Oral Answers to Questions

Ben Wallace Excerpts

Monday 31st October 2016 Commons Chamber

[James Berry (Kingston and Surbiton) (Con)]

12. What steps she is taking to safeguard vulnerable people from online radicalisation.

[The Minister for Security (Mr Ben Wallace)]

We are taking robust action to tackle online radicalisation and to counter the poisonous ideology promoted by extremists. In 2010, the Home Office and police set up the Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit to tackle and disrupt terrorism-related material. The Government are also supporting community-based initiatives that challenge extremists’ core communications and provide credible counter-narratives.

[Nigel Huddleston]

Will the Minister tell the House how much online material has been removed as part of this initiative?

[Mr Wallace]

Since February 2010, internet companies have removed 220,000 pieces of terrorism-related material following referrals from the CTRU.

[James Berry]

The Select Committee on Home Affairs has issued two reports calling on Twitter and Facebook to take much tougher action on extremist material, much of which breaches their own terms of use. Does the Minister agree that social media companies should do much more to prevent and remove this material voluntarily, without the need for a request from police officers, which is at the taxpayer’s expense?

[Mr Wallace]

Yes, I agree with my hon. Friend. Although the industry has taken some positive steps to address the issue, the internet is still being used to recruit, radicalise, incite and inspire. The CTRU’s relationship with the industry continues to be successful, but we would like internet companies to be more proactive and take more of a lead in tackling the global threat.

[Mr David Hanson (Delyn) (Lab)]

Some 12 months ago, Zack Davies was sentenced to life imprisonment following his attempt to behead an Asian citizen in a random attack in a Tesco supermarket in Mold, in my constituency. He was radicalised on the internet by neo-Nazi and Hitler-worshipping material. Will the Minister focus on that issue as well as on Islamist terrorism?

[Mr Wallace]

The right hon. Gentleman is right; interestingly, the Prevent strategy is seeing a growth in far-right referrals. In some areas of the country, these Prevent referrals outnumber those about the other parts we are worried out.

[Margaret Ferrier (Rutherglen and Hamilton West) (SNP)]

In what many see as a blow to the Government’s Prevent scheme, the Muslim Council of Britain has announced that it will be setting up its own anti-radicalisation programme. The Home Secretary appears to be losing the confidence of Muslims, so what does she intend to do to reverse that loss of trust?

[Mr Wallace]

I thank the hon. Lady for her question, but she is, of course, wrong. The Prevent programme set up by her Government in 2003 has had considerable successes throughout the communities. We should reflect on the fact that Prevent is about safeguarding vulnerable people from being exploited and saving many people’s lives, across the country and abroad. Repeating the echo chamber of people saying that this is about targeting one group or the other is a fallacy.

[Mr David Nuttall (Bury North) (Con)]

8. What steps her Department is taking to reduce levels of immigration into the UK.

--- Later in debate ---

[Martin Vickers (Cleethorpes) (Con)]

Two of my constituents have been defrauded of in excess of £60,000, and their cases are not helped by the lack of co-ordination between Action Fraud and the local force. They are unable to get updates on the investigation. What can be done to improve that co-ordination?

[The Minister for Security (Mr Ben Wallace)]

Following my hon. Friend’s contribution at the previous Home Office questions, I will be visiting Action Fraud to take up his specific case, and more generally to discuss how Action Fraud deals with constituents and inquiries from Members, to make sure that the service is improved.

[Louise Haigh (Sheffield, Heeley) (Lab)]

The Home Secretary’s decision is a slap in the face of the campaigners, the victims and their families, some of whom have lost their lives in the wait for justice. It is not just Labour Members who disagree with the decision; the police and crime commissioner, South Yorkshire’s chief constable and the Independent Police Complaints Commission all said that there was evidence to support a public inquiry. Will the Home Secretary ensure that all material pertaining to Orgreave is released, and at the very least the operational order of the day, which has never been made available to the IPCC?

Draft Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (Continuation) order 2016

Ben Wallace Excerpts

Wednesday 26th October 2016 General Committees

[The Minister for Security (Mr Ben Wallace)]

I beg to move,

That the Committee has considered the draft Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (Continuation) Order 2016.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Flello. I hope that the Committee approves the draft order, which will extend the Secretary of State’s powers in the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 for a further five years.

The first and foremost responsibility of the Home Secretary is to keep the people of this country safe. As my hon. Friends will be more than aware, the threat from terrorism is ever present. The events in France, Belgium and other parts of the world in recent years bring home to us the very real danger posed by terrorists who would seek to do us harm.

My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary and I are absolutely clear that the police and security services should have the powers that they need to disrupt terrorists. Of course we should always ensure that, wherever possible, we prosecute those individuals who would seek to harm the people of this country, to ensure that they are brought to justice. However, in a very small number of cases, that is not possible, so the police and security services need alternative powers to disrupt terrorist-related activity. That is why I am here today seeking parliamentary agreement to extend for a further five years the powers available to the Secretary of State under the 2011 Act.

The TPIM Act first came into force on 14 December 2011. The Act introduced a new framework for placing restrictions on individuals where it is appropriate to do so. TPIMs are civil preventive measures intended for use only when the prosecution, or deportation—in the case of foreign nationals—of individuals considered to be involved in terrorist-related activity is not possible. The Act allows the imposition of restrictive measures on an individual where the Secretary of State is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the person is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity. Those measures include an overnight residence requirement; a ban on overseas travel and holding travel documents; exclusion from specific places; restrictions on the use of financial services; restrictions on ownership or transfer of properties; limits on the use of telephones and computers, including the internet; limits on association; restrictions on the individual’s ability to work and/or study; police reporting; and requirements to be photographed as required and to wear an electronic tag.

[Keith Vaz (Leicester East) (Lab)]

I fully support what the Minister is proposing. These are very important measures. However, in the past couple of years, a number of individuals have gone missing while on these orders, and statements have been made to the House by the Minister’s predecessor about the individuals who have gone missing. Can the Minister update the Committee on how many of those individuals have now been apprehended?

[Mr Wallace]

After the absconsion of two individuals—I think that that was the number—a review was done, looking at the operational failures that perhaps allowed that to happen, and that review was submitted to David Anderson, the reviewer of terrorism legislation. It would not be appropriate to give the details of the review, because obviously that might expose vulnerabilities in our capability, but certainly the lessons have been learned and addressed.

[Keith Vaz]

It is always good to learn lessons when mistakes occur, and obviously I do not blame the Minister—the system clearly let us down—but my question was whether those two individuals have been apprehended, or are they still out there in the public space?

[Mr Wallace]

The right hon. Gentleman may not understand, but we do not comment on individual TPIM cases, for reasons, obviously, of operational security. However, he should take some comfort from the fact that the lessons from what led to those individuals absconding have been learned and measures are in place to do so. I can point him to the statistics for the number of people on TPIMs: there was one, and now we are at six for this year. I can certainly say that, where possible, we use them. We certainly do so as a last resort, but where we need to use them, we will. I think that we are in a better place than we were with control orders.

Under part 2 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, a TPIM notice can require the individual to reside in a property up to 200 miles away from their own residence without their consent, ban the individual from possessing certain weapons and require the individual to attend appointments arranged by the Secretary of State.

A key objective of the TPIM Act was to introduce a more focused regime that protected the public from the risk of terrorism but increased the safeguards in place to protect the civil liberties of those subject to the measures. There are several differences between the TPIM Act and the previous control order regime, including the strengthening of the legal threshold required to impose an order from “reasonable suspicion” under the control order legislation to “reasonable belief” for TPIMs. That threshold was strengthened even further to “the balance of probabilities” under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. Additionally, control orders lasted for a maximum of 12 months, but there was no limit to how many times they could be extended. In a small number of cases, they lasted for more than four years. Under the TPIM Act, notices last for a maximum of 12 months and are extendable only for a further year. Evidence of new terrorism-related activity is required to justify a new TPIM notice.

An automatic right of appeal is built into the TPIM legislation. That allows individuals who are subject to TPIM notices to challenge through the courts the Home Secretary’s decision to impose them. However, unlike the previous control order regime, no TPIM has been quashed by the courts. In accordance with section 21 of the TPIM Act, the director general of MI5, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation and the intelligence services commissioner have all been consulted, and they all recommend the continuation of the Secretary of State’s powers. I commend the draft order to the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dr Huq]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. That is why, had he listened, he would have heard me use the caveat that non-sensitive advice with bits redacted could be published. One of the virtues of having an independent reviewer—not a Labour party person—is that it allows a degree of transparency and scrutiny in counter-terrorism legislation that is not otherwise possible in areas that concern national security. That builds public and parliamentary confidence in our laws. When the Government can be transparent, they should be transparent—the previous Prime Minister was always saying that sunlight is the best disinfectant.

Therefore, although we support the draft order, I have a couple of questions for the Minister about the effectiveness of TPIMs. The security forces have been using TPIMs on fewer and fewer occasions. Between the first quarter of 2012 and the last quarter of 2013, between eight and 10 individuals were controlled by TPIMs at any one point, whereas three people at most have been controlled by them since 2013. In the last written statement to the House, the Minister revealed that there is now just one individual subject to a TPIM. I wish that I could say that that is a result of the terrorist threat having disappeared or receded, but throughout that time we have all seen the annunciator screens in our offices that say the threat level is severe. We have also seen a new wave of Islamist attacks on the continent. The Minister listed Nice and Brussels; there are loads of them, including Paris. The list goes on.

There is a danger that the security forces are using TPIMs on fewer occasions because they do not find them to be a useful tool for tackling terrorism. The previous independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Lord Carlile, said:

“It is surprising and worrying that we are down to just one T-Pim given the situation appertaining all over Europe. We know that there is a severe risk of a terror attack. I hope that the Government is examining the possibility of increasing the use of T-Pims or toughening them up.”

As we have already heard, TPIMs have already been toughened up in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015—in particular, the security forces can now restrict where an individual resides. In the impact assessment that accompanied that Act, the Government anticipated that their changes to the TPIM regime would lead to an increase in the use of TPIMs. In fact, they estimated that there would be an

“additional five to 15 TPIM cases per year”.

At the time, there were two TPIMs in use; here we are a year later and there is actually one fewer.

[Mr Wallace]

There are six now.

[Dr Huq]

Are there six at the moment, not one? [Interruption.]

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Wallace]

We should all recognise that we do not take TPIMs lightly and that they are not our first preference. Our first preference is to achieve a prosecution, but very often in counter-terrorism it is necessary to make a decision about the prosecution and, if that is not possible, the disruption of individuals who place a threat. Sometimes TPIMs are placed on people released from prison, and sometimes that they are placed on people about whom we have intelligence to indicate they pose a threat but we do not have the criminal prosecution level that we require at that time. It is not easy for either this Government or the Government who bought in control orders to decide to go down that path. Nevertheless, it is something we have all felt that we have to do as the threat has increased over the past 15 years.

As long as safeguards are in place and as long as people can appeal to the court and test the case that is put before them, the courts will uphold the legislation. I think that, in the change from control orders to TPIMs, it was right to have a higher threshold. Good counter-terrorism action has to keep communities onside. We cannot look like we are bending the law for a specific group of people. We have to keep people onside to ensure their support.

TPIMs serve a role in counter-terrorism in this country and they are successful in a number of areas. Size does not matter. The number of TPIMs is not necessarily the issue. What matters is that they are one of the tools in the toolbox that we can use to ensure that we protect the public. We cannot decide whether the policy is successful based on the number of TPIMs issued a year. One individual subject to a TPIM could wreak large amounts of damage to the community if we did not have some level of supervision. Six is the current figure, and that was released today. Two reports—a written ministerial statement and a memorandum to the Home Affairs Committee—were published at 1 o’clock today, and they indicate that there are between one and six active TPIMs. We cannot grade the total number with the threat posed.

[Richard Arkless]

I accept what the Minister is saying. My point was that if orders are not granted, one has to assume that it is not necessary and proportionate in those circumstances. If six orders have been granted, the inference is that it has only been necessary and proportionate to do that in six cases. I am trying to get an outline of the effectiveness and whether the number is justifiable in terms of effectiveness. It all boils down to necessity and proportionality.

[Mr Wallace]

If we look at the toolbox to stop someone making or being a threat to the public, there is a broad range of tools—it does not just have to be TPIMs. For example, if someone was trying to leave the country and we suspected that they were going to fight with ISIS in Syria, we could remove their passport. Legislation is in place for a Minister to remove that individual’s passport and prevent them from travelling. That is an alternative that could be used. We use a range of powers and tools to disrupt and deter and, if necessary, to restrict people’s ability to threaten society.

Moving to the points raised by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Ealing Central and Acton, and the right hon. Member for Leicester East, the former Chair of the Home Affairs Committee, I agree that the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation has been a good post. They have done a tremendous number of reports—both open reports and reports that are more sensitive. They inform Government, along with the Intelligence and Security Committee, which is a cross-party, independent committee. They challenge Government policy and inform us of changes. The post has been a great success. It has also been successful in providing reassurance that people are not too quickly interpreting intelligence into evidence. I am perfectly open to the hon. Lady’s suggestion about whether we should have an independent reviewer for counter-extremism. There is an open consultation on counter-extremism, and I recommend that she and her Front-Bench colleagues contribute to that and put forward her ideas. Discussion will take place once consultation is closed.

Do I anticipate an increase to more than six TPIMs? We should not forget that we have approximately 850 people who we think have gone to fight in Syria. Some of them will come home and it may be a challenge to deal with some of them in another way, so we may see an increase in TPIMs. We may, however, use other tools to ensure that we deal with such individuals. We are pragmatic. The professionals who deal with this issue—the security services and the police—should be free to make those decisions and recommendations. I will not interfere with their professionalism in deciding the appropriate measure or power to use.

On whether we would publish the advice to Ministers from the director-general of MI5, the police and other people, I will certainly reflect on the hon. Lady’s point. I would have to satisfy myself that that would not undermine or threaten national security. I suspect that the Intelligence and Security Committee—it could request to see that advice; it has much more powers thanks to the legislation we passed a few years ago—would have the ability to look at the advice. I would not dare to anticipate the Chair of the ISC, but the ability is there. I am open to the point that the hon. Lady made, but I have to check whether we can do that.

I was asked why we will not tell, say, reveal or publish what has happened to those two individuals who absconded from TPIMs. It is an ongoing police investigation, and we have to be careful when commenting on such things. Let me outline some possible scenarios that are not in any way linked to those individuals: they could have been found, and be abroad or under surveillance; they could have already been dealt with and relocated; or they may not have been found at all. However, publishing that information may threaten our operational capability. If we had people under surveillance abroad, we would want to know who they were mixing with and talking to, and we might not be able to go and get them. If I were to start doing a running commentary on the operational nature of a police investigation, it would seriously undermine the point.

We do not publish the names of individuals who are subject to TPIMs and we do not say if they have relocated or where they have relocated to. The TPIM is as much a tool for us to disrupt terrorist activity as it is about ensuring that we put a protective shield around certain individuals to protect the public from the threat that they may pose. It is easier said than done to say, “Let’s tell you what has happened.” I am not informing the Committee of what we know; I am just giving some scenarios to show that it may not be in the best interest of the police and the people charged with investigation to make those details public.

Overall, I am grateful for the Scottish National party and Labour party Front-Bench support for the measures, which are not done lightly. They are an important tool in our toolbox to ensure that we deal with the threats posed by terrorism, and they are constantly reviewed. All I can say is that we take such matters very seriously. The Home Secretary and I get advice from the professionals who are out there every day on the frontline, dealing with the dangers that many of us are often a long way from. I take the professionals’ views seriously, as do many around the House. That is why TPIMs should be extended, so I urge the Committee to support the order. The measures will be reviewed again as the legislation requires.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That the Committee has considered the draft Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (Continuation) Order 2016.

Criminal Finances Bill

Ben Wallace Excerpts

2nd reading: House of Commons & Money resolution: House of Commons & Programme motion: House of Commons
Tuesday 25th October 2016 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Security (Mr Ben Wallace)]

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.

First, may I, through you, Madam Deputy Speaker, apologise to the House on behalf of my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary, as she is unavoidably detained on departmental business pertaining to national security and has therefore asked me to open this debate?

Both terrorism and serious and organised crime pose a real and present threat to the UK. Those involved in terrorist activities endanger our domestic security and overseas interests. Terrorism may be the greatest threat we face, but serious criminality arguably causes the greatest harm, costing the UK at least £24 billion annually, causing loss of life, and depriving people of their security and prosperity. Right hon. and hon. Members must not doubt the scale of this problem, as it damages our economy and our communities. It also has impacts on real people, whether we are talking about a grandparent being scammed out of their life savings; the trade of weapons that enable the type of marauding firearms attacks we have seen in Paris; the smuggling of illegal drugs that blight our high streets and local neighbourhoods; or the organised trafficking of young women and children.

Those crimes have a corrosive impact on the most vulnerable in society—they ruin the lives of real people—but this is part of a truly global issue. As David Cameron has said, international corruption is

“one of the greatest enemies of progress in our time”

and the

“cancer at the heart of so many of the world’s problems”.

Financial profit is at the heart of almost all forms of serious and organised crime. The UK drugs trade alone is estimated to generate £4 billion of revenue, and Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs estimates that more than £10 billion was lost to tax evasion and criminal attacks against the tax system in 2014-15 alone.

[Gavin Robinson (Belfast East) (DUP)]

I agree entirely with that comment from the former Prime Minister and with the thrust of the Bill. One great concern of Christian Aid is that the Bill does not extend to or legislate for the Crown dependencies or overseas territories. Will the Minister respond to that at this early stage?

[Mr Wallace]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that point. The Bill does extend some of the offences and powers it contains to cover an extra-territorial extent, which will go a considerable way to getting to the bottom of money laundering, whether that be carried out here or elsewhere around the world. It also goes some way to dealing with people who evade tax overseas. Just because they are not evading our tax but are robbing another country, it does not mean that we would not still like to take action against those individuals. The Bill goes some way on that.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

[Mr Wallace]

I will make some progress and Members will doubtless be able to make their points throughout the debate.

Many of the criminals who profit from such activities live in plain sight, untouched by law enforcement agencies. They reap the benefits by money laundering—moving, hiding and using the proceeds of their crimes to fund their lifestyles and enable further criminality. It is estimated that the annual amount of money laundered globally amounts to $1.6 trillion, while the National Crime Agency assesses that many billions of pounds are laundered into or through the UK as a result of international corruption.

We should be rightly proud of the UK’s status as a global financial centre. This is one of the best places in the world in which to do business, but we must recognise that the size of our financial sector and open economy and the attractiveness of the London property market to overseas investors make this country unusually exposed to the risks of international money laundering. That is why this Government are taking action—to combat money laundering, terrorist finance and corruption—here and overseas. We are sending a clear message that we will not stand for money laundering or the funding of terrorism through the UK.

[Dame Margaret Hodge (Barking) (Lab)]

I am extremely grateful to the Minister for giving way. I agree with the content of his remarks, but I wish to pursue further the issue that has been raised by the hon. Member for Belfast East (Gavin Robinson). Does the Minister agree that transparency is absolutely key to trying to tackle some of the corruption and money laundering that take place? If he does agree, why is he not using this Bill to ensure that the overseas territories and Crown dependencies, which come under our jurisdiction, publish publicly available registers of beneficial ownership?

[Mr Wallace]

Yes, I absolutely agree that transparency is one of the steps along the path of tackling both corruption and money laundering. That is why, at the anti-corruption summit in May, the Prime Minister basically reaffirmed that commitment. Even before that, we had worked with the overseas territories and Crown dependencies to ensure that, hopefully by the end of this year or into next year, there will be transparency, registers, of which a considerable number will be public, and automatic information exchange between our tax authorities and those of our dependencies. In that way, we will be able to have access to information about people hiding tax from us, and our law enforcement agencies will then be able to set about tackling the matter.

This Bill is part of that process. A key element of that approach will be ensuring that we work with the private sector to make the UK a more hostile place for those seeking to move, hide or use the proceeds of crime.

[Liz Saville Roberts (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)]

Prosecuting corporations for failing to prevent economic crimes was expected to be a core part of this legislation as it appeared during the consultation phase. It seems that, despite Government indications that they would include provisions to hold to account corporations that let their staff facilitate tax evasion and other economic crimes, those provisions are not part of the Bill. Will the Minister explain why he has chosen not to include such eminently sensible precautions?

[Mr Wallace]

Yes, but I will come to that part of the Bill later on. It is certainly our intention to prosecute those corporations, or the corporate body, that allow their companies to facilitate tax evasion. Under the current system, an individual can be prosecuted for evading tax, and someone within a company can be prosecuted if they facilitate that evasion. At the moment, it is very, very hard to prosecute the corporate body. We are intending to make that change in our Bill. If the hon. Lady reads the Bill, she will see how we will do that. We will go after not only the corporate body here in the UK, but overseas companies. Being an overseas company will not be an excuse, and we will go after them in the same extra-territorial way that we do with the Bribery Act 2010.

[Keith Vaz (Leicester East) (Lab)]

I congratulate the Minister on his appointment to the Home Office.

In evidence to Parliament earlier this year, the private sector made it very clear that it is trying to co-operate with the Government. There were 381,000 suspicious activity reports made under the ELMER system, only 20,000 of which could be looked into. What support is he giving the National Crime Agency to allow it to have a better system to deal with those reports?

[Mr Wallace]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention and for his kind comments about my appointment.

First, we will remove those barriers to information sharing. Often some of the regulators or the bodies that we deal with say that they would like to pass on more to us, but feel that they are not protected from sharing wider information. We will remove those barriers so that the National Crime Agency can see the full chain of a financial instruction. We will also empower the NCA with a stronger disclosure order so that it can force people—it can go and apply for an order—to release documentation or to comply with questions about a particular transaction. Such an order currently exists in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, but it only covers fraud. We will now do the same for money laundering. We will also extend the time limit for a suspicious activity report. At the moment, there is a one-off extension of up to 31 days, but we would like to see that extended to six months, which means that the NCA will have much longer for its investigations.

[Keith Vaz]

I thank the Minister for his very full answer, but the real problem is that the system is old. The ELMER system needs to be replaced and renewed. Will he give the National Crime Agency the additional resources to pay for the new system to do all the things that he is suggesting? Without a new system, 20,000 simply does not go into 381,000.

[Mr Wallace]

The right hon. Gentleman is absolutely right that 381,000 referrals is a hefty amount to get through. First, we need to ensure that there is time to get through them. Secondly, what we do not want is what has happened in the past, which is that the private sector makes a suspicious activity report by default. If we can remove those excuses about why it cannot get to the bottom of a transaction before it passes it on, that will ensure that it passes on proper suspicious activities, rather than the ones that it can satisfy itself are not such a problem. In that way, we can cut out some of the referrals that are unnecessarily done.

[Mr Alistair Carmichael (Orkney and Shetland) (LD)]

I thank the Minister for giving way. He is being exceptionally generous.

Does that example not actually illustrate exactly what prosecutors are up against here and the complexity of these cases? Compulsion for transparency will be necessary, as it will put prosecutors on the front foot. Will he look at this matter again—it has already been raised by a number of Members—as the Bill progresses?

[Mr Wallace]

Yes, I can assure the right hon. Gentleman that that will happen throughout the passage of the Bill and even after. This is part of a longer process. We will make sure that, where we cannot get hold of the information that we need, we will prosecute people who are deliberately trying to evade tax, and also prosecute people who are trying to launder money. That is part of the process. Many of these powers, including the unexplained wealth orders, give us the benefit of the doubt and put it on to us to say, “Actually, we think you’re linked to serious organised crime, or we can show you are. Explain to us where your money is from.” At the very least, that will get over some of those hurdles about not being able to get to the bottom of the information in that process. That is one of the steps that we will take and that I hope the right hon. Gentleman will support as the Bill goes through.

[Charlie Elphicke (Dover) (Con)]

I welcome my hon. Friend to his place as Security Minister. His appointment is much deserved.

May I ask him about seizure and forfeiture powers? Previous legislation in this area has not been entirely successful in ensuring that the assets of criminals are seized. Can the Minister explain to the House why the provisions in this Bill will make a difference? We want to ensure that we grab the money off the criminals so that they cannot carry on with their illegal enterprises.

[Mr Wallace]

My hon. Friend is right that, in the past, it has been a challenge. Crafty hoods have been very good at taking their money out of cash and putting it into a range of moveable valuables, such as fast cars, paintings, jewels, or even betting slips, which I know the Scottish Government are quite keen for us to consider. We need to broaden it out and ensure that when they are crafty, we are crafty as well.

This Government have already done more than any other to tackle money laundering and terrorist financing. More assets have been recovered from criminals than ever before, with a record £255 million recovered in 2015-16, and hundreds of millions of pounds more frozen and put beyond the reach of criminals. We set up the Panama papers taskforce to ensure an effective, joined-up approach to those revelations. The London anti-corruption summit in May built capacity with overseas partners.

It is important to note that we are already doing this. In November 2015, the UK returned £28 million to Macau, which were the proceeds of corruption laundered in the UK. That is a concrete example of our giving back money to those countries that have been robbed by crooks who have used Britain to launder the money or to make the money in its jurisdiction. I want to see more of that and to see it go further.

There was a need for legislation and a need to build on the process of the anti-corruption summit and to find out where we were still vulnerable. In October 2015, the Government published the “National risk assessment for money laundering and terrorist financing”, identifying a number of areas where these regimes could be strengthened. Our response to that assessment was the action plan for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist finance, which was published in April 2016. It represents one of the most significant changes to our anti-money laundering and terrorist finance regime in more than a decade.

The Bill will give effect to key elements of that action plan. It will significantly enhance the capability of UK law enforcement to tackle money laundering and to recover the proceeds of crime. It will strengthen the relationship between public and private sectors and combat the financing of terrorism.

Part 1 contains a number of measures that will amend the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, including the creation of unexplained wealth orders. There are criminals who declare themselves almost penniless, yet control millions of pounds. Law enforcement agencies may suspect that assets are the proceeds of international corruption, but they are unable to freeze or recover them, often because they cannot rely on full co-operation with other jurisdictions to obtain evidence. A court will be able to make an unexplained wealth order to require an individual or organisation suspected of association with serious criminality to explain the origin of assets, where they appear to be disproportionate to their known income. If that person does not respond, this may enable the property to be recovered under existing civil recovery powers.

Part 1 chapter 1 will extend the use of disclosure orders, which allow a law enforcement officer to require someone who has relevant information to answer questions as part of an investigation. Those orders are already in use for civil recovery and confiscation investigations. They will now be available for money laundering cases.

Chapter 2 will enhance the process by which private sector companies report suspected money laundering—the suspicious activity reports, or SARs, regime. Where a company in the regulated sector, such as a bank, accountancy or legal firm, suspects that it may commit a money laundering offence, it is obliged to submit a SAR to the National Crime Agency, seeking consent to proceed. At present, there are occasions where these SARs are incomplete and where further information is needed to inform the NCA’s decision. The Bill will give law enforcement agencies more time to investigate those suspicious transactions that require consent and the NCA extra powers to request further information from companies to help to pursue those investigations and conduct wider analysis.

The Bill will provide a gateway for the sharing of information between regulated companies—subject to appropriate oversight—to help to build a broader intelligence picture of suspected money laundering. This has been piloted through a programme known as the joint money laundering intelligence taskforce. In the 12 months from February 2015, the taskforce led directly to 11 arrests, the restraint of more than £500,000 and the identification of 1,700 bank accounts linked to suspected criminal activity. We want to build on the success of that work, by providing the clearest possible legal certainty that companies can share information for the purposes of preventing and detecting serious crime.

Part 1 chapter 3 will improve the ability of law enforcement agencies to recover the proceeds of crime. Existing legislation contains civil powers to confiscate cash, but criminals hold proceeds in other forms, as I said earlier, and we must adapt. The types of asset covered by the power are listed in the Bill, so that Parliament can properly scrutinise its potential use. We continue to consult operational partners on their requirements, and I expect that we will introduce a Government amendment to extend the list to include gambling slips and tokens, which are often used by organised criminals to launder their ill-gotten cash. I hope that such an amendment will attract cross-party support.

The rest of part 1 will extend existing POCA powers to a number of other organisations, including the Serious Fraud Office, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and the Financial Conduct Authority. It will make a range of minor and technical amendments to POCA.

The first duty of any Government is to keep their citizens safe. The terrorist threat is real and is growing. If we are to combat that threat, we must cut off the funding streams that enable terrorist-related activity. The 2015 national risk assessment identified two key weaknesses in this area: the raising and moving of terrorist funds through vulnerabilities in the financial sector, including money service businesses and cash couriering; and the abuse of the charitable sector for terrorist purposes. To combat these issues, part 2 will make complementary changes to powers for terrorist finance cases, by mirroring many of the provisions in the Bill, such as those on SARs, disclosure orders and seizure and confiscation powers, so that they are also available for investigations into offences under the Terrorism Act 2000.

Part 3 will deliver on the Conservative manifesto commitment to make

“it a crime if companies fail to put in place measures to stop economic crime, such as tax evasion”.

At present, if an individual evades tax and that is criminally facilitated by those working for a company, the individual taxpayer will have committed a crime and those individuals facilitating it could also be prosecuted, but it is very difficult and often impossible to hold the corporate entity to account. That needs to change. That is why we are creating two new offences of corporate failure to prevent the criminal facilitation of tax evasion—one in relation to UK taxes; another in relation to taxes owed to other countries.

Tax evasion is wrong. It is a crime. It cannot be right that a business operating in the UK can escape criminal liability simply because a tax loss is suffered by another country rather than the UK. The new offence in relation to foreign taxes will be of particular benefit in tackling corporate facilitation of corruption in developing countries. HMRC has conducted two public consultations on these offences, including engagement with the private sector—banks, accountants and legal practices—and everyone is clear of the need to take responsibility for ensuring the highest possible standards of compliance in this area.

As I have said, tax evasion and corruption in the developing world are key contributors to global poverty. Those crimes are frequently facilitated by companies in other jurisdictions. We cannot abdicate our responsibility and leave solving this problem to other countries. The UK’s financial sector should lead on the disruption of tax evasion, money laundering and corruption. This measure will help to do just that.

The Government are committed to reducing the regulatory burden on business, which can make it harder for companies to focus on real risks. The measures in the Bill were developed in close partnership with law enforcement agencies and the regulated sector, including major financial institutions, as well as other key representatives.

[Robert Jenrick (Newark) (Con)]

Although I support the Bill, does the Minister agree that there is no point in legislating if the agencies tasked with enforcing the legislation simply do not have the resources to do so? For example, since the creation of the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, as far as I am aware from talking to lawyers who work on white-collar crime practices, there has been no enforcement whatever. All of us who want to support the Bill would like to hear reassurance that there will be the resources to match the good intent.

[Mr Wallace]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his intervention. In the past few months, I have visited regional organised crime units up and down the country, including in his region, and the NCA, and they all say that their barrier to getting further with some of these problems is not the resource issue; they all say that their barrier has been the ability to find the cash, see the cash and seize it. Those three things are incredibly important. We can put all the resources in the world into our law enforcement agencies, but if they do not have the powers to take back some of the stolen assets, it will not make a difference.

The thing that struck me coming into this job only a few months ago, although I thought I knew a bit about terrorism from my previous life, and what has absolutely shocked me is the weight and strength of organised crime across the United Kingdom. To see its depth, how it affects my community in the north-west and how close it comes to us all really takes my breath away. I am absolutely determined not only that the guys and girls at the top, the Mr Bigs, get sent to jail for as long as possible, but that those people who consider themselves a little removed from it—the facilitators, the white-collar smoothies who launder the money into property and so on—also face their time in court, because they are the people who contribute to the message that there is a permissive society and that it is okay to be associated with crime. They are the people who help the nasties to put a gloss on themselves.

That is what I am determined to do with the Bill. All Members should rest assured that I will use the Bill to try to build momentum in non-legislative areas—in the non-regulated sector. I want to ask the regulators of estate agents and accountants what they are doing to play their part. If we can change the powers here, if their members get into trouble, what are they going to do to hold their members to account? Legislation is only one part of this. I hope that everyone supports the Bill and that the message goes out that there is more to do and that we will make sure that those people who facilitate and think that they live on the edge of the crime know that we are coming after them.

[Charlie Elphicke]

I thank my hon. Friend for giving way again; he is being incredibly generous. As he says, this is a question not just of laws but of the culture of the organisations. The NCA’s predecessor organisations all seemed to be more culturally bureaucratic. The NCA seems to be more intelligence-led. It seems to have more officials at the top who were intelligence operators in past times. From everything that I have seen, the NCA is far more vigorous at chasing down the intelligence, which is what it really needs to do.

[Mr Wallace]

There are several parts to this. The NCA has absolutely got the bit between its teeth, and I see a professional organisation up and down the country determined to tackle the threat that we face. I compliment police forces throughout the country that have put away the old-fashioned territorial boundaries that organised crime often exploited and have been determined to work together. When we visit Police Scotland and regional organised crime units in the north-west and all the other regions, we see police forces all sitting around the same table, working together for their own ends, led by intelligence, deciding on their priorities, sharing capabilities and knuckling down and getting on with it, rather than just focusing on their small areas. The NCA and regional organised crime units have provided the impetus on this, and the results will speak for themselves. I can assure the House that each of the Bill’s provisions will be subject to a set of stringent safeguards and robust oversight, so that they can be used only where it is necessary and proportionate to do so.

We considered carefully the responses to the public consultation on options for legislative proposals to implement the action plan. We published the Government response alongside the Bill earlier this month. I am grateful to everyone who responded to that consultation. There will inevitably be some additional pieces of statutory guidance to underpin the measures in the Bill. We will seek, wherever possible, to make that available to Parliament during the passage of the Bill, to ensure the widest possible consultation on how it will work in practice.

The Bill is only one part of a wider package of measures, as I have said, aimed at strengthening the Government’s response to money laundering and increasing the amount of criminal assets confiscated by the state. Our wider programme includes improving the effectiveness of the supervisory regime for the regulated sector; reforming the SARs regime, including investment in systems and processes; and further increasing our international reach, working with other Governments, overseas territories, Crown dependencies and international organisations to crack down on money laundering, tax evasion and corruption. We must ensure that the Bill and those other projects have the greatest possible impact on money laundering and terrorist finance in this country and abroad.

I welcome the hon. Member for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott) to her post as shadow Home Secretary, and I am pleased that she has been able to meet me since her appointment to discuss this Bill. I would be delighted to continue to meet her and her team during the passage of the Bill to make sure that we get it right. Hopefully, we can work to ensure that the whole House agrees to support the Bill to send a message to the crooks, criminals and facilitators that we will not tolerate this any more. I hope that the hon. Lady, her colleagues and Members from the Scottish National party agree that it is in the public interest that the Bill be enacted at the earliest opportunity, hopefully with clear cross-party support.

I also congratulate the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) on her recent election as Chair of the Select Committee on Home Affairs. I am afraid that she is not in the Chamber, but she has a wealth of experience in home affairs, and I look forward to discussing these issues with her and the Select Committee.

The Government are committed to protecting the security and prosperity of our citizens, and the integrity of our world-leading financial system. We must ensure that we can pursue vigorously those who abuse that for illicit means. That is what the Bill will do, and I commend it to the House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Richard Arkless]

I have a great deal of sympathy with both of the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s points. I suggest, however, that the first one is rather a half-house measure that does not go far enough. It will not pin criminal liability on the banks. On the second point about vicarious liability, it is interesting to note that the United States is often considered as the free market monster of the entire world, yet the US feels comfortable with criminalising banks for the actions of their rogue employees. I suggest that we should do the same in the UK.

[Mr Wallace]

It is a joy as a non-lawyer to be skewered between two barristers in this place, but may I point out to the hon. Gentleman that one reason why the Bill imposes an unlimited fine for a conviction of corporate facilitating of tax evasion is that we believe it will change behaviour. It is one thing to fine a company for a capped fee, but we need to change the attitude not only of the bosses but of the shareholders—and massive fines make a difference. If that is coupled with our provision to increase the powers of the Financial Conduct Authority, we hope that both will help to change behaviour.

[Richard Arkless]

I agree with the Minister, but my point is that under the Bill, corporate economic crime extends only to tax evasion and not beyond it. Within the four corners of the Bill, there is relatively little to disagree with, but it does not go beyond tax evasion, which I think is a huge omission.

SNP Members can support other parts of the Bill without much hesitation—for example, the expansion of the suspicious activity reports regime, information sharing disclosure orders and combating terrorism. We support all those measures in principle. Notwithstanding our in principle support, we do not think it goes far enough, as I have said.

I shall shortly go through some of the issues that we think are missing from the Bill. Before I do so, however, I wish to make a small point about the time we have had to consider this Bill and its contents. We do not agree that the Scottish Government were given adequate time to scrutinise them. The Bill has been instructed and drafted with high speed, admirable though that may be, but with limited consultation. Only in the last fortnight were we shown draft clauses that related to unexplained wealth orders and mobile items of value—and even then, they were tagged “in confidence”. That said, we welcome the move to extend to Scotland the powers for wealth orders and disclosure orders, as requested by the Scottish Government.

For these reasons, the Scottish Government have not had the chance—and neither have I—to consider the Bill in sufficient detail, to consult Scottish stakeholders properly or to provide the Minister and the Government with some detailed advice. The Scottish Government will do so in due course. In addition, we are already aware of concerns among some Scottish stakeholders, particularly the civil recovery unit, that their advice has not been fully listened to and acted upon by the Home Office, and that the current approach adopted in the draft seizure and forfeiture powers provisions may not be the most effective available. I would encourage the Minister to continue his dialogue with the Scottish Government. He demonstrated yesterday evening that that is ongoing, for which I thank him.

So what is missing? It remains the case for us that the most notable aspect of the Bill is what is not in it. The headline objective of the Tory manifesto in this context was to deal with tax evasion, but, as has already been pointed out, the Bill makes absolutely no mention of the United Kingdom overseas territories and Crown dependencies. Given the aforementioned statement of intent in the Tory manifesto and the problems highlighted by the Panama papers—and the public reaction to the Panama papers—that omission seems very odd and very peculiar indeed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Margaret Hodge]

Indeed. I would also add that the Brexit provisions might also lead to increased activity through the overseas territories and tax havens, so there are several dangers.

A number of Members have mentioned the evidence that backs up the importance of the Bill, but I want to point out two or three facts that have not yet been raised. The World Bank reviewed 213 corruption cases from a 30-year period between 1980 and 2010. Shell entities were involved in 70% of them, and UK Crown dependencies and overseas territories were second after the US on the list of those who provided shell entities. That is clear evidence of the importance of the role played by the Crown dependencies and overseas territories. Do we always have to wait for another leak to understand that? We will keep on getting them—the Mossack Fonseca leaks and the Panama papers will be just one in a stream. If we look at the information we garnered from the leaks, over 200,000 corporate entities were exposed, more than half of which were registered in the British Virgin Islands. I ask the Minister to consider that.

I also came across the African Progress Panel, which found that citizens of the Democratic Republic of the Congo were deprived of some £1.35 billion—twice their health and education budgets combined—due to the sale of mining contracts to five anonymous BVI companies. Those assets were sold at about one sixth of their commercial value, enabling the secretive offshore companies to sell them on and secure profits of more than 500% of the original moneys they paid. Again, desperately needed resources were lost to the poorest countries in the world.

If we are really to tackle the corruption, evasion and avoidance that occur in jurisdictions over which we have ultimate control, we must have the transparency that a number of Members have asked for this afternoon.

[Mr Wallace]

I have listened carefully to what the right hon. Lady said. Will she not concede that since the lead-up to the London anti-corruption summit in May, the Crown dependencies and overseas territories have agreed to establish a central register of beneficial ownership and a data-sharing system with the UK enforcement agencies that will give us access to those data almost in real time, and that that goes a long way to meeting some of her concerns? I recognise that the Scottish National party would like this to be public as well as shared with our law enforcement agencies, but it still goes some way on this issue. On the other side, the unexplained wealth orders for politically exposed persons will allow us to grab the money should they put it in this country and live in the nice houses that they sometimes seem to live in.

[Dame Margaret Hodge]

In my view, and indeed the British Government’s view, publicising those registers of ownership is crucial. We decided to do that for ourselves, so why are we not using our powers to enforce it on the Crown dependencies and overseas territories? There are multiple reasons why we have decided to do it for ourselves, and I shall mention two of them. First, for many of the poorer countries, getting their agencies up to speed so that they can pursue people and know what questions to ask is tough, and public registers make it much easier for those people to be interrogated. Civil society should interrogate them, and the registers make it much more likely that the type of activity that I mentioned in the DRC is revealed.

Secondly, we are talking about a very reactive response; if a register can be interrogated only by the international agencies that are allowed to have access, people will have to know that there is something they are after before being able to discover whether or not there is information about beneficial ownership that is relevant to a criminal activity or to aggressive tax avoidance and so on. Such an approach presupposes a degree of intensive resources and knowledge that will not necessarily be in place. Although one of course welcomes the creation of these registers, having them made public is central to making them work.

The Minister should listen not to my words on this, but to those of the former Prime Minister, who was absolutely clear, year on year, when talking about these issues, that the openness and transparency of these registers was what mattered. In 2013, he said to the Crown dependencies and overseas territories that they had to rip aside the “cloak of secrecy” by creating a public register of beneficial ownership. In April 2014, he wrote to the overseas territories, saying that

“beneficial ownership and public access to a central register is key to improving the transparency of company ownership and vital to meeting the urgent challenges of illicit finance and tax evasion.”

He also expressed his hope that overseas territories would follow suit to

“consult on a public registry and look closely at what we are doing in the UK.”

On a trip to the Caribbean in September 2015, he said:

“Some of the British Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories are making progress in this direction. And others, frankly, are not moving anywhere near fast enough. I say to them all today, including those in this region”—

the Caribbean—

“if we want to break the business model of stealing money and hiding it in places where it can’t be seen: transparency is the answer.”

When we established our own public register here in the UK, David Cameron said that

“there are also many wider benefits to making this information available to everyone. It’s better for businesses here, who’ll be better able to identify who really owns the companies they’re trading with. It’s better for developing countries, who’ll have easy access to all this data without having to submit endless requests for each line of inquiry. And it’s better for us all to have an open system which everyone has access to, because the more eyes that look at this information the more accurate it will be.”

I simply say to the Minister that I really do agree, in this instance, with the former Prime Minister and I hope the current Government will listen carefully to his wise words.

[Dame Margaret Hodge]

I, too, have seen that survey. Any action that the Minister takes will be warmly welcomed by the public across the whole of the United Kingdom—by people of all ages and all genders. This is a really important bit of work, and I hope that the Minister will take it seriously.

I am concerned about the action taken so far. I am concerned that in December 2015 when we had the Overseas Territories Joint Ministerial Council, the Government failed to persuade those territories to implement public registers. I am concerned that, in March 2015, the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands refused to meet Ministers from the Foreign Office and the Treasury. I am concerned that they failed to meet the Financial Secretary’s request that they adopt registers by November 2015. I am concerned that—as I understand it—they have ignored letters from UK Ministers. I am deeply concerned that tax is not even on the agenda for the forthcoming meeting of the Overseas Territories Joint Ministerial Council. I hope that the Minister can address that point. We do have the powers, and, as was mentioned in a previous intervention, we have used them before. The Government must act.

If the Minister could at least tell us that he will set a timeline, at the end of which, if matters cannot be resolved in a collective and collaborative way with the overseas territories and the Crown dependencies, the Government will use their power. That would go a long way to settling some of our concerns today. I hope that he can at least consider that as a possibility for taking the matter forward.

May I briefly comment on some of the other provisions in what is a warmly welcomed bit of legislation? On the unexplained wealth orders, it is particularly welcome that they will be applicable no matter where in the world the offence takes place. May I ask the Minister two questions? If the money comes from an overseas territory —a developing country, for example—will there be a notification to that country of the setting of an unexplained wealth order? Again, our enforcement agencies will be more capable than some others in pursuing laundered money.

[Mr Wallace]

I can get an exact answer to the right hon. Lady’s question. Just around that, though, we have started to sign memorandums of understanding with a number of countries—we signed one in August with Nigeria—to help them recover their assets, without barriers between here and there, and to assist them, both in their country and here, with tackling crime. Once they find their assets, we will get them back to them as soon as we can.

[Dame Margaret Hodge]

I am grateful to the Minister for providing that information. Will he explain why the orders do not apply to politically exposed people inside the European economic area? Will he look again at that issue, because there may occasionally be a relevant instance where that is important?

[Mr Wallace]

That is quite straightforward. We are unable under EU law to discriminate against different members of the EEA in relation to the UK citizen. What we do for the UK citizen we also have to do for other members of the EU.

[Dame Margaret Hodge]

I wish to raise two other issues. One arises from a debate held in the House on March 2012, initiated by the hon. Member for Esher and Walton (Mr Raab), on what is known as the Magnitsky-style amendment. The argument there arose from the horrific and brutal killing of Sergei Magnitsky—a Russian lawyer who was tortured and murdered because he uncovered a huge $230 million tax fraud in Russia. Allegedly, $30 million of that found its way laundered into the UK, according to evidence given to the Home Affairs Committee.

The hon. Gentleman proposed something similar to an amendment enacted in America—he and I would support such an amendment during the proceedings on the Bill—that would have ensured that foreign individuals involved in corruption and human rights abuses had their assets frozen, be denied right of entry to this country and be publicly named and shamed. Again, although that is slightly different to other provisions in the Bill, I think that there is strong cross-party support for introducing a Magnitsky-style amendment into UK legislation.

I hope that the Minister will look favourably on such an amendment. I have looked at the details, and a particularly disturbing aspect is how many UK banks were involved in laundering the alleged $30 million into the UK, according to evidence given to the Home Affairs Committee. They include Barclays, HSBC, NatWest, Bank of Scotland, RBS, Citibank, Bank of America, Lloyds TSB and the Bank of Tokyo. I hope that, from that horrific tragedy, we can introduce an important change in our legislation.

Finally, I want to talk about the corporate failure to prevent tax evasion, which other hon. Members have spoken about. I welcome the Bill as the first attempt to place responsibility for tax evasion not just on individuals but on corporations. However, this is a very small first step towards making those who are responsible for devising, advising and facilitating evasion and avoidance accountable for their actions.

Before we go over the top on saying what a great change the Bill represents, we should realise that it will apply only where a criminal offence has been successfully prosecuted against an individual or where an individual adviser has committed an offence when working for a corporation. It does not cover negligence by the corporation. It will not make the corporation responsible for the crimes of its staff. It does not cover aggressive tax avoidance. Unlike my Front-Bench colleague, I think that that is where the important bit of action must be taken if we are to ensure that we get the resources into coffers according to people’s wealth and their profits and incomes.

The Bill simply asks that reasonable procedures are in place, which is a risk-based and proportionate exercise, so it does not represent a fail-safe procedure. As I think through some of the instances we heard about during my time chairing the Public Accounts Committee, where we felt that corporations were misbehaving, I do not think that it would cover PricewaterhouseCoopers and all the stuff that it was doing in Luxembourg, where it was clearly selling schemes in an industrial way that had no other purpose than to avoid tax. We had a discussion earlier today about Heathrow. I do not think that it would cover Heathrow, which has managed to avoid paying a heck of a lot of tax on massive billion-pound profits that it has made. I do not think that it would cover Google. I do not think that it would cover—this is really important—the fact that when we interviewed advisers about the tax advice they give to corporations and individuals, they said that they would give advice so long as there was a 50% chance that it was not challenged by HMRC. The reverse of that is that there is a 50% chance that it will be challenged by HMRC, but given the size of the task and HMRC’s limited resources, it takes a long time to catch up with such schemes and does not have the resources that some of the big accountancy firms, advisers, banks and lawyers et al. have. That will be caught not by the first welcome but small measures that are being taken.

From all the work that we did in the PAC, the only thing that I can think would be caught is probably HSBC’s actions. The non-executive director, Rona Fairhead, gave evidence to us, sought to blame the whistleblower in that instance for being a thief—I thought that that was pretty awful—and blamed the front-line staff for doing what was obviously expected of them by the organisation for which they worked. She, as a non-executive director earning £500,000 a year at HSBC, felt that she did not have any responsibility to ensure corporate governance. The measure might catch that sort of instance, but it is very limited, and as we examine the Bill, I would welcome opportunities to extend that important first step in ensuring corporate liability as well as individual liability and accountability for actions that have been taken. I warmly welcome the Bill and I hope that the Minister can take the further steps that I have suggested.

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[Roger Mullin (Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath) (SNP)]

Many people in the Chamber consider much of the Bill to be praiseworthy. It struck me that all the critical speeches this afternoon—spanning all parties represented by the Members who have spoken—have been about what is not in the Bill, rather than what is in it. I wondered who would put the Bill in the context of the challenge that we face, and I think the Minister did that best in his opening remarks. He said of the extent of the criminality that he discovered on becoming a Minister that

“it…takes my breath away.”

The extent to which the Bill will deal with such criminality does not quite take the breath away.

I would like to comment on three areas that have been mentioned, the first of which is the permissive culture of banks. The best critique of that culture has come not from me or from anybody who is currently in the Chamber, but from the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) on 24 May this year. When talking about this forthcoming Bill, he commented:

“we in this country are very bad at dealing with white-collar crime, and there is growing awareness of that. If someone wishes to rob a bank, they go to the LIBOR market; they do not put on a balaclava and pick up a shotgun—that is much less profitable.”

He very succinctly drew out the problem of how the culture in banks has created a context in which it is easier to commit grand crimes in them than it is for the old-fashioned external robber to do so. He went on:

“London is still the money-laundering capital of the world. For an African despot or a serious international criminal, London is the best place to put their money, because they can trust the bankers to look after it and not to steal it from them.”

He concluded:

“I hope we will also impose a duty on those at the head of the institutions involved to ensure that they take positive steps to stop those working for them encouraging such activities.”—[Official Report, 24 May 2016; Vol. 611, c. 450.]

I doubt whether anybody in this debate would disagree with the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s words in May, but I do not think that his optimism about the Bill is reflected by the reality of what we now face.

On banking, I suggest that the Minister look at two things. The right hon. Member for Barking, who is no longer in her place, gave the example of what happened in HSBC, where someone was willing to speak up but was then pilloried by senior management. One thing I would suggest to the Minister that needs doing is to strengthen protection for whistleblowing in the banking and financial sector. If we could find a mechanism to encourage people to speak up about criminality or bad practice, that in itself would be a useful measure. Many people have commented that the crisis in the banking sector in 2008 was not predominantly because of the details of regulation, but predominantly because of the culture at the top level. It was caused by group-think on the boards of banks, and by the over-confidence of individual chief executives who were immune to considering anything other than a dash for cash. The other thing I would suggest to the Minister is that it would be useful for a requirement for proper cultural analysis to be built into the banking sector.

The second area on which I want to comment has already been hinted at by my hon. Friends the Members for Dumfries and Galloway and for Aberdeen North (Kirsty Blackman), but no one else has talked about it in this debate thus far. It is the topic of Scottish limited partnerships. This may be new to some hon. Members, so I hope they will allow me to give a few examples. Scottish limited partnerships are not a new phenomenon. They are not a devolved matter; they are a matter for this House. Although they were created by Asquith in the Budget of 1907—even I do not remember it—from 2008 they began to be used much more extensively for criminal behaviour. Since 2008, the use of SLPs has risen by approximately 40% year on year.

Scottish limited partnerships have been at the heart of some of the major corruption scandals in the world. For example, they have been named in major corruption scandals involving the former Soviet Union, particularly Ukraine, where they are still openly marketed as off-the-peg zero-tax offshore companies. Elsewhere, one Scottish limited partnership is at the moment at the heart of a $1 billion digital bootlegging case in the United States. The International Monetary Fund has warned that the risk posed by SLPs to the fight against money laundering and organised crime is something to which attention needs to be given. Other Scottish limited partnerships are involved in pornographic and even in paedophilia websites. Indeed, the span of criminal activity through these financial vehicles seems to know absolutely no bounds.

Closer to home, The Herald newspaper, which has done extraordinary work in this area, revealed barely six days ago that the tax haven bank owned by Lord Ashcroft is being used, without his permission, as a base to set up dozens of firms utilising SLP loopholes linked to a known fraudster. Indeed, two Belize companies have been falsely using the address of the HQ of Lord Ashcroft’s bank for at least six years. Those secret Belizean businesses, Sherbrook Assets and Whitmoore Solutions, have formed at least 70 other Scottish entities, most of them registered, I am sorry to say, to a convicted fraudster who lives in Fife in Scotland, Anzelika Young. The Bill should be ensuring that every SLP, along with any similar financial vehicle elsewhere in the UK, is exposed to rigorous due diligence at the very least.

During proceedings on the recent Finance Bill, I attempted to add a very simple new clause calling on the Government to investigate SLPs. They chose to vote that new clause down. When, subsequently, yet more criminal activity came to light, on 26 September I wrote to the Chancellor—I have a copy of the letter with me—seeking a meeting about this major international criminal activity. As of last week, when I was yet again chasing this up, the only response I have had—this is after a month, showing the Government’s lack of concern about international criminal activity—is that they are still considering how to respond to my request for a meeting. It is quite inappropriate for a Member of this House seeking a meeting about a major criminal activity to have to wait a month for any response.

[Mr Wallace]

I reassure the hon. Gentleman, given our meeting yesterday, that I have listened to what he said. I will meet my ministerial colleagues to discuss the problem he raised with me and see what we can do about it.

[Roger Mullin]

I am particularly grateful to the Minister for that clarity. Indeed, in coming to the Dispatch Box at that moment he confirmed what I was about to say in my closing line on the issue of SLPs. Given how he has discussed this matter with those of us on the Opposition Benches who are interested in it, and his understandable and quite appropriate concern about the matters raised, I was going to suggest that the Prime Minister could appoint him the formal tutor for all Treasury Ministers, in addition to his role as Minister for Security; I am sure they would learn a great deal from the appropriate way he deals with matters. I commend that new appointment to the House. I speak in jest, but surely there is an issue here, as some of the Treasury Ministers who have been turning a blind eye for months need to learn that these are matters of great concern and importance, and deserve to be treated as such.

The third area I will briefly mention—and it will be very brief, as many Members have already commented on it—is what has been happening post Panama papers on Crown dependencies and the like. The clear view expressed in this debate is that the Bill does not yet go far enough, particularly on the much needed transparency and openness on beneficial ownership. If the Minister would be willing to think about how we might, in a collegiate way across the House, begin to address that issue and some of the others raised today, he will win himself many friends indeed.

Oral Answers to Questions

Ben Wallace Excerpts

Monday 5th September 2016 Commons Chamber

[Jack Dromey (Birmingham, Erdington) (Lab)]

7. What recent assessment she has made of trends in the level of cybercrime.

[The Minister for Security (Mr Ben Wallace)]

As crime falls, we know that it is also changing. The internet and new technology offer criminals new opportunities to commit crimes, such as fraud and cybercrime. We welcome the increased reporting to Action Fraud: such reporting has trebled since it was set up. With new experimental data from the Office for National Statistics, we will be able to better map the trends in cybercrime and, I hope, take steps to combat it.

[Jack Dromey]

On the day Parliament went into recess, the Office for National Statistics confirmed that there had been 5.8 million incidents of cybercrime in the past 12 months, affecting one in 10 of the population. This means that crime has near doubled. Does the Home Secretary agree that the legacy of her predecessor—now the Prime Minister—is one of 20,000 fewer police and soaring crime?

[Mr Wallace]

I do not think that that is much of a point. The reality is that, under the hon. Gentleman’s Government, there was no proper reporting mechanism for fraud. We set up Action Fraud, which has received the massive number of 300,000 referrals. Rather than playing politics with crime, the best advice we can all give our constituents is that GCHQ advises that if people change their passwords regularly and have up-to-date anti-virus, they will cut their vulnerability to cybercrime by 80%.

[Mr Edward Vaizey (Wantage) (Con)]

I hate to play politics with crime, but this Government have an excellent record on tackling both crime and cybercrime by setting up the National Cyber Crime Unit. I wonder whether the new Minister, whom I warmly welcome to his position, will use his imagination and energy to consider a bespoke career path, at graduate level, for people entering the police force. People tackling cybercrime perhaps need very different skills from those the police have relied on hitherto, before the growth of digital crime.

[Mr Wallace]

Yes, we are working on that. We are working on direct recruitment to ensure that both the police and the National Crime Agency have the skills they need. We have already invested in upskilling members of the NCA, which hosts the National Cyber Crime Unit. It is also very important to make people understand that everybody can play a role in defending against cybercrime, and that if they follow the advice of GCHQ, they will go far.

[Mr Speaker]

Well done.

[Stephen Doughty (Cardiff South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)]

14. Not least in the context of the expansion of the Prevent duty, is the Minister currently satisfied with the level of support being given by social media and internet companies to police and other public authorities for tackling online radicalisation, as well as for tackling those who are preparing terrorist acts themselves?

[Mr Wallace]

Every day the police get good co-operation from many multimedia companies and internet service providers. We would, of course, like to see more, and will keep pressing companies for more because it is very important that we all protect vulnerable people from the effects the internet can have in turning them into radicals and attracting them to terrorism.

[Liz Saville Roberts (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)]

Given the increase in cybercrime, will the new Minister commit to investigating the storage of seized hardware and, specifically, ethical concerns that destruction orders on hardware containing child pornography can be successfully challenged by convicted offenders in court?

[Mr Wallace]

That is a very good point. We must make sure that the data are always there to help convict people of their crimes, and that those data cannot be challenged or put aside. I hope the hon. Lady will therefore support the Investigatory Powers Bill when it returns to this House, because the retention of data is one of the best ways to counter crime.

[Sarah Champion (Rotherham) (Lab)]

For clarity, no one, particularly a child, chooses to be or facilitates being trafficked.

The Minister will know that online child abuse has reached unprecedented levels and is increasing. The Internet Watch Foundation states that there has been a 417% increase in child sexual abuse images since 2013, with the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre stating that 50,000 people in the UK downloaded or shared images in 2012. However, children and parents are woefully underprepared when it comes to recognising or preventing abuse and exploitation online, despite the fact that 65% of 12 to 15-year-olds own a smartphone. What does the Minister plan to do to address and prevent online child abuse, other than changing passwords?

[Mr Wallace]

The obvious answer is that we need to continue to educate both parents and children, either in the school setting or at home, to make sure that they operate safely when they surf the net. The Department for Culture, Media and Sport, the Home Office and the National Crime Agency have engaged in making sure that there are guides online for everyone of every age to follow. That is the first step. Certainly, the National Cyber Crime Unit, which I went to visit at the NCA, is responsible for making sure that we catch people whether at home or abroad, through its network of overseas postings, to make sure that we bring people to justice whatever side of the channel they are on.

[Mr David Nuttall (Bury North) (Con)]

8. What assessment she has made of recent trends in the level of immigration.

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[Simon Hoare (North Dorset) (Con)]

12. What steps she is taking to protect people from fraud and its effect on families and communities.

[The Minister for Security (Mr Ben Wallace)]

Fraud is a heinous crime, which can have a devastating effect on individuals, families and the most vulnerable members of society. That is why this Government launched the Joint Fraud Taskforce last February with law enforcement and banks, and have committed to spending £1.9 billion over the next five years on cyber-security, including to tackle cyber-enabled fraud.

[Simon Hoare]

I thank my hon. Friend for that answer. What specific assessments has he made of fraud in my area?

[Mr Wallace]

The Joint Fraud Taskforce will obviously cover all of the United Kingdom. Of course, members of the banks and other organisations that are on the taskforce will be involved in ensuring that when people commit fraud, they cannot take the money out of the country, which will provide at least some time to track it down. I congratulate the Dorset police who in 2015 launched a fraud prevention campaign called “Hang up on Fraudsters” after reports that my hon. Friend’s county had lost over £1 million to fraud.

[Mr David Hanson (Delyn) (Lab)]

I am still not convinced by what the Home Secretary said about European co-operation. Will the Minister confirm that we will remain members of Europol, which tackles fraud across Europe as well as in the United Kingdom?

[Mr Wallace]

The right hon. Gentleman might have to wait a bit for the answer, because my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary and her ministerial colleagues will be meeting Europol. What we want to continue to do, first and foremost, is co-operate with Europol, Interpol and all the other forces of the European Union to make sure that this country is safe and secure.

[Mr Speaker]

Finally, I call Karl MᶜCartney.

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[Martin Vickers (Cleethorpes) (Con)]

T2. I am currently assisting a constituent who has been the victim of a fraudulent scam, losing over £30,000 of life savings. The case has been referred to ActionFraud. The Minister spoke earlier about an increase in referrals to ActionFraud, but it is results that matter. The cases I have dealt with show poor results. What action is being taken to ensure that ActionFraud improves its performance?

[The Minister for Security (Mr Ben Wallace)]

First, we are investing in a new software programme for ActionFraud that will not only improve the analytics of crimes that are reported to it, but allow victims of fraud to track their cases in live time online. In response to my hon. Friend’s concern, I have also asked officials to look into how ActionFraud communicates with members of the public. I think it important to remember that these are victims, many of whom have done nothing wrong whatsoever and have been preyed upon by some of the worst people in society.

[Carolyn Harris (Swansea East) (Lab)]

The Home Secretary will be aware of continuing concern about the historical conduct of South Yorkshire police. I understand that she is meeting members of the Orgreave Truth and Justice Campaign next week to discuss their call for a public inquiry. Is she also aware of the tragic case of Terry Coles, a Swansea City supporter, who was trampled to death by a police horse at a football match in 2000? Will she agree to look at the evidence, and accept that, unless we have the truth about all these past injustices, we shall not be able to restore trust in South Yorkshire police?

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[Diana Johnson (Kingston upon Hull North) (Lab)]

T4. Given the level of public concern about British citizens who travel to fight Daesh and then attempt to return to this country, will the Minister tell me when the number of those who are attempting to return will be published, and what action will be taken to keep us safe in this country?

[Mr Wallace]

It is incredibly important that when people return—and we hope that they do—they are properly introduced back into society. If they pose a threat, it is important for that threat to be managed, and it is also important that if they can be removed from radicalisation, we take the right steps to do that. I will certainly review the hon. Lady’s request for the publication of the number of passports, for instance, that have been withheld from individuals. First and foremost, however, I assure her that we have measures in place to ensure that these people are not just left alone and we do not lose track of them of them, which would pose further risks to the British people.

[Julian Knight (Solihull) (Con)]

T5. Fraud and scams have a huge impact on individuals, especially the elderly, who are seen as easy prey. Does my hon. Friend welcome the Back-Bench debate on scams that I shall be leading on Thursday, and will he commit himself to considering what more can be done to tackle this rank criminality?

[Mr Wallace]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on the leadership that he has shown on not only fraud but consumer rights in ensuring that the vulnerable in society are not taken advantage of. We have set up a Joint Fraud Taskforce, inviting, for instance, Age Concern to help to protect the elderly, so that we can do more to ensure that in future the people who commit those crimes are caught and the elderly are defended from unscrupulous behaviour.

[Peter Grant (Glenrothes) (SNP)]

T7. One of my constituents, Lorna Ross from Markinch, recently returned from Greece, where she had been working as a volunteer in a refugee centre. She brought back harrowing accounts of the conditions facing, in particular, young unaccompanied refugees. What steps is the Home Secretary taking to ensure that if such refugees have the right to move to the UK to be with their families, they are allowed to do so without delay, wherever they arrive in Europe?

HM Passport Office

Ben Wallace Excerpts

Thursday 12th June 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mrs May]

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I will attempt to be brief in my response.

As has been made clear publicly, Ministers were not aware of the document to which the hon. Member for Coventry North West (Mr Robinson) refers, and they asked for it to be withdrawn immediately.

[Mr Ben Wallace (Wyre and Preston North) (Con)]

May I say how much I appreciate my right hon. Friend taking pragmatic steps to deal with the situation, especially with the 12-month extension? If it gets worse, will she perhaps consider extending that to UK citizens in this country as a short-term measure? Does she agree that the Passport Office had to spend £257 million after being diverted to an identity card scheme, and that if it had been able to spend that money on its core offering, perhaps this would not have happened?

[Mrs May]

I have already referred, of course, to the identity card scheme.

My hon. Friend talks about the possibility of the extension to passports being brought in domestically as well as in overseas cases. We did examine that possibility, and it was what the Labour Government did when they had queues at passport offices back in 1999. To introduce that now would have meant setting up new centres and processes, which could have disrupted the work that the Passport Office is already doing. That is why I believe it is better to concentrate on dealing with the applications that are being made.

Mohammed Ahmed Mohamed

Ben Wallace Excerpts

Monday 4th November 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mrs May]

For those who are under TPIMs, and others, we make every effort to ensure that prosecutions take place whenever possible. I commend the Security Service in this regard. A number of individuals were prosecuted earlier this year for terrorism-related offences relating to significant plots. This shows the very good work that the police and the Security Service do on a daily basis to keep the public safe. I believe that it is appropriate to have slightly changed the ruling in relation to the interpretation of the exercise of the royal prerogative. It is important to have that measure available; and, as the hon. Gentleman will see from the fact that I am here at the Dispatch Box answering his question, I am also accountable to this House.

[Mr Ben Wallace (Wyre and Preston North) (Con)]

Unlike the shadow Home Secretary, I have actually taken part in surveillance operations, and it is incredibly hard to watch someone 100% of the time. To come here and try to blame the Home Secretary for what is probably an operational front-line challenge is to play politics with our forces of law and order. Does the Home Secretary agree that one way to improve the capability of our Security Service and police force—to improve surveillance or to get more convictions—would be to introduce the communications data Bill which Labour opposes and our coalition partners block?

[Mrs May]

I commend my hon. Friend for bringing his personal experience to the debate; he has more experience of participating in surveillance operations than I do. He is absolutely right that we ask our Security Service and law enforcement agencies to undertake difficult tasks and that they do an excellent job for us on a day-by-day basis; they are not, I think, often enough praised for the work they do. My hon. Friend is also right about the importance of communications data. I have been clear on many occasions, including in this Chamber, that I believe we need to increase the ability of our law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies to access the data that will enable them to investigate—but, crucially, in many cases, also to prosecute —those involved in terrorism and organised crime.

Intelligence and Security Services

Ben Wallace Excerpts

Thursday 31st October 2013 Westminster Hall

[Dr Huppert]

No, I do not. I understand that the secretary who looks at the defence advisory notices has confirmed that nothing has been published in The Guardian that suggests a risk to life. The Guardian has not published photos on its website of anybody who works in the area without pixellating their faces.

[Mr Ben Wallace (Wyre and Preston North) (Con)]

How does the hon. Gentleman know that? He does not have complete oversight of either The Guardian’s material or the intelligence material with which it fits in. He is just assuming that what he has read in The Guardian is fine, safe and vetted by Guardian journalists. That is simply not enough to satisfy people of their personal safety.

[Dr Huppert]

The hon. Gentleman makes an interesting point. His argument, unfortunately, falls foul of the fact that one could say that about absolutely anything: one can never know whether some innocent revelation has been made. However, it is clear that The Guardian has been in contact with the security services and has spoken to the DA notices committee since 17 June. That is the assurance that it has had.

I think that The Guardian has been deeply responsible. It would have been irresponsible if it had refused to have any role in the matter and allowed the information to be passed out by other people who might not have the same regard for our security and staff.

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[Mr Raab]

My hon. Friend is shaking his head, but this is what the MI5 director-general said, so we ought to pay it some heed. There was a spike after 9/11, but it then dipped. In the most recent speech, given this month, the director-general said that the threat had not got worse.

My hon. Friend is certainly correct to pay tribute to the unstinting work of the intelligence agencies and law enforcement. In fact, however, the conviction rate for terrorist offences has reduced dramatically, which is also a real issue—the question of prosecution, rather than intelligence, if we are not only to keep track of, but to disrupt and deter, terrorist activity.

In this month’s speech, the MI5 director-general also lambasted The Guardian for handing terrorists a “gift”—he used a potent word. More recently, Ministers have claimed that the disclosures have put lives at risk. I want to take that seriously, because Mr Parker claimed that making public

“the reach and limits of GCHQ techniques”

breaches national security. To be clear about what was being discussed, the newspaper was not disclosing interception techniques—the technical aspect—or revelations of sources or operatives, which would clearly be a major source of concern, but simply revealing our intelligence “reach”. I find the assertion that was made difficult to take at face value. The contention may be true, but it cannot be taken on mere assertion.

Any serious terrorist groups assume that their phones, e-mails and internet use will be monitored. That is no secret, and learning that Western spies drain the swamp of their own citizens’ data in the process does not aid terrorists in any tangible way. If national security had been materially breached, why has no one at The Guardian been charged or even arrested since the search of its offices back in July? Why was David Miranda not arrested and bailed, following his detention for several hours at Heathrow, in August? Either UK law enforcement is surprisingly slow—given the assertions—or national security is being used as a fig leaf to muzzle disclosures that are just plain embarrassing.

I accept, by the way, that the disclosure that 850,000 contractors can access data from Project Tempora represents a security concern, but of course that vulnerability is entirely of the Government’s own making.

I am prepared to be proven wrong about all that, but Ministers and intelligence chiefs need to understand that the bald assertion of national security cannot be used to guillotine all debate. We are here to correct that understanding. Without revealing details that would prejudice the work of the security services, we need a coherent explanation of the damage to national security, not only vague and opaque assertions.

[Mr Wallace]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Mr Raab]

I will not give way, because I am conscious of time. If I get through my speech, I will be happy for my hon. Friend to intervene.

From reports in The Guardian, we also know that the Government are concerned about the legality of the powers that they are using—fears that public debate might lead to litigation, fears about legal challenge under the Human Rights Act. Those are legitimate concerns. I recall similar ones from my own experience of working with the agencies as a Foreign Office lawyer. Those, however, are altogether more nuanced concerns than the shrill and unsubstantiated suggestion that we have somehow lost track of terrorist plotters as a result of the revelations.

The issues need to be debated in Parliament, not stifled by the blanket assertion of national security. Scrutiny is vital. In the US, as mentioned, the Democrat chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Dianne Feinstein, has called for a total review of NSA surveillance:

“Congress needs to know exactly what our intelligence community is doing.”

This week, on a bipartisan basis, a USA Freedom Bill was proposed in Congress, with support from more than 80 Congressmen—including, no less, the architect of the US Patriot Act, Republican Jim Sensenbrenner. The Bill would block collection of bulk data on American citizens, insert judicial oversight—something missing in this country—and increase transparency and reporting on the part of companies and Government. If that is good enough for the Americans, why here in Britain would we settle for anything less? Congress and the public in America have woken up to the scale of unfettered surveillance, and it is time that we in this House did the same.

What do we need to do next? First, we need a proper account to Parliament of the exercise of existing surveillance powers. Why and where are they deemed inadequate? Will the Minister, when he has the opportunity to speak, confirm that no MPs have been subjected to such surveillance, given that the House has not been informed of any change to the Wilson doctrine? Will Ministers clarify the extent to which GCHQ was involved in what has recently been reported about the NSA tapping Google and Yahoo! communications, without consent or any observation of the authorisation procedures agreed with those companies?

Secondly, if there are shortcomings—we need to be alive to those, on both sides of the debate—we need a clearer explanation of their impact on national security. Successive Governments have been remiss in proposing such broad data communications legislation, beyond the imperatives of national security or of access by police and the intelligence agencies, as most people and most Members of the House accept. That has undermined parliamentary and public support for the more forensic task of plugging any holes in our intelligence capabilities.

Thirdly, we need to consider any exposure of our agencies to “fishing expedition” legal challenges—I understand that concern. GCHQ has cited the Human Rights Act, a concern that I suspect stems from the expansion in the right to privacy under article 8 of the convention. If there is broader concern about the HRA, that must feed into the debate about its future.

Finally, I am not convinced that the Intelligence and Security Committee is able to provide the oversight that we need. I say that without casting any aspersion on current or former members, least of all its formidable Chair, who is present today. I do not believe, however, that the ISC has the tools or the independence to do the job properly. It is billed as a creature of Parliament, but through its appointment and accountability, and under the statutory regime, it is ultimately and really beholden to the Executive. It needs to develop into more of a Committee of the House, tailored in a bespoke way, but acquiring more of the powers and independence of normal Select Committees, if it is to deliver the kind of oversight capable of commanding public confidence.

Above all, we must take this debate forward, away from the polarised and untested assertions on either side, and place the work of those who would protect us on a firmer footing. Karl Popper said:

“We must plan for freedom, and not only for security, if for no other reason than only freedom can make security more secure.”

We need to pursue our security in a way that respects our freedoms, limits incursions to genuine cases of national security and does so under a regime that commands the rule of law. Failing to do that would be the real gift to the terrorists—a victory for everything that they believe in and a blow against everything we stand for.

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[Mr Winnick]

My hon. Friend the Member for West Bromwich East (Mr Watson) spoke about the latest technology. I opposed my own Government on identity cards because I thought they would be an intrusion into civil liberties. Such documents should not be introduced, except perhaps in war time, because they would not assist in the struggle against terrorism in any way. I was pleased that they dropped the proposal, but the growth in information technology to which reference has been made several times during the debate and the amount of information that the intelligence agencies can accumulate would have been unthinkable even 10 years ago and in some ways that dwarfs the dangers posed by identity cards. That is why I take the view that it is unlikely that the parliamentary oversight that we are debating today, despite some of the changes that I am pleased about, including the additional powers that have been given to the Committee, will be effective, but oversight is essential.

Going back to The Guardian, during Monday’s debate on the Prime Minister’s statement on the European Council, he said:

“I do not want to have to use injunctions, D notices or other, tougher measures; it is much better to appeal to newspapers’ sense of social responsibility. However, if they do not demonstrate some social responsibility, it will be very difficult for the Government to stand back and not to act.”—[Official Report, 28 October 2013; Vol. 569, c. 667.]

That is the most blatant threat to the press in recent times. It says in effect, “Do as I say or the Government will take the necessary measures.” That is all the more unfortunate while we are debating a royal charter that is being described as no threat to the press. What the Prime Minister said on Monday is very much a threat to the press. I tabled a question to the Prime Minister asking what information had appeared in The Guardian on intelligence matters that the Government objected to on security grounds. The answer, which I could have given when I tabled the question, was that he had nothing to add.

[Mr Wallace]

I do not think the suggestion is that any newspaper should be above the law, whether it is The Guardian or a Murdoch newspaper. They are all subject to the law, as are all citizens of this country.

[Mr Winnick]

Indeed. No newspaper should be above the law, as I understand the position at the moment. I must be careful because something that is taking place in the courts is sub judice, but it demonstrates that newspapers are not above the law. When they break the law, they can be charged like any individual. I believe in a free press and I have mentioned the paper that is in the spotlight at the moment. If it were The Sun, the Daily Mail or The Times, I would take the same view. I do not take the view that I do because the newspaper in question happens to be The Guardian. I take it because a newspaper has the right to publish material that it believes is in the national interest. That is a free press, which I happen to be in favour of. I would have hoped that the hon. Gentleman was also in favour of that. In the argument on another subject, it has been said that we have had a free press for more than 300 years. It has had many setbacks during those 300 years, but I am keen that we should continue to have a free press and not something that is more like what happened in the past in eastern Europe.

I have two hopes about the present situation. I hope that The Guardian will not give way, and that it will demonstrate that it will continue to publish what it believes is important. It is interesting that the Prime Minister said in response to a Conservative Member that the paper had agreed not to publish certain matters, so suggestions of irresponsibility are not relevant.

I also hope that there will be sufficient parliamentary support for what the paper is doing. If we believe in a free press, and no one on the Government side or members of the Intelligence and Security Committee would disagree for one moment that there needs to be a free press, I hope that we will uphold the right of The Guardian to do what it is doing and resist the Government’s pressure and blackmail. It is absolutely essential that the information that Snowden has revealed, which is not helping the terrorists, but which we should know about—really, to a large extent, it was done in our name—should be in the public domain, and I am glad that it is.

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[Mr Ben Wallace (Wyre and Preston North) (Con)]

I congratulate the hon. Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) on securing the debate. I regret that it does not address the real problem of how to rebuild trust in the work of our intelligence services, to protect our country and our spies from the many allegations that circulate around them, against which they cannot defend themselves.

Let us be clear that spies spy. That is no big revelation. Britain spies, as do other countries, to protect itself and to further its interests. If we were to discover that banks in, say, Liechtenstein were hiding British taxpayers’ money and refusing to reveal which British citizens were avoiding paying tax, I believe that it would be perfectly legitimate for British intelligence services to go there and find out who those tax avoiders were. To do so would not protect us against terrorism, but it would protect Britain’s interests.

I venture to suggest that it is right for our spies to go abroad and find out which countries are not playing by the rules—which countries are cheating and stealing our secrets—to protect British industry, British jobs and British national security. That is what spies do, and we should be proud of the fact that we do it particularly well. In fact, we do it better than most across the globe, and it gives Britain a place at the top table. That is not to be sniffed at.

I am not a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee, but I worked in intelligence in Northern Ireland before half the legislation, which the hon. Member for Cambridge seems to have missed, came into play. I also worked for QinetiQ before I first came to the House. While the hon. Gentleman was a biological scientist, I was a computer geek. I wrote COBOL from the age of seven or eight, which was about the time when he was born. The debate is often couched in a language of, “Wow, can we do that?” and people are surprised by what is possible. Already, without being a member of a security service or a Government, I can find out how every person in this room shops, where they live, when they bought their car and what their credit rating is. I can probably get hold of everybody’s details without very much effort.

Interestingly, I have heard no criticism of the fact that we do not regulate the private sector. No one has expressed fear about that or demanded that we do so. The big capitalist companies in America—the Googles and the Facebooks—harvest our data without a by-your-leave, sell it on and on through intermediaries and make billions of pounds. However, I have not yet heard anyone mention that they all keep their servers offshore to avoid tax. That is the area that needs regulating to protect people.

I am proud of the fact that our security services are regulated, and I would rather have the state than the international private sector grooming through my internet capabilities. I am aware that each of us is subject to oversight, because we are democratically elected. The Home Secretary is appointed by the Prime Minister, in a Government who are is created through a democratic process.

Additional oversight is provided by the relevant legislation. The Intelligence Services Act 1994 mentioned the intelligence services as though they were simply a normal body. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 attracts a lot of criticism, but I operated before it was introduced, and I did not have to sign off anything, keep a log or register with anybody the things that I wanted to do. RIPA did not give people new powers; it made them register how they use their powers. It is a good piece of legislation, not a negative one. My former colleagues still hate it, which is a good sign, because it means that they are accountable for how they use their powers.

[Mr Robert Buckland (South Swindon) (Con)]

To amplify the point, RIPA and the Police Act 1997, which predated it, were a response to rulings by the European Court of Human Rights that the previous regime was not compliant with the convention. They were introduced to bring the United Kingdom into compliance with the convention.

[Mr Wallace]

RIPA is not perfect. It has its flaws, like any legislation, but it was an attempt to put on a statutory basis what we were doing to protect our agents, our personnel and the functions that we carry out. Let us remember that spying is dangerous. It is about risk. Our men and women in Cheltenham, in Vauxhall and all over the country put their lives at risk to protect Britain, and there is a serious downside to getting it wrong. If they get it wrong, they do not get charged the wrong price, or something of the sort; if they get it wrong, people die. If that happens, constituents get very upset, and the country becomes less secure. Terrorists start to win; countries that are not our friends or allies start to win; and British industry starts to lose out. Spying has a strong role to play, but getting it wrong carries great risks.

I will not go on about The Guardian, but I will make one or two points. First, the newspaper has yet to specify any crime committed by the British Government, authorities or spies, even though that is what its public interest defence hinges on. It has yet to produce any evidence that British spies are breaking British laws. It is welcome to do so at any time, and I would be delighted to discuss that in a meeting with the editor of The Guardian. Until he publishes such evidence, however, the reports amount to saying, “Yahoo! Look how exciting technology is. Look what we can do.” That is not a public interest defence; that is an attempt to sell more newspapers.

Secondly, how do we know the whole picture? I am assured that grown-up people in The Guardian are sitting down in a sealed room and looking through all the evidence. Perhaps they could have asked for help from their former features editor, Richard Gott, who had to resign in 1994 after allegations emerged that he had taken money from the KGB. He would have been a good man to review the evidence.

Who should be the judge and jury in this case? I venture to suggest that a state with some form of oversight would be a better judge and jury than a whole load of journalists locking themselves up in a room with the evidence. Until The Guardian produces evidence of a crime that our agents are supposed to have committed, it has no public interest defence. That is all that it has to answer, and I will defend its right to publish if it produces evidence of a crime.

[Mr Winnick]

What sort of oversight was there in the case that I have mentioned of Binyam Mohamed, who was tortured with the knowledge of MI5 officers? I am not aware that such information was reported to the Intelligence and Security Committee, or that it took the initiative in trying to find out whether other such cases occurred. To a large extent, oversight has been defective, either because of indifference on that Committee’s part or because the security agencies have not been willing to provide the relevant information. The hon. Gentleman is putting a total gloss on the practices of the past—I hope that they are in the past—which were unacceptable to Parliament and to the British public.

[Mr Wallace]

I totally agree that there have been failures, which is why we introduced new legislation to give greater powers to the Intelligence and Security Committee. It does not have to take things at face value; it can appoint an investigator to go in and do what it wants to do, not what it is told to do. I recognise that there have been failures in the past, but that is why, step by step over the past 20 years, we have seen layer on layer of new legislation and new oversight. Yes, there were failures and no one is perfect, but our state has oversight and a democratic legitimacy that many of our opponents do not.

Let us remember that Mr Snowden could have gone to Switzerland—the Americans have been after Roman Polanski for decades and they have never got him back—but, no, he went to China and Russia. I am not sure whether he is a traitor, but I question his judgment about the countries to which he decided to run off. Russia, for example, is killing journalists and lawyers as we speak. We must keep in mind the motives behind that so-called whistleblower.

The world will become increasingly vulnerable to abuse of communications data, which will be used by more and more people for criminal reasons. I am conscious of the sub judice rule here, but I must point out an irony regarding communications data that is so viciously opposed by several colleagues. Should we ever, have to investigate, say, a couple of journalists exchanging e-mails, if we were to go to an internet company to ask for the e-mails between Mr A and Mr B, there is no guarantee that it will have kept that data. Internet providers currently have no obligation to keep records in the same way as mobile companies. The hon. Member for West Bromwich East (Mr Watson)may want to reflect on that.

I have issues with the way that intelligence is used as evidence by politicians. I risked my life in Northern Ireland to avoid shortcuts and the imposition of 28 or 90-day detentions without charge, which I opposed, ID cards, which were a complete waste of time, and detention without trials. Spies have risked their lives to keep us within the law. Politicians have a duty to ensure that they do not bend the law to try to cut corners on good intelligence gathering, to turn it into evidence to get a conviction in court.

[Mr Graham Brady in the Chair]

Undercover Policing

Ben Wallace Excerpts

Monday 24th June 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mrs May]

I can assure the right hon. Gentleman that I will, of course, take seriously the references made today by my hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Mr Whittingdale), who chairs the Culture, Media and Sport Committee.

[Mr Ben Wallace (Wyre and Preston North) (Con)]

Undercover work requires exceptional personnel and thorough controls. Selection and training are vital components to ensure that such operations as have been reported to us today do not happen again. Will my right hon. Friend look at training across the country to ensure that the training of undercover officers is of the highest standard and that the training of senior police officers ensures that they understand the very important need for control throughout an operation, whether it be a short-term or a long-term one?

[Mrs May]

My hon. Friend is right to raise the importance not only of training for individual officers, but of the need to ensure that senior officers properly manage any deployment of undercover operatives. That is indeed one of the issues that, as I mentioned earlier, was raised in the HMIC report last year. HMIC will, of course, look at the implementation of its recommendations, and will be reporting this Thursday. Having set up the College of Policing, we now have a body that is responsible for ensuring that for police operations across the board, appropriate training is given and to the right and correct standards.

Ibrahim Magag

Ben Wallace Excerpts

Tuesday 8th January 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mrs May]

I am confident in the TPIM package that was available—the TPIM measures plus the extra resources that were made available to the Security Service and the police. We of course consulted on them at the time this was done. As I said in response to the urgent question from the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), they were clear that there was no substantial increase in risk, and that remains their position.

[Mr Ben Wallace (Wyre and Preston North) (Con)]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that the best way to avoid such dangerous individuals being loose in our society is to improve our ability to intercept their communications? Will she therefore agree to carry on supporting the telecommunications Bill—which I hope will come before the House—so that our agencies can do the best job they can?

Olympics (Security)

Ben Wallace Excerpts

Monday 16th July 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mrs May]

Well, there is a very great difference, and I am sure that the hon. Gentleman understands that difference. When G4S recognised that it was having difficulty scheduling and getting sufficient staff numbers to the posts for which they were required it came to the Government and said that it could not deliver the numbers that it thought it could.

[Mr Ben Wallace (Wyre and Preston North) (Con)]

As we speak and as the House meets, athletes from all over the world are arriving at Heathrow to take part in one of the world’s greatest athletic gatherings. Does my right hon. Friend agree that one of the things that undermines national security is petty point scoring and hysterical opposition, talking the games down?