Reserve Forces

John Baron Excerpts

Wednesday 3rd July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

I suggest that the Government have still failed, however, to show that their plans represent value for money or are in the best interests of this country. The fact that further cash incentives have been announced today, that that ex-regular reservists will be on a better scale of pay than brigadiers and that TA numbers have been falling all point to doubt being cast on Government plans—and that is before we consider the issue of capability. Would it not be wise to halt the disbandment of the regular battalions and to stop the loss of 20,000 regular troops until we know for sure that these plans will work?

[Mr Hammond]

My hon. Friend returns to a familiar theme—he has suggested that course of action to me on many previous occasions. We are restructuring our armed forces to reflect the threat they will face in the future, as identified in the strategic defence and security review, and to respond to the fiscal challenges we must address if we are to have a stable platform for the proper defence of this country. I am afraid to say to my hon. Friend that although it might be tempting to wish that we had the resources to retain the regular Army at its historic strength while we recruit up to 30,000 trained reserves, we do not have that luxury. I think the Opposition would acknowledge—and have implicitly acknowledged—that reducing the size of the regular Army while increasing the size of the reserves is not without risk but is the best way to manage the resources we have to deliver the military output we require.

Armed Forces

John Baron Excerpts

Tuesday 25th June 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

Before the right hon. Gentleman moves on from veterans, does he think that it is important that we recognise the role played by British nuclear test veterans? Those veterans played a unique service role at the dawn of our nuclear weapons programme, but the country has never recognised them properly. We rank pretty close to the bottom of the international table of decency on this issue compared with other nuclear countries. Does he think that it is time to put that right?

[Mr Murphy]

The hon. Gentleman raises an important and long-running issue. All I would say is that I have met, and will continue to meet, representatives of those veterans, as do hon. Members on all sides of the House. I am sure that the Government are grappling with this matter. Under the previous Government a settlement offer was made, but my recollection and understanding is that that was blocked, seemingly by legal process and by lawyers. If that had not been the case, compensation might already have been provided. It is disappointing and regrettable that that has not happened.

An essential element of duty of care is how we support those who have served to get back into work post-service. Being in the armed forces often provides personnel with friendship, if not near-familial support. It can be disorientating and disconcerting when bonds with compatriots are suddenly broken and the norms of military life are lost.

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[Mr Murphy]

My hon. Friend has been so strong in support of his Territorial regiment. When I was in Dudley, the campaign was so fierce that it was the one issue about which the local media wanted to talk. I congratulate him, and the Government will have to take into account the point he makes, not only about the high regard in which the unit is held in Dudley but the fact that it is recruited to full strength and is indeed over-subscribed. I look forward to the Minister responding to that specific point.

There must also be real protection for reservists. Current legislation says clearly that an employer has a duty to re-employ a returning reservist in the occupation they were employed in before their service and on the same terms and conditions. There is, however, no legislation to prevent an employer from discriminating against reservists in their hiring procedures on the grounds of their military affiliation. The Government should now consult employers specifically on new legislation to protect against discrimination in hiring reservists, which would need to be coupled with an obligation of transparency from reservists to declare their status.

[Mr Baron]

Is the shadow Secretary of State’s concern compounded by the fact that if we look at the present mobilisation rate of the existing TA, which stands at about 40%, we see that plugging the gap left by the loss of 20,000 regulars would require 50,000 reservists and not 30,000? Does the rundown of the TA forces in recent years, including the closure of TA centres and the fact that TA numbers are in decline, worry him?

[Mr Murphy]

The hon. Gentleman has raised these matters in Defence questions and other defence debates, and he will continue to do so. He sounds a clear warning to the Government and anyone who wishes to govern that in order to be successful, this policy—of boosting reservist numbers, engaging with employers and getting right the proportion of regulars to reservists and the relationship and integration of units and individuals—has to be done almost faultlessly. It is an enormous challenge to cut the Regular Army at this pace in the expectation that reservists will fill the gap, and I know that he will continue to raise that point.

Finally, the evidence shows that some reservists can suffer worse post-service psychological issues than regulars, in part because of the speed of the transition from military to civilian settings, so we should consider how we can increase access for reservists to military medical services in order to tackle the potential mental health problems that a minority—I stress, a minority—experience.

The Opposition will regularly disagree on many aspects of domestic and on some aspects of defence policy, and the decision to leave certain key capability gaps following the defence review will remain controversial and continue to provoke enormous debate, but Armed Forces day should be defined not by a political contest between parties, but where possible by consensus and celebration. The groups comprising our national defence—the high-skilled industrial work forces that make world-class equipment, the civilian government work force who do so much to support our forces, the charities whose unrivalled support and commitment to our armed forces personnel provide a lifeline when often another does not exist, and the families, who are sometimes forgotten, but who make sacrifices to support the actions of their family members on the front line—will each participate in this Saturday’s celebrations, but uppermost in our thoughts will be the hundreds lost in recent conflicts and the thousands in service overseas this weekend and unable to be at home and to join in the commemorations and celebrations. We remember them, we thank them and, this weekend, we celebrate them.

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[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

We can disagree with nothing in the motion, but without wishing to break the consensual mood of the House, I think that this is too good an opportunity not to ask at least some questions of Ministers, in the hope that they will at least reflect on them and perhaps return later.

I am concerned, as are a number of Members on these Benches, that by keeping on cutting defence expenditure, we risk creating imbalances on a variety of fronts. Can it be right, for example, that the budgets of Departments dealing with health, welfare and international aid are being protected, if not expanded, as a percentage of Government expenditure? That puts disproportionate pressure on other Departments, such as Defence, when trying to save costs. I also wonder whether imbalances are being created in regard to our transatlantic relationship. Our defence capability is one of the key anchors of that relationship, but it is not a one-way ticket. There are obligations on both sides, including our own. If we keep shaving our defence capability, might we put elements of that relationship at risk?

I also suggest that we might be creating imbalances in other areas, such as our capability to meet our foreign policy objectives, whatever they might be, and defend our interests overseas. The House knows that I have not been supportive of our military interventions over the past decade, but let us put that to one side. There have been moments during those interventions when our resources have not matched our ambitions. It was not the fault of the troops on the ground, but in Iraq and Afghanistan in particular the necessary resources were lacking, and that had a knock-on effect on our ability to achieve our objectives.

I have other concerns but, as an ex-soldier, I shall focus on the Army. The plan to disband 20,000 regulars before knowing whether the plan to recruit 30,000 reservists to take their place will work is high risk, given that we do not know whether those reservists will be able to plug the gap from a capability point of view, or from a boots-on-the-ground point of view. I ask Ministers to ensure that that issue is centrally addressed in the forthcoming White Paper. There are key questions that need answering very soon, because redundancies are taking effect as we speak, and we do not know whether the plan will work.

There is a real danger that Government proposals will prove a false economy, in financial terms and in terms of military capability. Let us take cost savings as an example. I am conscious of the figure of £1.8 billion over 10 years, and more details will follow in the White Paper, but at the moment the Government are long on promise and short on costings and details. They have admitted in the Green Paper that it costs more to train reservists than regulars. The financial incentives being offered to regulars to join the reserves mean that they will be on a better scale of pay than a serving brigadier, if we include the £5,000 sign-up bonus, the bounty, the daily rate and so forth. There is also the question of civilian salaries being matched, although I am aware that the Government are considering capping an element of that. Again, we need to see the details. And all that is before we even consider the fact that the reservists will not be deployable in their first year.

I have already raised the question of the number of reservists that will be required. According to Ministry of Defence figures, the present Territorial Army mobilisation rate is 40%. If we apply that to the 20,000 regulars, we will need 50,000 reservists. I look forward to seeing the details of how that magic figure of 40% is going to be increased. It will take a concerted effort to achieve a mobilisation rate of much more than 40%, given that many people in the Army believe that we are not even hitting 40% at the moment.

There is also the question of the capability gap. In the 1980s, when many of us served, the TA did a very good job that basically involved reservists being transported out to Germany, digging a trench and waiting for the Soviet or Warsaw pact forces to arrive. Today, asymmetric warfare is becoming the norm. The skills base will become much higher, and our requirements will be much more demanding, yet I understand that the number of training days is being increased to 40 overall—an increase of only five days. I question that on the capability front, particularly when those forces are going to be mobilised as groups rather than as add-ons. That factor must be considered.

[Dr Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Does my hon. Friend share my fear that, with the scale of priorities we have at the moment, there is a danger that if we reduce the size of the Army much more, they will all be able to fit into the single first High Speed 2 train?

[Mr Baron]

Let us hope it is not a one-way ticket!

Let me finish with a concern some of us have about the potentially distorting effect on the ground. Excellent, well recruited battalions, such as the 2nd Battalion the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, are being axed, while more poorly recruited battalions are being saved. It is costing millions of pounds to keep over-strength battalions up to the mark. Such a policy is, in many respects, simply reinforcing failure.

In conclusion, I think this is a high-risk policy, and I ask Ministers to make sure that they cover the base very carefully. In my view, we need to see concrete evidence that the reservist plan will take effect and will work—before we let the regular battalions go. Here we are dealing with the defence of the realm, and this is happening when many countries not necessarily friendly to the west are arming and increasing their expenditure on defence. No one here can tell when or where the next threat will come from. I therefore ask Ministers to consider these points very carefully.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

There are three Members still to speak and we have only 15 minutes before the winding-up speeches.

Oral Answers to Questions

John Baron Excerpts

Monday 17th June 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Robathan]

The hon. Gentleman tempts me to reveal what has yet to be decided through the White Paper on reserves, which we confidently expect to be published before the summer recess. By that, I mean this summer recess, not next year.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

The Government have promised to make up the difference between civilian and reservist rates of pay. What estimate has been made of the cost to the Government of that policy?

[Mr Robathan]

Already, reservists are paid the same or very much the same as regular service personnel. We are looking at all aspects of this subject. Again, I am afraid that my hon. Friend must wait for the White Paper on reserves. I am relatively confident that enough people will come forward to join the reserves and that we can look forward to having a vibrant reserve Army.

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[Mr Speaker]

The hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) has spoken eloquently at me on the matter for 30 years.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

T1. If he will make a statement on his departmental responsibilities.

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Philip Hammond)]

My priority remains the success of operations in Afghanistan. Beyond that, my priorities are to deliver the sustainable transformation of the Ministry of Defence, to maintain budgets in balance and to deliver equipment programmes so that our armed forces can be confident of being properly equipped and trained.

[Mr Baron]

A number of us on the Conservative Benches have reservations about the Government’s reservist policy, including its cost-effectiveness. Given that the MOD’s figures show that the Territorial Army’s mobilisation rate is 40%, which suggests we need 50,000 reservists not 30,000, and that rates of pay for ex-reservists will beat those of a serving brigadier, how confident is the Secretary of State that the £1.8 billion will cover the policy?

[Mr Hammond]

As in many areas, we have to work within the financial constraints presented to us, and we are currently tailoring a package of support for the reserve forces that can be accommodated within the £1.8 billion. I am quite confident that we can do so.

I would like to correct a possible misunderstanding. The top-up to rates of civilian pay has always been available in the system and our proposal is to limit that so that we make sure that we pay only people who have specialist skills what are sometimes very large amounts of money.

Better Defence Acquisition

John Baron Excerpts

Monday 10th June 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

They will see benefits at two levels and a healthier BAES as a result of this announcement. First, large defence contractors, perhaps counter-intuitively, do not relish the lack of a capable interlocutor in their trading partners. They would welcome our beefing up our capability and having higher-skilled, better-paid project managers on our side of the table, because that would drive genuine efficiencies into the process. At that level, we know that the companies will welcome this announcement. Secondly, on single-source procurement, I am confident that over time by incentivising cost-efficiency we will increase the exportability of British defence products, which are an incredibly important part of our high-tech manufacturing industries and help us to sustain jobs at the very top of the curve.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

These are early days and final decisions are yet to be made, but what indication can the Secretary of State give about the impact of this announcement on jobs at MOD Abbey Wood? Will he ensure that suitable provisions are in place for the employees who may be affected?

[Mr Hammond]

As my hon. Friend knows, the TUPE transfer of an enterprise does not imply any reduction in job numbers at the outset. It is true that a private sector partner taking on a work force of this nature will, over time, look to reconfigure the shape of the work force to make the business as efficient as possible. However, it will have to do that within the constraints of the TUPE regulations, normal employment law and the arrangements that are in place for negotiation with the trade unions.

Reservists

John Baron Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd April 2013 Westminster Hall

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) on securing the debate and on his excellent speech, which was born out of experience of commanding soldiers in the field.

When I was a young platoon commander in Berlin in 1984, we were told not to worry, because the quality of our troops and our kit would see us through. We knew very well that we could hold out only for so long, because quantity has a quality all of its own, as the German forces on the eastern front during the second world war found to their cost.

I mention that because I see similarly flawed thinking in the Government’s plans for 30,000 reservists somehow to plug the gap left by the loss of 20,000 regular troops. Let us be clear: this plan is designed to save money. It is not what the MOD would have wanted to do, as the CGS confirmed to the Defence Committee. The focus seems to be on the bottom line. The plan might work on paper, but a number of us severely doubt whether it will work on the ground.

I have three main concerns. First, could this be a false economy? The Green Paper admitted that it costs more to train reservists than regular soldiers, a fact confirmed by the Secretary of State during Defence questions. When we add in other factors, such as force-generation figures and the additional costs of matching a TA soldier’s civilian salary, there is a big question mark over how much this will all cost. To date, the Government have been coy about costings. We are promised a White Paper, but it has been too long in the coming. As several colleagues have said, none of that would matter were it not for the fact that five regular infantry battalions will be disbanded over the next 18 months; indeed, 20,000 regular troops have been given their marching orders. Pursuing such a policy before we are sure that the reservist plan will work is foolhardy and a high-risk strategy.

Secondly, I have concerns about whether 30,000 reservists could plug the capability gap. In my day—in the 1980s—TA reservists, gallant though they were, were essentially expected to ship out to Germany and wait for the Warsaw pact forces to come to them. Today, reservists are expected to have a much broader range of roles, but they are still expected to achieve that higher skill base with about 35 to 40 days’ training. We live in a world where challenging, asymmetrical warfare will become the norm.

My third concern is about boots on the ground. I doubt whether 30,000 reservists can plug the gap. The Government make great play of the fact that they have had many expressions of support from prospective employers, but expressions of support and boots on the ground are often two very different things. The latest MOD figures I have—they are fresh out of the MOD, and the Minister is welcome to challenge them if he so wishes—show that the establishment strength of the TA infantry is about 6,700 soldiers, but only 2,800 of them are actually eligible for mobilisation. That suggests an effective rate of about 40%. The MOD’s own figures—as I say, the Minister is welcome to challenge them if he so wishes—suggest that, in terms of plugging the gap left by 20,000 regulars, the Government’s estimate of 30,000 reservists is way off beam. A minimum of 50,000 reservists is more the ballpark figure.

We then need to look at further factors, which could throw even the figure of 50,000 into doubt. MOD figures confirm that the TA is losing infantry soldiers. Furthermore, as a number of colleagues have pointed out, the current economic climate means that small and medium-sized enterprises, in particular, will struggle to allow key employees to leave employment with them for extended periods without being compensated by the MOD. I am not convinced that that costing has been factored in.

For those three reasons—value for money, the capability deficit and boots on the ground—several of us have severe reservations about the Government’s plans. Meanwhile, however, those plans are having distorting effects on the ground. Excellent infantry battalions are being lost, and the 2nd Battalion Royal Regiment of Fusiliers is a case in point. It is one of the most experienced battalions in the British Army, having served in all the major conflicts during the past 15 years, including Kosovo and Bosnia. It remains one of the best recruited. By the MOD’s own admission, it was not one of the original five infantry battalions to be disbanded; instead, more poorly recruited battalions were meant to go. However, through interference, intervention or whatever we want to call it, it was decided to save a poorly recruited battalion north of the border. The MOD then had to go hunting for a battalion south of the border, and, for some reason, fell on 2RRF.

[Thomas Docherty]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr Baron]

I am conscious that I am running out of time, so I will proceed if I may.

In our contracting Army, one-battalion regiments stand less chance of survival. We were told a few years ago that the future rested with larger battalions. However, that distortion means the Government are spending millions of pounds unnecessarily supporting understrength battalions. Surely, the Minister can understand that it is more economical to keep well-recruited battalion families together than to spend millions of pounds trying to bring understrength battalions up to strength. Such a policy simply suggests we are reinforcing failure.

In short, these plans are fundamentally flawed. Parliament has not been made aware of the costings to justify their execution, despite the fact that five regular infantry battalions have already been given their marching orders. I strongly suggest to the Minister that it would be wiser to see whether the plans work first, before losing 20,000 regular troops.

There is one final reason why the Government’s policy is high risk. Our armed forces are being reduced at a time when many countries, which are not necessarily friendly to the west, are increasing their expenditure. No one can tell where the next threat will come from. We must always remember that the first duty of the Government is defence of the realm.

[Several hon. Members]

rose—

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[Andrew Selous]

I accept that there has been a change in the culture, and part of the Government’s job will be to give the Army Reserve a clear direction and mandate. We have already received commitments about training and equipment. Only today, the Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Peter Wall, said in an article in The Daily Telegraph that there would need to be a “cultural reset” among employers. That is right, and my hon. Friend’s point is valid.

We need not look far to find other countries that have already achieved what the Government want to achieve. The reserve forces of our near neighbour Ireland are already larger as a proportion of the working population than the total that the Government want to achieve here. The same thing has already been done in the United States and other countries. It is by no means unachievable. Of course, what is envisaged will be easier for larger companies; but we need only 0.15% of the younger working age population—we are not talking about taking the crucial foreman of a small engineering business away on a six-month tour of duty, so that the firm will collapse. We will be able to manage things by taking the employees we need from larger companies, and from among part-time and seasonal workers and those whose civilian work fits their Reserve Army commitments.

[Mr Baron]

One of our key concerns is that, although enough money thrown at the situation will get 30,000 reservists, the MOD’s figures suggest a 40% effective rate when it comes to established strength and ability to mobilise. On those MOD figures, it is not 30,000 but a minimum of 50,000 reservists that are needed—and then there are additional concerns.

[Andrew Selous]

My hon. Friend makes a good point, in that we must make sure that the 30,000 we seek are battle ready and deployable. That is a fair point and my hon. Friend is right to make it.

In the late 1980s, there was the National Employers Liaison Committee, but we will need a similar body to do the work of cultural reset that the Chief of the General Staff has suggested. We need a band of patriotic employers. Perhaps the idea of something on the letterhead would be useful, as my hon. Friend the Member for Banbury (Sir Tony Baldry) suggested.

The Army Reserve plays a crucial role as a bridge between the civilian and military populations, two communities that can become very separate. When I was a Territorial soldier the great phrase that was used was “one Army”. There should not be a distinction between regular soldiers and part-time soldiers who are somehow less professional. We need to re-establish the ethos of one Army, with both components working together and integral to the whole. Several hon. Members have already pointed out that in Afghanistan up to 10% of troops on the ground have been provided by the Territorial Army; and I think that my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) mentioned a figure of up to 14% for Iraq.

As we know, the Government are putting £1.8 billion towards the training and equipment that the reserve forces will need. The increase in training from 35 to 40 days a year will come from weekend and evening commitments, and so should not be a burden on employers.

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[Mr Robathan]

I am sorry, but I do not have time to give way.

We have planned that, over time, reservists will have access to exactly the same equipment for training that is currently used by regulars. There will be opportunities for deployment, as we have mentioned already, but there will also be opportunities for shorter periods of deployed service commitment for those in some specialist roles, and reserves will also routinely fill roles that historically were the preserve of the regulars.

Officers and soldiers will also have command appointments, which have not always been available, and my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury has been bending my ear about that for many, many years—since way before 2010. We need the Government and society to get behind this process. The skills and experience gained by reservists will be of considerable value to civilian employers, as has been mentioned, making the proposition all the more attractive.

We need to get behind the new reserves. NEAB, which is the National Employer Advisory Board, and SaBRE, which is Support for Britain’s Reservists and Employers, although I do not know where the “a” in SaBRE came from, are working on these issues, and we need to continue that work. Soon we will publish the White Paper that will set out a number of measures to encourage that process, and the collaboration with employers is absolutely vital. I take the point that it is not an easy answer, but we are determined to get this process right.

Of course, collaboration needs to be tailored to fit different types and sizes of employers. I was in Keighley last week, visiting Snugpak, which had a SaBRE commendation signed by the Secretary of State for Defence. Snugpak is a medium-sized enterprise rather than a small one, which incidentally produces some very decent kit if anyone wants insulation for their camping trips. While I was there, I spoke to a reservist who was indeed supported by his employer. However, we need to take this process further.

Although it is still in its early stages, we are confident that we can get a more streamlined recruiting process, in conjunction with Capita. I know that Capita has been slightly criticised in one or two scurrilous magazines such as Private Eye, but we believe that we are getting there and Capita should deliver an acceleration in enlistments during the next few years. If my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham, who was somewhat sceptical about that, wishes to review the recruiting process, we would be very happy to facilitate that. Key changes that we are introducing include: a national recruiting centre administering all applications to a common process; a more imaginative approach to marketing; and a fully resourced assessment process for the reserves.

[Mr Baron]

Will the Minister give way?

[Mr Robathan]

I am sorry but I really do not have time to give way.

We remain confident that our proposition, in addition to being the right thing to do, will deliver value to the taxpayer. The independent commissioner for reserves concluded that reserves are significantly cheaper to maintain than regulars, and that they are no more expensive than regulars even when we take into account the costs on operations. In response to my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron), who just tried to intervene, I will say that part-timers are inevitably cheaper than full-timers.

As I have said, we need a change in the mindset regarding reserves, and a change in the attitude towards them. I absolutely believe that this policy is the right thing to do. It is not that we are keen to reduce the regular Army, but it is ridiculous to have a trained reserve of 19,000 for a country of our size; that is a ridiculously small number. We can do better than that—using reserves has huge social benefits—and we shall do better than that. Rather than admire the problems that we faced on inheriting an overblown defence budget in 2010, this Government have taken the necessary decisions to deliver a credible future Army which is fit for the challenges of the 21st century.

Just before I sit down, may I also say that my hon. Friend the Member for South Dorset (Richard Drax) and I served in another English regiment, and not just in the Fusiliers? On St George’s day, we used to have a service, quite a good lunch as I recall and then the rest of the day off.

Oral Answers to Questions

John Baron Excerpts

Monday 15th April 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Francois]

I am aware of the issue that the hon. Gentleman raises. Our instinct is to try and garner employer support voluntarily, as it were, but we are aware of the issue and intend to address it in our response in the White Paper.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

I suggest that expressions of support and troops and boots on the ground are two different things. Given the widespread concerns about defence cuts and force generation factors, how confident is the Minister that the plan to plug the gap left by the loss of 20,000 regular troops will not prove to be a false economy?

[Mr Francois]

As I think I have already said, I am confident that we can do this, based not least on my own experience and that of my hon. Friend the Member for South West Bedfordshire (Andrew Selous), who, as my hon. Friend will know, was a Territorial Army officer in the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers—the same regiment to which he belonged.

Army Basing Plan

John Baron Excerpts

Tuesday 5th March 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

I am sure that my right hon. Friend the Minister for the Armed Forces, who has responsibility for such matters, will be very happy to meet my hon. Friend to talk about those issues.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

Having served in Germany twice, I know that this is an important announcement. In welcoming the basing plan, I suggest to the Secretary of State that its success will be contingent in part on the ability of 30,000 royal reservists to plug the gap left by the loss of 20,000 regular troops. Given that some of us have concerns about the cost and recruitment assumptions underlying the reservist plan, is it the Secretary of State’s intention to publish or keep the House regularly updated on the costs of implementing it?

[Mr Hammond]

That is slightly off the beam of the regular Army basing announcement. It is certainly my intention, once the recruiting campaign for reserves gets under way this year, to publish routinely—I think quarterly would be most appropriate—the recruiting data for the reserves. My hon. Friend is right that success in delivering our reserves programme is a crucial part of the Army 2020 plan. I will reflect on his suggestion that the cost of the reserve programme should be published, although I am not so sure it will be that easy to identify and isolate it.

Oral Answers to Questions

John Baron Excerpts

Monday 25th February 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

No. The right hon. Gentleman is simply wrong. The figure of £12.5 billion is from CAAS—the internal cost assessment and assurance service. It was quoted by the National Audit Office and has subsequently been reassessed at £4.4 billion. [Interruption.] No, it was by CAAS and has been reassessed at £4.4 billion. The right hon. Gentleman is simply wrong.

Labour has to decide whether it is going to engage seriously in this debate or not. At last year’s Labour conference, the right hon. Gentleman told his party that it

“must deal with the issues we would if we were in power…No smoke and mirrors, no delay in tough decisions”.

Just two weeks ago, however, he told The Daily Telegraph:

“I’m not going to say we will guarantee to overturn this cut or the other.”

Which is it to be: tough decisions or more ducking and weaving?

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

The 2011 independent commission acknowledged the increased cost of collectively training Territorial Army units over their regular brethren when force generation factors were taken into account. Given that the Green Paper makes clear that TA units will be more frequently used, will the Government justify their claim that replacing regular troops with reservists is cost-effective?

[Mr Hammond]

As my hon. Friend knows, we have allocated £1.8 billion over 10 years for additional training, infrastructure and equipment for the reserves to try to rebuild the broken trust that resulted from the previous Government’s slashing of funding for reserve training and equipment. On the economics of using reserves instead of regular forces, it is true that, when deployed on operations, reserves are more expensive than regulars, but, held as a contingency, reserves are significantly lower cost than regular forces. We are simply trying, within the budget envelope available, to create the greatest amount of military capacity it is possible to generate.

Deployment to Mali

John Baron Excerpts

Tuesday 29th January 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

(Urgent Question): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on deployment to Mali.

[The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr Philip Hammond)]

On 14 January the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for Boston and Skegness (Mark Simmonds), made a statement to the House outlining the UK’s deployment of two C-I7 transport aircraft to provide logistical support to France, as well as a small detachment of technical personnel deployed to Bamako airport to assist with the reception of the C-I7 aircraft. Since that announcement, we have decided to extend our support to the continued provision of one C-I7 in support of the French for a further three months. There are currently about 20 people deployed in Bamako supporting liaison with French forces and, following a French request for additional surveillance support, we have deployed a Sentinel R1 aircraft to Dakar, Senegal, with supporting ground crew and technical support staff of about 70 people.

EU Foreign Ministers agreed on 17 January to establish an EU military training mission to Mali—EUTM—and work is ongoing to scope that mission. Today in Brussels, representatives from EU member states, including the UK, will meet to discuss the individual member state contributions to the mission. The UK is prepared to contribute up to 40 personnel to the EUTM, either in an HQ or training team role. We do not envisage UK personnel fulfilling a force protection role, and it is quite possible that all 40 personnel will not be required, dependent on the contributions from other member states. I can assure the House that we will not allow UK personnel to deploy on any mission until we are satisfied that adequate force protection arrangements are in place.

Today in Addis Ababa the African Union is hosting a donor conference to discuss how the international community can support the African-led intervention force, AFISMA, in delivering the role that the United Nations Security Council has mandated it to fulfil. The UK will today offer £5 million for two new UN funds to support the strengthening of security in Mali, with £3 million directed to AFISMA and £2 million to activity in Mali that facilitates and supports political processes for building stability. The UK is also prepared to offer up to 200 personnel to provide training to troops from Anglophone west African countries contributing to AFISMA, although the numbers required will be dependent upon the requirements of the AFISMA contributing nations. To establish those requirements, we have deployed a small number of advisers to Anglophone west African countries that are likely to contribute to the AFISMA mission, to assess their needs and to gain situational awareness.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office Ministers will provide an update to the House on the outcome of the discussions in Brussels and Addis Ababa at the appropriate moment.

[Mr Baron]

I thank you, Mr Speaker, for granting this urgent question, and thank the Secretary of State for his answer.

British involvement in Mali and the wider region is deepening, and it is clearly in everyone’s interests that we do not allow legitimate Governments to fail, particularly when faced with extremists. It is no secret that I opposed our recent interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, because I fear that one can be drawn into ever-deepening conflicts. Afghanistan illustrated the dangers of being sucked into larger deployments. That mission morphed into something much larger: it changed from a mission to defeat al-Qaeda or deny it the use of Afghanistan to one of nation-building.

Drawing on our lessons in Afghanistan—and, perhaps, on other interventions—will the Government clarify the following points? We need greater clarity on the role of British troops. The Government have said they will not be placed in a combat role, but there are a host of grey areas between combat roles and support roles. What exactly will these advisers do? Will they be involved in logistics or training, or will they advise on strategy? Equally importantly, how will they be protected? Are we deploying troops on the ground to protect these advisers, or are we relying on our French colleagues to provide that protection?

May I also ask the Secretary of State what exactly is the exit strategy? It is very easy to get drawn into these situations, but it is not always clear what the endgame and exit strategy are, and even what the endgame looks like. What are the contingency plans if military progress does not go to plan? Is there talk on the table that we should perhaps be deploying or committing, or be prepared to commit, more troops if the fighting goes badly? At the moment, that is all going well, but the situation can change very quickly.

Finally, what lessons should we learn from United Nations Security Council resolution 2085, which was passed last year and called on local African nations to lead the combat role in defeating these extremists in northern Mali? There was tremendous delay in the implementation of that resolution. What lessons have we learned from that, because we seem to be playing catch-up? On a related but slightly separate issue, what is the international community’s broader strategy on encouraging local forces to play a more proactive role, not only in Mali, but in the wider region, in combating these extremists? These are legitimate questions and the British public and we as a House need to ask them, because there is a real danger of getting drawn into a much larger deployment, particularly if things do not go to plan on the ground.

[Mr Hammond]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his questions. First, the UK has a clear interest in the stability of Mali and in ensuring that its territory does not become an ungoverned space available to al-Qaeda and its associates to organise for attacks on the west. Secondly, we have established military co-operation with France, which is an important part of Britain’s strategy for the future, and this situation, along with the Libya campaign, is an opportunity for us to demonstrate the validity of that working relationship with France. The role of British troops, as I set out in my response to the urgent question, is clearly not a combat role, and it will also not extend, as we envisage it at the moment, to a force protection role. We are looking for force protection arrangements to be put in place, probably by the French, but certainly by the European Union in relation to the EU training mission.

My hon. Friend asked me about the exit strategy. France has made it clear that it envisages a short intervention to stabilise the situation on the ground while the African forces from neighbouring countries and the Malian army deploy to sustain the situation in the longer term. We concur with that strategy. I should say, again, that it is not our intention to deploy combat troops; we are very clear about the risks of mission creep and we have defined very carefully the support that we are willing and able to provide to the French and the Malian authorities.

My hon. Friend referred to UN Security Council resolution 2085 and the time delay in deploying African forces. I think it is well known that the intention was to deploy African forces in support of the Malian authorities later this year, but the situation on the ground has become more urgent, hence the decision by the French to intervene. Some of these forces require equipment and some require additional training, and the response time to the mobilisation envisaged by resolution 2085 has perhaps been longer than we would have liked. The lesson we can learn from that is that if we want local forces to be able to deploy and respond to resolutions of this nature, we may have to take a more proactive role in resourcing them to do so.

On the broader strategy for encouraging local forces to tackle extremism, part of our defence posture, set out in the strategic defence and security review 2010, is to devote an increasing proportion of our defence resources to upstream engagement, building capacity in fragile nation states to allow them to deal with early threats to their security, rather than waiting for the situation to degenerate to the point at which it requires outside intervention.

Armed Forces Redundancies

John Baron Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd January 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Francois]

For the purposes of this process, Scottish personnel will be treated in much the same way as personnel throughout the rest of the United Kingdom. I believe the House thinks that is right; so do I.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

Some of us who have served question the wisdom of cutting regular battalions before knowing for sure that the reservists can fill the large gap that will be left behind. We live in an uncertain world. What objective measures exist for Parliament to gauge progress on this issue?

[Mr Francois]

As my hon. Friend may recall, he raised this matter with me at Defence questions last week. At the risk of being repetitious, I pointed out to him that we are delighted that recent tri-service and Army recruiting campaigns have already produced a 25% increase in TA inquiries, while regular Army engagements are up 3% against a three-year rolling average. I have taken a close personal interest in the plan to increase the size of the reserves. I understand what lies behind his question, but I genuinely believe that we can do it.