Courts and Tribunals Bill (Tenth sitting)
Linsey Farnsworth Excerpts(2 weeks ago)
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Dr Mullan
I rise to speak in enthusiastic support of the clause. If we were starting from scratch, would we deal with this issue in primary legislation? I expect not. I do not know the history of why the approach of the time was followed, but it seems that the matter should be addressed flexibly via regulations. Members will have heard us argue vociferously against the use of both positive and negative regulations in different contexts, but it seems appropriate in these circumstances. The proposal reflects the changing nature of how people work, interact and fulfil their role as magistrates. We want to support and accommodate that in a way that is not over-rigid.
Of course, there will be opportunities for scrutiny of the legislation to come. Even though we have talked about the significant limitations of the negative procedure, scrutiny is still an option in theory if something were proposed that that we really were not happy about. Considering the stakes of this issue, that is a proportionate approach.
Linsey Farnsworth (Amber Valley) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Jardine.
I wanted to speak on this clause because, as the Minister said, while it is technical and feels dry, it is incredibly important. I appeared in front of many magistrates over my 21 years as a Crown prosecutor. They do an incredibly important job and provide a huge public service. During the course of this legislative process, it has been concerning to hear suggestions that magistrates are, in some respects, an inferior bench or forum for our criminal justice system. That is far from my experience over 21 years.
I put on record my thanks to all the magistrates who serve day in, day out, across this country. The clause recognises them and shows that we can be dynamic in rewarding them. The Minister mentioned the medal, which I welcome. I can think of many magistrates who deserve a medal for their work. It is important that we pass the clause today.
Courts and Tribunals Bill (Seventh sitting)
Linsey Farnsworth ExcerptsTuesday 21st April 2026
(2 weeks, 2 days ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Courts and Tribunals Bill 2024-26 View all Courts and Tribunals Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Notices of Amendments as at 21 April 2026 - (21 Apr 2026)
The Chair
I say gently that if we are referring to the Lammy review we give it its name, and if we are talking about the Secretary of State we refer to him as that and not just his name.
Linsey Farnsworth (Amber Valley) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Jardine. I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington for tabling new clause 29, which I support. It is a long-standing principle, established in the case of R v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy, that justice must be done and be seen to be done. It is famous as a legal precedent in establishing the principle that the mere appearance of bias is sufficient to overturn a judicial decision.
To be confident in our criminal justice system, the public need to be satisfied that it is fair. New clause 29 would provide important reassurance that there is a check and balance in place to review the changes the Bill introduces, and that any issues of bias arising from a trial without jury can and will be addressed.
The Chair
Order. As I have said, if you are referring to the Secretary of State, can you use his title?
Linsey Farnsworth
I do apologise, Ms Jardine.
The report by the Deputy Prime Minister, as he is now, was conducted almost a decade ago. It highlighted concern about the sentencing decisions of judges, so it is often cited—understandably—as a reason to be cautious about judge-only trials. New clause 29 would ensure that a review of judge-only trials will be conducted after a year, and should there be disparities in the conviction rates for those of an ethnic minority background and/or for white British persons living in lower-income households, measures can and will be put in place to prevent such disparities from arising.
It is also right that a further review is conducted between 35 and 36 months after enactment, as the new clause suggests, both to check the initial findings and to take account of the fact that things can change. In the review conducted by the Deputy Prime Minister, for example, it was found that where CPS charging decisions were concerned, a defendant’s ethnicity did not affect the likelihood of their being charged. However, subsequent research conducted by the University of Leeds, in which the outcomes of decision making in 195,000 cases between 2018 and 2021 were examined, identified evidence of disproportionality in CPS decision making. Specifically, defendants from minority ethnic backgrounds were significantly more likely to be charged than a white British defendant for a comparable offence.
Additional research by the independent disproportionality advisory group and scrutiny by the CPS itself has led to an action plan to tackle the disproportionality that was found to exist, and to deliver change. There is precedent for ongoing review of disparities in outcomes within the criminal justice system where ethnicity is concerned, and precedent for action being taken to address such disparities.
Recent research by the University of Birmingham identified concern about racial bias within juries, particularly when there is no representation of ethnic minorities among the 12 people serving on a jury. This research cited a case in which an attack on the victim was caught on CCTV, yet in May 2022 a jury with no black members acquitted most of the perpetrators. The researchers concluded that their study raised important questions about whether the public in England and Wales see juries as being fair and just in relation to racial minorities, and that juries in England and Wales remain extremely lacking in diversity; that is what the study found. Another problem the study identified in that case was that the concerns of victims’ families about racial bias among the jury were never investigated.
Linsey Farnsworth
No. I will make some progress; we need to make progress today.
The researchers found that more than 90% of respondents in the survey they conducted believed that discrimination on juries should be reported to trial judges and properly investigated, yet there is no mechanism under current law that allows juries to do so.
Appeal, a not-for-profit organisation, has submitted evidence opposing some elements of the Bill. However, in a paper that it prepared in 2024, Appeal set out concerns relating to majority decisions, as opposed to unanimous jury decisions, and the impact of racial bias. The case of R v. Connor et al was cited, in which questions from the jury suggested that there had been a focus on the defendant’s race and a letter from a juror after conviction confirmed racial bias in the jury’s deliberations.
Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 provides for confidentiality in jury decision making. However section 8A, enacted in Scotland, permits the Lord Justice General to allow information about deliberations from the jury room to be disclosed for the purposes of research. That provides an opportunity for the same to follow in England and Wales. Recent statistics show an increase in hate crime, including crime based on race and religion, rates of which spiked after Brexit and, recently, following the Southport murders. Now more than ever, we must be conscious of the impact that discrimination could have on the fairness, or otherwise, of jury trial.
Linsey Farnsworth
I am about to conclude, so I will not.
I support new clause 29, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington, but I submit that the change and modernisation that the Bill seeks to introduce bring an opportunity to review all aspects of the criminal justice system in relation to ethnicity and socioeconomic background to ensure fairness for all.
Yasmin Qureshi (Bolton South and Walkden) (Lab)
I want to comment on two points. First, I agree entirely with the speech of the hon. Member for Chichester on the problem with clause 3 and jury allocation, and I especially agree with her point about the retrospective reallocation of cases, whereby people waiting for trial by jury will suddenly find that their case will be removed from the jury and heard elsewhere. She outlined in comprehensive detail all the issues—not just jurisprudence issues but legal and factual issues. I support what she said so I will not repeat it.
I also agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Amber Valley about these issues. She highlighted the disparities in the way that different groups of people are treated in our criminal justice system. I applaud my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Erdington for tabling new clause 29. I hope that the Government will consider accepting it although, of course, if we did not abolish jury trial we would not need it.
We are told that the reason for clauses 1 and 3, which restrict access to jury trials in many cases, is to do with the backlog. That is where the Government start their position—the backlog—and I want to concentrate on that aspect. Please bear with me: I will blind the Committee with a few facts and figures because I think that they will make logical sense of why people such as me say that juries are not the reason for the delays. It is important that we get that sense.
There are currently around 88,000 cases awaiting trial in the Crown courts. The queue for the Crown court is now so long that some trials are being fixed for 2030—the Committee has heard that. We have talked about the old adage that, “Justice delayed is justice denied.” That is happening, and the delay is unacceptable, but the answer is honestly not to get rid of one of the fundamental systems that we have had in our country for centuries.
The reason for the delay is not juries but the court structure and how things happen there. One judge sitting in one courtroom for one day is known as a sitting day. The Old Bailey has 18 courts. It therefore has capacity for 18 sitting days per day, 90 sitting days per week and 4,500 sitting days in a 50-week year. For the last 15 years, restrictions have been placed on the number of sitting days in Crown court centres around the country. Resident judges, who are the principal judges at each court centre, have been told that funding will be given only for a limited number of sitting days. Restrictions of between 9% and 25% have been imposed. That is what the previous Government did.
There is always a queue for the Crown court; that is inevitable, as cases cannot be tried immediately. However—and here is the story—up until the start of 2019, that queue was managed without any undue delay. The backlog had come down from around 56,000 cases in 2014 to 33,000 cases by the start of 2019. All those cases were tried by a jury, and within a reasonable time: within six months if the defendant was in custody, and between eight and 12 months if they were on bail. Given that cases were being tried within a reasonable time in 2019, the suggestion that jury trials somehow take longer or are more complicated has no basis.
The length of the cases backlog rose from 33,000 at the start of 2019 to 71,000 by summer 2024, and rose by another 10% to around 80,000 last year. That increase is a direct consequence of the restrictions placed on sitting days. The problem was exacerbated by the closure of some courts. For example, Blackfriars Crown court in central London, which was a custom-made, modern Crown court building with eight courtrooms and the capacity to host 2,000 sitting days in a 50-week year, was closed and sold in 2019. Over the six years since then, 12,000 potential sitting days have been lost.
There are around 4,000 rape cases in the backlog. Trials for rape that have one defendant and one complainant often takes five days—although some trials are quicker and some take longer—so 2,400 of such cases could have been tried in the 12,000 sitting days that were lost following the closure of those eight courtrooms at Blackfriars. The budgetary decision to close one court led to the inability to try what would have been half of all rape cases in the backlog. Similar examples exist all over the country, including where individual courtrooms within a Crown court building sit empty, meaning that the court is open but operating below its potential capacity.
The Crown court estate has a maximum capacity of around 130,000 sitting days. Currently, it is permitted to have 113,000 sitting days, which is partly because the Government have invested some money and allowed an increase to the number of sitting days. The Government have said that that number is a “record high”, but it is high only relative to the low numbers of the previous 15 years. Given the current backlog, I would say that it is incorrect to say that it is high. We need to invest in more sitting days and having more courtrooms open.
Courts and Tribunals Bill (Sixth sitting)
Linsey Farnsworth Excerpts(3 weeks ago)
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Linsey Farnsworth (Amber Valley) (Lab)
This is a decision that magistrates make every day. Every sitting day, they look at allocation, and they do not put their finger in the air to decide what the sentence might be. The Sentencing Council provides guidelines for each individual offence. I know that the Conservative party does not like the Sentencing Council and has at times called to get rid of it, or Conservative Members have, in particular the former shadow Justice Secretary who has now moved to the Reform party, the right hon. Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick). The sentencing guidelines, however, are used by magistrates every day. Sentencing guidelines are also already available to Crown court judges. Does the hon. Lady accept that this is not something that judges will do willy-nilly? There are guidelines and factors that have to be taken into consideration, which is a safeguard in itself to ensure a fair decision.
Rebecca Paul
The hon. Lady is absolutely right that magistrates are doing that now, frequently and—as far as I am aware—fairly well, but we have to remember that they are doing it for low-level cases. In fact, their sentencing powers have increased only recently. The key point is that we will have an additional process. The magistrates do it, but now we will have this additional process at the Crown court level to decide between judge only and jury.
Obviously, the sentencing guidelines and all the things we have just set out would be entirely relevant to that process and will factor in. I will go through a that in a bit more detail, so I hope the hon. Lady will bear with me. I will of course let her intervene—that would be really helpful. She clearly has a huge amount of experience in this area, and I want everyone to feed in. I am asking questions about how this will work in reality, so it would be really good to draw on everyone’s experience. The Crown court deals with sexual assault and other more complex cases and, as she knows, the sentencing has to take into account things such as victim impact, so it is lot more difficult to estimate the sentence. Let us continue the debate, because it is very helpful to have this discussion.
To suggest that a judge in the plea and trial preparation hearing can undertake that assessment accurately and quickly off the back of the information that they have at that point, potentially on a paper determination without a hearing, is unrealistic. That could be very difficult for them. I will give a few examples, and again I am very happy for people to intervene or give their views, because we need to work through the nitty-gritty of how the measure will work in reality.
For category 2 sexual assault, the achieving best evidence full transcripts of the complainants’ evidence are often not available. Instead, the court has to rely on a written summary, but my understanding is that that information is needed to provide an accurate and realistic estimate of the likely sentence. How is it proposed that that will be done in practice for allocation? Will the judge watch the videos of the complainants’ evidence for an hour or two before deciding? If the case hinges on CCTV footage, is it proposed that the judge watch that before making the allocation decision? Those practical points do not appear to have been considered in preparation for the Bill, although the Minister may have all the answers and I obviously look forward to hearing how she thinks the process will work in practice.
It is not sufficient just to say that the judge will decide the likely sentence length without ensuring that they have the information they need to do that properly, particularly given the magnitude of the impact of the allocation decision. I therefore ask the Minister whether anyone has calculated how long it might take for the judge to go through the various videos and footage before the PTPH to get the information they need to make an allocation decision.
It is important to remember that victim impact is often a significant factor in sentencing. Is it proposed that victim impact statements will be relied upon at the point of determining an allocation? What happens if, at that point, the impact is not yet known? For example, the complainant might still be in hospital, medical evidence might remain outstanding or the psychological impact might not be known for many weeks or months.
On the face of it, we probably all thought that a judge deciding whether the likely sentence will be more than three years sounded straightforward. We would think that they just look at the sentencing guidelines, but I am not sure it is that straightforward. Once we start thinking it through and listening to those working in the justice system—I have spoken to people about this—we soon realise that it is far from simple, especially for complex cases such as sexual assault. The judge does not magically know the likely sentence; they need to understand the facts, the detail of the alleged offence and the impact on the victim before they can even begin to do that accurately. If they get it wrong, which is increasingly likely if insufficient information is available to them, that could result in defendants being denied a jury trial when they should have had one.
That brings me on to my next concern. How long will it take on average for the judge to do all this? Has that been factored into the Crown court saving of 27,000 sitting days? Has the increased time that the magistrates will need to spend on this, due to the complexity of cases, been factored into the increased demand of 8,500 sitting days? We also need to bear in mind that the allocation process that the magistrates undertake under the current rules will also get more complex once the sentencing powers increase up to two years. There will have to be allocation decisions for more complex offences such as sexual assault and death by careless driving. Do magistrates have the expertise to accurately assess the likely sentence in those types of cases to adequately assess victim impact?
The Government’s approach sounds simpler on paper, but I hope I have demonstrated that in reality I am not sure it is once we delve into it. These proposals add a not insubstantial amount of work simply to decide where to allocate the trial, essentially undertaking almost a mini trial to review the evidence before the allocation can even be decided. That does not sound time saving to me. It is the wrong way round. We expect the judge to make a judgment on sentence before the trial has even happened, which could change the type of trial the defendant is entitled to. That is fundamentally wrong. It is a flawed approach that will lead to bad outcomes for defendants and complainants.
Linsey Farnsworth
The magistrates court goes through that process. The process of allocation to the Crown court bench division essentially mirrors what already happens in the magistrates court, and that is quite a straightforward procedure. It often takes less than five minutes—virtually always less than five minutes. Because the prosecution makes its representations on the Crown’s case, it sits highest. For the most serious version of the offence, what would the likely sentence be, based on the sentencing guidelines that I have already mentioned? That will be the case in the Crown court. There will be a prosecutor in the Crown court standing up and saying, “The Crown’s case at its most serious does not warrant a sentence above three years. We therefore think it can stay in the Crown court bench division.”
For it to be a big argument, the defence advocate would need to argue that their client deserves a much longer sentence than the CPS says they deserve, if all the most serious elements of the case are proven. That strikes me as a very unusual argument for a defence barrister to make—that they would suggest their client deserves a longer sentence. That is what we are talking about here. How often is a barrister going to argue that their client deserves a longer sentence?
If the defence barrister convinces the judge, the judge might think, “Actually, maybe it does deserve a longer sentence; we will have a jury trial”, and that person is convicted after trial. Then there is the plea and mitigation stage. At that point, the defence barrister will try to argue, “I know the case is now proven, and I know that I said it deserved longer than three years, but actually, even though the case is proven, they deserve less.” That would be a very strange position for a barrister to be in, and I think they would be at risk of misleading the court at some point along the way, which is something they very much would not like to do. I can reassure the hon. Member that in my experience these arguments just do not happen.
Rebecca Paul
It is really helpful to hear the hon. Member’s perspective from her in-depth knowledge and experience, but I would challenge one aspect of her point: I might argue for a longer sentence if it meant I was more likely to get a jury trial and be found not guilty. Allow me to give an example. If I had created an offensive social media post, I would know that, if I could make my case to a jury, they would be much more likely to use their discretion and compassion and accept the human foibles that we have. They might well say, “This person did not intend to cause any harm—not guilty”. I therefore disagree with the hon. Member; I think she will find herself in a situation where—it sounds bizarre—people will argue that they should get a longer sentence in order to go to jury, so that they have a chance of being found not guilty and clearing their name.
Linsey Farnsworth
Please allow me to finish.
It is because barristers have a duty not to mislead the court. If they are saying to the judge, “I know my client is not really going to get more than three years, but I am going to argue that they are because I want the jury trial,” then that would be very much against the requirements on barristers.
Dr Mullan
I beg to move amendment 41, in clause 3, page 5, line 38, at end insert—
“(7) Where a court has determined in accordance with this section that a trial is to be conducted without a jury, the defendant may request a different judge to preside over the trial than the judge who made the determination that the case was suitable to be tried without a jury.”
This amendment enables the defendant to request a different judge to try the case than the judge who determined that the case was eligible for trial without a jury.
The amendment draws into acute focus the challenges with public confidence and the risk of clouding judicial decision making that the proposals of a new judge-only court bench division will create.
It is important to set out the distinctions between different types of allocation decisions both now and in the future, if the proposals are passed. It is important to restate that we have summary-only cases based on the offence type rather than anything subjective, and then we have the indictable-only offences, again based on the offence type. In our previous debate on allocation, I pointed the Minister to grey cases, such as drug dealing and burglary offences, that are triable either way. At the moment, if it is about three of those offences, they have to go to the Crown court. I ask the Minister for clarity at some point about how they will operate.
Presently, we have what I sometimes call a clear and distinct separation of powers—a separation between those anticipating sentencing outcomes and those deciding sentencing outcomes, and a powerful safeguard for where that is not the case. Under the Bill, those lines will be blurred in a new and novel way, because the judge anticipating sentence length in the Crown court can then determine guilt and sentence length, and potentially issue a longer sentence of more than three years. That is important for the defendant and, in certain scenarios, for the victims and bereaved.
The hon. Member for Amber Valley, with her expertise, earlier described the fact that allocation and sentencing take place in the magistrates court, but importantly, the defendant can elect, and say no to their being involved in that process. They can say, “I want a jury trial; I want the judge who passes the sentence to be separate from the people involved in allocation.” Of course, the scenario is one in which a defendant is unlikely to have a reasonable claim of bias against their interests in relation to the sentence.
We discussed why someone may prefer a jury trial, even if the sentence might be higher. However, if we are talking about the defendant’s ultimate view about the judge, it is unlikely that someone in the magistrates court—if the case stays in the magistrates court—will say, “You chose to keep me here because of a shorter sentence, so I think you are biased in giving me a longer sentence.” They already have a positive disposition about the view of the sentencing.
More importantly, there are strict limits on the sentence length if a case stays in the magistrates court. It cannot go beyond what the initial judgment was. If the court decides, during or at the conclusion of the trial, that the sentence should be higher, it is up to someone else to pass that sentence. It goes to the Crown court for sentencing.
Linsey Farnsworth
It is true that the case has to go up to the Crown court, but it is not for the purposes that the hon. Member would like, as it were. It is because the magistrates’ maximum sentencing powers have been reached, and therefore they do not have the power, as opposed to it being preferable that the case go to somebody else.
Dr Mullan
That was not the point I was seeking to make, so I thank the hon. Lady for clarifying.
I sometimes wonder what victims think. Do they sometimes follow a case, hear the evidence and then think it should be getting more than the magistrates’ limits? Do they question whether the magistrates, who have a preliminary view about whether the case will hit a certain maximum at the outset, have come to the trial with some degree of bias about what outcome might be? Do they think the magistrates would therefore have some reluctance, even having heard the evidence in full, to pass a sentence that is beyond their powers and send the case up? Of course, magistrates do reallocate sentencing. As we have said, just because I feel there is a risk of a perception of bias does not mean I think we should scrap the whole lot and never let magistrates pass a sentence, but seeing that things are not perfect on balance does not mean that we accept them.
These proposals will add a degree of seriousness because of the potentially significant differences between possible sentence lengths. The sentencing guidelines for the offences are narrower than we will perhaps see with triable either-way cases, which have already been curtailed at a certain level of seriousness and might go up to an even greater level of seriousness.
If the clause passes unamended, the scenario could be as follows. A Crown court judge will receive an outline of the case, and make an initial judgment on the likely sentence outcome. They will decide, for a triable either-way offence, whether a sentence is likely to be more than three years. That same judge could then hear that case. That is the same judge whom a victim or bereaved family member could reasonably—perhaps not correctly, but reasonably—perceive on some level had already made a decision about the case, because of course they have: they have taken an initial view of the case and on what the outcome was likely to be. Importantly, that is not something that happens in any way shape or form with the jury trial system, where the two things are separate.
We all agree that perception as well as reality is important in our justice system. It is possible that some victims or bereaved family members might question whether the judge, who formed a view, is not best placed to then objectively and fairly decide what the actual sentence should be, if it should be longer than three years. They might even be concerned that passing a sentence of more than three years would suggest that they had got it wrong in their initial view. Again, we do not have to form a view about how likely or unlikely that is; we should form a view on what the perception of that will be. As politicians, we are very used to the concept that perception is important. Even if someone has not necessarily done something wrong, whether the public perceive that they might have done something wrong is important.
All that can be readily and simply avoided through our amendment, which would introduce a separation of powers, as I have described it. This is a modest and narrow amendment. It will provide a greater degree of confidence in the new system; even if the Minister is happy to proceed with the system, I am sure she would accept that it has generated questions and debates about rights and impartiality. This amendment is a very simple and modest way in which the Minister can minimise that. I know she wants maximum possible confidence in the new system, so I hope our amendment achieves that and that she can support it.
As we are still discussing allocations and who will or will not be allocated to different parts of the court, I would also be grateful if the Minister could provide clarity on triable either-way offences, such as drug dealing and burglary offences, where multiple versions go into the Crown court at the moment. What will happen to those cases in relation to allocation as part of the new division?
Dr Mullan
I beg to move amendment 42, in clause 3, page 9, line 23, leave out subsection (4) and insert—
“(4) Where a court has determined in accordance with section 74A that a trial is to be conducted without a jury, the court cannot pass a sentence of imprisonment or detention of more than three years on a person convicted of an offence.
(4A) Where a person is convicted of an offence and the court considers that the appropriate sentence is more than three years’ imprisonment or detention, the court must refer the case for retrial by jury.”
This amendment prevents a judge sitting alone from sentencing a defendant to more than three years in prison, and requires that if this is the likely sentence, the case must be remitted for trial by jury.
It is my pleasure to speak in support of amendment 42, tabled in my name, which really drives at the heart of the question of fairness in relation to this new system. It would prevent a judge, sitting alone, from sentencing a defendant to more than three years in prison, and requires that, if that is the likely sentence, the case must be remitted for trial. Again, related to the important points I made earlier, it also introduces the element of “must”.
Again, we have to revisit the process of allocation; triable either-way offences will be allocated on the basis of sentence length. That is the important part for us to consider here. The Government have agreed that the suitable manner in which to allocate offences to trial with or without a jury is based on sentence length. We can only conclude, therefore, that the Minister accepts that the possible consequence—the possible time in prison—is intrinsically linked to the fairness, reasonableness, desirability or however the Minister might want to describe it of remaining with a jury trial.
In this case, if criminals—because they will have been convicted at this point, we can say criminals rather than defendants—ended up with a sentence of more than three years, they would have a reasonable basis on which to say that their treatment was not in keeping with the Government’s own decisions about what would be preferable in relation to fairness. Let us be clear: I spend a lot of time working with victims and campaigning for longer sentences for offenders, and I think that, across the board and for many decades, our sentencing regime for convicted criminals has been insufficiently punitive and has given insufficiently long sentences. But that does not mean that I do not think that there is a fair and proper way of going about that.
I agree with the Government that sentence length is inherently related to fairness in regard to whether someone gets a Crown court trial with or without a jury—although, in my view, it should always be a jury trial—but a convicted criminal now will look at this and say that he has a sentence greater than he otherwise should have expected to get, and that, if the judge had anticipated correctly that sentence at the outset, he would have had a jury trial. That would be his reasonable conclusion.
Linsey Farnsworth
On that point, what are the hon. Member’s thoughts in relation to a magistrates court where a magistrate has made a decision that a case is suitable for summary trial but then they have the opportunity—or the right if you like—to commit somebody for sentencing at the Crown court if the offence turns out to be more serious than had originally been envisaged? Actually, the safeguard for the expectation of the defendant is dealt with at an early stage—at the allocation stage—when the defendant is told of the decision that the case will stay in the magistrates court, but they could be committed in due course to sentencing in the Crown court.
Dr Mullan
That goes straight to the point we discussed earlier about why it is important to separate the two, because in this scenario it is the same person all the way through. Ultimately, the sentencing process ends up being separate to the people who decide whether or not someone is guilty, and they will have decided the mode of trial, as well.
Linsey Farnsworth
Can I also just mention Newton hearings? A defendant has pleaded guilty but does not accept all the allegations that the prosecution’s case sets out—perhaps the most serious aggravating feature. Then, there is a Newton hearing, at which a judge sits and decides what the factual situation is and goes on to sentence as well. There is already precedent in the Crown court for a judge to hear evidence, make a decision based on the evidence, and pass sentence. I wonder what the hon. Gentleman’s view on that is.
Dr Mullan
This is a great opportunity for me to learn and understand an element of the system that I did not understand—I know about it, rather than understand it.
I will go back to the point that we have made repeatedly. We are designing a system from scratch here. We have the opportunity to do things exactly as we want to. We do not have to be forced into replicating other elements of the wider system; we can design this system as we best think it should operate. I think that the best thing in this scenario, in which we are starting from scratch, would be to say to somebody that they should be able to derive the benefit of having a jury trial if the case is of a nature that the Government themselves agree would typically enjoy the benefits of a jury trial. This is just inherently a fairness question.
That is why we have replicated the process—in a positive way—in a magistrates court. The decision is the decision that has been made; the court cannot go above it. That is because we say that in a magistrates court, if someone seeks to go above that court, that is not the right place to do that; it would not be fair and reasonable. We are making a similar point here in relation to mode of trial, for jury trial.
We think that the amendment is sensible, reasonable, balanced and does not prevent the Government from undertaking their reforms; it is not what could possibly be described as a wrecking amendment. I hope that the Government will reflect on that and accept the amendment.
Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fifth sitting)
Linsey Farnsworth Excerpts(3 weeks ago)
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Dr Mullan
The hon. Member has articulated extremely well that these things can be done differently and have a different outcome. I heard about case management directly from Liverpool Crown court. It has an aggressive approach to case management: it swept the cases and was clear whether it needed to be hearing a case or whether it could do any work to get a plea. It does a lot of work, and if every court was doing that, it would deliver different outcomes. The Minister might rightly point out that different courts have different circumstances, but surely the goal should be to correct those circumstances so that the positive things enabling some courts to bring the backlogs down can be done everywhere.
Linsey Farnsworth (Amber Valley) (Lab)
My point follows on from the powerful point the hon. Member is making about the need to look at good practice, which is something we should all get behind. Over my many years of working for the Crown Prosecution Service, I saw various schemes aimed at doing just that, but unfortunately, given that we are here today, they did not sort out the issue entirely.
Does the hon. Member recognise the evidence Sir Brian Leveson gave specifically about Liverpool Crown court, in which he cautioned against suggesting that that case could simply be replicated across the whole country? Liverpool Crown court deals with a single police force and Crown Prosecution Service, and has a very small local Bar that work together well. Although we would like it to be, that is not necessarily the case across the country. Does the hon. Member recognise that those circumstances are unique and may not be possible for the whole country?
Dr Mullan
Yes, absolutely. In the NHS, I worked on what we might call change and improvement programmes or quality improvement programmes. We worked hard to replicate the best clinical practice everywhere, but it is simply not possible to directly replicate everything that goes on in every unit, although that is not to say that we cannot do some of what goes on. As the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden pointed out, we are not talking about a single court; that is why I was clear about looking at this on a regional basis. I do not think that the data in any of these regions is getting better because of one court that has specific circumstances that cannot be replicated. That is why we have to show a high degree of interest in understanding what can be replicated and in trying those measures.
As we heard from the representatives of the criminal Bar and the circuit, we should give them a chance to try some of these things before we do something so unprecedented that will lead to a curtailment of rights. Nobody thinks that the other, positive parts of the Bill, or the measures that do not even require legislation, take away from anything else; they are just exceptionally positive things we could be doing where we do not pay some kind of price. Surely, we should try those before taking the step proposed in the Bill. Whether or not we think this step is reasonable—Labour Members have made it clear that they do—I doubt they think it will not lead to a loss in relation to jury trial rights.
Dr Mullan
I draw the Committee’s attention to my remarks at the outset of our proceedings: our judicial system, victims and defendants and how we manage crime in this country are my personal priorities. That is primarily the reason why I sought to be elected to this place, so I will never disagree that justice should get a higher priority than it has historically. I also pointed out that Labour Members more broadly have accepted that justice getting insufficient priority in our political system has gone on for many decades.
The hon. Member for Birmingham Erdington is right in pointing out the backlogs that existed prior to the pandemic, and they were actually lower than those we inherited from the previous Government. If we are talking purely about what happened with the backlogs, our record prior to the pandemic was an improvement on that of the previous Labour Government. That does not mean it is okay; that does not mean we say, “We did a great job,” but it is important, in balancing and understanding the debate, to know that.
In terms of what we did in relation to the covid pandemic and all the challenges it posed, we had uncapped sitting days and Nightingale courts, and we took steps to try to address the backlog. I served on the Justice Committee, scrutinising what the Government were doing at that time. I was very frustrated, because we would visit Nightingale courts and one of the biggest challenges they faced was the lack of certainty about whether they would be renewed in the future. I questioned Ministers at the time about that. To all of us on the Committee, on a cross-party basis, it was obvious that those courts would need to carry on for longer—why not just get on and agree that and let them run in that sustained way? There were many things we could and should have done better. That is not to say that we did not do anything or that, prior to the pandemic, our record did not compare favourably to that of the previous Labour Government.
As I said, in that particular example we introduced the innovation of making the provisional data available earlier. In June, given the challenges with that data being wrong on occasion, a decision was taken to temporarily stop publication, to see if we could close that gap. If that data is significantly different from the revised published data, there is sense in looking again at the methodology and seeing whether the gap between the provisional and final data can be closed. But here we are, almost a year later, and the Government have not chosen to reinstitute the publication of that provisional data. I think everyone on the Committee would benefit from seeing that data, so I would be interested to know whether that is the basis on which the Minister has said the backlogs in some regions are not going down, when in fact, from the evidence and data I have seen, they are.
Our amendments are aimed at delivering a fairer system. Amendment 23 also seeks to achieve that outcome, in a more specific but equally valid way. As my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate said, human beings in criminal cases are not neat, so we need a degree of flexibility. There is not flexibility in all parts of the system at the moment, but allowing a judge, on their own, in these types of cases, to allocate, hear the case, determine guilt and issue a sentence is unprecedented in our judicial system—
Linsey Farnsworth
District judges in the magistrates courts sit alone every sitting day and hear cases and trials. They then go on to sentence if that person is convicted, or to release them if they are acquitted. That happens every day, so there is precedent within our criminal justice system. District judges hear the most serious and complicated cases that go to the magistrates courts. So there is already precedent for this, and indeed in the youth court as well.
Linsey Farnsworth
I am afraid I have to disagree with the hon. Member, because the youth court has powers to sentence people for up to two years, so it already has higher sentencing powers than magistrates. Many of the cases we are talking about in the Crown court bench division would command a sentence of perhaps two years.
Dr Mullan
I covered that in earlier remarks, when I pointed out that those people are not adults, so it is a different set of circumstances. If the hon. Member is asking me to be ultra-specific—I am happy to be—what is proposed is unprecedented for cases of this nature, with adults, with these sentence lengths. That is, of course, the vast bulk of our justice system. There are lots of things that we do differently for children than we do for adults in the justice system. I am not familiar with arguments suggesting that those distinctions cannot be made, and that something we do with the youth custodial element or judicial process must therefore be perfectly acceptable with the adult estate. We do not do that.
Linsey Farnsworth
But the hon. Member is happy that youths are treated fairly in the criminal justice system, even if a single judge hears their case.
Dr Mullan
Again, we talked about this before. There are degrees of fairness. Specifically on whether a defendant will get a judge who is as fair as possible in terms of representation, understanding their background and so on, I think it is less fair than a jury system. But I made it clear that other factors are given greater weight in the youth court. For example, the intimidation that a young defendant might feel in the adult court versus the youth court is given greater weight. I might think overall that the deal, so to speak, for the youth defendant is fair and reasonable, but that does not mean that I cannot say that the absence of a jury might be less fair for a youth defendant in some regards.
Linsey Farnsworth
I think the hon. Member is saying this is a balancing exercise. It is about having a fair trial, but one that is equipped within our criminal justice system. That is exactly what the Government are doing here. Of course we need fair trials, but we also need a criminal justice system that is fair, and justice delayed is justice denied. That is not fairness. Would the hon. Member recognise that?
Dr Mullan
To use the word that the hon. Member used at the start of her intervention, it is a balance. We in the Opposition are clear that the Government have that balance wrong, which is why we oppose the measures. As I said, the Government want to have this both ways: on the one hand, when it suits them, they say that it is a balancing exercise, but on the other hand, when we point out flaws in the balance, they say, “Everything’s fine. You would be just as happy in a trial with or without a jury.”
The Government should be consistent. If the Government just said, “This is a balancing exercise. There will be some detriment to people as a result, but we believe that it is right”, and then stuck to that line, at least it would be intellectually coherent. The Minister might think that makes it a debating point, but I think it is pretty important in politics to be intellectually coherent. We take a different view from the Government.
The other point that we think is different, too, is that the proposal will not achieve the desired outcome. Even if we agreed, in theory, that the balancing exercise was correct and that the trade-off that the Government seek to achieve were a reasonable one to make against the loss of the rights that we are talking about, we do not think that the Government will get those outcomes. We therefore think that the Government’s argument is fatally flawed in two respects, which is why we continue to oppose the Bill.
As I said, fairness is important. We focused on the example where a first-time offender might end up with fewer rights in our judicial system than a repeat offender; in respect of, for example, loss of respect, reputation, employment or income, the person who has more at stake has their rights removed. That is a point made clearly by JUSTICE, which supports our amendment 39. JUSTICE states that the three-year threshold is likely to lead to outcomes that are seen as unfair by those within the system and by the public. Repeat offenders are more likely to qualify for a jury trial, because their previous convictions would push the likely sentence above three years, while first-time offenders committing the same offence may be denied a jury trial.
When we put that to Ministers, as I said, they say that it is perfectly fine for those people to have a trial without a jury, and that is fair. Ministers also say, however, that they are keeping jury trials for the most serious cases—but if they are keeping it for the most serious cases, they must at some level accept that it is a superior system in some way. Otherwise, why keep it for the more serious cases, as they define them? The Government cannot hold both positions coherently.
Absolutely, as I said, the core issue is fairness. The Government want to have it both ways in this argument, but of course the defendants will not get to have it both ways. The defendants will just have what they are told by the judge, without any ability to exercise their rights in the way that they think is fair or consistent with the broader point. We therefore continue to press our amendment 39 and that is why I ask Labour Members to think carefully; this might not be universal, but how many of them would feel happy if they—with their previous good character, and all the damage that could happen to their reputation and income from a conviction—were not allowed to have the option of a jury trial? I cannot say for sure, but potentially some of them might feel differently then.
Yasmin Qureshi
I do agree. It is important to remember which offences are kept in the magistrates court. There was discussion on Tuesday about burglaries and other offences making it to a magistrates court. With respect, burglaries have never been reduced to being tried in a magistrates court.
What happened was the way that motor theft offences were tried was tweaked. What used to happen is that people, particularly youngsters, would take away a car and were charged with the theft of a car, but as everybody knows, the definition of theft includes intention to permanently deprive. Those people never had the intention to permanently deprive; they were just taking the car for joyriding, and they were then going to leave it somewhere else.
That is why a new offence was introduced: it was initially called TWOC—taking without owner’s consent—and then it became TDA, or taking and driving away a motor vehicle without the consent of the owner. That offence went down to the magistrates court, because it was seen as a misdemeanour—something that a young person might do—and was not the same as giving someone a theft conviction. We had to make some changes, which were very sensible changes. Look at all the cases being dealt with in magistrates courts at the moment: any charge that goes to the issue of honesty is still either-way or indictable.
Linsey Farnsworth
No, but it could very well come down to credibility. My hon. Friend is suggesting that no offences in the magistrates court would come down to credibility, or am I misunderstanding her point?
Yasmin Qureshi
I was giving the example of TDA and theft legislation. I was talking about offences involving dishonesty, such as theft and burglary or defrauding someone. Even producing a fraudulent insurance document is an either-way offence, because it involves dishonesty. Even now, producing a dodgy insurance certificate is not a magistrates court offence; it is still an either-way offence, because of the element of dishonesty—not in the sense of people saying different things but in terms of intent. That is what I am talking about—not what my hon. Friend was saying.
Linsey Farnsworth
I recently introduced the criminal offence of unauthorised entry of a football stadium. That is a summary-only offence. There are examples in the magistrates court where credibility and dishonesty are key points of summary-only offences.
Yasmin Qureshi
My hon. Friend is comparing apples and pears. Entry of a stadium that someone is not entitled to be in is not the same as being charged with stealing, even in minor instances, such as stealing a bottle of water. They are two different things. For example, entering enclosed premises is dealt with in a magistrates court. There are different elements involved. What is at stake if I steal a bottle of water? That is very different from entering a stadium that I am not meant to be in.
We have had a good discussion. I still ask the Government to look at my amendment. As I have said from the beginning, I will not put it to a vote, but I am asking them to consider it. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 39, in clause 3, page 5, line 26, at end insert—
“or,
(c) the defendant demonstrates to the court that the circumstances of his case are such that to be tried without a jury would amount to a breach of the principles of natural justice.”—(Dr Mullan.)
This amendment would ensure that trials by jury continue for indictable offences carrying a sentence of less than three years in prison if the defendant can demonstrate that it would be in the interests of natural justice.
Courts and Tribunals Bill (Fourth sitting)
Linsey Farnsworth Excerpts(3 weeks, 2 days ago)
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Dr Mullan
It absolutely does—but the Minister is not doing what Sir Brian recommended. She is rejecting his approach, but when we want to reject his approach, she asks how we can possibly question what Sir Brian has to say on such matters. That is the reality of what is happening. It is a consistent flaw that the Government cannot undo.
My hon. Friend the Member for Reigate did a good job of illustrating the nature and seriousness of so many of the offences we are considering. She also sought a firm answer on, for example, the modelling of the increases in guilty pleas that we might expect owing to the increase in the length of suspended sentences.
We had a debate about, “Well, it’s in the explanatory notes, not in the impact assessment,” as if that was just immaterial. The Minister and her officials will know very well that there is a big difference between what goes into an impact assessment, given the statutory nature of that document and everything that the Government have to do before they put things into it, and what a Government can put out in what is effectively a non-statutory document. They could really put anything in there that they wanted to.
Of course we would expect the Government to be fair, frank and honest, but the reason why we have impact assessments—and the reason why, when Labour Members were in opposition, they hammered the Conservatives repeatedly about what did or did not go into an impact assessment in particular, as opposed to broader documents—is that it has a statutory footing and is important in its own way. I think my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate did a good job of illustrating what was absent from that impact assessment.
We talked about the Crown Prosecution Service, and there was an attempt to say that what a senior member of the management said, one would assume—
Dr Mullan
I will finish the sentence, and then I will.
Of course, we would assume that they had done that in consultation with other leadership figures, so we might reasonably say that they speak on behalf of the senior leadership team of the CPS, but there was an attempt to say that their views can somehow be taken to represent the views of the many people who work across the CPS—
Linsey Farnsworth
Mr Guest was giving evidence to the Justice Committee in his capacity on behalf of the CPS. He was talking with authority from the CPS, on the organisation’s behalf, on its official policy position. It is fair to say that the CPS, as Tom Guest said, is in favour of the structural reform we are making, is it not?
Dr Mullan
Nothing that I have said is in disagreement with that. The point we are making is about whether that reflects the wider, individual views of all the people who work for the CPS. I am not aware that the CPS, for example, undertook an internal staff survey. Does the hon. Lady want to intervene and tell me whether the CPS asked people about that? I am not aware that the CPS undertook an internal consultation exercise. Did the CPS consult all the many people who work for it and say, “This is our position. This is what we think”? How did it come to its view about these decisions?
The hon. Lady is very welcome to intervene and talk about how the CPS formulated its position in the way that she sought to talk about it, covering all the different people who work for the CPS. As I explained to her, I know there are people who work for the CPS who do not agree. She may well know people who do agree, but some do not agree. I took the liberty of re-contacting one of the people who works for the CPS over the Committee’s lunch break. Their—quite rightly—anonymous and private view, which they are entitled to hold and express to me is that, as a prosecutor, we should all be very worried when a state prosecutor wants to do something that further curtails the rights of defendants. I might not express it in those terms, but that is how someone from the CPS expressed it.
The hon. Lady is absolutely right to say that the formal policy position of the organisation of the CPS is as she described, but she was not right to refer to it as being meaningful because it covers lots and lots of people who have had no formal engagement whatsoever in helping the CPS to come to that conclusion. It is a bit like the Minister getting up and saying, “The Ministry of Justice is a big organisation and we all think this is what should happen.” The Minister knows that her civil servants are asked to produce policy; what they actually think about it and whether they agree with it is totally irrelevant, and she would never use the size of the organisation to add weight to the strength of her argument, because it is nonsense. As I pointed out when His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service gave evidence, people are not allowed to give their individual views; it is a policy position that the organisation has to hold.
Joe Robertson
I thank the shadow Minister. I am probably not in a position to arbitrate between the two arguments; the hon. Member for Rugby will have to forgive me, as I come from the starting position that I back the shadow Minister, not least because he was wielding a particularly substantial file when he just spoke.
I want to address a provision that is not the immediate subject of this grouping, but which fundamentally determines the significance of clause 2—the reform of appeal rights from the magistrates court contained in clause 7. Currently, a defendant convicted in the magistrates court has an automatic right of appeal to the Crown court. That right is exercised in approximately—
Linsey Farnsworth
On a point of order, Ms Butler. I seek guidance on how we get back to clause 2, because we have veered off significantly from it. Clause 2 relates to provisions that have not yet come into force but could well come into force in the future, specifically in relation to how cases could proceed from the magistrates court to the Crown court by way of written submissions. The idea behind that provision was to avoid the need for a court hearing if everybody agreed. How can we get back on to clause 2, because I fear we are veering significantly away from what it is trying to do?
The Chair
I will give a little leeway, but I ask the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East to please go back to clause 2.
Dr Mullan
My final point in opposition to clauses 1 and 2 is that the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East (Karl Turner), who is not here today, would have had a lot to say during our proceedings. He is a Labour MP who has quite literally never rebelled against the Labour Whip. Ms Butler, you have probably been here longer than all the rest of us, so you know that in our parties we have the usual suspects, who rebel when they get the opportunity and take any chance to disagree with the governing party—we all have a sense of what that means. The hon. Gentleman is not one of the usual suspects. He is a passionate practitioner. He will have dealt with clause 2 cases. He will have sat in court and dealt with the sorts of things that clause 2 covers.
Linsey Farnsworth
Clause 2 relates to measures that have not come into force yet, so my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull East cannot possibly have any experience of that.
Dr Mullan
Sorry—I am not clear that there will not be real-world consequences in the kind of ways that the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East will understand. The Minister nodded her head when I suggested that fewer people will get a Crown court trial as a result of clause 2. The Minister indicated from a sedentary position that it is correct to say that fewer people will get a Crown court hearing specifically as a result of clause 2. If the Minister can clarify that, I am very open to hearing her. I ask Labour Members to think very carefully about the fact that one of their own, who is not one of the usual suspects, is so vehemently opposed to the change.
Courts and Tribunals Bill (Third sitting)
Linsey Farnsworth Excerpts(3 weeks, 2 days ago)
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Dr Mullan
The hon. Gentleman’s question articulates the gap between what the Opposition and the Government think about these issues. Actually, for a case like the first example, the sentence passed will be almost irrelevant to the person. If they are found guilty and convicted of an offence, they will suffer all the consequences that I have talked about whatever sentence they are given. Such consequences do not exist for the individual in the second example; they do not have employment or a reputation to lose.
The Government also often portray the assumption that people are guilty—if they are accused, they are guilty. The whole point of the jury trial system is to allow what we have all agreed, at some point and in some ways, is the fairest and most balanced way to determine guilt. The Justice Secretary himself has talked in detail about how it is the fairest way to determine guilt. When someone’s decision is going to have huge consequences for the accused’s life, it is perfectly reasonable for people to want the fairest mode of determining that guilt.
Linsey Farnsworth (Amber Valley) (Lab)
Is the hon. Gentleman saying two different things? At the start, I heard him say that we have fairness across the whole criminal justice system, but he seems now to be suggesting that magistrates court trials are inferior and less fair. Is that the position of the Opposition?
Dr Mullan
As I said, it is actually the position of the Justice Secretary, in his own report, where he said that the fairest and most balanced element of the justice system is jury trials. If the hon. Member thinks it is odd for me to hold that view, perhaps she should have a conversation with the Justice Secretary.
Linsey Farnsworth
It is right that we should talk about language. I refer the hon. Member to guidance on the CPS website in relation to the use of the term “victim”. In its guidance, the CPS says that it often uses the word “victim” when talking about general crime. When someone is making a speech in Parliament to say that there are victims waiting for justice, it is perfectly right and proper to do so, because they are not talking about an individual case. That is set out in the CPS guidance.
Rebecca Paul
The hon. Lady makes an interesting point, but we need to always be aware of the technical definition of the words that we are using. When the Government talk constantly about victims needing justice, and it all being about victims, I am not sure it is in the right spirit.
What all of us in this Committee Room agree on, however, is that the Crown court backlog is a critical problem that needs to be addressed. But limiting trial by jury is not the way to do it. We have heard that repeatedly from knowledgeable and experienced people working in the justice system—we have even heard it from one of the Government’s own Members, the hon. Member for Bolton South and Walkden. The Bar Council does not support it, the Criminal Bar Association is opposed, and the Law Society says the Government’s proposals go too far.
Linsey Farnsworth
We have heard a lot about the Bar Council and the Law Society. What we have not heard a lot about is the position of the Crown Prosecution Service on this point. If the Crown Prosecution Service was a legal firm, it would be the biggest in the country. It has thousands of lawyers working for it. Tom Guest, a member of the policy team at the Crown Prosecution Service gave evidence to the Justice Committee, in which he set out that the CPS is supportive of this legislation to look at structural reform. He said that it is not the only answer, but that it is necessary. The CPS considers us to be at a critical juncture, and that the backlog needs dealing with. Does the hon. Member agree that it is not universally the case that people working within the criminal justice system are against the legislation? Actually, the biggest law firm in the country is in favour of these structural reforms.
Rebecca Paul
I thank the hon. Lady for making that point, and I of course agree. Clearly, there is not a consensus, which is why we are here today, but we can categorically state that most knowledgeable and experienced people working in the justice system are against what this Labour Government are trying to do.
Rebecca Paul
I completely agree with my hon. Friend. If I recall correctly, the hon. Member for Amber Valley has previously worked in the CPS—she might want to disclose her interest.
Linsey Farnsworth
Yes, that is correct; I was a Crown prosecutor for 21 years, and I worked all the way through the terrible, terrible years when the Conservative Government were absolutely ripping apart our criminal justice system, so I speak with experience on this matter. I speak with a lot of former colleagues who still work on the frontline, and every single one of them supports this proposal. The difficulty is that, as civil servants, they cannot speak out. That is why we do not hear from them as much as we do from barristers. I worked at the CPS until just before the general election, so my experience is very recent.
Rebecca Paul
I thank the hon. Lady for making that point, and I hope that she is comfortable having put that on the record. It is good to hear her view.
Linsey Farnsworth
May I refer the hon. Member to the fact that the youth courts often deal with cases of this nature? They have sentencing powers of up to two years. Would the hon. Member suggest that youths are not getting a fair trial in those circumstances?
Rebecca Paul
I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention, but I will not comment on that specifically. I am talking about the magistrates courts, which generally deal with low-level motoring offences.
Rebecca Paul
I will look into the hon. Lady’s point, and I have no doubt that we will talk about that later on.
Can a Government who pride themselves on putting victims first truly be comfortable with what I have just laid out? Those are just two examples, but we see the same pattern for numerous other serious offences such as actual bodily harm, fraud and affray. In what world can those offences ever be considered minor enough to qualify only for summary justice? I do not believe that this is what victims want, either. For justice to be done, they need to have complete confidence that people will respect and accept the verdict given. That is a key part of the justice process.
Limiting jury trials for some of the most serious offences will mean that a verdict, whether innocent or guilty, will lose its current gospel status in the eyes of the populus. Clause 1 sows doubt into our justice system, and that doubt will eat away at it. At the opposite end of the spectrum less serious offences are impacted, but that will still have huge ramifications for the individual in the dock. We must always remember the human being at the centre of this. The offence with which someone is charged may be minor, but that does not stop it being the worst thing that has ever happened to them.
Courts and Tribunals Bill (First sitting)
Linsey Farnsworth ExcerptsWednesday 25th March 2026
(1 month, 1 week ago)
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The Chair
I want to get three more people in, so pithy questions and pithy answers, please.
Sir Brian Leveson: I am sorry.
Linsey Farnsworth (Amber Valley) (Lab)
Q
On 17 March, we heard evidence on the Justice Committee from Tom Guest, the director of policy at the Crown Prosecution Service. He talked about the CPS being supportive of the structural reform that is proposed in the Bill. He said that we were “at a critical juncture” and that this is
“a generational opportunity for end-to-end reform. Our view is that we have gone far beyond the point where piecemeal or non-legislative solutions will suffice. They are definitely part of the solution, but they will not solve the problem. The status quo is failing victims, witnesses and defendants.”
Do you recognise that sentiment, and do you have any comments in relation to the view of the Crown Prosecution Service and its role to play in this structural reform?
Sir Brian Leveson: I do recognise the sentiment: it is exactly my own. I think the CPS has an enormous role to play. You will know from the report that I wrote that there are lots of areas in which improvement and co-ordination of activity is critical. IT changes have to made: there are 43 forces with 43 different IT systems, each of which the CPS have to negotiate with. Redaction is an enormous problem, as is file build. The relationship between the police and the CPS, and the inability of police defence lawyers to speak to CPS lawyers—all that needs to change, and that is why I suggested the adviser.
Joe Robertson
Q
Farah Nazeer: Absolutely. The presumption is a really important first step because without the presumption, we will automatically default to the status quo. That is where the training and an understanding of domestic abuse and coercive control come in. As you can hear, we are not in a situation where safeguarding is applied consistently or domestic abuse or sexual violence are understood consistently. That is where the mandatory training piece has to come in to accompany the change to the law.
Linsey Farnsworth
Q
As a former Crown prosecutor, one aspect of the criminal justice system that concerned me was the appeals process from the magistrates court to the Crown court. As you all know, if somebody is convicted in the magistrates court, they have an automatic right to a retrial at the Crown court without having to give any reasons, regardless of whether there was a fair trial in the magistrates court or otherwise. If the victims and witnesses want to continue the process, they have to give evidence all over again through that appeal, otherwise the appeal is successful.
The Bill seeks to get rid of that automatic right and put the process more in line with the Crown court appeals process. There will have to be grounds to suggest that the original trial was unfair. As victims and survivors who have had access to the criminal justice system, what is your view on the current system of retrials and appeals from the magistrates court in terms of fairness to victims and the likelihood of victims attending to give evidence and being re-traumatised? I am also interested in whether the automatic right to appeal and have a retrial is used as coercive control in the current justice system. There is a lot to unpack there, I grant you.
Charlotte Meijer: There are a lot of questions there. From my experience, we will never know whether my perpetrator picked a magistrates court because he knew that, if he was found guilty, he could have then dragged me on to a Crown court case—we do not know.
It is absolutely terrifying because, as we all know, going through a trial for the first time is horrific—it is something that I never want to do in my life again. I had the ability to go to court again for rape, and I declined it; if there had been an appeal and I had to go again to a Crown court, I probably would have dropped out. It is not something that I would want to experience twice.
There is also a really interesting thing there. What does that say about our magistrates courts? Are we basically saying that they cannot do what they should be doing? I think that changing the system strengthens the trials and credibility of magistrates courts—they should be credible, given that 90% of cases go there. It also shows that it is the final choice; the decision will be made there, unless more evidence comes forward.
On what you said about fairness to the victim, there is obviously no right to appeal for a victim if there is a not guilty verdict. I know there is a tiny bit of legislation to say that, if there is a huge amount of new evidence, they could reopen a case. However, that barely happens. You are basically told no, so how come a perpetrator can just appeal without any reason? From victims’ perspectives, and from my perspective, it is an absolute no-brainer.
Paulette Hamilton
Q
Farah Nazeer: I think the repeal of the presumption is the cornerstone, because that gives the foundation on which the other measures rest. I think the first thing is mandatory training so that there is real understanding of coercive control and domestic abuse. I still speak to survivors daily who tell us that judges are saying, “Well, why didn’t you leave earlier? If it was that bad, why are you still there?” There is a real lack of understanding of coercive control, economic abuse and how coercive control can manifest in multiple different ways—the isolation, the withdrawal of technology and all the many things that make it impossible to leave. I think that mandatory training is really important.
The training also has to include a real understanding of the barriers that survivors face, particularly those with minoritised backgrounds, such as black women, women from minority backgrounds, deaf and disabled women and LGBTQ+ constituents. They face additional barriers and challenges in accessing justice, as well as in accessing empathy and understanding of their particular situations, which might have cultural implications, or mean different things in the domestic abuse context. We need really comprehensive training and understanding.
We also need unevidenced concepts like parental alienation to be banned from family courts, and we need actual regulated professionals—if they need to be brought in—to advise courts and judges in a way that the system and survivors can have confidence in. Right now, this is inconsistent and, in some cases, outright dangerous, as we can see from the many reports we have produced at Women’s Aid. I would say that those are the three most important things to ensure that we have a safe system.
The other piece that perhaps sits outside the provisions of the Bill is the specialist domestic abuse and sexual violence services that need to be there to support survivors through either the family court processes or the criminal court processes. Unless you have someone supporting survivors through those processes, they can be brutal. It is very hard to sustain the energy and commitment to return to those settings, time after time.
You build yourself up, as my fellow panellists have said, and then you are let down again. The experiences themselves are also deeply distressing. Without those specialist services there to support survivors, justice will not happen either way. It is really important that there is a recognition that specialist services are pivotal to ensuring that justice happens.
Courts and Tribunals Bill
Linsey Farnsworth ExcerptsTuesday 10th March 2026
(1 month, 3 weeks ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Courts and Tribunals Bill 2024-26 View all Courts and Tribunals Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Nick Timothy
I will not give way.
Of course, when the Justice Secretary’s predecessor, the Home Secretary, commissioned Sir Brian Leveson to conduct a review of the criminal courts, she knew what she was doing, because in an earlier review Sir Brian had already said that jury trials should be restricted, with magistrates deciding the mode of trial and appeals made to a circuit judge. Perhaps the Justice Secretary sees this, like the early release scheme, as another hospital pass from his predecessor, who like the hardened criminals she let out of prison early, got out of the MOJ before facing the consequences of her actions. If he does think that, he should not feel that he has to go ahead with it.
Yet here the Justice Secretary is today proposing not only what Sir Brian Leveson recommended, but an even more radical change. He is telling the House that he has no choice but to rush this very serious legislation through Parliament at breakneck speed. The Bill was published less than two weeks ago, after no consultation at all, and today he is already asking hon. Members to approve its Second Reading. He is allowing only five days for Members to scrutinise the Bill line by line in Committee. That is less than the Government allowed for the Railways Bill, the Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill and the Pension Schemes Bill. It is about the same time the House once spent scrutinising the Salmon Act 1986, which introduced the offence of handling salmon in suspicious circumstances. It is less time than the 44 debates, statements and urgent questions this House has heard on Israel, Palestine and Lebanon since the election.
We are not talking about legislating to recognise the sentience of crustacea or regulate travelling circuses; we are talking about a fundamental change to our constitution, the operation of our courts and the rights of our people. In the words of His Honour Geoffrey Rivlin KC, this Bill is
“one of the most radical and revolutionary events in English legal history. Yet it has not appeared in any manifesto; it has not been put out for consultation; it has not been recommended by Leveson”.
He says that it
“has been ‘published’ with virtually no notice to anyone”.
What arrogance, Madam Deputy Speaker—what a disgrace!
If this Bill had been the subject of consultation and this Justice Secretary had spent any time listening to judges, lawyers and the public, he would know that it will fail on its own terms. He says that it will deliver justice for more victims, but in Canada and Australia—jurisdictions he cites as an inspiration—judge-only trials have seen more acquittals than jury trials. Indeed, the impact assessment predicts that fewer people will go to prison as a result of these changes. That should be no surprise: asking judges sitting alone to take responsibility for depriving somebody of their liberty is far more onerous than asking 12 fellow citizens who can discuss the evidence, argue the case and share the burden between them.
A corresponding danger to justice is posed by the proposals to increase magistrates’ sentencing powers to two years and to limit the right to appeal their rulings. As the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull East (Karl Turner) said earlier, no fewer than 40% of appeals against verdicts and 47% of appeals against sentences issued by magistrates are successful. Incredibly, the Justice Secretary seemed to suggest just now that these figures are not a cause for concern, but a cause for celebration.
Linsey Farnsworth (Amber Valley) (Lab)
On appeals against magistrates’ rulings, is the shadow Minister aware—as I am, through my experience—that appeals are essentially a retrial in the magistrates court, and that many appeals are successful simply because the victim cannot face giving evidence for a second time and being retraumatised? Defendants will use that to retraumatise the victim all over again, particularly in circumstances where there is domestic abuse.
Nick Timothy
I do not accept that characterisation of magistrates courts. If that were a true cause for concern for the hon. Lady, this Bill would perhaps try to address what she says, yet it does not.
The Government’s claims about what the Bill will achieve are hopelessly confused. The Justice Secretary leans heavily on Sir Brian Leveson, who says that limiting jury trials will save 20% of court time, but there has been no modelling to justify this number, and Sir Brian has admitted that it is little more than a guess. When challenged by my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley (Dr Shastri-Hurst), the Justice Secretary said,
“We will…publish our modelling alongside the…Bill”.—[Official Report, 3 February 2026; Vol. 780, c. 109.]
Yet no modelling worthy of the name has been published. The impact assessment takes Sir Brian’s guess and uses it as the median estimate. This is fiction masquerading as science.
The Criminal Bar Association calls the impact assessment “meaningless verbiage”, “total gibberish” and something that
“would make the script writer of ‘In the Thick of it’ wince with embarrassment”.
It concludes:
“If anyone can make any sense of this, please get in touch.”
If the Justice Secretary wanted to accept that invitation right now, I would be willing to give way to him—but he does not.
The Government have overstated the length of trials for cases in scope of the proposed change by more than 100%. The better estimate has been made by the Institute for Government, where researchers have listened to judges and lawyers and understood that only 20% of Crown court time is spent trying either-way offences. Of course, half of those cases will remain jury trials because the likely sentence is above three years. The cases in scope therefore take up only 5% to 10% of Crown court time, so even if they could be tried 20% faster, it would save only 1% or 2% of court time.
Nick Timothy
My right hon. and learned Friend is exactly right. I was planning to turn to that point, because the Bill creates a problem not only in the burden of time it creates, but in the politicisation of our judiciary.
The Bill does create new time burdens. When juries deliberate, judges do other work in court, including on other trials. If judges deliberate instead, the court time used to hear other cases is lost. Because a defendant’s right to a jury trial will depend on the likely custodial sentence if he is found guilty, if the Bill becomes law, a judge will, for the first time, be needed to first conduct a hearing to determine the likely sentence. The Bill says that the parties involved should make representations; in cases with several defendants, the judge would need to hear from all their representatives and the prosecutor, taking up hours of time. There is more: defendants often plead guilty after the plea and trial preparation hearing, but before trial. In these cases, the sentencing judge—possibly not the same as the allocating judge—will have to hear the submissions all over again.
Then there are the reasons for conviction or acquittal, as my right hon. and learned Friend has just said. Juries do not have to provide reasons, but the Bill says that judges must. That will inevitably take many hours per case—time that right now is used to try cases.
Nick Timothy
I will make some progress.
This opens up new risks. The publication of judges’ reasons is likely to lead to more appeals and more court time being taken up. As questions are posed about judges’ reasons, we are likely to see the politicisation of judges and judicial appointments—something that will be made worse by the blurring of our adversarial model and the European inquisitorial role of judges. Under our model, judges are entitled to intervene and seek further information to help the jury with their assessment; in a judge-only trial, where the judge inevitably takes on a more inquisitorial role, those interventions and requests will inevitably be portrayed as the display of bias.
This will be made worse when it comes to the role of the judge in deciding on the admissibility of evidence. A judge usually sees all manner of material that is prejudicial to the defendant but deemed inadmissible, which does not matter when it is a jury who decides innocence or guilt. When a judge sees prejudicial material and deems it inadmissible, however, it will be difficult for anybody to believe that the information was simply erased from their mind. Judges may be professional and fully committed to their impartiality, but they are not superhuman.
Jon Trickett (Normanton and Hemsworth) (Lab)
When I was working for a living as a building worker, rather than being here, if there was a backlog of work, we were told to work through the night and at weekends, and on not very much additional pay. I wonder how it is that, today in our country, one tenth of all the courts are not even sitting, despite the backlog that the Deputy Prime Minister has told us about and many others have spoken about. Why is it that, when there is a backlog, manual workers, as I was, are made to work hard, and rightly so, to catch up, but the barristers, judges, solicitors and all the other accoutrements of a court are simply told, “Well, we’ll make it easier for you by reducing the amount of jury trials that are going to be held.” It is rather odd.
Jon Trickett
No. I have only five minutes, and I will have to move fast.
The Deputy Prime Minister did convince me, and I am sure all of us, that there is a backlog, and it is not reasonable or fair, in terms of justice, that people should wait so long. Obviously, today we have heard some very powerful speeches from victims that reinforce the case. However, he has not shown to my satisfaction that the cause of the backlog is the juries. In fact, there is much evidence to show that they have a marginal impact at the most. The cause of the backlog is all sorts of things, including the failure of the courts to meet for long enough hours, as other working people have to do all over the country.
Let me reflect for a moment—in a sense, going back to the basics—on why juries are in place, and I think it is to do with the fact that the Crown has the power, uniquely, to imprison people and deprive them of their liberty. No other organisation has that massively powerful capacity. The point is that, in a case where the Crown—or the Government, acting on behalf of the Crown—is operating in an unreasonable, unfair or even oppressive way, what the person facing imprisonment has is the jury system. Twelve people drawn from the citizenry of our country at random are able to speak together and make a final decision about whether the Crown has made out the case that that person should be imprisoned. That is a fundamental part of our constitutional system, and the idea that we should begin to abandon it is mistaken. Some hon. Members have said today that we have done similarly in the past, but making mistakes in the past does not at all justify continuing to make mistakes in the present. I have not heard the case made that juries are a bad thing in principle, although we are reducing them.
One further point I want to raise is the question of how the backlog occurred. Again, no one has made the case that the backlog occurred because of some sort of permanent, strategic problem with the way our judicial system works. It is the product of a series of cuts by Governments of both parties, to be honest, and of a number of failures—there was privatisation, and all sorts of other issues. If those changes are contingent, rather than permanent, and a temporary problem that can be resolved, why are we destroying an element of the jury system? If the Deputy Prime Minister had said that the world and the country had changed, and that our way of looking at the judicial system had to be reformed, he might have had a case, although I would not necessarily agree with it. However, he has not said that. He has said that this is a contingent problem.
When I was working for a living, I regularly used a ratchet—I do not know if the DPM has ever used one. A ratchet is a device that moves in only one direction. In the jury system, citizens have had, over centuries, a ratchet that gives protection from an oppressive Government. If the Deputy Prime Minister had come to the House and said that he was going to do some things that were extraordinary but temporary, to deal with the problems facing all victims, I might well have been prepared to listen to him. However, he has not said that; instead, he says that this will be a permanent change to the way that we do things. I am not convinced. This is oppressive, authoritarian and, quite honestly, much as I admire the Deputy Prime Minister, reactionary.
Linsey Farnsworth (Amber Valley) (Lab)
Anyone who has worked on the frontline of the criminal justice system knows that the Crown court crisis has been years in the making. Underfunding, austerity, covid and the changing nature of crime, with cases becoming increasingly complex and evidential volumes growing exponentially, have compounded the issue.
The changes in the Bill offer a pragmatic solution, and it is important that we are all clear about what is being proposed. The Bill does not abolish jury trials; it simply adjusts the threshold at which a case warrants a jury’s involvement. Magistrates are absolutely capable of hearing cases commanding a sentence of up two years; they already do in the youth court and there has been no outcry that young people do not get justice because of it.
As the Crown court backlog has increased, so has the percentage of cases committed to that court, because defendants have overruled the magistrates’ decision, and that is despite the sentence, in the most serious version of the Crown’s case, not exceeding the magistrates’ maximum powers. One may wonder why a defendant would seek to take his case to a court with greater sentencing powers, but the calculation is clear. The longer the wait for a trial, the harder it will be for witnesses to have a clear recollection of events and the more likely it is for victims to withdraw. Indeed, in one of my cases, a defendant hoped that the 96-year-old victim of burglary would die before the trial took place.
Amanda Hack (North West Leicestershire) (Lab)
This is the crux of the issue that we are discussing today: how do make sure that justice is given to victims as quickly as possible? Does my hon. Friend agree that the Bill enables us to do that?
Linsey Farnsworth
I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend that this is about getting justice to victims, which defendants game the system to prevent.
Arguments against the Crown court bench division seem to presuppose some measure of unfairness of having a single judge deciding guilt or innocence, but district judges have sat alone in the magistrates court for decades, and there have been no campaigns suggesting that they should be abolished on the grounds of unfairness or otherwise. The Crown court bench division is predicted to save 5,000 sitting days in 2028-29. As well as reducing the time spent in the courtroom, fewer jury trials will also free up administrative staff, who are feeling under immense pressure.
For those who suggest that greater investment and efficiencies alone will be sufficient, I remind them that Sir Brian Leveson has said that this alone cannot solve this crisis. That accords with my experience of working as a Crown prosecutor from 2003 right up until just before the general election, during which time countless efficiency initiatives were introduced but were ultimately unable to prevent the crisis from developing. Efficiencies alone cannot turn this around.
Lloyd Hatton
I thank my hon. Friend for making such an eloquent speech. Does she share my concern that if we were, heaven forfend, to walk away from the crucial reforms in this Bill, the police officers, prison officers, CPS staff and those who work in our Crown courts would not thank us for the mess that we would be leaving them, with the Crown court system grinding to a halt and backlogs ballooning?
Linsey Farnsworth
I absolutely agree with my hon. Friend, and I thank all those people working in the criminal justice system who, frankly, have been propping up the system with the generosity of their time, working extra hours over and above, and giving everything. They have propped up the criminal justice system in that way for years.
If we do not act now, the wait time for cases to reach trial is projected to increase, and the consequences will be stark. First, justice will be delayed. That means victims waiting years for closure and a chance to heal, it means the wrongly accused waiting years for their name to be cleared, and it means those who have offended waiting years until they can be rehabilitated. Secondly, if we do not act, we will not fix the vicious cycle of interconnected crises: the staffing crisis, the prison crises, the recidivism crisis and the VAWG crisis.
We finally have a Government brave enough to grip these problems through record levels of investment, through the emergency early release scheme, through sentencing reform and through the measures in this Bill. The Bill rebalances the criminal justice system to ensure that jury trials are always available for the most serious cases, that cases are heard sooner, that victims are treated more fairly, that our criminal justice system continues to provide justice now, and that it is future-proofed for years to come. I wholeheartedly support the Government and this Bill.
Jury Trials
Linsey Farnsworth Excerpts(4 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Sarah Sackman
My hon. Friend is right that if a case is determined by a judge, reasons will need to be given. Indeed, reasons are a good thing—those convicted of a crime will have transparency, knowing why the result has been reached. I am sure Sir Brian Leveson will have been well aware of the need for a judge to give reasons, and will have factored that into his conclusion, in the same way that we have the data from Canada and from New South Wales. I met judges at the Supreme Court in Toronto, where equivalent cases are tried by judges alone and tried by a jury. It is not about the relative merits of those two things; simply as a practical matter of timing, those judges told me that it takes about half the time. Given the evidence that we have, it is undeniable that trying cases by judges alone is going to take less time. When I have to focus on creating an efficient system that deploys resources in a proportionate way and delivers swifter justice for victims, it would be madness to ignore the conclusions of the independent review.
Linsey Farnsworth (Amber Valley) (Lab)
On the point of saving time through fewer jury trials, does my hon. and learned Friend agree that this is not just about the amount of time a jury is in the courtroom? It is about all the other factors within the criminal justice system that contribute to the time taken—the time it takes for back office staff to organise jury selection and summonsing, the time it takes for the Crown Prosecution Service to prepare reams and reams of paper for jury bundles, the time it takes to deal with the expenses, and so on. This is about the criminal justice system as a whole, not just the time spent in the courtroom.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)
Before the Minister responds, and to save another Member from any embarrassment, coming in halfway through a speech and trying to intervene is not acceptable.
Jess Brown-Fuller
The right hon. Gentleman pre-empts what I will go on to say in my speech. We are yet to see an impact assessment. That was spoken about by the shadow Justice Secretary, the right hon. Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick). It is also mentioned in the amendment tabled by the Government. We need to see the modelling and the impact assessment, and understand where these savings are coming from. Even if the figures are accurate, they avoid the glaringly obvious fact that they are measured against a completely inefficient system. The system is fundamentally not undermined by jury trials, but instead plagued by years of under-investment, creating an ever-growing list of unaddressed issues across the system. The Government seem willing to ignore that fact, despite it being present in every piece of discourse surrounding their proposals. They have bought a car that will not run, and they have decided to spend all their time and money on a new paint job before opening the bonnet.
This proposal is utterly shameful, fundamentally because there are alternatives, despite the narrative that the Government are advancing. They do not have to attack jury trials, especially when their own Ministers and their own Prime Minister have been fierce advocates of jury trials in the past. Instead, they should be looking at the real issues within the system that have led us to this point. Chief among them is the productivity decline that our criminal courts have experienced since 2016. Wasted time in and around courts is caused by a wide range of issues, all of which are being ignored by the Ministry of Justice. It means that the Government’s increased investment is being used inefficiently. It also means that many of these issues will persist, even if their attack on jury trials leads to reductions in trial length.
The solutions are out there, and the majority of legal professionals opposing the Government’s reforms are overflowing with practical suggestions, but the Government are not listening, so today I will lay some of them out. First, there must be investment in the courts estate, not only to reopen the hundreds of courts closed under the Conservatives—including my court in Chichester—but to properly maintain those that remain open. Evidence of leaking roofs, foul smells and flooded rooms across the estate is hardly indicative of a properly functioning justice system, and that must be addressed. Trials being abandoned because the heating is not working or there is no running water is unacceptable for those victims.
Even at the roughest of estimates, the restriction of jury trials will at best save 9,000 sitting days in court a year. That is based on not being able to see an impact assessment. The Government could increase the number of sitting days up to the possible 130,000, which would far exceed the apparent savings they would gain from the removal of trials. The concept of a restriction on sitting days is artificial. If there is a case, a courtroom, a defendant on remand and court staff ready to go, the case should be heard.
Linsey Farnsworth
I gently point out to the hon. Lady that it is not just about a courtroom being available, but the resources that have to go into that. It is about not just whether we have the space, but whether we have the barristers and the solicitors, and whether we have enough CPS lawyers, court clerks and ushers. There is a bigger picture, and that is why the whole package that the Government are putting forward is incredibly important. Just tinkering around the edges has been done for years, and we are in this crisis now.
Jess Brown-Fuller
I do not disagree with the hon. Lady when she points out that it has to be a full package of support, but that is not what we are debating today. I am laying out all the things that she rightly points out, such as the total inefficiencies within our court system, but until we see those situations addressed and those things fixed, how do we know that that would not save the court sitting days that we would apparently see by eroding the right to jury trial?
David Davis
I am losing the House, piece by piece, but that is okay. The Minister should pay some attention to the detail of the speech by the hon. Member for Chichester, because she made some extremely important points.
As for the Chair of the Justice Committee, the hon. Member for Hammersmith and Chiswick (Andy Slaughter), he and I have fought together on some spectacular cases of miscarriage of justice—successfully, I think, in the biggest ones—but I do not agree with him that the Government’s policy does not address matters that are morally fundamental to the justice system, because the jury system is absolutely fundamental, for a few reasons that I will touch on in a minute.
The Minister has a difficult job. Bluntly, her Department—not just the Ministers, but the Department itself—has not done a very good job of managing the system over decades. The system failures have been serially spectacular, and I recommend that she look back at some of the National Audit Office reports. I commissioned one when I was Chair of the Public Accounts Committee; it is the longest NAO report that I can remember and the most complex, because these matters are systemically complex and do not lend themselves to off-the-cuff answers. She talks about modernisation, which is often important, but it should not be at the price of taking out the most important building block in our justice system—one that the rest of the world, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark said, has been copying for centuries.
Of course, the majority of the judiciary does not agree with restricting jury trials. When I raised this matter with the Justice Secretary—I think I did so in oral questions on one occasion—I asked him whether he had read the report by Mr Rivlin KC, which does a formidable job of forensically taking apart the Leveson recommendations. One of the points he makes is that Leveson is making judgments—quite properly, as a very distinguished judge of very long standing—but he is not making them on the basis of empirical data. There was very little empirical data behind what Lord Justice Leveson argued, and it is really important that we look at that. I recommend to the Minister that she read Mr Rivlin’s note. He was the head of Southwark Crown court, which has one of the highest throughputs in the country, and he put this point to all his judges. Not one of those working, active judges agreed with Leveson.
Implicit in Leveson’s comments, and certainly in what the Minister said, is an underlying idea that juries are not quite up to it in certain cases. It is suggested that they cannot quite cope, particularly in technical and financial cases. Well, I have handled about a dozen miscarriage of justice cases over the course of the last decade or two, and in not one of them was the jury the source of the error. More often than not, it was a misdirection by a judge or an error of the system, or the court case was allowed to get out of control in some way or another—I will come back to an example or two in a minute. It was pretty much always down to the judge, and sometimes to the lawyers in court, but not to the jury.
The risks involved in restricting jury trials are significant. When the Minister is modelling the numbers—she talks about the speed of the magistrate system—she should look at the appeal rates for magistrates’ decisions and the number of appeals in which the magistrates’ decisions are overturned.
Linsey Farnsworth
I gently say to the right hon. Member that the current system for appeals from the magistrates court requires a full retrial. When somebody comes to give evidence, we ask a lot of them, particularly the victims. To do that all over again, after a wait of a considerable number of months or even years, is very onerous. Quite simply, the victim does not want to go through it all over again. That is the problem, which this policy fixes.
David Davis
Frankly, the hon. Lady highlights yet another problem with the magistrates court. The point is that if we are going to implement a big, systemic change, we should not change the fundamentals. That should be done as a separate testable exercise later, after we have tried everything else.
Let me come back to the expertise of juries. It is illegal in Britain to talk to jurors about what happened in the jury room—it is not allowed—but there is a spectacular lacuna in that. One of the most complicated financial cases was the Jubilee line fraud trial, which collapsed. As a result, it was possible to interview the jurors. This case was in an area where it is said that jurors cannot cope: complex financial law. They were asked, “Couldn’t you cope? Was there a problem?” When they were asked if they could not understand the case, they answered unequivocally, “Oh yes, we could understand the case. It was the lawyers who couldn’t understand the case.” That is precisely what the outcome of that analysis was.
The Minister resisted publishing the model, which is understandable. I can see why she is doing that. She wants it to be presented properly and transparently, I hope, but she has made the decision already, so at the very least, she should tell us the size of the saving and the size of the change. In my judgment, it is less than half of 1%—a point that I made in an intervention earlier. She may disagree. Well, let us see what she thinks the size of the saving really is, because we are expected to take this on trust, and we should never change something that is so fundamental to our constitution and justice system on trust. I do not think the Government’s policy will move the dial at all.
There is one other systemic issue that I want to raise. Again, my hon. Friends might not like it—
Criminal Court Reform
Linsey Farnsworth Excerpts(5 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Mr Lammy
I refer the right hon. Lady to paragraph 9 of Sir Brian’s review, which says:
“it is important to underline that greater financial investment on its own, without systemic reform, cannot solve this crisis.”
We are investing, but it will take time. It is not fair to ask victims to wait.
Linsey Farnsworth (Amber Valley) (Lab)
I spent two decades working on the frontline in the criminal justice system, and I can tell hon. Members that this crisis has been building for years and years and years. I spoke to one of my former colleagues today to ask him how things are. He said:
“Something has to be done. The backlog and delay is distorting the justice system as people need to wait so long for justice that defendants are pleading not guilty in the hope that the case ends up being considered not in the public interest. Meanwhile the public, victims and witnesses pay the price. Justice delayed is justice denied.”
Right now, my former colleague is working on the frontline in the criminal justice system, so let us support the people working in that system, and let us support our victims of crime so that they get justice quickly and fairly. My request to the Secretary of State is please to be bold.
Mr Lammy
I am very grateful to my hon. Friend, who puts her remarks so well. Let us be clear that there are defendants playing the system, and if we continue to allow them to do so, vulnerable victims of the most serious offences in our country will pay the price. That is why this is not just about financial investment; it has to be about reform, and I am determined to see this through.