Reservists

Thomas Docherty Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd April 2013 Westminster Hall

[Thomas Docherty (Dunfermline and West Fife) (Lab)]

It is a privilege to serve under your chairmanship once again, Dr McCrea; I think that this is my third outing with you in the past three years. I congratulate the hon. Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) on securing this timely debate. I am sure that the Minister is heartened that so many of his Conservative colleagues are here, obviously to support him.

The debate is timely because the decisions made in the 2010 strategic defence and security review are beginning to hit home. The regular basing announcement was made some five weeks ago, and the first thing that struck me was that, for all the talk from the Ministry of Defence about our single Army and the regulars and reserves being the same, it is clear that some people in the MOD—not the Minister, who has experience in the reserves, but some of his civil servants—think that the reserves are an afterthought. We still do not have the lay-down for the reserves, because the work has not been completed, and not making a single announcement was a grave mistake. Hon. Members on both sides of the House share that view, so will the Minister address why there was not a single announcement, rather than two separate bits?

Shrinking Army strength has been mentioned. When the Chief of the General Staff appeared in front of the Defence Committee in December, we directly asked him at what point the British Army would no longer be able to achieve the planning assumptions made in the 2010 SDSR. As the hon. Member for Beckenham mentioned, 2018 is universally agreed as that critical date.

The mistake has been to cut the Regular Army before the reserves have been uplifted. We are already falling behind on the recruitment target for reserves. In a written answer to a question about the recruitment target for this financial year, the Minister of State, Ministry of Defence, the right hon. Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois), replied that out of an Army Reserve target of more than 6,500, only 2,000 reserves had been recruited in the first three quarters of the year. I think that we would all agree that that shows that we are already significantly off track.

I am sure that the Army will tell the Minister for the Armed Forces that it has a plan, and that that will centre on the £1.8 billion that has apparently been allocated to the reserves for the next 10 years. The Army probably has not told him that all £180 million for the first year was spent on the regulars. Not one penny of the money allocated to the reserves was spent on the reserves. The Chief of the General Staff took the money—I understand why he had to make this choice—and spent it on his regulars. Will the Minister explain the point of giving the reserves money if the regulars then claw it back to spend on their own pressing requirements?

The hon. Member for Beckenham also talked about training. I am not convinced, and nor is the Defence Committee, that the adaptable forces themselves will have sufficient training. They will go to readiness for only six months in a three-year period and it is clear that relatively senior military personnel still do not have a grasp on how that can be delivered. Why would somebody join the Regular Army, wanting to become a professional soldier, if they are to be told after their training, “Congratulations, you are off to the adaptable force, where you will get your kit for only six months in three years and you will effectively be doing something useful for only six months in three years”? The problem will be even worse for the reserves attached to the AF, so will the Minister explain how he will ensure that there is adequate training for the adaptable force and the reserves?

It is important to recognise that there are tasks to which the reserves are particularly well suited—the medical corps and logistics, for example. It is obvious, but when operational requirements increase, those skills need to be uplifted. However, the “teeth of the British Army”, as the Army calls it, is a capability that must be maintained all year round. I am not sure that I have heard how the MOD intends to ensure that we have sufficient reserves not only with the skills for logistics, the medical corps, public relations and other back-office functions, but to fill combat roles.

I am conscious of the time available, and many speakers will probably be more knowledgeable than me. I hope that we will get answers from the MOD today.

[Sir Tony Baldry (Banbury) (Con)]

I am proud to be a yeoman. Throughout history, the reserves have risen to the challenges that they have been set. I appreciate the concerns of regular soldiers and regiments that the Regular Army has to contract, but the British Army has contracted and expanded over the years in accordance with perceived threats. To listen to some hon. Members, one would think that no regiment in the British Army had hitherto been disbanded. My grandfather served as a regular in the Highland Light Infantry and my great grandfather served as a regular in the Gordon Highlanders, and both regiments were disbanded many years ago. The reserves have managed to fulfil full-time regular roles with great efficiency. My hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) made it clear that when he was interviewing soldiers in Iraq, he could not distinguish between full-time regular soldiers and the reservists, because the reservists demonstrated all the professional skills of a regular soldier.

My last appointment in the Territorial and Army Volunteer Reserve was as honouree colonel of what would seem to many a somewhat unglamorous unit. When they were on parade, however, they all had a chest full of medals, because they had served in pretty well every conflict since Iraq 1. We were always over-recruited. That was the laundry troops of the Royal Logistics Corps, and that demonstrates that if we give men and women a purposeful task through which they can see that they are contributing, whether that is as laundry troops, in the Army media group or as front-line combat troops, they will respond. There has been a scintilla of a suggestion from the hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife (Thomas Docherty) and my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham that reservists do not necessarily have a high degree of competence.

[Thomas Docherty]

rose—

[Sir Tony Baldry]

The hon. Gentleman said that it was all very well for reservists to be working as medics or doing back-office jobs. During my 22 years in the TAVR, I was fortunate to serve for eight years as a staff officer to the artillery commander of the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force. If one is trusted as a command post officer to have under one’s command a multi-force battery of guns, as a TA officer, it is perfectly clear that, with training and commitment, reserve officers, men and women can do whatever task is required of them in the British Army.

We will clearly need to recruit men and women into the reserves, and as MPs, we all have a duty in that. We all have convening skills. I certainly talk to local employers in my patch to ensure that they understand what is required of them and what is involved in the reserve forces of the 21st century, and to ensure that Oxfordshire gives the armed forces—the Army and our reserves—the fullest possible support, as it always has done. I hope that Ministers will consider ensuring that those employers that step up to the plate by releasing men and women to the reserves are able to demonstrate that on their letterheads. Such a thing has been done in different ways throughout history.

My final point is totally separate from, but related to, the thrust of my comments. The reserves have a number of skills that the Regular Army either does not have, or is giving up. One of the Royal Logistic Corps units that regularly trains at Bicester, in my constituency, is a railway unit that is made up almost entirely of Network Rail employees. Its intention is to keep a railhead open from ports to theatres of war. It was used in Kosovo, and its guys are very committed. When I was recently in Kosovo, the Kosovan Government said that they would be very willing to have them go there to continue their training, if the Ministry of Defence was agreeable. I understand that the unit might be threatened with disbandment, but such areas of expertise within the reserve forces are worth keeping.

I was a founder member of the Army’s media group, which was set up by Colonel Alan Protheroe—recently deceased, I am afraid—who was a deputy director-general of the BBC, because the Regular Army realised that it did not have people who could cope with journalists and the media in times of conflict. Over the years, the group has built up considerable expertise. The reserves often can cost-effectively ensure that the Army has areas of expertise that it can call upon.

The evidence of history will show that when the yeomanry—the reserves—have been given a task and training, and have been told what is required of them, they have always stepped up to the plate. I have every confidence that if the reserves are pointed in the right direction and given the right support and training, along with the encouragement of this House and others, they will have no difficulty recruiting and retaining, and ensuring the operational efficiency required for the defence of the realm.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Bob Stewart) on securing the debate and on his excellent speech, which was born out of experience of commanding soldiers in the field.

When I was a young platoon commander in Berlin in 1984, we were told not to worry, because the quality of our troops and our kit would see us through. We knew very well that we could hold out only for so long, because quantity has a quality all of its own, as the German forces on the eastern front during the second world war found to their cost.

I mention that because I see similarly flawed thinking in the Government’s plans for 30,000 reservists somehow to plug the gap left by the loss of 20,000 regular troops. Let us be clear: this plan is designed to save money. It is not what the MOD would have wanted to do, as the CGS confirmed to the Defence Committee. The focus seems to be on the bottom line. The plan might work on paper, but a number of us severely doubt whether it will work on the ground.

I have three main concerns. First, could this be a false economy? The Green Paper admitted that it costs more to train reservists than regular soldiers, a fact confirmed by the Secretary of State during Defence questions. When we add in other factors, such as force-generation figures and the additional costs of matching a TA soldier’s civilian salary, there is a big question mark over how much this will all cost. To date, the Government have been coy about costings. We are promised a White Paper, but it has been too long in the coming. As several colleagues have said, none of that would matter were it not for the fact that five regular infantry battalions will be disbanded over the next 18 months; indeed, 20,000 regular troops have been given their marching orders. Pursuing such a policy before we are sure that the reservist plan will work is foolhardy and a high-risk strategy.

Secondly, I have concerns about whether 30,000 reservists could plug the capability gap. In my day—in the 1980s—TA reservists, gallant though they were, were essentially expected to ship out to Germany and wait for the Warsaw pact forces to come to them. Today, reservists are expected to have a much broader range of roles, but they are still expected to achieve that higher skill base with about 35 to 40 days’ training. We live in a world where challenging, asymmetrical warfare will become the norm.

My third concern is about boots on the ground. I doubt whether 30,000 reservists can plug the gap. The Government make great play of the fact that they have had many expressions of support from prospective employers, but expressions of support and boots on the ground are often two very different things. The latest MOD figures I have—they are fresh out of the MOD, and the Minister is welcome to challenge them if he so wishes—show that the establishment strength of the TA infantry is about 6,700 soldiers, but only 2,800 of them are actually eligible for mobilisation. That suggests an effective rate of about 40%. The MOD’s own figures—as I say, the Minister is welcome to challenge them if he so wishes—suggest that, in terms of plugging the gap left by 20,000 regulars, the Government’s estimate of 30,000 reservists is way off beam. A minimum of 50,000 reservists is more the ballpark figure.

We then need to look at further factors, which could throw even the figure of 50,000 into doubt. MOD figures confirm that the TA is losing infantry soldiers. Furthermore, as a number of colleagues have pointed out, the current economic climate means that small and medium-sized enterprises, in particular, will struggle to allow key employees to leave employment with them for extended periods without being compensated by the MOD. I am not convinced that that costing has been factored in.

For those three reasons—value for money, the capability deficit and boots on the ground—several of us have severe reservations about the Government’s plans. Meanwhile, however, those plans are having distorting effects on the ground. Excellent infantry battalions are being lost, and the 2nd Battalion Royal Regiment of Fusiliers is a case in point. It is one of the most experienced battalions in the British Army, having served in all the major conflicts during the past 15 years, including Kosovo and Bosnia. It remains one of the best recruited. By the MOD’s own admission, it was not one of the original five infantry battalions to be disbanded; instead, more poorly recruited battalions were meant to go. However, through interference, intervention or whatever we want to call it, it was decided to save a poorly recruited battalion north of the border. The MOD then had to go hunting for a battalion south of the border, and, for some reason, fell on 2RRF.

[Thomas Docherty]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr Baron]

I am conscious that I am running out of time, so I will proceed if I may.

In our contracting Army, one-battalion regiments stand less chance of survival. We were told a few years ago that the future rested with larger battalions. However, that distortion means the Government are spending millions of pounds unnecessarily supporting understrength battalions. Surely, the Minister can understand that it is more economical to keep well-recruited battalion families together than to spend millions of pounds trying to bring understrength battalions up to strength. Such a policy simply suggests we are reinforcing failure.

In short, these plans are fundamentally flawed. Parliament has not been made aware of the costings to justify their execution, despite the fact that five regular infantry battalions have already been given their marching orders. I strongly suggest to the Minister that it would be wiser to see whether the plans work first, before losing 20,000 regular troops.

There is one final reason why the Government’s policy is high risk. Our armed forces are being reduced at a time when many countries, which are not necessarily friendly to the west, are increasing their expenditure. No one can tell where the next threat will come from. We must always remember that the first duty of the Government is defence of the realm.