(12 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberYes, and to those who say that a single individual will not necessarily have the skills to provide leadership and to be a good manager and forensic accountant, the straightforward rebuttal is that one would expect someone who was going to be up for re-election after four years to have their mind focused on what the electorate wanted and to bring in people who could help with that work. At the end of the day, the mandate given to an individual, and the knowledge that they are accountable to the people, should certainly focus the mind—not the minds of 17 people in a diffuse police authority, but the mind of one individual, who will certainly be accountable as police authorities are not so accountable at the moment.
On the ways in which a smaller number—not a hugely smaller number—of officers can deliver more police hours, I must say that they will be required to spend less time during the average shift in a police station and more time visibly on the streets. I have said that reducing bureaucracy is one way in which we can square that circle, but the Government’s future work, which I know my right hon. Friend the Policing Minister is driving forward personally, involves a streamlined crime recording procedure. The previous Government undertook such work, to which I shall be generous and pay tribute.
The four-force pilot involving Leicestershire, West Midlands, Shropshire and Surrey created a more streamlined and time-efficient way of recording incidents, with police officers given the discretion, over a certain range of offences, to write shorter reports. I should like to see that regime become absolutely standard throughout the 43 forces, so it would be useful to hear how many have adopted it.
There is more to be done on rolling back statutory charging. It is ridiculous that for quite a slew of offences a charging sergeant has to ring up the Crown Prosecution Service to get permission on some triable-either-way offences. It is fair to say that—
Order. I am very concerned that the hon. Gentleman is in danger of taking more time than the Front Benchers. That is not good for all those hon. Members who have waited a long time. We are on a time limited debate, which finishes at 3.47 pm and we have another 10 speakers to get in, so I hope that he is now coming to the end.
I take note of what you have said, Mr Deputy Speaker, and shall bring my remarks to a conclusion; they were coming to a conclusion anyway.
The second way in which we can get the police to spend more hours visible and out there, so that people are aware that they are around, is greater collaboration. I will not repeat some of the initiatives that the Government—this Home Secretary, this Policing Minister —have driven forward, but that work goes ahead in Suffolk, delivering the efficiency savings that can be ploughed back into the front line. As I said, the savings could amount to £1.5 billion out of the total police budget if all the forces became as efficient as the currently most efficient one. That money could be ploughed back into the front line to obviate the need for any significant reduction in uniformed officers.
The message must go forth from this debate that in a tough economic climate, the spending reductions against historically high levels of police funding are not fatal to the fight against crime. The police must do more with less. The public want them to; they want the police to spend more time on the streets and less time behind their desks. In that spirit of cheerful optimism, I commend the Government’s policy and announcement today.
I will now have to put a time limit on speeches. I am sorry to hon. Members waiting to speak; they must take the matter up with others. There is now to be a 10-minute limit, although that might have to be reduced.
On a point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker. I completely understand what you have just said, but again and again when I come to the Chamber for time-limited debates, I find that huge amounts of time are taken. The Minister spoke for three quarters of an hour in a three-hour debate. I believe that in future there should be restraint from Government Front Benchers in time-limited debates.
I do not want to get into an argument about either side. I understand that having a time limit is frustrating. A 10-minute time limit is being imposed. Members making speeches should take on board the fact that others are waiting to speak. I have brought in the time limit to try to get everybody in. That is the best that we can do. As I said, the limit may have to be reduced even further for later speakers.
Had the hon. Gentleman been listening to my speech, he would have heard that I spoke at the beginning about the great strides that have already been made by the chief constable, the police authority and the police to make the service more efficient. There is no doubt that numbers of people have gone, and that that process has been managed so far. My argument—the hon. Gentleman may wish to ask his own police force about this—is that there is a point beyond which we cannot go. The loss of 20% of Greater Manchester's uniformed police by 2015 and a similar loss in numbers of non-uniformed staff cannot happen without its impinging on our ability to provide the visible policing that the Minister and others claim to want.
People in Greater Manchester are desperately concerned that the cuts are too fast and too deep, and that when push comes to shove, problems will emerge not in the Prime Minister’s constituency but in the inner-city areas of Manchester, Liverpool and Birmingham, and other equivalent areas. We are not getting the Boris bung that the Metropolitan police force has received, and the hon. Member for Skipton and Ripon (Julian Smith) ought to raise that issue with the Policing Minister. Historically, the Metropolitan police force has been better funded than the police in other metropolitan areas, and in a difficult financial year and when other metropolitan areas are being denied, it is hard for us once again to see London given an increase in spending. These cuts are too fast—
(13 years ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government new clause 9—Northern Ireland: information about financial resources.
New clause 17—Extension of scope of legal aid in complex cases—
‘(1) Civil legal services other than services described in Part 1 of Schedule 1 are to be available to an individual under this Part if subsection (2) is satisfied.
(2) This subsection is satisfied where the Director—
(a) has made a complex case determination in relation to the individual and the services, and
(b) has determined that the individual qualifies for the services in accordance with this Part,
(and has not withdrawn either determination).
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), a complex case determination is a determination—
(a) that the individual has complex, interconnected needs in relation to which the individual requires comprehensive civil legal services, and
(b) not all of those civil legal services would otherwise be available to the individual because they do not all fall within the scope of Schedule 1.’.
New clause 43—Funding for civil legal advice—
‘(1) The Lord Chancellor may make funding available for the promotion of civil legal advice on matters not included in Schedule 1, Part 1 where it appears to the Lord Chancellor that the provision of such services would be consistent with the purpose of the civil legal services provided for under that schedule.
(2) The Lord Chancellor may make arrangements by—
(a) entering into funding arrangements with other Government departments and public bodies to facilitate the provision of services,
(b) making arrangements to support the delivery of civil legal advice through the provision of grant in aid to providers of legal services, including any consortia or partnership arrangements into which providers of legal services may choose to enter, and
(c) any additional arrangements which the Lord Chancellor considers appropriate to ensure the provision of services as set out in subsection (1).
(3) In making any such arrangements the Lord Chancellor shall ensure that value for money is achieved.
(4) Welsh Ministers shall be consulted upon the funding and provision of civil legal advice in Wales.
(5) “Civil legal advice” means the types of services given in section 7(1) and includes advice and assistance which is usually given by any representative in the steps preliminary or incidental to proceedings and as to any appeal, mediation and other forms of dispute resolution, but does not include representation for the purposes of proceedings.’.
Government new schedule 3—‘Northern Ireland: information about financial resources.
Amendment 162, in clause 1, page 2, line 7, at end insert—
‘(c) funding for the promotion of civil legal services, not including representation, on matters not included in Schedule 1, Part 1 where it appears to the Lord Chancellor that the provision of such services would be consistent with the purpose of the civil legal services provided for under that schedule.’.
Amendment 123, in clause 4, page 3, line 25, leave out subsection (4) and insert—
‘(4A) The Director must, except to the extent that section (4B) applies, act under the direction of the Lord Chancellor.
(4B) The Director must act independently when performing any functions or duties under this Part.’.
Amendment 116, page 8, line 29, leave out clause 12.
Amendment 104, in clause 12, page 8, line 31, leave out from ‘station’ to end of line 20 on page 9.
Amendment 125, page 8, line 35, leave out subsections (2) to (7).
Amendment 90, page 9, line 27, leave out subsection (9) and insert—
‘(9) Sections 20 and 26(2) do not apply in relation to this section’.
Amendment 148, page 21, line 7, leave out clause 26.
Government amendments 1, 2 and 25 to 27.
Amendment 69, in schedule 4, page 130, line 36, at end insert—
‘(3A) A transfer scheme shall make pension provision and compensation provision for and in respect of persons who become employed in the civil service of the State under paragraph 1 which is at least as favourable as the pension provision and compensation provision applicable to them immediately before they ceased to be employees of the Legal Services Commission.’.
Government amendment 64.
Amendment 71, page 131, line 9, at end insert—
‘“compensation provision” means the provision of compensation under a compensation scheme;’.
Amendment 70, page 131, line 14, at end insert—
‘“pension provision” means the provision of pension and other benefits under an occupational pension scheme;’.
Government amendments 65, 137, 66 to 68, 138, 19 and 54.
We now move on, or perhaps I should say back to, legal aid. When we discussed legal aid on our first day on Report, we had two very constructive, albeit lengthy, debates in which I took more than three dozen interventions. That was partly the reason, along with the many valuable contributions that were made, why we were unable to cover all the groupings—[Interruption.] I know that that disappointed a number of hon. Members in all parts of the House.
Order. Let us not start where we left off the other day. Let us see if we can make progress. We do not want to run out of time, and I am sure that those on both Front Benches want to make good time.
I want to try to avoid delay today, so I shall speak to Government amendments now and respond to the points made in debate later, rather than pre-empting in my opening remarks what hon. Members may have to say about their amendments.
Government new clause 4, which is a technical amendment, has two purposes. First, it seeks to provide clarity about the role of the director of legal aid casework, by ensuring that the exercise of the functions of the office is on behalf of the Crown, and that service as the director is service in the civil service of the state. The second purpose of new clause 4 is to ensure that the Lord Chancellor is treated as a corporation sole for the purposes of part 1 of the Bill.
The new clause is necessary in order to clarify the position in relation to the Lord Chancellor’s ability to hold an interest in land for those purposes, and so applies to charges that transfer from the Legal Services Commission to the Lord Chancellor at the point when the LSC is abolished, and for future charges to be taken over property under clause 24. The statutory charge is the charge that arises under clause 24 on any property recovered or preserved, including costs, by a legally aided person in respect of the amounts spent by the Lord Chancellor in securing their legal aid services and any other amounts payable by them under clauses 22 and 23. The amendment is essential, as the current value of charges held by the LSC is £212 million.
Government new clause 9 and new schedule 3 make provision on information sharing in relation to checking a person’s financial eligibility for legal aid in Northern Ireland. They replicate for Northern Ireland the information gateway for England and Wales created by clause 21 and further provided for in clause 32. Government amendments 26 and 27 are technical amendments that make it clear that regulations made under new schedule 3 will be prescribed not by the Lord Chancellor but by the Northern Ireland Assembly. Government amendment 54 is also a technical amendment that makes it clear that the Bill extends to Northern Ireland for the purposes of new clause 9 and new schedule 3, which create the information gateway, and for the purposes of clauses 38 to 40. I should point out that under paragraph 2(4) of new schedule 3, it will be a criminal offence to use or disclose information contrary to the provisions of paragraph 2.
Government amendments 25 and 64 to 68 relate to the transfer of LSC employees to the civil service when the LSC is abolished. The powers currently set out in the Bill include a power, in schedule 4, for the Lord Chancellor to make transfer schemes to transfer to the Lord Chancellor or the Secretary of State the LSC’s rights, powers, duties and liabilities under or in connection with an LSC occupational pension scheme, of which there are currently two, or compensation scheme. The occupational pension and compensation scheme arrangements for LSC employees are different from those for existing civil servants. When the employees transfer to the civil service and become civil servants, they will join the principal civil service pension scheme.
Amendment 64 confers new powers upon the Lord Chancellor that can be exercised as part of any transfer scheme. Proposed new sub-paragraph (6A), set out in amendment 64, allows for the Lord Chancellor to apply legislation with modifications as far as it is necessary to give effect to any transfer scheme. That is appropriate when transfer schemes are of an administrative nature relating to the specific issues in question. For example, it will allow the Lord Chancellor to provide that an aspect of pensions legislation applies in a particular way to that particular scheme. It will assist, as appropriate, in enabling the continuation of the LSC pension scheme or schemes after the abolition of the LSC so that they can continue for the benefit of their pensioner and preserved members. Those are members who have contributed to the schemes before leaving LSC employment and either draw a pension from the scheme or will be entitled to do so in future.
For compensation scheme arrangements, as well as allowing the modification of legislation, proposed new sub-paragraph (6B), set out in amendment 64, provides that the transfer scheme may amend or otherwise modify the existing LSC compensation scheme. That will allow compensation arrangements for LSC employees transferring to the civil service to be brought into line with those of other civil servants over a transitional period.
Amendment 65 reflects the fact that when LSC employees transfer to the civil service there will no longer be any active members of the two current LSC occupational pension schemes, known as the No. 3 and No. 4 pension schemes. The amendment provides the Lord Chancellor with the power to make a scheme to merge the two residual pension schemes. It is explicit that a scheme exercising this power must not result in members of the pension schemes, or other beneficiaries under the schemes, being deprived of any rights accrued prior to the merger.
The LSC’s No. 3 pension scheme has fewer than 100 pensioner and preserved members, and no current LSC staff members. The No. 4 scheme is for current staff and also has a number of pensioner and preserved members. At present there is much duplication in the administration of the No. 3 and No. 4 schemes, such as producing two sets of accounts and actuarial valuations. Merging the schemes would allow us to cut significantly the administration costs of running two trust-based schemes. The amendment will also give the power to wind up an LSC occupational pension scheme.
Amendment 25 corrects a slip in clause 38(7)(j). The intention was not to make regulations that contain free-standing provision that modifies an Act either directly or indirectly, subject to the affirmative procedure. Amendments 66 to 68 clarify the fact that the regulation-making power provided to the Lord Chancellor under paragraph 10 of schedule 4 can be used in connection not only with transfers affected by schedule 4, but with schemes under schedule 4, meaning schemes dealing with something other than a transfer.
Government amendments 137 and 138 concern schedule 4 to the Bill, which governs transfers of employees and assets following the abolition of the LSC. They are purely technical amendments that simplify existing provisions. Paragraph 10(1) of schedule 4 currently allows the Lord Chancellor to make consequential supplementary, incidental or transitional provision by regulation, and paragraph 10(2)(b) specifies separately that such regulations may include transitory or savings provision. Rather than continue to separate these related provisions, for the purposes of simplification amendment 137 brings them together in a revised paragraph 10(1) and amendment 138 amends paragraph 10(2) to reflect that simplification. That mirrors an identical amendment to clause 115.
Finally, Government amendments 1, 2 and 19 are minor and technical amendments to clause 32 and schedule 5, consequential on the removal in Committee of what was then clause 71.
That is not a point of order, but the hon. Gentleman has certainly got it on the record.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 4 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 9
Northern Ireland: information about financial resources
‘Schedule [Northern Ireland: information about financial resources] (Northern Ireland: information about financial resources) has effect.’.—(Mr Djanogly.)
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 17
Extension of scope of legal aid in complex cases
‘(1) Civil legal services other than services described in Part 1 of Schedule 1 are to be available to an individual under this Part if subsection (2) is satisfied.
(2) This subsection is satisfied where the Director—
(a) has made a complex case determination in relation to the individual and the services, and
(b) has determined that the individual qualifies for the services in accordance with this Part,
(and has not withdrawn either determination).
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), a complex case determination is a determination—
(a) that the individual has complex, interconnected needs in relation to which the individual requires comprehensive civil legal services, and
(b) not all of those civil legal services would otherwise be available to the individual because they do not all fall within the scope of Schedule 1.’.—(Yvonne Fovargue.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
I beg to move amendment 21, page 29, line 6, leave out Clause 41.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 150, page 29, line 36, at end insert—
‘(4A) The amendments made by subsections (2) and (4) do not apply in relation to proceedings which include a claim for damages for loss or bodily injury resulting from exposure to a harmful substance or process where the claim is made against a person who—
(a) carries on business in more than one country, or
(b) owns (wholly or partly) one or more businesses carried on in more than one country or in different countries.’.
Amendment 164, page 29, line 36, at end insert—
‘(4A) The amendments made by subsections (2) and (4) do not apply in relation to a success fee payable under a conditional fee agreement made in relation to—
(a) any proceedings in relation to a claim for—
(i) libel,
(ii) slander,
(iii) misuse of private information;
(b) any proceedings arising out of the same cause of action as any proceedings to which sub-paragraph (a) refers.’.
Amendment 163, page 29, line 41, at end insert—
‘(7) The amendments made by subsections (2) and (4) do not apply in relation to a success fee payable under a conditional fee agreement made in relation to—
(a) any proceedings based on a claim of defamation; or
(b) any proceedings based on a claim of privacy under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights; or
(c) any proceedings arising out of the same cause of action as any proceedings to which paragraphs (a) or (b) refer.’.
Amendment 22, page 31, line 1, leave out clause 43.
Amendment 151, in clause 43, page 31, line 45, at end insert—
‘(6) This section does not apply in relation to a costs order made in favour of a party to proceedings which include a claim for damages for loss or bodily injury resulting from exposure to a harmful substance or process where the claim is made against a person who—
(a) carries on business in more than one country, or
(b) owns (wholly or partly) one or more businesses carried on in more than one country or in different countries.’.
Amendment 165, in clause 43, page 32, line 4, at end insert—
‘(4) The amendments made by this section do not apply in relation to a costs order made in favour of a party to proceedings in a cause of action in relation to a claim for—
(a) libel,
(b) slander,
(c) misuse of private information.’.
Amendment 72, page 32, line 5, leave out clause 44.
New clause 39—Road traffic accident pre-action protocol—
‘(1) The Table in Rule 45.29 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (SI 1998/3132) (Amount of fixed costs under the Pre-Action Protocol for Low Value Personal Injury Claims in Road Traffic Accidents) is amended as follows.
(2) The figure for Stage 1 shall be £200.
(3) The figure for Stage 2 shall be £400.
(4) The figure for Stage 3 for Type A fixed costs shall be £125.
(5) The figure for Stage 3 for Type B fixed costs shall be £125.
(6) Any further amendment to the Table shall not be made by the Civil Procedure Rule Committee but may be made by the Lord Chancellor by rules made by statutory instrument and may not be made until a draft of the rules has been laid before and approved by resolution of both Houses of Parliament.’.
This is an important group of amendments to part 2 of the Bill, which deals with a complex and vital area of access to justice. Because there are only 20 minutes left to debate this group, and I want to be fair to the Minister and give him 10 minutes to reply, I shall speak quickly in the hope of getting through the main part of my argument. I should make it clear at the outset that I wish to press to a vote amendment 21, which would undo the destruction of conditional fee agreements that the Government are pushing through in the Bill. I also ask, with the leave of my hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant), the lead signatory to amendment 163, that we press that amendment to a vote.
Conditional fee agreements, also known as no win, no fee agreements, were brought in by a Conservative Government to preserve access to justice for those on moderate means at a time when vast areas were being removed from the scope of legal aid and eligibility criteria were being removed. The provisions were amended, with a remarkable lack of contention from the Conservative Opposition, in the Access to Justice Act 1999, to create their modern form.
The idea of contingency fee agreements was to create a viable market in legal services by introducing success fees paid by losing defendants—wrongdoers, in other words—to compensate lawyers for the cases that they lost, for which, of course, they received no fees. For lawyers, that form of payment by results meant not that they would take on spurious cases, but that they were allowed to take on cases that might be 75:25 or 50:50. That has created a system that works, for the main part, very well. It has created a viable market in legal services and permitted access to justice for millions since it was introduced.
What sort of people have availed themselves of contingency fee agreements? More than half of those who have used them have had an income below £25,000 a year and only 18% have had an income of more than £40,000 a year. Government Members carp on about footballers and models using them, but the average claimant is the average constituent.
How do the Government’s proposals work? First, winning claimants will lose. Victims will have to pay the costs of their insurance and their lawyer’s success fees from their damages—up to 25% of damages, aside from damages for future care, can be taken by the lawyer, and the insurance premium will take up even more of those damages, perhaps wiping them out altogether. To make up for part of those losses, the Government plan a 10% increase in damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenity. Simple maths should be sufficient to show that that will not make up for all losses.
Losing claimants, including those bringing speculative and nuisance claims, will gain. They will benefit because it is unlikely that they will have to pay the costs of the winning defendant—that is part of the perverse, qualified one-way cost-shifting scheme that the Government intend to introduce when the Bill passes.
Losing defendants—wrongdoers, in other words—and their insurers will gain. Wrongdoers will benefit, because they do not have to pay the cost of after-the-event insurance or the victim’s lawyer’s success fees, thus limiting their liabilities and those of their insurers. Winning defendants will lose out. A winning defendant will no longer be able to reclaim the cost of their defence, thanks to qualified one-way cost shifting. To summarise, winners lose and losers win. That is simply wrong.
There was a time when the Conservative party worried about access to justice, but now it appears to be nothing more than the parliamentary wing of the insurance lobby, which according to an investigation by The Guardian has donated £4.9 million to the Tories since the Prime Minister became leader.
I have spent the past few months speaking to victims who have used contingency fee agreements to get justice. I have heard them tell me how our justice system helped them, and their fears that others who suffer in future will not get the help they need. A number of areas of law will be badly—
PPSs are allowed to make points of order. Throughout the proceedings on the Bill Opposition Front Benchers, particularly the hon. Member for Hammersmith (Mr Slaughter), have made points about the perceived failure of Government Front Benchers to declare their interests. However, the hon. Gentleman has failed to point out that on 119 separate occasions the Labour party has received donations from lawyers who make their money from success fees.
Order. That is not a point of order and the matter was dealt with earlier in the week. Let us have no more of that.
Let me just say that if the Government start talking about conflicts of interest on this Bill, they will open a Pandora’s box.
Order. We are not going to open Pandora’s box. We are going to deal with the amendments before us.
I was not talking about the Minister; I was talking about the Bill. I am not surprised that the Minister’s PPS is embarrassed by the Bill, after sitting through our proceedings in Committee.
The common link between parts 1 and 2 of the Bill is the destruction of access to justice in a way that we have not seen since the introduction of legal aid by a Labour Government after the second world war. The insurance industry is being given one of the biggest pay-offs in history which, as we know from experience, will go into the pockets of their directors and shareholders. While other aspects of this Bill display the startling incompetence of this Government, none shows their intent more truly than the provisions in part 2, which would give the whip hand to large public and private corporations, while taking rights away from ordinary people. What is the point in having rights if they cannot be enforced?
I ask the Liberal Democrats to look at amendment 21, which would deal with cases such as Trafigura and pleural plaques, and amendment 163, which would deal with cases such as that of Milly Dowler, and join us in the Lobby tonight.
(13 years ago)
Commons ChamberI shall be extremely brief, given the time. It would be helpful, following the Secretary of State’s meeting with me and my right hon. Friend the Member for Wythenshawe and Sale East (Paul Goggins), if he assured the House that reconsideration of the detail will take place in the House of Lords. There is no difference between those of us who accept that the original intention has not been followed through and those who think that the changes that my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) introduced have not fully bitten as intended, but the propositions before us this afternoon do not meet the specific need that was identified back in the early 2000s by my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn, and which I carried into being.
Order. The right hon. Gentleman knows that he should make a short intervention, not a speech at this stage.
Order. I remind the right hon. Gentleman that he may have finished, but he should not take so long in future.
Order. May we have brevity? We want to hear as many speakers as possible.
I declare an interest as a former barrister and a former criminal prosecutor, who has worked on several murder trials.
I assure my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley (Philip Davies) that I am not soft on crime, but I support the Government in their reform of this untenable, shocking and wrong system. With great respect to the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw), he should hang his head in shame for being party to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, both of which were useless pieces of legislation that introduced something that the Prison Reform Trust, the Institute for Criminal Policy Research, the Nuffield Foundation and the criminal justice joint inspectorate described as
“one of the least carefully planned and implemented pieces of legislation in the history of British sentencing.”
The flip-flops of the shadow Justice Secretary would put a kangaroo to shame. It is entirely right to reform a system that was underfunded, worked poorly and is manifestly wrong in the circumstances of a 21st-century country. I will speak only briefly but I remind the right hon. Member for Blackburn of the comments in the House of Lords on the 2003 and 2008 Acts, when the Lords addressed IPPs in the cases of the Crown v. James and the Crown v. Lee. In a decision that effectively lambasted the then Secretary of State, Lord Hope of Craighead said:
“There is no doubt that the Secretary of State failed deplorably in the public law duty…He failed to provide the systems and resources that prisoners serving those sentences needed to demonstrate to the Parole Board by the time of the expiry of their tariff periods…that it was no longer necessary for the protection of the public that they should remain in detention.”
I could go on to quote from the judgments of Lord Carswell and Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, but I shall pause there.
I have made it clear that I am not soft on crime, as others have suggested. The debate has sadly been too short, but the new clause should certainly be supported by the House.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment (a), after first ‘paid’ in (1)(a), insert
‘will be paid, has made an agreement to be paid,’.
Amendment (b), after ‘pays’ in (1)(b), insert
‘will pay, has made an agreement to pay’.
Amendment (c), after first ‘paid’ in (2)(b), insert
‘will be paid, has made an agreement to be paid,’.
Amendment (e), at end of (4)(b), insert—
‘(2A) A breach of the provisions of this section shall be an offence, punishable on summary conviction by a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or on indictment for a term of imprisonment not exceeding two years, or a fine, or both.’.
Government new clause 19—Effect of the rules against referral fees—
‘(1) The relevant regulator must ensure that it has appropriate arrangements for monitoring and enforcing the restrictions imposed on regulated persons by section [Rules against referral fees].
(2) A regulator may make rules for the purposes of subsection (1).
(3) The rules may in particular provide for the relevant regulator to exercise in relation to anything done in breach of that section any powers (subject to subsections (5) and (6)) that the regulator would have in relation to anything done by the regulated person in breach of another restriction.
(4) Where the relevant regulator is the Financial Services Authority, section [Regulation by the FSA] applies instead of subsections (1) to (3) (and (7) to (9)).
(5) A breach of section [Rules against referral fees]—
(a) does not make a person guilty of an offence, and
(b) does not give rise to a right of action for breach of statutory duty.
(6) A breach of section [Rules against referral fees] does not make anything void or unenforceable, but a contract to make or pay for a referral or arrangement in breach of that section is unenforceable.
(7) Subsection (8) applies in a case where—
(a) a referral of prescribed legal business has been made by or to a regulated person, or
(b) a regulated person has made an arrangement as mentioned in section [Rules against referral fees](2)(a),
and it appears to the regulator that a payment made to or by the regulated person may be a payment for the referral or for making the arrangement (a “referral fee”).
(8) Rules under subsection (2) may provide for the payment to be treated as a referral fee unless the regulated person shows that the payment was made—
(a) as consideration for the provision of services, or
(b) for another reason,
and not as a referral fee.
(9) For the purposes of provision made by virtue of subsection (8) a payment that would otherwise be regarded as consideration for the provision of services of any description may be treated as a referral fee if it exceeds the amount specified in relation to services of that description in regulations made by the Lord Chancellor.’.
Amendment (a) to new clause 19, leave out subsection 5.
Amendment (b), leave out from ‘services’ in (8)(a) to end of paragraph (b) and insert
‘but only where the consideration was proportionate and reasonable in the circumstances.’.
Government new clause 20—Regulation by the FSA.
Government new clause 21—Regulators and regulated persons.
Government new clause 22—Referral fees: regulations.
Government amendment 139.
(13 years ago)
Commons ChamberAll too recently the Government wanted to give anonymity to male rapists. Now women who face domestic violence will not receive the protection that should be offered to them. The Government are failing to take account of what we know about the implications for women and children who, having experienced domestic violence earlier in their history, end up in the criminal justice system. Is it not the case that they do not understand what happens to women and children—
I agree with my hon. Friend. Earlier speeches gave us the impression that we were retreating to a previous position, and that much of the ground that many of us thought we had gained might be lost. That would be highly regrettable, and I hope that it is not the case. I hope that, even at this late stage, the Minister will reconsider his opposition to our amendment.
I was heartened to read in the Sunday papers that members of the minority party in the coalition were up for a fight on these issues. I hope that that was not just more Sunday paper grandstanding, giving a false impression to many campaigners and others who have been hoping against hope that the Government will see reason.
It is important that we do not think of this issue only in terms of the relationship between a husband and wife, because domestic abuse can also occur in other circumstances, such as where people take in an elderly parent. That may seem a good idea at the time, but subsequently events might take a different turn and the elderly parent may therefore also become a victim of abuse.
Order. The hon. Gentleman has only recently entered the Chamber, and he ought not to have intervened so soon. It is, of course, up to the hon. Member for South Swindon (Mr Buckland) to decide if and when to take interventions, but may I remind Members that they ought to make sure they have been in the Chamber for some considerable time before seeking to make interventions?
I am extremely grateful to my hon. Friend for making the point about elder abuse. It often occurs in a domestic scenario, and we, as policy makers, should also consider it when setting out a unified cross-Government definition of domestic violence.
I beg to move amendment 80, page 99, line 21, leave out ‘other than’ and insert ‘including’.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment 85, page 110, line 18, leave out ‘other than clinical negligence’.
Amendment 143, page 110, line 18, leave out ‘other than’ and insert ‘including’.
Amendment 86, page 110, leave out lines 28 to 30.
Amendment 142, page 110, line 32, at end insert—
19A (1) civil legal services provided in relation to Clinical Negligence.
(2) In this paragraph clinical negligence means breach of duty or care or trespass to the person committed in the course of the provision of clinical or medical services (including dental or nursing services)’.
Amendment 88, page 111, line 4, leave out ‘other than’ and insert ‘including’.
Amendment 132, page 118, line 27, after ‘negligence’, insert
‘with the exception of clinical negligence’.
I will be brief, because other hon. Members wish to speak and, crucially, we need to get to the social justice provisions. The purpose of amendment 80 is to bring clinical negligence back within scope in cases involving abuse of a child or a vulnerable adult. Amendment 88 is designed to retain specific provision for tort and damages claims engaging European convention rights, and extending provision to cases involving clinical negligence. Amendments 85 and 86 are consequential, and cover the abuse of a position of power by a public authority. They would specifically provide for cases involving a particularly serious variety of public wrongdoing and would remove the exclusion of clinical negligence cases in such a context.
Taken together, the amendments reflect my concern, which I know is shared by many hon. Members, about the huge gaps in protection of the vulnerable that will come about as result of implementation of the exceptions to funding by legal aid. What is perhaps most concerning in such instances is that individuals will come up against the state during proceedings. People involved in cases of clinical negligence by a public authority are, by definition, at their most destitute. Frequently, parents or other family members will bring cases against public authorities resulting from traumatic injuries sustained by their children and their relatives.
As the hon. Member for Makerfield (Yvonne Fovargue) said in Committee:
“the inequality of arms is never more obvious than when an individual comes up against a decision made by the state”.––[Official Report, Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Public Bill Committee, 7 September 2011; c. 327.]
That is because the state will always have access to full and expert legal advice, and will often have a team of lawyers at its ready disposal. That is even more ironic when we consider the stark fact that the state should have a responsibility to ensure that every individual has the means to hold it to account. I said that on Second Reading, and I do so again. In the reforms, the Government seem to have lost sight of that all-important state duty to support the vulnerable, as well as to protect them.
The Minister said in Committee that there is often a viable source of alternative funding for cases of clinical negligence through contingency fee arrangements. That sounds all right, but is not as simple as it sounds. What about the people who, on entering into such an arrangement with solicitors, would not be able to afford a policy to cover them for the initial necessary medical examinations? I know that some ground has been given on that, but I would be grateful to hear more. For many parents, for example, contingency fees cannot be the answer since they do not have the money up front to buy a policy to provide cover when making an arrangement with solicitors. Indeed, very few firms would take on a clinical negligence case on a no win, no fee basis because of the complexity and specialism involved in this area of civil law.
I am grateful, but I see Mr Deputy Speaker in the Chair this evening. I am sure that if I am out of order at any stage, he will upbraid me. I do not need any lessons from the hon. Member for Hammersmith about how to speak in this Chamber or indeed about the remarks I intend to make tonight. [Interruption.] The simple fact of the matter is—[Interruption.]
With the leave of the House, I was about to make my final few remarks.
(13 years, 2 months ago)
Commons ChamberOrder. It might be helpful if Vernon Coaker gave way to the Home Secretary.
On a point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker. It is good that the Home Secretary has now spoken to the House, but before this debate, when the Chancellor was at the Dispatch Box, the new commissioner’s appointment was widely publicised on television. So, as my right hon. Friend the Chairman of the Home Affairs Committee was suggesting, the appointment has not come to the attention of the House as quickly as it should have.
The right hon. Gentleman has been in the House a long time and will recognise that that is not a point of order. He has put his point on the record.
On behalf of the shadow Home Secretary, myself, and all Members of the House, may I wish Mr Hogan-Howe well in his new role as commissioner and in the important job of work that he will have to do?
The issue of the politicisation of operational independence is important, but Members have also referred to the huge problems that will be caused by having one police and crime commissioner to represent such a large number of areas and communities. Despite that, the Government are reinserting the proposal in the Bill with no indication of how they expect such problems to be overcome. We have heard from Devon and Cornwall, and Avon and Somerset, about this issue of size, yet the Minister just says that it will not be a problem. We also learn from the Minister that he believes that the Bill contains proper checks and balances and that, therefore, the reinstatement of the provision is not a problem. However, he fails to point out to Members that the police and crime panel has only two powers. One—to be fair to the Government, they have amended the majority that is required from three quarters to two thirds—is the veto over the appointment of the chief constable, and the other is the veto over the precept. That is it. The police and crime panel has no other power. The policing Minister wants us to disagree with the Lords amendments on the basis of his assertion that the Bill contains proper checks and balances, but I say to him that the police and crime panel has only two real powers to hold the police and crime commissioner to account.
(13 years, 4 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am grateful, Mr Deputy Speaker. I did not really want to get into the legal aid aspects of the Bill. I have expressed my concerns and I am sure that Front Benchers are listening to them. I am concerned that the Opposition have at least not spelled out any detail as to where they would make the cuts that they accept have to be made to the legal aid budget.
Will my hon. Friend please understand this? When someone is subject to an IPP, they have no knowledge about when they will be released. Does he know that they can be released only when they are deemed no longer to be a risk to society? A relatively small number of people have been released and we can assume that they were released only because they were no longer deemed a risk to society. The reason for that is that they have been on the sort of courses that other people on IPPs have not had the benefit of. The lack of courses is the real problem.
Order. May I ask for shorter interventions, because many Members wish to speak and I want to try to get everyone in?
My hon. Friend is right that people are released only when it is safe to release them. My constituents think that it is rather a good thing that people are released from prison only when it is safe to let the out. I am all for that, unlike the Lord Chancellor.
The reason why the Lord Chancellor is not bothered about reoffending and indeterminate sentences is that he is not interested in reoffending at all. What then is his priority? It is the same as it has always been: simply reducing the number of criminals in prison. That is highlighted in the Bill’s explanatory notes, which state:
“The overall impact of the sentencing proposals will result in annual savings of approximately £80m in 2014/15, due to a reduction in the demand for prison places of 2,650”.
I invite all my hon. Friends to look back at what they promised their constituents at the general election in their personal manifestos and at what they said against their opponents at the hustings. Which of those who will vote for the Bill tonight said at the hustings that they were standing on a platform of reducing the number of criminals sent to prison by 2,650? I suspect that none of us said that, and I invite my hon. Friends to consider that when they decide how to vote tonight.
I am also concerned about the widely reported mandatory six-month sentence for thugs who use knives to threaten people. As I have already shown, this is a solution looking for a problem, because the sentencing guidelines already insist that such cases are sent to Crown court for a first offence because it is deemed that magistrates do not have sufficient sentencing powers.
It gets worse. On threatening with knives, clause 113 states:
“It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove good reason or lawful authority for having the article with him or her in the place…concerned.”
That is a reasonable defence for possession of a knife, but how is it a reasonable defence for using a knife threateningly just to be able to explain why one has the knife in the first place? Either that is a drafting error or it is complete nonsense. Perhaps the Minister will enlighten us in his reply.
The provision is not mandatory anyway, because it is later stated that people do not have to be sent to prison if there are particular circumstances that relate to the offence or the offender that would make it unjust to send them there. So much for it being mandatory. It is a joke.
Clauses 56 and 57 are further examples of the Lord Chancellor’s aim of sending fewer people to prison. Clause 56(2)(a) removes the duty of the court to impose more onerous conditions once someone breaches a community order, or to resentence them to custody. It says that the court “may” do so instead of saying that it “must”, as currently applies.
Clause 56(2)(b) allows the court to impose a fine as a punishment for breaching a community order. That provision did not exist before. Clause 57 increases the length of sentence that can be suspended from a maximum of 51 weeks to two years and removes the need to attach any community requirements at all. If a criminal has committed an offence that deserves a custodial sentence of up to two years in prison, that is what they should get: a two-year sentence in prison. Furthermore, if someone is given a suspended sentence with no requirements, they will effectively not be punished at all.
As I said a couple of weeks ago, breaches of suspended sentences can now result in a fine, thanks to clause 58. Anybody who breaches their existing get-out-of-jail-free suspended sentence should go to one place only: immediate custody. Is it any wonder that the British public have no faith in sentencing? The criminal justice system can be effective only if the public have confidence in it.
The Bill also fails to extend a magistrate’s power of sentencing to up to 12 months, yet that was a firm manifesto commitment. Not only are we not implementing what was already in the law, we are repealing that part of the law in this Bill. We have already heard at length how schedule 10 removes the ability of the courts to remand somebody in custody, to try to make it harder for people to be remanded in custody so that they are instead granted bail. In the previous Parliament, the last Labour Government introduced the mechanism that time spent on bail on a tag could be knocked off a prison sentence in the same way as time spent on remand is knocked off a prison sentence. We were apoplectic with rage about that, and my hon. and learned Friend the current Solicitor-General said when we were in opposition that this proposal
“will cause a great deal of scepticism, undermine public confidence in the justice system and make the Government look increasingly ridiculous if the court is then required to say, ‘By the way, all the time that you have spent at home in bed is time that can be taken away from your custodial sentence.’”—[Official Report, 9 January 2008; Vol. 470, c. 369.]
I could not agree more. The only difference is that I still believe that this is wrong, whereas my Front-Bench colleagues have gone from thinking it was utterly ridiculous to formalising the policy as part of the Bill. Of course, the other measure to which we were wholly opposed in the previous Parliament was the automatic release of people halfway through their prison sentence, and that, too, is formalised in this Bill.
The British public are losing faith in the criminal justice system. One only has to look at the Populus polling carried out by Lord Ashcroft that showed that 80% of the public—80% of victims of crime, 80% of police officers—think that sentences for convicted offenders are already too lenient. When asked how they expected the new coalition Government would compare on crime with the last Labour Government, more than 50% of those polled said they expected them to be tougher. When asked their views a year after the coalition Government came to office, only 13% thought the Government had been tougher, whereas 23% thought they were less tough. That perception is a disaster for the Conservative brand, and this Bill will only further weaken our position.
All the above shows that this Bill is not the rehabilitation revolution or the reduced reoffending revolution we were promised; rather, it is a release revolution that will simply catapult more criminals out on to the streets to commit more crimes. I do not know if the Lord Chancellor is trying to break the world record for the number of manifesto pledges broken in one Bill, but if he is, he has made a good fist of it.
Order. Just before I bring the next speaker in, I am going to reduce the time limit to six minutes. We still have 20 speakers to come, and I do want to get everybody in, so anybody who can shave a little time off that will be gratefully welcomed.
I welcome the Bill’s focus on making the criminal justice system more victim oriented. In the few minutes allowed, I shall focus my contribution on what more can be done in the Bill to help to prosecute and punish offenders for the crime of child sexual exploitation.
Despite being a mother of three children, I was unaware that horrendous crimes were being perpetrated in my community—crimes of online grooming, and the sexual abuse and rape of children. Like most of my constituents, as the news broke of the prosecution of Michael Williams last year, I found it difficult to believe that such crimes were possible in this century and this country, and especially in the community where I grew up.
A few months later, the further revelation of six men operating a paedophile ring in my part of Cornwall—it was uncovered and prosecuted by Devon and Cornwall police’s Operation Lakeland—forced me to find out more about the horrendous crimes that those men perpetrated against children as young as five years old. I am impressed by the determination to tackle and prevent that and to raise awareness shown by the Home Secretary, the Under-Secretary of State for Education, my hon. Friend the Member for East Worthing and Shoreham (Tim Loughton), who has responsibility for children, and the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (James Brokenshire), who has responsibility for crime prevention. However, they need some help from their colleagues in the Ministry of Justice in two respects. First, the Ministry of Justice could improve support for young witnesses who give evidence in criminal proceedings, and secondly, it could improve sentencing policy.
As with all crimes, to secure successful prosecutions witnesses must be prepared to come forward, give evidence and be cross-examined in court. Unless witnesses, their families and carers believe that they will be supported and fairly treated when they go to court, they will not come forward. I am grateful to Sheila Taylor of Safe and Sound Derby who has given me information on cases that vividly illustrate why the current system must change.
The first case concerns a 15-year-old girl who was repeatedly sexually abused. She was forced to give evidence in court for eight days, and she was cross-examined by a team of nine defence lawyers, including, on one occasion, by five in a row, working as a team to try to undermine her evidence. Although the court showed respect for the defendant’s human rights, there was no understanding of how the crimes perpetrated against the victim had left her a vulnerable and terrified witness. She was physically sick every day before she came to court and became so traumatised by the experience that she ran away from home during the case. Sadly, the case was dropped. The second case concerns a girl who, when shown into the witness box, found that the screens promised to her to prevent her from having to see the people who had abused her had been forgotten. Seeing the men who had sexually abused her, she understandably became hysterical. As such, she was deemed unfit to give evidence, and again the case was dropped.
I want to improve the experience and cross-examination of children in our courts. I am fully aware that the Ministry of Justice has prioritised this concern with the recent publication of “Achieving Best Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Guidance on Interviewing Victims and Witnesses, and Using Special Measures”. However, there is still an issue about how to get legal practitioners to use it. The majority of cases that go to trial at the Crown court have first to go through a plea and case management hearing. According to Crown Prosecution Service guidance, a PCMH is compulsory only where the child is a defendant but not a victim. That should be changed.
Such a hearing should be compulsory for both a child defendant and complainant, because the PCMH, which is purely an administrative hearing at which outstanding issues of law or procedure are dealt with by the judge before trial or evidence commencement, provides the judge with an opportunity to give a direction to all counsel that they should abide by the Ministry’s own “Best Evidence” publication when dealing with young witnesses, be they defendants or complainants. If such judicial direction was made compulsory at the PCMH, lawyers could not say that they had no knowledge of such information or that their approach was the norm in practice.
Furthermore, some judges need to be made aware of this issue and be encouraged to intervene when questioning methods are inappropriate. Publishing guidance for judges in the criminal procedures rules would greatly improve good practice. I believe that the Government really want to make our criminal justice system more victim-orientated. What better place to start than with the children and young people who are the victims of the most horrendous of crimes? What better way to convince them and society as a whole that we consider these crimes to be totally unacceptable than by ensuring that perpetrators serve long sentences, including life sentences—sentences designed to ensure that they will not be released until they have demonstrated that they have effectively controlled their sexual urges and can resist reoffending.
For the victims, the combination of the crimes perpetrated against them, even when the disclosure and subsequent support is excellent, and the experience of giving evidence in court can give them a lifelong sentence of suffering. Is this fair? Surely, the life sentence should go to the perpetrator not the victim. I urge the Government, therefore, while the Bill passes through the House—
Order. The hon. Gentleman has only just come into the Chamber.
I beg your pardon, Mr Deputy Speaker.
Is the hon. Lady aware that knives are often sold on the internet priced with British pound signs and does she agree that action needs to be taken to combat that?
I remind the House that we will now have a six-minute limit on Back-Bench speeches right across the piece.
I beg to move,
That this House has considered matters to be raised before the forthcoming adjournment.
I move the motion on behalf of the Backbench Business Committee. It uses the Hollobone method.
Before I call the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley (John Hemming), I have been asked by Mr Speaker to remind him of his ruling yesterday, when he said:
“I strongly deprecate the abuse of parliamentary privilege to flout an order or score a particular point…It is important…that we recognise the need to temper our privilege with responsibility.”—[Official Report, 23 May 2011; Vol. 528, c. 653-654.]
I trust the hon. Gentleman will not test the patience of the Chair today.
(13 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberWith this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 151, in clause 28, page 21, line 9, leave out ‘5 or’.
Amendment 152, page 112, line 15, leave out Schedule 5.
New clause 6 deals with the police and crime panel and, specifically, the powers that it may or may not have in respect of assessing and setting the precept. Ever since I first considered the issue of elected commissioners and their proper role, I have found the issue of budget setting particularly knotty and difficult. As a strong proponent of elected commissioners, I see a good argument for giving them the power to set the precept and the budget, and just letting them get on with that. I can see the argument that they have the mandate, so surely they should make the decision.
However, I have at least a slight concern about giving such significant budget-setting power over a whole electoral term to one individual. That is why I am attracted to some of the ideas we have heard, including from colleagues on the Liberal Democrat Benches, about the police and crime panel. There has been a very positive, highest common factor rather than a lowest common denominator approach, and the Bill has been improved through the interchange of ideas between Conservative and Liberal Democrat Members.
We have heard about the capping arrangements of the Labour party in recent years. There was capping under previous Conservative Governments but it seemed to become almost standard in Labour’s 13 years in government for Ministers to set a number—it was never quite clear how they determined that number—over which anything, regardless of the circumstances and however low the council tax base, was capped by central Government. That approach seems wrong to me and we have a proposal to deal with it in relation to local government: instead of having a Secretary of State—I assume for Communities and Local Government—capping a council above a certain level, that Secretary of State would have reserve powers to require a local referendum in an area where he considered an increase to be excessive. That strikes me as a reasonably sensible balance, and certainly an improvement on the status quo and the current capping power.
My position was well summarised by an Opposition Member who spoke earlier. It is a shame that there has been a conflation of two separate issues—one about Israel-Palestine and the whole sordid tale there, and the other a legal debate about what the system ought to be. I wish it were possible to have that discussion.
The DPP made it clear that he would talk to the Attorney-General, but he said five or six times that there would have to be a very powerful weight in favour of prosecuting, because the crime is one of universal jurisdiction. The public interest would have to be overwhelming. I take comfort from that, because I am concerned that at present the Attorney-General can stop any process going ahead. We do not have a functioning private prosecution system in this country, because the Attorney-General can stop any such prosecutions at any stage. Including the DPP in the provision would make it harder for the Attorney-General to do that, because straight after the DPP—a recognised independent person—said, “Yes, there is a case. This person can be prosecuted,” the Attorney-General would be faced with the prospect of saying, “Actually the DPP is wrong. He doesn’t understand this,” and trying to end it.
The provision makes prosecutions easier, and it is prosecutions that I am concerned about. I should like to hear more about how the Government will make sure that the police take stronger action. I should like to hear whether they agree with recommendations from the Joint Committee on Human Rights, on which I serve, that would weaken the role of Attorney-General in terminating private prosecutions. My remaining concern is about the fact that the DPP may decide not to go ahead because the evidence is too weak. If that is genuinely the case, I do not think that any of us would have a problem with it. However, what worries me are cases in which the DPP does not get round to making a decision because there is a pocket veto. I should like an assurance from the Minister that the Government will report on such cases. If there are a large number of them in which a pocket veto is exercised and no proper decision is made, I hope that the Government will look at the matter again and make sure that there is due process.
There are two minutes remaining, as I will call the Minister at 6.54 pm.
We heard one Liberal Democrat voice. May I, in the remaining two minutes, quote the Liberal Democrat document which I have already quoted with regard to Tzipi Livni, who has been mentioned? It says:
“Tzipi Livni, as Israeli Foreign Minister, was one of those responsible for authorising these attacks”—
on Gaza, which deliberately targeted civilians and civilian infrastructure—
“and made public statements that appeared to encourage the Israeli military to use disproportionate force and engage in deliberate destruction with no legitimate military objective.”
I ask the Serjeant at Arms to investigate the delay in the No Lobby.
On a point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker. During the last debate, I heard a Member make a comment about another Member in this Chamber. The language that they used certainly was not parliamentary. Will you take some action, or advise me on how I might make a complaint against the right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Sir Gerald Kaufman) for the comments he made when the hon. Member for Liverpool, Riverside (Mrs Ellman) stood to make an intervention?
If it had been within earshot of me, obviously I would have dealt with it straight away, but I did not hear anything.
(13 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberMay I remind the Minister that Northamptonshire police’s grant funding will decrease by 5.1% next year, when it should have decreased by only 0.9%? That is due to the damping formula, under which Northamptonshire police will lose £3.4 million in 2011-12 and a further £3.7 million in 2012-13. They are subsidising forces throughout the country. Will the Minister promise to look at this matter for next year’s grant?
May we have shorter inventions too, please? Will the hon. Gentleman give me that promise for the future?
I have met my hon. Friend and his local chief constable. He knows that I consider this matter very carefully, and he made his points very well on behalf of his constituents. I will discuss damping in a moment, but my hon. Friend’s comments reflect the fact that there will always be differences of view in this House between Members whose police forces benefit from damping and who therefore do not wish to see any change in its application, and Members whose forces have, effectively, paid out under damping and who desperately wish there to be a change. It is therefore not possible for the Government to satisfy everybody. We have had to take decisions in the round, and in accordance with what we consider to be the best and fairest way to address the totality of policing in this country.
As I have said, I decided to apply damping at the level of the average cut. As a result, each force will face an equal percentage reduction in core Government funding in 2011-12 and 2012-13, thereby ensuring that no one force will face an unacceptably large reduction in its budget. This mirrors the approach we took in the in-year savings following the emergency Budget and, importantly, it is what police forces were expecting and planning upon.
I appreciate that different forces have different views on this decision, as do hon. Members, and I understand why forces such as the West Midlands and Dorset—and, indeed, Northamptonshire—are keen to see damping phased out or removed entirely, while others such as Cumbria and Cheshire welcome its retention. As I have said, in making decisions such as these I must, of course, think about policing as a whole. I also appreciate the wider case against damping, and there is a strong argument for moving at the right time to a full application of the formula, recognising the policing needs of each area, but doing so now would have created real difficulty. I should also point out that the vast majority of funding that forces receive is allocated according to the formula. Therefore, force level allocations will remain as I announced in December.
Historically, there have been a number of ring-fenced grants to police forces. The Government’s general approach has been to remove ring-fencing and to roll funding into the main grant so that forces have greater local flexibility in determining how resources are spent. That has been the case for the rural policing fund. From 2006-07, it had already been amalgamated with four other specific grants to create what is known as rule 2 grant, but we are now rolling that into the police main grant. I want to emphasise, especially to Members representing rural constituencies, that as result of my decision on damping levels the decision on rolling this grant into the main grant means that no force will be worse off.
In some instances, I believe the case for ring-fencing grants remains strong. Outside London, the neighbourhood policing fund will be ring-fenced for the next two years to ensure the continuing funding of police community support officers, who play a valuable role in community policing. When police and crime commissioners are introduced, it will be up to them to make decisions over funding. In London, where the Mayor can already exercise this local determination, the ring fence is being lifted now, but the fund is being maintained at £340 million next year and £338 million the following year. When some Members make their allegations about cuts in front-line policing, they might like to note that that ring-fenced fund has been maintained.
The counter-terrorism specific grant has been relatively protected with a 10% cut in real terms over four years. This is a cut of just 1% in cash terms, and must be seen against a very rapid increase in resource and capital spending—some 49% in the last four years. The Government and the police service are confident that there will be no reduction in police effectiveness in this crucial area, where savings can be made but where well over £500 million will continue to be spent each year.
I agree that the police can save money, and they might start to do so by addressing some of the equality and diversity politically correct drivel on which they waste millions of pounds each year. If the Government were simply cutting the police budget and savings could be found, that would be fine. However, the problem with the Government’s argument is that they are doing this against the backdrop of restricting the police’s ability to use the DNA database to catch criminals and trying to restrict further the use of CCTV cameras which also help the police catch criminals, and they are releasing people from prison and having fewer criminals in prison. They cannot do all those things with fewer police.
As I have already said, we must have much shorter interventions.
I always know it is a mistake to take interventions from my hon. Friend, but no doubt it is a mistake I will continue to make. I enjoy his interventions, but I note that, although it seemed to me that Opposition Front-Bench Members were giving lots of nods to what he said, they have still not understood the importance of ensuring a proper balance between security and liberty in this country. In spite of everything the new leader of their party has said, they have still not understood that.
There are also areas beyond the HMIC’s report—this comes directly to the point made by the right hon. Member for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears)—where savings can be made by forces working together. There are 2,000 different IT systems across the 43 police forces, and some 5,000 staff. We estimate that savings of some £330 million could be found through joint procurement of goods, services and IT. The vast bulk of these savings —around a third of a billion pounds or more—will be additional to the savings identified by HMIC.
The time for just talking about IT convergence, collective procurement, collaboration, sharing and outsourcing services is over. We cannot afford not to do these things, and we cannot afford to delay, so, where necessary, the Government will mandate the changes required. That is why I am about to lay regulations before Parliament to require the police service to buy certain IT vehicles, and so on, through specified national framework arrangements.
(13 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberOn a point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker. We are being informed by television that Mr Andy Coulson, one of the most important figures in Her Majesty’s Government and one of the Prime Minister’s closest aides, is now resigning. As the House is sitting, I believe that it would be appropriate for the Prime Minister to come to the Commons, explain why that is happening and give the public the full details here in the House of Commons, rather than burying the news on a day when, frankly, an awful lot of other news is taking place. This is the Commons, where the Prime Minister should—
Order. That is not a point of order, as the right hon. Gentleman, who has long been a Member of the House, knows. The fact that a member of the Prime Minister’s staff has resigned has nothing to do with the House.
Order. Before we get carried away, I should say that that has absolutely nothing to do with the House. Neither of the points made is a point of order.
I am delighted to pull the House back to the important issue of succession.
I was just saying that the property of the killer’s parents was distributed according to the statutory intestacy rules. The intestacy rules are a default regime; they apply where a person has not exercised his or her right to make a will or to the extent that his or her will is not valid. Their aim is to safeguard the deceased person’s family by providing for them from the deceased person’s estate in a manner that is thought to mirror the wishes of the average person had he or she made a will.
Generally speaking, an intestate estate will pass to the surviving spouse or civil partner and the deceased’s children first, but if the deceased is not survived by either of them, then other blood relatives of the deceased will inherit the estate in a strict order of priority set out in section 46 of the Administration of Estates Act 1925, as amended. I am not going to read out the rules, but if any hon. Members wishes to know more about them, I shall provide the information.
When there are no known eligible blood relatives to inherit, the estate is dealt with by the Treasury solicitor. On receiving the estate, the Treasury solicitor will make full inquiries into the estate and will advertise for eligible kin in the hope of distributing the estate. If there appear to be no eligible kin, or none can be traced, the estate becomes “bona vacantia” which means “ownerless goods” and it will pass to the Crown, the Duchy of Cornwall or the Duchy of Lancaster, depending on where in England or Wales the deceased lived.
When a minor inherits on intestacy, the property to which they will be entitled is held on trust. The terms of that trust are specified in the intestacy rules. Basically, the trustees will hold the property for the benefit of the child until he or she reaches the age of 18 or marries or enters a civil partnership under that age.
All that may seem relatively straightforward, and hon. Members could be forgiven for thinking that the grandchild in the DWS case would have inherited their property on reaching the age of 18, or marrying or forming a civil partnership before then, but there is a devil in the detail and, sadly, there was a family dispute that led to litigation. That culminated in the decision of the Court of Appeal in 2000 in the case Re DWS (Deceased). By that time, it was agreed that the son himself could not inherit because, as he had murdered his parents, the forfeiture rule prevented it. The forfeiture rule is a common law rule, applying the general rule of public policy that a person is not able to benefit from their wrongdoing. It is illustrated by the 1892 case of Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association, when it was held that a person is not entitled to benefit from the estate of a person he or she has unlawfully killed.
A person who is convicted of the unlawful killing of another, or of aiding, abetting or counselling another to do so, is automatically disqualified from inheriting from his or her victim under the forfeiture rule. However, persons convicted of manslaughter or other offences less serious than murder may still be permitted relief to inherit the victim’s property by the court under the Forfeiture Act 1982.
The question for the court in Re DWS (deceased) was who would receive the grandfather’s property. Had the son died before his father, the property would have gone to the son’s only child, who was aged only two at the time of the murder and was also the grandfather’s only grandchild. However, the son—that is, the killer—was not dead, but merely disqualified from inheriting because of the operation of the forfeiture rule.
The relevant provision of the intestacy rules setting out the statutory trusts contained in the Administration of Estates Act 1925 provides that the grandchild will inherit only if his or her parent has already died. The court accordingly decided that the law did not allow the grandson to take the property. Instead, it was decided that the property would have to go to the estate of the dead grandfather’s sister, who had also died by the time of the court case. Thus, in this situation, not only is the killer disqualified from inheriting, but so also are all the killer’s direct descendants. The Court of Appeal expressed concern that this may have been an unforeseen and unintended consequence of the present intestacy rules.
In July 2003, the then Department for Constitutional Affairs, whose responsibilities in this regard have been assumed by the Ministry of Justice, asked the Law Commission to review the relationship between the forfeiture rule and the law of succession. The terms of reference were as follows: first, that in conjunction with its work on illegal transactions, the Law Commission should review the relationship between the forfeiture and intestacy rules; secondly, that the review should be carried out with reference to the difficulties highlighted in the case of Re DWS (deceased) and should explore ways the law might be reformed to prevent apparently unfair outcomes of this sort; and, thirdly, that the review should also consider any ancillary areas of succession law that might produce analogous outcomes—for example, disclaimer and attesting beneficiaries.
In October 2003, the Law Commission published a consultation paper, “The Forfeiture Rule and the Law of Succession”, which considered the problem raised in Re DWS, and discussed whether a similar problem arose in other contexts. The consultation paper provisionally proposed that in cases such as Re DWS there should be a “deemed predecease” solution—that is, where a person forfeits a benefit on intestacy through having killed the deceased, the estate should be distributed as if the killer had died immediately before the deceased. The Law Commission also proposed that the deemed predecease rule should apply where a gift under a will fails because of the forfeiture rule.