(1 year, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
I put on the record my previous engagements with the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, on many excellent and informative trips that contributed to our relationships across the Commonwealth, and my past engagement with the International Committee of the Red Cross.
I am delighted to see the Bill back in the House; I hope that there will be wholehearted unity today to ensure that it makes it to Royal Assent. I think this is its fourth iteration. The last time it was debated here was as a private Member’s Bill in the last Session, but sadly it ran out of time before the Dissolution of Parliament for the general election. I pay tribute to the former Member for Basingstoke for her tireless work in introducing that Bill and pushing it through, and to many hon. Members, some of whom I see here today, for their past work with the CPA and the ICRC.
It is critical that both the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association and the International Committee of the Red Cross be given their correct status in UK legislation to conduct their work and deliver their objectives while operating in the UK. This will help to guarantee that the CPA remains headquartered in the UK and will ensure that the UK can guarantee the ICRC that the confidential information that it shares as a matter of course with the UK Government is secure and protected.
The UK is deeply committed to the Commonwealth and believes that the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, which the Foreign Secretary is attending in Samoa, will be an important opportunity to mobilise action on shared interests, including upholding shared Commonwealth values. Those values are embodied by the CPA’s important work to strengthen inclusive and accountable democracy across the Commonwealth. I think back to my own many engagements with the CPA in which I have seen that work at first hand, both when delegations have visited and when I have been part of delegations. The UK values its partnership with the CPA and is proud to support the work of the CPA and its regional branch CPA UK. That includes developing benchmarks and indicators of parliamentary democracy and addressing modern slavery in supply chains and issues such as gender-based violence with Parliaments and parliamentarians across the Commonwealth.
The ICRC is an essential partner in achieving the UK’s global humanitarian objectives. It has a unique mandate from states to uphold the Geneva conventions and works globally to promote international humanitarian law. Its impartiality, neutrality and independence allow it to engage and negotiate with all parties to a conflict and to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations, often in contexts in which other agencies are unable to operate. I have witnessed its important work, in opposition and in my past career in the humanitarian sector.
Clauses 1 and 2 will therefore provide for both organisations to be treated in a manner comparable to an international organisation, with the associated privileges and immunities. Treatment as an international organisation will allow the CPA to continue to operate fully across the Commonwealth and international fora. It will allow the organisation to participate fully in areas in which it is currently restricted, including signing up to joint international statements and communiqués. That is vital to ensure that the CPA can continue its work to promote democracy and good governance across the Commonwealth. The CPA is currently registered with the Charity Commission for England and Wales and is not an international intergovernmental organisation; it therefore has its own unique constitutional arrangements that reflect its specific international mandate.
Clause 2 is critical to enable the ICRC to operate in the UK in accordance with its international mandate, maintaining its strict adherence to the principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence and its working methods of confidentiality. The ICRC is not an inter-governmental organisation either; it has its own unique and historical international humanitarian mandate to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence and to provide them with assistance.
Nobody doubts the good work of the CPA or the ICRC—we have all seen it as parliamentarians—but does the Minister understand that many of us are a little wary about conferring privileges and immunities by Order in Council after the Bill is passed, since this House is not, in general, in the habit of granting privileges and immunities without scrutiny?
The right hon. Gentleman can be assured that these are the appropriate measures. We have determined this way in line with previous discussions on the previous iteration of the Bill. This is the best way to achieve the aims of the Bill in a timely fashion, so that the provisions are put in place for the CPA and the ICRC. I am very happy to write to him further on this matter. The Bill will face scrutiny in Committee, where we will be able to discuss these matters in greater detail.
The provisions in clauses 1 and 2 will ensure that the CPA and the ICRC can be accorded comparable treatment to an international organisation, even when the definition of international organisation in existing legislation is limited to intergovernmental organisations. For the CPA, this treatment will be limited to its core international organs, such as the secretariat. It is not intended that any privileges, immunities or other facilities be extended to any of the national or sub-national branches, so this is a limited provision.
The arrangements for both organisations will detail the day-to-day management of the privileges and immunities granted on a functional needs basis, and other facilities. They will make it clear that there will be no immunity for the CPA’s secretary-general or representatives of the ICRC in respect of damage caused by, for example, a motor vehicle operated or owned by either. The way that the limitations and requirements have been set out in this regard is important.
Clause 2(1)(e) lays out an important confidentiality provision, to protect certain information provided in confidence to His Majesty’s Government by the ICRC from being disclosed in UK civil court proceedings or under any statutory provision or rule of law. As my noble Friend Baroness Chapman stated on Second Reading in the other place, this provision reflects the ICRC’s standard working method of confidentiality, which is designed to protect its staff and operations in active conflict zones. I am sure that Members will understand that publicly disclosing information that the ICRC obtains from confidential dialogue with conflict parties is likely to put at risk its ability to have confidential dialogue with conflict parties, its humanitarian access and, indeed, the security of its staff, and might result in the ICRC restricting the information it shares with the UK.
However, in relation to the concerns that Members have raised in the past, the Bill does not provide an absolute blanket exemption for disclosure requirements for all ICRC communications. Important limitations have been incorporated, such as the exclusion of criminal cases. The Government continue to be committed to respecting the confidentiality of ICRC information as a matter of policy. Past practice has demonstrated the importance of doing so. The Bill is an opportunity to end any uncertainty about the Government’s position and to put this practice on a statutory footing.
I want to turn briefly to clause 3, which is equivalent to section 8 of the International Organisations Act 1968, which allows the Secretary of State to certify questions of fact relating to the status of, or the privileges and immunities conferred on, the organisations. In the context of court proceedings, if a question arises of whether a person is entitled to any privilege or immunity by virtue of an Order in Council made under clauses 1 or 2, such a certification is to be treated as conclusive evidence of those facts for the purposes of proceedings.
Clause 4 details the scope and extent of the Orders in Council that confer privileges and immunities on both organisations under clauses 1 and 2 respectively—this relates to the intervention from the right hon. Member for South West Wiltshire (Dr Murrison). An Order in Council may make different provisions for different cases or persons, and it may also contain consequential, supplementary, incidental, transitional or saving provisions. Clause 4 also provides the enabling power for two important aspects: first, the Order in Council may specify circumstances in which privileges and immunities do not apply, either because of an exception or because they have been waived by the organisation; and secondly, the Order in Council may specify that fiscal reliefs and exemptions are subject to arrangements or conditions imposed by the Secretary of State.
Clause 4 provides that any Order in Council made for these purposes will be subject to the draft affirmative parliamentary procedure, which means that they will require the approval of both Houses before they may have effect. The list of privileges and immunities that may be conferred on both organisations is set out in the schedule to the Bill and has been informed by the International Organisations Act.
Briefly, clause 5 explains that the term “ICRC” means the International Committee of the Red Cross, as given under clause 2(1)(a), and it ensures that the definition of “statutory provision” allows for the treatment of the CPA and the ICRC as international organisations in respect of all relevant primary and secondary legislation, including devolved legislation in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland whenever made.
In conclusion, and to reiterate what was said in the other place, the Bill will give the CPA and the ICRC the correct status in UK legislation to allow both organisations to continue their international operations without unnecessary restriction. The Government have a strong commitment to the Commonwealth. It continues to support our global humanitarian objectives through our work with the ICRC, and the Bill is a true reflection of that. I hope that it will enjoy the wholehearted support of the House as it proceeds swiftly into law. I commend it to the House.
(1 year, 7 months ago)
Commons Chamber
Hamish Falconer
I thank my hon. Friend for her important question. We are absolutely clear that attacks by the IDF on UNIFIL bases must stop, and they must stop immediately. We have called on Israel to that effect. We have called on all parties to uphold their obligations in ensuring the safety and security of UNIFIL personnel. I am sure that many in this House will be looking each day at the reports from UNIFIL on the situation there. As I have said in answer to previous questions, only a political solution consistent with UN Security Council resolution 1701 can restore stability and security. We continue to raise these matters with the Israelis at every level, and I will continue to do so this week.
UNIFIL and UN Security Council resolution 1701 plainly have not prevented the construction of tunnels and forward attack positions by Iranian proxies south of the Litani river. What discussions will the Foreign Secretary be having with the United Nations to ensure that something is put in place to replace 1701, to strengthen the role of UNIFIL and prevent aggressive action by Hezbollah and its fellow travellers?
Hamish Falconer
The first thing we have to do is get Hezbollah back north of the Litani river, consistent with 1701. We should not move away from 1701 until we have made progress under it. I recognise the force of what the right hon. Gentleman says about the concerns about Hezbollah’s presence close to the Israeli border, in breach of UN Security Council resolutions. I condemn the attacks, including the missile strikes that have been happening since 8 October, and all the other violence that Lebanese Hezbollah has been responsible for. It is proscribed under UK law and we hold no truck with it, but the way to get Hezbollah away from the border is 1701, and that is what we have to stick to.
(1 year, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberMy hon. Friend makes an important point. I have repeatedly made it clear, not least in the Falklands and Gibraltar, that we stand by their sovereignty and self-determination and will defend them. Indeed, that goes for the British overseas territories family, and it is a commitment that I will be making in person when the leaders join me at the Joint Ministerial Council in a few weeks’ time.
Since no migrants have arrived in BIOT since 2022, and given that this agreement lapses after 18 months, what is the problem that the Minister is trying to solve? And given that Rwanda was apparently considered immoral and this is not, is he not simply offering an insult to Kigali?
Absolutely not. This is prudent contingency planning. Unfortunately, we inherited a situation from the previous Government where many holes had been left in these very arrangements and where there were significant problems. We are now taking steps to pragmatically address that.
(1 year, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberMy hon. Friend makes an important point. He knows, as the whole House knows, that it does not matter who is in the White House or who is in No. 10: for generations, the US and the UK have acted in concert, and the future of Diego Garcia has been central to that. It has been central to the security of the Indo-Pacific and the wider Pacific, and central to global security. The capabilities across our nations are essential. That is why it is so sad to see the Conservative party not living up to where it should be on these crucial issues of national security, which ought not to be partisan.
My old boss, Admiral Lord West of Spithead, won his Distinguished Service Cross in the Falklands in 1982. As the right hon. Gentleman will know, Lord West is a former Labour security Minister. Why does the right hon. Gentleman think that Lord West is of the view that what he is doing poses a grave security risk to this country and is likely to undermine our position in the Falkland Islands? Will he give a straight answer to my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest East (Sir Julian Lewis), who asked whether Lord Robertson had been consulted in any way over the decision that the Foreign Secretary has made?
I urge the right hon. Gentleman to read the remarks of the Chief Minister of the Falkland Islands, and I urge him to consult more widely the defence establishment in this country, which is pleased that an issue that was looking as though it might become very contentious between us and the United States in terms of global national security has now been settled.
(1 year, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe right hon. Gentleman asks an important question. I can confirm that this is the legal framework around which the programme will sit. I can also confirm that the Defence Secretary yesterday met with his Japanese counterparts at the show and they were able to have further interesting discussions. The right hon. Gentleman will be able to continue his questioning when he is surely once again a member of the Defence Committee in the autumn.
Many jobs in our constituencies depend on contracts with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which is also interested in GCAP. What conversations have been had with Saudi Arabia, particularly in the light of the procrastination by the Prime Minister on this programme—reaffirmed, if I am honest, by the Minister today in her remarks?
The right hon. Member asks an important question, but there has been no procrastination. Within a month of being elected, we have got the legal framework to the House of Commons for a debate, expediting all the important organisational arrangements so that the programme can proceed at pace. He talks of procrastination, and after 14 years, I am sure he is a master of procrastination as part of the last Government.
The privileges and immunities conferred on agency personnel and representatives are not for their personal advantage, but to ensure complete independence in the exercise of their functions in connection with GCAP. To be clear, agency personnel have no personal immunity if they commit a crime and there is a clear carve-out ensuring that they have no immunity in any vehicle incident.
The immunities in respect of the GIGO cover immunity from suit and legal process, inviolability of premises and archives, and appropriate tax exemptions and reliefs in relation to official activities. In respect of representatives of the parties and staff, the provisions cover functional immunity and an immunity waiver. Additionally, the order includes an exemption from the legal suit and process immunity in the case of a motor traffic offence or damage caused by a motor vehicle. That is a standard clause included in statutory instruments and treaties to provide for privileges and immunities.
The support for the GIGO’s establishment ensured through the order is a unique opportunity to showcase UK leadership and innovation in the air force defence industry on a global stage. Through the GIGO the UK will lead on the development of an innovative stealth fighter jet with supersonic capability and equipped with cutting-edge technology, and facilitate collaboration with key international partners that raise the profile of the UK’s combat air industrial capacity.
I congratulate you, Madam Deputy Speaker, on your victory. You will be brilliant and I look forward to serving under your chairmanship in the three or four years ahead.
May I say how very much I support the statutory instrument? I do not support the Prime Minister’s lukewarm words at Farnborough. I think the concerns we have on the Conservative Benches are to do with the hares he set running not by what he said, but by what did not say. My advice to Ministers would be, “For goodness’ sake, up the rhetoric around this.” No Government in their right mind would cancel this project. This project is not only essential to our defence; it is the bridge to the unmanned future of defence that will come by mid-century. Kick away that bridge and we are left with very little: we undermine fundamentally the defence of these islands; we destroy the reputation of this country not just with the Japanese and the Italians, but with practically any partner in defence, present and future, that we can imagine, not least the Saudis; and it means that we will not be able to successfully translate our defence industrial base to the future, which we all appreciate is largely unmanned in each of the four domains that defence these days has to consider. Words mean what words say, except when they trip from the lips of politicians. Then, it is very often what is not said that influences the conversation, particularly in the media.
My plea, in the very short time available to me, is for Ministers, senior Ministers and the Prime Minister to correct what was said this week and, in particular, to ramp up the rhetoric on our support for this fundamentally important programme that is vital to our defence and our defence base. I appreciate that the Prime Minister has a problem, in that he has failed to commit to 2.5% of GDP within a recognisable timeframe, which is no commitment at all, and he has launched a largely unnecessary defence review, which will be a distraction for at least 12 months. I am confident in the sound good sense of Lord Robertson and Richard Barrons. I cannot image that they will be party to the cancellation or delay of this programme.
(3 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am grateful to the hon. Lady for welcoming me to the Dispatch Box to answer this question. Frankly, I answer many questions on behalf of the Foreign Office, so it is not very unusual to find me at the Dispatch Box for an urgent question.
I am more than happy to respond to the hon. Lady’s letter after the debate. I will not go over many of the things that I have said before. I will say that there are a number of stories relating to the situation on the ground, and I do not want to speculate. The situation is fast-moving and fluid, and we are monitoring it very closely. The Minister responsible for South Asia, Lord Ahmad, has been working very closely on this matter and does raise human rights issues.
Clearly, the dire economic situation forced by ex-President Rajapaksa and his outfit lies at the heart of what is going on in Sri Lanka. Given Sri Lanka’s indebtedness to China and the prospect of cheap fuel from Russia, does the Minister agree that the risk is that Sri Lanka stands every chance of falling within the maw of malign jurisdictions? Will she therefore do everything in her power to ensure that the International Monetary Fund is engaged to try to sort this out, particularly given that part of the issue would appear to be uncosted, unfunded, populist and inflationary tax cuts from 2019 that I am sure the IMF will take a very severe view of?
I reassure my right hon. Friend that UK economic support is forthcoming through multilateral institutions such as the IMF.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberI remind the House that the UK has played an absolutely central role in providing military assistance to Ukraine. Indeed, only last week the Prime Minister announced a further £1 billion-worth of military support to Ukraine, and we will be adding additional cutting-edge multiple launch rocket systems. On training, which is important, over the past decade we have trained over 22,000 Ukrainian troops. I take the hon. Gentleman’s point about making sure that, where possible, there is a joint approach in the support for Ukraine, but I also point him to what was agreed at the Madrid summit last week, which was a historic agreement by all NATO partners to step up support for Ukraine and to provide it with advice, training and equipment.
I draw attention to my entry in the register.
I very much welcome this statement. Does the Minister recognise that notwithstanding Sweden and Finland’s non-aligned status, since 1997 they, along with Austria, have been active participants in NATO’s Partnership for Peace? Will she pay tribute to that programme and say which other members of Partnership for Peace she anticipates making similar overtures in the near future?
As I said in my opening remarks, Finland and Sweden have been working very closely with NATO for a considerable period. On other partners, every country has its own path towards NATO membership, and no third party has a say in that process. Ukraine, among other countries, is currently an enhanced opportunity partner, and NATO remains firmly committed to the open-door policy. I cannot be more specific at this point.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberIt is always a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak (Steve McCabe). I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick) on giving us this opportunity. I listened carefully to everything he said, and I agree with all of it.
In June 2019, I went to Tehran as Middle East Minister while Tehran was sinking shipping throughout the Gulf. I went there to remonstrate at its malign regional activities and to insist that it meet its JCPOA commitments, including the limits imposed on its enriched uranium stockpile. In hindsight, it was probably not the best use of my time; the truth is that the deal had been moribund since President Trump withdrew in 2018. Attempts to revive it have failed, and now it is comatose.
I suppose we should not turn off the life support entirely, but in my view we have no need to bust a gut trying to revive the plan. What we need is a stronger, longer deal. Indeed, with every day that passes, the JCPOA becomes less attractive: while Iran’s technical capabilities advance, the original terms become redundant and sunset clauses loom large. Some of those clauses have lapsed or shortly will—the UN arms embargo from October 2020; restrictions on ballistic missile-related goods next year; and, the year after, restrictions relating to Iran’s advanced centrifuge R&D. In 2031, the ban on weapons-grade uranium ends.
That said, we should not be seen to be a guilty party or a co-author of the plan’s coup de grâce. We have to stick with it, I suppose, to the bitter end. Iran too—at least, the potentially reconcilable part of it—wants to be perceived as keen to talk, but, with artful duplicity, says one thing and does another. The reported tenor of ongoing discussions is very much true to form. On Sunday, Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs invited poor Josep Borrell of the European Commission to Tehran. His plaintive line following the meeting was that
“the more supply of oil, the better for the energy prices.”
How pathetic is that? It looks as though the European External Action Service, in its quest for purpose and relevance, has been all too eager to swallow a pro-Iran line that conveniently gets its members out of a tight temporary fix. Not for the first time, it is grossly misreading the Iranians in a disappointing display of naivety and self-service.
Borrell’s line suggests that the EU is prepared to swap Russian for Iranian energy, so the Doha talks go on with the Americans and the Iranians, bizarrely, in separate rooms. The reality is that Iran’s demands for compensation and guarantees are intractable. Those who believe Iran will settle for a deal in order to trade with the west misread the ideological basis of the regime and its President. They seek nothing less than the complete Islamisation of society and the elimination of western influence. Tehran has no desire to be our partner, even less our friend. Let us be quite clear in separating the good and great people of Iran from the regime: the two are plainly different things, as recent shows of unrest have demonstrated, and we should encourage the one and not the other.
Meanwhile, Iran ratchets up its pressure on the international community through the expulsion of IAEA officials. The day after Borrell’s meeting in Tehran, it showcased a missile launch, and we contemplate a uranium breakout time probably in weeks, certainly not months. The Iran of 2022 is very different from the Iran of 2015. Hardliners and the IRGC have tightened their stranglehold over the state and the economy. President Raisi has populated Ministries with Guards commanders responsible for atrocious acts of terrorism. We recall, as has been recalled already today—correctly so—his participation in the 1988 death committee, and in the extrajudicial murder of some 4,000 political prisoners.
Sanctions work. Tony Blair’s Institute for Global Change has revealed that, following the first wave of sanctions relief in 2014, Iran’s terrorist and military activity increased significantly. Kasra Aarabi writes:
“The number of militias created by the IRGC surged after this period, and the Guard’s presence abroad peaked, with the Quds Force expanding its operations in Iraq, Syria and Yemen.”
If that occurred under the previous relatively benign regime, what effect will sanctions relief—estimated to mean an immediate $90 billion windfall, and as much as $800 billion over five years—have on the zealots now in control? I suggest that sanctions relief at this time would not be a good move at all.
US special envoy Rob Malley called for a “stronger and longer” deal shortly after his appointment, and he is right. Alternatively, we could offer less for less, but we cannot offer more for less. The integrated review points the way. It says:
“Alongside our allies, the UK will hold Iran to account for its nuclear activity, remaining open to talks on a more comprehensive nuclear and regional deal.”
There is no specific mention of the JCPOA, which is very sensible. If we managed to reheat the JCPOA in its current form, we would have a stop-gap agreement at best, but the prospects of definitive talks and a long-term solution led by Washington will evaporate. Iran expert Professor Ali Ansari suggests we play it cool, and I agree.
Although we should not be complacent, we should not be worried about a no-deal scenario. The Iranian regime is struggling to rid itself of Israeli infiltration, which is preventing it from advancing its nuclear apparatus and security state. We all remember the killing of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh last year. Most recently Hossein Taeb, IRGC head of intelligence, has been dismissed, and on 22 May IRGC colonel Sayyad Khodaei was shot dead outside his home.
Nobody goes to Iran without being lectured about Britain being the source of all the country’s woes; the grievance culture stoked by the regime makes the SNP look rather like rank amateurs. It is mildly flattering to think that Iran’s rulers believe we are still so influential, albeit in their minds entirely malignly. Historically, however, the villain has been seen to lie elsewhere. This debate takes place amid Putin’s imperial war. He invokes Peter the Great, by reclaiming lost territory and advancing autocracy. There is no doubt that revanchist Russia and Iran have grown closer under Putin’s leadership. It has developed from a transactional, military relationship to one of shared ideological outlook, in so far as both countries despise the western world order and its culture, have a theological sense of mission for their countries, and talk in Anglophobic terms of grievance and resistance. Their shared paranoia about democracy has grown collaboration and suppression at home—and also abroad, notably in Syria.
However, it has not always been so. Professor Ansari points out that
“the greatest sleight of hand achieved by the Russian state with respect to Iran has been to reinvent its relationship from that of imperial predator to a fully fledged member of an axis of resistance against the west.”
Indeed, there is a strong argument that Russia—certainly not Britain—has been the chief cause of historic Iranian humiliation, imposing capitulatory treaties in 1808 and 1828, which lasted until 1921. Nascent Iranian democracy was stamped out by Colonel Liakhov of the Cossack Brigade in the early 20th century, as he shelled the Majlis in Tehran and executed constitutionalists. The parallels with the present day are pretty clear.
Lord Curzon described “avowedly hostile” Russian activities in Iran, and pointed out that
“piece by piece, partly by open war and partly by furtive nibbling, Russia has appropriated more and more of Persian soil.”
There are historic continuities in the Iran-Russia relationship, namely in Iran’s junior status, and Iranian popular sentiment against Russia. The 1828 Treaty of Turkmenchay ensured that Iran became a de facto vassal state, with strictures outlining Russia’s preference for the Qajar succession. Now, as then, Iran’s presidential candidates and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps leaders court Putin for his approval. In line with that junior status, we learn from Minister Javad Zarif’s leaked audio tape on the war in Syria that Russia
“entered the war by air force, but dragged Iran’s ground force to war too. We didn’t have ground forces in Syria by then.”
It is a candid assessment of Putin’s disregard for Iranian life, and reluctance to spill blood when he can use those he sees as inferiors. We see that, too, in Putin’s feeding the Ukrainian meat grinder preferentially with troops from east of the Urals.
But if the regime wants that kind of partnership, the Iranian people do not. The popular mood in Iran is antithetical to the Russians; we have seen that most recently in protests against Russia’s invasion. Meanwhile, the regime blunders on, blaming NATO and the west, and defending Russia and the UN. Again, that bifurcation has precedent. An Iranian member of the Majlis once wrote of the
“dislike of the Persian people for the Russians,”
which was based on
“wars…cruelty and aggression…encouragement given by them to the extravagancies of the Persian court…the ascendency they had gained by promising to maintain the succession…the many concessions they had obtained from the Persian Government…the undue influence exerted by them.”
He concludes that Russia is
“the home and centre of autocracy and ancient foe of all liberal ideas.”
That was more than 100 years ago, but it resonates with us today. That is why it is so important—so imperative—for us to call this partnership out, reveal its weak foundations, learn from the past, and support the good and great people of Iran in their struggle against a wicked regime.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberIf the hon. Gentleman will allow me, I want to make a few more points.
This Bill represents a failure of statecraft and puts at risk the reputation of the United Kingdom. The arguments in support of it are flimsy at best and irrational at worst. The Bill risks economically harmful retaliation and runs the risk of shredding our reputation as a guardian of international law and the rules-based system. How in the name of heaven can we expect to speak to others with authority when we ourselves shun, at a moment’s notice, our legal obligations? A hard-won reputation so easily played with—
My hon. Friend and constituency neighbour is making a good speech. Of course, the Bill is permissive legislation; meanwhile, negotiations are ongoing. He referred to a failure of statecraft—whose failure?
Well, it seems to me that whether it disadvantages or not is not something that Her Majesty’s Government get to decide. While I am clear that there are problems with the protocol, clearly there are aspects of it that are working very well, as indeed those on the Treasury Benches have admitted. I will set out some of the examples, particularly over trade, where it is not having the impact that we are told, in all aspects, that it is. I come from the point of view that trust has been broken between the UK Government and the people of all these islands, as well as between the UK Government and our international partners. That gets right to the nub of the issues about trying to renegotiate it.
We should not really need to say this, but it is absolutely vital that the UK Government should be able to respect the international obligations that they enter into freely. Lord Butler, who was head of the civil service for 10 years, has said that this country has repeatedly criticised states like Russia and China for breaking the rules-based international order and yet now holds that it is perfectly justified in breaching international law itself. It seems that in this Bill we are going from a “limited and specific” breach to something that is potentially extensive and egregious. General Sir Richard Barrons, the former chief of joint forces command, who served in Afghanistan, Iraq and Northern Ireland, has said that
“what the government is proposing is short-sighted tactics which will do much harm strategically in the wider world. In fact what is being done is particularly stupid.”
He went on to warn that these moves will empower our adversaries as
“it will undermine us with our enemies by giving them the opportunity to accuse us of hypocrisy when we call them out for breaking the rules-based international order. It will also undermine us with our allies who will doubt whether they can rely on us to keep to an agreement, keep to our word.”
I am listening to the hon. Gentleman with a great deal of interest. He is right to defend international law and international treaties. Did he raise the concerns he has just expressed when the European Union was busy breaking those treaties—for example, over subsidies to Airbus?
It is always a great pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Bristol South (Karin Smyth), although I profoundly disagree with the implication that those of us who decided Britain’s place in the world was best served by leaving the European Union view the EU—let alone the Republic of Ireland, for goodness’ sake—as “the enemy”, to use her words. Clearly, that is not the case.
My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, who is winding up, will be spoilt for choice when it comes to commenting on speeches. If I may say so, however, in a brief period of time the right hon. Member for Lagan Valley (Sir Jeffrey M. Donaldson) pretty much nailed it with his assertion in an intervention on the hon. Member for North Down (Stephen Farry). The status quo is clearly not compatible with the Good Friday agreement and the Acts of Union, and the doctrine of necessity certainly applies in this case.
It is remarkable, is it not, that the protocol’s supporters appear to be the opposition parties, while those who drafted it and are trying to change it sit on the Conservative Benches? I also enjoyed the remarks of one or two Opposition Members who appeared trenchantly to support the other place in the hope that it will defenestrate this Bill, which I sincerely hope it fails to do. That said, though I welcome this Bill, I hope it will be improved in Committee and in the other place, and in particular that some of the swingeing powers that it gives Ministers will be clipped.
I have to say to Ministers, while assuring them of my support this evening, that I remain somewhat bewildered by their refusal to consider in a meaningful way triggering article 16. That is already available to them, and nobody has marshalled a creditable argument—certainly not one that satisfies me—that it could not or should not be done. The grounds for triggering article 16 are clearly there, in that we do not have anything approaching proper governance in Northern Ireland—not at all. Despite the May elections, the Assembly has failed to assemble and the institutions are not working.
Surely to goodness, those are grounds—the strongest grounds possible—for triggering article 16. They are far stronger, I must say, than the grounds chosen by the President of the European Commission early in 2021 to trigger this thing, albeit very briefly and ignominiously, on the grounds of trying to prevent vaccines from transiting from the Republic of Ireland to Northern Ireland.
My right hon. Friend makes a very important point. Does he agree that, from a legal perspective, if article 16 were to be triggered, at least we would be able to argue that we had used all means available to us under the protocol, as is necessary to meet the necessity test—in other words, that the state has exhausted all the options open to it before it acts unilaterally? That is exactly the value of using article 16.
I absolutely agree with that. It is argued—of course it is—that triggering article 16 is meant to be temporary. Those of us who have been around a bit realise that temporary very often turns into something far more permanent. However, that would certainly be a reasonable first step in dealing with this situation, which pretty much all of us—apart from the SDLP—agree is unsatisfactory. I am still unsure, despite the earlier remarks of my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, why the Government are not doing that. The Secretary of State, when he winds up, may like to address that.
I would also like to know where in this legislation there is a threat to the single market. Trade between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland is pretty much a rounding error—a point that has been made by others. Companies such as Sainsbury’s do not exist in the Republic of Ireland, so goods going to Sainsbury’s in Northern Ireland from GB cannot possibly land up on Sainsbury’s shelves in the Republic, because there are none. There are more checks on this border than on the border with Chile, and checks for what? It is not clear to me why we need checks at this point in time, since we have an agreement on tariffs and we have standards and regulations that have not yet had the opportunity to diverge.
Many contributors today have talked about the doctrine of necessity, but what they have not mentioned is that there is a second part to that doctrine; it is a lesser part, but it is germane nevertheless. It does not deal with grave or imminent peril; it allows parties to rescind an obligation if to do so would not
“seriously impair an essential interest of the states towards which the obligation exists or of the international community as a whole.”
Where in this Bill, and where, indeed, in triggering article 16, would the threat to the single market come from? Indeed, I would argue, as Ministers certainly have, that the Bill is helpful in many respects to the single market, and it certainly is to the internal market.
So why is the EU doing all this? Why is it not giving Mr Šefčovič the powers he needs in order to negotiate properly with, first, Lord Frost and, secondly, the Foreign Secretary? We can all suggest geopolitical reasons for not doing that, and of course some member states are perfectly happy, for their own benefit, with the status quo. The Republic of Ireland is probably rather enjoying the current export opportunities as a result of Northern Ireland being unable to get what it needs from GB. But we have to hope that the EU, even at this stage, will recognise the damage this is doing to the Good Friday agreement and the prospects of ongoing peace and harmony in Northern Ireland, and that it will, even at this late stage, consider the interests of the people of Northern Ireland first, in which case this Bill will not be needed.
The Government, in my view, signed the Northern Ireland protocol in good faith. They were entitled to receive the same back from the EU, but after 18 months it is plain as a pikestaff that that reciprocation has not happened. It is not as if there are not technical solutions to the current problems. I wrote about this in my report when I chaired the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee. It distresses me that, all this time later, nothing appears to have been done about the recommendations that I made, and that others have made subsequently, to deal with this perfectly elegantly. Of course, things may very well get worse, with the SPS offset through the movement assistance scheme likely to be viewed as ultra vires by the European Court of Justice, and the prospect of energy VAT—I hope very much that it will be reduced in GB—not being reduced in Northern Ireland, completely contrary to the Good Friday agreement and the Acts of Union.
The right hon. Member for Leeds Central (Hilary Benn), who is no longer in his place, said that the EU “needs to move”. It does, but it will not; I hope this legislation gets it moving.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe hon. Gentleman is right to point out the major world hunger issues we face as a result of Russian actions. That is why the UK and our partners have stepped up with the largest-ever World Bank financial commitment to developing countries, to support them in the face of this economic hardship that results from the appalling war in Ukraine. In our aid strategy and aid budget we have moved funding into humanitarian aid and are one of the leading funders into Ukraine, but we are also annually increasing our budget into Africa to support those countries at this very difficult time. I am in regular contact with the United States Secretary of State Tony Blinken, talking precisely about how we can provide direct support, both humanitarian and military, to Ukraine.
The geopolitical consequences of hungry people in poor countries are not lost on our NATO ally Turkey, which is preparing plans to escort merchant vessels out of Ukrainian ports using its resources. What assistance can we give the Turks in that respect, particularly given our long and distinguished history of mine clearance on land and at sea? What naval assets can we offer to assist them in their plan, and will we continue to assist efforts to ship grain overland to Baltic ports and ports in Poland, to extract grain through that route also?
I can assure my right hon. Friend that we are in talks with Turkey and our G7 allies about all the assistance we can give and all the UK resources that we can deploy, both for the sea route and, as he mentions, the rail routes. There is more that we can do to increase the capacity on those rail routes to get grain out faster, but ultimately to get the full harvest out, we need to use the sea routes as well, and that is why we are in talks with the Turks, and with our G7 allies.