(10 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberAs someone who has commanded reservist soldiers, I understand very clearly the importance of local roots and regiments having a basis in their own community. We have said that we will look carefully at the basing announcements that we have made with regard to the reserve. In particular, we will analyse those units that are especially well recruited. If we see units that are recruiting well, we may be prepared to take that into account before final decisions are made.
One of the reasons why many of us opposed the Government’s reservist reforms was the prospect of false economies. Given that the financial incentive to ex-regular reservists has recently been doubled because of poor recruitment and that other costs have increased, will the Minister update the House on the financial cost of this initiative, if not now then in writing subsequently?
It is true that there have been a number of financial incentives designed to encourage ex-regulars to join the reserves, although those incentives generally operate in a way such that those regulars have to commit for a number of years in reserve service and do not necessarily get all of that money up front. It is still highly cost effective to have reserves that can be mobilised for operations. In addition, I was at the Ten Tors Challenge on Saturday on Dartmoor, which was supported by a number of Army Reserve units. I spoke to a number of Army Reserve commanding officers, including Major-General Ranald Munro, the Deputy-Commander Land Forces and the senior reservist in the British Army. They are absolutely confident that we can hit our targets, and so am I.
(10 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberAs my right hon. Friend the Defence Secretary has said on numerous occasions, the Ministry of Defence and the armed forces cannot operate oblivious to the country’s fiscal position. However, we and the Army are quite clear that Army 2020 represents the best answers to the challenges, fiscal and otherwise, the country faces and is best placed to help us address the future.
Events such as in Crimea and the South China sea remind us of the need for strong defence. Has the time not now come for a fundamental reassessment of how much we spend on our armed forces? That figure should be increased even if white elephants such High Speed 2 have to be sacrificed along the way. We may have the fourth or fifth biggest defence budget, but we rank nearer 30th when it comes to deploying troops overseas, which is nonsense given the extent of our global interests.
My hon. Friend might want to turn up to Treasury questions in the near future and ask the same question. In the meantime, as he mentions overseas deployments, he might be interested to hear that last week I visited 2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers in Cyprus, in which I know he takes a strong interest. I can report to him and the House that despite difficult circumstances its members are in good order. The planning for the merger of the two regiments of the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers is almost complete and a number of soldiers in the 2nd Battalion have expressed interest in remaining in the Army. We are seeking to facilitate that wherever possible.
(10 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe plan to replace 20,000 regulars with 30,000 reservists is beset with problems, including more than £50 million wasted on a botched IT system, missed recruitment targets, cancelled reserve courses and a widening capability gap. Given that the previous Secretary of State recently confirmed in this House that the original plan was to hold the regulars in place until the reservists were able to take their place, can this Secretary of State inform the House why and when that plan changed?
First, my hon. Friend continually asserts, and I continually rebut, the idea that we are trying to replace 20,000 regular soldiers with 30,000 reservists— that is not what we are doing. We are restructuring the regular force; the regular force will be smaller. We will use civilians in a different way from how we have used them in the past. We will use contractors more effectively, learning the lessons, particularly from the US experience of using contractors to support combat operations. We will also use reservists, but it is simply wrong for him to suggest that this is a straightforward swap of 20,000 regulars replaced by 30,000 reservists. That is not how it works.
My hon. Friend knows very well the answer to the second part of his question: there is not the budgetary capacity to maintain the Regular Army at 102,000 while building the reserve to 30,000 by 2018. That simply cannot be done without imposing new and unwanted cuts elsewhere.
(10 years, 10 months ago)
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That is precisely what I am doing. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman should remind himself that the initial gate business case for this project to outsource recruiting was approved in July 2008, so I hope we are not in dispute over the principle.
The hon. Gentleman mentioned an IT debacle. Yes, there are big problems with the IT and I have told the House on repeated occasions that we have IT challenges. There are problems with IT in Government. The hon. Gentleman speaks as if he was not a member of the Government who spent £13 billion on a health computer system that we had to write off and £400 million on a work and pensions computer system that had to be written off.
What we are doing now is gripping this problem and addressing it. That means, in the short term, workarounds and putting additional manpower into the system to provide additional support. Short-term solutions include the new front-end web application, which will go live over the next two weeks, to improve the experience of applicants accessing the platform.
The hon. Gentleman asked about the costs and I can give him some figures. The Capita solution will cost about £47.7 million to produce a full new IT platform. The alternative Atlas IT platform proposal would have cost about £43 million, so the additional cost of the Capita solution is about £4.5 million. He asked about the £15.5 million of sunk cost. Our initial estimate is that about £6.7 million of that represents costs that will have to be written off, but that will be subject to a proper audit process.
The hon. Gentleman asked about the additional cost—the running cost, as it were—of the interim solution that we have put in place. It comprises additional payments that have to be made and the cost of the additional manpower that has been delivered into the system. That is currently running at about £1 million per month. The solution that we have adopted and that we have now approved—going ahead with Capita platform and placing the integration risk back on Capita—is judged to be the quickest way of eliminating that ongoing expenditure and the best way of delivering a permanent solution for the benefit of the Army and the taxpayer.
I again suggest to the Secretary of State that plans to replace 20,000 regulars with 30,000 reservists will cost much more than the Government envisage, leading to false economies and a waste of taxpayers’ money. Given the tens of millions of pounds already wasted on this IT shambles, will he outline how much more it will cost to put it right? Does this not reinforce the point that the Government should now halt and stop the disbandment of regular units until we are sure that the plan to replace them with reservists is both cost-effective and feasible?
Let me deal with the cost point first. The overall programme, the Capita recruiting partnership project, has a budget of about £1.3 billion over a 10-year period. As I have just outlined, the additional cost of the IT platform is estimated to be £47.7 million.
Repeating the question that he has asked many times, my hon. Friend asked whether it is appropriate to replace 20,000 regular soldiers with 30,000 reservists. That is not what we are doing; we are changing the shape of the British Army and we are changing the role of reservists, whom we intend to fill specialist roles and provide resilience in the case of a prolonged future deployment. He makes a regular versus reserve point, but I should be clear with him that the recruiting platform is used for regular and reserve recruitment: it affects both regulars and reservists.
(10 years, 11 months ago)
Commons ChamberThe King’s centre for military health research, among others, is expert in the field. Professor Sir Simon Wessely is not only nationally but internationally renowned as a great authority on the subject. When veterans present with PTSD, which can be some years after they have left the service, we find that sometimes, because of a trigger event, the symptoms begin to emerge quickly and the challenge is to reach those people rapidly and to begin to give them help when they need it. We are talking to the NHS about how we can do that even better than we do now and we hope to make some further announcements about the progress we are making.
The charity Combat Stress has suggested that reservists are twice as likely to suffer from mental health issues and PTSD than regular soldiers or, indeed, the population at large. Will the Minister confirm that those potential costs have been factored in to the new Army Reserve costings?
It is true that reservists returning from operations have a slightly higher rate of incidence of PTSD than regular personnel, but according to my last briefing on the subject the rate is only about 1% to 1.5% higher. I am afraid that I do not agree with the analysis that it is twice as likely. My hon. Friend might not agree with me, but, if he wants, he can pop down and see Professor Sir Simon Wessely and have a word with him about it.
(11 years ago)
Commons ChamberI am most grateful to my right hon. Friend for his tribute. I understand how strongly he and a number of other Members feel about the timing of the decision. However, although he and I—and, I am sure, the Secretary of State in his private heart of hearts—would like more money to be spent on defence, it is a question of the cash envelope within which any Government are likely to operate. If we wound up the whole Territorial Army tomorrow, it would be possible to pay for only 6,000 or 7,000 regulars rather than 20,000, and that would mean losing most of our medical capability as well as a number of other benefits.
I accept what my hon. Friend has said about the MOD’s cash envelope, but surely this comes down to national priorities. The plan was not to wind down the regulars to such a degree without first ensuring that the reservists could take their place, but the plan has changed. None of the new clauses and amendments is asking for extra money from the MOD. It is, as I have said, a question of national priorities: it is a question of whether more money should be committed to defence, which is the first priority of Government.
I will respond to my hon. Friend’s intervention, but I hope he will forgive me if I leave it for a couple of minutes. I shall deal briefly with new clause 2, and then I shall come to his new clause.
Ever since Haldane, the reserve properties of the Army, but not all those of the other two services, have been managed largely by the RFCA. The fact is that the Defence Infrastructure Organisation—or the Defence Estates, as it used to be called—has a poor track record. There are so many quotations available that I am spoilt for choice, but according to the latest report from the National Audit Office,
“Defence Estates is not well placed to weigh up and challenge Budget Holders assessments of estate requirements.”
While I am certain that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and his team will sort out the problems, two quite different jobs are involved. We do not want an organisation whose job is to look after super-garrisons to be worrying about repairing the roof of a cadet hut. The vast number of locations—2,500—across which reserves and cadets are spread need to be looked after by a local organisation with local feel, which can call on local expertise, often free of charge, and which, above all, has a low overhead. As I have said, new clause 2 could not become law, but I wanted to put those points on the record.
I now come to the new clause tabled by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron), who has fought a very good-tempered campaign, and one that I respect although I disagree with him. It is no secret that I stepped down as a Cabinet Parliamentary Private Secretary 20 years ago because I was unhappy about “Options for Change”. I would dearly love to see more money spent on defence, and I know that my hon. Friend would as well, but the reality is that the money is not there. Despite all the Secretary of State’s battles, the fact remains that no Treasury team that is likely to take charge will give us more money. The effect of my hon. Friend’s new clause would be not to guarantee a larger Regular Army, but to devastate our attempts to rebuild the reserve forces by putting them all on hold.
My hon. Friend must be familiar with his own wording. Are we to push to one side the plans for better training and better equipment? Are reservists, many of whom have served on operations and have struggled through a difficult period with no kit and no training, suddenly to be told. “This has all been put on hold, because the House of Commons wants it all to be looked at again”? The people to look at it are the RFCAs, and the Secretary of State has generously said that he will arrange for that to happen.
My hon. Friend is being very generous in giving way, and I appreciate the tone in which he is setting out his case, but may I address his central point by reminding him that the delay or postponement—the pause—need not be long at all because the report could be laid before Parliament the day after the Bill becomes an Act, and then it is up to the Government to decide how promptly we can scrutinise that report? The pause may not be long at all, and as for all the other comments about wrecking amendments and that this would turn the plans upside down, they are wide of the mark—they are Aunt Sallies—that do not do the Government’s cause any good.
I am a signatory to new clause 1, and I want to make a simple statement about its power. It will provide an independent element to the scrutiny of the whole process that comes back to Parliament. The debates that we will now have about new clause 3 and other things must be based on the truth on the ground; they must be based on the reality and an understanding so as to inform the decision making properly. This amendment is about doing that and also about cementing consent from the public and involvement of the public in building the consensus that we require to develop the quality of reserve recruitment into the Army, RAF and Navy and to make a whole force that is properly integrated. If we do not have that consent, we will not achieve that. If the amendment helps to provide that, it will be valuable and important. I am glad some Damascene conversion has taken place and the Government have now recognised the sense in accepting the amendment.
New clause 3 and consequential amendments tabled in my name and those of other hon. Members will, if successful, postpone the implementation of the Government’s reservist plans until their viability and cost-effectiveness have been scrutinised and accepted by Parliament. I should clarify what these amendments are not about, because a number of Aunt Sallys have been proposed by various interested parties. Contrary to some claims and implications, these are not wrecking amendments; they are not designed to scupper, reverse or tear up the Army reserve plans, and they are certainly not an attempt to recreate, or go back to, Victorian-style and size armies. These arguments are Aunt Sallys that do not do the Government’s cause any good.
I also want to make it clear that if these amendments are passed the delay to the Army reserve plans could be kept to an absolute minimum if the Government allowed prompt scrutiny of the report. There is no intention to drag this out or turn it into a campaign that goes on for months and months. The report could be produced the day after the Bill becomes an Act and we could have a debate in this place within weeks. I have to say that the stories that this is scuppering the Army reserve plans or reversing them are very wide of the mark.
As the House may imagine, my hon. Friend and I have discussed these issues at some length. I think he will acknowledge that while a debate could be held in short order the requirement is for the Government to carry the House at the end of that debate. Will my hon. Friend acknowledge that the Government would have to get that vote through before we could progress with the reserves agenda, and setting out that hurdle today would send a negative signal to the reserves community, which has heard a message of reinvigoration and growth for the future?
I will very directly answer both those questions. I completely agree that the report the Government would submit would be subject to the scrutiny of this House and a vote, but the fact that the Secretary of State seems concerned about that points to a bigger story about the reforms. If the Government are concerned that they might not carry the House as to the logic of their report, I suggest that that shows a weak point. I therefore suggest that the Secretary of State should, perhaps, not pursue that argument for too long, because for the Government not to accept this amendment because they are concerned they might not be able to carry the House tells a bigger story.
I am very concerned about that point because if the Government are saying they think they have real problems with this and they might not carry Parliament, the Executive are trying to implement something that Parliament does not approve of, and that is totally unacceptable.
I agree with my hon. Friend. The restructuring of other areas of government, such as the NHS, has been subject to the scrutiny of this place, yet here we are undertaking a major restructuring—the Secretary of State cannot disagree with that—of the Army and we are not prepared to subject it to that scrutiny, apparently for fear that we might not carry the House. It is not a very good reason.
Surely, this is a common sense approach, and to say it will cause confusion among the reserves is borderline ridiculous, because they are quite capable of rationalising things for themselves.
I very much agree. I sometimes think in this place, where there is no shortage of former serving soldiers, that Front Benchers can be a little too sensitive about how stoical troops are. Their job is to get on with it, particularly if they are professional soldiers. They know these debates are taking place, but they get on with the job in hand, because that is what they are paid to do.
Would my hon. Friend not accept, though, that there is no attempt to avoid scrutiny here? By indicating that I will accept the intention of our hon. Friends’ new clause 1 and legislate to require an annual independent report—not for a limited period, but as a permanent arrangement—we are in effect creating a mechanism whereby annually the House will receive a progress report on the state of the reserves, and I would expect the House to debate that progress report. That will provide the level of scrutiny that he seeks. What we cannot accept is the destabilisation of the programme that introducing an artificial hurdle—
Order. Interventions need to be brief. The Secretary of State is an experienced Member of the House, and he knows that. Also, it would be good if he addressed the whole House, particularly the Chair, not just the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron).
What the Secretary of State cannot get away from, however, is that this is not that sort of report. It would be the equivalent of a speech to the House followed by questions; it would not be subject to proper parliamentary scrutiny and a vote. We are talking about proper scrutiny of the plans. We know that things are not going well. Reservist recruitment targets are being badly missed, TA numbers are falling, there is a widening capability gap as a result and we have deviated from the original plan, as was just clearly confirmed by the former Secretary of State, my right hon. Friend the Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox); the original plan was to maintain the regulars until the reservists could take their place, but that has now been scrapped, and as we keep missing the reservist recruitment targets, the capability gap gets ever wider. These are legitimate questions that we in Parliament should be asking, and we need proper scrutiny of the answers the Government are giving. At the end of the day, that is all we are asking for.
As I have said, the report on its own is not enough, because we need proper scrutiny and a vote in the House, and if it does not bear scrutiny, perhaps that tells a wider story. A number of us, on both sides of the House, have tabled these amendments because we have deep-seated concerns that we believe have not been adequately addressed by the Government. I take no pleasure from saying this, but that includes the response to a well-attended general debate in the Chamber only a few weeks ago, when the Government could not muster one single vote in support of their position. One reason was that we put forward a series of questions, but very few, if any, answers came back.
The hon. Gentleman’s points about scrutiny might be well-intentioned, but new clause 3 talks about further implementation of the plans being halted. What would be the implication for the process already under way of giving reservists access to the armed forces pension scheme? What signal would it send to our reservists if we practically halted the implementation of a widely supported measure to give them better pension provision?
My hon. Friend will just have to accept that we are suggesting a brief pause. Why should Parliament not be able to ask for a brief pause in a process that is clearly not going to plan, with recruitment targets being missed, an ever-widening capability gap and rising costs? If we all accept that defence is the first duty of Government, which I know we do, it is incumbent on Parliament to ask these questions.
My hon. Friend is making some perfectly sensible points, many of which I agree with, and I entirely agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury (Mr Brazier) that his campaign has been conducted in an extremely measured way. My difficulty with his new clause is that I think it addresses a point he is not that interested in. I think he wants to reduce or stop the running down of the regulars, yet, so far as I can see, his new clause would stop the beneficial changes to the reserves that all of us—including him, I suspect—want to see.
If I could just answer the question. I thank my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot) for his kind words, but let us be clear: there have been three major tranches of redundancies in the regulars already. I think a fourth one is due shortly, although I do not know the Secretary of State’s exact intention on that. The plan to replace 20,000 regulars with 30,000 reservists essentially hinges on our ability to recruit those reservists, but the plan is clearly in trouble, and if we do not stop now, if only briefly, to re-examine the logic and ensure it stands up and properly scrutinise the viability and cost-effectiveness of the plan and the widening capability gap, we risk heading towards false economies and unacceptable capability gaps, which people will not thank us for. It is not unwise, therefore, to say, “Pause briefly and let Parliament properly scrutinise these plans.”
I have just received another text from a Royal Air Force reservist that reads, “A pause will cause widespread concern”. The problems with recruitment are not about footfall, as I set out in my speech. What message does my hon. Friend have for the officers in a reserve unit who have seen the regular recruitment apparatus block up and wreck their ability to enlist people and who are now being told to stop once more, just as things are starting to move again?
To save my hon. Friend mentioning texts and e-mails a third time, I can assure him that I have no shortage of texts and e-mails from reservists and members of the TA saying, “Yes, you’re absolutely right. These plans are not working and it would be right to pause and examine them again.” I will happily swap those with him after the debate.
On the effect of my new clause on the morale of the TA, let us consider the present situation. The latest figures, which came out last Thursday, show TA numbers falling, not rising, despite all the expensive recruitment programmes. Then we have the figures—and they are not full figures either; some of them were actually missing—for reserve recruitment going forward. I can tell my hon. Friend that it has got to such a state that the Army Reserve and TA courses scheduled for next January and February have had to be cancelled owing to a lack of recruits. The Secretary of State may be willing to check that, because I heard it very recently in one—in fact, more than one—of the texts and e-mails that my hon. Friend keeps mentioning. That shows the current state of recruitment. I therefore suggest to my hon. Friend that there are fundamental problems with this plan and it is only right that Parliament should scrutinise it more carefully.
I am a practical individual. In my lifetime, I have lost hundreds of full-time jobs within the armed forces in my constituency, with the latest losses due to air traffic control at Prestwick moving down to Swanwick. That means that there is not a single full-time job within our armed forces in my constituency, whereas before there were hundreds, yet there is still a recruitment centre. What chance is there of recruiting full-time members of the armed forces in my constituency when we have closed down the whole position as regards full-time jobs?
I hear what the hon. Gentleman says, but I am focusing my remarks on the reservists—that is what the Bill is about—rather than full-time regulars. I suggest that we could very easily reverse the cuts to the regulars because, as things stand, more people are willing to become regular soldiers than reservists.
My hon. Friend is of course right that anecdotally one can prove anything. Nevertheless, I will tell him a story from half an hour ago. The last reservist I dealt with before coming to the debate—he is one of the cleverest members of the TA and the kind of person who should be its future—has a brother trying to join the TA who, for 13 months, has had his paperwork lost in the hopeless regulars system. While the TA is trying to struggle with that, it is grossly unfair to tell it that we are putting all this on hold too.
I completely disagree; it is not grossly unfair at all. In fact, my hon. Friend highlights the fact that we have fundamental problems with the way the system works. If people are having to wait 13 months for computer systems to talk to each other, then that, if anything, reinforces the case that we should be saying, “Let us pause for a moment and properly scrutinise these plans.” That is all we are asking for.
I have acknowledged in this House recently and shall do so again later that we have challenges in the recruitment pipeline and problems with the IT systems. We cannot wait until next May to deal with them—we are dealing with them now on a daily, weekly basis. The senior management at the Department and the senior leadership of the Army are all over these problems; they cannot wait until next year for my hon. Friend’s pause.
My right hon. Friend is ascribing a victory to me before it has taken place. The bottom line is that the new clause, like the Bill, would not take effect until the Act receives Royal Assent in the spring of next year. If he is as confident as he says that this is all going to work out, then he has until the spring of next year, before the Bill becomes an Act, to work on these problems. So I do not buy that one either, I am afraid—it is a not a particularly strong card to play when the new clause, like the Bill, would not take effect until the Act receives Royal Assent.
My hon. Friend talks a great deal about pausing, scrutinising and thinking, but would it not be more accurate to say that he has already reached his conclusion and that he wishes to increase the size of the Regular Army? If so, will he confirm that and explain how he intends to pay for it?
I disagree with my hon. Friend. The intention behind the new clause is very straightforward; it does what it says on the can. These plans are not working and a series of things are going wrong, and it merely says, “Let’s pause for a moment to make sure that the plans stand up to scrutiny in terms of viability and cost-effectiveness so that rising costs do not lead to false economies and we are not opening up ever-widening capability gaps.” I am afraid that my hon. Friend is not quite fair in ascribing such a motive to me.
One of the first questions I would like the Secretary of State to answer is why the plan has changed. As we heard from the former Secretary of State in his own words—it came from his mouth, not mine—the original plan was that the regulars would be held at their current level until the reservists were able to take their place. That plan has changed. To return to a point that several Members have already made, by the end of last year a good number of the regulars had already gone—the final tranche may be next year; we are not sure—and by the end of next year most of the regular units and battalions will have been disbanded. Meanwhile, the reservists are not due to reach adequate strength to take their place until 2018, if present plans are met, but there is every indication that, because we are struggling, we will not even achieve that. That was not the original plan, as the former Secretary of State said. It would be good if, for once, we could get an adequate answer to this question, because we have asked it many times in this House and have not got one.
Let me talk about the recruitment problems. Last Thursday, figures confirmed yet again that TA numbers are in decline—not rising, but in decline. We also know that the Army Reserve recruitment targets are being badly missed, as confirmed in a spate of reports, some derived from leaked MOD documents. Figures due last Thursday regarding Army Reserve recruitment were not released in full. It is clear that the required recruits are not coming forward and that computer problems have added to the problems, as confirmed by my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury (Mr Brazier). As everybody can imagine, there has been no shortage of texts and e-mails about this debate, and I have learned in such messages from the north-east that raw recruits to the Reserve have been told that it could take up to 15 months for them to get into uniform once they sign up. These are the sorts of delays we are talking about and which Parliament has every right properly to scrutinise. As even the Secretary of State may not be aware, the Army Reserve courses for January and February have had to be cancelled in their entirety because of lack of recruits. The fact that the Government are offering significant payments to businesses underlines the reluctance of many businesses, particularly smaller businesses, to let valued and key employees go on more frequent and extended deployments. All that is part of the cycle which in itself is adding to costs.
Our concerns are not just about reserve targets not being met; we also have deep-seated concerns about the resulting capability and manpower gaps, which are getting worse as we miss the reserve recruitment targets. Let us take as an example the mobilisation rate. At present, the MOD confirms that the TA mobilisation rate is 40%. In other words, for every 100 reservists there are on paper, the MOD deems that 40 are deployable. That can be to do with fitness, kit, sickness or all sorts of reasons. In order to make the Army Reserve plans work, the mobilisation rate has to double from 40% to 80%. I see nothing in the plans about how that massive increase in the mobilisation rate can be justified or whether it has been costed. It is a massive ask to go from 40% to 80% mobilisation. These questions need to be answered.
There are also concerns about the plan risking capability gaps. The nature of conflict is changing. Many countries that are not necessarily friendly to the west are increasing their military spending, and war is becoming more asymmetrical. Gone are the days of binary conflicts involving good guys versus bad guys—terrorism has ensured that things are much more complex nowadays—and we need professional, mobile, high-readiness, agile forces that are ready to respond to the threats that we face.
My hon. Friend is making an interesting argument. At its core is whether those on the Front Bench made a promise to increase the size of the TA before the regulars were downsized. Did he ever hear the Secretary of State say that he would guarantee that that number of reservists would be recruited before the regulars were downsized by the proposed number?
I am pleased that my hon. Friend has asked that question. It completely misses the point, and illustrates the weakness of the Front-Bench position. I am not saying for one moment that the present Secretary of State has said anything other than what he has said. My point is that the plan under the previous Secretary of State was very different only two years ago. I do not want to labour this point, but we heard from my right hon. Friend the Member for North Somerset no more than half an hour ago that the original plan was not to wind down the regulars until the reservists were able to take their place. We heard that from his own lips. I do not want to enter into a war of words between the present and former Secretary of State, but we know that the plan has changed over the past couple of years, and that is another reason for scrutinising it.
Going back to the cost of deploying reservists, the Government have said that they want to increase the percentage who are deployable at any given time from 40% to 80%. “Deployable” does not necessarily mean that they would be ready to be deployed in theatre, however. In many cases, it will mean that they are ready to begin training. I had five months of additional training before I was deployed in theatre. That kind of training involves additional costs, as does the reservist award, so this is not quite as clear-cut as the Secretary of State suggests.
I completely agree with my hon. Friend. To double the mobilisation is a big enough challenge. The plan represents a fundamental change in another respect, which provides a further reason to scrutinise it in some detail. I am proud to have served alongside TA soldiers, but the bottom line is that they were in large part in-filling. We helped each other along.
Will my hon. Friend give way?
I will not, if my hon. Friend does not mind; I am responding to another intervention.
Those TA soldiers were in-filling, but let us not forget that part of the present plan is to deploy reservists as units. That is very different from what has happened before; it represents yet another whole-scale change to the plan. It is therefore only right that we should scrutinise it in detail.
I thank my hon. Friend for giving way. I apologise for being late; I have been upstairs in the Northern Ireland Select Committee. What impact would my hon. Friend’s amendment have on the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines, both of which play a significant role in my constituency? They have already been the subject of significant cuts, and the Army appears to be being protected as a special case.
I have made it clear that I shall be taking no more interventions. I think that hon. Members would agree that I have been quite generous in that regard, and I shall now move on because I know that others want to speak. We also need to address another important group of amendments.
The Government’s Army Reserve plans raise many questions on recruitment problems, assumed mobilisation rates and rising costs which could lead to false economies, but one of my greatest concerns is the ever-widening capability gaps that could result from the proposals. If passed, new clause 3 would confirm that the time had come for Parliament properly to scrutinise the Government’s plans. There comes a stage in any struggling project when the evidence and common sense suggest, and perhaps demand, a rethink. We have reached that stage with these plans.
If the Government are confident about their plans—that is what Ministers claim, and I have no problem with that—they should not be afraid of the new clause. Let them present their plans to Parliament, and if their case is as strong as they think it is, Parliament will allow the plans to be passed and the reforms will carry on as intended. However, I urge all Members to support new clause 3 and consequential amendments 3 and 4. I shall seek to press new clause 3 to a vote.
I offer profound congratulations to the hon. Member for Canterbury (Mr Brazier), not just for the concession he has achieved today but for the formidable way he has pursued this issue over the years. He harassed me when I was in office—I perhaps remember that with a fondness I never felt at the time—and has continued to harass his own Government and the defence establishment on the issue of the reserves and the role they can play in the country’s defence. No matter who wants to claim credit for some of the changes now being brought about, he can feel real satisfaction at something very few Back Benchers can say they have been able to do: profoundly to change a significant area of Government policy. He has most certainly done that through his work on the reserves over the years.
I totally support the hon. Gentleman’s new clause 1 and am enormously pleased that the Secretary of State has accepted it. I also support new clause 3, and I have to say that I believe the Secretary of State is being a little heavy-handed in suggesting that to support it is somehow to sabotage the direction of the Army or to play politics with the defence of the realm. I say that as a former Secretary of State who had to put up with allegations by the then loyal Opposition that I had deliberately delayed life-saving vehicles getting to our troops in Afghanistan. It is enormously important—particularly in the field of defence, where there is such a degree of cross-party support—that the Government’s own defence of their policies is somewhat measured, but I am not at all sure it has been in this regard. We can all read: we can see what new clause 3 says and does not say. As I say, my respect for the hon. Member for Canterbury is about as high as an Opposition Member’s can be for a Government Member, and I have not heard from him, or from anybody else here today, anything to suggest that the new clause does all the terrible things it is said to bring about.
New clause 3 calls for a report within a particular time frame after the Bill has been enacted, and a pause if Parliament does not accept it. It does no more than that. The hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) may have an agenda that is not mine—I do not know—because I support the general direction of policy in this area wholeheartedly. This development could bring about huge improvements in capability. I see nothing to justify the counter-argument that is being made.
From memory, I believe it came after that decision, but I cannot be certain. It was a good thing for the then Secretary of State to say. Quite apart from that, it is a good thing for Governments to keep their promises. However, I thought I should briefly tell the House why I shall be voting with the Government tonight. First, as my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury (Mr Brazier) said, although new clause 3 highlights the problem, it does not provide the answer. I think that what my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay really wants to achieve is not the halting of changes to the reserves, but the halting of changes to the regulars, which his proposal does not mention.
My proposal does not mention the regulars because the Bill is about the reservists. A couple of hon. Members have suggested motives for these proposals which I cannot agree with. The bottom line is that most of those regulars—this is my understanding and I am willing to stand corrected—have been disbanded in any case. Let me be clear about what my proposal says, because motives that I do not take kindly to are being attributed to it. The proposal is about saying that these plans are not working and we should take time, if only a brief amount of it, to scrutinise them properly to check for their viability and cost-effectiveness. That is the right thing to do—
Order. The hon. Gentleman has now made his point several times in one intervention, so I call James Arbuthnot.
I must apologise to my hon. Friend for having entirely failed to cover in my few remarks about why I am supporting the Government the issue of SMEs, which are of less relevance to this reservist issue than larger companies. None the less, my hon. Friend makes a perfectly sensible point, and I hope that he will be able to make it again later during the course of the debate.
I said that there were a number of things that my hon. Friend had said and would be saying with which I entirely agree, and that is one of them. That was a peroration, so I had better sit down.
I do not think it is for me to say that. I am not advocating a pause. It is my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay who is doing so and he has told us that he thinks it all could be done in a matter of months. We have to understand what the Chief of the General Staff has said. There is a process under way.
I have talked to my commanders in Aldershot, about whom I am very proprietorial: the Secretary of State may think they are his commanders, but actually they are mine. The Army has taken this on the chin and said, “Right, this is the political remit we’ve been given. We salute, turn right, march off and do the bidding of the politicians.” Whether they think it is right or not, they do it and they are doing it now. Putting this spanner in the works will not hold back the run-down of the regular Army; it will create a run-down in the whole Army structure. As everyone knows, I am a light blue, but we are talking essentially about the Army.
I give way to my hon. Friend, because I have made some observations about his position.
I thank my hon. Friend for giving way. Those who say that we are trying to reverse the Army Reserve plans are completely wide of the mark. I recommend that one or two Members actually look at the wording of the new clause. It is very simple. It basically proposes a pause while we examine whether rising costs will lead to false economies and whether we are opening up unacceptable capability gaps. The pause could be very short if the Government allow prompt scrutiny of the report. It need only take a few weeks: the report could be produced immediately after the Bill gains Royal Assent and we could have a debate and vote in this House within weeks.
I appreciate my hon. Friend’s position, but I am afraid to say that we will just have to disagree. I think it would have a destabilising, adverse effect. My hon. Friend has not made the situation clear. What would happen if we initiated his proposed process, scrutinised the plan and the House then rejected it? Where would we be then? Would the House go back to square one and trade alternative views—perhaps even within our own parties—while in the meantime the whole thing implodes and melts down?
In direct answer to that question, if the plans do not bear scrutiny in this place, that tells us that we should not be doing it in the first place and suggests a much bigger story that the plans are not working. The argument that this place cannot scrutinise something because we are afraid it will not pass the test of scrutiny is a particularly weak one, and I would suggest that we do not promote it for those who genuinely want to defeat the new clause.
My hon. Friend is a gallant and, indeed, very honourable friend, but party politics do come into this from time to time. I cast no aspersions on the shadow Secretary of State, the hon. Member for Gedling (Vernon Coaker), but it is a fact that, sometimes, if the Opposition see an opportunity to defeat the Government, they will use it. That is the way in which our system works, notwithstanding what the shadow Secretary of State has said about the general cross-party agreement on defence. Such agreement never existed when I first came to the House in 1983, so it is refreshing to debate matters in a much more intelligent way than in the mid-1980s.
I will conclude, because others wish to speak. We are not where I particularly would like to be, but the Army is to be commended for its professional approach. My hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury is also to be commended for the lead he has given. Our duty now is to crack on and make this work and, in the meantime, to address some of the longer-term structural issues as we approach the 2015 strategic defence review. I put my right hon. Friends on notice that I want the Conservative party to commit to giving more money to defence and it has to come out of the aid budget or any other budget—frankly, I do not care which. I think that the world is a dangerous place and we need our armed forces. The world has seen how professional they are. They are the finest armed forces in the world and they really can deliver what the Prime Minister wants, which is for this country to help shape the world in which we find ourselves.
I am grateful for that intervention. Recruitment in the Province was always good—despite the troubles—and I hope that it is even better now.
I commend my hon. Friend for all his good work on behalf of the regular armed forces in this place, but with the greatest of respect his point that the MOD budget has to be cut because of the financial constraints does not quite ring true because other Departments have escaped the cuts. It is a question of national priorities. Does he agree?
I always feel instinctively uneasy when anyone says, “With the greatest of respect,” because it almost certainly means, “With no respect at all.” Of course, I agree with my hon. Friend: of course, we would all love the budgets to be as they were; of course, many of us would like the aid or other budgets cut, possibly in favour of defence; of course, those of us who believe passionately in defence would like to see the defence of the realm maintained as it has been for the past many years; of course, we would like us to achieve the NATO target of spending 2% of GDP—or even the NATO target of spending 2.5%—of GDP on defence, but this is realpolitik and those things are not going to happen.
I will leave that to one side for a moment. We all start from the position of regretting the cuts but realising the reasons for them. On the reserve forces, we all hope the plans in place work. We are all committed to making them work and believe that the reserve forces have done a superb job. In recent years, and as long ago as the first world war, they have made a gigantic contribution to the defence of the realm, and we strongly support that. Everyone in the Chamber is deeply concerned about whether the 20,000 regular soldiers will be replaced by the increase in the TA that is posited. Of course, we are concerned about that, about the recruitment figures and about whether the Secretary of State’s plans will work out. Those are common positions. I suspect that not one person in the Chamber would disagree.
The disagreement arises when we consider what to do about it. The Regular Army is already at about 86,000 or 87,000. By early February, it will be at about 82,760. The redundancy notices have gone out. People are already on their leaving training and getting ready to leave the regular forces. We cannot reverse that. No matter what we do in the Chamber today, there is no magic wand that will reverse it. By the middle of January, the Army will be at 82,760 soldiers. Regret it as we may, we cannot reverse that. The second thing for certain is that, whether or not we have confidence it will work, we will have to set about increasing the size of the reserve forces, their training and their equipment so that they can replace the lost regulars. Those two things are certainties, and regret them as we may, they are going to occur.
The question, therefore, is: what do we do about it? That is the nature of this debate, and it seems to me that there are two possibilities. The first thing we could do, as my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) seeks to do—I have to admit that I signed his new clause 3—is to write our aims and concerns into legislation. In recent years we have done that in this House on a number of occasions—for example, with regard to the green carbon targets and reducing child poverty. In such cases, there is a law that says, “The Government will do this or do that,” and if it does not achieve those aims there will be some penalty to pay. It is therefore perfectly possible that we could do what my hon. Friend seeks to do by writing into legislation—the law of the land—something that says that the Government will improve our reserve forces in the way described. The alternative approach would be to do what we do with regard to every single thing in this place—to scrutinise what the Government are doing in questions and debates in this Chamber, in Westminster Hall and in Select Committees. We can do that in a variety of ways.
I am very encouraged by the fact that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State tells me that because of my hon. Friend’s new clause and this debate, he, the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Defence as a whole have been entirely focused on this matter for a number of days. That means we have achieved one of the things we wanted to achieve. We have said to the nation as a whole—it has been wall to wall in the media—that we are deeply concerned about these cuts in defence spending, about the fact that we have an Army of 82,000 that may not be able to do its job, and about whether the re-growing of the Territorial Army will actually occur. However, should we take the further step of writing those concerns into legislation?
I agree with what my hon. Friend said about nation building. He had his opportunity to adjudicate on the Government’s nation building when we had the Afghanistan vote in 2010. Does he not accept that what we are arguing for here is a very brief pause—it does not have to be a long pause—and the longevity of that pause is in the Government’s gift?
I do not wish to quote my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot), but my peroration was somewhat interrupted by that intervention.
Above all, it seems important that our relationship with the reserves is characterised by one word, which is “seriousness”. We need a plan, a direction and a confidence of Government, and that will turn around recruitment. People do not join the reserves for exactly how many days they serve, for how much money they receive or for the pension terms they get. They join because they feel that it matters: Government are serious about them, Parliament is serious about them and we know where we are going. The reason I will not vote for new clause 3 is that it passes exactly the wrong model at exactly the time when we should be moving forward with the wonderful work of my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury and producing the excitement and the vision that we require. Another muddle and another conversation would be catastrophic.
I am afraid that I do not have time to give way to the hon. Gentleman. Of course, Labour also cut TA training completely in 2009, so it is difficult to take lessons from Labour Members. It is opportunistic to join this argument now, as others have said.
I think that my hon. Friend has inadvertently misrepresented what I said. I was commenting on the previous Secretary of State’s plans and his commitment to the House that there would be no wind-down of regular forces until the reservists were able to take their place, which my right hon. Friend the Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox) confirmed only a few minutes ago.
I hope that the Secretary of State will respond to that point, because in an earlier intervention I asked the question to get to the heart of that aspect.
I am concerned about the message that would be sent to our allies, both NATO allies and the United States, if Parliament halted or interfered with the recruitment drive that the Bill is designed to enable. The redundancy notices for the regulars have already gone out, so it is clear that there is no quid pro quo and that we cannot stop this plan and keep the regular forces at the size we would allow. The Bill allows a method of influencing, and indeed improving, recruitment, through the relationships with employers and so forth.
On the capability gap, an important question was asked: how will the wider world perceive that? Any pause in the recruitment of reservists would be dangerous, because the TA is at a lower state of readiness. The idea is to replace 20,000 regulars with 30,000 reservists. Are they the same? No, of course they are not, but that raises the question of what world we are now working with.
I was interested in what my hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border said. He touched on some of the concerns about how the conduct of war is changing. I asked those on the Opposition Front Bench to say exactly what it is, with our withdrawing from Afghanistan and reducing in size, to have a standing commitment, and what the armed forces, however they are comprised, will actually do, because the balance between war fighting, stabilisation and peacekeeping has changed. The idea that we have to win over local support is now more central than it ever has been. Infrastructure, development, local governance and the drive for agriculture have all been mentioned. All that is secondary to the war fighting that takes place, but in Afghanistan and Iraq the war fighting was conducted and completed relatively quickly. We lost in those cases in the peacekeeping and nation-building. That is where it is very interesting to see the TA provide value, because it has the linguistic skills and can come in when skills in banking, cyber-technology, civil service and governance are required.
I must make some progress, because I have very little time and I want to leave a couple of minutes for my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury to wind up the debate.
I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury will not press new clause 2. It is essential that we manage the defence estate as a whole. We are on the brink of completing the appointment of a strategic business partner for the Defence Infrastructure Organisation, which will mean that we have the very best private sector estate management capability to deliver the defence estates programme. That will be to the benefit of the regulars and the reserves.
I will say something about new clause 3 and will then take an intervention from my hon. Friend.
First, I recognise that my hon. Friend is a passionate supporter of the armed forces. It is ironic that today, that passion has manifested itself in an attempt to block or inhibit the growth and reinvigoration of the reserves. I know that that is not what he wants. Indeed, I know that he would like to see more capability across our armed forces, not less. As I have made clear, we have no problem with submitting information to the House for scrutiny. By accepting new clause 1, we will deliver the intention behind subsection (1) of new clause 3. I believe that making it an annual report for annual scrutiny will provide for better scrutiny than what he is proposing.
I cannot accept the halt that is proposed in new clause 3. That would send out a signal now to the thousands of people who are in the reserve forces or are thinking of joining them. The Government have set out their plan and are legislating to deliver it. The Army has embraced the plan wholeheartedly. For Parliament to introduce additional tripwires at this stage would create uncertainty, undermine the message about the roll-out of improved terms and conditions, and cast doubt on our intention to spend the sizeable sum of £1.8 billion that is available to support this agenda. In short, it would make the whole agenda into a political football.
As my hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire (Mr Gray) said in his contribution, the proper way to scrutinise the implementation of this programme is through the established mechanisms of the House—the annual report, Select Committee hearings and the reporting of data—and not by halting the roll-out of the programme. We do not do that elsewhere and we should not do that for our reserve forces.
What I am attempting to do is to ascribe the most transparent of motives to my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron), but listening to him I could not help detecting just a hint of an undertone of a hidden agenda. Maybe what he wants is not to help us to fix the challenges we face in the reserves agenda, but to find a reason to abandon the project. In his own words, he told the House:
“we could very easily reverse the cuts to the regulars”.
Using language such as “tripwires” and apportioning motives that do not exist does not do my right hon. Friend any good at all. The bottom line is that it is perfectly right for Parliament to say, “Let us pause and examine in detail,” and it is in the Government’s gift to make it a very brief pause indeed. The Secretary of State has still not answered the question. Does he accept that the plan has changed since 2011? We have heard in the House that the previous Secretary of State said that the intention was not to wind down the regulars until we were sure that the reservists could take their place. When and why did that plan change?
I can tell the right hon. Gentleman that, although we have not publicised it, we have increased the recruiting cap on units in Northern Ireland to 115% of liability, and the Army will continue to consider increases in liability caps in other parts of the country where recruiting performance is strong. I can go further and tell him that a review is currently under way to look at trade skills available in Northern Ireland. Most of the reserves recruiting is trade skills-specific. If we find that pools of additional trade skills are recruitable, we will consider locating additional units in Northern Ireland to tap into them. We have to be agile and go where the potential recruits are and where the skills we need are.
I want to go briefly through some of the other points that have been raised. I want to nail the point my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay has made several times in debate and in the media. He says that a 40% or an 80% mobilisation rate is not achievable. We are looking at a maximum mobilisation of between 3,000 and 4,000 reservists at any given time, out of an Army Reserve of 30,000. By my maths, that is significantly below 40% or 80%. During Operation Telic in Iraq, 85% of reservists responded to call out—an 85% mobilisation rate—and Operation Herrick had a 79% mobilisation rate, so I do not quite understand his point.
Order. The Secretary of State is not giving way and he has very little time to finish.
(11 years ago)
Commons ChamberI am grateful for that question. I am aware of the difficulty and that is also my understanding of the issue. I will make further inquiries. Of course, one of the problems we know we will face is when we have bereaved families both north and south of the border and what will occur in such circumstances. I would be more than happy to discuss the issue further with the hon. Gentleman.
T4. Parliament sent a very clear message to the Government—the vote was 92 to nil—not to disband regular units until we were sure that the Army Reserve plan was both viable and cost-effective. What plans do the Government have to enact Parliament’s will?
As I have said in answer to an earlier question, it is just not possible, within the resource envelope available, to maintain the regular forces at their previous level while also recruiting and building the reserve. Neither would it allow us to restructure the force in the way necessary to deliver the outputs required from Future Force 2020.
(11 years ago)
Westminster HallWestminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
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We are very proud of and grateful to the Royal Navy and to our Vanguard-class submariners, who are on patrol as we speak, for their service to our country. It is right to recognise that service, but there is a legacy from the dawn of our nuclear deterrent that has yet to be fully recognised and a debt of gratitude that has yet to be fully acknowledged—that is to our British nuclear test veterans.
The deterrent that this country now has would not have been possible without the efforts of 20,000 servicemen during the 1950s and 1960s at nuclear tests in the south Pacific and Australia. The science at the time was not well understood. Precautions, therefore, were primitive and inadequate, and they often failed to protect individuals from the effects of blast, heat and ionising radiation. Many test veterans believe that their health was adversely affected by their service. That view has been substantiated by scientific research undertaken relatively recently by Professor Rowland in New Zealand. That work was peer-reviewed and accepted by the then New Zealand Government.
Some years ago, I was contacted by a constituent about those issues. That initial contact spawned an association with the British Nuclear Test Veterans Association, which is the largest organisation by far that represents both veterans and their descendents. I am pleased to say that I am its patron, and I take this opportunity to commend all those who work for the BNTVA, its membership and especially the chairman, Nige Heaps, and the vice-chairman, Jeff Liddiatt.
After a long campaign, the BNTVA, I and others in the House persuaded the Ministry of Defence, with the help of the hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), to undertake a health needs analysis of surviving veterans. Many helpful and practical measures are being introduced as a result, particularly in relation to a veterans pathway through the NHS. Our first priority was to focus on health, given the age profile of the veterans.
Following the success of the health needs analysis, over the summer, the BNTVA, I and others in this place launched the second and final part of our campaign, which essentially involves two main objectives. The first is official recognition from the Prime Minister—preferably orally, but in writing, if not—for the veterans’ unique service. The second part of that campaign, which we are presently in, involves the establishment of a £25 million benevolent fund administered by a board of trustees that would be distributed on the basis of need, not entitlement.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Streeter—I apologise, but I will be leaving before the end of the debate, as I have other duties. I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing this important debate. I have at least five survivors and families of survivors from that time in my constituency, and I would be very interested to hear him flesh out more details about the potential funding pot. We have had numerous letters in and out of the MOD since I became an MP in 2010, and I am looking for a glimmer of hope that there will be practical measures as well as support, verbal apologies and congratulations to the servicemen involved at the time.
The benevolent fund that we are discussing would be distributed on the basis of need and not entitlement, which is terribly important to understand. That is what differentiates this fund from other recognition or compensation elsewhere. There is often an automatic entitlement to compensation in other nuclear test countries if veterans can prove that they were there at the tests and have suffered ill health. The US is an example, as is Canada, and even the Isle of Man. I shall come on to the point in a minute that we are near the bottom of what I would call the international table of decency, in terms of how we treat veterans, compared with other countries.
I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on securing the debate. He does a lot of good work for veterans, in relation not only to nuclear tests, but to reductions in defence forces in general. I welcome the proposal for the £25 million benevolent fund; I think that the suggestion is a practical one on the basis of need. These veterans made a major contribution to understanding the effects of nuclear war. That is very important, and to do that they often sacrificed their health, and they are still suffering for it today. I find it very strange that, in this country, we always have continual battles to get recognition for veterans. Some years ago, it was about getting recognition for the merchant navy during the war. I do not know what it is about this country, but we seem to be falling behind everybody else in recognising the contribution that people have made on our behalf. I hope that we do not make the same mistakes with the veterans of Afghanistan in future.
Having served myself, I sympathise with what the hon. Gentleman says and I understand the campaigns that he mentions. This is one of the key points that we wish to make about the benevolent fund: if we look at other countries—I shall come on to this very briefly—and compare how they treat their test veterans, we rank very near the bottom. However, I suggest to the Minister—this is where there has been confusion in the MOD before—that the payment should be ex gratia; in other words, there would be no admission of liability. There has been some confusion within the MOD that the BNTVA, as an organisation, has been involved in litigation through the courts, when that has not been the case. If we look at other countries that have made ex gratia payments, we see that the case being made very much stacks up. There would be no admission of guilt or liability, but it would put right an injustice.
It is important to reinforce that point. The campaign organised by the BNTVA, other hon. Members and I has been very much focused on Parliament and not on taking this issue through the courts. Perhaps I should also add that the BNTVA has put in a submission to the medal review led by Sir John Holmes, and it is waiting for the outcome of Sir John’s deliberations. However, that is separate from the campaign that we are discussing today.
I return to both interventions, in a way, and to the point about how other countries treat their test veterans. It is clear, when looking at the comparisons, that we rank towards the bottom of what I would call the international table of decency. Let us take the US for example. Our campaign is about recognition, and all that people have to prove for compensation there is that they were present at a nuclear test—one is sufficient—and there they have a list of more than 100 illnesses. They do not have to provide a causal link between the two. Providing that someone can prove those two things, they will automatically get compensation—£47,000 for the first illness and £47,000 for any secondary attributable illness as a bonus. No causal link between service and illness is required; payment is simply automatic. That is in addition to the fact that veterans in the US have access to free health care.
Commonwealth countries played a great part in our nuclear tests. Canadians were there in large numbers, and Canada pays some £15,000 to each veteran, in addition to war pensions, and enjoys a health care system like the NHS—free at the point of use. Closer to home, the Isle of Man, which has been supportive of our campaign, makes an ex gratia payment of £8,000 to any resident test veteran, and 17 such payments have been made to date.
I stress that our proposals are different from the comparisons that I have just listed, because the £25 million would be distributed on the basis of need, not entitlement. That is why it is important to stress the ex gratia nature of the payment. There is no admission of liability; no admission of guilt. The benevolent fund would be there to help veterans and their descendants who need help with their care and treatment. The fact that someone is a veteran does not necessarily mean that they would gain access to the fund in question.
I urge the Minister, when considering the proposals, to look further afield again. I remind her that in the 1990s this country made an ex gratia payment to Australia that just so happened to be for the exact sum of £25 million, and that payment was made in compensation for having undertaken tests in Australia. It was the equivalent sum of money, and if it is good enough for Australia, I do not see why it is not good enough for our own test veterans. I remind the Minister that Australia already offers a generous pension to its test veterans.
I very much appreciate the work that my hon. Friend has put into this. Does he agree that the test veterans, by far and away, will be better supported by the £25 million fund that he has talked about than the Australian Government? In other words, their need is greater than that Government’s ever was. Does he also agree that, with ex gratia payments, far less administrative time, effort and money would have to be put in by the Ministry of Defence and other state bodies in disbursing that money than if compensation was based on a careful assessment of all the criteria implied by a strict compensation scheme?
I agree completely. The benevolent fund would be administered by a board of trustees; it would be an established charity. It would be up to them to distribute the funds, as I said, on the basis of need, not entitlement, and the payments would be ex gratia. Therefore, there would be no admission of liability or guilt.
Perhaps we need to focus on progress with the Government to date, during the second phase of the campaign, which was launched only on 11 June here in Parliament. We also had a superb art exhibition on the theme of the veterans’ experiences during the tests. Some of the pieces were created by the descendants themselves. Progress since 11 June has been somewhat slow. I had a meeting with my right hon. Friend the Minister of State, who was then responsible for veterans. I had a brief meeting with my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister. I wrote to the Prime Minister. I have now received a response, and there are warm words about the role of the nuclear test veterans, but there is no sympathy for the idea of a benevolent fund at all.
What the Prime Minister did mention was the war pensions scheme, and no doubt the Minister will address at length the generosity of that scheme when it comes to our veterans generally, but many test veterans—I must say this to her—have found the system not sympathetic to their cause. War pensions are fine on paper, but time and again, veterans find that the system is stacked against them. A recent questionnaire of BNTVA members revealed that 90% had seen their application for a war pension declined. For one thing, with claims made seven years after leaving service, the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that the illness or injury was caused by service; for another, the system is time consuming and complicated for these elderly veterans, even when successful. The perception is that they are still having to take on the system. As if to illustrate the point, a British lady received payment from the US for the role that her British husband played, while flying for the RAF, during one of the American nuclear tests. She had been repeatedly refused a war widow’s pension in this country, but managed to get a payment from the US authorities.
The Government, including the Minister, should be in no doubt that we will not walk away from this campaign. On 27 November, veterans and their descendants will march on Parliament to draw attention to the cause. We are determined to see this through. In welcoming the Minister to her new post, may I urge her to reconsider our campaign? After all, the Government have a very good record of recognising just causes and righting past wrongs—mesothelioma and thalidomide victims are just two examples. The nuclear test veterans fit into both categories. I suggest that we do owe our veterans a debt of gratitude for helping to ensure our safety. Many people would argue that they were instrumental in helping us to win the cold war.
I congratulate my hon. Friend on his leadership of this campaign. While we are talking about the calibre of the individuals, I want to mention one gentleman in my constituency, who I suspect would prefer not to be named. When I went to see him, he outlined his service during the nuclear tests. He was obviously unaware of the dangers at the time, but he told me—this shows the calibre of individual we are talking about—that had he known the dangers, he would still have done it for the good of his country, because he thought that it was essential. That shows the calibre of these people. We can show that we have a debt of gratitude without, as my hon. Friend correctly said, needing to show a causal link.
I completely agree. What has been striking in discussing this issue with test veterans has been their dedication to duty for their country, but also the fact that they have less concern about their own well-being and more concern about their descendants. That is an important point for the Minister to take on board.
We should never forget, either, that it was a unique service by these veterans in many respects. The science was unknown and the risks were unquantifiable, but the cost to the veterans and their descendants was very severe indeed. Official recognition—I stress that we are talking about recognition, not compensation, as I hope that I have made clear in relation to the second phase of our campaign—of this unique service and contribution to our defence is therefore only right. If the Government continue to fail to recognise that, they fail not only our veterans but their descendents, and they fail to lift the veil of shame that almost uniquely hangs over this country. The time for action is now. Warm words are no longer enough.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship today, Mr Streeter. I congratulate the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) not only on securing today’s debate, but on all the work that he has done in recent years on this important issue.
I recognise the vital job that all our armed forces do and that all our veterans have done for us and the country, including the nuclear test veterans. I recognise the unique nature of their service. I regret the worry and uncertainty that they have experienced in the years since their service. Whatever the facts, it is highly regrettable that we have ended up in the situation that we are in today. It is clear from the comments made that there is a lot of good will and a desire to see an outcome, but there is also frustration that it has not been achieved. I shall refer to that point in a few moments.
I was delighted to meet representatives from the British Nuclear Test Veterans Association earlier this year in Brighton. I am grateful to those from the group who took the time to host a reception and exhibition there. The art exhibition “Shadow of the Bomb” is extremely powerful and helps to convey the spectrum of emotion and feelings with which the test veterans and, indeed, their families live. It helped me to understand that the fear of what might happen, what might have happened and the fear of the unknown can, in a different way, have debilitating effects on some veterans, almost as great as a physical illness. That is also true for their children and grandchildren. We can all appreciate that those are horrible doubts and fears to have to carry around. We have to spend only a short time speaking to the veterans to get a sense of deep uneasiness about their experiences. One image that stuck in my mind was of those carrying out the tests being covered from head to foot in protective clothing, while the serving personnel, as the veterans were then, went about their work just in shorts.
The events took place in the 1950s, and just as they do now, service personnel signed up and did what was asked of them, without question and with 100% commitment. They did so alongside individuals carrying out their national service, who had not volunteered to be there, but they did what was asked of them with just as much commitment. Another difference between then and today is that there is far more scrutiny today of what we ask our service personnel to do and how they are treated, as shown by the recent discussions on whether human rights laws and the concept of negligence should apply to service personnel on operations and in what circumstances.
Times have changed markedly since the 1950s, when there was far less external scrutiny of the treatment of our forces and probably less awareness on the part of the serving personnel themselves about whether what they were being asked to do was unreasonable. We would now, rightly, find troubling the prospect of the deliberate testing of radiation on people who had signed up to protect and defend their country, who did not have full knowledge of the implications or the option to say no or ask questions.
As the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay outlined, the BNTVA is looking for two things: recognition of what happened and their service; and the possibility of some sort of financial settlement. I hope that the debate today goes some way towards providing the recognition sought, but I appreciate that that desire is for recognition to come from a more high-profile source.
The proposed financial settlement is in the form of a benevolent fund. Members may be aware that the hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), the former veterans’ Minister, authorised a financial settlement proposal. The nuclear test veterans involved in the case at the time were not made aware of the offer, and disappointingly, it appears that the lawyers acting on behalf of the veterans rejected the offer without putting it to them.
I am pleased that the hon. Lady made that point about the lawyers. As I am sure that she is aware, she is referring to the legal proceedings outside this place, in which the BTNVA has never participated. It has been criticised for not participating by those outside. It is important to make the distinction.
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for putting that on the record. It is important that we look at the issue, rather than at particular groups representing people. I appreciate the distinction, which is why earlier in my remarks I said that the situation is regrettable because we could by now have come to some sort of settlement or agreement. I fear that lawyers have prevented that from happening. If an agreement had been reached then, an agreement about the wider issues would also have been possible. I understand that the legal route has now been exhausted and no avenues to pursue remain.
I appreciate that the reins on the public purse are tightly held at the moment, but could the Minister look at whether it is possible to allocate money from the LIBOR fund, because that money is already set aside, to kick-start a benevolent fund? There are many demands on the fund and applications to it have been made, but it would be an obvious source of money that could be released quickly and easily. Nothing will ever take away the worry and uncertainty about the impact of the tests, but if something can be done to help to draw a line and help the veterans move forward, we should certainly consider it.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this afternoon, Mr Streeter. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) on securing the debate. I pay tribute to all those who have contributed: the hon. Members for Scunthorpe (Nic Dakin) and for Coventry South (Mr Cunningham), and my hon. Friends the Members for South Derbyshire (Heather Wheeler) and for Cleethorpes (Martin Vickers) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Hazel Grove (Sir Andrew Stunell).
This subject evokes considerable passion among some, perhaps even many, people. We have heard the veterans’ cause argued with that passion yet again by my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay, and he is right to do so. Members should bring issues that are dear to their hearts to this place, so that we can debate them and causes and ideas can be advanced, only for Ministers then to say too often, unfortunately, “Well, it all sounds very good, but I am afraid I don’t agree with you, and I’m afraid that at the moment this proposal will not advance particularly far within Government. We’ve made our position clear.”
Before I explain why that is, I want to make something absolutely clear. It seemed to be suggested that the Government have not acknowledged the significant role played by the men and women who participated in the nuclear test programme. My hon. Friend quite properly mentioned a letter written to him by the Prime Minister. I repeat some of the Prime Minister’s words, because I cannot put it as eloquently as he did:
“This Government continues to recognise the servicemen who participated in the British nuclear testing programme. Their contribution ensured that the UK was equipped with an appropriate nuclear deterrent during the cold war, which thankfully we never needed to use.”
To be absolutely clear, I do not hesitate to acknowledge the hugely significant role played by all those veterans, and I pay tribute to all who participated in the programme. We owe them a huge debt of gratitude.
I do not doubt the Minister’s genuineness on this issue, or indeed the Prime Minister’s. The letter that the Minister read out was a response to me. All test veterans would welcome a statement from the Prime Minister addressed to them, officially recognising their role and our debt of gratitude to them. We would prefer it to be given orally—perhaps in a statement in the House—but if not, a written statement would go a long way towards ticking that box, rather than just giving part of a response to me about a wider issue in the campaign.
It is not for me to say what the Prime Minister should or should not do, but he has written in clear terms to my hon. Friend, who I assume shared the letter with all those in the association. However, I understand—he will correct me if I am wrong—that not all those who participated in the test programme necessarily belong to the association. I am now putting it on record, in Hansard, for all to see and to broadcast to all veterans the Prime Minister’s clear acknowledgement and tribute to those veterans, as well as his acknowledgement of the great service that they did our country.
That is very much my point. The Prime Minister’s response was to me. Not every test veteran is a member of the British Nuclear Test Veterans Association. Although I welcome the Minister’s warm words of acknowledgement and gratitude and I do not doubt her genuine intent, a statement to all test veterans from the Prime Minister, preferably orally but if necessary in writing, would cost nothing and would tick that box, and it would be gratefully received by all concerned.
I will ensure that the Prime Minister hears my hon. Friend’s words. He will then decide how he may or may not be able to advance the matter. However, I think that my having read out the letter so that it can be publicly recorded in Hansard goes a considerable way towards making it absolutely clear that the Prime Minister acknowledges the great work done and why it was so important.
As we know, for many years, veterans of the nuclear tests have claimed that their health has been damaged by exposure to ionising radiation. The Ministry of Defence has consistently rejected those claims on the basis of the findings of three comprehensive studies on cancer incidence and mortality among nuclear test participants carried out by the independent National Radiological Protection Board. The three studies were conducted and published over a 20-year period, beginning in 1983 and finishing in 2003. Overall levels of cancer incidence and mortality were similar to those in matched service controls, and death rates from all causes were lower than expected from national rates.
On specific cancers, there was some evidence of a raised risk of certain leukaemias, but the researchers concluded that it was due to chance rather than radiation exposure. The Government has every confidence in those independent studies. Accordingly, we believe that there are no grounds for paying compensation to British nuclear test veterans as a group.
In 2010, the MOD commissioned a health needs audit of all BNTVA veteran members resident in the UK. The survey, which had a return rate of 71%, asked respondents to self-report on serious illnesses and long-term conditions diagnosed by a doctor since their participation in the nuclear tests. Overall, the range and severity of problems reported was typical of older people in the UK in general. Whatever their health experience, most respondents indicated that, in general, they felt that their health care needs were being met very well by the NHS; primary care services were particularly well regarded.
My hon. Friend referred to the Rowland report. I am reliably informed that the report, published in a specialist genetics journal, concerned a laboratory-based study of peripheral blood lymphocytes—I apologise for my pronunciation, which may not be great—that were taken in the mid-1990s from 50 New Zealand naval veterans who had been on weather ships 50 to 100 km from the detonation centre of Operation Grapple in 1957-58. Dr Rowland reported the findings of three cytogenetic tests. Two showed no difference between the veterans and matched control groups. The third showed an elevated translocation frequency in the peripheral blood lymphocytes—I am more than happy to share that in plain English with my hon. Friend—of the veterans compared with the control group.
The sample size was acknowledged to be small, and there has been some doubt about the suitability of the control group. Known possible causes of increased translocation include ageing and cigarette smoke as well as ionising radiation. The report emphasises that the study makes no comment on the health status of the veterans. At this time, such cytogenetic tests are not in routine clinical use, because no relationship has been shown between any genetic abnormality and health effects or clinical state.
May I return to the health needs analysis? I am pleased that the hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) has now taken his seat, as I paid him a compliment earlier by suggesting that he was instrumental in helping us get the health needs analysis, which was our campaign’s first objective. The veterans of the BNTVA have found it helpful as a pathway to guide them through the NHS.
To return to the science briefly, we can argue about it. Professor Rowland’s report was peer-reviewed and was accepted by the New Zealand Government of the time; the Minister should not skirt over that too lightly. The point that I am suggesting to her is that, compared with other countries that have test veterans, we are near the bottom of the table in terms of how we treat them. Surely, there is a moral obligation to consider where Britain fits in. In many other countries, veterans do not have to establish a causal link between being at the tests and ill health. Compensation comes automatically, although I stress once again that I am not arguing for compensation in this case; I am asking for recognition, as highlighted.
I am interested by that intervention. My hon. Friend now seems to be saying that we should put the science to one side, because it perhaps does not suit his argument, but the science is absolutely clear. However, I am more than happy to turn now to the comparison of international provisions for nuclear test veterans.
I will deal with this first, and then I will be more than happy to give way. I hope that I can set the record absolutely straight.
Comparisons of provisions in the United Kingdom and other countries can be very misleading. We are not at the bottom, and I do not want these good people, who have served our country so well, to feel that they are in some way being short-changed and that an advantage is being given to test veterans from other countries. I will go through some of the other schemes.
Let us talk about America. The compensation scheme offered by the United States Department of Veterans Affairs must be seen in the context of the United States health care system, which, as we know, is not free. Access to veterans’ health care is for those with service-connected disability of a certain level, and it is means-tested for all veterans, including atomic veterans. I would therefore argue that is not as good as the scheme in our country.
No. I am so sorry. I will be happy to give way at the end, but I want to go through all these other countries to put the record straight.
Let us look at the compensation scheme run by the Canadian Government. It was run for just one year—from 2008 until 2009—and it was principally designed for approximately 900 personnel involved in the clean-up of the Chalk River radiation leak, without reference to any illness or injury. If I may say so, therefore, its relevance to our nuclear test veterans is, at best, peripheral.
In France, nuclear test veterans have been eligible for compensation only since 2009, and they were not consulted on the design of the scheme now in existence. As a result, although it may appear more generous than the UK’s war pensions scheme, which I will describe later, the scheme in France demands a greater burden of proof of a link to service. If I may say so, it would do, because it was introduced only in 2009. As a result, we believe only one award has been made in France, which speaks volumes about that scheme.
It is a similar story in Australia, where the compensation scheme operates in part on the basis of a reasonable hypothesis. Again, that may appear, at first blush, to be more generous than the terms of our war pensions scheme, which demands only that a reasonable doubt of a link to service is raised on the basis of reliable evidence. However, in fact, nuclear test veterans in Australia face a tougher test, which is set out in the legislation. For example, for cancer of the bladder, veterans must have received a cumulative dose of at least 100 mSv of ionising radiation a number of years before clinical onset, while there is no such requirement in the UK scheme.
My hon. Friend mentioned the Isle of Man scheme. The Isle of Man decided to award £8,000 to nuclear test veterans, with no proof of medical causation required. That is, of course, a matter for the Manx Parliament. The UK Government rightly have an evidence-based policy. They also strive to provide value for money for the taxpayer, which the Isle of Man has less need to be concerned with, because it has made only two payments.
Our central argument is not to put the science to one side, as the Minister suggested. We can argue about the science, and both sides will be able to draw justification for their particular line. The Rowland report was certainly peer reviewed and accepted by the New Zealand Government of the day, so it cannot be easily discarded by the Minister.
Let me return, however, to what I call the international table of decency. The Minister needs to check what happens with regard to US veterans, because those who turn up at a veterans’ hospital have access to free health care. In addition, there does not have to be a causal link between being at the tests and one of a series of illnesses—mostly cancer, but other illnesses, too.
The Minister also mentioned Canada; again, no causal link is required, but it is clear that the payment is there to be made. Likewise, the Minister is slightly incorrect, or disingenuous at least, to suggest that we can simply discard the example of the Isle of Man. She says that only two payments have been made, but she also needs to check that figure, because my evidence suggests that 17 have been made to date.
Order. Before I call the Minister, may I repeat the obvious point that interventions should be brief?
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for providing that information. That is another compelling argument in relation to the science.
I want to make it absolutely clear that it gives no one any pleasure to stand up and to have to talk about these things, because it sounds as if no one cares. On the contrary, those of us who do not agree with my hon. Friend and the £25 million fund that he advances do so not because we do not care, but because we know what the science says and because—I certainly take this view—we have to set this issue in the context of all our veterans, so that we do justice by everyone. We must always be careful not to be seen in any way to single out one group and put it above another.
I really take issue with the idea that we are somehow being shameful, or that we are in any way wrong, in our attitude to our nuclear test veterans. That is not the case. The existing scheme is good, fair and, arguably, generous, and it is one we should be proud of. Of course one could always argue that anyone in receipt of any form of compensation or benefit should have more, but what we have at the moment is fair and generous.
Let me come on to our scheme, because it is important to put on the record that any veteran who believes they have suffered ill health due to service has the right to apply for no-fault compensation. We therefore have a no-fault compensation scheme under the war pensions scheme. Where there is reliable evidence that disablement is due to service, a war pension is awarded, with the benefit of reasonable doubt always given to the claimant. Nuclear test veterans are no different, and war pensions are paid to claimants for disorders accepted in principle as being caused by radiation, where the evidence raises a reasonable doubt of service-related radiation exposure. In addition, awards are made automatically to nuclear test veterans who developed certain leukaemias within 25 years of participating in the tests. For some, therefore, there is an automatic entitlement, which is absolutely right. Again, that begins to move us up that so-called league table, if, as some would argue, such a table exists.
It should be noted, however, that in May this year the first-tier tribunal, the war pensions and armed forces compensation chamber, delivered a decision in a group action of 14 nuclear test veterans’ war pension appeals. The majority of the appeals were rejected. The tribunal found material exposure where appellants undertook work in forward areas or otherwise came into contact with radiation, but not in relation to the majority of the bystander appellants. The decisions of the tribunal support the MOD’s current policy relating to claims for a war pension made by nuclear test veterans.
The veterans have made it clear that they find the war pensions process time-consuming and arduous, even when they are successful. We talk about success rates, but 90% of the veterans membership have failed to get a war pension.
As for the international table, the compensation payments in the USA, Canada and so on—although I am focusing on recognition, not compensation—are made in addition to war pensions that are already given to veterans. We should not paint this country’s war pensions as doing anything special, when those are very much automatic in other countries, and there is compensation on top of that.
I have made my comments about the so-called league table, and have relied on the information I have been supplied with, but I do not believe that our nuclear test veterans are at the bottom of any league table. I certainly do not believe that our record is shameful.
The Government’s second reason for remaining unable to support a benevolent fund concerns the comparison that my hon. Friend has made with compensation packages provided abroad. I hope that I have dealt with all that. My hon. Friend mentioned the sum—it is actually £20 million—given by the UK Government as compensation to the Australian Government in the 1990s. We should be clear about why that money was made over. The £20 million was ex gratia and was given to the Australian Government to contribute to the total cost of rehabilitating the test sites in Australia. Payments were made in instalments, the last being made in 1998. I do not want it to be suggested that the Government somehow advantaged veterans or other people who served in the forces in Australia.
The Government hold the view that to create a benevolent fund would be tacitly to accept liability for which no legal grounds exist. That was demonstrated in the atomic veterans group litigation for damages against the MOD in 2006. In 2009, 10 lead cases were allowed to proceed to a full trial on causation, at the judge’s discretion, under the Limitation Act 1980; normally, there is a three-year statute of limitations on personal injury claims. The MOD appealed, and in 2010 the Court of Appeal overturned the High Court ruling in all respects, except for one case. In arriving at its judgment, the court also considered the merits of the claims in terms of causation and concluded that their general merits were extremely weak.
The Minister has been generous in giving way, which is appreciated in a debate of this sort. Payment to a benevolent fund would not necessarily be an admission of liability. An ex gratia payment makes no admission of liability or guilt. We need to make that clear. The Government have made ex gratia payments to other countries, as the Minister readily admits.
I must throw that back to my hon. Friend and ask him for what purpose he wants a benevolent fund. Is he saying that the nuclear test veterans’ need is greater than that of other groups of veterans? What would the payment redress?
I am pleased that we are clarifying this. To repeat what I said earlier, the payments would be dispensed on the basis of need, to help with care and treatment, not on the basis of entitlement. Not all veterans would receive it, but it would be recognition of the fact that their service was in many respects unique, that the science was at the time unknown and that the risk was unquantifiable. Let us not forget that those servicemen were doing national service; that is an important factor. In many respects their service was unique, and we should recognise that.
(11 years, 1 month ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move,
That this House notes concerns about the Government’s defence reforms in relation to whether its proposals for the reserve forces will deliver either the anticipated cost savings or defence capability; and urges the Government to delay the disbandment of regular units until it is established that the Army Reserve plan is viable and cost-effective.
Let me first express my gratitude to the Backbench Business Committee for granting this debate. Many of us on both sides of the House believe this to be an important topic for discussion.
I suggest that Government plans to replace 20,000 regulars with 30,000 reservists are on the rocks. Territorial Army numbers are at a low ebb; reserve recruitment targets are being missed; costs are rising; and there are delays and disorganisation. The plans will produce neither the anticipated cost-savings nor the capability envisaged. The time has come to say “Halt”—to halt the axing of the regular battalions and units until we are sure that the reservist plans are both viable and cost-effective. We run the risk of wasting taxpayers’ money on the back of false economies and unrealistic expectations.
Were we not promised by the previous Secretary of State that the cuts to the regular forces would happen only if it were clear that we could increase the reserves? Yet that is not going to happen, so what happened to the original promise?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right about the original plan, which was to allow the build-up of the reserves before we axed regular battalions because it was deemed that deployability was terribly important. Exchanges took place on the Floor of the House in 2011 between the then Defence Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox), and my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot), which clearly confirm that the plan was to get the balance right—to build up the reservists before winding down the regulars.
My first questions, then, to the Minister of State, Ministry of Defence, who is replying to the debate, are: why and when did the plan change? To make this debate as productive as possible, I would be delighted to take interventions from my right hon. Friend if he wishes to answer the questions we pose as the debate proceeds. I think that the questions why and when the plan changed are wholly legitimate ones, because the plan has changed and the House should be in no doubt whatever about that. Just two years ago, the plan was to say, “We will not wind down the regular troops until we know that the reservists are up to strength”. That plan has changed.
I agree with the hon. Gentleman, and the plan also changed in respect of the original strategic defence and security review. It initially planned for a reduction of 7,000 troops, but it suddenly increased to 13,000 and if recent press reports are to be believed, it might be even higher.
The hon. Gentleman makes a good point. A number of changes to the plan have occurred, but to my knowledge, at no time have we had any explanation from the Dispatch Box of why the plans have changed, of the cost implications or indeed of when they changed.
The entire Army reforms depend on the successful recruitment of reserves. Let us examine that for a moment, and let us remember that without such recruitment up to 30,000, the Army reform plans fall apart. What do we know about recruitment so far? We know that TA numbers have been falling, not rising, since 2009 and are now at their lowest ebb since 2007. We know today that new reservist recruitment targets are being missed. The front page of The Daily Telegraph, under the heading “Reforms have left the Army in chaos” refers to documents clearly showing that reservist recruitment targets both for this and next year are being missed—and not just by a small margin, but by a massive margin—thus bringing the whole plan into doubt. Various reasons are put forward, including criticism of the Ministry of Defence for closing down local recruitment offices, and there is talk about privatisation and Capita, but I think that is somewhat overplayed. What we know is that there has been a lack of communication in the IT systems in the MOD as between Capita and Atlas. There are all sorts of reasons, but the bottom line is that key reserve recruitment targets are being missed.
I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing this debate. The issue of recruitment targets within the reserve forces and the TA cannot be helped when it can take several months to get from someone signing up to join to turning up for their first night’s training. That is too long for people to be delayed along their way.
My hon. Friend, who has experience of these matters, makes a valid point. [Interruption.] Yes, he is my hon. and gallant Friend.
Other reasons include the draw-down in Afghanistan, which is perhaps not encouraging reservists to sign up, and the fact that employers are reluctant to let key employees go. There is a host of reasons, but as I say, the bottom line is that the key reserve recruitment targets are being missed. Another key concern is that costs may be rising faster than anticipated, yet the Government have not presented to Parliament a fully costed plan, despite numerous requests for them to do so.
On that point, would the hon. Gentleman care to comment on an observation in the current issue of the Army Reserve Quarterly to the effect that it is all to do with
“rebalancing Her Majesty’s Forces in light of the country’s needs and resources in the years ahead”?
I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing this timely debate. Before he deals further with the question of cost, may I as a layman suggest to him that, if the reservists cannot make up their membership in time for the disbandment of the regular battalions, there is bound to be a gap in capability?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. I shall be dealing with the capability gap—very briefly, if my hon. Friend will forgive me—because I think that it is an important issue, but may I test the patience of the House and stick to the cost issue for the time being? There is a real risk that, if costs rise faster than anticipated, we shall create false economies that will bring the whole project into doubt. That is terribly important, and we are right to ask questions about it on behalf of the taxpayer.
The Government have not come here to present a fully costed plan, but the pieces of the jigsaw that we can see do not reveal a rosy picture. We know from the Green Paper—and the Independent Commission to Review the United Kingdom’s Reserve Forces has confirmed this—that it costs more to train a reservist than to train a regular. We know that those who leave the regular forces to join the reserves will be given a £5,000 bounty, payable over four years. We have some questions about the reservist award, which is the difference between reservists’ pay and what they earn in civilian life. We are told that the potential cost has been accounted for, but the assumptions have not been made clear. We also know that, because employers are reluctant to let key employees go for extended periods, the Government have come up with an incentive for prospective employers amounting to £500 per reservist per month. Those are all added costs, but we still do not know what the fully costed plan is.
My hon. Friend referred to the Independent Commission to Review the United Kingdom’s Reserve Forces. I serve on the commission, and I do not accept his statistic. Broadly speaking, the cost of a reservist is about a fifth of the cost of his regular counterpart. In America, it is about a quarter, and my guess is that following the changes that we are making, it will be something between a quarter and a fifth.
I must say to my hon. Friend, with the greatest respect, that he has confused training with deployment. There is no argument in the House about the fact that reservists will be cheaper; the question is, how much cheaper will they be? When costs are rising, do we enter the terrain of false economies—which brings into doubt the whole question of value for money and whether the plan should have been instigated in the first place? I was talking about training. There has been a dispute about whether it costs more to train a regular, but my hon. Friend should know from the Green Paper that it costs more to train a reservist.
However, this is not just about the bits of the jigsaw that we have seen. We know that there are hidden costs further down the line. According to a recent report by the charity Combat Stress, reservists are twice as likely to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder as regular troops. We may be storing up a ticking time bomb for ourselves. The necessary support structures for reservists are not in place, and I should be interested to know whether there are any proposals in that regard.
May I ask the Minister how much of the £1.8 billion—spread over 10 years—has been set aside for the Government’s plans? We are told that that money has been set aside and all is well, but there are various reports that some of it has already been eaten into. Has any of it been spent, and if so, how much?
While I am on the subject of costs, may I question the Minister about the impact assessment, which attempts to take an overall view of the costs? Again, we are dealing with assumptions and projected usage rates, and not all the figures are on the table, but I think we can all agree that the assessment is very dependent on projected usage rates. The way in which the reserve forces are used will depend on assumptions about future costs.
Artificially low rates can create false economies. The central case in the document seems to be based on an assumption of 3,000 annual deployments. I must ask the Minister whether that projection is realistic, given the original rationale of the reserve reforms. We are meant to be replacing 20,000 regular troops with 30,000 reservists. If the central projected use is 3,000, something is not adding up on the terrain. We need to examine the facts very carefully, because, again, we may be creating false economies and the taxpayer may be presented with a much larger bill than was originally envisaged.
As my hon. Friend knows, I strongly support those who are concerned about a capability gap, but I am slightly worried about some of the figures that he has given. For example, the figure relating to the higher cost of training a reservist is correct on a per-day basis, but it is not correct overall. What worries me is that, if Members give incorrect figures, the Government will very quickly knock them back. Let us stick to the main thrust, which is our fear that there will not be enough soldiers to fight in any future deployments that may take place.
I am indeed very worried about the possibility that we shall not have enough troops to deploy. I refer my hon. Friend to the Green Paper, which states that it costs more to train a reservist than to train a regular. However, he has made a valid point about the manpower gap, which I think is a central issue of concern. Will 30,000 reservists be enough, even if they can be recruited? According to figures from the Ministry of Defence, the present TA mobilisation rate is 40%. In other words, for every 100 TA soldiers on paper, 40 are deemed to be deployable at any one time. That suggests that if we are plugging a gap left by 20,000 regulars, we shall need 50,000 reservists, not 30,000.
In response to a letter sent to him a while ago by 25 Conservative Members, the Secretary of State suggested a mobilisation rate of 80%. He said:
“The total strength target for the Army Reserve in 2020 is 38,000, in order to deliver 30,000 trained reservists.
May I ask the Minister what research, what study, what evidence justifies the claim that the MOD’s budgets will double the mobilisation rate? It is one thing to recruit 30,000 reservists, but doubling the mobilisation rate as well would require an extremely large investment. Many of us would be interested to know what evidence supports the claim that the £1.8 billion that has been put aside will achieve both those objectives. It is a very, very tall order.
My hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere (Mr Clappison) raised the issue of the capability gap, and he was right to do so, because there is a fear that the Government plans risk creating such a gap. The Army reforms were put together before the strategic defence and security review, and since then a string of events have changed the international strategic dynamic. The nature of conflict is changing. Previously, it was thought of very much in binary terms—there would be one bloc against another bloc—but more fluid geopolitical forces are now at play, both state and non-state. War is becoming more asymmetrical, and we need well trained, agile, regular forces at high readiness if we are to meet the challenges that lie ahead. There is no disguising among the military their frustration about the fact that they could not have been more supportive to the French in Mali. The penny may have dropped on that side of the channel, but it has not yet dropped on this side.
I must ask the Minister whether 40 days’ training is really enough. Let us be absolutely clear about this: the Government’s plans represent a step-change in our approach. We are proposing to deploy whole units of reservists into the field. We have got to ask serious questions about this. Some would say, “Well, it happens in the US with the National Guard,” but it is, perhaps, not fully appreciated that the US National Guard has its own bases and its own equipment and training programmes. They take it very seriously in the US; they throw a lot of money at it, and even then the National Guard units are not infantry units. That is the interesting thing: the National Guard units are not infantry units, despite the investment the US puts into it.
My last visit to a National Guard infantry unit was in Kabul about a year and a half ago. It was doing an excellent security job, and it also had detached platoons along the Pakistani border. Some 60% of the American infantry is in the National Guard and 40% is in its regular army.
All I would say to my hon. Friend is that there is a general view that the National Guard is very much focused on supporting roles, and the Americans treat their National Guard very differently from what I think is being proposed here. For example, I do not know of there being any details about separate training programmes, operational programmes or equipment programmes in the Government’s plans, which we have yet to see. All we are asking is to see those plans, because £1.8 billion may sound like a lot of money but it is spread over 10 years, and we must consider the scale of what we are asking—not just raising 30,000 reservists, or, to be more accurate, adding another 12,000 or 13,000 reservists, but doubling the mobilisation rate. That is a very big ask indeed.
What research has been undertaken to ensure that the money earmarked is sufficient to bring reservist units up to the same standard as regulars upon deployment? That is especially important given that it appears that human rights legislation will require equal training and equipment. That has not been raised much in the debate thus far, but human rights legislation is a concern in the sense that it is going to say, “Any troops put into the field, reservist or regular, have to have equal training and equipment.” I would be interested to hear the Minister’s thoughts on that.
There is a concern that these plans are having a distorting effect on the ground. I come back to the fact that well-recruited battalions are being axed, including my own battalion, the 2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, yet more poorly recruited, and therefore more expensive, battalions are being saved. Such a policy reinforces failure. Can the Minister justify the decision for 2RRF to replace on the list one of the more poorly recruited battalions when it was not on the original list of five battalions to be scrapped? We know, because we have seen it in writing from the MOD, that five battalions were originally due to be axed as they had poor recruitment figures. One of those was replaced. They had to go looking for another battalion and they fell upon 2RRF, which happened to be the best-recruited battalion in the British Army. Many fusiliers and their families in swathes of constituencies across the north and the midlands of England would like an answer to that question.
Both 2RRF and the 1st Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers are very close to my heart, my dad having been a member of the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers before and during the second world war. I wonder what the MOD wants out of our defence forces. One of the battalions to be axed, 2RRF, is referred to as “Daring in all”, and it is said:
“Where ever the Fusiliers have deployed to they have proved capable of meeting every challenge with courage, determination and a will to win.”
That is on the Army website.
That goes without saying. I sympathise with what the hon. Gentleman says. We have still not yet had a straightforward answer to a straightforward question: 2RRF was not in the original five; those five were chosen because of their poor recruitment and retention figures; one was removed and they had to go looking for another battalion to take its place; and they just happened to fall upon the best-recruited battalion in the British Army, and one with a very proud recruiting history. We recruit from across the major cities of Lancashire, Warwickshire and Northumberland—Newcastle, Coventry, Birmingham, Manchester—as well as from London, yet we were told we were having trouble with our recruitment, and that is simply not the case.
No wonder ex-military chiefs are critical. Many are pointing out that strategic thought has been abandoned at a time when many other countries, not necessarily friendly to the west, are increasing their defence budgets. They are asking all politicians to think again.
There comes a stage with any struggling project when common sense and evidence dictate a revaluation and I believe we have reached that point now. There is no doubt—let us be clear about this—that reservists are cheaper than regulars, but rising costs threaten the anticipated cost savings and raise the very real prospect of false economies, and that is before we consider the issue of capability gaps, yet the Government seem determined to plough on with this misguided plan and play down concerns.
That is evidenced today by this important debate having been downgraded, I believe, to a one-line Whip. That does not surprise me, but, all the same, I think it speaks volumes about the Government’s approach. This is a very important issue and the debate has been very well-subscribed to, yet we drop it down to a one-line Whip at a time when the Government have still not produced fully costed plans and there are very real concerns about whether 30,000 reservists can plug a gap left by 20,000 regulars.
I intend to test the will of the House on this motion. The time has come to say “Halt”—halt to the axing of the regular battalions until we know that the reservist plan is both viable and cost-effective; otherwise the taxpayer could bear the brunt of many false economies to come.
I welcome this debate and I congratulate my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) on securing it. It is also a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Coventry South (Mr Cunningham).
I understand my hon. and gallant Friend’s loyal defence of his fine former regiment. As the 100th anniversary of the start of the first world war is almost upon us, it is time to remember six Lancashire and Warwickshire Fusiliers who won Victoria Crosses in that war. Sir John French made the famous remark that without the Territorial units available at the very beginning of the fighting we would have lost in France before the war had really begun.
The reality is that we have a good plan that is being unevenly implemented. America’s land forces are almost exactly split 50:50 between regulars and volunteer reserves. Canada has 44% regulars and Australia has 36% regulars; in all countries there are more reserve infantry than regulars. Uniquely, Britain has a target that is much less ambitious. It is broadly the case that a reservist costs a fifth of the price of a regular. All of us who are keen on defence would like more resources to be allocated to defence. Indeed, more than 20 years ago, I stepped down from my post in government as a Cabinet Parliamentary Private Secretary over that issue. However, the reality is that we have to work within these very difficult economic times, and the alternative to 30,000 reservists is not 20,000 regulars, but somewhere between 6,000 and 7,500, and that would be if we got rid of all the specialist medics, cyber-people and so on whom the Regular Army does not have.
I therefore strongly support this plan; I have seen the work of American and Australian reservists, and I am proud that 20% of the British division that captured southern Iraq was made up of reservists. However, I am concerned about some of the details of how the plan is being implemented. From the beginning, Ministers and the Chief of the General Staff have made a strong commitment to it. Ministers have secured the support of every employers’ organisation in the country. The CGS, starting with his own pitch to employers in his excellent article in the Financial Times, immediately spotted the governance issue by appointing, for the first time since the second world war, a TA two-star—a major-general—to play a pivotal role in it. The problems largely lie within the recruiting group. At a time when the proposition has improved immeasurably as a result of changes the Army Board is making, it is deeply depressing that this department is failing to deliver.
I have before me the monthly recruiting statistics for one unit—I will not disclose which, for obvious reasons. In the 12 months before the first push on TA recruiting in autumn 2011, the unit had enlisted between three and 12 people a month. The figures after that push are: 15 for November 2011, 21 for December 2011 and 19 for January 2012. Then, for a reason not understood by anyone, the recruiting group introduced its new system for medicals and common selection, without any market testing and without talking to units, and within three or four months the figures had dropped to one or two a month. That muddle was sorted—it had nothing to do with Capita. Second time around, the arrangements with Capita—I do not blame Capita—were introduced without any market testing or discussion with units. I am sure we have all dealt with cases of soldiers who have waited six or nine months with their documents repeatedly lost in the system.
Time is extremely short, so I want to suggest three things that the Government need to do turn this around. The units I talk to tell me again and again that there is more interest in joining the reserves and that the figures for the two groups that are not under control of the recruiting group—officer applicants and ex-regulars—are both improving. So, first, we need to get more of the control over the enlistment process back with the units again.
May I suggest that this is a clear example of where the plan is driven by costs, rather than by strategic design? The cost for Capita to take on the recruitment was derived in large part by scaling down, if not selling up completely, local recruitment offices. So to start opening those offices, although a sensible proposition, would require additional cost if we are going to reverse that recruitment loss.
My hon. and gallant Friend makes an interesting point. That is not what I am arguing for, although I would strongly argue that it is ridiculous that the offices we still retain are open 9 am to 5 pm Monday to Friday instead of, for example, 9 am to 9 pm Tuesday to Thursday, which would allow the people there to do both jobs rather than only regulars. I am calling for more emphasis on the units. A temporary measure has been adopted in that area, which I suggest should be more permanent—it need not be expensive.
The second major change we need is to have a senior reservist officer in the recruiting group who is tasked with talking to units and who has real power in the way in which decisions in that area are made. We have done it at Land Command at the senior level, where two highly effective successive deputy commanders at Land in that position have worked well, and the improvements in the proposition have stemmed in no small part from that. The same needs to be done in the recruiting group.
The third change we need is on a relatively small scale, as seven or eight changes among the 400-odd decisions that had to be made to the location of the reserves are not right. Seven or eight really well-recruited sub-units have been wrongly selected for disbandment, including the best-recruited squadron in the yeomanry, which is going down to troop level, the best-recruited battery in the TA gunners and three or four well-recruited infantry sub-units.
I believe that this plan is achievable and it is moving us in the direction of the allies we fight alongside. It is a good plan; it just needs an improvement in implementation.
It is a privilege to serve under your chairmanship this afternoon, Madam Deputy Speaker.
I would like to associate myself with the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury (Mr Brazier), who sadly is no longer in the Chamber. Like him, I think that the whole plan for the Army Reserve is a good one. I know a great many serving reservists in my constituency who are excited and enthused about their role in a fully manned, 30,000-strong force that will ensure that they and others in future can make their contribution to the British Army. I note with interest that the south-west has been given an important role to play in this expansion, with the equivalent of 940 new posts being created for the region. However, like my hon. Friend, I have some concerns about the proposals as they stand.
What is in no doubt is that one has great respect for the TA and, in many respects, wants the reserve plan to work. What one is arguing here is that, given the shortfalls in recruitment and the rising costs, surely it would be wise and prudent to stop the axing of the regular battalions until we know that the reserve plan is viable and cost-effective, because we in this House must not forget that defence is the first priority of Government.
I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. I have certainly never forgotten my personal responsibility or the fact that the defence of our nation is, collectively, our first responsibility in this Chamber, and I do not think for one moment that the Ministers on the Front Bench have forgotten their responsibilities either. We have not yet had an opportunity to hear the Minister respond to the debate or explain the current situation with regard to reservist recruitment. I have some concerns about recruitment, which is why I am speaking in this debate.
The Green Paper published in July contained some proposals that concern me. One, in particular, is for the reconfiguration of D company of 6th Battalion The Rifles. I believe that the proposal, as it stands, will frustrate the delivery of the Army Reserve plan in Cornwall, particularly the aim of maximising its local potential now and in years to come. D company is an important part of 6 Rifles. It is currently based and headquartered in Truro and Plymouth, which allows riflemen from across Cornwall to play a full role in the life of the regiment. The Green Paper proposes a reconfiguration that would see the majority of the company, including its headquarters, based in Plymouth by 2016 and one platoon housed at a new facility in Barnstable.
The move from Truro would cause real problems for serving riflemen living in west and central Cornwall and impact on future recruitment from those areas. Cornwall, as Members will know, is a large and rural county, and it can take a considerable time to travel to Plymouth. A rifleman taking the train from Falmouth in my constituency to an evening training session in Plymouth would face a four-hour round trip. Those travelling further west would face even longer journey times. Is it reasonable or, with a view to future recruitment, wise to add such an inconvenience to the many other sacrifices required of our reservists?
I am afraid I really do not have time.
For some employers, there will be directly transferrable qualifications, skills and experience between reserve service and civilian employment, which can be very valuable. To come to the heart of this matter, I believe that as parliamentarians we should get behind the reserves and the Army to support them in their endeavours. It is true that there have been some administrative issues in the process—it is too bureaucratic, as some of my hon. Friends have pointed out. However, we are working with our recruiting partner, Capita, and the senior Army leadership to actively address those issues.
I believe we can work through those issues, simplify the system and meet the objective. We should remember that the key target is 30,000 trained to phase two by 2018. We start with around 19,000 or so trained. That is not a cold start: we are two thirds of the way there, and we need to achieve the other third over four years. My hon. Friend the Member for South West Bedfordshire (Andrew Selous) summed it up brilliantly: we need, on average, an additional 20 reservists from each parliamentary constituency across the country in order to do that. I believe we certainly can do that. As the Chief of the General Staff reminded us at a successful reception in Parliament for the Royal Engineers reserves only yesterday, that is a challenging proposition, but a workable one. I agree with CGS: we can do this; let us get on with it.
I would like to add my warm welcome to you, Madam Deputy Speaker, in your new post.
I am afraid that I listened to my right hon. Friend the Minister, but found that key questions remained unanswered. In fact, I do not think he answered one of the questions I put to him. In a debate of this nature and importance, it is a shame that he is not willing to take an intervention from the Member who sponsored it. The bottom line is that questions such as “When did the plan change from back in 2011?” and “How much of the £1.8 billion has already been spent?”, questions about the impact assessment, about the costs involved in doubling the mobilisation rate and so on and so forth have not been answered in detail—all we have had is a sense of direction.
No one doubts for one moment the courage and service of past reservists or indeed of future reservists. One is not critical of that—
I do not normally comment on leaked documents, and I am not about to start now. What I will say to my hon. Friend on the point of costs—in fairness, I had only about seven minutes—is that he knows that he wrote to the Secretary of State about this in detail and he knows that the Secretary of State replied to him in detail and rebutted every point that he made. For the benefit of the House, I will ensure that a copy of that letter is placed in the Library this afternoon.
I am pleased that the Minister is going to do that because all the points made by the Secretary of State have, in turn, themselves been rebutted; many of them were based on false assumptions.
Given how little time is left, let me clarify this. One is not saying “Scrap the reservist plans”. In many respects, one wants them to work. What one is saying is that there comes a point in any project whereby if extra costs keep being thrown into a plan—because it is failing or because recruitment targets cannot be met or because costs are rising and TA numbers are at a low ebb or because of disorganisation—there comes a point when one has to ask “Is this project creating false economies, therefore costing the taxpayer dear?” The motion says simply that we should “delay” the axing of the regular battalions until we know that the reservist plan is both “viable and cost-effective”; otherwise, because of false economies and unrealistic expectations, the taxpayer could pay dearly. That is not unreasonable, but I am afraid that my right hon. Friend has failed to answer that central point in the motion. I thus have no hesitation whatever in pressing the motion and calling for a Division.
Question put.
(11 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberI understand that the right hon. Gentleman desires to get to the bottom of this matter—as do we all—but he is right that there is little I can say. An inquiry by Dyfed-Powys police is under way, and when it is complete there will be a service inquiry into the events of last weekend. We will get to the bottom of what happened, and if there are systemic lessons to be learned, we will learn them. I give the right hon. Gentleman an undertaking that once the inquiry is complete, I will report to the House in an appropriate way.
The need to address the public sector structural deficit and the deficit in the defence budget has meant tough decisions and a relentless focus on squeezing more capability out of what remains the world’s fourth largest defence budget.
My right hon. Friend talked, quite rightly, about the first duty of government, but he will be aware that some of us on the Government Benches are concerned that misguided Army reserve plans will throw up false economies and unacceptable capability gaps. Given that the present Territorial Army mobilisation rate is 40%, will he explain how we are trying to plug a gap from the loss of 20,000 regular troops with only 30,000 reservists? A 40% figure would suggest that we need nearer 50,000.
My hon. Friend’s view on this matter is well known. Two weeks ago the Government set out robust proposals in a White Paper, “Future Reserves 2020”. I am confident we will be able to deliver the force we have set out, and that that force will support the level of ambition for deployment set out in the strategic defence and security review 2010.