ryan) held a previous debate on it, but I spoke in the good and important Westminster Hall debate held by the hon. Member for West Ham (Lyn Brown). What strikes me about county lines is that sometimes the debate goes from the ground up—from the vulnerability of the young people up—and sometimes it is about the organised criminals at the top coming down. That is the challenge we face with county lines.

County lines gang activity and the associated violence, drug dealing and exploitation has a devastating impact on young people, vulnerable adults and local communities. That includes the impact on the hon. Gentleman’s constituency. As has been reported, last week brought the sentencing of two south London men, drill rapper Daniel Olaloko and Peter Adebayo, who ran a county line from London all the way to Barrow—that is 300 miles. Other areas in Cumbria are also affected: Connor Halliwell and Kieran Howe were sentenced in September for county lines drug dealing in Kendal; and there is an ongoing trial of a 16-year-old London schoolboy for dealing in Carlisle.

The plus side of those convictions is that some of those people were the leaders of organised crime groups in London, and it was not just low-level individuals who were taken out. One reason we have seen a shift of London organised crime groups to Barrow—the hon. Gentleman will be interested in this—is the work that was done regionally, through the organised crime unit, to take out some of the Merseyside gangs that were blighting north Lancashire and Barrow. The gap left by their displacement has been filled with London organised crime groups. With the technology that they use, they can be quick to exploit gaps and vulnerably.

Let me try to answer the point made by the hon. Member for York Central (Rachael Maskell) about North Yorkshire police. All the work we have done on tackling county lines shows that some of the best ways to respond to the organised crime group is through the region, rather than just through the home force. The home force can play a role at spotting exploitation and cuckooing, but if we are to cut the head of the snake in the organised crime groups, it is often best done through the organised crime unit. I am sure that if she were to engage with her regional organised crime unit, the people there would be able to show her some of the work going on across the whole of Yorkshire. I do not think that it would be a case of the police not doing it; I suspect they have moved it into a regional or even a national response as a way to tackle some of the challenges and ensure they have the specialties needed to take on some of the secure communications these people use.

[John Woodcock]

If the current co-ordination efforts do not prove sufficient, is the Minister alive to the possibility of designating a lead force, in the manner that the Met works on counter-terror for the whole country?

[Mr Wallace]

I know that the hon. Gentleman has called for that. The national county lines co-ordination centre is about trying to fill that space. It is not just a couple of desks; it is more than 40 officers and staff, centred, pulling together not only the intelligence, but some of the investigations and response. They are making sure the investigations are in the right place, so that where we pick up someone who is low-level, we can trace across to an organised crime group that is already under investigation by the Met, for example. That is one of the main aims of this co-ordinated approach—the county lines co-ordination centre. I have arranged for some hon. Members to get a briefing by the National Crime Agency on that, and I am happy to facilitate that for the hon. Gentleman if he would like.

Time is tight, so I will not be able to deal with all the points, but I will write to the hon. Gentleman about some of the figures. We recognise the figures that he used. We assess around 1,500 lines in service as of July. The improvements from the national county lines co-ordination centre’s work with the National Crime Agency and the National Police Chiefs Council has started to have an impact already. Last week, the centre co-ordinated the first in a series of regular intensifications of activity targeting county lines. In one week alone, there were more than 200 arrests; 58 vulnerable people, including a number of children, were identified and safeguarded; deadly weapons, including hunting knives, a firearm with ammunition, an axe, a meat cleaver and a samurai sword, were seized; tens of thousands of pounds of suspected criminal cash were seized; and significant quantities of heroin, crack cocaine and other illegal drugs were seized. That is in one week, which shows the benefit of that co-ordination. Whether it is a single force or, I would venture, a co-ordination centre, that shows what can be done when we focus and bring our efforts to bear.

We need to be clever about how we prosecute these individuals. In some cases, we prosecute them under the Modern Slavery Act 2015 for in effect trafficking the children up and down the country. On 4 October, Zakaria Mohammed was sentenced to 14 years for human trafficking offences, but he was leading a county lines drug cartel operation. That was an important way to deal with it.

[Ronnie Cowan]

The Minister is outlining success stories—big arrests, big sentences and big drug seizures—yet the problems continue to get worse. Is it not perhaps time to consider other tactics?

[Mr Wallace]

The problems are getting worse, and this business model is a fantastic business model, as the right hon. Member for Enfield North said, partly because of the turbo boost that communications give these people. Secure communication and end-to-end encryption mean that people can order with total impunity, because it is very hard for us to get into the telephones to see what they are doing. They can use modern technology to resupply and communicate, and to launder the money at the same time. I do not agree that the approach should be to legalise drugs. In my experience, criminals are interested in the margins, not the product. If we legalise one drug, they will push fentanyl tomorrow; if we legalise fentanyl, it will be another. They want the margin: in my experience, it is the money that drives them, which is why we have to do more work.

The right hon. Member for Enfield North correctly talked about prevention. We need to harden the environment. The hon. Member for Barrow and Furness is always full of good ideas, and he will have seen in our latest counter-terrorism Bill that I have absorbed some of them. I think that is a polite way to say that I have nicked them. I certainly believe that he is right about somehow making sure that people take responsibility. We cannot arrest our way out of this problem, so we have to burden-share. We have to educate the public. We have to educate taxi drivers in Barrow. Both modern slavery and county lines often hide in plain sight. It is amazing how many people in effect work in slavery on our high streets and no one does anything about it or thinks about it. Someone might have had their nails done but never said to themselves that most of the women working in the nail bar were probably—more often than not—victims of human trafficking. That is why we have to try to encourage part of the wider community—the hon. Gentleman may say we should legislate—because they have a role to play.

When I saw a Merseyside county lines group get taken apart, it was brilliant to see the way the Merseyside local authority worked alongside the local police. When it came to dismantling the group, the people who needed care got care and the people who needed to be prosecuted—some of them were young; they are not all vulnerable—were prosecuted. One challenge we have is that not all the 15 or 16-year-olds are exploited; some of them are pretty hard and dangerous. At the same time, we took some assets, and in the end the Merseyside police, in public, pulled down the gates of the organised crime group’s house, to show that permissive society was not going to tolerate that behaviour. That group’s operations went all the way into Lancashire, so it was a good success.

I absolutely hear what the right hon. Member for Enfield North said about the need for better prevention, community provision and diversion for these young people. I have a list as long as my arm that I think I sent to some Members in the context of the previous debate on this subject. We have the anti-knife crime community fund. The Home Secretary has announced a £22 million early intervention youth fund and a £200 million youth endowment fund. There is an £11 million modern slavery innovation fund, which is all about trying to deal with that in the communities and how we can wrap around it.

We also support and fund local authorities that are engaged in mapping county lines. I definitely urge hon. Members to encourage their local authority to seek to do that, and the Home Office and the police will support them in delivering such action—with our funding rather than theirs. In that way, local authorities can get an understanding of what is going on in their very community. It is a phenomenon. Although I understand the pressure on the police—I am not deaf to the challenges around that and to the fact that more will need to be done—the biggest single contribution from what I have observed has been mobile communications, encryption and money laundering in a way that is so different from the past. Those lines can be run from the very top of an organised crime group in Colombia. The group can order, resupply and get delivery so that drugs arrive on the doorsteps of our communities.

We all have a role to play—a really strong role—to make sure that schools do not go down the exclusion route, because that puts many of those young people out on the streets to be preyed upon. We have to do a lot of work around the permissive society. What we find is that there are a few areas—they are significant and solid—where these crime routes are coming. There are communities that are permitting the organised crime routes to become strong enough to send people into our communities. Work on permissive societies is something that we all have to address.

Organised crime might involve someone buying an illegal pack of cigarettes behind a bar. They might say that it does not really matter—a bit of a knock-off at the local bar—but people do not realise that that pack of cigarettes is moved by people who move women on a Monday and children on a Tuesday, and flog drugs on a Thursday. Someone might say, “Wink, wink, I got this a bit cheap down the local bar,” but that person is fuelling and helping organised crime. We all have a role to play. We must tackle permissive societies, harden the environment, get everyone knowledgeable about what is out there to stop young people being exploited and help our local authorities to deal with those cases. It will be a growing issue. Co-ordination, planning and investment will be key. I from my end and the organised crime end will help to support such action through the serious organised crime strategy, which is due to be launched very soon, and I know that the Minister responsible for crime reduction is keen to tackle this from the bottom up. We will make sure that we work across the Government and across parties to try to achieve that.

Question put and agreed to.

Draft Data Retention and Acquistion Regulations 2018

Ben Wallace Excerpts

Monday 15th October 2018 General Committees

[The Minister for Security and Economic Crime (Mr Ben Wallace)]

I beg to move,

That the Committee has considered the draft Data Retention and Acquisition Regulations 2018.

I am delighted to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Graham. The retention of and access to communications data is crucial in enabling investigators to obtain intelligence and evidence that can prevent terrorist attacks, disrupt the activities of serious and organised crime groups, and establish culpability so that offenders can be brought to justice. It is used to investigate crime, keep children safe, locate missing persons, support or disprove alibis and link a suspect to a crime scene.

The regulations introduce additional safeguards to ensure that the UK’s regime complies with EU law. They also bring into force the code of practice of parts 3 and 4 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016—IPA—the regime for communications data acquisition and retention. Between November 2017 and January 2018, we consulted publicly on the changes to the legislation and code of practice.

The regulations provide for the independent authorisation of communications data requests. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner, a senior judge, is given that power and will delegate the responsibility to a newly appointed body of staff, which will be known as the Office for Communications Data Authorisations.

OCDA will report directly to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and will be responsible for considering the vast majority of requests made by public authorities to access communications data. The new body is expected to begin operating in April 2019 with independent authorisation being rolled out across public authorities during 2019. The internal authorisation of requests will continue to be permitted in urgent cases—for example, where there is a threat to life or where requests are made for national security matters, which are outside the scope of the European law.

The regulations restrict the crime purpose for which events data such as call histories and location information can be retained and acquired to serious crime. We have carefully considered how serious crime should be defined in the context of communications data—a decision that the European Court has rightly left to member states. We have worked with the operational community to focus on where communications data can be a valuable tool. Indeed, in some cases, it is the only investigative tool.

We have mirrored the definition that already exists in the IPA for the more intrusive interception and bulk powers, but we have adjusted the custodial threshold to one year, rather than three, to reflect the less intrusive nature of comms data. That will ensure that the power is not used in the investigation of low-level offences.

The definition also makes specific provision for offences that, as an integral part, involve the sending of a communication or a breach of a person’s privacy, which will ensure that communications data can be used to investigate all harassment and stalking offences. Similarly, the definition extends to offences committed by corporate bodies, such as corporate manslaughter, where custodial sentences are not available. In addition, in every case, even where the serious crime threshold is met, an application for communications data can be authorised only where it is necessary and proportionate to what is sought to be achieved.

To ensure that the serious crime restriction can be brought into force on 1 November, the regulations amend the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000—RIPA. Until part 3 of the IPA is brought into force early next year, RIPA remains the legal framework for accessing communications data.

The new code of practice provides comprehensive guidance on the data retention and acquisition regime and describes roles and responsibilities, considerations that must be given and detailed processes that must be followed. The code takes account of the changes made in the regulations, in particular the role of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and OCDA. It also provides further guidance on factors to take into account when considering the seriousness of offences in deciding whether communications data should be acquired.

The changes support the important right to privacy and the right of citizens to be protected from crimes and terrorism. They ensure that public authorities can continue to access retained communications data in a way that is consistent with EU law and our responsibilities to protect the public. The additional safeguards, the clear requirements set out in the code of practice and the independent oversight provided by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner establish clear limits around the use of the powers and provide reassurance for the public that communications data is being used only where it is necessary and proportionate. I commend the regulations to the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Wallace]

I will first address the experienced points of the hon. Member for Wallasey. The balance between allowing our police forces to get on and do their job and bureaucracy is a challenge that the Home Office and Government have always faced. If there was a reason why we did not initially propose this type of independent authorisation, it was not some deep-state conspiracy theory, but the amount of bureaucracy we expect at a comms data level and whether that is proportionate to the police doing their job.

It is a difficult balance. Comms data is the norm. We are all wedded to our telephones—as I speak, some Members are wedded to theirs—and people conduct a serious amount of business, communication and crime on them, so that data will only increase. Comms data is not about the content, however; it is about the who, where and when, so it is at the lower level.

Subscription details—basically, which mobile telephone belongs to who and the billing address—are included in the regulations. The Court did not require us to do that, but we have put it into the independent authorisation, partly because law enforcement said, “Just get rid of the bureaucracy and hand it over to OCDA. We do not want to have it just for subscriptions and not others,” and partly because it now fits that all these authorisations, whether they are the more intrusive bulk data and content intercept communications or not, are dealt with and oversighted independently.

That leads me to the points of the hon. Members for Wallasey and for Paisley and Renfrewshire North. The oversight will be independent. It will be accountable through the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, Lord Justice Fulford. He is also involved in the independent authorisation of the more intrusive areas of intercept and has an oversight role to look back at how the powers were used and whether they were proportionate and necessary. Funnily enough, within that, he can order disclosure to individuals if he feels that their data has been used wrongly. That goes some way to our venture—we have said to the European Court that there is already a form of notification in the system, which is that there are several opportunities for someone to be notified.

At the same time, there will be other scrutiny, such as an annual report by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. The Intelligence and Security Committee will also be able to look at some of the more sensitive capabilities in detail. There is the Home Affairs Committee and the investigatory powers tribunal that individuals can take cases to if they feel that their data has been wrongly collected, wrongly stored or abused.

Without wandering too far off the regulations, I entirely agree with the hon. Lady’s point about the private and public balance. We have a balance where if any of us in this room, or if I as a Minister, wants to do something, we need a warrant or authorisation with quite a lot of oversight, but if a private individual wants to park a car with a camera in it outside someone’s house on a public highway, there is very little that person can do to stop them. If a large company wants to buy and sell someone’s data or effectively surveil you and I, there is very little that we can do about it, Sir Graham. I worry that we go around in circles and that that goes pretty unchallenged by the law enforcement community. The General Data Protection Regulation is a good piece of work, which has sought to deal with that by bringing ownership of data back to individuals.

As the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North said, we have drawn down the definition of “serious crime” to a crime with a sentence of one year or more. We have included some carve-outs below that, simply because most of those offences depend purely on comms data. For example, when investigating the persistent stalking or harassment of an individual, it is incredibly important to be able to use data about telephone behaviour, but the offence of stalking does not always meet that sentencing threshold—injunctions are often used, and so on. We therefore venture that that carve-out is important. Corporate manslaughter does not carry a custodial sentence, but I think we all believe comms data is really important in proving that a corporation or body failed in its duties or committed a criminal offence, which are often large in scale.

That is a pragmatic way of trying to keep people safe. The Court said it was up to the member state to define “serious crime”—it did not seek to do so itself. It is recognised that comms data is not as intrusive into our privacy as an intercept, which means that the serious crime threshold can be different from the three-year threshold that applies to the regime for more intrusive data collection.

On what the hon. Member for Torfaen said, we obviously told the Court that we would comply with its ruling about independent authorisation, but we have until April 2019 to set up independent authorisation on a scale that allows our police forces up and down the country to do their job. We have started recruiting and establishing a secure IT system—posts have been advertised and people are being interviewed for them. It is simply set-up time. We cannot immediately rustle up that type of body. The OCDA will be answerable to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and based throughout the United Kingdom. It will obviously spend a lot of its time liaising with police forces, because it will make direct requests via the single point of contact—the expert—in each force.

The Court accepts that, and it is really important that we deliver to that timetable. I have asked for an update every two weeks on how we are progressing. The Court recognises that we actually have to deliver—it cannot just immediately rule everything illegal, because the system would in effect fall over. The Court gave us time, and it has recognised our ability to do that.

The Court ruling on which the draft regulations are based considered five arguments. In two cases—independent authorisation and the serious crime threshold—the Court found that our law was unlawful and needed to be changed. We have addressed that. In the other three cases, the Court did not find in the plaintiff’s favour or make a ruling. For example, it did not find that our retention was “general and indiscriminate”. That is why we are dealing with comms data. The hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North referred to bulk data. The draft regulations focus specifically on the comms data regime, as requested.

I hope I have answered hon. Members’ questions. We are in a good position. I am entirely comfortable that independence will be used in the authorisation process. We have not popped some conspiracy—this is a perfectly functional thing. At the moment, the Home Office is funding the set-up of OCDA, alongside the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. I recognise the pressure on resources for police forces. I have to do my best to ensure that that body is as minimally bureaucratic as possible but does the job of giving assurances that people’s data is dealt with independently and not abused.

Question put and agreed to.

Foreign Fighters and the Death Penalty

Ben Wallace Excerpts

Thursday 11th October 2018 Commons Chamber

[Chris Bryant (Rhondda) (Lab)]

(Urgent Question): To ask the Home Secretary to make a statement on foreign fighters and the death penalty.

[The Minister for Security and Economic Crime (Mr Ben Wallace)]

Thank you for your patience, Mr Speaker; I apologise. You were even more efficient in the conduct of the previous urgent question than normal, so I have had to run to the House to answer the hon. Gentleman’s question.

The management of Syria travellers is not a new or emerging issue. Since the conflict began, approximately 900 people have travelled from the UK to take part, of whom 40% have returned and 20% are thought to have been killed. There have been several high-profile convictions in this country for terrorist activity linked to travel to Syria.

The Government take seriously their responsibility to protect the public. We have been consistently clear that where there is evidence that crimes have been committed, foreign fighters should be brought to justice in accordance with due legal process, regardless of their nationality. The appropriate process will always depend on the individual circumstances. Everyone who returns from Syria or Iraq can expect to be the subject of an investigation to determine whether they pose a threat, and they should be in no doubt that we will take the strongest possible action to protect our national security.

We have planned and prepared for the risk posed by British returnees as Daesh is defeated in Iraq and Syria, and we are using a range of tools to disrupt and diminish that threat, including prosecution under the full range of existing counter-terrorism legislation and the use of other powers such as terrorism prevention and investigation measures or temporary exclusion orders to help to manage the risk posed. We are going further by introducing new measures in the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill that will help to deal with the scourge of foreign fighters.

Our long-standing policy on the death penalty has not changed. We oppose the death penalty in all circumstances as a matter of principle, regardless of nationality. Decisions to provide assistance are taken in accordance with the Government’s overseas security and justice assistance, or OSJA, guidance, introduced in 2011. The guidance clearly sets out the UK Government’s policy in respect of the death penalty.

[Chris Bryant]

I like the Minister, but that was a load of sententious guff that has nothing to do with the question in hand. Yesterday, the Government marked World Day Against the Death Penalty by declaring, as the Minister has again today, that they are committed

“to oppose the use of the death penalty in all circumstances as a matter of principle.”

In the past, that has always meant that before co-operating with a foreign judicial system where the death penalty is in operation, we seek assurances in every case that the suspects will not face the death penalty; yet, as the Minister admitted on 23 July, the Government secretly decided earlier this year not to seek such assurances in the case of two foreign fighters. I want to see those fighters face justice, but the people who lost family members to those people do not want them to face the death penalty.

The Minister claimed on 23 July that there was precedent for not seeking such assurances and he undertook to write to us; his precise words were that that would be our “summer reading”. I got his letter late this Tuesday afternoon. He clearly does not understand the word “summer”, but does he actually understand the word “precedent”? His letter says that this has happened on two previous occasions since 2001, but it point blank refuses to give any details whatever. According to the dictionary, a precedent is meant to be

“an earlier event or action that is regarded as an example or guide to be considered in subsequent similar circumstances.”

So we cannot cite a precedent without citing any of the details, because we cannot consider whether it is a precedent unless we know what actually happened on the previous occasion.

Will the Minister give us any details of the two cases that he says happened since 2001? Can he confirm that one relates to a case in Thailand in 2014? If so, it is exactly the opposite of a precedent—it is an anti-precedent—because the courts then decided that the police had acted unlawfully and failed to have regard for public policy, and the Government’s decision was struck down. The Minister also told the House in July:

“There was no request from the US Administration for us to vary our assurances.”—[Official Report, 23 July 2018; Vol. 645, c. 728.]

I am sorry, but I do not think that that is true. Can the Minister confirm that, when the Home Secretary met the US Attorney General in May, Jeff Sessions made it absolutely clear that any request from the UK for the customary assurances was likely to result in political outrage in the Trump Administration and that is why the Home Secretary decided not to seek any assurances?

Will the Minister also confirm that the then Foreign Secretary wrote to the Home Secretary to say that this case was “unprecedented”? The truth is that the only thing that was unprecedented about this case was that the US Government barked and the UK cowed.

Mr Speaker, you know what I think really happened? The Government got the collywobbles. Jeff Sessions huffed and puffed and blew the Home Secretary down. The Prime Minister decided to kowtow to Trump, and the Government changed the policy secretly without telling this House.

[Mr Wallace]

I am old enough to remember “Jackanory” and I think that I have just heard a “Jackanory” narrative from the hon. Gentleman. Let me deal with his questions. He asserted that, in every case previously, we have always sought assurances. That has not been the case. I apologise for not getting back to him in time for his summer reading. We did have to go back into the previous Labour Government to find a number of cases; I am talking about a Government in which the hon. Gentleman was a Minister in the very Department where this was taking place. We discovered that one of the cases took place in a Labour Government after 2001.

Secondly, the details of mutual legal assistance arrangements, as the hon. Gentleman will know, are subject to strict confidentiality, because they are often about individuals involved in an investigation. However, I can help him in his “Jackanory” story: the 2014 Thailand example that he has cited is not a case where this has happened; it has not been brought to my attention. Perhaps he has raised another case, but, certainly, the two of which I am aware do not relate to that case.

Furthermore, when the hon. Gentleman comes to talk about the policy of successor Governments, he should know that, in 2011, this Government brought forward, for the first time, through the OSJA, written guidance. It was very clear in paragraph 9 that, on some occasions, there were strong reasons for not seeking assurances in such cases. The policy before 2011, including the time when the hon. Gentleman was a member of the Government, was that a Government could exchange evidence without seeking assurances on the death penalty in “exceptional circumstances”—[Interruption.] I think that the hon. Gentleman knows that his Government did do it. Certainly, he was a member of the Government when one of these cases took place.

The reality is that the two individuals in question, who are suspects and innocent until proven guilty, are charged, or effectively viewed, as having been part of very, very dangerous and heinous crimes, including torture and beheading, against many, many people, and that they are held in a place of detention, effectively in a war zone in north Syria, by non-state actors. That means that the choices are stark for any Government charged with keeping people safe and trying to deliver justice for the victims.

We are guided by the overseas security and justice assistance. The Home Secretary and the Foreign Secretary considered this guidance strongly, found that there were strong reasons and took the necessary decision that in this case we would share with the United States evidence on the condition that Guantanamo was not part of the process, but in this case we did not seek death penalty assurances.

[Sir Desmond Swayne (New Forest West) (Con)]

Some of us, and most of our constituents, are a lot less squeamish about this than the Minister and the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant). Indeed, they take the view that these people had it coming, didn’t they?

[Mr Wallace]

What these individuals who are suspected of an offence and many others have coming is justice. We will do everything we can to work with our allies to see that justice is administered in a way that follows due process and that takes place in a court of law, where there is a separation between the judiciary and the Executive, where people have a right to defence and to make an argument, and where the rule of law prevails. That is what they and anybody else who involves themselves in that type of terrorism has coming to them, and that is what we are trying to uphold.

[Afzal Khan (Manchester, Gorton) (Lab)]

May I also apologise for not being here at the start of the urgent question?

Wednesday was World Day Against the Death Penalty. The Foreign Office Minister in the other place spoke about the Government’s absolute opposition to the death penalty. The Labour party also opposes the death penalty. It is barbaric and was rightly abolished in this country more than half a century go. Yet, at the same time, the Government have agreed to help the US in prosecuting El Shafee Elsheikh and Alexanda Kotey, who could ultimately face the death penalty. I will say no more on this specific case, as it is subject to a High Court challenge.

The Labour party makes it absolutely clear that those who commit abhorrent crimes should face the full force of the law, but in bringing people to justice we should never sacrifice the very values that those who wish us harm seek to attack. We are therefore rightly concerned following the Government’s revelation that, on two previous occasions going back some years, the UK has co-operated with foreign states in cases involving the death penalty. Does the Minister agree that if the Government oppose the death penalty in principle, they must oppose it in every case without exception?

It was revealed in the court earlier this week that the Home Secretary had written to the former Foreign Secretary stating that

“significant attempts having been made to seek a full assurance, it is now right to accede to the mutual legal assistance request without an assurance”.

Can the Minister explain what “significant” means in this context? Also, what response was received from the US authorities when these requests for full assurance were made? Furthermore, what new material factor caused the Secretaries of State to conclude that assurance was no longer necessary, in contravention of the long-standing policy of successive British Governments and their commitments to opposing the death penalty in all circumstances? Why did the Government not renew the death penalty strategy in 2016? Is that an oversight? If not, when do they intend to come to the House to explain the matter? Finally, does the Minister agree that making exceptions undermines our own credibility on human rights issues around the world?

[Mr Wallace]

I think both the hon. Gentleman and I were slightly caught short by the speed of the previous urgent question. I will do my best to answer his questions. Our guidance for upholding our principled position on the death penalty and following MLA requests is contained in the OSJA, published in 2011. Paragraph 9(b) on the death penalty clearly states:

“Where no assurances are forthcoming or where there are strong reasons not to seek assurances, the case should automatically be deemed ‘High Risk’ and FCO Ministers should be consulted to determine whether, given the specific circumstances of the case, we should nevertheless provide assistance.”

It was our view that there were strong reasons not to seek assurances.

This case has no easy solutions. It is easy for everyone to say, “We want justice for the victims”, but the options before this Government, our security forces and our citizens do not include a magic wand to get people miraculously into a UK court or provide evidence that matches the statute book that we happen to have. The strong reasons that, we would say, mean that the rights of those individuals detained are better served by a judicial trial in the United States are that they have a better chance of proper representation in a court of law than if they were left in detention by non-state actors in a war zone in north Syria, sent to Guantanamo Bay—something that the Government oppose fully—or allowed to go back into the battlefield and wreak murder and death in the same way that they have been accused of doing in the past. Those were the options on the table that we as Ministers, charged with keeping people safe and balancing our obligations, and implementing the Government’s policy as set out in the OSJA, have to weigh up. We felt that there were strong reasons not to seek death penalty assurances when sharing the evidence for a criminal trial in the United States.

[Mr Philip Hollobone (Kettering) (Con)]

My constituents in Kettering are as outraged as I am that 900 British citizens should have decided to go abroad and become foreign fighters engaged in armed conflict against members of Her Majesty’s armed forces; 180 have been killed in theatre, 360 have returned and 360 remain at large. Why on earth are we not stripping these people of their British citizenship, not allowing them back into the country or, if they are allowed back in, trying them for treason?

[Mr Wallace]

My hon. Friend makes an important point and reminds us that we have to balance everyone’s rights—the rights of my constituents to go about their business securely and safely and their right to life against the rights of other people to a fair trial and not to be subject to torture and other conditions. There are no easy solutions. Where we find we have the powers to deal with individuals we explore all of them, including deprivation of citizenship, royal prerogatives to prevent people travelling and prosecuting people in a United Kingdom court, as we have done in some cases where we have the evidence to do so. We recognise that over many decades there has been a deficiency in offences on the statute book such as in extra-territorial legislation; sometimes we might have evidence of travel but the intelligence cannot be submitted in court. That is why in the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill, which I am pleased to say the Opposition support, we have sought to improve the statute book so that we do not face problems like this in the future.

[Patrick Grady (Glasgow North) (SNP)]

The Government are tying themselves in knots over this. If it is the Government’s position, as the FCO reaffirmed yesterday on World Day Against the Death Penalty, that they oppose the use of the death penalty in all circumstances as a matter of principle, it stands to reason that, no matter how heinous and barbaric the alleged crimes are—and they are—if individuals are brought to justice, they should be not subject to the death penalty.

If that is the Government’s position, why are they not willing to state that clearly and seek the assurances from the US Government that others suggest we should ask for? What is the point of the special relationship if we cannot speak clearly and honestly to what is supposed to be our closest ally?

Can the Minister confirm whether the US or other allied countries were the subject of the two other cases that have been raised in which assurances were not sought?

[Mr Wallace]

It is the policy of this Government to seek justice for the victims, in accordance with not only our principles but the OSJA guidance, which is the published policy of this Government, introduced under the coalition Government in 2011. I asked whether I had received any representations from any Member of the House on the OSJA guidance while I have been Security Minister or whether my predecessor had. I have not seen anybody take issue with that guidance.

Our key aim is to seek justice. Our preference for Mr Elsheikh, for example, would have been to seek justice in this country if we had the evidence. The CPS was clear that it did not have the evidence to try them in this country. That was a challenge for us. Opposition Members say, “We want to see justice for everyone,” but I have yet to hear a solution from them or what they would do in this type of case, other than to just let these people go who would ultimately wreak havoc and death on the streets of Syria, Iraq or the United Kingdom.

[Bob Blackman (Harrow East) (Con)]

I congratulate my right hon. Friend on his answers so far. Can he give us an assurance that under this Government, Britain will not be a safe haven for terrorists or those suspected of terrorism? What further action can he take to exclude people seeking admission to this country who are suspected of terrorist offences?

[Mr Wallace]

Every week, I see cases of exclusions. We exclude people in line with the legislation. If they are from the EU, we have some powers to exclude, and if they are from outside the EEA, we have more powers to exclude. We exclude people and, as I said, deprive people of their citizenship where the intelligence evidence points to the fact that either there is no alternative or they pose a considerable threat.

The biggest challenge for the future is safe spaces—people’s ability to communicate through end-to-end encryption, go online or go to a warzone such as north Syria, where they can play a part in planning and directing attacks. We, as a country, have very little reach into those places, either to affect behaviour or indeed get justice delivered. One of the biggest challenges in this case is that the detention of these individuals is not by a state; it is by a non-state actor in a prison in north Syria, which is a warzone. That is a real barrier to what we can do in the pursuit of justice for the victims of the crimes that these people are accused of.

[Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South East) (Lab)]

May I remind the House that this urgent question is about the death penalty? People are against the death penalty either because it is inhumane or because there could be a miscarriage of justice, and we should remember that. We either believe in the death penalty or we do not. We do not have the death penalty in this country, which means that whenever we deal with these issues, we must at all times seek assurance that there will be no death penalty. That is the question here.

[Mr Wallace]

As I said earlier, this Government, the coalition Government and the Labour Government before it have, in exceptional circumstances or where there are strong reasons, not sought death penalty assurances. That has been the long-standing position of successive Governments under the OSJA. That is partly because, while we oppose the death penalty in principle, we have to balance the options on the table.

These two individuals are not United Kingdom citizens in this country; they are in a country where there is a war. People seem to forget that. If they were in this country, the courts would have much more power to gather evidence, put them on trial and so on, but they are not, and therefore we are guided by the OSJA, published in 2011 under the coalition Government. It seems, having looked through previous records, that other Governments have on occasions viewed something as exceptional or having strong reasons not to seek death penalty assurances.

[Jamie Stone (Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross) (LD)]

It seems to me that what bedevils this extraordinarily difficult issue is establishing a dividing line between the powers of Ministers and the proper role of this Parliament, by which I mean the role of parliamentary oversight. Will the Minister undertake to consider that point and bring to the House suggestions as to how parliamentary oversight could be increased—if nothing else, to give the public genuine faith in the mechanism?

[Mr Wallace]

The hon. Gentleman makes a valid point. MLAs, which are often operational and judicial processes, are incredibly sensitive until they are aired, such as in a case or a hearing, as we saw at the beginning of the week with the case of the two individuals in Syria. That is partly because to publicly air the details of an investigation or an MLA request and our police asking for that information, which could be about someone in the hon. Gentleman’s constituency who is under investigation, could expose the fact that there was an investigation into that individual.

It is a delicate balance. However, I will agree to look at this, and I am happy to meet the hon. Gentleman to discuss whether there is a way in which we can give details of cases once they have passed and it is felt that there is no risk, and to see what more we can do to scrutinise the practice of MLAs. To put them in context, there are hundreds of them every year.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

I thank the Minister for his firm response to the urgent question. He stated that the Government are monitoring all those who have been involved in terrorist attacks in Syria and Iraq, and that they will be detained and held accountable for their activities. Can he assure the House that any foreign fighters guilty of any heinous crime will not be able to access the land border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, or any back door to the UK mainland?

[Mr Wallace]

One of the biggest challenges we face in our free and open democracy, where international travel is common and affordable for many people, is that that makes us vulnerable. The 900-odd people who travelled to Syria did so predominantly on scheduled flights from this country, and a number of those who have returned came via, for example, Turkey, often using flights from holiday resorts. We do our best to analyse passenger records, to prevent people from leaving this country or to stop them when they return, to examine their digital material and question them, and if possible to prosecute them.

The hon. Gentleman is right: the land border of Northern Ireland is a challenge. We work with the Irish Government to keep the island of Ireland’s border safe; we share intelligence and data where we can. The free travel area is exactly that, and in the past some individuals have used the Northern Ireland border to return to the United Kingdom. That is why we have always had some forms of control on the Northern Ireland border. He will know better than anyone in this House that it has never been the case that nothing has gone on at that border. The controls may have varied and been less solid, but there have always been checks on and around the border, and we have used those powers in the past.

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)]

Many of these fighters seek to undermine our democratic values by the most evil and despicable of means. Does the Minister understand the essential importance of not outsourcing our moral and ethical base by helping in the execution of the death penalty, against those democratic values?

[Mr Wallace]

I understand the hon. Lady’s point about our values. As a former soldier, I have stood and upheld those values in pressing times, when the enemy or indeed the local population are very hostile; it is about us being better than them. In this specific case, however, the two individuals are not in our control; we cannot extradite them, move them or control them. This is about evidence—could we share evidence with another country, with an independent judiciary and the rule of law, that sought justice for its victims? The decision was made, based on our guidance, that in this case there was strong reason to do so without seeking a death penalty assurance.

[Chris Elmore (Ogmore) (Lab)]

On 23 July, the Minister told the House:

“On Guantanamo Bay, again our position has not changed. The UK Government’s long-standing position is that the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay should close. Where we share evidence with the US, it must be for the express purpose of progressing a criminal prosecution, and we have made that clear to the United States.”—[Official Report, 23 July 2018; Vol. 645, c. 725.]

Can the Minister confirm that, contrary to that statement, the Home Secretary decided in this case not to ask for any assurances that the men will not be sent to Guantanamo Bay detention centre?

[Mr Wallace]

I have to disappoint the hon. Gentleman. When the agreement on the MLA was made, it was stated clearly that if any other use of the evidence was requested, they would have to come back here to get permission for that use. The Government’s stated policy is to oppose Guantanamo Bay detention—[Interruption.] Hang on. “Any other use” covers every use they would like to make of the evidence other than a judicial trial. It was clear that for every use other than a judicial trial, they would have to come back and seek permission, and our position on Guantanamo Bay is clear. I made it clear in my meeting with the Department of Justice in April or May, that if they were to come back and their request was to do with Guantanamo Bay, permission would not be given. One can argue about whether we could have written back saying, “Not for Guantanamo Bay,” but we said “any other reason”, which could be Guantanamo Bay or going on holiday.

[Dr David Drew (Stroud) (Lab/Co-op)]

When I have made foreign visits to countries that still apply the death penalty, I have been proud to say that the British Government categorically oppose its use. Can I say that now?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Wallace]

Yes, the hon. Gentleman can say that. This case is obviously before the courts, but it was an evidential request for a criminal trial and we followed OSJA guidance back in 2011, which is better guidance than the non-existent guidance of the previous Labour Government.

Salisbury Incident

Ben Wallace Excerpts

Wednesday 12th September 2018 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Security and Economic Crime (Mr Ben Wallace)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered the Salisbury incident.

Let me underline your comment, Madam Deputy Speaker, about the ongoing case. This is a very important case, with two suspects who have been named, and you are absolutely right that we must maintain caution throughout our discourse inside and outside the House to ensure that we do not undermine it. I ask colleagues engaging in today’s debate to remember that. It is of course a challenge that the individuals we seek are in a difficult jurisdiction, but nevertheless our rule of law is what we set our values by and that is the difference, perhaps, between us and many others.

On 2 March, two individuals, using the aliases Alexander Petrov and Ruslan Boshirov, flew into Gatwick airport on flight SU2588 from Moscow. They mingled with other passengers, travelling on business visas and genuine Russian passports. Police have confirmed that the suspects had travelled to the United Kingdom before. The suspects then travelled by train into London and stayed at the City Stay hotel in Bow Road, east London on 2 and 3 March.

[Henry Smith (Crawley) (Con)]

I apologise for intervening so early in my right hon. Friend’s speech. He mentions Gatwick airport and the rail route the suspects took into central London, which are in my constituency. I appreciate that almost 50 million throughput passengers a year travel through Gatwick airport, but what assurances can be given that passengers and, indeed, my constituents who work at Gatwick airport will be kept safe from this appalling rogue and reckless action of foreign agents?

[Mr Wallace]

The assurance I can give my hon. Friend about this incident is that, throughout the whole process of the investigation as it has unfolded, we have sought expert scientific and public health advice to ensure that people who could have been at risk were not disregarded, whether or not they were in the threatened area. We felt that at Gatwick, for example, there was no threat to his constituents or the people who work there, but we made our decision by seeking the advice of our world experts in places such as the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory and Public Health England.

This also underlines an important point: when a hostile state is determined to try to use its full resources to penetrate another state, the challenge is much greater. The logistical support of that state in assisting its agents is significant. For example, these two individuals travelled on genuine Russian passports, making them harder to spot. There was clearly some attempt to create a legend to ensure that they circumvented our checks. This is only speculative, but at the other end of the aeroplane journey the baggage checks were probably not, I should think, as good as they might have been.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Mr Wallace]

If I may just set the scene by pressing on a bit, I will happily give way later.

On 3 March, the two individuals travelled to Salisbury before returning to London after a few hours. We believe that the purpose of that was a recce. On 4 March, they returned to Salisbury by train, and they were in the immediate vicinity of the Skripals’ house between 11.58 and 13.00 on that day. We believe that it was at that time they sprayed the deadly Novichok nerve agent on to the handle of the front door. That same afternoon, Sergei and Yulia Skripal left the house and travelled by car to the centre of Salisbury. After a meal and a walk around, they were taken ill at the centre and slipped into unconsciousness at 4.15 pm on 4 March.

As hospital staff and paramedics worked to save the lives of the Skripals, the two suspects left London and travelled to Heathrow, flying back to Moscow at 10.30 pm on 4 March on flight SU2585, leaving behind them a deadly trail. We should not forget that only the brave actions of police and NHS staff on that day ensured that the damage to that community was minimal. Because of the actions of the GRU agents, Detective Sergeant Nick Bailey fell gravely ill, and he ultimately bore the consequence of their reckless action. I am convinced that if it was not for the expertise in the hospital and the bravery of those in our blue-light services, who often acted with disregard for their own safety, we would have been reflecting today on a far worse situation.

Novichok is a deadly chemical nerve agent, and it was used in this attack. We believe that it was brought in in a counterfeit perfume bottle, in the packaging of a Nina Ricci bottle. That bottle was then recklessly discarded on the streets of Salisbury and had the potential to kill or injure dozens or hundreds of people. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has recently reported that, having tested it, it is confident that the liquid within the recovered perfume bottle had a very high level of purity.

Since the incident in March, some 250 detectives, led by SO15, have worked around the clock, trawling through 11,000 hours of CCTV and taking more than 1,400 statements. They have worked painstakingly and methodically to identify exactly which individuals are responsible and the methods they used to carry out the attack.

[Chris Philp (Croydon South) (Con)]

The Minister, like the Prime Minister a few days ago, has today presented clear evidence linking this incident to the GRU and the Russian state. He has also pointed out how the attack was facilitated by the apparatus of the Russian state. Does he therefore agree that it would be appropriate to ask the Foreign Office to look again at expelling further Russian diplomats beyond those expelled already to degrade their ability to plan and execute such activities on our soil as well as the other espionage activities they conduct?

[Mr Wallace]

My hon. Friend makes a point in response to the horrific facts of this case. We of course seek to keep pressure on the malign activity of the Russian state—to push it back, as the Prime Minister has said—and we will keep all options on the table for doing that. For now, we are working on a number of measures, to which I shall come later, to push back Russia’s activities, and we are doing our best to degrade Russia’s intelligence services.

[John Woodcock (Barrow and Furness) (Ind)]

Given the crystal clear evidence of Russian state involvement in these attacks—indeed, in the masterminding of them—why have the Government reached the conclusion that the other deeply suspicious deaths of Russian dissidents and others on British soil should not be reinvestigated?

[Mr Wallace]

I read the BuzzFeed allegations about the 14 deaths that that report viewed as suspicious. We have re-examined those cases, with other people looking at them—rather than only the officers who initially did the investigations, we have peer-group looked at them—and I have tested the assurances that I have had. In those cases, the investigations themselves did not throw up anything that would currently lead us to be suspicious. At the same time, the investigations and actions were done properly. That does not detract from the fact that Russia clearly uses lethal force where it chooses and that that must be challenged where we find it.

The important thing to tell the House is that, having visited the investigation a number of times, I believe that it is absolutely clear that the United Kingdom is in a unique position to solve this issue. We used a network of expert police officers from the local forces of many Members present today. It was incredibly refreshing to visit the investigation and find police officers from Devon and Cornwall and from all over the country. We have used the counter-terrorism network to share our knowledge and expertise. I met officers who had worked on the Litvinenko case. Britain has a real depth of experience of investigations of this type, and we have some of the best people in the world with some of the best equipment in the world. I can reassure colleagues that, although this attack was horrendous, we should be really proud of what our police and intelligence services have achieved, and that has been built on successive Governments’ investment in those organisations and the fact that, fundamentally, we do learn lessons from our past mistakes. Good organisations do that.

[James Heappey (Wells) (Con)]

Does the Minister agree that if we are to defend ourselves against threats such as the one we saw in Salisbury, we need to change the record, particularly with some Opposition Members and the scepticism that they have shown towards the work of our security services? It is about time that we realised that our security services are working for our national security. We should take their judgment seriously, not go on social media and rush to dismiss it.

[Mr Wallace]

My hon. Friend is right. When we meet the people who do the job of keeping us safe every day, we find that they are honest, law-abiding, decent people of all backgrounds and all political persuasions who are determined to uphold this country’s values, which include the rule of law and the protection of rights. It is unfair to doubt them in the way in which they are sometimes doubted in parts of the political arena, when it is often politicians who have made regretful decisions, rather than it being about the intelligence services’ intelligence.

We have heard a number of supportive voices from both sides of the House, including from the Labour party and members of its Front-Bench team. I will say one thing about the leader of the Labour party, the right hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn). He has for many years challenged the Government of the day when our intelligence services have done something that he does not like, and he is allowed to do that. He has a record of that and he is proud of it, and there is nothing wrong with doing that. When the Russian intelligence services have done the same, he has somehow not yet been able to make the same challenge to the Government of Russia as he has historically made to the Government of Britain. That is where I would leave it; I think that is the best way to reflect on it. Apart from that, I do not doubt the Labour Front-Bench team’s support of our police and blue-light agencies; nor do I doubt the wishes of Labour Members to support this investigation and to discuss it and the next measures to take, many of which they have supported. Labour should, though, think about calling out the responsibility for this attack. I think that is a fair position to take.

[Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)]

I hope that the Minister will follow my logic. A couple of weeks ago, it was widely reported that the head of MI5 had offered the Leader of the Opposition a detailed briefing on the threats that this country faces. Does the Minister know whether, after the Prime Minister’s statement and what she said about the GRU’s involvement, the Leader of the Opposition has decided to take up that very sensible offer from the head of MI5?

[Mr Wallace]

My right hon. Friend will understand that it would be wrong for me to detail conversations between our intelligence services and the Leader of the Opposition, our Prime Minister or anyone else. I regularly give briefs, in an open manner and on Privy Council terms, to some Opposition Members, including the shadow Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott), and we have a full and honest discussion about things. I have never found the shadow Home Secretary wanting; she has always wanted to know and has always been engaged. I am not going to speculate about the Leader of the Opposition’s relationships with the security services or anyone else; I am simply reflecting the fact that the people in our police and intelligence services are good people and they are doing the right thing. That does not mean that we do not hold them to account, because we do. The Intelligence and Security Committee does, along with everything else. The important thing about this event is that it was not an ad hoc, amateur event; it was the state-sanctioned use of a chemical weapon on our soil that lead to the death of a British citizen and could have led to the deaths of many more. It is therefore unbelievable that we should have any doubt about calling people out when they are found. It is now in multicolour, and we can see all the presentations.

[Ms Diane Abbott (Hackney North and Stoke Newington) (Lab)]

rose—

[Anna Soubry (Broxtowe) (Con)]

rose—

[Mr Wallace]

I give way first to the shadow Home Secretary.

[Ms Abbott]

On a point of information, I have certainly had a meeting with the head of MI5 on Privy Council terms. The Minister will not find us lacking in this debate in laying blame where blame should be laid.

[Mr Wallace]

I now give way to my right hon. Friend.

[Anna Soubry]

To go back to the point that my right hon. Friend has made so eloquently, as ever, many would argue—I certainly would—that it is not just about the Leader of the Opposition; it is part of the hard left’s long history that they subscribe very quickly and far too easily to that conspiracy theory, which invariable means that they take the default position that all the brave men and women who work in our security forces so admirably, as my right hon. Friend has described, are wrong, and they act in a wrong way.

[Mr Wallace]

What I take from my right hon. Friend’s point is that we should let the message come out from this debate that there is nothing wrong with working in our intelligence services and our police forces and stopping terrorism and espionage on our streets. It is a noble thing to do, and those who do it should not be hounded for it. I must say that her characterisation of the hard left or whatever may have been as it was in the 1980s and 1990s—there are certainly people like that from the Momentum movement in my Twitter feed—but I would add that the rules have changed in the 21st century. We see conspiracy theories among nationalists, peddling all sorts of things. We see the far right in Europe in league with some of Russia’s friends and allies. The rules have changed: multimedia and social media have given volume to conspiracy theories. Trust is so important for us on both sides of the House, and we have to maintain that. I trust our judiciary, and I trust our leaders. We have to maintain trust.

[Wayne David (Caerphilly) (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for giving way. May I simply express the hope, through you, Madam Deputy Speaker, that we do not have a sectarian debate but recognise that we are facing a real threat to our country, and that that requires us to act collectively? The shadow Home Secretary has made Labour’s position clear, and we should go forward from that.

[Mr Wallace]

The hon. Gentleman makes a fair point. I am trying to be as pragmatic and as accurate as possible about my view. I made it clear what my view was of the particular statement by the Leader of the Opposition. I have also said that I do not characterise that as the collective view of the Labour party. We will see what the statements are, and they may be different from the response that we heard last week. But I want to move on. I said that that was the only political point I was going to make, because it was important, but I want to move on now to where we have got with the investigation.

Following the work of the police and the intelligence services, which identified these individuals, the Crown Prosecution Service concluded that there was sufficient basis on which to bring charges against the two men for the attempted murder of Sergei and Yulia Skripal in Salisbury on that day. The two men identified by police are also the prime suspects in the poisoning of Dawn Sturgess and Charlie Rowley. Our world-class experts at the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory at Porton Down and the OPCW have confirmed that the exact same chemical nerve agent was used in both cases. The two incidents now form a single investigation, and there is no other line of inquiry.

The security and intelligence agencies have carried out their own investigations into the organisation behind the attack. Based on that work, the Government have concluded that the two individuals named by the police and the CPS are officers from the Russian military intelligence service, also known as the GRU, which is a highly disciplined organisation with a clear and effective chain of command.

This was not a rogue operation. The attack was almost certainly approved outside the GRU at a senior level of the Russian state. Although I cannot go into operational detail about the work of our security and intelligence agencies, I can say that this conclusion is based on a clear body of intelligence.

This was a despicable act in which a deadly and illegal nerve agent known as Novichok was used on the streets of Britain. I know the whole House will join me in recognising the remarkable resilience shown by the people of Salisbury in the face of this act. The Government stand ready to assist Salisbury in getting back to normal. We have released £7.5 million to support business and tourism in the town and a further £5 million to support the cost of policing. I know that, throughout this process, my hon. Friend the Member for Salisbury (John Glen) has been keenly and eagerly active in making sure that Salisbury, along with the county council, gets the resource and support it needs to deal with this.

[Sir Edward Davey (Kingston and Surbiton) (LD)]

I want to take the Minister back to how we counter the Russian threat to security in this country and elsewhere. As Secretary of State for Energy in March 2015, I used powers never used before to force the sale by LetterOne of its North sea oil assets. This was in the context of Ukraine-related sanctions against Russia. Following the terrorist outrage in Salisbury, are the Government looking at using powers such as unexplained wealth orders to investigate the cronies of Putin whose presence here brings our country into disrepute and does not help the fight against Russian aggression?

[Mr Wallace]

I will get to my response later on, but the right hon. Gentleman makes the point that we have to deal with Russian state aggression across a wide front. We have said that we will use all legal powers within the rule of law to push back the malign action of the Russian state. The Criminal Finances Act 2017, which had cross-party support, gives us tools to deal with illicit finance. It is a fact that some of the two biggest flows of illicit finance into this country come from Russia and China. Therefore, it is obvious that we will be looking in those areas and making sure that we deal with such illicit activity, but we also look elsewhere. I cannot comment on individual investigations, but where we see a break in the law, whether it be illicit finance or any other type of malign activity, we will act using those powers and push it back.

[Leo Docherty (Aldershot) (Con)]

The Minister is making a very eloquent statement. Will he confirm that some of the most important lessons learned are now being incorporated in the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill that is currently going through the House of Commons?

[Mr Wallace]

The Bill went through only yesterday with a large majority. I was disappointed that not all parties could support it. Labour supported it, and I enjoyed our going through the Lobby together. I urge the Liberal Democrats to think again and not to throw the baby out with the bathwater. Clearly, there were issues that not everyone agrees with. I do not think that voting entirely against the Bill would have helped our security or indeed the businesses that could have been compensated by Pool Re for loss of trade as a result of terrorism. Nevertheless, it is why, in that Bill, we have the measures against a hostile state. We wanted to mirror what we have in schedule 3 as what we have in schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 and give our police and ports that power to examine individuals.

[Mr Bob Seely (Isle of Wight) (Con)]

Is the Minister aware that the Danish Government recently announced an 11-point plan to deal with malign Russian influence? Many of those points were among the 10 items that I have discussed with him and that I wrote to him about last week. I do not pretend to be a font of all knowledge on this—absolutely not—but I am merely trying to present good ideas to the Minister to use. Will he meet me to discuss them, and can he give me any indication of where any of those points may be of benefit, specifically the one in relation to the standing group or organisation that could look into state subversion in the UK of both official and unofficial, state and non-state, kinds?

[Mr Wallace]

I have spoken to my hon. Friend. He has not only considerable experience in this area, but some interesting and refreshing ideas that I have discussed with him and that I am happy to discuss further with him. He makes another point, which is that if we are to respond to any hybrid threat, whether that is from Russia or any other hostile state, we need to be as co-ordinated and nimble as the people doing the planning. One of the unfortunate characteristics of some of the hostile states is that they do not really have collective Cabinet responsibility. They are quite able just to decide that they will all do something and everyone is told to do it. At the very least, we must be more nimble and co-ordinated. Our work in that area is ongoing. What I can say to him is that because, over the decades, investment has gone into the intelligence services, our specialist police and, increasingly, the National Economic Crime Centre, we are in a position where we have effectively funded all the actors on the stage. They have the capability, but we now need to make sure that the direction of their work is improved. That is what we work at every single day. I will perhaps be able to say more about it to my hon. Friend at another time as the work is currently in progress.

[Nick Smith (Blaenau Gwent) (Lab)]

rose—

[Mr Wallace]

I am sorry, but I really must press on.

[Nick Smith]

It is on that point about co-ordination.

[Mr Wallace]

We will get to that in a second.

I wish to express my gratitude to all the emergency services, and also to the staff at Salisbury District Hospital. It must have been very frightening for them suddenly to find on their wards a weapons-grade lethal nerve agent and, at the same time, the world’s press—not the local press, not the national press, but the world’s press—on their doorstep. They also had to put up with some rather odd behaviour by a Russian television crew who went down there probably to just cause trouble. Those hospital staff had to go to work and to live with not knowing whether they had come into contact with something. It must have been incredibly worrying. They have behaved brilliantly as has the leader of their hospital. I also want to place it on the record that the joint working with the DSTL, which was, by chance, down the road, really made a massive difference. I am sure that it gave confidence to the nurses, the doctors and the other staff at that hospital that they were in good hands and that answers would be reached.

[Nick Smith]

I want to pursue exactly that point. First, may I support the Minister’s remarks on dealing with this Russian state aggression that has brought this terrible nerve agent into our country? Will he tell us a bit more about the public health costs and the extra public health measures that may now need to be introduced to deal with this alarming development?

[Mr Wallace]

I was going to come to that, and we should also thank the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, which basically took over the decontamination of the site when the crime scenes were released and worked continuously with Government scientists and international experts to ensure that we got it right. We will jointly fund the decontamination costs. Part of the support package for the local authority will include that, and obviously there will also be internal money going out, but the work is being funded.

Again, this goes back to the United Kingdom’s expertise and knowledge, but from about 2010 we already had in place something called the chemical, biological or radioactive response framework. It was an easy-use, off-the-shelf guide to what to do and where to get scientific advice—Members who have sat on the Science and Technology Committee will know that it held an inquiry about 18 months ago into whether that advice is shared correctly through local government—so the network and the structures were in place. Certainly I have never felt that DEFRA or the local authority wanted for support. There are lessons to be learned. I went down to visit DSTL and the laboratories last Monday. We have seen a nerve agent that we have not seen before—it is not something that I think any of us would have predicted 10 months ago would be on our streets—and that will feed into our ongoing work on decontamination and detection capability. We are confident that DSTL and our aerospace sector have some of the finest minds in detection, and we will continue to invest in ensuring that we keep that.

Following the incident in March, we took action against Russia with one of the toughest packages of measures that the UK has levied against another state in three decades. We have expelled 23 Russian diplomats who have been identified as undeclared Russian intelligence officers. In doing so, we have helped to degrade their capability in the UK for some years to come. Twenty-seven other countries, as well as NATO, joined us in collective solidarity and, in recognition of the shared threat that we face, expelled 153 intelligence officers, the largest collective expulsion ever. Mr Putin should be under no illusion: the solidarity shown that day by the international community in response to the actions of the GRU has not waned.

In the United Kingdom, we have introduced schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill, which had its Third Reading last night and has moved to the other House, to allow examining officers to stop, question, search and detain a person at UK ports and the border area in Northern Ireland to determine whether the person appears to be, or has been, engaged in hostile state activity. I was also pleased that Parliament passed the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, which was taken through earlier this year by the Foreign Office and gives us powers to sanction individuals or entities for a wide range of purposes, including those who fail to comply with, or are in breach of, international human rights law.

[Stephen Kinnock (Aberavon) (Lab)]

I absolutely join the Minister in welcoming the so-called Magnitsky amendment to the sanctions Act, but in the last few years, five other countries have passed and implemented Magnitsky legislation, which has led to 79 named Russian citizens being sanctioned. Those countries are the USA, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Canada. It has been four months since the Magnitsky amendment was passed in this House, yet the Government have done absolutely nothing to implement the legislation. Will the Minister please explain why the Government are so reluctant to take action and implement the Magnitsky amendment?

[Mr Wallace]

We are not reluctant, and I am interested in the hon. Gentleman’s examples that are European member states, because he will know, with his European background, that sanctions are implemented at a European level. As a member of the European Union, we have always sought to implement our sanctions as the European Union. We stand ready to use the new powers on sanctions after Brexit, where we can.

[Stephen Kinnock]

rose—

[Mr Wallace]

I am sure the hon. Gentleman will be able to give me a legal clarification.

[Stephen Kinnock]

I would respectfully point out to the Minister that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are member states of the European Union.

[Mr Wallace]

Maybe the hon. Gentleman can explain how together they can lay a sanction, whereas the policy has always been at a European level—

[Stephen Kinnock]

They are EU member states; they’ve done it.

[Mr Wallace]

Well, let’s see.

[Richard Benyon (Newbury) (Con)]

There are three routes to sanctions, it seems to me. The first is through a collective operation with the European Union—it issues an order in Council that this Government can apply as a regulation the next day. The second is through the United Nations, which recently named, for example, Burmese generals, who we should be able to sanction quite separately from the European route. The third route is under the new legislation. Will my right hon. Friend at least confirm that work is in train to ensure that everything has been done to allow the Government to unilaterally sanction named individuals under that system on 30 March 2019? That message would go a long way towards discouraging dirty money from coming into this country.

[Mr Wallace]

We have made it very clear that we will use the powers set out in the Act. I am not going to say that we are about to fire a starting gun or say, “Here’s the list.” That will be for the Foreign Secretary and the Government collectively. We now have the power to act through our sanctions Act. We will not hesitate to use it, and there is more to come. I am trying to ensure that the legislation coming before the House over the next few months will include serious crime as a factor for laying a sanction, because it is important to see what the Americans have done around cyber-crime and serious organised criminals in that space.

[Sir Edward Davey]

Will the Minister give way?

[Stephen Kinnock]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Wallace]

No, I am going to move on.

We introduced many provisions in the Criminal Finances Act 2017. They included asset-freezing orders, of which we have used many, and unexplained wealth orders, which we used within six weeks against what I shall describe as an overseas individual—obviously the court decides how much I can tell hon. Members about individuals—and there are more in the pipeline. I know that Members are impatient to know why we cannot just issue lots of unexplained wealth orders. The simple reason is that the provision became law at the beginning of this year. We used it very quickly and we have to work it through the judiciary. At the high end, the oligarchs and their type use lawyers, and lots of them, to test these things. The wheels grind and there are more orders in the pipeline, but we have to ensure that this is tested, that the judiciary gets used to it and that we learn from the first use—which, by the way, has gone well to date.

[Sir Edward Davey]

The Minister is absolutely right; I found that the legal issues around the use of such orders requires a little bit of time, and I have sympathy with him on that point. However, can he at least reassure the House that the Government are absolutely determined to use unexplained wealth orders and other powers to chase down dirty money and stop Britain being used as a haven for it?

[Mr Wallace]

There is a reason why my title has changed from Minister of State for Security to Minister for Security and Economic Crime. The Prime Minister said not so long ago in a speech that she is determined to step up the response to illicit finance in this country and target those individuals. We have put some resource behind that. We have put in place the National Economic Crime Centre, and we are absolutely targeting and driving investigations in that area in a much more aggressive way than in the past. I have been very clear with the National Crime Agency and the other agencies that this is about targeted cases and sending messages, but it is also about going after facilitators—those who allow those crooks to enjoy their money in London. We must ensure that we deal with them all—not just the far-distant crime baron, but the smart, perhaps sharp-suited individuals who think they are just helping and not really engaged, but who in fact are absolutely corrupting our system, littering our streets with dirty money and then allowing those crooks to enjoy it.

[Mr Seely]

It is just a minor point, but when it comes to all the lawyers facilitating the work of these oligarchs who are testing and playing the system—they are very aggressive in the United States, as well as in London and elsewhere—should we not be gently highlighting the fact that these companies that are taking on significant Russian players are being used to test the law? They have a very ethical basis for doing so, but at the same time they are taking an awful lot of money from our adversaries and enemies to learn how to game the system.

[Mr Wallace]

Tempting as my hon. Friend’s suggestion is, vilifying people who carry out the role of defending plaintiffs is not how we do business in this country. We are not Russia. Reputation is clearly important to some of those companies, and no doubt they will bear that in mind. However, everyone has a right to a defence. It is up to us to make sure that the law is in the right place to deal with this.

I fully expect that in some of these cases we will be successful, while in others we will probably try but not be successful. That is partly because of the myriad facilitators, shell companies, foreign jurisdictions and corrupt jurisdictions that this money comes through. One challenge is that in some cases the money is already cleaned when it comes here. It is not being washed here; it is cleaned, has come into the system, and has bought nice houses and everything else. That is why we squeeze at one end with the unexplained wealth orders and the asset-cleaning orders, which have also been used quite successfully recently, and then, at the other end, we have better regulation through the use of the suspicious activity reports regime. That regime has, for far too long, been in need of reform to make sure that people are making those reports when they see suspicious activities. I see some horrendous stories where people have handed over hundreds of thousands of pounds in cash and people have not thought that it is remotely suspicious, so have not made any report. People have bought houses with cash, and somehow some estate agents have not thought that that is remotely suspicious. There is an obligation—a legal obligation—on them to report these issues. Funnily enough, when we follow up on those cash purchases, they are, more often than not, a dodgy purchase.

[Sir Edward Davey]

The Minister is describing a situation where the people who wish to do our country harm are very creative and have very expensive advisers to quickly get round the rules. Can he assure this House that the economic crime unit that he described in a previous answer to me will, within the law, be as creative as possible to chase down these people?

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[Mr Wallace]

I can give the right hon. Gentleman that assurance. The key point about the unit being part of the National Crime Agency, within a policing and intelligence-led environment, is that a target-led investigation is often about bringing to bear more than just criminal charges. It is often about disruption and discouragement—using the whole paraphernalia of the state to make life difficult, to recover assets, or to persuade people to go elsewhere. It has to be about everything, partly because of the scale of this. It does not matter how well we fund it—the scale of illicit finance throughout the world is so large that we have to pick our targets well and develop the case around them.

I have no doubt, though, that in dealing with illicit finance, especially illicit finance that has come here from Russia, for example, the National Crime Agency has the right people with the right skill set to deliver, and the right leadership under its director general, Lynne Owens. We have already had arrests and progressed a number of cases, and I think that over the next few months, or maybe years, we will see some results. The message has certainly already gone out in the City that, through the use of the unexplained wealth orders and having them on our statute book, we are stepping up and taking this seriously. In my conversations with the United States Government, I find that they are delighted to engage with us and to help us in finding international money launderers. We are helping each other to make sure that people do not hide in different jurisdictions.

As the Prime Minister said last week, we have repeatedly asked the Russians to account for what happened in Salisbury in March. I am afraid that I have to report that our requests were met with obfuscation and lies. They responded with disinformation on an industrial scale. They tried to blame terrorists, our international partners, and the United Kingdom itself. They have accused “English gentlemen” of killing those whom they consider to be beneath them, as one of the theories of what happened. They have tried to blame the future mother-in-law of Yulia Skripal. They have even tried to blame the Prime Minister herself. This deluge of disinformation merely reinforces their guilt and does them no favours whatsoever.

[James Heappey]

It is clear from the way in which the Russian Government have responded that they show no remorse whatsoever. Will the Minister therefore suggest to colleagues in the Foreign Office that they encourage Germany and the EU to revisit their enthusiasm for the Nord Stream project, because that would bring with it the dual advantage of diminishing Russian leverage over our friends and allies in eastern Europe while also hitting Putin very hard indeed in his bank account?

[Mr Wallace]

It is just good energy policy for any country not to be dependent on one single source, either because of political exposure or just because of differences on energy. It is really important that we always make sure that our energy policy is diverse. Obviously, our European partners have tried to do the same, and I would urge them to continue with that.

[Sir Edward Davey]

As Secretary of State for Energy, working at the EU Energy Council, I helped the European Commission to draft Europe’s energy security strategy, which is very much aimed at reducing Europe’s dependence on imports of Russian fossil fuels. That is good for climate change and good for security. Can the Minister assure the House that after Brexit, that level of influence on Europe’s energy policy will be there in some other way, because by being at the table we were able to hit Putin in the pocket very effectively?

[Mr Wallace]

I think that, in the middle of the negotiations, that is what we are trying to do. Our relationship with Europe post Brexit is not just about taking or giving—it is still going to be a partnership. Our security will be a partnership. Our relationships with NATO and many of the countries in NATO will be a partnership. On strategic issues like energy, it is in the interests of both the European continent, as it will be then, and us to have that strategic dialogue. We will need each other for energy policy whether we are in or out of the European Union. I would certainly share the right hon. Gentleman’s view that we must continue to work at delivering that.

This was a chemical weapons attack that left four people fighting for their lives and one innocent woman dead. I know that the thoughts of the House will be with the friends and family of Dawn Sturgess, in particular. We will never stop pursuing justice for Dawn Sturgess and other victims, nor will we ever stop pursuing the people responsible for this malign attack. As the Prime Minister told this House last week, were the two suspects within our jurisdiction, there would be a clear basis in law for their arrest for murder.

[Alex Burghart (Brentwood and Ongar) (Con)]

I thank the Minister very much for the speech he is giving. I am sure that the House will be aware of the remarks made by President Putin today in saying that these are not criminals but citizens. Does he agree that if the President is so assured of that statement, he might want to encourage those individuals to come to the UK for trial?

[Mr Wallace]

I believe in the British justice system, and if those individuals are innocent, they will be acquitted. I have every faith in that, so I would urge the President to hand them over for a trial. They are suspects and they are innocent until proven guilty.

We have obtained a European arrest warrant and submitted an Interpol red notice so that if these individuals leave Russia in future, they can be apprehended and brought back to the UK to face justice. We have not made a formal extradition request, because we have learned from experience, following the murder of Alexander Litvinenko, that such a request would be futile. The UK does not have an extradition treaty with Russia, and the Russian constitution prohibits extradition of its nationals. But should either of these individuals ever again travel outside Russia, we will take every possible step to have them detained, to extradite them, and to bring them to face justice here in the United Kingdom.

As the Prime Minister also said, we have taken action against the GRU itself. The Salisbury incident is but the latest example in recent history of Russian malign activity in which the GRU has played a key part. The GRU has been involved in the botched coup in Montenegro and the illegal annexation of Crimea. Last year, we determined that GRU hackers were responsible for the indiscriminate NotPetya cyber-attack, which caused some £15 million-worth of damage in the United Kingdom. We exposed its despicable use of chemical weapons in Salisbury, we have exposed its operatives and its methods, and we will share this information with our allies in recognition of the shared threat we face. It is important to remember that the message to our international partners is that if the GRU can do it here, it can do it anywhere—in those people’s countries as well. People who are perhaps tempted to think that Russia is going to be their friend should reflect on the actions it took this year in this country with a nerve agent. We will use every means possible to counter the threat by the GRU, both covert and overt, to ensure that the threat it poses to the United Kingdom is reduced.

The use of deadly, illegal chemical weapons on our soil is part of a pattern of behaviour: Russia’s actions in Crimea, the Donbass and Montenegro; repeated violations of the national airspace of several European countries; sustained cyber-espionage and election interference; and a Russian-made missile belonging to the Russian army launched from territory held by Russian-backed separatists, bringing down civilian airliner MH17.

[Mr Seely]

Is the Minister aware that the senior Russian general in eastern Ukraine at the time was a GRU general whose code name was Orion, and he was exposed in an investigation in Holland a few months ago as being the senior GRU officer responsible for that?

[Mr Wallace]

My hon. Friend makes the point that the GRU’s fingerprints have been all over these types of events. MH17 was a civilian airliner travelling between Schiphol and Asia, and 200-plus people—women and children going on holiday—were blown out of the sky. It is an outrageous thing to have happened to anyone, and it seems that Russia does not want to bear responsibility for any of that. This is way outside any international norm—it is on another planet from any international norm—and it is time that we said, “Enough is enough.”

Russia has now started to undermine international institutions and degrade the structures and treaties that keep us safe. Russia is failing to act as a responsible member of the international community—one that has the privilege and responsibility of a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. The Russian state must account for the despicable use of chemical weapons by the GRU on British soil. It must recognise that there can be no place in any civilised international order for the kind of barbaric activity we saw in Salisbury in March.

Regrettably, there are some who repeatedly flout the established rules of international conduct, their flagrant disregard threatening the entire international rules-based system. We have acted to protect our citizens and allies against the malign activities of those who disregard international norms and to send a message to all those who would contravene the international rules-based system: you cannot and will not act with impunity.

Deterring unacceptable actions by Russia and other malign actors is critical to our collective security. Recent joint action using transparent, multilateral mechanisms such as the OPCW demonstrates the strength of our shared commitment to tackle the threat of malign state activity and to reinforce the global rules-based system. The June European Council endorsed a comprehensive package to tackle hybrid threats, including the creation of a new chemical weapons sanction regime. We will continue to work with our European partners for its speedy adoption. The US has announced additional sanctions against Russia for the Salisbury attack, and in June, the G7 agreed in Canada a rapid response mechanism to share intelligence on hostile state activity. NATO has subsequently strengthened its collective deterrence, including through a new cyber-operations centre.

As the Prime Minister has said, we will push for new sanctions regimes against those responsible for gross human rights violations and cyber-attacks, as well as robustly enforcing the existing regime against Russia. We will also work with our partners to build the OPCW’s capacity to attribute chemical weapons in Syria and more widely.

Malign actors have, for some time, been using a range of methods to undermine the international norms and laws, and our security and prosperity, and it depends on us to make sure we take a stand. They are trying to destabilise our advanced democracies, open societies and free economies. Those methods range from conventional military interventions to acts of non-military aggression in the form of disinformation and cyber-attacks. All these methods are designed to destabilise by sowing chaos, fear, uncertainty, division and mistrust.

In the face of such behaviour, the international community must continue to unite and to defend the laws, norms and institutions that safeguard our citizens. We must maintain and build on our strong alliances with those who share our values, stand shoulder to shoulder with our many partners and allies, send clear messages to malign actors that unacceptable behaviour will not be tolerated, and remain resolute, determined and united against those who seek to divide us.

--- Later in debate ---

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

My hon. Friend the Member for Derby North (Chris Williamson) is not a shadow Front Bencher, the last time I checked. It is up to Back Benchers on both sides of the House to put their views as they see fit—[Interruption.] Looking at the Back Benches today, I look forward to the contribution of my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon (Stephen Kinnock).

On 4 March, Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia were admitted to hospital after emergency services responded to reports of them both being in an extremely serious condition. Mr Skripal and his daughter were left hospitalised for weeks. Detective Sergeant Nick Bailey also fell ill after attending the incident, and all three were later discharged from hospital. I pay tribute to Detective Sergeant Bailey for his fortitude and endurance in undergoing medical treatment. I also pay tribute to all the staff at the Salisbury District Hospital. The hon. Member for Salisbury (John Glen) is in his place. I hope that he will pass that on and pass on the gratitude of both sides of the House for what the staff did in those very difficult weeks.

The Prime Minister confirmed that the poisoning agent used on the Skripals was part of a group of nerve agents known as Novichok. A further 48 individuals were also assessed in hospital in relation to the incident. We of course also think of all of them and of what they went through at that time.

Four months later, on 30 June, Charlie Rowley and Dawn Sturgess were also admitted to hospital, having been found unwell at a property in Amesbury. This only goes to show the abomination of using nerve agents in this way. They cannot be targeted. They leave a trail. Clearly, that is what seems to have happened in the case of Charlie Rowley and Dawn Sturgess.

Having been admitted to hospital in a critical condition, Dawn Sturgess sadly died on 8 July, making her the only victim to have died as a result of exposure to this deadly nerve agent. The thoughts of everyone in this House are with her family and friends. I think we would all agree that a needless death has occurred on the streets of this country. After her death, a formal murder inquiry was launched. In July, the Home Secretary confirmed that tests at Porton Down confirmed that both Mr Rowley and Ms Sturgess were poisoned by the same type of Novichok substance used to poison the Skripals. As I have already said clearly, and as the Prime Minister has set out, strong evidence points towards direct Russian culpability and we condemn the Russian state for that culpability.

I want to say a word about the police and the intelligence services. With 1,400 statements and more than 11,000 hours of CCTV—and a report from the OPCW that I mentioned in response to an intervention—we commend the police, the security services and the UK’s colleagues at the OPCW, as well as the people of Salisbury, for their patience, co-operation and fortitude in these very difficult circumstances. Following consideration of that evidence, the Crown Prosecution Service and Scotland Yard announced on 5 September that sufficient evidence had been collected to charge two Russian nationals, Alexander Petrov and Ruslan Boshirov. I choose my words very carefully as I refer to those two individual suspects. In her statement to the House on 5 September, the Prime Minister also stated that the same two men are the prime suspects in the case of Dawn Sturgess and Charlie Rowley.

We understand, as the Security Minister has set out, that on 2 March those two men travelled from Moscow to London on Russian passports. Two days later, the nerve agent Novichok was sprayed on the front door of the Skripals’ home in Salisbury, Wiltshire, and it seems that the individuals returned to Russia the same day. The police believe the pair arrived at Gatwick and stayed in the City Stay hotel in Bow Road, east London. It is believed, as the Security Minister has set out, that a modified perfume bottle was used to bring the nerve agent into this country and to spray the door. It appears that Dawn Sturgess and Charlie Rowley were later exposed after handling a contaminated container.

The Prime Minister has indicated that, although there is no extradition treaty in place with Russia, as has already been mentioned in this debate, she has none the less issued an Interpol red notice and taken advantage of the European arrest warrant. The Security Minister and I debated this in the context of the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill last night. We of course all hope that, after 29 March 2019, the European arrest warrant will still be valid and that the Government will have negotiated a position where that is the case.

The attack in Salisbury was an appalling act of violence. Nerve agents are abominable in any war and it is utterly reckless to have used them in a civilian environment in this way. In the words of the shadow Home Secretary in July:

“We cannot allow the streets of ordinary British towns and communities to become killing fields for state actors.”—[Official Report, 5 July 2018; Vol. 644, c. 537.]

The Security Minister has already set out the behaviour of the Russian state during the course of the investigation. Russia has consistently failed to answer the questions put to it by the international community. It has responded with obstinacy and mocking, which I suggest demonstrates a lack of respect for the gravitas of this situation. The language it has used is not the language of a state dedicated to helping to shed light on the events that have happened.

The use of this agent on the streets of Britain is shocking. The exposure to military grade nerve agents by a foreign state is a reckless, dangerous and egregious breach of international law. Opposition Members believe that it is incumbent on all states to act within international law and with respect for human rights.

[Mr Wallace]

I recognise the point that the hon. Gentleman made about condemning the Russian Government. I would like to put on record the last statement by the Leader of the Opposition in his response to the statement last week, which was an opportunity to condemn the Russian state. I have just reread the response. There is condemnation about the act and the reckless use of a nerve agent and so on, but the closest I can find to a condemnation of the Government of Russia is the final line, which says that

“we will support any reasonable action to bring those responsible to justice and to take further action against Russia for its failure to co-operate with this investigation.”—[Official Report, 5 September 2018; Vol. 646, c. 172.]

What I do not see is a condemnation of the Russian Government for this act in Salisbury. I ask the hon. Gentleman to make it clear that it is his party’s position and his leader’s position that they condemn the Government of Russia for this act.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I am quite happy to do that. When I set out the statements by the Leader of the Opposition, I was quoting both his words following the Prime Minister’s statement and indeed what his spokesperson said on his behalf. I will read again—I have already read it once to the House—what the Leader of the Opposition’s spokesperson said on 6 September, the day after the Hansard extract to which the Security Minister referred:

“It’s clear now that very strong evidence points to Russian state culpability, and obviously Jeremy condemns the Russian state for that culpability.”

It could not be any clearer. That is what my right hon. Friend said through his spokesperson. There it is.

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[Mr Wallace]

He could have said it in the statement.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

Well, that is the position. I have read out the position pretty clearly. It is the second time I have done so. I say to the Security Minister: we worked in a consensual way on the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill and I hope that we can continue to do that in our response to this terrible incident and send out a very clear message that we are united in the measures that need to be taken to keep our country safe.

The expulsion of the diplomats has already been mentioned in the discussion in this House. They were identified by the Prime Minister as undeclared intelligence officers. This also led to the amendment of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill that—

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[Stephen Gethins]

I know that the hon. Gentleman does, and I respect that. I would also say that RT continues to be an Ofcom-regulated broadcaster, so it should be for people’s own judgment, rather than for me to tell them, whether or not they should appear on an Ofcom-regulated broadcaster, but I thank him for his intervention.

This was a chemical weapons attack on UK citizens on UK soil, which we condemn unequivocally, and we thank the Minister, his colleagues and all others involved for the work they have put into this so far. There can be little doubt that the murder attempts—this was murder and attempted murder—were authorised by the Kremlin. Russia’s actions can only reasonably be characterised as an extrajudicial, state sanctioned murder of a foreign citizen on a foreign soil, which we condemn without any equivocation.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Ross, Skye and Lochaber (Ian Blackford) has already called for stronger action against Russia in the wake of the Salisbury attack, saying it was clear that the attacks were an “act of state terrorism” and that tougher financial sanctions are needed to make Russia “sit up” and pay attention.

For some time—this is not in the Minister’s portfolio, but I hope he will ask his colleagues to reflect on it—the Scottish Government and Scottish National party Members in this place, not least my party leader, have looked to the Government to tighten up the regulatory framework relating to Scottish limited partnerships. I hope that he will take back to his Government colleagues the message that we are very willing to continue to work with them on that.

[Mr Wallace]

My commitment during the passage of the Criminal Finances Act 2017 stands. The work is ongoing, but we absolutely see the dangers and vulnerabilities of how those tools are used at the moment, and there is a lot more that can be done. I am grateful to the SNP for raising the issue with us in the House and in relation to the Criminal Finances Act. It is a niche thing: anyone who is not in Scotland or who does not happen to be in one of the other countries that, remarkably, have huge amounts of them will probably not have not come across them.

[Stephen Gethins]

I thank the Minister for his work on the issue. If I may gently say so, however, the one area on which I disagree with him—although I am sure that he actually agrees with me—is that I do not think it is particularly niche, given the volume of foreign transactions. I know that is not the point he was making, and I hope that he will take my comment in the spirit with which it was intended.

It has been pleasing to see the collective robust response of the international community to these attacks. In particular, the UK’s ambassador to the United Nations, Karen Pierce, has done an excellent job in very difficult circumstances. She said that the nerve agent attack was a

“direct challenge”

to the

“rules-based international system that has kept all of us safe since 1945.”

I associate myself with those remarks.

The European Union has been an extraordinarily valuable tool when we seek to confront Russian aggression, whether in the UK, Ukraine or elsewhere in Europe. We welcome the leadership that the United Kingdom has shown on Ukraine. I hope that I do not step outside the spirit of the debate, but I am concerned about the effect that Brexit will have on that, and I know that that is also of concern to a number of Ukrainian politicians. I hope that Ministers will bear in mind over the coming weeks and months that our relationship with our European partners is absolutely crucial when it comes to Russia. I also gently welcome the fact that a European arrest warrant has been issued. I repeat that it is an incredibly valuable tool in these circumstances, and I hope that Ministers will reflect on its value over the coming months.

On Russian bullying as a whole, all of us in this House need to reflect on the fact that this is not entirely new. Since the fall of the former Soviet Union, we have seen acts by Russia in places such as South Ossetia and Abkhazia and in Georgia, whose territorial integrity we respect. We have seen Russia’s heinous actions in Syria. We must remember that the state that can most hold back Assad and his murderous regime is Russia. I want to highlight in particular the targeting of the White Helmets online, which should appal each and every one of us. None of us should be in any doubt about the way in which they are being targeted at the moment. There is also the illegal annexation of Crimea and the ongoing conflict in the east of Ukraine, and the shooting down of the Malaysian Airlines flight. None of us should forget that the actions in Salisbury, as appalling as they are, are in line, unfortunately, with the way in which Russia has carried out its foreign policy in recent years.

In addition to addressing how Russia has carried out its actions here, I want to reflect on how it is viewed by many of its nearest neighbours. The Baltic states have thrived since independence in the early 1990s. The very fact that we have had to deploy UK and NATO troops to the Baltic states should be of concern to us all in this day and age.

Finally on soft power—this welcome point was well made by the hon. Member for North Wiltshire (James Gray)—the people of Russia have contributed hugely to European civilisation. We have benefited enormously from our relationship with the Russians. I hope that nobody will mind if I plug the great work of Billy Kay—I should add that he is my constituent—who in his excellent BBC Scotland series looks at links with Russia, particularly those between it and Scotland, over the years. We have benefited from that fruitful relationship. We should be grateful to people in Russia for their ongoing contributions to science and culture. It is why we benefit from a strong relationship and why soft power and maintaining those relationships are so important. In particular, I will mention the excellent work of the British Council. We should continue to support its work in Russia—this is not one for the Minister, but I hope that he will relay the message to his colleagues in the Foreign Office—because it is as important, if not more important, than it ever has been.

As we reach the centenary of the end of the first world war, none of us should forget the huge price paid by the Russian people in that conflict and the second world war. We owe them a huge debt of gratitude for the sacrifices they made in the 20th century in particular. That is why we should stand with the people of Russia. We are right to reflect on the victims of Salisbury in this debate, but we should also reflect on the other victims of Putin’s Russia—the human rights activist who finds himself targeted, the LGBT activists who find themselves targeted by the police. In particular, I would like to highlight Mothers of Russia. These are mothers who have lost their sons and daughters in Putin’s wars who find themselves targeted because they want to find the truth for their children. It is appalling. They are among the bravest people I have ever had the good fortune to meet and a credit to their country.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Wallace]

The hon. Gentleman made a powerful point about the British Council and its excellent work. Will he join me in condemning Russia’s decision, in response to our expulsions in March, to order the closure of its activities in Russia—the very thing, if anything, that will help to lay the foundations for improved relations in the future?

[Stephen Gethins]

Of course, I absolutely agree with the Minister in condemning that. The work of the British Council has been outstanding. The bravery of its employees, both Russians and UK nationals, is something for which we owe them an enormous debt. I realise that this subject is very close to the heart of the hon. Member for Aberavon (Stephen Kinnock) as well.

To conclude, we stand with the UK Government over Salisbury, but we must also stand with the people of Russia, who fundamentally are the Putin regime’s biggest victims.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Kinnock]

Yes, I do share that concern. I think it is clear that, at the very least, a pause is necessary, and I think that the European Union needs to take the required action to make that happen. We need to pause and review how it will work, but Europe needs a plan B for its energy, and the key must be to reduce its dependence on Russian hydrocarbons. That must be the strategic objective.

When oil is selling at over $100 a barrel there are rich pickings, and the nexus of Government officials and mafia bosses who run modern Russia are able to co-exist in relative peace and harmony, but a few years ago the price dropped to nearly $40 a barrel, and although it has risen recently, it is still struggling to reach $70 a barrel. The pie has therefore shrunk, which has constrained the Kremlin’s ability to incentivise and buy loyalty. What do you do if you are a Russian President who is no longer able to offer the carrot to your henchmen and cronies? You must then deploy the stick. You must send a message, loud and clear, to all those who may know your secrets and may be thinking about betraying you that retribution will be brutal, cruel and swift.

While assassinations on the streets of Britain are Putin’s specific weapon of choice when it comes to securing the loyalty of the various clans and cabals that run Russia, he also knows that he must retain the broader support of the Russian people, which he has done through a series of cynical and ruthless foreign policy initiatives and military interventions. He knows that he needs to compensate for the abject failure of his Government to place the Russian economy on a sustainable growth footing, and he does so by seeking to unite his people against a range of common enemies. It is the oldest trick in the book. Thus the Russian threat to our security is not only through the Salisbury attack, or through the murder of Litvinenko; we see it in the invasion of Ukraine, and we see it in the indiscriminate bombing of Syria. From 24 to 28 February, Russia conducted 20 bombing missions every day in eastern Ghouta. The month-long assault on eastern Ghouta alone is estimated to have killed over 1,600 people, most of them thanks to Russian bombs, bringing the death toll in Syria to over half a million people, with 5 million refugees and over 6 million displaced people.

As we have seen with the refugee crisis and the threat from IS, the effects of the Russian intervention have rippled on to our shores. President Putin deploys state-sponsored murder in order to retain the loyalty and discipline of his immediate entourage, and he uses military aggression in order to secure the broader support of the Russian people. Both strategies represent a grave threat to our national security and the security of our partners and allies, and both must therefore be tackled and defeated.

Russia’s geopolitical influence and substantial military clout stand in stark contrast to the small size and fragile state of its economy. In 2013 Russia’s economy was roughly the size of Italy’s and considerably smaller than Germany’s. Russia is grossly over-reliant on hydrocarbons, with approximately 70% of its GDP linked to the oil and gas industries. With the price of a barrel of oil plummeting, the value of the rouble tumbling, the demographic time-bomb ticking, sanctions biting and poor economic policy decisions compounding these problems, the Russian economy is facing a perfect storm. It is against this backdrop that sanctions as a foreign policy tool are ultimately likely to have real effect. The sectoral sanctions imposed by the EU in the wake of the shooting down of flight MH17 by Russian-made missiles in July 2014 certainly led Russia to tread more carefully in terms of incursions into eastern Ukraine, and there is some evidence to suggest that President Putin is not actively seeking to up the ante there.

The Government must now build on the success of those measures by committing to the following. First, we must ensure that the Magnitsky amendment to the sanctions Act is implemented effectively. It needs to be implemented effectively without excuses about our membership of the EU being an impediment; that clearly is not the case because Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have all implemented their Magnitsky legislation.

[Mr Wallace]

I have now seen the Estonian and other measures, and I would not want the hon. Gentleman to make out that they are sanctions regimes. They are a travel ban regime under which the country sets out a list of named people it will prevent from entering it. They are not sanctions regimes in the way we would understand that; they are travel bans saying, “You can’t come to our country.” We in this country do it differently; we have always had that power and we regularly take steps to keep people out of this country either through exclusion or refusal of visas if they pose a threat to the common good or a security threat and so forth. I am afraid that the Baltic states regimes are not sanctions regimes; they are a predetermined list of people not allowed into the country. We already operate a case-by-case scheme; we just do it differently.

[Stephen Kinnock]

I thank the Minister for that clarification, but it remains a mystery to me that it is now four months since the Magnitsky amendment was passed by this House and we have not even drawn up a list of names and made it publicly available, whereas the United States, Canada, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia have all produced lists of names of Russian citizens whom they intend to sanction, or have sanctioned, albeit initially by travel bans which can clearly be built on. It is still a mystery to me why four months have passed and there has been absolutely no follow-up whatsoever on the Magnitsky amendment, so I look forward to hearing a little more from the Minister on that in his winding up.

The second key point is on unexplained wealth orders. Again, far too little action has been taken to instigate those targeted measures. Thirdly, while I have been robust in my comments on the Magnitsky amendment and on the unexplained wealth orders, I believe that the measures that the Minister set out from the Dispatch Box on the work we are doing multilaterally and internationally, through the G7, the UN and elsewhere, are absolutely to be welcomed and fully supported. The shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen (Nick Thomas-Symonds), has already expressed support for them.

It is also vital that we argue forcefully for the completion of the European Union’s energy union. The EU’s fragmented energy market and infrastructure are causing several EU member states, including Germany, to be more reliant than necessary on Russian oil and gas, which in turn gives Russia disproportionate influence in its dealings with the EU. By investing in interconnectors and integrating the energy trading market, the EU would fundamentally rebalance its relationship with Russia.

My abiding memory of my time in Russia was of a burgeoning sense of polarisation between society and state. I saw and heard the values, instincts and hopes of growing numbers of young, well-educated and internationally minded Russians contrasting sharply with an increasingly reactionary and authoritarian governing elite. Support for Mr Putin was, and still is, relatively strong and widespread, but it is also brittle. He derives his legitimacy from the fact that people are prepared to trade the rule of law, pluralism, transparency and freedom of speech for what they perceive to be security, stability and economic growth. However, when Russian holiday jets are being blown up in response to military adventurism, and when recession and inflation become the dominant features of the Russian economy, many more Russians will start to draw the conclusion that their President is failing to keep his side of the bargain.

Change in Russia will not come any time soon, however, as evidenced by the recent election. President Putin can still count on the support of the majority of Russian voters, with the only notable exception being the growing middle classes in Moscow and St Petersburg. Clearly, the assiduously developed propaganda that is pumped out by the state media machine plays a major role in maintaining Putin’s approval ratings, but my time in Russia also taught me that the Russian people are still traumatised by what they perceive to have been the chaos and humiliation of the Yeltsin years, and the stability that Putin brought following that turbulent period continues to underpin his popularity today. It is therefore essential that we respect the will of the Russian people. Vladimir Putin has been the leader of choice for more than 15 years, and he will in all probability continue as President until 2022.

Let us therefore engage with Russia as it is, not how we would like it to be. Let us demonstrate through our words and deeds that we truly understand the history, culture, interests and foreign policy objectives of this vast nation with its huge potential, but let us also be absolutely clear, strong and resolute in the face of Russian aggression. That clarity, strength and resolution must start right here in this House. The Kremlin will constantly and consistently attempt to divide us, and we must not allow it to do so. That is why it is vital that my party makes it crystal clear that we support the words and actions of the Government, the EU and our NATO allies in the action that we are taking against the Russian state. This is not the moment for whataboutery. This is the time for a robust defence of our values and for the clear recognition that if we give a bully an inch, he will take a mile.

Let us therefore move forward together, across parties and communities, to forge an unbreakable and unanimous position on this issue of profound importance to our national interest, and let us send this message to Mr Putin, loud and clear: the British people will no longer tolerate the brazen and reckless actions of your regime, and we will no longer tolerate the way in which you and your cronies use London as a laundromat for your ill-gotten gains. We will therefore act rapidly and robustly to deliver the changes that are long overdue. We have the utmost respect for the history and culture of Russia, and we will never forget the tremendous sacrifices that the Russian people made when they stood shoulder to shoulder with us to defeat the Nazis. We also accept that Russia will probably never be a liberal democracy, and we have absolutely no desire to impose our world view. Nobody in their right mind is talking about regime change, but we do need to see radical behaviour change.

I referred to respect, the Russian word for which is uvazhaniye, and underlined the importance that Russia rightly attaches to being respected by others. But respect is a two-way street, and it has to be earned. If the current occupants of the Kremlin wish to earn our respect, they must radically change their mindset and behaviour, and they must do so now.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Wallace]

I will start by clearing the air. I have sat through this debate from the beginning, as has the right hon. Member for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott) and indeed the hon. Member for Torfaen (Nick Thomas-Symonds) on the Labour Front Bench, and I have just heard the right hon. Lady’s speech. She will have heard me say at the beginning of the debate that I did not question the motives of the Labour Front-Bench team or their commitment to security. In all our meetings and discussions, I have found the shadow Home Secretary to be engaged and to care about security. I have not heard a single person make the assumption that people on the left are less patriotic than people on the right. In fact, I made the point, when one of my Back-Bench colleagues raised it, about the growth of nationalism in the 21st century and how far-right nationalists were peddling the same tune. It was as if she had come with a prepared speech aimed at tackling the stereotypes of her own office—the idea that we were all queuing up to say these things.

The only point I made about the Leader of the Opposition—not the Labour party, not the Front-Bench team, not my friends in the Labour party—was that I had not heard from his own lips, during last week’s statement, which was the perfect opportunity, a condemnation of the Russian Government; it had to be left to his spokesperson later. It is important that such a thing be heard from the lips of the party leader and at the right time. I do not doubt that collectively the Labour party is condemning the Russian Government and has at its heart a commitment to keeping us safe. We will continue to disagree about the methods and the balance of power between liberty and our security services—we will continue to have our disagreements—but we will continue also to agree.

In this matter, from the time I have spent with him personally, I do not doubt Jeremy Corbyn. We visited Iran together once. Interestingly, it was I, Jeremy Corbyn and the former Member for Blackburn, and I found myself to be the most pro-European, if anyone is interested—

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

Order. I need to emphasise that we do not call hon. Members by their names. We refer to their constituencies or, in this case, to the Leader of the Opposition. I am afraid that both Front-Bench spokespersons were guilty of it, but I could not let it go the third time.

[Mr Wallace]

The casual 21st century—it is becoming a bad habit! I apologise, Madam Deputy Speaker.

There are things on which we disagree fundamentally, but my opening speech was not an attack on the Labour party or the left collectively. We can argue about our methods, but I do not doubt people’s patriotism on the left at all. I have served as a soldier with people who voted Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat and the rest. Our patriotism has nothing to do with our politics.

The incident in Salisbury was an appalling and despicable act. Operatives of the Russian military and intelligence service deployed an illegal chemical nerve agent on the streets of Britain. This intentional act resulted in the death of an innocent woman and left four others fighting for their lives. Our thoughts remain with all those affected, particularly the family and friends of Dawn Sturgess. I acknowledge once again the dedication and professionalism of the emergency services and the staff at Salisbury District Hospital and of the police and security and intelligence services.

In summing up, I should set out what we have done to return Salisbury to normal. I thank the police and experts from Public Health England for their hard work in ensuring that the public spaces immediately affected by the incident are once again accessible and safe. I extend my thanks to the Defence, Science and Technology Laboratory at Porton Down, where more than 430 world-leading scientists and experts have been providing specialist advice and assistance to Wiltshire police, the well-led Wiltshire County Council and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. I also thank the military personnel for their support in helping to clean up Salisbury and return it to normal as quickly as possible while ensuring public safety. They did this at risk to themselves. Obviously, they were wearing protective clothing, but who knew early on how widely this deadly nerve agent had been spread and the risk posed?

The clean-up work by DEFRA is well under way on a small number of potentially contaminated sites to bring them back into safe use for the people of Salisbury and Amesbury and their visitors. In total, nine sites were identified from the first incident in Salisbury as requiring some level of specialist decontamination. This work is now complete at six sites. The three other sites remain cordoned off so that the clean-up work can be carried out safely.

In connection with the June incident in Amesbury, there are currently three sites of decontamination. In addition, 21 vehicles involved in the response to the first incident, in March—a mixture of emergency response vehicles and private vehicles—have been moved to a hazardous landfill site. The clean-up process on the streets of Salisbury and Amesbury has been comprehensive and exhaustive, and I am content to say that it is our assessment that all the areas that have been handed back after the decontamination process are now safe. Indeed, I visited a number of those sites in Salisbury last Monday, and it was good to see the people of Salisbury back to normal: cafés were full, people were enjoying the park, and children were paddling in the river. We should pay tribute to the people of Salisbury, who have not been put off by this horrendous incident, and who are determined to get that wonderful cathedral city back to normal.

I must, however, echo the advice of the chief medical officer. We must ensure that the public remain vigilant. It is important to guarantee that no other materials are present elsewhere. As other Members have already pointed out, it is vital that the public continue to follow the advice of the chief medical officer, and not to pick up anything that they do not recognise as an item that they themselves have dropped. We must continue to be guided by that advice, and we must give the police, the local council and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs the space and resources that they need to proceed with their valuable work ensuring public safety.

It is with that in mind that I again pay tribute to the patience and resilience of the people of Salisbury. I also pay tribute to the city council and, indeed, to the county council for its response to what was not only an outrageous attack, but a situation that was highly complex and difficult to deal with. Who would plan, who would regularly exercise, for the releasing of a nerve agent on our streets? They acted extremely professionally, and, on behalf of my officials, I must express my gratitude for the way we were able to work together to deliver the right package of decontamination to help to reassure the public—and, indeed, to deliver a package to support the local community and help it to put itself back together.

[Dr Murrison]

I entirely agree with my right hon. Friend: the resilience of the people of Salisbury is remarkable. One group that he has not mentioned—I am sure that it is inadvertent—are the healthcare workers who were involved, particularly those at Salisbury District Hospital. The rapidity with which an extremely unusual set of symptoms was diagnosed accurately at the hospital was truly remarkable and an exemplar. Had that not been the case, the outcomes might not have been as favourable as they were. My right hon. Friend will recall that the media were talking of the imminent demise of the Skripals, and the fact that that has not occurred is largely due to the expertise deployed at Salisbury District Hospital.

[Mr Wallace]

My hon. Friend may not have been present at the beginning of the debate. In my opening speech, I paid considerable tribute—as did the hon. Member for Torfaen—to the staff and clinicians, and to the paramedics who initially went to the victims’ aid. We were incredibly lucky, not only with the professionalism that we encountered in Salisbury, but because of Salisbury’s proximity to the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory and the knowledge that it could provide. Some of the clinicians had, in the past, had expertise in or knowledge of matters of this kind. That was a significant piece of luck. We could have been looking at a worse situation had this happened a long way away from where it did.

Let me return to our support for the council and the people of Salisbury. The Government have committed a £10 million package to support local businesses, to boost tourism, and to meet some of the policing pressures. In the coming weeks and months, we will continue to work alongside the council and businesses to identify further or exceptional cases arising from the incident, to ensure that Salisbury, Amesbury and, indeed, Wiltshire are not adversely affected by events that were completely out of their control.

I also note Members’ concern about the pressure that was placed on Wiltshire’s vital public services, including the local police and NHS. I am happy to commit myself to ensuring that neither will be left financially worse off as a result of the events of March and June. So far we have provided £6.6 million in special grant funding for Wiltshire constabulary, and we will continue to work closely with the local police forces and health services to identify rapidly when and where further funding is needed.

As I have said, painstaking and methodical police investigation has identified sufficient evidence to allow the Crown Prosecution Service to bring charges against two Russian nationals for the attack. These same two Russian nationals are also the prime suspects in the investigation into the poisoning of Dawn Sturgess and Charlie Rowley, and both incidents now form a single investigation.

The two suspects were from Russian military intelligence. It was not a rogue operation, and the attack was almost certainly approved at the senior levels of the Russian state. Ultimately, though, how and why this decision was taken are questions that the Russian state can answer. The action we have taken against Russia since April constitutes some of the toughest packages of measures we have ever taken. Many Members contributed today with regard to the next steps and I want to respond to a number of them.

The hon. Member for Aberavon (Stephen Kinnock) talked about sanctions. I am as keen as he is to use the sanctions mechanism to tackle and push back against Russian activity, including illicit finance. The sanctions he highlighted in respect of Estonia and the other Baltic states relate to travel bans. We have that power already and use it on a case-by-case basis to deter people, stop or exclude people from coming to this country; we have used it and we will continue to use it, not just around this particular issue but around many other issues. Also, there is already in place an EU-wide sanction list covering 150 individuals, including the chief of the general staff and prominent people in the GRU; it is like a “Who’s Who” of the Russian state, linked to both Crimea and the leadership of Russia and its security. It makes for interesting reading: the European Council journal document is comprehensive, with the siloviki—the internal security state of Russia—named in considerable numbers. I do not think that the list would be very different if it were compiled purely on the Salisbury incident; it is a fairly comprehensive list, and so long as we remain in the EU we will press to keep it up to date and in place, not only with regard to Salisbury but in recognition of the fact that Crimea was invaded by another sovereign state.

My hon. Friend the Member for Copeland (Trudy Harrison) will know only too well that Russian state activity extends a lot further than just the south-east. Barrow-in-Furness, the home of our submarine manufacturing, is not far from her constituency, and for many years what goes on up there has been of interest to a number of states. We must remember that hostile states are not only concerned about London and the centre; we saw action in a cathedral city in England and we see activity up and down our country. That is true of Scotland as well, and I welcome the strong support of the SNP Front-Bench spokesman, the hon. Member for North East Fife (Stephen Gethins). He made some clear points about the good influence of Russia in Scotland and vice versa, but about the negative influence Russia could have on the people of Scotland, too. We should note that the SNP support has been extremely strong, and I welcome that.

I heard the discussion between the hon. Gentleman and my hon. Friend the Member for Stirling (Stephen Kerr) about Russia Today. My instinct is that we are better than Russia. I think RT is like a comic channel—I do not find it sensible at all—but we do not go around banning media outlets. That is the job of totalitarian and other such states. We ask media outlets to comply with the regulation of Ofcom, the regulator, and if Ofcom makes a recommendation, it makes a recommendation; it will not be interfered with by Ministers, and it will not be up to me to tell it to go and pick on people. We believe in that type of operational independence and we should not forget that it is what makes us better than them.

That also goes to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Harborough (Neil O’Brien) about soft power: the power of these hostile states to use our open media sometimes to manipulate us and our political systems and spread seeds of doubt.

I am now going to say something rather controversial from the Conservative Benches. I am an incredible fan of the BBC, and one of the things that gives me hope that the United Kingdom is not as vulnerable as some other countries to that type of malign behaviour is that our mainstream media—ITV, Sky, BBC News—usually all start from the point of view of accepting the same facts. They might interpret them differently, but they are a vital reference point in what is in this century a hectic, crowded and shouty social media space. To me, the soft power of the BBC World Service and the BBC’s reputation, as well as of ITV’s main news, is really important, and I hope that it will help to protect us from some of that malign disinformation. If that means that I have to swallow some of the things that the BBC says about me and my Government, I shall just live with it.

My hon. Friend the Member for Harborough also asked what more we could do about internationalising the response and keeping it going, and about reaffirming our commitment to the international rules-based system. I was at the G7 in Toronto discussing these matters. We should not underestimate how supportive the international community is, not only of our response but of our view of the Russian state and where it has got to today. Other countries may express themselves differently, and they may do things in the covert space rather than in the overt space, but there is a genuine recognition not just by the Five Eyes, the NATO members and the European states but by middle eastern and Asian states that this is unacceptable and a dangerous direction for Russia to be taking. Those nations know that if Russia can use a nerve agent here, it could do it anywhere. We have felt no weakening of that resolve, and we will continue to invest in it to ensure that the international response is the way to proceed.

As ever, my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk) made a brilliant speech. Not only was it proportionate and necessary, but he made the point that we have to respond in a proportionate and necessary way. This is another thing that makes us different from those kinds of regimes. Yes, we could indulge ourselves by going beyond what is proportionate and necessary, and we could appeal to the populist agenda on certain occasions, but what keeps the international community and our free media with us is the fact that our responses are proportionate and necessary. Throughout this debate, we have talked about suspects and people whom we wish to put on trial. We have not convicted them. I hope that justice will catch up with them and that they will face trial one day.

My hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Leo Docherty) talked about the predominantly military activity that we are seeing at the moment, with Russia entering our airspace, the major exercises taking place on some of our allies’ borders and the stepping up of the military rhetoric. That is a matter of serious concern to our allies, because some of the Baltic states are not far away from those large exercises. We question whether their purpose is purely to exercise soldiers rather than making a menacing statement to people Russia disagrees with.

Coming back to a point made by the hon. Member for Aberavon and my right hon. Friend the Member for Newbury (Richard Benyon), who is no longer in his place, I understand the impatience felt by many Members about illicit finance and about locking up or dealing with people they view as oligarchs funded with illicit money or criminals. Carrying out investigations into those types of people is a difficult, resource-intensive and complex thing. In the case of a number of those people, we will get there from around the world, not from one particular country, based on who presents the most threat, who could do the most harm, who has stolen the most money or who is corrupting us here. Those will be the guiding principles, but the biggest guiding principle will be the operational independence of our law enforcement agencies.

Again, what makes us different is that I do not sit in my ministerial office picking up the phone and telling our police to pick on whoever I choose. Of course, Ministers can push, test and question how much resource the police are putting in and how much resolve they are committing. We can ask whether they are picking up on public opinion or on the desire to do something. We can help them with priorities when it comes to the reputation of the United Kingdom. Ultimately, however, it is about the decisions of professionals, coupled with advice from the CPS and others, about how and when we take action against individuals.

This Government could not be clearer. We want action on illicit finance. We passed the Criminal Finances Act 2017 and the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018. The Labour party passed the Bribery Act 2010 and we implemented it. We have produced a suite of legislation that allows us to take the matter on and to build Britain’s reputation as a better, more transparent place in which to do business. That is why I was pleased that we moved from 10th to eighth in Transparency International’s rankings. We are moving up, not down. I feel the impatience of others, but things are not easy when we are dealing with people with layers of facilitators and so on.

Many right hon. and hon Members made the point that the Russian people are our friends. We all have the highest regard for Russian culture and the Russian contribution to our history. This is not Russophobia or an attempt at regime change; this is about dealing with unacceptable, reckless, dangerous, aggressive behaviour by the agencies of the Russian state—the GRU in this case—and a direct challenge to our values, not only in the west but around the world, and to the international rule of law. Thanks to our values and perhaps our size, this country has decided that we are going to take a stand. Perhaps that is why they choose to attack us here in our country; we represent the very things they hate.

When I say that we are better than them, that sometimes costs us something. It means that we have a freer media and open travel, which gets abused by people coming to carry out the attack in Salisbury, for example. However, that is the cost of being better. The strongest message that we can send to Mr Putin in response to the Salisbury incident is that we are better than them. We have identified the people whom we suspect carried out this attack. We seek justice, but not summary justice, and we will continue to pursue them. We are not just going to sit back and say, “That’s enough.” We are going to press and push back the malign activity of the Russian state if we see it in our media, the military space, the espionage space or cyber-space, and we will do that using the resources that we have invested in over decades.

I am grateful that the whole House has been united on this issue, on the response and on pushing back against Russia, but my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham was right about our actions being proportionate and necessary because we also have to resolve the situation. There have been lots of outrageous events, but our aim is to have good relations with the Russians one day. It is worth their while reversing some of their actions and their views. We want to get them back into the international order of things. We cannot demonise or act recklessly; our actions must be proportionate and necessary. We will defend our values. We will pursue the individuals involved for justice. I am proud of the work of the people of Salisbury, the NHS, the blue-light services and the intelligence services in dealing with the horrendous incidents in March and June, and we will not let up the pressure.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That this House has considered the Salisbury incident.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Ben Wallace Excerpts

3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Tuesday 11th September 2018 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Security and Economic Crime (Mr Ben Wallace)]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[Mr Speaker]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 1 to 5 and 15 to 18.

Amendment 13, in clause 18, page 19, line 14, at end insert—

“(8) After section 39 (Power to amend Chapter 2), insert—

‘39AA Review of support for people vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism

(1) The Secretary of State must within 6 months of the passing of the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2018 make arrangements for an independent review and report on the Government strategy for supporting people vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism.

(2) The report and any recommendations of the review under subsection (1) must be laid before the House of Commons within 18 months of the passing of the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2018.

(3) The laying of the report and recommendations under subsection (2) must be accompanied by a statement by the Secretary of State responding to each recommendation made as part of the independent review.’”

[Mr Wallace]

Today is obviously the anniversary of 9/11, a devastating terrorist attack that happened on the soil of our ally the United States and ended in the deaths of 77 United Kingdom citizens who were working in New York at the time. Today is also one of the first days of the inquest into the Westminster Bridge attack, when we lost PC Keith Palmer and four other people.

Let me deal as succinctly as I can with the Government amendment in this group, beginning with new clause 2. Since the phenomenon of UK-linked individuals travelling to join terrorist organisations in Syria and Iraq began in earnest in 2014, the Government have kept under review various options for banning or requiring notification of travel to conflict zones overseas, underpinned by criminal sanctions. The essential feature of new clause 2 is to make it an offence for a UK national or resident to enter or remain in an area overseas that has been designated by the Home Secretary. The designation of an area will be given effect by regulations, and any such regulation would necessarily need to come into force quickly, but we recognise the need for full parliamentary scrutiny of any designation. Accordingly, such regulations will be subject to the affirmative procedure.

Once an area has been designated, there will be a grace period of one month, enabling persons already in the designated area to leave before the offence takes effect. Of course, there will be individuals who have a valid reason to enter and remain in a designated area, such as to provide humanitarian aid, to work as a journalist, or to attend a funeral of a close relative. To cover such cases, we have provided for a reasonable excuse defence. Once such a defence has been raised, the burden of proof, to the criminal standard, will rest with the prosecution to disprove the defence. The new offence carries a maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment, and it will be open to the court to impose an extended sentence.

The new offence is necessary for two primary reasons. First, to strengthen the Government’s consistent travel advice to British nationals, which has advised against all travel to areas of conflict where there is a risk of terrorism. And secondly, breaching a travel ban and triggering the offence will provide the police and the Crown Prosecution Service with a further tool to investigate and prosecute those who return to the United Kingdom from designated areas, thereby protecting the public from wider harm.

[Sir Edward Davey (Kingston and Surbiton) (LD)]

The Minister said a few moments ago that it will be for the prosecution to show that a person does not have a reasonable defence, but that is not what new clause 2 says:

“It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that the person had a reasonable excuse for entering, or remaining in, the designated area.”

[Mr Wallace]

I disagree with the right hon. Gentleman. If a person produces a reasonable defence, as it would play in court, we would have to say, “That is not a valid defence,” and therefore we would have to prove why it is not. In addition, the public interest consideration will be involved when the CPS seeks to bring charges.

It is also important to inform the House that, obviously, reasonable excuses will include those in line with the European convention on human rights, such as access to family, the right to visit and all those things that give people their rights, but we are trying to introduce an important tool to make sure we deal with the scourge of the foreign fighter threat we now face here.

[Mr Jim Cunningham (Coventry South) (Lab)]

I do not want to digress too much, but in those circumstances, at which point could a person lose their British citizenship? Will that come into play at all?

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Wallace]

The decision to deprive a person of their British citizenship would not be affected by this at all, one way or the other. The factors involved in making that decision range from intelligence to criminal behaviour and whether that person poses a threat to the United Kingdom. The decision would not be linked. Obviously, some people who have been deprived of their citizenship have been foreign fighters overseas engaged in fighting for ISIS or al-Qaeda, and this measure is aimed at stopping exactly that type of offence.

Everyone recognises the challenge we have in Europe. I was at the G7, and every member state has a cadre of foreign fighters who are a challenge when they come back. It is important to get a statute book that can deal with that. We often have evidence that foreign fighters have travelled to, say, Raqqa, and we may have evidence to some extent that they have supported or been engaged in areas of terrorism, but it has been very hard to prosecute. That is what this Bill is trying to do. The Danish Government have similar legislation, as do the Australian Government.

[Keith Vaz (Leicester East) (Lab)]

The Minister is obviously right. We have to deal with foreign fighters, and the best way to do that is to prevent them from going in the first place. Will he confirm that no aspect of new clause 2 or the Bill will specifically address the issue of citizenship, and that even if a British citizen travels to a designated area, they will not have their British citizenship taken from them?

[Mr Wallace]

What I can say is that if a British citizen goes to a designated area and commits an offence, it will depend on what they were doing. If a British citizen who is a dual national goes to one of these areas to fight for ISIS or al-Qaeda, and if we cannot prosecute them, deprivation becomes more of an option. I would prefer to see these people put on trial in a British court, convicted and sent to prison. That is my preference, and all these other measures have been introduced to try to deal with these very difficult issues.

The Bill also extends the jurisdictional reach of some offences, such as under the Explosive Substances Act 1883, to try to ensure that people committing offences over there can be tried.

[Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)]

As the Minister says, we already have quite a lot of offences with extraterritorial jurisdiction, and clause 5 would add to them. What can he do to convince us that the new clause is necessary and proportionate, given the plethora of extraterritorial offences that already exist?

[Mr Wallace]

We have 400 people in this country who have returned from activity in hotspots, many of whom we believe, from intelligence, have been active, but whom we have been unable to prosecute. That is a serious number of people. A number of them continue to pose a threat, and we have not been able, despite quite a lot of effort and looking, to find evidence to bring to court to prosecute them for the terrorist activity they may have been involved in.

If I was talking about one or two people, it might be a different issue. The French and the Germans have the same problem. It is a growing phenomenon that people are travelling in this world to commit offences. They are tech-savvy; they are capable of sometimes masking some of their behaviour. The grooming that has gone on to seduce people into these locations is a big challenge, and I fear that if we do not legislate, we will not be able to prosecute those people coming back. Do I think the legislation will prosecute hundreds of people? No, I do not, but I think there will be a few people that we can prosecute if they did this. As I said to the shadow Home Secretary yesterday, I recognise that we have introduced this measure into the Bill late, and I apologise for that. However, we are in the Commons, and the Bill will no doubt go to the other place, and I am happy to discuss further how we can clarify it and safeguard it and make sure that it is not abused as a system, and that the reasonable excuse issue is further explored. I think that is appropriate.

[Sir Edward Davey]

Can the Minister say where else in British law it is an offence to be located somewhere, rather than to act in a certain way in that place?

[Mr Wallace]

I would have to speculate; I am not a barrister or lawyer, so I dare not venture down that road. A court may grant an injunction on an area. A stalker often faces injunctions—they are not allowed within 100 metres of a house, and if they go within 100 metres of it, they have committed an offence.

[Sir Edward Davey]

Because they have done something wrong.

[Mr Wallace]

The question was, is there anywhere else in law where going somewhere becomes the offence? There clearly is if someone breaks an injunction. I think there are injunctions not just against someone who has done something wrong, but I shall not pilot off down that course.

As I said earlier, obviously there is the further safeguard that breaching a travel ban and triggering the offence will provide the CPS with a further tool to investigate and prosecute those who return, thereby providing protection. Government amendments 15 to 25 are consequential on new clause 2.

[John Woodcock (Barrow and Furness) (Ind)]

I congratulate the Minister and the Government for—although belatedly—bringing in this power, for which I and many others have long been calling. It was patently obvious that many of the Brits who we knew were travelling to Iraq and Syria had no other reason to be there than to support terror, but there was not sufficient evidence to prosecute, hence 400 of them, by the Government’s own estimate, are coming back largely without prosecution. Do the Government have an estimate of how many of those 800 Brits who we know went over to Raqqa during the recent conflict could have been prosecuted under this legislation, had it been on the statute book at the time?

[Mr Wallace]

I am happy to write to the hon. Gentleman with a specific number, if we trawl through the whole lot. I certainly see cases where we have footage of people in certain locations. They may not necessarily be carrying a black flag, but they are dressed in combats and they are standing in front of an iconic building somewhere. I cannot express how frustrating it is to see what I see, with some very dangerous people coming back to our communities, and I long to be able to prosecute them. Very often the “You done nothing” critics do not provide an alternative suggestion. This is an alternative suggestion. I have not heard other suggestions.

I have taken my time on this. When I was in Singapore last year, I met my Australian counterpart, who talked about such legislation. I spoke to the people who use it on the ground—the Australian police force and security services—and we have explored other ideas. It is incredibly frustrating to know that in our communities are people who pose a real risk and who we have struggled to be able to prosecute. That is not because of resource, but because of statute, and that is what we are trying to fix.

I place on record that the hon. Member for Barrow and Furness (John Woodcock) has done a lot on this issue. Unlike many people who speak on these things, he has met detainees in Turkey and other places. He will know the challenges that the Turkish Government and our Government face. He has been supportive and made suggestions on this type of measure, which will make a difference. While Syria is tragically coming to a place where there are endless horrors on the horizon in terms of Idlib that we must all unite to try to stop, the groomers are encouraging people to go to new places and new safe spaces. We have seen aspirant travellers into parts of Africa. We have seen aspirant travellers to the conflict in parts of the Philippines. They are out there now encouraging our young people to go into a safe space, so they can indoctrinate them to become terrorists. That is why I passionately feel and the Government feel that we need to put this measure on our statue book.

[Sir William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

My right hon. Friend and I have had quite a lot of discussions on this issue. I have also had discussions with the former Home Secretary, now Prime Minister, on the subject as long ago as 2015. The Minister knows what I am going to say, because I gave a speech during the proceedings of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 on 6 January 2015—more than three years ago—on whether we could stop these terrorists coming back to kill people. Since the events I referred to in that speech, many have been killed. The issue is about making people stateless. I know my right hon. Friend will have considered that; will he please comment on it?

[Mr Wallace]

My hon. Friend knows that making people stateless is a hefty measure. From our legal advice, we cannot make someone stateless. If they are a dual citizen, we can deprive them of citizenship. I understand the point that my hon. Friend makes, but in an international community, we cannot entirely pass our problems around. Part of the offence with designated areas is that other countries do not like us unilaterally saying, “It is not our problem anymore. We do not have any offences to charge them with, so we are going to deprive them of citizenship and off they go to you. It is your problem now.” Our preference is to bring them back, charge them and put them in prison. We think very hard about the international consequence of deprivation.

[Sir William Cash]

Will the Minister allow me one further point? I had referred to the international convention, article 8 of which clearly states that if a person who is effectively in a designated area under the new clause has sworn allegiance to, or acted in a manner such that he is giving his allegiance to, another state and is also saying by implication that he no longer regards himself as a British citizen, it is possible to make them stateless. For that reason, I wish I could get a more emphatic answer to my question.

[Mr Wallace]

As ever, my hon. Friend makes an articulate and knowledgeable point. My disagreement is that, no matter how it may take allegiance, I do not recognise ISIS to be a state. It is a non-state. It is a fabrication of pretty awful people. We should not give it credibility: just because some poor, weak, often exploited people, but also some pretty nasty people, have sworn allegiance to it, it does not make them part of a state. It is one thing for someone to renounce citizenship and say, “I am now going to be a citizen of country X,” but Islamic State is a fiction of many people’s imagination, as we have seen. It is in rapid decline.

I would like to push on to amendment 1, the flag seizure power, which would confer on the police a power to seize flags or other articles associated with a proscribed organisation. Under section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000, it is an offence for a person to wear, carry or display an item of clothing or other article in such a way as to arouse reasonable suspicion that they are a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation. By conferring on the police the power to seize such articles, we will ensure that they and the Crown Prosecution Service have the best evidence to pursue a prosecution under section 13.

Of course, the police already have the powers to seize evidence following an arrest, but in the context of policing a march or demonstration, arresting an individual may not always be an option if the tests for making an arrests are not satisfied. Even if arrest is an option, it may not be an appropriate policing response at that time. Obviously, the decision would be at the discretion of the police. In such cases, if the police wish to take action against a person displaying such a flag, then instead of arresting the individual, the officer may choose to report the person for summons on suspicion of committing an offence under section 13 of the Terrorism Act. This new power would enable the officer in these circumstances to seize items such as flags that are reasonably in evidence under the section 13 offence without there having been an arrest, provided that the officer is satisfied that it is necessary to seize such items to prevent the evidence being concealed, lost, altered or destroyed. By preventing the loss and destruction of such items and articles, this approach will better support investigations and prosecutions by providing more evidence to help take forward prosecutions.

[Gavin Robinson (Belfast East) (DUP)]

The Minister will know that there are particular issues around flags and their association with proscribed organisations in Northern Ireland. Will he outline for our benefit what engagement he has had with the Police Service of Northern Ireland, or indeed with the Public Prosecution Service in Northern Ireland, around this clause, the associated difficulties in pursuing such prosecutions and the ancillary arguments that are made that a modern-day flag associated with a proscribed organisation actually has roots in the legitimate historical associate group?

[Mr Wallace]

I know that throughout the passage of the Bill we spent days with the PSNI. On the point about the DPP, I will make sure that the hon. Gentleman gets an exact answer on that from officials. As he will know, I have first-hand experience of what can go wrong and of the consequences of trying to take a flag or something from a proscribed organisation. Certainly, taking away a flag in certain parts of Northern Ireland has, in the past, acted as an instant lightning rod for a riot or a breakdown in civil order, and there were definitely better methods that could be used to police a parade. There is also an obligation on the police to make sure that policing is done in a way that allows a legitimate march to go ahead, but that does not provoke a public order disaster. That is why police discretion is important.

I understand the point that the hon. Gentleman is trying to get at, which is that, in Northern Ireland, the matter is not straightforward. A flag does not have pure terrorist content. Different parts of the community will interpret other people’s flags. There is also a historical basis in organisations having a flag which links to the first world war. Things are not as straightforward as people think. I have been very cautious in introducing this amendment to make sure that my experience—and, obviously, the hon. Gentleman has greater experience—of Northern Ireland is not forgotten. I do not want to see flag protests becoming more and more polarised than they were in the past. I will happily get back to the hon. Gentleman in relation to the DPP in Northern Ireland.

I turn now to Government amendments 2 to 4 to clause 3, which close a widely recognised gap in the law with regard to the viewing of terrorist material online. Following the helpful debate in Committee and considerable discussions with the Labour party and its Front-Bench Members, I took the decision that it was best to drop the concept of the three clicks. Throughout the passage of this Bill, I have been open to suggestions from all parts of the House. I agreed completely that, first, the three clicks would not survive the test of time and that, secondly, we would not end up with good law or achieve our aim. I undertook to see how we could improve on this, and I listened to the hon. Member for Torfaen (Nick Thomas-Symonds). I am 48—just about a kid of the ’80s—so I remember the Spectrum and the ZX81, but I think it is best that legislation in the digital age looks like us, sounds like us and is not written by people who probably switch on a computer once a year.

Instead of splitting hairs about clicks and everything else, we came to the view that it was right in principle for the Government to update legislation for the digital age with provisions on the collection or recording of information that is likely to be useful to terrorists. The provision applies consistently to information that is accessed online, rather than as under the current measure, which only covers information that is downloaded. When the previous legislation was written regarding downloading content or taking copies, broadband was very slow—if it existed at all—so the only way people could watch content was by downloading it first. Now with superfast or fast broadband, people are streaming everything. This creates a loophole that can be exploited and that we have to close.

[Joanna Cherry]

I am a little puzzled. The Government have conceded that clause 3, as originally drafted, was imperfect and lacked sufficient clarity, but do they not make the problem worse by removing the requirement for three clicks, so that only one click will suffice, and broadening the offence to include not just viewing but accessing material in any way? I do not understand how these amendments address the imperfection and lack of clarity.

[Mr Wallace]

The intention behind the three clicks provision was an ambition to ensure proportionality and provide a safeguard for those who might inadvertently access such material, but we recognise the underlying difficulties of this approach and the uncertainty regarding how it will be implemented. That is why we tabled amendment 2.

Amendment 4 complements amendment 2. It is intended to provide a similar safeguard, but in a clearer and more certain way, without relying on a blunt instrument. These amendments will make it clear on the face of the legislation that the reasonable excuse defence would apply if the person does not know, and has no reason to believe, that the information they are accessing is likely to be useful to terrorism. This means that a person would be able to defend themselves on that basis in court. As a result of section 118 of the Terrorism Act 2000, if such a defence is raised, the court and jury must assume it to be satisfactory, unless the prosecution is able to disprove it beyond reasonable doubt.

[Joanna Cherry]

I am not satisfied with that explanation, because the reasonable excuse defence is only there for somebody who does not know what they are doing. What if somebody legitimately accesses the material, knowing its content, but without any intent to commit harm—for example, an academic or a researcher? They would not be protected by that defence, would they? [Interruption.]

[Mr Wallace]

The hon. Member for Torfaen is absolutely right; it is set out quite clearly in the 2000 Act. The reasonable excuse defence is a good defence. It will cover journalists and academics, which is important. It would also mean that the prosecution is unlikely to commence in those circumstances, because it would not pass the Crown Prosecution Service threshold test of being in the public interest and of there being a realistic prospect of conviction. The police and the CPS are rightly focused on those who pose a genuine threat, and they have no interest in wasting their valuable time investigating and prosecuting people who pose no threat, where there is no public interest and no prospect of conviction.

Amendment 3 expands the offence of viewing information likely to be useful to a terrorist, so that it also includes otherwise accessing such material through the internet. This is simply intended to ensure that the offence captures non-visual means of accessing information such as audio recordings, in addition to video, written information or other material that can be viewed.

The Government recognise the sensitivities of the issues and the need to ensure proportionality and to provide appropriate safeguards, and we have been open to exploring how clause 3 can be improved to do so in a clearer and more certain way. But we make no apologies for sending a clear message that it is unacceptable to view or stream such serious and harmful terrorist material without a reasonable excuse, nor for having in place robust penalties for those who abuse modern online technology to do so. We consider that clause 3, as amended, is both proportionate and necessary to allow the police to take action to protect the public from potentially very serious threats.

Government amendment 5 responds to the oral evidence heard by the Public Bill Committee about the maximum penalty for the offence of failure to disclose information about acts of terrorism. Section 38B of the Terrorism Act 2000 makes it an offence to fail to disclose to the police information that might be of material assistance in preventing an act of terrorism or in securing the apprehension, prosecution or conviction of a terrorists. This offence might apply in a case where a person, not themselves a terrorist, knows that a family member or a friend is planning or has committed an act of terrorism and fails to inform the police. In his evidence to the Committee, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Max Hill QC, argued that the maximum penalty for this offence is too low and should be increased. Having considered the issue further in the light of recent cases, we agree. Those who know that others are engaging in, or planning, terrorist activity have a clear duty to inform the police about such actions. Where people do have information about attack planning or other terrorist activity and they fail to inform the police, it is right that we have appropriately stringent sentencing options in place. An increase in the maximum penalty from five to 10 years’ imprisonment will send a clear signal about the seriousness of this offence.

This group of amendments also includes amendment 13, in the name of the hon. Member for Torfaen, which seeks to provide for an independent review of the Prevent programme. I shall wait to hear what he has to say about that amendment.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds (Torfaen) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the Minister for setting out the designated area offence.

Before I turn to that, I join entirely with the Minister in his opening remarks marking the anniversary today of the terrible attacks on the twin towers on 9/11 in 2001, and indeed his remarks about the inquest on the Westminster bridge attack. We all join together in paying tribute to our emergency services, to the first responders in the United States and to all the families who were affected by those terrible events. Of course, as we debate this legislation today, we bear in mind that experience, and indeed the experience of other terror attacks.

I am pleased by and accept what the Minister said in apology for the late arrival of this new clause. I am sure he will appreciate that it was disappointing that we were not able to subject it to scrutiny in Committee, because it would obviously have been more useful had we been able to do so. Of course, that does not mean that we will not want to put it to scrutiny in the other place, and we certainly will do that, but I would have liked to have been a position to give it more scrutiny before today. None the less, I accept that, as legislators, we have to look to deal with the threat that foreign fighters pose to this country when they return, and I am not proposing that the Opposition oppose this measure. However imperfect legislation can be, the rule of law is paramount. If we ever sacrifice the rule of law—if we undermine our own values in dealing with those who seek to destroy them—then we lower ourselves to the level of their barbarism.

I am pleased that, in dealing with this, the Minister has rejected calls to update the law of treason, which, after all, reached our statute book in 1351, has not been used since 1945, and was meant for a different age. We are also pleased that the Minister has rejected calls simply to dole out justice summarily and arbitrarily, which would undermine the rule of law. Unfortunately, other members of the Government—not least the Defence Secretary, I am afraid, last December—have previously suggested that. I am glad that those courses for dealing with this have clearly been rejected by the Minister.

As the Minister set out, new clause 2 designates in a statutory instrument laid before Parliament an area for the purpose of protecting members of the public from terrorism. In a letter to me, the Minister made it clear that such a statutory instrument would be introduced via the affirmative procedure, so that whenever an area was to be designated, it would be done on the Floor of the House. I hope he can confirm that that will be the case.

As the new clause sets out,

“It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that the person had a reasonable excuse for entering, or remaining in, the designated area.”

That reasonable excuse defence will be an extremely important safeguard. I also draw attention to what Max Hill QC, the current independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, said in October 2017:

“those who travelled out of a sense of naivety, possibly with some brainwashing along the way, possibly in their mid-teens and who return in a state of utter disillusionment…we have to leave space for those individuals to be diverted away from the criminal courts.”

Prosecutorial discretion and whether prosecution is in the public interest will, of course, be vital in this area.

While it is essential to deal with this matter by legislation, we will want to look at it in more detail, particularly in the other place. I welcome what the Minister said about being willing to work constructively on this, as he has on other parts of the Bill. We clearly cannot guarantee where future conflicts will take place, but we have to be prepared for those eventualities. We will want to look at the mechanism by which the Home Secretary designates these areas and ensure that we have appropriate safeguards. I am sure that nobody in this House would want to discourage aid workers and other people who we want to be in these areas from going to them. That clearly is not the intention of this law, and we will have to look at how we can ensure that that is the case.

I turn to the issue of seizing flags. In evidence to the Committee, Assistant Commissioner Basu mentioned the absence of this power from the Bill. I have looked carefully at amendment 1, and I am grateful to the Minister for his briefing on the context of how this power will be used. The issue of the sensitivity with regard to Northern Ireland was raised in interventions on the Minister. I am grateful to hear that he has been in contact with the Police Service of Northern Ireland, and I hope that that will continue.

At present, the issue is that police can only seize material with an arrest at the scene. Amendment 1 allows material to be seized where notice is given of a summons—in other words, the person does not have to be arrested at the scene, and a summons can follow within the prescribed six-month period. The person will still have to appear in court, but there will not have been an arrest at the scene. There is a suggestion of the power being used where there is not quite enough evidence to arrest someone at the scene, but I suspect that that would be extraordinarily rare in practice, because if a flag is in support of a proscribed organisation, it is difficult to see how someone would not be committing a criminal offence in those circumstances.

I tend to see this amendment in terms of how large protests will be managed. This power provides police at the scene with an additional option. It may well be the case that trying to arrest someone at the scene can either cause a public order problem or exacerbate one, and the summons method might be easier. It is not, of course, for us to comment on an operational matter. That would have to be a judgment of the police officer at the scene, but we can set out the framework. I expect that we will have to review how the power works in practice, but it is not my intention to oppose the amendment in principle.

I turn to the Government amendments on the three clicks offence, which has been raised in interventions on the Minister. I raised a number of concerns about this in Committee and tabled a total of five amendments on it. First, let me say that I understand why the law needs to be updated in this area. It was designed for a different internet age, when people tended to download content and watch it. It does not cover those who stream it, and clearly it must cover those who do so. The difficulty in my view is that the three clicks approach simply creates more problems than it solves, and I am grateful to the Minister for listening in that regard.

--- Later in debate ---

This is not an easy issue; in fact, it is an extremely difficult and almost impossible one. Safaa, along with her mother and sister, had planned to carry out truly terrible acts. The fact that she was convicted and, just last month, sentenced to life imprisonment is testament to that. I am not saying for one second that people like Safaa should not be punished—of course they should—but I know that we have to do more to help people like her before they become radicalised. Despite the fact that the Prevent strategy is better implemented on the ground in Scotland than it is south of the border, I am pleased to support amendment 13, which I urge the Minister to accept. All it asks for is a review.

[Mr Wallace]

The hon. Gentleman makes an honest and powerful point about Safaa Boular, whom he met. Terrorists do not always present themselves in balaclavas or as nasty pieces of work, and they are often the victims of grooming or other troubles. The people who groom the likes of Safaa Boular are those returnee fighters who are hardened and who come back here. In the past, we have found such people difficult to put on trial and put away to protect the likes of her from those groomers. The designated area offence will give us the ability to do that. If returnee fighters pose a real and present threat of radicalising people in these communities, as they do—

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Sir Lindsay Hoyle)]

Order. Just to help: the Minister will obviously want to come back at the end of the debate, and I want him to save something to come back with. Even those on the Front Bench are meant to make only short interventions.

[Mr Wallace]

I apologise, Mr Deputy Speaker.

[Mr Deputy Speaker]

No problem.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Edward Davey]

I am just going by what the Minister has tabled today.

David Anderson, the former independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, said in 2016 of a very similar proposal that

“this offence would not be worthwhile for the UK.”

He also complained about the burden of proof being

“on the honest and worthy to show entry into the prohibited area for a legitimate purpose.”

He said that foreign terrorist fighters

“will also cite aid purposes, so the ultimate burden of proof will still demand evidence not just of presence but also of training, logistical support, or involvement in fighting”

and went on to argue that such activities are of course already covered by the law. He also looked at the practical problems, referring to the fluidity of the

“area controlled by Islamic State (Daesh)”

and how difficult it would be to fix an area in law when the task might be like mapping the shifting sands of time and reality as the space governed by such organisations changes. There are practical problems with this legislation and, like the former independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, the Liberal Democrats do not think that the Government have made a case for it. We want to ensure that the other place scrutinises the measure given that this House has not been given sufficient time.

Finally, Government amendments 2 and 4 seek to replace their original proposal for obtaining and viewing certain material over the internet—the so-called three-click rule—with a one-click rule and a defence of ignorance about the content of the click. I spoke against the three-click proposal on Second Reading, as did many other Members on both sides of the House, and asked Ministers to go away and think again, but I did not expect them to come up with an even worse proposal. The defence for viewing such material with good cause has actually been reduced, and I am not alone in thinking that. Amnesty International fears that there is a serious risk of a chilling effect on the freedom of inquiry, whether from journalists, academics or researchers.

[Mr Wallace]

The right hon. Gentleman makes the same mistake that the SNP Front-Bench team made. Contrary to narrowing the definition, proposed new subsection (3A) in amendment 4 states:

“The cases in which a person has a reasonable excuse for the purposes of subsection (3) include (but are not limited to) those in which at the time of the person’s action or possession, the person did not know, and had no reason to believe”.

There is no finite list. The legislation is as broad as possible to include a whole range of reasonable excuses, including ones that we have not even thought about.

[Sir Edward Davey]

I am grateful to the Minister for trying to clarify the situation, but I will let others in the House read the words on the amendment paper and reach their own conclusions. In my opinion, there is a serious concern that the definition is not wide enough and that there will be, as Amnesty International and others have said, a serious chilling effect on independent inquiry. Let us remember that it is already an offence under legislation introduced by the previous Labour Government to collect or record such information. Anyone behaving in a way to prepare for a terrorist act or to encourage such an act already, rightly, commits an offence, and there is a reason why, under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, viewing material, as opposed to collecting or recording it, was not made an offence—it is called evidence.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Woodcock]

I am of course aware of David Anderson’s views, and I am afraid I simply do not agree with him. Will the measure solve the problem of British citizens being brainwashed into supporting jihad? Clearly, it will not—I will say a little more about the Prevent strategy in a moment—but it is surely a valuable extra tool that has been shown to be severely lacking in the UK’s arsenal in the past few years, given the hundreds of people who have come back from the terror hotspot of Daesh-controlled Iraq and Syria and not been prosecuted.

I will wind up my remarks by talking about Prevent. I heard what the shadow Minister said about the official Opposition’s motion on review, and I have no doubt that those views are sincerely held, but I will not support him on the amendment, if it is pressed to a vote. I agree that Prevent should be continually under review, but I am concerned about the head of steam that has developed, sometimes from my good friends in this place, which has given the impression that there is something fundamentally at fault with Prevent. There are of course those in Muslim communities who question it, but the responsible position for people in this House and beyond is to make the case for the Prevent programme’s valuable work and to highlight the number of people who feel that their lives or the lives of their loved ones have been saved through it.

Ultimately, those who want to discredit Prevent and want it to fail are those who want to give a very different message to our young people. I hope that those on my side of the House—it remains my side of the House, at least—will reflect on the language and tone that they use when describing Prevent.

[Mr Wallace]

I was listening to the hon. Gentleman’s dulcet tones. He articulates the challenge with security. None of us wants to ratchet up security. We want to balance our liberal open democracy and our individual freedoms with the clear and solid duty of the state to keep people safe.

In the 21st century, we have had a rapid growth in insecurity around the world, brought to our doors by such things as the internet and communications service providers. My hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Dr Johnson) talked about the work on CSPs and what we can do to deal with the issue. That is why the offence related to streaming is so important for us. It may not satisfy the Scottish National party on streaming, but streaming is a method by which people are being radicalised and terrorist content is being spread. Streaming is a modern method of viewing terrorist content that helps to turn those young 16-year-olds into potential terrorists. People have to come up with better alternatives. They cannot say, “We are going to stick with the older legislation that is entirely predicated on downloading.” They have to recognise how these people are doing business. That is why we brought in that offence of streaming.

The right hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton (Sir Edward Davey) made a point about designated areas and the burden of proof. I wrote to the Opposition spokesman, the hon. Member for Torfaen (Nick Thomas-Symonds), on exactly that point. He has clearly articulated from the Dispatch Box that once the defendant has raised the defence, the burden of proof to disprove that defence to the criminal standard rests with the prosecution, as in section 118 of the 2000 Act. The burden of proof is positioned in that way, and at the moment we have decided that not having an exhaustive list is the way to go. Just as with the previous issues of reasonable excuse and streaming, we think the right thing to do is to allow people to present an excuse for being there. It also allows the broad space for their human rights and everything else to be correctly regarded.

[Joanna Cherry]

I am very grateful to the Minister for the many telephone conversations that we have had during the passage of this Bill and for keeping me up to date, albeit not on last week’s amendment. Does he understand that the reason why some of us on the SNP Benches are concerned by the designated area clause is that my very good friend and professional colleague at the Bar, David Anderson, who has expertise in this area, has expressed some concerns? Will the Minister note for the record that that is why some of us want to put this measure to the test—not for any reasons of frivolity, but for reasons based on sound legal concerns about necessity and proportionality?

[Mr Wallace]

Of course we listen to and respect current and former reviewers of terrorism. Lord Carlile, the former Liberal Democrat, has often had different opinions from Lord Anderson. Indeed, the current reviewer of terrorism, Lord Hill, has different views. They all do an amazing and thorough job, and they will, for example, have oversight of the use of this offence. They will be able to review the use of this offence as part of their role. I have no doubt that Max Hill, who has gone to be the next Director of Public Prosecutions, will be able to carry out the prosecution’s discretion, which is so important when deciding on the public interest test in some of these offences in the Crown Prosecution Service. The hon. and learned Lady may have confidence in those reviewers of terrorism, but I have confidence in Max Hill as the next DPP, coming from the review of terrorism, to make those sound judgments about when it is in the public interest to prosecute or not.

I can give assurances to Members about the Sentencing Council. Absolutely, we shall continue to work with it, and we will write to its members to make sure. When it comes to the naming of the designated areas, I will seek to bring the matter to the Floor of the House. It is an affirmative motion, and I am absolutely open to that; I do not oppose it in any way.

The hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) made a point about data and the European Union. She will know that national security is not in the jurisdiction of the European Commission or the European Union. What a country chooses to share in data for national security purposes is entirely the business of the member state. We can choose what we want to do with our intelligence, and it is not for someone else to pass that on. Her point about the “Five Eyes”, therefore, is not correct. Even when we share intelligence in the “Five Eyes”, if the intelligence comes from another partner in the “Five Eyes”, we do not have the authority to share that with our European partners because it does not belong to us; it belongs to that sharing partner.

Furthermore, on that data sharing point of the European Union, that is a negotiation that we are seeking to secure. Such a negotiation is in the interests of both the United Kingdom and the European Commission. If they want to keep their people safe, security is a partnership; it is not a competition. That is why our offer on negotiation of security is an unconditional open offer, which seeks to share in a way that we have done in the past.

[Joanna Cherry]

rose—

[Mr Wallace]

I am sorry, but I want to press on, because I want to get to the final point and address Labour’s amendment on Prevent. I hear what the hon. Member for Torfaen says and I in no way question his motives.

Since I have been the Security Minister, I have made sure that we have published more and more statistics on Prevent; they did not previously exist. These statistics enable all of us in the public realm to scrutinise the results of Prevent referrals, including information on where they come from, people’s ages and the accuracy of the referrals. Without any statutory review, after some time—I think we have published two bulletins so far—we will be able to see whether the accuracy of Prevent referrals from different sectors is producing the results that we want. We will know how many people are being correctly identified as vulnerable and exploited. At the same time, we regularly review Prevent within the Government and the Department, and through engaging with the 80-odd community groups that deliver some of the Prevent programmes.

If the Government or I felt that Prevent was not producing a result and diverting many people from the path of violence, I would be the first to come to the House and say, “We have to get it right.” The critics of Prevent—which the hon. Member for Torfaen is not—never set out an alternative. They criticise its title, but always set out a provision that is exactly the same as Prevent.

It is not necessary to have a statutory review of Prevent at this time. It is improving and becoming more accurate, and people are absolutely becoming champions of it across every sector. Today I saw, I think in The Daily Telegraph, a letter by a long list of academics about the chilling effect of Prevent. Never mind that the Higher Education Funding Council for England said in its evidence to this House that it had yet to see any evidence of the chilling effect. In fact, a judge in a recent challenge about the Prevent duty said the same thing—that the defendant had yet to prove any chilling effect. I have not seen a letter from academics about the chilling effect on universities of no platforming, whereby people are shut out of debates entirely. The Prevent duty is about having balance in debate and due regard to the impact.

I understand the hon. Gentleman’s motives and, to some extent, what the Opposition want to achieve. I would say that the publication and transparency that we are increasingly moving towards with Prevent, and the assurances that Prevent is not an inward reporting system—that is, people do not go into Prevent and get reported to the intelligence services; it is deliberately kept as a separate safeguarding activity—means that the best way forward is to continue improving Prevent as it is. We can discuss its accuracy and success rates, but until someone comes up with an alternative policy to what we and the Labour Government had, it is unnecessary to put a review in statute. Therefore, despite our collaborative working on the Bill, I ask the House to reject the hon. Gentleman’s amendment.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

The House proceeded to a Division.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Sir Lindsay Hoyle)]

I ask the Serjeant at Arms to investigate a delay in the Aye Lobby.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Edward Davey]

I rise partly because I have been encouraged by the speech made by the Chair of the Select Committee, the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill). He made the point that this issue is central to the Brexit negotiations, so the House is grateful to the Labour Front Benchers for tabling new clause 1. I also rise because although the Government wish to sign up to some new security deal and the Minister understands the importance of the European arrest warrant, there can be no doubt that these tools are at risk. Given how significant they are, not only for the fight against terrorism, but for the fight against some of the most serious criminals in our world, many people are deeply worried.

The Government have continually made the argument—I have some sympathy with it—that the other members of the European Union will want to work with us because we have some of the best security services in the world. That is undoubtedly the case. I visited Europol and Eurojust in the Hague. When I talked with the then executive director of Europol, Rob Wainwright—he has now left and been replaced by Catherine de Bolle—he made it clear that the UK was at the heart of this crime-catching set of tools and instruments. It was clear from that and the work of the Select Committee and others who have delved into the issue that co-operation has become central to our activities to tackle criminals, whether that is organised crime, terrorists or others. If that is put at risk at any level, it should worry the House greatly.

It may be—I suspect it will be—that there is a deal on some of the most serious crimes. I would imagine that our European friends will want to co-operate with us against terrorists and other people who seek to commit mass murder. Of course they will want that co-operation, and I wish the Government well in achieving that goal. That is why it is good to see new clause 1, but I say to the Minister that there is a whole range of other serious offences that Europol, Eurojust, the European arrest warrant and the various data-sharing systems enable our forces to use. I am not yet convinced that Europeans are going to gladly throw all those open to us. There is certainly an incentive when it comes to terrorism and mass murder, but what about financial fraud? When I was at Europol, it was pretty clear that a lot of its resources were going after financial fraud in the capitals of the European Union and beyond—in Switzerland and elsewhere. I am not so sure we will be let in on that major issue, which is of crucial importance to the British economy.

If we go down the list of activities that Europol does on a day-to-day basis, it is not clear that the incentives for the Europeans to co-operate with us are as great as they are on terrorism. I am deeply troubled, because we need to deepen co-operation in tackling these organised criminals. The Government do not quite understand how these European organisations work. When Rob Wainwright, an ex-MI6 agent, was there, Britain was leading the operation at Europol. We will no longer be leading that operation, and that means a big loss of influence. We will not be in the room.

I went to Eurojust, and I saw the one floor of the office block in the Hague where it has one delegate from each country. They sit and work together to help each other deal with the different issues with criminals crossing jurisdictions, whether they are warrants for tracking mobile phones or other legal necessities required to conduct an investigation and, in some cases, a chase. They were clear that they had to be in that room, in that building. Where will the UK delegate to Eurojust be? I think that they will be outside. Furthermore, given the Government’s red line on the European Court of Justice, one really feels that the Europeans will be slightly less flexible on many aspects of these crime- fighting tools. I know that we are rightly focusing on terrorism today, but these other aspects of security link into that. The Government need to work much harder than I have seen so far to make sure that we are fully signed up members of absolutely everything and that the Europeans have an incentive to include us in on everything.

Finally, other Members have mentioned Northern Ireland. It is absolutely clear that the use of the European arrest warrant to tackle terrorists who go across the borders there is an essential tool, and it is right at the top of the concerns of the PSNI and the Garda. Whatever the scenario in the future—whether it is a no deal and a crash-out, or some other cobbled-together deal—the real concern is the European arrest warrant and whether it will operate on all these issues. I am talking about not just on suspected terrorism, but on suspected fraud and smuggling from where the terrorist organisations get their money.

Ensuring that we get the European arrest warrant sorted out in these negotiations on terrorism and on other offences could not be more important for the security of the British people. I wish the Minister and his colleagues well on this, but the Opposition are absolutely right to press this point. This could not be more central to the security of our country.

[Mr Wallace]

I will start if I may by addressing the amendments in this group. First, let me turn to the Anti-Terrorism Traffic Regulation Order. Amendments 6 and 7 respond to the debate in Committee about the provisions of clause 14, which, among other things, will enable a traffic authority to impose reasonable charges in connection with the making of an Anti-Terrorism Traffic Regulation Order or Notice.

In Committee, I indicated that I would consider amendments tabled by the hon. Members for Paisley and Renfrewshire North (Gavin Newlands) and for Torfaen (Nick Thomas-Symonds) designed to prohibit charges from being imposed on the organisers of public processions and assemblies. They were quite properly concerned about protecting the right to peaceful protest. Having considered the matter further, I agree that it should not be possible to impose those charges as they have suggested, and amendments 6 and 7 ensure that that is the case.

Throughout the Bill, I have made it my business to make sure that we make changes with as much consensus as possible. I have made the point that, in my time as an Opposition Back Bencher, I rarely, if ever, saw my party or the Opposition get any concession—small or big—from the Government. I do not take that attitude in legislation, and I am delighted that we could make concessions. The Opposition and the SNP were correct in making their points, and it is right that we have put them on the statute book in the right place.

The other Government amendments in this group concern the new power in schedule 3 to stop, search, question and detain persons at a port for the purpose of determining whether they are, or have been, engaged in hostile state activity. It is important to note that this is an exact mirror of schedule 7 concerning counter-terrorism as was introduced by the previous Labour Government in 2000. Therefore, all the questions raised by hon. and hon. and learned Members from all parts of the House should be put in context that some of those issues have been in existence for 18 years—the point on the Irish border, for example. The power was specifically introduced into the Bill to deal with the aftermath of the attack in Salisbury in March. The point is that, in an open trading liberal democracy, we are vulnerable to hostile states abusing that ability to travel and that openness to come and do harm to our society and our citizens. It is a very real threat.

This was in fact considered before last March because the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, David Anderson—who has often been quoted by the Opposition— highlighted the fact that we were stopping people we suspected of hostile state activity under schedule 7 counter-terrorism stops and said that hostile state activity needed its own separate stop power. We agreed with his observations and have acted on them. It was a tragic coincidence that the attack happened in March, reminding us just how hostile some states can be.

Amendment 10 is about oversight and representations to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, as we seek to allow those representations also to be made in writing. It is incredibly important that we have these powers. We face a real challenge if a state—as opposed to an amateur or a terrorist—seeks to penetrate our border supported by the logistics of that state. An example is the recent case of GRU officers entering this country with genuine passports, logistically supported by the wider state. This type of activity is better disguised. It is not as easy as it is to stop someone with a rather dodgy back story who is coming here for the purposes of terrorism. This is serious, which is why it is important to take this power.

I know that there is concern about having no requirement for suspicion. That goes to the heart of the ability for us sometimes to action intelligence that is broad. For example, we might know about a certain route that is used or about certain flights in a period of a week, but known no more beyond that. We need to be able to act on that intelligence effectively on the spot.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I accept that point. Indeed, I set it out in my speech. Our concern is specifically in relation to Northern Ireland. How best are we going to secure accountability for how the power is used?

[Mr Wallace]

I agree. We have had the power regarding the Northern Ireland border, or any other border, since 2000. In theory, we able to deal with matters using a counter-terrorism stop. Over the years, I have never seen so much nonsense written about the border of Northern Ireland. I have patrolled the border. I have lived on the border. I have been on the border of Northern Ireland as the Minister for Northern Ireland. I have known the varying powers—the smugglers and the people involved—on that thing for decades.

There have always been checks and stops on the border. There has been a different customs regime on the border of Northern Ireland since the 1920s. Famous smugglers have taken advantages of duty differences. There have been different tax ratios, duties and powers to make immigration stops, and we have carried these out even since the Good Friday agreement. In fact, one of the last things I did before the reshuffle that made me the Security Minister was to stand on the road near Newry doing a traffic stop of cars coming across from Ireland; they were squeezing the money out of me during my time there. These checks have always happened. This has happened for counter-terrorism for the last 18 years and we feel that should be mirrored in the case of hostile state activity.

[Sir Edward Davey]

May I take the Minister back to the point about spies from other countries and people from other security forces, whether from Russia or elsewhere? In my time in government when I was occasionally asked, as a member of the National Security Council, to sign off warrants so that the security services could search bags, tap phones and so on—even at very short notice—it was clear to me that we had powers, if we had suspicions, to do everything required to track, trace and examine the people coming into this country with hostile intent from foreign powers, and we did that on a regular basis. Will he just explain to me why the new powers are needed, given that we already have a panoply of powers?

[Mr Wallace]

I can clarify briefly. If we had a line of reporting that said, in a certain week, that there was intelligence that a hostile state was seeking to come in via Heathrow airport, but we only had a certain period, or if we had some intelligence that someone from a hostile state was coming in on a plane on a Monday through there, and we were therefore choosing to focus on those planes, that would be too broad to issue a specific warrant, and too broad for us to seek a warrant to search everybody’s bags covertly on the whole aeroplane. Everyone would be standing around worrying how long it was going to take. This is a power that reflects the operational pressure. On the Front- Bench spokesman’s question about oversight, when someone is stopped under this power, a report will be taken and made to the judicial commissioner, who has the power of oversight. I can give the hon. Gentleman the assurance that it will be recorded, and if materials are retained—journalistic or legal—that, again, will involve a permission needing to be given to examine it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

On the point about consultation with a lawyer, I have offered a very practical solution. Will the Minister at least undertake to look at that before this Bill goes to the other place?

[Mr Wallace]

I know that the hon. Gentleman absolutely means the best in making his recommendation. I certainly give him the assurance that I will take it away and look at it before the Bill’s introduction in the other place. Many of his points about giving reassurance to people are certainly valid. He accepts, I think, that there is a risk that a state that has deliberately planned to enter this country will sometimes be making sure—if they do a proper operation—that the so-called lawyer they would consult would be in a position to be tipped off. That is why his suggestion is a good one, and I promise to take a look at it.

[Tony Lloyd (Rochdale) (Lab)]

There is really no fundamental disagreement on the objective that the Minister is trying to achieve. The idea that the Irish border could be used as a way for foreign powers, or those who would do us harm, to come into Great Britain and Northern Ireland is simply unconscionable, so we are in the same place. However, he knows Northern Ireland well and knows the border well, and he also understands the necessity of having a regime of trust. Given that background, he has gone quite a long way in what he has said about the reporting requirements. Between now and when the Bill moves to another place, will he think very long and hard to make sure that there is enough reassurance to those involved that, in the context of Northern Ireland, this could not be used in a way that leads to misunderstanding or—I do not want to use the word “frivolous”—would allow those who want to trash what lies behind his intent to so do? We are in the same place; we simply want a mechanism of accountability.

[Mr Wallace]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for the tone of his comments. I am happy to give him as much assurance as he would like. I am very conscious as to the issue around the Irish border and its sensitivities. I will certainly seek to give him that reassurance in writing. If there is any further assurance that we can seek to give in relation to the PSNI, I will definitely do that.

SNP Members have made a similar point about their concern about the border. With all due respect to them, they make a strong point—and also with regard to the European arrest warrant—about the value of seamless sharing and the value of the Union, but there is an issue whereby they seek on a daily basis to erect barriers between our Union. It is no good their saying that they like the seamless tool of the European arrest warrant while at the same time seeking to split our great nation and erect barriers between a political and economic union. They should just remind themselves that they cannot have it both ways.

My hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Robert Neill) made a clear point on the European arrest warrant. It is very clear that the Government’s offer on security to the European Commission is unconditional. We wish to have the European arrest warrant or something as identical as possible. Some Opposition Members made a point about the current Brexit Secretary’s position. I assure them that if that was not our negotiating position, I would not be standing here as the Security Minister. The key to good security is partnership, and not just on the European arrest warrant. One fault of the new clause is, why not say the Schengen information system II? Why not say Prüm? Why not say all the other sharing mechanisms that are really important to our security?

I do not believe that placing this in primary legislation makes sense, first because this is a counter-terrorism and hostile state Bill, and secondly because it is what we are asking for. If it was not what we were asking for, I might understand the pressing need for the new clause, to try to change the Government’s position, but it is what we are asking for. The message I urge all Members to give to the European Commission is, “How far do you want to cut off your nose to spite your face?” It is not a position of the members of the European Union. When I meet their intelligence services, police forces and Ministers, they all agree that they want to give us a security agreement.

It is not because we have better capabilities, which we do. It is because the sum of the parts is greater than the individual parts when it comes to security partnership, and this will benefit us both. It does not matter who has equity of capability. It benefits us both when we work together in a security partnership.

[Stephen Doughty]

If what the Government seek to achieve is no different from new clause 1, the Minister should just vote for it. I ask him in all seriousness, what message does he have for the 80 Members on his own Back Benches who threaten to vote down the Chequers deal because of their concerns about European Court of Justice oversight of those security arrangements? I see the hon. Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees- Mogg) in his place. What does the Minister have to say to those Members, who would wreck the security co-operation we have with Europe?

[Mr Wallace]

I would say to them and to anyone else that the first duty of a Government is security, and it is absolutely important that we maintain that. The message to Michel Barnier is that security is not a competition; it is a partnership. I hope he will reflect that in his negotiations with this country, but I do not believe that putting it on the face of primary legislation is the best way to go about it, especially as it is our Government’s ask to the European Union on that issue. I therefore urge the hon. Member for Torfaen (Nick Thomas-Symonds) to withdraw his new clause.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I certainly will not be withdrawing my new clause. Continued participation in the European arrest warrant is vital for the security of this country. Can the Minister name another example of a Minister failing to vote for a part of a Bill he agreed with?

[Mr Wallace]

I would be interested to know whether the hon. Gentleman could name a single Labour Minister who, during the passage of any European treaty or any other treaty, put the negotiating position—not the results of the negotiation, but the negotiating position—in primary legislation. I do not think he will find one. We do not intend to put it in primary legislation, especially because it is what we are asking for and we do not need to. I therefore urge hon. Members to reject the new clause.

[Nick Thomas-Symonds]

I do not find that explanation convincing in any sense.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Wallace]

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.

On 22 May last year, I was woken from my slumber by the tragic news of the attack on the Manchester Arena: the murder of women, children and men who had been out enjoying their day and night at the arena. A member of ISIS chose to target them ruthlessly, in a way that showed total discrimination, when they were at their least defensible. Last year, society faced numerous attacks from terrorists. In March this year, we saw the reckless and very dangerous use of the Novichok nerve agent on our streets, which sadly led to the death of a British citizen.

The Government did not knee-jerk—we did not jump, as has sometimes happened over the past few decades, to take measures. The Government considered the issues, considered our vulnerabilities and not only took strong steps to produce a Bill that will help our security forces and our police tackle the changing threats, but were determined to be as collaborative as possible throughout the legislating process. Tonight, Members will have heard how we rightly accepted the observations from the Labour Front Bench and the SNP about some of the measures. The Labour party and the Government discussed the streaming of content online and came up with a sensible solution to make sure that people who stream horrific material are brought to justice.

This is not an attention-seeking Bill; it is a Bill designed to make a difference, to make our streets safer, to make our citizens safer and to send a message that one of the reasons the United Kingdom is one of the world leaders in counter-terrorism is that we not only learn our lessons from every event, but build on the experience of previous Governments. Much of the Bill is built on the back of the Terrorism Act 2000, which was brought in by the last Labour Government. We have taken the best elements and learned from our experiences and the threats to produce a piece of legislation that in my view and that of the Government strikes the right balance between liberty, individuals’ rights and the security of this nation. It is a balance that we do not take for granted and that we review constantly.

That is why this country probably has some of the greatest oversight of its intelligence services, ably led by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), the judicial commissioners, Lord Justice Fulford and the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. All those learned and respected individuals take a strong role, as do the Members who sit on the Intelligence and Security Committee, in scrutinising the people who are charged with delivering the security of this nation. That, coupled with our long adherence to human rights, makes me confident that the Bill does not tip the balance in the wrong way, but navigates the difficult course that we are faced with, given the emerging technologies, to keep people safe.

[Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark) (Lab)]

I am grateful for the approach that the Minister and the Secretary of State have taken and for the fact that the loophole in terror insurance to cover non-physical damage has been addressed in the Government’s plans. However, the explanatory notes suggested that the Government would do several things to support my community, which was so badly affected last June, yet still not a penny of Government support is going to the employers in my constituency who were affected by that terror attack. Despite the fact that the Government failed to update the legislation sooner, that could have been done some time ago and was not. My constituents and their businesses are still not being compensated for the damage they have experienced—150 firms have lost more than £2 million.

[Mr Wallace]

The hon. Gentleman made that point in Committee. I was due to meet him last week. Unfortunately, because of the Salisbury issues, that meeting was delayed, but I will meet him. I have spoken to the Exchequer Secretary. The hon. Gentleman is right about some of the issues with the package for his community, compared with what has happened after other events. That is a discussion for us to have with the Mayor of London.

[Neil Coyle]

rose—

[Mr Wallace]

The hon. Gentleman’s points are well made but, with respect to him, I need to draw to a close.

If it is passed, this Bill, much of which has the support of all parties in this House, will leave this House doing the right thing to keep people safe, striking the right balance with our rights and allowing us to remember those people who in the last few months and years have lost their lives tragically to terrorism and, lately, to the actions of a hostile state. I am afraid we must remember that out there, there are very bad people, very bad terrorist organisations and, nowadays, some very bad states who wish to do real harm to our values. This Bill protects our values, but deals with the issues and gives our security services and police forces the tools that they need.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Edward Davey (Kingston and Surbiton) (LD)]

In his opening remarks, the Minister rightly reminded us of the terrorist outrages that have been inflicted on our country and our people. The response to those outrages brings the whole House together, and I know that the Minister and his colleagues do their very best, along with the skilled people in the security services, to keep us safe on a daily basis.

On Second Reading, I explained to the Minister why I had some concerns about individual measures in the Bill. The Liberal Democrats wanted to see whether or not they would pass through the House and emerge in a better form. I have to say that in our view, regrettably, the Bill has not improved as a result of that scrutiny, and if anything, it has got worse. I will not rehearse what I said on Report, but I will say that my criticisms referred to the comments of independent experts—independent reviewers of counter-terrorism legislation—and were not made in the absence of any evidence.

There are, of course, some good parts of the Bill. Clause 5, which extends extra-territorial jurisdiction, is very welcome, as is clause 19, which deals with terrorism reinsurance and which I discussed on Second Reading. Those welcome measures, however, have been packaged with a collection of ill-thought-through measures that will not work: they will not do what they promise to do. In its report, the Joint Committee on Human Rights concluded that

“some of these offences risk a disproportionate interference with the right to privacy, the right to freedom of thought and belief, and the right to freedom of expression.”

The Committee—a Committee of both Houses—warned us that the Bill

“strikes the wrong balance between security and liberty”

and doubted its compliance with the European convention on human rights.

My list of things that are wrong with the Bill has grown since Second Reading, and the more I have looked at those items, the more my concern about some of them has deepened. Clause 1, for instance, expands the offence of inviting support for a proscribed organisation to recklessly expressing support for such an organisation. I was too kind about that on Second Reading. I argued that the concept of recklessness already exists in criminal law in respect of physical actions and physical violence, but even in that context it is controversial, given the different legal versions of what “recklessness” actually means in respect of physical actions. How much more subjective is “recklessness” when applied to speech? Ministers have failed to defend this extension, and I think that they are in serious danger of criminalising innocent people and the naive.

Given that this is a Third Reading debate, I will not rehearse many of the other problems with the Bill, but I do want to end on one particular problem that I failed to mention on Second Reading. It relates to the border security powers we briefly discussed in the last part of our debate. What the Bill says in schedule 3 is quite chilling. It gives a lot of power to state officials, which goes beyond anything I have ever seen before. I refer what the Bill says to colleagues, because this is what they are voting on tonight. In giving powers to border security guards to stop, question and detain, the Bill does not require them to justify that at any level. It states:

“An examining officer may exercise the powers under this paragraph whether or not there are grounds for suspecting that a person is or has been engaged in hostile activity.”

It says “whether or not”; not “if” there are grounds for suspecting, but “whether or not”.

[Mr Wallace]

As I said earlier, these are just mirrors of the powers that have been in force since 2000. When over subsequent years the right hon. Gentleman was a member of the National Security Council in the last coalition Government did he use his senior position in the Government to seek, as this power is so unjust, and “chilling” as he says, to undo it? Will he also please reflect on this? I read the Joint Committee on Human Rights report, and there was one flaw in it: it did not take evidence from the police, the intelligence services or victims. It took evidence from Cage and other such groups, but I think its duty was to be balanced. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will reflect on his time in government.