Defence Reforms

James Gray Excerpts

Thursday 17th October 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Baron]

I must say to my hon. Friend, with the greatest respect, that he has confused training with deployment. There is no argument in the House about the fact that reservists will be cheaper; the question is, how much cheaper will they be? When costs are rising, do we enter the terrain of false economies—which brings into doubt the whole question of value for money and whether the plan should have been instigated in the first place? I was talking about training. There has been a dispute about whether it costs more to train a regular, but my hon. Friend should know from the Green Paper that it costs more to train a reservist.

However, this is not just about the bits of the jigsaw that we have seen. We know that there are hidden costs further down the line. According to a recent report by the charity Combat Stress, reservists are twice as likely to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder as regular troops. We may be storing up a ticking time bomb for ourselves. The necessary support structures for reservists are not in place, and I should be interested to know whether there are any proposals in that regard.

May I ask the Minister how much of the £1.8 billion—spread over 10 years—has been set aside for the Government’s plans? We are told that that money has been set aside and all is well, but there are various reports that some of it has already been eaten into. Has any of it been spent, and if so, how much?

While I am on the subject of costs, may I question the Minister about the impact assessment, which attempts to take an overall view of the costs? Again, we are dealing with assumptions and projected usage rates, and not all the figures are on the table, but I think we can all agree that the assessment is very dependent on projected usage rates. The way in which the reserve forces are used will depend on assumptions about future costs.

Artificially low rates can create false economies. The central case in the document seems to be based on an assumption of 3,000 annual deployments. I must ask the Minister whether that projection is realistic, given the original rationale of the reserve reforms. We are meant to be replacing 20,000 regular troops with 30,000 reservists. If the central projected use is 3,000, something is not adding up on the terrain. We need to examine the facts very carefully, because, again, we may be creating false economies and the taxpayer may be presented with a much larger bill than was originally envisaged.

[Mr James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

As my hon. Friend knows, I strongly support those who are concerned about a capability gap, but I am slightly worried about some of the figures that he has given. For example, the figure relating to the higher cost of training a reservist is correct on a per-day basis, but it is not correct overall. What worries me is that, if Members give incorrect figures, the Government will very quickly knock them back. Let us stick to the main thrust, which is our fear that there will not be enough soldiers to fight in any future deployments that may take place.

[Mr Baron]

I am indeed very worried about the possibility that we shall not have enough troops to deploy. I refer my hon. Friend to the Green Paper, which states that it costs more to train a reservist than to train a regular. However, he has made a valid point about the manpower gap, which I think is a central issue of concern. Will 30,000 reservists be enough, even if they can be recruited? According to figures from the Ministry of Defence, the present TA mobilisation rate is 40%. In other words, for every 100 TA soldiers on paper, 40 are deemed to be deployable at any one time. That suggests that if we are plugging a gap left by 20,000 regulars, we shall need 50,000 reservists, not 30,000.

In response to a letter sent to him a while ago by 25 Conservative Members, the Secretary of State suggested a mobilisation rate of 80%. He said:

“The total strength target for the Army Reserve in 2020 is 38,000, in order to deliver 30,000 trained reservists.

May I ask the Minister what research, what study, what evidence justifies the claim that the MOD’s budgets will double the mobilisation rate? It is one thing to recruit 30,000 reservists, but doubling the mobilisation rate as well would require an extremely large investment. Many of us would be interested to know what evidence supports the claim that the £1.8 billion that has been put aside will achieve both those objectives. It is a very, very tall order.

My hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere (Mr Clappison) raised the issue of the capability gap, and he was right to do so, because there is a fear that the Government plans risk creating such a gap. The Army reforms were put together before the strategic defence and security review, and since then a string of events have changed the international strategic dynamic. The nature of conflict is changing. Previously, it was thought of very much in binary terms—there would be one bloc against another bloc—but more fluid geopolitical forces are now at play, both state and non-state. War is becoming more asymmetrical, and we need well trained, agile, regular forces at high readiness if we are to meet the challenges that lie ahead. There is no disguising among the military their frustration about the fact that they could not have been more supportive to the French in Mali. The penny may have dropped on that side of the channel, but it has not yet dropped on this side.

I must ask the Minister whether 40 days’ training is really enough. Let us be absolutely clear about this: the Government’s plans represent a step-change in our approach. We are proposing to deploy whole units of reservists into the field. We have got to ask serious questions about this. Some would say, “Well, it happens in the US with the National Guard,” but it is, perhaps, not fully appreciated that the US National Guard has its own bases and its own equipment and training programmes. They take it very seriously in the US; they throw a lot of money at it, and even then the National Guard units are not infantry units. That is the interesting thing: the National Guard units are not infantry units, despite the investment the US puts into it.

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[Mr Clappison]

The figure comes from someone who knows more about this than me; it is contained in the National Audit Office report of 2010. I have only six minutes to speak. I will happily debate the black hole in the accounts and the whole of the debt that the previous Government left to this Government, but that is not really why I want to take part in the debate. I wanted to do so to pay tribute to our Ministers. We have an excellent Minister who has served in the armed forces and we are lucky to have him serving in this Department.

The longer this debate has gone on, the more it has become clear to me that something is going wrong with the implementation of the Government’s plan. I speak on these matters as a layman. I do not have any gallant service of my own, but as a Conservative I take an interest in our armed forces and the strength of our defence. I am not remotely qualified to judge the merits of the plan, nor the size of the Army, although I have some sympathy with what the hon. Member for Colchester (Sir Bob Russell) said about the size of our armed forces. Least of all am I qualified to judge the relative capabilities and costs of reservists as against regular soldiers. However, there is clearly common ground emerging that something is going wrong with the recruitment of reservists. My hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury (Mr Brazier), who has played a distinguished role in this regard, described it as “uneven”. Perhaps the Minister can put me right, but it seems that initial reports are not uniformly optimistic about the recruitment of reserves to take the place of our regular forces.

Let me put to the Minister the case that has already been put in a very distinguished way by my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron). If there is a problem with the recruitment of reservists, and those reservists are needed to make up for the capability lost through the loss of the five regular battalions, surely the Government should look again at the question of disbanding those battalions.

[Mr Gray]

rose—

[Mr Clappison]

I give way to my hon. Friend, who is much more distinguished in these matters than I am.

[Mr Gray]

I am not even slightly distinguished. I very much agree with my hon. Friend about the risk of there being a capability gap. Does he agree that, while the MOD may well hope that the TA recruitment figures will improve, there must arrive a point at which it will become obvious that that is not going to occur? We might therefore want to hear from the Minister a date or a time at which the MOD might be ready to admit that the bold plan in “Future Army 2020” has not worked and will think again about regular units.

[Mr Clappison]

I hope that the Minister has heard my hon. Friend. If I may, I would put it even more strongly. My hon. Friend mentioned hope. I would say to the Minister that, if there is even an element of doubt about the recruitment of reservists, the Government should put these plans on hold and look again at the whole question of disbanding the regular battalions. In saying that, let me make it absolutely clear that I mean no disrespect at all to the excellent individuals who serve in our Territorial Army and to whom we owe the deepest debt of gratitude, not least for the way in which they have performed in Afghanistan.

This is simply a question of whether the implementation of the plans as they stand will give us the capability that we require. I very much hope that it will not be part of the Government’s thinking or policy to say, “Here we have a plan which should meet our capability needs, and will also save us costs, but even if it doesn’t meet our capability needs we will go ahead with it none the less.” That is not a position in which a Conservative-led Government should find themselves, and I am sure that they will not under the watchful custodianship of my right hon. Friend the Minister.

Let me say a few words about our Navy, which is also encompassed by the defence reforms. The previous Government’s strategic defence review in the late 1990s concluded that Britain required a fleet of 32 surface ships, destroyers and frigates, in order to fulfil its capability needs. Now we have a fleet of 19 surface ships in the form of frigates and destroyers. I know that these ships have greater capability than ever before, but I would be surprised if they had acquired a capability proportionate to the loss of numbers that has been experienced since the defence review in the late 1990s. Even as an amateur strategist, I can understand that, as the noble Lord West, a former Sea Lord, has helpfully pointed out, a ship can only be in one place at one time. I doubt that there are fewer threats in the world today than there were in the late 1990s and that the world has become a much safer place since the turn of the last century. While other nations are responding to the world as it is by increasing the number and capability of their surface fleet, we are seeing a diminution in ours.

The hon. Member for Colchester mentioned Waterloo. Helpfully, next Monday is Trafalgar day, which used to be celebrated nationally and is still celebrated in our Navy. I was interested to find out how many warships the British Navy had at the time of the battle of Trafalgar, and my rather amateur research unearthed a figure of 950 warships in 1805, so we may not have had a very big Army, as the hon. Gentleman said, but we certainly had a very good Navy.

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[Andrew Selous (South West Bedfordshire) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to speak in your first debate in the Chair, Madam Deputy Speaker.

I speak as a former Territorial Army soldier, first in the Honourable Artillery Company and then in the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers. I served for about 12 years in total. A great-great uncle of mine lost his life as a member of the 25th Battalion the Royal Fusiliers during the German east African campaign of the first world war.

My understanding of the objective that the Government have set for the reserve forces and the Army Reserve in particular is that they need to capture 0.15% of the working-age population. I do not think that that target is beyond us, because many of our closest allies, such as America, Canada, New Zealand and Ireland, all manage to achieve significantly better than that. If our neighbouring countries and closest allies can achieve that, we should have faith in the volunteer ethic in British society. It is also important to remember that we will still have a larger proportion of regular forces in our total military than many of our closest allies.

[Mr Gray]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Andrew Selous]

I give way to my hon. Friend, who, like me, is a former HAC soldier.

[Mr Gray]

I am most grateful to my Honourable Artillery Company colleague. It is the oldest and, of course, greatest regiment, regular or territorial, in the British Army.

[Mr Ellwood]

Division!

[Mr Gray]

No dissent from other Members, please.

I agree with the optimism and hope of my hon. Friend the Member for South West Bedfordshire (Andrew Selous) that we can recruit a first-class reserve army to play the role called for by Army 2020. However, does he agree that the statistics so far are extremely disappointing to say the least? Does he think we will reach a point during the next year or two when it will become obvious that we will not be able to achieve the Army 2020 targets and we will have to think again?

[Andrew Selous]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his point. I have one or two positive suggestions on how we might be able to improve recruitment, based on what has worked in the past. I also have every confidence that our colleagues on the Front Bench want and need this to work. They are not stupid and I am sure they will make the necessary adjustments, if needed.

At present there are 19,000 people in the Army Reserve and the Government want 30,000, an increase of 11,000. To put that in round terms, that will be fewer than 20 recruits per parliamentary constituency, although I do appreciate the point that has been made about the fact that the Army Reserve is becoming slightly more regional than local.

Employers will play an essential role in this process. It is really important that the National Employer Advisory Board and Support for Britain’s Reservists & Employers do their job well and properly. I also want chambers of commerce, the Federation of Small Businesses, the CBI and the Institute of Directors—all the employers’ groups—to get behind the need to recruit and retain more reserves.

When I first joined the Honourable Artillery Company as a young man, I was working in the Lloyd’s of London insurance market, which had a reserve forces association. Many young underwriters and brokers joined the reserve forces. There was significant employer buy-in. We could talk about our weekend’s training when we got back on Monday morning. It was a normal and natural thing to do. There is no reason why clusters of employers could not copy that model.